Sitting of 3 August 1971

Preamble
The House met at half-past Two o'clock
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]
PETITION

  Queen Charlotte's Maternity Hospital
  Mr. Richard: I beg to ask the leave of the House, Mr. Speaker, to present a Petition signed by 70,000 residents of the United Kingdom, who, unfortunately, have signed the Petition form not in accordance with the Rules of the House; but it will in due course be delivered to the Secretary of State.
  This Petition is:
  "on behalf of the undersigned, being residents of the United Kingdom"
  who show that they are profoundly shocked that Queen Charlotte's Maternity Hospital may be closed, and state that the worldwide reputation of Queen Charlotte's Hospital is based on the faith and confidence of generations of patients.
  Wherefore your petitioners pray that Queen Charlotte's Maternity Hospital may be retained and its development plan be allowed to proceed.
  To lie upon the Table.

ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
  SOCIAL SERVICES

    Unemployment Benefit
    Mr. Prenticeasked the Secretary of State for Social Services when he expects to announce the outcome of the Government's current consideration of the proposal of the Donovan Commission to allow unemployment benefit to workers laid off by reason of a trade dispute at their place of employment, but who were neither participating in nor directly interested in the dispute.
    The Secretary of State for Social Services (Sir Keith Joseph): I have no statement to make at present.
    Mr. Prentice: Would the Secretary of State confirm that it is now virtually the universal view that this rule ought to be changed, and that if the Government persist in this out-dated rule they are only really doing so to effect the strike situation by trying to put pressure on strikers through the hardship on non-strikers' families? Is not that a pretty unworthy way of conducting an industrial relations policy?
    Sir K. Joseph: I undertook, in Standing Committee, to consider discussing with my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Employment later in the year, and that undertaking, of course, stands.
    Mrs. Shirley Williams: The right hon. Gentleman showed a great unease about this in Committee and, indeed, on Second Reading, because he knows that what was already a rather unfair provision has now become doubly unfair because of the Government's proposed legislation in this field. I wonder whether he would treat this with some urgency, since the Act will come into force in the immediate future.
    Sir K. Joseph: I think the hon. Lady is doing me an injustice in using the word "unease". I freely and voluntarily agreed that there were strong arguments on both sides of this case. I think "unease" is unfair.
    Mr. Ralph Howellasked the Secretary of State for Social Services if he

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    is aware that when unemployment pay is disallowed because an employee has left employment of his own accord or because of misconduct, he can receive more in social security benefit than he would have received in unemployment benefit; and if he will take steps to remedy the situation.
    Sir K. Joseph: Anyone who becomes unemployed, whatever the reason, is entitled to supplementary benefit to bring his income up to his requirements as defined in the 1966 Act. If he is not paid unemployment benefit for the reasons given, he is paid less for up to six weeks than the normal amount of his supplementary benefit requirements. The difference now is 75p. After the Social Security Bill has become law, the maximum difference will be £2·30 a week or £13·80 for the full six weeks.
    Mr. Howell: Is my right hon. Friend aware that in certain instances people who are on social security can receive as much as £2 more if they have lost unemployment as a result of misconduct?
    Sir K. Joseph: It is a difficult question to debate in this way, but I am simply assuring my hon. Friend that someone who loses unemployment benefit for the reason he has instanced suffers a penalty, which is being increased under the Social Security Bill, in supplementary benefit for up to six weeks.
    Mr. Merlyn Rees: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that in an area such as Norfolk, which I visited politically the other day, it is brought to one's notice from all quarters that the problem is that it is a low-wage area? It was put to me frankly by my friends there that people in authority seemed more interested in cows than people.
    Sir K. Joseph: The East Anglian claim for F.I.S. is at about the same level as in other mainly agricultural areas. I believe that the F.I.S. will help many people working on farms.

    Family Income Supplement Scheme
    Mr. McCrindleasked the Secretary of State for Social Services if he will consider amending the requirement under the Family Income Supplement Scheme that the beneficiary must be in full-time employment when such beneficiary is a widowed or divorced woman.
    Sir K. Joseph: I am keeping a close watch on the progress and effectiveness of the scheme particularly as it affects women who are bringing up children on their own. I will bear my hon. Friend's suggestion in mind.
    Mr. McCrindle: I am sure that my right hon. Friend will be anxious that this unique scheme should have the maximum effect, and I would like to suggest to him that a number of the women described in the Question are debarred for no better reason than that they go out to work for only a limited period whereby to look after their children. Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind in a future review that these people should be allowed as categories included in any extension of the scheme?
    Sir K. Joseph: I will certainly bear that point in mind. The House may like to know that about 25 per cent. of the awards so far given are to single-parent families.
    Mr. Dalyell: Has the close watch revealed, since the last time we had Questions to the Secretary of State, why so many families should not be claiming?
    Sir K. Joseph: I think there are Questions on the Order Paper to which the answer would be more appropriately given on that subject.
    Mr. O'Malley: Since there seems to be considerable confusion both in this House and outside as to what constitutes full-time employment under the terms of the Act, could the right hon. Gentleman explain exactly what full-time employment is under the terms of the Act?
    Sir K. Joseph: Under the Regulations under the Act, 30 hours per week.
    Mr. Skinnerasked the Secretary of State for Social Services what plans he now has to increase the number of successful applications for family income supplement.
    Sir K. Joseph: The publicity campaign is continuing. The number of successful applications is continuing to increase.
    Mr. Skinner: Is the Minister aware that the figure of 20,000 successful applicants divided into the number of constituencies represents about 32 apiece, in

    1309
    my case two in each parish, and they take some finding? Does he also realise that an average payment of £2 per week per person comes to about £2 million instead of the £8 million which he was bragging about this time last year? What will he do about this, apart from paying the cost of television advertising?
    Sir K. Joseph: I do not think that I have bragged about anything connected with this scheme. It will put much-needed money into the households of the very poorest wage earners. It will take time to acquaint the under 1 per cent. of the working population involved of their rights, and the Government have just embarked on the second stage of advertising for that purpose.
    Mr. Speaker: Mr. Allaun.
    Mr. Arthur Lewis: How much is Mrs. Proops paid?
    Sir K. Joseph: With permission, Mr. Speaker, since that question seeks to impugn an individual, I must say that Mrs. Proops had every right to ask for a fee for her advertising, but she voluntarily forwent a fee and is doing the service for nothing.
    Hon. Members: Withdraw !
    Mr. Arthur Lewis: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I am being asked to withdraw. I made an interjection and asked how much, but the Minister did not say how much the fee was.
    Mr. Speaker: Order. This just shows the trouble the House gets into from sedentary interruptions.
    Mr. Frank Allaun: Coming to more informed matters, why has only one in four of the 160,000 applications expected actually been made, whether successful or not? Does not this indicate that the flaw in this and similar schemes of the Government is that they are based on the assumption that there are large numbers of people ready to hold out their hands for anything? This just is not true. There are many poor people who are too proud to do this, and that is the weakness in all these Government schemes.
    Sir K. Joseph: I do not think that conclusion can be drawn; 50,000 people have already applied, about half of whom have been allotted awards. Until today
    1310
    no payments have been made. Until last week no advertising was done by television. We shall need several months—and it may be perhaps well into next year—before we can judge how successful this scheme is in reaching those for whom it is intended. So far I am not discouraged by the response.
    Sir B. Rhys Williams: Will my right hon. Friend give further consideration to the possibility that the Inland Revenue department might automatically provide the names of people eligible for this supplement?
    Sir K. Joseph: I think that raises very dangerous possibilities that my hon Friend might not wish to pursue. Perhaps my hon. Friend might wish to pursue this, but many hon. Members on both sides of the House might not support him in that.
    Mr. Laneasked the Secretary of State for Social Services if he will now give his latest estimate of the number of families who will be entitled to benefit from the Family Income Supplement Scheme.
    Sir K. Joseph: The number given on Second Reading was nearly 190,000; this may be on the high side.
    Mr. Lane: Would it not be helpful if hon. Members opposite, instead of denigrating a novel scheme which the previous Government did not manage to introduce, were to take every opportunity in their many speeches during the recess to publicise the scheme among their constituents?
    Sir K. Joseph: Yes, certainly, and I am sure that hon. Members in their surgeries are drawing attention to these benefits.
    Mrs. Shirley Williams: Of course we are, but we think the scheme is a bad one. May I remind the right hon. Gentleman that on Second Reading of the Family Income Supplements Bill he said:
    "The finances presume that we shall have an 85 per cent. take-up. I will do my best to do that, and better ".—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 10th November, 1970; Vol. 806, c. 227.]
    We on this side of the House replied that we did not for one moment believe that the take-up would be anything like as high as this. If we show ourselves to be right within the next six months, will the

    1311
    right hon. Gentleman withdraw this abortive scheme and replace it with a decent scheme of family allowance increases?
    Sir K. Joseph: I shall certainly draw the lessons that can be sensibly drawn from our experience over the next months and year. It was my duty to give Parliament the best estimate I could of the likely cost, and I had to base that on an estimate and an aim as to the take-up. That is where the figures come from.
    Mr. William Hamiltonasked the Secretary of State for Social Services what is the latest number of applicants for family income supplement; how many have been accepted and how many rejected; and what is the average award.
    Mr. Meacherask the Secretary of State for Social Services what are the latest figures for successful applications for the family income supplement, and of this total, how many have been awarded a grant of £4 per week.
    Sir K. Joseph: Up to 27th July 56,229 claims for family income supplement had been received; of the decisions so far given 23,152 were favourable and 23,301 unfavourable. In addition, over 20,000 families on supplementary benefit but wage-stopped will benefit automatically when the F.I.S. Scheme starts. As regards the average award, I have no figure later than that which I gave in my reply to the hon. Members for Oldham, West (Mr. Meacher), Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Marks) and West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell) on 13th July. At that time we estimated that about 8 per cent. of awards are in the range £3·60 to £4 a week.—[Vol. 821, c. 191–4.]
    Mr. Hamilton: In view of the derisory results of this scheme—[An HON. MEMBER: "Derisory?"]—yes, because the right hon. Gentleman himself said that he was not satisfied with the results up to date—will the right hon. Gentleman now give an assurance, which he did not give to my hon. Friend the Member for Hitchin (Mrs. Shirley Williams), that if in 12 months' time the results do not come up to the estimate which he made on Second Reading, he will undertake to have another look
    1312
    at the desirability of returning to the election pledge and solve this problem by family allowances—including, we hope, family allowances for the first child?
    Sir K. Joseph: I should be very reluctant to commit myself to withdraw the benefit from families with only one child, which is what that would involve. I cannot believe that an increased income as from this week to some 43,000 families, as a result of one phase of advertising occurring before any payment had ever been made, is so discouraging. I believe that 43,000 households from this week will be very glad that this scheme has been introduced.
    Mr. Meacher: Will the Secretary of State not acknowledge that this miserable figure of 11 per cent. take-up means that the Government's whole anti-poverty strategy is stillborn? Will he note for future policy-making the stark contrast between the 100 per cent. take-up of his over-80 pensions, because people take those benefits as of right, and the wretched 11 per cent. take-up of family income supplement?
    Sir K. Joseph: The hon. Member is not quite right. Part of the over-80 benefit had to be applied for, and the high take-up was the result of a quite large advertising campaign. I should not like the hon. Gentleman's wrong calculation to get on record. So far 23 per cent. of the estimated number entitled are from this week receiving benefit.
    Mr. McCrindle: Would not my right hon. Friend agree that the best advertising agent he could employ is likely to be the man who from this week will receive the extra money?
    Sir K. Joseph: Yes, and that is why the latest advertising campaign emphasises those who are already in receipt of it. Hon. Gentlemen on both sides of the House should not under-estimate that for the first time an effective step is being taken to relieve those on the wage-stop.
    Mr. Dalyell: Has any pilot study been undertaken in any area of the country to discover the reasons why people are not taking up benefit?
    Sir K. Joseph: One is to be undertaken in September.
    Mr. Dalyell: Where?
    Sir K. Joseph: I cannot give the hon. Gentleman the answer at the moment. I am taking advice about a thoroughly typical area.
    Captain W. Elliot: Would my right hon. Friend agree that if the Government identify an area of want, provide the resources to help the people in it and give the matter the maximum publicity, there is very little more they can do? Will he resist a request from the other side to plaster the whole area with money, which will only mean that those in real need will not get enough?
    Sir K. Joseph: I am sure my hon. and gallant Friend is right. These families by hypothesis are people in work, despite the fact that the benefits for being out of work are higher than their household income. They are very good people, but they need education by advertising and personal help on how to obtain what is now their right.
    Mrs. Shirley Williams: If that scheme does not reach those intended, it is a bad scheme and should be withdrawn? We have asked whether the right hon. Gentleman will consider in six months' or a year's time what the take-up then is and whether he will be honest enough, if that take-up is below the majority, to withdraw the scheme and admit he is wrong?
    Sir K. Joseph: I am as anxious as the hon. Lady to get the money into the hands that need it. Obviously, if it fails to reach the majority of those entitled to it, the Government will have to find better methods of helping those people. I doubt whether it will mean withdrawing the scheme, but may mean refining it.

    Population Statistics
    Sir D. Rentonasked the Secretary of State for Social Services whether the Registrar General supplies the British Broadcasting Corporation and the Independent Television Authority with his quarterly returns of population statistics.
    Sir K. Joseph: Yes, Sir.
    Sir D. Renton: As knowledge of how much its population may be increasing is about the most important thing that a nation can know about itself, will my right hon. Friend take every step that he can to see that this knowledge is made widely and regularly known to our people?
    Sir K. Joseph: I do not think that that arises directly from the Question. The B.B.C. and the I.T.A. do not come within my field. They are, in so far as they are anybody's responsibility, within that of my right hon. Friend the Minister of Posts and Telecommunications.

    Redditch (New Hospital)
    Mr. Terry Davisasked the Secretary of State for Social Services whether he will announce the proposed catchment area for the new hospital at Redditch; and the date when the new hospital will be started.
    The Under-Secretary of State for Health and Social Security (Mr. Michael Alison): The new hospital is being planned to serve Redditch and Bromsgrove urban districts, most of Bromsgrove rural district about half of Alcester rural district and a small part of Droitwich rural district. Detailed planning has been commenced by the Birmingham Regional Hospital Board but it is too soon yet to say when construction will start.
    Mr. Davis: Has the Birmingham Regional Hospital Board decided on a date for starting to build this hospital? If the board has not decided on a date, will the Minister tell us when he expects it to do so? If the board has decided on a date, even tentatively, will he explain why this information cannot be given to us in the House of Commons and to the people of Redditch?
    Mr. Alison: The regional hospital board fixes dates tentatively some years ahead for planning purposes, but it is not the custom to publish dates more than a year in advance in case for some reason there is a slippage.

    Remand Home Vacancies (North-West)
    Mr. Blakerasked the Secretary of State for Social Services whether the

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    Children's Regional Planning Committee for the North-West will be paying special attention to the deteriorating position regarding remand home vacancies for girls and boys in the region; and when he expects to receive the committee's proposals for improving this situation.
    Mr. Alison: The regional planning committee consists of representatives of local authorities, with which the responsibility for the provision of remand facilities rests. The committee is required to include provision for such facilities in the regional plan it is at present preparing, and will be reviewing its needs accordingly. Its plan is due to be submitted to my right hon. Friend by the end of the year.
    Mr. Blaker: While the position regarding vacancies for both boys and girls remains unsatisfactory, is my hon. Friend aware that the difficulties of the non-providing authorities in the North-West in securing vacancies for boys have got much worse since the beginning of this year, when part of the Children and Young Persons Act, 1969, came into effect? Will he undertake to consider the report urgently with the Home Office when it is received?
    Mr. Alison: My hon. Friend will know that half the advantage of these new regional plans is that they will, we hope, show up local shortages where they exist. If we felt that the plans put forward were not adequate, my right hon. Friend would send them back for further consideration.

    Maternity Facilities (Liskeard)
    Mr. Hicksasked the Secretary of State for Social Services if he is now in a position to make a statement on the provision of maternity facilities in the Liskeard district.
    Mr. Alison: Maternity facilities for the Liskeard district are provided by the local health authority, general practitioners and the regional hospital board. Facilities for hospital confinement are provided at Plymouth, Launceston, Tavistock and St. Austell. I have decided that the Trebarras Maternity Home should be permanently closed. The regional hospital board has
    1316
    considered the provision of alternative facilities in Liskeard, but has concluded that it is impracticable to provide them. I am writing to my hon. Friend.
    Mr. Hicks: Is the Minister aware that his announcement today will bring great disappointment to the growing population of the Liskeard catchment area since during the three years in which Trebarras has been closed people have had to travel considerable distances to the alternative hospitals which the Minister has announced? I hope he will reconsider his decision, especially as there appears to be an alternative scheme in conjunction with the local practitioner hospital.
    Mr. Alison: The local general practitioner scheme to which my hon. Friend referred has not, I am afraid, proved practicable, because it would involve the taking on of three domiciliary nurses for a total number of deliveries of no more than two or three a week. It is simply uneconomic to provide a comprehensive service locally for so few deliveries.

    Keresley Hospital (Sale)
    Mr. Leslie Huckfieldasked the Secretary of State for Social Services whether he is satisfied with the procedures attending the sale of Keresley Hospital; and whether he will make a statement.
    Mr. Alison: Yes, Sir; and I have written again today to the hon. Member for Nuneaton (Mr. Leslie Huckfield).
    Mr. Huckfield: Will the hon. Gentleman accept that I am most grateful that he feels he has to write to me yet again? Will he accept that this hospital ought to have been put on sale with at least outline planning permission for possible hotel development, particularly when local planning officers had already indicated this would be the case? Would he accept that the hotelier in question got a very cheap bargain and that the hon. Gentleman's Department, through its own negligence, got a very bad one?
    Mr. Alison: I shall always write to the hon. Gentleman when he writes to me. So far as the bad bargain is concerned, a reserve price was set by the

    1317
    district valuer at the auction, and that price took into account the possibility of the development of the building as a hotel.

    Sick Persons (Services)
    Mr. Ashleyasked the Secretary of State for Social Services what proposals he has to improve services available to the aged sick who are not in hospital.
    Mr. Alison: We are currently holding a series of regional conferences specifically to encourage local health authorities to continue developing their services, including services for the elderly, in the period before reorganisation of the National Health Service.
    Mr. Ashley: I appreciate that reply, but, in view of the general lack of information about old people, the different kinds of welfare, domiciliary care and sheltered housing facilities, would the hon. Gentleman institute a special inquiry into the circumstances of old people, on the same lines as the inquiry which has just been undertaken into the problems of disabled people?
    Mr. Alison: No doubt the hon. Gentleman is aware that Section 45 of the Health Services and Public Health Act, 1968, which gives local authorities specific powers to make arrangements for the welfare of the elderly, was brought into force on 1st April. In connection with this we are issuing a circular which advocate comprehensive experiments in limited areas in the first instance, and many authorities will no doubt conduct surveys in such areas covering all elderly people.
    Dr. Stuttaford: Although his reply is quite satisfactory, is the Minister aware that in a written reply to me he said that he considered it adequate nursing care to leave a totally paralysed woman of nearly 70 lying in her own bed for six days attended only by a district nurse and unattended for some 16 hours during the day? Would my hon. Friend like one of his own constituents, or one of his own family, to be treated in this way?
    Mr. Alison: I had hoped that the extremely encouraging and conciliatory letter I sent my hon. Friend today would have pre-empted that rather sharp supplementary question. I do not believe the lady in question has suffered to the extent he has suggested.
    Dr. Stuttaford: I do.
    Mr. Alfred Morris: Is the hon. Gentle man aware that, although there have been some excellent achievements, progress in implementing the Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act, 1970, in the localities is still decidedly uneven? What does he now propose to do to ensure the full and humane implementation of the Act as it affects the elderly and home-bound sick? In what terms and with what guidance to local authorities will Section 1 of the Act be implemented in October this year?
    Mr. Alison: I cannot comment about the alleged unevenness, although this is a risk inherent in the delegation of powers to local authorities. My right hon. Friend intends shortly to give guidance to local authorities on carrying out their duties under Section 1, which will come into force on 1 st October, and on development of services under Section 2.
    Mr. Crawshaw: Would the Minister agree that every aged person who wishes to remain at home ought to be allowed to do so provided he can get the basic services? Having regard to the economic aspects, surely every pound spent on giving help which will keep a person out of hospital in the long run will save money.
    Mr. Alison: I take the point. Local authorities possess adequate powers to supply all the required services to people in their homes.

    Retirement Pensions
    Mr. Thomas Coxasked the Secretary of State for Social Services how many letters his Department has received on the increase in state pensions, which is to take place in September.
    The Under-Secretary of State for Health and Social Security (Mr. Paul Dean): This information is not available.
    Mr. Cox: In spite of the fact that the information is not available, I am sure that the hon. Gentleman is aware of the deep concern which many retired people are expressing about the continued fall in their living standards. Unfortunately, because of the continual rise in the cost of living, with more in the pipeline, the pension increase next September will do very little to improve their situation. Therefore, will the hon. Gentleman give a pledge to retired people that early in the New Year there will be a full review by the Department of the real value of the pension which people are then in receipt of?
    Mr. Dean: The hon. Gentleman is being far too pessimistic. The increase in the pension of £1 is the largest increase ever. It will more than restore the purchasing power of the pension. No fewer than 10 million people will benefit next month to the tune of an additional £600 million.
    Mr. Alfred Morris rose—
    Mr. Speaker: Order. The Question related to the number of letters received and the answer was, "None". I think I was in error in calling the hon. Member for Wandsworth, Central (Mr. Cox) for a supplementary question.

    Hospital Casualty Units
    Mr. Hugh Jenkins
    Mr. Alison: We do not have information on which to base a detailed comparison of this kind, but my right hon. Friend is fully aware of the need for improvement both in premises and in staffing. Hospital boards have been asked to aim at faster progress in improving accident and emergency services, and my Department is discussing medical staffing problems with the profession.
    Mr. Jenkins: The answer indicates a proper awareness that there is a serious
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    problem here. In order to bring about some correction and to give added urgency to the improvements of which the hon. Gentleman has indicated the need, would it not be desirable to have some more facts? If that information were to disclose that the situation of the treatment of casualties is getting worse, that there are long delays between people having an accident and receiving treatment, would not this be a good reason to look into the matter with even greater urgency than the hon. Gentleman has indicated?
    Mr. Alison: We are looking into the matter with great urgency. The switch in emphasis towards well-equipped and highly-developed central accident and emergency centres often means that, although delay may arise, more people are dealt with more satisfactorily and fully in those centres.

    General Medical Practitioners
    Dr. Miller
    Mr. Alison: As the reply consists of a table of figures, I will, with permission, circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Dr. Miller: I shall read the figures with great anticipation. As these payments are intended for practitioners to supply and be able to employ assistants in order to give their patients better services, will the hon. Gentleman encourage the grouping together of doctors so that they can increase the services which they provide for patients? What steps is he taking to encourage group practice and to further the building of health centres for this purpose?
    Mr. Alison: The hon. Gentleman is right in pinpointing the question of health centres as one of the most important factors. Substantially increased expenditure, as he knows, is forecast for their development over the next few years. This is only one of the aspects of encouragement that we are giving to the development of

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    group practices, the number of which is growing steadily.

    DIRECT PAYMENTS MADE TO GENERAL MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS IN ENGLAND AND WALES IN RESPECT OF ANCILLARY ASSISTANCE

    Year ended 31st March (i)

    Total payments £m. (ii)

    Number of practices claiming† in quarter ended 30th September (iii)

    Column (ii) Column (iii) £ (iv)

    Total unrestricted principals providing general medical services‡ 1st October (v)

    Column (ii) Column (v) £ (vi)

    1966–67

    …

    …

    0·8§

    *

    *

    19,832

    40§

    1967–68

    …

    …

    3·7

    6,851

    540

    19,837

    185

    1968–69

    …

    …

    4·7

    7,080

    665

    19,957

    235

    1969–70

    …

    …

    5·8

    7,297

    795

    20,133

    290

    1970–71

    …

    …

    70

    7,354

    950

    20,357

    345

    1971–72

    …

    …

    8·11||

    *

    *

    20,529¶

    395

    * Figure not available.

    † Information about the number of principals in these practices is not available.

    ‡ This column includes principals who do not employ ancillary staff.

    § Represents one quarter's payment only.

    || Estimated figure.

    ¶ At 1st April. 1971

    De-toxification Units
    Mr. Fowler
    Mr. Alison: We hope to arrange for two or three experimental centres to be set up as part of the hospital service. Hospital boards have been invited to put forward proposals. So far, four proposals have been received and are being considered by my Department.
    Mr. Fowler: While I thank my hon. Friend for that reply, I want to stress the urgency of this situation. Does he not agree that such treatment units could make a considerable contribution in tackling the problem of drunken offenders? Would it not as well take the burden off the prisons which at the moment have to deal with them?
    Mr. Alison: I take the point, but we are bound to hasten slowly in this because the establishment of a de-toxification centre requires considerable planning locally, including the provision of hostels and other associated services.

    Welfare Foods and Milk
    Dr. Stuttaford
    Following is the information:
    Sir K. Joseph: The number of persons in England entitled to free welfare milk and vitamins, apart from those in receipt of supplementary benefit, was increased under the Welfare Food Order. 1971, from an estimated 327,000 to an estimated 420,000. About 230,000 persons receiving supplementary benefit also have an entitlement.
    On present evidence it is estimated that the number not receiving supplementary benefit who are taking up their entitlement has increased by about one-third from an estimated 166,000 to an estimated 220,000. The grand total of persons taking up their entitlement, including those receiving supplementary benefit but after making a deduction to allow for the fact that some of these have an entitlement as large families, is estimated at 420,000 out of an estimated number entitled of 650,000.
    Dr. Stuttaford: Is my right hon. Friend aware that these figures are very satisfactory but that he must continue his publicity efforts and even increase them, as nourishment obtained in these early years is among the factors which determine the future stature and health of the adult? Although one is pleased by the present take-up, will he continue his publicity efforts so that the number still further increases?
    Sir K. Joseph: We want to raise the proportion, but I remind my hon. Friend that all those on the family income supplement with children below school age

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    will be entitled, and their number will have to be added to the figures I have just given him.

    Prescription Charges
    Dame Irene Ward
    Sir K. Joseph: I assume that my hon. Friend is referring to people other than the approximately 23 million people covered by the wide automatic exemptions for children under 15; people aged 65 and over; people receiving supplementary benefit or family income supplement; patients suffering from specified medical conditions; expectant and nursing mothers; and war pensioners for their accepted disablements. The number of exemption certificates issued in Great Britain in the 13 weeks ended 22nd June, 1971, to people who applied for them—[HON. MEMBERS: "TOO long."]—I apologise for the length of the reply, but the Question requires a full answer and it cannot be given quickly—on grounds of income was about 44,000, more than 10 times as many as during the preceeding three months. No reliable estimate can be made of the number of people who, during any period, both need prescriptions and are eligible for exemptions on income grounds.
    Dame Irene Ward: Does my right hon. Friend agree—I am sure that he does—that it is a difficult estimate to make, in view of all the difficulties which his Department seems to have, which is understandable, in finding all the people whom we are anxious to help? Would it not be rather a good idea to ask the Prime Minister's think tank—[HON. MEMBERS: "Sink tank!"]—which probably has much more time than my right hon. Friend, to look into the matter of estimating and finding those who are in need, because we certainly want to help them far more than all those odd people sitting opposite?
    Sir K. Joseph: I take all my hon. Friend's suggestions very seriously indeed. But we are here faced with the problem which the Labour Government had, of trying to get into the hands of minorities the help which hon. Members on both sides
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    of the House want to get to them. This is a question of persisting in our efforts.
    Dr. Summerskill: Will the right hon. Gentleman assure the House that he has now repented for the sin of his plans for the infamous cost-related prescription charge scheme, that those plans have now been permanently abandoned, and that he will not attempt to replace them by an increase in the basic prescription charge?
    Sir K. Joseph: That does not arise immediately from the Question. I am still considering the outcome of the rational dialogue which I undertook to have with the professions.

    Occupational Pensions
    Sir B. Rhys Williams
    Mr. Dean: I can assure my hon. Friend that we are planning to publish our proposals for the preservation of occupational pension rights as soon as possible.
    Sir B. Rhys Williams: Will my hon. Friend bear in mind that, while Parliament delays, people changing jobs are losing their pension rights at the rate of £100,000 every working day? While we look forward to the Government's White Paper on the future conduct of occupational pension schemes, does he agree that where existing accrued rights in these schemes are concerned there is no reason for action not being taken at once?
    Mr. Dean: Yes. I am glad that my hon. Friend has drawn attention to that matter. We hope that the growing number of firms providing for this already will continue to do so.
    Mr. O'Malley: As each year that passes without legislation means that thousands of people are being deprived of future income in retirement, why do not the Government show a little more urgency on this matter?
    On the question of the protection of pension rights, do not the Government believe that the time has now arrived when there should be legislation to insist that private occupational pension

    1325
    schemes, many of which are bad and provide little dependency cover, should have minimum standards as defined by the Government rather than provide the bad schemes we see too often today?
    Mr. Dean: I assure the House that, unlike the Labour Government, this Government will not take five years to produce their plans.

    War Widows' Pensions
    Mrs. Kellett-Bowman
    Mr. Dean: Increases in war widows' pensions of at least £1·30 a week will be paid to about 100,000 war widow pensioners this September.
    Mrs. Kellett-Bowman: I thank my hon. Friend for that reply. As there is a war memorial village in my constituency, I have more than the average number of widows in this category who will be particularly grateful for this assistance.
    Mr. Dean: I am obliged to my hon. Friend. I am sure that she is aware that we are also introducing two new improved aspects of benefits for war widows in September.

    National Health Service Reorganisation
    Mr. Arthur Lewis
    Sir K. Joseph: 19th July; the letter contained comments on my proposals for reorganising the National Health Service, with particular reference to London; 27th July; consideration of the comments was promised and the Council's attention was drawn to the existence of the Consultative Group under the chairmanship of my noble Friend the Minister of State which is considering reorganisation in London.
    Mr. Lewis: I thank the right hon. Gentleman for that detailed reply. Is
    1326
    he aware that this council, which is one of the most progressive in the country, has great doubts about the consultative document? Will he assure the House that before taking any action he will give serious consideration to this and any other council's opinions on this subject?
    Sir K. Joseph: I share the hon. Gentleman's respect for many of the aspects of Newham's services. I assure him that I shall consider comments received even after the end of July.
    Mrs. Shirley Williams: Since the Secretary of State has been reported at least once as having said that on all aspects of the consultative document he has made up his mind, will he assure the House that it is still open for consultation on all the major points which were put before the public?
    Sir K. Joseph: Except for what is in summary called unification and the date of unification, that is so.

  CENTRAL POLICY REVIEW STAFF
  Mr. Lipton
  The Prime Minister (Mr. Edward Heath): The annual salary cost is £98,000. There are twenty-four staff, including 11 secretarial and other supporting grades.
  Mr. Lipton: In order to enable us to know whether we are getting value for money, will the Prime Minister go a bit further and list the names of the persons employed, the salaries that they are drawing, and the extent to which the work they are doing could equally well be done by the Permanent Under-Secretaries in the various Departments?
  The Prime Minister: The answer to the last part of the hon. Gentleman's supplementary question is "No". The unit was created for a specific purpose as part of the Cabinet Office, and it is carrying out that work. As to the members and the salaries that they are paid, the names of the senior appointments were announced as they were made, as were the salaries that they were to receive.

  1327
  Details of the rest of the appointments will appear in the standard works of reference.
  Mr. Hugh Jenkins: As we are told that the work of this unit includes examining the feasibility of the Concorde project, what is so secretive about it? Why cannot the right hon. Gentleman tell us a little more about what it is doing? If it is true that it is proposing to recommend against Concorde, will he guarantee that that recommendation will be published?
  The Prime Minister: The advice given by Departments to Ministers is never published. As this unit is part of the Cabinet Secretariat, it would be quite wrong if the advice which it gives to Ministers were made public. Ministers must take responsibility for decisions, and the advice which the unit gives them will be taken into account together with other advice.

  FOREIGN SECRETARY (SPEECH)
  Mr. Joel Barnett
  The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir: and in particular that part which read:
  "A vote for the Socialists now would mean S.E.T. back again—the reductions in taxation cancelled—the Industrial Relations Bill taken off the Statute Book and Mr. Wilson on our backs again as Prime Minister. Let us banish such nightmares and get on with the business of restoring the nation's fortunes."
  Mr. Barnett: Is the Prime Minister aware that economic experts other than the Foreign Secretary are unable to interpret the Government's changes in policy quite so easily? For example, do the Government intend to pursue a prices and incomes policy to sustain the 3 to 3½ per cent. growth in the March Budget or the 4 to 4½ per cent. growth planned in the July mini-Budget?
  The Prime Minister: The C.B.I, has taken its own initiative on prices, and any initiative which the T.U.C. may take in response to that will be warmly welcomed.

  EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
  Mr. Skinner
  The Prime Minister: About 5,000 since the General Election.
  Mr. Skinner: Is the Prime Minister aware that he has now been urged by one of his colleagues to write a letter calling for a General Election on the Common Market? Does he realise that if he did this he would be carrying out the pledges given in the Tory General Election manifesto, that he would be carrying out the wishes of the vast majority of the British people and that, what is more important, he would also be carrying out the wishes of many hon. Members on this side, including the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party, who believe that a General Election should be called?
  The Prime Minister: If I wanted any inducement, the last part of the hon. Gentleman's question is the last thing I should want.
  Mr. Tom Boardman: Have a number of those letters confirmed that industry as a whole welcomes entry into the Common Market and that it recognises that the larger market will produce great benefits to all sections of the nation in terms of employment and otherwise?
  The Prime Minister: The views expressed in the letters vary, but the C.B.I. has expressed its support, from the side of industry, for entry into Europe, and I notice that the chairmen and directors of many firms have publicly stated that that is their position, too.
  Dr. Gilbert
  The Prime Minister: After the Ministerial negotiating meeting with the European Economic Community in Luxembourg at the end of June, President

  1329
  Nixon sent me a message of congratulations. In it he referred to the long and consistent support of the United States for enlargement of the Community, and to his belief that the historic decisions reached reflected a determination on the part of all concerned to lead Western Europe to that unity which will permit it to play its proper rôle in world affairs.
  Dr. Gilbert: I thank the right hon. Gentleman for that detailed reply. May I ask whether he has noticed the recent ominous growth in protectionist sentiment in the United States, in the Administration, in Congress, and in the trade union and management sides of industry? Would he therefore consider calling, if not a full formal conference, at least for informal conversations with our major trading partners to ensure that these developments are reversed as soon as possible?
  The Prime Minister: I think the hon. Gentleman's remarks are too wide-sweeping. There has been an increase in protectionist sentiment in certain parts of the United States. This arose in the first instance from the problems of textiles and shoes, not from trade with the Community. The amount of agricultural trade which the United States has with the Community has almost doubled in the last 10 years. I accept that one must do everything that one can to prevent protectionist sentiment from growing. The Community takes the view that after enlargement it would be right to have discussions on this matter, and I think that that is the best way of going about it.
  Mr. Selwyn Gummer: Would my right hon. Friend agree that it would be greatly to the benefit of Anglo-American relationships if Great Britain were to make every effort to ensure that she was a strong partner within the unification of Europe?
  The Prime Minister: I think that that is not only our view but the view of the President and the Administration.
  Mr. Harold Wilson: We have supported the right hon. Gentleman, as he supported us, on all matters affecting the development of industrial protectionism in the United States, but is he aware of the growing feeling in the United States, expressed by members of the United States Cabinet, and most recently in Britain by Senator Humphrey, a former
  1330
  Vice-President, about American reactions to the degree of protectionism in Europe in agricultural matters? Has the right hon. Gentleman studied the statement made by Senator Humphrey in London last Friday, and has he any comments to make on it?
  The Prime Minister: I saw the statement by Senator Humphrey. When he was Vice-President, he and the Administration supported the enlargement of the Community. He therefore, as I understand it, has always supported the policy which we are trying to carry through, just as much as does the present Administration. As to protectionism in agriculture, I have stated the increase in American sales to the Community. In the last 10 years, 1961 to 1971 they have just about doubled. The United States also has interests in agriculture and in agricultural support. What one requires is an open association recognising this between the United States and the enlarged Community.
  Mr. Harold Wilson: In the message which the Prime Minister received from President Nixon, having regard to recent statements on this question by members of President Nixon's Cabinet, does the President accept the degree of protectionism against the third world, the outside world, be it New Zealand or the United States, which is implicit in the negotiations and is the result of the negotiations for which the right hon. Gentleman is responsible?
  The Prime Minister: In the message, the contents of which I have given to the House, there is full support for the enlargement of the Community, and no detailed questions were raised about its agricultural policy. When the right hon. Gentleman talks about the protectionism of the Community, he should remember that its common tariff is lower than our tariff, and that the help that it gives to associated countries is much greater than the help that we are able to give. As far as agricultural protection is concerned, we do it through support prices, and the Community does it through the levy system.
  Mr. Meacher
  The Prime Minister: About 5,000 between the General Election and when I answered Question No. 3: but a few more may have arrived since then.
  Mr. Meacher: What credible assurances can the Prime Minister give to retirement pensioners and low-paid workers about the cost to them of entry into Europe when the Government's whole pension increase at present is being eroded by price rises even before it is received and when the family income supplement today is worth precisely 4p per week per person entitled?
  The Prime Minister: We have given a specific pledge on social service benefits in the White Paper, and it will be dealt with in the biennial review. That review is due to take place in the spring of 1973. Price increases in food resulting from entry into the Community will not be taking place until the spring and summer of 1973.

  GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS (SECURITY)
  Mr. William Hamilton
  Mr. Leslie Huckfield
  The Prime Minister: I have nothing to add to my statement of 17th June.
  Mr. Hamilton: As the right hon. Gentleman has confirmed the report in The Guardian of 26th July that four people had been arrested, can he say whether any of those four were associated with activities within foreign embassies, and to what extent foreign embassies are being investigated by Scotland Yard in this connection?
  The Prime Minister: It has been publicly announced that arrests have been made, and charges made, too. In that respect these matters are sub judice, and I think the hon. Gentleman will agree that it would be improper for me to comment on any aspects of the activities of those concerned.
  Mr. Huckfield: Is the Prime Minister aware that there is increasing evidence
  1332
  that information from Government Departments—and this includes information on private individuals—is finding its way into the hands of private firms, local authorities and all sorts of people who have no right to that information? Is it not about time that certain changes in practice were instituted, and when is the right hon. Gentleman going to do something about it?
  The Prime Minister: I have announced to the House the changes that we have made in practice. If the hon. Gentleman—or any other hon. Member—gives me information of the kind that he has cited it will immediately be inquired into. When the matters were raised by The Guardian immediate action was taken, and, as a result of police inquiries, further legal action has been taken. I cannot now comment on that, or take further action until the cases have been disposed of.
  Mr. Harold Wilson: Will the Prime Minister recognise that no one will expect him to make any statement on matters that are sub judice, but should there be any further development as a result of the Government's investigation, following the statement in The Guardian, will he undertake to keep the House informed while we are sitting, and during the recess, if there is anything about which he thinks the House ought to be informed, will he use the methods available to him to make a public statement so that hon. Members can know what the situation is?
  Further, while the Prime Minister cannot comment on any individual cases before the courts now, or on any further cases that there may be, should he decide that it is desirable to make further changes in the machinery of Government to deal with this problem, will he make an early statement, even if the House is not sitting?
  The Prime Minister: I am prepared to give all those assurances. If anything emerges either from the tribunal that is now sitting or as a result of the cases to be heard in the courts we can act immediately to prevent any recurrence of it, and I shall state publicly exactly what we have done.
  Mr. Biggs-Davison: On a security matter which is no longer sub judice, may I ask the Prime Minister whether he is satisfied that his predecessor did justice

  1333
  in the case of Colonel Lohan, and has he any further inquiry in mind?
  The Prime Minister: I have no comment to make on that.

  UNEMPLOYMENT (DEPARTMENTAL CO-ORDINATION)
  Mr. Ashley
  The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir. There is already close co-ordination between all Departments concerned with the problems of unemployment.
  Mr. Ashley: Is the Prime Minister aware that 829,000 people in the dole queue today will receive that reply with unalloyed rapture? But, if the coordination is so marvellous, can the right hon. Gentleman explain why only 17,000 of those people are receiving any kind of Government-sponsored retraining?
  The Prime Minister: I am anxious that more retraining should be accepted. There is space available. On 20th July my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Employment announced further measures to increase the amount of Government training. In particular, he announced that the training allowance would be substantially increased from 27th September. Employers in every region have been asked directly to use any spare capacity in their factories for the retraining of workers.
  Mr. Idris Owen: Would my right hon. Friend be prepared to receive a deputation from the North-West Industrial Development Association to discuss the subject of unemployment in the North-West?
  The Prime Minister: As I have told the House, the association has been in communication with me. It has sent me a memorandum, which we have studied carefully, and I have replied to the association that I should be delighted to meet it to discuss this issue on the next occasion that I am in the Northwest.
  Mr. Loughlin: Will the Prime Minister recognise that his lethargic nonchalance is of no value to the 829,000 people now unemployed?
  The Prime Minister: The hon. Gentleman's remarks bear no relationship to reality. The whole purpose of my right hon. Friend's measures, and those of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, was to inject greater demand into the economy and to improve employment.
  Mr. Loughlin: Stick to your yacht !

CHARTER FLIGHTS
Mr. Mason (by Private Notice)Mr. Mason (by Private Notice) asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry if he will make a statement about the inquiry that he has ordered into illegal charter flight operations and the reported compliance with such operations by his officials.
The Minister for Trade (Mr. Michael Noble): I have been informed that a general allegation has been made against an officer of the Department. It is now being investigated by one of our senior inspectors. Naturally, I take any such allegation—from whatever source it may come—seriously, but the right hon. Gentleman will appreciate that it is very easy to make mischief by allegation of this kind. The allegation is of a general character and I have not the slightest reason to believe that there is any truth in it.
Mr. Mason: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that I sincerely hope that the allegation is without foundation? However, if, as he says, there is no truth in it, why did not he take steps immediately to squash the leading Press story which has placed so many of his officials under a cloud of suspicion? Why has it taken nearly four days before he has made any statement?
Secondly, when this inquiry is concluded, will the right hon. Gentleman be making a public report or a public statement?
Finally, has the right hon. Gentleman instituted any inquiry at all into these illegal charter flight operations and the possible collusion between ticket shops and operators?
Mr. Noble: The answer to the first of the right hon. Gentleman's supplementary questions is that it is impossible to deal immediately with any allegation that may appear in the Press or elsewhere, especially when it is of a very general nature, as the right hon. Gentleman now knows this was.
On his second question, if the inquiry produces evidence on which action should be taken, the appropriate action will immediately be taken. If there is no such evidence, quite clearly no report should be made in this House or elsewhere.
On the third question, our enforcement officers continue to check charter flights. Recently we have had some successful prosecutions, and we shall continue our checks so long as these undesirable features of charter operations continue.
Mr. Kenneth Lewis: In view of a report that appeared at the weekend, it is clear that these allegations were quite disgraceful and should never have been made in the first place. However, in order to ease the public's mind on the obvious chaotic situation that exists at the moment with these clubs and charter flights, will my right hon. Friend seek an early opportunity to indicate what his Ministry's policy will be on this matter? Does he agree that it is better to keep on prosecuting the maximum number of these clubs—in order to make it clear to them that they cannot continue this kind of operation—than to allow the matter to drift?
Mr. Noble: That is a rather wider question, but I can tell my hon. Friend that we are certainly continuing both with the checks and with discussions with our international colleagues in the aviation business. It is clearly essential that approximately the same rules should apply at both ends of a flight.
As for prosecutions, we shall bring forward as many as we can, consistent with obtaining proper evidence. That is as far as I can go at the moment.
Mr. Leslie Huckfield: Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that the noise and pandemonium which these regulations are causing is reducing our airports to secondhand knackers' yards? Will he not now agree that these sets of rules and regulations cannot be continually
1336
enforced? Will he therefore set about negotiating a decent bilateral charter agreement with the United States which will give the ordinary man in the street his chance to fly to some far-away places?
Mr. Noble: Questions on this subject are already on the Order Paper, and I shall be answering them in due course. Certainly we shall continue to discuss vigorously with other countries—as we are at the moment—ways of stopping the trouble that is arising.
Mr. Adley: I do not wish to be associated with any of the wild charges that have been made, but does not my right hon. Friend agree that the problem arises from the domination of I.A.T.A. by American carriers? That is the source of the problem. In view of the possible enlargement of the European Community, will he give serious consideration to the creation of a European Air Transportation Association?
Mr. Noble: In this matter I am prepared to consider anything. My hon. Friend is quite right in saying that agreement in I.A.T.A. is an essential first step in getting this situation put right.

PERSONAL STATEMENT
Mr. Benn: Mr. Speaker, at the end of the debate last night, I raised a point of order to give notice that I should be seeking an amendment of one word attributed to me in the OFFICIAL REPORT in the debate on the Consolidated Fund which I believed to be a misprint. The word printed was "merit" instead of "meaning", which I believed that I had said.
This may have led to a complete misunderstanding of the sense of my remarks, which I have since sought to correct elsewhere. However, the shorthand writer's note being clear for "merit", you have not felt able to accede to my request for correction, and I absolutely accept your decision.
Since I may, quite unintentionally and in good faith, have misled you by my point of order, I should like to apologise unreservedly to you and the House.
Mr. Speaker: I am grateful to the right hon. Member.

ORDERS OF THE DAY

  INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS BILL
  [4TH ALLOTTED DAY]
  Lords Amendments considered.
  3.38 p.m.
  Mrs. Barbara Castle: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker, at the outset of these proceedings, which are on the last day but one that the Bill will be before the House, I should like to raise with you a serious matter arising from the debates in another place. This relates to an Amendment which the Government have made de facto to the Bill without any written Amendment being in front of us to enable us to discuss it. I am referring to the provision to fine the trade union movement a sum of up to £5 million for failure to register as a result of the withdrawal of tax reliefs from their provident funds.
  In Committee in the House my hon. Friends and I put forward an Amendment to deal with that situation. We were assured by the Secretary of State that such an Amendment was not necessary. He also assured us that if the Amendment were necessary it would be made. It is clear from the discussion in another place that that is the effect of the present provisions of the Bill. I see that the right hon. Member opposite nods.
  It is now clear that the trade union movement has been advised on the highest legal authority that that will be the effect that non-registration will have on their provident funds and that tax relief will not be available to them, as the right hon. Gentleman assured the House it would.
  As the right hon. Gentleman's honour is involved, and as, no doubt, unwittingly, the House of Commons was misled on this matter, may I appeal to him through you, Mr. Speaker, to seize this last opportunity to put this matter right before the discussions on the Bill are completed?
  The Secretary of State for Employment (Mr. Robert Carr): The right hon. Lady gave me no prior warning that she intended to raise this point. In my belief,
  1338
  the guidance that I gave did not mislead the House. I still believe that there is no insuperable obstacle to a trade union separating off its provident fund activities into a separate activity, and that therefore what I said was correct. But, as I say, I have had no warning of this, so I have had no chance to look at it again.
  Mrs. Castle: Further to that point of order. I have given the right hon. Gentleman two days' warning, in the sense that we still have two days of debate on the Bill. May I therefore appeal to him again, through you, Mr. Speaker, to consider this matter further, taking further advice, and, if he finds that there is any doubt about the value of the assurances that he gave the House in Committee, to put the matter right in the time left to us?
  Mr. Speaker: The right hon. Lady having said that, it all seems highly irregular.

  INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS BILL
    Clause 22

      FAIR AND UNFAIR DISMISSAL
      Lords Amendment: No. 48, in page 17, leave out lines 3 to 7 and insert—
      '(1) In determining for the purposes of this Act whether the dismissal of an employee was fair or unfair, it shall be for the employer to show—

      (a) what was the reason (or, if there was more than one, the principal reason) for dismissal, and

      (b) that it was a reason falling within the next following subsection, or some other substantial reason of a kind such as to justify the dismissal of an employee holding the position which that employee held.

      (1A) In subsection (1)(b) of this section the reference to a reason falling within this subsection is a reference to a reason which'.
      Order read for resuming adjourned debate on Question proposed [2nd August] on consideration of the Lords Amendments, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
      Question again proposed.
      3.42 p.m.
      The Solicitor-General (Sir Geoffrey Howe): When the House rose last night, I was replying to the debate on this

      1339
      Amendment and had not sought the leave of the House to make that reply. Therefore, with the permission of the House, perhaps I may now continue my reply to the debate.
      I had almost finished answering the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Tynemouth (Dame Irene Ward) and I had explained that, under the Bill, an employer will not be able, by dismissal, to do anything to compel membership of a union of his choice or of the union's choice except under the conditions laid down, where the approved closed shop has been established on the conditions specified in Schedule 1, or where an agency shop has been established and then only if the worker refuses to contribute to the agency union.
      This means that, if a particular union has persuaded the Commission on Industrial Relations to approve a unit as one which it should seek to represent, and if that union has secured the support of the workers in the union, so that an agency shop has been established, then a non-member of the successful union can be required to contribute to the agency union, but cannot—this answers the point of the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle)—be required to belong to that union and remains free to remain a member of the union of his own choice.
      I welcome the recognition of the hon. and learned Member for Leicester, North-West (Mr. Greville Janner) of the importance of these provisions. He discussed a number of difficulties inherent in any unfair dismissal scheme—difficulties which were considered by both the present Government and our predecessors, difficulties which, if they exist, are common to both schemes, which are on similar lines, and which I am sure the House would feel should not stand in the way of the introduction of these proposals.
      The hon. and learned Gentleman suggested that it was regrettable that it was only after a two-year qualifying period that a worker should be entitled to take advantage of the unfair dismissal provisions, but that is the preliminary stage. The qualifying period may be shortened hereafter, once the size of the case load has been ascertained. There was a similar provision in the Bill introduced by the
      1340
      right hon. Lady at the end of the last Parliament.
      The hon. and learned Gentleman mentioned the possibility that dismissals might take place just before the expiry of the two-year period in order to escape the provisions of the Bill. If that is so—it should not be assumed that it is—it is in line with the provisions already operating under the redundancy payments scheme, and there is no evidence that it has been taken advantage of in that way.
      The hon. and learned Member also suggested that documented cases to justify unfair dismissal might prove cumbersome before the industrial tribunals, and implied that this might be encouraged by the availability of legal aid. But, as he will remember—I think that he raised the point in an earlier debate—legal aid would be available not before the industrial tribunals, under this or under the previous Bill, but before the Industrial Relations Court.
      In fact, of course, if an employer, in order to justify a dismissal, has to produce a documented statement setting out what he is complaining of and why he is seeking to dismiss an employee, that is, on the whole, regarded in industry as to the good, because it means that he cannot merely launch bland assertions with which to justify his dismissal.
      The hon. and learned Gentleman also suggested that a settlement as a result of conciliation of an unfair dismissal claim was not admissible under Clause 153. That point is fair in relation to the Bill as it left this House in March, but has been taken into account by the provisions of Lords Amendment No. 259.
      Going back to some extent over old ground, the hon. and learned Member also argued that it would be possible for an employer to get away with the dismissal of a troublemaker and to buy him off for a maximum of £4,000. But of course, that is a great deal better than the present position, under which the "troublemaker" unfairly dismissed has no claim to compensation or benefit at all. In other words, the scales are now tilted against the employer even in this situation.
      Mr. Greville Janner: Is the position now to be that

      1341
      a settlement will be permitted only if it has the blessing of the conciliation officer concerned, or will the settlements, in the hon. and learned Gentleman's view, be permitted where there is no such blessing? My understanding of this is that, even as the provision is amended, the conciliation officer will have to approve of any settlement.
      The Solicitor-General: I think that the conciliation officer will have to have been brought into it in the sense that he will have had to be notified. It is the object of the scheme that any claim of this kind should be notified to the conciliation officer. There were similar provisions in the last Government's Bill relating to the notification of a conciliation officer. Everyone is anxious to see that claims of this kind particularly should be resolved by conciliation rather than by litigation if at all possible.
      The last point that the hon. Gentleman raised relates to the first point raised by the hon. Member for Manchester, Black-ley (Mr. Rose), about the extent to which it is possible that an employer might be tempted to dismiss summarily in order to show that he was dismissing on good and substantial grounds, and thereby avoid the softer option of dismissal on notice.
      One cannot dispute that, under this scheme or under the arrangements contained in the last Government's Bill, that would be a theoretical possibility. The essence of the protection provided for the worker there, as in every other dismissal situation from now on, is that he would be able to challenge such a summary dismissal and secure a remedy from the industrial tribunal.
      The effectiveness of that remedy depends, of course, upon the extent to which he can establish his claim before the tribunal. That is where we come to the point which is common to both hon. Members—about the adequacy of the provisions in relation to the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the dismissal. The hon. Member for Blackley, I think, suggested that the provision of Lords Amendment No. 48 required the employer only to establish the fact or existence of a reason and did not give the tribunal notice of the extent to which the sufficiency of the reason had also to be considered. In fact, one must look at
      1342
      Amendment No. 48 with Amendment No. 50. The employer has to show what was the reason and that it was one of the listed reasons; and then, under Amendment No. 50, once the existence of the reason has been established, the tribunal still has to consider
      "whether in the circumstances he "—
      the employer—
      "acted reasonably or unreasonably in treating it as a sufficient reason for dismissing the employee."
      That is intended to meet the same point as was met by Clause 35(3) of the Labour Government's Bill, save for the fact that in that case the dismissal was not held to be unfair unless the tribunal was satisfied that the employer acted unreasonably in dismissing the employee. Under those provisions unreasonableness rested with the employee to establish, whereas under Amendment No. 50 the burden of proof is left open, so that, if anything, it is easier for the dismissed worker to establish that the employer acted unreasonably in dismissing him.
      We cannot go as far as the hon. Member for Manchester, Blackley would wish in maintaining the presumption of redundancy in the case of a mixed claim—a claim on the ground of redundancy and/or unfairness of dismissal; and Amendment No. 326, which requires the tribunal to decide one way or the other without the existence of a presumption, is in line almost exactly with Clause 50(3) of the Labour Government's Bill.
      Mr. Paul B. Rose: I think the hon. and learned Gentleman has misunderstood me. I asked him whether he would apply the principle that applies to redundancy payments to the case of unfair dismissal, and thereby create a rebuttable presumption.
      The Solicitor-General: I appreciate the distinction which the hon. Gentleman has in mind, and that is the object of the clarification of the burden of the proof that we have undertaken. Once an employee goes before the tribunal and shows that he has been dismissed, it is then for the employer to show the existence of a reason under Amendment No. 48. This puts the employee beyond first base without having the additional complication which was in Clause 35(1) of the Labour Government's Bill.

      1343
      The next point raised by the hon. Member for Blackley was whether "reasonableness" would be assessed fairly and by objective standards relative to the employee and the job he was doing. I refer the hon. Gentleman to the provisions in Amendment No. 48(1)(b). If the employer is relying on a substantial reason outside those listed in the Clause as it stands, then that must be a
      "substantial reason of a kind such as to justify the dismissal of an employee holding the position which that employee held".
      In other words, rather than being assessed subjectively, the matter must be related to the work that he was doing and considered objectively. In addition, Amendment No. 50 leaves the burden of proof open rather than placing it on the employee in showing whether it was reasonable or unreasonable.
      The hon. Gentleman then suggested that a wide area of discretion will exist here. If one looks at Clause 22(1)(a) of the Bill and then at Clause 22(b), one has the position set out. In the first instance, one of the admissible reasons for dismissal may be
      "related to the capability or qualifications of the employee for performing work of the kind which he was employed by the employer to do."
      Subsection (6) defines "capability". The hon. Member for Blackley expressed anxiety lest that might be regarded as too wide. I answer him in a not very aggressive spirit, and I hope in a modestly defensive one, by saying that those two provisions are taken verbatim from Clause 35(2)(a) and Clause 35(5) of the Labour Government's Bill.
      Mr. Rose: Is the hon. and learned Gentleman aware that that Measure was a Bill in draft, had not passed through its Committee and Report stages in this House, had not been through the House of Lords, had not returned to this place and, therefore, had not had the benefit of being amended? Will he please answer the point and not keep fobbing me off with reference to an earlier Bill which did not have the benefit of a thorough consideration by Parliament, with the possibility of being improved?
      The Solicitor-General: Dear, oh dear! I am sorry that the hon. Gentleman is so sensitive about this. In the spring of
      1344
      1969 that Bill was in prospect from the then Labour Government.
      Mr. Rose: But only in prospect.
      The Solicitor-General: In June 1969, the prospect of that Bill was brought to an end and, thereafter, one assumed that for the next 10 months the Labour Government gave the closest consideration to a Bill which they would introduce, which they did, before the General Election. Indeed, the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) in earlier debates when attempting to repudiate my arguments on this topic, in which I had referred to "In Place of Strife", described that Measure as one which had had the support of the entire Labour Movement.
      I dare say that the Bill was capable of improvement and that it would have been subjected to a mass of amendments both in this House and another place. I am, nevertheless, entitled to make the point that these provisions are in line with the fruits of the deliberations, lasting almost 12 months, of the Labour Government, leading to the publication of these proposals in their Bill.
      However, that is not the only defence I offer. The proposals themselves are sensible and acceptable. The employer must show that he is relying on the ground that the dismissal can be justified because it can be
      "related to the capability or qualifications of the employee for performing work of the kind which he was employed … to do"
      and "capability" is defined in Clause 22(6)(a)
      Of course, the working of these provisions as with the working of any provisions providing a remedy for unfair dismissal, will depend on the objectivity with which the tribunal applies the test of reasonableness as contained in the Bill, as it was contained in the Labour Measure.
      I suggest that these provisions are entirely workable, are entirely fair and that the obligations in respect of the burden of proof in this matter are now clearly set out in response to the wishes expressed in another place and in this House by way of the group of Amendments now under consideration.
      Question put and agreed to.
      Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

    Clause 24

      DISMISSAL IN CONNECTION WITH A STRIKE OR OTHER INDUSTRIAL ACTION
      Lords Amendment: No. 51, in page 19, leave out lines 35 to 40.
      Mr. R. Carr: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
      This Amendment was moved by the Opposition in another place and accepted by the Government. I hope, therefore, that as well as proving non-controversial, it will be welcomed by hon. Gentlemen opposite. A brief explanation of its purpose may be all that is necessary.
      Clause 24 lays down that in the event of making dismissals during a strike or irregular industrial action, the employer shall not be liable for a claim for unfair dismissal unless he acts against some of the workers in the group in a discriminating way compared with the rest of the workers in the group, and also unless his reason, or at least his principal reason, for taking dismissal action was on account of the trade union membership activity of the people dismissed prior to the strike or irregular industrial action starting.
      The effect of the Amendment is to remove that proviso about the protection only being available to trade union activities prior to the strike beginning. We believe that this is right and that those taking part in a genuine trade union activity should be protected in this way.
      I believe that the right hon. Lady and her hon. Friends admit the need, in the event of a strike, of employers having more protection against the charge of unfair dismissal than they have in normal circumstances. Our Clause is more comparable to the equivalent Clause in the right hon. Lady's Bill. Initially, in the right hon. Lady's Bill she, too, had the condition that the trade union action was protected only if it took place before the strike. We understand why she made that provision, just as to begin with we felt that we had to, but I am glad that, on further consideration and as a result of the case put to us in another place, we have felt able to remove this proviso from the Bill. I therefore hope that the Amendment will commend itself to the House.
      4.0 p.m.
      Mr. Harold Walker: We on this side are getting a little weary of having thrown at us the contents of a Bill which was not debated in the House and which, if it had been debated, would have been subjected to the winnowing and harrowing processes of Parliament. Further, the provision to which the right hon. Gentleman has referred was in an entirely different context. Our unfair dismissal procedure was in no way linked with Clause 5.
      However, I welcome the Amendment. The Secretary of State really should not drape himself in virtue as he appears to be doing. He should acknowledge that it was the action of the workers' representatives at the I.L.O. General Conference in June, 1971, which was the principal influence in bringing about this change in another place. It is an odd and cutting criticism of the Bill, which the right hon. Gentleman so often presents to the House as a Bill to protect and extend workers' rights, that in the same month as he presents that argument in the House of Commons in London the I.L.O. in Geneva proves that it is exactly the contrary and moves in the opposite direction by passing a recommendation which obliges the right hon. Gentleman to ask the House to agree with this Amendment.
      Mr. R. Carr: I am not quite sure that I understand the point that the hon. Gentleman makes. I am sometimes accused of not being prepared to consult, which is not true. Then it is somehow wrong when, although the unions refuse to confer with me, I, having listened to views which have been expressed, act upon them. I do not feel in any way ashamed of listening to advice from workers' representatives or from anybody else, provided that it is good advice and worthy of being taken seriously.
      Mr. Norman Buchan: I seek a little clarification. It cannot be said that I have intervened frequently during the proceedings on the Bill. I do not know if the right hon. Gentleman is right in saying that this matter would have been the subject of previous legislation. In my few excursions into these debates that seems to have been said on almost every occasion. What I am sure of is that any legislation produced by my right hon. and hon. Friends would not

      1347
      be couched in the way that this Clause is.
      The Amendment helps by removing something from the Clause. I cannot see any trade unionist being able to understand what the Clause as it stands means. This is related to Clause 22(2) which provides that
      "the dismissal of an employee by an employer shall be regarded as having been unfair if the reason for it … was that the employee had exercised, or had indicated his intention to exercise, any of the rights conferred on the employee by section 5(1) … .
      Clause 5(1) is the basic establishment of trade union rights, providing that a worker has the right to choose membership of a trade union, to take part in the activities of a trade union, and so on. So far, so good.
      Following Clause 22(2) we come on to Clause 24(2) and (3) and to the proviso which is to be deleted. Subsection (2) provides:
      "If the reason or principal reason for the dismissal was that the claimant took part in the strike or other industrial action, the dismissal shall not be regarded as unfair … .
      Those three lines as they stand run counter to Clause 22(2), at any rate in formulation. It is then bound up with the extraordinary proposition in subsection (2)(a)—that is, unless other employees were not so dismissed.
      This will not make sense to the trade unionist. If there is a provision as to someone else not having been dismissed, it will seem to a trade unionist that he is being singled out for unfair treatment. I believe that this will lead to a great deal of anxiety on the part of trade unionists. As it stands, the very condition relating to others not being dismissed will seem to a trade unionist to be the very condition which will impose it as being the cause of the action.
      Therefore, it is not only that the language of Clauses 5, 22 and 24 is very complex. It is also that the concept which seems to emerge may well cause a great deal of anxiety among trade unionists. It does not by any means make it sufficiently clear merely to cut off one leg from the proviso at the end. All that this does is to narrow the area of confusion.
      Mr. R. Carr: By leave of the House, I will seek to reply to the hon. Member
      1348
      for Renfrew, West (Mr. Buchan). I think that I have understood the point which is worrying him and, if I have, I think that I can put it at rest.
      The difference between the situation in Clause 22 and that in Clause 24 is caused by a reason which I thought that I made clear in my brief remarks in introducing the Amendment, namely, that we recognise, as I believe that the Labour Party does, that the situation when industrial action is taking place is different from the situation when it is not. That is why Clause 24 is admittedly different from the other Clauses.
      I also apologise for the fact that, because we have all got into the habit of talking, I think rightly, about an action for unfair dismissal, we also talk about things not being unfair rather than their being fair and thus become involved in double negatives which make matters confusing.
      I assure the hon. Gentleman that Clause 24 makes it absolutely clear that, if an employer were to discriminate by dismissing in the course of a strike one or more members of a group but not the whole group, he would indeed be open to an action for unfair dismissal. That is absolutely certain. The other thing we say here is that an employer will be open to a claim for unfair dismissal if the principal reason for dismissal is on account of trade union activity. The Clause as originally drafted rendered all this applicable only if the trade union activity took place before the strike began. Now we are deleting that proviso. Trade union activity during the course of the industrial action will also be protected.
      Question put and agreed to.

    Clause 25

      EXCLUDED CLASSES OF EMPLOYMENT
      Lords Amendment: No. 52, in page 20, line 17, leave out from "employees" to second "at" and insert:
      "who had been continuously employed for a period of not less than thirteen weeks, whether they are or had been all employed at the same place or are or had been employed".
      The Under-Secretary of State for Employment (Mr. Dudley Smith): I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

      1349
      This is a small but logical Amendment. It provides that in calculating the aggregate of employees in an undertaking for the purposes of exclusion from the unfair dismissal provisions only employees who have been continuously employed for 13 weeks or more would be taken into account. This would exclude most casual or temporary seasonal workers from the aggregate. The Government consider that only regular workers should be taken into account.
      Subsection 1(a) excludes from the right to appeal against unfair dismissal employees in undertakings where there are fewer than four employees at the time of a dismissal. However, representations were made to the Government that under the provision in the Bill regular full-time employees in certain sectors which employed large numbers of casual or seasonal type labour would be excluded for the greater part of the year but would acquire a right of appeal during a comparatively short season where casual workers were employed.
      We had an odd situation where protection against unfair dismissal depended in some industries on the vagaries in the weather. If the weather was good and casuals were employed there would be protection for full-time employees, but if the weather was bad there would be no protection afforded for the regular employees. In the Government's view, this is most unsatisfactory and therefore we consider that only regular employees should be taken into account for the purposes of this exclusion and that it would be wrong for casual and temporary seasonal workers to be taken into account.
      The Amendment, therefore, excludes from the calculation employees who had not been employed continuously for 13 weeks or more at the time of the dismissal in question. The period of 13 weeks corresponds with the new qualifying period in Clause 17 for an employee's entitlement to a week's notice. We consider that this arrangement is fair and reasonable. It was pressed upon us in another place; after due consideration the Amendment was made and that is why it is before us this afternoon.
      Mr. Harold Walker: I shall detain the House only briefly. First, I express my gratitude to the Under-Secretary for not
      1350
      invoking, for a change, the contents of my right hon. Friend's Bill. Of course, he could not do so this time, because whilst my right hon. Friend's Bill made provision for exclusions, which in this Bill can be varied by order of the Secretary of State, one purpose of this exclusion of establishments employing fewer than four people is to enable the Government to assess the initial case load. It was not intended in my right hon. Friend's Bill to introduce any such qualification as is now proposed.
      I recognise the argument that the hon Gentleman has presented. Of course, there are people on the fringe who present problems, and I do not think this point would have gone unrecognised if it had not been drawn to our attention. However, it works both ways. The hon. Gentleman might argue that the purpose of the Amendment is to ensure that the excluded category is kept to the size originally intended and that it is for this reason that action is being taken to prevent any such alteration arising from seasonal factors as those to which he has referred.
      I agree that it is an odd sort of justice which hinges on the weather at the time of a man's dismissal. However, as I say, it works both ways. The Government say that it is anomalous that a person who, under the provisions of the Bill, may be denied access to the tribunal for 50 weeks of the year should have the door opened for a fortnight or three weeks, whatever the period is, for, say, hop-picking or the pea harvest, and I can see the sense of that argument.
      The hon. Gentleman refers in general terms to cases where the work load fluctuates, causing corresponding swings in the labour force, but where there is a small nucleus of permanent workers, and he says that that situation should be taken into account. But he ignores the other situation where the work load may remain constant but where the labour force may vary considerably. There may be a steady nucleus but there may be a transient labour force operating, as for example in the building and construction industry, the distributive trades and the transport industry. One thinks, for example, of a small haulier employing six lorry drivers, three of whom are constant and steadfast in their allegiance to the employer, the other three being replaced.

      1351
      The steadfast and loyal drivers in that situation, under the provisions of this Bill, can lose out. If the hon. Gentleman wants to help those who would not in the normal course of events be given access to the tribunal he should give access to those who might be unfairly excluded. He should either tackle both of the problems or leave the thing alone. At the moment he is only tackling half the problem.
      I said that there may well be fringe problems. It seems to us illogical and inequitable to select part of the problem and deal with it in isolation. That we cannot accept.
      Question put, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
      The House divided: Ayes 264, Noes, 223.

      Division No. 454.]

      AYES

      [4.15 p.m.

      Adley, Robert

      Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)

      Kershaw, Anthony

      Allason, James (Hemel Hempstead)

      Elliott, R. W. (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, N.)

      Kilfedder, James

      Archer, Jeffrey (Louth)

      Emery, Peter

      King, Evelyn (Dorset, S.)

      Astor, John

      Eyre, Reginald

      King, Tom (Bridgwater)

      Atkins, Humphrey

      Farr, John

      Kinsey, J. R.

      Awdry, Daniel

      Fell, Anthony

      Kirk, Peter

      Baker, Kenneth (St. Marylebone)

      Fenner, Mrs. Peggy

      Kitson, Timothy

      Baker, W. H. K. (Banff)

      Fidler, Michael

      Knox, David

      Balniel, Lord

      Finsberg, Geoffrey (Hampstead)

      Lambton, Antony

      Barber, Rt. Hn. Anthony

      Fookes, Miss Janet

      Lane, David

      Batsford, Brian

      Foster, Sir John

      Langford-Holt, Sir John

      Beamish, Col. Sir Tufton

      Fowler, Norman

      Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry

      Bennett, Sir Frederick (Torquay)

      Fox, Marcus

      Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)

      Berry, Hn. Anthony

      Fraser, Rt. Hn. Hugh (St'fford & Stone)

      Lloyd, Ian (P'tsm'th, Langstone)

      Biffen, John

      Fry, Peter

      Longden, Gilbert

      Biggs-Davison, John

      Galbraith, Hn. T. G.

      Loveridgc, John

      Blaker, Peter

      Gardner, Edward

      Luce, R. N.

      Boardman, Tom (Leicester, S.W.)

      Gibson-Watt, David

      McAdden, Sir Stephen

      Body, Richard

      Gilmour, Ian (Norfolk, C.)

      MacArthur, Ian

      Boscawen, Robert

      Gilmour, Sir John (Fife, E.)

      McCrindie, R. A.

      Bossom, Sir Clive

      Glyn, Dr. Alan

      McLaren, Martin

      Bowden, Andrew

      Godber, Rt. Hn. J. B.

      Maclean, Sir Fitzroy

      Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hn. John

      Goodhew, Victor

      Macmillan, Maurice (Farnham)

      Braine, Bernard

      Gorst, John

      McNair-Wilson, Michael

      Bray, Ronald

      Gower, Raymond

      McNair-Wilson, Patrick (NewForest)

      Brewis, John

      Grant, Anthony (Harrow, C.)

      Maddan, Martin

      Brinton, Sir Tatton

      Gray, Hamish

      Madel, David

      Brocklebank-Fowler, Christopher

      Green, Alan

      Maginnis, John E.

      Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)

      Grieve, Percy

      Marten, Neil

      Bruce-Gardyne, J.

      Grimond, Rt. Hn. J.

      Mather, Carol

      Bryan, Paul

      Grylls, Michael

      Maude, Angus

      Buchanan-Smith, Alick (Angus, N&M)

      Gummer, Selwyn

      Mawby, Ray

      Buck, Antony

      Gurden, Harold

      Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J.

      Bullus, Sir Eric

      Hall, Miss Joan (Keighley)

      Meyer, Sir Anthony

      Burden, F. A.

      Hall, John (Wycombe)

      Mills, Peter (Torrington)

      Butler, Adam (Bosworth)

      Hall-Davis, A. G. F.

      Mitchell, David (Basingstoke)

      Carlisle, Mark

      Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)

      Moate, Roger

      Carr, Rt. Hn. Robert

      Hannam, John (Exeter)

      Molyneaux, James

      Channon, Paul

      Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)

      Money, Ernie

      Chapman, Sydney

      Haselhurst, Alan

      Monks, Mrs. Connie

      Chichester-Clark, R.

      Havers, Michael

      Monro, Hector

      Churchill, W. S.

      Hayhoe, Barney

      Montgomery, Fergus

      Clark, William (Surrey, E.)

      Hicks, Robert

      More, Jasper

      Clarke, Kenneth (Rushcliffe)

      Higgins, Terence L.

      Morgan-Giles, Rear-Adm.

      Clegg, Walter

      Hiley, Joseph

      Morrison, Charles (Devizes)

      Cockeram, Eric

      Hill, John E. B. (Norfolk, S.)

      Mudd, David

      Cooke, Robert

      Hill, James (Southampton, Test)

      Murton, Oscar

      Coombs, Derek

      Holt, Miss Mary

      Neave, Airey

      Corfield, Rt. Hn. Frederick

      Hooson, Emlyn

      Noble, Rt. Hn. Michael

      Cormack, Patrick

      Hordern, Peter

      Normanton, Tom

      Costain, A. P.

      Hornby, Richard

      Nott, John

      Critchley, Julian

      Hornsby-Smith, Rt. Hn. Dame Patricia

      Onslow, Cranley

      Crouch, David

      Howe, Hn. Sir Geoffrey (Reigate)

      d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry

      Howell, David (Guildford)

      Oppenheim, Mrs. Sally

      d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Mal.-Gen. James

      Howell, Ralph (Norfolk, N.)

      Orr, Capt. L. P. S.

      Dean, Paul

      Hunt, John

      Osborn, John

      Dixon, piers

      Hutchison, Michael Clark

      Owen, Idris (Stockport, N.)

      Dodds-Parker, Douglas

      Iremonger, T. L.

      Page, Graham (Crosby)

      Douglas-Home, Rt. Hn. Sir Alec

      James, David

      Page, John (Harrow, W.)

      Drayson, G. B.

      Jessel, Toby

      Parkinson, Cecil (Enfield, W.)

      du Cann, Rt. Hn. Edward

      Johnson Smith, G. (E. Grinstead)

      Peel, John

      Dykes, Hugh

      Joplin, Michael

      Percival, Ian

      Eden, Sir John

      Kaberry, Sir Donald

      Pink R. Bonner

      Edwards, Nicholas (Pembroke)

      Kellett-Bowman, Mrs. Elaine

      Pounder, Rafton

      Powell, Rt. Hn. J. Enoch

      Skeet, T. H. H.

      van Straubenzee, W. R.

      Prior, Rt. Hn. J. M. L.

      Smith, Dudley (W'wick & L'mington)

      Vaughan, Dr. Gerard

      Proudfoot, Wilfred

      Soref, Harold

      Vickers, Dame Joan

      Pym, Rt. Hn. Francis

      Speed, Keith

      Waddington, David

      Quennell, Miss J. M.

      Spence, John

      Walder, David (Clitheroe)

      Raison, Timothy

      Sproat, Iain

      Walker, Rt. Hn. Peter (Worcester)

      Rawlinson, Rt. Hn. Sir Peter

      Stewart-Smith, Geoffrey (Belper)

      Walker-Smith, Rt. Hn. Sir Derek

      Redmond, Robert

      Stodart, Anthony (Edinburgh, W.)

      Walters, Dennis

      Reed, Laurance (Bolton, E.)

      Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir M.

      Ward, Dame Irene

      Renton, Rt. Hn. Sir David

      Stokes, John

      Weatherill, Bernard

      Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon

      Stuttaford, Dr. Tom

      Wells, John (Maidstone)

      Ridley, Hn. Nicholas

      Sutcliffe, John

      White, Roger (Gravesend)

      Ridsdale, Julian

      Tapsell, Peter

      Whitelaw, Rt. Hn. William

      Roberts, Wyn (Conway)

      Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)

      Wiggin, Jerry

      Rodgers, Sir John (Sevenoaks)

      Taylor, Edward M. (G'gow, Cathcart)

      Wilkinson, John

      Rossi, Hugh (Honnsey)

      Tebbit, Norman

      Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick

      Rost, Peter

      Temple, John M.

      Wood, Rt. Hn. Richard

      Russell, Sir Ronald

      Thatcher, Rt. Hn. Mrs. Margaret

      Woodhouse, Hn. Christopher

      St. John-Stevas, Norman

      Thomas, John Stradling (Monmouth)

      Woodnutt, Mark

      Scott, Nicholas

      Thomas, Rt. Hn. Peter (Hendon, S.)

      Worsley, Marcus

      Scott-Hopkins, James

      Thorpe, Rt. Hn. Jeremy

      Wylie, Rt. Hn. N. R.

      Sharples, Richard

      Tilney, John

      Shaw, Michael (Sc'b'gh & Whitby)

      Trafford, Dr. Anthony

      TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

      Shelton, William (Clapham)

      Trew, Peter

      Mr. Paul Hawkins and

      Simeons, Charles

      Tugendhat, Christopher

      Mr. Tim Fortescue.

      Sinclair, Sir George

      Turton, Rt. Hn. Sir Robin

      NOES

      Albu, Austen

      Duffy, A. E. P.

      Johnson, Walter (Derby, S.)

      Alaun, Frank (Salford, E.)

      Eadie, Alex

      Jones, Barry (Flint, E.)

      Allen, Scholefield

      Edelman, Maurice

      Jones, Dan (Burnley)

      Archer, Peter (Rowley Regis)

      Edwards, Robert (Bilston)

      Jones, Gwynoro (Carmarthen)

      Armstrong, Ernest

      Edwards, William (Merioneth)

      Jones, T. Alec (Rhondda, W.)

      Ashley, Jack

      Ellis, Tom

      Kaufman, Gerald

      Ashton, Joe

      English, Michael

      Kelley, Richard

      Atkinson, Norman

      Evans, Fred

      Lambie, David

      Bagier, Gordon A. T.

      Faulds, Andrew

      Latham, Arthur

      Barnett, Guy (Greenwich)

      Fernyhough, Rt. Hn. E.

      Lawson, George

      Barnett, Joel (Heywood & Royton)

      Fisher, Mrs. Doris (B'ham, Ladywood)

      Leadbitter, Ted

      Beaney, Alan

      Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)

      Lee, Rt. Hn. Frederick

      Benn, Rt. Hn. Anthony Wedgwood

      Foley, Maurice

      Leonard, Dick

      Bennett, James (Glasgow, Bridgeton)

      Foot, Michael

      Lewis, Arthur (W. Ham N.)

      Bidwell, Sydney

      Ford, Ben

      Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)

      Bishop, E. S.

      Forrester, John

      Lipton, Marcus

      Blenkinsop, Arthur

      Fraser, John (Norwood)

      Loughlin, Charles

      Boardman, H. (Leigh)

      Freeson, Reginald

      Lyon, Alexander W. (York)

      Booth, Albert

      Galpern, Sir Myer

      Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.)

      Bottomley, Rt. Hn. Arthur

      Garrett, W. E.

      Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson

      Boyden, James (Bishop Auckland)

      Gilbert, Dr. John

      McBride, Neil

      Bradley, Tom

      Ginsburg, David

      McCartney, Hugh

      Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, Provan)

      Golding, John

      McGuire, Michael

      Brown, Ronald (Shoreditch & F'bury)

      Gordon Walker, Rt. Hn. P. C.

      Mackenzie, Gregor

      Buchan, Norman

      Gourlay, Harry

      Maclennan, Robert

      Buchanan, Richard (G'gow, Sp'burn)

      Grant, John D. (Islington, E.)

      McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.)

      Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)

      Hamilton, James (Bothwell)

      McNamara, J. Kevin

      Callaghan, Rt. Hn. James

      Hamilton, William (Fife, W.)

      Mallalieu, J. P. W, (Huddersfield, E.)

      Cant, R. B.

      Hamling, William

      Marks, Kenneth

      Carmichael, Neil

      Hannan, William (G'gow, Maryhill)

      Marquand, David

      Castle, Rt. Hn. Barbara

      Hardy, Peter

      Marsden, F.

      Clark, David (Colne Valley)

      Harper, Joseph

      Marshall, Dr. Edmund

      Cocks, Michael (Bristol, S)

      Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)

      Mason, Rt. Hn. Roy

      Conlan, Bernard

      Hart, Rt. Hn. Judith

      Meacher, Michael

      Corbet, Mrs. Freda

      Hattersley, Roy

      Mellish, Rt. Hn. Robert

      Cox, Thomas (Wandsworth, C.)

      Healey, Rt. Hn. Denis

      Mendelson, John

      Crawshaw, Richard

      Heffer, Eric S.

      Millan, Bruce

      Cunningham, G. (Islington, S.W.)

      Horam, John

      Miller, Dr. M. S.

      Dalyell, Tam

      Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas

      Milne, Edward (Blyth)

      Darling, Rt. Hn. George

      Howell, Denis (Small Heath)

      Mitchell, R. C. (S'hampton, Itchen)

      Davidson, Arthur

      Huckfield, Leslie

      Molloy, William

      Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)

      Hughes, Mark (Durham)

      Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)

      Davies, Ifor (Gower)

      Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen, N.)

      Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)

      Davies, S. O. (Merthyr Tydvil)

      Hughes, Roy (Newport)

      Morris, Rt. Hn. John (Aberavon)

      Davis, Clinton (Hackney, C.)

      Hunter, Adam

      Moyle, Roland

      Davis, Terry (Bromsgrove)

      Irvine, Rt. Hn. Sir Arthur (Edge Hill)

      Mulley, Rt. Hn. Frederick

      de Freitas, Rt. Hn. Sir Geoffrey

      Janner, Greville

      Murray, Ronald King

      Delargy, H. J.

      Jay, Rt. Hn. Douglas

      Ogden, Eric

      Dell, Rt. Hn. Edmund

      Jeger, Mrs. Lena (H'b'n & St.P'cras, S.)

      O'Halloran, Michael

      Dempsey, James

      Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)

      O'Malley, Brian

      Doig, Peter

      Jenkins, Rt. Hn. Roy (Stechford)

      Oram, Bert

      Douglas, Dick (Stirlingshire, E.)

      John, Brynmor

      Orme, Stanley

      Douglas-Mann, Bruce

      Johnson, Carol (Lewisham, S.)

      Oswald, Thomas

      Driberg, Tom

      Johnson, James (K'ston-on-Hull, W.)

      Owen, Dr. David (Plymouth, Sutton)

      1354

      1355

      Paget, R. T.

      Rose, Paul B.

      Torney, Tom

      Palmer, Arthur

      Sandelson, Neville

      Urwin, T. W.

      Pannell, Rt. Hn. Charles

      Sheldon, Robert (Ashton-under-Lyne)

      Varley, Eric G.

