Sitting of 19 November 1969

Preamble
The House met at half-past Two o'clock
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
  SCOTLAND

    A9, Inverness—North
    Mr. Maclennanasked the Secretary of State for Scotland what progress has been made in the study which he has initiated of the A9 road north of Inverness.
    The Minister of State, Scottish Office (Dr. J. Dickson Mabon): The studies of possible lines of the A9 north of Inverness are well advanced and I hope that the analysed results will be available next spring.
    Mr. Maclennan: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that reply. Is he prepared to initiate straight away a survey in depth of the feasibility of a crossing of the Dornoch Firth in view of the growing industrial development of the Moray Firth area and the importance of shortening the route from Caithness to the South?
    Dr. Mabon: My hon. Friend, who, quite rightly, has been very persistent in this matter, will be glad to know that we have done a great deal of field work on the studies of the possible reconstruction of A9 between Inverness and Dingwall. Obviously we must consult the local authorities concerned and, just as important, the agricultural interests and others. The results will be available in the spring, and after that we will have some consultations.
    Mr. Gordon Campbell: As part of the studies, have the Government made a feasibility study of the crossing of the Kessock ferry by causeway or some other means?
    Dr. Mahon: That is involved in the same proposition. We must take the whole thing as one.

    White Paper "The Scottish Economy"
    Mr.MacArthurasked the Secretary of Slate for Scotland what plans he has to publish a revised edition of the White Paper, The Scottish Economy, Command Paper No. 2864.
    The Secretary of State for Scotland (Mr. William Ross): None, Sir.
    Mr. MacArthur: Will the right hon. Gentleman stop being so obstinate and complacent about his totally discredited pre-election employment forecast? Will he revise his figures and face the fact that there has been a net loss of 67,000 jobs in Scotland over three years?
    Mr. Ross: The hon. Gentleman should start reading the White Paper again. I am neither obstinate nor complacent. I see no need to revise a document whose objectives are so evidently being achieved. If he looks at the emigration figures, the road figures and the housing figures, he will see that we are making progress in the right direction.
    Mr. Gordon Campbell: I have the White Paper in my hand at the moment. The six-year period which it covers is due to end in just over a year. Will not the Secretary of State at least issue a progress report to show how differently events have turned out from what was forecast?
    Mr. Ross: I assure the hon. Gentleman that progress reports on housing, roads, and so on, are always made available. Meetings of the Economic Planning Council are always followed by Press conferences.

    Health Services (Reorganisation)
    Mr. MacArthurasked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will make a further statement about his proposals for the reorganisation of the health services in Scotland.
    Mr. Ross: I am not yet in a position to add to the reply I gave to the hon. Gentleman on 22nd October.—[Vol. 788, c. 269–70.]
    Mr. MacArthur: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that a further statement

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    on this important question is anxiously awaited? Does he agree that any reorganisation of the Health Service depends very much on the morale of those it employs? Would he therefore consider making an early statement about the problems confronting the nursing profession in Scotland?
    Mr. Ross: That is a separate problem. I have received a telegram from certain nurses, to which I have sent a reply. On the main point, no recommendation was made by the Wheatley Commission, which left the Government to decide on the National Health Service in its local authority aspects. It is only right that we should wait until we have received all the comments and then make up our minds. I cannot promise an early statement.

    Sugar Beet (Cupar Factory)
    Mr. Stodartasked the Secretary of State for Scotland on what grounds his Department estimated in April, 1967, that £ 150,000 would solve the problem of the sugar beet factory at Cupar in view of the fact that the loss in that year was one of £188,000 plus a transport subvention of over £30,000.
    The Joint Under-Secretary of State for Scotland (Mr. Norman Buchan):My Department made no such estimate.
    Mr. Stodart:Is not the hon. Gentleman aware that the figure of £150,000 has been extracted from his own speech in an Adjournment debate? Would he not agree that the furnishing of him with those figures was an example of the British Sugar Corporation leading him just as far up the garden path as it has been leading farmers regarding the sugar beet factory in recent months?
    Mr. Buchan:The hon. Gentleman, who clearly has been doing some research, should have done a little more. The figure and the estimate came from his hon. Friend the Member for Fife, East (Sir J. Gilmour).
    Mr. Stodart:Quite wrong.

    Local Government Reorganisation
    Mr. Gordon Campbellasked the Secretary of State for Scotland when he expects to have completed consultations
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    with local authorities in. Scotland on the Report of the Wheatley Commission.
    Mr. Monroasked the Secretary of State for Scotland what is his estimate of the earliest date upon which he expects to introduce legislation to implement local government reorganisation in Scotland.
    Mr. Ross: The Government are carrying out consultations on the Wheatley Report in two stages. First, I have asked for comments by the end of January on the Royal Commission's proposals for the broad structure of local government and the division of functions: and I expect I shall wish to discuss these issues with the Scottish local authority associations.
    Second, after we have announced next spring our decisions on the basic framework, there will be further consultations on the commission's other recommendations. Legislation will follow as soon as possible after these further consultations have been completed.
    Mr. Campbell: Is it possible for the local authorities to be able to give their considered views, particularly by January, if no proposals for finance exist? When will the local authorities be fully, informed on this aspect?
    Mr. Ross: I have already answered Questions about that and I may be answering further Questions today. Comments are required at this stage only on the broad structure and the division of functions. I think that, four months to make up their minds about it is quite adequate. If we took the hon. Member's advice on these things, we would never get local government in Scotland reorganised.
    Mr. Morro: Does "as soon as possible" mean this Session? Second, can the Secretary of State make a further statement on what he said on 14th October—that we would have a debate on this matter in the Grand Committee?
    Mr. Ross: Debates in. the Grand Committee are a matter no: for me but for my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House and for both sides of the House. I would welcome a debate and the opportunity to hear what hon. Members have to say on the subject. "As soon as possible" means what it says—as soon

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    as possible striking a balance between the urgency of the matter of implementing the report in some form or another and having full discussions.
    Mr. Russell Johnston: Is the Secretary of State aware that his assertion that four months is adequate is not a universally held view? Can he say specifically whether any local authorities have said to him that the time is too short?
    Mr. Ross: One or two authorities have said that it is too short, but they are not necessarily in the majority. There are, of course, a variety of views about this, but the hon. Member should know, as a member of the commission, that this is not something which has suddenly come about. Most of the people concerned have already given evidence to the commission on the subject; so they have had plenty of time to consider it.
    Mr. Dewarasked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether he will ask for an interim report on Scottish matters from the Constitutional Commission before the proposed publication of plans for the structure of local government in Scotland.
    Mr. Ross: No, Sir, but it is open to the commission to submit an interim report on any aspect of its work if it sees fit.
    Mr. Dewar: Will my right hon. Friend assure the House that there is no danger of options which might be open to the Constitutional Commission being once and for all pre-empted by earlier decisions on the Wheatley structure? Is he prepared to say that there will be no question of ruling out of those decisions the possibility of a Scottish tier of Government if at any time this was thought appropriate as the result of the Constitutional Commission's findings?
    Mr. Ross: I do not think that the fears expressed by my hon. Friend are justified. On the other hand, it would be wrong for the Government to ask the Constitutional Commission to determine its work in a particular way and, by implication, to put a time limit on its report.
    Mr. Russell Johnstonasked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether he proposes to set up a committee or
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    commission to examine local government finance in relation to the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Local Government in Scotland.
    Mr. Ross: No, Sir.
    Mr. Russell Johnston: Could the Secretary of State say why he has rejected the recommendation in paragraph 1038 of the report that there should be an inquiry into finance following the publication of the report? How does he intend to work out the financial results of local government reform?
    Mr. Ross: The hon. Gentleman is reading too narrowly the Commission's finding. It suggested a special inquiry. That does not necessarily mean a new commission or an outside body. I have already said that the Government are examining this matter on a broad field.
    Mr. Manuel: Would my right hon. Friend not agree that ultimately he would be wise to do as the hon. Member for Inverness (Mr. Russell Johnston) is asking? We cannot apply any proposals of the Wheatley Commission until the House decides on the matter and until we know the financial structure under which the new system would operate.
    Mr. Ross: My hon. Friend would be the first to appreciate that the financial structure must be related to the viability of the new areas. We are at present examining the alternative ways of raising money and supplying the finance required consistent with what may well be the viable structures on which we will eventually decide, although the answer will come later. We are right to have a broad inquiry on the present basis.

    Scottish Economic Planning Council
    6. Mr. Gordon Campbellasked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will now vacate the position of Chairman of the Scottish Economic Planning Council.
    Mr. Ross: No, Sir.
    Mr. Campbell: That is a not unexpected answer. If this is an advisory and not an executive body, does it make sense for the Secretary of State to continue to be in the chair and thus appear to be giving advice to himself?
    Mr. Ross: It is far better that I should be there and get the advice directly. This makes for clarity and speed in communicating the advice.

    Fishing (Hunter Committee's Report)
    7. Mr. Dalyellasked the Secretary of State for Scotland for what reasons he has not issued a Green Paper or a White Paper on the Hunter Committee on Fishing.
    Mr. Buchan: I would refer my hon. Friend to the answer given him on 12th March, 1969, to which I cannot add.—[Vol. 779, c. 293.]
    Mr. Dalyell: If four months is, as I believe it is, the correct time to progress chase the complexities of the Wheatley Report, do we have to wait four years for the complexities of the Hunter Report? If it is that bad a report, would it not be better to say so?
    Mr. Buchan: It does not necessarily follow from that that it is either good or bad. There are many complications and complex issues. A great and continuing variety of points are being made about this matter and we want to come up with the right answer.
    Mr. David Steel: Regardless of the value of the Report, is the Minister aware that there is a great impatience in areas such as the Borders, where there are fishing interests, that this matter still remains unresolved? When will the Government make a decision about this?
    Mr. Buchan: To use the words of a former member of the hon. Member's party, we must wait and see. I am, however, aware that there is a good deal of restlessness about this. The task is to make sure that we come up with the right kind of radical proposals to open up our rivers and lochs properly for the average fisherman in Scotland. That is what I want to do.
    Mr. Stodart: Does the hon. Gentleman recollect that his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State said that this matter was receiving urgent consideraton three years ago? How long will he be able to endure the urgency of the strain?
    Mr. Buchan: If I remember rightly, I capped that last time by agreeing that it was extremely urgent.
    Mr. Monroasked the Secretary of State for Scotland what representations he has received regarding the Government's continuing delay in implementing the Hunter Report; and how much longer he expects the process of consultation to take before legislation can be introduced.
    Mr. Buchan: Apart from representations from hon. Members, my right hon. Friend has received a number of inquiries and representations from angling clubs and associations and other individuals interested in freshwater fisheries; not all of these wish the report to be implemented as it stands. I do not consider that the time we are taking to get the right answers on this complex and controversial matter is excessive but I cannot forecast when it will be possible to legislate as a result of the Hunter Report.
    Mr. Monro: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that this is a classic example of "instant" and "dynamic" government? After a report published in 1965 he is not yet in a position to bring legislation before the House.
    Mr. Buchan: I must say that when I took office I made my way with difficulty through the corridors of St. Andrew's House because of the various reports and preparations littering them and left by the party opposite.

    Fish Stocks
    8. Mr. Dalyellasked. the Secretary of State for Scotland what proposals he has for the stocking and improvement of currently poor fishing waters in Scotland.
    Mr. Buchan: This is primarily a matter for owners or lessees of fishing rights, who can obtain guidance from my Department's Freshwater Fisheries Laboratory at Pitlochry.
    Mr. Dalyell: Are not considerable enabling powers at the, disposal of any Government? Can consideration be given, for instance, to the way in which the Forestry Commission could help to stock and improve poor waters?
    Mr. Buchan: The main point is that we have a good deal of research and advisory resources available at the laboratory and we make them available to a

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    large number of agriculturists and others who sometimes seek our advice in this way.
    Mr. Maclennan: Does not my hon. Friend's reply emphasise the extreme importance of coming to a decision about the Hunter Report in view of the fact that many fishing grounds, particularly in the Highlands, are not properly used or stocked?
    Mr. Buchan: Yes, Sir.

    Slum Clearance (Local Authority Debts)
    9. Mrs. Ewingasked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will seek to provide payment of a lump sum to wipe off in whole or in part the housing debts of local authorities in Scotland facing the task of clearing slums; and if he will take steps to waive interest rates for two years to enable them to tackle the national emergency of Scotland's housing.
    Dr. Dickson Mabon: No, Sir. This would be neither fair nor effective.
    Mrs. Ewing: Does not the Minister agree that his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Scotland, wearing his eighth most important hat as a member of the Cabinet, accepted a similar principle in the writing-off of £250 million of London Transport debt before the continuing obligation was handed over? Will not the right hon. Gentleman, therefore, press his right hon. Friend, wearing both his Cabinet hat and his Scottish housing hat for this much more socially pressing case, to deal with Scottish housing as a national emergency?
    Dr. Mahon: The hon. Lady must recognise that the writing-down of the debt of British Railways affects Scottish railways to some extent and that this category involves a figure of about £1,000 million. It is not the debt itself that is an impediment to new building. It is the question whether local authorities can borrow for capital expenditure and meet the loan charges and other expenditure from these sources. If the hon. Lady takes into account the review of interest rates every year and the fact that especially burdened authorities like Glasgow, for example, can look to additional subsidies—up to £75 a year—if they prove a case, she will realise that this solves the problem more equitably.
    Mr. Hugh D. Brown: Is my right hon. Friend aware that we welcome this newfound but belated interest in the housing problem of Scotland by the hon. Member for Hamilton (Mrs. Ewing)? Has he, however, any information from Opposition Front Bench spokesmen whether they subscribe to the view of the Conservative candidate in Craigton, who is suggesting that all local authority debt in Glasgow should be written off? Does that represent official Conservative policy?
    Dr. Mabon: That is not for me answer. Such an outrageous financial argument could never be addressed to the Government.

    Technical Teachers
    Mrs. Ewingasked the Secretary of State for Scotland what is the present shortage of technical teachers in Scotland, Lanarkshire and Hamilton constituency, respectively, at the most recent convenient date.
    The Joint Under-Secretary of State for Scotland (Mr. Bruce Millan): More reliable methods of estimating shortages and surpluses of teachers of particular subjects are at present being worked out. Until they are ready, I cannot give the hon. Lady accurate and detailed information.
    Mrs. Ewing: Is the hon. Gentleman aware of the concern of headmasters in my constituency and other parts of Scotland about this shortage? Will the Minister consider a special recruitment drive to court back from industry the technical teachers who were lured to go there?
    Mr. Milan: I know that there are shortages in Lanarkshire in this field, as in many other fields, but the situation varies very much from one part of Scotland to another. The hon. Lady will know that as from next year we are introducing new training arrangements for technical teachers. I very much hope that that will make the profession in this respect more attractive.

    Housing Programmes (Approvals)
    Mr. Eadieasked the Secretary of State for Scotland how many representations he has received from local authorities about delay in approval of their housing plans and tenders by his Department.
    Dr. Dickson Mahon: My right hon. Friend has had few formal representations but the new cost planning system, which is designed to reduce delay and inconvenience at the tender stage, encountered some early difficulties, which are being overcome.
    Mr. Eadie: Is my right hon. Friend aware that that reason has been voiced in some quarters as an excuse for curbing or delaying house building? Will he undertake to investigate the facts of the matter, to make sure that housing receives prior consideration rather than be treated by people as a matter of political propaganda?
    Dr. Mahon: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for bringing that up, because we are ahead of the number of approvals last year before the system was introduced. Of course, we have had excuses in both England and Scotland, but this is the reason why there has, in effect, been a cut in house building programmes in Scotland.
    Mr. Buchanan-Smithasked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will review the cost procedures in relation to house building proposals submitted to him by local authorities in order to reduce delays in housing programmes.
    Dr. Dickson Mabon: Yes, Sir. This is being done.
    Mr. Buchanan-Smith: Would the Minister confirm that earlier this year these cost procedures held up approvals, contrary to what was said by the hon. Member for Midlothian (Mr. Eadie). Would he give an absolute assurance that the procedures for cross-checking will be streamlined?
    Dr. Mabon: In the first quarter of the year there was a setback. Since then there has been a substantial readjustment by local authorities which have got used to the costing aspects of the new procedure, on which Parliament would insist in any case. We are now dealing not with unit subsidies but subsidies based on entire costs. Delays are due to bad forward planning by authorities, but they are small in number and we are trying to get over them as quickly as we can.
    Mr. Eadie: Will the hon. Member for North Angus and Mearns (Mr. Buchanan-
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    Smith) please read the appropriate issue of HANSARD? He will then see that I said nothing of the kind.

    Educational Provision, Livingston
    Mr. Eadieasked the Secretary of State for Scotland what extra financial provision was made in the current financial year to Midlothian education authority as a consequence of educational provision requiring to be provided in the new town of Livingston.
    Mr. Millan: The authority's allocation for school building allowed £215,000 for a primary school in Livingston.
    Mr. Eadie: Is my hon. Friend aware that this week, in evidence to the Scottish Select Committee, some representatives of the County Councils Association expressed their misgivings about the financial structure and financial arrangements in new towns? Would he undertake to look into those allegations and give us some factual information on them?
    Mr. Millan: Certainly I will look into this, but I think my hon. Friend is now raising a very much wider issue than was raised in his original Question. I am certainly of the view that our allocations for educational building take account of the special needs of new towns.

    Lochs and Rivers (Public Ownership)
    Mr. William Hamiltonasked the Secretary of State for Scotland what plans he has for taking into public ownership all the lochs and rivers in Scotland, so as to ensure the fullest use of all their amenities by the entire populace.
    Mr. Buchan: The Countryside (Scotland) Act, 1967, already enables various public authorities to provide recreational facilities on water, if necessary following compulsory purchase procedure.
    Mr. Hamilton: But is my hon. Friend aware—he must be—that that is a completely unsatisfactory answer? When are his Government going to take their finger out in these matters—and nationalise the lochs and the rivers of Scotland, without compensation, so that the population as a whole can enjoy amenities which are so far denied them?
    Mr. Buchan: As my hon. Friend will know—to answer the first part of his

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    question—I was aware that he would think it an unsatisfactory answer, but it would be wrong of me to comment on any final decision we may make. The task, as I have said, is to come up at the right time with the right radical answer to the problem which has been posed.
    Mr. Gordon Campbell: Is the Under-Secretary of State aware of the considerable extent to which the rivers in my constituency are already under public ownership, with access to them, and that this means simply that I have to pass to him from time to time complaints which come from local anglers and others?
    Mr. Buchan: I would not like to make a comment on that, but I would think that it would be pretty favourable to the publicly-controlled structure rather than to the privately controlled structure, like that represented, for example, by my hon. Friend the Member for Caithness and Sutherland (Mr. Maclennan). I think that any ordinary angler in Scotland could have informed the hon. Member of this if he had tried himself to investigate the position.

    Private House Building
    14. Dr. Millerasked the Secretary of State for Scotland what steps he is taking to increase the number of houses available in the private sector.
    Dr. Dickson Mabon: The option mortgage scheme, which is being improved, and the guarantee schemes are helping those of moderate means to buy houses; and we are continuing, in consultation with the private sector, to do everything we can to remove hindrances to private house building. In the 12 months to 30th September this year over 9,000 private houses were completed and over 10,000 were started: these are higher figures than have ever been achieved before.
    Dr. Miller: Does my hon. Friend not appreciate that this falls considerably below the number which the Government felt ought to be built in this sector, and that while it is not reasonable or practical to expect local authorities to build houses for everyone who requires housing, it does mean an increase of building in this sector to rehouse everybody who needs a house?
    Dr. Mabon: Yes. I agree absolutely. I think that that is perfectly fair. Certainly the representations of the industry itself are welcomed by the Government, and we have had new suggestions put to us by the National House Builders Registration Council and the Scottish Association of Registered House Builders and we are considering them very seriously.
    Mr. Bruce-Gardyne: Will the Minister of State not agree that withdrawal of the Measure which the House was discussing yesterday, designed to increase the burden on rates of the housing deficits in Scotland, would be a substantial step in assistance in the direction which his hon. Friend desires?
    Dr. Mabon: No. I do not agree. I think I made a very good speech last night—at least, so I have been told. I really do feel that the hon. Gentleman has got this the wrong way round. We ought to extend the fair rent system into the private sector even more.

    Local Authority Rented Housing
    15. Dr. Millerasked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he is satisfied with the co-operation he is receiving from local authorities in the construction of houses to rent; and if he will make a statement.
    Dr. Dickson Mabon: While the great majority of the authorities appreciate their local needs and are trying to meet them, the efforts of certain authorities are very disappointing.
    Dr. Miller: Is my hon. Friend aware that in Glasgow, for example, the local authority is so obsessed with the fear of applying a reasonable rate for the purpose of building houses for its people that it is deliberately running down, for example, the direct labour department which builds houses for rent? Will he see to it that Glasgow is not permitted to prejudice schemes which the Government have to help people in the city to get houses which they so very much require?
    Dr. Mabon: I know my hon. Friend feels very deeply about this, as does the Secretary of State for Scotland, and when I meet the Corporation of Glasgow next month, I shall do my very best to try to persuade it to agree not only to build

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    more in Glasgow but also to build more outside Glasgow.
    Mr. Edward M. Taylor: Is the Minister satisfied with the situation in which Glasgow was landed with a housing debt as a result of Socialist policies over many years, and will he at least abandon the policy of intimidation and blackmail he is using towards the city over the Erskine project, and trying to saddle it with an unreasonable financial burden?
    Dr. Mahon: On the contrary, the hon. Member has this entirely wrong. He is doing his city a great disservice. Glasgow has been given more by the new adjustment of the rate support grant formula, and the offer made by the Government in relation to Erskine, Larkhall and East Kilbride and so on is a most generous gesture by the Government, comparable to no other in the United Kingdom. He and his short-sighted Tory friends are saying "No" to that.

    Stonehaven By-Pass and A92, Stonhaven-Aberdeen
    Mr. Dewarasked the Secretary of State for Scotland when he expects to authorise work on the Stonehaven by-pass and the completion of the A92 between Stonehaven and Aberdeen as an express dual-carriageway.
    Dr. Dickson Mahon: I cannot give the Stonehaven by-pass a high priority in the programme for the 1970s. The improvement to dual carriageway standard of the A92 between Stonehaven and Aberdeen will continue to be undertaken in sections, though I cannot yet say when the work will be completed.
    Mr. Dewar: Will my hon. Friend accept that there really needs to be a very drastic improvement in the road communications between the north-east of Scotland and the central belt if the economy of the area is to prosper, and will he please give the most urgent consideration both to the speeding up of the work on the dual carriageway and to reconsidering his very disappointing decision on the by-pass, because the patience of many people in the area is very badly strained?
    Dr. Mabon: My hon. Friend is becoming too agitated about this matter. I must tell him that the communications with
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    the North-East are really quite good. The improvement we are proposing at Dunnottar Avenue will relieve congestion in the summer at the town of Stonehaven. I accept my hon. Friend's point that in the long term we should make substantial improvements. It is the question of phasing them which is very important.
    Mr. Buchanan-Smith: Does the Minister of State realise that this road serves not only Stonehaven but the whole of the north-east of Scotland, including the City of Aberdeen, and that there is a very real sense of urgency in, this area and a feeling that he is not giving it special attention but just passing the buck instead of making a decision?
    Dr. Mabon: That is most unjust, because I have written letters to many people to give a full explanation about the way we are selecting the priorities that we are in the North-East, and I may say that we have had no complaints from those to whom we are giving grants, but complaints only from those further down the queue. Stonehaven happens by chance to be one.
    Mr. Hector Hughes: Will the Minister bear in mind that the works mentioned in this Question are of the utmost importance from the industrial and tourist and every other point of view to the City of Aberdeen, and will he, therefore, take immediate steps to see that these works are constructed and dealt with?
    Dr. Mahon: The answer to the first part of the supplementary question is, yes, and to the last part, no.

    Primary Schools, Fife
    Mr. Adam Hunterasked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will make extra financial provision for the modernisation or replacement of existing primary schools in Fife
    Mr. Millan: No, Sir. Fife education authority's present allocation of investment for school building is enabling some progress to be made with the modernisation and replacement of primary schools.
    Mr. Hunter: Will my hon. Friend say what reply he has given to the Parents' Association of St. John's Catholic School in Rosyth? Is he able to give us any hope that in the near future money will

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    be made available to replace this old, out-of-date school?
    Mr. Milan: I have had no proposals from the authority for the replacement of this school, so clearly the authority does not consider it to be of sufficient priority in comparison with other projects which it is putting forward, and a reply in that sense has been sent to the Parents' Association.

    Schools (Fire Risk Inspection)
    Mr. Adam Hunterasked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will amend the regulations to ensure there is a statutory requirement to make compulsory and regular inspections for fire risk in Scottish schools.
    Mr. Millan: No, Sir. In my view, the responsibility for ensuring that schools are regularly inspected for this purpose is best left to the education authorities or other school managers, with advice from the local fire authority.
    Mr. Hunter: Is my hon. Friend aware that much is wrong with the provision for fire inspection in schools, and that the teachers' organisation in Scotland has sent representations to him—this, of course, is coincidental and not collusion? Will he do something, and does the fault lie in the cost?
    Mr. Millan: No, inspection costs virtually nothing. This is a matter which can be left to the education authorities. I am not aware that the general position in Scotland is unsatisfactory. If there are complaints about particular authorities and particular schools, I shall certainly look into them.