      Parker, John (Dagenham)

      Shore, Rt. Hn. Peter (Stepney)

      Wainwright, Edwin

      Parry, Robert (Liverpool, Exchange)

      Short, Mrs. Renée (W'hampton, N.E.)

      Walker, Harold (Doncaster)

      Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred

      Silkin, Hn. S. C. (Dulwich)

      Wallace, George

      Pendry, Tom

      Silverman, Julius

      Watkins, David

      Pentland, Norman

      Skinner, Dennis

      Weitzman, David

      Perry, Ernest G.

      Small, William

      Wells, William (Walsall, N.)

      Prentice, Rt. Hn. Reg.

      Smith, John (Lanarkshire, N.)

      Whitehead, Phillip

      Prescott, John

      Spearing, Nigel

      Willey, Rt. Hn. Frederick

      Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)

      Spriggs, Leslie

      Williams, Alan (Swansea, W.)

      Probert, Arthur

      Stallard, A. W.

      Williams, Mrs. Shirley (Hitchin)

      Reed, D. (Sedgefield)

      Stoddart, David (Swindon)

      Wilson, Alexander (Hamilton)

      Rees, Merlyn (Leeds, S.)

      Strang, Gavin

      Wilson, Rt. Hn. Harold (Huyton)

      Rhodes, Geoffrey

      Summerskill, Hn. Dr. Shirley

      Wilson, William (Coventry, S.)

      Richard, Ivor

      Taverne, Dick

      Woof, Robert

      Roberts, Albert (Normanton)

      Thomas, Rt. Hn. George (Cardiff, W.)

      Roberts, Rt. Hn. Goronwy (Caernarvon)

      Thomas, Jeffrey (Abertillery)

      TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

      Robertson, John (Paisley)

      Thomson, Rt. Hn. G. (Dundee, E.)

      Mr. Alan Fitch and

      Rodgers, William (Stockton-on-Tees)

      Tinn, James

      Mr. Donald Coleman.

      Roper, John

      Tomney, Frank

    Clause 29

      EXCLUSION IN RESPECT OF PROCEDURE AGREEMENT
      Lords Amendment: No. 53, in page 22, line 12, at end insert:
      ("() that every organisation of workers which is a party to the procedure agreement is an independent organisation.")
      Mr. R. Carr: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
      It has been the intention of everyone on both sides who has for some time now supported the concept of a statutory right of appeal in respect of unfair dismissal that we should at the same time encourage the continuation and, indeed, the spread of voluntary procedure agreements coping with dismissal, and that, provided that such voluntary agreements met the necessary standards, those who entered into them should be able to get them exempted from the statutory procedure.
      I believe that to be common ground. As at present drafted, however, Clause 29(1) might permit an application for exemption of a voluntary dismissal procedure by an employer and a non-independent organisation of workers. This is not the Government's intention. The present Amendment, therefore, would provide that an employer could be joined in an application for exemption of a voluntary dismissal procedure only by a trade union or an independent organisation of workers. By the exclusion of non-independent organisations—house unions—as parties to a joint application, em-
      1356
      ployees would be safeguarded against removal of their statutory right of appeal in favour of a management-dominated voluntary procedure. I hope, therefore, that the Amendment will readily commend itself to both sides.
      I take the opportunity afforded by the Amendment to add that I very much hope that the two sides of industry will make extensive use of the provision in Clause 29 for the exemption of voluntary procedure agreements in respect of dismissal. It is common ground on both sides of the House that it was high time we legislated, as other countries have done, to provide safeguards against unfair dismissal, but I feel that it would do great credit to our system of industrial relations if over a wide area of industry the safeguards were made in voluntary agreements jointly agreed, which must, of course, be up to the standard laid down in the statutory provisions.
      Furthermore, if there is, as I hope, widespread exemption of voluntary procedures, this will relieve the burden of the case load falling on industrial tribunals and will enable me, therefore, to relax the various restrictions in respect of appeal tribunals—in particular, the two-year qualifying period—earlier than I might otherwise be able to do.
      I know that many industries and firms, especially in the public sector, already include provisions regarding dismissal in their voluntary procedure agreements. It may be that these procedures will need some measure of alteration and improvement to bring them up to the standard to qualify for exemption, but I very much hope that the parties concerned in such

      1357
      procedures will seriously consider taking those steps.
      I also hope that where hitherto there have been no voluntary procedure agreements relating to dismissal serious consideration will be given to introducing them, and that this introduction of statutory procedures will be an incentive to the formation of new and better voluntary ones rather than a hindrance. That is my belief, and it was also the belief of the Donovan Commission.
      4.30 p.m.
      Mr. Eric S. Heffer: We give the Amendment a limited welcome. We find that it is extremely reasonable in that, to quote Lord Jellicoe,
      '"It is our feeling that Clause 29(1) might therefore permit the exemption of a management-dominated dismissal procedure, in the kind of situation where an employer was joined in an application by his house union, possibly to the exclusion of a recognised trade union. This is not the Government's intention and we are concerned that the provision may not in these circumstances provide adequate safeguards for employees."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, House of Lords, 13th May, 1971; Vol. 318, c. 1511.]
      We are glad that it is not the Government's intention to allow a situation where a house union could have an arrangement with an employer and the bona fide trade union was excluded. We are very pleased that to that extent the Government have listened to the Opposition. But it is a limited concession, because in this Clause and Clause 30, dealing with the whole question of unfair dismissal under procedure agreements made between trade unions and employers, we are dealing with procedure agreements that have been approved by the Industrial Court, and unfortunately the House has not had an opportunity to discuss the rôle of the Court in relation to this type of agreement. Our view is that it should not be involved.
      It would be wrong if procedure agreements between a firm and a company union meant that a worker who was dismissed under such agreements and was aggrieved felt that he was not being involved in proper representation because he was a member of a bona fide trade union. We are glad that that possibility has been recognised by the Government and eliminated.
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      Whilst we support the Amendment, we want to make it absolutely clear that we are not entirely satisfied, because it involves the Industrial Court, which we should like not to be involved in any way. The voluntary system, which the right hon. Gentleman says he is so much in favour of, should be extended and developed, but without the involvement of the Industrial Court.
      As I have said, we shall not oppose the Amendment, and we feel that the Government might have listened on other occasions to the Opposition as much as they have on this.
      Question put and agreed to.
      Lords Amendment: No. 54, in page 22, line 27, leave out "appropriate cases" and insert
      "cases where (by reason of an equality of votes or for any other reason) a decision cannot otherwise be reached".
      The Solicitor-General: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
      This is a small Amendment which the Government were pleased to accept when it was suggested by Lord Brown in another place to clarify the effect of subsection (2)(d), which enables exemption from the statutory procedure to be accorded when the Industrial Court is satisfied about the existence of an alternative agreement. As drafted, it suggested that to secure exemption under the procedure it was essential for independent arbitration or adjudication to exist at the end of the road. As my right hon. Friend has just said, everyone wishes to encourage voluntary settlements for the disposal of particular disputes, and no one wishes to discourage, where the parties think it appropriate, provision for independent arbitration or adjudication. But there was no desire in this context to make provision for arbitration or adjudication an obligatory and inescapable aspect of any procedure which was to secure exemption under these provisions.
      The Amendment replaces the reference to
      "appropriate cases"
      with a phrase which makes it plain that arbitration or adjudication should

      1359
      only be necessary for a procedure to qualify for exemption in
      "cases where (by reason of an equality of votes or for any other reason) a decision cannot otherwise be reached."
      In other words, where the procedure does not have built-in a machinery for resolving a conflict about whether the dismissal was fair or unfair, in those cases only some machinery for arbitration or adjudication is still believed to be necessary, but we do not wish it to stand in the way of the approval of exempt agreements. On the contrary, we want as wide a range of possibilities for exempting agreements under these provisions as possible.
      Mr. Heffer: We shall not oppose this somewhat complicated Amendment. Lord Brown admitted that it was complicated when he moved it, and when I read the OFFICIAL REPORT of the debate it struck me that it became more complicated. The idea of hurdles being put in the way of workers using the appeals mechanism seemed to me to make matters unduly complicated, and I am not entirely happy that the Amendment should have been accepted. It was accepted with alacrity by the Government in the other place, with no argument about it. We feel that it does not make any serious inroad on the rights of workers. It makes things slightly more difficult, but we have no basic argument against it, and are therefore prepared to accept it.
      Question put and agreed to.

    Clause 30

      REVOCATION OF EXCLUSION UNDER S.29
      Lords Amendment: No. 55, in page 23, line 18, after "effect" insert:
      "and shall have an extended time for presenting a complaint under Part VI of this Act in respect of a dismissal where the effective date of termination falls within that period".
      The Solicitor-General: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
      Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Robert Grant-Ferris): It will be for the convenience of the House if we also discuss Lords Amendments No. 56, in page 23,
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      line 28, leave out from beginning to "shall" in line 31 and insert:
      "a complaint to which those provisions apply".
      No. 322, in Schedule 6, page 154, line 7, leave out from "Act" to second "the".
      No. 323, in Schedule 6, page 154, line 10, leave out "with the effective date of termination" and insert:

      "(a) in the case of a complaint relating to dismissal, with the effective date of termination, or

      (b) in any other case, with the date of the action specified in the complaint (or, if that action occurred on two or more dates, the latest of those dates) ".

      No. 324, in Schedule 6, page 154, line 11, leave out from "termination" to end of line 12 and insert:
      "unless the tribunal is satisfied that in the circumstances it was not practicable for the complaint to be presented before the end of that period.
      (2) Any provision made by regulations in pursuance of the preceding sub-paragraph shall have effect subject to any order of the Industrial Court under section 30 of this Act."
      No. 325, in Schedule 6, page 154, line 12, at end insert:
      ". In relation to proceedings on complaints under section 103 of this Act, the regulations shall include provision precluding an industrial tribunal from entertaining such a complaint unless it is presented before the end of the period of four weeks beginning with whichever is the latest of the following dates, that is to say—

      (a) the date of the action specified in the complaint (or, if that action occurred on two or more dates, the latest of those dates);

      (b) the earliest date on which that action came to the knowledge of the complainant;

      (c) where the complaint relates to a matter in respect of which an application has been made under section 79 of this Act, the date on which the registrar gave notice of his conclusions on investigating that matter or gave notice that he had determined not to proceed with the application."

      The Solicitor-General: Amendment No. 55 is designed, again in the context of exempting certain cases from the statutory procedure because a voluntary procedure is in existence, to take account of the relevant substantive changes to be made by Amendments 322–325 in Schedule 6. The Amendments are designed to alter, in a direction which I think is favoured in the House and by others, the circumstances in which an employee may proceed out of time, after his time for application has expired, to an industrial tribunal. I will explain in a moment the substantive provisions.
      Lords Amendments 55 and 56 are designed to alter Clause 30 so as to ensure that on revocation of an exemption order an employee is not barred from access to the kind of remedies on the same kind of terms he would have had if there had been no exempted agreement.
      The substantive Lords Amendments No. 322 onwards are to Schedule 6. The first, No. 322, takes account of the fact that it is now possible for an employee or worker to complain under Clause 102 not only of unfair dismissal but of other unfair action.
      Lords Amendment 323 does the same thing by making it plain that the date from which the time begins to run against him is either the date of dismissal, in a dismissal case, or the date of the act of which he complains.
      The substantive point is contained in Lords Amendment No. 324. As originally drawn, it was possible for the tribunal to extend his period for applying for relief to the tribunal "for special reasons". In this context, as hon. Members suggested, that simple provision "for special reasons" was not sufficiently precise, and so the concept of power to extend the time "for special reasons" is now being replaced by the power to extend the time where the tribunal
      "is satisfied that in the circumstances it was not practicable for the complaint to be presented before the end of that period".
      The tribunal has to look at the practicability and, if reasons are shown why the employee or worker concerned could not have got to the tribunal any quicker than he did, power is given to extend the time in those circumstances. Lords Amendment 324 also requires the court, in discharging or ending the exemption agreement, to give the worker the same kind of opportunity of going to the industrial tribunal, and that is the substantive effect of Lords Amendments Nos. 55 and 56.
      Lords Amendment No. 325 deals with a similar point. As the Bill now stands the employee or worker will have the right to present a complaint not only under Clause 102 but also under Clause 103 in respect of different kinds of action taken against him, and in that context as well the tribunal will have the same power as to the period in which he should have presented his complaint.
      I hope the House will follow the object of the exercise. It is in substance to remove the concept of "special reasons" from any application under Clauses 102 and 103 to the industrial tribunal and allows an extension of time where the worker could not get to the tribunal any sooner than he did. On that basis I commend these Lords Amendments.
      4.45 p.m.
      Mr. Heffer: The hon. and learned Gentleman quite rightly concentrated on Lords Amendments 322 to 325 which are really the Amendments of substance. He quite rightly said that the "special reasons" are being removed. Nevertheless, we are not happy because we find that despite the fact that a certain amount has been done to meet our objections this does not meet the serious objection which this side of the House has about the period of four weeks. We regard that as a matter of principle.
      We believe that it should not merely be left to the tribunal to decide whether there are special reasons. We believe that the time for a worker to bring forward a complaint about unfair dismissal should be much longer than four weeks. There are all sorts of reasons why this should be so. The worker could find himself dismissed unfairly, or he may believe, and rightly, that he was dismissed unfairly, but is not able to ascertain the truth of the situation within the period of four weeks. That may require him or his trade union or his friends to dig around, as it were, to get the actual proof, and although he may know the situation, he may require a longer period of time to establish the facts. If there is a period of only four weeks, and if the tribunal has discretion, it may not be prepared to grant the application for the matter to come before the tribunal.
      We contrast this provision of four weeks with what happens in relation to unfair industrial practices. Until an Amendment was moved in another place the time was almost unlimited in which an employer could go to the court and say that an unfair industrial practice had taken place. In another place an Amendment was moved by the Government, and accepted, that there should be a limitation of at least six months. That was pressed upon the Government by the Opposition.

      1363
      It is fair to contrast that situation, in which for up to six months the employer can say that in his opinion an unfair industrial practice has taken place and that he wishes to bring it before the court, with this situation where the worker who has been dismissed and feels he has been unfairly dismissed has to bring that before the tribunal in four weeks. We regard that as inequitable.
      The Solicitor-General: Will the hon. Member acknowledge this fact, that the rather more complex provisions of Clause 34 of the last Government's Bill provided for a claim to be brought within 15 days, and that it was because we regarded that as insufficient in this kind of case that we extended the period to four weeks and improved the provisions in this Bill?
      Mr. Heffer: I do not care what was in that other Bill. I want to make that absolutely clear I also want to make it quite clear that if that 15 days suggestion had come before the House I would have moved an Amendment to exclude it and to have a longer time provided. We are now discussing what has been brought forward to the House by the right hon. Gentleman and this Government, and it is time that the Government stopped hiding behind certain provisions which were in a Bill which was brought forward by my right hon. Friend but which was never discussed by this House. The Government really ought not to continue to do that, but should deal with what is in this Bill and the points we are raising about it, and we are saying that if it is right for an employer to have up to six months—it was an unlimited period until an Amendment was brought forward in another place—in which to go before the court and apply on the ground of an unfair industrial practice, then the time in which a worker who feels he has been unfairly dismissed should be allowed to present his case should be extended from four weeks to a much longer period.
      On that argument we are not prepared to accept this Lords Amendment and we shall certainly be voting against it.
      Mr. Stanley Orme: My hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) is right about this issue. The whole paraphernalia of appeals against unfair dismissal is nega-
      1364
      tive unless there is a right of reinstatement. We believe that allowing pieces of eight to be paid for getting rid of a worker—and it is sometimes worth up to £4,000 to an employer to see the back of a worker—is no solution to industrial problems.
      It is interesting that the period has been reduced to four weeks. The Amendment moved by my noble Friend in another place assisted the Government and made another loophole for the man to jump through. No wonder the Government accepted the Amendment with such alacrity. Speaking purely for myself, I think it is a bad Amendment, yet the Solicitor-General is trying to convince the House how fair he is being to the trade union movement, and how nice it will be for a man who thinks he has been unfairly dismissed to go to a tribunal which can award damages.
      I have never known a worker to be dismissed for trade union activities. Dismissals take place for bad time-keeping, failure to do the job properly, for redundancy reasons, and the gentle methods of the Solicitor-General in putting over these proposals should be exposed for what they are.
      This series of Amendments will not assist the trade union movement. The exercise is valueless unless there is a right of reinstatement. Unfair dismissal is most difficult to prove, and that is why workers take industrial action over it and why employers resist industrial action. Apart from wages and conditions it is the thing the workers fight for most when employers sometimes try to get rid of dissident workers. I do not think it possible for a court of law or an industrial tribunal to adjudicate on such matters.
      Once unfair dismissals are taken out of collective bargaining and are no longer an issue betwen trade union and employer but are brought into the realms of law we go into a land of no return. The Solicitor-General has not given the trade union movement anything, and the provision for four weeks as against the six months for unfair industrial practices shows where his bias lies.
      Mr. John Fraser: I am subject to correction, but I believe that the time for making a claim for redundancy payment, which is analogous to a claim unfair dismissal, is a much longer

      1365
      period than four weeks. The Solicitor-General will no doubt correct me if I am wrong, but my recollection is that it is about six months. I hope that he will think seriously about this four-week period.
      Any person who has dealings with industrial injury claims, damages claims, and so on, will agree that short limitation periods create gross injustice. A man often does not realise that he has been unfairly dismissed until four or five weeks afterwards. He might have been dismissed while he was on holiday. No doubt the Solicitor-General will say that that will be a special reason and it was impracticable for him to make a claim within four weeks. But there are other circumstances where a man might need to investigate. He might have been dismissed because he did not have a certain qualification. Probation officers and youth leaders have special diplomas and qualifications for their jobs, and it might sometimes take three or four months to establish whether a man had the correct qualifications. Some qualification regulation are extremely complicated and provide for exemptions, and it might, therefore, be a long time before a man could prove his case.
      A man might be dismissed because of his conduct. Before putting in his claim, he might have to obtain statements from his work mates or people who might not be accessible at the time. To do all that within four weeks places a severe burden on the man, and may mean that he has to put in his claim without knowing whether or not it is justified. It is much better that a claim should be investigated before it is made, so as to save waste of time by the tribunal.
      Once claims are made, attitudes tend to become frozen. This is why accident proceedings are not instituted in the High Court or the county court very often for 18 months to two years after the accident. It is realised that to negotiate is better than to go to a court or a tribunal.
      It is better, especially on his Bill which has no provision for reinstatement, for a man's lawyer, trade union representative or friend to go to the employer and say, "We could make an application to the tribunal for damages for unfair dismissal, but all our chap wants is to get back into the job which he has been doing for
      1366
      many years." The man may have his family established in the neighbourhood and may have bought a house near to his place of employment. The employer might reply that the man was dismissed because of his conduct. His representative might then say, "I think you are mistaken about that and, if you give me time, I can provide evidence to prove that you are mistaken." So long as a claim has not been presented to the tribunal there is a possibility of fruitful negotiation with the employer with a view to reinstatement and settling the matter amicably. Early application to the tribunal precludes this fruitful and sensible way of solving these problems.
      In an earlier contribution the Solicitor-General reiterated that legal aid will not be available before the tribunal. This is crazy. If at the moment a man is dismissed unfairly because he has had only two weeks' notice when he is entitled to four weeks' notice, he has six years in which to make an application to the county court to recover damages for unfair dismissal which is a breach of his contract of employment, and he can get legal aid for that purpose. A man who has been dismissed may have no funds at his disposal, but may badly need to take legal advice and be represented in a complicated and difficult case. He is caught two ways. He is caught because he has to get his application in within four weeks, and he is caught because he cannot get legal representation.
      There is an increasing reluctance for people to go to tribunals, even for redundancy payment claims, because employers are increasingly employing legal representatives and, as case law accumulates, it is becoming more difficult to establish claims. To give one example, on a claim to the industrial tribunal for redundancy payment, an employer can sometimes get away with meeting the claim by proving that there was another principal reason for the dismissal. I have known claims to be dismissed because, although there was some evidence that the man was redundant, the employer has proved some other principal reason for dismissing him.
      Mr. Orme: Industrial misconduct.
      Mr. Fraser: The case may not have involved industrial misconduct. Sometimes a salesman who may not have been doing well may have been got rid

      1367
      of. If such a man is not legally represented it is extremely difficult to meet the points that arise. There is a reluctance to go to a tribunal if there is not legal assistance in dealing with difficult cases.
      The absence of legal aid for cases before a tribunal coupled with the short limitation period work a double injustice. This contrasts unfavourably with the rights of a person to go to the Industrial Court to complain about unfair industrial conduct. I hope the Solicitor-General will think seriously about this matter and, if necessary, will introduce a manuscript Amendment to lengthen the period to six months.
      5.0 p.m.
      Mr. David Waddington: I listened with interest to the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer). I do not think I missed any part of his speech, but I did not hear him say what he thought would be a satisfactory period within which a man should have to bring a case of unfair dismissal. Perhaps he would tell the House what sort of period he had in mind.
      I have some sympathy with hon. Members opposite who say that perhaps four weeks is not long enough, but on the other hand everybody would agree that one can allow too long a period because it is vitally important that all the facts should be clear in everybody's mind.
      The hon. Member for Norwood (Mr. John Fraser) said that the object of the exercise was to try to get the man reinstated. If that is the aim, then one does not want to develop a situation in which lawyers are busy preparing a case in minute detail, when they should be getting on with the job as quickly as possible and presenting the case before the tribunal so that the man may be reinstated.
      Mr. John Fraser: The hon. Gentleman has misunderstood me. Under the legislative provisions reinstatement cannot be altered. There is a stage, before the matter is crystallised by legal proceedings, at which it may be possible to negotiate reinstatement. That was the point I was making. I say that we should allow a period of at least four weeks to get that kind of negotiation under way. I agree that it is important to have a
      1368
      rapid conclusion of the proceedings, but if reinstatement is sought it has to be negotiated.
      Mr. Waddington: I take the hon. Gentleman's point, but I do not accept that once proceedings have been launched before the Industrial Tribunal all hope of negotiating reinstatement with the employer has gone. I am anxious that we should not allow a state of affairs to develop where nothing happens for a great length of time because under the rules there is no need for urgency and as a result opportunities to reinstate a man are not grasped.
      I have, as I say, a certain sympathy with the hon. Gentleman's position. I would like to hear what sort of period the Opposition have in mind. One has to strike a fair balance; there must be ample time for proper advice to be taken; and finally, proceedings have to be instituted as quickly as possible so that all the facts are fresh in everybody's minds.
      We know from experience that some employers are zealous in making quite sure that all opportunities to obtain evidence of an industrial injury are grasped. The National Coal Board ensures that within days of a man being injured all possible witnesses are interviewed; indeed, almost everybody concerned is interviewed by the Board. It is important that these matters should be dealt with expeditiously. I repeat that the Opposition have my sympathy on their point about legal aid. It is a pity that provision has not been made to make legal aid available in dealing with important cases.
      Mr. Alex Eadie: The Solicitor-General should have another look at this proposal. I believe the legal profession in Scotland will feel some resentment at what has been done since the right hon. and learned Gentleman seems to be riding roughshod over established procedures of Scottish law.
      I should like to explain what the four week provision will involve. Established procedures are laid down in the mining industry. A situation can arise in which one court can battle against another. Do we know exactly what we mean when we talk about "court"? In the mining industry there is a procedure to deal with anybody who is alleged to have committed a breach of the Coal Mines Act.

      1369
      Such a man generally is dismissed straight away, if the management feel that the case warrants such a course. It is a tradition that the miners' union never contests an allegation of a serious breach of the Coal Mines Act. The offence may involve smoking underground, or a serious offence against procedure—the man may have been riding on trucks underground, which could endanger life and limb and could interfere with machinery. The trade union never attempts to interfere with that sort of case, and the man must wait until he is tried by the court.
      If the man has to wait a couple of months, what is he to do in the meantime? It might be said that the man was guilty and that was why he was dismissed in the first place. But the man may not be guilty. He may come before the court and be found not guilty. If that happens and the four week period has elapsed, what will happen if the man alleges unfair dismissal?
      To take a more difficult example, what will happen if the man's case is found to be not proven? This may be a matter with which the Solicitor-General is not acquainted in Scottish law. I feel that the Scottish legal professional will resent the right hon. and learned Gentleman writing into this legislation a provision which will not take account of the Scottish legal situation.
      I personally have gone to the union and said, "This case was found not proven and therefore I, as the man's accredited representative, demand his reinstatement." I have to some extent been successful in getting men reinstated, but the management has often said ' We are prepared to reinstate the man, but there is some doubt about loss of earnings since the verdict was not proven rather than not guilty. "Does the Solicitor-General say that the man will be entitled to say," I am going to the Industrial Court to claim unfair dismissal and will claim compensation. Although I have my job back, I have suffered loss of earnings in the time I have been unemployed." Is the right hon. and learned Gentleman also saying that the Industrial Court will then decide on the validity of a not proven verdict? Does he intend to give guidance on that aspect of the law?
      I doubt very much whether the Amendment is a starter in relation to both
      1370
      English and Scottish law. I certainly believe that it would build up deep resentment in the legal profession in Scotland, irrespective of what the hon. and learned Gentleman may think. There has not been sufficient thought on this matter. The hon. and learned Gentleman must consider re-examining the proposal with a view to taking it back. I trust that we will not have to go into the Division Lobby not only in protest against the lack of time provided but in order to establish the fact that Scottish law is entitled to some consideration in legislation about industrial relations.
      Mr. Edwin Wainwright: I want to say something to the Solicitor-General about his attitude to the Amendment. He mentioned that the Bill brought in by the Labour Government specified a 15-day period. He gave the impression that it was wonderful of the present Government to extend that period to one month. If the Labour Government had not brought in a Bill, or had not mentioned a 15-day period in it, I wonder what length of time the present Government would have recommended. Would it have been 30 days, or 60 days, or 90 days, or even six months?
      The question of obtaining evidence is always difficult. We are not here talking about good employers on every occasion. In this context, we are talking about bad employers—on this side of the House, anyway. There are still too many bad employers in the country. As my hon. Friend the Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme) mentioned, a bad employer will want to get rid of a man because of his trade union activities but he will choose other reasons. Other things are brought in against the employee. Provocation comes into it on many occasions when the employer wants to get rid of a man. In effect he compels the man to do something that common sense would advise him not to do. Then, when he is dismissed, he has been so unhappy in the job for a long time—when he has been fighting on behalf of his fellow workers—that he decides, "There is no future for me at this plant. I will find work elsewhere."
      Then, however, the unfortunate fellow finds that he cannot get other work because he has been blacklisted. Wherever he goes, they will ask what his name is.

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      When he tells them, they will reply, "We are sorry. There is no work for you here." He thereupon drifts about trying to find a job. This happens on many occasions, and, of course, it is more difficult with the present rate of unemployment for a man to get a job anyway, quite apart from the reluctance of employers to take him on. He is running about for one month or two months trying to get another job but finding that he cannot get one.
      Then he thinks, "I should now make application on grounds of unfair dismissal", only to be told, "Sorry, but you are out of time." There is no fairness in this limit of one month. Perhaps it is not a good analogy, but a claim for damages has a statutory period of three years. I believe that the judge says, in a claim for damages, that three years after the date of the accident is in effect a claim for damages on the first day. Three years is allowed to a man before he is barred by Statute in such cases. Here, however, a dismissed man is to be allowed only 30 days. It is my candid opinion that no consultation has taken place with the trade union movement about this period.
      5.15 p.m.
      I ask the Solicitor-General whether he has consulted the trade union movement on this matter. Is he satisfied that the 30 days is a fair and just period? What knowledge has he got about what is happening in industry? From where has he got his information? Has he got it from the employers on every occasion? Has he ever discussed this sort of issue with shop stewards or full-time officials of the trade union movement? Of course he has not, for otherwise, I am certain, he would not have recommended a one-month period.
      This is too short a time. A man's future is at stake on many occasions. When we talk about £4,000 that can be paid instead of reinstatement, it is rather disgusting to think that one can rob a man of work in the area that he has been living in for a long time—rob him of his work because of his trade union activities, his willingness to fight on behalf of his fellow men against bad employers on many occasions—so that he has no future in the area and has to leave it.
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      It is not a pleasant thing to have to move from one place to another and to keep being told, when one's name is mentioned, "You are not wanted". Many of us have experienced this sort of thing.
      The hon. and learned Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Waddington) mentioned that no time limit had been suggested by my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heifer). I will suggest a time. I suggest that it should be at least six months so that the man has plenty of time and can get the proof by questioning people and obtaining evidence. Do not let us forget that when a man goes for evidence in a plant where there is a bad employer there is a freeze, in effect, from his fellow workers because they are afraid of what will happen to them. All industry is not like work in some of the modern plants where there is a strong trade union movement and some understanding between unions and employers. Many plants have employers who are not fit to be in charge of men.
      Because of all this, we must make certain that such employers cannot take advantage of any legislation. I hope, therefore, that the Government will listen to what has been said by my hon. Friends on this issue and will extend the time beyond one month to at least six months in order to enable a man to build up his case, thereby ensuring that he can be dealt with fairly and justly.
      Mr. Ronald King Murray: I would like to echo the feeling of disquiet which have been expressed by my hon. Friends about the limit of four weeks on these particular complaints. It seems to me that my hon. Friend the Member for Midlothian (Mr. Eadie) has raised a substantial point which certainly has validity in regard to Scots law and may well have a validity which extends beyond that into the law of England and Wales, because it is obvious that many dismissals may well proceed upon a ground which is also a ground for a statutory prosecution in regard to some statutory provision—for example, in regard to the Factory Acts or some equivalent Act.
      In such cases, it is obvious that the question whether the facts justify such a dismissal will be bound up in such a way that they cannot be separated from the facts on which a prosecution is

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      grounded. As far as Scotland is concerned it is the case that a summary prosecution for a statutory offence has to be completed within a period of six months. Therefore, it would follow that the period of four weeks was much too short. On any view, the period for such a complaint—and it is justifiable to ask whether there is need for a period of limitation, whether this kind of procedure demands any sort of limit at all—should be much longer than four weeks and, I should have thought, longer than six months, in order to allow the matter involved to be properly canvassed and to cover amply the procedure which may be involved in a criminal prosecution.
      My hon. Friend the Member for Midlothian mentioned the Scottish verdict of "Not proven." A more sympathetic view would be to take the case of a clear acquittal when an accused is acquitted of the statutory offence which is the ground for the dismissal. It is obvious that in that case the court might say that there was no ground for the complaint and the man would be entirely vindicated. It would be extraordinary that he should be completely vindicated in a criminal court and, long before that, be found guilty in a civil court under the tribunal set-up which is given jurisdiction for this purpose in the Bill.
      The argument from this side of the House is, first, that we should probe the matter strongly and ask the Government why there should be a limit and, secondly, if there is to be a limit, that it should be at least six months, as it is for complaints of unfair industrial practices in Clauses 97 and 98.
      I have some sympathy for the point made by the hon. and learned Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Waddington) about reinstatement. It is clear that were the emphasis in this part of the Bill on reinstatement there might be an argument for speed. It might be that one could say that reinstatement is so important that one must get people moving so that the man who has been unfairly dismissed may be fully reinstated to his position in the quickest possible time.
      My hon. Friend the Member for Norwood (Mr. John Fraser) dealt with that matter in his opening remarks. He pointed out that the Bill makes no provision for reinstatement. That is one of the worst features of the Bill in the view
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      of the Opposition. It is a serious defect. The Bill provides for re-engagement, but nowhere does it provide that a person who has been unfairly dismissed, dealt with in a scabby way, shall be reinstated. The proper way to deal with such a situation would be for the man concerned to be restored to his former position, and that would be nothing short of reinstatement.
      The Bill is basically deficient in this respect and therefore we are justified in voting against these provisions in their entirety. The absence of a provision for reinstatement shows the Bill for what it is. When we look into the four weeks limitation we see what a miserable Bill it is. So far from giving a dismissed worker full reinstatement, restoration, or restitution in law, we have a shabby limitation.
      I should like to raise a short technical point of some importance. The words used in Lords Amendment No. 324, allowing a tribunal to go beyond the four weeks, are:
      "unless the tribunal is satisfied that in the circumstances it was not practicable for the complaint to be presented before the end of that period."
      I do not want to be unfair, but it seems that clearly the Amendment is better than the original provision which dealt with "reasonable cause" which is so unsatisfactory from the legal view. Criticisms made by the Opposition both here and in the other place in that regard were well justified.
      What worries me is that the industrial tribunal, in construing the words "not practicable", may take a legalistic or a common sense approach. If it took a common sense approach—I hope that that is the approach which the tribunals will take in construing those words—the tribunal would not take the view that it was hidebound to some period of about four weeks. It is important to stress this point. If the words "not practicable" are to be construed in a common sense way, then, on the face of it, there is no reason for a tribunal, presented with the argument so cogently put forward by my hon. Friend the Member for Midlothian, not saying, "Obviously this is a case where it was not practicable for the complaint to be presented earlier", and to extend the period of four weeks to seven or eight months or even a year. From the common sense view, if common sense is to

      1375
      rule the tribunal rather than legal interpretations, we would not have a great deal to fear, because the tribunal is composed of people who, one hopes, are not predominantly lawyers but have practical experience of industrial relations. The common sense view would take them beyond the legalistic limit of four weeks.
      My fear all along has been that the National Industrial Relations Court, on the one hand, in its divisions, if there are divisions, and the industrial tribunals, on the other hand, transformed by the Bill into mini courts, will tend to be riddled with legalism. That is one reason for strongly echoing the plea of my hon. Friend the Member for Norwood that, if the tribunals are to become legalistic in their interpretation of the Bill and in their application of its provisions, the need for legal aid will be paramount. It will be essential for people to have legal aid if they are to get adequate legal advice and assistance. However, if the tribunals are to be common sense bodies, as they were before the Bill got at them, where the dominant consideration is practical knowledge of industrial relations, this fear would not be justified.
      I end by making a powerful plea for the words "not practicable" to be construed in a common sense, rather than a legalistic, way. My fear is that if they are to be construed by an industrial tribunal as a mini-court in a legalistic fashion, they will take the view that
      "not practicable for the complaint to be presented before the end of that period"
      will be the kind of thing which is limited by the period of four weeks which is set in the Bill. They will probably say that "not practicable" is to be taken as something of the order of those few weeks. In other words, they will be contemplating an extension of a week or possibly two weeks, not an extension many times the limitation.
      I hope that we shall hear some reassuring words from the Government on this matter, but I fear that we shall not. I believe that we shall be left in the legalistic quagmire with which the Bill has presented us throughout its passage.
      5.30 p.m.
      Mr. Albert Booth: It is exceedingly difficult to discuss an Amendment to part of a Bill which claims to give men protection against unfair dismissal
      1376
      when we know that the whole effect of this portion of it is to take away from a number of practical trade unionists the only effective protection they have against unfair dismissal, which is the right to threaten to withdraw their labour until they have had a proper opportunity of discussing whether notice given to an active trade unionist is fair or unfair. Therefore, I propose to consider the matter against the background of what happens in practice.
      If, in an engineering works, a shop steward, who normally has a good timekeeping record and is known to be a good worker, comes in late one morning and that afternoon receives notice of dismissal because he was late, no suggestion is made that he should go along to a court of law if he wants redress against his employer for unfair dismissal. His convenor goes to the manager and says, "If that chap goes outside the door in one week's time, he will not be the only one going out. All the other members of his union in this works will also go out. "The manager then calls in the trade union representative and they sit round a table and try to thrash the thing out. In other words, they will discuss whether the dismissal was unfair, with the man not outside the door, but still on his job.
      If they cannot resolve the issue, the convenor will ask that the notice be withdrawn while a full-time representative of the union and a full-time representative of the employers' association are brought in to consider the matter further. A works conference will be held on the issue whether the man is to be dismissed, irrespective of any provision made for that in procedure agreements, or otherwise. At that works conference evidence will be adduced to show whether the man is being fairly or unfairly dismissed. That evidence can be adduced because the man is still at work, and other men who can testify to the way in which he did his work can be brought forward.
      If the Bill is amended in the way suggested it will take away a man's right to have discussed whether his dismissal was fair or unfair while he continues at work. Whether it is the intention of the Government or not, it will introduce a presumption of guilt, because the man will be outside the door, having been dismissed by his employer on some charge or other, and he will have to prove before

      1377
      the Industrial Court that he is innocent before he can return to work. That will place him at a great disadvantage.
      All men who believe in justice feel that it is necessary to protect people against unfair dismissal. The trade union movement not only shares that concern, but has a special concern to protect against that form of unfairness which relates to getting rid of men who are active on behalf of their fellow workers. In other words, the trade union movement has to protect the representatives of its workpeople.
      Once a work people's representative is put outside the door the organisation of his case and the means of protecting the man who is to follow him as shop steward, or work people's representative, or whatever name he is given, are undermined. His successor is at a disadvantage because the same threat hangs over him of being put outside the door and being forced to appeal through the machinery provided by the Bill.
      It will be a severe handicap to anybody who is dismissed and told to go to a court if he has to operate under the proposed procedure, compared with his position under the present procedure because at the moment, whether there is provision for it in a procedure agreement or not, his case can be discussed while he is still at work.
      In so far as special machinery will be required to obtain evidence, it is fair to say that that situation does not apply now. And who is to say that the employer will facilitate the obtaining of evidence about whether the man was fairly dismissed? The allegation can be extremely vague. It can be said that the man's work was unsatisfactory. But which part of his work was unsatisfactory, and in what capacity was he acting? Where was he at the time? Who says that his work was unsatisfactory? The very people who will give evidence about that at the court will be those who themselves are in danger of having the same action taken against them by the employer.
      Let us imagine a shop steward being dismissed and going before an industrial court to answer the allegation of not doing a certain job properly. He will say that he wants to call the foreman to give evidence that he did do his job properly. What will happen to the fore-man
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      before he goes to the court? He will be called in to see the manager. Does anybody think that the manager will say to him, "I want you to make sure that justice is done on behalf of this ex-shop steward. I want you to speak highly of his work." Anybody who imagines that industry is run on such fair and just lines has not tried organising men in any shop in any engineering works.
      This provision will create an unjust situation and impose unreasonable pressures upon people. Reinstatement is the only thing which can be satisfactory in terms of trade union representation. The least that the Government must concede is that there will be adequate time for the preparation of a case. In all equity that time must be comparable to the time that would be allowed to an employer to bring a case of unfair action against a trade union.
      Mr. Neil McBride: If a worker complainant is denied legal aid in a case before an industrial court while the employer defendant, because of his circumstances, is able to have full and adequate legal resources, that seems to me to be a travesty of justice. If the Government say that legal aid can be granted in some cases, clearly we have the right to ask why they are refusing it in this instance. The Government must give a reason for their refusal to grant legal aid in the circumstances which I have described.
      I turn now to the point made by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Edinburgh, Leith (Mr. Ronald King Murray) about reinstatement. The Solicitor-General will remember that I raised this matter last night, but I make no apology for raising it again, as it is in order to do so. If the worker complainant wins his case, reinstatement should be full and automatic, and the onus should be on the employer to perform that operation. Such a provision should be written into the Bill.
      The Solicitor-General: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I am prepared to discuss the comparative provisions in respect of reinstatement and what ought or ought not to be in the Bill. The hon. Member for Swansea, East (Mr. McBride) raised the question of reinstatement last night. When I attempted at the beginning of my reply to the debate

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      to deal with the point, and to discuss it on the merits, the right hon. Lady the Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle) protested that I ought not to do so. I am glad to see the hon. Member for Edinburgh, Leith (Mr. Ronald King Murray) acknowledging his recollection of that.
      The hon. Gentleman has raised the matter again now. As I was prevented by the right hon. Lady's protest from replying to the matter last night, is it, or is it not in order on this Amendment to discuss the broad general question of reinstatement? I should find it difficult to see how such a proposition could be brought within the rules of order, but if you think that it is within the rules of order, and that the hon. Gentleman is entitled to go on with this point, I hope that I may be allowed to reply to it.
      Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Robert Grant-Ferris): In the circumstances I think that it will be for the benefit of the House if the hon. Member continues with the point he is making, and the Solicitor-General has a chance to reply to it.
      Mr. Heffer: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. As I understood it, my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle) was not complaining about the issue of reinstatement having been raised. She was complaining about the fact that in our previous discussions we had never been able to have a full and lengthy discussion of the whole question.
      Mr. Deputy Speaker: I think that in a debate such as this, when we are operating under the guillotine procedure, a certain amount of latitude must be allowed. We are very near the conclusion of this great matter, and my view is that a certain amount of leniency from the Chair and forbearance on the part of the Government should be the order of the day.
      Mr. R. Carr: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. We willingly accept your Ruling, but I should like to make it clear—I am sure that you would not wish to be unfair to the Government benches—that it was not lack of forbearance on our part which brought the debate on this subject to an end yesterday, but that it was concluded because of an objection by the Opposition.
      Mr. Deputy Speaker: I readily accept what the Minister said. I did not wish to imply that. I feel that we should be a little broad in the debate, and I am casting no aspersions whatsoever on the Government's action yesterday.
      Mr. McBride: Thank you, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I am gratified to know that my observations are in order because, to a man who is dismissed, the ability to take action to prove that his was an unfair dismissal is of great value to his self-respect. It is very important to him to prove himself right in a court of law.
      Coming to the reasons for dismissal, I wonder whether the Solicitor-General has ever heard of the black list referred to by my hon. Friends the Members for Salford, West (Mr. Orme) and Dearne Valley (Mr. Edwin Wainwright)? Those who come from industry are aware of such a list. It is unpublished, but it is none the less extant. Many a trade unionist has found that the ostensible reason for his dismissal is not the real one. One never hears of a trade unionist being dismissed for indulging in trade union activities. He is dismissed because he is alleged to have done some other specified thing. I believe that this period of four weeks should be increased to six months. A person wishing to enter an action should not be precluded from doing so because the specified period is four weeks.
      On the matter of collecting evidence, the hon. and learned Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Waddington) said that some firms were very good when it came to offering facilities for the collection of evidence for and by employees. That is all to the good, but not all employers extend these facilities, Furthermore, not all workers have an adequate knowledge of the law. It therefore follows that in terms of legal aid the worker is at a disadvantage all along the line, and that he should have adequate legal representation. If that is not so. I should like to know the Government's idea of the meaning of the word "justice".
      In my view there is a sense of apology on the part of the Government for the Bill that they are putting before the House—a Bill that has gone sour on public opinion and is no longer backed by it. Those who have anything to do with industry are very apprehensive that insufficient attention has been paid to the

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      employees' position, in terms of the rightful prosecution of his interests. That seems to have been a sin of omission on the Government's part. They have not eliminated the sense of injustice that exists as a result of their omissions from the Bill. As my hon. Friend the Member for Norwood (Mr. John Fraser) said, they could still make a manuscript Amendment to rectify the position.
      If the Government consider the matter seriously they should take into account the necessity for adequate legal aid for employees in the institution of such actions. The worker-complainant is entitled to that; no more and no less. If the Government accede to my request in that respect they will have at least gone a little way towards helping the worker. He is entitled to every protection in the form of legal aid, and the logical outcome of a successful court action should be immediate and full reinstatement in the job from which he has been unfairly dismissed.
      Mr. Heffer: I want to put one or two points arising from what my hon. Friends have said, and the remarks of the hon. and learned Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Waddington). My hon. Friend the Member for Barrow-in-Furness (Mr. Booth) raised a very important point when he drew attention to the fact that until the application of the Bill workpeople in factories will be able to defend their shop stewards and others who represent them on the basis of industrial action for unfair dismissal.
      That has always been the practice. It has been understandable that such action should be taken by workers. Whenever their shop stewards or other representatives have been under threat of dismissal by their employer the workers have made it clear to the employer that they would withdraw their labour in the event of such a dismissal. Under the provisions of the Bill, however, if they withdrew their labour the workers would be carrying out an unfair industrial practice, which means that a right that they have enjoyed up to now, in terms of defending their fellow workers—their elected representatives—is being taken away from them.
      The Solicitor-General: This point is so important that I must ask the hon.
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      Member to specify where in the Bill it is stated to be an unfair practice to call for industrial action as a means of protest against unfair dismissal or for the reinstatement of an unfairly dismissed person. Does not the hon. Member appreciate that that point was suggested to us and we have formally rejected it? Not one provision in the Bill makes it illegal to call for industrial action in support of a worker who has been unfairly dismissed.
      We have made it clear that we are providing alternative arrangements. We are discussing remedies for the worker. He can go to the tribunal and challenge the justice of his dismissal, but alongside that there is the unchanged and unfettered right to take industrial action. It is wrong to suggest that that right has been eroded or minimised in any way.
      5.45 p.m.
      Mr. Heffer: The Solicitor-General knows that if workers taking unofficial strike action, or similar action, are going against an agreed contract they will be carrying out an unfair industrial practice, which means the removal of one of the basic rights that workers have had up to now to defend their shop stewards from being dismissed. There is no point in the Solicitor-General trying to deny that. It also puts into context the point with which I did not agree in my right hon. Friend's Bill—the point about the 15 days. There were no unfair industrial practices in that Bill.
      We have a position in which the workers are not guaranteed reinstatement. I am glad that you, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, have allowed a slightly wider-ranging debate on this point. Employers are put into favourable position in respect of workers who have been unfairly dismissed. A worker is allowed legal representation, but he may not have the money to pay for it. That means that the rich will be placed in a better position. An employer can come before the tribunal with a battery of lawyers while the worker has to suffer because legal aid is not involved.
      It is clear that the Bill is weighted in the interest of the employer, against the worker, despite all the great fanfares of trumpets about unfair dismissal. We cannot allow the Solicitor-General to get away with it so easily.

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      I was asked a fair question, namely, what did I think was a fair period of time in which a worker should be able to apply. I thought that I had made it clear in what I said, namely, that if it were recognised as fair for an employer to be able to go to the Industrial Court within a period of six months and claim that there had been unfair industrial practice it should be equally fair for a worker to go to the tribunal within a period of six months if he felt that there had been an unfair dismissal. That point has been stressed by my hon. Friend the Member for Norwood (Mr. John Fraser) and other hon. Members, who have argued that a period of six months is a reasonable one.
      A little earlier the Solicitor-General made what I thought was an interesting and revealing statement in relation to the £4,000 that could be paid to a worker if he could prove that he had been unfairly dismissed. He said that that put things right, because it tipped the balance in favour of the employer whereas in the past it had been tipped in favour of the workers.
      The Solicitor-General rose—
      Mr. Heffer: If the hon. learned Gentleman wishes to deny this, let him look up HANSARD tomorrow to see what he said.
      The Solicitor-General: If the hon. Gentleman is suggesting that, in answering the point of the hon. and learned Member for Leicester, North-West (Mr. Greville Janner), I suggested anything of that kind, either he or I must have got it wrong. What I was saying, it is plain beyond peradventure, is that, without the unfair dismissal provisions of the Bill, an employer could dismiss anyone and, subject to damages for breach of contract, could not be brought before any tribunal or made to pay any compensation. It is true that industrial action could be taken against him.
      After the Bill, he will not be able to escape without paying compensation. He will still be liable to industrial action but he will, in addition, be liable to pay a maximum of £4,000 compensation. Whereas, pre-Bill, dismissal could have been the subject of no compensation at no cost, post-Bill it will be at the cost of compensation up to £4,000. It is on that basis that I made the same point as I have
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      made many times before—that the scales are being tilted against the employer so as to make it more expensive for him to contemplate dismissing anyone unfairly in that situation. Surely that point is now clear beyond peradventure.
      Mr. Heffer: We shall just have to look at tomorrow's HANSARD to see what the hon. and learned Gentleman said. I noted it carefully because it seemed to me to be completely in line with the basic thinking behind the Bill—that is, that the scales are being tipped in the interests of the employers and against the workers and the unions. I say in advance that, if I am wrong, I apologise to the hon. and learned Gentleman. We shall have to look at HANSARD in relation to the part that I noted down, because it seemed to me to underline the basic philosophy of this Bill.
      On that basis, unless we get some pretty convincing arguments from the Minister, we shall certainly divide the House. Since we shall not get anywhere near the Amendments of consequence, Nos. 324 and 325, we shall have a token Division on this one.
      The Solicitor-General: May I reply with the permission of the House. To take the hon. Member's last point first, if I mis-recollected what I was saying, I apologise, but my clear recollection is that I said what I have just explained. We can both check this, because one makes mistakes of this kind in this kind of discussion.
      On the more general point, the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) used characteristic phraseology in suggesting that I should stand here as though I were facing some accusational charge and that, if he had his way, the House would not let me "get away with it". I do not know what it is that I am supposed to be getting away with, but let us bring ourselves back to reality for a moment and remind ourselves what we are talking about.
      We are talking about a group of Amendments designed to remove the concept of "special reasons" and to replace it with the more benevolent concept—as the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh, Leith (Mr. Ronald King Murray) acknowledged—of entitling a person to have extended time when he could not bring a complaint to the tribunal before.

      1385
      No one has been speaking against these Amendments. They have been generally acknowledged and if the debate were confined to that, the defence that I should have to put up would need to be very slender.
      But beyond that, in the wider context, we are discussing provisions introducing new remedies for unfair dismissal. We are not doing anything in respect of which we have to defend ourselves. I welcome this opportunity to make it clear to the country and the workers affected that there are here new rights and remedies which, if they were to listen to what hon. Members opposite are saying about them, they might wholly fail to observe or appreciate.
      I should like to deal first with the reinstatement or non-reinstatement point. I know that the hon. Member for Swansea, East (Mr. McBride) has taken a close interest in this because of his own experience and—if I may say so without doing him irreparable injury—from his own interest in the law as one of his side interests.
      The comparison between the two Bills in respect of reinstatement, without going through it at enormous length, can be put as follows. Under the last Government's Bill, it was open to a tribunal to order an employer to reinstate an employee, but under that Bill, as under any system of law so far in sight, the employer could disregard such an order. The Bill went on to provide for what happened if the employer did disregard it. Under Clause 52, the employee could go back to the tribunal for a larger cash award.
      In human relationships, one cannot ultimately compel someone to take someone else back into a job and the sanction against an employer at the end of the day must be a cash award. That was the provision in the last Government's Bill.
      Mr. Stanley Orme: Indeed, and that was the weakness of it. It is just the same as the weakness of this Bill. If there is a feeling of injustice, there is only one remedy—that is, workers taking or threatening to take industrial action to compel the employer to take back a worker or group of workers.
      The Solicitor-General: At least I am now clear that we have disposed of that argument. The hon. Member said that that was the weakness of the last Government's Bill and it is just the same as this Bill. That is my point. At the end of the day, an order for reinstatement or a recommendation for re-engagement can be disregarded by an employer and a cash award is all that this machinery can provide.
      Mr. Harold Walker: The hon. and learned Gentleman will understand that I have some personal feeling in this, since my name was on that Bill. He is saying that, in this respect, this Bill is no different from the previous Government's proposals. But the important difference is, that, unlike the present Bill, the former Bill did, as he said, provide for the tribunal to make an order compelling the employer to reinstate. If he had defied it, he would have suffered a financial penalty. There was a financial sanction. This is the normal sanction in law for any infringement of that law. There is not that sanction within the present Bill——
      The Solicitor-General: There is.
      Mr. Walker: Then I am waiting for him to tell me under what provision the employer suffers a heavier penalty for refusing to comply with any requirement to reinstate.
      The Solicitor-General: Under Clause 111(4). When an industrial tribunal has made a recommendation for re-engagement and it is not complied with, the tribunal may increase the cash award against the employer concerned. If anyone believes that an order for reinstatement, enforceable by a higher cash award if disregarded, is different in any respect from a recommendation for re-engage-men enforceable by a higher cash award if disregarded, I can only say that there is no difference in substance at all. The hon. Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme) is right on this point. He says that it is just the same——
      Mr. Rose: Will the hon. and learned Gentleman give way?
      The Solicitor-General: I am surrounded by a cloud of talent.
      Mr. Rose: Modestly, I accept the compliment. Is it not right that the difference is that in this case it is permissive, in that the wording is "may",

      1387
      whereas what we want is wording which will enforce a cash penalty when an employer fails to reinstate? There is a serious difference between the two.
      6.0 p.m.
      The Solicitor-General: I do not want to conduct a detailed analysis of these proceedings, but I am prepared, if necessary, to meet that point.
      The recommendation in the Labour Government's Bill for an increase in the cash award was still not mandatory. A scale was provided and reference could be made to it. The position, in practical terms, is exactly the same, as the hon. Member for Salford, West pointed out.
      Hon. Gentlemen opposite will have noticed in this Bill the specific reference to the question of reinstatement. One of the express functions conferred on conciliation officers, for which provision is here made, is directly to try to promote the re-engagement of an employee who has been subject to unfair dismissal——
      Mr. Harold Walker: I apologise to the hon. and learned Gentleman for the number of interruptions he is having to suffer. Does he recognise that there is a gulf between, on the one hand, the reinstatement provisions which appeared in the Labour Bill, and for which we are asking, and "re-engagement", which is the term he is using in this connection? "Re-engagement" means a new job. "Reinstatement" means going back to one's original job and continuing with it as if there had been no interruption. There is a great difference between the two.
      The Solicitor-General: I wondered when someone would get round to that. Again, the order for reinstatement provided for in Clause 38 of the Labour Bill allowed, in the alternative, for the reinstatement order to be made in a different position—[Interruption.]—and the order for re-engagement under this Bill requires the tribunal to determine——
      Mr. Walker rose—
      The Solicitor-General: The hon. Gentleman must contain himself and allow me to finish a sentence or two.
      1388
      If one has a provision which entitles the tribunal to order reinstatement, either in the original job or in such other job as seems reasonable, then it is re-engagement by any other name——
      Several Hon. Members rose—
      The Solicitor-General: I hope that hon. Gentlemen opposite will allow me to make this point.
      Mr. Walker rose—
      The Solicitor-General: I appreciate the hon. Gentleman's courtesy in wishing to interrupt me as little as possible, but I trust that he will listen for a moment to what I am saying.
      The order for re-engagement under this Measure, on such terms as the tribunal considers reasonable, includes the concept of reinstatement—[HON. MEMBERS: "No".]—so we are arguing about a non-point. The tribunal would in each case have to consider what sort of remedy it should secure, at best supported by a cash sanction in the event of default by the employer.
      You have been tolerant, Mr. Speaker, in allowing us to go this far in discussing a point which, by no stretch of the imagination, arises directly on this Amendment. Without discourtesy to the hon. Member for Doncaster (Mr. Harold Walker) and a number of hon. Gentlemen opposite who I know are particularly interested in this issue, I move on to the other topic we have been discussing.
      The hon. and learned Member for Leith was supported by the hon. Member for Salford, West in saying that these provisions were complex, and we were told that the Scottish translation of "complex" was "legalistic quagmire". It is worth bearing in mind that these provisions dealing with unfair dismissal are contained in 11 Clauses in this Bill compared with 24 Clauses in the Labour Measure, with the same structure of remedies, simply because we wish to reduce the complexity of the legalism implicit in the former presentation. One of the first things I said when I saw the precedents laid out in the earlier Measure was, "Gracious me. Need we have 24 Clauses to deal with this? Can we achieve a reduction?"
      There is a curious division on this issue among hon. Gentlemen opposite.

      1389
      The hon. Member for Salford, West and the hon. Member for Barrow-in-Furness (Mr. Booth) tend to reject the value of any pattern of tribunals or courts for determining the fairness or unfairness of a man's dismissal and believe that the only sort of sanction to which the worker should have resort is industrial action. I think I see the hon. Member for Sal-ford, West nodding his head in assent.
      Mr. Orme: No, though I am prepared to acknowledge that this is central to my argument. I do not say that it should be ruled out entirely. Perhaps there should be some sort of machinery which is independent of this Bill and of the State. In the main, however, I believe that this matter can be resolved only by trade unionism and by trade unionist support within the factory. To that extent, therefore, the hon. and learned Gentleman is correct.
      The Solicitor-General: So be it, but it is an approach which the House, almost in its entirety, rejects. [Interruption.] It is an approach which was rejected by the Labour Government and which the country rejects. One despairs of reducing the causes and quantity of industrial strife which takes place, to the disadvantage of the workers and the country, if one is to reject altogether the idea of setting up alternative machinery which can solve these matters without resort to industrial action.
      The hon. Member for Midlothian (Mr. Eadie) explained how difficult it was, without such a procedure, to secure a remedy for a man wrongly or unfairly dismissed. He was supported in particular by the hon. and learned Member for Leith in the circumstances of a case in which a criminal charge had been brought and in which a verdict of not proven was returned, or there was an acquittal, by a jury——
      Mr. Eadie: The hon. and learned Gentleman will appreciate that as well as a jury, it might be a sheriff.
      The Solicitor-General: By all means—the magistrate, sheriff, jury, tribunal, court; the criminal court. I do not wish to be drawn into an exposure of my comparative ignorance of the terms of art used north of the Border. I have great respect for the Scottish legal system and we owe many of our recent reforms
      1390
      to what goes on there. I leave it there because I do not want to follow the hon. Gentleman into the heart of Midlothian on this subject.
      With or without this machinery, it is difficult, as the hon. and learned Member for Leith knows from experience, to overcome this problem, and sometimes one would have to secure a situation in which one would attain reinstatement without compensation when negotiating as a trade union official. That is a possibility that the tribunal can recommend under this machinery, just as it could have done under the Labour Bill. In other words, it can do what it considers to be just to secure the redress of what was unfairly done to the worker.
      In the situation postulated by the hon. and learned Member for Leith, in which the worker has been triumphantly acquitted by the sheriff or jury, the hon. Member for Midlothian would no doubt seek to negotiate reinstatement with full back pay. Equally, the tribunal would no doubt seek to do it; and under this Measure, as under the Labour Bill, it is free to do so.
      The question is whether the power to extend the time within which a complaint may be brought would be sufficient, and the hon. and learned Member for Leith was right to raise this point. The wording relating to the power of the tribunal to extend the period for a complaint to be presented will be sufficient to deal with this.
      It may be—I would have thought that this would happen—that the dismissed worker would give notice to his employer saying "I am up before the sheriff court, but I am not guilty. If you have sacked me on the strength of that, I have been unfairly dismissed", and his claim would be left in abeyance, no doubt until the criminal proceedings had been brought to an end. That is the way we would want it to work and how it should work.
      I return to the remarks of the hon. Member for Barrow-in-Furness, in which there were three fundamental misconceptions. The Bill does nothing to prevent or restrain industrial action from being taken in support of a claim for the reinstatement of a dismissed worker, or by way of protest against his dismissal.
      There is nothing to erode the right which the hon. Member for Salford, West regards as at the heart of trade unionism,

      1391
      save in a respect to which the hon. Member for Walton referred. He said that it would not be open to workers to promote unofficial strike action by way of protest against an unfair dismissal if, by so doing, they were breaking a no-strike clause in an enforceable agreement.
      The hon. Gentleman went on to describe the right to take strike action in those circumstances as one of the basic rights of trade unionism. It is a sad, tragic and unnecessary picture. If a trade union has entered into an enforceable collective agreement providing for a proper grievance procedure in respect of a fair or unfair dismissal, which is no doubt what it would do, or if the State has provided this alternative machinery so that a worker who is being as he thinks unfairly dismissed can go to the tribunal and seek redress, it can no longer be claimed as a basic right of trade unionism to call unofficial strike action whether or not there is an agreement in existence to restrain it. To that extent certainly civilisation is intended to prevail, but not to the extent of destroying or removing anything resembling a basic right of trade unionism.
      Mr. Orme: May I enter a caveat here in regard to the industrial action? The Solicitor-General spoke as if we were welcoming it as the most marvellous thing. He must realise that workers will take action to defend someone who they think has been unfairly dismissed only if they see just cause for doing so. If a worker is properly dismissed, or if he does not think that he has been unfairly dismissed, the matter falls at that point. It is in the minority of cases in which workers feel that it is an anti-trade union activity or where a worker has been victimised for his industrial activity that workers take action. At that point there is no other way of redressing that grievance
      The Solicitor-General: The hon. Gentleman speaks sincerely about this. I acknowledge the significance of what he says. I appreciate that the most perfect system in the world, whether in terms of industrial relations or in any other sector, will never produce total justice in every case and will not satisfy every observer, particularly interested
      1392
      observers, that total justice has been arrived at.
      What I am saying is that the machinery here proposed is an alternative to which the workers and their representatives can go to appeal against a dismissal and which should much more often than not, produce an answer which will satisfy them and, in that case, produce a situation which is infinitely to be preferred to the resort to industrial action. I should have thought that that at least is common ground.
      Mr. Booth: The hon. and learned Gentleman's original contention went further than that he is now pressing. For a strike to take place, or even for the threat of a strike to be made which would enable discussions to take place before the man went out of the door, there would have to be a procedure agreement, enabling a strike to be called within the period of notice. In practice such procedure agreements do not exist in the vast majority of industries. Therefore, the alternative which is being offered is that of having the discussion at a court at a later date as opposed in practice, if there is strong feeling on the part of work mates, to having the discussion while the man is on the job. I contend that that is a vastly inferior alternative and not one greatly to be desired.
      The Solicitor-General: Almost every word that the hon. Gentleman utters is in support of our case. He says that procedure agreements do not exist for the discussion of such matters while the people remain at work. This is one of the deficiencies which we want to remedy. This is the point my right hon. Friend referred to in saying that he wished to encourage the evolution of procedure agreements designed to do that.
      The whole object of this set of provisions is not to impede negotiation on an allegation in respect of unfair dismissal. On the contrary, the requirement for notice to the employer within four weeks and concurrent notice to the conciliation officer is designed expressly to bring a conciliation officer in to get the parties talking even when there is no procedure agreement to try to promote a peaceful settlement. It does not impede negotiations.

      1393
      The hon. Gentleman's third point, that the worker who has been dismissed should be presumed guilty once he has been sacked, is the precise opposite of the presumption which we laboured throughout last night and the first part of today to write into the Bill. It is now plain that the worker who has been dismissed has to be shown to have been fairly dismissed by the employer, and not the other way round.
      6.15 p.m.
      I do not wish to take a great deal of time in answering this, because I have already spent more than a few minutes on it. The real heart of the criticism of the Government here is that this period is too short and that it is evolved as a result of no consultation. The hon. Member for Dearne Valley (Mr. Edwin Wainwright) almost flattered me by suggesting in the tone of his argument that four weeks was a figure which was dreamed up out of the back of my head and that it was my pitiful lack of experience across the board of industry that had led to this bizarre figure being advanced.
      That is absolute, if I may say so out of great respect to the hon. Gentleman, nonsense. The figure is one evolved from trying to be in line with comparable provisions in the Bill, it is longer than that contained in the last Government's Bill, and admittedly not founded on extensive consultation with the trade unions, to the regret of my right hon. Friend, as he has repeatedly said, but a perfectly reasonable period.
      Mr. Edwin Wainwright: Will the hon. and learned Gentleman get it into his mind that the Bill which was brought in by my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle) never faced the trade union movement in the Parliamentary Labour Party when we were in government? We should have argued as strongly against that part of that Bill as we are doing against this one, so the 15-day period would never have gone through.
      The Solicitor-General: I entirely accept that. I fully see that the Bill which was introduced, I think only days before the last General Election was announced, had not been subject to the scrutiny either within or outside the Houses of Parliament. The only interesting reflection I have on that is that if even that non-
      1394
      contentious Bill which was entirely acceptable to the Labour movement, as the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton said, was likely to provoke as many Amendments of that kind on representations by the hon. Member and his hon. Friends, how many Amendments in all would that modest, non-contentious Bill have provoked; and how far is it justifiable to criticise the present Government for our willingness to respond to representations and to introduce and support Amendments as we are now doing?
      Mr. Heffer: The hon. and learned Gentleman must not constantly assert that I said that the Bill was acceptable to the Labour movement, not in the context in which he is raising the question. I certainly said that the Bill was acceptable in the main to the Labour movement but that it would need to be revised and changed in the course of its progress through the House of Commons. That was the caveat I entered. The hon. and learned Gentleman must not put words into my mouth as though that Bill would have been in its entirety completely acceptable without amendment.
      The Solicitor-General: It is manifest from this discussion that it would not have been entirely acceptable. The only point I am seeking to make from that is that it ill lies in the mouths of hon. Members opposite to criticise us for having introduced this Bill when even their own Bill would, as they say, have been subject to many amendments.
      Mr. Harold Walker: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Is it in order for the hon. and learned Gentleman repeatedly to waste the time of the House by making references to a Bill which is not and which was not before the House? We are debating the Government's Bill and it is their Bill that they must be answerable for. We are not answerable for a Bill which is not under debate in the House.
      Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Robert Grant-Ferris): With the utmost good humour, may I say that it ill-becomes Opposition Members to raise points of order of that kind when the Chair has been fairly lenient with them. We shall come to a conclusion fairly soon now on this matter and I do not think that

      1395
      the hon. Gentleman should tax the Solicitor-General with being unfair.
      The Solicitor-General: Simply on the question of the length of the notice, the practical point is that, if a man has been dismissed and if the intention of all sides of the House is to secure a quick remedy for that, it is obviously in everybody's interests for the claim to be got to the bargaining table as quickly as possible. The idea of discussion should be promoted as soon as may be. That is the object of this. If the House recollects, under Clause 142 it is the function of the conciliation officer so soon as the matter is reported to him to try to promote re-engagement. The sooner that is done as a matter of ordinary course the better. That is the point that was made by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Waddington). He said that it was important to get the parties together quickly. The hon. Member for Midlothian said that they had to get together as quickly as possible. It will be recalled that the hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. Peter Archer) secured the introduction into Clause I of the words "expeditious and" before the words "orderly procedures". That is why we have a short period before notice is given, but capable of being renewed, and this is the substance of these Amendments.
      Mr. Ronald King Murray: The Solicitor-General mentioned Clause 1 which contains the word "re-engagement". May I take him back to what he said in answer to a previous point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Doncaster (Mr. Harold Walker) concerning "re-engagement" in comparison with "reinstatement"? The Solicitor-General referred to Clause 111(4)(b) in that connection. If one looks at that subsection, however, one finds that it says:
      "if the tribunal or Court finds that the reason for which the recommendation was not complied with was that the employer in question refused or failed to make such an offer …"
      That must be an offer of re-engagement.
      If "re-engagement" is to be taken in that context, it seems to me that the Solicitor-General's answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Doncaster will not do. There is a difference between re-
      1396
      engagement and reinstatement. A re-engagement can be for a considerable time after the original job has ceased—that is, after dismissal. The difference between that and reinstatement is quite obvious. An offer of reinstatement must be an offer of restitution at that date. Re-engagement cannot be raised to that level, so far as I can see. Compensation given under Clause 111(4)(b) can never reach the level of reinstatement.
      The Solicitor-General: I am slightly at a loss. A moment or two ago I was denounced by the hon. Member for Doncaster for discussing provisions in the last Government's Bill, and now the hon. Member for Edinburgh, Leith invites me to go back to it. There is a similar variable in the last Government's Bill. The amount of interim compensation which could have been awarded for that period was also in the discretion of the tribunal.
      I say one thing more. Several hon. Members have discussed the availability or non-availability of legal aid in this context. The hon. Member for Norwood (Mr. John Fraser) compared the existence of remedies in respect of wrongful dismissal, which will still be available, in the situation of the worker who is dismissed in breach of contract. But the machinery that we are seeking to set up and maintain for the resolution of these unfair dismissals is deliberately designed to discourage legalisation and legalism. We do not wish to give open-ended encouragement or make provision for the introduction of lawyers into this kind of machinery.
      There has been no evidence of any growing reluctance by workers to bring redundancy claims. It is for this reason that we have provided the alternative machinery of the conciliation officer, the same kind of person who intervenes in a case brought under the Race Relations Act. There is no direct legal access for the aggrieved party on these points. The worker who claims unfair dismissal has his case referred to the conciliation officer. If that does not work, he goes on to the tribunal. He may be represented by a trade union official. He can have the total resources of his union at his disposal. That will be one of the powerful arguments in favour of union membership rather than any semidetached relationship.

      1397
      In this kind of way the balance of the remedies which we have discussed at great length is, I suggest, entirely right. Certainly the Amendments that we are discussing have not been put up as candidates for dismissal by anyone on the other side of the House. They may not think the Amendments go as far as they
      would like, but no argument has been advanced as to why the House should reject them.
      Question put, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment:
      The House divided: Ayes 274, Noes 231.

      Division No. 455.]

      AYES

      [6.25 p.m.

      Adley, Robert

      Elliott, R. W. (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, N.)

      Kilfedder, James

      Alison, Michael (Barkston Ash)

      Emery, Peter

      King, Evelyn (Dorset, S.)

      Allason, Jame (Hemel Hempstead)

      Eyre, Reginald

      King, Tom (Bridgwater)

      Amery, Rt. Hn. Julian

      Farr, John

      Kinsey, J. R.

      Archer, Jeffrey (Louth)

      Fell, Anthony

      Kirk, Peter

      Astor, John

      Fenner, Mrs. Peggy

      Kitson, Timothy

      Atkins, Humphrey

      Fidler, Michael

      Knox, David

      Awdry, Daniel

      Finsberg, Geoffrey (Hampstead)

      Lambton, Antony

      Baker, Kenneth (St. Marylebone)

      Fisher, Nigel (Surbiton)

      Lane, David

      Baker, W. H. K. (Banff)

      Fookes, Miss Janet

      Langford-Holt, Sir John

      Balniel, Lord

      Fortescue, Tim

      Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry

      Barber, Rt. Hn. Anthony

      Foster, Sir John

      Le Marchant, Spencer

      Batsford, Brian

      Fowler, Norman

      Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)

      Beamish, Col. Sir Tufton

      Fox, Marcus

      Lloyd, Ian (P'tsm'th, Langstone)

      Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torquay)

      Fraser, Rt. Hn. Hugh (St'fford & Stone)

      Longden, Gilbert

      Benyon, W.

      Fry, Peter

      Loveridge, John

      Berry, Hn. Anthony

      Galbraith, Hn. T. G.

      Luce, R. N.

      Biffen, John

      Gardner, Edward

      McAdden, Sir Stephen

      Biggs-Davison, John

      Gibson-Watt, David

      MacArthur, Ian

      Blaker, Peter

      Gilmour, Ian (Norfolk, C.)

      McCrindle, R. A.

      Boardman, Tom (Leicester, S.W.)

      Gilmour, Sir John (Fife, E.)

      McLaren, Martin

      Body, Richard

      Glyn, Dr. Alan

      Maclean, Sir Fitzroy

      Boscawen, Robert

      Godber, Rt. Hn. J. B.

      McMaster, Stanley

      Bossom, Sir Clive

      Goodhart, Philip

      Macmillan, Maurice (Farnham)

      Bowden, Andrew

      Goodhew, Victor

      McNair-Wilson, Michael

      Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hn. John

      Gorst, John

      McNair-Wilson, Patrick (NewForest)

      Braine, Bernard

      Gower, Raymond

      Maddan, Martin

      Bray, Ronald

      Grant, Anthony (Harrow, C.)

      Madel, David

      Brewis, John

      Gray, Hamish

      Maginnis, John E.

      Brinton, Sir Tatton

      Green, Alan

      Marten, Neil

      Brocklebank-Fowler, Christopher

      Grieve, Percy

      Mather, Carol

      Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)

      Grimond, Rt. Hn. J.

      Maude, Angus

      Bruce-Gardyne, J.

      Grylls, Michael

      Mawby, Ray

      Bryan, Paul

      Gummer, Selwyn

      Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J.

      Buchanan-Smith, Alick (Angus, N & M)

      Gurden, Harold

      Meyer, Sir Anthony

      Buck, Antony

      Hall, Miss Joan (Keighley)

      Mills, Peter (Torrington)

      Bullus, Sir Eric

      Hall, John (Wycombe)

      Mitchell, Lt.-Col. C. (Aberdeenshire, W)

      Burden, F. A.

      Hall-Davis, A. G. F.

      Mitchell, David (Basingstoke)

      Butler, Adam (Bosworth)

      Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)

      Moate, Roger

      Carlisle, Mark

      Hannam, John (Exeter)

      Molyneaux, James

      Carr, Rt. Hn. Robert

      Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)

      Money, Ernie

      Channon, Paul

      Haselhurst, Alan

      Monks, Mrs. Connie

      Chapman, Sydney

      Havers, Michael

      Monro, Hector

      Chichester-Clark, R.

      Hawkins, Paul

      Montgomery, Fergus

      Churchill, W. S.

      Hayhoe, Barney

      More, Jasper

      Clark, William (Surrey, E.)

      Hicks, Robert

      Morgan-Giles, Rear-Adm.

      Clarke, Kenneth (Rushcliffe)

      Higgins, Terence L.

      Morrison, Charles (Devizes)

      Cockeram, Eric

      Hiley, Joseph

      Mudd, David

      Cooke, Robert

      Hill, John E. B. (Norfolk, S.)

      Murton, Oscar

      Coombs, Derek

      Hill, James (Southampton, Test)

      Neave, Airey

      Corfield, Rt. Hn. Frederick

      Holt, Miss Mary

      Noble, Rt. Hn. Michael

      Cormack, Patrick

      Hooson, Emlyn

      Normanton, Tom

      Costain, A. P.

      Hordern, Peter

      Nott, John

      Critchley, Julian

      Hornby, Richard

      Onslow, Cranley

      Crouch, David

      Hornsby-Smith, Rt. Hn. Dame Patricia

      Oppenheim, Mrs. Sally

      Curran, Charles

      Howe, Hn. Sir Geoffrey (Reigate)

      Orr, Capt. L. P. S.

      d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry

      Howell, David (Guildford)

      Osborn, John

      d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Maj.-Gen. James

      Howell, Ralph (Norfolk, N.)

      Owen, Idris (Stockport, N.)

      Dean, Paul

      Hunt, John

      Page, Graham (Crosby)

      Deedes, Rt. Hn. W. F.

      Hutchison, Michael Clark

      Page, John (Harrow, W.)

      Dixon, Piers

      Iremonger, T. L.

      Parkinson, Cecil (Enfield, W.)

      Dodds-Parker, Douglas

      James, David

      Peel, John

      Drayson, G. B.

      Jessel, Toby

      Percival, Ian

      du Cann, Rt. Hn. Edward

      Johnson Smith, G. (E. Grinstead)

      Pink, R. Bonner

      Dykes, Hugh

      Jopling, Michael

      Pounder, Rafton

      Eden, Sir John

      Kaberry, Sir Donald

      Powell, Rt. Hn. J. Enoch

      Edwards, Nicholas (Pembroke)

      Kellett-Bowman, Mrs. Elaine

      Proudfoot, Wilfred

      Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)

      Kershaw, Anthony

      Pym, Rt. Hn. Francis

      Quennell, Miss J. M.

      Soref, Harold

      Vaughan, Dr. Gerard

      Raison, Timothy

      Spence, John

      Vickers, Dame Joan

      Rawlinson, Rt. Hn. Sir Peter

      Sproat, Iain

      Waddington, David

      Redmond, Robert

      Stanbrook, Ivor

      Walder, David (Clitheroe)

      Reed, Laurance (Bolton, E.)

      Stewart-Smith, D. G. (Belper)

      Walker, Rt. Hn. Peter (Worcester)

      Rees-Davies, W. R.

      Stodart, Anthony (Edinburgh, W.)

      Walker-Smith, Rt. Hn. Sir Derek

      Renton, Rt. Hn. Sir David

      Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir M.

      Walters, Dennis

      Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon

      Stokes, John

      Ward, Dame Irene

      Ridley, Hn. Nicholas

      Stuttaford, Dr. Tom

      Weatherill, Bernard

      Ridsdale, Julian

      Sutcliffe, John

      Wells, John (Maidstone)

      Roberts, Wyn (Conway)

      Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)

      White, Roger (Gravesend)

      Rodgers, Sir John (Sevenoaks)

      Taylor, Edward M. (G'gow, Cathcart)

      Whitelaw, Rt. Hn. William

      Rossi, Hugh (Hornsey)

      Taylor, Frank (Moss Side)

      Wiggin, Jerry

      Rost, Peter

      Tebbit, Norman

      Wilkinson, John

      Russell, Sir Ronald

      Temple, John M.

      Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick

      St. John-Stevas, Norman

      Thatcher, Rt. Hn. Mrs. Margaret

      Wood, Rt. Hn. Richard

      Scott, Nicholas

      Thomas, John Stradling (Monmouth)

      Woodhouse, Hn. Christopher

      Scott-Hopkins, James

      Thomas, Rt. Hn. Peter (Hendon, S.)

      Woodnutt, Mark

      Sharples, Richard

      Thorpe, Rt. Hn. Jeremy

      Worsley, Marcus

      Shaw, Michael (Sc'b'gh & Whitby)

      Tilney, John

      Wylie, Rt. Hn. N. R.

      Shelton, William (Clapham)

      Trafford, Dr. Anthony

      Simeons, Charles

      Trew, Peter

      TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

      Sinclair, Sir George

      Tugendhat, Christopher

      Mr. Keith Speed and

      Skeet, T. H. H.

      Turton, Rt. Hn. Sir Robin

      Mr. Walter Clegg.

      Smith, Dudley (W'wick & L'mington)

      Van Straubezee, W. R.

      NOES

      Albu, Austen

      Duffy, A. E. P.

      Jones, Barry (Flint, E.)

      Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)

      Eadie, Alex

      Jones, Dan (Burnley)

      Allen, Scholefield

      Edelman, Maurice

      Jones, Rt. Hn. Sir Elwyn (W.Ham, S.)

      Archer, Peter (Rowley Regis)

      Edwards, Robert (Bilston)

      Jones, Gwynoro (Carmarthen)

      Ashley, Jack

      Edwards, William (Merioneth)

      Jones, T. Alec (Rhondda, W.)

      Ashton, Joe

      Ellis, Tom

      Kaufman, Gerald

      Atkinson, Norman

      English, Michael

      Kelly, Richard

      Bagier, Gordon A. T.

      Evans, Fred

      Kerr, Russell

      Barnett, Guy (Greenwich)

      Faulds, Andrew

      Kinnock, Neil

      Barnett, Joel

      Fernyhough, Rt. Hn. E.

      Lambie, David

      Beaney, Alan

      Fisher, Mrs. Doris (B'ham, Ladywood)

      Latham, Arthur

      Benn, Rt. Hn. Anthony Wedgwood

      Fitch, Alan (Wigan)

      Lawson, George

      Bennett, James (Glasgow, Bridgeton)

      Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)

      Leadbitter, Ted

      Bidwell, Sydney

      Foley, Maurice

      Lee, Rt. Hn. Frederick

      Bishop, E. S.

      Foot, Michael

      Leonard, Dick

      Blenkinsop, Arthur

      Ford, Ben

      Lever, Rt. Hn. Harold

      Boardman, H. (Leigh)

      Forrester, John

      Lewis, Arthur (W. Ham, N.)

      Booth, Albert

      Fraser, John (Norwood)

      Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)

      Bottomley, Rt. Hn. Arthur

      Freeson, Reginald

      Lipton, Marcus

      Boyden, James (Bishop Auckland)

      Galpern, Sir Myer

      Loughlin, Charles

      Bradley, Tom

      Garrett, W. E.

      Lyon, Alexander W. (York)

      Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, Provan)

      Gilbert, Dr. John

      Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.)

      Brown, Ronald (Shoreditch & F'bury)

      Ginsburg, David

      Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson

      Buchan, Norman

      Golding, John

      McBride, Neil

      Buchanan, Richard (G'gow, Sp'burn)

      Gordon Walker, Rt. Hn. P. C.

      McCartney, Hugh

      Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)

      Gourlay, Harry

      McGuire, Michael

      Grant, George (Morpeth)

      Mackenzie, Gregor

      Callaghan, Rt. Hn. James

      Grant, John D. (Islington, E.)

      Mackie, John

      Cant, R. B.

      Griffiths, Eddie (Brightside)

      Maclennan, Robert

      Carmichael, Neil

      Hamilton, James (Bothwell)

      McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.)

      Carter-Jones, Lewis (Eccles)

      Hamilton, William (Fife, W.)

      McNamara, J. Kevin

      Castle, Rt. Hn. Barbara

      Hamling, William

      Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield, E.)

      Clark, David (Colne Valley)

      Hannan, William (G'gow, Maryhill)

      Marks, Kenneth

      Cocks, Michael (Bristol, S.)

      Hardy, Peter

      Marquand, David

      Coleman, Donald

      Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)

      Marsden, F.

      Conlan, Bernard

      Hart, Rt. Hn. Judith

      Marshall, Dr. Edmund

      Corbet, Mrs. Freda

      Hattersley, Roy

      Mason, Rt. Hn. Roy

      Cox, Thomas (Wandsworth, C.)

      Healey, Rt. Hn. Denis

      Meacher, Michael

      Crawshaw, Richard

      Heffer, Eric S.

      Mellish, Rt. Hn. Robert

      Cunningham, G. (Islington, S.W.)

      Horam, John

      Mendelson, John

      Dalyell, Tam

      Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas

      Millan, Bruce

      Darling, Rt. Hn. George

      Howell, Denis (Small Heath)

      Miller, Dr. M. S.

      Davidson, Arthur

      Huckfield, Leslie

      Milne, Edward (Blyth)

      Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)

      Hughes, Mark (Durham)

      Mitchell, R. C. (S'hampton, Itchen)

      Davies, Ifor (Gower)

      Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen, N.)

      Molloy, William

      Davies, S. O. (Merthyr Tydvil)

      Hughes, Roy (Newport)

      Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)

      Davis, Clinton (Hackney, C.)

      Hunter, Adam

      Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)

      Davis, Terry (Bromsgrove)

      Irvine, Rt. Hn. Sir Arthur (Edge Hill)

      Morris, Rt. Hn. John (Aberavon)

      de Freitas, Rt. Hn. Sir Geoffrey

      Janner, Greville

      Moyle, Roland

      Delargy, H. J.

      Jay, Rt. Hn. Douglas

      Mulley, Rt. Hn. Frederick

      Dell, Rt. Hn. Edmund

      Jeger, Mrs. Lena (H'b'n & St. P'Cras, S.)