    Passenger Transport Authority, Glasgow
    Mr. Edward M. Taylorasked the Secretary of State for Scotland what proposals he has put to Glasgow Corporation regarding the setting up of a Passenger Transport Authority in the Glasgow area; and if he will make a statement.
    Dr. Dickson Mabon: None. I have now completed consultations with all parties concerned in this question, and my right hon. Friend is considering the outcome in the light of the Wheatley Report.
    Mr. Taylor: Does the Minister realise how satisfactory his answer is? Is he saying that he has now abandoned any plan to saddle the ratepayers of Glasgow with a loss on electric trains? Does this mean that we shall have no news of a possible public passenger transport authority until such time as we have legislation on Wheatley'?
    Dr. Mabon: To the first part of the supplementary question, the answer is, yes, and I am pleased that the hon. Gentleman is satisfied with the answer. To the second part of the supplementary question the answer is, no, and to the third part the answer is that the hon. Gentleman must await a statement on the matter.
    Mr. Rankin: Does not my hon. Friend agree that already we have more than sufficient authorities in our midst, and should not fewer authorities be created?
    Dr. Mabon: My hon. Friend, who is the first man to argue a case for the integration of public transport, will be ready and willing to examine any proposals for a P.T.A. between now and when the Wheatley Report is implemented if it is suggested by the Secretary of State. That is the point of the question, and I promise that a statement will be made soon.
    Mr. Gordon Campbell: Will the Minister guarantee that he will not try to impose a passenger transport authority against the wishes of the local authority?
    Dr. Mabon: No single local authority will have a veto over the question of a P.T.A. A P.T.A., if it is suggested at all, will be discussed with all the authorities concerned.
    Mr. Taylor: In view of the incomprehensible nature of that reply, I beg to ask leave to raise the matter on the Adjournment.

    Local Authority Fee-paying Schools
    Mr. Edward M. Taylorasked the Secretary of State for Scotland what discussions he has had with local authorities in Scotland regarding the future of local authority fee-paying schools; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Millan: It is now for those authorities which have fee-paying schools to

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    re-examine their arrangements following the passage of the Education (Scotland) Act, 1969, which will end fee-paying in education authority schools as from 1st August, 1970. In any case where difficulty arises, I shall be in touch with the authority concerned.
    Mr. Taylor: Will the Minister have an open mind in any discussions which take place? Does he realise that many hundreds of parents are concerned about the future of their children and their schools? Has he an open mind on the possible survival of selective schools without fees?
    Mr. Millan: No, I do not have an open mind on this, as I made clear during the passage of the Bill.
    Mr. MacArthur: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that we oppose his policy of compulsion and will restore to local authorities the right to continue with these schools if they wish to do so?
    Mr. Milan: I think that is a very hypothetical promise which is unlikely to be discharged.
    Mr. Manuel: Is my hon. Friend aware that many thousands of parents in Scotland have new hopes for the future education of their children and will support the line which he is taking?
    Mr. Millan: I am very much aware of that.

    Secondary Education Reorganisation
    Mr.W.H.K.Bakerasked the Secretary of State for Scotland what further plans he has in mind to implement proposals set out in Scottish Education Department circular No. 600 Reorganisation of Secondary Education; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Millan: Progress towards the reorganisation of secondary education on comprehensive lines has in general been satisfactory. My right hon. Friend has now approved wholly or substantially the proposals submitted by all authorities in response to Circular 600, and he will continue to maintain close contact with them to help implement these proposals.
    Mr. Baker: How can local authorities implement the policy which the right hon. Gentleman has laid down and
    1302
    approved if sufficient funds are not available for school building? Does the Minister realise that in the County of Banff there is a shortfall of well over £1 million in the school building programme in the next two years? How can this produce equality of opportunity in education in the county?
    Mr. Millan: I am delighted that the hon. Gentleman is asking me to press ahead even more rapidly with comprehensive reorganisation in his county.
    Mr. Baker: It makes no sense.
    Mr. Millan: Where it does make sense, as indeed it makes sense elsewhere. However, as the hon. Gentleman knows since he was present at the meeting I had with his authority on 31st October, there are problems of priority in school building. I hope that in this case we shall be able to reach a satisfactory conclusion with the authority, which has gone back to look again at its proposals.
    Mr. Maclennan: Can my hon. Friend say whether or not the school at Lairg in Sutherland will go ahead? The reorganisation of Sutherland's education on comprehensive lines may be understood by the Scottish Education Department, but it remains a mystery to the population of Sutherland.
    Mr. Millan: The implementation of the scheme of reorganisation in Sutherland provided for a four-year junior high school at Lairg. My understanding is that that is still the position.
    Mr. MacArthur: Is the Minister aware that the secondary school building approvals this year have been cut by more than half, and that this drastic cutback in school building investment will not enable local authorities to meet the educational needs of 1972?
    Mr. Millan: I am sorry, but the hon. Gentleman is completely wrong. He will know that starts in 1968 were at a record level and in 1969 they continued at a high level, particularly for secondary schools. He will be delighted to hear that completions in 1959 are also running at a very high level.

    Fireworks Accidents
    Mr. Stodartasked the Secretary of State for Scotland how many cases of

    1303
    severe injuries were caused by fireworks in the last full year for which figures are known to him.
    Mr. Buchan: I have asked for details of fireworks injuries received by patients treated in hospital in the period between 13th October and 9th November, 1969, and these will be published as soon as possible. I regret that figures for earlier years are not available.
    Mr. Stodart: Does not the Scottish Office keep similar figures to those which are kept for England and Wales? Has the Minister any reason to suppose that the regulations regarding the age at which fireworks may be sold to young people are being adequately observed?
    Mr. Buchan: In reply to the first part of the supplementary question, as the hon. Gentleman knows—because he, too, was at the Scottish Office for a considerable period—that has not been the case. The Home Office has been keeping statistics largely for the purpose of discussions with manufacturers, with which, of course, we have been associated. I am getting the statistics for this year. The second part of the supplementary question is difficult. It is one of the matters which we hope to discuss with the manufacturers when discussions are held on the whole problem after we have analysed the statistics which we are now examining.
    Mr. Eadie: Is my hon. Friend aware that our constituents are writing to us and asking us to ban the sale of fireworks to children? Is he aware that some co-operative organisations have already taken the initiative on this? Will not he give this matter more serious consideration? My constituents are alarmed about the number of injuries to children.
    Mr. Buchan: Yes. The figures this year look as if they will be better. This is largely due to increased public awareness and interest. On the larger question, all aspects of this will of course be under consideration.

    Teachers (Registration)
    Mr. Bruce-Gardyneasked the Secretary of State for Scotland how many qualified and experienced teachers have to date been dismissed and been sent notices of dismissal, respectively, for
    1304
    failure to register with the General Teaching Council since 1st April, 1969; what steps he has taken to recruit additional teachers to replace those who have been or may be dismissed for this reason; and what estimate he has made of the total cost to public funds of such recruitment.
    Mr. Milan: To date, one teacher has been dismissed. He registered immediately after dismissal and has been reinstated. A further 96 are under notice of dismissal, but I understand that those who register before their period of notice expires will be retained in service. As to the second part of the Question, I have nothing to add to my reply to the hon. Gentleman on 14th October.—[Vol. 788, c. 71–2.]
    Mr. Bruce-Gardyne: Is the hon. Gentleman hoping eventually to arrive at a balance in which the number of qualified and experienced teachers sacked from schools equals the number of unqualified teachers who are retained? Is he aware that the S.S.T.A. is now reconsidering its attitude towards the General Teaching Council? Should he not do likewise?
    Mr. Millan: I should be delighted if the number of teachers dismissed would equal the number of unqualified retained, since up to now nobody has been dismissed.

    Primary School Classes
    Mr. Maclennanasked the Secretary of State for Scotland what steps he is taking to reduce the number of pupils in primary school classes in Scotland.
    Mr. Millan: My right hon. Friend intends shortly to propose to education authorities and teacher associations new and improved staffing standards for primary schools and to invite their comments.

    British Standard Time
    Mr. Buchanan-Smithasked the Secretary of State for Scotland what action he is taking to study the effects of British Standard Time during the winter of 1969–70; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Buchan: My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary and I are making arrangements, in conjunction with other

    1305
    Government Departments and the interests most directly affected by the change, for information about the effects of British Standard Time during the winters of 1968–69 and 1969–70 to be assembled in preparation for the comprehensive review which the Government have undertaken to carry out next year. As already announced, this review will include a social survey.
    Mr. Buchanan-Smith: Will the hon. Gentleman say precisely when the review will take place? Could he also give any information about what machinery will be available for individuals and organisation to make representations and by what time he expects those representations to be made?
    Mr. Buchan: I would not like to give an exact answer as to the point of time at which any announcement will be made. We will be getting in touch with the various organisations which have already been consulted, and it will be open as usual for bodies to make representations and provide evidence. Representations tend to be made with very little evidence to back them.
    Mr. William Hamilton: Has my hon. Friend any indication that the Scottish T.U.C. has changed its mind on whether it supports the experiment?
    Mr. Buchan: I have no information that it has changed its mind. I presume its point of view remains as it was.
    Mrs. Ewing: Will the hon. Gentleman, in the social survey which is being carried out, take account of the views of ordinary people, not people in the categories of trade union membership or farmers? If he takes the views of ordinary people, even if they do not fall into any of those categories, he may find that ordinary people are angry at the robbery of some hours of their daylight.
    Mr. Buchan: The hon. Lady has it wrong. No one is robbing anybody of hours of daylight. This is similar to the problem in the 18th century when people thought that, because the calendar was changed, they would lose 11 days. The number of hours of daylight is dictated by God and the sun, not by us. Of course one has to consider the points of view held by ordinary people. I have to consider not only attitudes which often
    1306
    are stimulated by the wrong people in this connection, but also the actual facts which are unfolded. In fact, the accident figures have been marginally better than they were before. That is what I have to consider in my responsibilities for the people of Scotland.
    Dr. Miller: Will my hon. Friend not be pushed into precipitate action by vociferous mouthings by hon. Members on the other side of the House who are trying to make some kind of political capital of this matter, since the advantages outweigh the disadvantages?
    Mr. Buchan: That is a point of view. I did not quite say that. I said that I would examine the position to see which way the balance of advantage went rather than prejudge the matter, as has been done by far too many hon. Members opposite.
    Mr. Stodart: Would the hon. Gentleman examine the matter with the same urgency as he is examining a certain other matter?
    Mr. Buchan: We will examine it until we find a sufficient basis of fact before we make a decision, both with regard to the other matter and also this one. Hon. Gentlemen opposite should not have closed their minds before they had any results to go on.

    A830, Fort William-Mallaig
    Mr. Russell Johnstonasked the Secretary of State for Scotland when he estimates that work will commence on those sections of the Mallaig Road which are still not up to A standard.
    Dr. Dickson Mabon: The reconstruction of two miles between Glenfinnan and Craigag is in progress, and a contract is about to be placed for a new double-track swing 'midge at Banavie. An appraisal of the remaining unimproved length has started, with a view to including further schemes in the road programme for the 1970s.
    Mr. Russell Johnston: Is the Minister aware that what I was seeking was information when the road from Fort William to Mallaig will be completed up to A standard. I would like to be assured that it has top priority. The next

    1307
    phase of road development in the Highlands should not be overtaken by other more dramatic demands further north.
    Dr. Mabon: I would not like to get into arguments about priorities, but the hon. Gentleman, who is very fair-minded, ought to know that if we were to complete the improvement of A830, it would cost £21 million. This must be weighed against demands from other areas. It is our intention that the next length of road to be improved will be nine miles between Arisaig and Lochailort. Inverness County Council is at present surveying the possible route for this quite significant development.

    Retailers and Distributive Services (Selective Employment Tax)
    Mr. Clark Hutchisonasked the Secretary of State for Scotland what representations he has received regarding the burden of selective employment tax upon retailers and distributive services in Scotland; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Ross: Ten such representations have been received. As I have said in earlier replies, the most effective way of insuring the prosperity of retailers and distributive services in Scotland is not by protecting the service sector from general taxation but rather by our continuing to support the general development of the economy, on which the service sector so largely depends.
    Mr. Clark Hutchison: Does the Secretary of State not realise that the selective employment tax is doing immense damage in Scotland, particularly to the smaller businessmen, many of whom are having to give up their businesses? Will he look at the matter again, and indeed try to persuade his right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer to abolish the tax?
    Mr. Ross: No, I cannot accept the suggestion made in the last part of the question. The hon. Gentleman would be quite wrong to suggest that all the difficulties of small businesses should be laid at the door of this tax. There are many other changes in the retail industries which affect small businesses and large ones as well.
    Mr. Dewar: Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind that the service industries,
    1308
    and perhaps more important the customers, might get a bad bargain if in place of S.E.T. they were to get an added-value tax?
    Mr. Ross: One of the points made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer when the S.E.T. was introduced was that it was a revenue-raiser. Anyone who suggests that it could be removed without putting something else in its place is deceiving the public.
    Mr. Gordon Campbell: Is the right hon. Gentlemen aware that there is intense feeling amongst retailers in Scotland at the inequity of this tax as opposed to a value-added tax and other taxes falling upon people in commerce? Is he further aware that they particularly resent the recent increase in the rate of S.E.T., which is a heavy burden on retailers and also adds to the prices in the shops?
    Mr. Ross: As far as equity is con-corned, we made changes in the tax's incidence in respect of certain rural areas in development areas. These changes were of considerable advantage to certain parts of Scotland.

    Tweedbank Development
    Mr. David Steelasked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether he will make a statement about the present delays in proceeding with the Tweed-bank development.
    Mr. Dickson Mabon: The owners of some 190 acres of land, which forms a large part of the Tweedbank site, have appealed to the Court of Session for an order quashing the Darnick Compulsory Purchase Order, 1968, made by Roxburgh County Council and confirmed by my right hon. Friend last August. As the matter is sub judice, it would not be right for me to make any statement at the present time.
    Mr. Steel: Without going into the merits or demerits of the action, what estimate have the Government made of the likely delay occasioned by the appeal and perhaps an appeal to the House of Lords thereafter?
    Dr. Mabon: That is difficult to say. It is the intention of my right hon. Friend to contest the appeal. It is also our view that, although nothing can happen on the ground, detailed planning for the

    1309
    development should be taken to the most advanced stage possible.

    Housing Starts and Completions
    Mr. David Steelasked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether he will publish a table showing the numbers of housing starts and completions in 1966, 1967 and 1968 in the public and private sectors and in total.
    Dr. Mabon: This information is published in the quarterly housing return for Scotland.
    Mr. Steel: Does the hon. Gentleman share the general concern at the downfall of completions over the last six months? What steps will be taken to change this trend, in particular bearing in mind his answer to the previous Question in relation to the delay in housing at Tweed-bank? Is he aware that the Border local authorities are anxious to make an increasing contribution to the public housing programme?
    Dr. Mabon: I appreciate that, but if the hon. Gentleman will examine the figures he will see that the trend is in the right direction. Starts rose from 34,049 in 1966 to 44,460 in the last calendar year, 1968; the completions in 1966 totalled 36,029, while in 1968 they reached the record figure of 41,989. I take the point about Tweedbank and our setback there, but that does not underrate the fact that our record is good.
    Mr. Buchanan-Smith: What has happened to approvals this year?
    Dr. Mabon: If the hon. Gentleman dares to put down a Question on that, I will answer it.

    J. B. Maitland (Royal Prerogative of Mercy)
    Mr. Wolrige-Gordonasked the Secretary of State for Scotland why he has not recommended the exercise of the Royal Prerogative of Mercy in the case of John Burns Maitland, of 31 Hamilton Road, Fraserburgh.
    Mr. Ross: As I informed the hon. Gentleman in my letter of 26th August, I have given full and careful consideration to all the circumstances of the case of John Burns Maitland, but have reached the conclusion that no grounds had been disclosed which would be sufficient to
    1310
    justify a recommendation that the Royal Prerogative of Mercy should be exercised. It is contrary to practice to state the grounds on which a decision is reached whether or not to recommend that the Royal Prerogative of Mercy should be exercised in a particular case.
    Mr. Wolrige-Gordon: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the police of Fraserburgh are certain that Maitland was not involved in the circumstances which caused him to be charged and subsequently convicted, and that their view is supported without qualification by the chief constable? As the charges were brought in the first place by the police against this young man, why cannot he be cleared officially as well?
    Mr. Ross: The issue of the credibility of witnesses is primarily a matter for the courts and this was a point at issue when the case was heard. There was no appeal against the verdict, and I think that my noble Friend the Lord Advocate wrote to the hon. Gentleman in respect of this. I cannot act as a court of appeal. The circumstances of the case are not such, as I have said, as to justify action by me.
    Mr. Hannan: Does my right hon. Friend recall that the hon. Member for Aberdeenshire, East (Mr. Wolrige-Gordon) voted for the retention of the death penalty? While we appreciate the hon. Gentleman's concern for a constituent, is this not a case of being in favour of hanging in general but against it in particular? Is this not in contradistinction to the usual attitude of hon. Members opposite, which is that of being in favour of reform in general but not in particular?
    Mr. Speaker: Order. We cannot debate capital punishment now.
    Mr. Ross: My exercise of the Royal Prerogative of Mercy not confined to any one crime, and that the serious crime my hon. Friend mentioned. The case involving Mr. Maitland was that of being convicted of taking and driving a car without the owner's consent.

    Initial Teaching Alphabet
    Mr. Tilneyasked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether he is aware of the success of the initial teaching alphabet in schools in Glasgow and in

    1311
    other Scottish areas; and whether, having regard to the recent report by the Schools Council, "Initial Teaching Alphabet—An Independent Evaluation", he will encourage the spread of that method to other authorities.
    Mr. Millan: I know that the initial teaching alphabet is already used in many Scottish schools. While I welcome initiative in new methods and systems of reading, I have no evidence at present which would justify me in seeking to influence education authorities and teachers to use it more extensively.
    Mr. Tilney: Although Scottish children have the reputation of being better educated than those in Inner London or even in Liverpool, does not the hon. Gentleman agree that many children find it difficult to master the almost Chinese number of characters of the traditional orthography, which uses them for the 40 sounds of the English tongue? Is he aware that Aberdeen has increased every year the number of schools using the 44-letter Initial Teaching Alphabet?
    Mr. Millan: Some schools are certainly using the 44-letter alphabet. I have visited Scottish schools where it has been in use, and used successfully. But that is rather a different thing from my right hon. Friend advising all education authorities and all headmasters and teachers to use the Initial Teaching Alphabet. This is a matter which head teachers can decide for themselves.

    Dog Bites
    Mr. Doigasked the Secretary of State for Scotland how many people have been treated in Scottish hospitals for bites from dogs during the year to the nearest convenient date.
    Mr. Millan: I regret that this information is not available. Statistics are not maintained in a form that enables dog bites to be separately identified.
    Mr. Doig: Will my hon. Friend ask the Secretary of State to propose in the Cabinet legislation to amend the present law so that victims of this sort of attack can provide themselves with dog repellants in self-defence?
    Mr. Millan: I will put that suggestion to my right hon. Friend but I would
    1312
    not like to speculate on whether he will take the matter up in the Cabinet.
    Mr. Russell Johnston: Since the hon. Gentleman does not have these important statistics, has he any statistics about the number of people scratched by cats.

    Electricity Generating Station, Dundee
    Mr. Doigasked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will now authorise the building of another electricity generating station for Dundee as recommended by the Mackenzie Report.
    Dr. Dickson Mahon: The planning of generating capacity is a matter for the two electricity boards. No proposals for additional capacity at Dundee have been submitted to my right hon. Friend by the boards.
    Mr. Doig: Is my hon. Friend aware that this was one of the recommendations of the Mackenzie Report some years ago? It was decided then that this would be an ideal place for the station. The electricity board wanted one there, and the facilities were reserved within the harbour of Dundee for the purpose.
    Dr. Mabon: I am aware that seven years ago the Mackenzie Committee suggested that the Dundee site should be examined with a view to the installation of further capacity. Much has happened since, however. I remind my hon. Friend that the recommendation also said that the decision ought to be a matter for the industry. That is exactly the position as it stands at the moment.

    Medical Practitioners
    Mr. Rankinasked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will take the steps necessary to ensure that only properly qualified persons will be eligible to practise medicine in Scotland.
    Mr. Wrightasked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will take steps to ensure that unqualified people are not permitted to practise as doctors in general practice in Scotland.
    Mr. Millan: In general, the enforcement of the law against persons falsely pretending to be registered medical practitioners is a matter for the criminal authorities. As regards the National

    1313
    Health Service, it has been the standing practice to verify that the names of persons applying for admission to executive councils' lists are included in the medical register, and executive councils have recently been advised to ask for production of the applicant's certificate of registration from the General Medical Council, as a check upon identity. Hospital authorities have also been reminded to take steps to satisfy themselves as to the identity and qualifications of anyone applying for a medical post.
    Mr. Rankin: Is my hon. Friend, in effect, assuring us that medicine cannot be practised by anyone in Scotland merely because he has the price of a stethoscope in his pocket?
    Mr. Milan: Certainly I can give that assurance.
    Mr. Wright: When the hon. Gentleman says that local executive councils have been advised recently to look at their registration of general practitioners, does he mean before this incident took place or as a result of it?
    Mr. Millan: Precautions have always been taken, but, because of the recent incident, they have been tightened up.
    My right hon. Friend the Member for Lanarkshire, North (Miss Herbison), in whose constituency this incident took place, got in touch with me several months ago about it. Following her representations and the consideration that we have given to it in the Department, these tighter instructions were sent out.
    Miss Herbison: Is my hon. Friend aware that I and many of my constituents are grateful to him for the action that he has taken? Is he also aware that this would never have happened if there was not great difficulty, particularly in mining areas in Scotland, in attracting doctors to vacancies? What can he do to ensure that the position improves?
    Mr. Milan: That is a separate question. But my right hon. Friend will be aware of various steps that we have taken to make general practice more attractive to doctors qualifying. I am glad to say that these steps are having a limited effect, even in areas like North Lanarkshire where there are particular difficulties. The incident in my right hon.
    1314
    Friend's constituency presented some unusual factors. I hope that another case of this kind will not arise in Scotland.

FALKLAND ISLANDS
Mr. Speaker: Sir Frederick Bennett. To raise a point of order.
Sir F. Bennett: I should like to address you, Mr. Speaker, on a point of order of which I sought to give you slight private advance notice.
In the formal words of the Standing Order, I now beg to ask leave to move the Adjournment of the House under Standing Order No. 9 for the purpose of discussing a specific and important matter that should have urgent consideration, namely,
"the statement of the Argentine Government this morning that a joint statement would be made on Friday next, 21st November, by the Foreign Offices of both the British and Argentine Governments on the future of the Falkland Islands."
I can address you briefly on this matter, Sir. I do not think that. I should need a great deal to justify what I am about to say. There is no doubt of the specific nature of what I have said, because it has been reported widely on the tape, and such inquiries as I have been able to make of Her Majesty's Foreign Office have not elicited any contradiction of this report.
Secondly, I do not think that I need emphasise the importance of what I have said not only to this country and its people, but, even more so, to the people of the Falkland Islands, who will, by now, have been thrown into a situation of considerable doubt and apprehension about their future, which cannot be resolved one way or the other unless Her Majesty's Government make a statement or you, Mr. Speaker, grant my plea, until at least after Friday of this week.
I may add that, apart from our interests and those of the Falkland Islands, in this case the whole question of self-determination, to which both sides of the House pay attention, should receive serious consideration today
Finally, I do not think that I need emphasise the urgency of what I have said. Had I waited until tomorrow I should have been too late under the

1315
Standing Order procedure. In view of the difference in timing that obtains in the Argentine and here, if the statement is made in the Argentine at other than the extraordinarily early hours of the morning, the House of Commons will have risen on Friday afternoon before a statement could be made here. In any case, I query the propriety by which an Argentine Minister is able to announce in advance to the people of the Argentine a joint decision tomorrow by the British and Argentine Governments about the future of a British Colony before this House is informed.
I hope that it will be understood that on this occasion in making this plea no party point is involved. There are many hon. Members on both sides who pay equally serious attention to the problem. I hope that we can all accept that. I am not making any criticism of what may well be a reasonable answer by the Government to what I have raised. I am seeking the earliest opportunity for the Government to clarify something which otherwise will have to remain unresolved in this House probably until Monday next.
Mr. Speaker: The hon. Gentleman the Member for Torquay (Sir F. Bennett) was courteous enough to inform me this morning that he would seek to move the Adjournment of the House under Standing No. 9 on the issue which he has now raised in the House.
The hon. Gentleman asks leave to move the Adjournment of the House for the purpose of discussing a specific and important matter that he thinks should have urgent consideration, namely,
"the statement of the Argentine Government this morning that a joint statement would be made on Friday next, 21st November, by the Foreign Offices of the British and Argentine Governments on the future of the Falkland Islands."
As the House knows, under Standing Order No. 9 I am directed to take into account the several factors set out in the order, but to give no reason for my decision. I have listened carefully to the hon. Gentleman and have given careful consideration to the representations that he has made, but I have to rule that his submission does not fall within the provisions of Standing Order No. 9. There-
1316
fore, I cannot submit his application to the House.
Mr. Braine: On a point of order. While not in any way questioning your Ruling, Mr. Speaker—
Hon. Members: Oh.
Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman is quite right. He cannot question my Ruling.
Mr. Braine: May I ask for your guidance concerning the real difficulty with which the House now finds itself confronted, Sir? First, it is surely without precedent that news of the joint statement concerning the future of British subjects in a British Colony should first reach the ears of Parliament by courtesy of a foreign Government and the diligence of a Press agency.
Secondly, since the joint statement is to be made on Friday and the House may have dispersed for the weekend before any opportunity is given to hon. Members on both sides to question the Foreign Secretary, is there any way that we can insist on the right hon. Gentleman making a statement by not later than Friday morning?
Mr. Speaker: The House has heard what the hon. Gentleman has said. Mr. Speaker can never comment on his reasons for not allowing an application under Standing Order No. 9.
Mr. Thorpe: Further to that point of order. We accept your Ruling, Mr. Speaker, but could you assist the House in what now becomes a somewhat difficult procedural matter? If any hon. Member was minded to put down a Private Notice Question tomorrow on this matter, it could be that because the matter has already been raised in some shape or form he would be precluded from putting down such a Question. Therefore, hon. Members would, in that context, be at a disadvantage. Would it be in order to ask whether the Leader of the House, as he is here, could resolve these difficulties by stating whether the Foreign Secretary will make a statement tomorrow?
Mr. Speaker: I cannot answer on the part relating to Private Notice Questions. I decide the Private Notice Question when I receive it. I cannot pre-empt my

1317
tomorrow's decision. The Government will have heard what the right hon. Gentleman said.
Mr. Shinwell: Further to that point of order. Following what the right hon. Member for Devon, North (Mr. Thorpe) has suggested, would it not be possible for the Government to make a statement on the matter tomorrow and avoid any further trouble?
Mr. Speaker: Order. In Parliament everything is possible.
Mr. Heath: Further to that point of order. May I appeal to the Leader of the House, in this situation, to look into this again, in view of the great importance of the subject at issue, which is accepted by both sides of the House, as the right hon. Gentleman has just said, to see whether the Foreign Secretary could advance this matter with the Argentine Government and make a statement tomorrow which could be synchronised in both countries?
The Lord President of the Council arid Leader of the House of Commons (Mr. Fred Peart): In view of the representations which have been made, through points of order or otherwise, I will certainly consult and make representations to my right hon. Friend.

BILLS PRESENTED
  MERCHANT SHIPPING BILL
  Mr. Roy Mason, supported by The Prime Minister, Mr. Secretary Stewart, Mrs. Secretary Castle, Mr. Secretary Ross, Mr. Cledwyn Hughes, Mr. Secretary Thomas, Mr. Goronwy Roberts, and Mr. Attorney-General, presented a Bill to make fresh provision in place of certain enactments relating to merchant ships and seamen and to repeal some of those enactments without replacement; and for purposes connected therewith: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time tomorrow and to be printed. [Bill 18.]
  ROADS (SCOTLAND) BILL
  Mr. Secretary Ross, supported by Dr. J. Dickson Mabon, and Mr. Dick Taverne, presented a Bill to make certain amendments to the law relating to roads and streets in Scotland, and to provide for the use of appliances or vehicles on footways and footpaths for certain purposes: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time tomorrow and to be printed. [Bill 19.]
ORDERS OF THE DAY

  ULSTER DEFENCE REGIMENT BILL
  Order for Second Reading read.
  3.40 p.m.
  The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Denis Healey): I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
  The Bill, as I think the House will appreciate, deals with one of the most sensitive aspects of the present problem in Northern Ireland-an aspect which. in the past, has aroused the strongest passions in both communities. If we can find the right answers a significant contribution to peace throughout the Province can be made-indeed, a contribution to peace in Ireland as a whole. I recognise the deep concern felt in many parts of the House about certain aspects of the Bill, and I shall try to satisfy hon. Members that the Bill meets all their legitimate anxieties.
  I want to make one other point by way of introduction. Deep and sincere feeling on a matter like this often leads to words which may be regarded on one side or the other as provocative and inflammatory. We are used to speaking plainly in the House, but I hope that hon. Members will remember that an incautious expression of opinion here in Westminster can provoke a reaction in Northern Ireland which leads to ordinary working-class families at best living in terror and at worst having their houses burnt round their heads. I hope that we shall be able to satisfy ourselves, at the end of the day's debate, that the House has contributed to peace and not conflict in Northern Ireland.
  The central issue raised by the Bill is the future of the Ulster Special Constabulary-the B Specials, as they are often called. All Members recognise that this force is highly controversial. In paragraph 145 of his report Lord Cameron described the feelings of the Catholics about the U.S.C. force. No one can deny that that feeling, as he described it, exists. But the House should be equally aware of the feeling among the Protestants in Northern Ireland. Because of the circumstances in which
  1320
  Northern Ireland came into existence the U.S.C. is regarded by many Protestants as the only dependable line of defence against terrorism by forces from the South. I am not trying to justify this feeling, but the House would be making a great mistake in ignoring it. It is a reality, and an important political reality, in the situation that we now confront.
  It is only if we keep continuously in mind the real strength of feeling on both sides in Northern Ireland that we shall understand some of the reactions in Northern Ireland to the present Bill. Unless we do understand the psychological realities in Northern Ireland we have little chance of success in reaching the objective which I believe we all have at heart, namely, to bring lasting peace to this troubled Province.
  On 12th November my hon. Friend made a statement about the Government's proposal to form a new military force—the Ulster Defence Regiment—and on the same day a White Paper giving details of the proposals was presented to Parliament. The House will remember that the creation of such a force was recommended by Lord Hunt's Advisory Committee on Police in Northern Ireland. That committee based its main recommendations on the principle that the police role and military role should be separate in Northern Ireland, as they are in the rest of the United Kingdom.
  It proposed that the Royal Ulster Constabulary should be relieved of all duties of a military nature as soon as possible, and that the Ulster Special Constabulary should be replaced by two separate forces, one a volunteer police reserve to support the R.U.C. in normal police duties, the other a locally recruited part-time force under the command of the General Officer Commanding, Northern Ireland, to support the regular military forces on purely military duties. The Ulster Defence Regiment is the second of these forces, designed to carry out the essential military functions of the Ulster Special Constabulary.
  Lord Hunt's committee believed that it will be necessary for some time to come to protect key installations and to undertake such other tasks as may be necessary to guard against the threat of armed guerrilla-type attack. The Government endorse this view, and the tasks

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  upon which we propose to employ the force are described in paragraph 5 of the White Paper.
  First, let me repeat that it is not our intention to employ the new force on crowd control or riot duties in cities. The role that we envisage is quite a different one. There are, unfortunately, all too substantial reasons why a military force of this nature is needed in Northern Ireland and nowhere else in the United Kingdom. This year alone there have been a number of attacks on public utility installations in Northern Ireland.
  Mr. Hector Hughes: Be fore my right hon. Friend departs from his exordium may I point out that he is apparently continuing to mix up Northern Ireland and Ulster. Will he kindly distinguish between these before he departs from his introductory remarks?
  Mr. Healey: It seems to me that my hon. and learned Friend prepared his question before I began my speech. I have referred at all times to the territory of Northern Ireland.
  This year alone there have been a number of attacks on public utility installations in Northern Ireland. On 30th March there was an attack on the electricity sub-station at Castlereagh, when two transformers were severely damaged by explosion. On 20th April the main supply from Silent Valley reservoir was broken when two 30-inch diameter pipes were blown up. Part of Belfast was without water for four days, and repairs took about 10 days.
  On the same day an electricity pylon at Kilmore, County Armagh, was severely damaged by explosive charges. On 24th April a 48-inch water pipe was blown up at Dunadry and took 4 days to repair. Today's newspapers provide further evidence of the reality of the problem in Northern Ireland.
  And there is a long history of violence and terrorism in Northern Ireland.
  Mr. Eric Heifer rose
  Mr. Healey: I will give way in a moment. Perhaps my hon. Friend will allow me to finish this part of my remarks.
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  Without going back to the inter-war years, I would remind the House that the Hunt Report drew attention to the campaign of terrorism which lasted from 1956 to 1962. During that period over 300 major raids and nearly as many minor raids occurred. More than 30 of these raids were on police stations. Over the period about 11 million night patrols were carried out by part-time members of the U.S.C.
  Hon. Members will appreciate that the threat is of an attack on key points and installations by armed bands and members of subversive organisations. And—if this meets my hon. Friend's question—the attacks do not necessarily come from terrorists on one side of the political spectrum in Northern Ireland. An armed band could originate within Ulster, or, as in the past, come across the border from the Irish Republic. Its objective could be sabotage, seizing arms, or undermining public morale.
  This threat, which is unique to Northern Ireland because of its land border and its internal difficulties, must be countered and deterred. I know that some hon. Members believe that the threat is exaggerated, but the people of Northern Ireland have seen it repeatedly in the past, and have regarded the U.S.C. as an essential defence against a real threat. As the Hunt Report said, the fear of terrorist attacks is very real, and public anxiety will not be allayed unless precautions are taken and are seen to be taken.
  Mr. Heifer: I admit that there have been these difficulties in the past, but I do not understand how my right hon. Friend can talk about the mere blowing up of installations as being sufficient for the growth of a large new force. People in the City of Liverpool have had their pipelines broken on six occasions during the last three years by the Welsh Nationalists, and this has not led to my demanding in this House that we should set up a special force to deal with the Welsh Nationalists.
  Mr. Healey: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his self-restraint on those occasions, but I am bound to remind him that the political climate in which the attacks have taken place over nearly 50 years in Northern Ireland is, thank heaven, a very different climate from the

  1323
  political climate in Liverpool and the surrounding area. One could not make the same approach to the problem as it is known to be in Northern Ireland as we are legitimately able to make to the situation in other parts of the United Kingdom.
  What is essential, in view of Her Majesty's Government and of the Government in Northern Ireland, is that this threat should be met by a properly constituted military force, trained specifically for this purpose and under military discipline and control. That is why Lord Hunt's committee emphasised in its report the distinction that should be drawn between the military and the police tasks which the Ulster Special Constabulary has hitherto discharged; it recommended that the new force which is to undertake military duties should be under the command of the General Officer Commanding, Northern Ireland.
  My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary and I told the House on 13th October that this must be a military force under military discipline and control, and 1 must explain to the House why. It is not that we think that soldiers are necessarily better disciplined than policemen—though to the extent that there may have been some lack of discipline in the past I intend to make certain that the new force will not be open to criticism on that score. The real reason is that military discipline is imposed under the special sanctions of military law, because military law recognises the special stresses and responsibilities involved in the use of military arms. Disobedience, absence without leave, and so on, are not just questions of internal discipline in a military force; they are penal offences.
  Mr. Eric Lubbock rose
  Mr. Healey: I shall come to the hon. Gentleman's point later.
  Because this is a military force and its members are, in the words of Clause 1(2) of the Bill,
  "members of the armed forces of the Crown",
  its direction is under by control and hence under the control of this House, to which I am answerable.
  I draw attention to the fact that the Bill makes this explicit in one very important respect. The direction of the force will be under the control of the
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  Secretary of State in Whitehall and the power to call it out will be vested solely in regular officers of the Army on my authority alone. They are to be regular officers because it is important that they should be fully integrated in the military chain of command. This has been done to balance two requirements which might otherwise conflict; that an essentially local force should be able to respond quickly and flexibly to local emergencies, and that it should nevertheless be fully under the control of the central Government. This we consider to be the best means of ensuring that it will be a local force that is effective, but not liable to misuse.
  Its immediate commander will be a brigadier of the Regular Army; and he, in turn, will be under the command of the General Office Commanding Northern Ireland, who is responsible through the normal chiefs of staff machinery to me, as a member of the Cabinet, as the hon. Member for Orpington (Mr. Lubbock) was hastening to intervene to say.
  Officers of Regular Army will hold key positions in the force right down to battalion level. The chain of command is thus absolutely clear; but, obviously, the Northern Ireland Government will always be very closely concerned with the purposes that the Regiment is designed to serve, and we envisage that the G.O.C. will work in the closest consultation with them. The present machinery for doing so is through a Security Committee presided over by the Northern Ireland Minister for Home Affairs. But the final decision will always rest with Her Majesty's Government.
  Mr. Lubbock: Before the right hon. Gentleman leaves the question of the responsibilities of the officers of the new force, who are said in the White Paper to be subject to military law at all times, will he confirm that this means that they are subject to Queen's Regulations for the Army?
  Mr. Healey: I think that I can do that. However, I shall ask my hon. Friend to check that point and, if that is not the case, to correct me when he winds up the debate. But I am sure that that is the case. There will be about 200 regular officers and senior N.C.O.s of the Army interspersed at various levels in the new force.

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  Subsection 2 of Clause 1 of the Bill includes a provision that any member of the force shall be subject to military law at any time when he is in possession of arms, ammunition, or specified equipment belonging to the Army. The intention here is to ensure that members of the force who may be required in special circumstances to keep arms and ammunition at home shall be subject to military discipline while they are in possession of such arms or ammunition.
  This question of the need to keep arms at home was raised in the House last Thursday by the right hon. Member for Devon, North (Mr. Thorpe) and by other hon. Members. Some hon. Members suggested that the storage of arms at home might be a cause of concern, and I recognise this.
  The first point is whether there is any need to provide for arms to be kept at home. It has long been the custom for most members of the Ulster Special Constabulary to keep arms in their own homes. How far it was appropriate for a police force to do this is a question on which views may differ, but we are now clear that the military or para-military responsibilities of the U.S.C. are being transferred to an Army unit. It is not the general custom for members of Army reserves to keep arms at home, and it is our intention that as a general rule, and to the greatest possible extent, the arms of the Ulster Defence Regiment shall be kept in central armouries.
  But the primary task of this force is one that is not shared by any element of the Army Reserve. It is the task of defence against what Lord Hunt's committee called" armed guerrilla-type attack and the essence of such defence is the need for rapid reaction to any attack or threat. This rapid reaction may have to be achieved in rural districts where the homes of members of the regiment may be scattered over quite a wide area.
  Let me take an example which I do not consider far fetched. There are many analogies for it in history. A member of the regiment might very well live within a few hundred yards of a designated key point, but be several miles away from the headquarters of his unit. This man would not necessarily keep his arms at home all the time, but if intelligence gave reason to suppose that
  1326
  there was a threat of attack against this particular key point it would make obvious sense that so long as the direct threat persisted the man should keep his weapon and ammunition at home, even at times when he was not actually called out for guard duty. [Hon. MEMBERS: "No".] I do not believe that hon. Gentlemen would expect that he should be required to travel several miles to collect his rifle and then to travel the same distance back again at a time when speed would be of the essence if an attack materialised.
  Mr. Stanley Orme: What Army does that?
  Mr. Healey:I can tell my hon. Friend that not only the whole of the Swiss Army, but the whole of the defence force in Denmark, which I visited recently, does this. They keep at home not only small arms, but mortars and heavy machine guns as well.
  Mr. George Brown: Is not my right hon. Friend aware that comparing the situation in Northern Ireland, in Ulster, with the situation in Denmark of Switzerland makes a joke, a mockery, of the whole thing? If what he is saying —and I am willing to be carried along with him; I am trying very hard—is that we are setting up a regiment of the British Crown forces, then should not they behave like regiments of the British Crown forces normally behave? If he is saying that under the guise of setting up such a thing we are recreating the B Specials and behaving in the same way, up with that we are not going to put. Frankly, it looks to me as though my right hon. Friend is trying to ride the awkward horse of the B Specials under the guise of setting up a regiment of Her Majesty's forces.
  Mr. Healey: With respect to my right hon. Friend, I think that, on reflection, he will recognise that what he said was quite unfair. As I proceed with my speech, he will see other reasons why it is unfair.
  There was this problem over a period of six years a decade ago when about 300 attacks were carried out against key points. It was absolutely essential that when an attack had been carried out, a bank had been robbed and weapons stolen, perhaps from a police station, it

  1327
  should be possible to man a road block, within minutes of hearing of the attack in order to catch the perpetrators. We envisaged this when I was in the Local Defence Volunteers at the beginning of the last world war, and I think that I am right in saying that on many occasions Home Guard units kept their arms at home for the same sort of reason. [Interruption.] If I can complete my presentation of this point, hon. Members may find that some of their alarm is unnecessary. Let me repeat that this, the holding of arms at home, would he authorised only in special circumstances and that our general policy will be to centralise the storage of arms.
  My second point is that the execution of this policy will be under the direct control of the General Officer Commanding in respect both of central storage and of special authorisations for arms to be kept at home. This control will be effectively exercised, and the G.O.C. will delegate his powers to authorise arms to be kept at home only to senior officers of the Regular Army. This, I think, will allay a number of doubts which hon. Members may have.
  As the House is aware, it has been our policy since August that the arms of U.S.C. members in cities should be stored under central control, and for some time now there have been no U.S.C. arms kept at home in the cities of Belfast and Londonderry.
  Mr. Jeremy Thorpe: The right hon. Gentleman referred to hon. Members' concern about this matter. Would he not agree that if what he is saying is that as a result of intelligence one soldier in this reserve might be allowed to keep arms at home, surely nothing could be more dangerous and nothing could incite a would-be attacker more than the prospect of a one-man Army. Surely, in those circumstances, there would be at least half a dozen troops drafted in? Nothing would be worse than to have one man expected to put down a situation.
  Mr. Healey: I do not suppose that in such a case the General Officer Commanding would telephone the Commander of the I.R.A. telling him the name of the soldier who was allowed to keep his weapon at home. I think that
  1328
  the right hon. Gentleman is not seeing the problem as it would arise in reality.
  Mr. Gerard Fitt: My right hon. Friend referred to the I.R.A. Would he not agree that the recent explosions and sabotage which have taken place in Northern Ireland had nothing to do with the I.R.A.? Is he aware that at the moment there are men in prison who are members of the illegal Ulster Volunteer force and the extreme Protestant force?
  Mr. Healey: Yes, I am aware of that and it is a disturbing development. It is because I am aware of that that I made the point that the type of threat that the new force might have to counter may well come from any sides of the political spectrum of Northern Ireland. I am grateful to my hon. Friend for raising that point.
  May I now pass to the question of numbers, which is also a matter of controversy. The strength of the force is not laid down in the Bill, and it is the Government's intention that it should be controlled through the normal procedure of the annual Estimates. As the White Paper stated, the Government intend that the actual size should be determined in the light of experience as the build-up proceeds, but that in any case it will not ultimately exceed 6,000 officers and men.
  The House may wonder why this figure is higher than that mentioned in the Hunt Report. I should like to point out, first, that the figure of 4,000 was necessarily very tentative: the Committee did not have the means to take a detailed assessment of the requirement. Secondly, while we have assured the Northern Ireland Government that a fully adequate military garrison will be maintained in Northern Ireland, I am sure that nobody wants us to keep a regular garrison of the present size in the Province for any longer than is necessary.
  We have looked at the size of the Ulster Defence Regiment from the point of view of the part-time military element that we need to have available to support whatever full-time garrison may eventually be judged to be appropriate as the situation returns to normal.
  Our first assessment of the military requirement—bearing in mind that this is a part-time force and that there must

  1329
  be considerable limitations on the frequency with which a man can be expected to turn out for duty in a part-time force —is that a ceiling of 4,000 might not be sufficient and that we might need to be able to recruit up to a figure of 6,000. But I would stress that 6,000 is a ceiling —it is not a target—and that no decision has been taken to authorise recruitment to this level.
  Mr. Orme: Is my right hon. Friend aware that when he talks about 6,000 men in Northern Ireland, that sounds very few compared with the rest of Great Britain, but if we equate that number with the rest of the United Kingdom we would have a standing Army of 240,000 men, based on that parallel for Northern Ireland?
  Mr. Healey: This may well be so, but it is also the case that if we had had the sort of violence and disorders which have been seen in Northern Ireland in the last 50 years I doubt whether organised society in Britain would have stood it. One must recognise that the problem there is, unfortunately, different from the problem here.
  As I understand it, the purpose of all Members of good will on both sides of the House is to remove the fundamental problems which have been responsible for this tragic history. Until they are removed, the possibility of violence and disorder, as we have found in the past, remains. Unless people are satisfied that that possibility can be kept under control, the fundamental conditions for security in which political advance is possible will not be achieved.
  Mr. Paul B. Rose rose—
  Mr. Healey: May I be allowed to proceed a little further before I give way again? I have been tolerant, but I must be allowed to proceed a little further, or nobody will have a chance to make a prepared speech as distinct from a prepared intervention.
  As the White Paper said, the final decision will be taken in the light of experience as the build-up proceeds. There is bound to be a process of build-up, if only because the strict security vetting upon which we shall insist will take a certain time. It will be necessary by 1st
  1330
  April to have enrolled sufficient men, though not necessarily the eventual strength to enable the regiment to carry out such operational tasks as may be necessary in support of the Army formations that will still be there, but we envisage that recruitment will be a continuous process during the early months of the regiment's existence and that as it grows in strength it will increasingly take over the role which Lord Hunt's committee foresaw and which the Government have endorsed.
  We are determined to attract qualified people from all sections of the community, and we shall mount a vigorous campaign to do so. But as my hon. Friend said in his statement to the House on 12th November, it will be necessary initially to draw our …ecruits substantially from men at present in the U.S.C. After all, the fact that they have already volunteered for service in a force which has in part some of the functions of the U.D.R. shows that they may well volunteer for this new regiment.
  The application forms—and I shall deal with this point in more detail in the light of events of which some of my hon. Friends are conscious—will be available at many distribution points such as Army recruiting offices, Regular Army or T. & A.V.R. units, post offices, and police stations. I hope that these forms will be available by 1st January. With so many distribution points, any applicant wishing to join the Ulster Defence Regiment should be able to obtain a form quite easily. Completed application forms will be sent to the military headquarters Northern Ireland.
  Miss Bernadette Devlin(Mid-Ulster) rose—
  Mr. Healey:I will give way in a moment.
  Scrutiny of all application forms and the decision on individual applications will be vested solely in the military H.Q. Northern Ireland. If the, G.O.C. Northern Ireland, advised by the commander of the regiment, has any queries on recruiting in general or on particular cases he will, of course, refer these to me.
  I say again that recruiting will be organised and controlled by the British Army in Northern Ireland and that the British Army is responsible to me. Some

  1331
  confusion has, not unnaturally, been caused by certain publications of the Northern Ireland Government in the last week or so. As the Leader of the House promised, I now shall seek to clear up that confusion.
  As I said at the beginning of my speech, the House must recognise and accept the existence of widespread and genuine fear in Northern Ireland, among the Protestant community at least, lest the disbandment of the Ulster Special Constabulary should leave them defenceless against terrorism and infiltration. Some of us far removed from the area concerned may feel that these fears are exaggerated, but they are real; they have dominated the life of the Province for the last half century at least, and to ignore them would be to court disaster.
  Mr. Kevin McNamara rose
  Mr. Rose rose—
  Mr. Healey: With respect, hon. Members have asked me to make a careful statement on this problem. I hope that I shall be allowed to complete this part of my statement, and then I will readily give way to questions.
  I was not surprised, therefore, when, on 3rd November, the Northern Ireland Minister of Home Affairs told the Ministry of Defence and the Home Office that he was anxious to explain publicly in Northern Ireland that there would be no gap between the disbandment of the Ulster Special Constabulary and the creation of the Ulster Defence Regiment. The Minister for Home Affairs proposed to allay fears by a television broadcast which would begin with officers nominated by the G.O.C. Northern Ireland—
  Mr. Fitt: He did not succeed.
  Mr. Healey: If hon. Members will listen, they will know why he did not succeed—which would begin with officers nominated by the G.O.C. Northern Ireland and their Inspector-General of Constabulary answering questions on the proposed force. He asked to include in this discussion details of the Government's plans for these forces. My hon. Friend was unable to agree to this television broadcast, as Parliament had not been told of the Government's proposals.
  1332
  As he made clear in his letter of 17th November to the hon. Lady the Member for Mid-Ulster (Miss Devlin), which has now, I understand, been placed in the Library of the House, my hon. Friend agreed last Friday to the script of a proposed broadcast, arranged by the Northern Ireland Government on Ulster Television, subject to certain amendments. In consequence, the agreed text did no more than repeat the Government's intentions. It is a long-established practice that Governments, on the publication of a White Paper, co-operate with bodies who wish to make its provisions more widely known.
  I think that these points should be made clear. First, as soon as the issue of privilege was raised here, the Government of Northern Ireland took immediate action to withdraw all further advertisements. Secondly, no expenditure was specifically incurred by the United Kingdom Government on the television broadcasts or on any form of newspaper advertising. Thirdly, owing to various misunderstandings, both in London and in Northern Ireland, the newspaper advertisements appeared without our commenting on the project. I regret this, and I am taking steps to ensure that it does not happen again.
  Mr. Speaker, you ruled yesterday that there was no prima facie breach of privilege in these publications. If I may say so without impertinence, I am sure that you were right. Once a Bill is published, it is normal to discuss it widely. Statements about the Bill, in my experience, are rarely confined to the Government who sponsor it alone. Indeed, if that were so, public debate, and indeed parliamentary debate, would be impossible.
  I think that the House must understand the pressures under which the Northern Ireland Government felt themselves operating. I think that some of us rarely give sufficient credit to the members of the present Government of Northern Ireland for the great risks they have taken with their own political position in order to make more progress in the last two months than has been made in Northern Ireland during the last half-century.
  Mr. Fitt: That is irrelevant.
  Mr. Healey: The hon. Gentleman may believe it to be an irrelevant point, but at the moment the Northern Ireland Government are doing everything they believe is in their power to create a basis for a happier position than has existed in the past.
  We must understand, too, the natural and wholly legitimate desire of the Northern Ireland Government to reassure their own supporters that they were not to be left defenceless and that there would be no gap in time or capability between the disbandment of the U.S.C. and the creation of the new Ulster Defence Regiment.
  Some of the phrases used in some of the publications of the Northern Ireland Government, I confess, would not have commended themselves to me, but I hope that I can eliminate any confusion they may have caused by stating categorically once again that recruiting for the new force will not begin until the Bill becomes law, and in any case not earlier than 1st January next year. Recruiting will be carried out by the British Army in Northern Ireland, and the G.O.C. will be responsible to me as Secretary of State in the United Kingdom for the way in which it is carried out; and 1 shall be responsible to the House.
  Miss Devlin: If I heard the Secretary of State correctly, on two occasions during his speech so far he has stated that recruitment will not begin until the Bill becomes law. I therefore want to draw his attention to an article in The Guardian of 19th November, 1969, written by John Cunningham, which begins in this way:
  "Application forms for Northern Ireland's new security force were sent to all B Specials last week, the Minister of Home Affairs, Mr. Porter. admitted at Stormont yesterday."
  Mr. Healey: Can I help the hon. Lady by saying that I intend to deal with that specific point in a moment. As I have said, recruiting will be carried out by the British Army under the G.O.C. who will be responsible to me, and I am responsible to Parliament. I am coming to the so-called application form in a moment.
  I know that many hon. Members are concerned by the way in which we plan to vet potential recruits. The vetting procedures, which are broadly similar to
  1334
  those in Northern Ireland for the Regular Army and for the T & AVR, are based on the completion by each applicant who seeks to enrol in the Ulster Defence Regiment of a form containing personal details, namely, the name, address, nationality, date of birth and civil occupation of the applicant, his wife and his parents. It also lists the civil employments held by the applicant during the last five years, any previous service in the Armed Forces, and his religion.
  Each completed form will be scrutinised at Headquarters, Northern Ireland, and this scrutiny will include security vetting. In doubtful cases, the G.O.C. Northern Ireland will consult anyone whose opinion he values on either the sincerity of the application or upon the veracity of the personal details.
  The purpose of this screening process, which will be applied strictly to each application, is to ensure that no undesirable persons are accepted into the regiment, and, in particular, that applicants who are known to be members of, or sympathetic to, organisations on the extreme wings of Protestant or Roman Catholic opinion will be excluded. We will not recruit persons previously members of the police forces whom we know to have behaved improperly in the recent disturbances.
  The House will recognise that no system of security vetting can be foolproof, but I believe that the system I have outlined, which has been based upon considerable experience of the Regular Army and the TAVR in Northern Ireland, is as satisfactory as can be devised. It will not be rushed or skimped to complete recruitment by 1st April, 1970.
  Because the vetting procedure is vested in G.O.C. Northern Ireland, the House can rest assured that every application will be considered thoroughly, fairly and impartially. Applications from members of the U.S.C. will be examined in the same way as any other applications, and there will be no automatic right of transfer for them.
  I should make it clear in this context—here I answer the question raised by the hon. Lady the Member for MidUlster—that the so-called application form circulated to members of the U.S.C. is not an official Army document such as will be the basis for formal