      Murray, Ronald King

      Dempsey, James

      Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)

      Ogden, Eric

      Doig, Peter

      Jenkins, Rt. Hn. Roy (Stechford)

      O'Halloran, Michael

      Douglas, Dick (Stirlingshire, E.)

      John, Brynmor

      O'Malley, Brian

      Douglas-Mann, Bruce

      Johnson, Carol (Lewisham, S.)

      Oram, Bert

      Driberg, Tom

      Johnson, Walter (Derby, S.)

      Orme, Stanley

      1400

      1401

      Oswald, Thomas

      Roper, John

      Tinn, James

      Owen, Dr. David (Plymouth, Sutton)

      Rose, Paul B.

      Tomney, Frank

      Paget, R. T.

      Sandelson, Neville

      Torney, Tom

      Palmer, Arthur

      Sheldon, Robert (Ashton-under-Lyne)

      Urwin, T. W.

      Pannell, Rt. Hn. Charles

      Shore, Rt. Hn. Peter (Stepney)

      Varley, Eric G.

      Parker, John (Dagenham)

      Short, Mrs. Renée (W'hampton, N.E.)

      Wainwright, Edwin

      Parry, Robert (Liverpool, Exchange)

      Silkin, Hn. S. C. (Dulwich)

      Walker, Harold (Doncaster)

      Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred

      Silverman, Julius

      Wallace, George

      Pendry, Tom

      Skinner, Dennis

      Watkins, David

      Pentland, Norman

      Small, William

      Weitzman, David

      Perry, Ernest G.

      Smith, John (Lanarkshire, N.)

      Wells, William (Walsall, N.)

      Prentice, Rt. Hn. Reg.

      Spearing, Nigel

      Whitehead, Phillip

      Prescott, John

      Spriggs, Leslie

      Willey, Rt. Hn. Frederick

      Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)

      Stallard, A. W.

      Williams, Alan (Swansea, W.)

      Probert, Arthur

      Stoddart, David (Swindon)

      Williams, Mrs. Shirley (Hitchin)

      Reed, D. (Sedgefield)

      Storehouse, Rt. Hn. John

      Wilson, Alexander (Hamilton)

      Rees, Merlyn (Leeds, S.)

      Strang, Gavin

      Wilson, William (Coventry, S.)

      Rhodes, Geoffrey

      Summerskill, Hn. Dr. Shirley

      Woof, Robert

      Richard, Ivor

      Taverne, Dick

      Roberts, Albert (Normanton)

      Thomas, Rt. Hn. George (Cardiff.W.)

      TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

      Roberts, Rt. Hn. Goronwy (Caernarvon)

      Thomas, Jeffrey (Abertillery)

      Mr. Joseph Harper and

      Robertson, John (Paisley)

      Thomson, Rt. Hn. G. (Dundee, E.)

      Mr. Ernest Armstrong.

      Rodgers, William (Stockton-on-Tees)

      Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

    Clause 31

      PRESSURE ON EMPLOYER TO INFRINGE RIGHTS OF WORKERS
      Lords Amendment:
      No. 61, in page 24, line 26, at end insert—
      "() knowingly to induce an employer to comply with a provision declared to be
      void
      by an order of the Industrial Court under section 6(1B) of this Act, or".
      Motion made, and Question put, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said
      Amendment—[Mr. Dudley Smith]:—
      The House divided: Ayes 268, Noes 228.

      Division No. 456.]

      AYES

      [6.37 p.m.

      Adley, Robert

      Chapman, Sydney

      Gardner, Edward

      Alison, Michael (Barkston Ash)

      Chichester-Clark, R.

      Gibson-Watt, David

      Allason, James (Hemel Hempstead)

      Churchill, W. S.

      Gilmour, Ian (Norfolk, C.)

      Amery, Rt. Hn. Julian

      Clark, William (Surrey, E.)

      Gilmour, Sir John (Fife, E.)

      Archer, Jeffrey (Louth)

      Clarke, Kenneth (Rushcliffe)

      Glyn, Dr. Alan

      Astor, John

      Clegg, Walter

      Goodhart, Philip

      Atkins, Humphrey

      Cockeram, Eric

      Goodhew, Victor

      Awdry, Daniel

      Cooke, Robert

      Gorst, John

      Baker, Kenneth (St. Marylebone)

      Coombs, Derek

      Gower, Raymond

      Baker, W. H. K. (Banff)

      Corfield, Rt. Hn. Frederick

      Grant, Anthony (Harrow, C.)

      Balniel, Lord

      Cormack, Patrick

      Gray, Hamish

      Barber, Rt. Hn. Anthony

      Critchley, Julian

      Green, Alan

      Batsford, Brian

      Crouch, David

      Grieve, Percy

      Bell, Ronald

      Curran, Charles

      Grimond, Rt. Hn. J.

      Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torquay)

      d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry

      Grylls, Michael

      Benyon, W.

      d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Maj.-Gen. James

      Gummer, Selwyn

      Berry, Hn. Anthony

      Dean, Paul

      Gurden, Harold

      Biffen, John

      Deedes, Rt. Hn. W. F.

      Hall, Miss Joan (Keighley)

      Biggs-Davison, John

      Dixon, Piers

      Hall, John (Wycombe)

      Blaker, Peter

      Dodds-Parker, Douglas

      Hall-Davis, A. G. F.

      Boardman, Tom (Leicester, S.W.)

      Drayson, G. B.

      Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)

      Body, Richard

      du Cann, Rt. Hn. Edward

      Hannam, John (Exeter)

      Boscawen, Robert

      Dykes, Hugh

      Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)

      Bossom, Sir Clive

      Eden, Sir John

      Haselhurst, Alan

      Bowden, Andrew

      Edwards, Nicholas (Pembroke)

      Havers, Michael

      Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hn. John

      Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)

      Hawkins, Paul

      Braine, Bernard

      Elliott, R. W. (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, N.)

      Hayhoe, Barney

      Bray, Ronald

      Emery, Peter

      Hicks, Robert

      Brewis, John

      Eyre, Reginald

      Higgins, Terence L.

      Brinton, Sir Tatton

      Farr, John

      Hiley, Joseph

      Brocklebank-Fowler, Christopher

      Fell, Anthony

      Hill, John E. B. (Norfolk, S.)

      Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)

      Fenner, Mrs. Peggy

      Hill, James (Southampton, Test)

      Bruce-Gardyne, J.

      Fidler, Michael

      Holt, Miss Mary

      Bryan, Paul

      Finsberg, Geoffrey (Hampstead)

      Hooson, Emlyn

      Buchanan-Smith, Alick (Angus, N & M)

      Fookes, Miss Janet

      Hordern, Peter

      Buck, Antony

      Fortescue, Tim

      Hornby, Richard

      Bullus, Sir Eric

      Foster, Sir John

      Homsby-Smith, Rt. Hn. Dame Patricia

      Burden, F. A.

      Fowler, Norman

      Howe, Hn. Sir Geoffrey (Reigate)

      Butler, Adam (Bosworth)

      Fox, Marcus

      Howell, David (Guildford)

      Carlisle, Mark

      Fraser, Rt. Hn. Hugh (St'fford & Stone)

      Howell, Ralph (Norfolk, N.)

      Carr, Rt. Hn. Robert

      Fry, Peter

      Hunt, John

      Channon, Paul

      Galbraith, Hn. T. G.

      Hutchison, Michael Clark

      Iremonger, T. L.

      Monro, Hector

      Sinclair, Sir George

      James, David

      Montgomery, Fergus

      Skeet, T. H. H.

      Jessel, Toby

      More, Jasper

      Smith, Dudley (W'wick & L'mington)

      Johnson Smith, G. (E. Grinstead)

      Morgan-Giles, Rear-Adm.

      Soref, Harold

      Jopling, Michael

      Morrison, Charles (Devizes)

      Spence, John

      Kaberry, Sir Donald

      Mudd, David

      Sproat, Iain

      Kellett-Bowman, Mrs. Elaine

      Murton, Oscar

      Stanbrook, Ivor

      Kershaw, Anthony

      Neave, Airey

      Stewart-Smith, Geoffrey (Belper)

      Kilfedder, James

      Noble, Rt. Hn. Michael

      Stodart, Anthony (Edinburgh, W.)

      King, Evelyn (Dorset, S.)

      Normanton, Tom

      Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir M.

      King, Tom (Bridgwater)

      Nott, John

      Stokes, John

      Kinsey, J. R.

      Onslow, Cranley

      Stuttaford, Dr. Tom

      Kirk, Peter

      Oppenheim, Mrs. Sally

      Sutcliffe, John

      Kitson, Timothy

      Orr, Capt. L. P. S.

      Taylor, Edward M. (G'gow, Cathcart)

      Knox, David

      Osborn, John

      Taylor, Frank (Moss Side)

      Lambton, Antony

      Owen, Idris (Stockport, N.)

      Tebbit, Norman

      Lane, David

      Page, Graham (Crosby)

      Temple, John M.

      Langford-Holt, Sir John

      Page, John (Harrow, W.)

      Thatcher, Rt. Hn. Mrs. Margaret

      LeggeBourke, Sir Harry

      Parkinson, Cecil (Enfield, W.)

      Thomas, John Stradling (Monmouth)

      Le Marchant, Spencer

      Peel, John

      Thomas, Rt. Hn. Peter (Hendon, S.)

      Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)

      Percival, Ian

      Tilney, John

      Lloyd, Ian (P'tsm'th, Langstone)

      Pink R. Bonner

      Trafford, Dr. Anthony

      Longden, Gilbert

      Pounder, Rafton

      Trew, Peter

      Loveridge, John

      Powell, Rt. Hn. J. Enoch

      Tugendhat, Christopher

      Turton, Rt. Hn. Sir Robin

      Luce, R. N.

      Proudfoot, Wilfred

      van Straubenzee, W. R.

      McAdden, Sir Stephen

      Pym, Rt. Hn. Francis

      Vaughan, Dr. Gerard

      MacArthur, Ian

      Quennell, Miss J. M.

      Vickers, Dame Joan

      McCrindle, R, A.

      Raison, Timothy

      Waddington, David

      Maclean, Sir Fitzroy

      Rawlinson, Rt. Hn. Sir Peter

      Walder, David (Clitheroe)

      McMaster, Stanley

      Redmond, Robert

      Walker, Rt. Hn. Peter (Worcester)

      Macmillan, Maurice (Farnham)

      Reed, Laurance (Bolton, E.)

      Walter-Smith, Rt. Hn. Sir Derek

      McNair-Wilon, Michael

      Rees-Davies, W. R.

      Walters, Dennis

      McNair-Wilson, Patrick (NewForest)

      Renton, Rt. Hn. Sir David

      Ward, Dame Irene

      Maddan, Martin

      Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon

      Wells, John (Maidstone)

      Madel, David

      Ridley, Hn. Nicholas

      White, Roger (Gravesend)

      Maginnis, John E.

      Ridsdale, Julian

      Whitelaw, Rt. Hn. William

      Marten, Neil

      Roberts, Wyn (Conway)

      Wiggin, Jerry

      Mather, Carol

      Rodgers, Sir John (Sevenoaks)

      Wilkinson, John

      Maude, Angus

      Rossi, Hugh (Hornsey)

      Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick

      Mawby, Ray

      Rost, Peter

      Wood, Rt. Hn. Richard

      Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J.

      Russell, Sir Ronald

      Woodhouse, Hn. Christopher

      Meyer, Sir Anthony

      St. John-Stevas, Norman

      Woodnutt, Mark

      Mills, Peter (Torrington)

      Scott, Nicholas

      Worsley, Marcus

      Mitchell, Lt. -Col. C. (Aberdeenshire, W)

      Scott-Hopkins, James

      Wylie, Rt. Hn. N. R.

      Mitchell, David (Basingstoke)

      Sharples, Richard

      Moate, Roger

      Shaw, Michael (Sc'b'gh & Whitby)

      TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

      Molyneaux, James

      Shelton, William (Clapham)

      Mr. Bernard Weatherill and

      Money, Ernie

      Simeons, Charles

      Mr. Keith Speed.

      Monks, Mrs. Connie

      NOES

      Albu, Austen

      Castle, Rt. Hn. Barbara

      English, Michael

      Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)

      Clark, David (Colne Valley)

      Evans, Fred

      Allen, Scholefield

      Cocks, Michael (Bristol, S.)

      Faulds, Andrew

      Archer, Peter (Rowley Regis)

      Coleman, Donald

      Fernyhough, Rt. Hn. E.

      Ashley, Jack

      Conlan, Bernard

      Fisher, Mrs. Doris (B'ham, Ladywood)

      Ashton, Joe

      Corbet, Mrs. Freda

      Fitch, Alan (Wigan)

      Atkinson, Norman

      Cox, Thomas (Wandsworth, C.)

      Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)

      Bagier, Gordon A. T.

      Crawshaw, Richard

      Foley, Maurice

      Barnett, Guy (Greenwich)

      Cunningham, G. (Islington, S.W.)

      Foot, Michael

      Barnett, Joel

      Dalyell, Tam

      Ford, Ben

      Beaney, Alan

      Darling, Rt. Hn. George

      Forrester, John

      Benn, Rt. Hn. Anthony Wedgwood

      Davidson, Arthur

      Fraser, John (Norwood)

      Bennett, James (Glasgow, Bridgeton)

      Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)

      Freeson, Reginald

      Bidwell, Sydney

      Davies, Ifor (Gower)

      Galpern, Sir Myer

      Bishop, E. S.

      Davies, S. O. (Merthyr Tydvil)

      Garrett, W. E.

      Blenkinsop, Arthur

      Davis, Clinton (Hackney, C.)

      Gilbert, Dr. John

      Boardman, H. (Leigh)

      Davis, Terry (Bromsgrove)

      Ginsburg, David

      Booth, Albert

      de Freitas, Rt. Hn. Sir Geoffrey

      Golding, John

      Bottomley, Rt. Hn. Arthur

      Delargy, H. J.

      Gordon Walker, Rt. Hn. P. C.

      Boyden, James (Bishop Auckland)

      Dell, Rt. Hn. Edmund

      Gourlay, Harry

      Bradley, Tom

      Dempsey, James

      Grant, George (Morpeth)

      Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, Provan)

      Doig, Peter

      Grant, John D. (Islington, E.)

      Brown, Ronald (Shoreditch & F'bury)

      Douglas, Dick (Stirlingshire,
      E.)

      Griffiths, Eddie (Brightside)

      Buchan, Norman

      Douglas-Mann, Bruce

      Hamilton, James (Bothwell)

      Buchanan, Richard (G'gow, Sp'burn)

      Driberg, Tom

      Hamilton, William (Fife, W.)

      Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)

      Duffy, A. E. P.

      Hamling, William

      Callaghan, Rt. Hn. James

      Eadie, Alex

      Hannan, William (G'gow, Maryhill)

      Campbell, I. (Dunbartonshire, W.)

      Edelman, Maurice

      Hardy, Peter

      Cant, R. B.

      Edwards, Robert (Bilston)

      Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)

      Carmichael, Neil

      Edwards, William (Merioneth)

      Hart, Rt. Hn. Judith

      Carter-Jones, Lewis (Eccles)

      Ellis, Tom

      Hattersley, Roy

      1404

      1405

      Healey, Rt. Hn, Denis

      McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.)

      Roberts, Albert (Normanton)

      Heffer, Eric S.

      McNamara, J. Kevin

      Roberts, Rt. Hn. Goronwy (Caernarvon)

      Horam, John

      Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield, E.)

      Robertson, John (Paisley)

      Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas

      Marks, Kenneth

      Rodgers, William (Stockton-on-Tees)

      Howell, Denis (Small Heath)

      Marquand, David

      Roper, John

      Huckfield, Leslie

      Marsden, F.

      Rose, Paul B.

      Hughes, Mark (Durham)

      Marshall, Dr. Edmund

      Sandelson, Neville

      Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen, N.)

      Mason, Rt. Hn. Roy

      Sheldon, Robert (Ashton-under-Lyne)

      Hughes, Roy (Newport)

      Mellish, Rt. Hn. Robert

      Shore, Rt. Hn. Peter (Stepney)

      Irvine, Rt. Hn. Sir Arthur (Edge Hill)

      Mendelson, John

      Short, Mrs. Renée (W'hampton, N.E.)

      Janner, Greville

      Millan, Bruce

      Silkin, Hn. S. C. (Dulwich)

      Jeger, Mrs. Lena (H'b'n & St. P'cras, S.)

      Miller, Dr. M. S.

      Silverman, Julius

      Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)

      Milne, Edward (Blyth)

      Skinner, Dennis

      Jenkins, Rt. Hn. Roy (Stechford)

      Mitchell, R. C. (S'hampton, Itchen)

      Small, William

      John, Brynmor

      Molloy, William

      Smith, John (Lanarkshire, N.)

      Johnson, Carol (Lewisham, S.)

      Morgan, Elystan (Cardiganshire)

      Spearing, Nigel

      Johnson, Walter (Derby, S.)

      Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)

      Spriggs, Leslie

      Jones, Barry (Flint, E.)

      Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)

      Stallard, A. W.

      Jones, Dan (Burnley)

      Morris, Rt. Hn. John (Aberavon)

      Stoddart, David (Swindon)

      Jones, Rt. Hn. Sir Elwyn (W.Ham, S.)

      Moyle, Roland

      Stonehouse, Rt. Hn. John

      Jones, Gwynoro (Carmarthen)

      Mulley, Rt. Hn. Frederick

      Strang, Gavin

      Jones, T. Alec (Rhondda, W.)

      Murray, Ronald King

      Taverne, Dick

      Kaufman, Gerald

      Ogden, Eric

      Thomas, Rt. Hn. George (Cardiff, W.)

      Kelley, Richard

      O'Halloran, Michael

      Thomas, Jeffrey (Abertillery)

      Kerr, Russell

      O'Malley, Brian

      Thomson, Rt. Hn. G. (Dundee, E.)

      Kinnock, Neil

      Oram, Bert

      Tinn, James

      Lambie, David

      Orme, Stanley

      Tomney, Frank

      Latham, Arthur

      Oswald, Thomas

      Torney, Tom

      Lawson, George

      Owen, Dr. David (Plymouth, Sutton)

      Urwin, T. W.

      Leadbitter, Ted

      Paget, R. T.

      Varley, Eric G.

      Lee, Rt. Hn. Frederick

      Palmer, Arthur

      Wainwright, Edwin

      Leonard, Dick

      Pannell, Rt. Hn. Charles

      Walker, Harold (Doncaster)

      Lever, Rt. Hn. Harold

      Parker, John (Dagenham)

      Wallace, George

      Watkins, David

      Lewis, Arthur (W. Ham, N.)

      Parry, Robert (Liverpool, Exchange)

      Weitzman, David

      Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)

      Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred

      Wells, William (Walsall, N.)

      Lipton, Marcus

      Pendry, Tom

      Whitehead, Phillip

      Loughlin, Charles

      Pentland, Norman

      Wiley, Rt. Hn. Frederick

      Lyon, Alexander W. (York)

      Perry, Ernest G.

      Williams, Alan (Swansea, W.)

      Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.)

      Prentice, Rt. Hn. Reg.

      Williams, Mrs. Shirley (Hitchin)

      Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson

      Prescott, John

      Wilson, Alexander (Hamilton)

      McBride, Neil

      Price, J. T, (Westhoughton)

      Wilson, William (Coventry, S.)

      McCartney, Hugh

      Probert, Arthur

      Woof, Robert

      McGuire, Michael

      Reed, D. (Sedgefield)

      Mackenzie, Gregor

      Rees, Merlyn (Leeds, S.)

      TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

      Mackie, John

      Rhodes, Geoffrey

      Mr. Joseph Harper and

      Maclennan, Robert

      Richard, Ivor

      Mr. Ernest Armstrong.

      Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

    Clause 32

      PRESUMPTIONS RELATING TO COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS
      Lords Amendment: No. 63, in page 25, line 19, leave out subsections (3) and (4).
      The Solicitor-General: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
      Mr. Deputy Speaker (Miss Harvie Anderson): I think that it would be for the convenience of the House to take Lords Amendments No. 63 to 66 inclusive, together with No. 132, 182, 241, 267, 268, 269, 271 and 277.
      Mrs. Castle: I think that there may be a slight misunderstanding, Mr. Deputy Speaker, I thought that the Government's grouping was No. 63 plus 66. You said, "No. 63 to 66", and we would not wish that.
      The Solicitor-General: Perhaps I might be allowed to say what I think is the convenient grouping, which is as follows: No. 63, No. 66, in Clause 34, page 27, line 10, leave out subsection (3).
      No. 181, in Clause 92, page 70, line 40, leave out from "agreement" to "but" in line 42.
      No. 182, in page 71, line 4, leave out from "agreement" to end of line 6.
      No. 241, in Clause 143, page 105, line 10, leave out from "agreement" to "excluding" in line 12.
      No. 267, after Clause 157, in page 114, line 42, at end insert new Clause L.
      No. 268, in Clause 158, page 115, leave out lines 13 and 14.
      No. 269, in page 115, line 19, leave out "this section" and insert
      "section (Meaning of "collective agreement" and "procedure agreement") of this Act".
      No. 275, in page 116, line 28, leave out "this section" and insert
      "section (Meaning of "collective agreement" and "procedure agreement") of this Act".
      and No. 277, in page 117, leave out lines 27 to 44. If the House is agreeable, that is the set of Amendments which I propose to discuss.
      Mr. Deputy Speaker: I think it would be for the convenience of the House to take that sequence of Amendments.
      The Solicitor-General: The Amendments are grouped because they deal with the same subject. Basically they arise from the point made in Committee in this House that having the definition of a collective agreement in Clause 32 was misleading or confusing, and that it should be located in a different part of the Bill with the other general definition provisions. The opportunity has been taken to draw together a number of other definition provisions in one convenient place, substantially in new Clause L, which is the subject of Lords Amendment No. 267.
      Lords Amendment No. 63 removes from Clause 32 subsections (3) and (4), which define a collective agreement and a party. Lords Amendment No. 66 removes subsection (3) of Clause 34, which says that a collective agreement for definition purposes includes an agreement rendered enforceable as a result of an order made under Clause 39. Lords Amendments Nos. 181 and 182 remove from Clause 92 similar references to a collective agreement made enforceable as a result of an order under Clause 39, Lords Amendment No. 241 does the same in Clause 143.
      Lords Amendment No. 267 is the substantive new Clause which draws together all these provisions in one convenient place. I will return to it shortly.
      Lords Amendment No. 268 removes the reference to a definition of a collective agreement from Clause 158, because it will now be separately set out in new Clause L. Lords Amendments Nos. 269 and 275 make further consequential changes to the definition Clause, and Lords Amendment No. 277 removes from Clause 158 the definition of a procedure agreement, which also goes into the new Clause L.
      Therefore, in substance we are discussing Amendment 267, new Clause L, where there now appear the provisions which take the place of the various provisions I have identified as being within the other Amendments in the group. I hope that that explanation of what is happening will be helpful to the House so that we know exactly what we are talking about.
      Subsection (1) of new Clause L—Lords Amendment No. 267—relocates the definition of a collective agreement from its earlier position in Clause 32(3). It is placed near to the main definition Clause—Clause 158—so that any misunderstanding about its general application or its intention in the context of the whole Bill is removed. It is no longer stitched alongside Clause 32(1) and (2).
      The new Clause also includes a definition of a procedure agreement, which was previously in the main definition Clause. One of the reasons for separating this definition of a collective agreement from Clause 32 is to remove any room for misunderstanding about the proposition that Clause 32, which is the Clause containing the presumption of legal enforceability, unless that is disclaimed by the parties, applies only to a written agreement entered into after the commencement of the Act. The effect of Clause 32—the presumption—is plainly operative only in relation to a written agreement entered into after the commencement of the Act. My hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Stamford (Mr. Kenneth Lewis) was another of those who suggested that having the two definitions together led to confusion. This is the main object of the exercise.
      I shall now explain a little more fully what each subsection of new Clause L contains. Subsection (1) repeats the definition of "collective agreement". It is done in such a way as to extend the definition of people who may be parties to it to include employers' associations as well as simply employers and also to include a mixture of employers and employers' associations. There is no great substance in that except that it is more convenient. Subsection (1)(b) defines the nature of a collective agreement. The kind of thing that it has to deal with is the same as what was formerly Clause 32(3)(b).
      Subsection (2) of the new Clause clarifies a possible doubt——
      Mr. Orme: I am sorry to interrupt the hon. and learned Gentleman. Can he tell the House whether the definition "one or more employers" in subsection (1)(a) is the result of representations from the Engineering Employers' Federation?
      The Solicitor-General: I would not like, although not because of any evasiveness, to give an affirmative answer to that. I cannot recollect any such representation. It is, I think, prompted more by general convenience that a collective agreement can come into existence as the result of agreements between groups of employers and groups of unions or an employers' federation and a group of unions or, sometimes, an employers' federation and separate employers working alongside it. This is merely to make it plain for definition purposes that any such coming together of people gives rise to a collective agreement. I emphasise, however, that such a coming together resulting in a collective agreement does not itself give rise to any presumption of legal enforceability. It is only in the context of Clause 32—a written agreement entered into after the commencement of the Act—that that presumption arises.
      Subsection (2) of new Clause L makes it plain that a decision of a joint body to which Clause 33 applies—we will be discussing that on a subsequent Amendment—is to be regarded, provided that it is made in writing and in the manner there set out, as a collective agreement, which might not have been clear on the previous formulation.
      Subsection (3) replaces the old Clause 34(3) to make it plain throughout the Bill that the phrase "collective agreement" also includes an agreement rendered enforceable by a Clause 39 order. That enables one to simplify the repetition of a reference to that in Clauses 92 and 143.
      Subsection (4) makes clear who are the parties to a collective agreement when the collective agreement is made by representative organisations. This was a point on which the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh, Leith (Mr. Ronald King Murray) made observations during the Committee stage of the Bill, when he suggested that the previous formulation said that the parties should
      1410
      include certain people. The new formulation is designed with that point amongst other points in mind.
      Subsection (5) repeats with only one small change the definition of "procedure agreement" previously contained in Clause 158. The small change, which I should mention in case it has escaped attention, is that paragraphs (e) and (f) separate a procedure agreement relating to dismissal from a procedure agreement relating to matters of discipline other than dismissal. The point is that some agreements relate only to dismissals and others relate to matters of discipline apart from dismissal. Each of those would normally be regarded as a procedure agreement, and they should not be joined under one heading as they were under the previous formulation.
      As a result of all these restructurings of the Bill—as I say, they are drawn together in one place—the essential provisions remain in line with the points of view expressed during the debates in this House, and certainly they have been drawn in line with those points of view. However, the presumption of legal enforceability established by Clause 32 applies only to collective agreements in writing entered into after the commencement of the Act.
      The implication of a best endeavours obligation relating to Clause 34(2) again applies only to a collective agreement made after the commencement of the Act. There are similar provisions in Clause 33, which we shall discuss on the next Amendment, which make it plain that the presumption there applies only to a decision given after the commencement of the Act and when it has been recorded in writing.
      Mr. Harold Walker: The Solicitor-General will, I think, agree that this may be an appropriate point for me to raise with him the question, which I have raised both in Committee and on Report and about which he was good enough to write to me, of the effect of the repeal of the 1871 Act on agreements entered into before the Bill becomes law and which may, in consequence be exposed to action in the courts.
      The hon. and learned Gentleman said in his letter to me that it was not the

      1411
      Government's intention that any agreement which was not already directly enforceable should become directly enforceable merely as a consequence of repeal of the 1871 Act. I can find nothing in the Bill, however, that would translate that position into law. Can the Solicitor-General tell me of anything in the Bill that could reassure my anxieties on this point?
      7.0 p.m.
      The Solicitor-General: I am grateful to the hon. Member for raising that point now because it certainly arises here. I know his anxiety about it. We have exchanged correspondence about it. The relevant Amendment is Amendment No. 197 and the point is this. Both sides of the House were concerned that the status of an agreement which was not directly enforceable because of the provisions of the 1871 Act before the coming into operation of the Bill should not be altered by the repeal of Section 4 of the 1871 Act and in particular that remedies beyond those available under the 1871 Act should not be available under this Bill. The 1871 Act—I have not the text of it in front of me—basically provided that such an agreement should not be directly enforceable. We are concerned not to change that.
      By Amendment No. 197 to Clause 101 we are making it plain that if proceedings are brought about such a collective agreement under Clause 97 then the only remedy which would be available in respect of it would be a declaration of rights. That is the same position as would have existed in relation to such an agreement had Section 4 of the 1871 Act not been repealed. I know the hon. Member has been concerned about this and we are grateful to him for having reminded us of it. I hope the House will feel that that discharges the agreement we made in respect of that.
      I do not think I should say more than that at this stage about what these Lords Amendments are about, but I commend them to the House as a simplification and clarification of the substance of the previous provisions.
      Mr. Rose: This group of Lords Amendments revolves around the central new Clause L to come after Clause 157. The hon. and learned Gentleman referred
      1412
      to this as a restructuring. It is a restructuring, but I see no improvement save for the fact that a number of strands have been brought together. It seems to me a curious commentary on the original drafting of the Bill that these pieces have had to be collected not in Committee or on Report in this House, when we might have expected this to have happened, but the guillotine was in operation, but in another place where there was no Guillotine. That illustrates the point which we on this side of the House have made of the necessity for full debate on these matters of importance.
      We now have a new and extensive and, indeed, comprehensive definition of collective agreement, although I remember at an earlier stage expressing the view very forcefully that basically a collective agreement is a changing and continuing relationship entirely ill-suited to precise legal interpretation and enforceability. Even in the United States the arbitrator rather than the judge is the important third-party decision maker under collective bargaining agreements.
      There is also here a distinction drawn between the procedure agreement and the collective agreement and it becomes necessary in our law now because of the importation into the law of the fictitious procedure agreement. It would not be necessary if we did not have imposed on us the concept of the fictitious procedure agreement.
      I think the hon. and learned Gentleman would acknowledge that if ever there were an area which is delicate and where the law is ill-suited to enter it is this field of procedure agreements as such; and legal enforceability in regard to procedure agreements is perhaps the most difficult of all, let alone enforceability where there has been no agreement, where "agreement" is forced upon an unwilling party. It is because of this that I strongly resent the inclusion once again in subsection (3) of the new Clause of the reference to the collective agreement, taking Clause 39 of the Bill which deals with fictitious procedure agreements.
      I should like to go back for a moment to subsection (2) of the new Clause because the Solicitor-General referred to joint bodies. There is here a problem which I know is exercising the minds of

      1413
      many trade unionists. The problem was raised with me at a trade union conference which I addressed very recently. It is the problem of the minute book recording the negotiations between the two sides in an industry where agreement is recorded in writing in the minute book but neither side has appended a signature to a contract, neither side has concluded a bargain in the sense of signing, sealing and delivering any document, but the proceedings are recorded in writing. Because they are recorded in writing in the minute book it would seem that under Clause 32 they are enforceable, although there is no signature to them. I know that this is a problem which has been raised on a number of occasions, not in this House but at trade union conferences.
      Mr. Kenneth Lewis: Somebody, clearly, has to sign the records, the minutes, and these minutes are accepted because of signature?
      Mr. Rose: The minutes are accepted as a true and proper account of what occurred; they are not necessarily accepted as a legally binding agreement. In other words, if the hon. Member entered into an agreement with me to vacate a seat for a by-election, he would have to sign. This is very different.
      Mr. Orme: My hon. Friend has probably been informed on this matter, but what happens on many occasions in industry is that at a meeting between management and workers somebody takes a record of the meeting and certain decisions are arrived at and then at a later date, because the management have the facilities, those minutes are circulated by the management to the trade unions, in addition to the employer keeping a copy. They are not asked for a signature. Unless any serious objection is taken the minutes are taken as a form of agreement, but if they were to have legal backing the trade unions would have to approach the matter from an entirely different point of view. That is the important issue.
      Mr. Rose: Indeed, my hon. Friend is absolutely right. I advised, and certain legal friends of mine have advised, a conference of A.S.T.M.S., my own union, that on every occasion it would be necessary to enter a caveat immediately in
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      writing that these minutes would not be enforceable. That would be a procedure on the taking down of the minutes.
      I want to get back to the point of the procedure agreement for a moment. There is an artificial distinction between the substantive side and the procedure side. One could be a quid pro quo for the other. One could be part of an agreement. For example, for certain improvements in wages and conditions—additional holidays, for instance—a union might agree to certain procedures. There seems to me that there could be a highly artificial distinction in many cases—not in all—in trying to disentangle the procedure from the substantive side, as this new Clause seeks to do by this definition of the procedure side of an agreement.
      In part, as the hon. and learned Gentleman said, the new Clause only reproduces an assortment of subsections sprinkled through the Bill, and in that sense one might welcome it as a tidying up operation. Indeed, it is the only sense in which I would welcome it. As Lord Drumalbyn admitted in another place—and I take his word for it—the words "collective agreement" appear 25 times in the Bill. I would add, 25 times too often.
      Lord Drumalbyn said:
      "… the definition is so central to the whole purpose of the Bill."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, House of Lords, 10th June, 1971; Vol 320, c. 448.]
      In other words, according to the noble Lord, the central purpose of the Bill is to stand Donovan on its head.
      We debated in full in Committee the question of the enforceability of collective agreements, and pointed out some of the dangers. We pointed out the problem, not necessarily of the minute book of the type I referred to earlier, but the ordinary minute book which could render an agreement into writing. We referred to the lack of a requirement for a proper form of agreement. All one needs is something in writing, and there is no form laid down in the Clause. There may well come about a great deal of litigation in the courts, although I believe every trade union in the land will now be telling its members that the first item in any set of negotiations will be over a

      1415
      proviso to prevent legal enforceability, because this amendment must be looked at in the light of Clause 32.
      In particular I am concerned—and this concern was expressed in another place—about the words "or arrangement" in line 3 of new Clause L. Does this mean that an arrangement becomes a legally binding agreement where it is part of an understanding which is ancillary to a written agreement that is made enforceable by Clause 32? If it does—and this is the danger—it means that pre-existing arrangements that were not intended to be legally enforceable could become so by reason of a subsequent agreement in writing which makes on specific reference to the custom but may lead to an implication—and the court may draw this inference—that that pre-existing custom is part of the collective agreement.
      It is bad enough to import legal enforceability into the complex and shifting pattern within a modern and constantly changing relationship in industry when these customs are set down in writing, but to enforce customs which are not tangible and not susceptible to precise description would only add confusion and ill feeling. I hope that the learned Solicitor-General will apply his mind to that point.
      There is a new form of wording to which the hon. and learned Gentleman made no reference, and that is
      "(in whatever way and in whatever form)"
      This differs from the original Bill. That again may well be interpreted by the courts to allow for enforceability other than the enforceability intended by the Clause; in other words, it is intended only to cover agreements rendered in writing after the coming into force of the Bill.
      First, we must deal with arrangements separately and, secondly, we must deal with
      "(in whatever way and in whatever form)"
      in such a manner as to show that anything that is not actually set down in writing by the parties and signed by them cannot form part of an agreement. It is interesting to note, looking at the Clause, that agreements of organisations of workers come within the definition. We have double standards here. Where the Government want to get the organisations of workers by their lapels and force them
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      into a collective agreement, they hold them close, but when the Government want to tear off the workers' protective clothing they do so at their whim. The unregistered trade unions, under the Bill, seem to have become the new whipping boy for the Government, who are the real culprits for the industrial decline and stagnation we have seen recently at Rolls-Royce and U.C.S.
      How will the courts enforce a decision against a loose conglomeration of people who form an organisation of workers who are not within the definition of a trade union because they are not registered? The Government are likely to be laying up a great store of trouble for themselves by dealing with organisations of workers in that way.
      7.15 p.m.
      Much of the difficulty here could be cleared up merely by defining the form in which any collective agreement must be made to render it enforceable. There is no difficulty about doing that. There seems to be an intention in the Clause to bring surreptitiously within the ambit of enforceability as much as possible. As a result of the Clause we now have a six-fold system of arrangements. We have, first, arrangements not in writing and not enforceable; secondly, agreements not in writing and not enforceable; thirdly, agreements in writing and expressly stated not to be enforceable; fourthly, agreements in writing presumed to be enforceable; fifthly, agreements in writing stated to be enforceable; sixthly, arrangements not in writing but linked to either my fourth or fifth point and therefore possibly enforceable, and that is the difficult one.
      That illustrates the tangle we are getting into, and the complexity will keep our minutes secretaries busy looking over their shoulders and reading their minutes into the late hours to make sure they have not fallen into the Solicitor-General's trap by getting themselves involved in an enforceable collective agreement.
      I return to the underlying theme on this side of the House by quoting what Professor Wellington said in his evidence to Donovan:
      "A collective agreement is one episode in a continuing joint history of a firm and a union. It is a temporary calm in a restless, shifting relationship. Accordingly, an attempt to compel the employer or the union during contract time peacefully to yield on a deeply felt issue, particularly if it believes it never

      1417
      consented to yield, often will not resolve that issue."
      This links up with what my hon. Friend said in the last debate when he recognised the essential vagueness so important to collective agreements which encompass numerous unforeseen circumstances and unforeseeable events because industry is constantly changing. No amount of complex definition such as the Solicitor-General has introduced in the Amendment will help him in the context of our national traditions and our history of free collective bargaining. All the evidence is, as was clear from Donovan, that a judge's training and a lawyer's training—and I include the hon. and learned Gentleman and myself in this—are likely to make us reject some of what should be closely considered when we deal with collective agreements, because in many respects the person involved in industry is better qualified to understand these matters. Compromise, and not judicial rulings that have to be finite, definite and on one side, is the essence of free collective bargaining. Surely this is where the hon. and learned Gentleman goes wrong.
      To obtain satisfactory enforceable agreements of the type covered in this definition would mean great changes in industry, and Donovan understood this. The Solicitor-General has dismissed all that Donovan had to say. He has put the cart before the horse, because Donovan recommended the consideration of enforceability only after the reform of collective bargaining. All the documents that were drawn up by the previous Government, whatever criticism the hon. and learned Gentleman may level at them, straightforwardly opposed legal enforceability.
      There is the added fact that the Solicitor-General knows only too well that today, with wage drift and plant bargaining, the substantive agreement represents often nothing more than the minimum which the worker expects in that industry. Therefore, it is the procedure agreement that will be the subject of litigation, and it is the procedure agreement that gives the employer the opportunity to take action. There will be very few actions on substance by employees in that climate of collective bargaining, even if they have been unwise enough to enter a collective agreement that is enforceable. But define the
      1418
      agreement as he may, legal enforceability, as Roy Lewis pointed out in an excellent article in the British Journal of Industrial Relations, will be unlikely to deter unofficial or unconstitutional strikes.
      The Solicitor-General is misleading himself, the House and the public if he thinks this Clause will cut down the number of strikes. These problems
      "require the exercise of discretion and judgment based on practical experience, rather than the exclusive application of strict legal principles".
      Those words are taken from a document which the hon. and learned Gentleman well knows—"Fair Deal at Work". I fear that in introducing this new Clause and the consequential Amendment the Solicitor-General has failed to show that discretion and judgment. All he has displayed is the fact that, despite the long passage of this Bill through this House and through another place, the Government's judgment and discretion are just as lacking as they ever were.
      Mr. Ronald King Murray: I wish to echo two themes which were mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Blackley (Mr. Rose) in discussing this group of Amendments. The first concerns the meaning of "collective agreement". Various subsections which reappear in this arrangement of provisions have been re-engaged rather than reinstated, and I believe the results are not satisfactory. They have been moved round and although some improvement has been made—I do not want to be under-generous—there are two quite serious flaws which remain.
      This matter is connected with the point made by my hon. Friend about collective agreements. On the face of it many of the difficulties with this definition Clause are connected with the fact that the distinction between a registered trade union and an organisation of workers is drawn when it suits the Government to the disadvantage of organisations of workers; and, again when it suits the Government, it is drawn to the advantage of the employers. The result is that organisations of workers, who remain outlaws in the Bill for most purposes, are brought into the Bill for purposes of enforcement under the new Clause.
      The hon. and learned Gentleman the Solicitor-General yesterday ventured to

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      say that the Bill followed Donovan on registration of trade unions. That is less than fair to Donovan. He will see from paragraph 792 of the Donovan Report the following statement
      "We think, therefore that all trade unions should as from some convenient future date receive corporate status and be registered."
      The difference between that approach and the present Bill is the difference between chalk and cheese. What Donovan recommended was that trade unions for the first time should have conferred on them the full status of legal corporate bodies. They have been outlaws—pariahs—throughout industrial legislation in this country up to the present. This Bill does not propose to enfranchise them, as Donovan was proposing to do.
      It is worth noting that the fundamental point in that key sentence in Donovan is the conferring of corporate status. If a new freedom and liberty is to be conferred on these bodies, it is only fair that restrictions of law should follow. The Donovan restriction was that they should be registered so that it is known where they are and so that the corporate status can be given full effect.
      In this context registration is a different thing from registration under the Bill. Registration under the Bill is a special privilege conferred on trade unions which are prepared to eat humble pie and accept what is offered to them in the Bill.
      What worries me is that collective agreements still stand as something to be enforced against organisations of workers, although organisations of workers are not to get the corresponding franchise which registered trade unions will obtain under the Bill.
      I foresee that great trouble will arise from these provisions. It is questionable whether this Bill—this monstrous jumbo, indeed jumble, of a Bill—can ever be made to work. The more we discuss it the more questionable it becomes. I believe the provisions in the new Clause will become matters for heated controversy and much difficulty will be experienced in interpretation of a collective agreement.
      I should like to take another point on the new Clause. One sees in subsection (1)(a) of new Clause L a slight change from the original form of the provisions.
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      The original form in Clause 32(3) started by saying:
      "In this Act ' collective agreement ' means any agreement or arrangement (whether written or oral) …"
      and then the provision proceeds to define the characteristics to be given. However, in paragraph (a) of the new Clause there is the following definition of a collective agreement:
      "an agreement or arrangement made (in whatever and in whatever form) …".
      That is fantastic wording when one thinks of the physical reality to which it is supposed to apply.
      The House will recall that there was some criticism on both sides of the House when we originally discussed Clause 32, but there is a vagueness in the wording of the new Clause which is even more open to objection. The words:
      "an agreement or arrangement made (in whatever way and in whatever form) …".
      must be applied to the realities of shop floor experience. It is as plain as a pikestaff that often in the heat of a workshop a nod may be as good as a wink. A controversy exists, there is a great deal of discussion, and the people concerned get to the end of words and find they are getting nowhere. And then suddenly they agree on something that works. How on earth is one to prove such an agreement? Where does one start? Where is one to get the consensus which exists at the moment of crisis in the workshop? How is one to reproduce that afterwards when the heat has passed? The Clause is less workable than was the original provision. It seems to me clear that in this provision the contact between law and industrial reality is lacking.
      My hon. Friend the Member for Blackley stressed the fact that it is a mockery to talk about a procedure agreement when by the provisions of Clause 39 a procedure can be imposed against the will of those concerned. Surely the Government should have taken the opportunity to rectify that situation by deleting the word "agreement" altogether. An imposed procedure is a totally different thing from a procedure agreement. I am sure that industry would regard them quite differently. A procedure agreement is obviously a much more desirable entity. There has been a consensus, which is understandable, and both sides of industry should be held to

      1421
      it. In addition to the fact that there has been some kind of agreement, there is a moral sanction. But the moral sanction is often more powerful in the industrial sphere. Why get rid of that by reducing them both to the same level and by saying that a procedure agreement is to be regarded as the same kind of thing as an imposed procedure? Plainly, that is not true. What the Government are doing in putting them on the same level is levelling down on the worst possible consensus. They will find that they have poisoned the sort of atmosphere in which a procedure agreement might have a chance of viability today.
      For this reason, amongst others, this new Clause is a lost opportunity. The Government have had the opportunity of rectifying a great many evils and—I do not want to be ungenerous—they have rectified some defects, but they have lost the opportunity to transform this part of the Bill and recognise the true realities of the industrial workshop instead of stressing the legality.
      7.30 p.m.
      Mr. Roland Moyle: When I intervened in a debate last week, I drew attention to the fact that the Amendment we were then discussing was a more complex portion of the Bill than it had been when it left this House. I can make the same point exactly on this Amendment. The hon. and learned Gentleman said that subsection (1) of new Clause L was a retransposition of the original definition which had gone to the House of Lords, but he used a euphemism and said that the definition had been extended. Indeed, that is so. Another word he might have used was that the definition of the parties to a collective agreement had been rendered more complicated than when the provision left us. Now it has come back to us, we find that there are new types of people who can be parties to a collective agreement; there are new definitions of them.
      It is not a great increase in complexity, but once again the Government, faced with the problem of applying the instrument of law to what one might term either rich or appalling complexities in our industrial life—depending on one's point of view at a particular time—have solved it by extending the complexity of
      1422
      the definitions which they have worked into the Bill. This has happened over and over again throughout the Bill. As a problem has been met, instead of trying to solve it by process of simplification, it has been solved on the basis of increasing complexity and has rendered the Bill less and less useful to industrial personnel on both sides who will have to try and apply it in practice.
      An altercation took place between my hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Blackley (Mr. Rose) and my hon. Friend the Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme) about the question of the legal enforceability of minutes. This is a practical point. As someone who has been involved in this process, a practical question occurred to me. Supposing the parties to a collective agreement had had sufficient forethought to exclude their minutes from legal enforceability, as I think they would inevitably wish to do, for some reason peculiar to their trade or industry, but wanted to have the agreement itself enforced. It is well known that, if one has a dispute about the actual content of the agreement, perhaps it will not go as far as the industrial tribunal but the parties to the agreement around the table may wish to settle the dispute, and one of the documents they may take in evidence, in order to try to clear up what the collective agreement might mean, is the minutes of the joint negotiating body which had reached the agreement. Supposing there is a reference in the enforceable agreement to the non-legally enforceable minutes, for example, as a source by which obscurities in the legally enforceable agreement might be cleared up. Does that render the minutes legally enforceable—a situation which the parties to the joint negotiations deliberately wished to avoid?
      I am trying to look at this new Clause as someone trying to apply it. So far I have two strong objections to it—on the grounds that it is totally obscure and that it is an opaque document when it comes to helping people like myself in doing their job in industry. The matter can be taken further. Having referred to subsection (1) of new Clause L, one turns to subsection (5). First of all, there is an attempt to define there what a procedure agreement may mean from the point of view of legal enforceability. Here

      1423
      it becomes particularly difficult and complicated because, to start with, the subsection refers to
      "… machinery for consultation with regard to … settlement by negotiation …"
      This is indeed a very obscure phrase.
      As I have always understood it, in industrial relations consultation means a situation where the management may invite the trade union into the room, listen to what it has to say, and then the decision in that process still rests with the management. I may be wrong on this, but I have been unable to find a definition of the term "consultation" in the Bill. On the other hand, settlement by negotiation is a totally different process. The union and the management meet. They argue and the decision which emerges, if a decision does emerge—and it does most of the time—is a joint decision, and both sides are responsible for applying it. Given that, what I would like to know is how one can have machinery for consultation with regard to settlement by negotiation.
      It seems to me that these two technical phrases—at least they have a technical meaning to people who try to apply industrial relations matters in practice—only confuse the issue in the absence of some authoritative definition as to what the Bill will actually mean. This point, I suppose, I could have picked up when the Bill was in this House previously. In fact, the more one reads the Bill the more complex seem to be the issues raised, and one is forever coming across new aspects which were not recognised earlier. From that point of view, therefore, I feel that no apology is needed.
      The next point arising from subsection (5) is that whereas it attempts to define what a procedure agreement may mean, and whereas Clause 142 does give the Minister power to appoint conciliation officers, there is no reference in subsection (5) to the settlement of terms and conditions of employment by a process of conciliation. I wonder whether the Government intentionally mean to exclude the settlement of terms and conditions of service reached by a process of conciliation from the Bill, or whether this is an oversight on their part.
      I recall one negotiating body to which I was attached. It was the normal pro-
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      cedure for an officer of the Department to be present at every joint negotiating meeting. I take it that his main purpose was, if difficulties did arise, to refer the matter back to the Department. I have no doubt that, if a dispute had arisen where he felt he had the resources to conciliate and reach a settlement at the negotiating table by a process of conciliation, he would have done so. Supposing this sort of situation arose, would the right hon. Gentleman then assume that, because the agreement had been reached by a process of conciliation and not by a settlement by negotiation or arbitration, it was automatically excluded from the procedure agreement which it is the attempt of this part of the Bill to define? As I have pointed out, the Bill is not defining what a procedure agreement is but is throwing up an even greater number of questions as to what a procedure agreement is.
      There is an addition here. Subsection (5)(d) of new Clause L says that
      "facilities for officials of trade unions or other organisations of workers"
      are indeed matters for a procedure agreement. I take it that any agreement between the employers and the trade unions to have a member of the right hon. Gentleman's Department present, although it might tend to be a crucial factor in any settlement which might be reached at some future stage, would not be regarded as a procedure agreement.
      Another point arises on paragraph (g):
      "procedures relating to grievances of individual workers"
      I have had experience of collective agreements involving works councils, district joint industrial councils and a national joint industrial council. Under that procedure, there is the question of negotiating terms and conditions of service for the whole of the industry concerned, particularly manual workers, as they used to be called. I think that "operatives" is the usual term nowadays. In that situation there is a process by which an individual worker who has a grievance can appeal to his works council. If that does not produce satisfaction, he can appeal to the district joint industrial council. Finally, if that does not produce satisfaction, he can appeal to the national joint industrial council. I presume that that could be a procedure agreement which could be legally enforceable under subsection (5).

      1425
      What can also be found in industry is a situation where small groups of workers wish to appeal against a grievance. They do not wish to renegotiate any of the national or local agreements; they wish to ensure that the national or district agreement is correctly applied to them. They appeal through the same procedure that an individual worker might use if he had an individual grievance.
      Suppose it is a group grievance not of sufficient status to warrant being a national matter. Will this be a procedure agreement under subsection (5) of new Clause L? It is not clear. I assume that the Government have intentionally omitted to deal with the group procedure. If not, I hope that I have done them some service in drawing attention to the omission.
      Indeed, this point particularly arose in one industry with which I was connected when an entirely new form of agreement was negotiated and was being applied. At that time it was thought that, because it was a new form of agreement and misunderstandings might arise, a special procedure should be introduced for grievance appeals by small groups of employees against the national agreement so that it might be correctly applied to them in case the personnel staff concerned were misunderstanding it and were wrongly applying that procedure to individual groups of workers.
      The procedure was quite simple. It was that groups of workers were allowed to appeal directly from their works, offices or production stations, or whatever it might be, straight to the national joint industrial council. This was a specific procedure to deal with the grievances of individual groups of workers.
      I cannot see how subsection (5) will define whether that is a procedure agreement or not. I assume that if the right hon. Gentleman had had notice of this kind of agreement he would have said that it should be a procedure agreement. However, I suppose that as he has not had notice of it, it is unlikely to be caught by the definition in subsection (5), and therefore there will be a loophole which I hope can be used to the advantage of trade unions and organisations representing workers. It may just compound the confusion to which this subsection is already leading.
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      It is interesting to see that subsection (5) of new Clause L has been deliberately drafted in considerable detail with a view to avoiding legal confusion on many of these matters. However, I believe that anybody attempting to administer the provisions in the subsection in the circumstances of British industry, by virtue of the complexity with which it has been drafted, will be led ever deeper into the mire until the point where few trade unionists or personnel managers will be confident that they can apply it to industrial relations in their own industries.
      I should like answers to the many questions which I have asked. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman has those answers.
      7.45 p.m.
      Mr. Sydney Bidwell: In an earlier debate the Solicitor-General treated up to an intellectual exercise showing how trade unions and workpeople can be given exact equations at law. It was as if he were standing or leaning two playing cards against each other and suggesting that they could ever have equal weight. It is precisely that thinking which leads us into a situation where we now discuss the burden of enforceable contract law applying to collective agreements.
      My hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Blackley (Mr. Rose) put his finger on the crucial spot of industrial relations in this matter when he more or less pointed out that, under the concept of collective agreements between work people and trade unions and employers, the thing is in constant motion. The only constant factor in such a relationship is that of change. That is a matter which the law cannot possibly embrace, because the law is not a constant factor of change.
      I cannot help feeling, Mr. Speaker, that the proceedings of this House are made workable, possible and practicable, not as a result of the rulebook, but largely as a result of convention, of continuous trial and error and, of course, of the skill and experience of yourself in our proceedings.
      So it is with the realities of industrial relations. That is why we on this side of the House, with our experience and background in industry, whether in a particular trade union or over the whole of the trade union front, or whether, as in my

      1427
      case, in trade union education work for many years before coming here, having listened to workers' explanations at summer school and within the whole complex of the trade union educational system, have had borne in upon us the tremendous variety of relationships which exist between workpeople and employers in the great complexity of British industry.
      When we look at this attempt to draw together the concept of enforceable contract in new Clause L, I cannot help thinking that the reason that we have a relatively co-operative situation—not by any means a perfect situation—within our industry and economy is that at least we have not got the strike records and the turmoil which many other countries have. We have too many strikes in the sense that we do not want them. We want justice to be achieved without resorting to strikes. The co-operation which exists in industry results from the workers having a feeling of freedom within the existing system. If at the beginning, we had applied the concept of contract law to agreements, and had allowed it to have its run and then, over the years, progressed from it, that would have been all right, but instead of that we are walking backwards to Christmas.
      Very often when an agreement is made between trade unions and employers there is provision for a certain amount of freedom of action by both sides. On many occasions trade union representatives come to an agreement with employers and then find that in practice the agreement is unacceptable to the workers on whose behalf it has been made. The trade union negotiators have misread the situation but, because of the terms of the agreement, it is possible to countermand what has been agreed with the employers. If a contract is enforceable at law, trade union representatives will have to be doubly cautious. They may even not come to any agreement at all. That is what the Solicitor-General, with his excess of legality is missing, and he will find that if he tries to enforce this provision he will come unstuck.
      It is all a question of flexibility. I remember my experience as a railway worker. I was a departmental committee worker, a local shop steward. I was a shunter, doing a dirty and dangerous job.
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      At our meetings we always spoke about the spirit of an agreement. One cannot refer to the spirit of an agreement when there is enforceability at law. What matters is not the words on the lines of an agreement, but what is between the lines.
      We are not proposing that a trade union representative has to hold a ballot among his fellow workers before accepting any and every part of an agreement. That would be totally unworkable, but one wonders whether a trade union representative will ever come to a decision in the future, bearing in mind this threat of enforceability at law. He has not been brought up in that tradition, and that factor should weigh heavily with the Solicitor-General when he considers these matters.
      Time and again the Solicitor-General has referred to the Donovan Commission which laboured for so long with so much expertise and in the end gave us a brilliant presentation of the views at which its experts had arrived. In the trade union movement we had our different opinions about the extent to which we should permit the incursion of the State into trade union matters. We saw that when my right hon. Friend presented her Bill to deal with industrial relations. There was a discussion about how much of the Donovan Commission's Report would apply in the event of a Labour Government continuing in office. One thing that is certain is that we should never have ended up with the concept of enforceable contracts.
      Mr. Orme: The legal analysis of my hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Blackley (Mr. Rose), reinforced by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Edinburgh, Leith (Mr. Ronald King Murray), is an indication of the pitfalls that await us if we make collective agreements legally enforceable.
      I want to consider the problem from a practical point of view. In the engineering industry, when a national agreement is arrived at between the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions and the Engineering Employers Federation it is drawn up with a great deal of precision. It is probably one of the most precise agreements in the trade union world.
      The agreement having been drawn up, the two sides meet to define the notes

      1429
      for guidance. It must be remembered that an engineering agreement affects about 3¼ million workers. These notes for guidance are often of pamphlet size. They are circulated to all Engineering Employers Federation establishments and to the trade unions concerned. The trade unions then send copies of those notes to shop stewards throughout the engineering industry, and they become the bible for the current agreements.
      The agreement may last for three years, and the notes may deal with overtime, piece-work earnings, hours of work, holidays and so on, but by the very nature of things they are somewhat imprecise. Everyone knows that it is not possible to draw up even legal agreements with absolute precision. We all know of agreements being interpreted differently by different courts. A judge in one court puts a certain interpretation on a document. A judge in a higher court may take a different view. Although judges are authorities on the law, all too often differences of opinion and emphasis arise between them.
      When a trade union agreement is circulated to industry as a whole, one finds a different emphasis being put on different aspects of the agreement, depending on the area in which it is being considered. This is because of the historical background of the industry in an area. Because a certain skill predominates in, say, the Manchester area, the agreement is interpreted slightly differently there from the way in which it is interpreted in the Midlands, in London or in Nottingham.
      Because there are differences of opinion on the notes for guidance, negotiations take place between district committees and local employers' associations, and between shop stewards and employers at a plant or factory. This is the very meat of industrial relations and the day-to-day work of collective bargaining. Because an agreement has been arrived at nationally, it does not mean that every employer and employee will interpret it in the same way locally.
      8.0 p.m.
      I have taken part in negotiations about agreements. I have experienced disputes arising about agreements. They go from the factory to the local level, and then through a tortuous procedure to a conference under the York Agreement provi-
      1430
      sions, and possibly even there no agreement is possible. The matter is then referred back to the district or plant for some form of settlement. That does not happen because the people say, obdurately, "We are not going to have an agreement". It does not mean that either the employer or the union is saying that there is not going to be an agreement; it is simply a case of there being a different form of approach and a different analysis.
      That is a part of industrial relations and collective bargaining, and the human relations to which the Solicitor-General referred earlier. All that I say is that on top of the complicated procedure of the national agreement—and at the moment I am not talking about anything else—we are imposing all the business of legal enforceability, and making these agreements subject to the law, as if there is not enough trouble in collective bargaining and industrial relations at the moment!
      Mr. Kenneth Lewis: The Bill does not alter that position one iota, since if an agreement is made it is either accepted as legally enforceable or, if it is written in that it is not legally enforceable, it is not. In any event, the interpretation of any agreement is a matter for management and unions, at national or local level, to decide whether, in a given situation, a certain interpretation is acceptable. If it is acceptable to both unions and employers, whether at national or local level, a request is made to the workpeople on the shop floor that they should accept it. If they accept it, that is fine; if they go on strike, it is an unofficial strike.
      Mr. Orme: The hon. Member has missed the point. All right—unions can agree not to make agreements legally enforceable. But let us not have any illusions about this matter; the intention of the Bill is to bring into operation legally enforceable agreements, and the employers will bring pressure to bear upon the unions to accept such agreements. At the end of the day, in certain circumstances an agreement can be made legally enforceable unless the unions and employers specifically agree that it should not.
      Pressure will be imposed upon industrial relations. I was showing how the procedure operates in the engineering

      1431
      industry at the moment, and what problems will arise if agreements become legally enforceable. I was asking how on earth we would overcome all the negotiating difficulties and similar problems that would arise.
      In suggesting this procedure the Government fail to understand the realities of industrial life, and of negotiations and collective bargaining. Their whole effort is to switch power from the workers and trade unions to the employers. All this carefully prepared legal paraphernalia has one purpose—to restrict the activities and power of the trade unions.
      I now turn to the question of what happens locally in industry. I want to refer to the strange wording already mentioned by my hon. Friend in subsection (1)(a), which provides that
      "an agreement or arrangement made (in whatever way and in whatever form)"
      may be the basis of a legally enforceable agreement. The day-to-day working of industry is not like the working of the House of Commons in its committees—including the rarefied air of Standing Committees—backed by all the civil servants and Clerks of the House, with the careful drawing up of Amendments and agreements. Even in the most advanced sections of industry, life at factory level is much more "hit-and-miss" than that.
      I have worked in factories which have been 100 per cent. organised, where the management was anxious to obtain agreements with the workers and where, when agreements were arrived at, workers and management had respect for each other. The agreement was written out on a piece of paper, and there was no looking over one's shoulders to see whether it was legally correct, or whether some lawyer in the future would contest this phrase or that word. The two sides reached an agreement and got on with its implementation.
      What some people fail to understand is that in industry agreements take months or even years to achieve. Over a long period a shop steward may have wished to reach some form of agreement with the management which will radically change the working operations in his factory. It may change the whole piecework system, or the method of computing wages. The tremendous number of problems that arise involve months
      1432
      of long and arduous negotiations between management and trade unions, and when the two sides finally arrive at an agreement which they can set down in one or two clear, precise clauses, they do it and then get on with the implementation of the agreement. If there is a breakdown, or the management feel that the workers have gone back on the agreement, or the workers feel that the management have gone back on it, there may be a row, and then a clearing of the air. A few straight words may be spoken. But in a properly regulated industry the difficulty resolves itself and everybody gets on with the job.
      I have worked in factories in which the workers are told, "This is the agreement; it is an established fact." The works manager, or the managing director, or the shop steward in the factory may not have been a party to the agreement; it may not even be written down. It has become custom and practice. In many of these custom-and-practice agreements employers and unions stick rigidly to the rules and honour the terms. They are oral agreements, arrived at
      "in whatever way and in whatever form"
      They work by trial and error—by a building up of confidence in the factory or in the industry. Such agreements have worked for a long period.
      This Clause and all that is appended to it will bring into industry a fear that agreements of the kind to which I have referred can no longer be made. A rigidity will be introduced. The Secretary of State has had some experience in industry. I do not believe that he has ever operated a legally enforceable agreement; neither have I. I have tried to indicate what this provision will mean. It is being held as a sword over the heads of the negotiators. It brings into play a weapon that is alien to industrial relations.
      That is the crux of the matter. The Opposition are opposed to the Clause. We feel that the Government are introducing something that will be very difficult to implement—something that will be an irritant at best, and a much more serious deterrent to industrial relations at worst. On that basis we believe that the Amendment should be rejected
      Mr. Buchan: We have been listening to a great deal of trade union experience,

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      but the Government must recognise that the best of management are saying exactly the same. One of the tragedies is the lost opportunity. Enough has been said before, during and since Donovan, in this House and in another place, to make the Government think again. This is one of the five major provisions that they should have removed entirely from the Bill. It can do nothing but exacerbate relationships in industry, and this is particularly serious at a time when this Government may be moving us into a great deal of difficulties in industry.
      We could have a difficult year ahead of us if the economic policy is continued as it is, and on top of that they try to write this kind of agreement into existing industrial relationships. Much has been said about constant factors in industrial relations. One of my hon. Friends said that the constant factor was change. But the really constant factor is the relationship itself. One cannot govern this kind of relationship by a set of written, legally binding rules.
      All that agreements between the two sides of industry can achieve is set out the kind of ground work to which management and workers adhere. Often, they too have to ignore the background work, because they know that it is sensible, that this is the relationship—but what on earth happens when it is bound to a legal agreement?
      There are one or two disturbing and sinister aspects apart from this terrible lost opportunity. I should have thought that the Secretary of State, with his background, would know why this should not have been done. What does the phrase "however expressed" in Clause 32(1)(b) mean? It requires that the exclusion must be in writing, as the agreement must be collectively enforceable. But the Amendment brings in the phrase "agreement or arrangement ", made in whatever way and in whatever form.
      What on earth does that mean? What is an "arrangement"? In what way is this different from "however expressed", when it relates to a written exclusion clause? What is the difference? Is it something written? Is it custom and habit? How, for example, would existing custom be altered if it must be legally enforceable? When does this become included in it?
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      We cannot proceed with the Amendment until we see this new concept. In the whole period of the Bill, every time I come into the Chamber, I find that a new concept has emerged as we proceed to Mark III, Mark IV or Mark V of the Bill. This is becoming a frightening piece of legislation.
      What are the implications of dealing in future with legally enforceable agreements? One of the problems with this, as with all written agreements relating to relationships in industry, is that we cannot envisage all circumstances. Very often, what is left out of an agreement has an equal effect in a factory to what is included. People know what is meant and when it comes to the crunch they can discuss it. They cannot discuss it if it has been spelled out in legally enforceable form—or if it has not been so spelled out. The situation creates its own problems.
      In modern factories, as the Minister should know, circumstances can change so that the meaning of the original agreement alters, so that it no longer means what it was originally thought to mean. An example is the situation which the Government face in Upper Clyde Shipbuilders. Can one really have envisaged an agreement in which the management would say, "We must write in an exclusion clause saying that it will not apply if you choose to have a work-in"? But this has happened. A new dimension has been given to our industrial relations and not one Member of the Government had envisaged this situation when this clause was drawn up.
      What will be the situation if this becomes legally enforceable and 7,000 workers say, "We want to work; give us work."? Will the Government say, "You have a legally enforceable agreement and you forgot to include a Clause saying that this would not apply to a work-in. You will now feel the majesty of the law."? What will the reaction be, not only among workers but among the Government's own supporters on Clydeside?
      So they are exacerbating this situation on top of the problem that their economic policy is forcing upon the country. They are doing it in such a way that the law can provide no solution. What will

      1435
      happen, as has been predicted often enough, is that, to a great extent, every written agreement will include an exclusion clause. But if that is so, this kind of legislation should not be imposed.
      The real difficulty will occur in small groups and small factories, when everybody knows that the management does not really mean it and so they do not take the necessary care—then suddenly the crunch comes and it begins to matter.
      The Government are embarking on a dangerous course. Despite all the self-praise that the Solicitor-General gave, saying that they had now cleared up the former mess of the Bill—what an admission of bad drafting this is, by the way—by bringing it together, they have shown how impossible and dangerous the whole thing is.
      We must know what is meant by an "arrangement". Does it mean custom or the nod and the wink? How are we to know if an agreement as nebulous as this has been made, let alone define the way in which it has been made? We may not even know that it has been made at all.
      I hope that the Government will think again and withdraw this concept. It would at least give a little comfort in a disturbed and troubled industrial world.
      Mr. John Fraser: My hon. Friend the Member for Renfrew, West (Mr. Buchan) spoke of nebulous agreements. I can think of a contract that is made without any written or word of mouth agreement. Somebody gets on a bus, does not say anything to the conductor, who gives the passenger a ticket without saying a word. A contract has been made, neither in writing nor by word of mouth. That contract is legally enforceable between the passenger and bus company. Other arrangements of that nature can be entered into.
      If a trade union negotiates an agreement on behalf of a number of employees to the effect that they will not come out on strike or will work a certain amount of overtime in return for three weeks' holiday and certain incremental payments, when the workers accept the extra holiday and do the overtime they are, in effect, amending their contracts of employment.
      1436
      Although not a word in writing has passed between the employer and employees, a collective arrangement has been entered into by the trade union. That arrangement has, as a result, been incorporated into their individual contracts of employment. In other words, an arrangement which need not be in writing or be made by word of mouth can become a legally enforceable contract.
      This was accepted by Donovan when it was pointed out that all sorts of collective agreements could be incorporated into individual contracts of employment. There has, therefore, always been legal enforceability as between employer and worker. Indeed, in most cases of unofficial strikes the employer could sue the individual workers for breach of contract. That is not normally done because he would be suing only when the strike is over, and his action would exacerbate a situation which has probably been solved by a return to work.
      The Government thought how they could overcome this problem. By making the leadership of workers subject to an action for damages in cases where a collective agreement is broken, they have missed an opportunity and in this connection my hon. Friends have two main arguments against this set of proposals. The first is that if an agreement is made legally enforceable—for example, by saying that the terms will be enforceable unless there is a disclaimer clause, that the proceedings of a voluntary body are presumed to be legally enforceable, or if an agreement is imposed by the court when no collective agreement has been arrived at—one is attempting to impose on organisations of workers a legal liability.
      This is a lost opportunity because, in practice, few employers will choose to sue trade unions. The Government have been challenged on this in the past and have been unable to provide one instance where a bad industrial relations situation—a strike or go-slow—would have been averted as the result of the existence of a legally enforceable contract with the trade unions.
      This is, therefore, a lost opportunity in the sense that while we are against legal enforceability, because it will not work, we are deeply concerned to improve industrial relations. This is not a private fight between the benches in this House.

      1437
      We want to reduce the number of strikes and industrial disputes.
      Why have the Government flown in the fact of all the recommendations of, for example, Donovan? Having gone thoroughly into the proposition that legally enforceable agreements would reduce the number of disputes, Donovan came to the conclusion in every case that that would not be so.
      The second missed opportunity results from the fact that once one begins to attach legal enforceability to agreements, people will be more shy to enter into them. This is rather like a client being told by his lawyer about the possibility of buying a business, "For heaven's sake don't sign anything". Ordinary working people are afraid of the law. They do not like to get involved with legal commitments because they have found from experience that the processes of the law and litigation often involve one individual facing a powerful and large body.
      In many cases tenants do not enforce their rights under the housing legislation because they are afraid of a confrontation between the individual and a large organisation. They know that legal proceedings are a gamble. Indeed, they can be more of a gamble than going to a casino in Monte Carlo. A man with a small wage and limited savings does not want to get involved in the courts because the course of legal proceedings appears to be capricious. At the end of the day he may lose a case that he expected to win, with the loss of his personal wealth. That is why people do not want to enter into legal obligations.
      There are, of course, circumstances when recourse to the law is sensible. A man will obviously wish to sue for damages for an industrial injury. He will not ask his colleagues in a factory to come out on strike to get him compensation. He uses the processes of the law because he can usually get legal aid and because he knows from experience that the arrangements are satisfactory.
      In this instance the Government are not saying, "We want the legal enforceability of remedies between one worker and his employer" but "We want to place a legal liability on the representatives of that and other employees". It is rather like a lawyer making an agreement on behalf of a client and being told
      1438
      that he will be personally responsible if the client does not observe it.
      This Measure says that if the client, the worker and member of a trade union, does not obey an agreement negotiated on his behalf, then his representatives, the trade union, will be liable for damages. Indeed, it goes further and says that people who purport to encourage a breach of an agreement negotiated on their behalf can be made liable for damages.
      This all adds up to the fact that people will cry off making better procedure and working agreements, the very things that Donovan said were at the centre of any solution to the problem of bad industrial relations. Nobody produced credible evidence before Donovan—no such evidence was produced up to the time when we left office—to show that legal enforceability would improve industrial relations.
      As this long debate draws to an end, I plead with the Government to give an example, if they cannot give evidence, of how legal enforceability will improve industrial relations and lead to more and better procedure and collective agreements being entered into. If they cannot, as I am convinced that they cannot, these proposals will be shown to be the pursuing of an idealogy which was conceived before the Donovan Commission was set up, an ideology which remained unaltered by the conclusions of the Donovan Commission and of most responsible commentators on industrial relations, and an ideology which will harm and not benefit industrial relations.
      8.30 p.m.
      Mrs. Castle: I have immense sympathy with my hon. Friend the Member for Renfrew, West (Mr. Buchan), who said that whenever he entered the Chamber in the course of the many weeks of debate we have had on the Bill he found that some new elaborate form of redrafting was under consideration.
      I felt on listening to the Solicitor-General a sense of despairing sadness spreading through the Chamber as we face the fact that in these very complicated Amendments we are dealing with three of the Bill's major Clauses—we are dealing with the presumption of legal enforceability, we are dealing with the incredible Clause 33, and we are dealing with the iniquitous Clause 39 under

      1439
      which the Government take power to impose an agreement where none exists. These Clauses are at the heart of the industrial relations argument and the industrial relations battle.
      This is an absolute complex of Amendments. Perhaps I am more stupid than other hon. Members—that is perfectly possible and I am prepared to accept it—but I had to sit for an hour in intense concentration following just the meaning of this group of Amendments in drafting terms. They change literally nothing. The Government have not heeded one argument advanced in this House, in another place, or outside Parliament, about their policy. They have gone to enormous trouble to regroup, redraft and rejig, to give us exactly the same result at the end of the day and to leave everybody who is trying to understand the Bill and the many people who will have to work by the Bill in future years literally more confused than ever.
      The Solicitor-General is like a sort of favoured son of the Government who has been given his head on his pet theme and in his pet sphere. He sits there with his enormous and staggering ingenuity. We are all dazzled by the forensic brilliance with which he goes on drafting and redrafting, grouping and regrouping, to his own personal satisfaction but to the increasing mystification and despair of everyone else.
      It is a tragic commentary on the Government's whole approach that they should have handed over this admittedly serious problem of industrial relations to the Society of Conservative Lawyers to have a field day of the kind we have been having here again today.
      This group of Amendments does nothing to meet the objections which have been poured out against the Government's policy and which have been reiterated by my hon. Friends so tellingly today. It does not do anything to alter the provisions of Clause 32, which seek to presume legal enforceability where none was intended to exist by some of the parties. It does nothing to alter Clause 39. It does nothing to alter Clause 33.
      I turn to one of the policy implications of what we have been discussing but which nobody has touched on today. I speak as a layman lost in a lawyer's
      1440
      world—the unreal world in which we have been debating this subject for all these weary weeks and months. I am lost in that world, but I cannot afford to be lost in it, just as no shop steward can afford to be lost in it and no trade union official can afford to be lost in it. I want to try to follow the Solicitor-General through one part of this legal labyrinth.
      I want to look at the effect of the Amendments on Clause 143, to which Lords Amendment No. 241 applies. This Clause is part of the Government's argument in what they are doing about the right to strike. This is crucial to the whole theme of trade union rights. If trade unionists are to be put under the threat of legal penalties, they will have to understand those rights. Clause 143 appears on the surface to be a charter of the right to strike. It says that where a worker strikes after having given due notice, he shall not be held to be in breach of his contract of employment. This all fits in with the image of reasonableness which the Government have tried to present to the country. They say, "We are only getting at the wildcats." I have heard the Secretary of State saying so effectively and plausibly on television and on radio—" Nobody need fear anything unless he is a wildcat." That is a nice emotive expression.
      Clause 143 says that where a man takes part in a strike after due notice, he is not to be held to be breaking his contract of employment. If I understand subsection (2)(d) of that Clause, nobody who calls him out on strike can be committing an unfair industrial practice. It says:
      "shall not be regarded as a breach of his contract of employment for the purposes of … (d) section 92 of this Act."
      Section 92 relates to the unfair industrial practice of inducing people to break their contracts of employment.
      We now know that it is not as simple as that. It never was as simple as that in Clause 143 in its old form. Subsection (3) says that none of these immunities shall apply in certain circumstances—and this has not been altered by the Amendment; it has, in fact, been elaborated in new Clause L.
      Subsection (3), as amended by new Clause L, says that even if a worker does give notice before striking, he will be

      1441
      breaking his contract of employment if there is in his contract of employment any term, implied or incorporated, which excludes his right to strike. I should have thought that was a lawyer's diet for a month in itself. A man will be breaking his contract of employment if there is in his contract of employment any implied term arising from any of the following—first, a collective agreement which, as we see from new Clause L(5), includes a procedure agreement.
      New Clause L defines a collective agreement for us at great length, and it includes a procedure agreement. Secondly, a man will be breaking his contract of employment if there is a decision of any joint body of any kind under Clause 33, or if there is an imposed procedure agreement under Clause 39. So the man's right to strike with impunity provided that he gives due notice, is now eroded if it can be held that there is an implied term in his contract of employment arising either from an imposed procedure agreement or from any negotiated procedure agreement or from any decision of a joint body under Clause 33.
      Their Lordships were considerably exercised about this when they discussed it in another place. The noble Lord, Lord Diamond, put this question to the Government, having heard that explanation by the Government spokesman of what this complex of Amendments meant. He said:
      "What the noble Lord is saying is what I feared was the effect of this subsection; namely, that an 'agreement' (in inverted commas)—meaning an arrangement imposed upon you—can include (I shall be delighted if the noble Lord will tell me I am wrong) a provision, under which a no-strike clause is involved, as a result of which it is a breach of that contract to strike, What I am concerned with is getting a clear statement from the Government of the limitations on the freedom to strike."
      That was the question asked in another place, and we must ask it here at this stage. Lord Diamond was saying that if under Clause 39, a procedure agreement is imposed which contains a no-strike clause, the right to strike under due notice can be taken away by imposition from above; and the same is true equally if there is any kind of no-strike clause negotiated in any sort of collective agreement.
      The noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, had a rather vague shot at answering that, and then the Lord Chancellor decided
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      that he had not got it right because he then intervened with legal explanations even more involved than those which we hear from the Solicitor-General. It is not surprising, therefore, that the subject still remains obscure. Answering Lord Diamond, the Lord Chancellor said:
      "I am not sure this is quite right. Perhaps I am talking out of turn, but I think the difficulty lies in the difference between the two phrases ' collective agreement ' and ' procedure agreement '."
      When my noble Friend Lord Diamond pointed out that a collective agreement may include a procedure agreement—under new Clause L it expressly includes a procedure agreement—the Lord Chancellor blundered on, adding more and more confusion. "Oh, no", he said, "there is a difference; and my understanding is that a collective agreement is related to terms of employment and a procedure agreement is not". This difference, therefore, he said, was crucial to the definition of the right to strike, but he went on, with unaccustomed humility, to add:
      "Having said that, I would rather look at it again in order that I may be able to retract if I am wrong".
      He kept returning to the point: the collective agreement can be of two kinds; it can either relate to terms and conditions of employment or it can be a procedure agreement, and he went on to say about a procedure agreement,
      "that, in the nature of things, is not something which is imported into the individual contract of employment, because the individual workman does not necessarily work on those terms ".—[OFFICIAL REPORT,House of Lords, 9th June, 1971; Vol. 320, c. 350–6.]
      But is that not exactly what is being imported into the contract of employment by this Amendment? Is it not being expressly done by the Amendment, and is that not exactly what new Clause L is all about, that is to say, that the right to strike, if notice be given, shall not apply where a strike is contrary to any term of the worker's contract of employment implied by a collective agreement—which new Clause L now makes clear can include a procedure agreement? What is more, new Clause L, in subsection (3), expressly provides that a collective agreement may include a procedure agreement imposed under Clause 39.
      So the distinction which the Lord Chancellor drew was false. In practice, as everyone knows, it is impossible to draw a strict line between the terms and

      1443
      conditions of employment and the procedure for negotiating them. If a man has a no-strike clause imposed on him in a procedure agreement, the effect is to reduce his bargaining power. That is the intention in doing it. So the distinction was always false from the start. But the Lord Chancellor went further. He misrepresented new Clause L. So he was wrong, on my reading of it, when he said that a procedure agreement could not affect a worker's rights under Clause 143. He said, again somewhat tentatively, "I am not always sure that I am right, but I believe myself to be right." I ask the Solicitor-General to tell us when he replies, because the Lord Chancellor explicitly silenced doubts on the issue in another place by promising to reconsider. Who was right in the reading of the Clause and the effect of the Amendments? Was Lord Diamond right when he said that an agreement to be imposed can include a no-strike clause, as a result of which it would be a breach of contract to strike? Of was the Lord Chancellor right when he said, "Oh, no. It is only a collective agreement that we are concerned with here, and a collective agreement is different from a procedure agreement"? The House is entitled to clarity on this point at least.
      8.45 p.m.
      I do not think that the Secretary of State is really a party to most of the Bill, for the simple reason that, like us, he could not possibly understand it sufficiently to do so. I think that he appreciates the paramount importance of psychology in industrial relations. I want to leave with him this thought about the provisions of Clause 39, which we are reaffirming in the Amendments. We are limiting the workers' freedom to strike by imposing on them a legally enforceable agreement to which they never agreed. What kind of example do the Government think they are giving in doing that? I entirely agree with the wise words of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Edinburgh, Leigh (Mr. Ronald King Murray) on this point. If the Government can, through the law of the land, say that "agreement" shall mean what they say it means, what can they expect the ordinary worker on the shopfloor to define it as meaning? Have not the workers the right to say, "No. 'Agreement' shall mean what we say it means"?
      1444
      If the Government say, "You will not get away with that, because we are in power, and we shall enforce an agreement through our power", the workers will retaliate by saying that the only answer is the use of power. So we have got away from negotiation, away from conciliation, away from agreement, into industrial war. The right hon. Gentleman knows that the Bill feeds the very opposite psychology to that at which we should be aiming.
      Perhaps the Solicitor-General can tell me which of the two sides in another place was right.
      The Solicitor-General: With the leave of the House, I should like to reply.
      I am tempted, rather sadly, to ask which of the two personae in which, within the space of two years, the right hon. Lady the Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle) has appeared before the House is to be regarded as the persona she wishes to go down in history as representing her contribution to this very important subject. To hear her closing her speech suggesting that to admit the concept of law into this subject, to admit the idea of prescribing or varying procedure agreements——
      Mrs. Castle: That was never in my proposals.
      The Solicitor-General:—was to be regarded as wholly unacceptable, to hear her putting it in such a regrettably provocative style and tone of voice, must be sad for those who remember the attempts she was making two years ago to solve the very problems with which we are dealing. It is unconvincing, to say the least, to hear her denouncing this kind of provision, when she proposed to take powers for the imposition of cooling-off periods, and the imposition on individual workpeople of an obligation to return to work when some situations arose. I know—I do not want to reopen the whole debate—that there are variations—[Interruption.] If the right hon. Lady will contain herself and allow me to answer the last point and then go on to the other one, I will do so but I must finish disposing of this point.
      Of course variations in method are adopted to solve these problems, but the most unimpressive variation is the translation of the right hon. Lady from someone who was at one time responsibly putting forward proposals related to these

      1445
      problems into the tone on which she has just closed her speech to the House. I say that it is a sad translation honestly and meaningfully. It will be a difficult task for history to decide with which character the right hon. Lady is to be credited in the years ahead.
      As regards Clause 143(3) of the Bill, the right hon. Lady has used an Amendment which is designed to translate from one part of the Bill to new Clause L exactly the same reference to Clause 39. The right hon. Lady asked to what extent Clause 143(3) makes any variation in the apparent intention of Clause 143(2). The effect of subsection (3) is to say that where the terms of a collective agreement are implied or incorporated in a contract of employment, in the same kind of way as they are now implied or incorporated in the overwhelming majority of contracts of employment, by reference to the surrounding circumstances, the terms of that collective agreement have effect in that contract of employment.
      If the collective agreement prescribes a different period of notice by having a "notice of strike action" clause, say, on 14 days' notice rather than on seven days' notice, that different period of notice operates to vary or replace the due notice which would otherwise arise from the contract of employment. That is what would happen today.
      If a collective agreement provided for no notice of strike action, but that notice to terminate a contract of employment should not be less than six weeks' notice, the worker in his own contract of employment would be bound by such a clause from the collective agreement if it was implied into the contract of employment.
      Mrs. Castle: This would, therefore, be true where an imposed procedural agreement contained a no-strike clause. Therefore, Lord Diamond was right and the Lord Chancellor was wrong.
      The Solicitor-General: I am coming to the point.
      If a collective agreement includes a provision which varies by extending or, perhaps, diminishing—it would probably be by extending—the length of notice which has to be given to terminate a contract of employment, if it is incorporated into the original contract, that takes effect; and it follows from the reference to Clause 39 in the Clause as drafted
      1446
      and from the replacement, that the incorporation of a no-strike clause, including a minimum notice period in a procedural agreement made enforceable under Clause 39, that it would have the same effect. There is nothing particularly sinister in saying that the length of notice which has to be given under an individual contract of employment is that which is incorporated into it by reference to the governing conditions in the place of work where the worker is employed.
      Mrs. Castle: There was a long debate on this in another place. The Lord Chancellor, the highest legal luminary in the land, replied to Lord Diamond's analysis of the position—which is exactly what the Solicitor-General has confirmed was right—by saying that he was not sure that it was right and then said, "I do not understand it. I will go away and look at it. If I am sure that it is right, I will come back and rectify the position." The Lord Chancellor obviously thought that for an imposed procedure agreement to have the effect which the Solicitor-General now reveals was rather shocking. Therefore, he denied it was Government policy. Can we have that corrected?
      The Solicitor-General: I think the right hon. Lady is reading too much into this. Obviously, since the reference to this, I have not restudied what my noble and learned Friend said about it, but the effect of the provision is as I have explained. The provision in Clause 143 is there to prevent the judgment of the case of Morgan v. Fry from being overturned to the disadvantage of the worker. Notice which the worker has to give to terminate his employment is notice either as contained in his contract of employment or by reference to the collective agreement, if the provisions of that collective agreement have been incorporated in the contract of employment. That is the answer to the right hon. Lady's question.
      Apart from that, however, the greater part of this debate has been concentrated on the reconsideration of the central idea of enforceability of collective agreements. The hon. Member for Manchester, Blackley (Mr. Rose) quoted Professor Harry Wellington and his evidence to the Donovan Commission, and the right hon. Lady asked for evidence which would justify disregarding Professor Wellington's view, and the hon. Member for Liverpool,

      1447
      Walton (Mr. Heffer) also wanted justification for disregarding Professor Wellington's view on balance against the enforceability of collective agreements.
      The evidence which justifies that is evidence of almost the whole of industrial experience outside this country, even the evidence of the country from which Professor Wellington was coming, and the evidence is supported by the example given by the hon. Member for Norwood (Mr. John Fraser), which, given in a different context, was saying that in every walk of life we expect as a matter of course that legally enforceable agreements are the relationships which we have when dealing with one another. He made reference to the existence of industrial injury legislation, of rent tribunal legislation. He certainly did not go on to argue that we should disregard or abandon those provisions—it would be an absolutely nonsensical proposition—or that in those areas where we have effective law giving rise to remedies we should discard them.
      All we are saying is that in this field it is important to introduce the idea of people being bound by agreements which they make, unless they expressly decide to the contrary. The argument has been advanced that this is out of line with the Donovan approach and that we ought more constructively to take the opposite view. I want to make this point about that. Rather significantly, the hon. Member for Blackley, defending the present non-enforceable contract, said it was important to have regard to the essential vagueness of the relationships which prevail in industrial relations, and that was illustrated by the example given by the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh, Leith (Mr. Ronald King Murray) with his reference to a nod and a wink.
      This is the point. Donovan said in paragraph 502:
      "We are not in principle opposed to the use of legal sanctions for the enforcement of agreed procedure."
      Donovan went on to say that he would not recommend the use of legal sanctions till those procedures had been improved. That second part is important, because Donovan was saying, as far as quality of agreements is concerned—this is paragraph 503—that
      1448
      "wherever possible, collective agreements should be written and precise … procedure agreements should be comprehensive in scope and should provide for rapid and equitable settlement of disputes."
      Specifically—and this is why I take up the essential vagueness referred to by the hon. Member for Blackley—the Donovan Commission made its summary judgment in paragraph 504 in this way:
      "Those resorting to unconstitutional action should not be threatened with any disadvantages imposed by law until new procedures have been put into operation, procedures which are clear where the present procedures are vague, comprehensive where the present procedures are fragmentary, speedy where the present procedures are protracted, and effective where the present procedures are fruitless."
      All experience in other fields and in other countries suggests that until people approaching the collective bargaining table start from the premise that they are intending to arrive at a legally enforceable bargain, they are unlikely to set about the task effectively, negotiating procedures which are clear where the present procedures are vague, and so on, and that is the emphasis of our approach.
      Once people appreciate that this is what they are after, once they acknowledge the overwhelming force of the Donovan diagnosis that our troubles spring from vague, imprecise, indecisive, slow procedures, they will appreciate what the Government are saying, that it is a good thing for people to approach the business of looking at their collective agreements on the basis that they mean what they say.
      9.0 p.m.
      Mr. McBride: The hon. and learned Gentleman quoted Donovan as being in favour in principle, but he did not say that Donovan was in favour in fact. Is there not a difference in law between principle and fact and should not the hon. and learned Gentleman's definitive preference have been given the other way?
      The Solicitor-General: This is not so much a legal argument as a more practical matter of judgment. It is a question of carts and horses. We make it perfectly plain that it is only collective agreements in writing arrived at after the commencement of the Act to which the presumption of enforceability is to be attached if the parties do not dissent from that. Upon the footing that no presumption is attaching to anything save that which is hammered out hereafter,

      1449
      people are more likely to come to bargains which are plain, precise and expeditious, rather than the opposite.
      Mr. Bidwell rose—
      The Solicitor-General: I do not want to give way any further at this point. I will now follow up what the hon. and learned Member for Leith said about registration and non-registration, because we have already canvassed that territory many times. When he makes the point that an unregistered organisation can be under liability on a collective agreement, I reply, "Yes, certainly, but only when the agreement is written, when it has not secured an exclusion of enforceability and when the agreement is reached after the commencement of the Act." There can be no question there, or anywhere else, of a trap situation.
      The hon. Member for Renfrew, West (Mr. Buchan) raised a point which was touched on by the hon. Members for Blackley and Salford, West (Mr. Orme) about the meaning of the phrase:
      "(in whatever way and in whatever form)"
      introduced instead of "whether orally or in writing". It is important to see the two settings in which this can arise. Sometimes the court and those operating the Bill will be concerned with such things as the reporting of a procedure agreement. In that sense it is often important to know about arrangements or agreements that are founded upon custom and practice. When one is concerned with making an agreement enforceable, then—again going back to Clause 32—enforceability cannot be attached to custom and practice in that sense, but only to something which is reduced to writing after the commencement of the Act either under Clause 32 (1)(a) or Clause 33.
      I think it was the hon. Member for Lewisham, North (Mr. Moyle) who asked how far minutes about a non-enforceable agreement could be relied upon to construct an enforceable written agreement thereafter That is related to the same kind of point: how far will custom and practice be capable of importation into a subsequent written agreement? The answer is that the minutes would not in the ordinary way be admissible. If they are non-enforceable minutes, they are part of the negotiations between the parties—
      1450
      just as correspondence between people is not admissible to construe what they finally put into a written agreement. They would become admissible only if incorporated by express reference in the written agreement when made. They would not become admissible by presumption but only if they had been brought into it in that way.
      Mr. Heffer: What is the situation when minutes of a joint committee are circulated because they contain decisions of that committee? Would not such a document be presumed to be legally binding, unless there is a disclaimer?
      The Solicitor-General: That was not the point put by the hon. Member for Lewisham, North. If a minute recording a decision of that joint body is unaccompanied by a statement saying that it is not to be legally binding, then it is presumed to be legally binding—the hon. Member for Walton is right. But the hon. Member for Lewisham, North asked whether a minute recording a decision and having attached to it a statement "This is not intended to give rise to a legal obligation" could be incorporated in some subsequent, legally-binding document. The answer is that it cannot and would not be unless expressly incorporated. If a decision were reached which was not intended to be legally binding—say a decision which regulates the variation of shifts or the manning on a job—but if at a later stage the parties got to the point of drawing up a legally binding agreement and said, "The arrangements informally arrived at in minute 123 six months ago shall hereafter be incorporated in the collective agreement ", then it would be brought in. It would not otherwise be brought in as a matter of implication.
      I was going to deal with the point raised by the hon. Member for Lewisham, North, who referred to the definition of procedure agreements. I was simply going to say that when he pointed out that in new Clause L subsection (5)(a) included machinery
      "for consultation with regard to, or for the settlement by negotiation or arbitration of, terms and conditions of employment"
      that is only setting out alternatives. It refers to machinery for consultation with regard to terms and conditions of employment, or machinery for the settlement by negotiation or arbitration of terms

      1451
      and conditions of employment. So that machinery by either party could give rise to a procedure agreement. It does not involve machinery for consultation with regard to settlement. They are two separate concepts.
      I refrain at this comparatively tranquil stage of the debate from making any comparison on the source of that definition with the previous Government's Bill. I imagine that if I were to speak from now until midnight tomorrow on this provision, I should not persuade hon. Members opposite to accept our approach to this question of enforceability.
      Mr. Moyle: Could the hon. and learned Gentleman say whether subsection (5)(a) refers to settlement of disputes by conciliation?
      The Solicitor-General: I do not think it does, not expressly; but that does not relate to the conciliation arrangements set out under the Act, because those exist anyway. This is merely a definition of those matters which would be
      regarded as a procedure agreement which is in line, apart from the variations I have mentioned, with that adopted by the previous Government's Bill.
      I was drawing to a close and saying that these provisions, as the right hon. Lady said, are not significantly different from those originally debated by the House. They are an important part of the Bill.
      It is a little hard for the Government to be criticised for altering the drafting in this way simply on the basis that it changes nothing when, in fact, we redrafted the definitions in this way in response to requests from both sides of this House. All we have done is to bring them together to make them plain and simple. They are an important part of the policy of the Government and on that basis I commend them to the House.
      Question put, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment:—
      The House divided: Ayes 270, Noes 231.