  1335
  application to join the U.D.R. when recruiting starts in January.
  Mr. John Mendelson: It is an application form.
  Mr. Healey: I think that if my hon. Friend showed a little more patience he would advance the debate and his own knowledge a little better than would otherwise be the case. This so-called application form was initiated by the staff officer of the U.S.C., not to recruit members for the new forces, but essentially to enable an impression to be formed of the numbers of U.S.C. members who would be interested in applying for membership of the two forces.
  Mr. Mendelson: I have here a report of the debate in Stormont in which Mr. Porter took part. This is what the report says:
  "The form referred to had been sent out to B Specials by their staff officer, but only after publication of his speech. It simply asked how long they had been in the force, if they had military experience, and which force they would prefer to join. (Mr. Hume): 'Tell us what is written at the top of the form? ' (Mr. Porter): 'Application form'."
  Mr. Healey: I have just told the House that this was called an application form. I have also explained that it has nothing to do with an application form for joining the new Ulster Defence Regiment.
  Mr. Mendelson: Then why circulate it?
  Mr. Healey: I have just explained that the reason it was circulated was to enable U.S.C. leaders to form an impression of the numbers of their men who would wish to join one of the new forces. I think that I answered each one of my hon. Friend's questions even before he rose.
  Mr. McNamara: I have listened carefully to what my right hon. Friend has said. An important point here is: on whose responsibility, and with whose knowledge, was this form issued? At the moment, the Specials are supposed to be under the general command of the G.O.C. Northern Ireland. Was this done with or without his knowledge?
  Mr. Healey: I believe that the Northern Ireland Minister for Home Affairs is making a statement on this matter in the
  1336
  Stormont this afternoon, and I prefer that to be left to him.
  Mr. John Mendelson: We should know before we vote on the Bill.
  Mr. Healey: This was not an official Army document. It has nothing to do with the recruiting procedure which will be carried out by the British Army under the command of the G.O.C., Northern Ireland, starting in January. It was not a fortunate choice of words to call it an application form.
  Mr. McNamara rose
  Mr. Healey: I have given way a great deal. If I may, I will get on a little further and then I may start giving way again.
  Mr. W. Howie: I have listened intently to the interruptions which have come from below the Gangway and, in part, I sympathise with them. My right hon. Friend has referred to a statement which is being made elsewhere today. Will some reference to that statement be made in the winding-up speech tonight so that we may be fully acquainted with its contents? We are very disturbed about this matter.
  Mr. Healey: I hope that when winding up the debate my hon. Friend will have the advantage of this statement to comment on it and, if necessary, to communicate it to the House.
  Mr. Stanley R. McMaster(Belfast, East): The right hon. Gentleman has referred to the TAVR. Will it be possible for people leaving the Territorial Army to apply to join the Ulster Defence Regiment? If so, will they have to go through all the vetting? Would it be possible for them to transfer automatically if they transferred from the TAVR?
  Mr. Healey: Anybody who wishes to join the new force will, of course, be subject to the process of vetting to which I have referred. After all, if members of the police on transfer are subject to it, I see no reason why members of the TAVR, if they wish to join on leaving the TAVR, should not be similarly subject.
  Miss Devlin: On a point of order. Is it in order for the debate to continue, as

  1337
  the general public may be confused between the force which we are now discussing and a non-existent force for which application forms have already been sent out and which will not have the authority of this House? Given that the general public may confuse this nonexistent, and therefore illegal, force with the force being established by the Bill, is it in order to continue the debate?
  Mr. Speaker: If the debate were not in order. I would have stopped it.
  Mr. Healey: The new regiment must get off to a good start and I hope that it will not be subject to the same interruptions as my speech. The stop-go principles which I have been compelled to adopt have been forced on me. Perhaps my hon. Friends who are responsible for this stopping and starting will forgive me if I do not give way.
  As my hon. Friend has informed the House, initially it will be necessary to draw substantially on the U.S.C. and as nearly 60 per cent. of the officers of the U.S.C. are over 50 and almost 40 per cent. are over 55 years old, we think that it is prudent as a transitional measure to be prepared to make a certain number of exceptions to the normal age limit of 55. To a lesser degree, the same applies to senior N.C.O.s.
  This transitional arrangement will permit the enlistment of experienced men who can contribute much to the success of the new force in its formative days arid until younger men can be trained to the appropriate standards.
  Mr. Orme: We will have to vote against this.
  Mr. Healey: The arrangements will also allow present county commandants of the U.S.C. to be considered for appointment as full-time battalion commanders.
  Some hon. Members have suggested that an advisory committee on recruitment might be set up to assist the G.O.C., Northern Ireland. We have noted this suggestion and agree that there might be advantages in it. Such a committee might give advice on recruitment policy, bearing in mind, for example, the importance that we attach to recruiting from all sections of the community. The detailed composition and terms of reference would
  1338
  require careful consideration after a closer study of the problem, and I will of course inform the House of our conclusions on this at the right time.
  Mr. Stratton Mills(Belfast, North): Has the right hon. Gentleman seen that John Hume and Ivan Cooper, of the Civil Rights Movement, at Stormont, have welcomed this new force and called on their supporters to join it?
  Mr. Michael McGuire(Ince): Not unequivocally.
  Mr. Healey: I read with care the full HANSARD of the debate from which my hon. Friend the Member for Penistone (Mr. John Mendelson) quoted earlier. I believe that the leaders of Roman Catholic opinion in Northern Ireland, particularly after some of their anxieties of recent days have been allayed, as I hope they will be by my statement this afternoon, will be prepared to advise their supporters to join the new force, because I believe that the success of the new force in fulfilling its many vital functions cannot be complete unless there is a reasonable balance of the communities inside it. I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for making it possible for me to make that point.
  The emoluments of part-time members of the Ulster Defence Regiment have been pitched at a level which we hope will be attractive to intending recruits. Part-time members of the U.D.R. will receive a tax-free annual bounty of between £25 and £35, depending on their length of service, on completion of their annual training obligation, and they will receive regular rates of pay for full days' training or duty in the same way as the TAVR. A Supplementary Estimate will, of course, be required to cover al expenditure on the force incurred before the end of this financial year.
  These emoluments compare favourably with those of the Ulster Special Constabulary and we consider this is to be fully justified by the more stringent training requirements of the new force. These requirements are considerably stricter than those of the U.S.C. because the U.D.R. will be essentially a military force with military duties.
  The training requirements are described in Clause 2(5) of the Bill and our plans are set out in paragraph 15 of the

  1339
  White Paper published last week. The obligation will consist of 12 full days' training and 12 two-hour training periods. A certain number of optional training periods will also be available. The requirement for 12 full days we regard as the minimum which should be set in addition to the two-hour training periods.
  The 12 days will normally include one consecutive period of not more than a week. This will provide an opportunity for sustained and concentrated unit training, which in many ways is the most valuable part of the whole training programme. A week's camp may not be required of every man every year, but it will be a normal feature of the programme and we must ask every member of the regiment to be prepared to take it on.
  Naturally, when members of the force have been called out for duty in an emergency such as at present, it might well be neither sensible nor appropriate to insist on the full training obligation in addition to the time spent on duty. The White Paper made this clear. It also stated that in exceptional circumstances the requirement for a substantial consecutive period might be varied. The point here is that there might in exceptional circumstances be compassionate or other personal reasons why a man could not get away for a whole week at the time that he was required to do so. In such a case we would certainly try to meet the man's special circumstances by adjusting his training requirement.
  I must, however, make clear that there will be no general relaxation of the training obligations and that it would be very difficult to provide for a man whose business commitments, for example, would make it regularly impracticable for him to get away for a week's camp. We will do what we can for the exceptional case, but the overriding requirement must be the need for a proper standard of training for this Army unit.
  The Bill provides the necessary legal framework for the establishment of the Ulster Defence Regiment. As my hon. Friend said in his statement last week, the Government are determined that the new regiment shall be a success and will do everything in their power to ensure that this is so. We regard its success as vital to the people of Northern Ireland
  1340
  and I hope that all sections of the community will give the regiment their support and that the leaders of all sections of the community will encourage to join the regiment all those who are willing and qualified to serve the community in this way.
  I say again, the regiment will be a military force with a military function. It will be part of the British Army as a whole responsible, like the rest of the Army, to the Chief of the General Staff and the British Secretary of State for Defence in London. I believe that, as now designed, it will not only fulfil the role in the security of Northern Ireland for which it is primarily designed; it may also fulfil a far wider and even more constructive function.
  Ever since I first became Secretary of State for Defence I have been struck by the role of the Services in Britain as an instrument of social integration—as a means by which men of all walks of life and from all parts of Britain and the Commonwealth can be welded into a living unit. This is true, above all, of the Northern Irish regiments of the British Army. For many years, our Irish regiments have included both Protestants and Catholics. Indeed, they now have almost as many Catholics as Protestants. But while the Catholics and Protestants in these regiments remain equally proud of their faith and their special traditions, this is never a source of conflict in their daily work, and still less in battle. The religious affiliation of the individual officer or soldier has been completely irrelevant: at most, it is a matter for banter and leg-pulling on mess nights.
  I think that both sides of the House will agree that in recent months the Army in Northern Ireland has given a practical demonstration of its ability to provide that framework of security which is indispensable if a successful effort is to be made for removing the sources of conflict between the communities. We all now want to move forward from the negative aim of preventing conflict to the positive purpose of binding all sections of the community together in work for the common welfare.
  The Ulster Defence Regiment will, like the reorganisation of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, provide a first-class opportunity for progress in this direction. Like so many Irish regiments before it, it can

  1341
  set the pattern for common effort in the Province as a whole. As an integral part of the British Army, it will join with other Army units in satisfying all sections of the community in Northern Ireland that they can live henceforward in peace and security. I commend the Bill to the House.
  Mr. George Brown: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Many of us who do not want to be obstructive are, none the less, very disturbed by the situation. Speaking for myself, much of my disturbance has not been allayed by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State.
  I was hoping to raise this point before Mr. Speaker left the Chair. The issue on which I seek your advice is to discover how one can move from this point. My researches, aided by officers of the House, have revealed many possibilities. One that was used in 1875 and admitted by the then Speaker was that, the Second Reading of the Bill having been moved, a Mr. Stephen Cave—a name not unknown to those of us who are interested in the history of this House—was allowed to move that a Select Committee be established to consider and report upon the various complications raised. That was accepted as being the equivalent of deferring the passage of the Bill.
  I regret that I have to put this to you, Mr. Deputy Speaker. As I say, I was hoping to put it to Mr. Speaker before he left the Chair. In the circumstances, may I ask you whether you would, either now or later in the debate, accept a Motion that a Select Committee should be established to consider and report upon the various complications of this Measure, and let that be considered as a Motion for the deferment of the Bill?
  Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Harry Gourlay):I could not accept a Motion at this stage, and I cannot now say what I would rule in the future.
  Mr. Howie: Further to that point of order. I have considerable sympathy with the views put forward by my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. George Brown), which seem to have some support from my right hon. and hon. Friends below the Gangway. However, is it not clear to us all that the situation in Northern Ireland is one of some urgency and that, however well intentioned, it
  1342
  might be an error to refer this matter to a Select Committee? Should we not perhaps—
  Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. That is not a point of order.
  4.34 p.m.
  Mr. Geoffrey Rippoa: I begin by thanking the Secretary of State for the way in which he has introduced the Bill. I think that all of us will echo the sentiments expressed in his introductory remarks, and I am sure that most of us feel that both the tone and content of what he said will commend it to moderate opinion both here and in Northern Ireland.
  We are debating a Measure which should be welcomed by the House as a whole. The formation of the Ulster Defence Regiment on the lines set out in the Bill must be regarded as an essential part of a rational reorganisation of the police and defence arrangements in Northern Ireland.
  As the Secretary of State said, the Bill arises directly out of the Hunt Report. The Hunt Committee was set up by the Northern Ireland Government, who promptly accepted its main recommendations, as, subsequently did this House in the debate on 13th October. In view of that, there ought not to be any grave difference of principle between us.
  The chief of the Hunt Committee's recommendations was that there should be this clear distinction, which we on this side readily accept, between policing and security functions. Therefore, it seems to be right that this aptly named Ulster Defence Regiment, which is to be a volunteer force modelled on the Territorial Army, should undertake the task of assisting the Regular Armed Forces in what are essentially military duties.
  Mr. Hector Hughes: The right hon. Gentleman has announced categorically what he will accept. Will he accept the difference between Northern Ireland and Ulster and realise that Ulster is a larger place than Northern Ireland, and, therefore, that the Bill is misnamed and should be withdrawn?
  Mr. Rippon: I do not think that the hon. and learned Gentleman's objection is widely echoed here or in Northern Ireland.

  1343
  It is equally right that there should have been this simultaneous announcement of the creation of the new unarmed Police Reserve which will be recruited to assist the Royal Ulster Constabulary. Accordingly, the Police Bill met with general acceptance in the Second Reading debate on Monday.
  The Bill that we are considering today is in line with the division of responsibilities now taking place, I think with general approval here and in Northern Ireland. That stems from the understanding which all of us now have that, in the past, the Royal Ulster Constabulary has been saddled with too many roles. However, we ought to take the opportunity of reiterating that these Measures are not in themselves any reflection on the brave and patriotic men who have served with distinction in the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the Ulster Special Constabulary or the B Specials for many years. They are not personally responsible for the fact that fears and tensions have been aggravated during the recent tragic disturbances by having men who were armed for para-military duties being called upon also to perform police duties for which they should have been unarmed and crowd control duties for which they were essentially untrained.
  I am sure that the Home Secretary went to the root of the problem when he said, on 13th October:
  "It was this mixture of roles which, in some ways, separated the constabulary from the public and so prevented that free and relatively easy communication which prevails in this country between police and public and which makes the public feel that the police are part of the community."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 13th October. 1969; Vol. 788, c. 52.]
  The armed forces are also part of the community, as will be the new Ulster Defence Regiment. But their role is fundamentally different. In consequence, the recruitment, the organisation and the deployment of the new regiment raises issues which are separate from those which we considered on Monday.
  We all now recognise that there has to be this clear distinction between the para-military duties which the bulk of the 8,000 members of the Ulster Special Constabulary carried out, predominantly in rural areas, and the urban duties, including crowd control, which are required of a normal police reserve. Bearing in
  1344
  mind the existing strength and responsibities of the Ulster Special Constabulary, it seems to us that the proposed maximum strength of the new regiment of us to 6,000 officers and men is about right. It is, in fact, based on the military advice tendered to the Government and is in line with the suggested 1,500 in the Police Reserve. With the sharing of existing responsibilities, it seems a properly balanced division.
  In the defence debate last Thursday, my right hon. Friend the Member for Harrogate (Mr. Ramsden) expressed our admiration for the way in which the Army have been successfully pursuing their peace-keeping role in Northern Ireland. As my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Down, South (Captain Orr) said:
  "The services which the Army has rendered to us in Ulster are incalculable, and it would be very wrong if this occasion passed without my saying on behalf of my colleagues from Ulster how deeply we all appreciate what the forces have done."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 13th November, 1969; Vol. 791, c. 715–716.]
  Nevertheless, we must all share the Secretary of State's hope, which he expressed this afternoon, that as many as possible of the additional Regular forces now deploy in Northern Ireland will be relieved of their arduous responsibilities as soon as the situation permits. I do not want to dwell today on the way in which, some of us think, our defence forces are overstretched or lack the reserves to meet our commitments or other unforeseen emergencies at home or overseas. One thing is certain: no matter how many Regular troops are kept in Northern Ireland, no one can doubt the value of, and the immediate need for, an Ulster volunteer force to meet what the Hunt Committee called the armed guerilla type of attack, to guard key points and installations—
  Mr. Hector Hughes: On a point of order. The right hon and learned Member has spoken of an Ulster volunteer force. Such a reference is an infringement of the sovereignty of Eire, which is an adjoining territory. I have made the point—
  Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. I am seized of the hon. and learned Member's point of order, which, in fact, is not a point of order, although it may be his point of view.
  Mr. Rippon: Perhaps it would be better if I substituted the phrase "Northern Ireland volunteer force" so as to make it clear that I am now talking about it in general terms in the light of the present situation and the Government's proposals, in which I concur.
  Mr. John Biggs-Davison: Will my right hon. and learned Friend please not give way to that sort of nonsense? Have we not for many years had regiments of the British Army incorporating the word "Ulster", in which province Northern Ireland is situated?
  Mr. Rippon: I cannot, of course, foresee whether an interruption will be nonsense. The reason I modified what I have said, although I entirely support the title of the proposed new regiment, was the connotations which might be involved by using in a vague way the term" Ulster volunteer force". Many people will understand why I made the slight amendment.
  We need this force to deal with the armed guerilla type of attack, to guard key points and installations, to carry out patrols and to establish check points and road blocks. That there is this real risk of continuing terrorist activity in Northern Ireland is confirmed by the information given in the Hunt Report, to which the Secretary of State referred. It is also confirmed by the Cameron Report, paragraph 9 of which states:
  "The Irish Republican Army (hereinafter called the I.R.A.)"—
  it is a lawyers' report—
  "continued a campaign of violence even as recently as the period between 1956 and 1962, and there is evidence that its activities still continue and its objectives remain the same even if temporarily its tactics vary."
  This is in no sense a fear which is an illusion. It is a real and present fear.
  Certainly, the number of Regular troops who would be needed to supply guards and patrols along the border and over the six counties would be impossibly large in the absence of a trained volunteer force. Even if they were available for this purpose, which they are not, such Regular troops would inevitably lack the necessary local knowledge of the countryside and the people which is vital in counteracting terrorist attacks and infiltration.
  1346
  While we agree that it is right that the general practice will be to store arms centrally, I am equally sure that it is sensible to acknowledge, as the Government have done, that there must be exceptions if the only way in which men can respond to emergencies is by keeping their arms at home. That must apply particularly in rural areas. It may be that we ought to bear in mind to some extent the special vulnerability of central stores to terrorist activities.
  The safeguard, which I consider an adequate safeguard, as the Secretary of State said, is that men keeping arms at home will be subject to military law, and I understood from the statement of the Minister of Defence for Administration that they must have been given permission by an officer of the British Army. In making his statement to the House last week the Minister of Defence for Administration stated that the new force will "of necessity" be drawn substantially from the Special Constabulary for its initial recruitment, and that has been borne out by what the Secretary of State for Defence said this afternoon. This must be so.
  At the same time, I am sure that no hon. Member on either side of the House wishes otherwise than that the new regiment will attract recruits from all sections of the community, and we must all share the Secretary of State's hope that all the leaders of the communities in Northern Ireland will do what they can to encourage this and to support it. But recruitment from the Special Constabulary is obviously essential if the new regiment is to become viable—even if not complete as the Secretary of State said—by 1st April, 1970 from the start of recruiting on 1st January.
  Moreover, as the Minister acknowledged in his statement, no one can doubt that the Special Constabulary is composed of a majority of men who have given good service and who are suitable as members of the new regiment. Meanwhile, I understand from what the Secretary of State said that we have been given the Government's firm assurance that the Special Constabulary will remain in existence until the new security system is established. It is essentially a security system which is being set up in rather

  1347
  special circumstances and we therefore welcome what the Government said about the need for strict security vetting—and, I add, strict security vetting on the lines Indicated this afternoon by the Secretary of State. It is clearly necessary to eliminate extremist political elements of all complexions. I am sure that he is right in saying that the system must be applied "thoroughly, fairly and impartially".
  The danger is not just of an attack across the border, which it is the Army's responsibility to defend. As the Home Secretary said on 13th October:
  "There can be incidents. It is, therefore, important that the Northern Ireland Government Security Committee should have the fullest consultation on the composition of this force and upon the role which it will fulfil."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 13th October, 1969; Vol.788, c. 56.]
  As the Government have said, although the defence of the United Kingdom is the responsibility of the Government of Westminster, the tasks for which this new force will be raised are of the greatest importance to the Government of Northern Ireland. Accordingly, we welcome the fact that at every stage there has been close consultation between Westminster and Stormont and that mutual agreement has been reached.
  Mr. Orme: We have only to recall the application forms and the advertisements which have gone out over the last seven days to realise that there has been no co-operation. The Government here should have insisted that the Stormont Government complied with our regulations.
  Mr. Rippon: I cannot improve on what I thought was the wholly adequate answer of the Secretary of State to his hon. Friends, and I will not begin to try to do so.
  While we must all hope that the existence and role of the Ulster Defence Regiment will in itself be a sufficient deterrent, we must accept that there is a real danger that on occasion small units of the regiment will be in action against terrorists and will have to deal with infiltration and sabotage. It therefore might be helpful if the Government made it clear that the regiment will remain an active force until such time as not only the Ministry of Defence but the Govern-
  1348
  ment of Northern Ireland are satisfied that all risks of terrorist activity have passed. That might appear to be a wholly unnecessary assurance to give, but, if I may be forgiven this observation, no one a few years ago would have conceived of the dismemberment of our own Territorial Army in this country.
  I was very interested in what the Secretary of State said about the wider role which the Ulster Defence Regiment will ultimately play when there is an end to the threat of guerilla attacks and terrorist activities. It is to play the role which one normally associates with the Territorial Army. I agreed entirely with what he said this afternoon about the tremendously valuable role played by the forces and the Territorial Army in what he called, in a somewhat academic but not too bad a phrase, "social integration". It is not just a force for the Tories in Northern Ireland or over here.
  The White Paper and the Bill give a fair amount of information about the organisation, terms of service, equipment, and so on, of the new regiment, and the Secretary of State has filled in some more details today. There are, however, one or two matters which I should like to raise now. Perhaps they can be more easily dealt with in Committee, but perhaps the Minister who is to reply would deal with some of them which might save time later.
  We welcome the fact that it appears to be the intention that the new regiment will be better paid and more fully equipped than the Special Constabulary and that the Government have stretched the age requirements beyond the normal Territorial Army limits to allow the maximum number of experienced Specials to join, as he said, in the formative stage. But may we be given a little more information about what other weapons the Government will supply to the force apart from rifles? Will the rifles be the modern FN rifles, and will some automatic weapons be available, although not necessarily kept at home as in other countries?
  Paragraph 17 of the White Paper refers to the mobile element of the force, but the organisation paragraph makes no mention of it. May we be told a little about what it will consist of? Will there be a mobile element in each battalion or only in those which have the particular requirement for the operational area which they control?