      Division No. 457.]

      AYES

      [9.10 p.m.

      Adley, Robert

      Carr, Rt. Hn. Robert

      Foster, Sir John

      Alison, Michael (Barkston Ash)

      Channon, Paul

      Fowler, Norman

      Allason, James (Hemel Hempstead)

      Chapman, Sydney

      Fraser, Rt. Hn. Hugh (St'fford & Stone)

      Amery, Rt. Hn. Julian

      Chichester-Clark, R.

      Fry, Peter

      Archer, Jeffrey (Louth)

      Churchill, W. S.

      Galbraith, Hn. T. G.

      Astor, John

      Clark, William (Surrey, E.)

      Gardner, Edward

      Atkins, Humphrey

      Clarke, Kenneth (Rushcliffe)

      Gibson-Watt, David

      Awdry, Daniel

      Clegg, Walter

      Gilmour, Ian (Norfolk, C.)

      Baker, Kenneth (St. Marylebone)

      Cockeram, Eric

      Gilmour, Sir John (Fife, E.)

      Baker, W. H. K. (Banff)

      Cooke, Robert

      Glyn, Dr. Alan

      Balniel, Lord

      Coombs, Derek

      Godber, Rt. Hn. J. B.

      Barber, Rt. Hn. Anthony

      Corfield, Rt. Hn. Frederick

      Goodhart, Philip

      Batsford, Brian

      Cormack, Patrick

      Gorst, John

      Beamish, Col. Sir Tufton

      Costain, A. P.

      Gower, Raymond

      Bell, Ronald

      Critchley, Julian

      Grant, Anthony (Harrow, C.)

      Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torquay)

      Crouch, David

      Gray, Hamish

      Benyon, W.

      Curran, Charles

      Green, Alan

      Berry, Hn. Anthony

      d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry

      Grieve, Percy

      Biffen, John

      d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Maj.-Gen. James

      Grimond, Rt. Hn. J.

      Biggs-Davison, John

      Dean, Paul

      Grylls, Michael

      Blaker, Peter

      Deedes, Rt. Hn. W. F.

      Gummer, Selwyn

      Boardman, Tom (Leicester, S.W.)

      Dixon, Piers

      Gurden, Harold

      Body, Richard

      Dodds-Parker, Douglas

      Hall, Miss Joan (Keighley)

      Boscawen, Robert

      Douglas-Home, Rt. Hn. Sir Alec

      Hall, John (Wycombe)

      Bossom, Sir Clive

      Drayson, G. B.

      Hall-Davis, A. G. F.

      Bowden, Andrew

      du Cann, Rt. Hn. Edward

      Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)

      Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hn. John

      Dykes, Hugh

      Hannam, John (Exeter)

      Braine, Bernard

      Eden, Sir John

      Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)

      Bray, Ronald

      Edwards, Nicholas (Pembroke)

      Haselhurst, Alan

      Brewis, John

      Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)

      Havers, Michael

      Brinton, Sir Tatton

      Elliott, R. W. (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, N.)

      Hawkins, Paul

      Brocklebank-Fowler, Christopher

      Emery, Peter

      Hayhoe, Barney

      Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)

      Eyre, Reginald

      Hicks, Robert

      Bruce-Gardyne, J.

      Farr, John

      Higgins, Terence L.

      Bryan, Paul

      Fell, Anthony

      Hiley, Joseph

      Buchanan-Smith Alick (Angus, N & M)

      Fenner, Mrs. Peggy

      Hill, John E. B. (Norfolk, S.)

      Buck, Antony

      Fidler, Michael

      Hill, James (Southampton, Test)

      Bullus, Sir Eric

      Finsberg, Geoffrey (Hampstead)

      Holt, Miss Mary

      Burden, F. A.

      Fisher, Nigel (Surbiton)

      Hooson, Emlyn

      Butler, Adam (Bosworth)

      Fookes, Miss Janet

      Hordern, Peter

      Carlisle, Mark

      Fortescue, Tim

      Hornby, Richard

      Hornsby-Smith, Rt. Hn. Dame Patricia

      Monks, Mrs. Connie

      Smith, Dudley (W'wick & L'mington)

      Howe, Hn. Sir Geoffrey (Reigate)

      Monro, Hector

      Soref, Harold

      Howell, David (Guildford)

      Montgomery, Fergus

      Speed, Keith

      Howell, Ralph (Norfolk, N.)

      More, Jasper

      Spence, John

      Hunt, John

      Morgan-Giles, Rear-Adm.

      Sproat, Iain

      Hutchison, Michael Clark

      Morrison, Charles (Devizes)

      Stanbrook, Ivor

      Iremonger, T. L,

      Mudd, David

      Stewart-Smith, Geoffrey (Belper)

      James, David

      Murton, Oscar

      Stodart, Anthony (Edinburgh, W.)

      Jessel, Toby

      Neave, Airey

      Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir M.

      Johnson Smith, G. (E. Grinstead)

      Noble, Rt. Hn. Michael

      Stokes, John

      Jopling Michael

      Normanton, Tom

      Stuttaford, Dr. Tom

      Kershaw, Anthony

      Nott, John

      Sutcliffe, John

      Kilfedder, James

      Onslow, Cranley

      Tapsell, Peter

      King, Evelyn (Dorset, S.)

      Oppenheim, Mrs. Sally

      Taylor, Edward M. (G'gow, Cathcart)

      King Tom (Bridgwater)

      Orr, Capt. L. P. S.

      Taylor, Frank (Moss Side)

      Kinsey, J. R.

      Osborn, John

      Taylor, Robert (Croydon, N.W.)

      Kirk, Peter

      Owen, Idris (Stockport, N.)

      Tebbit, Norman

      Kitson, Timothy

      Page, Graham (Crosby)

      Temple, John M.

      Knox, David

      Parkinson, Cecil (Enfield, W.)

      Thatcher, Rt. Hn. Mrs. Margaret

      Lane, David

      Peel, John

      Thomas, John Stradling (Monmouth)

      Langford-Holt, Sir John

      Percival, Ian

      Thomas, Rt. Hn. Peter (Henden, S.)

      Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry

      Pink, R. Bonner

      Tilney, John

      Le Marchant, Spencer

      Pounder, Rafton

      Trafford, Dr. Anthony

      Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)

      Powell, Rt. Hn. J. Enoch

      Trew, Peter

      Lloyd, Ian (P'tsm'th, Langstone)

      Prior, Rt. Hn. J. M. L.

      Tugendhat, Christopher

      Longden, Gilbert

      Proudfoot, Wilfred

      Turton, Rt. Hn. Sir Robin

      Loveridge, John

      Pym, Rt. Hn. Francis

      van Straubenzee, W. R.

      Luce, R. N.

      Quennell, Miss J. M.

      Vaughan, Dr. Gerard

      McAdden, Sir Stephen

      Raison, Timothy

      Vickers, Dame Joan

      MacArthur, Ian

      Rawlinson, Rt. Hn. Sir Peter

      Waddington, David

      McCrindle, R. A.

      Redmond, Robert

      Walder, David (Clitheroe)

      McLaren, Martin

      Reed, Laurance (Bolton, E.)

      Walker, Rt. Hn. Peter (Worcester)

      Maclean, Sir Fitzroy

      Rees-Daves, W. R.

      Walker-Smith, Rt. Hn. Sir Derek

      McMaster, Stanley

      Renton, Rt. Hn. Sir David

      Walters, Dennis

      Macmillan, Maurice (Farnham)

      Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon

      Ward, Dame Irene

      McNair-Wilson, Michael

      Ridley, Hn. Nicholas

      Weatherill, Bernard

      McNair-Wilson, Patrick (New Forest)

      Ridsdale, Julian

      Wells, John (Maidstone)

      Maddan, Martin

      Roberts, Wyn (Conway)

      White, Roger (Gravesend)

      Maginnis, John E.

      Rodgers, Sir John (Sevenoaks)

      Whitelaw, Rt. Hn. William

      Marten, Neil

      Rost, Peter

      Wiggin, Jerry

      Mather, Carol

      Russell, Sir Ronald

      Wilkinson, John

      Maude, Angus

      St. John-Stevas, Norman

      Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick

      Mawby, Ray

      Scott, Nicholas

      Wood, Rt. Hn. Richard

      MaxwelI-Hyslop, R. J.

      Scott-Hopkins, James

      Woodhouse, Hn. Christopher

      Meyer, Sir Anthony

      Sharples, Richard

      Worsley, Marcus

      Mills, Peter (Torrington)

      Shaw, Michael (Sc'b'gh & Whitby)

      Wylie, Rt. Hn. N. R.

      Mitchell, Lt.-Col.C. (Aberdeenshire, W)

      Shelton, William (Clapham)

      Mitchell, David (Basingstoke)

      Simeons, Charles

      TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

      Moate, Roger

      Sinclair, Sir George

      Molyneaux, James

      Skeet, T. H. H.

      Mr. Victor Goodhew and

      Money, Ernie

      Mr. Hugh Rossi.

      NOES

      Albu, Austen

      Cant, R. B.

      Duffy, A. E. P.

      Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)

      Carmichael, Neil

      Eadie, Alex

      Allen, Scholefield

      Carter-Jones, Lewis (Eccles)

      Edelman, Maurice

      Archer, Peter (Rowley Regis)

      Castle, Rt. Hn. Barbara

      Edwards, Robert (Bilston)

      Armstrong, Ernest

      Clark, David (Colne Valley)

      Edwards, William (Merioneth)

      Ashley, Jack

      Cocks, Michael (Bristol, S.)

      Ellis, Tom

      Ashton, Joe

      Coleman. Donald

      English, Michael

      Atkinson, Norman

      Corbet, Mrs. Freda

      Evans, Fred

      Barnett, Guy (Greenwich)

      Cox, Thomas (Wandsworth, C.)

      Faulds, Andrew

      Barnett, Joel

      Crawshaw, Richard

      Fernyhough, Rt. Hn. E.

      Beaney, Alan

      Cronin, John

      Fisher, Mrs. Doris (B'ham, Ladywood)

      Benn, Rt. Hn. Anthony Wedgwood

      Crossman, Rt. Hn. Richard

      Fitch, Alan (Wigan)

      Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)

      Bennett, James (Glasgow, Bridgeton)

      Cunningham, G. (Islington, S.W.)

      Foley, Maurice

      Bidwell, Sydney

      Dalyell, Tam

      Foot, Michael

      Bishop, E. S.

      Darling, Rt. Hn. George

      Ford, Ben

      Blenkinsop, Arthur

      Davidson, Arthur

      Forrester, John

      Boardman, H, (Leigh)

      Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)

      Fraser, John (Norwood)

      Booth, Albert

      Davies, lfor (Gower)

      Freeson, Reginald

      Bottomley, Rt. Hn. Arthur

      Davies, S. O. (Merthyr Tydvil)

      Galpern, Sir Myer

      Boyden, James (Bishop Auckland)

      Davis, Clinton (Hackney, C.)

      Gilbert, Dr. John

      Bradley, Tom

      Davis, Terry (Bromsgrove)

      Ginsburg, David

      Brown, Bob (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, W.)

      de Freitas, Rt. Hn. Sir Geoffrey

      Gordon Walker, Rt. Hn. P. C.

      Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, Provan)

      Delargy, H. J.

      Gourlay, Harry

      Brown, Ronald (Shoreditch & F'bury)

      Dell, Rt. Hn. Edmund

      Grant, George (Morpeth)

      Buchan, Norman

      Dempsey, James

      Grant, John D. (Islington, E.)

      Buchanan, Richard (G'gow, Sp'burn)

      Doig, Peter

      Griffiths, Eddie (Brightside)

      Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)

      Douglas, Dick (Stirlingshire, E.)

      Hamilton, William (Fife, W.)

      Callaghan, Rt. Hn. James

      Douglas-Mann, Bruce

      Hamling, William

      Campbell, I. (Dunbartonshire, W.)

      Driberg, Tom

      Hannan, William (G'gow, Maryhill)

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      1455

      Hardy, Peter

      McGuire, Michael

      Rhodes, Geoffrey

      Harper, Joseph

      Mackenzie, Gregor

      Richard, Ivor

      Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)

      Mackie, John

      Roberts, Albert (Normanton)

      Hart, Rt. Hn. Judith

      Maclennan, Robert

      Roberts, Rt. Hn. Goronwy (Caernarvon)

      Hattersley, Roy

      McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.)

      Robertson, John (Paisley)

      Healey, Rt. Hn. Denis

      McNamara, J. Kevin

      Rodgers, William (Stockton-on-Tees)

      Heffer, Eric S.

      Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield, E.)

      Roper, John

      Horam, John

      Marks, Kenneth

      Rose, Paul B.

      Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas

      Marquand, David

      Sandelson, Neville

      Howell, Denis (Small Heath)

      Marsden, F.

      Sheldon, Robert (Ashton-under-Lyne)

      Huckfield, Leslie

      Marshall, Dr. Edmund

      Shore, Rt. Hn. Peter (Stepney)

      Hughes, Mark (Durham)

      Mason, Rt. Hn. Roy

      Short, Mrs. Renée (W'hampton, N.E.)

      Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen, N.)

      Meacher, Michael

      Silkin, Hn. S. C. (Dulwich)

      Hughes, Roy (Newport)

      Mellish, Rt. Hn. Robert

      Silverman, Julius

      Hunter, Adam

      Mendelson, John

      Skinner, Dennis

      Irvine, Rt. Hn. Sir Arthur (Edge Hill)

      Millan, Bruce

      Small, William

      Janner, Greville

      Miller, Dr. M. S.

      Smith, John (Lanarkshire, N.)

      Jay, Rt. Hn. Douglas

      Milne, Edward (Blyth)

      Spearing, Nigel

      Jeger, Mrs.Lena (H'b'n & St. P'cras, S.)

      Mitchell, R. C. (S'hampton, Itchen)

      Spriggs, Leslie

      Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)

      Molloy, William

      Stallard, A. W.

      Jenkins, Rt. Hn. Roy (Stechford)

      Morgan, Elystan (Cardiganshire)

      Stewart, Rt. Hn. Michael (Fulham)

      John, Brynmor

      Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)

      Stoddart, David (Swindon)

      Johnson, Carol (Lewisham, S.)

      Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)

      Stonehouse, Rt. Hn. John

      Johnson, James (K'ston-on-Hull, W.)

      Morris, Rt. Hn. John (Aberavon)

      Strang, Gavin

      Johnson, Walter (Derby, S.)

      Moyle, Roland

      Taverne, Dick

      Jones, Barry, (Flint, E.)

      Mulley, Rt. Hn. Frederick

      Thomas, Rt. Hn. George (Cardiff, W.)

      Jones, Dan (Burnley)

      Murray, Ronald King

      Thomas, Jeffrey (Abertillery)

      Jones, Rt. Hn. Sir Elwyn (W.Ham, S.)

      Ogden, Eric

      Thomson, Rt. Hn. G. (Dundee, E.)

      Jones, Gwynoro (Carmarthen)

      O'Halloran, Michael

      Tinn, James

      Jones, T. Alec (Rhondda, W.)

      O'Malley, Brian

      Tomney, Frank

      Kaufman, Gerald

      Oram, Bert

      Torney, Tom

      Kelley, Richard

      Orme, Stanley

      Tuck, Raphael

      Kinnock, Neil

      Oswald, Thomas

      Urwin, T. W.

      Lambie, David

      Owen, Dr. David (Plymouth, Sutton)

      Varley, Eric G.

      Wainwright, Edwin

      Latham, Arthur

      Paget, R. T.

      Walker, Harold (Doncaster)

      Lawson, George

      Palmer, Arthur

      Wallace, George

      Leadbitter, Ted

      Panned, Rt. Hn. Charles

      Watkins, David

      Lee, Rt. Hn. Frederick

      Parker, John (Dagenham)

      Weitzman, David

      Leonard, Dick

      Parry, Robert (Liverpool, Exchange)

      Wells, William (Walsall, N.)

      Lever, Rt. Hn. Harold

      Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred

      Willey, Rt. Hn. Frederick

      Lewis, Arthur (W. Ham, N.)

      Pendry, Tom

      Williams, Alan (Swansea, W.)

      Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)

      Pentland, Norman

      Williams, Mrs. Shirley (Hitchin)

      Lipton, Marcus

      Perry, Ernest G.

      Wilson, Alexander (Hamilton)

      Loughlin, Charles

      Prentice, Rt. Hn. Reg.

      Wilson, William (Coventry, S.)

      Lyon, Alexander W. (York)

      Prescott, John

      Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.)

      Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)

      TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

      Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson

      Probert, Arthur

      Mr. John Golding and

      McBride, Neil

      Reed, D. (Sedgefield)

      Mr. James Hamilton

      McCartney, Hugh

      Rees, Merlyn (Leeds, S.)

    Clause 33

      PRESUMPTIONS RELATING TO PROCEEDINGS OF VOLUNTARY JOINT NEGOTIATING BODIES.
      Lords Amendment: No. 64, to leave out Clause 33 and insert the following new Clause—
      "33.—(1) This section applies to any joint body consisting of representatives of one or more organisations of workers and of representatives either of one or more employers or of one or more organisations of employers or of a combination of one or more employers and one or more organisation of employers, with or without other persons, and established by or under a collective agreement (whether made before or after the commencement of this Act) for either or both of the following purposes, that is to say—

      (a) regulating the terms and conditions of employment of workers of one or more descriptions;

      (b) determining, in relation to workers of one or more descriptions, any matters for which a procedure agreement can provide.

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      (2) The following presumptions shall apply to any proceedings of a joint body to which this section applies, where those proceedings take place after the commencement of this Act.
      (3) For the purposes of any such proceedings it shall be conclusively presumed that the parties (whether organisations of workers, employers or organisations of employers) for the time being represented on that joint body (in this section referred to as "the constituent parties ") intend to authorise it, in relation to matters falling within the scope of its functions, to make decisions having effect as legally enforceable contracts made on behalf of the constituent parties.
      (4) Any decision made by any such body in any such proceedings, in relation to matters falling within the scope of its functions, if the decision—

      (a) is duly recorded in writing by or on behalf of that body, and

      (b) as so recorded, does not contain a provision which (however expressed) states that the decision is intended not to be legally enforceable,

      shall be conclusively presumed to be intended by that body to have effect as a legally

      1457
      enforceable contract made on behalf of the constituent parties.
      (5) In this section "decision" includes any award or resolution, by whatever name called, and "functions", in relation to a decision of a joint body established by or under a collective agreement, means its functions under that agreement as it has effect at the time of that decision."
      Mr. R. Carr: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
      The Amendment replaces the original Clause 33. The new Clause like the one it replaces, relates to joint voluntary negotiating bodies from national level down to works or plant committee level, and it applies to the written decisions of such bodies a presumption equivalent to that applied by Clause 32—which we have just been debating—to collective agreements reached by other ways of collective bargaining.
      The basic purposes of redrafting the original Clause 33 in this new form are twofold—first, to take account of criticisms which were made of the original Clause; second, to put beyond doubt that, like Clause 32, the Clause has no retrospective effect.
      Subsection (1) differs from the drafting in the old Clause in specifying more comprehensively the composition of bodies to which the Clause relates. The difference is small, but it is significant, because it recognises that for some of these bodies the parties represented may include individual firms and one or more employers' organisations. The functions of these bodies are as defined in subsections (1)(a) and (b), and these are unchanged compared with equivalent subsections in the original Clause 33.
      The functions, as so defined, are that these bodies are there to regulate either the terms and conditions of employment of any workers, or any matters provided in the procedure agreement, or both, and that deals with the first subsection of the new Clause.
      Subsection (2) is designed to bring out more clearly that the presumptions specified in the Clause apply only to proceedings which take place after the commencement of the Bill. Some hon. Members, at least, will remember that when we had our debate on Clause 33 at an earlier stage although we made it clear that it was our intention and, indeed, it
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      was our belief that the original form carried no danger of retrospection, nevertheless some doubt was thrown on it, and the new Clause makes it clear beyond any doubt that it affects only proceedings which take place after the commencement of the Bill.
      Subsection (3), taken with the definition of "functions" in subsection (5), is designed to remove the doubts which have been voiced about whether the conclusive presumption in the earlier version was too absolute and, more particularly—and this comes back in a second way to the point that I was making a moment ago—to make quite sure that there is no risk at all of its being interpreted by the courts as having any retrospective effect.
      We do not think that there was such a risk, but to allay any uneasiness the Clause substitutes the wholy contemporaneous concept of
      "matters falling within the scope of its functions"
      in place of the earlier and less certain phrase
      "purposes for which it was established"
      We are sure that subsection (2), coupled with subsection (3), makes it absolutely certain that there can be nothing retrospective about the application of the Clause.
      Subsection (4) is in substantially the same form as subsection 3 in the old Clause. It is true that the word "award" has been omitted but, as the definition subsection—subsection (5)—makes clear, a decision of the body includes "any award or resolution" where either may be the term appropriate to a particular body.
      It might not be out of place for me to remind the House that by way of Lords Amendment No. 267, which was included in our previous debate, we are providing that any reference in the Bill to a collective agreement shall include a decision of a joint body to which this Clause applies.
      That is the explanation of the new Clause, and the case for it. It is a clarification and a removing of doubts and fears which were there before. It is not an attempt to change the policy, any more than—as my hon. and learned Friend made clear—the previous Amendments were; our basic policy on these issues was deeply thought out and considered

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      before we became committed to it. It has never been our intention to change it. We are making a genuine attempt to allay those fears which, however shaky their foundations may have seemed, the Government recognise were nevertheless genuinely disturbing to ordinary people and therefore ought to be removed, even though we do not believe that they were justified in the first place.
      I realise that hon. Members opposite would like us to go much further, to the point of changing our basic policy. That is something that we are not prepared to do, and this Amendment does not attempt to do so. I commend it to the House in the terms that while reaffirming our previous policy it clears up some uncertainties about it and, in the context of that policy, removes doubts and fears that previously existed.
      9.30 p.m.
      Mr. Heffer: In introducing the new Clause, the right hon. Gentleman has rightly pointed out that it in no way changes the Government's basic policy and that it does not attempt to do so. The Government are deeply committed to the policy that is now embodied in the Bill. The right hon. Gentleman is correct in saying that, because if we examine the new Clause against the old one we see that although there have been some drafting changes the essence is precisely the same.
      One significant change has been made, to which we ought to draw the attention of the House. The old Clause contained the phrase "procedure agreement". That phrase is repeated in subsection (2) but is replaced in the new Clause by "collective agreement".
      This touches on our previous debates, because it is a recognition by the Government that a collective agreement and a procedure agreement cannot be divorced. In that sense, the new Clause widens the scope of the agreements that it will cover. It was previously confined to procedure agreements and it could be argued that the substantive collective agreement would not be covered. There could have been some argument on this, but it has now been eliminated.
      The right hon. Gentleman was right to point out that this covers agreements from national to works committee level. We
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      had some heated debates on the issue in Committee, but our arguments have not been accepted. The Government have only accepted the need to rewrite the Clause for clarification: our essential arguments were not accepted. As the right hon. Gentleman said, the principle is precisely the same.
      We are as totally opposed as the right hon. Gentleman is totally committed to the legal enforcement of collective agreements and to the concept that, without disclaimers, agreements will be legally binding. This will create immense problems, despite the Secretary of State's suggestion that it will iron out problems, keep disputes to a minimum and get rid of what they term the wildcat strike.
      The T.U.C. has already invited all its affiliated members not to conclude an agreement with an employer if it would be legally binding. So the first item discussed in any negotiation will inevitably be a disclaimer to ensure that the agreement is not legally enforceable; this is a point of conflict where none existed before.
      In a very small minority of cases, legally enforceable agreements are in existence. These have been concluded where there has been agreement between employers and trade unionists that such agreements should exist, and that has been done without the existence of this legislation. However, the overwhelming majority of trade unions have never gone along with this concept of legally enforceable agreements, and they are not prepared to do so now. This is, therefore, a new point of conflict in industrial relations.
      Consider the chaotic state of affairs that could arise. Will the minutes of a joint body containing a decision made at a meeting of that body and circulated to union members be regarded as legally enforceable—that is, unless a disclaimer is included in the minutes? The right hon. Gentleman will be aware that in industry there are at all levels any number of joint bodies such as works, welfare and safety committees. These all exist within the terms of a collective agreement. If such an agreement does not contain a disclaimer clause, will these organisations be covered by this proposal?
      Lord Drumalbyn made it clear in another place that even if a disclaimer is

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      inserted in the original agreement at works committee level, if somebody forgets to put in a new disclaimer when new agreements are made at that level, such agreements could become legally enforceable. This is absolutely chaotic and certainly will not assist industrial relations. More points of conflict will be created.
      We are totally opposed to the whole idea of legally enforceable agreements and to this proposal, which basically changes nothing. I accept that it gets rid of some of the fears which we expressed but, as the right hon. Gentleman said, it represents a basic point of fundamental difference between the two sides of the House, as it does between the trade union movement and the Government.
      New Clause 33, which is Lords Amendment No. 64, refers in subsection (4) to
      "Any decision … as so recorded, does not contain a provision which (however expressed) states that the decision is intended not to be legally enforceable."
      We discussed the expression "however expressed" earlier. This represents another possible point of conflict because of the legal argument that could ensue over the meaning of that phrase.
      Subsection (5) provides that
      "'decision' includes any award or resolution, by whatever named called …".
      There can be continual arguments about what is an award, what is a resolution, and about the type of award or resolution. Anybody who knows anything about industrial relations knows that these are points of argument in any case. When there is the possibility of an agreement's being legally enforceable, these points of conflict will exacerbate what is already a sufficiently difficult matter.
      For all these reasons, we believe that the Government have not made out a case. We do not think that the Clause should be accepted. We are opposed in principle to the Clause and to the ideas expressed in it. We know that unfortunately the House will not support our view, because we do not have the majority, but we shall continue to argue against this type of legally enforceable agreement and against this presumption, because we believe that this is a very serious introduction of a point of conflict which has not existed up to now.
      Mr. Bidwell: The essence of the Secretary of State's presentation of the Government's thinking in tabling a Clause of this kind has been that they are according people greater liberty and are not depriving workers of the right to leave their employers. However, the Government are attacking the right to collectivism. As soon as they step on the road of making things more difficult in that sense, they set about attacking the ordinary worker as an individual, because faced with the power and strengh of employers workpeople are forced to rely upon collectivism.
      I object to the new Clause 33 because, even though it is now more clearly defined, I believe that it is more objectionably expressed. The Clause attacks the fundamental liberty of the ordinary workman, in that it attacks his right to take collective action, not merely against his employer, but against his trade union representative if necessary. What happened at Ford's not too long ago was an example of how workers will kick over the traces. At Ford's the union officials had concluded an agreement with the employers. In future, union representatives will have much less facility and freedom to make agreements.
      Psychology will play a great part in it. Union representatives will not in future take the chances that they have been prepared to take hitherto. The Clause looks nice and tidy with all this wording about legal enforceability and obtaining as much as possible in writing. My experience has been in a national industry. In seeking to conclude local agreements the struggle with employers has always been to get them to commit themselves in writing. There will be a great reluctance in future on the part of workers' representatives to enter into written agreements, particularly at the level where the Government are virtually accusing union representatives of being always on the itch to call wildcat strikes or to lead their members out of the factory gate at the drop of a hat. I do not know how employers will react. It is an almost ludicrous situation when people have to keep reminding themselves to write in advance that an agreement shall not be legally enforceable, with all the consequent nonsense that that implies.

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      9.45 p.m.
      I want to expose the whole fallacy of the Government's thinking in this matter. The Solicitor-General, who is the principal architect of the ideas in such provisions as Clause 33, is not with us at the moment. The hon. and learned Gentleman attempted to justify these Amendments—these so-called "tidying-up" Amendments—and he referred to the position in other countries. Other countries have legally enforceable laws of this kind, and the assumption is that Britain is somehow lagging behind because we do not have such legally enforceable contracts. I submit that there is no comparison. In Germany and Japan the strike record is not so great as it is in this country—I think they are the two exceptions—but in many other countries where such laws obtain, such as Australia where the conflicts are sometimes bloody and bitter, we take no lessons in relation to Clauses such as Clause 33—this applies particularly to the United States of America—because it is in those countries where the iron-bound characteristics of contract law are drawn up by a handful of people representing many workers, on the one side, and representatives of employers, on the other.
      I know that the Secretary of State and the Solicitor-General have exercised a little so-called trade union compassion in their approach to this matter, but in this country that approach cannot be interposed in such a massive way. It is the maturity of our situation which makes this unworkable. The Secretary of State—not the Solicitor-General, who is a legalistic theoretician—is a man of some experience and he holds a difficult and responsible job as Minister responsible for employment. He has to get the two sides together and get the wheels of production rolling. I am not sermonising to him, but I suggest that he is nearly choking himself to death with all this rigmarole. He cannot do it in Britain. He cannot enforce provisions such as Clause 33. He can introduce changes, but I do not think he will get the fundamental changes that he wants. Only a Labour Government will do that because this situation is geared up with property relationships and the slave-master relationship which is the psychological attitude of British workers when they
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      face employers. The employers have always had the edge on the workers.
      Many employers will have a sufficiently progressive mentality and prefer to have a co-operative work force, so they will accept a preamble to any agreement providing that it shall not be legally enforceable. They know that they will have to live with their workers. They value their skill, and they want to retain it. Other more clumsy employers will not be so co-operative and they will run into headlong collision.
      For those reasons, I very much resent the Amendment, and I am sure that all my right hon. and hon. Friends will wish to divide against it.
      Mr. Ted Fletcher: The new Clause 33 is virtually the same as the old one, with the exception of the dropping of retrospection, and it is just as obnoxious. It will have no great effect upon trade union negotiations, because there is an option for a union to decide that an agreement shall not be legally enforceable.
      The Trades Union Congress has advised its affiliated unions not to enter into legally enforceable agreements, and it is almost certain that the unions will follow that advice, for two reasons. In the first place, they cannot see an end to the rise in the cost of living. The cost of food has gone up by 10 per cent. in the last twelve months of Tory Government, and no trade union leader knows how it will go in the next twelve months. A union official would be foolish to set his signature to an agreement which could not be revised from time to time and which would be legally enforceable for twelve months or two years without knowing what the economic situation would be towards the expiry of such an agreement. Inevitably, therefore, trade unionists will be reluctant to enter into legally enforceable agreements.
      We are told that the object of the Bill is to improve relationships between work people and their employers. This Clause may well make the situation worse and make it more difficult for trade unionists to reach agreement with their employers. Let us suppose that an industrial dispute which led to a stoppage of work has reached the point of settlement and it is possible for the union and the employer

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      to agree upon an increase. Work is resumed. The negotiations may well be protracted because the employer will insist on the terms of the agreement being legally enforceable. The strike may have lasted several weeks, and the negotiations several days, but they may yet break down because of the employer's insistance on legal enforceability. The trade unions are for that reason, too, rightly suspicious of this Clause.
      The Government have had no second thoughts. They have made no change of principle by introducing the new Clause, save on the question of retrospection. It is the same obnoxious Clause in a different guise. We shall divide against it. We disagree violently with the principle, and the Government have conceded anything in their new form of words.
      Mr. David Stoddart: When I return to the power station where I used to work and talk to the chaps on the shopfloor about the Bill, one of the things I tell them about is legal enforceability. When they first heard about it, they regarded it with amusement, but afterwards they regarded it with disbelief, and then with anger. From then on, they called the Secretary of State names that I cannot repeat without using unparliamentary language. [HON. MEMBERS: "Go on."] I am being tempted, Mr. Speaker, but I do not want to risk your wrath, because I know that you would call me to order.
      The people on the shop floor see exactly what legal enforceability means to them. They have been working in works committees and joint consultative bodies for a long time. Their shop stewards have been making collective agreements with the employers orally and in writing, and over a period of time there has grown up between the two sides, a mutual understanding. As a result, good industrial relations have been built up. That has happened without any legal enforceability. The people who have made the agreements know perfectly well that those on the other side can be trusted to keep their word, and that if there is a misinterpretation it will be put right comparatively easily.
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      If agreements, which are often on both large or small issues locally, are to be made legally enforceable, the trust which has been built up is likely to be diminished, because there is always a suspicion of employers, and it is growing at present.
      Mr. R. Carr: Where both sides have developed the trust of which the hon. Gentleman is speaking, where agreements on both sides are kept, I am sure that both sides will quickly and easily agree to have a waiver clause. There is no merit in legal enforceability in itself; the merit is in making good, precise agreements and then keeping them.
      Mr. Stoddart: I was coming to that. In such places the Bill is unnecessary. I am saying that the very act of putting in legal enforceability is likely to undermine the position which has been established and to create new tensions at a time when they are already being created. For example, in works committees it will not be sufficient for a waiver clause to be put at the head of each set of minutes. If my understanding is correct, it will have to be put at the end of each resolution, and it will be necessary to have a member of the committee watching to see that on each resolution someone moves that it is not legally enforceable.
      Some people believe that one side of a negotiating body can insert the waiver clause. As I read the Bill, it has to be the joint body itself—in other words, a majority of both sides voting for the waiver clause. Immediately, therefore, there is conflict and an obstacle to negotiation——
      It being Ten o'clock, the debate stood adjourned.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
Ordered,
That at this day's Sitting Consideration of Lords Amendments to the Civil Aviation Bill may be proceeded with, though opposed, until any hour; and that the Motions relating to Petroleum (S.I., 1971, No. 1062 and 1961) may be proceeded with, though opposed, until half-past one o'clock or for one and a half hours after the first has been entered upon, whichever is the later.—[Mr. Goodhew.]

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS BILL
Question again proposed, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
Mr. John Page: I think that the hon. Member was casting his mind back to the Second Reading debate. The whole point is that unless there is agreement, there is no new contract. The position is not that if both sides do not agree it is legally binding. Unless both sides agree, there is not a contract in the first place.
Mr. Stoddart: I think that if the hon. Member reads it correctly, he will find that I am right and he is wrong. The Minister appears to be confirming that. Before the interruption, I was saying that this could create obstacles to agreement and harmony in industry. That is why I and my hon. Friends, most of whom have had experience in industry at shop floor level, violently oppose the Clause.
I do not know whether it is generally realised that throughout industry, as in many other walks of life, there is great difficulty in getting people to serve. I am sure that my hon. Friends will have had experience that it is not easy to get people to serve on works councils, works committees and similar bodies, which are voluntary in nature but nevertheless carry great responsibilities. The fact that the contracts are made legally enforceable will make it even more difficult to get people to serve on a voluntary basis on these important bodies in industry.
Make no mistake about it: works committees, with the participation of shop stewards at local level, are the sort of bodies that make industry tick. Without these bodies and without trust and mutual confidence, industry will collapse at local level and the difficulties for management and worker alike will be increased beyond measure.
I urge the Government, even at this late hour, to have another look at the Clause and take it out. It will do far more harm than good, it will cause a great deal of injury in industrial relationships and the worker on the shop floor simply will not have it.
Mr. McBride: This new Clause, as my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) so rightly emphasised,
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lays great stress on legal enforceability of contracts as between employers' representatives and trade union representatives, and this concept is not British. It is totally foreign to our way of life and our way of doing things. Large employers in Britain will not welcome this Lords Amendment because it would induce a sense of rigidity, as the Secretary of State is well aware, because he is a former industrialist and knows this to be so. The rigidity which this would introduce into British industry would be in contrast to the flexibility which now exists and joint committees, if this new Clause were carried into law, would not function so efficiently as they do now.
In my estimation this new Clause abrogates the principles of common sense. I wonder whether the right hon. Gentleman has ever thought how day-to-day bargaining between employers and shop stewards takes place. There are effected daily thousands of oral agreements. I have been a party to many of them. One comes from the shop floor and listens to hon. Members opposite arguing about industrial relations and one knows that they are not able to earn their living with their hands; the great majority of them have never done so; they have no concept of the relationships on the shop floor. It is staggering beyond belief that it should be so, but it is.
Mr. Kenneth Lewis rose—
Mr. McBride: When I want the advice of the hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford (Mr. Kenneth Lewis) I will ask for it.
Mr. Lewis: The hon. Member can have it now. Will the hon. Member give way?
Mr. McBride: No. I would say to the hon. Member that if he were to offer advice he would devalue it at the moment of giving it.
Very often employers cannot wait, and it is only by the very nature of the flexible methods of the day-to-day consultation between shop stewards and managements in industry that industry proceeds on its way, and that will continue if this Bill is enacted, because I believe that a great many of the larger employers will simply ignore this.
Mr. R. Carr: A few moments ago the hon. Member was talking about the

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making daily of oral agreements. This new Clause does not affect oral agreements at all. It is specifically limited to written agreements. It has no effect at all upon what the hon. Member is talking about.
Mr. Kenneth Lewis: May I say to my right hon. Friend that——
Hon. Members: No.
Mr. McBride: No. The presumption of some hon. Members opposite is beyond belief. I remind the hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford of a proverb which we have in this House and which has been mentioned very often, that good manners are for the Labour Party but not for the Tory Party.
Mr. Kevin McNamara: That is being proved now.
Mr. McBride: The right hon. Gentleman was talking about agreements and I draw his attention to the new Clause which says, in subsection (4), "any decision". I would presume that in law, as that is not qualified, "any decision" would be an oral or written decision and that the term "any decision" would embrace oral agreements.
Must we have a multitude of case law precedents which would shackle industry and delay work and—let us be frank about it—increase the costs of industrial products? There is the creation of the problem in industry of making the ramifications of these proposals fully known throughout the whole of industry, and I venture to suggest that there will be widespread evasion of this legal enforceability.
As I say, this is the abrogation of the principles of common sense, and the very terms of this Lords Amendment suggest the Government should have thought this out. I am bound to say that the Government have failed to do so, and that the common sense and give and take principle which is so essentially British, and which has helped industry so much, will be deliberately thrown away because of the legal rigidity of this Lords Amendment.
Subsection (4)(b) provides that unless a decision is stated not to be legally enforceable it shall be legally enforceable. Subsection (5) contains the definitions, and it affects committees at all levels and illustrates the sweeping nature of the
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Clause. Every body will be involved, from the national executive council and the national joint committee in the great industries to the smallest joint committee in the smallest shop in the country. As my hon. Friend the Member for Swindon (Mr. David Stoddart) says, the difficulty of getting people to serve on these committees will be increased by the operation of the Clause. This great British tradition of people serving on joint committees because they feel that they are responsible to the community and to the industry to which they belong will be swept away.
The right hon. Gentleman is no legal theoretician, but he will have the job of explaining to industry precisely how the Clause will affect it without the benefit of his legal adviser at his side. Industry will look for his help to escape from the morass of the Bill's legal complexity, but the legal implications of the Bill are completely lost on the right hon. Gentleman.
Right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite thought that this would be a vote winner but, curiously enough, the man who is defeated is the Prime Minister who supposes that we shall go into the Common Market. When the British people understand fully the nature and content of the Bill they will regard it as another stage in their reckoning with the Government.
10.15 p.m.
Mr. E. Fernyhough: In introducing the new Clause the Secretary of State pretended that it was to meet the criticism made by this side of the House of the original Clause. He has changed a noun there, a verb here, and an adjective elsewhere, but the end result is precisely the same. He has made no concession to the arguments and pleas put forward in Committee. He has, therefore, wasted the lawyers' time because we are in precisely the same position after his concessions as we were before.
The Secretary of State said that we were trying to learn from the experiences of other countries. He is a pro-Common Market man, but has he learned anything about strikes from Italy, France or Belgium? One would think that the British worker was the most strike-prone worker in the world. Although we may be bottom of the league in some respects

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and at the top in others, we are neither bottom nor top in respect of strikes. We come somewhere about half way up the table. In other words, there are some better and some worse but, on average, we are as good or as bad as the rest of the industrial workers in the world.
Why should the right hon. Gentleman believe that these measures will reduce industrial unrest in this country? Wherever legally enforceable agreements apply, it does not follow that this automatically brings down the number of days lost through strikes—as anybody knows who looks at the league table and takes account of those countries in which legislation on the lines of this Bill is already in existence.
When agreements are entered into in this country as between trade union officials, shop stewards and management, both sides believe that in future they will be able to interpret those agreements to their mutual satisfaction. It is just like the electorate last June who thought that the Tory Party manifesto was an agreement that, if the British people gave the Tories their support, the Tories would deliver the goods. The further we get away from 18th June the less they believe this.
We have had legislation in the past to deal with strikes and the breaking of agreements. My right hon. Friend said that the Secretary of State has become a prisoner of the legal profession. This is quite true. It may be remembered that there was a Minister of Labour during the war—a not unknown figure on these benches—who occupied the position now held by the right hon. Gentleman. That Minister of Labour decided that, because an agreement had been broken, the law should be brought in. Never was a Minister of Labour, as he was then called, more humiliated when he tried to introduce the law into this field.
The right hon. Gentleman knows—and I know the circles in which he moves, and I say this in no condemnatory manner—that none of the large employers will bother with this provision. Does anybody believe that there will be legally enforceable agreements in the I.C.I., the National Coal Board, British Railways, the gas and electricity industries and the motor car industry? Of course, there will not. The people who will be hit will be
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the little people—the people who are not very strong and in relation to whom trade union leaders are not able to bring the same pressure to bear on employers. Those people probably will have to accept legally enforceable agreements.
But for the vast majority of British industry, particularly that part with which the right hon. Gentleman wants to deal—the strike-prone part—this will be completely ineffective because none of the employers in those large, basic, fundamental industries will even attempt to get the unions to sign legally enforceable agreements.
Mr. Adam Butler: Does not the right hon. Gentleman think that the American-controlled car industry at least, from my experience in America, would be prepared to push for legally enforceable agreements for a period of perhaps two or three years, as in the United States?
Mr. Fernyhough: All I know is that the vast majority of British employers would not like a strike record as bad as that of the United States. America is almost at the top of the strike league table. If American industrialists only had the size of our strike problem they would be happy, because theirs is far worse. If he believes that the introduction of American methods would be beneficial here, the hon. Gentleman should look at the number of days lost in America compared with the number lost here and he will appreciate that our people are good boys.
Mr. Harold Walker: In Committee we also had this comparison between the American motor industry and ours. I threw out a challenge to hon. Members opposite then. I asked them to compare the strike record of my workers at the Ford plant in Doncaster with any American Ford plant. I wagered that the Doncaster boys would have the better record. I am still waiting for that wager to be taken up.
Mr. Fernyhough: I am sure that my hon. Friend will wait a long time because he is on a certain winner, while those who challenge him know that they are on a certain loser. I know that it is the eleventh second of the eleventh minute of the eleventh hour, but I ask the right hon. Gentleman, who I know has a good

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measure of common sense, even now to reflect upon what he is doing to future negotiations and to be big enough to do the sensible thing and withdraw this Clause entirely.
Mr. Hugh Jenkins: I make it clear that even those unions which have incorporated an element of enforceability into some parts of their own agreements are absolutely opposed to this Clause and endorse every word which has been said on the subject by my right hon. and hon. Friends. Negotiating in certain circumstances an element of enforceability of part as an agreement by agreement between the two parties is quite different from proposing to enforce by law, unless everybody opts out on specific occasions a universality of enforceability.
What the right hon. Gentleman is doing is rather ironical. He is forcing everyone to contract in automatically unless specifically they decide to contract out of enforceability. It is ironical that he should seek to impose a sort of contracting in on the entire trade union movement. Up to now what I have said is of universal application, but I am sure that my hon. Friends would be disappointed if I were not to illustrate my case from Equity, whose name I have not mentioned so far in this speech. They would like me to illustrate from the case I know best. I want to illustrate the immense variety of the trade union movement which the right hon. Gentleman always underestimates in trying to create this cage in which we are all supposed to operate.
It is the case that Equity and its members accept in certain circumstances that contracts are not only enforceable as between the union and the employers' organisation but are also individually enforceable, as indeed are all contracts between the employer and the employed. So there is an enforceability of contract between employee and employer. What is done in collective agreements is to provide circumstances in which the contract between the employer and the employee becomes non-enforceable. It is in this respect that I want the right hon. Gentleman to give me an undertaking. It is important that he should do so. Will it be possible to provide for circumstances in which the contract between the employer
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and employee ceases to be enforceable? That is the position at the moment.
In the example which I have given, if any employee is not a member of the union the contract between the employer and the employee ceases to be enforceable. Equally, if the employer is not a member of an employers' association, again the contract ceases to be enforceable between the employer and the employee. This is the method by which a union shop is organised. In consequence, the moment that a person who is not a member of Equity appears on the stage the contracts of everybody cease to be enforceable. Therefore, the star can and will walk out of the show.
Is the right hon. Gentleman seeking to get the best of both worlds? Is he trying to make a universality of enforceability between trade unions and employers' associations without permitting the breaking of non-enforceability? Does the Clause, as drafted, prevent non-enforceability being written in? Can it become part of an agreement that in all circumstances all members in this area of employment shall be members of the trade union? Can it be part of the agreement that all employers in this industry shall be members of the employers' organisation? If the right hon. Gentleman can give that assurance, it will not remove the objection to the Clause as a whole, but it will certainly make it somewhat more palatable.
Mr. Kenneth Lewis: I must intervene. If I am tedious in speaking to the House at least I do not have to sit and listen to the same speeches again and again from hon. Gentlemen opposite. I get a rest by listening to my own voice.
The hon. Member for Swansea, East (Mr. McBride) indicated that we know very little about this matter. I assure him that, having listened to the debates in the last few days, if we did not know anything at the beginning, we certainly know a good deal more now. [An HON. MEMBER: "We know a good deal less."] My hon. Friend complains that we know a good deal less. We have heard many times from hon. Members opposite that the legal Members of the House and the lawyers who will be concerned will complicate matters in industrial relations. Having listened to the speeches by hon. Gentlemen opposite today, I have heard

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more complications from laymen about what the lawyers are proposing than the lawyers could possibly conjure up.
New Clause 33 is extremely simple. How could it be made so complicated by hon. Gentlemen opposite I fail to understand. I am particularly pleased that my right hon. Friend took out the word "oral". We had a fierce debate on this word in Committee. Some hon. Members on this side of the House could not understand how an oral agreement could be made legally enforceable. It is interesting to note that the other place, doubtless with the guidance of my right hon. Friend and his Department, finally decided that we were correct in suggesting that this word should be removed.
10.30 p.m.
Mr. Ronald King Murray: Would the hon. Gentleman tell the House where the word "oral" appears in the original Clause?
Mr. Lewis: We discussed this earlier, and my right hon. Friend mentioned it.
Legally binding contracts are voluntary. No group of trade unions or workers need to have a legally binding contract if they do not wish it. It is
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as simple as that. The complications that have been suggested by hon. Gentlemen opposite simply do not exist. There are no complications at all. There are no difficulties. If there is a legally binding contract, it has been made because it is acceptable to both sides. I have no doubt that such a contract would not be acceptable to a trade union unless it believed that it was in its interests and in the interests of its members to make the contract legally binding. If the employers were to offer a deal which the union thought it was worth accepting as legally binding, it would do so. If it did not wish the agreement to be binding, it would simply accept the present situation, make an agreement with the employers, and the courts would not come into it.
We discussed this issue in Committee, it was mentioned on Second Reading, and yet hon. Gentlemen opposite still seem to want to introduce their own complications. It is my belief that once the Bill is on the statute book, unions and employers will work this provision to their benefit in the way in which they want to work it, and not in the way in which we think they will want to work it.
Mr. Ronald King Murray: One good thing about the new Clause is that subsection (2) makes it clear that the provisions of the Clause are not intended to apply to proceedings which take place before the Bill comes into force. But for the rest the new Clause replaces the bad by the worse.
I should like to underline the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) about subsection (3). My hon. Friend said that whereas the original corresponding subsection was restricted to procedure agreements, there is no such restriction in the new Clause. It means that the impact of the new Clause is greatly extended. Indeed, it is extended to an extent which nobody can foresee.
The extension may be very wide, indeed, and may lead to all kinds of things being regarded as legally enforceable agreements which previously no one conceived to be in that category at all. While there was a restriction to procedure agreements one could keep one's feet pedestrianly on the ground. Now that contact with the ground has been lost nobody can predict where the Clause will lead, but it can be said with certainty that it will lead to trouble.
There is another respect in which the Clause has been revised. The right hon. Gentleman said that he took some pride in the fact that the word "functions" had replaced the words "purposes for which it "—that is the body—"was established". In some respects I accept that that is an improvement, because functions are things one can test by an examination of facts. One can see what the body does and judge from that what its functions are.
But any advantage which that appears to provide rather appears to be lost when one looks at the definition subsection, subsection (5), because there it says that functions
"in relation to a decision of a joint body … means its functions under that agreement as it has effect at the time of that decision."
When we look at that it seems clear that we have to consider "functions" as they are effective at the time of the decision. In other words, a joint body of the type conceived by the Clause may be doing a great deal more than it was originally set up to do; it may operate
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over a much wider sphere than the purposes for which it was originally set up. Whereas the original Clause 33 confined the ambit of this operation to the purposes for which it was established we are now dealing with functions instead of getting precision. There is a spurious precision. When we examine the realities we may find that it is doing something wider than the purposes for which it was set up. We have gone from some precision to a great extension of the ambit of the Clause.
I do not want to go into too much detail about the difficulties that we discussed with a great deal of anxiety in the earlier stages of the Bill, but hon. Members opposite will remember that the subsection corresponding to the present subsection (4) in the new Clause was the one that gave rise to enormous difficulty. It started with great difficulty, because the Solicitor-General himself assured the House that it did not mean what it apparently said, namely, that legally enforceable agreements would be spelt out of the minutes unless there was a disclaimer for each entry. It is fair to point out, however, that the Solicitor-General withdrew that interpretation at a later stage in Committee.
That subsection (4), with all its ambiguity and unfortunate consequences, remains unchanged, and the reasons canvassed previously in relation to the two points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Walton, about collective agreements, and myself, about the question of functions, are cogent reasons why the new Clause should be abandoned by the Government before it is too late.
I want to give an illustration of the extent to which the Amendment may be going when taken in conjunction with the Amendments we discussed with Amendment No. 267. My hon. Friend the Member for Renfrew, West (Mr. Buchan) posed a question that the Government Front Bench did not seek to answer. He asked what would happen after the Bill had come into force if a situation arose corresponding to the "work-in" now taking place in John Brown's yard in Upper Clyde Shipbuilders.
It seems to me that on a strict reading of the Bill, as it will stand with these two Amendments, the arrangement under

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which the workers in John Brown's are at present operating in the shipyard may be a collective agreement that is enforceable under the Bill. Amendment No. 267 defines "collective agreement" as
"an … arrangement made … by or on behalf of one or more organisations of workers and either one or more employers".
There is no doubt that there is an organisation of workers who are seeking to run John Brown's yard at the moment. There is an organisation—not a trade union. It may be an ad hoc organisation, but I conceive it to be covered by the new Clause.
One finds what "employer" means in Clause 158, in paragraph (a) or (b). If it is said that the definition contained in paragraph (a) does not apply, it seems obvious that the alternative definition contained in paragraph (b) applies, because it says that an employer
"in any other case, means a person regarded in that person's capacity as one for whom one or more workers work or have worked or normally work or seek to work."
That definition would apply to the shop stewards' management committee in John Brown's.
One has only to postulate one further step to get the application of Amendment No. 64. The shop stewards' management committee must have minutes of its decisions. Therefore, after the Bill has come into effect, a work-in like this could be a legally enforceable collective agreement within the meaning of the Bill. That is a measure of the absurdity to which this Clause and the previous one can carry us.
Mr. James Tinn: We have heard few speeches from hon. Members opposite, and, to judge from the speech of the hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford (Mr. Kenneth Lewis), that might be because they find it astonishingly difficult to argue in favour of this Clause or the one that it will replace. The Government seem to rely on the argument that the new Clause can be disregarded by writing disclaimers into collective agreements. This is true, but what a negative argument !
The Secretary of State did argue that, even if this contracting out procedure is adopted- -as it will be on a wide scale—
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it will at least add greater precision and clarity to industrial agreements. We have just had a wonderful example from my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Edinburgh, Leith (Mr. Ronald King Murray) of what legal precision and clarity can mean in this context. Negotiators, on both sides, will not have the benefit of the Government or their advisers. The people doing the day-to-day jobs in industry will have to rely on their own common sense and the increasingly expensive and growing amount of legal advice which they will come to need.
But in the end it will be disregarded. I imagine that the first management negotiator who forgot to insert a disclaimer would quickly be shown the door—because management will not like this any more than the unions will.
But we cannot be sure that the new Clause will do no harm. It may do great harm. I believe that the C.B.I. is very worried about this. It is not difficult to envisage firms coming to this country from abroad, perhaps from the United States, from a different industrial relations system where legal enforceability is taken for granted, and assuming that they can stand on their legal rights in this country too. Just as they are beginning to get their enterprises off the ground, they will run headlong into totally unnecessary clashes with the trade unions.
10.45 p.m.
It is sometimes suggested that similar provisions exist in other countries, though little has been said about foreign experience to justify legal enforceability. It is important to consider the way in which this system was introduced in other countries. Indeed, that is crucial in determining whether it is likely to succeed here.
A similar system was introduced in Germany after the war, during which the trade union movement there had been destroyed. A whole new system was being formed, and an essential feature of the process was that the system was acceptable to the unions. On the rare occasions when it has been used, such as during the strikes in the coal and steel industries a couple of years ago, the legal terms of the agreement have not been used against the unions. In other words, the German system is essentially voluntary.

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These provisions in Australia date back to the last century and were adopted in an entirely different climate. At that time the small, fragmented trade unions of the Australian sub-continent were under attack, and the legal enforceability provisions have been used by them more as a defence, but that situation does not apply here.
While these provisions may not prove as damaging as their critics make out—because they will be largely ignored—I fear that they will not ease the conduct of industrial relations and that they could be potentially damaging when foreign firms are involved.
Mr. Harold Walker: I led the debate on this subject from this side of the House when we discussed the original Clause 33 in Committee. Hon. Members may recall that on that occasion my hon. Friend the Member for Swindon (Mr. David Stoddart) described the reaction of the trade unionists and shop stewards in his constituency to the proposal.
I had exactly the same reaction when I first read the Clause. My emotions were disbelief, incredulity and anger. My hon. Friends have made it clear that there is no reason now, in view of the Amendment, for us to change our attitude or emotional reaction to the original Clause. In other words, we have no reason to change our fundamental objection to these provisions.
I will not go over the ground that has been eloquently covered by my hon. Friends, except to remind the House that whereas some people might think that here is an example of the Government responding to pressure to change the Bill, in fact, as my hon. Friend the Member for Cleveland (Mr. Tinn) pointed out, the Amendment is likely to create as much difficulty for employers as for trade unions.
I have evidence to support this view. The starting point in the process is the Royal Commission's Report, made after two and a half years' consideration of the subject. This distinguished Commission, which sat for three years and which gave the question of legal enforceability the most careful scrutiny, said this in paragraph 475 of its Report, talking about the kind of unofficial strikes about which the Government are concerned:
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"… the root of the evil is in our present methods of collective bargaining, and it is in the absence of speedy, clear and effective disputes procedures. Until this defect is remedied, all attempts to make procedure agreements legally binding are bound to defeat themselves."
The Commission said this in paragraph 476:
"Any attempt to deal with unofficial and unconstitutional strikes in isolation must be deprecated. This applies to the legal enforcement of procedure agreements as much to the proposal to eradicate these strikes…."
Paragraph 506 states:
"We thus reject the proposal to make collective agreements—whether substantive or procedural—enforceable at the present time. We do so, not because we think that the law could not in any circumstances assist in the reduction of the number of unofficial strikes. It cannot do so in this country today—that is the point."
These are the Commission's words:
"To take steps in this direction today would be not only useless but harmful, and they would undo a great deal of the good we hope to see done through the reform of the collective bargaining system which we recommend."
My hon. Friends, whether consciously or subconsciously, have echoed that theme. What the right hon. Gentleman proposes will do irreparable damage to our system of industrial relations, because it will put shop stewards and trade unionists in a position where they will unwittingly enter into legally binding collective agreements.
The hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford (Mr. Kenneth Lewis) said that nobody needs to enter into a legally binding collective agreement if he does not want to. The proposed Clause will provide that if the disclaimer is entered into the agreement will not be legally binding. That presumes that the parties to the negotiations will have read and understood the Bill and will know what they are about.
Mr. Kenneth Lewis: Of course they will.
Mr. Walker: How many of the thousands of trade unionists and shop stewards and managers who sit round the negotiating table in industry to discuss matters of mutual concern have read any of the Statutes relating to the negotiations or affecting industrial relations? The Lord Chancellor confessed his difficulty in dealing with the complexities of the Bill. We have all acknowledged the complexities of the Bill. I wonder how shop stewards

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will deal with the complexities of the Bill if indeed they ever read it at 90p a time.
We have not at any stage during our lengthy proceedings on the Bill referred to the evidence submitted to the Royal Commission by the Engineering Employers' Federation, paragraph 37 of which says this about the proposal to make collective agreements legally enforceable:
"To introduce a system of general legal enforcement in the civil courts would involve making fundamental changes in our system of industrial relations without any certainty that such changes would effectively deal with the problem of strikes in breach of agreements."
Paragraph 38 states:
"The reason why the Federation takes this view is that it does not consider it practicable or desirable for employers to be put in the position of having to sue their workpeople in the civil courts to secure the observance of an agreement. Many employers would be extremely reluctant to take such action."
The Confederation of British Industry raised a number of objections and said to the Royal Commission about the proposal to introduce enforceability:
"We cannot assume that the contracts to be enforced would be similar to the present agreements. Trade unions might well be reluctant to accept as a legal liability certain undertakings which are now given voluntarily and honoured in the main."
They went on to say:
"The British system of industrial relations is founded upon the principle that the parties at every stage accept responsibility for their actions and agreements and that resort to outside bodies is strictly limited. Legal enforcement would undermine this responsibility and lead to constant references to the Courts whenever one or other of the parties was dissatisfied."
The C.B.I. then said:
"Enforceability of contracts would almost certainly be accompanied by a host of other legal provisions as in the American system. British employers would be most reluctant to envisage a system under which almost all their actions in the industrial relations field might be challenged in the Courts—or under which they themselves would regularly be the plaintiffs in suits against their employees or the trade unions with which they negotiate."
Finally they said:
"The legal remedies likely to be available would not be well adapted to the industrial situation. What the employer wants is a good day's work willingly performed; this cannot be obtained by legal action. Fines might well not be paid, and action for contempt of court become necessary."
Those were the views of the Confederation of British Industry submitted
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to the Royal Commission. They are powerful arguments. They are not arguments advanced by the trade unions or by hon. Members from this side of the House. They are the arguments of people with deep knowledge of industry, who can see what problems these proposals would present.
Mr. R. Carr rose—
Mr. Walker: Will the right hon. Gentleman forgive me for not giving way? I am about to conclude. There is etched on my mind the memory of the discussions that were held at the Department of Employment and Productivity following the publication of the Royal Commission's Report when the views of the Confederation of British Industry were expressed and reinforced orally. It was pointed out by the C.B.I. that legal responsibility would be unlikely to lead to any improvement in our industrial relations system. The then Director-General of the C.B.I. is the present Secretary of State for Trade and Industry.
I recall the words which I used on the occasion of our last debate on Clause 33, in Committee, which seem as appropriate as any:
"The proposal is impractical to the point of absurdity. Furthermore, it will have a harmful effect on industrial relations at shop floor level, and it is inequitable in the extreme."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 1st February, 1971; Vol. 810, c. 1358.]
Mr. R. Carr: With the leave of the House, I should like to try to deal with some of the points which have been raised. May I first deal with the closing remarks of the hon. Member for Don-caster (Mr. Harold Walker). Two things need to be said about them. First, the quotation of evidence that he read out was anticipating fines on individual workers. We are opposed to fines on individual workers just as much as anybody else. It was the hon. Gentleman's party, when they were in power, who thought of imposing fines on individual workers. We never proposed that. It is nowhere in our Bill.
Mr. Harold Walker: The right hon. Gentleman must not misrepresent me or the employers' organisations who submitted evidence. The employers were anticipating the kind of legal enforceability that the right hon. Gentleman has in mind and is proposing now, where

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the agreements will be turned into contracts, for which people will be accountable in the civil courts. As to the right hon. Gentleman's reference to fines, it is a lot of nonsense, and he knows it.
11.0 p.m.
Mr. R. Carr: It is not a lot of nonsense, but I shall not embark on an argument about that. I am sure that if the hon. Member looks it up he will see that fines for workers was part of what he read out. The other and more substantial point is that he did not tell the House when that evidence was given. Does he have a date by him? It was given certainly five or six years ago, or that sort of time, and, of course, he must remember that the Donovan Report was published——
Mr. Harold Walker: It was 1968.
Mr. Carr: The Donovan Report was published in 1968 but I am fairly sure that the evidence about which he is speaking was given considerably earlier than that. As the Donovan Report was published in 1968, a good bit of it must have been written and the conclusions reached probably in the last half of 1967, and I suspect, a great deal of the evidence, including the evidence he mentioned, may well have been given even earlier than that.
The House will remember that it was the rapid and serious deterioration which took place in the number of strikes in the latter half of the 1960s which led the party opposite when in power to a complete reversal of its previous policy.
Mrs. Castle: Can the right hon. Gentleman tell the House the date on which the document of the Society of Conservative Lawyers, "A Giant's Strength", on which the proposals for the right hon. Gentleman's Bill are based, was published? Was it not 1959?
Mr. Carr: It could well have been. But that does not alter the point.
Mrs. Castle: Of course it does.
Mr. Carr: No. Many of us have been feeling for a very long time that legislation of this kind was necessary. I personally, I think, went on record around 1959 expressing the view that legislation was necessary. Some of us, we believed, were some way ahead and showed more
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foresight as to what might have been necessary in this respect than others. I make no apology for that. But there are many people, including many employers and many from all parties and all walks of life, who went on maintaining the view that I once held but gave up around the end of the 1950s, that legislation would not be helpful. Many of us have changed our minds. I make no secret of the fact that I have changed my mind. I changed my mind somewhat earlier than some others changed theirs.
In this debate we have been doing what one of my hon. Friends graphically described to me in the Lobby last week, having listened to another similar debate, as "sawing sawdust". He said it seemed to him that we were, at the choice of the Opposition, sawing it up over and over again, finer and finer, and not getting on to all the new things the Opposition are always complaining there is no time to debate. This is exactly what we have had.
In the last debate, a long debate, the main object was to discuss principles of enforceable agreements. We had a substantial debate to which my hon. and learned Friend replied. Yet throughout most of this subsequent debate the main subject has been, believe it or not, the principle of legally binding agreements. We have discussed this twice this evening, in two successive debates, and goodness knows how many times in the past 400-odd hours that this Bill has been before the House.
All right; if that is what hon. Members wish to debate over and over again, they are at liberty to do so. We have arranged the procedure to give the Opposition every opportunity. [An HON. MEMBER: "We are doing our best with the right hon. Gentleman's Bill".] I am not complaining. It is hon. Members opposite who make a habit of complaining that they never have a chance to get on to the new matters which they could discuss, yet, at the same time, they go on talking about some things over and over again, sawing sawdust, as I have said.
I shall not go into detail on the general principle again. I have done that several times already, and my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor-General did it earlier in the evening. I shall now take up some of the separate points which were raised. The hon. Member for Putney (Mr. Hugh

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Jenkins) asked me a question. I am sure that he quite well knew the answer when he asked it, but I shall give it none the less. Of course, if an employer makes an agreement with a union that he will employ only union members, he will lay himself open if he discriminates against a would-be employee by refusing to take him on, because of Clause 5 of the Bill. That is absolutely clear.
The right hon. Member for Jarrow (Mr. Fernyhough), in arguing against the principle, cited the experience of one of my most illustrious predecessors, Ernest Bevin, a man who will always rank among the most illustrious Ministers at my present Department. I take it that the right hon. Gentleman was thinking of the attempt to bring action against the Kent miners during the war. But, when he stops to think about it, he must know that that was an entirely different sort of law. Ernest Bevin at that time was trying to enforce a criminal law which laid down that it was illegal to strike. That is not a law which one can enforce. Perhaps one had to have that experience to discover that it is an unenforceable law, but it was discovered, and, because it was, there is nothing approaching a similar law in our Bill. Therefore, the experience of Ernest Bevin and the Kent miners is not remotely relevant to the sort of proposals which we are discussing now. They are as different as chalk and cheese.
Mr. Fernyhough: At a time when the whole nation believed that anything which offended against what one called the war effort was unpatriotic and pro-Hitler, even in those circumstances men felt so aggrieved that, despite the whole of public opinion and the law, they took that step. What I was trying to explain to the right hon. Gentleman is that there will be occasions when, despite any legally enforceable agreement, men will be so outraged and so frustrated that they will not consider what the consequences may be; and there will be consequences—they have been spelled out—if they do it.
An Hon. Member: Like the Upper Clyde, for instance.
Mr. Carr: We have never claimed, and I have often gone to the point of underlining that we have never claimed, that this or any law can create a state of perfection. We are talking about making
1488
things better or worse, about pressures and incentives to make things less imperfect in what, no doubt, will always be an imperfect world. We are talking about creating pressures and incentives to make things more nearly perfect, or less imperfect.
What the right hon. Gentleman says is right. He is right in our experience of contract law and the other fields in which people enter into binding agreements. Such agreements are sometimes broken. But, just because they are sometimes broken, it does not follow that they are without influence or that, if there were no binding agreements, there would not have been even more agreements broken than is the case now. The law has a general influence for the better, and people enter into agreements with more seriousness if they have the general belief that they are agreements which should not be broken and that, if they blatantly or carelessly break them, they may have to suffer some liability for the damage they cause to the other party by their action. We have discovered in every other sphere of human activity in this country, as other countries have discovered it in this sphere as well, that such liabilities on the whole leads to better, more precise agreements, which people think about more seriously before entering into them, and having entered into them they take marginally, but importantly, more care in trying to keep.
That is our claim, but we believe that it is important. It is why for many years we have been convinced that among the proposals—by no means alone, or even perhaps the most important single proposal—for the reform of industrial relations in this country, in a new legal framework, is the concept that both sides should in future come to the negotiating table with the presumption that unless they wish to say otherwise they will enter into an agreement that they will both feel bound to keep to the best of their ability. If we have that concept, of course we shall still have failures to keep agreements—employers will fail, trade union leaders will fail, shop stewards will fail. We shall go on failing, but perhaps a little less often than in recent years. If we can get even a marginal improvement, even a slide in the right direction of better agreements, better kept, it will be to the enormous

1489
benefit of this country and the people most directly involved.
That is what we are after here. Let the House remember, however sceptical hon. Members may be of things like public opinion polls—and we can all, thank goodness, be pretty sceptical of them—we have had opinion poll after opinion poll, taken by all sorts of different people and organisations, all of which have shown that the ordinary people of this country including the ordinary rank and file trade union members and industrial workers, all approve of this proposal—[Interruption.]—I should not have said that they all approve, but over and over again a substantial majority have said that they
approve. They may say that they do not like the Bill as a whole and that they do not like the Government of which I am a member, but over and over again, when the right hon. Lady and her party were in power, and still today, the polls have shown that a substantial majority believe that, among other proposals, the making of collective agreements legally binding is sensible and something they would like to see in this country. That is what we are providing.
Question put, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment:—
The House divided: Ayes 261, Noes 226.

Division No. 458.]

AYES

[11.13 p.m

Adley, Robert

Dean, Paul

Hiley, Joseph

Alison, Michael (Barkston Ash)

Deedes, Rt. Hn. W. F.

Hill, John E. B. (Norfolk, S.)

Allason, James (Hemel Hempstead)

Dixon, Piers

Hill, James (Southampton, Test)

Amery, Rt. Hn. Julian

Dodds-Parker, Douglas

Holt, Miss Mary

Astor, John

Douglas-Home, Rt. Hn. Sir Alec

Hooson, Emlyn

Atkins, Humphrey

Drayson, G. B.

Hordern, Peter

Awdry, Daniel

du Cann, Rt. Hn. Edward

Hornby, Richard

Baker, Kenneth (St. Marylebone)

Dykes, Hugh

Hornsby-Smith, Rt. Hn. Dame Patricia

Baker, W. H. K. (Banff)

Eden, Sir John

Howe, Hn. Sir Geoffrey (Reigate)

Balniel, Lord

Edwards, Nicholas (Pembroke)

Howell, David (Guildford)

Barber, Rt. Hn. Anthony

Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)

Howell, Ralph (Norfolk, N.)

Batsford, Brian

Elliott, R.W. (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, N.)

Hunt, John

Beamish, Col. Sir Tufton

Emery, Peter

Hutchison, Michael Clark

Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torquay)

Eyre, Reginald

James, David

Benyon, W.

Farr, John

Jessel, Toby

Berry, Hn. Anthony

Fell, Anthony

Johnson Smith, G. (E. Grinstead)

Biffen, John

Fenner, Mrs. Peggy

Jopling, Michael

Biggs-Davison, John

Fidler, Michael

Kershaw, Anthony

Blaker, Peter

Finsberg, Geoffrey (Hampstead)

Kilfedder, James

Boardman, Tom (Leicester, S.W.)

Fisher, Nigel (Surbiton)

King, Evelyn (Dorset, S.)

Body, Richard

Fookes, Miss Janet

King, Tom (Bridgwater)

Boscawen, Robert

Fortescue, Tim

Kinsey, J. R.

Bowden, Andrew

Fowler, Norman

Kirk, Peter

Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hn. John

Fox, Marcus

Kitson, Timothy

Braine, Bernard

Fraser, Rt. Hn. Hugh (St'fford & Stone)

Knox, David

Bray, Ronald

Fry, Peter

Lambton, Antony

Brinton, Sir Tatton

Galbraith, Hn. T. G.

Lane, David

Brocklebank-Fowler, Christopher

Gardner, Edward

Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry

Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)

Gibson-Watt, David

Le Marchant, Spencer

Bruce-Gardyne, J.

Gilmour, Ian (Norfolk, C.)

Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)

Bryan, Paul

Gilmour, Sir John (Fife, E.)

Lloyd, Ian (P'tsm'th, Langstone)

Buchanan-Smith, Alick (Angus, N & M)

Glyn, Dr. Alan

Longden, Gilbert

Buck, Antony

Godber, Rt. Hn. J. B.

Loveridge, John

Burden, F. A.

Goodhart, Philip

Luce, R. N.

Butler, Adam (Bosworth)

Goodhew, Victor

McAdden, Sir Stephen

Carlisle, Mark

Gorst, John

MacArthur, Ian

Carr, Rt. Hn. Robert

Grant, Anthony (Harrow, C.)

McCrindle, R. A.

Channon, Paul

Gray, Hamish

McLaren, Martin

Chapman, Sydney

Green, Alan

Maclean, Sir Fitzroy

Chichester-Clark, R.

Grieve, Percy

McMaster, Stanley

Clark, William (Surrey, E.)

Griffiths, Eldon (Bury St. Edmunds)

Macmillan, Maurice (Farnham)

Clarke, Kenneth (Rushcliffe)

Grylis, Michael

McNair-Wilson, Michael

Clegg, Walter

Gummer, Selwyn

McNair-Wilson, Patrick (NewForest)

Cockeram, Eric

Gurden, Harold

Maddan, Martin

Cooke, Robert

Hall, Miss Joan (Keighley)

Maginnis, John E.

Coombs, Derek

Hall, John (Wycombe)

Marten, Neil

Corfield, Rt. Hn. Frederick

Hall-Davis, A. G. F.

Mather, Carol

Cormack, Patrick

Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)

Maude, Angus

Costain, A. P.

Hannam, John (Exeter)

Mawby, Ray

Critchley, Julian

Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)

Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J.

Crouch, David

Haselhurst, Alan

Meyer, Sir Anthony

Curran, Charles

Havers, Michael

Mills, Peter (Torrington)

Davies, Rt. Hn. John (Knutsford)

Hayhoe, Barney

Mitchell, Lt.-Col. C. (Aberdeenshire, W)

d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry

Hicks, Robert

Mitchell, David (Basingstoke)

d'Avigdor-Coldsmid, Maj.-Gen. James

Higgins, Terence L.

Moate, Roger

Molyneaux, James

Rees-Davies, W. R.

Tebbit, Norman

Money, Ernie

Renton, Rt. Hn. Sir David

Temple, John M.

Monks, Mrs. Connie

Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon

Thomas, John Stradling (Monmouth)

Monro, Hector

Ridley, Hn. Nicholas

Thomas, Rt. Hn. Peter (Hendon, S.)

Montgomery, Fergus

Ridsdale, Julian

Tilney, John

More, Jasper

Roberts, Wyn (Conway)

Trafford, Dr. Anthony

Morgan-Giles, Rear-Adm.

Rost, Peter

Trew, Peter

Morrison, Charles (Devizes)

Russell, Sir Ronald

Tugendhat, Christopher

Mudd, David

St. John-Stevas, Norman

Turton, Rt. Hn. Sir Robin

Murton, Oscar

Scott, Nicholas

van Straubenzee, W. R.

Neave, Airey

Scott-Hopkins, James

Vaughan, Dr. Gerard

Noble, Rt. Hn. Michael

Sharples, Richard

Vickers, Dame Joan

Normanton, Tom

Shaw, Michael (Sc'b'gh & Whitby)

Waddington, David

Nott, John

Shelton, William (Clapham)

Walder, David (Clitheroe)

Onslow, Cranley

Oppenheim, Mrs. Sally

Simeons, Charles

Walker, Rt. Hn. Peter (Worcester)

Orr, Capt. L. P. S.

Skeet, T. H. H.

Walker-Smith, Rt. Hn. Sir Derek

Osborn, John

Smith, Dudley (W'wick & L'mington)

Wall, Patrick

Owen, Idris (Stockport, N.)

Soref, Harold

Ward, Dame Irene

Page, Graham (Crosby)

Speed, Keith

Weatherill, Bernard

Parkinson, Cecil (Enfield, W.)

Spence, John

Wells, John (Maidstone)

Peel, John

Sproat, Iain

White, Roger (Gravesend)

Percival, Ian

Stanbrook, Ivor

Whitelaw, Rt. Hn. William

Pink, R. Bonner

Stewart-Smith, D. G. (Belper)

Wiggin, Jerry

Pounder, Rafton

Stodart, Anthony (Edinburgh, W.)

Wilkinson, John

Powell, Rt. Hn. J. Enoch

Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir M.

Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick

Prior, Rt. Hn. J. M. L.

Stokes, John

Wood, Rt. Hn. Richard

Proudfoot, Wilfred

Stuttaford, Dr. Tom

Woodnutt, Mark

Pym, Rt. Hn Francis

Sutcliffe, John

Worsley, Marcus

Quennell, Miss J. M.

Tapsell, Peter

Wylie, Rt. Hn. N. R.

Raison, Timothy

Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)

Rawlinson, Rt. Hn. Sir Peter

Taylor, Edward M.(G'gow, Cathcart)

TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

Redmond, Robert

Taylor, Frank (Moss Side)

Mr. Paul Hawkins and

Reed, Laurance (Bolton, E.)

Taylor, Robert (Croydon, N.W.)

Mr. Hugh Rossi

NOES

Albu, Austen

Delargy, H. J.

Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas

Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)

Dell, Rt. Hn. Edmund

Howell, Denis (Small Heath)

Archer, Peter (Rowley Regis)

Dempsey, James

Huckfield, Leslie

Ashton, Joe

Doig, Peter

Hughes, Mark (Durham)

Atkinson, Norman

Douglas, Dick (Stirlingshire, E.)

Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen, N.)

Bagier, Gordon A. T.

Douglas-Mann, Bruce

Hughes, Roy (Newport)

Barnett, Guy (Greenwich)

Driberg, Tom

Hunter, Adam

Barnett, Joel

Duffy, A. E. P.

Irvine, Rt. Hn. Sir Arthur (Edge Hill)

Beany, Alan

Eadie, Alex

Jay, Rt. Hn. Douglas

Benn, Rt. Hn. Anthony Wedgwood

Edelman, Maurice

Jeger, Mrs. Lena (H'b'n & St. P'cras, S.)

Bennett, James (Glasgow, Bridgeton)

Edwards, Robert (Bilston)

Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)

Bidwell, Sydney

Edwards, William (Merioneth)

Jenkins, Rt. Hn. Roy (Stechford)

Bishop, E. S.

Ellis, Tom

John, Brynmor

Blenkinsop, Arthur

English, Michael

Johnson, Carol (Lewisham, S.)

Boardman, H. (Leigh)

Evans, Fred

Johnson, James (K'ston-on-Hull, W.)

Booth, Albert

Faulds, Andrew

Johnson, Walter (Derby, S.)

Bottomley, Rt. Hn. Arthur

Fernyhough, Rt. Hn. E.

Jones, Barry (Flint, E.)

Boyden, James (Bishop Auckland)

Fisher, Mrs. Doris (B'ham, Lady wood)

Jones, Dan (Burnley)

Bradley, Tom

Fitch, Alan (Wigan)

Jones, Rt. Hn. Sir Elwyn (W.Ham, S.)

Brown, Bob (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, W.)

Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)

Jones, Gwynoro (Carmarthen)

Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, Provan)

Foley, Maurice

Jones, T. Alec (Rhondda, W.)

Brown, Ronald (Shoreditch & F'bury)

Foot, Michael

Kaufman, Gerald

Buchan, Norman

Ford, Ben

Kelley, Richard

Buchanan, Richard (G'gow, Sp'burn)

Forrester, John

Kerr, Russell

Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)

Fraser, John (Norwood)

Kinnock, Neil

Callaghan, Rt. Hn. James

Freeson, Reginald

Lambie, David

Campbell, I. (Dunbartonshire, W.)

Galpern, Sir Myer

Latham, Arthur

Cant, R. B.

Garrett, W. E.

Lawson, George

Carmichael, Neil

Gilbert, Dr. John

Leadbitter, Ted

Carter-Jones, Lewis (Eccles)

Ginsburg, David

Lee, Rt. Hn. Frederick

Castle, Rt. Hn. Barbara

Golding, John

Leonard, Dick

Clark, David (Colne Valley)

Gordon Walker, Rt. Hn. P. C.

Lever, Rt. Hn. Harold

Cocks, Michael (Bristol, S)

Gourlay, Harry

Lewis, Arthur (W. Ham, N.)

Coleman, Donald

Grant, George (Morpeth)

Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)

Conlan, Bernard

Grant, John D. (Islington, E.)

Lipton, Marcus

Corbet, Mrs. Freda

Griffiths, Eddie (Brightside)

Loughlin, Charles

Cox, Thomas (Wandsworth, C.)

Hamilton, William (Fife, W.)

Lyon, Alexander W. (York)

Crawshaw, Richard

Hamling, William

Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.)

Cronin, John

Hannan, William (G'gow, Maryhill)

Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson

Cunningham, G. (Islington, S. W.)

Hardy, Peter

McBride, Neil

Dalyell, Tam

Harper, Joseph

McCartney, Hugh

Davidson, Arthur

Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)

McGuire, Michael

Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)

Hart, Rt. Hn. Judith

Mackenzie, Gregor

Davies, Ifor (Gower)

Hattersley, Roy

Mackie, John

Davis, Clinton (Hackney, C.)

Healey, Rt. Hn. Denis

Maclennan, Robert

Davis, Terry (Bromsgrove)

Heffer, Eric S.

McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.)

de Freitas, Rt. Hn. Sir Geoffrey

Horam, John

McNamara, J. Kevin

1492

1493

Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield, E.)

Parry, Robert (Liverpool, Exchange)

Stewart, Rt. Hn. Michael (Fulham)

Marks, Kenneth

Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred

Stoddart, David (Swindon)

Marquand, David

Pendry, Tom

Stonehouse, Rt. Hn. John

Marsden, F.

Pentland, Norman

Strang, Gavin

Marshall, Dr. Edmund

Perry, Ernest G.

Summerskill, Hn. Dr. Shirley

Mason, Rt. Hn. Roy

Prentice, Rt. Hn. Reg.

Thomas, Rt. Hn. George (Cardiff, W.)

Meacher, Michael

Prescott, John

Thomas, Jeffrey (Abertillery)

Mellish, Rt. Hn. Robert

Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)

Thomson, Rt. Hn. G. (Dundee, E.)

Mendelson, John

Probert, Arthur

Tinn, James

Millan, Bruce

Reed, D. (Sedgefield)

Torney, Tom

Miller, Dr. M. S.

Rees, Merlyn (Leeds, S.)

Tuck, Raphael

Milne, Edward (Blyth)

Rhodes, Geoffrey

Urwin, T. W.

Mitchell, R. C. (S'hampton, Itchen)

Richard, Ivor

Varley, Eric G.

Molloy, William

Roberts, Albert (Normanton)

Wainwright, Edwin

Morgan, Elystan (Cardiganshire)

Roberts, Rt. Hn. Goronwy (Caernarvon)

Walker, Harold (Doncaster)

Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)

Rodgers, William (Stockton-on-Tees)

Wallace, George

Morris, Charles R. (Opsnshaw)

Roper, John

Watkins, David

Morris, Rt. Hn. John (Aberavon)

Rose, Paul B.

Weitzman, David

Moyle, Roland

Sandelson, Neville

Wells, William (Walsall, N.)

Mulley, Rt. Hn. Frederick

Sheldon, Robert (Ashton-under-Lyne)

Whitehead, Phillip

Murray, Ronald King

Shore, Rt. Hn. Peter (Stepney)

Williams, Alan (Swansea, W.)

Ogden, Eric

Short, Mrs. Renée (W'hampton, N. E.)

Williams, Mrs. Shirley (Hitchin)

O'Halloran, Michael

Silkin, Hn. S. C. (Dulwich)

Wilson, Alexander (Hamilton)

O'Malley, Brian

Silverman, Julius

Wilson, William (Coventry, S.)

Oram, Bert

Skinner, Dennis

Woof, Robert

Orme, Stanley

Small, William

Oswald, Thomas

Smith, John (Lanarkshire, N.)

TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

Owen, Dr. David (Plymouth, Sutton)

Spearing, Nigel

Paget, R. T.

Spriggs, Leslie

Mr. Ernest Armstrong and

Palmer, Arthur

Stallard, A. W.

Mr. James Hamilton.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS BILL
  Clause 34

    BREACH OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT
    Lords Amendment: No. 65, in page 26, line 46, leave out from "action" to "that" in line 1 on page 27 and insert:
    "contrary to an undertaking given by that party and contained in the collective agreement or in".
    The Solicitor-General: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
    Mr. Speaker: It will be for the convenience of the House to discuss also Lords Amendment: No. 67, in page 27, line 15, at end insert:
    "() For the purposes of subsection (2) of this section action taken by a person other than the party who gave the undertaking in question (in this subsection referred to as "the contracting party") shall be regarded as action taken contrary to the undertaking if either—

    (a) it is action which, if taken by the contracting party, would have been a breach of the undertaking by the contracting party, or

    (b) it consists in doing that which, in accordance with the undertaking, was not to be done, or in not doing that which, in accordance with the undertaking, was to be done."

    The Solicitor-General: These two Amendments to Clause 34 are drafting Amendments, although plainly important ones. They do not change the purpose of Clause 34. They serve to remove doubts that have been expressed about whether the drafting fulfils the purpose.
    1494
    The House will remember that this Clause applies to collective agreements, and in particular Clause 34(2) applies to enforceable agreements made after the commencement of the Act. So that it deals only with legally binding obligations consciously entered into by the parties after the Act comes into force. The obligation contained in this Clause is that the parties to such a collective agreement should use their best endeavours to uphold that agreement by preventing action inconsistent with any undertaking contained in the agreement: In other words, to prevent or bring to an end action being taken by agents or members of the party which would, if taken by the party itself, amount to a breach of the agreement. That was and is the Government's intention in this Clause.
    The intention is that the parties should use their best endeavours to uphold an agreement; an aim to which all try to aspire. The effect of these Amendments is only to make more clear the Government's objective.
    The important point to appreciate is that the effect of the Amendments is to impose on the party to a collective agreement the obligation to use the best endeavours to prevent any action that would be a breach of an undertaking given by the party to the agreement; to prevent anything being done—or being left undone—that is contrary to the undertaking given by the contracting party.

    1495
    Some people have said it would be possible, and admissible in this context, to attach to a trade union or organisation of workers, or anybody else, an overriding responsibility from which it could not escape for the mass action of its members, whatever the terms of the contract it had entered into. That is not the intention or effect of this Clause and these Amendments.
    Let me illustrate the situation that could arise. If a collective agreement entered into with the intention that it should be binding after the commencement of the Act says that the party to the agreement shall not strike or lockout before going through procedure, then with an agreement of that kind if a strike or lock-out occurs, the party should be required to use its best endeavours to prevent or bring to an end an action on the part of its members or agents—in other words, to bring to an end that strike which was taking place in breach of the current terms of the agreement to that effect.
    If, on the other hand, the agreement said that the party would not call a strike or order a lock-out without the matter going through procedure, then the best endeavours obligation would be available to prevent any agent or member of the party calling a strike on behalf of its members before the agreed procedure was exhausted. But the best endeavours obligation will be limited to doing all that is reasonably practicable to prevent or bring to an end action, by or on behalf of the party, that is contrary to the undertaking given by the party set out in the agreement which was intended to be legally enforceable. It does not go beyond that.
    It does not attempt to reach the solutions suggested by some people or introduce the implications that arise in some other contexts, namely, that the organisation shall be automatically responsible, whatever it does or does not do, for the mass action of its members. All it does is to write in what the Government have always made plain is their intention. An obligation should rest on the party to an enforceable collective agreement to take all steps reasonably practicable to uphold and secure the performance of the agreement or undertaking that it has entered into or given. It is on that basis I
    1496
    commend these two Amendments to the House.
    11.30 p.m.
    Mr. John Prescott: I make it clear to begin with that it is with dislike and protest that I make these comments so briefly. Hon. Members opposite have accused us of making Second Reading speeches on this Clause, but there is here a substantial point which the House has not had the opportunity to consider adequately, and it includes issues concerning international trade unionism. Because of our desire to get on to more fundamental Amendments, I shall attempt to be brief, but I put it on record that many of us are having to curtail important points about various Clauses and Amendments.
    Again the hon. and learned Gentleman has given the impression that the Government are making a concession, that they are making the provision clear or tightening it up or giving a bit more protection to trade unionism. But the Government do not truly appreciate the full consequences of the Clause as it must be interpreted in the light of the practicalities of active trade unionism both in this country and abroad.
    Clause 36 places an obligation on the union which is a party to an agreement which it has been agreed shall be legally binding to attempt to see that it and its members observe it. The difficulties of the Amendments arise from the attempt to get appropriate drafting to meet a number of complex problems arising from that objective. Reading the debates in another place, one is considerably confused, particularly by the contradictory statements on the issue by the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor. If such an eminent legal authority makes mistakes of interpretation of the Clause, one hesitates oneself to attempt to interpret it.
    The Clause seeks to put the responsibility on the parties to an agreement to see that it is observed. It puts the responsibility on to the union to see that it takes all reasonable steps practically possible to ensure that the agreement is observed. If it does not take all reasonable steps to do so, that will be an unfair industrial practice. What is so onerous to us is that the union is being cast in the rôle of policeman. I have served on disciplinary committees and there has

    1497
    always seemed to me a conflict in such circumstances in that a democratic organisation, whose members electing its officials and pay contributions so that they can look after their interests, exercises disciplinary functions over the members. But the question of disciplinary procedures may be a controversial point for debate later.
    If the Amendment is accepted, subsection 2(a) will read:
    "of preventing persons acting or purporting to act on behalf of that party from taking any action contrary to an undertaking given by that party and contained in the collective agreement or in that part of the agreement, as the case may be;"
    Clearly an attempt is being made to make it clear that whoever is party to that agreement will be responsible for the conditions laid down in it and for seeing that they are observed. That is the intention of the Amendment.
    I should like to raise one point with the Solicitor-General. I make no apology for the fact that it is based on my seafaring experience. A seamen signs articles on a ship. That constitutes a contract of employment for him individually with the captain of the vessel. He will also hold a collective agreement with the company involved and he may hold a collective agreement with the industry through the Shipping Federation. A conflict may arise concerning the terms of his collective agreement and a notice of finishing in a period of three months may have to be given. The articles solely require him at his place of work to give 48 hours' notice. Which agreement will have to be applied when we talk about whether it is an unfair industrial practice to breach a collective agreement? I hope that the Solicitor-General does not say, as he said about the ballot, that we cannot continue to exempt seamen and that there are some people for whom it is difficult to compose a law.
    When we started these debates I said that other enactments had exempted seamen. If that logic was correct, then the hon. and learned Gentleman should have considered it must be so in this situation. But he has chosen to make the Bill fit the circumstances of the seamen, which is totally unjustifiable.
    The second Amendment raises the whole issue of international trade
    1498
    unionism, which has not been discussed due to the imposition of the guillotine. Subsection (3) is concerned with making it clear that in certain circumstances actions by persons other than those who gave the undertaking—in this case, the trade union which may be party to the signing of the collective agreement—can be treated as committing an unfair industrial practice if they breach the agreement. Therefore, there is concern to give a remedy to deal with those who originally were parties to the collective agreement.
    This is a substantial point. It concerns the whole rôle of international trade unionism. There are many international trade union bodies. One which will be readily known to the House is the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions which embraces metal, chemical and transport workers. It is important to understand this obligation within the concept of international trade unionism.
    The International Transport Federation has been in being since 1896. I think that the hon. Member for Derbyshire, South-East (Mr. Rost) is one of the auditors of that organisation. It has over 6 million members with unions in 80 countries representing 320 organisations in aviation, rail, transport and shipping.
    My section, shipping, resolved—this is important to the concept of international trade unionism—not to allow or to tolerate competition between maritime countries to be fought out on the backs of the seafarers. We sought to establish minimum standards internationally. It is important for trade unions in this sphere, because we face competition internationally. Companies can get foreign labour, which is cheaper, and that, therefore, puts us at a serious disadvantage. This applies not only to seamen, but to aviation and transport workers. However, it is more pertinent to seafarers who sail around the world. International trade unionism seeks minimum standards for all seamen. In many cases—for example, on Greek and Liberian ships—the captains pay very low wages and provide very little food. We have many examples of ships coming to this country, the crews of which have not been paid for months, have not been fed properly for a long period, and have no power to force their captains to pay their wages.
    The international trade union movement attempts, in those circumstances to

    1499
    use its influence and bring pressure to bear on those concerned. In the case that we are considering here, it is in Britain that this happens. If one of these vessels comes to one of our ports we, as a union, go on board to see the conditions. Sailors from Liberia and Greece can expect no help from their courts to force the company or the captain to pay their wages. To get that done we have to call on affiliated unions for help. To take this in the context of shipping, it means that we go to the dockers and say, "Will you support us? Do not service this ship. Pull off the dockers". We use that as a sanction against the owner to get him to pay the men their wages.
    Clauses 91, 92 and 93 deal with extraneous parties, but, due to the guillotine procedure, we shall not be able to debate them, and I must therefore raise the issue in the context of this Amendment. If a trade union such as the International Transport Federation were to call on another union to take the kind of action to which I have referred, what would happen? Let us suppose that there is a legally binding collective agreement, and the union wants to call on the dockers to withdraw their support. It will find itself in the position of saying that this cannot be done because to do it would breach a collective agreement and would mean committinig an unfair industrial practice.
    In those circumstances, because of the feeling among trade unionists, some people in the labour force will say, "This is our international trade union obligation. We intend to observe it, and we will refuse to service this ship". The union will be placed in a dilemma. It is supposed to be able to take all reasonable practicable steps to see that its members observe the collective agreement, but at the same time it will know that it is denying its obligation to the rest of the international trade union movement, which is to assist other trade unionists who find themselves in difficult circumstances.
    The Clause will make it difficult, in fact almost impossible, for any help to be given to those who desperately need it. An essential principle of trade unionism is to help people who find themselves in that kind of situation, and I ask the
    1500
    Solicitor-General to reply to the points that I have raised.
    Mr. John Fraser: I should like to take up what the Secretary of State said with some fervour towards the end of this speech. He said that the Government might fail, but that they would fail a little less than the Opposition had failed when they were in power. I think that the right hon. Gentleman is going to fail even more, because the point that is dealt with in the Amendment was considered by Donovan, and in paragraph 1054 on page 268 the Commission came to the conclusion that
    "A measure which had the effect of putting on unions a legal obligation to use their best endeavours to secure the observance of procedure agreements would be more likely to lead to internal union disruption than to fewer unofficial strikes."
    The likelihood is that this kind of provision will either increase the number of disputes, or decrease the number of agreements being entered into. That is what we are faced with, and the Secretary of State says that this kind of Clause has the support of working men. I have been out canvassing a great deal, and in response to inquiries on doorsteps I have not heard any working men talking about Clauses 32, 33 or 34.
    The Secretary of State's allegation reminded me of the story of Serjeant Sullivan when he appeared before the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords. When asked by one of the Law Lords whether his client had ever heard of the maxim volenti non fit injuria, he replied, "In the little village in Ireland where my client comes from they talk of little else".
    11.45 p.m.
    Mr. Ronald King Murray: My hon. Friend is right in referring to Serjeant Sullivan, but I understand that the maxim he quoted was not the one that my hon. Friend has given us, but "Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas" which, freely translated, is, "Mind your own business, and do not harm your neighbour". I suspect that it was the free translation which was the topic of conversation in the village referred to.
    Mr. Fraser: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that correction. It may be that in the little village of Lambeth, from which I come, they talk of nothing else but Schedule 6.
    The Solicitor-General: Does the hon. Member wish to intervene?
    Mr. David Mitchell: My reason for seeking to interject was the hon. Member's suggestion that the Secretary of State had no backing for his contention that binding agreements had widespread support among trade unionists. I would have thought that the fact that the Daily Mirror—hardly a Conservative newspaper—carried out the largest poll ever conducted of trade unionists and found that over 70 per cent. favoured binding agreements would have been something that he ought not to have overlooked.
    Mr. Fraser: I prefer to believe the evidence of Donovan and its considered opinion on this point, which I have quoted, to the opinion given in a public opinion poll. I do not know whether the hon. Member will tell the House at some stage that if the majority of the people of this country, in a public opinion poll, are against going into the Common Market, we should not do so. Will he suggest that? Otherwise it is no good praying in aid a public opinion poll on this issue.
    The Solicitor-General dealt with the kind of undertaking that might appear in an agreement—an undertaking not to strike. I believe that this provision is unfair because, first, not only does it apply to trade unions but it means that a trade union commits an unfair industrial practice if it does not prevent people from purporting to act on behalf of it in breach of an undertaking. In other words, the trade union is fixed with an obligation to take proceedings against people acting entirely outside the scope of its authority. It seems unfair, in that it provides that the union should take action against its own members, and that is likely to lead to appalling union dissensions, as Donovan said.
    Let us examine the position of a trade union if it is to be faced with a possible action for damages for failing to prevent other people from breaching the agreement. It will lead to less effective and not more effective agreements. That is the point that the Government seem to have missed all the way through. Donovan points out that trade unions infrequently breach undertakings contained in
    1502
    agreements, but they are often breached by other people.
    The fact is that this obligation upon a trade union will diminish the chances of reaching agreement and not increase them. It is like asking the bride at a wedding, "Do you promise to love, honour and obey?" and when the bride says "Yes", the vicar says, "That means that you have to undertake to prevent your mother-in-law from interfering, as well." That is the conclusion.
    Mr. Rose: I wish it were!
    Mr. Fraser: The result will be to diminish the effectiveness of agreements and not to increase it. We shall not vote against this, because if we were to defeat the Amendment we would simply have something even worse. That is our dilemma, but we disagree fundamentally with this approach and with the philosophy of the Clause.
    The Solicitor-General: If I may reply, with leave of the House—but not to deal with the general arguments of the hon. Member for Norwood (Mr. John Fraser), with the literate support of his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Edinburgh, Leith (Mr. Ronald King Murray). On that front, I would feel obliged to start my observations in Latin, but I do not feel up to that at this time of night.
    The hon. Member for Kingston-upon-Hull, East (Mr. Prescott) asked two questions which he is entitled to have answered. The first was about the impact of this obligation where an individual seaman is bound by articles with a 48 hour notice provision, but is also employed in a situation to which a collective agreement with a long notice provision applies.
    In this context the obligation is only placed upon the party to the collective agreement—the union or organisation—in respect of action which would be a breach of the collective agreement. So it is that agreement and only that agreement which affects the obligations of the union. It cannot be expected to enforce or uphold varying or shorter or inconsistent obligations applying in individual contracts of employment which are nothing to do with the collective agreement.
    As for his question about international trade unionism, again the agreement with which he was concerned, I understand,

    1503
    was the agreement made by the shore-based union in respect of dock workers who are required by their international obligations, as he puts it, to refuse to unload the ship. If the union concerned had entered into a legally enforceable agreement, including a no-strike clause, it would in doing so, presumably, have chosen to disregard its obligations, however they may be defined, in the international trade union movement. But one might then wonder about its wisdom in making an agreement inconsistent with the international brotherhood of which the hon. Member spoke when it would be subject to the obligation to comply with the legally enforceable agreement into which it had entered. It would be binding on it to the extent that it had agreed to make it binding and only to that extent.
    Mrs. Castle: But could not the Government's Bill mean that it could have a no-strike clause imposed upon it under a procedure agreement?
    The Solicitor-General: That is entirely right, but the union would be free, would it not, to make the collective agreement into which it had entered consistent with its international obligations? It could also, possibly, be subject to an agreement containing a clause of this kind under Clause 39 if previously the situation had been one of persistent and chronic strike action, which called for the inclusion of such a clause in such an agreement.
    The reaction of the hon. Member for Norwood, I understood, was friendly and receptive——
    Mr. John Fraser indicated dissent.
    The Solicitor-General:—because he said it replaced something which he regarded with less enthusiasm than the Amendment itself. It is on that basis that I commend the Amendment to the House.
    Question put and agreed to.
    Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

  Clause 36

    PROVISION FOR EXTENDING SCOPE OF REFERENCE UNDER S. 35
    Lords Amendment: No. 68, in page 28, line 42, after ("Commission") insert
    1504
    ("after consultation with the employer and with any trade union appearing to the Commission to be likely to be affected")
    Mr. Dudley Smith: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
    Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Robert Grant-Ferris): I suggest that it will be for the convenience of the House if we also discuss Lords Amendment No. 73, in page 32, line 18, leave out ("section 35(2)") and insert ("sections 35(2) and 36(1)").
    Mr. Dudley Smith: These Amendments have the purpose of an official Opposition Amendment in another place that the Commission on Industrial Relations should be required to consult those likely to be affected by any proposals in process of being formulated for extending the scope of reference in Clause 35. Amendment No. 73 is consequential, ensuring that where a reference concerns a composite unit, the requirement to consult under Amendment No. 68 shall be in respect of each employer in that composite unit.
    In another place the Opposition contended that Clause 36 might lead to the employer and trade unions concerned not being consulted by the C.I.R. about its proposals for extending the unit of employment, and the Amendment defines the extent of the requirement more precisely, thus ensuring that it is not interpreted too narrowly.
    I accept that the Opposition do not agree with these general proposals in the Clause, but I hope they will accept that this makes the position easier and fairer, particularly for the trade unions.
    Question put and agreed to.
    Lords Amendment: No. 69, in page 29, line 6, at end insert:
    "(In the opinion of the Commission)".
    The Solicitor-General: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
    Mr. Deputy Speaker: It will be convenient to discuss at the same time Lords Amendment No. 84, in page 35, line 30, at end insert:
    "(In the opinion of the Commission)".
    The Solicitor-General: These Amendments are in line with the last Amendments with which the House dealt. When

    1505
    the Commission on Industrial Relations is making a proposal which might affect a union or person not before it, and it fails to consult such a body or person, the words
    "In the opinion of the Commission".
    in Clause 36 and Clause 45 will be relevant. They will ensure that if the Commission makes its honest judgment of the people who should be given notice of the proposals, either the original ones or as a result of the extension of the reference, then the opinion of the Commission should prevail so as to prevent the possibility of it being challenged on a technicality or formality. They are, therefore, drafting Amendments to make the position clearer.
    Question put and agreed to.

  Clause 37

    ACTION BY COMMISSION FOR PROMOTING SETTLEMENT OF QUESTION REFERRED UNDER S. 35.
    Lords Amendment: No. 70 in page 30, line 1, leave out from ("be") to ("parties") in line 3, and insert:
    (" (a) those appearing to the Commission to be ").
    Mr. Dudley Smith: I beg to move. That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
    Mr. Deputy Speaker: It will be for the convenience of the House if we also discuss Lords Amendments No. 71, in page 30, line 6, leave out (" any other persons ") and insert:
    "('such other persons (if any)')"
    and No. 72, in page 30, line 7, leave out (" who ") and insert:
    "(' as in the Commission's opinion ')".
    Mr. Dudley Smith: These three Amendments are linked and their combined effect is to correct an inadvertent grammatical error in the provision in a way which will give the C.I.R. the maximum freedom of choice in the naming of the appropriate parties to further proceedings under the Clause. There is no political significance in this group of Amendments, which is designed to make a non-controversial correction.
    Question put and agreed to.
    Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.
    It being Twelve o'clock, further consideration of the Lords Amendments to the Bill stood adjourned, pursuant to the Orders [25th January and 28th July].
    Lords Amendments to be further considered this day.

CIVIL AVIATION BILL
Lords Amendments considered.
CIVIL AVIATION BILL
  Clause 3

    GENERAL OBJECTIVES, AND GUIDANCE BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE
    Lords Amendment: No. 1, in page 3, line 12, leave out "and".
    12.5 a.m.
    The Minister for Trade (Mr. Michael Noble): I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
    Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Robert Grant-Ferris): I suggest that with this Amendment the House should take Lords Amendment No. 2, in line 18, at end insert—
    "and;
    (d) subject to the preceding paragraphs, to further the reasonable interests of users of air transport services;".
    Mr. Noble: The purpose of these Amendments is to make specific reference to consumer interests in this section of the Bill, a desire which was expressed in this House and in the other place.
    Question put and agreed to.
    Subsequent Lords Amendment agreed to.

  Clause 5

    SPECIAL PROVISIONS AS RESPECTS CERTAIN FUNCTIONS
    Lords Amendment: No. 3, in page 5, line 24, leave out "1958" and insert "1971".
    Mr. Noble: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
    Mr. Deputy Speaker: I suggest that the House should discuss at the same

    1507
    time Lords Amendment No. 4, in line 31, leave out "5" and insert "8".
    Mr. Noble: These are minor and consequential Amendments arising solely because of the replacement of the Tribunals and Inquiries Act, 1958 by the Act of 1971.
    Question put and agreed to.
    Subsequent Lords Amendment agreed to.

  Clause 6

    GENERAL FINANCIAL DUTIES
    Lords Amendment: No. 5, in page 5, line 38, after "revenue" insert:
    "(including any grant towards revenue made to it in pursuance of section 10(1) of this Act)".
    Mr. Noble: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
    This Amendment makes it clear that the reference to "revenue" in subsection (1) may include sums from public funds made in pursuance of Clause 10. The Authority will therefore be able to meet the duty of balancing its books, taking one year with another, from the outset.
    Question put and agreed to.

  Clause 14

    ACQUISITION OF LAND ETC.
    Lords Amendment: No. 6, in page 12, line 14, at end insert:
    "; and subsections (1) and (2) of section 158 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1962 (which relate to telegraphic lines of the Post Office affected by the stopping up, diversion or improvement of a highway in pursuance of an order under section 153 of that Act) shall have effect as if references to an order under section 153 of that Act included references to an order under the said section 28 as applied by this section."
    Mr. Noble: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
    Mr. Deputy Speaker: I suggest that with this Amendment the House should discuss Lords Amendment No. 7, in line 38, at end, insert:
    "and for the references to subsections (1) and (2) of section 158 of the Town and Country
    1508
    Planning Act 1962 and to section 153 of that Act there shall be substituted respectively references to subsections (2) and (3) of section 111 of the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1947 and to section 46 of that Act."
    And Lords Amendment No. 8, in line 44, at end insert:
    "and in the application of subsection (6) of this section to Northern Ireland for the references to subsections (1) and (2) of section 158 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1962 and to section 153 of that Act there shall be substituted respectively references to subsection (2) of section 41 of the Roads Act (Northern Ireland) 1948 and to section 17 of that Act."
    Mr. Noble: These are technical Amendments to enable the Minister of Posts and Telecommunications to have control over telegraphic lines. The Amendments bring the Bill into the same category as the Highways Act, 1971, the Town and Country Planning Act, 1962, and the provisions of the Post Office Act, 1969.
    Question put and agreed to.
    Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

  Clause 24

    SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS RELATING TO AIR TRANSPORT LICENSING
    Lords Amendment: No. 10, in page 25 line 35, at end insert:
    "and the Secretary of State shall, when considering whether to give a direction in pursuance of regulations made by virtue of paragraph (b) of this subsection and when considering the terms of any such direction, have regard in particular to the duties imposed on the Authority by section 3 of this Act."
    Mr. Noble: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
    The imposition by the Amendment of a duty on the Secretary of State to have regard to these matters represents a significant step in underlining the Authority's independence. This is something which both Houses requested.
    Mr. Bruce Millan: I welcome the Amendment. The question of appeals was discussed at considerable length in Committee and in the other place. We were not in the least bit happy with the Clause as it was originally drafted. This is an improvement, although it does not go anything

    1509
    like as far as the improvement that which we on this side would have liked to have made. The cross-reference in the appeals section to the guidance and the duties imposed on the authority by Clause 3 represents a considerable improvement. I hope that in practice it will mean that appeals on licensing matters will not be as wide open as the Clause as at present drafted would seem to permit.
    Question put and agreed to.

  Clause 26

    REGULATION OF PROVISION OF ACCOMMODATION IN AIRCRAFT
    Lords Amendments: No. 11, in page 27, line 16, leave out paragraph (d) and insert:
    "(d) for appeals against refusals, variations, suspensions or revocations of licences to lie to a prescribed body or person (which may be a court, a Minister of the Crown, a body or person constituted or appointed by or under the regulations or such other body or person as the Secretary of State thinks fit) and for applying the provisions of an enactment, with or without modifications, in relation to such appeals;"
    Mr. Noble: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
    This is another Amendment on the question of appeals. There is, I believe, a need to examine in some depth with those principally concerned the precise grounds for appeal and to whom the appeal would lie. The Amendment gives the necessary width to do this at the appropriate stage.
    Mr. Millan: I do not object to this Amendment because it gives a certain flexibility which is not in the Bill at the moment. But I must say that I think it is rather unsatisfactory that when this Bill is at this very late stage we should have an Amendment which leaves the whole question of appeals under the Clause very vague. We do not know now whether an appeal will be to the courts or to the Minister or to some specially constituted body.
    There is, perhaps, a case for the Government thinking again about this, but I must say that I think it is very unsatisfactory that when one considers
    1510
    the whole genesis of this Bill—the Edwards Committee's Report, the Labour Party White Paper and the tremendous amount of discussion that we had—we should be faced with a power on the part of the Minister, after the Bill has become an Act, to decide the question of appeal.
    I do not want to sound churlish, but I think the Minister will agree that this is rather an unsatisfactory situation. However, I do not object to it because I think it will give everybody a chance to have second thoughts about it, but I think it is a pity that it was not more carefully considered before this late stage.
    Mr. Noble: I take the hon. Gentleman's point. Perhaps I should have pointed out that this Amendment merely gives powers, but hon. Members will have a further opportunity of considering the Government's proposals. They will have to be set out in regulations at the appropriate time. Therefore, another opportunity does exist.
    Question put and agreed to.

  Clause 27

    DESIGN, CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE OF AIRCRAFT
    Lords Amendment: No. 12, in page 28, line 14, at end insert:
    "and, if the advice was given in consequence of consultations required by virtue of this subsection, to publish particulars of the case forthwith in the prescribed manner".
    Mr. Noble: I beg to move, That this House agrees with the Lords in the said Amendment.
    This Amendment will require the Authority to publish forthwith particulars of any case on which they are obliged to consult the Airworthiness Requirements Board but decline to proceed in accordance with the advice given. This Amendment was requested by both sides of the Committee and I am glad to recommend the Amendment.
    Question put and agreed to.
    Lords Amendment: No. 13, in page 29, line 6, leave out "one member of the board as the chairman of" and insert
    "as the chairman of the board a member of it nominated by"
    Mr. Noble: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
    This is another Amendment relating to the Airworthiness Requirements Board and again is in response to requests from hon. Members on both sides of this House and, indeed, in another place, that the Chairman of the Board should be nominated by it.
    Mr. Millan: Again I welcome the Amendment which meets a point that the Opposition put in Committee, not in exactly the same terms but with the same purpose in mind. Taken with the previous Amendment, these two Amendments will be quite a considerable addition to the powers of the Airworthiness Requirements Board. Hon. Members who have followed our proceedings will welcome both these Amendments. We are grateful to the Minister for thinking again on these matters.
    Question put and agreed to.

  Clause 29

    REGULATION OF NOISE AND VIBRATION FROM AIRCRAFT
    Lords Amendment: No. 14, in page 31, line 45, at end insert—
    "(5A) The duties imposed by subsections (I) to (3) and (5) of this section in relation to aerodromes in Scotland shall be enforceable by order of the Court of Session on an application by or on behalf of the Secretary of State under section 91 of the Court of Session Act 1868."
    Mr. Noble: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
    This is a rather technical Amendment to bring the remedies available in Scotland for the enforcement of the duties under this Clause roughly into line with those available in England and Wales.
    Question put and agreed to.
    Lords Amendment: No. 15, in page 33, line 13, leave out from "which" to "is" in line 15.
    Mr. Noble: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
    This permits the powers of Clause 29 to be invoked in respect of any aerodrome. This is something which many
    1512
    hon. Members asked me to do. I had and still have some reservations as to how much we shall be able to do, but it meets the wishes of many hon. Members in this House and in the other place.
    Mr. Millan: I welcome this Amendment which gives an additional flexibility to the Clause and does not exclude private aerodromes. This is the right step to take and I know that hon. Gentlemen on both sides who have these noise problems will very much welcome the Amendment.
    Mr. Cranley Onslow: These are all very good Amendments but this is a particularly sensible one and on behalf of my hon. Friend the Member for Chertsey (Mr. Grylls) and myself I would like that to be recorded.
    Question put and agreed to.

  Clause 30

    MANAGEMENT ETC.
    Lords Amendment: No. 16 in page 34, line 3, at beginning insert:
    "Subject to the preceding section"
    Mr. Noble: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
    This is purely technical.
    Question put and agreed to.

  Clause 33

    PROVISION BY THE AUTHORITY OF ASSISTANCE ETC. FOR SECRETARY OF STATE AND OTHERS
    Lords Amendment: No. 17, in page 37, line 13, leave out "the following subsection" and insert
    "subsection (2) of this section"
    Mr. Noble: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
    Mr. Deputy Speaker: We shall consider at the same time the following three further Lords Amendments:
    No. 18, in page 37, line 17, at end insert—
    "(1A). Without prejudice to the preceding subsection, it shall also be the duty of the Authority—

    (a) to consider what aerodromes are in its opinion likely to be required from time

    1513
    to time in the United Kingdom in addition to or in place of or by way of alteration of existing aerodromes; and

    (b) to make recommendations to the Secretary of State arising out of its consideration of that matter;

    and it shall be the duty of the Secretary of State to publish the recommendations (except any of them of which the publication appears to him unnecessary) in such manner as he considers appropriate for bringing them to the notice of the public".
    No. 19, in page 37, line 18, leave out "the preceding subsection" and insert:
    "subsection (1) of this section".
    No. 20, in page 37, line 33, after "section," insert:
    "and in performing the duty imposed on it by subsection (1A) of this section".
    I should acquaint the House that there is a question of Privilege involved in Lords Amendments Nos. 18 and 20.
    Mr. Noble: These Amendments were put down in order to give the Authority the necessary powers and, perhaps, the duty to help the Secretary of State when there is any question of the planning of airports. This is generally called the National Airports Plan, though this title is in many ways a misnomer.
    Mr. Millan: I would certainly not object to this series of Amendments but I find it extraordinary that they should be to Clause 33. I had it in mind in earlier discussions that somewhere, subsumed in the general powers and duties that we were giving to the Civil Aviation Authority, there was a duty to look at the question of airport planning. I have never actually seen it stated explicitly in the Bill but I assumed that it was included in some of the general powers. That was the general assumption on both sides of the Committee in considering the Bill.
    There is something to be said for setting this out specifically in the Bill because there is a certain amount of concern, for example, in the British Airports Authority that the Civil Aviation Authority may not give a great deal of priority to airport planning, and that would be a great pity. That being so, I find it difficult to understand that this Amendment should be to Clause 33 and not to a much earlier Clause in which we specify the general duties of the Civil Aviation Authority. I am not altogether happy that this important provision should seem to be tucked away later in the Bill as a kind of afterthought. Having
    1514
    said that, however, I believe that it is an improvement which we should have in the Bill even though it is inappropriately placed.
    Question put and agreed to.
    Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to [Special Entry.]

  Clause 35

    PROVISION BY OTHERS OF INFORMATION FOR THE AUTHORITY AND SECRETARY OF STATE.
    Lords Amendment: No. 21, in page 40, line 5, at end insert "or an associated state".
    Mr. Noble: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
    This Amendment is purely technical, as is Lords Amendment No. 22, in page 41, line 12, at end insert "or an associated state", which goes with it.
    Question put and agreed to.
    Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

  Clause 41

    BORROWING BY THE BOARD
    12.15 a.m.
    Lords Amendment: No. 23, in page 46, line 19, leave out "any purpose" and insert "performing its functions".
    Mr. Noble: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
    Would it be convenient, Mr. Deputy Speaker, to take at the same time the following two further Lords Amendments:
    No. 33, in page 91, line 48, leave out from "and" to end of line 49 and insert
    "for the words from 'as' to 'discharging' there shall be substituted the words 'in sterling or other currencies as the corporation may require for performing'".
    No. 34, in page 92, line 10, leave out "any purpose" and insert "performing their functions".
    Mr. Deputy Speaker: Yes, if that be the wish of the House.
    Mr. Noble: All three are purely drafting Amendments.
    Question put and agreed to.

  Clause 53

    ACCOUNTS AND AUDIT
    Lords Amendment: No. 24, in page 53, line 7, leave out "and Corporate".
    Mr. Noble: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
    This is a technical Amendment.
    Question put and agreed to.

  Schedule 1

    ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO CONSTITUTION, ETC., OF CLVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY.
    Lords Amendment: No. 25, in page 65, line 21, at end insert:
    "or employed by the Authority in pursuance of paragraph 13A of this Schedule."
    Mr. Noble: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
    Mr. Deputy Speaker: We shall take at the same time the following two further Lords Amendments:—
    No. 26, in page 65, line 26, at end insert:
    "; and before the Secretary of State approves in pursuance of this sub-paragraph the terms of a contract to be offered to a person employed in employment to which paragraph I of Schedule 9 to this Act applies it shall be the duty of the Secretary of State to satisfy himself that those terms, taken as a whole, are not less favourable to that person than the terms ogn which he is employed as aforesaid on the date when the offer is made."
    No. 27, in page 66, line 5, at end insert:
    "13A.—(1) Notwithstanding anything in the last two preceding paragraphs, it shall be the duty of the Authority to make, to each person who at the passing of this Act and on such subsequent date as the Secretary of State may determine is employed by a relevant body, an offer of employment by the Authority on terms which, taken as a whole, are not less favourable to that person than the terms on which he is employed by the relevant body on the date when the offer is made; and an offer made in pursuance of this paragraph shall not be revocable during the period of three months beginning with the date on which the offer is made.
    (2) In the preceding sub-paragraph "relevant body" means a body which by virtue of section 27(1) of this Act is to cease or has ceased to have functions conferred on it in pursuance of section 7 of the Civil Aviation Act 1949."
    Mr. Noble: These changes have been made to give effect to assurances which I have already given that the staff of the Air Registration Board and civil servants transferred to the Authority will be offered terms and conditions at least as good as those which they had in the Air Registration Board or as civil servants. The third Amendment provides also for the staff of the Air Registration Board to be offered employment by the Authority. The success of the Authority will depend upon its staff, and I commend these Amendments, therefore, to the House.
    Mr. Millan: I welcome these Amendments. I shall not be so uncharitable at this hour to quote back to the right hon. Gentleman the reasons which he gave in Committee for saying that they were unnecessary and undesirable when we attempted to make similar suitable provision. I simply welcome his conversion to the idea that the Amendments should be made, and I am glad to see them.
    Question put and agreed to.
    Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

  Schedule 3

    LAND AND RIGHTS OVER LAND
    Lords Amendment: No. 28, in page 71, line 10, leave out "was" and insert "is".
    Mr. Noble: I beg to move. That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
    This merely corrects a small grammatical error.
    Question put and agreed to.

  Schedule 9

    TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS
    Lords Amendment: No. 29, in page 86, line 49, at end insert—
    "3A.—(1) For the purposes of paragraph 10(2) of Schedule 1 to the Contracts of Employment Act 1963 and section 13(1) of the Redundancy Payments Act 1965 (which relate to changes of ownership of businesses), there shall be deemed to be transferred to the Authority on the appointed day the business of any body which by virtue of section 27(1) of this Act is to cease or has ceased to have functions conferred on it in pursuance of

    1517
    section 7 of the Civil Aviation Act 1949; and a body whose business is deemed for those purposes to be transferred by virtue of this paragraph shall on the appointed day be deemed for the purposes of the said section 13(1) to terminate in connection with the transfer its contracts of employment with persons employed by it immediately before the appointed day.
    (2) In the application of the preceding subparagraph to Northern Ireland, for the reference to the said Act of 1963 and the references to section 13(1) of the said Act of 1965 there shall be substituted respectively a reference to the Contracts of Employment and Redundancy Payments Act (Northern Ireland) 1965 and references to section 23(1) of the last-mentioned Act."
    Mr. Noble: I beg to move. That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
    Subparagraph (1) of the new paragraph ensures that service of employees of the Air Registration Board who are later in the employment of the Civil Aviation Authority counts as continuous with service with the Authority for the purpose of the Contracts of Employment Act, 1963, and the Redundancy Payments Act, 1965. I am sure that the House will agree that this is right.
    Question put and agreed to.

  Schedule 10

    MINOR AND CONSEQUENTIAL AMENDMENTS OF ENACTMENTS
    Lords Amendment: No. 30, in page 88, line 15, after "19" insert
    "of the Ministry of Supply Act 1939".
    Mr. Noble: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
    This merely adds the words in the subheading to the text of the Bill and so is drafting.
    Question put and agreed to.
    Lords Amendment: No. 31, in page 89, line 31, leave out from "words," to end of line 33 and insert:
    ""approved under the Convention "there shall be substituted the words" which are either—

    (i) approved under any international agreement to which the United Kingdom is a party, or

    (ii) in the opinion of the Minister likely to be approved, before or within one month after the date when the regulations come
    1518
    into force, under any international agreement to which the United Kingdom is likely to be a party before or within one month after that date;"".

    Mr. Noble: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
    This Amendment enables regulations for the payment of navigation services charges to Eurocontrol under an international agreement to be made in advance of the United Kingdom bet-coming a party to the agreement if the Secretary of State considers that the United Kingdom is likely to be a party before or within one month after the date when the regulations will come into force. It is a somewhat technical Amendment.
    Question put and agreed to.
    Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.
    Lords Amendment: No. 36, in page 93, line 44, before second "the" insert "under".
    Mr. Noble: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
    Mr. Deputy Speaker: We may conveniently take at the same time Lords Amendment No. 37, in page 93, line 46, before "any" insert
    "or likely to be approved under".
    Mr. Millan: I am in some difficulty here. I do not understand these Amendments and I think that there must have been a misprint somewhere. Amendment No. 36 refers us to the second "the" in line 44. I can see only one "the" in that line. The second Amendment also does not seem to make sense. I do not believe that we can agree to the Amendments, because they will make the paragraph a nonsense. I am sorry that I have not been able to give the right hon. Gentleman notice of this point.
    Mr. Noble: I am sorry that I cannot give the hon. Gentleman the answer at this very short notice. In my list the Amendments were bracketed with No. 31.
    Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. May I help the House? The hon. Gentleman may be under a misapprehension. As far as we can make out from the Chair, the Amendment is correctly worded.
    Mr. Millan: I should be grateful if someone could explain why that should be so.
    Mr. Deputy Speaker: May I point out that the reference in the Lords Amendment is to the Bill as first printed by the Lords? Perhaps that is how the hon. Gentleman's difficulty arises.
    Mr. Millan: I understand that the Amendments refer to Bill 194, which is what I have in my hand, and if the two Amendments are made to Bill 194 they do not appear to make sense. Perhaps the Minister can explain it to me from his copy. The first Amendment is completely defective, because there is no second "the" to insert any word before. I see that the hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Onslow) agrees with me. The second is also defective, because if we insert the words we have an absolute nonsense. Something must have gone wrong with the printing. I am sorry if this is an embarrassment to the Government.
    Mr. Noble: I wish that I could help the hon. Gentleman more. I am told that the Amendments are correct in relation to the Bill to which they aim to be made. I agree that in my copy of the Bill line 44 has only one "the", but that may not be the copy of the Bill to which the Amendments are being made.
    Mr. Onslow: I think that the hon. Member for Glasgow, Craigton (Mr. Millan) is under a misapprehension about the second Amendment, because it makes a sort of sense, but he must be right about the first, because there is only one "the" in the line. No doubt there is a Bill somewhere which has the necessary word. I only regret that my right hon. Friend has been able to obtain a copy but the Vote Office was not able to supply hon. Members with it.
    Mr. Noble: The appropriate copy of the Bill has now arrived in my hands, and there are two "the"s in the line. If I hand my copy to the hon. Gentleman he will see that the Amendment was technically correct, and I believe makes sense.
    Mr. Millan: I am sorry if I caused a little confusion, particularly at this time of night. Now that I have seen the appropriate copy I think that I understand that the Amendments may indeed make some sense. Not all Government
    1520
    Amendments do, but I think that I have been under a misapprehension, and I apologise to the House.
    Mr. Deputy Speaker: I thank the hon. Gentleman for his characteristic courtesy.
    Question put and agreed to.
    Remaining Lords Amendment agreed to.

INFLAMMABLE SUBSTANCES (ROAD CONVEYANCE)
12.25 a.m.
Mr. Merlyn Rees: I beg to move,
That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty praying that the Inflammable Substances (Conveyance by Road) (Labelling) Regulations 1971 (S.I., 1971, No. 1062), dated 28th June 1971, a copy of which was laid before this House on 8th July, be annulled.
I hope, Mr. Deputy Speaker, that it will be for the convenience of the House if we take at the same time the second Motion,
That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty praying that the Inflammable Liquids (Conveyance by Road) Regulations 1971 (S.I., 1971, No. 1061), dated 28th June 1971, a copy of which was laid before this House on 8th July, be annulled
Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Robert Grant-Ferris)Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Robert Grant-Ferris) indicated assent.
Mr. Rees: I am obliged.
We wish to probe to ascertain the Government's intention in the Regulations on the important matter of the carriage of dangerous substances through the streets of towns, possibly affecting many of our constituents. The Regulations to which the first Motion relates deal with the labelling of inflammable substances for conveyance by road.
When an accident occurs to a vehicle which is carrying poisons, it is important that doctors and firemen should know what is contained in the tank. I know that there is a great deal of training for firemen in this respect, because increasingly nowadays they are engaged not in putting out fires but in dealing with accidents, particularly on motorways.
Given the labelling, how is the fire service kept informed of the changing nature of the liquids that are carried? It is important not simply that there

1521
should be labelling, but that it should be meaningful to those who function after an accident. In using the Ml a great deal, as do many hon. Members who have North of England constituencies, I have noticed that telephone numbers are often given alongside the label. I have often wondered how important those telephone numbers are and whether they are manned at all hours of the night. My first question, therefore, concerns the use to which the labelling is put.
Regulation 3 states that
"These Regulations apply to any inflammable substance (that is to say, petroleum-spirit, carbon disulphide… ."
I will not read the remainder; hon. Members are as capable of reading it as I am. How limiting is Regulation 3? The reason for my question is that Regulation 8 states that
"In the case of a container which does not contain any acetaldehyde or carbon disulphide… ."
Having had the limitation in Regulation 3, we then have Regulation 8, and I was surprised that Regulation 9(3) goes on to say that
"The substances to which this Regulation applies are as follows"
and it lists seven names which I am not capable of pronouncing. Therefore, Regulations 3, 8 and 9(3) appear to be in conflict. While I accept that Statutory Instruments and Orders must be legally correct, there comes a time when ordinary mortals who deal with this important matter have to read them.
Regulation 6, which will be of importance to trade unions whose members drive the vehicles in question, states that
"The owner of a vehicle used for the conveyance of any inflammable substance … shall … affix a copy thereof in some place where it can conveniently be read".
That may be a way of expressing it, as is done in countless Orders, but it is important that it should be done in a fashion that enables the drivers of vehicles to know what is going on.
I recall that when I had responsibility in the Home Office regulations existed to deal with inflammable liquids. Vehicles had to bear at the highest point of the front and rear a label indicating the nature of the dangerous substance being carried. In addition, tank vehicles and packages containing inflammable
1522
liquids were required to be marked with the name of the liquid contained. What changes do both sets of Regulations make in those requirements?
Regulation 3 of Regulations 1061 reads:
"Subject to Regulation 9 below, every person engaged in the conveyance, or the loading or unloading in connection with conveyance, of any inflammable liquid shall secure so far as is reasonably possible that none of the inflammable liquid is spilt."
My first instinct is to say, "So what?". What does the phrase
"so far as is reasonably possible"
mean? We have moved beyond the driver to anyone who is dealing with inflammable liquids. I recall that the staff of the Home Office was preparing a circular to be sent to responsible bodies giving advice on what to do in the event of a spillage. What has happened to that circular?
Regulation 6 reads:
"Subject to Regulation 9 below, a suitable and efficient fire extinguisher shall be carried in an easily accessible position on any vehicle conveying any inflammable liquid."
This may be meaningful to the people concerned, but it is important that they should know exactly what is meant by
"suitable and efficient fire extinguisher."
I am not clear about Regulation 8, which says:
"It shall be the duty of a local authority empowered under the Petroleum (Consolidation) Act 1928 to grant petroleum-spirit licences to enforce within their district the provisions of these Regulations …"
A problem may arise with a vehicle which sets out from Sutton in Surrey to go to Leeds in Yorkshire. Does this Regulation mean that a local authority has power to enforce the provisions in respect of vehicles that are not registered with that local authority? Problems arise in many towns in the North, including those in the constituency of my hon. Friend the Member for St. Helens (Mr. Spriggs). Vehicles are rerouted round the outskirts of towns, and the heaviest lorries carrying the most dangerous substances pass through streets which were formerly entirely residential. Serious trouble could arise in the event of an accident.
With regard to the various regulations which are already in existence, as I recall the situation there were requirements in the Poisons (No. 2) Rules of 1968. Do those rules still apply and, if so, do these

1523
new Regulations supersede them? Furthermore, I recall that the Ministry of Transport—now the Department of the Environment—made regulations concerning the construction of vehicles. I presume that such regulations have been drawn up by the Department of the Environment and I should like to know whether they still apply.
My hon. Friends and I have raised this matter at this late hour because we felt that these are important problems which should be aired in the House so that we may canvass the Government's views. We should welcome any information from the Government on this matter since the situation is worrying many people in the constituencies.
12.35 a.m.
Mr. Kevin McNamara: On the night of 30th/ 31st May this year a large tanker containing 5,000 gallons of ethanol, a highly inflammable and explosive liquid, was parked on waste land in Sculcoates Lane in my constituency. It sprang a leak through a faulty valve, and it was a potentially dangerous situation.
This tanker carrying ethanol was parked near several other loaded tankers, the one adjacent to it carrying acid and others containing similarly dangerous loads. If the tanker containing the acid had sprung a leak and both liquids—the acid and the ethanol—had mixed there would not have been just a potentially dangerous situation but, in the words of the Deputy Chief Fire Officer, "a major disaster". And this lorry was parked in a highly populated area.
On 19th May an empty tanker was parked on waste land in Sutton Street adjacent to a modern housing estate near the city centre. It had been carrying propane. Gas in the pipes forced open the safety valves and again there could have been a great tragedy.
I mention these two examples because they are important when dealing with these Regulations. I must give expression to the grave concern of my constituents on these matters. We have recently seen the devastating and tragic results of accidents occurring to tankers carrying dangerous loads in the city. These accidents have caused fatalities.
1524
Although these Regulations are admirable and praiseworthy as far as they go, they do not deal with some of the problems involved. Although the Regulations govern conveyance by road, there is no suggestion in the Regulations about the place where vehicles bearing these labels should be parked.
From the examples I have already given, it will be seen that the Regulations should state that the lorry carrying this label should be parked not on waste land—because the owners do not have adequate parking for their vehicles or because the driver wants an "early off" but in a recognised park, securely watched, where vehicles can be checked and away from built-up areas. Indeed, my own city corporation in Hull, in conjunction with the Road Haulage Association and the Department of the Environment, have decided to establish such a park. They are very much aware of the disasters which, fortunately, they missed earlier this year.
The point is that the requirements for parking should not rest upon a particular intention of a local authority, no matter how praiseworthy and progressive it is, as my local authority is. It should be mandatory on employers with licences to convey these substances to have such parking facilities available for their lorries and their contents both at the start of the journey and at the destination. They should have rules preventing their drivers from parking in unauthorised places. Vehicles bearing the symbol should be away from the tremendous temptation they present both to children seeking to tamper or play with valves and things of that sort, and also, potentially, to vandals and people unthinking about the problems which exist.
Further, there should be in the Regulations an obligation not only on the owners of the vehicles but on the main contractors as well to satisfy themselves that the Regulations are obeyed. My union, the T. & G.W.U., which organises the great majority of the drivers of these vehicles, has no fear that the Regulations will not be observed by the well-established firms in the industry. It is the "cowboys", the small subcontractors, that it fears most. It fears that many of these Regulations, praiseworthy as they are, may well be ignored by some of the people involved.

1525
It does not appear to me that the Regulations cover vehicles containing, for example, empty vessels—jars, bottles, drums, and so forth—which have previously contained substances. I give the example of a lorry load of empty drums which contain the residue vapour which might be highly dangerous, highly explosive and highly inflammable. Will the Regulations cover this sort of situation? It appears to me that they do not. Regulation 9 says:
"Regulations 3 to 7 of these Regulations shall not apply in relation to the conveyance of any inflammable liquid (other than acetaldehyde) in a vehicle, if—"
—and then follow subparagraph (a) and subparagraph (b), which states:
"in the case of conveyance otherwise than in a tank wagon or tank trailer, the total quantity of inflammable liquid in the vehicle does not exceed 500 kilograms (1,102·5 pounds)."
One can easily imagine the sort of situation where a lorry parked or even moving has a loose load. The drums fall off, there is a spark and then an explosion causing considerable damage.
I welcome these Regulations but they go only some way—not the whole way—to making our roads as safe as they could be. Hull City Council is going a considerable way to meet our problems locally. Because I would not want the same fears to arise in other areas, and because other areas might not be so lucky as Hull, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will tell us that the problem is being looked at urgently and carefully by his Department.
12.45 a.m.
Mr. Albert Booth: There are now over 40 pieces of legislation—Acts, Regulations and Statutory Instruments—dealing with the transport of chemicals by road. This leads me to make a simple request: that all these should be published in a single volume so that the many people who are concerned with the transport of dangerous chemicals by road can examine the legislation without having to refer to so many different publications.
The dangerous substances with which we are concerned are all listed and defined in the Petroleum (Inflammable Liquids) Order 1971, No. 1040. It lists, in all, some 206 inflammable liquids, including acetone, Bromobutane, Butyl nitrite, Diethyl ether, Flurobenzene, and
1526
many others which I would not claim to be able to pronounce. I mention these to show that we are dealing not solely with petrol but with 206 substances which, subject to their being in combinations which can give off inflammable vapour below a temperature of 23 degrees, could be subject in any circumstances to control by Regulation.
The first of the Regulations which I wish to criticise is Statutory Instrument No. 1061, The Inflammable Liquids (Conveyance by Road) Regulations 1971. It includes within its provisions the requirement that
"every person engaged in the conveyance … of any inflammable liquid shall secure so far as is reasonably possible that none of the inflammable liquid is spilt."
That is a perfectly reasonable provision. I admit that it might be more tightly defined, but the aim is clear and it is desirable practice.
It then requires that
"no person engaged in the conveyance … of any inflammable liquid shall smoke or carry any naked flame."
It also provides that vehicles carrying these inflammable liquids shall not have portable lights capable of igniting inflammable vapour, and that a suitable fire extinguisher shall be carried.
All these are perfectly laudable Regulations. What is amazing and absolutely horrifying is that Regulation 9 promptly excludes 204 of these 206 inflammable liquids from any of these safety requirements, subject only to their being carried in a road vehicle, other than a tanker, in quantities not exceeding 500 kilograms.
Therefore, I cannot join my hon. Friends in welcoming the Regulations. These Regulations put at hazard citizens of this country by exempting from perfectly reasonable safety regulations the conveyance of 204 highly dangerous liquids.
The Inflammable Substances (Conveyance by Road) (Labelling) Regulations 1971, No. 1062, exclude the same liquids from the requirement to label if they are carried in quantities up to 500 kilograms. For reasons which have already been adduced, which I need not repeat, the ability to identify quickly in circumstances of accident and hazard the chemicals with which we are dealing can be a major factor in achieving a lessening of the hazard and preventing dire

1527
consequences for people in the vicinity of an accident.
I do not ask the Minister to accept my word for the risk involved in the kind of accident which arises from the conveying of these substances. I ask him, however, to consider carefully the words of Dr. H. K. Black, Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Explosives at the Home Office. He delivered a paper to the symposium on "Disasters—their prevention, control and social effects" in 1968 at the Dundee meeting of the British Association.
I want to quote a few of the accidents to which he drew attention because they appear to be totally relevant to these Statutory Instruments. He gave details of one accident at West Bromwich in 1962, in which
"A mixed load of goods, amongst which were some organic peroxides in drums, and some hydrogen peroxide in glass carboys was found to be on fire in passing through the town; after being driven on to a waste piece of ground the load blew up. As a consequence 32 people were injured, and there was considerable damage to property. This accident provided evidence that the properties of organic peroxides were not sufficiently well known, for this was the first occasion on which it could be shown that, with one type of peroxide, a low-order explosion was capable of communication to all the load."
For that piece of knowledge 32 people were injured.
Another example that he gave was of an explosives accident at Marshall's Creek, Pennsylvania, which caused the death of five people. In this case
"the tyres of the vehicle went on fire which then communicated to the load. It was only then appreciated that, following a tyre failure, fire might only be seen to occur maybe 15 or 20 minutes after the vehicle had stopped."
The last case that I want to quote—and I take it from another country to show that this is an international problem and has been recognised as such—occurred at Martelange in Belgium. On this occasion
"a tanker vehicle was conveying liquid propylene and came into collision with the parapet of a bridge. It went on fire and an explosion killed at least nine people and injured many others …"
Propylene is one of the substances which the Government are proposing to exclude from the safety regulations if it is carried in quantities of between 250 and
1528
500 kilograms. It seems to me that the House cannot welcome these Orders.
Whilst inflammable liquids are conveyed by road it may not be possible to ensure complete safety. I think that there must be some element of hazard. All that we can do by regulations, by legislation in any form, and by the most careful policing of it is to cut down the risks involved in the carriage of these liquids, and take precautions to minimise the effects of accidents when they happen. The two Statutory Instruments before the House reduce the precautions that have to be taken and increase the risks, and therefore I believe that both Regulations should be rejected.
12.53 a.m.
Mr. Leslie Spriggs: I shall do my best to avoid repeating what has been said because I think that we have all been following very closely the publications of the authorities who have been writing and speaking on these two subjects over the last few years.
I follow my hon. Friend the Member for Barrow-in-Furness (Mr. Booth) in saying very firmly and, I think, very fairly, that we should not accept these Regulations, and nor should the Minister. In reply to a Question that I put to him the Minister said:
"The Standing Advisory Committee on Dangerous Substances is considering a number of proposals for improving the arrangements for conveyance by road."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 22nd July, 1971; Vol. 821, c. 1655.]
As the Committee's report is apparently not ready, I should have thought that the Department would have withheld its hand. We recognise that if any precautions can be taken in relation to the conveyance of petroleum and dangerous substances they should be taken. I hope that when I have made my short contribution the Minister will announce his decision to withdraw these Regulations.
I want to deal first with S.I. 1061. I am amazed at the weakness of these Regulations, in terms of the number of exemptions. Paragraph 3 of the Schedule provides that
"The receptacle must be so constructed and closed that none of the contents can, under normal conditions, escape from it."
Can the Minister tell us how many roads over which this kind of heavy traffic travels every day and night are normal

1529
roads? If he will visit St. Helens and examine our road surfaces he will see what this heavy traffic is doing to them. He can also listen to the complaints of my constituents about those damaged road surfaces.
Paragraph 4 provides that
"The receptacle must be so constructed that no part of its interior surface can, under normal conditions, be so affected by contact with the contents as to make the use of that receptacle dangerous."
What are "normal conditions"? If it is the intention of the Department to provide safety measures for the conveyance of petroleum, the safest way would be to order the construction of receptacles that will stand up to abnormal rather than normal conditions.
In view of the danger of this highly inflammable liquid I cannot see why a load should be exempted because it does not exceed the maximum of 1,102·5 lb. If there is an accident many people could be severely burnt, or burnt to death, with a load like that. It can set large properties on fire; it can set whole buildings going. I want to know why the opportunity to provide safeguards against serious accidents on our roads, in our streets, at the docks, and elsewhere, was not taken by putting forward stronger Regulations. For that reason I invite the Minister to accept our criticism in the spirit in which it was offered from the Opposition Front Bench and withdraw these Regulations.
It would be wrong of me to sit down without dealing with the question that I raised in the House on the date that I referred to a few moments ago. I am looking forward to the Report of this Committee. It is remarkable that in this Instrument, we should be asked, apart from the exemptions for safety regulations, to accept that receptacles constructed for the carriage of dangerous substances should provide for normal conditions. This is a weakness. It would be far better if they provided for abnormal conditions.
I have had a great deal to do with labelling, including dangerous cargoes. Even the most securely tied label can be destroyed in an accident. So, in a safe system, the label should not be used as an alternative to the indelible marking, but only as a secondary method. I wonder whether Regulation No. 6 could
1530
be of use where a driver is unconscious or worse.
Can a driver's knowledge of these Regulations be used at all times? If not, the markings on such vehicles should conform to a national hazard identity system. It should be available to and clearly understood by the emergency services. The hazardous potential of such an incident would be rapidly ascertained and the prescribed first aid action taken.
All persons concerned with accident prevention agree that an accident is an event waiting to happen and, given the right conditions, it will happen. Schedule 3 provides an alternative to the indelibly marked vehicle or tank. As I said earlier, the label should not be used as an alternative to marking such vehicles indelibly. More care should be taken to obtain the opinions of, for example, the Institute of Industrial Safety officials and officers of emergency services, including the fire brigade.
Where dangerous substances are being conveyed, it is vital that receptacles are constructed in such a way that they will withstand the toughest transport conditions. Schedule 4 is important in this respect. To lower the standards would only mean a lowering of the safety standards.
I hope that the Minister has listened to our submissions with care. As we have made clear, this is not a political matter. This is an Instrument which, if allowed to pass unchallenged, might result in safety standards on the roads being lowered. I urge the Minister to withdraw these Regulations and to replace them by others with teeth that will provide the provisions we are seeking.
1.7 a.m.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Mr. Richard Sharples): I wish to make it clear at the outset that I in no way underestimate the importance of these Regulations or the dangers which face many people, particularly in industrial constituencies, where dangerous substances of the kind we are discussing are carried by road.
I will answer as many questions as I can, and a number of hon. Members have asked about technical matters. It might be convenient if, first, I make

1531
some general remarks about these Regulations compared with the 1968 Regulations. In many respects they are identical, but first I will deal with the main changes.
First, the exemption limit of 250 kg. in the 1968 Regulations has been increased to 500 kg. This is designed primarily to ease the difficulties of the small common carrier who may from time to time need to carry quantities of more than 250 kg. as part of a general load.
The second change is that the provision in the 1968 Regulations that containers containing not more than one kilogram of an inflammable liquid need not display either the "inflammable" label or the name of the substance contained therein has been extended to cover individual metal containers containing not more than five litres of inflammable liquid.
The third change is that containers in which what are called potable spirits—that means in common language spirits such as whisky, gin and rum—are conveyed are no longer required to display the "inflammable" label, and provision is made for both containers and tank vehicles containing such spirits to display the commonly accepted name of the substance instead of the correct chemical name, which I have discovered for the first time this evening is "ethanol mixture".
Fourth, containers and tank vehicles conveying inflammable waste may now display the words "disposable waste" instead of the name of the substance.
Fifth, the exemption from the container and vehicle labelling requirements provided under the 1968 Regulations in respect of packages complying with certain specified requirements, which were set out in Schedule 3 to the 1968 Regulations, has now been extended to apply to metal aerosols enclosed in a wrapping of polyethylene film by a process of shrinking and sealing by heat.
Sixth, a new provision has been included in the 1971 Regulations requiring containers and vehicles conveying certain inflammable liquids which are also corrosive to display the "corrosive" label in addition to the "inflammable" label.
1532
All these changes have been recommended by the Home Office Standing Advisory Committee on Dangerous Substances, following consultations which have taken place through all the normal channels. The Home Office Standing Advisory Committee was set up by the previous Government in 1965 and it has been carrying out a fairly long programme of examination of the whole of this subject. The Committee decided the following order of priorities. First, it would examine the question of inflammable liquids. That has been done to a large extent, and the 1968 Regulations were largely to deal with this question. Second, it dealt with corrosives. I introduced Regulations a short time ago to deal with corrosives. The third priority was organic peroxide, and the fourth priority was toxics.
As part of that plan of operation, the Committee has so far recommended controls for the labelling of vehicles and containers for inflammable liquids under the 1968 Regulations.
At the moment the Committee has under consideration proposals for, first, the labelling of containers and vehicles for the conveyance of organic peroxides. This was announced in a debate in February, 1968, by the then Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department. He said at that time it was hoped that the Regulations would be introduced within a matter of months. To illustrate the complexity of this subject, I can say that these Regulations have not yet been introduced, although I very much hope that they will be introduced—I use now the words used by the Under-Secretary in 1968—within a matter of months.
The Committee has under consideration proposals for, second, the operation and construction of vehicles for the conveyance of inflammable liquids. These proposals would be susceptible of extension, with minor modifications, to corrosive and organic peroxides. The third set of proposals relate to the operation and construction of vehicles for the conveyance of liquefied petroleum gases. This is of particular importance in relation to the kind of accident to which the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull, North (Mr. McNamara) referred as having occurred in his constituency. One of the reasons this has been given priority is that accident.
Mr. McNamara: The accident occurred in the constituency of one of my hon. Friends.
Mr. Sharples: Anyway, it occurred in the City of Hull of which I know the hon. Gentleman is a distinguished Member.
All these matters will be within the scope of the 1928 Act and, as I say, it is expected that draft Regulations concerning them will be prepared within the next few months.
May I deal with as many as possible of the questions which were raised by hon. Members. I should like to say how grateful I was to the hon. Member for Leeds, South (Mr. Merlyn Rees) for giving me prior warning of some of his questions. He asked me how the ordinary fireman who goes out to deal with an accident of this kind is kept informed. The position is that we in the Home Office send out circulars to all those concerned, giving detailed guidance about the action to be taken in dealing with particular substances in accordance with the labels on the vehicles. We are producing, shortly I hope, all this guidance in the form of a single booklet. The guidance is given by us to the various fire authorities and through the normal channels in the fire service this is given to members of the various fire brigades.
The hon. Gentleman also referred to Regulation 3 of Statutory Instrument No. 1062. This repeats word for word the substance of Regulation 1 of the 1968 Regulations. He also asked about Regulation 6 and inquired where a notice would be put so that it could be read. The answer is that normally a notice would be put up in a depot, and the intention is that those persons concerned directly with the handling of the substances should be able to read it. Once again, this was taken from the 1968 Regulations, namely Regulation 4.
I was also asked by the hon. Gentleman about the exceptions, and I think I covered that point when I pointed out the differences between these Regulations and the 1968 Regulations.
The hon. Gentleman then referred to the list of the seven substances which are mentioned in Regulation 9 and asked why they are separate. The answer is that those seven substances—I will not attempt to pronounce their names—are
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corrosive as well as inflammable, and therefore they have to bear both the "corrosive" and the "inflammable" labels.
The hon. Gentleman referred to Regulation 3 of Statutory Instrument 1061. This again repeats word for word what was in the 1968, and indeed in the 1957 Regulations.
In reply to the hon. Gentleman's question about fire extinguishers—I think this arises on Regulation 6—we do not advise any particular make or classification of fire extinguisher. The purpose of the fire extinguisher carried in the vehicle—this is the advice that we give—is to prevent a fire which may start in the engine or cab of a vehicle from spreading to the load. It is not practicable to carry in the cab of a vehicle a fire extinguisher capable of dealing with a dangerous load, which may weigh as much as 10 tons or more, but it is important to be able to deal with any fire in a cab quickly and prevent it spreading.
Mr. Booth: If the purpose of the fire extinguisher is to deal with a fire arising from the engine, why exclude from the requirement to carry a fire extinguisher vehicles which are carrying loads up to 500 kilograms? One could understand the argument if the fire hazard were coming from the inflammable cargo. If the fire hazard is coming from the engine, how can there be logic in excluding those vehicles carrying a smaller inflammable load?
Mr. Sharples: There always was an exemption. The previous exemption was 250 kilograms. It has been extended to 500. The principle of the requirement has not been altered in any way. What has been altered is simply the exemption limit.
The hon. Member for Leeds, South asked me about the responsibilties of local authorities. Licensing is a matter for the local authority in which the vehicle has its depot and starts its journey. When the journey is through different local authority areas or from one local authority area to another, responsibility lies upon any authority through which or to which the load may be passing as well as the local authority in the area from which it originated. He also asked about the poisons rules. They are not affected by this.

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The hon. Member for Kinston upon Hull, North asked me about parking regulations. This is a most important subject. The Standing Advisory Committee is preparing regulations to deal with this specific problem. I cannot say when these regulations will be brought before the House but I appreciate, particularly from what the hon. Gentleman said, the urgency of this matter.
Mr. McNamara: I am most grateful for what the hon. Gentleman said because it is of great importance. I wonder whether in his other capacity at the Home Office he would instruct local police forces to be more vigilant in supervising where tankers are parked to ensure that this sort of hazard is not created where it could be avoided and where there might be suitable parking for tankers away from built-up areas.
Mr. Sharples: Neither the Home Secretary nor I can give instructions to local police forces, but I will see that this point is drawn to the attention of those concerned.
The hon. Member for St. Helens asked about labels, and suggested the invariable use of a label fixed to a vehicle in such a way that it could not be removed. One of the difficulties with this, and one of the reasons for the provision of the alternative, is that liquids or substances of this kind may be carried in general-purpose vehicles which may be used for other things. That is the reason for the flexibility. He also asked me about the receptacles and normal loading. The Regulations are taken word for word from the 1968 Regulations. I will certainly look at the question again when they are revised again.
Mr. Spriggs: I made my plea to the hon. Gentleman because heavier and heavier loads of dangerous substances are being carried by road and in view of this we should not follow the example of the earlier Regulations. Surely we should move with the times and with the growth of this industry on the roads.
Mr. Sharples: If the Regulations need to be altered it will be right for the Standing Advisory Committee to consider the point.
One of the points that has struck me since I have been looking at these matters
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is that it is not very satisfactory to go on dealing with them under the 1928 Act, which was designed for entirely different purposes. The difficulties in bringing forward Regulations like these are first, that every substance must be named, and, second, that we are confined to the substances contained within the overall provisions of that Act, when things were very different.
What we have done in the Home Office is to set up a review to look at the whole question of the ways in which the system of control of dangerous substances requires to be rationalised and modernised, and what fresh legislation is needed for the purpose. We have made a certain amount of progress, and are considering the controls required on the ground to govern the manufacture, importation, keeping, use and conveyance of those substances over which my right hon. Friend exercises control in the interests of public safety.
What we want to do is to consider how those controls can best be enforced—for instance, which aspects are so technical as to call for the expertise of the Explosive Inspectorate; which are appropriate to the police because, for example, they have a security aspect; and which are predominantly fire risks, suitable for enforcement by local authority fire brigades. From that we are working back to establish what enabling legislation will be needed, what additional substances need to be controlled, and how that might best be achieved.
The House will appreciate that it is a fairly complex operation upon which we have now embarked. I cannot say that we shall be able to produce any short-term results. I think that for a time we shall have to go on working under the provisions of the 1928 Act, that the Advisory Committee will go on functioning, and that we shall go on producing amending Regulations for the time being. I appreciate that there is an urgency about this, and that the matter is very complex. For the longer term I believe that we shall need new legislation to deal with modern substances, substances which were never intended to be covered by the 1928 Act. I think that that is the right way to tackle the matter.
I recommend the Regulations to the House. I have listened carefully to everything that has been said, and I appreciate

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the strong feelings on the matter held by hon. Members.
1.28 p.m.
Mr. Merlyn Rees: The Minister said that he recognises that there is concern about the problem of the carriage of dangerous substances. We see from the way that the Regulations are drafted that they emanate from the Standing Advisory Committee of experts; they hardly emanate from political decisions of the Cabinet. While we accept that, I ask one thing on behalf of my hon. Friends, that in all the changes the hon. Gentleman intends he will keep an eye on the increase of weight for exclusion purposes. Without being necessarily on the side of bigness in business, we can say that it is sometimes with some of the smaller carriers that many of the problems arise. I am sure that the Minister will keep an eye on that aspect.
We were glad of the news about what the hon. Gentleman intends to do on parking, which is a problem in other cities besides Hull. We hear time and time again about the parking of vehicles in our cities, and if they have the kind of load we have been discussing that causes additional problems.
Above all, we are glad to hear the Minister's announcement that there will be a rationalisation of the law. It is the basic law that now needs to be looked at. Much of the legislation on which the Regulations are based is very much out of date. When we hear dates quoted in the 1870s for the Explosives Acts—which do not apply directly here—it is time we looked at the question again.
In view of what the Minister said, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Motion.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

FALMOUTH (CONTAINER TERMINAL)
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Hawkins.]
1.30 a.m.
Mr. David Mudd: In addressing myself to this important subject, I do not overlook the substantial and very welcome support I have received for an Early Day Motion
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on this topic, including the support of hon. Members with port interests on both sides of the House. But to set my basic case in its true perspective, I shall state what I regard as being two vital national and international considerations—first, Channel safety, and second, the need to stimulate cargo handling growth for United Kingdom ship owners and United Kingdom ports.
In his important Adjournment debate on 28th July this year, my hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Kemptown (Mr. Bowden) called for greater control and greater safety surveillance in the congested waters of the English Channel. In his reply, my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Trade and Industry referred to measures which, he said, could and would be introduced. But he went on to say:
"We hope that once this system starts to operate, there will be a substantial drop in the number of ships using the lanes in the wrong direction ".—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 28th July, 1971; Vol. 822, c. 748.]
With the greatest respect to my hon. Friend, I suggest that he was then talking in terms of first aid at a time when thought should be given to the application of major surgery. What is needed in the interests of Channel safety is to find an effective way of reducing the number of ships in the Channel at any one time, particularly those deep-draught loaded giants jam-packed with valuable and potentially lethal cargoes.
I refer now to Thames Television's pertinent and responsible "This Week" programme on 27th May, 1971, which dealt in some depth with the problems and dangers in the Channel. As the programme showed, the Dover Straits are reaching a state of violently congested constipation, with about 800 ships passing daily in both directions, and about three accidents a week.
Such a toll of accidents would be bad enough were it restricted to small coasters, but this constant toll of accidents extends to supper-tankers and the ever-increasing number of giant container ships which threaten to make the "Torrey Canyon" look like a child's super-toy and which have the lack of manoeuvrability and lack of stopping power of a demented bull in a supermarket on a Saturday afternoon. As this

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situation degenerates and becomes more serious, as constantly it does and will, practical methods must be found to keep these dangerous and unmanoeuvrable ships out of these congested waters in the first place.
The second major need is to create a new international stimulus to the ports of the United Kingdom to offset the effects of Common Market entry. On page 413 of his important survey, "British Shipping and World Competition", Dr. S. G. Sturmey warns of the diminution of the traditional trade to the United Kingdom if the United Kingdom and Europe were to become a mere generic destination for ships upon British entry into the E.E.C. The Common Market, he goes on to say, is unlikely to add any great new opportunities to British ocean shipping.
Here, then, is the first contention of my argument. If the United Kingdom is to be immersed in the Common Market, convenience will dictate the consigning of ships and cargoes to Continental ports rather than to those of the United Kingdom unless and until we can reach the situation in which the facilities of the West Coast of the United Kingdom at least equal those to be found on the western and north-western coasts of Europe.
Secondly, we must not lose sight of the fact that once international shippers are committed to destination routes to a united Europe, they will not readily begin to reallocate themselves to alternative destinations. The point is, therefore, self-evident that the maximum British containerisation trans-shipment facilities must be established and fully operative before world shipping begins to home itself on the ports of Western and Northwestern Europe.
That belief is not personal to myself. It has been reinforced by no less an authority than Mr. J. P. Rosegaarde Bisschop, Director of the Netherlands Container Association. He has gone on record as prophesying that when the mammoth third generation container ships go into service—and we are within perhaps five years of seeing the dawn of third generation traffic—there is every possibility that they will seek and utilise a port on the west coast of England rather than use the North Sea.
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Therefore, if we are to look towards an alternative port on the West Coast of England, my submission is that the only port that can reasonably be considered is the Port of Falmouth. Accordingly, I ask: what can the Port of Falmouth offer to answer the threefold demands of safety, ease of access and strategic positioning to attract the Transatlantic cargoes?
I therefore summarise some of the many definite advantages of the Port of Falmouth for the development of such a containerisation facility. First, as a custom-built port utilising industrial waste land, the cost per virgin berth would be infinitely less than the cost of buying, demolishing, rebuilding and extending London, Southampton, Rotterdam or Hamburg. Therefore, in terms of money invested for a direct return, Falmouth is the best buy for port development.
Secondly, Falmouth is a deep-water port at all states of tide. It has no necessity for locks and the various other navigational hazards which create delays and potential dangers to deep-draught shipping. The deep water at Falmouth allows direct and prompt access for the arrival and departure of all ships, with the economic attraction of there being no delays to the vital speed of turn-around times and the added safety attraction of unrestricted room for manoeuvre.
Any Transatlantic ship using the Port of Falmouth rather than Rotterdam would knock 33½ days off the time for the return round trip to the United States, thus increasing ship availability by 3·936 round voyages every year, thereby attracting the maximum utilisation of ships and cargo space. Falmouth is the only undeveloped deep-water port in the United Kingdom which is able to accommodate deep-draught ships without! hindrance, interference or danger to other shipping.
The development of a container terminal at the Port of Falmouth would improve the financial revenue of the port and the port facilities to such an extent that soon it would be translated into improved and increased services to all the other forms of shipping that currently and traditionally use Falmouth, thus assisting the economy and the employment prospects of an area of high potential but, alas, so far, of very little development.