  1349
  The Secretary of State has helped us quite a bit today by telling us a little more about the training required, which was dealt with by the Minister of Defence for Administration in his statement last week. Some anxiety was expressed, especially about the one week's consecutive training, which might bear unduly harshly on the family farmer and the farmworker and so inhibit recruitment. I am told that there is also a little concern in some quarters about the possibility of having to train on Sundays. The Secretary of State said that he would look into the exceptional case, but some of these cases are not so much exceptional as quite likely to arise in the rural areas. Perhaps he would make it clear that he has these difficulties, particularly for the rural community, very much in mind.
  I have been concerned today primarily with the direct issues raised by the proposed formation of this new regiment and the specific military role which it will play. At the same time, I am sure that it is right that I should reiterate that we on this side of the House are all extremely conscious of the need to bring about change that is politically acceptable to all sections of opinion in Northern Ireland. We hope that this separation of military functions from police functions in a way which diminishes fear and animosity and encourages much more broadly-based recruitment will be helpful. We think that the Bill should be welcomed and we must hope that in the calmer atmosphere which now prevails the Northern Ireland Government will once again be able to forge ahead with their programme of reform andreconciliation to which they set their hand, not —and I think that this should be said in fairness—just in the last two months or so, to which the Secretary of State referred, but a considerable time before the recent troubles began.
  4.55 p.m.
  Mr. E. Shinwell: We on this side of the House are in complete agreement with the opening words of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State. No matter what differences prevail as between the two sides of the House, we seek to promote peace and harmony in the Six Counties and hope that whatever measures are taken by the Stormont Government or by Her Majesty's Government will enable all sections in the
  1350
  Six Counties, whatever their creed, to enjoy security and prosperity. That is our purpose. But there I part company with my right hon. Friend. There was no mistaking his clarity of expression or his presentation of the Bill. But I am bound to say that I thought that his arguments were, for the most par, irrelevant.
  I propose to deal with this matter as objectively as possible in the circumstances. During my right hon. Friend's speech there was a symptom of turbulence on this side of the House. But that is not altogether surprising. After all, in both the speeches made so far not a word was uttered about the origin of the Bill. It has nothing to do with militarism. It could have been avoided. There need not have been any legislation of this character at all if the Stormont Government, since they were initiated many years ago, had recognised the rights of the minority in the Six Counties to quite justifiable reforms in housing, adult suffrage, and the like. It is precisely because the Stormont Government negelected their obvious responsibility to the minority in the Six Counties that this Bill has become necessary.
  One should treat the, subject with as much objectivity as possible. Perhaps I have some qualifications for dealing with it in that fashion, because a few months ago I was in Belfast and I was approached by some Press people and asked for my views about some of the notabilities in the Six Counties. For example, I was asked for my opinion of the Rev. Ian Paisley, and I replied that he was obviously a man of strong convictions. I was asked what I thought about Captain Terence O'Neill, and I said that it was obvious that he was a man of the highest integrity. I could not have been more objective and diplomatic than that.
  But it is idle to suppose that passions and even turbulence can be allayed in the Six Counties by this legislation. If I sought to find a reason for opposing the legislation, the reason which I am about to advance might be regarded as strange, but not altogether strange in the circumstances. When I discover that on the other side of the House, and, in particular, among hon. Members from the Six Counties, there is a remarkable euphoria and enthusiasm and, as the right hon. and learned Member for

  1351
  Hexham (Mr. Rippon), leading for the Opposition, has just said, a welcome for the Bill, that is quite sufficient for us on this side to oppose it.
  Mr. Stratton Mills: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?
  Mr. Shinwell: Already?
  Mr. Mills: The right hon. Gentleman is being less than fair. I would refer him to HANSARD of Stormont for 12th November, in which John Hume, the Civil Rights Movement leader, says:
  "I will encourage all sections of the community to join this new force."
  Mr. Orme:What did he say in Stormont yesterday?
  Mr. Shinwell: I cannot imagine anything more irrelevant than that interjection by the hon. Member for Belfast, North (Mr. Stratton Mills).
  My reason for advancing opposition to the legislation may be regarded as even fantastic and grotesque, but one's political complexion is often conditioned by what opponents say and when I find such an extravagant welcome for this legislation I wonder about it. Anyway, I dislike it. That, for me, is quite sufficient reason for speaking in opposition.
  My right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence advanced some remarkable arguments in support of the legislation. He dealt with the background associated with the Six Counties for many long years. He mentioned terrorism, sabotage and the like and said that the purpose of the Bill was to prevent it. The manner of preventing it is to create a para-military force so that some members of it, in rural areas in particular, when they are appraised of an act of sabotage or apprehend an act of sabotage, can seize their rifles, proceed to the scene and deal with the situation. That is about the most grotesque conception of the role of a military force that I have ever heard.
  I could have understood my right hon. Friend if he had said that some elements of this para-military force were sent to particular areas where sabotage or terrorism was apprehended—that would be different—and that they would be provided with the necessary means of dealing with sabotage or terrorism. That, however, was not what my right hon.
  1352
  Friend said. They are to be spread all over the place and some provided with arms, which may or may not be used when there is an act of terrorism or sabotage. It is very odd to me. What kind of force is this to be? It certainly will not be of much value.
  There is something more about this. It is intended to recruit members of this force. My right hon. Friend said—I noted in particular his observations on this aspect of the legislation—that intending recruits will be furnished with an application form; they will be asked to answer a set of questions concerning, in particular, their religion. They must be desirable persons. That was my right hon. Friend's language. "Desirable persons" was his expression.
  The interpretation in the Six Counties among not only the Unionist Members of this House, but also the general public —I do not want to speak of the Orange Order—associated with the Unionist side of politics about who is desirable may not satisfy those who are making application.
  Mr. Healey: My right hon. Friend will recognise that the decision will not be taken by members of the Unionist Party. The decision about whom to accept and reject will be taken entirely by the General Officer Commanding, who is a British officer and responsible to me. I made this clear in my speech.
  Mr. Shinwell: If somebody applies to join the British Army and goes to a recruiting office, he is weighed and studied carefully—his length, breadth and the rest of it—and is asked a few questions and he signs a document. That is all easy going. It is a different situation, however, in the Six Counties.
  The most desirable characters have to be recruited. That is the intention. We cannot want undesirable characters. What is an undesirable character in the opinion of the Stormont Government or of some of the extremists associated with the Unionist Party?
  Mr. Healey: That is a totally irrelevant question, because the Stormont Government, the Unionist Party, the extremists and all the demonic characters to whom my right hon. Friend refers will have nothing whatever to do with recruiting,

  1353
  selecting or vetting the persons concerned.
  Mr. Shinwell: That interjection is also irrelevant. I am merely posing the general proposition, disregarding the question of the creation of a para-military force.
  Who will be responsible for the interpretation in the Six Counties? What will be the interpretation of those members of the Orange order, the Unionist Party or the extremists associated with them? What is the interpretation of "desirable character"?
  I will deal with the proposed Army. Somebody goes along, fills in an application form and is security vetted. I suppose that he would be asked a few questions—for example, what is his religion? He might reply that he is a Roman Catholic. That is all right. He might then be asked, "What is your opinion about partition?" I would be interested to know what the reaction would he. He might be asked, "What is your opinion about the Stormont Government?". I can imagine what the answer would be. Or have you ever been associated with the Civil Rights Movement? Have you ever been arrested for anything in the nature of turbulence in recent months in the Six Counties "—in other words, "Are you a desirable character?".
  I doubt very much whether there would be many recruits accepted from the minority section in the Six Counties. Indeed. I do not suppose that those on the other side of the fence want them.
  Mr. McMaster: I am trying hard to listen to the right hon. Gentleman's somewhat irresponsible speech. Does he not know that the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, the former Prime Minister and many members of the Government have made it clear that they want all sections and members of all religions to join the force? One of the faults of the previous force, and why the B Specials did not succeed, was that too few of the minority came forward to join it, which was a great pity.
  Mr. Shinwell: I am familiar with what appears in the Press and the utterances of those associated with the Stormont Government. Of course, they have made those declarations, just as my right hon.
  1354
  Friend has made them and just as my hon. Friend the Minister of Defence for Administration made them the other day. Of course, they say, "We would like these people in." I would like them in, also.
  I recognise that this will be very difficult for them if they arc security vetted and if they are asked—this may not be satisfactory for some hon. Members on the other side—to give their allegiance to the Queen. I know, of course, that the Roman Catholic Primate of All Ireland, Cardinal Conway, was asked the question, during the turbulence in recent months, whether he would give an assurance of allegiance to the Queen. There was no satisfactory response. And I am not surprised. We may be certain that in the attempt to recruit these people there will be considerable difficulty, and, at the end, the majority in the Six Counties will be satisfied that an overwhelming number of those not associated with the minority are in control.
  Now I come to the B Specials.
  Captain L. P. S. Orr(Down, South): A point of clarification, because I want to be sure that I understand what the right hon. Gentleman is arguing. Is he arguing now that in any force which is set up an oath of allegiance to the Queen should not be obligatory?
  Mr. Shinwell: I am not creating the force. I have had some association with the forces in this country over a fairly long period of time, and I understand what the drill is. Of course, if one enrols in the Army, the Navy or the Air Force, one takes an oath of allegiance to the Queen, and the force proposed is to be part of the British forces. In the Six Counties a large number associated with the minority will find great difficulty in making such a pronouncement. That is my opinion. I think that I am right about this—for various reasons, but largely because they do not trust the Stormont Government.
  Now I want to deal with the Stormont Government. What is the reason for this legislation? The inability of the Stormont Government to maintain law and order. There is no question about that. Is it denied? If the Stormont Government had been able to maintain law and order over a period of years, and particularly during recent months, since

  1355
  the Civil Rights Movement was initiated, there would be no need for this legislation at all. The question I venture to pose, and I should like an answer—presumably it will come from somebody on the other side of the House, or perhaps from the Minister who is to wind up—is, if the Government are incapable of maintaining law and order, are they reliable? If they are unreliable and unable to maintain law and order over periods of time and there is no guarantee that they can do so in future this legislation would be irrelevant. Ought we not to look for some alternative?
  I recognise that there is a difficulty here. I do not want to see Her Majesty's Government here taking over the Six Counties lock, stock and barrel. I do not think that it would work, but the question is: is there an alternative if the Stormont Government are proved unreliable? I challenge contradiction on that point. The Stormont Government have been proved unreliable and unable to maintain law and order, otherwise there would be no need for this legislation.
  Then, clearly, the same Stormont Government must be prepared, irrespective of this legislation, to promote reforms, particularly as regards civil rights, which we in this part of the United Kingdom possess, otherwise this legislation is simply whitewash and there will be no settlement at all.
  Mr. McGuire: I should just like to go back to what my right hon. Friend said about Cardinal Conway, because I think that unwittingly my right hon. Friend has done a disservice to what I think is the point of view. I do not think that it is so much a question of Catholics—and my right hon. Friend knows I am one, although I am not in Northern Ireland—in Northern Ireland, if they accept a position under the Government, accepting an oath of allegiance. It may be true that this is made a fetish of by Unionists, but I do not think that that is an obstacle. I think that what creates an obstacle in the minds of the Unionists is that they want men like Cardinal Conway to abandon for ever the concept of a united Ireland, and they relate that refusal to abandon that noble concept with being in some way in a traitorous position to-
  1356
  wards the Government of Northern Ireland.
  Mr. Shinwell: My hon. Friend has reinforced my contention. I revert back to what I was saying about the difficulty of recruiting this force, because if anybody wishes to join and were to declare that he wants a united Ireland he would be regarded as an undesirable character, even by the military, and I do not think my right hon. Friend would contest what I have just said.
  I want to come to the question of the Regular forces in the Six Counties at the present time.
  Mr. Lubbock: It is quite possible for a person who believes in a united Ireland to stipulate that that must be accomlished by peaceful means. Would not a person who holds this view be eligible to join the force? Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman or some other Minister could answer that?
  Mr. Healey: May I make this simple point, that 45 per cent. of the members of the Irish regiments of Her Majesty are Roman Catholics and that many of them come from Southern Ireland and none has any difficulty in taking this oath whatever. I am sure that the hon. Member for Belfast, East (Mr. McMaster), who knows a great deal more about the problem and has much more recent knowledge of it, will confirm what I said.
  Mr. Shinwell: The position of the Royal Ulster Constabulary is quite different from the position of this paramilitary force, because anybody who wishes to enter the Royal Ulster Constabulary is not security vetted—they are not under the control of the Commanding Officer in the Six Counties. If one is a member of an Orange Lodge, there is no difficulty about enrolling in the Royal Irish Constabulary. He is welcomed at once. [Interruption.] Is there any doubt about this? There is no need for the hon. and gallant Member for Down, South (Captain Orr) to tell me about the Six Counties. I knew more about the Six Counties than he does before the hon. and gallant Gentleman was born. I do not require to be informed by him on the subject.
  I want to ask about the Regular forces. Before this trouble occurred we had, I

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  think, about 5,000 of the British forces in the Six Counties. I think that that is right. We had a few regiments there. That number has now been escalated to about 9,000. I want to know: are those troops to be withdrawn when we have the paramilitary force in the Six Counties? Is the paramilitary force to take over the functions of the Regular Army?
  Mr. Healey: May I help my right hon. Friend by repeating what I said both in this debate and a fortnight ago? The troops will be withdrawn when the special duties on which they are engaged in preventing violence in the cities are no longer necessary, when things have returned to normal. We have deliberately, since we assumed responsibility in August for order in Northern Ireland, not used the Special Constabulary on those duties. The function of the new force is to replace the Special Constabulary for a completely different type of duty. With great respect to my right hon. Friend, I made this repeatedly clear, both in this debate and the previous one, and I think that if perhaps he had paid more attention on those two occasions, rather than to his experience before the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Down, South (Captain Orr) was born, my right hon. Friend would be more closely in touch with the problem.
  Mr. Shinwell: My right hon. Friend has made another speech. He has made several speeches during the course of this debate, but we have got no further as a result. I will say no more about that, though I may, perhaps, take another occasion to do so.
  Let me deal with the position. My right hon. Friend has not answered the question at all: how many of the Regular forces are to be brought back from the Six Counties? What my right hon. Friend has said is that when we have got this paramilitary force in operation, when there is no further sign or apprehension of turbulence or any trouble, then, of course, our troops, members of the British forces, will be brought back to this country.
  In those circumstances, we shall be left with the paramilitary force. It is surprising that my right hon. Friend who was responsible for practically disbanding the whole Territorial force in this country be-
  1358
  cause it cost too much, should now recreate a territorial force in Northern Ireland. If it is not a Territorial Army, what is it? It will even receive higher bounties than the Territorial forces—
  Mr. Healey: With respect to my right hon. Friend, I wish that he would listen. I have made it clear that the new force will receive higher emoluments than the U.S.C. and less than the Territorial Army Volunteer Reserve, which is well recruited in Northern Ireland at the moment and doing an excellent job as a reserve for the Regular Army, which is its function.
  My right hon. Friend would make a more helpful contribution to the debate if he would listen to what is said and not base his arguments on assumptions which are totally contrary to the facts both as known and as stated to the House.
  Mr. Shinwell: Perhaps my right hon. Friend will listen to what I am saying. I am asking why he has created what, in effect, is a Territorial Army in Northern Ireland.
  Mr. Healey: I explained that in the debate.
  Mr. Shinwell: My right hon. Friend did so to deal with apprehended turbulence, and the fashion in which he proposes to use the force is, in my judgment, ridiculous.
  I come to the question of arms. This is a package deal which is concerned not only with the creation of a military force but with the B Specials. The Royal Ulster Constabulary will be fortified by the new B Specials. Is that denied? Of course not; it is contained in the White Paper.
  Mr. Healey: Of course I deny it; it is absolutely wrong.
  Mr. Shinwell: Let us see what has happened. There has been a demand by the minority in the Six Counties for the abolition of the B Specials, because they were not trusted and were alleged to be brutal and sometimes uncivilised. I do not vouch for these statements, but that is what we have been told and what we understand to be the position.
  The B Specials are not to be provided with arms. There will be a centralised depot for the storage of arms and

  1359
  occasionally the B Specials will be provided with arms. I suppose that, before the present situation arose, the Royal Ulster Constabulary was provided with arms and did not require to apply for firearm licences. Similarly with the old B Specials, they were provided with arms which they could keep at home or take from a centralised store, and they did not require to apply for licences.
  A question recently asked the Stormont Parliament was replied to by Mr. Taylor, who is Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry for Home Affairs. He gave particulars of the firearms certificates issued in the Six Counties. The firearms certificates issued were as follows: for small bore rifles, 13,649; for revolvers, 1,562; for rapid fire weapons, 595; for shotguns, 51,752. The total number of certificates issued by the Stormont Government was 77,358—for a population of less than 1¼ million.
  Mr. John E. Maginnis(Armagh)rose—
  Mr. Shinwell: Have you got one?
  Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. I should point out that the Chair does not have one.
  Mr. Shinwell: Interruptions, most of them irrelevant and unnecessary, have caused me to occupy more time than I should and I hope that will be accounted to me for righteousness.
  Who are all these people in the Six Counties who are provided with firearms certificates? Are questions asked when a firearms certificate is issued? I guarantee that the overwhelming majority of holders of firearms are those not among the minority but in the majority. They will now be supplemented and fortified by B Specials, the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the paramilitary force of 6,000.
  The position is ridiculous. I cannot understand why the Government have introduced this legislation. I do not believe that it will procure peace in Northern Ireland, but that it will create a revulsion of feeling, unless the Stormont Government play ball and introduce reforms which have been justifiably demanded over and over again and which are denied to the minority in the Six Counties. I want peace in the
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  Six Counties, but I do not believe that we shall achieve it as long as the present Stormont Government are in power and the Unionist majority adopt the attitude of welcoming legislation simply because they know that they have gained a victory.
  5.26 p.m.
  Lord Hamilton: I cannot share the apprehension, if not the anguish, of hon. Gentlemen opposite about this White Paper. Representing a Border constituency remote and in the main rural, I welcome the White Paper and the formation of this new regiment, and for this reason I intend to be brief.
  The working party, which was set up only in the middle of October, realised the essence of swift decisions and has worked out its finding with commendable speed. The White Paper underlines the Government's concern and recognition of a need for adequate defence in Northern Ireland. It is obvious from the instant and inevitable protest from the hon. Member for Mid-Ulster (Miss Devlin) that the White Paper is both constructive and realistic. I trust that the majority of people in Northern Ireland, regardless of persuasion, either religious or political, will give full support to the regiment in recruitment and recognition. It is essential that the force should gain the confidence of the entire community.
  There are two serious but not insurmountable impediments to the gaining of this confidence. The main recruitment in rural areas will come from the farming industry, comprising, in the main, owner-occupiers, who will not be able to give up seven consecutive days each year for training. Industrial employees with only two weeks' holiday each year will be in the same position. Relaxation of this obligation must be made, otherwise recruitment, especially in rural areas, will undoubtedly suffer, and, just as important, there will be strong resentment among those who want to serve Northern Ireland in this force but, because of circumstances beyond their control, will not be able to do so.
  I welcome the Secretary of State's clarification of security vetting, which has already become a vexed problem. I trust that this will be put over to the people of Northern Ireland in a simple straightforward way so as to alleviate

  1361
  any mistrust or misapprehension. I emphasise that one wrong recruitment in this new force could endanger future morale and the feeling of the public towards the force. A more thorough system of vetting will have to be undertaken than is normal with military applicants. I hope that the Special Investigation Branch in Northern Ireland will consult the Intelligence Service of the Royal Ulster Constabulary in this matter.
  Before the debate is concluded, I trust that the Government will give an assurance to the people of Northern Ireland that the existence of this force will not be subjected to the whims of the Government of the day or in any way be affected by financial stringency. Northern Ireland is entitled to this assurance. I welcome paragraph 14 of the White Paper concerning the fact that members in certain circumstances can retain arms and ammunition in their homes. Obviously, this is an important matter in rural areas. The Ulster Constabulary in the County of Fermanagh, which I represent, during the last 50 years has not lost one weapon, nor during that time has there been one accident.
  I am also concerned about the position of the permanent staff of the Ulster Special Constabulary so that their future should in no way be jeopardised as a result of a deliberate and virulent propaganda campaign which is at present being carried out against them. The Government must not be taken in by this new campaign of denigration. I trust that the force will meet with success, and I also hope that many members of the Ulster Special Constabulary will join this force. I appreciate that many members of the Ulster Special Constabulary harbour a feeling of anguish and also disillusionment in regard to unfounded criticisms, but if they join this force they will be serving Northern Ireland, as they have so loyally done in the past.
  5.32 p.m.
  Mr. John Mendelson: In opening the debate, the Secretary of State for Defence embodied the tone and spirit with which the Government during these troubled times have rightly been approaching a difficult situation in Northern Ireland. I wish to put on record my tribute to the way in which the Gov-
  1362
  ernment as a whole, particularly the Home Secretary and Lord Stonham, our armed forces in Northern Ireland and the G.O.C., General Freeland, have conducted themselves in the past weeks and months. They have all made a considerable contribution to the stabilisation which has so far occurred, and no speech this afternoon would be complete without paying tribute to this good record.
  It is a fact that up to about last week the Government carried with them the full support of right hon. and hon. Members on this side of the House. We have all been impressed by the way in which they have handled this difficult problem and potentially tragic situation. But the announcement of this particular measure and the way in which the argumentation in favour of it has been backed up by Ministerial speeches has caused serious concern among the ranks of some Government supporters. This has been echoed in certain sections of the Press and also in Northern Ireland.
  I would take up one point which was made by an hon. Member opposite who referred to Mr. Hume. I normally treat what that hon. Gentleman says with respect, because I know that he likes to quote correctly and to b2. put right if he errs in that respect. Therefore, I should like to bring the record up to date by referring to what Mr. Hume said at Stormont yesterday afternoon about the intended wholesale recruitment of the Special Constabulary into this new Defence Regiment. I quote from a report of the Stormont debate:
  "We know that the key question is the reorganisation of the Ulster Special Constabulary. Lord Hunt has seen fit to have that force disbanded. Why, asked Mr. Hume, should such a force be given preference in the setting-up of a new force?"
  That is the key to this debate, and it is important that I should direct my right hon. Friend's attention to this matter. The wholesale, almost automatic, transfer of the Special Constabulary into the new Defence Regiment is being bitterly opposed by the Opposition in Stormont and in Northern Ireland generally and has given the gravest possible concern to hon. Members on this side of the House.
  It is not possible to brush the problem aside as easily as my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence tried

  1363
  to do earlier this afternoon in one phrase, by saying that an unfortunate term was used by Mr. Porter in allowing these application forms to be sent out. That is not good enough. I would not be so concerned with the fact that the form had been sent out if it were not a symptom of the most serious difficulties which will beset the policy of the Government, as is the intention of extremists in Stormont.
  We all know that Mr. Porter and Members of his Government have been under great pressure from their own extremists. We know what Mr. Craig has been saying about Mr. Porter's policy. But the Government must not pander to the Craigs. Their political influence must be broken if there is to be peace in Northern Ireland. One can have any amount of understanding for Captain O'Neill, but what broke Captain O'Neill was the opposition within his own ranks.
  When it became known that the Ulster Defence Regiment was to be set up, there was tremendous pressure put on the Government at Stormont by those who represent the extremists among the Special Constabulary or the B Specials. They threatened to break the Prime Minister. Anybody who has followed the discussions which have taken place in the parliamentary party at Stormont will know that I am simply stating the facts. A fresh campaign was worked up against Major Chichester-Clark. Threats were made that he would be broken and destroyed, as was Captain O'Neill, unless he bent to the wind of the extremists in his own party.
  It is the duty of the Government at Westminister to oppose any such tendency and not to underwrite any concessions to extremism in Northern Ireland. This is the purpose behind the over-hasty sending-out of application forms. Major Chichester-Clark said at his Press conference the other day, after my hon. Friend had announced the White Paper in this House, "Join up". He created the impression that it had been agreed with the Government at Westminster that there should be a wholesale takeover of the B Specials into the new force. If words have any meaning, nobody can deny that his words at that conference meant that and nothing else.
  Mr. R. Chichester-Clark: Was the hon. Gentleman present at this Press conference? If he was not, I suspect very strongly that the Minister was.
  Mr. Mendelson: I always think that there are two types of facts—facts one knows on good authority and facts one knows because one was present. Nobody was present at the Press conference that Napoleon I gave, but we hear much about it.
  I have read the full stenographic report of this Press conference. If the hon. Gentleman wishes, I will provide him with the text from which I am now quoting. There is no dubiety. This is what was said at the Press conference. If the qualification for quoting what was said at any Press conference was physical presence at the conference, debate in the House would be severely limited.
  I continue with what I am accurately putting to the House. If this force is to attract people from all sections of the community, as it must, and as it is certainly the Government's intention that it should, the first thing that must be countermanded is the easy assumption that in the first few months of recruitment the vast majority must come from the B Specials. Unless we can have a full assurance from the Government on this point, I shall find it difficult to support the Bill tonight.
  It is difficult to believe that other people in Northern Ireland, particularly members of the minority, will be easily persuaded to join the new force if already 3,000 to 4,000 B Specials have moved into it before they have had a chance of their applications being considered.
  Nobody has advanced any reason why there should be such a hurry. The application forms sent out by the officers of the Special Constabulary to their members were accompanied by a letter stating that recruitment would start on 1st January and that the whole force would be ready by 1st April. The hint thus was, "You come in now and leave no room for anybody else. Then the force will be composed entirely of you".
  What other reason was there for such a great hurry? Nobody is attacking