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I must ask two questions which are perhaps against my own basic case. First, is there any need for a further container terminal in the United Kingdom and, second, would the emergence and establishment of Falmouth lower the profitability of other container ports? For the answers to those key questions, I turn to the publications of no less an authority than the National Ports Council itself. First, the Council's deep sea trade forecast for 1973, reported in its Port Unit Transport Statistics for 1969, makes it abundantly clear that even the vast impetus in the provision of additional berths elsewhere would still make a trans-shipment terminal at Falmouth a useful adjunct, without taking traffic away from existing major United Kingdom ports.
This is underlined still further in the Council's Annual Report for 1969, which, after stressing, quite rightly the vital national importance of the increased exports of manufactured products, goes on to stress that the potential of the major British container ports has hardly yet been tapped. Falmouth would certainly attract trade to the United Kingdom that does not otherwise exist, although obviously shippers are unwilling to commit such statements to paper while they are contracted to Continental ports.
In conclusion, therefore, I re-assert my personal reasons for wishing the Falmouth container terminal scheme well. First, it will contribute substantially to the decongestion and subsequently to the safety of other ships using the English Channel. Second, the scheme will provide an important outlet for overseas currency earning facilities to the United Kingdom. Third, the spin-off estimate of both finance and employment will be a valuable contribution to the economic and employment prospects of a very difficult area of Britain.
Fourth, it will provide a vital new opportunity for British shipping at a time when it must be threatened with the imminence of the Common Market. Fifth, it cannot be claimed that the establishment of the Falmouth facility will offset the potential of other ports when, on the admission of the National Ports Council, that potential is presently both untapped and in any case the provision is likely to be inadequate by 1973. Sixth, the establishment of Falmouth can only satisfy a genuine existing European
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demand which would otherwise be lost to the British economy, British industry and British work people.
While accepting that it is the rôle—nay, the duty—of the Ports Council and the Department of the Environment to act in the national interest and in the interests of commercial viability and the preservation of amenity, I hope that my hon. Friend will at least let me glimpse the subject headings on the criteria yardstick against which this exciting scheme will soon be measured.
1.44 a.m.
Mr. Robert Hicks: I should like to congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Falmouth and Camborne (Mr. Mudd) on raising the subject of (his important development, which could have many desirable consequences, not least for the economy of the West Country, particularly Cornwall. Most of Cornwall is in the south-west development area and the remainder within the Plymouth intermediate area.
My hon. Friend mentioned possible spin-off effects. May I remind my hon. Friend the Minister that in pursuing their development area policies the Government place great emphasis on improving the infrastructure of the regions. In the context of Cornwall this means, above all, improved communications. We are confident of a stepping up in the rate of progress of road building in the West Country. I regret to say that we are less confident about the future of the railway to the west of Plymouth. I am informed that at least 8 per cent. of the traffic generated by this proposed port development would be rail-fed. This most certainly would play a significant part in helping retain our rail links in Cornwall—in other words, helping to retain and improve the basic attraction of the South-West Region. For this reason and others outlined by my hon. Friend, I have great pleasure in supporting him.
1.46 a.m.
The Under-Secretary of State for the Environment (Mr. Eldon Griffiths): If anyone in the House had any doubt about the wide interest in this imaginative project, that doubt would have been ended by the contribution of my hon. Friend the Member for Falmouth and Camborne (Mr. Mudd). I wish to congratulate my hon. Friend on the vigorous way in which he has drawn attention to the

1543
potential advantages of such a scheme in Falmouth harbour. I had already taken note of the terms of the Early Day Motion which he put down last month and which attracted a large number of signatures. I can certainly sympathise with the natural desire of local interests in Falmouth to encourage a development which, in their view, will benefit the economy of the South-West Region generally. I well understand their desire to seek additional employment in an area which, as I know well from personal experience, has a high unemployment level, particularly marked in the winter months.
The Falmouth Container Terminal Company's Private Bill received Royal Assent on 17th February, but the company still has to obtain authorisation of the project by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Environment under Section 9 of the Harbours Act, 1964. I understand that the company applied to the Secretary of State on 13th May and, in accordance with the Harbours Act, my Department is responsible for consulting the National Ports Council which is now in process of considering the application. Its recommendation must be received before my right hon. Friend can reach a decision, and we have not had its recommendation. For that reason it is not possible, indeed it would be quite improper, for me to pass any judgment on whether or not the scheme stands a good chance of being authorised by my right hon. Friend. However, it might be helpful if, as my hon. Friend suggested, I set out some of the matters about which we shall need to be satisfied before reaching any final decision.
I emphasise that, however imaginative this or any other project may appear to the promoters, the Secretary of State has a statutory duty to satisfy himself on all these matters before giving a favourable decision. First and foremost we shall need to be satisfied, on the advice of the National Ports Council, on the economics of the proposal. In short, will this project be viable in the sense that an adequate return can be earned on the large investment involved? The answer turns primarily on what demand there is or is likely to be, for container facilities at Falmouth.
We should need to have firm evidence of this demand: which shipping lines
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would actually use Falmouth and on what routes would their container services operate; what are the quantities of traffic which are forecast for these routes; what size of ships would be used; to the extent that the case for the provision of an entirely new container port at Falmouth rests on the expectation of the emergence of a new generation of very large container ships which would take advantage of the deep water at Falmouth, what evidence is there that such ships are in fact likely to be in service within the time scale encompassed by the present proposals?
Then, again, we have to ask and be satisfied whether prospective users would be prepared to undertake contractual commitments relating to the use of the facilities and the rates which they would have to pay to ensure that the total revenue was adequate. There is also the question of raising the necessary capital, and again the Secretary of State will need to know how precisely it is proposed to raise the very substantial funds involved. On the engineering side, we shall need to be satisfied that the facilities proposed are fully capable of meeting forecast demand and how they are to cope with the double handling of trans-shipment traffic. I can tell my hon. Friend that these are only a few of the questions on which we would need to be satisfied before reaching a conclusion.
I want to turn now to two or three specific points he raised. My hon. Friend suggested, for example, that by siphoning off large container ships to Falmouth the general safety of shipping in the English Channel would be improved. I appreciate his thinking in this matter but I am not quite sure that I follow his logic. First, the giant ships that he mentioned are not container ships at all. They are super tankers and large bulk carriers and these, of course, would not be affected by the Falmouth plans. They will remain in the Channel whatever may happen at Falmouth.
Then again, if the deep sea container ships go to Falmouth, so as to trans-ship into smaller vessels bound for Europe or other United Kingdom ports, then the total number of vessels in the Channel will not decrease. It might very well increase for that reason. As I can testify from recent experience in the Channel myself, it is often the number of ships

1545
in the Channel at any one time, rather than their size or tonnage, which may give rise to the navigational hazards to which my hon. Friend rightly drew attention.
Secondly, my hon. Friend argued that the project will earn foreign currency. If that were so, I should certainly be very glad, but I must remind him that this argument can be valid only if it is demonstrated that additional export traffic can be generated at Falmouth which would not otherwise be attracted to some other United Kingdom ports.
My hon. Friend also suggested, and was supported strongly by my hon. Friend the Member for Bodmin (Mr. Hicks), that this project would add significantly to the jobs available in the South-West Region both when the port is ready to operate and during the construction period. I appreciate my hon. Friend's anxieties on this point and such jobs would certainly be welcome. But they would not by themselves justify major capital expenditure for which there was no convincing long-term case on economic grounds.
I turn specifically to the question of containers. I am not sure that I can quite agree with the suggestion that we have, as it were, only just touched the fringes of container traffic. The United Kingdom already handles more container traffic than any other Northern European country. In 1970, we handled nearly as much container traffic as the rest of Northern Europe put together. If, however, we do decide that it is right to add to the container facilities in the United Kingdom, we shall have to consider first whether it is right to build an entirely new container port, and if so whether Falmouth is the right place for it. We shall also have to consider the fact that major container terminals already exist or are being planned at, for example, Seaforth in Liverpool, at Southampton, at Tilbury, at Greenock and at Felixstowe.
Moreover, while I am as anxious as anyone else that this country should keep in the forefront of those countries which are providing up-to-date port facilities for container ships, it is vital not to exaggerate the significance of container traffic in relation to our total cargo carryings. For example, in 1969–70 total container traffic in and out of United Kingdom ports amounted to 12 million tons
1546
against a total of 107 million tons of general cargo and 214 million tons of bulk cargo.
I should also recall to my hon. Friend, without in any way underestimating the significance of container vessels, that there are many other important developments in cargo carrying. There are the huge bulk carriers for liquid and dry bulk cargoes, the roll-on/roll-off and drive-on/drive-off ships. There are what are known as LASH-lighter aboard ship—and BACAT—barges aboard catamarans—and so on. It would be a mistake therefore, at a time when the extent to which more container traffic will expand is by no means certain, to over-provide facilities of a specialised nature for which insufficient traffic could eventually be found.
In conclusion, I turn to my hon. Friend's point about the Common Market. He argued that construction of a container terminal at Falmouth would offset the disadvantages which he imagines will otherwise be suffered by the shipping and ports industries as and when we enter the Community. He claims that ships and cargoes would be consigned to the Continent rather than to the United Kingdom and that this would become an established arrangement.
I have already pointed out that the United Kingdom handles more container traffic, including deep-sea traffic, than any other North European country and that expanded port facilities for this have already been authorised. The Government see no reason whatsoever for fearing that deep sea container ships carrying cargoes destined for Britain are likely to be diverted to Continental ports. What matters here is not the Common Market but that our ports should offer the kind of service which alone will persuade shipowners and shippers that it is in their commercial interest to continue to use our ports.
But the Common Market will, in the Government's judgment, offer far greater opportunities to our shippers, shipowners and ports industries as a whole. This applies to Falmouth as to everywhere else. Indeed, we are convinced that our economy as a whole will do very much better inside the Common Market than outside. To that extent, the best hope for Falmouth, Cornwall and, indeed, the whole South-West Region is that we

1547
should be partners within an expanding and prosperous Community from which we should derive more resources for regional policies, including the benefit of the South-West.
To sum up, I very much welcome the widespread interest shown in these proposals and the eloquent way in which both my hon. Friends have supported them tonight. I assure them that the points made in the debate, and in particular Falmouth's advantages as a natural deep water harbour, will not be overlooked. It is certainly no part of the Government's philosophy to discourage any new private enterprise project which
1548
can be shown to have real prospects of benefiting the community. The onus in the end rests on the sponsors to make their case and to satisfy the National Ports Council and the Secretary of State, if they can. However, I give the assurance that, as soon as we have received the advice of the National Ports Council and any other information that the Secretary of State may require, there will be no delay in making the decision and informing the company and my hon. Friends.
Question put and agreed to.
Adjourned accordingly at Two o'clock a.m.

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  Property Bonds (Scott Committee)
  Animals (Experiments)
  Animals (Experiments)
  Rawtenstall (Vacant Factories)
  Rawtenstall (Vacant Factories)
  Hawkings Brick Company
  Hawkings Brick Company
  Companies Acts (Compliance)
  Companies Acts (Compliance)
  Motor Vehicles (Exports)
  Motor Vehicles (Exports)
  Motor Insurance Companies (Liquidity)
  Motor Insurance Companies (Liquidity)
  Motor Insurance Premiums
  Motor Insurance Premiums
  East Midlands
  East Midlands
  International Computers Limited
  International Computers Limited
  Electronics Industry (Redundancies)
  Electronics Industry (Redundancies)
  New Towns (Scotland)
  New Towns (Scotland)
  Air-Sea Rescue Helicopters
  Air-Sea Rescue Helicopters
WALES
  Caravans
  Caravans
  Caravans
  Caravans
  Mid-Wales (Hospital Services)
  Mid-Wales (Hospital Services)
  Industrial Development Certificates (Factory Development)
  Industrial Development Certificates (Factory Development)
  Local Government Reorganisation
  Local Government Reorganisation
  Swansea General Hospital
  Swansea General Hospital
  Atmospheric Pollution (Port Talbot)
  Atmospheric Pollution (Port Talbot)
HOME DEPARTMENT
  Vehicle and General Tribunal Inquiry
  Vehicle and General Tribunal Inquiry
  Fixed Penalty Notices
  Fixed Penalty Notices
  Vehicle Contents (Examination by Police)
  Vehicle Contents (Examination by Police)
  European Economic Community
  European Economic Community
  Police (University Courses)
  Police (University Courses)
  Police (Graduates)
  Police (Graduates)
  Australian Aborigines
  Australian Aborigines
  Illegal Gaming
  Illegal Gaming
  Anglo-Indians
  Anglo-Indians
  Indians (Migration)
  Indians (Migration)
  Communications to Members
  Communications to Members
EDUCATION AND SCIENCE
  Secondary Education (Northamptonshire)
  Secondary Education (Northamptonshire)
  Educationally Sub-normal Children (School Places)
  Educationally Sub-normal Children (School Places)
  Grammar School Places (Holland County Council)
  Grammar School Places (Holland County Council)
  CABINET PAPERS
  CABINET PAPERS
  CONCORDE
  CONCORDE
  EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
  EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
  U.S.S.R. (TREATMENT OF JEWS)
  U.S.S.R. (TREATMENT OF JEWS)
  NORTH-WEST DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION
  NORTH-WEST DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION
  RHODESIA
  RHODESIA
HOUSE OF COMMONS
  Members Cafeteria (Tea)
  Members Cafeteria (Tea)
  Car Parking (Disabled Members of Staff)
  Car Parking (Disabled Members of Staff)
DEFENCE
  Mark 24 Torpedo
  Mark 24 Torpedo
  Overseas Training Areas
  Overseas Training Areas
  Fishery Protection Duties
  Fishery Protection Duties
  Armed Forces (Pay)
  Armed Forces (Pay)
EMPLOYMENT
  Newark
  Newark
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS
  Republic of Ireland (Extradition Treaty)
  Republic of Ireland (Extradition Treaty)
  International Disaster Relief Co-ordination Office
  International Disaster Relief Co-ordination Office
  U.S.S.R. Citizens (Arrest)
  U.S.S.R. Citizens (Arrest)
  Laos
  Laos
  European Economic Community
  European Economic Community
  Mr. William Ross Wright
  Mr. William Ross Wright
SCOTLAND
  Museums and Galleries (Admission Charges)
  Museums and Galleries (Admission Charges)
  Highlands and Islands Development Board
  Highlands and Islands Development Board
POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS
  Sub-Post Offices
  Sub-Post Offices

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock:
THE LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop
of Bristol.

MOTOR CAR STEERING LOCKS
LORD SEGAL: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the first Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government when it is proposed to make steering locks compulsory on all new cars.]
LORD MOWBRAY AND STOURTON: My Lords, manufacturers already fit steering locks voluntarily on all new cars.
LORD SEGAL: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that thefts of cars are still quite a frequent occurrence, and would it not be advisable to make this provision compulsory in order to avoid a lot of needless trouble for the police?
LORD MOWBRAY AND STOURTON: Yes, my Lords; we are aware that there are many thefts. The voluntary fitting of locks on cars has taken place only from January 1, 1970, if the cars were of new design. But, of course, as from January 1, 1971, even cars of existing design have had them fitted. I am advised that the Home Office and the police wish to have this fitting made compulsory. But we are just feeling our way.
LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE: My Lords, arising out of that reply, may I ask what is the good of making the fitting of locks compulsory unless you also make the use of those locks compulsory, which would be a gross interference with the ordinary common sense conduct of citizens?
LORD MOWBRAY AND STOURTON: Yes, my Lords. But once we have introduced
998
the compulsory element I think this will be automatic. Many of these steering locks operate automatically when you take the key out.
LORD SLATER: My Lords, the noble Lord has talked about compulsion, and it seems that successive Governments have got into the habit of making compulsory things which interfere with the liberty of the subject. I think we ought to be giving more consideration to the liberty of the subject, and allowing a person to make up his own mind about whether he ought to do this or that with whatever is in his possession.
LORD FRASER OF LONSDALE: My Lords, before my noble friend replies, may I ask him two questions? First, if he makes fitting of locks compulsory will he see that the keys are different, because every key for almost every car in Britain opens every other car. Secondly, is it not very dangerous to lock the wheel? If you do you cannot drive the car.
LORD MOWBRAY AND STOURTON: My Lords, Her Majesty's Government have every sympathy with the noble Lord, Lord Slater, and understand his feelings on this matter. Equally, we all feel as citizens that we should not make crime too easy, and the fitting of locks would help stop motor theft which is a very serious matter. In reply to my noble friend Lord Fraser of Lonsdale, the problems of keys are a detail which I think we shall be able to overcome in due course. The only reason why we have not gone fully ahead with the European regulations is that we are not 100 per cent. satisfied that there are no slight risks that the steering might be locked while the engine was still running. But those are small details.
LORD SEGAL: My Lords, at the same time, could some indication be placed on the car to denote that it is fitted with a steering lock, which would act as a deterrent to some sections of the community who are frequently involved in exchanges with the police authorities?
LORD MOWBRAY AND STOURTON: My Lords, I think those are words of wisdom. Speaking for myself, my car has always had a sign on the window advertising that fact and, touching wood, since I have displayed the sign nothing has happened to the car.
LORD LEATHERLAND: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that love laughs at locksmiths, and that the gentlemen who go about stealing cars usually have a ring of 50 or 60 keys in their pockets?
LORD MOWBRAY AND STOURTON: Yes, my Lords; I am aware of that, but we can only do our best.

CAR RADIO THEFTS
2.41 p.m.
LORD SEGAL: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the second Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government how many thefts of car radios were reported during each of the last three years.]
THE MINISTER OF STATE, HOME OFFICE (LORD WINDLESHAM): My Lords, I regret that the statistics at present collected do not provide this information. I can, however, say that the number of offences of stealing from all types of vehicle known to the police decreased in 1970.
LORD SEGAL: My Lords, while thanking the noble Lord for that somewhat negative information, may I also ask him whether he can, nevertheless, say how many prosecutions have occurred for thefts from cars and how many convictions have followed?
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, I do not have those figures with me, but I can send them to the noble Lord. What I can give him, which I think will be of interest to the House, is the incidence of thefts reported to the police over the last three years. In 1968 the total was 188,000; in 1969 it was 176,000, and in 1970 it was 175,000. The clear-up rate—that is, the number of cases the police have been able to clear up—has been increased. Of course the success rate here is marked by the fact that the number of vehicles on the roads has been increasing in each of those three years, so that although the numbers are still large the trend is quite an encouraging one.
LORD SEGAL: My Lords, as these thefts are still very prevalent, would it
1000
not be worth while for the Government to attempt to categorise them to ascertain how many cases of thefts of car radios have occurred? Also, are Her Majesty's Government aware of the location of second-hand markets in car radios: and how far have they been successful in tracking down the receivers of this type of goods?
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, the current statistics do not distinguish between thefts of car radios and other thefts from vehicles. The classifications are based on the legal definition of the offence, which is theft, rather than on the article which is stolen. Again, I should like to consider the second half of the noble Lord's supplementary question and to write to him. I am sure I can give him for the Metropolitan Police District—I do not know whether I shall be able to do it for the whole country—the number of prosecutions and the number of successful convictions.

WATER SUPPLIES
LORD ROYLE: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether a statement can now be made on the Government's plans for the supply of water to the nation as a whole, as promised in reply to a Question in this House on June 23, last.]
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT (LORD SANDFORD): My Lords, my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for the Environment intends to make a Statement soon on the future organisation of water services in England and Wales, following the Report by the Central Advisory Water Committee. There are a number of complex considerations involved, however, and it will not be possible to do this before the Recess.
LORD ROYLE: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware of the Answer I received on June 23, which distinctly said that a Statement from his right honourable friend could be expected before the Recess and a Statement on final policy probably before Christmas? May I ask whether

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the Government are"thinking big"about this question, which is a very serious one indeed? I wonder whether the noble Lord would agree with me that the Water Resources Board recently advocated a national water authority instead of the regional boards. Is he further aware that at this time the nation is using 14,000 million gallons of water per day, and that the danger areas at the moment include Devon, East Anglia, the Pennines, the Lake District, Newcastle, Liverpool and many parts of Scotland? Would the noble Lord try to press his right honourable friend to get on with tackling this very big question?
LORD SANDFORD: Yes, my Lords, I am aware of most of those factors, and I dare say the noble Lord is right about the particular figures he quoted, but without notice I cannot confirm them. The Statement made by my noble friend Lord Mowbray and Stourton was made in good faith: it had been our hope and expectation that we should be able to make a Statement before the Recess. This expectation has not been fulfilled; but that has not been due to any lack of awareness of the urgency of the problem. I can confirm that my right honourable friend is fully aware of the urgency; but the considerations are most complex and it is important to get a solution, which must be a long-term solution and not merely the solution of particular problems of shortage, on the right lines.
LORD NUGENT OF GUILDFORD: My Lords, is my noble friend aware that the future organisation of the water industry has to fit in with the future reform of local government? Is my noble friend also aware that he and his noble and right honourable friends have indicated that they intend to legislate on that matter next Session? Is he aware, therefore, that it is most urgent that the Government should make up their minds what is to be the future reorganisation of water—which of course includes the sewerage function—very quickly now, because all local authorities, as all the other authorities engaged in the matter, require to know?
LORD SANDFORD: My Lords, we are only too aware of this particular factor, which is one that presses on us very much indeed.
LORD ROYLE: My Lords, can the noble Lord say whether consideration is being given in these days to proposals for barrages at Solway Firth and Morecambe Bay? Such proposals were being discussed many years ago and they might help very considerably to solve our problem.
LORD SANDFORD: Yes, my Lords. A week or two ago I answered a Question not only about barrages—with particular reference to the case of the Wash—but about the proposed desalination plant at Ipswich.
LORD ILFORD: My Lords, do the Government plans include consideration of the Report published some months ago by the Central Advisory Water Committee? Does not that Report include plans for the supply of water to the nation as a whole?
LORD SANDFORD: Yes, my Lords. This is the Report on which these considerations are chiefly based.
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR: My Lords, is my noble friend aware that if the Government's eventual pronouncement should foreshadow anything like the nationalisation of water supplies there will be a great deal of well-deserved opposition to it?
LORD SANDFORD: That is another consideration, my Lords.

CANCER INSURANCE POLICY
2.48 p.m.
LORD AMULREE: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether the attention of the Ministry of Trade and Industry has been drawn to the activities of Blue Seal Plans (U.K.) Ltd. in promoting insurance against cancer.]
THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO (LORD DRUMALBYN): Yes, my Lords. Blue Seal Plans (U.K.) Limited are a firm of insurance brokers who made arrangements with Consumers Life Insurance Company Limited to market a policy issued by the latter which provided certain fixed benefits to the insured

1003
in respect of confinement to hospital by reason of cancer. There was considerable criticism of the selling methods employed in marketing these policies, and the Secretary of State will bear this aspect in mind in the review currently being made of the Department's powers over insurance companies. I understand that sales of these policies have now been discontinued.
LORD AMULREE: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for that reply, which I think will allay a good deal of anxiety. But I should like to ask him whether it is not possible for some kind of consideration to be given to the type of person who is made a director of these companies under the terms of, I think it is. Section 54 of the 1967 Companies Act.
LORD RUMALBYN: Yes, my Lords. My right honourable friend always has this under review.
LORD BURNTWOOD: My Lords, the noble Lord mentioned the general review of insurance policy attitudes by the Government. Can he say whether a reduction in premiums is being considered for those who do not smoke; and, if not, why not?
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, that question is very wide indeed of the Question on the Order Paper. If the noble Lord would like to put it down, I will consider it but I should say that under the Insurance Companies Acts 1958 and 1967 the Department of Trade and Industry do not have powers enabling them to control policy conditions or premium rates.
VISCOUNT MONCK: My Lords, would my noble friend agree, particularly so that we should avoid showing favouritism to Lord Aberdare, that we be permitted to wish him many happy returns of the day?
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I am most grateful.

KILLINGHOLME GENERATING STATION (ANCILLARY POWERS) BILL [H.L.]
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (THE EARL OF LISTOWEL): My Lords, in moving this Motion, I should like to explain the purpose of the two Motions standing in my name. They are to enable two Private Bills to continue their progress through Parliament in the next Session. It is not due to the fault of the Promoters that the Bills have not been through both Houses of Parliament before the end of this Session. A similar Motion to carry over the two Bills into the next Session has been agreed in another place. If your Lordships agree to this Motion I will formally move the sub-sequent Motion on the Clyde River Purification Bill.
Moved, That the Promoters of the Bill have leave to suspend any further proceedings thereon in this Session, in order to proceed with the Bill, if they shall think lit, in the next Session of Parliament, provided that notice of their intention to do so be lodged in the Office of the Clerk of the Parliaments not later than three o'clock on the 4th August 1971;
That such Bill shall be deposited in the Office of the Clerk of the Parliaments not later than three o'clock on or before the third day on which the House shall sit after the commencement of the next Session of Parliament, with a declaration annexed thereto, signed by the Agent, stating that the Bill is the same in every respect as the Bill at the last stage of the proceedings thereon in this House in the present Session;
That the proceedings on such Bill shall, in the next Session of Parliament, be pro forma only in regard to every stage through which the same shall have passed in the present Session, and that no new fees be charged in regard to such stages;
That the Standing Orders by which the proceedings on Bills are regulated shall not apply, in the next Session of Parliament, to such Bill in regard to any of the stages through which the same shall have passed during the present Session.—(The Earl of Listowel.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

CLYDE RIVER PURIFICATION BILL
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: My Lords, I beg to move this Motion formally.
Moved, That this House do concur with the Commons in their Message of yesterday.—(The Earl of Listowel.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

CONSOLIDATED FUND (APPROPRIATION) (No. 2) BILL
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (EARL JELLICOE): My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a second time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Earl Jellicoe.)
On Question, Bill read 2a: Committee negatived.
Then, Standing Order No. 42 having been suspended (pursuant to the Resolution of July 22), Bill read 3a, and passed.

SOCIAL SECURITY BILL
2.54 p.m.
THE MINISTER OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY (LORD ABERDARE): My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a third time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 3a.—(Lord Aberdare.)
On Question, Bill read 3a.
LORD ABERDARE: My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill do now pass.
Moved, That the Bill do now pass.—(Lord Aberdare.)
BARONESS PHILLIPS: My Lords, I should like to thank the Minister for the courtesy that he has extended to this side of the House throughout the passage of this Bill. As I said earlier, we are very fond of the Minister but not very fond of his Bill. We appreciate that it is part of the package deal known as New Policies for Public Spending. I should like to reiterate our thanks for his courtesy and helpfulness.
LORD ABERDARE: My Lords, I am extremely grateful to the noble Baroness. I had not expected this ill-deserved tribute. I recognise that we had certain differences of opinion on the policy, but I am grateful for her kind remarks.
On Question, Bill passed.

HOUSING BILL
2.55 p.m.
LORD SANDFORD: My Lords, I beg to move that this Report be now received.
Moved, That the Report be now received.—(Lord Sandford.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
Clause 1 [Housing improvement in development areas and intermediate areas]:
LORD SANDFORD LORD SANDFORD moved Manuscript Amendment No. 1:
Page 1, line 12, leave out from beginning to (" before ") and insert (" the works have not been begun ").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move the first of five Manuscript Amendments. Perhaps I ought to explain that these Amendments are all consequential upon the acceptance by the Government of the Amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Derwent yesterday. The purpose of this Amendment is to give more precision in two respects to the Amendment made to Clause 1(1)(a) at the Committee stage. The use of the term"works"in place of"work"in that Amendment will bring it in line with the drafting of the earlier part of the clause. This applies the Act to"works eligible for financial assistance"and so on. The omission of the phrase"on the improvements"in the Amendment made at Committee stage is designed to avoid any risk of misunderstanding. As the Amendment stands, it might be thought that the provision related only to works eligible for assistance by means of a discretionary improvement grant. In fact, it applies to works eligible for assistance by means of all three types of grant: standard (basic amenities) and special (for houses in multi-occupation) as well as improvement grants. I beg to move.
LORD DERWENT: My Lords, may I thank my noble friend and his advisers? We improved the Bill with the help of noble Lords opposite and behind him, but, obviously, nobody expected that the drafting would be correct. I am very grateful to my noble friend and to his advisers for getting the Bill in the proper form. I only regret that his advisers—at any rate the noble Lord himself was

1007
sitting up late last night—may have had to sit up late. I apologise for that; but it was well worth it. They improved the Bill. So far as I am concerned, I agree with the other Amendments, but this particular Amendment is the main one applying to the Amendment we passed yesterday.
LORD GREENWOOD OF ROSSENDALE: My Lords, I should like to add our thanks to those of Lord Derwent to the Under-Secretary. We are all glad that the Government have resigned themselves to accepting the views of the House, and although a much more wide-spread resignation would be even more welcome we are at this stage grateful for small mercies. We appreciate the help and efforts of the noble Lord, and I should like to endorse what Lord Derwent said about the civil servants. We placed a considerable strain on them at very short notice when they are already overworked and must be looking forward, as we are, to the Recess.
LORD FLETCHER: My Lords, may I add my congratulations and thanks to the noble Lord for the wisdom shown in acceding to the wishes expressed by your Lordships yesterday.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 2 [Increase in financial assistance]:
LORD SANDFORD LORD SANDFORD moved Manuscript Amendment No. 2:
Page 3, line 21, at end insert: ("(2) Where this Act applies, so much of Section 5(1) of the Housing Act 1969 as requires the local authority to fix the amount of an improvement grant at the time when they approve the application for the grant shall not apply, and the amount fixed at that time may be varied by the local authority, subject to the provisions of the said Act, at any subsequent time.")
The noble Lord said: An Amendment of this sort, again consequential on the Amendment made yesterday in Committee by my noble friend Lord Derwent, is required to make works eligible for assistance under the provisions of the Bill, provided they had not been started by the relevant date, June 23, 1971. The Amendment allows a local authority, where this Bill applies, to vary at any subsequent time the amount of grant fixed at the time of approval, in the normal
1008
way of settling the rate of grant, subject to the provisions of the Bill. Without this Amendment, a local authority who had already approved a grant under Section 5(1) of the Housing Act 1969 and, as they are required to do under the terms of that subsection, had at the same time fixed the amount of the grant, would have no power to fix a higher amount under the provisions of the Bill with which we are now dealing. This is because, having given the original approval, they would have discharged their statutory function so far as the particular application was concerned (a point I made in my letter to my noble friend) and would have no power to vary the terms of that approval subsequently. I beg to move.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD SANDFORD LORD SANDFORD moved Manuscript Amendment No. 3:
Page 3, line 42, after (" and ") insert"begun and ").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is an Amendment directly consequential on the Amendment made to Clause 1(1)(9) at Committee stage, as now amended. The latter part of subsection (3) of the clause makes clear that for the purpose of the higher rate of grant towards the cost of environmental improvements in a general improvement area, expenditure on providing land for this purpose incurred during the period for which assistance is given under the Bill will be eligible, equally with the cost of works on environmental improvement, even although in the period no works are carried out on the land acquired. It is necessary that this provision should repeat the new provision incorporated in Clause 1(1)(a), by which entitlement to the higher rates of grants is made to depend on the date of commencement of the works instead of the making of the application. Precisely the same change is made for the same reason in the parallel Scottish provision in Clause 3(3). I beg to move.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 3 [Increase in financial assistance in Scotland]:
LORD SANDFORD LORD SANDFORD moved Manuscript Amendment No. 4:
Page 4, line 30, at end insert—
(" ( ) Where this Act applies, so much of section 29(1) and of section 42(3) of the said

1009
Act of 1968 as requires the local authority to fix the amount of an improvement grant or a standard grant at the time when they approve the application for the grant shall not apply, and the amount fixed at that time may be varied by the local authority, subject to the provisions of the said Act, at any subsequent time.")
The noble Lord said: I think your Lordships will readily see that this Amendment applies the effect of Amendment No. 2 to Scotland, and the next Amendment I shall read applies the effect of Manuscript Amendment No. 3 also to Scotland. I beg to move.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD SANDFORD LORD SANDFORD moved Manuscript Amendment No. 5:
Page 4, line 43, after (" and ") insert (" begun and ").
The noble Lord said: This produces in Scotland exactly the same effect as Amendment No. 3 produces in England and Wales. I beg to move.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Then, Standing Order No. 42 having been suspended (pursuant to the Resolution of July 22), Bill read 3a, with the Amendments, and passed, and returned to the Commons.

IMMIGRATION BILL
3.8 p.m.
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do again resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.
Moved, That the House do again resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Windlesham.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[The EARL OF LISTOWEL in the Chair]
Clause 26 [General offences in connection with administration of Act]:
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES: I should point out to the Committee that if Amendment 107B is agreed to I cannot call No. 108.
LORD BROCKWAY LORD BROCKWAY moved Amendment No. 107B:
Page 25, line 37, leave out paragraph (a).
The noble Lord said: It may be for the convenience of the Committee if I move this Amendment in association with Nos. 108A, B and C. These paragraphs indicate offences which are incidental to the major offence of illegal entry. I submit to the Minister that they are covered by the penalties for the overriding offence and it appears to be undesirable that persons should also be subject to criminal liability for offences which are all in reality part of the basic charge. On those grounds, I beg to move.
LORD DENHAM: The noble Lord, Lord Brockway, says that all these offences are incidental to the main offences under the Bill, and therefore feels that they are not necessary. We feel strongly that they are necessary for a variety of reasons. First, a patrial may refuse to submit to examination, or refuse to register at an hotel, and he cannot be refused permission to enter. The offences under Clause 26(1)(f), in connection with police registration or hotel registration are committed by people already in the United Kingdom, and so it cannot be argued that they could be adequately dealt with by refusal of permission to enter. Some of these offences might be quite trivial, and the court might think it adequate punishment to inflict a fine. To argue that the person concerned should not be allowed to stay in the United Kingdom at the cost of a small fine, but should be refused permission to enter, cannot be in the best interests of those for whom the noble Lord is concerned.
LORD BROCKWAY: As on other occasions, I do not propose to press this Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD FOOT LORD FOOT moved Amendment No. 108:
Page 25, line 37, after (" he ") insert (" without reasonable cause ").
The noble Lord said: This is a fairly small point, but I think it is not unimportant. Clause 26 provides that a person shall be guilty of an offence in certain circumstances, and the first of these is
" if he refuses or fails to submit to examination under Schedule 2 of this Act ".
In some of the subsequent types of offences the words"without reasonable excuse"are included. The whole object

1011
of this Amendment is to insert the words"without reasonable cause"in relation to in the first of these offences, so that it will read:
" if he without reasonable cause refuses or fails to submit to examination under Schedule 2 of this Act."
The types of examination with which Schedule 2 is concerned are examinations, first, by an immigration officer, and secondly, by a medical inspector. It might at first sight seem that where such an examination takes place at a port of entry, either by the immigration officer or by the medical inspector, it would be difficult for a person to have a reasonable cause for refusing or failing to submit to such an examination. That I accept. But if your Lordships look at Schedule 2, you will see that there are some medical examinations which can take place not at the port of entry, but after the person has come into the country: that is under paragraph 7 of Schedule 2, by which directions can be given to a person who has been permitted to come in that he shall at some subsequent date or dates present himself to a medical inspector in order that a further or initial medical examination can be made.
It is not difficult to imagine circumstances in which a person might inadvertently, because he is ill, or detained, or cannot keep the appointment, fail to present himself for such an examination. All that my Amendment is designed to do is to enable it to be a defence to any such charge that he can say that he had a reasonable cause for not presenting himself for such examination. I daresay that this is something which is acceptable to the Government, and I hope that it is. It does not involve any matter of principle, but it would avoid the possibility of somebody being foolishly prosecuted when he commits this offence by pure inadvertence.
LORD DENHAM: This Amendment was moved in Standing Committee in another place, and after discussion it was generally agreed that nobody could think of any occasions when the words"without reasonable cause"would really be necessary. The noble Lord, Lord Foot, has introduced some new arguments on this, and we should like to look at what he has said. We do not think there is
1012
any real worry here, but if the noble Lord will withdraw the Amendment, perhaps we can look at the matter again. I am advised that failure to submit to a medical examination could come under Clause 24(1)(d), which provides for"reasonable excuse ". We are almost certain that there is an answer to the noble Lord's suggested new case but, as I say, we should like to look at the point again. I will let him know how we feel about it.
LORD FOOT: I am obliged to the noble Lord, and I am almost satisfied with that answer. But I suggest that if your Lordships look at Clause 24(1)(d), which deals with failing to comply with a requirement imposed under Schedule 2 to the Act to report to a medical officer of health, where the words,"without reasonable excuse"are included, and you compare it with Clause 26(1)(a), where the words are not included, there is a conflict in the two clauses:"without reasonable excuse"applies in one case and not in the other. If the noble Lord will look at this point again, I think he will find that the way to put it right is to insert the words"without reasonable excuse"into this clause, so that the two clauses fit together. However, in view of what the noble Lord has said, I am happy to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
3.19 p.m.
LORD BROCKWAY LORD BROCKWAY moved Amendment No. 108D:
Page 26, line 21, leave out (" or other person lawfully ").
The noble Lord said: I think the members of the Committee will realise that this is a point of substance and importance. Clause 26 begins by saying that a person shall be guilty of an offence, and then there are listed the causes. The last of these causes, in paragraph (g), is:
" if, without reasonable excuse, he obstructs an immigration officer or other person lawfully acting in the execution of this Act."
It is the words"or other person lawfully acting"that I wish to delete. I wish to do so because the provision as it stands would extend the protection to members of private organisations. They are employed by such organisations as Securicor. Curiously enough, I have been in close association with Securicor from its inception, and I want to pay a tribute

1013
to the bravery of their staff. Nevertheless, it is a private organisation and the public have no control either over the organisation or the selection of its personnel. This applies not only to Securicor, which is the best known, but to other organisations. I suggest that it is wrong in principle that special powers or protection should be given to other than police officers, who are public servants and under public control. I suggest that this is a principle of great importance and that it is the duty of Her Majesty's Government to justify any departure from it. I beg leave to move this Amendment.
LORD WINDLESHAM: Under Clause 26(1)(g), the paragraph to which the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, has drawn our attention, it is an offence to obstruct without reasonable excuse an immigration officer or other person lawfully acting in execution of this Act. As the noble Lord has explained, he would like to see the deletion of the words"or other person lawfully ". Under the existing law it is an offence against the Aliens Order 1953 to obstruct any officer or person in the exercise of his functions under the Order; and it is also an offence against Section 4 of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 to obstruct an immigration officer or other person lawfully acting in the execution of Part I of that Act. So it is worth noting that these provisions not only exist in the present law but that the present law does not qualify them in the way that the Bill before your Lordships does; because here we have the words added without reasonable excuse ". So there is an additional safeguard in the wording of the Bill. Clause 26(1)(g), like the corresponding provisions of the existing law, is not intended to confer any personal immunity either on the immigration officer or on anyone else who is concerned with the operation of the Act, but only to provide a sanction against attempts to disrupt or impede the operation of immigration control.
The"other persons"mentioned in the provision would not only include the employees of private organisations such as Securicor which the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, mentioned—and he is quite right: it does include them, but it would be wrong to give the impression that it covers only people in that position—it would also include the port medical
1014
officers and their assistants acting under paragraph 2(2) of Schedule 2, and also the employees of shipping companies and State airlines who are responsible under paragraph 16 of Schedule 2 for ensuring that a person leaves the country in accordance with removal directions that have been made. It seems right that any deliberate attempt, without reasonable cause, to hinder any person in one of these categories in carrying out his lawful duties should continue to be an offence, as it is under the present law.
LORD BROCKWAY: Without support from other parts of the House, I will not press this Amendment and now beg leave to withdraw it.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 26 agreed to.
Clause 27 [Offences by persons connected with ships or aircraft or with ports]:
LORD DENHAM LORD DENHAM moved Amendment No. 109:
Page 26, line 31, at end insert (" in the United Kingdom ").
The noble Lord said: On behalf of my noble friend I beg to move Amendment No. 109. This is a paving Amendment for Amendment No. 128. The second Amendment affects paragraph 17 of Schedule 2 and its purpose is to ensure that where directions are given under paragraphs 8 to 14 (after refusal of entry or illegal entry) or under paragraph 1 of Schedule 3 (on deportation) for the removal of a person from the United Kingdom, the captain of the ship or aircraft should be required to prevent him from disembarking until the directions are fulfilled, and has express legal authority to detain him on board until he reaches his destination. As the Bill stands there is the anomaly that although the removal directions will specify a destination and the person concerned has an appeal as to destination under Clause 17, though in some cases exercisable only after removal, the captain of the ship or aircraft to whom the directions are given has no clear authority to enforce them by restraining the person from attempting to disembark at some other destination.
The Amendment is being made at the request of the Chamber of Shipping and

1015
B.O.A.C., in order to ensure that a carrying company is not put at risk of a legal action being taken against it in this country because it has sought to enforce directions given to it by the Immigration Service. Clause 27(a) makes it an offence for the captain of a ship or aircraft knowingly to permit a person to disembark when required to prevent it. The first Amendment ensures that the scope of this offence remains limited to disembarkation in the United Kingdom, because it is not necessary or desirable to apply Clause 27(a) to acts committed outside the United Kingdom.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 27, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 28 agreed to.
Clause 29 [Contributions for expenses of persons returning abroad]:
3.27 p.m.
BARONESS WHITE BARONESS WHITE moved Amendment No. 110:
Page 28, line 16, leave out from (" may ") to (" to ") in line 18, and insert (" subject to the following provisions of this section, provide funds to the extent that he may, with the approval of the Treasury, determine ").
The noble Baroness said: This Amendment is, in effect, a paving Amendment to Amendment No. 113. As your Lordships will observe, there are two other Amendments to this clause which in part, though not entirely, meet the points mentioned in our Amendments. Clause 29 is a very short clause, but it has caused as much controversy as any clause in this Bill because it deals with the proposal that the new authority should contribute to the expenses of persons being repatriated. As your Lordships will now be aware, there are already arrangements for persons who are in receipt of social security benefits to receive some assistance if they desire to return to their home countries; but the object of this clause is to extend such a provision to persons who are not patrial, who are not covered by the social security provisions, but who may wish to leave the United Kingdom and go to a country or territory where they intend to reside permanently. Such a payment is intended not only to cover their travelling expenses but also the expenses of members of their families or households.
I think most of us would be in general agreement with the idea that if someone had come to this country and found it really impossible to settle satisfactorily, for whatever reason, and who therefore wished to return home or perhaps to go elsewhere—and I will touch on that point in a moment—it would be in the public interest for help to be given to them to do so. Therefore the reasons why we are querying this clause and propose to amend it fairly extensively lie in the references that have been made to the provision for repatriation by spokesmen in the Conservative Party, and of course most particularly by the right honourable Member for Wolverhampton, South-West, Mr. Enoch Powell. We have to take his remarks seriously because he does, after all, represent a certain section of opinion in this country. He has made very clear in what he said, both in Committee and on Third Reading in another place, that he does not accept what we entirely believe to be the attitude of the present Government; namely, that these provisions should be used only for those who wish to go and that there should be no kind of pressure upon them.
I have no doubt that the attitude, not only of the Secretary of State but of Ministers representing Her Majesty's Government in this House, would be in line with ours, that these provisions should never be used except for those who wish voluntarily to leave and that they should not be under any sort of pressure, but unfortunately the Bill does not say that. This is why we are anxious about it. It is quite plain that those who hold the views of Mr. Powell wish to make this not just a safety net clause, but an instrument of policy deliberately to return as many as possible of those who have settled in this country from the new Commonwealth, and to return them from whence they came. Mr. Powell makes no bones at all that this is his view of what would be desirable. He has made various observations—I shall not worry your Lordships by quoting too many of them, but among other things he is quoted as having said—
LORD ABERDARE: Will the noble Baroness—
BARONESS WHITE: I am not quoting directly from what he said in the House, but I believe that I can quote what he

1017
said outside. He said outside the House, and I understand that I can only refer to what he said outside the House:
" Nobody who has listened to what the Conservative Party has said on this subject both during the General Election and before could have supposed that there was any intention to limit the availability of assistance for any immigrant who voluntarily applied for it. Such limitation would in effect be a serious breach of what I understood to be the undertaking of this Party when it went to the electorate ".
LORD ABERDARE: Will the noble Baroness say from what she is quoting?
BARONESS WHITE: This was a speech which I understand the right honourable Member for Wolverhampton, South-West, made outside the House. It was quoted in another place, but from a speech which he had made outside the House. On Third Reading in another place—which of course one cannot go into in precise words but I think it perfectly proper to indicate—the right honourable Member for Wolverhampton, South-West, made it very plain that his view differed entirely from the attitude of the Government and that in his view this provision should be used, not as a social service safety net, but as a deliberate instrument of policy.
For these reasons, therefore, I think we must look much more closely at this clause than one would have done had one taken it just at face value, which suggests that help might be given in suitable circumstances for people who wish to return home. We feel that in view of the statements which have been made by certain members of the Conservative Party it is most important that we should include in this clause a reference to a voluntary principle and make it perfectly plain that these provisions are intended to apply to those who, as I say, not having settled here satisfactorily wish to return home and who may be able to show that they are not in a position to meet all the expenses even though they are not in receipt of social security benefits.
We also wish to know how the Government propose to work this scheme because, again in the debates in another place, the Secretary of State indicated that he had had preliminary discussions with International Social Service and that he was minded to use that organisation (which is a very reputable organisation with considerable experience) to operate this part of the Bill. But we are not at
1018
all clear what the relationship would be between the Home Office and that organisation, or any other organisation that the Home Secretary might have in mind. We should like to have a great deal more information. Some time has elapsed since the discussions in another place and I hope very much that the Minister can now tell us just what is proposed.
From such inquiries as I have been able to make, I understand that International Social Service would not act directly as an agent for the Secretary of State; that it would be available to help in making arrangements if requested to do so, and would hope to receive some contribution to its administration expenses in performing this service, but that it would not itself, I understand, administer these grants, if it did not administer them, I am not quite clear in what way they would be administered, and we should like to know what sort of arrangements the Home Secretary has in view. This may be a very expensive and sensitive operation in certain circumstances.
We should also like to know whether other organisations might possibly be used for this purpose. The one I have mentioned has its headquarters in London. I am not sure whether its operations extend, for example, to Scotland. We should like to have more information about this aspect because there is nothing at all in the Bill as it stands to indicate that such provisions may be made. It is for this reason that we have suggested in the second of the two Amendments—I think it convenient to refer to the second of them while proposing Amendment No. 110—that the Secretary of State should clarify this matter by making regulations which can be placed before Parliament and should be approved by Parliament, and that in making such regulations he should make it plain that such assistance is for voluntary repatriation, and specifically only for voluntary repatriation, and that there should be no suggestion either of a threat or an inducement to people to apply other than the straightforward payment of necessary expenses.
There are one or two other points on which we would like further clarification. I think I am correct in supposing that if someone came to this country and did not settle here, but did not wish to

1019
return to the country from whence he came—for example, someone who when he found he could not stay in this country, if he were a Jewish person coming from one of the Iron Curtain countries, wished to go to Israel—assistance would be available for such a person and his family to go to Israel rather than to the country from which they originated. That is one point.
Another point that we should be quite clear about is again on this technical conception of"patrial"which the Government are putting forward and the fact that there will be mixed families some of whom are patrial and some are not. Presumably in the fourth line of the clause, where reference is made to the expenses of persons who are not patrial, whereas a couple of lines further down reference is made to"expenses for members of their families or households ", it is the head of the family who is considered non-patrial. There may be patrial members of the family who would be included in the expenses of"members of…families or households ". We should be quite clear about what is meant here before passing this clause, for it is not quite clear as the clause stands. When we were discussing another matter concerning families it was said that there could be some families who were pa trial and some who were not. We should like to be entirely clear on this point.
From what I have said, I am sure that in the immigration community in this country, because of the speeches to which I referred earlier in my remarks, there has been considerable distress and apprehension about this clause. So far as the Government are concerned, I am sure that their intentions are not unreasonable. But the clause, unless it is amended and improved in various respects, could leave the way open to some restrictive behaviour on the part of a future Administration, if they were prepared to yield to political pressure. Therefore we feel it is essential that this clause should be significantly amended before the Bill leaves your Lordships' House. I beg to move.
3.41 p.m.
LORD WALSTON: May I support my noble friend, and add one particular point which she barely touched upon at the
1020
end of her speech? It is with regard to the effect on the immigrant families in this country. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, and his colleagues are as anxious as any of us that those who come to this country should feel that they are at home here and are not in any way being persecuted. I am afraid, largely for the reasons which my noble friend has given of the speeches that have been made in another place and outside of it, that that feeling has to a great extent been dissipated, and this repatriation clause is, understandably, looked upon by those who do not go into the full details of it, but simply hear about it from outside, if not as the intention of Her Majesty's Government to get rid of a significant number of existing immigrants, at least as a taking of power by the Government to enable them to do this at any time that they wish. I agree entirely that that is not the intention of Her Majesty's Government, and is certainly not the intention of the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, but I assure noble Lords that what I have described is the reaction of many immigrants to this country. The acceptance of this Amendment would allay those fears, unjustified though they may be, and make it abundantly clear that this is a clause which is designed to help and not in any way impede or pursue the immigrants with any form of vendetta. I urge the Government to accept the Amendment.
BARONESS GAITSKELL: I should like to support my noble friend's Amendment, but not in quite such mild terms as she moved it. This is one of the shabbiest provisions in the Bill. I cannot believe that such a provision has ever before been put into an Immigration Bill. We all know the politics behind this provision; we know the kind of people which it is meant to appease. We are all being rather careful in not describing these people, or talking about them, but we all know them. The truth is that when an immigrant wants to go home—and I quite understand that after this Bill has been passed it may be that more may want to go home than have previously wished to do so—he saves up, and may apply to voluntary organisations which can help, and he does this of his own accord. Then he goes home to his sunny island, or wherever he came from. This clause can only make community relations

1021
worse; it can do nothing to help race relations, and I deplore it. I strongly support my noble friend's Amendment.
LORD BARNBY: The noble Lord, Lord Walston, said that this clause would increase rather than dispel apprehensions about the Bill. I find it hard to understand why there should be so much apprehension about it. I am not quite clear about the mechanics of its implementation, but the bare proposal in Clause 29 is to provide means whereby those who have come to this country and wish to go back to where they came from should be assisted. I was perplexed by the noble Baroness, Lady White, when she used the phrase"to be compulsorily returned ". The whole point is that they should have the opportunity to return, and the Government propose to provide funds for them to go back. With regard to migration, we know that there are a great number of people who embark on such a course—whites or non-whites—and after the first part of the experience they feel they wish to go back to where they came from. It would be logical that we should he as generous as possible so as to enable people to obtain the resources with which to go back. Far from being concerned as to whether too many people will be involved, we all know from the discussions on this Bill that long talks have been carried out on matters which could affect relatively small numbers of people compared with the large migration that has taken place.
I cannot refrain from interpolating now that when I was a young fellow I lived in the United States. I saw 900,000 people a year entering the United States. That is a lot of people. Of course conditions were very different. We all remember the move from Turkey back to Greece—that was not voluntary but was obligatory repatriation. To return to the point, need we be unhappy? We are not short of population in this country. I read the other day that in the past five years 76,000 people were killed on the roads in this country against 122,000 who were killed in the same period in France. That seems pretty substantial warfare on the roads. I am among those, quite candidly, who think we should not be any worse off if we had fewer people in this country. There are those who suggest methods of birth control,
1022
and other ways of immigration restriction. We are applying ourselves at the moment to the simple matter of assisting the repatriation of possibly a few people from this country.
For a large part of my life I have been associated with migration—I was on the Migration Council for a long time—from this country to the Dominions. I have always believed that it is good for the country because those people will purchase British goods in the countries to which they go. We have evidence of that in the States and in the Argentine. The records show that of those people who migrated, whether to New Zealand, Australia or Canada, a proportion always wanted to come back. They were un-happy, they thought they had taken a wrong decision. If that happens with white people in the Dominions, surely it is much more certain that a great number who have come to these shores, who find themselves in a country very different from their own, often talking a different language, and with a different outlook, will want to go back.
May I give a personal instance? I was in Bradford, Yorkshire, the other day. I was at the airport and hired a taxi. A non-white was standing there who wanted to get transport to the city. I said to him,"Join me in my cab." So he did. I said,"Where do you come from? ". He said,"I have just come from Jamaica; I have been on vacation "."Had a good time? "."Yes. I'm glad to get back now to see my family, but I should have liked to stay there ". I said,"Are you married? ". He said,"Yes, I have three children ". Then I said,"What happened to your wife and children? He answered,"Of course, I couldn't afford to take them. I just saved enough for my own holiday to Jamaica and the wife and children were put on National Assistance. But if I only had the money or could get it I would willingly take the whole family back to Jamaica. That's where I should like to go." I suppose that is one instance of a great number.
I have already suggested to the Committee that a great deal of time has been taken by a number of these Amendments which would affect a very small number of people. If the noble Baroness is right in suggesting that a great number of people might be affected, I am one of

1023
those who would not shed tears. If there are a great number in this country, nonwhites, who are not happy here, it is much better that they should go home, and I should be among those who would genuinely support public funds to make them happy and help them to go back to places where they would be happy. I am very much surprised at the attitude taken by the noble Baroness. When it comes to the noble Lord, Lord Walston, with whom I find myself in agreement on many questions and disagreement on others, I doubt whether he is right in saying that more restriction on this clause would be helpful rather than the reverse.
LORD WADE: After listening to the noble Lord, Lord Barnby, I can only say that I hope his views do not represent the views of Her Majesty's Government. If they do, I should feel even more disturbed at the inclusion of Clause 29 in this Bill. He referred to a very small number of persons, but I would suggest that this clause has had a considerable effect on the minds of, I think, the great majority of communities from the Commonwealth who are living and settled here. The clause has been interpreted very widely as having been inserted for more sinister motives than would appear from the reading of it. Personally, I think it might well have been better if this clause had not been included at all, as it is clear, as the noble Baroness, Lady White, has said, that it may be used as an instrument of policy.
Most of us in taking part in these debates have drawn upon personal experience, and I can only add to the words of others that in speaking to members of the Commonwealth communities who have settled here—and I am thinking of those who have been settled for a number of years—I find the almost unanimous fear that this is the thin edge of the wedge and is going to be used in a way that I do not think the Government intend at the present time. I hope the clause will be amended if it is not thrown out altogether. I support the Amendment proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady White. An an alternative, there is an Amendment which my noble friend Lord Foot has on the Marshalled List, but certainly I should like at this stage to impress on the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, the need for some amendment
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of this clause in order to clarify the position and remove some of the very real misunderstandings that exist as a result of what has been said outside the House as well as inside as to the purpose of this clause.
LORD DONALDSON OF KINGSBRIDGE: I very much enjoyed the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Barnby. I had some difficulty in relating it to the clause we are discussing, but one of the beauties of your Lordships' House is that we are allowed to range fairly wide. The purpose of this series of Amendments is perfectly specific. It is to clear away the fear in the minds of immigrants that this opportunity offered to help them to go home is a means of getting rid of them. It is as simple as that. This series of Amendments turns on the fact of those who voluntarily wish to leave. Or, in the words of Amendment No. 113, that no funds are to be made available except to a person applying therefor voluntarily. This is the whole point of this series of Amendments. As things of a kind which most Members of your Lordships' House would not agree with have been widely said and widely publicised, suggesting that the best thing we could possibly do with a large number of our black population is to send them home, it seems extremely important that we should make it as clear as a bell in this Bill that any assistance we give them in getting them home is only given if they want to go. It seems to me that Her Majesty's Government should accept this series of Amendments, or modify the Bill in that direction.
3.57 p.m.
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR: I think we shall get the clause right only if we are in agreement about what we are trying to do. I am in close agreement with what the noble Lord, Lord Donaldson of Kingsbridge, has just said. My interest in the matter arose first, as I said on Second Reading, when years ago it came home to me that those who had come to this country from the Commonwealth and, after experience of this country, found they had made a mistake, either because of the climate or their reception or because of difficulty in getting work, or for some other reason, were unable to get assistance to go back to their own country unless they first became destitute. This seemed to me to be

1025
absurd, and seemed to be doing no good to anybody; certainly it did no good to race relations. Those people had to hang on in this country with their resources dwindling until, when they had virtually nothing left, what was then the National Assistance Board would help with their passage home. I am sure we all ought to want to bring that situation to an end, and if a clause of this kind is required in the Bill let us have it. There should of course be no compulsion or harassment of anybody to go home.
I know that not so much this clause as earlier speeches of Mr. Enoch Powell have caused dismay. I am bound to say that the principal cause of dismay was produced by people, who ought to have known better, who instantly misrepresented Mr. Enoch Powell's first speech on this subject by saying that he was advocating compulsory repatriation. If anybody cares to read that speech carefully he will see that Mr. Powell never said that; indeed, I think he threatened an action for libel against anybody else who repeated that misrepresentation. I never believed in Mr. Powell's idea of a Ministry of Repatriation, or anything like that, but in my view Mr. Powell and others have been quite right in drawing attention to the future dangers of race troubles if the coloured population in some of our big cities rises, as it seems likely to do, to one-third or more of the whole. Those will be very different cities from what we have hitherto known them to be, and a tremendous amount of tolerance will be required if those difficulties are to be overcome.
LORD O'HAGAN: May I ask the noble Lord on what figures he has based his estimate of some of our cities having a one-third coloured population, and by what date?
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR: Nobody can say for certain what it will be. The best means of resolving this problem is by dispersal. The total population of coloured people is extremely small and if they were evenly spread through the country there would be no race problem at all. The real difficulty is that the coloured population is so strongly concentrated in a relatively small number of big centres of population. I
1026
myself do not have a solution for this; I do not know how one can effectively encourage dispersal. Nevertheless, that would be a much better solution than any form of pressure on the coloured population to leave these islands altogether.
LORD WALSTON: May I interrupt the noble Lord again to pursue this particular point, which the noble Lord, Lord O'Hagan, has just raised, because I am quite sure that Lord Brooke does not want to be misrepresented or misunderstood in any way. But when somebody of his eminence and experience goes on record, as he appears to have done now, as saying that it is most likely (I think those were his words) that in some of our cities the total coloured population will rise to one-third, that is something one can well envisage as making headline news in certain papers and causing a great deal of alarm. Unless the noble Lord has substantial figures and estimates and projections with which to substantiate such a figure, I am sure he would be much happier if it were not put in such a concrete and absolute form as he put it.
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR: I am grateful for what the noble Lord has said. I hardly think it would make headline news because I said exactly the same in your Lordships' House four years ago, and have been saying so ever since. I do not think one can escape the fact. Whether it is 33, 30, 25, 37 or 40 per cent., I do not think anybody can determine with certainty at the present time, but as things are going there is likely to be a situation in which something like one-third of the population in some of our big centres of population will by the end of the century be coloured. I greatly hope not only that tolerance will prevail but also that the coloured population will gradually disperse itself, so that these high concentrations, which are centres of potential trouble unless everybody is very wise, will be diminished. But the right way to diminish them is not by harassing people or seeking to send them abroad compulsorily. There should be an absolute denial from the highest possible authority of any talk that there is to be either compulsory repatriation or any sort of pressure to make them go.

1027
My concern is to see this clause so drafted that it will adequately and successfully provide for the kind of case I mentioned in the first instance; that is, the man or the family who have come to this country, have been disappointed by it, for one reason or another, and feel that they would rather go home but are not in a position to afford to remove themselves there—just as my noble friend Lord Barnby described a little time ago. It ought not to be beyond the powers of Parliament; it ought not to be beyond the powers of the Parliamentary draftsman, and it certainly ought not to be beyond the powers of people of good will so to provide, whether by legislation or otherwise, that this object, on which I think we are all universally agreed, shall be accomplished. If this clause, either amended or unamended, can achieve that object, I should have thought we should all be satisfied and have done a good day's work.
LORD REDCLIFFE-MAUD: May I, as a Cross-Bencher who has listened with great admiration to speeches on both sides of the Committee, and in particular to the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Cumnor, just now, put in one word on the side of those who say that not only do we want this clause to do what the Government say they want it to do—which objective Lord Brooke has so admirably set out—but we also want it to be impossible of being used to do something that this House would not want, which, as Lord Brooke said, was to drive anybody out or harass immigrants if they did not want voluntarily to go. To me as a Cross-Bencher that is the one point that is before us. If the Government can assure us that they will bring forward an Amendment of their own, or will in some other way ensure that the word"voluntary"is used, and if it is made abundantly plain that this clause cannot be used to harass or evict anyone, I shall be very happy.
THE EARL OF BALFOUR: May I say one or two words here? First of all, on Amendment 110 I presume that the noble Baroness, Lady White, means it to refer to the first"may"because the word"may"occurs twice in line 16. Secondly, the noble Baroness and one or two other noble Lords have mentioned the words"returning home ". I must respectfully state that there is nothing about returning
1028
home either in the clause as it stands or in her Amendment No. 110, or indeed in her Amendment No. 113. The clause as it stands refers to a person going to
" a country or territory where they intend to reside permanently ".
The noble Baroness, Lady Gaitskell, pointed out that many people may have emigrated here and then made a tremendous effort to save up enough money to return home. A great many people from this country have decided to emigrate to Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Newfoundland or elsewhere, and have then discovered that they are not happy there and so they return home. How much better if Lady Gaitskell's idea were that immigrants could save some money and have assistance to return home so that they do not arrive back in their own country completely destitute! It costs a great deal of money to travel across the seas, and if people do not fit in and want to return home it is only right that they should have the encouragement to do so. In respect of putting people's minds at rest, as the noble Lord, Lord Wade, said, I feel that this clause as it stands would put my mind much more at rest if I were an immigrant in this country. I should realise that there was a chance that if I came here and was not happy I might manage to get some money to help me go back home again. This is the important point of this clause.
The noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Cumnor, touched on the question of climate. I am certain that many immigrants to this country had no idea before they came how cold it is compared to, say, India, Pakistan, or those glorious islands in the West Indies with probably the mildest climate in the world. They may be thoroughly unhappy here, but because they do not have enough money to go home they must remain. From all that has been said in your Lordships' Committee, from both sides, I ask your Lordships to accept one thing. If people are going to emigrate here they must either mix with us and become part of our society, or go back to where they came from. We cannot afford to have separate little cities of different colours, which I am afraid is exactly the sort of thing that is building up. This is disastrous. We have been told by so many noble Lords how worried they are about immigrants reporting to the police, and how

1029
they do not fit in. I feel we should give every possible encouragement to immigrants to mix in our society—except possibly for marriage; that is the only case where I hold some reservations. Lastly, having listened to everything that has been said, may I suggest altering Clause 29 by these few words: In line 19, leave out the words"in leaving"and substitute"voluntarily wishing to leave ", and otherwise leave the whole provision strictly alone.
LORD FOOT: Would the noble Earl look at the Amendment I am proposing. Is that not exactly what he wants?
THE EARL OF BALFOUR: I apologise to the noble Lord, and I think there is a great deal in what he has to say.
LORD FOOT: May I interrupt just to say that it is to my absolute astonishment that I find, when I propose to move this Amendment in a moment, I am going to receive the assistance and support of the noble Earl?
4.10 p.m.
LORD ABERDARE: Before we come to the Amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Foot, we are now discussing Amendment No. 110, coupled, I understand, with Amendment No. 113, for which it is a paving Amendment. These are identical Amendments to those that were moved in another place. In moving Amendment No. 110 the noble Baroness, Lady White, drew attention to the fact that this particular subject of repatriation had been the centre of a great deal of controversy, and indeed that has been reinforced by what has been said throughout this short debate. To start with, I should like to quote verbatim from the words of my right honourable friend the Home Secretary in another place on June 17, just for the sake of the record in regard to Government policy:
" The Government do not believe in the concept of large scale repatriation as an act of policy designed to change the pattern of population in this country…. It would be inimical to a policy of better community relations to give the impression that, by the action and policy of Government, our first purpose was to get rid of the people whom we are trying to make welcome here."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons; 17/6/71, col. 697.]
We are talking in this clause about what was so admirably described in the
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opening words of my noble friend Lord Brooke of Cumnor. We are attempting to provide a social service to help those immigrants who want to go home, who are not happy here but who have not got the means to do so.
LORD WALSTON: May I—
LORD ABERDARE: May I just finish? It is a little early to interrupt me because I have not really got going yet. May I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Gaitskell, that there really are such cases. Several of them were quoted in another place, and I think Members of Parliament who have immigrants in their constituencies would vouch for the fact that there are people who want to go home, but who have not got the means and cannot even save the means to do so. As things stand at present, the only ones who can be helped are those who are destitute, whom the Supplementary Benefits Commission have power to help. It is to allay all these suspicions, and at the same time to accomplish the object which the Government have in view, that my right honourable friend has decided to try to find some independent international voluntary organisation to handle the whole of this social service. The one mentioned by the noble Baroness, the International Social Service, is the one of which we are speaking at the moment.
LORD WALSTON: The noble Lord is very kind and I am sorry that I tried to interrupt him before he had really got going. I only wanted to question him a little further on the quotation from his right honourable friend the Home Secretary. The point at issue as I understand it, and as the noble Lord, Lord Brooke, and also the noble Lord, Lord Redcliffe-Maud, so clearly put it, was the voluntary principle—that there should be no repatriation unless it were voluntary. The quotation that the noble Lord gave us from his right honourable friend spoke solely of large-scale repatriation—that there was no intention on the part of the Government to have any large scale repatriation. He did not bring forward any evidence to show that his right honourable friend was thinking of voluntary or involuntary repatriation. If he could provide a quotation to the effect that it would be only voluntary repatriation I would be a little more satisfied.
LORD ABERDARE: I think I gave way to the noble Lord a little too early after all. Of course it is voluntary repatriation that we are talking about, but I will come to that a little later. This is the main reason why International Social Service has been selected. It is a body which, as the noble Baroness, Lady White, said, we all hold in the highest regard, and it would take the whole of this controversial matter out of politics, I would hope, and make it what it should be—a social service to help those who really need it. If we are successful in our talks with International Social Service—and I am afraid I must say to the noble Baroness, Lady White, that we are still talking to them: there are no snags but the time has not been sufficient to finalise any scheme with them—I hope that this will allay many fears and will help towards what the noble Lord, Lord Walston, was suggesting.
The difficulty with these particular Amendments is that I am afraid they would not help in our dealings with International Social Service or with another voluntary body. They suggest a fairly massive administrative machinery of regulations which would be all very well and quite acceptable if this was to be a Government scheme, but where it is a voluntary welfare organisation such a rigid arrangement of rules and regulations and annual reports would not be right. It would not help us, and it would not help the voluntary organisation. Indeed, it might well deter them from undertaking this very scheme which we have in mind. That is the reason why I am unable to accept the two Amendments, Nos. 110 and 113. But if one agrees, as I hope your Lordships will, that the best way of achieving an aim which I think we all have in mind, and the best way of allaying everybody's suspicions, is by putting the administration of this scheme in the hands of an independent voluntary organisation, I suggest that it is not right to saddle that voluntary organisation with a lot of rules and regulations. May I now answer two small points that the noble Baroness, Lady White, asked me specifically?
LORD ROBBINS: Before the noble Lord does that, would he perhaps answer a question which I think is directly on the point he is now making? What he has said already has persuaded me—if
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I needed persuasion, which I did not—that he and his colleagues on the Government Front Bench are entirely in harmony with the sentiments which have been expressed in all parts of the House. What I do not quite understand is the objection to inserting somewhere the adjective"voluntary ", so that this can be pointed out to those unfortunate, simple-minded members of the coloured community who think that somehow they are being"got at ".
LORD ABERDARE: I appreciate what the noble Lord, Lord Robbins, has said and I will try to come to that point, which of course is bound up with the next Amendment.
LORD FOOT: If the noble Lord will indicate that he is going to accept my Amendment we could get on with the business much more rapidly.
LORD ABERDARE: I am sorry; I cannot give that indication at this moment. May I quickly answer the two points made by the noble Baroness, Lady White. The first is that such assistance would be available to any person who wished to settle permanently in a country other than the one from which he had come originally. The second point is that the head of the household must be non-patrial but members of his family could be patrial; in other words, that children who were born here, if the family wished to take them also, would be eligible for assistance.
Perhaps after what has been said I really ought to answer something of what the noble Lord, Lord Robbins, and others have said, although it does trespass slightly on what I was going to say about the Amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Foot. This proposal to add a few words to the clause, particularly the word"voluntarily ", was in an Amendment put down in another place, although it was not selected, and my right honourable friend has given it extremely careful consideration. As I have indicated to your Lordships, I do not think there is anything between us anywhere in principle on this matter. But we really feel that there is not any very great need to amend the clause as it stands.
The clause itself contains no power to compel anybody to do anything; it

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is entirely a permissive clause. Assistance can be offered only to those who desire to have it, and even in the unlikely event of a most illiberal Home Secretary having office the clause would still give him no powers to force non-patrials to leave. The real difficulty is that there is no compulsion in this clause and, therefore, there does not really seem any need to alter it. The Home Secretary of the day is responsible to Parliament for his actions. The present Home Secretary is going to put matters in the hands of a voluntary organisation so that power is removed from any pressure groups. Any other action that might be taken in the future by any other Home Secretary would necessarily mean taking that power away from the voluntary organisation, and that of itself would be very clearly a matter in which Parliament would be vitally interested.
We believe that, in view of the fact that there is no power of compulsion in this clause, that it is entirely a voluntary offer of help, that it will be in the hands of a voluntary body and that the Secretary of State will be responsible to Parliament for its administration, there are already adequate safeguards here and that it is not necessary to add anything further.
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR: Before my noble friend sits down, can he explain to your Lordships why, if this clause can only be used to help people who voluntarily wish to leave and if that is the intention of the Government, the word"voluntary"should not be somewhere inserted?
LORD FOOT: I very much welcome that intervention by the noble Lord, Lord Brooke, because that seems to me to sum up the whole point that we are discussing here to-day. There are two issues, as I understand it, before the Committee on this Amendment and on this clause. The first of them is the issue as to whether the Government are right in providing that public funds shall be made available to people who want to go back home or to some other country. There are a few people who dissent from that. For myself, I think it is right that the Government should provide money to enable people to return home if indeed they voluntarily want to go. I accept that,
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and I think that the arguments for it are really overwhelming.
I think noble Lords on all sides of the House are agreed that no pressure should be brought to bear on people to go home; that they should go home only if they want to go home. I think this represents the general view on all sides of the House. The only remaining question is whether there is some way of writing it into the Bill, into this clause, and is it indeed desirable to do so? As to whether it is desirable to do it, I suggest that we are back on the same argument that we had on the first Amendment moved from these Benches at the beginning of this Committee stage; the Minister will remember what we were urging then. We were saying that the Government have said over and over again that they do not intend anything in this Bill adversely to affect the status or rights of the Commonwealth immigrants already here, and the purpose of our Amendment was—and this was the only Amendment which I think we succeeded in getting, because it received support from all sides of the House—to say,"If it is your intention, what harm is done by writing it into the Bill, thereby allaying the fears, possibly groundless fears, of so many of the immigrant community? ".
The point this afternoon, as I understand it, is precisely the same. The Government have said over and over again that they do not want to pressurise anybody; they do not want anybody to be induced to leave unless they really want to go. The question which we have to resolve this afternoon in these Amendments is whether it is right and the sensible thing actually to write it into the Bill. The way proposed by the Amendment we are now discussing the Minister says that there are objections to, because it raises up a superstructure of rules and regulations and that therefore practically and administratively it is undesirable, if that is so, none of those objections can be raised against my Amendments when we come to them, because they do not propose any superstructure of rules and regulations, but merely that we should write the word"voluntarily"into the clause; that is all. The answer given by the noble Lord, Lord Aberdare, is this, as I understand it,"Well, it is not really necessary, because

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there is nothing in this clause which talks about compulsion; it means voluntarily ". If it means voluntarily, why not say so?
THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY: I find the Government's reply very disappointing at a moment when there seems to be widespread agreement about two things in your Lordships' House. The debate has revealed widespread agreement that it is desirable that people who want to go home should be helped to go home before they have become destitute in order to get home. The debate has also revealed widespread concern not only that the law should concern voluntary going home, but that it should be made abundantly clear to the general public that the voluntary principle is there. It seems very odd that there is an unwillingness to write that into the Bill by two or three words. I believe that in itself the reluctance to do so causes unnecessary misgivings, and will do so in a wider public.
LORD NUGENT OF GUILDFORD: May I thank my noble friend for his answer on this very important point. He certainly reassured me as to the Government's intentions. The point which is being pressed upon him now from all sides is purely a matter of presentation. I speak of the point in Lord Foot's Amendment, as we are now dealing with a general debate on the whole clause. I wonder whether my noble friend would be good enough to agree to take this back and look at it again before Report stage. It is purely a matter of presentation. I am entirely in agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Robbins, that the general public do not understand this point, and if we are not going to alter the substance, putting in some such words as Lord Foot's would be a very great help, I am sure, to get over to the general public the very sentiments my noble friend expressed when he was explaining the Government's intentions. I ask my noble friend to be kind enough to take it back and look at it again before Report.
4.30 p.m.
BARONESS WHITE: We have had a debate which has shown how necessary it was to discuss this particular clause, because we have given voice to anxieties which I think have been felt in all
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quarters of the House. May I first refer to our own Amendments? I appreciate the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Aberdare, that these discussions with the International Social Service are still proceeding and he is not therefore able to tell us very much about it. I appreciate also his point that our Amendment, as it stands, would perhaps be over-elaborate for its purpose. On the other hand, I am sure that he will understand that we are anxious to know what exactly is to be the relationship between the Home Office and this particular body, or any other bodies that might in the future be employed for such a purpose, and exactly who is going to handle the money, and on what basis and on what principle of accountability to Parliament, and so on. As, plainly, it would not be fair at this point of time to press any such matter, I shall in a moment ask the leave of the Committee to withdraw our Amendments, because I do not think it would be opportune to press them now. I think we might return to this subject on Report, when we may hear more from the Government as to what precisely their arrangements are going to be.
On the point which surely we all agree is the main one, and which really arises under the next Amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Foot, I would strongly urge my noble friends to support that Amendment. It seems to me that we ought to make it quite clear to the public that we feel this is something that should be put into the Bill. As the noble Lord, Lord Nugent of Guildford, said, perhaps one may regard it as a matter of presentation rather than principle, but I think some of us go further and regard it as a matter of principle. We feel that it should be made abundantly clear and positive that there is no intention to coerce. I do not believe for a moment that there is, but if there is no intention to coerce what possible harm can there be in making it plain, in words, that these provisions are to apply to those"who voluntarily wish to leave "? Having said that, and making it plain that if the noble Lord, Lord Foot, moves his Amendment we shall support it, if necessary in the Division Lobby, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment No. 110.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
4.33 p.m.
LORD FOOT LORD FOOT moved Amendment No. 111:
Page 28, line 19, leave out (" in leaving ") and insert (" who voluntarily wish to leave ").
The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 111. Some of your Lordships may have observed that a strange thing happened to me just now. When I was turning round in order to pick up this copy of Hansard in order to quote from it, the most reverend Primate mistook me for intending to bring my remarks to an end. There is no need for him to apologise about it, because I regard it as a great honour to be interrupted in that way by the supreme Prelate of the land. I think I can be quite brief now in moving this Amendment, because I only want to add the things that I was going to say if I had not been so nobly interrupted. The point 1 was endeavouring to make was that it has been said over and over again by the Government, both in the other place and here, that they are determined that the provisions of this clause shall only be available to people who voluntarily want to return. I should just like to take up a few seconds of the Committee's time in quoting some of the things that were said on this subject by the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, on the Second Reading debate, because, if I may most respectfully and sincerely say so, I do not see how this matter could have been expressed better than he expressed it on that occasion. It seems to me to be the expression of a proper and liberal attitude to this matter, and I should like to quote one or two things he said.
First of all, he made the point that the noble Lord, Lord Aberdare, was making, that the Government do not accept any proposals for large-scale repatriation as an act of policy, and so on. Then he went on to say:
" What we believe, however—and I have some personal experience of this—is that there are circumstances when it is only plain common sense to be able to give travel assistance to an immigrant who himself wishes to depart."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 24/6/71, col. 1000.]
Later on he said:
" But what about the man who comes here, who does not settle down, who is not happy even though he may have a job of sorts, whose wife is homesick and who wants to return home…. Is it not desirable to be able to give some financial help towards travel costs when people genuinely ask for it…."
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Over and over again the noble Lord was emphasising,"We want to make these monies available only to people who really voluntarily want to go home ".
He finished off, when he was referring to International Social Service, by saying that he wanted to make arrangements for financial contributions to be made available under the power contained in this clause:
" where I.S.S. was satisfied, first of all, that the applicants genuinely wanted to leave and needed help to do so…."
Over and over again that has been said. What possible harm is there in transferring those assurances from Hansard and from the noble Lord into this clause of this Bill? That is all that is sought to be done, and in view of the very wide range of support which this Amendment has received in the course of the discussion of the previous Amendment—and I am most grateful to the noble Baroness for indicating that she and her friends will be giving their support—I hope that the noble Lord is not going to make it necessary to force this issue to a Division. As a matter of fact, I have a suspicion we might win, but I do not want to win. I should be far more grateful if the noble Lord would give way over this. I do not think any major matter of principle is involved, and it would be a much greater victory if the noble Lord were persuaded by argument rather than if we had to force it to the Division Lobby.
LORD ABERDARE: Naturally I have been greatly impressed by the words that have been spoken and the advice that has been given to the Government from all sides of the House. My noble friends, Lord Brooke of Cumnor and Lord Nugent of Guildford, have been joined by the most reverend Primate and the noble Lord, Lord Redcliffe-Maud, the noble Baroness, Lady White, and the noble Lord, Lord Foot. I certainly take deep note of what they have said, and if the Committee will allow me, I will take this matter back to my right honourable friend and draw his attention to the weight of feeling in this Committee this afternoon. May I make one point to the noble Lord, Lord Foot, about his Amendment. It is a technical difficulty but it is worth drawing attention to the fact that in deleting the words"in leaving"he actually broadens the scope of the clause, and an unscrupulous Home Secretary of the

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future could make grants of a rather wider character, such as resettlement grants, whereas as the clause stands the payments are limited to the travel expenses of the people concerned. By deleting these words"in leaving ", which limit the clause, he could make it even more undesirable from his point of view. I could not accept the Amendment for that reason. As I say, I have been impressed by what has been said, and if the noble Lord is willing to withdraw his Amendment I will certainly draw the attention of my right honourable friend to everything that has been said.
LORD ROBBINS: May I urge the noble Lord, in making representations to his right honourable friend, to emphasise that what is crucial is not the words,"in leaving"or anything of that sort, but the word"voluntarily ". The argument there is not, I am sure, from any side of the Committee, based on any suspicion whatever of the intentions of the Government. This is a matter of presentation. If any one of us is approached by some unfortunate coloured person who has been bemused by malicious rumours as to the Government's intention, it is true that we can say, as the noble Lord, Lord Aberdare, said,"There is no reference to compulsion in this clause. The clause is perfectly innocent of any such intention. Anybody who tells you that is a liar." But how much stronger the argument would be if one could say,"Look at the clause itself. It has the word voluntarily ' in it."
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR: I should like to congratulate my noble friend Lord Aberdare on recognising what is the obvious will of your Lordships. I confess I had hoped, at the beginning of the debate on this clause, that we might reach unanimity. It seemed to me that there was scope for doing so. I cannot think that it is beyond the bounds of human possibility to produce an amended draft for this clause which will meet the main point which the noble Lord, Lord Robbins, has so admirably expressed. If we can do that on the Report stage, then I venture to think that your Lordships will have done a very good piece of work to-day.
LORD O'HAGAN: In thanking the noble Lord, Lord Aberdare, very warmly
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for the assurance and undertaking that he has given, may I raise one more point on this matter of voluntary repatriation? The noble Lord said that the Government are seeking no powers to force non-patrials to leave. I wonder whether I may ask him to include in his deliberations during the Recess a subject mentioned by his right honourable friend during the Twenty-second Sitting of the Standing Committee on this Bill in another place. The noble Lord's right honourable friend was talking about supervised departures—not repatriation, but voluntary self-induced repatriation and this is what I, and I am sure many of your Lordships, would like more information about. He said:
"…where it has been decided by a court that a young person should be deported we may exercise our discretion and decide that it is a case where voluntary departure under supervision is adequate, rather than deportation. Where the person, say a youngster, has no money, if he is deported one can pay his fare, but if he goes under supervision voluntarily, then without this provision "—
and by"without this provision"he is referring to Clause 29—
" there is no statutory power to pay the fare, although it is done at present by extra-statutory concession."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Standing Committee B, 25/5/71; col. 1303.]
I am not of course attributing to the right honourable gentleman any motives other than those which have been attributed to him by the rest of your Lordships. But I would ask the noble Lord to spell out on Report stage whether the sort of procedure that was mentioned by his right honourable friend could be used as a Powellite technique for repatriating people against their will, even though, apparently, it is not intended to do so.
LORD ABERDARE: I shall certainly look into the noble Lord's remarks. Of course, supervised departure is an alternative to deportation. It is used only to help where the members of the family are leaving with somebody who is being deported; or a young person who would otherwise be deported is helped by this method to avoid the stigma that might be thought to attach to deportation. But I shall certainly go into the matter.
LORD O'HAGAN: I just wanted to make sure that that was voluntary, as well as everything else.
LORD FOOT: If no other Member of the Committee wants to speak upon this Amendment, may I say that I am very grateful to the Government for the concession which they have made. At this stage, I am very happy to beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
On Question, Whether Clause 29 shall stand part of the Bill?
LORD BROCKWAY: I am so happy with the result of the earlier discussion that in making my few remarks I shall not press for the deletion of this clause. The noble Lord, Lord Aberdare, has made my speech for me. I regard this matter as a social service, as he emphasised, and my regret is that it is included at all in an Immigration Bill. The fact that it is so included has contributed to the doubts and suspicions that have arisen. At the present time, the Department of Health and Social Security has considerable powers in these respects but they are inadequate. None of us who has any knowledge of immigrant communities doubts that there are among them, for reasons of inability to earn a living, for reasons of health, for compassionate reasons of family association, or inability to acclimatise to our way of life, many people who wish to return, and we should want to assist them in doing so. But I should have sought to urge that this is a matter not for an immigration Bill, but for the type of social service which the noble Lord, Lord Aberdare, has himself emphasised. It might have been possible to extend the powers of the Department of Health and Social Security and speed up their methods, which are now deplorably delayed, in order that this matter could have been dealt with in a way that would not have caused doubt. The noble Lord may wish to comment.
LORD ABERDARE: I wish only to say to the noble Lord that I am back on my familiar ground if he is talking about the Department of Health and Social Security. But the scope for the Supplementary Benefits Commission in repatriating people is very limited. I shall not go into details, because I am sure the noble Lord knows them. There have to be very many conditions satisfied and a man has to be pretty destitute before the Supplementary Benefits Commission can pay his fare. I really think that we are
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going to get further by working through International Social Service, if we can make an agreement with them, than by any other way.
LORD BROCKWAY: I recognise at once that it is good that we are going to do this through the International Social Service, but there is no reason why it should not be done through the Department of Health and Social Security. If it had been done in that way, the present suspicions would not have arisen. But in view of the happy conclusion to our previous debate, I shall not press for the deletion of this clause.
Clause 29 agreed to.
Clause 30 [Return of mental patients]:
4.49 p.m.
LORD ABERDARE LORD ABERDARE moved Amendment No. 114:
Page 28, line 33, at end insert—
(" (2) Under section 90 of the Mental Health Act 1959 (as under section 82 of the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1960) the Secretary of State shall only authorise the removal of a patient if it appears to him to be in the interests of the patient; and accordingly in section 90 after the words"and for his care and treatment there"there shall be inserted the words"and that it is in the interests of the patient to remove him ".")
The noble Lord said: This is an Amendment which I hope your Lordships will accept, because it is to meet a point that was made in another place on the Report stage. At column 711 of the OFFICIAL REPORT, my right honourable friend the Home Secretary undertook to introduce an Amendment of this sort to meet the point that he should authorise the removal of a patient under this clause only where it is quite clearly in the patient's best interests medically to do so. I hope your Lordships will agree that this Amendment meets that point, that the Home Secretary's power should be strictly limited to the cases in which removal appears to him to be in the interests of the patient.
I notice that noble Lords opposite have set down an Amendment following this one, and perhaps I could make a quick comment on that Amendment, No. 115, because there are two points, I think, on which it differs slightly from what I am proposing. One is that it includes a requirement that there should be evidence from two doctors. But I would emphasise

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that this is not the only type of medical evidence that the Home Secretary will be taking: he will go rather wider than that. He will have to take other expert evidence—particularly as to what facilities exist for care and treatment in the country to which the patient is going to go—so this also has to be taken into account. Nevertheless, on behalf of my right honourable friend I can give an absolute assurance that he will in all cases proceed on the basis of the medical advice tendered to him by those in charge of the patient and will, if necessary, call in independent medical opinion. He has no intention of initiating any action under this clause unless he is first approached by the patient's medical adviser.
The Opposition Amendment would also allow an appeal to an adjudicator. This is another matter to which we have given very careful consideration, and we have concluded that it would not be right to do what is proposed. Since neither the adjudicators nor the Appeal Tribunal would be qualified to reach decisions on matters which primarily hinge on medical evidence, we feel that these are best decided by the Secretary of State in the light of medical advice given to him, including advice about the standard of mental health care in the receiving country. We feel that to allow such appeals to adjudicators would present them with formidable difficulties in the case of mentally ill patients, often coupled with linguistic difficulties. I hope that your Lordships will accept this Amendment, which meets the commitment entered into by my right honourable friend. I beg to move.
LORD DONALDSON OF KINGSBRIDGE: I think one must welcome this Amendment, but I wonder really whether the clause is worth keeping in. If the Government's promise is properly exercised, I cannot conceive of a single case in which a Commonwealth or United Kingdom and Colonies citizen or patrial could be sent home as a mental patient to his benefit, because the facilities in this country are, in nearly every case, very much better than in the countries from which these people have come. The form of mental illness which is most common nowadays is of the kind that yields to treatment, so that most persons concerned
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are people who will get better if they are properly treated; and as they will be better treated here than anywhere else, there seems to be absolutely no case for sending them away in their own interest. But I do not want to be difficult about this. I think the noble Lord has given a very full assurance which we can accept. I would only point out that I think very few people will be sent away if the assurance is acted upon.
LORD O'HAGAN: The noble Lord, Lord Aberdare, remarked the other day how silent I was being on the Committee stage of this Bill. I took that as an invitation to speak more frequently, and I hope that the noble Lord is not regretting it. All I am going to say now is that I am authorised by the National Association for Mental Health to say that they like the Government Amendment. Whether they would like the Opposition Amendment even more, I do not know; but they like the noble Lord's Amendment.
LORD ABERDARE: I am very grateful to both noble Lords. I think the answer to the noble Lord, Lord Donaldson of Kingsbridge, is that it will involve very few people indeed. Under the existing power something like eight foreign nationals are removed each year. They really are very much happier sometimes to go home, and it also speeds their treatment just because these people who are mentally ill very often recover very quickly at home, provided that the facilities are good. I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord O'Hagan. I hope that when he speaks in future he will be equally helpful.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
On Question, Whether Clause 30, as amended, shall stand part of the Bill?
LORD BROCKWAY: Again, I have only a few words to say on this Question. My desire to see this clause deleted is on the same grounds as I put forward on the previous clause: that I regret to see it included in an Immigration Bill. It is a matter of health, and it would have come much more naturally, and without arousing any suspicion, if it had been a subject for the Department of Health and Social Security. It is an intensely personal and an intensely sensitive matter, and I would have hoped

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that the welfare officers, many of whom are very experienced, who would be reporting to the Department of Health and Social Security would have been the source of initiative on decisions in this matter. I do not entirely agree with what my noble friend Lord Donaldson has said, although his argument would rather favour my proposal for the deletion of this clause. I do not entirely agree with him, for this reason: from my own experience I have found immigrants who were suffering from mental illness when the cause of that mental illness was the conditions under which they were living in this country and the different way of life in this country from the way of life to which they had been accustomed. Because of that. I feel that it might be desirable, and help their recovery, if they did return home. My regret, I repeat, is that this provision is included in an Immigration Bill, which in my view gives a wrong impression of the purpose which we have in mind. Again, if the noble Lord, Lord Aberdare, wants to make a comment. I will withhold my objection. The noble Lord indicates that he does not wish to do so. I do not press my objection to this clause.
Clause 30, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 31 and 32 agreed to.
Clause 33 [Interpretation]:
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD HATLSHAM OF ST. MARYLEBONE)THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD HATLSHAM OF ST. MARYLEBONE) moved Amendment No. 116:
Page 30, line 29, leave out from (" means ") to (" adopted ") in line 31.
The noble and learned Lord said: On behalf of my noble friend I rise to move this Amendment. I am afraid that this and the next one are rather dull little Amendments. Amendment No. 116 is paving for No. 117, and is rendered necessary because there was a race between Section 4 of the Adoption Act 1968, which has not yet been brought into force, and the coming into law of this Bill. A commencement order has not yet been made for Section 4, but it is likely that the section will be brought into force some time this summer; that is, probably before this Bill becomes law. Once one has accepted this as a probability, the two Amendments become drafting Amendments,
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necessitated because of this fact. I beg to move.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I beg to move Amendment No. 117.
Amendment moved—
Page 30, line 32, at end insert (" or by any adoption specified as an overseas adoption by order of the Secretary of State under section 4 of the Adoption Act 1968; ")—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
5.0 p.m.
LORD BROCKWAY LORD BROCKWAY moved Amendment No. 117B:
Page 31, line 20, leave out subsection (5).
The noble Lord said: I desire to move this Amendment largely to obtain information. Subsection (5) of this clause reads:
" This Act shall not be taken to supersede or impair any power exercisable by Her Majesty in relation to aliens by virtue of Her prerogative ".
I want to ask what these powers are. The powers which are in the Bill already are so comprehensive and of such detail that I find it difficult to think that any additional powers are necessary. When immigration is to be regulated by the rules under the Bill, why should it be necessary to have extra powers of this kind, powers of which we have no knowledge? Why should these powers be extended by the Royal prerogative?
LORD WINDLESHAM: I think I can answer the noble Lord quite briefly. The prerogative powers in question have existed for very many years. They include the power in the Crown in times of war to intern, expel or otherwise control enemy aliens at its discretion, which is exercised on the advice of the Home Secretary. As noble Lords will know, the power of internment was exercised during the Second World War; its legality was tested in the courts and was accepted by the Court of Appeal. It is possible that these powers might have to be invoked again in some future war—although we hope that such a time may never arrive. The Government do not think it necessary to surrender these powers, which go back many years. We are talking about residuary prerogative powers for the kind of exceptional circumstances which have

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arisen in this century only on the occasion of the two World Wars.
LORD BROCKWAY: I am relieved to know that this refers only to circumstances of war. I will make this comment. Surely in those circumstances a State of Emergency would be declared which would give this power; and this power would therefore still be unnecessary in this Bill. But in view of the assurances given by the noble Lord I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 33, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 34 [Repeal, transitional and temporary]:
5.5 p.m.
LORD WADE LORD WADE moved Amendment No. 119:
Page 32, line 22, at end insert (" and such leave shall not be revoked.")
The noble Lord said: Subsection (4) of this clause reads:
" A person who at the coming into force of this Act is neither patrial nor exempt under any provision of this Act from the provisions relating to those who are not patrial, but is then settled in the United Kingdom, shall for the purposes of this Act be treated as having been given indefinite leave to enter or remain."
The Amendment proposes that there should be added the words:
" and such leave shall not be revoked ".
When on an earlier debate we discussed the word"indefinite"and I suggested that it should be replaced by the word"unlimited ", I withdrew the Amendment; but the noble Viscount, Lord Boyd of Merton, regretted that I had not pursued the matter further. My reason for not doing so was partly because I was anxious to get to another important Amendment and partly because the noble Lord opposite had drawn my attention to the definition on page 30 of"limited leave ". I am still not absolutely satisfied. In the interpretation clause
"' limited leave ' and ' indefinite leave ' mean respectively leave under this Act to enter or remain in the United Kingdom which is, and one which is not, limited as to duration."
Does that mean that it can be withdrawn? I am raising this point in order to ascertain whether the position is completely
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clear. For that reason I am proposing the addition of the words"and such leave shall not be revoked ". I beg to move.
LORD DENHAM: I am advised that this Amendment is not necessary. There is no difference between us on this point, but the Amendment is not necessary because there is no power in the Bill as it stands to revoke an"indefinite leave"to enter or remain.
LORD WADE: I think we are getting into the realms of semantics. In spite of the fact that I am always a little suspicious when the Government say that anything is unnecessary, I will pay heed to the advice and ask the Committee's leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 34 agreed to.
Clauses 35 and 36 agreed to.
Clause 37 [Short title and extent]:
LORD O'HAGAN LORD O'HAGAN moved Amendment No. 120:
Page 34, line 1, leave out (" Immigration ") and insert (" Migrant Workers ").
The noble Lord said: Stimulated by the sudden appearance and the equally sudden disappearance of the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack I am almost tempted to embark upon a Third Reading speech now to get him back again; but I will restrain myself and speak briefly to this Amendment which is designed to make things clear. I hope it will commend itself to the Committee. Recent immigration Bills have had a marked impact on numbers; this one will not, and the Government have said so repeatedly. I think that many people believe that the words"Immigration Bill"and the concept of an Immigration Bill mean automatically a reduction in the numbers of black immigrants or in the numbers of black people here. In the interests of clarity and in order to help the Government carry out the intention of promoting good community relations, I think it would be helpful for the general public if the Bill were to have a different name, as it is so different in character from previous immigration Bills.
The Bill does not entirely replace the present legislation: the administrative

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procedures which control numbers and the regulation and registration procedures are not affected. Really the Bill states which classes of persons are here as of right and which classes of persons are not here as of right. It is mostly concerned with those who come here, without security of tenure, to work and without the right to bring in their families. In short, it is mostly concerned with migrant workers. Thus the title"Migrant Workers Bill"expresses both the objectives and the results of this Bill and explains how aliens and most Commonwealth citizens will in fact become migrant workers and nothing else. The title"Immigration Bill"is misleading. It would be both within the spirit of the Trade Descriptions Act and the new style of Government if the title could be altered to"Migrant Workers Bill ". I beg to move.
LORD WINDLESHAM: The title"Migrant Workers Bill"would imply that this Bill provides solely for workers from overseas to be admitted for limited periods only, after which they would have to return to their countries of origin. There is nothing to that effect in the Bill. On the contrary, the draft immigration rules published with it make clear the Government's intention that overseas workers from all countries should he able, as are aliens at present, to qualify for permanent residence after four years' approved employment here. The noble Lord, as he said earlier, has been silent during the Committee proceedings. I think that he was here for a good deal of the time, but he must have had some fairly protracted absences if he thinks that the title of"Migrant Workers Bill"would be appropriate. The Bill deals with the whole structure of immigration control; with the people who are exempt from control and the grounds on which they are exempt, and with people who come here for visits or for any reason other than work. We have spent about two days discussing the appeal system, which has nothing whatever to do with work permits and migrant workers. The Bill consolidates and continues the immigration appeal system set up under the 1969 Act while making some changes. It deals with the whole question of deportation and with criminal proceedings. How could we have deportation in a Migrant Workers Bill? No, my Lords;
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this Bill is what the Government said it would be a comprehensive review of the law, temporary in character as that law is at the moment, which has been written on to the Statute Book in the course of over half a century. I think that the existing Title of the Bill is more appropriate.
LORD O'HAGAN: I thank the noble Lord for giving a serious answer to my Amendment and giving me such a kind and magisterial lecture on the merits, as he sees them, of the Bill. I have a little lecture which I have stored up for Third Reading, in which I explain what ought to be in a proper Immigration Bill, but for the time being I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 37 agreed to.
Schedule 1 [Registration as citizen by reason of residence, Crown service, etc.]:
5.12 p.m.
LORD BROCKWAY LORD BROCKWAY moved Amendment. No. 121A:
Page 35, line 37, leave out from"(Kingdom ") to end of line 39.
The noble Lord said: The effect of this Amendment would be to remove he requirement of residence without conditions for five years as a ground for registration as a British citizen. I do not intend to make the argument long. Surely, if residence has been continuous, it is irrelevant whether conditions have been imposed during that period. Is it really necessary to have this condition? I beg to move.
LORD WIN DLESHAM: In rising to reply to this Amendment I think I really must regiser a protest. This Amendment is the first of 33 Amendments which were tabled yesterday and appeared on the Sixth Marshalled List for the first time. We know the noble Lord's interest in this subject and we are always ready to discuss with him and answer his questions on matters about which he feels strongly, but I feel that to put down, not just one or two, but a complete set of 33 independent Amendments the night before puts a great strain on those who are trying to make sure that the noble Lord has a full and accurate answer, apart from anything else.
LORD BROCKWAY: I recognise the strength of what the Minister has said. I have already paid tribute to the way in which he has conducted this Bill. I would just say this to him. Those of us who are Back Benchers do not have the service which he and the Government and some other Members of the House have, and it has been extraordinarily difficult during the proceedings on this Bill to prepare all the Amendments and briefs in favour of them. I regret very much that these last Amendments to the Schedules have been put down so late. This was not because of any deliberate intention, but because on previous days I was so much involved in the other issues before the Committee. I assure the Minister that I have no intention of being unfair in this matter or unsympathetic to him or to the civil servants who have had difficulties as a result.
LORD WINDLESHAM: I will not pursue this matter any further. Of course I accept what the noble Lord has said. In reply to the Amendment which he has just moved, the present situation is that Commonwealth citizens are entitled to be registered as citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies on completion of five years' residence in the United Kingdom. Under the Bill, they will be able to apply for registration after five years' residence, but registration will be at at the discretion of the Secretary of State. Paragraph 2 of Schedule 1 makes transitional provision whereby Commonwealth citizens resident at the end of July 1971 are to be entitled to registration on completion of five years' residence free of conditions.
This Amendment seeks to provide that in these transitional cases there is to be an entitlement to register on completion of five years' residence whether or not any part of that time is spent subject to conditions. The Schedule is another example of where the Bill provides safeguards for Commonwealth citizens. There is an automatic entitlement to acquisition of citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies, when five years of residence free of conditions ends. The Amendment is based on the view that, provided residence has been continuous, it is irrelevant whether or not conditions have been retained on the person concerned. But this seems to miss the point; it is only when a person's conditions have been
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cancelled that he can be said to be accepted for settlement in the United Kingdom. The Amendment would, for example, give an automatic entitlement to registration to a person resident here at the end of July 1971 who had succeeded, by various temporising devices, in spinning out his stay for five years, notwithstanding that at no point had he ever been accepted for permanent settlement. The Government do not accept that such a person would be appropriate for registration as provided under the Schedule.
LORD BROCKWAY: I thank the Minister for his explanation and beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
5.20 p.m.
LORD BROCKWAY LORD BROCKWAY moved Amendment No. 121B:
Page 37, line 5, leave out (" may ") and insert (" shall ").
The noble Lord said: In moving this Amendment, may I speak also to Amendments Nos. 121C and 123A, which deal with a similar point. This Amendment is designed to give the right of registration irrespective of national origin. Amendment No. 121B, which is now before the Committee, removes the Secretary of State's discretion in regard to registration, and makes this automatic provided that the individual has been here continuously for five years and has enjoyed the relevant employment. Why necessarily should there be doubt about this, and why are the qualifications which are in the Bill necessary? I beg to move.
LORD WINDLESHAM: The current position is that an alien may apply for naturalisation after five years' residence, the decision being at the discretion of the Secretary of State. A Commonwealth citizen is entitled, as I explained on the last Amendment, to registration after five years. Under the Bill, leaving the transitional cases which we debated on the last Amendment on one side, Commonwealth citizens are brought broadly into line with aliens, their registration becoming a matter for the Secretary of State's discretion. This Amendment seeks to provide that any person, whether an alien or a Commonwealth citizen, shall be entitled to registration on completion of five years' residence without any discretion in the Secretary of State to refuse the application.

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The Amendments would seem to us to be defective in applying registration to aliens, since registration is a procedure which applies only to Commonwealth citizens. But this technical defect apart, the Amendments would not be acceptable in substance, since they would seek to reverse the decision which has already been taken by your Lordships and by Members of another place, to the effect that registration for Commonwealth citizens in future is to be discretionary. They would also be unacceptable, in the view of the Government, in that they would give aliens an automatic entitlement to registration on completion of five years' residence. It is the verb"may"in paragraph 5(1) which introduces the discretion, and the conditions that have to be fulfilled are set out in heads (a) to (e) of that sub-paragraph.
BARONESS WHITE: Did I hear my noble friend say that he was proposing to move Amendment No. 121C as well?
LORD BROCKWAY: Yes.
BARONESS WHITE: That being so, if by any chance that Amendment were carried, Amendment No. 122 would be subsumed under it. So perhaps it will be for the convenience of the Committee if I discuss Amendment No. 122 at this point. This is one of the conditions included in those which will be required in future for Commonwealth citizens who wish to register as citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies; it refers to"sufficient knowledge of the English language ". I raise this point for two reasons. One is to ask the Government about their attitude towards the Welsh language. This is not a purely frivolous point, because the Welsh language is recognised by statute in Wales as being of equal validity with English. Therefore it seems to me perfectly proper that in a situation of this kind the Welsh language should be regarded as having equal validity with English; and if we are to make any conditions concerning knowledge of language, anybody who has sufficient knowledge of the Welsh language would surely be entitled to be registered as almost anything. It is an extremely difficult language to learn.
But there are Welsh persons living in communities in various parts of the world where Welsh is maintained as the family language. Some years ago, a relative
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of mine came back to this country from Patagonia; he could speak only Welsh and Spanish, and had no knowledge at all of English. His father had been born in the United Kingdom, but he had been born in Patagonia. There are other Welsh communities in various parts of the Colonies where it is reasonable to suppose that the children would have been brought up with Welsh as the language of the home. As the Welsh language is, as I have said, recognised by statute as having equal validity with English in the Principality of Wales, and as these conditions apply to citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies, it seems to me that we ought at a later stage to insert a reference to Welsh as well as to English. I do not think that would cause undue difficulties. I hope that the Government will take notice that we may wish to do this.
I turn now to the words"sufficient knowledge of the English language ". We should like some further information as to how the Government propose to deal with this matter, because I think it is causing a good deal of concern in certain quarters."Sufficient knowledge"is not an easy term to define. Sufficient for what? Sufficient to shop in the supermarket? Sufficient to go to the post office? Sufficient to claim sickness benefit? Sufficient to carry on a philosophical conversation? There are so many degrees of"sufficiency ", according to the circumstances in which the language is to be employed. I think we should have some indication as to what sort of standards are to be applied, and who is to apply them; and also what steps the Government might he taking—although obviously they would not be referred to directly in the statute—to assist in teaching English as a second language to those who come here as adults. I am not speaking of those who are in school, for tuition in English is provided for them. I am thinking particularly of women, who often find it difficult to obtain much knowledge of English because, naturally, they are confined much more to their homes; they do not have occasion, by going out to work, to pick up some smattering of the language.
Before we agree to this condition as being a requisite for registration as a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies I think that we should hear a

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little more from the Government as to how they propose to deal with it. I might also say that there are parts of the Commonwealth where English is spoken, but it is a rather different kind of English from that commonly spoken in parts of the United Kingdom—and I am thinking more particularly of the Caribbean. Can we be assured that those who believe they speak English, and in their own eyes certainly do so, will not be put at a disadvantage by any sort of test or examination that the Government propose to conduct?
LORD DONALDSON OF KINGSBRIDGE: I think I am right in saying that we are now discussing Amendment No. 122. If that is the case, I should like to go rather further than my noble friend has done. The Amendment asks that the condition that the applicant for registration should have knowledge of the English language should be omitted. This, I think, is really the point at issue. If there is a qualification of this kind, it is important to see what the point of it is. Everybody, I suppose, would agree that people who come to live here would do well to speak the language. But that is not the issue. The issue is whether it is sound to make it a condition that they shall do so.
One has to visualise that the person who comes here and applies for registration has been here for five years. Whom do the Government say this provision is aimed at? I suppose that any worker would be on a work permit for five years, which means that at the end of the first year he would have had a satisfactory report from his employer (otherwise he could not continue his employment) and at least speaks the language well enough to get on with his work. So it is not likely to be such a man who is involved. I suppose it might be his aunt or his mother. Is it really worth putting in a qualification of this kind for one or two old people? They have probably learned to shop, anyway. It seems to me that we should be clear what we are going for. Is this provision a plus or a minus? I think I have said enough to show that it can hardly be much of a plus. It cannot affect many people whose absence of knowledge of the language would do any harm to anybody. I think we must next
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consider whether it is a minus. The Community Relations Commission do not like it. They have said they think that it ought to be removed and they do not see the reason for it. On the whole, I can think of no reason for keeping it and of several reasons for keeping it out.
There are two practical reasons for keeping it out. The first was touched on by my noble friend: if you have to satisfy someone that you have a sufficient knowledge of something you have to satisfy a test, and if you have to satisfy a test somebody has to apply that test. At the moment this is done, not very satisfactorily I may say, in the case of students coming in, by immigration officers. There have been a number of cases that have given rise to serious complaints because a student with a short-term permit, who has been accepted by a university, has been turned down on language grounds by an immigration officer. I do not want to go into this at the moment, but I can give noble Lords three examples.
LORD WINDLESHAM: I am baffled by the references made by the noble Lord. We are talking about applications for naturalisation, or registration in the case of Commonwealth citizens, where a language condition has to be fulfilled. I do not see how such a condition could conceivably apply to a student entering this country and having discussions with an immigration officer.
LORD DONALDSON OF KINGSBRIDGE: The only relevance is presumably that the immigration officer will be the person who has to be satisfied.
LORD WINDLESHAM: No. If I may say so, this displays a total lack of comprehension. The provision has nothing to do with immigration officers or the entry of students. We are talking about people who have been in this country for five years, and very often a good deal longer. When the time comes they may decide to take up British citizenship and apply to do so. There is no question of students talking to immigration officers at the ports.
LORD DONALDSON OF KINGSBRIDGE: I accept that with pleasure. It is very much better if that is so; but the noble Lord still has not told us who conducts the examination. I do not know

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whether he would like to do that now or later. I find it difficult, if there is to be an examination in the English language, to visualise the kind of standard that would give satisfaction. I really believe this to be quite an awkward matter. Secondly, if the standard is not absolutely rigid there is cause for complaint, because people will say,"He passed, and I did not ", and in the long run you are really dropping a piece of gravel into the wheels. You are making it more and more difficult for these people to become citizens in a convenient way. I cannot understand what is to be gained by this action. If I could, I should feel less hostile to it. I feel that there are objections here and the fact that somebody has got to conduct an examination is one of them. The fact that there are no firm standards of examination means that this could he used like a potato riddle—if you have too many immigrants you can make it more difficult, whereas if you have too few you can make it easier. It may never in fact be done, but it would be thought to be done. I think these are great disadvantages and I am unable to see the point of retaining this condition. I should be grateful if this matter could be explained.
LORD GRIDLEY: Might I just put forward this point of view in connection with this Amendment? It seems to me that there is a need that a person who wishes to become a citizen of the United Kingdom should know enough about our customs, our laws and so on, to be able to speak our language. Perhaps my noble friend will correct me if I am wrong about this, but it seems to me that a citizen would have the power to vote in elections. He would be playing his part in the community; he would, we hope, be fully settled and integrated with this country. Therefore I think it would be quite reasonable to have this provision in the Schedule that such a person, before he becomes registered, should have sufficient knowledge of the English language and accordingly I would support this provision. May I say, in conclusion, that it was an essential requirement for many of us who served overseas that in the performance of our duties we should understand the customs and the cultures of the country in which we served and that we should make a very close and efficient study of the language of the country.
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For those coming to this country, I think this is an essential requirement if they are to share all the privileges, and indeed the responsibilities, of citizenship.
5.35 p.m.
LORD SLATER: I was very interested in the observations and comments made by my noble friend Lady White when she talked about the Welsh language, because we know that the Welsh language is recognised in Wales, although it is part of the United Kingdom. I remember some years ago sitting on a Committee, of which my noble friend Lord Diamond (Jack Diamond as he was then), was chairman. My noble friend Lord Maelor, who was known as Tom Jones at that time, was also a member of the committee. He wanted to know why he could not speak in his own native tongue and why he had not the right to do so. But, to come back to the particular point of speakers of English, there are many forms of dialect; I could myself speak in a form of dialect which noble Lords would be unable to understand. I should be speaking English, though it might not be recognised as English, and it would be divorced from the way in which English is usually spoken, in grammatical terms.
As regards immigrants coming into this country, I have attended many meetings of the Council of Europe, and have also been to Moscow with the Leader of the Opposition; and what I discovered was that the second language, which students now learn at their universities for purposes of travel, is English. The two classified languages in the whole of Europe are French and English. This is what we had in the Council of Europe; so I cannot see any great difficulty regarding immigrants and others coming to this country. There should be no great difficulty in regard to our particular language. I have much sympathy with the ideas expressed by my noble friend Lady White. I have no doubt that, as she said, this point will come up eventually, if not in the near future. It has arisen in Wales, as we have found already, because post offices have Welsh names; there are Welsh stamps and Welsh facilities for the people there, although they are still part of the United Kingdom. It is possible that we may find this spreading to Scotland where, for example, you have the Gaels, who do not speak one

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word of English yet are connected with the United Kingdom. I certainly wish to support what was said by my noble friend Lady White.
LORD WADE: We have had quite a wide discussion on Amendment No. 122 although we have not yet reached it. It would be helpful—perhaps this is what the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, is about to tell us—to know how this test is to be applied. I can see many practical difficulties, but we are in the dark until we know how it will be done. In dealing with that there is one small point to which probably I should know the answer. What is the position when a man has been here for more than five years and satisfies all these conditions but whose wife scarcely speaks any English at all? There are a good many cases. Does that affect the position?
LORD GARDINER: Apart from the language we are supposed to be discussing, can the Minister give any indication of the sort of case in which the Secretary of State would refuse naturalisation although all the conditions are met? Is there any real reason why"may"should not be"shall "? Secondly, are these requirements there simply because they have always been the requirements for naturalising aliens and it is many years since anyone really applied his mind to whether any of them was actually necessary?
LORD STONHAM: Having listened to what the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, has said, I wonder whether there is any justification for including this language requirement at all. As he said, we are considering only people who have lived here, got their living here and worked here for at least five years, and in many cases a good deal longer. It is scarcely conceivable to me that they should have lived here and worked here and got jobs here without having acquired a working knowledge of the language that might not even satisfy an academic but it would satisfy most people. It might even satisfy Welsh-speaking people because the same applies to them. I think they would have to acquire a working knowledge of English. It seems therefore that not only do we want to know why this proviso is in the clause but what is the justification for it. Would it not be much better
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to meet the problem by deleting it and accepting Amendment No. 122?
LORD WINDLESHAM: If I may take my theme from what the noble Lord, Lord Gridley, said, which I thought struck home at the purpose of this part of the Bill, if someone is a citizen of another country and has come to live and work in the United Kingdom, and if after a period of not less than five years—very often more—he decides that he would like to be a citizen of this country, he is taking a big decision. Very often we allow dual citizenship in our law but many other countries do not—it is rather the exception now. The decision will mean giving up his own citizenship or nationality and becoming a full member of our society. Throughout the world I am told that it is a common requirement that there should be a standard of language which the applicant should achieve. I shall come to the question of why that should be so, which was correctly and interestingly raised by the noble Lord, Lord Wade; but it is a general requirement of citizenship proceedings and applications for citizenship in other parts of the world that there should be a knowledge of the language.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, asked me about the sort of cases in which the Home Secretary decided not to grant an application for naturalisation. There are a certain number of these cases which I see in my Department, and they are difficult ones. These are decisions taken by the Secretary of State, and he is relieved by Statute from the obligation to give reasons, specifically relieved by Statute, and he does not do so. Although there is not very frequently a large number of these cases, when refusals do occur they are normally quite controversial. Someone who has made an application and has been refused naturalisation naturally feels strongly about it and wants to know why the Secretary of State has so decided and why he should be relieved by Statute from giving his reasons. But the grounds for refusal would generally, I think, fall under paragraph (c), that the applicant was not of good character.
LORD GARDINER: I am sorry to interrupt, but what I asked was what were the circumstances in which the

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Home Secretary would refuse naturalisation although all these conditions were met, because if he does not refuse"may"ought to be"shall ".
LORD WINDLESHAM: I cannot answer that question without notice. I think the quick answer would be that it would be difficult to have a list which was absolutely inclusive and covered all possible circumstances. There would almost always be the probability that something would lie outside that list, although normally I think it would be because one condition was not met. I will look into that point and, having done so, will write to the noble and learned Lord and give him the result of my researches.
Under the Bill, the requirements for registration will be broadly in line with those at present applying to the naturalisation of aliens; and they will be identical on this question of the language requirements. The Second Schedule to the British Nationality Act 1948 requires an alien applying for naturalisation to have sufficient knowledge of the English language. In making registration for Commonwealth and Irish citizens discretionary, the Government think it reasonable to require that applicants wishing to throw in their lot with this country should acquire a knowledge of the English language. I say in passing to the noble Lord, Lord Wade, that I am advised that for the purposes of this Bill English does not, we think, include Gaelic or Welsh.
BARONESS WHITE: But will it include those languages if we put down an Amendment to that effect? I might pursue this. There is the Welsh Language Act which gives equal validity in the Principality to the Welsh language and that is of some substance.
LORD WINDLESHAM: I will certainly look at that. It is an extraordinary point to come up, and I take it. I only question the last comment of the noble Baroness, that it is a point of some substance. I think it is one that will occur in very few instances indeed, but there is one point, to which I shall come, bearing on that. A fear has been expressed, as I think the noble Lord, Lord Wade, said, that this requirement of ability to speak English might be a bar to assimilation, particularly of people from the
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Commonwealth. But, on the contrary, we believe that the requirement of knowledge of English is, if anything, likely to encourage assimilation. It is a general requirement of most countries that applicants for citizenship should have mastered their language. As to jury service, it is open to the appropriate authorities to satisfy themselves that people selected as jurors can follow the proceedings intelligently and in matters of that sort, as in other aspects of citizenship, a knowledge of the language is a crucial instrument by which these civic privileges and rights may be fulfilled.
The noble Baroness, Lady White, and some noble Lords who have spoken in the debate asked me what the words"sufficient knowledge of the English language"in the Bill amount to in practice, and how the Secretary of State will satisfy himself on this point. This, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner has just pointed out, has for many years been a requirement when aliens have applied for naturalisation. As a result, the Home Office has long experience of applying the requirements. I may say, in passing, that there is a separate department of the Home Office, the Nationality Department, which handles these applications for citizenship from aliens and from Commonwealth citizens. The requirement is not applied in an exacting way. When inquiries are made in the course of an application for naturalisation, the applicant is personally interviewed. Provided that he is able to understand what is said to him by the interviewing officer, and to answer questions and give an account of his life without the aid of an interpreter, we shall be satisfied on this score. Only if the applicant obviously has an extremely poor grasp of the language is a dictation test applied.
As to the knowledge of English required, the applicant is expected to be able to make himself understood for normal everyday purposes. While the detailed arrangements for registration in the future (because what I have been saying applies only to aliens at the moment) have not yet been settled, it is envisaged that the procedure for registration may well be rather less rigorous than that for naturalisation, which involves, for example, placing public advertisements in the Press. It might perhaps be based simply on an interview with the

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applicant and a check on records, and provided that the applicant was able to make himself understood without an interpreter at the interview this would be the end of the matter, so far as knowledge of English was concerned. The requirement of knowledge of English will not apply to any Commonwealth citizen who at the end of July, 1971, was lawfully in the United Kingdom and ordinarily resident here free of conditions. The position of such a person is safeguarded under paragraph 2 of Schedule 1; he will continue to have an absolute right of registration on completing five years' residence without having to satisfy any requirement as to knowledge of English.
May I now come on to the important point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Wade, about wives? If it is accepted that it is reasonable to expect heads of families to acquire a knowledge of English if they wish to register and so acquire our citizenship, it may nevertheless appear unreasonable to expect their wives to acquire a second langauge, since they may not have the same opportunities to learn from English speakers as their husbands and children will. We can satisfy the noble Lord on this point because once the husband is a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies—in other words, if he has been accepted by this process of registration—his wife will have an automatic right to register under Section 6(2) of the British Nationality Act 1948, irrespective of the length of her residence, her character or her knowledge of the English language. This automatic right is not affected by the Bill. The matter of her language ability would not be relevant, although from what I have seen in the Midlands and elsewhere—and the noble Lord, Lord Wade, knows about this from his experience in Yorkshire—local education authorities and community relations councils are making considerable efforts among the wives, especially of Asian families, for small groups of four or six people to meet together in their homes to try to help with language teaching and to familiarise people with British customs.
LORD BROCKWAY: We are getting a little confused in our discussion because the Amendment before us is Amendment No. 121B.
LORD WINDLESHAM: Yes; I replied fully because the noble Baroness moved her Amendment No. 122.
BARONESS WHITE: I did not move it.
LORD WINDLESHAM: No. The noble Baroness, quite properly, spoke to the Amendment because it was on a related point. It seemed both to the noble Baroness and to myself that it was as well to have one general debate—and we have had a very interesting one—rather than to take the Amendments one by one.
LORD BROCKWAY: I agree entirely. The last thing I wanted to do was to create more controversy. I want to help by saying that I will withdraw Amendment No. 121B, and I will not move Amendment No. 121C. That means that we shall have Amendment No. 122 before us. May I express appreciation of the contribution which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, made on my Amendment? When the Minister communicates with the noble and learned Lord would he also communicate with me about the conclusions of his inquiry? I beg leave to withdraw No. 121B.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
BARONESS WHITE BARONESS WHITE moved Amendment No. 122:
Page 37, leave out line 12.
The noble Baroness said: We have had a full discussion on this Amendment. In the circumstances, I will refrain from moving—
LORD O'HAGAN: I wonder whether I may ask a further question of the Minister?
BARONESS WHITE: In that case, to put us in order, I will move Amendment No. 122.
LORD O'HAGAN: I wonder whether I may ask the Minister for a little more detail about the nature of the test so far as character and, particularly, knowledge of English is concerned? I understand that at present in some circumstances a policeman calls at the house and makes an on the spot test of an alien to see whether he fulfils the requirements for good character and knowledge of the English language. Is this procedure going to be extended? Are there going to be special training programmes

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for people carrying out these duties? What qualifications will they be required to have so far as the use of language is concerned? In short, could the noble Lord outline the practical aspects of the tests? If he has done so already, and I have missed his answer, then I apologise.
LORD WINDLESHAM: I have referred to this matter, but I was speaking rather quickly at the time and was not as specific as the noble Lord, Lord O'Hagan, would like me to be. I said that the detailed arrangements for the future had not yet been settled and that it is envisaged that the procedure for registration may be rather less rigorous than that for naturalisation, perhaps based simply on an interview with the applicant and a check on the records. The interview may well be at the Home Office rather than with the police, or whatever seems to be the simplest and most straightforward way of making these inquiries. It is our hope that it may be somewhat less formal than the procedure which has applied in the past.
LORD O'HAGAN: I heard that reply on the first occasion and I will not detain the Committee. Will the noble Lord be able to give more details when we get to the next stage of the Bill? Will these procedures have been worked out by then?
LORD WINDLESHAM: I should like to take note of that point; I know the noble Lord's interest in this subject. At whatever time I am in a position to tell him what the proposed procedure is I shall do so, but I should not like to tie myself down necessarily in October.
LORD DONALDSON OF KINGSBRIDGE: I am not happy. We have not had any reason for including this clause. The noble Lord has said nothing to refute my view that there will be practically nobody to whom this requirement will apply after five years. If this is the case, is there any point in having a possible irritant in the Bill?
LORD WINDLESHAM: In the case of aliens, I am afraid that, strange though it may seem, there are people who have been here for five years who do not have a knowledge of the English language. I have seen such cases.
BARONESS WHITE: We have indicated that some of us are not happy about this condition. I do not want to press the Amendment at this point, but should like to consider more carefully what the noble Lord has said. A number of us are not fully convinced that this is really worth the trouble or the apprehensions involved. At this point I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
BARONESS WHITE BARONESS WHITE moved Amendment No. 123:
Page 37, line 25, at end insert (" in the Dependencies or ").
The noble Baroness said: I beg to move the Amendment standing in the names of my noble friends and myself. We should like to know why it is that in certain circumstances"relevant employment"includes work in a Colony or Protectorate, or service in the employment of a society, company or body of persons established in a Colony or Protectorate, but when we come to Crown service there is no reference to Crown service other than in the United Kingdom itself. In the changed circumstances of the Commonwealth, those territories which remain as Colonies and/or Protectorates are few in number nowadays and, with the exception of Hong Kong, are small. As we have taken away from the citizens of those areas rights which they have previously enjoyed, so that there is not very much left for them by way of benefit of being Colonies or Protectorates of the United Kingdom, surely in this relatively small sphere we might include Crown service in the Dependencies as one of the qualifying factors that should be taken into account for registration. I do not want to make very heavy weather of this point. The sort of people one has in mind are the citizens of Gibraltar, and it seems to us that this might be a gesture. In our disintegrating Commonwealth, surely Crown service in one of the Dependencies, not only in the United Kingdom, should be allowed to count for virtue, so to speak, in this field of registration. We should like to know what the Government think of this.
LORD DENHAM: Appendix A to Schedule 1 of the Bill is to form Section 5(1)(a) of the British Nationality Act 1948, and there is a definition of"Crown

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service"in Section 32(1) of the 1948 Act which is as follows:
"' Crown service under His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom '"—
which are the words the noble Baroness is seeking to amend—
" means the service of the Crown under His Majesty's government in the United Kingdom, or under His Majesty's government in Northern Ireland, or under the government of any colony, protectorate, protected state, United Kingdom mandated territory, or United Kingdom trust territory, whether such service is in any part of His Majesty's dominions or elsewhere; "
I think the noble Baroness's worries will be covered by that.
BARONESS WHITE: I am delighted to hear it. The confusing thing in other parts of this Appendix to Schedule 1 is that there is specific reference to employment in a Colony or Protectorate. It is confusing to someone who is not necessarily knowledgeable about the other Statutes, and I wondered whether the Government could not look at this and make it clear in this Bill that the words"in the United Kingdom"mean something very much broader than the words actually say; or if we could have a cross-reference to the Act from which the noble Lord has just quoted it might help. People, community relations officers and the like, will have to be advising immigrants in this country on these matters, and it would help public relations if we could at least have a cross-reference.
LORD DENHAM: I will certainly look at that. I do not know whether one could have a footnote or something like that in a Bill of this kind, but the Amendment from noble Lords opposite would I think do slightly less to cover the point than is done at present.
LORD SLATER: Would the noble Lord inform us what classification will be given, if we join the Common Market, to people who come from various countries to this country? How will they fit in with the Act already quoted to the noble Baroness, Lady White?
LORD DENHAM: I cannot see that it will make any difference.
LORD SLATER: They will not be citizens of the United Kingdom and they are not members of the Colonies or even
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of the Commonwealth. They belong to other States which are outside and they will be more or less immigrants. They will not have been members under the Constitution which we have always been accustomed to and worked with for generations. How are those people to have the same freedom in this country unless there is special legislation?
LORD DENHAM: This Amendment refers to Crown service under Her Majesty's Government.
BARONESS WHITE: I appreciate the explanation given by the noble Lord, but I hope he will seriously take into account the point I have made in regard to the drafting, to see whether he cannot bring in at least a reference to the other Statutes. In the confident hope that he will do something about it I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Schedule 1 agreed to.
Schedule 2 [Administrative provisions as to control on entry and departure]:
6.5 p.m.
LORD DENHAM LORD DENHAM moved Amendment No. 124:
Page 39, line 6, at end insert—
(" (5) An immigration officer, for the purpose of satisfying himself whether there are persons he may wish to examine under paragraph 2 below, may search any ship or aircraft and anything on board it, or any vehicle taken off a ship or aircraft on which it has been brought to the United Kingdom.")
The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 124 on behalf of my noble friend. Under the present law, and under the Bill as it stands, immigration officers have no power of search for smuggled immigrants such as customs officers have to search for smuggled goods. Their only power of search (under paragraph 4(3)) relates to passengers and their baggage. The growth in recent years of a traffic in illegal immigrants makes it desirable that there should be the power given by the Amendment to search ships, aircraft and vehicles: the power to search vehicles is particularly needed in dealing with car ferries, where there is always a risk of illegal entrants being concealed in car boots, caravans, et cetera. I beg to move.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD BROCKWAY LORD BROCKWAY moved Amendment No. 124A:
Page 39, line 42, leave out sub-paragraph (1).
The noble Lord said: I beg to move this Amendment very briefly. The point I want to put to the Committee is that in the difficult circumstances of immigrants coming to this country—difficulties of language and of background—to say that refusal on their part to co-operate with an immigration officer should be relevant to refusing entry seems to me to be going too far. This could easily be due to misunderstanding, maladjustment, tiredness after the journey, strange conditions. I would hope that we would not regard this as a condition under which entry would he refused. That is the purpose for which I am moving this Amendment, and it may save time if I take Amendment No. 124C with it.
LORD WINDLESHAM: In the Government's view it is in general right that a person entering or leaving the country should be obliged to give the immigration officer who examines him the information that the officer needs for the purpose of his functions. Withholding such information only slows down the operation of the control and so causes difficulty not only for the passenger himself but also for his fellow-travellers. The same obligation as appears in the Bill is now imposed by Article 7(2) of the Aliens Order 1953 and also the First Schedule to the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962; and its existence has not given rise to serious complaint. Therefore this power has been on the Statute Book for a number of years and immigration officers have not misused it.
The Wilson Committee, which has been referred to several times in the debate, said in their Report at paragraph 162:
" the impression we have received in the course of our inquiry is that, generally speaking, immigration officers act with fairness and respect for the rights and feelings of the people with whom they have to deal. In questioning people about their intentions and family circumstances, the officers are only carrying out duties laid clown by Parliament."
Clause 26 (which relates to this Schedule, as amended in another place) makes it a defence to a prosecution for refusing or failing to provide information that there was a reasonable excuse for the refusal or failure. We feel that this added protection should cover any exceptional cases
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of the type that the noble Lord may have in mind.
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: I will not delay the Committee, but may I say a practical word on this matter as somebody who has suffered? I hope the Government will keep in mind the possibility of allowing a little time lag to somebody who has made a long journey. On one famous occasion I flew all the way from Sydney, in Australia, to London, pretty well without a break; I had been practically all round the world, having had cholera injections and so forth. I arrived at London Airport, and a careful medical officer noticed that my vaccination card had not been stamped months previously in the city of Stoke on Trent by a little wench behind a counter. I was tired; I had been flying for 36 hours. I was hungry, dusty and dishevelled. I did not want to"pull rank ", for I like to be treated as anyone else is. However, he said to me,"Why haven't you done this and why haven't you done that?" I felt like exploding, and I said that I was tired. In the end I co-operated by pulling up my shirt sleeve and saying to him,"Make another hole in my arm." Those who are the least irate of people sometimes need time when they arrive in a foreign country, and I hope that some kind of provision to cover that situation will be made, so that the human situation is covered for people arriving in a strange country from afar. That is all I would ask the Minister.
LORD WINDLESHAM: That is a very reasonable request. The Immigration Service tries to operate on exactly that basis. There is a power whereby, if the immigration officer decides on the face of it not to admit somebody, the person can be held at the airport so that he can go to bed for the night if, say, an interpreter is needed, or if a friend or a solicitor or somebody of that kind is coming to make representations. The noble Lord, Lord Foot, is with us. His service comes into play here. The United Kingdom Immigrants' Advisory Service has counsellors at the ports who are there to help in these difficult cases. As I have mentioned previously, as a matter of practice no immigration officer on his own authority refuses entry to anyone into this country; the matter has to be referred to the chief immigration officer.

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But I entirely take the spirit of what the noble Lord has said, and it would not be challenged by the Immigration Service.
LORD BROCKWAY: In view of what the Minister says I ask leave to withdraw this Amendment. I shall probably be worrying him, as he anticipates, about the way in which these assurances are dealt with.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
6.15 p.m.
LORD BROCKWAY LORD BROCKWAY moved Amendment No. 124B:
Page 40, line 12, leave out (" appearing to the immigration officer to be ").
The noble Lord said: Noble Lords will see at the top of page 40 of the Bill a description about the procedure followed on the examination of an immigrant arriving in this country. Subparagraph (2)(b) refers to a person,
" conveying documents of any relevant description ";
and"relevant description"is defined as:
" any description appearing to the immigration officer to be relevant ":
My Amendment would delete the words"appearing to the immigration officer to be ". I seek that deletion on the grounds that it is a very unsatisfactory phrase which is indefinite and bad to have in an Act of Parliament. I would urge upon the Committee that if this phrase were deleted the clause would not suffer and there would not be this suggestion of the right of the immigration officer to decide this issue in a subjective way. I beg to move.
LORD GRIDLEY: In answer to the observations made by the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, I personally have had some experience overseas in a customs and immigration service of knowing what is required by persons entering any country; and this must equally apply to entry into the United Kingdom. If one wishes an immigration service to carry out its duties, the first requirement is obviously to obtain officers and members of that service of the highest qualities, capabilities, integrity and honesty. I am quite sure that in this country the members of the present Immigration Service—the officers at the ports of entry—are of the highest calibre. If we want to
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administer any Act and carry it out dispassionately, and in the interests of people coming here and of our own citizens, then we should obviously take care to ensure that we have the right people in the right place. I personally feel that, although the noble Lord has always exhibited so much interest in our overseas friends and people who come from the Commonwealth—indeed in anybody who is coming to this country—he is seeing behind this requirement difficulties and anomalies which do not exist. If we wish to administer such a Bill we must necessarily give these powers of discretion to the immigration officers, and I can see no objection to this provision remaining as it is.
LORD SOMERS: May I add to what my noble friend has just said? If it is not to be the immigration officer who decides what is relevant, then who does decide?
LORD STONHAM: I suggest that it is far better if the immigration officer does so decide. We have already agreed to an Amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Denham, which gives the officer very considerable powers and responsibilities as regards search and investigation. We agreed to that without a whisper simply because of our confidence in immigration officers—a confidence that is very well founded. I am extremely sorry to disagree with my noble friend Lord Brockway in this matter, but when I first read the Amendment I thought it was to insert the words concerned, and I felt that it was very good. Now that I realise we are asked to leave out these words, I feel, and I am sure that anyone who has had experience of immigration officers also feels, that we should be well content to leave them to decide in their judgment what papers or documents are relevant. I hope that we shall keep the provision in the Bill.
LORD WINDLESHAM: I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, for his support and I will pass on what he said about the Immigration Service to the Chief Inspector, because I know, in view of his own connection with the Service and his long tenure at the Home Office, that that comment will be particularly appreciated. Here again, these are features of the present law going back to 1953 and 1962. The subject was

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discussed at some length in another place in 1962 when a similar provision of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act was amended, and welcomed by spokesmen on both sides of the House in its final form as being a reasonable accommodation. The words"appearing to the immigration officer to be ", which Amendment No. 124B would delete, are needed because it is right that the power to ask to see documents should depend on the officer's assessment of their relevance as it seems to him at the time. It may be that when his examination is concluded, and he has a more complete picture of the facts, it will emerge that the documents were not as relevant as they seemed to him when he first started it. But it would not be right in those circumstances to say that he in asking for the documents had exceeded his powers.
BARONESS GAITSKELL: Although there can be no reflection on the difficult task of immigration officers in these cases, it seems to me that these words in a legal document are open to objection. I do not know what other words could be used, but such loose and fluid words as"appearing to the immigration officer to be relevant"become very subjective and it would be a good thing if other words could be found to replace them.
LORD BROCKWAY: I think the Minister knows my intention. I do not wish in the least to criticise the Immigration Service. He was kind enough to say the other day that he would pass on to them what I had said, just as he has now done in the case of the noble Lord, Lord Stonham. I was not directing attention to the immigration officer. I was directing attention to the word"appearing ". The criticism would be just as strong if it were"appearing"to a group of Members of Parliament, or to a group of Members of the House of Lords or, I would even say, to the British Lions Rugby Team.
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: Oh no, we cannot have that.
LORD BROCKWAY: They are my heroes at the present moment. The entire object of the Amendment is, as my noble friend Lady Gaitskell has said, to find more definite terms which are not so subjective and so vague. I hope that the Minister will look at this before the
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Report stage, and on that optimistic note I ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: I had hoped that the noble Lord would look at this again, and—
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Oh!
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: I am sorry, I will not detain the Committee if the noble Lord has withdrawn the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD BROCKWAY LORD BROCKWAY moved Amendment No. 124D:
Page 40, line 18, leave out from (" or ") to end of line 19.
The noble Lord said: If the Committee will refer again to the Immigration Bill itself it will be found that in paragraph 4(3) of Schedule 2 rights of search are given in the case of baggage which may convey documents that would be illegal. To that one does not object. What one does object to is that this power is given not only to the immigration officers but to a person acting under the directions of the officer. He may not be an immigration officer; he may not be a constable; he may not be a public servant. He is much more likely to be an individual employed by a private agency such as that to which I referred earlier. It seems to me that in this task the State should employ only its own staff and should not employ persons who belong to private agencies. It looks to me as though that is the meaning of the present clause and I shall be interested to hear the Minister's explanation of it. I beg to move.
LORD WINDLESHAM: I think I can give the noble Lord the assurance for which he asks. Securicor employees are not in fact used to carry out searches under the present law, and will not be so used under the Bill. The persons who conduct searches under the direction of immigration officers are usually employed by the Board of Customs and Excise, so that they are State employees; but where such a person is not available and a woman or girl has to be searched, the Immigration Service will ask the help of, for example, a police matron or a woman police officer.
LORD BROCKWAY: I am entirely satisfied, and with the goodwill of the Committee I ask leave to withdraw this Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
6.25 p.m.
LORD DENHAM LORD DENHAM moved Amendment No. 125:
Page 40, line 27, leave out from (" with ") to (" proceedings ") in line 28.
The noble Lord said: On behalf of my noble friend Lord Windlesham, I beg to move Amendment No. 125. Paragraph 4(4) of Schedule 2 in its present form provides that any documents produced by or found on a passenger when examined by an immigration officer may be detained by the officer for up to seven days in any case, and for longer if he is of the opinion that they may be needed in connection with legal proceedings. At the Report stage in another place Opposition Members criticised this provision, and said that an immigration officer should not have power to retain documents in connection with civil proceedings. My right honourable friend promised to consider this point. The effect of this Amendment and the next one is that documents may be retained only in connection with
" any proceedings on an appeal under this Act or for an offence ".
I think that that meets the criticism made in another place. I beg to move.
LORD GARDINER: I wonder whether the noble Lord can help me. Possibly I am being very stupid, but I seem to have got this wrong. With these Amendments, will not the second half of the paragraph now read:
"…and if on examination of any document so produced or found the immigration officer is of the opinion that it may be needed in connection with on an appeal under this Act or for an offence, he may detain it…"?
It does not seem to me to work out right. I should not have thought that one would need a document for an offence, but I have probably got it all wrong.
LORD STONHAM: I think we should use the word"proceedings"to make it read:
"…if on examination of any document so produced or found the immigration officer is of the opinion that it may be needed in connection with any proceedings…"
LORD GARDINER: That has been deleted.
BARONESS WHITE: It is the first word,"proceedings ".
LORD STONHAM: No, it is not deleted.
LORD DENHAM: My reading of the words is somewhat different. The words removed were the two words"any legal ", and I think the noble and learned Lord will find that makes sense.
LORD GARDINER: But the word"proceedings"is deleted in line 28.
LORD DENHAM: This is only a drafting point and I will look at it. If the noble and learned Lord is right we will certainly put in a drafting Amendment at another stage.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD DENHAM LORD DENHAM moved Amendment No. 126:
Page 40, line 28, after (" Act ") insert (" or for an offence ").
The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 126, which is consequential.
LORD GARDINER: With great respect, this Amendment is only consequential in that neither Amendment makes sense. I can understand that one needs a document for proceedings, but what do the words"or for an offence"mean? It really does not seem to me to make sense.
LORD DENHAM: I am advised that the effect of these Amendments would be that documents may be retained only in connection with any proceedings on an appeal under this Bill when it becomes an Act, or for an offence.
BARONESS WHITE: As my noble and learned friend has said, it would be much clearer if it were differently drafted—putting the"offence"before the"Act ", making the sentence read:"on an appeal or for an offence under this Act ".
LORD GARDINER: I should be quite happy if it could be looked at.
LORD WINDLESHAM: Of course we shall study what the noble and learned Lord has said. If the drafting turns out to be not correct, we will certainly come back with drafting Amendments at another stage.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD BROCKWAY LORD BROCKWAY moved Amendment No. 126B:
Page 41, line 40, leave out (" an immigration officer ") and insert (" the Secretary of State ").
The noble Lord said: This Amendment is for the purpose of substituting"the Secretary of State"for the term"an immigration officer ". I think it is worth while reading the present terms, in line 40 of page 41. They are these:
" Where a person arriving in the United Kingdom is refused leave to enter, an immigration officer may, subject to sub-paragraph (2)…"
do a whole series of things. I suggest that these powers are too great, too important for an immigration officer, and that instead of the immigration officer"we should here use the term"the Secretary of State ". With all the duties that the immigration officer has to perform, it seems to me that to give him these additional powers would be demanding too much of him. I beg to move.
LORD WINDLESHAM: Paragraphs 8 and 9 of Schedule 2 give an immigration officer power to arrange for the removal of persons refused leave to enter and illegal entrants, by giving the captain of the ship or aircraft removal directions. These Amendments, rather like the earlier ones we discussed, are based on the view that immigration officers should not have some of the powers that they do have, and that removal directions should be given by the Secretary of State. I am advised that here again the powers are, in substance, no greater than those already possessed by immigration officers, and that as a matter of practice it is not possible for any one other than the Immigration Service to give removal directions promptly to the carriers in these cases, which occur at any time of the day or night, weekday or weekend.
I think the noble Lord would recognise that even if this Amendment were carried it would not be the Secretary of State personally who would give the removal directions. The directions would be given by officials in the Immigration and Nationality Department of his office. In practice, there would not really seem to be very much difference. As the noble Lord knows, in these cases the Immigration Service are guided both by their own senior officers, and, in very many individual cases, which raise questions of
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policy, by officials of the Immigration and Nationality Department of the Home Office. So I think in practice there is not a great deal between us, whether one uses the words"the Secretary of State ", to include Home Office officials acting under his authority, or whether one uses the words"immigration officer ".
LORD BROCKWAY: I think there is a difference. The Minister knows that sometimes I come into conflict with a decision of an immigration officer and refer it to the Home Office, and it is always considered immediately and deportation may be deferred. The responsibility of the Home Office is much nearer to the Home Secretary, even if the Home Secretary does not give the decision, than is an immigration officer at the airport, I think. Therefore there is a real distinction between the use of the term"immigration officer"and the words"Secretary of State ". I should like some comment from the Minister on that point.
LORD WINDLESHAM: I really have not got very much that I can add. I think it is really a distinction that seems much stronger on paper than it is in real life. As I said in replying to the Amendment, the Immigration Service are day and night, weekdays and weekends, at the ports, and they are the people who exercise the immigration control. I have given the figures before; last year 14 million people came in through 50 different ports which are permanently staffed day and night by the Immigration Service. So in most cases it would seem right that they should carry out the law. Where there are difficult cases, such as those the noble Lord referred to, which are taken up by Members of your Lordships' House or of another place, they are then invariably examined by Ministers; and when representations are made by others they are examined by senior officials. But one must not get the impression that this is only done where representations are made. If the Immigration Service are in doubt they will refer to the Department for guidance, and the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, will confirm that there are many difficult cases referred by the Service to the Department. So in practice I think the difference is not quite as much as would appear.
LORD BROCKWAY: I thank the Minister. I did speak from experience

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rather than from what I read on paper. In view of his assurance, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
6.39 p.m.
LORD BROCKWAY LORD BROCKWAY moved Amendment No. 126D:
Page 43, line 14, leave out from (" leave ") to (" an ") in line 15.
The noble Lord said: I should like to have the attention of the Committee for a moment or two on Amendment No. 126D; it relates to line 14, page 43, and seeks to leave out the latter sentences. These latter sentences refer again to vague phrases—" intentions ","reasonably suspect ", and so on. It is always difficult to judge whether or not someone is intending to do something. This phrase asks only that there should be reasonable suspicion that someone is intending to do something. That again seems to me very vague language for an Act of Parliament. We know that other legislation with the concept of"reasonable suspicion"has been found unsatisfactory, and I would urge that nothing of substance would be lost by deleting these vague sentences. I beg to move.
6.40 p.m.
LORD GRIDLEY: May I make one very short intervention in connection with this matter, and refer again to what I said when I spoke to another Amendment a short time ago. Here again it seems to me that you must give a certain amount of authority to the qualified and responsible immigration officers on the spot, to exercise the powers which Parliament bestows upon them under this Bill. It is up to them to assert what is a reasonable suspicion of intention on the part of anybody coming into this country. If anybody is aggrieved by any action taken by the immigration officer, I understand that there is a power of appeal against any decision made at the port of entry, and in the circumstances this would be sufficient to see that justice was done. That is all I want to say on this particular Amendment.
LORD GARDINER: It had not seemed to me that we could really ask the Committee to re-write Schedule 2 this afternoon. There are always limits to everything, and I suppose that when the
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noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor or I describe our immigration law as the most liberal in the world, the sort of thing we have in mind is more, perhaps, to be found in Schedule 2 than anywhere else. Immigration officers who are civil servants, can arrest as if they were policemen, and arrest without warrant. Whereas a policeman usually must have reasonable cause to believe a crime has been committed, he can act on suspicion, and even when he is off duty. I hope that in this particular case the Government will consider this point. I appreciate that nobody has really tried to humanise this part of our law. As we all know, it took this extreme form originally because it was passed on the night of August 4, 1914, and it has been re-enacted under Expiring Laws Continuance Bills more or less every year since. That was its origin. Nothing really could be done until one had got a right of appeal, and the real breakthrough came with the Wilson Report, after many had been fighting this issue for twenty or thirty years. The Immigration Appeals Act for the first time provided that somebody could look at what the civil servants were doing, which somebody who was not a civil servant did not know before. There was an independent adjudicator to see what was actually happening.
Having declined eight offers from publishers for my biography, I do not propose to explain how that came about, though it obviously would not have come about if we had not had a Home Secretary who was both interested in civil liberties and a strong Home Secretary, because the pressure of civil servants not to give up powers which all their predecessors had was immense. We recognise now that we are very lucky in having Mr. Maudling as Home Secretary, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone, as Lord Chancellor, and, if I may say so, the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, as representing the Home Office here. If, before we finally leave this Bill, we could cut out some of the worst excesses, it would be something. Here is a man who has done nothing wrong at all, and the immigration officer, if he suspects him, has the considerable power of directing the captain of the ship to take him away. That is that; he is gone. I have the highest regard for the way the immigration officers work, but

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this really, for any system of law, is a very fierce power when the man has done nothing wrong at all. He has not broken any condition, he has been given leave to enter, and simply because the immigration officer is reasonably suspicious that lie may be going to do something wrong he can order the captain of the ship to take him away to some other country, and that is that. This being such an extreme case, I hope that the Government will be prepared to meet it.
LORD WINDLESHAM: The noble and learned Lord has gone very wide on this Amendment, to paragraph 12 of Schedule 2, which is confined to seamen and air crews. He took this as an example of, as he regarded it, Parliament having given too great powers to immigration officers in the past and continuing them from year to year. I think in nearly all this list of Amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, the power has been not only in the aliens legislation but in the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962, and that applies here. Paragraph 8(3) of the first Schedule to the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 is in similar terms.
Very often there is a practical reason behind these particular provisions which it is rather difficult to be aware of just from looking at the words on the paper. It is my responsibility, as it was of the noble Lord, Lord Stonham (who was present in the Committee earlier), when he stood at this Dispatch Box for five years for the same Department, to point this reason out. This Amendment, No. 126D, and the two after it, 126E and 126F, which really have a cumulative effect, would delete from paragraphs 12(2), 13(2)(a) and 13(2)(b) of Schedule 2 the words,
" or is reasonably suspected by an immigration officer of intending to do so ".
The provisions affected are those which empower an immigration officer to give directions for the removal of a person who, having arrived to join the crew of a ship or aircraft, overstays the time allowed to him for that purpose; or having arrived as a crew member, overstays shore leave; or having arrived as a crew member, overstays a limited leave given to him for the purpose of joining another ship or aircraft or for the purpose of hospital treatment or for repatriation by the shipping company; or
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who is reasonably suspected of intending to overstay. Noble Lords who have looked at the Schedule and the Bill itself will know that there are certain special categories of immigration control for the crews of ships and aircraft. They are, after all, in a different position from visitors and other passengers intending to enter this country. The crew of an aircraft or a ship do not intend to remain in this country, and do not intend to land for any purpose other than perhaps to spend a period of a few hours; so our immigration laws make special provision.
It has been suggested that the concept of"reasonable suspicion"is one that confers too great a power on the immigration officer. I do not know how far one can really counter that argument. I remember the noble Lord, Lord Foot, on at least two previous measures before your Lordships (the Misuse of Drugs Bill, and the Fire Precautions Bill), arguing very strongly for the insertion of words of this kind, that people should act only on"reasonable grounds"or on"reasonable suspicion ". The word"reasonable"is one I know noble Lords felt very strongly about. We have that word here in the Schedule before us. It appears in the formula,"reasonably suspected "—not just"suspected ", but"reasonably suspected by an immigration officer ". What would be lost by these Amendments, if they were accepted, is the power of the Immigration Service to forestall desertion by a seaman by taking action before the due date of departure to ensure that he sails on his ship. Once a seaman has remained behind after the ship on which he was due to go has sailed, there are often, understandably—noble Lords will appreciate this—great practical difficulties in then effecting his removal. The owners of the ship may be overseas; they may have no agents here; the shipping line may be one that very rarely sends vessels to this country.
It is for practical reasons of this kind that the power exists in the present law (in the Aliens Order 1953, Article 9(1), and as I mentioned in reply to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner—in Schedule 1 of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962) to give removal directions in respect of a seaman who is reasonably suspected of intending to overstay. The exercise in the past of this power to I take preventive action has not given rise

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to complaint and the power, it seems to us, is still needed. I hope that noble Lords will find this explanation of the practical need for a power of this sort helpful, and that it may meet the purpose of the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, in putting down this Amendment.
LORD GARDINER: My noble friend Lord Brockway will decide what course to take, but I should have thought the noble Lord might have said that he really would consider all these"reasonable suspicion"cases. I quite agree that with crime as it is, and with overworked police, obviously there is a lot to be said for sending somebody to prison, not because he has done anything wrong, but because a policeman reasonably suspects that he is going to do something wrong. But none of us would stand for that for one moment. I cannot see any real moral distinction between that and saying,"It is handy for the immigration officer to be able to put somebody on a ship and pack him off on reasonable suspicion, because if he deserted and committed an actual offence he would have to be fined."
This thought could be applied equally well to all criminals. It would save a lot of trouble if they could be sent to prison before they committed an offence. On the other hand, it obviously would not be just to send anyone to prison merely on suspicion, however reasonable the suspicion was. This is a case in which the man has done nothing wrong. He has not overstayed his leave. All that has happened is that the immigration officer reasonably suspects that he is going to, and to make sure that he does not he pushes him on a ship and sends him off. It is not right.
LORD WINDLESHAM: The noble and learned Lord is at his most persuasive. But really, this analogy of a policeman saying, I reasonably suspect that you may be about to commit an offence and I think you should go off to prison"will not do; it is a ludicrous over-statement of the position. Let us pause and think over what we are talking about. We are talking about the crews of aircraft or ships. For years the immigration laws have made special provision for seamen so that they can land and spend a few hours or days here before their ship
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sails again, without going through the whole formal process of examination by an immigration officer. I speak subject to correction, but I am not sure that they even need to have a passport stamped. It is made as easy as possible for the crews.
If the immigration officer had, not suspicion, but reasonable suspicion (because it is a qualified phrase) that the seaman was likely to desert or to remain here after his ship had gone this special leave to enter on reasonable grounds would be terminated. This is not a question of punishment or of saying,"You must go to gaol because I think you are about to commit an offence "; it is saying,"I have reasonable suspicion that you are going to desert, and before your ship sails I think you ought to get back on to it."
LORD BROCKWAY: Before the Report stage, I hope that in quieter retreat the Minister may be able to consider what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, has said. Meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
6.54 p.m.
LORD GARDINER LORD GARDINER moved Amendment No. 127:
Page 45, line 13, at end insert—
(" Provided that such person may not be detained for a period in excess of seven days unless—

(a) a justice of the peace is by written information on oath satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for so detaining him; or

(b) in Scotland, a sheriff, or a magistrate or justice of the peace, having jurisdiction in the place where such person is detained, is by evidence on oath so satisfied.")

The noble and learned Lord said: This is an Amendment to provide that persons here referred to could not be detained for a period in excess of seven days unless they were taken in England before a justice of the peace who is,
" by written information on oath satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for so detaining him:
or
(b) in Scotland, a sheriff, or a magistrate, or justice of the peace, having jurisdiction in the place where such person is detained, is by evidence on oath so satisfied."
I have not discovered the ultimate limits, if any, on the power of an immigration officer to detain people in this regard. It appears at first sight to be unlimited. But

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it is an ordinary principle of justice, even where people are arrested by the police, that they must be brought before a court within a certain limited time. It is recognised as part of the rule of law in, I think, all civilised countries. Therefore, it seems right, unless the Government have any particular explanation for the present position, that after seven days the detention should not be continued unless a justice of the peace is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for the detention. I beg to move.
LORD JANNER: I should like to support this Amendment, for the very simple reason that it is proper that a person who is detained should have an opportunity of putting his case before an impartial person within a certain time. I am not suggesting for one moment that there would be any partiality on the part of the people concerned, but a person should be able to put his case before a justice of the peace who has reasonable opportunities to decide issues of this sort. We are discussing here the possibility of a person being detained longer than the law allows in other respects, so I hope that this concession will be made.
LORD WINDLESHAM: I think I can meet the points of view expressed by noble Lords by referring them forward to the Government's Amendment No. 131. It might be for the convenience of the Committee if we debated Amendments Nos. 127 and 131 together.
LORD GARDINER: I see a possible disadvantage in that course, in view of the time. The debate could be rather long.
LORD WINDLESHAM: I was hoping to satisfy the Committee with what I have to say now about Amendment No. 131, because I think it meets what noble Lords are trying to do by Amendment No. 127. There is one change, but it might be an acceptable one.
LORD GARDINER: But it is rather long, is it not?
LORD WINDLESHAM: What I should like to do, if I may, is to speak for about five minutes. If noble Lords feel that what I have said meets their point, they might then wish to withdraw Amendment No. 127. But if they feel that it does not meet their point, then we can adjourn for an hour for the other business and
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resume the debate on the Amendment. That would enable us to dispose of this Amendment if what I have to say meets the noble and learned Lord's point, as I hope it will.
The Government's Amendment No. 131 provides that a person who is still detained under paragraph 16(1) seven days after his arrival in the United Kingdom, without his examination under paragraph (2) having been completed, is to have the same right to apply to an adjudicator for bail as is given by paragraph 24 of the Schedule to someone appealing against refusal of entry. For technical reasons, it is necessary to set out very fully in the Amendment separate provisions corresponding to those of paragraphs 26 to 28 about the consequences of bail-breaking (the forfeiture of the recognisance and the arrest of the bail-breaker).
The way in which the Government's Amendment differs from the Opposition's Amendment No. 127 is in that the question of continued detention or release is to be decided by an adjudicator rather than by a magistrate. In other words, having heard the debate in another place, my right honourable friend accepted the case on its merits. But he felt that the most appropriate body of people to consider applications of this sort would be the adjudicators within the immigration appeal system, rather than the magistrates. The adjudicator has special knowledge of immigration control, and we believe that he would be better qualified than a magistrate to assess the need for continued detention and the degree of risk involved in releasing the person concerned before a decision on his admission is reached.
That, I think, is all I need say, since we are now coming up to seven o'clock. We accept the principle. We feel that the adjudicator would be a more appropriate person than a magistrate to decide.
LORD GARDINER: There are a number of points which I should like to raise, if I may.
LORD WINDLESHAM: In that case, I beg to move that the House do now resume for an hour until eight o'clock.
Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
House resumed.