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  Northern Ireland at present. We have a large and efficient Army there under the command of the G.O.C. There are no reasons for creating an atmosphere of panic. On the contrary, political harm might be done if people were to feel that there was to be a stampede into the new force and that everything would be cut and dried before other people in the community could be properly considered for acceptance.
  The only reason for the hurry was political. Because Major Chichester-Clark was under very great pressure from the extremists, he decided that the only way to reassure them—after all, they did not like either the giving up of their arms or the disbandment of the B Specials was to go as near as possible to giving the impression that this would be a continuation of the U.S.C. without saying so. There might be political reasons why the head of the Northern Ireland Cabinet would want to do that, but it is not a reason which can commend itself to my right hon. and hon. Friends.
  Mr. Stratton Mills: I am not certain that the hon. Gentleman has fully grasped the point that this registration was brought about by the structural changes introduced consequent upon the report of the Hunt Committee. If he reads the Hunt Report carefully, he will find that it makes no broad general criticism of the B Specials.
  Mr. Mendelson: I will come to the question of criticism in a few moments. I am dealing now with the attitude of the Stormont Government. The points I have just made have nothing to do with the Hunt Report. I shall not pronounce on the behaviour of people in the constabulary force; nor have the Government the right to pronounce on that, nor has the hon. Gentleman, because the Scarman Commission has not yet reported.
  However, when I was a member of an official delegation of Labour Parliamentarians in Northern Ireland immediately after the disturbances, I found people in opposition disagreeing on a whole host of things, as the hon. Gentleman well knows. However, one point on which they will all agree—moderates and less moderate people among the opposition—was that they did not accept that most of the members of the Special Constabu-
  1366
  lary had in the past conducted themselves honourably and properly. This is their point of view.
  We shall have to await the report of the Scarman Tribunal on, for instance, what went on in Belfast, what went on when people were killed in their homes during the period of those troubles. I shall not pronounce on that issue, but I do not want anyone else to tell me that he can pronounce on it.
  This being so, the minority in the opposition being generally agreed that they do not accept that most of the special constabulary had conducted themselves properly and honourably, the least effective way of convincing them that they should encourage some of their people to join the new forces is to fill it up with 4,000 or 5,000 B Specials first and then say, "There may be a few places left for you".
  Mr. Chichester-Clark: The hon. Gentleman having warned us all not to take Scarman before it comes, is it worthy of him then to indulge in a generalised smear against a very gallant force?
  Mr. Mendelson: I am not making a smear against anybody. I am saying that the minority do not accept the view, which has been too easily assumed from both Front Benches at Westminster, that most of the B Specials have acted properly in the past.
  Therefore, I ask the Government to announce tonight that there will be no hurried recruitment, that people will be phased in, that plenty of time will be taken, that there will be no wholesale takeover of B Specials into the new force, that people from all sections will be encouraged to join by and by, and that there will be only a deliberately limited recruitment of the present members of the B Specials. My conduct at the end of the debate will depend to a large extent upon the answer on this point.
  I turn to the equally dangerous question of members of the force keeping arms at home. No good reason has been advanced for the way in which this provision is to be operated. Immediately after the disturbances—I have no reason to believe that they have changed their

  1367
  minds competent British military authorities in Northern Ireland took the view, first, that there were far too many arms about, and, secondly, as there were far too many arms about, that there was always the danger, as the last 12 years or so have shown, of incidents occurring, because people stick a gun through the window of somebody's car too early in a conversation when no untoward incident has happened. There is a danger of incidents developing when there is in fact nothing to justify them, because arms are in people's possession and somehow or other they think that something is going on.
  The Minister of Defence for Administration (Mr. Roy Hattersley): I am reluctant to interrupt my hon. Friend, but this section of his speech began with the words: "competent British military authorities" have suggested. It would be unfortunate if the House were to believe that the things that he went on to say were the opinion of what he described as "competent military authorities".
  It is very important for him to make it clear that, while the initial opinion that he expressed was certainly the view of military authorities, it has been the military authorities—indeed, the G.O.C. Northern Ireland—who have agreed, in extreme and special circumstances, to special constables keeping their arms at home during the last three months. It will be exactly the same competent military authorities who have to decide in future whether members of the new force keep their arms at home.
  Mr. Mendelson:I accept that. I correct what my hon. Friend has said, to this extent. In the period shortly after the disturbances had occurred, the same competent military authorities took the view that this would be only a temporary arrangement as regards the Specials and that it was not desirable as a permanent arrangement. I stand by this and deliberately read it into the record this afternoon. People can change their minds, but the arguments behind this concern about allowing people to keep arms at home are as sound today as in the weeks immediately after the disturbances took place. It is essential that the House should know, before passing this legis-
  1368
  lation, that this view is as reasonable now as it was then.
  On the problem of keeping arms at home, the Secretary of State said that there was nothing to worry about because the authorisation for their use would come from the military authorities. There is an obvious contradiction here. If it is to be the central military authorities that alert a small group of members of this special regiment somewhere in the countryside—I accept the examples that hon. Gentlemen opposite and the Government have advanced—surely the most efficient way of doing this would be for the Commander-in-Chief and his assistant commanders to have arms stored in different parts of the country. Then, when calling upon people to get ready for some conceivable action, they can be directed, as people in the Armed Forces normally do, as the right hon. Gentleman knows as a former Minister for the Army, to collect the arms, under supervision, and sign for them, as many of us had to do when we served in the Armed Forces, either in war or in peace, and be directed to the place of assembly. That is the normal and sensible way of doing it. I cannot see how anybody can contradict that.
  Why not do it in that way? Why create this disturbance in the minds of so many in the minority that a number of people will still be allowed to keep arms at home?
  I have not mixed this with the politics of the situation. I suggest this commonsense way of achieving the result that the Secretary of State advanced. I doubt whether any military authority would contradict this as a sensible way of doing it.
  I suggest that it was for political reasons that some of the B Specials over the last three months threatened to resign, and some even resigned, at the moment of handing in their arms. I suggest that a big movement was developing among the B Specials who wanted to resign if they had to hand in their arms, even in the city centres. I suggest that it is for political reasons that they wish to keep arms in their homes and because it gives them the feeling that somehow they are special citizens. If there is no sound military reason for them keeping arms in their homes, the Secretary of

  1369
  State has no business to accept such political reasoning. He should throw it out of his intentions and announce tonight that people will not be allowed to keep arms in their homes.
  I turn to my last point, which deals more with the political situation than with the practical matter of how this force should be arranged. I said at the beginning that the Government have conducted themselves very well during these difficult times. But my contribution would not be complete if I omitted saying that the chief spokesman for the Opposition on the political matters involved, the right hon. and learned Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg), has made a useful contribution to the development of the debate during the last few months.
  This matter is also a responsibility of the Opposition. I am not addressing myself particularly to hon. Members from Northern Ireland constituencies I am talking about the Opposition as a whole. After all, the Opposition have responsibility for the party which is in office at Stormont, because it is the Conservative and Unionist Party. The Unionist Party is not some extraneous body which has nothing to do with the Conservative Party here.
  We, on this side, have so far been lenient in the way that we have talked about the accumulated serious responsibility of the Conservative Party in this House and in the United Kingdom in general. After all, it is their intimate political colleagues who have been in office who have been responsible for the periods of intimidation and one-sided Government which has gone on for so long in Northern Ireland. They have a grave responsibility.
  I thought that when the hon. Member for Saffron Walden (Mr. Kirk), who used to have a junior position in the last Conservative Administration, was in Northern Iraeland, as a member of a Conservative parliamentary delegation, the hon. Gentleman expressed himself at a Press conference in very strong terms against the kind of regime that his fellow Conservatives had been carrying on at Stormont for many years. He warned them that if they went on in this way they would get no support here. We had no echo of this attitude from the right hon. and
  1370
  learned Member for Hexham (Mr. Rippon) this afternoon. He talked as if nothing had happened in the last 12 months. He spoke as if there had been no need for the Civil Rights Movement. He spoke as though in the normal course of routine there should be set up a new defence regiment and we are now discussing the details.
  There is a grave political responsibility on the leadership of the Opposition. There have been years of neglect. There has been no encouragement of their friends at Stormont to adopt a more responsible political attitude to the grave problems there. That being so, we would not regard the situation as other than utterly intolerable if it were to be completely covered up. What has happened in Northern Ireland under the Unionist and Conservative Government has been a complete breakdown of the ability to govern.
  I want to read into the record one example that I heard about when I was in Belfast. Referring to the disturbances in Belfast, I said to Mr. Peacock, who was then head of the R.U.C., the ordinary constabulary: "We have been told that at one point a group of extremists went from street to street and burned down five public houses owned by Catholics that some people tailing along behind asked them not to do it, to which they replied, 'Well, we are going to do it, and to hell with you.'; and that one or two clergymen who tried to argue with them were brushed aside." I then asked Mr. Peacock: "Purely on the point of maintaining law and order and the defence of property, what were your people doing when these outrages were taking place?" Mr. Peacock replied, in a quiet voice: "I must admit that at one point we were not in control of what was going on."
  This is the important factor that we have to consider. This is why there is such a large Army in Northern Ireland today. This has been passed over. It has not even been mentioned in passing in the debate. Yet it is the essential background to what we are discussing. Mr. Peacock was admitting that, with all the forces at his disposal, he could not control his own extremists. That is the significance of what I am saying. It was not a question of other people doing something against law and order he

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  could not control the extremists on his own side.
  We must not allow illusions to be created in Northern Ireland that there will be a wholesale transfer of the Special Constabulary forces into the new regiment.
  Mr. Hattersley indicated assent.
  Mr. Mendelson: I am glad to have the agreement of my right hon. Friend. I hope that it will be said in no uncertain terms today that limitations on numbers and phasing-in will be imposed.
  I am sure that this will disappoint some hon. Gentlemen opposite who may have committed themselves to the members of the B Specials by giving implied promises that there will be a wholesale takeover. It would be disastrous if the Government accepted this policy, and I hope that they will give the essential assurances for which we have asked.
  6.0 p.m.
  Mr. Henry Clark: We have heard what I can only call a misinformed, wise-after-the-event, and highly mischievous speech by the hon. Member for Penistone (Mr. John Mendelson). I must bracket him with his right hon. Friends the Members for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) and for Belper (Mr. George Brown).
  It is speeches of that sort, made over many years in the House, that have prevented any chance of our achieving a reasonable constitutional and constructive position in Northern Ireland, in the form of the Northern Ireland Labour Party. Time after time reasonable Ulstermen in the Northern Ireland Labour Party have had their political legs shot from under them by those on the Labour benches in this House. The Labour Party representatives in the House—especially that section below the Gangway—are in no position to make criticisms of the sort that they have made.
  Mr. McNamara: Does the hon. Member recall the memorandum submitted co the then Prime Minister of Northern Ireland Captain Terence O'Neill—by the Northern Ireland Labour Party about the Northern Ireland Committee of the All-Ireland Trade Union Congress? Does he recall the terms contained in that memorandum, and the fact that Captain
  1372
  O'Neill was not able to receive it because he was ill, but that he denied that the majority of the points contained therein required any sort of redress? Does he realise that it is precisely that sort of speech, coming from hon. Members opposite, that causes hon. Members on this side of the House to make such criticisms?
  Mr. Clark: If there had been consider. able electoral support for the Northern Ireland Labour Party—which, unfortunately, there was not, due largely to the anti-partitionist and republican speeches that we so frequently hear from English Labour Party Members—we might not have had the troubles that we have had, and we might not even have had the hon. Member for Mid-Ulster (Miss Devlin).
  We are doing today what the House has done on a number of occasions before —creating a volunteer militia for Ireland. There have been several predecessors. A ballad tells us that the South Down militia was the terror of the land. Another goes so far as to tell us that the Cork militia beat the Turks at Waterloo, which is unlikely. On a more serious level there is, laid up in Armagh Cathedral, a French eagle which was captured from the French by the Armagh militia in the Napoleonic wars. Even hon. Members opposite below the Gangway must pay some tribute to the Irish Volunteers, who not only defended the United Kingdom but played their part in obtaining a Parliament for Ireland.
  The new Ulster Defence Regiment will inherit a very honourable tradition. it will also inherit its purpose directly from its immediate predecessor, the Ulster Special Constabulary. The purpose of the Ulster Special Constabulary and the new regiment is to combat terrorism in Northern Ireland.
  To understand the function of the new force it is strictly relevant to look at the record of the Ulster Special Constabulary over the years. That force was created in an ad hoc fashion under the 1835 Special Constables Act in 1920 and came into existence in the first three years of violent civil war—a civil war which was possibly more intense and bitter in Northern Ireland than in any other part of Ireland at the time.
  Between 1920 and 1924 well over 1,000 people died violent deaths. Many more

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  were injured, and many others were frightened out of their lives. The trouble in Northern Ireland was more bitter than in any other place because there was no element of class struggle, which seems to give a certain respectability to bloodshed in some people's minds.
  The civil war in Northern Ireland in the 1920s could be expressed as Protestant village versus Catholic village and Protestant street versus Catholic street. It was the fighting that took place between these years that led to the polarisation between Catholic and Protestant. We had thereafter intermittent outbreaks, in the 1920s and 1930s. English Members will remember the attempts made by the I.R.A. to blow up Hammersmith Bridge, and the placing of bombs in letter boxes in 1938–39.
  The Ulster Special Constabulary, having proved its sterling worth in the bitter fighting from 1920 to 1924, remained continuously in existence with a strength of rather more than 12,000 men. Rather than refer to history, however, it is more appropriate to talk of current events of the troubles from 1956—the night of 12th December, when 12 separate I.R.A. attacks were launched without warning and without advance Intelligence information—right the way through until the campaign was brought to its horrible finale with the cold-blooded murder of Constable Anderson on the border at Fermanagh.
  The Secretary of State has given some details of that campaign, but to bring home what we mean by terrorism I am sure that you will bear with me, Mr. Speaker, if I talk about what happened in the years from 1956 to 1961 in the area around my home. I live 40 miles from the border. The local police barracks was attacked on three separate occasions in 1957 and 1958. At the time of the third attack there must have been at least 30 men involved on either side.
  All the roads were blocked immediately before the attack—and there are five roads leading to the border. Automatic weapons were used. There was a gun battle up and down the street of a small town, involving 30 to 40 people. Two were seriously injured, and it is amazing that no one was killed.
  We had the general ration of bridges, transformers and telephone kiosks being
  1374
  blown up, or of attempts being made to blow them up. A dozen such incidents took place within five miles of my home. A transformer within 100 yards of my home was blown up while I was standing at the door of my garage. My brother's car was wrecked by a tree felled with the obvious intention of killing him. We also found within five or six miles of my house four concealed dugouts, equipped with food, arms and bedding for terrorist attackers.
  Finally, the nastiest attack was made on a training hut, and if there had not been a fraction of a second's warning eight men would have been killed. The consequent hatred resulting from the deaths of those eight people would have meant that the incident would not have been forgotten for many years in my area. Fortunately, those deaths were averted. That is what terrorism is, and that is what we are trying to combat.
  The worst aspects affect not just those who go out to fight the I.R.A. or other terrorists, but those who stay at home, and especially the women. There are the bombs, the rifle shots in the night and the cars tearing up and down the road. There are the frantic telephone calls. It is not until hours later that people know what has been happening. That is not the kind of state that hon. Members would want their neighbours and relations to live in, but that is the state that we lived in on many nights between 1956 and 1961,
  It is worth remembering that during that period there was an expansion of the Ulster Special Constabulary. I believe that it reached a strength of 17,000 men and together with the R.U.C. the force amounted to over 20,000 men involved in fighting the terrorists. They enabled the I.R.A. attacks to be countered successfully. If those attacks had been successful—if the deterrent of the U.S.C., spread evenly over the country, had not been so great—I hate to imagine to what level the terrorist activities would have risen.
  But from the first day of their campaign the I.R.A. were defeated. If the I.R.A. had been successful and the forces opposed to them had been smaller Ulster might have been turned into chaos in 1957, and we would not have had to wait until 1958 and 1959. Those events took place only ten years ago. This year,

  1375
  again, there have been undoubted I.R.A. activities as well as the activities of Protestant extremists. Both the Hunt and the Cameron Reports made it clear that the straight military danger should not be overlooked, and that it was something very real. As the Secretary of State said, the prime object is the principal recommendation of the Hunt Committee. This answers the point about the constitutional position of the police and of the Northern Ireland Government in defence matters.
  The Hunt Committee recommended that the police should no longer have the responsibility for the military defence of Northern Ireland against terrorists. I am delighted that the police can now get on with the civil police work which they do so well. It is no coincidence that we have the lowest serious crime rate and the highest detection rate in the British Isles, possible in the world, since our excellent civil police force also has this other burden. I am delighted that the Government have accepted the Hunt recommendation.
  It follows, therefore, that the Ulster Special Constrabulary must be stood down. I am glad that the Army has realised that a force on the lines of the Special Constabulary is essential if terrorism is to be countered all over Northern Ireland. In fact, one must ask why the Ulster Defence Regiment was not created 50 years ago, when Ulster herself was created. It is a strange constitutional arrangement that a provincial Parliament should be given prime responsibility for the defence of the United Kingdom frontier and the defence of Ulster.
  In 1956–61—not in the war-weary Britain of 1920 or 1923—there were constant guerrilla attacks, and the man mainly responsible for defending against those attacks was the Minister of Home Affairs in Northern Ireland. Although the Army co-operated, generally well and reasonably, it was, in fact, the police and the Ulster Special Constabulary which, first of all, met those attacks and defeated them.
  I do not believe that it is the function of a provincial government to carry out defence. That should be primarily the function of a central Parliament. I welcome the fact that the creation of the
  1376
  Ulster Defence Regiment will end the constitutional anomaly and the Government of the United Kingdom will take over full responsibility for our defence. I hope, too, that when the Secretary of State for Defence has responsibility for meeting attacks across the border, rather firmer representations will be made to Dublin by the Foreign Office than have been made in the past. It is widely felt in Northern Ireland that the Government of Southern Ireland have for far too long winked at the existence of a terrorist force in Southern Ireland.
  Mr. Rose: That is not true.
  Mr. McGuire: The hon. Gentleman opposite will surely know that the Republic of Ireland Government deal far more severely with their extremists than the Stormont Government deal with the Northern extremists in Ulster.
  Mr. Clark: I thank the hon. Member. The answer is that they deal with them rather severely—occasionally. When the election is well over, for a couple of years they do put men into the Curragh, but the fact remains that continuously, for the last 50 years, a subversive terrorist organisation has drilled in Southern Ireland and the number of prosecutions for such drilling have been very few indeed.
  Mr. Rose: I know that the hon. Member means well. Will he take it from me that I was present in the Dail when the question of Northern Ireland was debated recently and that every speaker on that occasion was far more moderate than even I would claim to be on this subject and repeatedly said that although they hoped to see Ireland ultimately united it could never be by coercion, and that every party united in eschewing coercion as a matter of uniting Ireland?
  Mr. Clark: I have not read the HANSARD of the Dail quite as avidly as the hon. Member. I am prepared to accept that many people take a moderate view, but what we in Northern Ireland want is deeds, not words. We have known of this risk and have experienced terrorist attacks. Those of us who have been connected, as I have since my very earliest days, with the Ulster Special Constabulary, regret its passing. It was a body with many traditions and with a fine record. Despite what anyone has

  1377
  ever said about it, the I.R.A. never suggested that it was not a very effective weapon against terrorism—
  Mr. Orme: What did the Cameron Report say about it?
  Mr. Clark: It did not deal directly with the Special Constabulary, but only with a minority.
  As my noble Friend the Member for Fermanagh and South Tyrone (Lord Hamilton) said, there has been a campaign of vilification of the Special Constabulary by the I.R.A. It is not surprising that the most effective weapon of defence is the first thing attacked. I have no doubt that the attack and the vilification was planned from Dublin by the I.R.A. and carried through with considerable skill.
  It was an easy target, I admit, because the Special Constabulary appears seldom, except at night, and therefore the men who were seldom seen could be fixed upon as bogeymen, although they were ordinary citizens living next door to ordinary citizens. The average service in the Special Constabulary is probably 20 years for half an hour's action. Often, a man will have served 40 years 'and never seen action. It is not my experience — I have done many patrols late at night with the Special Constabulary—that it is composed of hotheads. The men who join are far more like the men who would man volunteer fire brigades or do civil defence work in this country. It is ridiculous to label the whole Special Constabulary, by arguing from the particular to the general, as hotheads and thugs.
  Our object, here and in Committee, is, I hope, to make the Ulster Defence Regiment a fully effective force. I emphasise again that, for purely military reasons, so that we may have an effective military force to replace the Special Constabulary, it is essential that it must draw in the early stages on the Special Constabulary for experience, officers and men. If this new regiment has not a military purpose, it has no purpose at all. If we ever begin to neglect its military purpose and emphasise its social purpose and other functions, we will be doing it a great damage.
  Roman Catholics will, of course, be welcome, just as there were Roman
  1378
  Catholics in the Ulster Special Constabulary—
  Mr. Fitt: Thank you very much—very decent of you.
  Mr. Clark: If the shouts below the Gangway are evidence of the bigotry which hon. Members seem to feel, it will not do them much good.
  There were Roman Catholics in the Ulster Special Constabulary a very few —but they did not remain long after the polarisation which occurred in the bitter fighting in 1923 and 1924. But we are prepared—I speak in this case for the Protestant community—to accept men, no matter what church they go to on Sunday, who are determined, as we are in Northern Ireland, to take the gun and the petrol bomb out of Irish politics. I believe that many people of both communities are prepared to place a deterrent there so that the gun may be removed from Ulster politics.
  To ensure that this force is seen to be what it will be, the oath-taking ceremony should be partially public and meaningful. The security vetting of the men to discover both Protestant and Catholic extremists is of the greatest possible importance. The training schedules —and I am glad the Secretary of State made this point—must be flexible enough to allow the farming community to play their full part, for the farming community have always supplied some of the best men in every Irish militia unit. We hope sincerely that when the new force is formed, the sergeant instructors—the regular training sergeants from the British Army were very much the backbone of the Ulster Special Constabulary —will be able to transfer and become sergeant instructors in the new defence regiment.
  There is an important point here, namely, the question of long service medals. The Ulster Special Constabulary has had few enough medals, although they have earned very many. Long-service medals are treated with considerable respect by the men who earn them. I ask that consideration be given to the possibility that men who have almost earned long service medals in the Ulster Special Constabulary should be allowed to take their medals when that force comes to an end. If a man has

  1379
  not completed a large number of years service, the years that he has completed in the Ulster Special Constabulary should go some extent towards a long service medal, which I hope many will earn in the new Ulster Defence Regiment.
  We are glad that the new force is to be paid considerably better than the B Specials were in the past. I wish to emphasise that the most economical way of moving men around today is by allowing them to use their own private cars. May we have some assurance that there will be an adequate car allowance for the volunteers in the new regiment to enable them to use their own cars? Will the Government also look into the question of allowing men with a number of years experience to start at the full level of gratuity instead of having to wait Four years and work up to it?
  In terms of equipment, to make the new regiment an effective defence against terrorism, communications, above all, are important. I would like short wave radio sets to be available for every patrol, and there should be telephones, if not in every volunteer's house, certainly in houses occupied by those down to the level of sergeant, because the instant turnout is the one thing which will make this an effective force for defeating terrorism.
  Reference has been made to the storage of arms, and I support the right hon. Gentleman's statement on this matter this afternoon. A real danger exists if arms are not stored in anything but the largest and most carefully protected armouries. The 1956 I.R.A. campaign was armed largely by the successful raid on Armagh Barracks two years earlier. If there had been no such raid, it is very doubtful whether the I.R.A. would have been able to open up the campaign in 1956.
  I think that perhaps the most important requirement of all is for the new force to have a better chance than the Ulster Special Constabulary had of achieving a good public image. We are delighted that they are to be given a smart walking out uniform, so that they may be seen more frequently and not criticised for not being seen, as the Ulster Special Constabulary was. Without forgetting the prime military rule, I think that we should
  1380
  find other new rôles for this force. They might set up a rescue and emergency service, and I should like to see them controlling crowds at football matches and agricultural shows. I certainly look forward to seeing the new regiment sending a team to Bisley. I hope that a full-time public relation officer for this force will be appointed almost at once. We want the reputation of this new force to be built up and we want it to be fully appreciated by. all sections of the community.
  One question about this new force that has frequently been asked in my constituency, where it has been welcomed and where many people have said they would be prepared to join it, is, "How long is it going on for?" I ask the Government for an assurance that they will not materially reduce this force or stand it down without the full agreement of the Government of Northern Ireland. If that assurance is given I believe there is every hope that the new Ulster Defence Regiment will be a proud successor to the many volunteer militia units which have played such a noble part in Irish history.
  Several Hon. Members rose
  Mr. Speaker: Many hon. Members wish to speak in the debate. Reasonably brief speeches will help.
  6.24 p.m.
  Mr. Kevin McNamara: I have been interested in the speech of the hon. Member for Antrim, North (Mr. Henry Clark). My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State referred to the fears of many people in Northern Ireland who were wondering what would happen if the B Specials went. I can understand the problem. This past year they have gone through a very difficult time and have had a bitter experience. Everything that they had been told to believe in has been shattered, and they have seen a complete political somersault turned by their leaders in Stormont.
  When I last spoke in the House on this subject I said that much of the problem was one of fear. I can understand the majority's position, but it is exactly the sort of speech such as we have just heard from the hon. Member for Antrim, North which builds up the fear and the trembling. It was exactly the people