FARM CAPITAL GRANT (VARIATION) SCHEME 1971
7.0 p.m.
EARL FERRERS: My Lords, I beg to move that the Farm Capital Grant (Variation) Scheme 1971, which was laid before the House on July 8, be approved; and perhaps it may be for the convenience of your Lordships' House if, at the same time, we discuss the Farm Capital Grant (Variation) (Scotland) Scheme 1971, which is the subject of the next Motion.
My Lords, if I may, I will deal' at the outset with a minor drafting point which these two Statutory Instruments seek to clarify in relation to paragraph 5(1) of the principal Farm Capital Grant Schemes, which are now the unified Schemes for grant aid. This is to be found in paragraph 2(a) of the Variation Schemes, and makes it clear that applications made under the principal Schemes before the closing date qualify only for consideration for grant, and would not qualify automatically for grant solely by virtue of being made before the closing date.
The main purpose of the Variation Schemes is to provide a special rate of grant to growers as an incentive to grub up unwanted apple and pear orchards of dessert and culinary varieties. The apple and pear industry to-day contains many growers who have equipped and improved their businesses, at no small cost to themselves, to a high level of competitive efficiency. The industry has done a great deal to help itself by introducing better methods of husbandry, better methods of storage and better methods of grading their produce. The Apple and Pear Development Council, while devoting itself primarily to the promotion of home-grown fruit, has also carried out research and other tasks important to the organisation and development of a competitive and effective industry. But, my Lords, these efforts by growers are being undermined by the haphazard marketing of mediocre fruit from orchards which are commercially barely viable or from pockets of old orchard land on farms which receive little care and attention. Such orchards are a burden on the rest of the industry. Their fruit reaches the market during the autumn and early winter, when supplies from the regular commercial growers are most
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freely available; and since the growers concerned have little or no interest in the long-term commercial future of apple production, they are often adequately satisfied to take whatever short-term return they can get. This, of course, can be highly disruptive of the market, and can have a serious effect for the regular supplier, on whom we must in the end depend for our supplies of good quality, home-grown fruit.
The new grant is intended to remove this source of weakness by encouraging the owners of these barely viable orchards to get rid of them once and for all. The grant will be at the full rate of standard grubbing costs, as fixed by Ministers. The standard costs run from 13p to £1·82 per tree, according to the tree's girth, and they are based on direct labour costs. The grant will become payable, if your Lordships approve these Orders, from September 1, and applications may be made up to March 31, 1973. Its life will therefore be quite short, for the aim is to encourage something of a crash programme of grubbing. It is no part of the purpose of these Schemes for orchards which are grubbed up with their assistance to be replanted with new apple and pear trees. The grant will therefore be subject to a no-replanting condition which will run for five years from the completion of grubbing. I would stress that this is a major difference from the old and lower grants for orchard grubbing, which will still continue to be available. Indeed, the present grubbing grant will continue to run concurrently with the new grant. Fruit growers who want to grub up trees in order to renovate their orchards as a matter of good husbandry will still, therefore, be able to apply for grant under the existing Schemes. There have been full consultations with the farmers' unions over the new Schemes, and they have been welcomed by the horticultural industry. I hope that the need for them cannot be doubted, and I invite your Lordships to approve these two Statutory Instruments. I beg to move the first Order.
Moved, That the Farm Capital Grant (Variation) Scheme 1971, be approved.—(Earl Ferrers.)
7.7 p.m.
LORD HOY: My Lords, we are grateful to the noble Earl, Lord Ferrers, for

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explaining these Orders. There are only one or two points I wish to put to him. First of all, I should like to associate myself with the tribute, if such it was—and I think he meant it as such—to the Apple and Pear Development Council, because I think that this Council, under the chairmanship of Sir Richard Boughey, has really done a first-class job at minimum cost for the apple and pear industry, and I am grateful to have the opportunity once more, and for the first time in your Lordships' House, to put my personal appreciation on record. We are grateful to the noble Earl for the clarification he gave when introducing this Order, because without it I think it might quite well have been misunderstood. I can only hope that the Order in fact carries out what the noble Earl has told the House, and that we shall not get into further trouble over some interpretation.
As I understand it, what is being done is to provide an Order which will enable the grubbing of trees to be carried out once and for all; so that it is entirely different, really, from the present Order, with which it will run concurrently. The present Order, of course, provides grants of something between 33⅓ per cent. and 40 per cent., but this is for people who really are in business, to encourage them to take out trees which have become less productive and to replace them. This Order will apply only to those who, I understand, will remove the trees once and for all; and for that reason I found it just a little difficult to understand the last two words of the Explanatory Note, which says that this is subject to a specified condition"restricting planting ". I take it from what the noble Earl has said to your Lordships this afternoon that"restricting planting"is equivalent to the prohibition of planting; but it seemed to me to be a peculiar phrase to use in the Order. As I see it, however, and as I gather from what the noble Earl has had to say, what this will do will be to remove what on the whole are regarded as uneconomic orchards—that is, those of a smaller type—and take them out of production altogether.
As a result of this, I do not think it will have any great appeal to the larger grower, who will in fact be prepared to carry on under the Orders at present in operation. But inasmuch as it appeals to those people who produce uneconomically
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and bring their produce on to the market at particular times, which frequently causes disruption and which indeed makes it non-profitable for those who really are engaged in the industry not only to provide food but to earn their livelihood, and inasmuch as it goes any way to meet that difficulty, then we welcome it. I thought we might have had one word of explanation as to why cider apples and other things did not qualify for this particular grant. Obviously, there must be a good reason for it, and perhaps when the noble Earl comes to say just a word or two in reply he will be able to tell us. We will then all understand completely what the Order is about.
7.10 p.m.
EARL FERRERS: I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hoy, for the welcome he has given these Orders. I should like to clarify the point about which he seemed to be in doubt. The purpose of the original scheme, which is going to run concurrently, is to encourage existing commercial apple growers to grub up old orchards which are no longer particularly fruitful and to replace them with new. But there are a number of growers who have had their orchards going for some years, sometimes for as much as forty years, who do not bother to take much care of them and who at harvest time collect apples and dump them on the market. This"mucks up"the whole market organisation—usually at a time of glut. Therefore the object of this Order is to encourage these people by means of a grant higher than the existing grant to remove their apple trees once and for all.
The noble Lord was right to interpret the last two words of the Explanatory Memorandum as restricting replanting operations. That is so. It is the principle of the Government to prevent people who do apply for such grants from replanting the same area of land within five years. Of course, should a person accept the grant, grub up his orchards and later sell his land to somebody who may wish to go into apple growing, this will not restrict the new owner from so doing. The whole purpose of the Order is to exclude the possibility of persons getting a larger grubbing-up grant and then re-planting their orchards. The

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noble Lord asked why cider apples were not included in this scheme. The reason is a simple one: that those who grow cider apples usually do so on contract, with a firm base for their outlet. It is not considered that those people are usually the cause of market disruption. I hope that with that explanation the noble Lord will be happy.
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, may I ask one question? Is it estimated, calculated or considered that the disruption of the market caused by these people with inferior orchards will be greater than the disruption to the market, when we are in the Common Market, caused by supplies from Europe.
EARL FERRERS: The noble Lord has put forward a crafty point, but I think that even he would agree that if these apples were on the market at the same time, even if we were in the Common Market, it would lead to greater disruption than was in the mind of the noble Lord when he asked the question.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

FARM CAPITAL GRANTL (VAR IATION) (SCOTLAND) SCHEME 1971
THE MINISTER OF STATE, SCOTTISH OFFICE (BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE): My Lords, I beg to move that this Order be approved. It has been considered with the first Order.
Moved, That the Farm Capital Grant (Variation) (Scotland) Scheme 1971, be approved.—(Baroness Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

WHITE FISH (INSHORE VESSELS) AND HERRING SUBSIDIES (UNITED KINGDOM) SCHEME 1971
7.14 p.m.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, I beg to move that the White Fish (Inshore Vessels) and Herring Subsidies (United Kingdom) Scheme 1971 be approved. The Scheme before your Lordships to-day provides for the payment of operating subsidies to the inshore and herring fleets for the
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twelve months from August 1 next. The Scheme covers white fish vessels under 80 ft. in length and all herring vessels, although almost all of the latter are also under 80 ft. The Government propose that for a further year the subsidy rates now payable should remain unchanged. In the review on which we based this decision, account was taken of profitability in 1970, when average profits, before depreciation, showed a further healthy increase of about 30 per cent. compared to 1969. Earnings in 1970 from white fish and herring catches for the vessels concerned by the Scheme were £22·8 million: an increase of £3·5 million over 1969. Since the beginning of this year, earnings have continued to rise, and at present stand about 24 per cent. higher than the same period of last year.
In the Government's view, the industry is generally in a very healthy state financially, and it is our policy to try to ensure that this continues. I therefore suggest to your Lordships that the subsidy settlement is a generous one, and I commend it to your Lordships. The Scheme itself, apart from some very minor drafting changes, is in the same form as that approved by your Lordships a year ago. I beg to move.
Moved, That the White Fish (Inshore Vessels) and Herring Subsidies (United Kingdom) Scheme 1971, be approved.—(Baroness Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie.)
7.16 p.m.
LORD HOY: My Lords, it has been the custom for as long as I can remember that when we came to deal with fish Orders of this kind—and those who were Members of another place will confirm this—we regarded it as an opportunity for saying something about the fishing industry in general. This was the Order on which we always"hung our hats ". The Joint Under-Secretary of State for Scotland, replying to the debate in the other place on this particular Order, said that it provided an opportunity of discussing everything about the fishing industry. I do not propose to discuss everything; but there are certain points arising from it. First, as to the health of the industry: one is delighted to note that it is doing so well, that the foundation which one had some hand in laying has provided the results which the noble Baroness was able to announce one year later. I was grateful to her for the most

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recent figures that she gave. I was glad that she left out of her remarks something put in by the Parliamentary Secretary at the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, who, in introducing the Order into the other place, said that the industry has done rather well and"we are leaving them with the money ". He issued a kind of warning that the Government might not be so generous next year. All I can say is that these words take away a little of the gilt from the ginger bread. Let us consider that matter next year. If the industry has not done well in the concluding part of this year perhaps it will come back and ask for additions.
It is good to know that the industry is in a fairly healthy condition, but there are one or two things worrying those concerned at the moment. First, the industry would like to know what its position is going to be if we go in the Common Market because subsidies play a considerable part in its net earnings. I think it is true to say that without the subsidies the industry would have been in a very nearly impossible position. Obviously, if this change into a wider market is going to take place, the industry would want to know what is going to be its position vis-à-vis subsidies. Secondly, the industry has been troubled, I think unnecessarily, about the extent of fishing limits. Under the new agreement, as I understand it, the present limit up to six miles is the strict preserve of the British fishing fleets; no one can come inside that 6-mile limit. Between 6 miles and 12 miles there are certain countries with historical fishing rights who, even at the present time, can come in and fish. If any alteration is going to be made, perhaps the noble Baroness might spell out just what other countries may be entitled to come inside this band in addition to those which at present enjoy that right.
A third problem has been raised recently. It is the announcement by Iceland that she proposes to extend her fishing limits to 50 miles. I do not want to say anything which would cause any trouble about this proposal, because it is only a short time ago since I had the privilege of visiting Iceland as the guest of the Government and met a warm and kindly welcome from the people there. When we remember the troubles we faced together in time of war, we are grateful
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for the friendship that existed between the two countries. But if they are proposing to extend their limits to 50 miles, this will have grave repercussions on our fishing industry. It is not good enough for people to claim limits for themselves without thinking of the repercussions that will follow. Our distant water fleet depends on fishing grounds in that band, and if changes are going to take place it means that the distant water fleet will have to concentrate on the fishing grounds which are already available to us and the situation will become more and more difficult for the industry as a whole, because of the intrusion of the distant water fleet into the grounds used by the middle water and even near water fleets. So this proposal does not fill the fishermen with great happiness.
One or two points arise from such a decision. These limits are fixed by the Law of the Sea Conference and I understand that the next conference is not due until 1973. I should think that the decisions made at the last Law of the Sea Conference were binding on all the countries concerned, but it would be as well if the noble Baroness could say to-night that it is the view of the Government that that decision is binding and that any proposed changes to be made before 1973 should be challenged at the International Court. It is difficult for an industry like the fishing industry to plan its future and the building of boats if it does not know what fishing grounds are going to be available to it. This is a repercussion which can have disastrous effects not only on the fishing industry as such but also on boat builders and all the ancillary industries. While we are all glad to know that the industry has done so well over the past 12 months, we must not shut our eyes to what is worrying it at present.
Though this is not in the Order, I was glad to hear announced only to-day by the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food an increase of £400,000 in the grants to the distant water fleet. I have no objection to this. They do a very good job of work. But even with all the success they have had over the past 12 months, it seems that the Government have had to provide another £400,000 in subsidies and, as I know from my experience in the Ministry and certainly from my experience of the Treasury, the fishermen would not get that increase if the

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Minister had not put up a very concrete case. If the noble Baroness could reply to these points, we should all be grateful to her.
7.23 p.m.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, I have always been told that there are not quite the same strict rules of order in your Lordships' House as can be found in another place, and on this Order, which is limited to the white fish and herring industry subsidies for next year, we have given ourselves an opportunity of what I think is a useful discussion on some of the main problems which are before the fishing industry as a whole. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hoy, for having welcomed the Order. I should also like to pay tribute to the fact that he was responsible for the foundations of the successful operations, the results of which have been given to the House tonight.
The noble Lord asked me four main questions. The first is: what is the position of the fishing industry under the Common Market regulations and what is the position of subsidies? This is a very important point. It is true that there is nothing yet definite, because the E.E.C. still has to agree on the forms of the Community subsidies to the fishing industry. On the other hand, at the moment it appears unlikely that the United Kingdom would be able to continue the operating subsidies, either for the inshore or the deep-sea fleets, after entry into the E.E.C. That is as we see it at present, but if we did abolish the subsidies we could raise fishermen's incomes in two main ways: first, by increasing grants and loans for vessels and equipment or by price support for minimum prices, while not necessarily increasing the prevailing market prices, which would cut out low prices owing to glut conditions and would give compensation under such conditions. Thus fishermen's average earnings might be expected to be at a higher level.
The noble Lord also asked about fishing limits and said, quite rightly, that there is a good deal of confusion about them. There is considerable confusion in the public mind. It is not realised that the United Kingdom has a 12-mile limit, which was agreed at the 1964 Fisheries
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Convention and which reserves to the United Kingdom all waters within 12 miles measured from base lines. As the noble Lord will know, as the base lines were drawn on the West side of the Long Isle, this has the effect in practice of including within our exclusive limits a greater area than might at first be supposed. Following the 1964 Fisheries Conference, the United Kingdom granted a number of specific rights to other countries who, as the noble Lord said, base their claims on historic rights. This was fishing for certain species of fish in defined areas between the 6-mile and 12-mile belt; and because these concessions exist around our coast there has grown up a kind of notion in the public mind of an exclusive 6-mile limit.
The noble Lord asked which countries would be likely to come in, were we to allow fishing between the 6-mile and the 12-mile belts beyond those members already fishing there, who are Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Eire, and whose rights are in perpetuity. There is also Norway, which has rights up to 1984. The noble Lord, Lord Hoy, will recall that Norway did not sign the 1964 Convention. The country which would be most interested in being able to join us in fishing between the 6-mile and the 12-mile limit would be Denmark. I do not think that Italy or Luxembourg would be very interested in this method of fishing.
But we did not ask for an exclusive 12-mile limit, because it would diminish the rights of the Community countries who have already got rights between the 6-mile and the 12-mile limit. If we look to the status quo as a permanent solution, this would imply a measure of discrimination between those who have already the right to fish in the 6-mile and the 12-mile belt and, for example. Denmark, the country most likely to wish to have that right. That is why we put forward a compromise proposal and suggested that the only satisfactory way of resolving the Community's fishery problem, as an enlarged Community, is to restrict fishing in waters within our 6-mile limit, as measured from the base lines, to vessels belonging to the ports from which these waters are now being fished—in other words, our own vessels—and that therefore we would consider opening the 6-mile to 12-mile fishing

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limits to those countries who apply to join the European Community.
The noble Lord asked me about Iceland. I must say that I am glad he has raised this question, even if it does refer particularly to the deep water fleet, because it is an important matter to our fishing industry. As the noble Lord has said the Icelandic Government has announced its intention of extending its limits up to 50 miles by September, 1972. The noble Lord asked me to give the Government's position on this matter. I would say quite categorically that we consider that to extend fishery limits beyond 12 miles is contrary to international law and is also contrary to the 1961 Agreement, which first of all said that we should have consultation and at least six months' notice, and that if no agreement was reached then, we should bring the matter to the International Court. At the moment, we have made our position on this matter quite clear through our Ambassador in Iceland, and we are trying hard to clarify the position.
The noble Lord mentioned the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference in 1973, and that brings back memories of when the noble Lord and myself were members of the Council of Europe at Strasbourg. We raised the question of fishing limits, and I think there were few countries on the Continent at the time who realised the importance of fishing to some of the nations represented round that conference table. We have a preparatory committee at work at the moment in Geneva, and it is here that we shall hope to get the preliminary statement of Iceland's position, when we shall of course make our own position absolutely clear. On this point I would say that in 1970 the distant water fleet took off Iceland about £12 million worth of fish from the waters in that region: the corresponding Scottish figure is considerably less, but it is also of great significance to us namely, £750,000.
Lastly the noble Lord mentioned the fact that he had seen on the tape—and I think he must have had word of this before—
LORD HOY: No.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: All I can say to the noble Lord is——
LORD HOY: I am sorry to interrupt the noble Baroness, but the tape apparently had more information than your Lordships' House. I had to go out and get it from the tape.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, I think it was probably because it was in answer to a Written Question which should have become available at six o'clock in another place. It is quite true that my right honourable friends have decided to make a change in the deep sea subsidy arrangements for the two years commencing August 1 of this year, which will have the effect of increasing the operating subsidy by £400,000, subject to the existing maximum of £4 million in any 12 months' period. There are considerable details as to this, but I do not think at this hour the House would wish me to go into them. The position in the deep water fleet, as the noble Lord knows well, is that these subsidies are payable for three years at a time, while the subsidies which are before the House and we are now discussing are reviewed every year. Therefore, I would return the House to the Order which is before us, and hope that your Lordships will approve it.
LORD BURTON: My Lords, before my noble friend sits down, may I ask her two questions? She has given us some interesting facts on the limits to the fishing, but I believe that one of the things that concerns the public at large is the type of fishing, and in particular the mesh of the nets used by a number of Continental countries which will come within the area. Will there be any restriction on these? Furthermore, there is concern about the amount of poaching and illegal fishing at night around our coast. I wonder whether anything further will be done to try to improve our fishery protection.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, in answer to my noble friend's first question, as to the limitation of net size and the type of fishing, this of course is subject to the international agreements on this matter to which we are a party. On the second question, about trying to contain poaching, I cannot at this moment give any indication that we are about to start on a large building programme of more fishery protection vessels. However, I

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would say that we are well aware of the necessity not only of trying to contain poaching through our own fleet, but also with the help of the Royal Navy.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

PRICE STABILITY OF IMPORTED PRODUCTS (SPECIFIED COMMODITIES) (POULTRY MEAT) ORDER 1971
7.35 p.m.
EARL FERRERS: My Lords, I beg to move that the Price Stability of Imported Products (Specified Commodities) (Poultry Meat) Order 1971, laid before your Lordships' House on July 20, be approved. The Order is made under Section 1 of the Agriculture and Horticulture Act 1964 which enables Ministers to make Orders introducing minimum import price and levy arrangements
" in the interest of maintaining in the United Kingdom a stable market for agricultural and horticultural produce of any description produced in the United Kingdom ".
As your Lordships will see from its title, this Order is about poultry meat; and I shall start by explaining why the Government are now asking your Lordships to approve it. Imports of uncooked poultry meat into the United Kingdom have been prohibited on veterinary grounds from most countries in the world since 1955. During that time the Government have tried to control fowl pest, first by a policy of slaughter and compensation, and more recently by the use of dead vaccine. Either policy would have been prejudiced if we had allowed the import of birds from countries allowing the use of live vaccine. However, the Government decided last December to allow the use of live vaccine in this country, and in announcing this decision my right honourable friend the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food announced that once live vaccine was effectively in general use the present veterinary controls on imports would no longer be required or indeed be justified. From October 1 imports will be permitted, subject to official veterinary certification, from countries which have not in the past been able to send poultry meat to this country.
However, my right honourable friend also made it clear that, before the time came to remove the present veterinary restrictions, the Government would be
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considering what measures were necessary to prevent"unduly low-priced"imports. There is no doubt about the need for such measures. In all the highly developed poultry industries of the world there are periods of over-production. When that happens, one way of bringing the market into equilibrium again is to export some of the excess stocks. But the number of export markets is very small—many countries have import restrictions of one sort or another—and so the competition for export markets is intense. When the prime object is to liquidate excess supplies, export prices may be accepted that are very low indeed. This can have very disruptive effects even on a highly efficient poultry industry like our own. The interests of producers and consumers alike require that the industry should operate in conditions of reasonable stability. These conditions cannot be maintained if the market is undermined by the threat of disruptive imports. We are therefore anxious to ensure that our industry can continue to meet—as it has in the past—the needs of virtually the whole of the home market at very reasonable prices.
With this end in view, the Government have decided to introduce minimum import price arrangements, and my right honourable friend gave details of the proposed arrangements to the House of Commons on July 19. The first step in introducing them is to specify the commodities concerned, and that is what this Order does. It specifies dead poultry—fowls, ducks, geese, turkeys and guinea fowls—as commodities for which Orders may be made prescribing minimum import price levels and charging levies to maintain those levels. The Order covers all uncooked poultry meat, whether fresh, chilled or frozen and whether in the form of whole birds or parts of birds. The further Orders prescribing the actual levels of minimum import prices and the arrangements for charging levies will be laid before Parliament in due course; but, as I said, the details of the Government's proposals were announced on July 19 so that your Lordships should be in a position to see how the Government intended to use these powers. With that explanation, I beg to move.
Moved, That the Price Stability of Imported Products (Specified Commodities) (Poultry Meat) Order 1971, be approved.—(Earl Ferrers.)
LORD HOY: I am grateful to the noble Earl for what he has said about this Order and the proposals which were announced on July 19. Indeed, when the Order came to be presented in another place on, I think, July 30, not a single word was said, because on Friday afternoons Members are all in"another place"and if you want to get an Order through, that is the time to take it. So there was no debate at all upon this Order and this is the first time it will have been discussed in either House. One sympathises with the poultry industry because of the tremendous slaughter that took place due to fowl pest disease. Indeed the Government, I think even against their will, adopted the policy of using dead vaccine to cope with the trouble, because up until then its use was not permitted in this country. As a consequence, obviously we did not allow importation from other countries where the vaccine was used. This was the sole reason for the tremendous slaughter which the industry had to bear.
May I ask one other question? It is true, of course, that one ought not to allow the whole industry to be disrupted by very cheaply produced or subsidised exports from countries other than our own, countries that may well be faced with surplus quantities and who might decide to get rid of them at cheap prices by exporting them to this country. It seems to me that we must not reach a position where this is used as a reason for allowing prices to get out of balance in this country. This is the second Order of this kind that we have had—at least we had a similar one on meat prices—and the more we restrict the industry in this way quite obviously the higher prices are going to get. At the end of the day it is the housewife who will have to pay these increased prices. The production of poultry in this country has made remarkable strides. Its contribution to the meat supply of the country is very great indeed compared with a few years ago. We are entitled to ask the Government for an assurance that, while they may be protecting our home industry, which is a first-class industry, producing very efficiently indeed, advantage will not be taken of that position to pass on further increases to the housewives of this country. Therefore, while we may have no objection to the Order on that
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score, at least we are entitled to ask for an assurance.
Indeed, I should like to put one further question to the noble Earl, because while he says that this Order is made under Section 1(2) of the principal Act, under a further section—and he will know the one to which I refer—provision is also given to the Government to cancel these levies for certain reasons. As I understand it, if this has to be done, again it must be done by Order. Subsection 3(a) says that the Government
" may by order provide for the granting…of allowances or reliefs in respect of the levy (if any) chargeable on the imported commodity."
So obviously, having taken that provision under the principal Act, it was done for some reason. I should like to know, if in fact it was found that these levies were proving impossible and were putting up prices to the consumer and the housewife, what powers the Government have to remove them, apart from another Order, because subsection 3(a) says that,"it may by Order provide ".
I wonder whether this is the quickest way to deal with this problem if it should arise. I ask this not only so that we may have an assurance about prices, but also to inquire what will happen if they reach the stage at which prices are rising and levies are not required. What speedy action can we then take to protect the housewife from the high prices she would be asked to pay? I am sure that the House will be grateful if the noble Earl can reply to these points.
EARL FERRERS: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for his welcome of this Order. At the outset he referred quite rightly to the fact that this was required because of the problems of fowl pest by which we have been beset in this country over the last few years. It is a measure of the effectiveness and indeed the efficiency of the British poultry industry, that, despite the ghastly problems of fowl pest—and they have been monumental: first of all with the slaughtering and compensation policy, whereby huge numbers of birds were slaughtered, and then by means of the dead vaccine which was not wholly effective; then by the current use of the live vaccine, which is not 100 per cent. effective either—they have

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managed to overcome these problems and still remain highly competitive. I can assure the noble Lord that the minimum import prices which it is intended to lay on the poultry industry will not result in a method of subsidising unfairly the home-produced commodity because if he knows, as I am sure he does, of the complexities of the poultry industry, he will know that in fact they have run into considerable problems in the past and that it is not an industry where vast sums of money are readily to be made, simply because there is always the ever-present danger of over-production.
LORD HOY: I think the noble Earl has misunderstood me. I was not talking about a subsidy: what I wanted was an assurance that this Order will not result in unfair price increases to the housewife. Someone has to carry the burden if levies are imposed—someone has to pay for them—and all I ask for is an assurance that this will not be used as a method for increasing prices to the housewife.
EARL FERRERS: I did not misunderstand the noble Lord, but probably I did not express myself quite accurately enough. This will not be used as a method of keeping up prices, or rather charging an unfair price to the housewife. All that it will do is to prevent very low-priced imports coming into this country which may be almost equivalent to dumping. This, as I am sure the noble Lord will appreciate, is not something which is required in order to keep any form of market stable.
On his second point about the alteration of the levies, this is done by Orders which are subject to the Negative Resolution procedure, and a new Order can be laid very quickly should it be found that any untoward effect is occurring. I think the noble Lord need have no doubt of the fact that it is the Government's intention that the minimum import prices should be such as to make the home-produced product adequately and reasonably competitive and merely to prevent the virtual dumping of unduly low-priced poultry meat.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

MEDICINES (RETAIL PHARMACISTS—EXEMPTIONS F R 0 M LICENSING REQUIREMENTS) ORDER 1971
7.50 p.m.
LORD ABERDARE LORD ABERDARE moved, That the Draft Medicines (Retail Pharmacists—Exemptions from Licensing Requirements) Order 1971, laid before the House on July 21, be approved.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Order makes certain modifications of exemptions from the licensing provisions of the Medicines Act 1968, under which, in general, persons manufacturing and dealing in medicinal products will require to hold licences. The exemptions in the Act mainly relate to small scale activities carried on by persons who prepare or supply medicinal products as part of their professional functions as medical and veterinary practitioners, nurses and pharmacists, and the Act enables orders to be made modifying or extending these exemptions. This draft Order is to be made in pursuance of this power so as to modify the provisions about retail pharmacists. During the extensive consultations with representative bodies which have taken place in the last year or so, it became evident that the provisions on this matter were unsatisfactory in certain respects. This Order embodies the results of those discussions. It restricts and clarifies the provisions in some respects and extends them in others. If any of your Lordships want a further explanation of various articles in this Order, I shall be happy to explain them, but I understand that they are entirely acceptable to the representative bodies. I therefore beg to move.
BARONESS PHILLIPS: My Lords. I wish to thank the Minister for his very clear explanation. In the event of our needing further information we shall certainly know where to seek it.
On Question, Motion agreed to.
LORD ABERDARE: I beg to move that the House do now adjourn during pleasure until 8 o'clock.
Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
House adjourned during pleasure.
8.0 p.m.
House resumed.

IMMIGRATION BILL
House again in Committee on Amendment No. 127.
LORD GARDINER: We have had an opportunity during the adjournment of considering both Amendment No. 127, which is ours, and Amendment No. 131 which will be proposed later. I appreciate that the point which we were seeking to make has been sought to be met by the Government. When we come to deal with that in detail there are one or two criticisms I will make. For the time being, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD WINDLESHAM: This Amendment, No. 128, is consequential on Amendment No. 109 on which my noble friend Lord Denham spoke earlier. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 45, line 28, after (" Kingdom ") insert (" or before the directions for his removal have been fulfilled ").—(Lord Windlesham.)
LORD GARDINER: I am sorry, but neither my noble friend Lady White nor I can understand this. I am sure that it is our fault. We understand subsection (4) as it is in the Bill:
The captain of a ship or aircraft, if so required by an immigration officer, shall prevent from disembarking in the United Kingdom any person placed on board the ship or aircraft under paragraph 11 or 15 above, and the captain may for that purpose detain him in custody on board the ship or aircraft.
If after the word"Kingdom"you insert:
" or before the directions for his removal have been fulfilled "
I do not understand where the alternative comes in:
"…shall prevent from disembarking in the United Kingdom or before the directions for his removal have been fulfilled…".
It is probably entirely our fault, but it is not so worded to be clear to us.
LORD WINDLESHAM: The Amendment was debated earlier and it may be for the convenience of the Committee if I repeat the explanation. Amendment 128, in paragraph 17 of Schedule 2, has as its purpose to ensure that where directions are given under paragraphs 8 to 14 of the Schedule after refusal of entry or illegal entry, or under paragraph
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1 of Schedule 3, which concerns deportation, for the removal of a person from the United Kingdom, the captain of the ship or aircraft may be required to prevent a person from disembarking until the directions are fulfilled; and the captain has express legal authority to detain him on board until he reaches his destination. I understand that as the Bill stands, unamended, there is the anomaly that although the removal directions will specify a destination and the person concerned has art appeal as to destination under Clause 17 although in some cases exercisable only after removal, the captain of the ship or aircraft to whom the directions are given has no clear authority to enforce them by restraining the person from attempting to disembark at some other destination.
The Amendment is being made, as my noble friend Lord Denham mentioned earlier, at the suggestion of the Chamber of Shipping and B.O.A.C., in order to ensure that a carrying company is not put at risk of legal action being taken against it in this country because it has sought to enforce directions lawfully given to it by the Immigration Service. Noble Lords will appreciate that we cannot give protection against legal proceedings brought overseas. I hope that that explanation is helpful to the Committee.
BARONESS WHITE: I am sorry, but perhaps as we are getting towards the end of the Bill we are becoming peculiarly dense. If the noble Lord would be good enough to read sub-paragraph (4) of paragraph 16 in the Schedule (the noble Lord referred to paragraph 17, but according to us it is paragraph 16) he will appreciate that while from the point of view of drafting it may not be inaccurate, it is surely inelegant. It does not seem to flow at all, with the peculiar alternative suddenly coming in the middle. My noble and learned friend and I do not wish to make heavy weather of the Amendment, but on reading it we both find it extraordinarily difficult to follow.
LORD WINDLESHAM: I will certainly arrange for this to be checked with the draftsmen. If two noble Members of the Benches opposite, after study, have found it difficult to follow, it may be that some small rearrangement of the words would make the matter clearer. If things can be expressed more clearly I am sure that it would be in all our interests.
LORD GARDINER: The word"or"ordinarily postulates an alternative; it appears to be an alternative as to the time when something can be done. It says:
" or before the directions for his removal have been fulfilled ".
But there is no alternative of time. The sub-paragraph simply provides that the captain can prevent from disembarking in the United Kingdom
" any person placed on board the ship ",
and so on. But I think the noble Earl, Lord Balfour, has an explanation.
THE EARL OF BALFOUR: I win sorry to interrupt, but I am wondering whether line 28 should in fact have been line 23. It seems to fit in there very well.
LORD WINDLESHAM: I will take note of that observation as well, and if there is a need for clarification I will come back at Report stage.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
8.10 p.m.
LORD BROCKWAY LORD BROCKWAY moved Amendment No. 128D:
Page 46, line 7, leave out (" photographing, measuring or otherwise ").
The noble Lord said: This is a new matter. It refers to paragraph 18(2) on page 46, which reads:
" Where a person is detained under paragraph 16, any immigration officer, constable or prison officer, or any other person authorised by the Secretary of State, may take all such steps as may be reasonably necessary for photographing, measuring or otherwise identifying him."
Paragraph 16(1) on the previous page reads:
" A person who may be required to submit to examination under paragraph 2 above may be detained under the authority of an immigration officer pending his examination and pending a decision to give or refuse him leave to enter."
That is to say, he has not been found guilty; he is to submit to examination pending a decision.
My concern here is that it would be undesirable to create a"rogues' gallery ". I recognise that it is not disputed that reasonable steps should be taken to identify persons, but only in the last resort should these means of photographing, et cetera, be applied. There is too much tendency to-day to use photographs to identify suspected persons and I hope that the Minister may be able
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to give us an assurance that this is not going to become a general practice. I beg to move.
LORD WIN D LESHAM: Paragraph 18(2) of the Schedule to which the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, has drawn our attention provides that where a person is detained pending a decision on his entry, or pending removal from this country, steps may be taken to photograph, measure or otherwise identify him. These steps may be taken by an immigration officer, a police officer, a prison officer or any other person authorised by the Secretary of State.
Here again, corresponding powers are given by the existing law—the Aliens Order 1953, and the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962. I understand that these powers are used, in practice, primarily for providing the passport-issuing authorities of other countries with the information they need to issue a travel document to one of their own nationals who has arrived here without documents and has been refused entry. They can also be used to identify a person for other purposes: for example, in order to determine whether or not he is identical with someone who has a criminal record in this country. In practice, any photographing is normally done by an immigration officer, a police officer or a prison officer; but there have been occasions on which it has been convenient to have it done by others, such as police civilian employees. I can assure the noble Lord that this work does not form part of the duties of any Securicor employees. The words in question,"photographing, measuring or otherwise ", to which the noble Lord has drawn attention, are taken from the existing law and, because of the requirements of the passport-issuing procedure, it is important that the scope of the power under paragraph 18(2) should be not less than that of the existing provisions.
There is no question of a"rogues' gallery"being built up here. Failing the power sought to be deleted by Amendment No. 28D there would inevitably be increased delay, involving longer detention. When a passenger arrives without a passport or travel document—and unfortunately, as the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, knows, there are such cases—if he is refused entry the Amendment would mean that he would be likely to be

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held in detention longer while arrangements were made for him to return to his own country. Without a power of this sort it is difficult to envisage how the passport-issuing authorities in the countries concerned would be able to issue a passport to one of their nationals who was not in their country but who might be held in detention at London Airport. With that explanation I hope that the noble Lord may be satisfied and feel able to withdraw his Amendment.
LORD DONALDSON OF KINGSBRIDGE: In relation to getting a passport from the original country, of course no-one will have any objection to that; but that should be covered by saying"with the person's consent ". Where it is not with the person's consent my noble friend is worried. I am not absolutely happy to think—I am open to conviction—that somebody who has not been convicted of anything should be photographed or otherwise measured. I am not sure that this is a good thing from the point of view of civil liberties. I do not wish to make a case of it but I would like to hear a little more about what other purposes this might be used for and which a person may not consent to.
LORD WINDLESHAM: The only information I have before me is what I have given. I am informed that the powers are used primarily for providing the passport-issuing authorities of other countries with information. There was a second point I mentioned, that the provision could be used to identify a person for other purposes, for example in order to determine whether he was identical with someone with a criminal record. I think we must take it that the first category would be the largest. I can envisage, as no doubt the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, can, the case of a person who seeks entry to this country without a passport or entry documents. These are persons who for various reasons feel compelled to come and there has to be some way of arranging for them to be documented if they are to return.
LORD DONALDSON OF KINGSBRIDGE: That would be with their consent, would it not?
LORD WINDLESHAM: Some people have arrived in desperate conditions; they have sometimes travelled halfway
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across the world to try to gain entry into this country. They may have defaced or destroyed their passport in the process. If they have gone to those lengths they might easily feel they were not willing to consent to any measure which might lead to their being returned to their own country. I am afraid that in some cases it would be without the consent of the individual.
LORD BROCKWAY: Paragraph 16 concerns people who have not been found guilty. They are only under examination. Of course I accept the Minister's statement, and I would like to believe that the primary purpose is to supply passport photographs. If that is so, the phrase"with consent"would meet that situation. But one is concerned that people who have not yet been found guilty should have to pass through this identification procedure which, to put it mildly, must be humiliating to them. However, in view of the fact that the Minister says that the majority are desired for passport photographs, and hoping that he may consider the proposal to adopt the words"with their consent ", I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD DENHAM LORD DENHAM moved Amendment No. 129:
Page 47, line 4, at end insert—
(".—(1) Subject to the provisions of this paragraph, in either of the following cases, that is to say,

(a) where directions are given in respect of an illegal entrant under paragraph 9 or 10 above; and

(b) where a person has lawfully entered the United Kingdom without leave by virtue of section 8(1) of this Act, but directions are given in respect of him under paragraph 13(2)(a) above or, in a case within paragraph 13(2)(a), under paragraph 14;

the owners or agents of the ship or aircraft in which he arrived in the United Kingdom shall be liable to pay the Secretary of State on demand any expenses incurred by the latter in respect of the custody, accommodation or maintenance of that person at any time after his arrival while he was detained or liable to be detained under paragraph 16 above.
(2) If, before the directions for a person's removal from the United Kingdom have been carried out, he is given leave to remain in the United Kingdom, no sum shall be demanded under sub-paragraph (1) above for expenses incurred in respect of that person and any sum already demanded and paid shall be refunded.

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(3) Sub-paragraph (1) above shall not have effect in relation to directions which, in consequence of an appeal under this Act, are for the time being of no effect; and the expenses to which that sub-paragraph applies include expenses in conveying the person in question to and from the place where he is detained or accommodated unless the journey is made for the purpose of attending an appeal by him under this Act.").
The noble Lord said: On behalf of my noble friend, I beg to move Amendment No. 129. This Amendment inserts in Schedule 2 an additional paragraph relating to the liability of carrying companies for detention costs. Paragraph 19 of the Schedule already provides, with certain exceptions, that where leave to enter has been refused, the cost of detaining a passenger pending removal is to be borne by the carrying company which brought him here. The corresponding provisions of the existing law—that is, the Immigration Appeals Act 1969, Section 21(1), and the Aliens Order 1969, Article 2, subsection (1)—apply not only where entry has been refused but also where directions are given for the removal of an illegal entrant or crew member without an express refusal.
These cases were overlooked when paragraph 19 of the Bill was being prepared. It is the Government's intention that the scope of the carrier's liability for detention costs should be no less and no greater than under the present law. The purpose of this Amendment is to give effect to this intention by making provision, parallel to that made by paragraph 19 for ordinary passengers, for detention costs in respect of illegal entrants and crew members overstaying shore leave. I beg to move.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD DENHAM: Amendment No. 130 is consequential on Amendment No. 103, which has already been accepted by your Lordships. I say that with slight trepidation. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 47, line 13, after (" police ") insert (" or an immigration officer ").—(Lord Denham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
8.22 p.m.
LORD WINDLESHAM LORD WINDLESHAM moved Amendment No. 131:
Page 47, line 14, at end insert—
(" 20A.—(1) A person detained under paragraph 16(1) above pending examination may,
1112
if seven days have elapsed since the date of his arrival in the United Kingdom, be released on bail by an adjudicator on his entering into a recognizance or, in Scotland, bail bond conditioned for his appearance before an immigration officer at a time and place named in the recognizance or bail bond or at such other time or place as may in the meantime be notified to him in writing by an immigration officer.
(2) The conditions of a recognizance or bail bond taken under this paragraph may include conditions appearing to the adjudicator to be likely to result in the appearance of the person bailed at the required time and place; and any recognizance shall be with or without sureties as the adjudicator may determine.
(3) In any case in which an adjudicator has power under this paragraph to release a person on bail, the adjudicator may, instead of taking the bail, fix the amount and conditions of the hail (including the amount in which any sureties are to be bound) with a view to its being taken subsequently by any such person as may be specified by the adjudicator; and on the recognizance or bail bond being so taken the person to be bailed shall be released.
20B.—(1) Where a recognizance entered into under paragraph 20A above appears to an adjudicator to be forfeited, the adjudicator may by order declare it to be forfeited and adjudge the persons bound thereby, whether as principal or sureties, or any of them, to pay the sum in which they are respectively bound or such part of it, if any, as the adjudicator thinks fit; and an order under this sub-paragraph shall specify a magistrates' court or, in Northern Ireland, court of summary jurisdiction, and—

(a) the recognizance shall be treated for the purposes of collection, enforcement and remission of the sum forfeited as having been forfeited by the court so specified; and

(b) the adjudicator shall, as soon as practicable, give particulars of the recognizance to the clerk of that court.

(2) Where a person released on bail under paragraph 20A above as it applies in Scotland fails to comply with the terms of his bail bond, an adjudicator may declare the bail to be forfeited, and any bail so forfeited shall be transmitted by the adjudicator to the sheriff court having jurisdiction in the area where the proceedings took place, and shall be treated as having been forfeited by that court.
(3) Any sum the payment of which is enforceable by a magistrates' court in England or Wales by virtue of this paragraph shall be treated for the purposes of the Justices of the Peace Act 1949 and, in particular, section 27 thereof as being due under a recognizance forfeited by such a court and as being Exchequer moneys.
(4) Any sum the payment of which is enforceable by virtue of this paragraph by a court of summary jurisdiction in Northern Ireland shall, for the purposes of section 20(5) of the Administration of Justice Act (Northern Ireland) 1954, be treated as a forfeited recognizance.
20C.—(1) An immigration officer or constable may arrest without warrant a person

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who has been released by virtue of paragraph 20A above—

(a) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that that person is likely to break the condition of his recognizance or bail bond that he will appear at the time and place required or to break any other condition of it, or has reasonable ground to suspect that that person is breaking or has broken any such other condition; or

(b) if, a recognizance with sureties having been taken, he is notified in writing by any surety of the surety's belief that that person is likely to break the first-mentioned condition, and of the surety's wish for that reason to be relieved of his obligations as a surety;

and paragraph 17(2) above shall apply for the arrest of a person under this paragraph as it applies for the arrest of a person under paragraph 17.
(2) A person arrested under this paragraph—

(a) if not required by a condition on which he was released to appear before an immigration officer within twenty-four hours after the time of his arrest, shall as soon as practicable be brought before an adjudicator or, if that is not practicable within those twenty-four hours, before a justice of the peace acting for the petty sessions area in which he is arrested or, in Scotland, the sheriff; and

(b) if required by such a condition to appear within those twenty-four hours before an immigration officer, shall be brought before that officer.

(3) An adjudicator, justice of the peace or sheriff before whom a person is brought by virtue of sub-paragraph (2)(a) above—

(a) if of the opinion that that person has broken or is likely to break any condition on which he was released, may either—

(i) direct that he be detained under the authority of the person by whom he was arrested; or

(ii) release him, on his original recognizance or on a new recognizance, with or without sureties, or, in Scotland, on his original bail or on new bail; and

(b) if not of that opinion, shall release him on his original recognizance or bail.

20D. The power to make rules of procedure conferred by section 22 of this Act shall include power to make rules with respect to applications to an adjudicator under paragraphs 20A to 20C above and matters arising out of such applications.")
The noble Lord said: This is the Government Amendment to which I referred when the noble Baroness, Lady White, moved Amendment No. 127. I explained that in the course of proceedings in—
BARONESS WHITE: My noble and learned friend moved that Amendment, not I.
LORD WINDLESHAM: I beg your Lordships' pardon—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner. I explained the concern that had been expressed in another place, and that where somebody had been held for over seven days while inquiries were still being made or pending his removal, the Government accepted in principle the arguments that there should be some arrangements on these lines; that there should be a form of appeal. The noble Lord, Lord Janner, spoke on the matter earlier. Members of another place felt that the appeal might be to the magistrates' court. As I explained before the supper recess, the Secretary of State feels that on balance the immigration appeal authorities are those who have special experience in this field. They are an independent body of people who have the confidence of immigrants and others using the appellate procedure, and we feel that it is more appropriate that the appeal should lie to the adjudicator than to the magistrates' courts. I beg to move.
LORD GARDINER: I must confess that where the physical freedom of the individual is concerned I have a preference for ordinary courts rather than for administrative machinery of this kind. On the other hand, I quite understand that it is possible to take the view that an adjudicator is an experienced kind of judge in this particular field. But I shall be grateful if the Government will reconsider the wording of some of this provision, because there is no doubt that once you embark on the field of our present immigration law you are providing a much lower standard of justice. It is provided here that the adjudicator can release on bail, on a man's entering into a recognizance in addition to his appearing before an immigration officer. Then it provides:
" Where a recognizance entered into under paragraph 20A above appears to an adjudicator to be forfeited…".
The Committee have already seen many examples of the standards which are required before either an adjudicator or an immigration officer can act. He very rarely has to decide that something has happened; it depends upon what appears to him. This is the ordinary immigration formula. It does not depend on whether the recognizance is forfeited or not, but whether it appears to the adjudicator to be forfeited.

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Then there is a pretence—well, I say pretence—in that he has to"specify a magistrates' court"and then one has to deem the order to have been made in that magistrates' court, although of course he has never been anywhere near the magistrates' court. Then he can declare the bail to be forfeited. Then it is provided that any sum the payment of which is enforceable is to be treated for the purposes of the Justices of the Peace Act 1949 as being clue under a recognizance forfeited by such a court. Then we get the usual provision again in paragraph 20C:
" An immigration officer or constable may arrest without warrant "—
there is this passion for civil servants to have powers of arresting people without warrant—
" a person who has been released "—
that is, on bail—
" (a) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that that person is likely to break the condition of his recognizance or bail bond that he will appear at the time and place required or to break any other condition of it, or has reasonable ground to suspect…"
et cetera.
The Committee has seen this afternoon that there is another refrain that runs through our immigration law. I know they are foreigners—we would not stand for it for ourselves. A police constable may in some circumstances arrest without warrant if he has reasonable cause to believe that a crime has been committed, but the standard of our immigration law is reasonable suspicion that somebody who has done nothing wrong at all is going to do something wrong in the future. It is because of the repetititon in this new Amendment of what is such a familiar and objectionable feature of our immigration law as a whole that I venture to hope that the Government—and particularly, if I may say so, the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, whom I know to be as devoted to civil liberties as I am and to have entertained in the past the same sort of view about our immigration law as I have entertained myself—will reconsider whether these extreme powers of arresting without warrant, on a mere suspicion that somebody who has done nothing wrong may be going to do something
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wrong, are justified, in which event I shall be grateful.
LORD WINDLESHAM: I must take up the noble and learned Lord on this point. He has made the allegation several times that the immigration laws are illiberal and intolerant and that Governments which come forward with proposals of this kind are insensitive to the rights of the individual. He diverged temporarily from that line of criticism earlier in the evening to pay tribute to one of his former colleagues in introducing the immigration appeals system during the previous Administration. The Immigration Appeals Act 1969, unlike the aliens legislation and some parts of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, which were based on it, is fresh. It contains a bail provision for the cases of appellants whose appeal is pending, and the criteria, as set out in Schedule 3 to the Immigration Appeals Act, were placed before Parliament and approved when the noble and learned Lord opposite was himself the Lord Chancellor.
I did not have warning of this and therefore I have been unable to make extensive researches, but as the noble and learned Lord was giving examples I checked through the 1969 Act and found that most of the points he raised are in it. Forfeiture of recognisances, for example, we find in Schedule 3, paragraph 8(1) of the 1969 Act, which says:
" Where a recognisance entered into under this Schedule conditioned for the appearance of an appellant before an adjudicator or the Tribunal appears to the adjudicator or the Tribunal, as the case may be, to be forfeited,…".
This is the same provision. Then we find in paragraph 9(1):
" An immigration officer or constable may arrest without warrant a person who has been released by virtue of this Schedule ".
I daresay the other points raised by the noble and learned Lord are either contained verbatim in his own Act or are closely modelled on it.
Of course we are all concerned to see that proper expression is given in Acts of Parliament to the rights of individuals, but at the same time we have to ensure that the immigration service, the police, the immigration appeal authorities, all have sufficient latitude to carry out the tasks which have been placed upon them by Parliament. The way in which people

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carry out their duties is sometimes more important than what is contained in the Statute, and we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, and others with considerable first hand experience. They have all gone out of their way to pay tribute to the considerate and courteous way in which the Immigration Service have carried out the duties placed upon them. I do not think it would be right for anyone to challenge the noble and learned Lord on what he is saying, because that is exactly what Members of Parliament and particularly members of the Opposition should always say, but at the same time there is another side to this matter.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
8.34 p.m.
LORD BROCKWAY LORD BROCKWAY moved Amendment No. 131A:
Page 49, line 6, leave out (" not ").
The noble Lord said: This Amendment refers to paragraph 23(5) which appears in the Bill at page 49 and reads:
"…where an appeal to an adjudicator is dismissed, an appeal shall not be regarded as pending unless forthwith after the dismissal—

(a) the appellant duly gives notice of appeal against the determination of the adjudicator; "

I hope I may be allowed at the same time to speak to Amendment No. 131B, because No. 131A does not make sense unless it is read in conjunction with 131B. If these two Amendments are taken together the new wording would read:
"…where an appeal to an adjudicator is dismissed, an appeal shall be regarded as pending unless forthwith the appellant duly gives notice that he does not wish to appeal against the determination of the adjudicator."
My main purpose in moving this Amendment is to be quite sure that no person shall be removed from this country without being informed of his right to appeal, and that therefore it should be assumed that he does appeal unless he actually indicates, in the words of this Amendment, that he does not wish to do so. If this change were made there would be no doubt that all the persons concerned would be well aware of their right to appeal. I beg to move.
LORD WINDLESHAM: The effect of paragraph 23(5) of Schedule 2 is that, when an adjudicator dismisses an appeal against refusal of leave to enter or against removal directions, the appellant may be
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removed unless he gives immediate notice of appeal to the Tribunal against the adjudicator's decision or, if leave to appeal is required, he obtains leave from the adjudicator.
As the noble Lord has explained, the Amendments would convert this into a provision that the appellant may not be removed unless he gives notice that he does not wish to appeal against the adjudicator's decision. If, as I think is the case from what the noble Lord has said, his purpose is to ensure that no person is removed from this country without being informed of his rights of appeal, his mind can be put at rest. In practice when an adjudicator dismisses an appeal he always informs the appellant, either, as the case may be, that he is entitled to appeal to the Tribunal or that he may ask for leave to appeal to the Tribunal. If this is what is causing the noble Lord concern I think he can rest assured that this is a statement of the actual practice of the adjudicators.
LORD BROCKWAY: My only concern is that there are difficulties of language and of circumstances, and sometimes I think the individual, even though he is informed in that way, may not be quite clear about the consequences thereof. But in view of what the Minister has said, I ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
8.39 p.m.
LORD BROCKWAY LORD BROCKWAY moved Amendment No. 131D:
Page 50, line 6, leave out (" may include ") and insert (" shall be ").
The noble Lord said: This Amendment refers to line 6 on page 50, and proposes that the words"may include"be left out and that the words"shall be"be inserted. This issue has been much discussed; namely the conditions under which bail is given. The present wording says that bail"may"include the purpose of the attendance at the relevant Tribunal. As amended the paragraph would read"shall include ", and it should be related only to this factor—that bail should be decided on no other issue than that of ability to attend the Tribunal. I beg to move.
LORD WINDLESHAM: Paragraph 24(5) of the Schedule dealing with the

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grant of bail pending an appeal to the immigration appeal authorities, provides that the conditions of a recognisance"may include"conditions appearing to the person fixing the bail to be likely to result in the appearance of the appellant at the time and place named. This Amendment seeks to insert the words"shall be"for the words"may include ", for the reasons the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, has expounded.
The purpose of the provision that the conditions of the recognisance may include conditions appearing to the adjudicator or Tribunal to be likely to result in the appearance of the appellant when required is to ensure that in a case in which there might otherwise be difficulty in granting bail this may be overcome by the adjudicator applying some such conditions as that the person shall live at a particular address or report at stated intervals to the police or the Immigration Service. It is not clear to us what the effect of the Amendment would be, but it would not appear, at first sight, to result in decisions by the adjudicator to grant bail in a greater proportion of cases than if the Bill were left unamended. There is no question of bail being used for any improper purpose, and indeed it is difficult to see how it could be.
LORD BROCKWAY: I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD BROCKWAY: The only point here is that surely a man could be released from his obligations at his own request if he feels unable to continue them and to fulfil them. Why should he be asked to provide a reason for doing this? Is it not enough for him to say he is unable to do it? I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 51, line 45, leave out from beginning to (" or ") in line 47.—(Lord Brockway.)
LORD WINDLESHAM: Perhaps this is a good opportunity to say a word or two about the subject of bail in the immigration law. It is a matter that has been discussed in a number of recent Amendments, and it may be helpful if I give a brief explanation.
Paragraph 28(1) makes provision for arrest of appellants who have been released on bail. It provides that an immigration officer or a constable may
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arrest without warrant a person who has been released on bail if he has reasonable grounds for believing that that person is likely to break the condition of his recognisance that he will appear at the time and place required, or to break any other condition of it, or has reasonable ground to suspect that that person is breaking or has broken any other condition; or, if, a recognisance with sureties having been taken, he is notified in writing by any surety of the surety's belief that the person on bail is likely to break the condition requiring his appearance and of the surety's wish for that reason to be relieved of his obligations.
The provision for the grant of bail in certain immigration appeal cases was introduced under the Immigration Appeals Act 1969, to which I referred in an earlier reply to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner; but at present it applies only to deportation cases. The provisions in the Bill follow closely those in the Act of 1969, which have been re-enacted largely in their existing form, there having been little experience on which any Amendment might be based. I understand that the provisions in the Act of 1969 were themselves based on the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 relating to bail in ordinary criminal proceedings. In the circumstances, the Government do not at present see grounds for amending the procedure which commended itself to Parliament in 1969. The occasions on which the immigration officer would wish to arrest a person believed to be likely to break a condition of his recognisance would no doubt be very rare, but they cannot be ruled out altogether. In such a case a constable might not be available. For the constable himself not to have power to arrest without warrant would mean that in practice no effective steps could be taken when the constable first had reasonable grounds for believing that the person was likely to abscond. It would be wrong to allow a surety to renounce his obligations, thus putting the person on bail in danger of immediate arrest, on any ground except that the belief was that the person did not intend to surrender to his bail.
Therefore, in brief, these provisions in this part of the Bill, and those which have been inserted also by the Government Amendment No. 131, which are

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largely similar, are based on the Act of 1969, but are an extension. I think this should be welcome to noble Lords in this Committee. The Act at the moment applies only to deportation cases. This Bill applies to cases where somebody is held pending inquiries or is being detained for some other purpose of the immigration control not connected with deportation.
LORD GARDINER: The noble Lord is, of course, quite right in saying that the 1968 Act, and indeed the 1969 Act, contain a good deal of the old immigration jargon of which I have been for so long ashamed; that is quite right. The 1969 Act was a breakthrough, because at least for the first time it provided a right of appeal. This was absolutely basic to all subsequent reforms. In the ordinary course, if a person skips his bail, there is no difficulty in the police getting a warrant and going to arrest him. I am not quite clear why in the case of immigration these arrests have to take place without warrant. This occurs all the way through; I am not sure that there is any place where the arrest is with warrant. It is always the immigration officer or a constable; it is always without warrant. It is always not something you do, but something he thinks you are going to do or that maybe he reasonably suspects you are going to do. In relation to the question of registration with the police, as I understood it, one of the arguments for registration with the police was that if the person disappears it is the policeman who will have to find him and arrest him.
I cannot make out why in a case like this the immigration officer has to arrest anybody at all. There are grave civil liberties objections to anybody except the police arresting people. The first of all civil liberties is that of physical freedom as against detention. I do not know why one always has to have an immigration officer as well as a constable and arrest always has to be without warrant. If I may say so respectfully, this is not at all a Party political point; most of the division on this Bill has not been on Party lines, but between those who believe rather more in civil liberties and those who feel less concerned about that matter. It would be of great help if the Government would go through the Bill, particularly Schedule 2, which I
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think has always been the worst part, to see whether this old immigration lore, such as the immigration officer always being treated as a policeman and having powers of arrest without warrant and arresting the person because if he does not the person might do something, could not really be overhauled.
LORD WINDLESHAM: The noble Lord asked why an immigration officer should have powers of arrest. Just consider a case at an airport, where in the course of examining a passenger it is decided that he is not entitled to enter the United Kingdom. He is held for further inquiries; the case has to be referred to a chief immigration officer; the man absconds. If the immigration officer had no power to apprehend him, he would have to call in a police officer. If the police officer could not stop the man without a warrant, the police officer would then have to apply to a magistrate for a warrant. In the meantime the passenger would presumably be able to go on his way unhindered. The immigration officer would have said,"I do not think you are entitled under the current laws of Great Britain to enter the United Kingdom ", but he would say,"You try to stop me!". He would he through the airport, in a taxi and have disappeared before any of this process had been set under way. The policeman would still be looking up the address of the nearest magistrates' court to try to get a warrant. Therefore, some powers are needed.
As the noble and learned Lord will know, the Criminal Justice Act 1967 contains in Section 23 and following sections provisions about bail in criminal proceedings, which correspond very closely to those in the Bill about bail in this proceeding. These include provision for arrest without warrant by a police officer on reasonable suspicion of breach of recognisance, or reasonable cause to believe that future breach is likely. I do not think that this is a question of one law for foreigners and another for ourselves. The system is really very close in both cases.
LORD BROCKWAY: After the days the Minister has had on this Bill, I hope he will have a period when he will be able to forget it. Following that, I hope that he will give his mind—because I

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know how conscientiously he approaches these things—to the whole question of these doubtful restrictions in Schedule 2. They really cause disquiet in those of us who believe in civil liberties. In the hope that he may be able to do that, I will withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Schedule 2, as amended, agreed to.
Schedule 3 [Supplementary provisions as to deportation]:
8.52 p.m.
LORD BROCKWAY LORD BROCKWAY moved Amendment No. 131K:
Page 52, line 37, leave out (" either ").
The noble Lord said: I am moving this Amendment with some hope that the Minister may be able to accept it. This paragraph in the Schedule gives the Secretary of State power to direct that anyone who is deported shall be sent to a particular country. It gives two alternatives: either,
" (a) a country of which he is a national or citizen; or
(b) a country or territory to which there is reason to believe that he will be admitted."
The purpose of this Amendment and the next one is to delete the words"either"and"or ", and not make these alternatives but to make the country of which he is a national also a country where there is reason to believe that he will be admitted, and that the latter condition should apply to the country of which he is a national.
The reasoning behind the Amendment stems from the recent terrible experience of British Asians who have just been shuttled backwards and forwards; leaving Uganda and Kenya and trying to come into this country illegally, being refused entry, and being sent back to Uganda and Kenya; being again refused admission there, and again sent back here—countinuous journeys to and fro. No Member of this House wants that kind of system to continue. The purpose of this Amendment is to ensure not only that the country to which the deported person goes is that of which he is a national citizen, but that the Secretary of State shall come to the conclusion that it
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is also a country to which he will be admitted. I beg to move.
LORD WINDLESHAM: Paragraph 1(1) of Schedule 3 dealing with the removal of persons liable to deportation, provides that the Secretary of State may give directions for the removal of a person, against whom a deportation order is in force, to a country or territory specified in the directions, being either a country of which he is a national or citizen or a country or territory to which there is reason to believe that he will be admitted. This Amendment seeks to provide that the removal directions must be given for removal to a country of which the person is a national or citizen being a country to which there is reason to believe that he will be admitted.
United Kingdom passport holders were in the mind of the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, as he spoke. They are not, in fact, deported at all from this country. I know it may seem a somewhat fine distinction to him, but I do not think that these Amendments would have any impact on the people he is trying to help, because they are not deported under the equivalent provisions of the present law. What happens is that they are removed under provisions which are the equivalent of paragraph 8 of Schedule 2. They are never admitted to the country at all. They are not admitted here and then deported again; they are not admitted at all.
The only consolation I can offer to the noble Lord and I think he will probably know this from his own resources—is that since my right honourable friend's decision to double the quota of special vouchers, and to provide a once-and-for all allocation for the most extreme cases, the numbers of those seeking to enter without proper entry documents, and who therefore are sent back, have been very greatly reduced. This is an indication, at any rate, that the rate at which people are leaving East Africa is now getting closer to the rate at which they, are properly admitted to this country with vouchers for work and settlement.
Another point is that people are not deported to a particular country. They are deported from the United Kingdom and removed to a country, normally being the country of which they are a national. But in some circumstances removal to

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some other country may be more appropriate—for example, a person may have lived for years outside his own country and may have facilities to re-enter the country of his last residence. In those circumstances, and certainly where the person concerned wishes to return to his country of last residence, return will be arranged to that country. But the effect of the Amendment would appear to be that return would have to be to the country of nationality. This would not be in the interests of those for whom the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, is concerned.
He can be assured that the Home Office is not concerned to remove people being deported to any particular country, and that such people are always given the opportunity to state the country of their choice; and if they are admissible to that country the Home Office will raise no difficulty about their going to it, provided that no extra charge on public funds is involved. It is further relevant that a person being deported has a right of appeal as to the country of destination, a right of appeal that is continued under Clause 17(1) of the Bill.
LORD DONALDSON OF KINGSBRIDGE: I do not think there is any real difference between the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, and my noble friend. But it seemed to me that what my noble friend was trying to effect in his Amendment was that somebody should not be deported to a country which would not admit him. This is a situation which could arise and which the Bill ought to meet, but I do not think either paragraph 1 or the Amendment meets it. I do not know whether the noble Lord agrees with me that that is probably the intention of the paragraph, but I do not think it is what comes out.
LORD WINDLESHAM: We are in deep territory here, and I should not want to be specific without checking further. But I am assured that the Amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, will not do what he wants. I say that for two reasons. First of all, it would not affect United Kingdom passport holders at all, because they are not deported anyway; and, secondly, it would narrow the range of destinations to which a man could go, because he would have to fulfil both paragraphs (a) and (b). Therefore, if he
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was not a national or a citizen of the country to which he wished to go and which was willing to receive him, he still could not go to it. At the moment, that option is open to him and it seems better to preserve that flexibility.
LORD BROCKWAY: It seems to me that under the original terms of the Bill the choice of going to a country which will admit him is also excluded. I listened with very great care to the Minister and I supported what he said in his concluding remarks, that a person could go to the country of his choice if it was willing to admit him. I have had many cases where I have succeeded in getting that right. But that does not even seem to be in the terms of the Bill itself, so will the Minister look at this point again before the Report stage?
LORD WINDLESHAM: I shall certainly look at it to see whether I have misled the Committee in any way, but I do not think I have. It would fall within paragraph 1(1)(b) of Schedule 3, would it not, if the person said that he wanted to go to a particular country or territory which was willing to admit him? He could be deported to that territory under paragraph 1(1)(b).
LORD BROCKWAY: I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Schedule 3 agreed to.
Schedule 4 [Integration with United Kingdom law of immigration law of Islands]:
LORD BROCKWAY LORD BROCKWAY moved Amendment No. 131M:
Page 54, line 42, leave out paragraph 2.
The noble Lord said: I am moving this Amendment largely in order to get some clarification. The first part of paragraph 2 suggests that a person who has decided to go abroad—perhaps on holiday or on business—does not automatically have the right to return, and that the process of obtaining Leave to enter this country will have to be repeated. That is rather qualified by the last three lines of the paragraph and I shall be glad to hear from the Minister exactly what they mean. I beg to move.
LORD DENHAM: This Amendment applies to a man who, on leaving the United Kingdom, as is visualised under Clause 3(4) which we have already discussed, is able to re-enter without seeking new leave—in other words, he can go off to Paris for the weekend because he is one of the exceptions under Clause 8. Under paragraph 2 of this Schedule, if instead of coming straight back to the United Kingdom he goes to one of the Islands where he needs permission, his previous permission to come back to the United Kingdom is cancelled. The reason for this is that if he needs to get leave under paragraph 1 to go to the Islands and gets it, that leave will extend to the United Kingdom. He will not need his former leave and it will be cancelled so as to make matters easier and avoid confusion. If, on the other hand, an Island refused him leave to enter, then it is thought by Her Majesty's Government that there would probably be good reason when he came back to the United Kingdom to see whether his leave should be granted again here. I hope that that has explained the position to the noble Lord.
LORD BROCKWAY: Yes, I think so. Will the noble Lord tell me whether a refusal to go to the Island is a refusal by the Island, or a refusal by us to allow him to go there?
LORD DENHAM: The Island will be refusing him leave to enter, although he already has leave to enter the United Kingdom. We have no jurisdiction over whether or not the Island accepts him, but if the Island accepts him then his leave to the Island will extend to the United Kingdom.
LORD BROCKWAY: I am not quite satisfied, but I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Schedule 4 agreed to.
Schedule 5 agreed to.
Schedule 6 [Repeals]:
9.6 p.m.
LORD GARDINER LORD GARDINER moved Amendment No. 132:
Page 58, column 3, leave out lines 6 to 9 and insert (" The whole Act ").
The noble and learned Lord said: In moving this Amendment may I also speak to Amendment No. 133? I am sorry to have to take up time at this hour of the night with what are probing Amendments. May I assure the Government that I do not expect any answer at all to-night. I said a word about this matter on Second Reading, which I think was misunderstood. There are two different questions here. There is the question whether, in a particular field of law, the whole of that law needs an overhaul in the sense of substantial alteration; and there is the question whether, in a particular field of law, the law is all right but is all over the place and needs consolidating and putting together in one place. In relation to our law of citizenship and our law of immigration, which are quite different, there is a division of opinion between the Government and the Opposition. As the Committee knows, our view is that an Immigration Bill is quite unnecessary. The numbers are down and there is now no problem there at all; race relations are never better and we do not need an overhaul of our immigration law. But what we do need—and we said in our Election programme that we were going to prepare this—is a new citizenship law, because I imagine that we must be the only country which has no clear statement as to who our own citizens are. In recent years both America and Canada have overhauled their citizenship law. But this is a difference of opinion between the Parties, and I am not going to say any more about it.
On the other point, which is quite a different one, as to whether we ought not, in either or both of these two fields, to put all our law together in one place, I am not in the least surprised, of course, that the Government have left our various British Nationality Acts exactly as they are, because they say, quite rightly,"This is not a citizenship Bill at all; this is an Immigration Bill ", and I accept that that is so. But, being an Immigration Bill, I am a little puzzled at the statutory course which they have taken. They have repealed the whole of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968, and that is quite right because here is an entirely new immigration code. They have repealed the whole of the Immigration Appeals Act 1969, and that is also quite right because it is in here. But when it comes to the 1962 Act, they have

1129
repealed the whole of it except for two subsections of two sections. One of them is Section 20(1) and (3), and so I looked to see what those subsections did in the 1962 Act. What they did was to omit two words with regard to deportation from Section 18(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1950. That rather puzzled me, because the Matrimonial Causes Act 1950 was repealed by the Matrimonial Causes Act 1965. I am not quite sure where we are getting to.
The position with the old Aliens Restriction Acts is even more curious, because they have repealed altogether the Aliens Restriction Act 1914 but have left three or four little bits of the amending Act, which was the Aliens Restriction (Amendment) Act 1919. They have left bits which puzzle me very much. I am not clear, therefore, why, in the field of immigration as such, all these provisions have not been repealed and put into this new code. As I have said, I am not expecting any answer to-night. These two Amendments are intended to be probing Amendments, and if necessary we can proceed with them when we come to the Report stage of the Bill. I beg to move.
9.10 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: As I have been awaiting this, my great moment, for some hours, I shall not take advantage of the generous leave which the noble and learned Lord has given me not to reply to his interesting comments. I shall not reply to the Second Reading points at any length. I should dearly have liked to have a citizenship law, but for reasons I explained in a lecture to the Race Relations Institute some little time ago I think it is not a feasible proposition, since we made the cardinal error of not having one in 1948 when it was still, I think, a relatively easy thing to unravel the knots which we had begun to tie. But our idealism about the Commonwealth then, although it was genuine at the time, is quite different from what our idealism about the Commonwealth is now, or what the facts have turned out to be, and I very much question whether we can unravel the knots at the present time. I do not want to go into the details, because they are highly technical, but I should dearly have liked to achieve that result, if not in this Bill at least in another one.
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In the meantime, I think the noble and learned Lord was a little less than generous in not acknowledging that it really is intolerable that the whole of the control into this country of the entry of aliens should depend upon the old Defence of the Realm Act 1914. That was passed in a single night when we were expecting a war with Germany which took place but which has now finished for the greater part of a human lifetime. That Act has never been repealed but, with small amendments, has remained in the Expiring Laws (Continuance) Schedule enacted by Parliament year by year. Whatever the merits or demerits of the Bill, the noble and learned Lord really ought to recognise that that position is at least theoretically intolerable even if in practice it leads to rather less injustice than you would expect.
To revert now to the noble and learned Lord's particular points, the Bill as it stands repeals the provisions of the 1919 Act which were concerned with immigration control. That is because it is an Immigration Bill. The sections concerned are Section 1. Section 2(1), Section 13(3) and Section 14(1). Sections 2(2), 7, 14(2), 15 and 16(2) are being repealed in this Session's Statute Law (Repeals) Bill (Part V of the Schedule). That leaves me with Sections 9 to 12 and certain others to which I will come. Sections 9 to 12 related only to former enemy aliens and these were repealed between the Wars. The remaining sections containing substantive provisions deal with the following matters—I have taken these matters from the side notes. Section 3 deals with incitement to sedition; Section 4 with pilotage certificates; Section 5 with employment of aliens in ships of the mercantile marine; Section 6 with the appointment of aliens to the Civil Service; Section 7 with restriction of change of name by aliens; Section 8 with provisions as to aliens on juries. Of these Section 5 is repealed by tile Merchant Shipping Act 1970 although it has not yet been brought into force. Section 7 is being repealed in this Session's Statute Law (Repeals) Bill. The other restrictions on aliens contained in Sections 3 to 8 are not part of the law of immigration control and I am advised that provisions for repealing or amending any of these would be outside the

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proper scope of an Immigration Bill. The need for continuance of these restrictions has been re-examined and will continue to be re-examined from time to time as the appropriate field of law comes under review; an example being jury service, to which Section 8 of the Act of 1919 refers.
Under E.E.C. regulations, the phrase"our own nationals"may be favoured so far as public employment is concerned (that is to say, employment in the Civil Service), in that the free movement of labour provisions do not apply to posts in the public service. But in introducing this Bill it was no part of the Government's intention to make any change in the relative position of British subjects and aliens under the general law of this country, and it was not therefore appropriate to carry out a general review of the position of aliens in fields of law, other than immigration control, before the Bill was introduced.
As the noble and learned Lord pointed out, the Bill as it stands repeals the whole of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962, to which I now come, except for a few provisions which amend other legislation that is not affected by the Bill. Section 12(2) of the Act of 1962 is repealed only in part; in so far as this provision deals with the qualifying period for naturalisation of British protected persons it is not superseded or otherwise affected by anything in the Bill, and so it would not have been appropriate to repeal it and re-enact it in this Bill. Section 12(4), I gather, is still needed as an ancillary provision to Section 12(2). The noble and learned Lord referred to Section 20(1). This amends the Matrimonial Causes Act 1950 and the Matrimonial Causes Act (Northern Ireland) 1939. These enactments, I am advised, are still in force for certain purposes and consequently any provision amending them has to be preserved. Section 20(3) is still needed as an ancillary provision to Section 20(1). It is thought, therefore, that it is not possible—or, if it is possible, not desirable—to sweep away the whole of the 1962 Act. But, as I have said in earlier portions of this fascinating discourse, the relative portions of the Act will be re-examined from time to time when we examine the field of law to
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which they apply. In the meantime this is an Immigration Bill.
LORD O'HAGAN: As the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor is in a forthcoming mood, may I ask whether he can help me on a question of citizenship? I am sure that he will tell me if I have it wrong. Shall we not have to evolve a de facto citizenship law when we come into the Common Market, defining those who are and those who are not our nationals for the European Economic Community? As I understand it, we shall have to tell them which of these various types of British citizen we say do belong and which do not. They may say to us,"You cannot have all these patrials. There are far too many of them to come into Europe. We must keep them out. And we do not like the idea of these Kenya Asians ". Whatever happens we shall have to produce something that satisfies them, and it must not be a makeshift form of citizenship law.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I do not really know the phrase "de facto" law; I know only the type of law we call de jute law. It is true that we already have a jungle of regulations which people might mistake for a citizenship law if they did not think deeply enough about it. This was what my lecture to the Race Relations Institute was about, up to a point. We never have had citizenship as a legal concept in this country. It started with the idea of mediaeval allegiance and this is the basis on which the whole thing is founded, in rather a complicated kind of way. The matter first came to a head at the Union of the Crowns between England and Scotland. The question then arose as to the status of Scotsmen in England. An interesting case was heard in the Court of King's Bench in 1607, about a class of people called post-nati, a case which goes through about 50 pages of Coke's Reports, in which all the arguments are set out at length, beginning at the Book of Genesis. It was eventually decided that Scotsmen were not aliens even if they were post-nati. Of course, this might have been very beneficial, but from the point of view of the clarity of our jurisprudence it might not have been quite so good as it sounds. Your Lordships will remember that the King at that time was a Scotsman.

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I have always thought that the moment at which we went wrong in modern times was in 1948, when we enfranchised India and Pakistan. I think that we should have said, rather crudely and logically, that however many benefits we conferred on the citizens of countries which were enfrancised, we should start with the proposition, which I have always been brought up to believe but which was not universally approved, that the human race could be divided into two classes—British subjects and aliens. Instead of that, we said that persons in Schedule 1 of the 1948 Act should be citizens of the Commonwealth, thereby for the first time introducing the concept of citizenship, and in order to make things abundantly clear we said in the same section of the Act that, being citizens of the Commonwealth, they should have the same rights as British subjects, which did not, I think, clarify the issue at all.
Then we had the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962. Under this Act, as subsequently interpreted by the courts, the human race was divided into several categories. There were the aliens, assuming they were not sub-divided into friendly and enemy aliens. There were the Commonwealth citizens and the United Kingdom and Colonies citizens. Unfortunately, again no opportunity was taken to clarify the legal issue, and all the United Kingdom and Commonwealth citizens are again sub-divided. I am speaking of the situation before 1968, when the right of entry was unrestricted. Anyone from Gibraltar, which was still a Colony, became subject to immigrant control as a Commonwealth immigrant. This means that there was a further subdivision of the human race. It become even more complicated with the legal decisions. Suppose one started in Gibraltar and went to the Seychelles Islands (I hope I am getting this right), if you got your passport from the United Kingdom High Commissioner you were all right and could come in; but if you got it from the Governor of Gibraltar without going to the Seychelles Islands you could not.
BARONESS WHITE: With respect to the noble and learned Lord, the Seychelles are still a Colony. There is no High Commissioner there.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I may be wrong. I think Mauritius is what I
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have been thinking of. I am grateful to the noble Baroness. If you got it through a Governor it did not work; but if you got it from a High Commissioner, it did, even though you came from a colony. This led to intense confusion about the 1968 Act, which was passed in an emergency without clarifying the law. When we have gone into the Common Market, of course, there will be a further sub-division of humanity, because the aliens will begin to proliferate; hitherto it has only been British subjects who have proliferated. If the noble and learned Lord can really suggest that you can simplify that at all easily, I think he is making a mistake. I do not think our entry into the Common Market will do more than add another sub-division to the human race.
LORD GARDINER: Returning, if I may, to the mysteries of Schedule 6, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor for all the homework that he has evidently done on this point. The situation under that Schedule is now crystal clear to the whole Committee, and I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Schedule 6 agreed to.
In the Title:
9.27 p.m.
VISCOUNT ST. DAVIDS VISCOUNT ST. DAVIDS moved Amendment No. 134:
Line 3, after (" law ") insert (" to restrict the immigration of coloured persons into the United Kingdom ").
The noble Viscount said: It has long been our custom in Parliament that the Long Title of a Bill should contain the purposes of the Bill. It seems clear to many noble Lords on both sides of the Committee that one of the effects of this Bill is to restrict, or possibly control, the immigration of coloured persons into the United Kingdom. It is for that reason that I am suggesting that these words be added to the Long Title. There appear to be four possible lines of opinion on this. There are those, largely on this side of the Committee, who are opposed to the Bill having this effect. Nevertheless, if the Bill has this effect—and we believe that it does—and also has this intention, we hold that this should be

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added to the Long Title simply as a matter of common sense.
There is a second possible opinion, mainly held, I believe, on the other side of the Committee, but also by certain noble Lords on these Benches. They believe that the Bill should restrict the immigration of coloured persons into this country. I am not saying that they hold this view for any bad reason; it may be for the honourable reason that they believe that better race relations will result if this is done. If they believe that this is a right thing to do, then they should be happy to say so in tile Long Title of the Bill.
It seems to me, in logic, that there are possibly two other opinions on this. One is that the Bill does not do these things, and is not meant to do them. I suppose that is a point of view that may be held in logic, but I do not think that if any noble Lord gets up and suggests that the Bill does not do these things he will be believed by many people. Most people in this country believe that this is one of the major purposes of the Bill, and indeed it has been extensively canvassed in the country on this basis.
There is also a possible fourth opinion, which I do not think much of myself but which nevertheless may exist; that is, that the Bill does these things but that we should not say so. This slightly takes my breath away, because any attempt to hold that opinion is an attempt to perpetrate just about the worst kept secret in history. I do not believe it is really possible for anyone to hold that the Bill does these things but that we should somehow make a secret of it. Who on earth will not have heard of the purposes of this Bill and who on earth will not believe that this is not one of the purposes of it? For that reason, I believe that this point of view is completely out of court. Now I come to think of it, that is possibly the limit of the possible arguments on this point. I shall be intensely interested to hear what the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, intends to say on this matter. I will say nothing more. I beg to move
LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY: I hope that the noble Viscount and his noble friend will not pursue this line of argument any further. They must know
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that they have great sympathy from us on these Benches, but I suggest that this particular Amendment, and even this debate, if persisted in, can do nothing but harm. This is a discriminatory law. I think it is a bad law and I dislike it intensely; but one thing that it does not do is to restrict immigration. It has been totally accepted on all sides of the House at every stage that in fact immigration is already restricted without this Bill and this Bill has no significant effect upon it. It is true, as the noble Viscount pointed out, that the Government have got a great deal of kudos from a large number of ill-disposed people who believe that it does exactly that. I do not think that we should reinforce this by changing the Title of the Bill to make them believe it more strongly. To start with, I am not in favour of this Government getting any undeserved kudos from any quarters, no matter how ill-disposed, nor am I in favour of these ill-disposed people thinking that the Government necessarily agree with them and back them up. Therefore although I sympathise intensely with the aim behind the Amendment of the noble Viscount, I sincerely hope that he will not press it any further.
LORD CONESFORD: Arthur James Balfour once described a deplorable scene in the House of Commons which he had witnessed by saying that they had reached the very dregs of debate. He evidently foresaw Lord St. David's speech.
LORD O'HAGAN: I should like to be a little more polite and to associate myself with the words used by the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley. Whatever people outside this Chamber and in another place may think, this Amendment is by implication an attack on the integrity of the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, and his right honourable friend Mr. Maudling. Although I believe this Bill is unnecessary and undesirable and I share many of the apprehensions of the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, and the noble Viscount, Lord St. Davids, I do not think this Amendment would improve things very much.
LORD BROCKWAY: During the Committee stage of the Bill I have tried to be co-operative but I did not want to hide the fact that I regard this as a bad Bill in itself and one which will have a very bad effect on community relations

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in this country. As I see it, the Amendment which has been moved by the noble Viscount, Lord St. Davids, is a plea for honesty. Ever since we had our first Immigration Bill in 1962 I think we have all been hypocritical in this matter. These Bills have not been introduced to deal with the problem of immigration. Except for two years, in every year since the war more people have left this country than have come in. The problem, therefore, is not one of immigration.
If we are all honest with ourselves we know that this is a problem of colour. Before the Act of 1962 we had the"Keep Britain White"campaign. It was that campaign and the apparent response to it which created the atmosphere in the House of Commons which led to the Act of 1962. The noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, has said that this Bill does not restrict immigration. What it does is to continue the restriction of immigration. The Bill co-ordinates the various immigration Bills which we have had and maintains the restrictions which they have imposed. It does therefore restrict coloured immigration. Take the factor which has been mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, the new division between patrials and non-patrials. Is there anyone in this Committee who believes that that will not work against the non-white populations in our Commonwealth more than against the white populations? One can become a patrial if one's father was born in this country, and can be admitted to this country. How many of the non-white citizens of the Commonwealth are able to take advantage of that clause and come to this country?
The clause in the Bill which outrages me perhaps more than any other is that which provides a condition over labour vouchers by which an immigrant can come for a year and be tied to a particular employer. I have described that as"indentured labour ", and it fulfils all the conditions of indentured labour—
LORD BARNBY: If the noble Lord will give way for a moment, I wonder whether he could give me some help in this matter. Is he speaking to the question of the Title of the Bill, or is he treating us to a general review of the effects of the Bill?
LORD BROCKWAY: I am speaking to the Title of the Bill. If what I have said is true, then the real purpose, among others, of the Bill, the real core of the Bill, is the restriction of the entry of coloured immigrants into this country. If there was not the feeling in the country on that matter which has been whipped up by Mr. Enoch Powell, we should not have had so many clauses in this Bill. I believe that to be honest we should recognise that and say that. Politicians to-day, particularly the young politicians, are suffering because we are not honest and because we hide our intentions. It is because of this that I support the Amendment which has been moved by my noble friend Lord St. Davids.
LORD SHACKLETON: I intervene only because of the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Conesford. It is certainly not the view of my colleagues on the Opposition Front Bench that we should support this Amendment, for the reasons given by the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley. It would be inappropriate to support the Amendment, although I fully acknowledge the sincerity of my noble friends in this matter. The case against this Bill was fully put by the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, at the moment when he said that we should not support this Amendment.
I must say to the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, for whom I have deep affection and the greatest respect, that if he had continued with his remarks I should have asked for the reading of Standing Order No. 30, which clearly lays down that the type of remark he made about my noble friend Lord St. Davids is not something that your Lordships do. It may be that the noble Lord wishes to withdraw the remark.
LORD CONESFORD: Such is my respect for the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition, and also because I have given further thought to the final sentence of my intervention, that I unhesitatingly withdraw the remark. May I say what I had in mind without detriment to that withdrawal? Of course it was not meant to be—and in so far as it was I withdraw it—a comment on the character of the noble Viscount, Lord St. Davids, with whom I have had, and hope to continue to have, friendly relations. It was a comment that I thought

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we had reached the very dregs of debate. Having said that, and cordially agreeing with the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition, I beg to withdraw my remarks.
LORD SHACKLETON: I am sure that the Committee appreciate that generous withdrawal. I realised, watching the noble Lord across the Floor of the House, that he was getting somewhat incensed, and at such a moment one occasionally utters words which one might have put in another way. I am sure that my noble friend Lord St. Davids will accept that as a most generous withdrawal.
I do not think I need detain the Committee much longer, and I may save the time of the Committee and of the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, if I speak on behalf of my noble friends in these, the final stages of the Committee stage. Our objection, and the objection of many noble Lords in all quarters of the Committee to this particular Bill, has been made clear. I do not think it is appropriate again to voice this objection in trying to amend the Title of the Bill. The Government know full well that there will be opportunities for amendment when we come back on Report, and we hope that we shall have seen wisdom by then. I urge upon my noble friend who has moved this Amendment, who I know feels deeply on this matter, that the question here is not one of sincerity or honesty, but of the appropriateness of this particular Amendment. Therefore, so far as the official Opposition is concerned, we are not proposing to support the Amendment if my noble friend divides the Committee. In the light of this discussion and of the arguments he has heard, and in the light of what the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, may wish to say, I hope he will decide that he has made his point with sufficient vigour.
9.45 p.m.
LORD WINDLESHAM: This is probably an appropriate time for me to intervene on this last Amendment to a long Committee stage. I do not think a very long speech is called for. I have spoken so often during the six days of Committee that I think noble Lords who have been present know what my views are. The Bill establishes a new single system of control over all immigration
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from overseas and does so by creating a right of abode. It is a law reform measure; it brings together 50 years' worth of legislation, much of it quickly put on the Statute Book in response to events. All those who have this right of abode are described by the word"patrial"and they will be completely free to come and go and work here as they wish. We might just bear in mind that Clause 2, the patrial clause, is an exempting clause. It is a clause which exempts people from immigration control and does not subject them to it. We have seen as we have gone through the Bill that the visitors, the passengers, the normal tourists, the working holidaymakers, the students—people of this sort—are hardly affected by the Bill.
LORD SHACKLETON: If I may interrupt the noble Lord, I have tried to be as helpful as I can in this matter. I beg him not to make a Third Reading speech on this particular Amendment. I realise that he has had to put up with a lot on this and he will have to put up with quite a lot more. If he is going through the whole of the Bill on an Amendment to the Long Title I think it is likely that some of my noble friends will wish to reply to him.
LORD WINDLESHAM: I regret that intervention. I hope that the noble Lord will not jump the gun on this. He has joined the Committee, if I may say so, at a very late stage. He is quite right to come in and express the views of his Party on the Bill. I was about to make two general observations. He can be sure that I was not going to make wide ranging remarks. I think that noble Lords who have heard the debate will agree that it is a general one. The noble Viscount, Lord St. Davids, intended it to be a general debate—I do not criticise him for that—arid the noble Lord, Lord O'Hagan, had a rather similar Amendment in the Short Title to the Bill which we debated in these rather general terms. We got through it in 10 or 15 minutes and without any heat being generated, and I certainly do not want to do that now.
VISCOUNT ST. DAVIDS: The noble Lord referred to me. I intended it to be a very short debate on this particular point. I did not intend it to turn into a Third Reading of the Bill. No doubt we shall have that in due time after many

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other proceedings during which we hope to further amend the Bill because I hope that this Bill will in fact be considerably further amended. I shall not take this Amendment to a Division to-night, although it would be fascinating to me to see how many noble Lords there were in the House—
LORD WINDLESHAM: I was giving way to the noble Viscount because I thought he wished to interrupt me. I am afraid I must say to the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, that I had not come to the end of my remarks. When I do, I have no doubt that the noble Viscount may wish to say whether or not he wants to divide. That is for him and his own Party. I was addressing myself to the Amendment, admittedly in rather general terms. The wording of the Amendment is to restrict the immigration of coloured persons into the United Kingdom and to insert these words into the Title of the Bill.
I was talking about the nature of Clause 2. The noble Lord, Lord Brockway, devoted most of his remarks to the patrial concept. I do not criticise him for that. I think the concept is the essence of the Bill. Here is, the difference between us, and it is one that we are entitled to debate. However, I am not, as I said at the beginning, going to make a long speech; in fact very much the contrary. I wanted to end on one particular note. I think that noble Lords who have been sitting throughout the Committee stage will share the view that we have in this country done a remarkable job over the last ten years in absorbing so remarkably quickly a large number of immigrants from different cultural and racial backgrounds, with surprisingly little tension. We can continue to do this; we can continue to provide an example of how these problems can be treated in a civilised society. But we cannot take this process of absorption for granted and we must devote our thoughts and actions and priorities in this direction. That is what the Government intend to do.
If the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, will bear with me for two minutes more on this last Amendment, we are at the end of a very long Committee stage and I should like to thank noble Lords who have taken part for their patience and tolerance. Issues of principle are involved. I know how deeply noble Lords
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opposite feel. We had the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, speaking this evening on the civil liberties aspects of the Schedule—what might appear to be in many ways very detailed points. But underneath them all, as he told us—he has told us forcibly on a number of occasions—there was his concern that officials should not have too much power over people coming into this country who may have difficulties in understanding languages and customs, and that they should have the same rights as other people have.
Our Report stage is not to take place until October. There will therefore be a very much longer interval than would normally be the case, but it gives me an opportunity to study what has been said during the Committee stage. The Government have given a number of assurances, some on major issues of principle, and we will of course want to consider them very carefully indeed. I am sorry if I have gone a little wide on this, but it is the end of our proceedings on this stage and I think it is appropriate to make some general observations of this kind.
9.52 p.m.
BARONESS WHITE: Before my noble friend Lord St. Davids has his say, I should like to reciprocate our thanks to the noble Lord for the careful and courteous way in which he has dealt with Amendments during the Committee stage. But he was making what sounded to me much more like the kind of speech one makes at a much later stage.
LORD WINDLESHAM: We have the Recess.
BARONESS WHITE: We have a Recess; indeed we have. And we hope very much that during the Recess, and refreshed by it, the noble Lord will look very carefully indeed at the many points which have been made, not by any means only from the Opposition Benches. What has been so remarkable in this Committee stage is that there have been expressions of concern and disquiet on certain aspects of this Bill from all quarters of the House. Therefore we are particularly disposed to hope that when we return in October the noble Lord will already have himself placed upon the Order Paper a number of constructive Amendments.
VISCOUNT ST. DAVIDS: I am sorry if I started rather too early under the impression that the noble Lord. Lord Windlesham, had sat down, when according to our custom he had not, but I thought it was necessary to put something on the Paper at the end of this Bill to show that a large portion of this Bill has been an effort by the Party opposite to win favour with some most disreputable political—
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Order!
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: If the noble Lord proceeds, I shall ask that the Standing Order be read.
LORD SHACKLETON: If I may interrupt at this point, may I say that Standing Order No. 30 does not apply. And if the noble Lord cannot control himself it might be a good idea to have it read, because I can see that he is getting very excited.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I am not getting excited at all. If we read it, we can see whether it applies or not. If I may say so to the noble Lord, the Leader of the Opposition, he is getting into the frame of mind in which he is beginning to dictate to people, not only the form of their speeches but the content of their speeches. This is not the first time he has attempted to do it. He has attempted to do it to my noble friend Lord Windlesham, and I am bound to tell him that he is exceeding the power even of the Leader of the House by so doing.
LORD SHACKLETON: I hoped that my interventions earlier were intended to be helpful to the Government. I will not pursue this matter any further. I am only pointing out that the noble and learned Lord has forgotten what Standing Order No. 30 contains. I think probably we had better bring this debate to an end.
VISCOUNT ST. DAVIDS: I am sorry if I have aroused too much ire on the part of the noble and learned Lord. I was in fact briefly recapitulating what the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, had said. But since obviously it excites a great deal of heat, and possibly it would be better if we had less heat, while still continuing to say that it is my belief and the belief of many noble Lords that this is one of the purposes of the Bill and
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therefore it should go into the Title, in order to try to get a slightly better state of affairs in this House I shall at present withdraw this Amendment.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: With leave.
VISCOUNT ST. DAVIDS: With leave, if I may, so that we may possibly reach a somewhat calmer atmosphere at a later stage.
THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (LORD ALPORT): Is it your Lordships' pleasure that this Amendment be withdrawn?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Object!
BARONESS WHITE: How childish!
THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES: The Question is, That this Amendment be agreed to.
On Question, Amendment negatived.
House resumed: Bill reported, with Amendments.

BRITISH TRANSPORT DOCKS BILL
CITY OF LONDON (VARIOUS POWERS) (No. 2) BILL
ISLE OF WIGHT COUNTY COUNCIL BILL
LONDON TRANSPORT (No. 2) BILL
OXFORDSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL (No. 2) BILL
TORBAY CORPORATION (No. 2) BILL
Returned from the Commons with the Amendments agreed to.

BOURNEMOUTH CORPORATION BILL [H.L.]
EXETER CORPORATION BILL [H.L.]
FLINTSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL BILL [H.L.]
MANCHESTER CORPORATION (GENERAL POWERS) BILL [H.L.]
SCUNTHORPE CORPORATION BILL [H.L.]
Returned from the Commons agreed to, with Amendments: the said Amendments considered and agreed to.

  RHODESIA TEAM AND WORLD PLOUGHING CONTEST
  RHODESIA TEAM AND WORLD PLOUGHING CONTEST
  ARMED FORCES' PAY
  ARMED FORCES' PAY