  1381
  going around at night on their patrols, putting up road blocks, stopping cars, knocking on doors and pushing rifles through windows who made my family and other relatives afraid of the B Specials.
  Those are the people who now appear to want to be taken over completely into the new Ulster Defence Regiment. These are the people who make those of us who study the problem and who have relatives in the area very suspicious about the new regiment.
  I join with my hon. Friend the Member for Penistone (Mr. John Mendelson) in acquiting the Government on this point. We all know how hard the task has been for the Government and we know what a difficult path they have had to tread. But I also know that the general feeling amongst the minority in Northern Ireland is that they have been hoodwinked by the Stormont Government. The statement which emerged after the Downing Street conference that the B Specials were to go and that this other force would be a new one will not, we feel, turn out to be true.
  We have carefully read the contents of the White Paper and the Bill and we have listened with attention to the statements which were made last week and by my right hon. Friend today. He has tried to build in safeguards for the minority. We accept that, but we fear that the ground has been taken away from beneath him. The moment the idea for this new force was mooted, and as soon as the Hunt Report was published, statements were immediately made to the B Specials, "You have nothing to worry about. You can come in. This will be a spendid new organisation, boys, and we want you in it."
  I am prepared to accept that many of the B Specials are honest and hardworking men who feel that they are doing a job. It is not a job which I believe to e necessary for them to do; nevertheless, they are doing a job properly and correctly. But when general statements of this nature are made, when these points are put across by spokesmen from the Stormont Government, when we have statements—presumably accurately reported in the Belfast Telegraph—made by the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, saying that the tradition of the B Specials will continue in the new force,
  1382
  that there will be plenty of room in the new force for these men and that the training conditions will be very flexible, we begin to be suspicious.
  However, the difficulty over flexibility in training can result in there being no training. Everyone can make an excuse to get out of the training but can still be a member of the force, can still be a bully boy and can carry on in the way that the B Specials have behaved in the past.
  Mr. Shinwell indicated assent.
  Mr. McNamara: I see that my hon. Friend the Minister of Defence for Administration does not agree, but that is the fear which exists. It is because it is feared that the people coming in will be the very people who were involved in incidents where we have seen B Specials wearing white armbands, attacking civil rights marchers and going berserk, and that they will be fully mobilised again, that we are worried and suspicious about the situation. My right hon. and hon. Friends must understand how we feel.
  It was with those fears in mind that I listened with interest to my right hon. Friend's statement about the idea of a new advisory committee. In many ways, it is a good idea, and I would like to see it implemented. However, if such a committee is to be set up, can it be written into the Bill? Can the necessary provision be made in Committee or on Report, or even introduced in another place, to set up this advisory committee'? Can we also be given any idea of the source of the information which is to be used when recruits are vetted by the G.O.C.? Presumably it will come from the Royal Ulster Constabulary, that being the body which has most of the information. Again, it would not be beyond the bounds of possibility for us to be a little suspicious of the information being laid. We need more clear and categorical assurances about it.
  The number of people in the force needs to be clearly considered. Nothing makes me more suspicious about the whole concept of this regiment than the fact that its numbers were jumped up from 4,000 to 6,000. When one adds to that the 1,500 men who are to go into the Police Reserve, one is very much on

  1383
  a par with the number serving in the B Specials at the moment.
  I have never been convinced of the military reason for this force. In his report, Lord Hunt states that in many ways the fear of trouble from across the border is an exaggeration and a myth. But I accept that it is a real fear. The noble Lord opposite says that the trouble is more likely to come from sectarian bitterness inside the Six Counties. If that is so, we have to make sure that the new regiment starts off on a proper footing.
  That brings me back to the military reason for the force. If I were a member of the Stormont Government, faced with the problems and with Westminster intervening, I would be confronted with three alternatives. The first is to abolish the B Specials. If that was done, the Northern Ireland Government would lose their political supporters. The second alternative is to maintain the B Specials. That would be unacceptable here, as well as being constitutionally difficult with an unarmed police force and armed police reserves. The third alternative is to hit on a political compromise. That is what the Northern Ireland Government have done and, because it is a political rather than a military decision, we are very suspicious about the number of men proposed and the way in which the B Specials are to continue in what is called the transitional period.
  We are suspicious about the officer cadre and the people who are to form it The White Paper says that the battalion commanders will come from the existing officers of the B Specials. When one looks at the gentlemen concerned, one sees that, at best, some were guilty of grave neglect of duty in that they were unable to control their men and made no attempt to prevent them behaving in a fashion which was completely alien to the idea of any sort of police force. I put it no higher than that.
  If that alone is not sufficient to show why we are suspicious of them, when one looks at the likely junior officers, many of them have been positively identified as being involved in specific incidents, and that makes us even more suspicious.
  My right hon. Friend said that all those concerned would be carefully vetted. It
  1384
  will have to be done with the maximum publicity to overcome the evil which we have seen in the past few days following the television broadcasts, the advertising and, now, the statement which is to be made in the Stormont and which, unfortunately, we shall not hear.
  When I interrupted my right hon. Friend, he answered my point by saying that it was to be the subject of a statement to be made in Stormont. However, it should be the subject of a statement in this House. After all, the G.O.C. is responsible to the Secretary of State, and the B Specials are under his control. For us to be able to continue this debate, we should be told what disciplinary action is being taken.
  Other matters arise from it, and I have referred already to the problems of recruitment. In addition, we need more details of what is to be demanded of recruits in terms of educational qualifications than the vague answer given to my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Ulster (Miss Devlin). We want details of the physical and mental fitness requirements. There is nothing in the White Paper about that, although it is referred to in the White Paper dealing with the Police Reserve.
  We are concerned about the upper age limit and the reasons given by my right hon. Friend for taking in people at such an old age. I can understand the paper argument, but it must not be forgotten that the age limit proposed will bring in the very people who were involved in the I.R.A. troubles of 1956 and 1961. They were brought up in the bitterness of the 1920s and 1930s. They are imbued with the old traditions of the Specials.
  Mr. Lubbock: It is said that the recruitment of people over 55 is a transitional measure. Has not the Secretary of State failed to advance any reason why it should be allowed and why we should not stick to the upper age limit of 55 during the whole period in which the force is to operate?
  Mr. McNamara: That is partly true. However, I think that my right hon. Friend was trying to argue that men of this age were made up partly of former Regular Army officers and experienced men who had been in the B Specials and that their experience would be of assistance in the transitional period.

  1385
  I can understand that as a paper argument, but, as a factual argument concerning the attitude of mind of these men, we are concerned about what is likely to happen if they are recruited.
  I come then to the point which, above all, I find most difficult to understand. It is the statement that the force is to be called the Ulster Defence Regiment. In this, I know that I carry with me my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Hector Hughes). Ulster comprises nine counties; six of these are in Northern Ireland. The Ulster Defence Regiment, therefore, is not to operate in one-third of the area after which it is designated. This could be used as a stage term for an Irishman's Army, but it is nevertheless important to many people.
  Captain Orr: Can the hon. Gentleman suggest any alternative?
  Mr. McNamara: Certainly—the"Northern Ireland Territorial Force", the "Northern Ireland Defence Regiment". This would have the added merit of being the title which has been used in legislation coming from this House ever since that State was set up. Our Gracious Sovereign is Queen of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, not Queen of Great Britain and Ulster. Indeed, all the appeals for loyalty and support for the Crown and the Union Jack and the Ulster connection were well displayed in the Shan-kill Road when rioters went in with the Union Jack in one hand and petrol bombs in the other against British troops. "Northern Ireland" is a far better title.
  But there is a far more important reason. The word "Ulster", used in connection with any of these forces, is bound to make the minority apprehensive. We who have been brought up in the tradition of Ulster volunteers, "Ulster will fight and Ulster will be right" and all these other connotations—Smith and Carson and the various organisations set up by people such as the Rev. Ian Paisley—regard these as emotive words which are sometimes not understood or appreciated over here. It is partly because of what is almost a siege mentality among the majority that they like this title, but among the minority it is scarcely acceptable. I should like my hon. Friend seriously to consider this.
  Captain Orr indicated assent.
  Mr. McNamara: The hon. and gallant Gentleman seems to be supporting me when I suggest a different title. It seems reasonable to call it the Northern Ireland Defence Force. If that is the case, and we can reach an amicable agreement, I am sure that the hon. and gallant Gentleman will join with us in Committee in pressing such an Amendment.
  We want satisfaction on these points—the vetting, the numbers, the training, the recruitment and the title—and it is on these subjects that we look for replies from my hon. Friend.
  6.43 p.m.
  Sir Knox Cunningham(Antrim, South): There are many Unionists in my constituency and throughout Ulster who are very unhappy about the Ulster Defence Regiment Bill. The initial mistake was made in August, when the military were not called in to assist the civil power, as has previously always been the case. Instead, they took over the control of security in Ulster and gave orders to the police forces, the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the Ulster Special Constabulary.
  Following rapidly on and perhaps because of the innovation of military rule came the setting up of the committee under the chairmanship of Lord Hunt and comprising himself, Sir James Robertson and Mr. Robert Mark. They were appointed on 26th August, this year. When they reported on 3rd October, 37 days later, they acknowledged that it had not been possible to have made as detailed an examination as they would have wished and they stated that they would have preferred to have had several months at their disposal.
  However, they emphasised that it was
  "our conviction that nothing less than the full implementation of the proposals it contains, within the shortest time possible, can suffice to lay a sound foundation for the good order and security of the Province".
  They were referring to the proposals in their report.
  This appears to be rather an arrogant assumption, since they used in the document phrases such as:
  "… had time permitted we would have wished to consult many others".

  1387
  and,
  "… the magnitude and complexity of the undertaking necessarily compressed into so short a period"
  and,
  "… we did not have time to examine this in depth".
  and,
  "… time did not allow us to examine".
  Such phrases show the rushed nature of the report.
  Yet on the day it was published, it was accepted by the Government of Northern Ireland before any consultation could take place with the people, who are deeply involved, or, indeed, with their democratically elected representatives in Parliament. The Home Secretary was in Ulster on that day and I have no doubt that immense pressure came from Whitehall to get an immediate acceptance.
  We are here today to implement one recommendation of the Hunt Report. The report refers to the Ulster Special Constabulary, or B Specials, as they are generally called, in the following terms:
  "We know that to a man members of the U.S.C. are devoted to the cause of Ulster and that they and their forebears have done gallant service and we recognise the value of the anti-guerilla patrols and armed guard duties they have carried out, particularly in times of emergency."
  Having praised them, they recommend their abolition and their replacement by two new forces. It is the second of these new forces, the Ulster Defence Regiment, which we are discussing today.
  There is a fundamental change in the composition of this new security force. It is to be separated from the police and it will be recruited and controlled from Whitehall. In recommending this change, Lord Hunt gave scant consideration to the history of the constabulary in Ireland over the past century. This attempted division of responsibility and authority may prove unworkable in practice, and, in times of emergency, it could be disastrous.
  As an instance, in the last days of Whitehall rule in Ireland, security in Dublin Castle was non-existent. One saw a top secret stenographer typing a top secret order for the Army commander and at the same time adding an extra carbon copy which went out of a side door to Sinn Fein headquarters. I and
  1388
  many of my constituents fear that the I.R.A. will infiltrate the Ulster Defence Regiment and that security in the new Ulster security force will be non-existent.
  In addition, the control and direction of this force will be from Whitehall. For nearly half a century Ulster has controlled her own destiny with a security force which gave gallant service and which was devoted to a man to Ulster's cause. This control is now to be taken from Ulster and her people. It is strangely cynical when one recalls the protestations of greater control in their own affairs which are being given to Scotland and Wales in the brave new world to come.
  I myself cannot support the Second Reading of the Bill. I believe that the troubles which will spring from it will be endless and I look forward to the day when the law will be drastically amended and when Ulster will again control her own destiny.
  Until that day comes, I advise the B Specials to join the new Ulster Defence Regiment and loyally to play their part, however restricted it may prove to be and however frustrated they may feel in the defence of Ulster.
  I end by saying that I have listened carefully to the debate. The House has much to learn about Ireland which it will learn in the years to come.
  6.50 p.m.
  Mr. Gerard Fitt: Having listened to the remarks of the hon. and learned Member for Antrim, South (Sir Knox Cunningham), I can begin to gauge the extent of the problem in Northern Ireland as regards the formation of the new force. It is the mentality of the hon. and learned Gentleman and those who support him that has made things so difficult over recent years, and particularly recent months, in Northern Ireland. They have at all times prevented the implementation of the reforms which were so necessary and which have been brought about by the action of this Government.
  This debate will be one of the most important debates ever to take place in this House. It is concerned with the happiness and future peace and prosperity of all the people in the Six Counties of North-East Ireland.

  1389
  The Secretary of State asked all hon. Members to be moderate and not to make inflammatory remarks, on the ground that if we said anything in the House which might offend the Unionist extreme Right wing in Northern Ireland it could result in a backlash. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that it could bring about a backlash. I go further and say that the very formation of this regiment has been brought about to prevent a Unionist backlash from occurring in Northern Ireland. After 50 years of inaction in social justice and fundamental freedoms in Northern Ireland, the Government at Westminister had the courage to force the Northern Ireland Government to implement social justice in that part of the United Kingdom.
  Unfortunately, the formation of this regiment is part of the price that we must pay for asking for those reforms. I do not think any reasonable hon. Member can believe in his heart that there is a need and a reason for the Ulster Defence Regiment.
  Captain Orr: I gathered from Monday's debate that the hon. Gentleman had accepted the Hunt Report.
  Mr. Fitt: I agree. I accept the recommendations of the Hunt Committee, but I realise that, whatever the attitude of myself and particularly that of my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Ulster (Miss Devlin) and others who support me on this side of the House, this regiment will come into being.
  I ask the Secretary of State for Defence that guarantees be given that this force will be representative of the whole community in Northern Ireland. Guarantees should be given that members of this force will be recruited purely and simply on grounds of ability, that no impediment will be put in their way if they are Roman Catholics, that no impediment will be put in their way if they believe in the eventual reunification of Ireland. I do not believe that that should be an impediment.
  The right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) said that all the restrictions which can be imposed by the Unionist mentality when it comes to questioning the suitability of a recruit will mean that 95 per cent. to 100 per cent. of the new force will be members of the present Ulster Special Constabulary or people who have a like mentality.
  Mr. Healey: I hope that the hon. Gentleman will accept that, as the vetting and acceptance of all applicants to join this force will be wholly in the hands of the G.O.C., Northern Ireland, who is responsible to me—and am responsible to the hon. Gentleman, amongst others—he can rely on a great deal more objectivity in the selection of recruits than he seemed to suggest a moment ago.
  Mr. Fitt: I accept the promise which has been given to-day by the Secretary of State that there will be impartiality in the recruitment of this force. We will have to see it written into the Bill that the advisory committee, of which the right hon. Gentleman spoke this afternoon, will also be representative of the whole community in Northern Ireland. That would dispel the fears of the minority in Northern Ireland that the new force will be only the carrying on of the B Specials in a diffierent uniform.
  I realise that the Government must tread a very wary path, but it is very important at the outset that, when the force is created, it is seen to be a fair force, is seen to be representative of the whole community in Northern Ireland. We cannot afford to make a single mistake.
  Over the past two or three days mistakes have been made. There was the terrible fiasco of the publicity of the Unionist Party in Northern Ireland and the abject apology and admission of fault by the Minister for Home Affairs in Stormont yesterday afternoon. We have been told that the present Ulster Special Constabulary has been under the control of the G.O.C. since a date in August. What has been the liaison? What were the reasons for the breakdown? If the Ulster Special Constabulary is under the control of the G.O.C., this must mean that its administration as well is under his control. Yet last Wednesday afternoon, as soon as the White Papers were published, a high ranking staff officer of the Ulster Special Constabulary—a colonel, in fact—sent out application forms.
  Then we had the wriggling of the Northern Ireland Government—and, indeed, wriggling at this end—to try to excuse what happened. Yesterday, in Stormont, the Minister for Home Affairs, after

  1391
  being repeatedly questioned by the Member for Mid-Derry, let out that it was an application form. This afternoon the Secretary of State told us that it was not an application form. I can only say that those B Specials who received application forms last Wednesday and on succeeding days of last week took them to be application forms. If we have only clarified that point today, this debate will have been worth while.
  I listened to the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull, North (Mr. McNamara) when he launched his first objection to the name of the new regiment. I realise that an Englishman, a Scotsman or a Welshman may not be able to understand why citizens in one part of the United Kingdom object to the name "Ulster". The facts of history are there to prove that we have very real reasons for our suspicions, and I shall bring these reasons to the attention of right hon. and hon. Members.
  The true geographical entity of Northern Ireland is nine counties. Six counties are in Northern Ireland, part of the United Kingdom. Three are part of the Republic.
  It would be just as logical for the Government of the Irish Republic, particularly in view of the Ballyshannon incident which happened four or five weeks ago, when members of the Ulster Volunteer Force attempted to blow up the transformer at Ballyshannon, to set up an Ulster Defence Force. If that were to happen, we should have the ludicrous position that there would be an Ulster Defence Force on one side of the border trying to prevent ex-B Specials from going over, and, on the other side of the border, an Ulster Defence Force composed of ex-B Specials trying to prevent people from the other side from coming over.
  Mr. Stratton Mills rose—
  Mr. Fitt: I have no intention of giving way to the hon. Gentleman. Interrupting is a tactic of his which he has employed repeatedly since I have become a Member of the House.
  Mr. Stratton Mills rose—
  Mr. Fitt: Mr. Speaker—
  Mr. Speaker: Order. It is clear that the hon. Member for Belfast, West (Mr. Fitt) is not giving way.
  Mr. Fitt: The term "Ulster" has very serious connotations for those who are opposed to Unionism in Northern Ireland. I can understand the Unionist mentality over the years, desperately searching for a national identity. They are not British. They are not Irish. They are Scottish-Irish. They do not know what they are at certain given times, so they try to establish that they are Ulster people.
  We have in Northern Ireland a terribly emotive force known as the Ulster Constitution Defence Committee, led by Ian Paisley and ably supported by the hon. and learned Member for Antrim, South. We have the Ulster Protestant Volunteers.
  Sir Knox Cunningham: On a point of order. I am not a member of the committee which the hon. Gentleman has named. I have risen on a point of order merely to state that to the House.
  Mr. Fitt: The hon. and learned Member is a contributor to the Paisley Press, known as the Ulster Protestant Telegraph. Indeed, he has been billed as its Westminster correspondent.
  The term "Ulster" is a further attempt by the Northern Ireland Unionist Party to usurp a historical term which covers nine counties in the province of Ireland, and which has covered them for many centuries since the dawn of Christianity. That is one of the reasons why we object to the use of the term "Ulster" and why the minority in Northern Ireland object to the Union Jack. Repeatedly throughout history we have heard it said by the Unionist Party in this House that the minority are disloyal and that they owe no allegiance to the monarchy, the Crown and the Union Jack.
  That is not strictly correct. For years the minority in Northern Ireland have had the Union Jack stuck down their throats as the party political rag of the Unionist Party. Every week when I come to the House, as I travel from the aeroplane to the air terminal at Gloucester Road, I see the Union Jack flying. I recognise it as being the flag of the United Kingdom, but in Northern Ireland that is not so; it is a party political rag of the Unionist Party.

  1393
  Exactly the same objection arises to the use of the term "Ulster". This is why we have taken offence at the inclusion of the term "Ulster" in the name of this regiment. Northern Ireland was set up under the aegis of an Act of Parliament, 1920, and the Government there is known as the Government of Northern Ireland. I suggest that if the regiment has to come into being—and I believe that it will come into being—it would have been less offensive to call it the Northern Ireland Defence Regiment.
  Even then I question the term "defence", because the only people who will attack Ulster and who will ensure that Ulster will finish are people within the ranks of the Unionist Party and whose representative this afternoon is the hon. and learned Member for Antrim, South. These are the people who will finally ensure that the Province of Ulster finds its true place in a United Ireland. It will have been brought about by those people themselves.
  May I deal with our objections to the Bill? We have heard it justified by the deliberations of the Hunt Committee. I have accepted the Hunt Report and its conclusions. One of its conclusions was that there should be 4,000 men in the new Ulster defence force. I believe that figure to be far too high, but I have accepted it. If there is to be a defence force in Northern Ireland, I accept the conclusion that it must have 4,000 men. The Hunt Committee's conclusion was reached after a clinical examination by Lord Hunt and his two colleagues of the committee. They were not pressurised by the Unionist Party; they had not been allowed to make representations to the Hunt Committee. The figure of 4,000 was, therefore, reached after Lord Hunt had made a clinical assessment of the situation.
  But what happened after that report was issued? We could tell when we listened to the remarks of the hon. and learned Member for Antrim, South. The Government of Northern Ireland accepted the Hunt Report the day it was issued—and the reason was the presence of my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary, who happened to be in Northern Ireland on that day. But then the pressure was imposed. and we now see that there are to be 6,000 men in this force. If there is no reason for having 4,000 men, there
  1394
  is far less reason for having 6,000 men. It will cost the British taxpayers £1 million a year to keep this Force in Northern Ireland, defending Ulster—against what? As a Socialist, I bitterly resent this expenditure, especially in view of the fact that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Education and Science this week announced an increase in the cost of school meals. This is an imposition which should never be offered to people on this side of the Irish Sea.
  We object, therefore, to the numbers in the force and we object to the recruitment. The latter is the most important objection which has been heard throughout the debate. Since it was announced that they had accepted the Hunt Report—and certainly immediately after the production of a White Paper last Wednesday —the Unionist Party have gone out of their way to make it as difficult as possible for members of the minority in Northern Ireland to join this new defence force.
  My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State said that he would not necessarily have agreed with all the wording in the advertisements of which we have complained. The first statement in the advertisements was that applicants must swear an oath of loyalty to the Queen. I have already said that that in itself may not be offensive to large sections of the minority in Northern Ireland, but, mentioned as it was in the advertisement, it was meant to deter Catholic applicants from joining this force.
  Mr. Kenneth Lewis rose—
  Mr. Fitt: I will not give way.
  I realise that the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland is in difficulty. I recognise that he may have to face a possible threat from the extreme Right wing of his own party or the B Specials. They feel that they are being thrown to the four winds. The hon. and learned Member for Antrim, South obviously did not listen to the appeal made by the Secretary of State this afternoon in which he asked for moderation, because the hon. and learned Member went out of his way to justify every single action of the Ulster Special Constabulary since it was formed in 1920. No force could be absolutely blameless over those years,

  1395
  and certainly not the Ulster Special Constabulary.
  The hon. and learned Member quoted from the Cameron Report and said that it had commended the Ulster Special Constabulary.
  Sir Knox Cunningham: The Hunt Report.
  Mr. Fitt: I accept that correction.
  But paragraph 145 of the Cameron Report makes it quite clear that the minority in Northern Ireland have lived in terror of the Ulster Special Constabulary since it came into existence as a sectarian force on the setting up of the State. Why are the minority in Northern Ireland so terrified of the Ulster Special Constabulary? They have a reason to be terrified of the constabulary. Throughout the years there have been numerous incidents in which special constables have been found guilty in the minds of the public of carrying out infamous acts against those people they were allegedly protecting.
  But let us take only the last 12 months. In November, 1968, a civil rights march was taking place in Armagh. There was a counter-demonstration run by Ian Paisley and his supporters. Riots broke out, and, finally, five members of the Ulster Constabulary were found to be involved, out of uniform. They were arrested and they were to be charged. But they got away, because an amnesty was quickly announced by the Government.
  Evidence is in existence that well-known members of the Ulster Special Constabulary were at Burntollet, armed with vicious cudgels and weapons, beating up defenceless students, including my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Ulster. The matter was raised in the Northern Ireland Parliament and the Minister for Home Affairs were asked why no prosecutions had been undertaken against the B Specials so readily identifiable in photographs which had been taken. He replied —and this could happen only with the Minister for Home Affairs in Northern Ireland—that their presence in photographs, even if they are carrying cudgels, is not evidence of a criminal offence.
  The Tynan platoon of the Ulster Special Constabulary was involved in
  1396
  an incident in County Armagh where a young man lost his life. Later, that platoon was summoned to an inquest to give its evidence of what happened that night. It was instructed by its own legal adviser not to give evidence, and so far it has not done so.
  One can therefore readily see the reason for the real fear among members of the minority about the formation of the new regiment that there will be a complete takeover by the Ulster Special Constabulary. This has been deliberately brought about by misrepresentation of the facts by the Northern Ireland Government. The Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, Major Chichester-Clark, in the Press conference referred to by my hon. Friend the Member for Penistone (Mr. John Mendelson), said that 8,500 men would be lost when the Ulster Special Constabulary was eventually disbanded. There will be 6,000 members in the new force, the Ulster Defence Regiment, and 1,500 places in the reserve force, the R.U.C., making a total of 7,500.
  Therefore, he said, everyone would be able to apply and their membership would be carefully gone into. In other words, he was saying that there are now 8,500 in existence and that with the natural fall off through age, sickness and other reasons there would be places for all those left in the Ulster Special Constabulary.
  This is a most serious matter. As a minority spokesman, I have been talking to some of my constituents who have been seeking my advice and asking me whether they should volunteer for the new Ulster Defence Force. I said, and I say the same now, that I am in no position to advise them about joining the force unless guarantees are given about their recruitment. Once I am satisfied that there will be equal opportunity in this force for all sections of the community in Northern Ireland, I shall be prepared to recommend my constituents to joint it. But at this moment I am far from being in a position to recommend my constituents to joint this force, and I sincerely hope that the Secretary of State, or whoever winds up the debate, will be able to give the necessary guarantees. If not, I shall unhesitatingly call a Division on the vote in all conscience because I realise the serious situation which now exists in Northern Ireland.

  1397
  I hope that the Minister will be able to ease some of the suspicions in my mind and in the minds of many thousands of people in Northern Ireland. One of them concerns the method of recruitment. Will an advisory committee be set up? Who will be the personnel? How will the personnel be appointed? Will they be representative of the Catholic minority? Will they be representative of the trade union movement and the other various minority interests in Northern Ireland? It should not prove to be too great a difficulty for my right hon. Friend to set up such an advisory panel.
  I do not see any reason for all the haste. It is not absolutely necessary that this force should be in operation on 1st April, 1970, as laid down in the White Paper. If we act in haste, the only people eligible for the force will be members of the present Ulster Special Constabulary. I have often heard the old saying, "The more haste, the less speed". There have been many civil rights demonstrations in Northern Ireland over the past 18 months. I hope that the days of civil rights marches in Northern Ireland have gone. I hope that society could be so changed that it would be unnecessary ever to have an outdoor demonstration again demanding social justice in Northern Ireland. But, if it becomes clear that there is to be a wholesale transfer of the B Specials to this new force, there will be demonstrations on the streets in Northern Ireland, because having won so little at such a terrible cost—at the cost of lives, homes and possessions all over Northern Ireland—we are not prepared to see a continuation of this sectarian force as it has existed in Northern Ireland for so long.
  I ask for a guarantee that there will not be rigid adherence to the figure of 6,000, and there should be no rush towards the all important date of 1st April. If we rush forward to that date, it will be an appropriate day. It will certainly be All Fools' Day, because only a fool would rush to bring this regiment into existence in present circumstances without ensuring that it is representative of the whole community.
  The Minister and the Government can allay the fears of the Northern Ireland minority because they want this force. But they want to be sure that if they go into it they will be given equal op-
  1398
  portunity with the other members of it. I realise that pressure may be brought to bear on my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence. I have no doubt that pressures have been brought to bear and that behind the scenes the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland has been telling my right hon. Friends the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State, "Unless we take all the B Specials into this new force there will be a backlash". I believe that that is one of the reasons why the Government here agreed to the name "Ulster Defence Force" and why they have agreed to the figure of 6,000.
  But if there is to be a backlash in Northern Ireland appeasement will not prevent it. The extreme Right wing element in Northern Ireland are at present intent on creating a backlash—I do not level any charges against hon. Members opposite they know this as well as I do—and if action must be taken to crush this backlash, I believe that this Government should take it unhesitatingly and stop the appeasement policy which they appear to be following at the moment.
  The fact that not all of my hon. Friends are in the House now should not indicate to the Secretary of State that they are unconcerned about the present situation in Northern Ireland, because I know that if we are not given undertakings this evening many of there will find themselves in the Lobby against the Government. I should be hesitant to take that step, particularly as the hon. and learned Member for Antrim, South said that he will not support the Second Reading. There might be something of an altercation in the Lobby.
  I am trying to be as reasonable as I can. All over Ulster there are violent passions just beneath the surface. These passions are surging through the whole community in Northern Ireland. The Government will find themselves in a difficult position if they appear to be doing one thing for one side of the community which brings a reaction from the other side. But they have acted very stupidly in acceding to this request for a force of 6,000, particularly in view of the publicity which has been associated with the recruitment. I hope that it will be made clear this evening that this force

  1399
  will be representative of the whole community and that no bar will be placed on any potential recruit because of his religion. If he believes in the eventual reunification of the country, he should be eligible to become a member of this force.
  In three-quarters of his speech, the hon. Member for Antrim, North (Mr. Henry Clark) justified every single action of the B Specials and then indulged in something like a charity performance. He wanted car allowances for them. He wanted them to have telephones in their houses. I realise why he had to make that speech—because he was looking over his shoulder at the vote of no confidence passed on him by one of the more extreme associations in his constituency. But he will have to show courage, just as all hon. Members from Northern Ireland constituencies will have to show courage. I could take the stand this evening that I am opposed to this regiment at all costs and that as someone who believes in the eventual establishment of an Irish workers' republic it ill becomes me to say that there should be a British force to defend Ulster. I am taking a courageous stand against many people who may be militantly opposed to me.
  I dare say that this force will come into being. I want to see in Northern Ireland an acceptable force to prevent the activities of the Ulster Volunteer Force—people who have been causing such disruption in Northern Ireland and who were threatening no later than yesterday morning to cause further disruption. At the same time, I want to make it clear that if we are given guarantees I will not oppose the formation of the new force. But my hon. Friends and I will table many detailed Amendments and because we shall feel so intently about them we shall have to take them to a Division unless the Government agree to what we regard as reasonable requests.
  By accepting this force, because I believe as a political realist that it is something that will have to be brought about, I in no way abdicate from my belief in the establishment of an Irish Republic in the future. In doing so, I know that I have the support of my hon. Friends on this side of the House because
  1400
  I believe that that is something which could not in any way harm the interests or the prosperity of the people in these islands.
  I hope that I will be given the undertakings which I have reasonably asked of the Secretary of State for Defence. If those undertakings are not given, I will unfortunately, for the first time since I entered this House, find myself in the Lobby, even tonight, against the Government.
  7.21 p.m.
  Mr. Eric Lubbock (Orpington): I hope that the hon. Member for Belfast, West (Mr. Fitt), with his acceptance in principle of the Ulster Defence Regiment, will not be accused by the hon. Lady the Member for Mid-Ulster (Miss Devlin) of being one of the dupes of Major Chichester-Clark or a latter-day Redmondite, a phrase which, I understand from the Irish papers, the hon. Lady has used recently in connection with Mr. John Hume.
  I also think, as does the hon. Member for Belfast, West, that the regiment had to be formed. A force of this kind was essential in the Northern Ireland situation. My concern tonight is to see that we get the right kind of force as described by the hon. Member. I agree with many of the conditions which he has attached to it and which, I am sure, my right hon. and hon. Friends will support in Committee.
  One condition which the hon. Member has mentioned and which other hon. Members have touched upon but about which I am not sure is the formation of the advisory committee, which the Secretary of State said that he would consider. In setting up a committee of this kind, we might be implicitly accusing the General Officer Commanding of bias, since under the present arrangements he would be responsible for the selection and vetting of recruits. I am sure that no one in this House would wish to suggest that the G.O.C. needs to have somebody looking over his shoulder to make sure that there is no element of bias.
  Mr. Healey: I have that very much in mind as a risk. It would not be my intention to give the advisory committee, as it were, oversight over the G.O.C.'s responsibility for vetting as such. I think, however, as was suggested in a speech

  1401
  earlier by the hon. Member for Belfast, West (Mr. Fitt), that there may well be a case for such a committee to keep an eye on the general policy and the way the whole thing is going. That is rather the sort of role that I would envisage for the advisory committee. I hope that the House will not press me beyond this today, because it is a new suggestion in which I see merit, but I would like to consider it more carefully before taking a final decision.
  Mr. Lubbock: The right hon. Gentleman's intervention has been very useful in clarifying the way his mind is working on the proposition that if one has an advisory committee of this kind, its terms of reference should be very broad and should in no way derogate from the authority of the G.O.C., who will be trusted by everybody in Northern Ireland to make his unbiased selection of applicants for recruitment to the regiment.
  The other point on which I wish to touch briefly, and which was made also by the hon. Member for Belfast, West, is the name of the regiment. If it makes the force more acceptable to the minority in the province, it does not matter what we call it. After all, what is in a name? Cannot the Secretary of State consider this and, in the special conditions that exist, think seriously about the proposal that the force should be called the Northern Ireland Defence Regiment instead of Ulster Defence Regiment? Most hon. Members of this House could not care less what it is called, but if there were likely to be strong passions in the Province, I am sure that we would not object to a modification in the Bill to which, I am sure, not even the Unionists should object. It would be a more factual description.
  Captain Orr rose—
  Mr. Lubbock: I will give way presently. As I understand it, Northern Ireland is the correct constitutional name of the Province which the regiment is being formed to defend. If that is the case, I know that my suggestion is slightly longer than the name merely of Ulster, but I cannot see why there should be objection in principle to a change in the title.
  Captain Orr: What I dispute is the hon. Member's use of the word
  1402
  "factual", because the most northerly point of the island of Ireland is not in Northern Ireland.
  Mr. Lubbock: I know that the hon. and gallant Member is concerned about this. He has said to me on many occasions that he would like citizens belonging to the minority in Northern Ireland to become recruits in the new force. If it will make it easier for Catholics to join by changing the name from Ulster to Northern Ireland, as well as supporting his own proposition, the hon. and gallant Member would be helping to secure an object on which he is very keen.
  Mr. Michael Foot (Ebbw Vale): What about the title Six Counties Last Ditch Defence Force?
  Mr. Lubbock: That might be thrown into the melting pot as well in considering what should be the name of the regiment. It is difficult for an Englishman to understand these fine distinctions, but I understand from the speech of the hon. Member for Belfast, West and from discussions that I have had with hon. Members representing Northern Ireland that these minutiae are things that worry them and that the big issues can be slipped through without difficulty provided that one can be satisfied on things like names.
  The hon. Member for Belfast, West spoke about the so-called application form, which was disowned by the Secretary of State in his introductory speech this afternoon. He said that it was introduced by a staff officer of the U.S.C. to give an indication of the numbers of former U.S.C. members who might apply. We need to go into this a little more thoroughly, because if the G.O.C. is responsible for recruitment to the new force, presumably any steps which might be taken to find out the numbers who apply, their qualifications and so on, should be taken only with the assent of the G.O.C.
  I would like the Minister to make it clear whether the staff officer who distributed the so-called application form to all the former members obtained the approval of the G.O.C. before doing so. This is a rather important point, because, first, Mr. Porter or his Department issued a denial when the accusation was made by Mr. John Hume over the weekend that the form was being distributed. Then.

  1403
  he made a further denial in Stormont yesterday afternoon. It was only when, as pointed out by, I think, the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull, North (Mr. McNamara), Mr. Hume asked Mr. Porter to read out the title at the top of the form that he said, "All right. If you insist, it is, in fact, called an application form." The Secretary of State told us this afternoon that it was no such thing and that that description was a misnomer.
  Mr. McNamara: It was, in fact, my hon. Friend the Member for Penistone (Mr. John Mendelson). On the point which the hon. Member is making, if approval had not been given, what was the reason and what is my right hon. Friend doing about it? What is happening to the individual concerned?
  Mr. Lubbock: I hope that all these matters will be looked into. I am grateful to the hon. Member for suggesting further matters which might be examined by the Minister when he replies. This is all of a pattern, as the hon. Member will have seen from the point I made concerning the advertisements.
  The Secretary of State for Defence told us this afternoon that he did not look at the texts. He said that there were certain phrases in the advertisements which might have been more happily worded. That was a great masterpiece of understatement, because certainly, whatever may have been the motivation behind the drafting of the advertisements, the impression which was given was that Catholics would be discouraged from applying, contrary to the policy of both Her Majesty's Government and the Stormont Government. Once again, therefore, one wants to ask who drafted the advertisements, who gave authority for them to be inserted in the newspapers and all the similar questions which the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull, North has put concerning the application form.
  When one considers both these two developments, the application form and the advertisements, one is bound to ask, who is in charge? Is it the General Officer Commanding, as we have been told in the White Paper, subject to the advisory committee and the Secretary of State, or are a great many things being done behind our backs by the Stormont Government without any proper consul-
  1404
  tation whatsoever? I must say that, if one looks at these two unhappy precedents, one draws the conclusion that many things have been left to the Stormont Government which would be more happily retained in the hands of the G.O.C., subject to the final authority of the Secretary of State, so that, for instance, Questions can be asked in this House, as they could not be in relation to the actions of the Stormont Government.
  That is really all I want to say on this, but I think it is important that the respective duties and roles of the Stormont and Westminster Governments should be clarified a great deal before we can be perfectly satisfied with the arrangements.
  Now I want to come to the composition of the Ulster Defence Regiment, as we will call it for the time being till some Amendment is tabled by hon. Members who object to that name. I want to deal, first, with the statement made by the Minister of Detence for Administration on 12th Novmeber, when he said:
  "Of necessity, the new force will draw substantially on the Ulster Special Constabulary for its initial recruitment…."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 12th November, 1969; Vol. 791, c. 418.]
  After this statement, my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Liberal Party asked the Minister whether he thought it was likely to increase the acceptability of the new force if a substantial majority of it were to be recruited from the former B Specials, and the Minister rather dodged this question in his reply. What he said was that a majority of the men concerned were
  "men who have given good and honourable service to Northern Ireland."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 12th November, 1969; Vol. 791, c. 420.]
  which seems to me a complete non sequitur. I am not going to dispute the Minister's statement. I have no doubt these men have given good and honourable service to Northern Ireland. I do not take the view that most of them are ogres going round slitting the throats of Catholic babies in the middle of the night, but what I do consider is that a small minority of this force have brought the whole force into disrepute and I think, without in any way intending to prejudge the findings of the Scarman Tribunal, we have enough circumstantial

  1405
  evidence, some of which has been reported to the House by the hon. Member for Belfast, West and others who have visited Northern Ireland, to say that a minority of the force have not behaved responsibly and that the name of the Ulster Special Constabulary has been tainted by the actions of this very small number.
  I do not see why the Minister of Defence for Administration should say "of necessity" the new force has to be drawn entirely from these people. Why, indeed, cannot we look to the large numbers of ex-Service men who must exist in the Province of Northern Ireland who have been trained in Her Majesty's Armed Forces, whether during the Second World War or since then during their two-year National military service. I hear an hon. Gentleman saying sotto voce that they are already in the U.S.C. I cannot believe that, because, surely, not all the men who passed through a period of military service while conscription was in force can be either Protestants or part of the 8,500 present members of the U.S.C. It must have been a very much larger number than that who reached military age while conscription was in force in the immediate post-war period and who would still be young enough to come within the age limits specified in the Bill. So I do not accept at all the Minister of Defence for Administration's statement that it is a matter "of necessity" that the majority of this force should be recruited from former members of the U.S.C.
  Also, my suspicions have been aggravated, as, I suppose, those of other hon. Members have been, by the decision to raise the maximum size of the force from the 4,000 officers and men recommended by Lord Hunt's Committee to the 6,000 announced in the White Paper. This point was touched on on 12th November. The Minister of Defence for Administration said that the higher ceiling
  "is a matter of calculation based on the military advice available to my right hon. Friend."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 12th November, 1969; Vol. 791, c. 421.]
  But Lord Hunt also had access to military advice. as he indicates in paragraph 5 of his Report, where he mentions the consultations he had with the G.O.C., Northern Ireland. I also refer the House to paragraph 7, where he says:
  1406
  "We have been able to bring to bear on the matters falling within our terms of reference a varied background of experience gained … during military operations elsewhere in aid of the civil power."
  So it appears to me that Lord Hunt's Committee had access to precisely the same military advice as was available to the Secretary of State, even though, perhaps, it was not in front of the Committee quite so long. I agree with only one thing said by the hon. Member for Antrim, North (Mr. Henry Clark), that during the period the Committee had this under examination there may have been many aspects of the problem the Committee did not have opportunity to pursue in more detail.
  It seems to me there has not been adequate consultation. How did the Minister arrive at a ceiling of 50 per cent. higher than Lord Hunt';, and apparently on the basis of the same advice? The inference which has been drawn is that a concession has been made to the reactionaries who want to provide a home for as many as possible of the B Specials who want to be retained in the force. I know that many hon. Gentlemen would take the opposite point of view, that if the force is kept up to a fairly high level, then it gives greater opportunity for people not former members, or not members of the Protestant religion, to come in, and that is an arguable case.
  Captain Orr: If there is more room.
  Mr. Lubbock: Yes, if there is more room, as the hon. and gallant Member says. All I am saying is that the general impression created in Northern Ireland is that the increase from the figure in Lord Hunt's Report to the one announced in the White Paper has been designed as a concession to the B Specials.
  Also, while dealing with the optimum size of this force, I should like to refer to paragraph 27 of Lord Hunt's Report —the Report of The Advisory Committee on Police in Northern Ireland—where this passage occurs:
  "Indeed everyone hopes that the reforms already in hand and those still being planned will, by removing the causes of discontent, make it less likely that in the future extremists will be able to provoke disorder and so bring about the conditions in which terrorism can be effective. Moreover a realistic assessment of the capacity of the I.R.A. to mount serious terrorist attacks would probably not rate it very high, particularly as the Government of

  1407
  the Irish Republic has stated publicly that it is opposed to the use of force on the border".
  So, quite apart from the military calculation, to which I have referred, and the advice obtained by Lord Hunt from the G.O.C., there is the political factor which must enter into the assessment being made by the House of the size of the force which is required.
  If, as we hope and expect, Stormont press forward with the reforms which have been undertaken, then there will be a lessening of sectarian tension, and the type of violent action which was described by the Secretary of State, against which this Force is designed to protect Northern Ireland, will become of decreasing frequency. Therefore, if anything, I would have said that 4,000 men would be perhaps the absolute ceiling—certainly a figure very much smaller than 6,000—since these reforms. I hope, will come into effect before very long.
  If we say it should be higher are we not giving a hint to those people who fear that the undertakings given by Major Chichester-Clark and the majority of the Stormont Unionists in control there are not to be carried into effect? I do not believe that. I always think the better of people till the worse has been proved, and I hope that, as far as Major Chichester-Clark is concerned, he has every good intention of pressing on and getting these reforms through. Therefore one hopes that the need for a force of this kind will decline in the near future.
  I am delighted to know that it will be the G.O.C. under whose command the regiment will fall who makes the assessment of whether or not people are entitled to join the new force. I think that a test of age is a good thing. The right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell), who made many criticisms about practically everything in the Bill and in the White Paper, did not refer to the Secretary of State's qualification that men of over 55 would be retained for a short interim period after the introduction of the regiment. This worries me—it has nothing to do with the right hon. Member for Easington, who is an evergreen—but I feel that men who are aged over 55 cannot be fit for arduous and perhaps hazardous military operations. There is also a feeling in Northern Ireland that the older the people in the B Specials are the
  1408
  more likely are they to be sectarian bigots. There should be an upper age limit of 55 right from the start of our operations instead of it being introduced later.
  I come to the other criteria; suitability of service for a military force and strict security vetting. The clarification of those phrases we shall have to look into carefully in Committee. The Secretary of State said that a person would be asked to give his name and address, his civil employment, his previous service in the Armed Forces and his religion. There may be two views on whether we should ask for a person's religion. I understand the right hon. Gentleman's motives. He wants a balanced force, and this is his method of securing it. But none of those questions on the application form will enable him to distinguish the extremists whom he wishes to exclude from the U.D.R.
  The right hon. and learned Member for Hexham (Mr. Rippon) said that it was clearly necessary to eliminate extremists of all complexions, and I absolutely agree with him, but from the description which the Secretary of State for Defence gave of the vetting procedure, I am not sure how this is to be done. I hope he will disclaim the idea put forward by one hon. Member that security vetting should be done by the Ulster police. I do not like that idea. It should be purely for the military to discover which people are extremists and should be excluded. I would go further than taking out the extremists. Anyone who has taken an active part in politics in Northern Ireland, of whatever kind, should be automatically debarred from joining the new force.
  I asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether the officers would be subject, to Queen's Regulations. I am not sure what interpretation one should place on paragraph 13 of the White Paper which states:
  "Officers will be subject to military law at all times others when on training or duty."
  I do not know whether this means whether they will be subject to Queen's Regulations. It is important to know this because, as anyone who has served in the Army wll remember, the Army has no politics. Paragraph J672 of Queen's Regulations for the Army states:
  "Regular personnel are not to take any active part in the affairs of any political organisation or party."

  1409
  Perhaps one of the guidelines which the advisory committee might give to the G O.C. is that any person who has been the chairman or a prominent officer of a constituency association, whether Unionist, Nationalist, or whatever, or any person who is or has been a member of an Orange Lodge —
  Captain Orr: Queen's Regulations do not go as far as that.
  Mr. Lubbock: Queen's Regulations do not go as far as that, and I will explain why I use the phrase "is or has been". An extremist might merely resign the chairmanship of his local Orange Lodge, say that he has no political affiliation and get into the U.D.R. No one would want that to happen.
  Mr. Kenneth Lewis: If a person resigned for bona fide reasons because he wanted to join the force, he would be debarred.
  Mr. Lubbock: The G.O.C. would have a very difficult decision to make in deciding whether a person had resigned because he had genuinely repented of his evil ways and wanted to turn over a new leaf, or whether he was determined to carry the ideals of the Orange Lodge or the I.R.A. into the U.D.R. and suborn it from the inside.
  Dr. M. S. Miller (Glasgow, Kelvin-grove): I am following the hon. Gentleman's argument and I can see the point in it, but would not he agree that to go as far as he is suggesting would produce exactly the kind of situation which, for example, developed into the witch hunt in the United States? I do not think that he could go to the extent he is advocating in keeping people out of this force.
  Mr. Lubbock: No, because I am not discriminating against any particular people as was done in the United States. The witch hunt mentioned by the hon. Gentleman was directed against the Communists. I am saying that, in the tense situation of Northern Ireland, anyone who has taken a prominent part in political activities in whatever cause should automatically be excluded from the new force. By that I do not mean the ordinary rank and file member of the Unionist Party or the Nationalist Party. I mean someone who has been, for in-
  1410
  stance the chairman of a constituency association or an Orange Lodge, someone who has occupied a promient position in a political or quasi-political organisation.
  May I give an additional reason for treating the rules about political activity of members of this force more strictly in the context of Northern Ireland than in the rest of the United Kingdom. I wrote in the summer to the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Army about two N.C.O.s of the Royal Irish Rangers who appeared before their commanding officer in Ballymena for taking part in the Orange demonstration in the town. The commanding officer admolished them and gave them a rocket for disobeying an Order. I thought that this was a serious enough offence to warrant more severe punishment and I wrote to the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State asking what rules applied to political activities by members of the Armed Forces in Northern Ireland. In his reply the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State said this:
  "In the case of the two N.C.O.s referred to … the G.O.C. took the view that in the situation prevailing in Northern Ireland association of any kind with the political events of 12th July would inevitably raise questions as to the impartiality of the Army and would thereby impede service duties. In the circumstances he was justified in forbidding soldiers to take part in them. The two N.C.O.s disobeyed this specific order and were dealt with for that disobedience."
  There, the hon. Gentleman was telling me, and I agree with him, that the old rule that the Army has no politics has to be interpreted even more strictly in Northern Ireland than perhaps in any other part of the world where British forces may be stationed.
  On security vetting, I agree that anybody who believes as a political philosophy in a united Ireland should not be debarred from joining the new force. I happen to believe in a united Ireland, not in the immediate future, because that would not be possible against the wishes of the majority in the Province, but I see this as a long term goal on a purely voluntary basis between the peoples of the North and the South and I think ultimately it will come.
  I would not advocate the use of any force. In fact, I would defend Northern Ireland against anyone who attempted to

  1411
  impose unification upon it. I was glad that in an intervention the Secretary of State for Defence appeared to approve the point of view that people who believe in the philosophy of a united Ireland should not be debarred from joining the force. I should like this to be made plain by the Secretary of State in the House and in any future advertisements inviting persons to join up.
  I conclude by saying that I consider it to be a dangerous precedent to allow people to keep weapons at home. The examples of Switzerland and Denmark given by the Secretary of State are quite irrelevant. There is no sectarian bitterness in those countries and there is no likelihood that weapons kept at home by the citizen forces of those countries would be abused.
  I realise that the retention of weapons in homes will be authorised only in special circumstances and with the approval of the G.O.C. But the example given by the Secretary of State in answer to an intervention was ridiculous. He said that if a man lived near to a key installation and the depot in which the arms were kept happened to be several miles away, then in the event of imminent sabotage that individual could not be expected to go all the way to the depot to draw his arms and then travel back to the power station, or the dam, whatever it may be, which saboteurs were expected to attack.
  Surely the Secretary of State is not saying that only one man would be put on such a duty. He would be working in a unit. If other members of the unit lived in the neighbourhood of the depot, why should they not come out, together with their arms, and join the man at the installation concerned when an emergency arose and not before. I cannot think of any military circumstances in which it would be necessary for individuals to retain weapons in their own houses. This point must be gone into in more detail in Committee.
  I know that many hon. Members still wish to speak and I will draw my remarks to a close. Although this debate has emphasised the military aspect of the Northern Ireland situation, we shall not lose sight of the fact that the civil rights reforms which have been set in train, and which are to be pursued vigorously
  1412
  by the Home Secretary and also by the Northern Ireland Government, will move to a rapid conclusion so that the new force will be of a temporary nature and so that Northern Ireland can be restored to peace in the shortest possible time.
  7.55 p.m.
  Mr. Eric S. Heffer (Liverpool, Walton): I would make a brief comment on the speech of the hon. Member for Orpington (Mr. Lubbock). I agreed with practically the whole of his speech. But I could not possibly agree with the idea that anybody who had been a member of the Orange Lodge or a similar organisation should be debarred from becoming a member if this force. I thought that we desired to eliminate discrimination altogether, not to replace one form of discrimination with another. We would not be wise to pursue that particular line of thinking—although I can understand why the hon. Member sought to raise the matter—and I hope that we will not move in that direction.
  I was uneasy when the announcement was made in the House that this new regiment was to be formed. I still am uneasy, but for different reasons. It seemed at the outset as if my right hon. Friends were agreeing to the disbandment of the B Specials, but replacing it with something else which basically was the B Specials in another form. However, my right hon. Friends cannot be accused of that particular sin. They have been falling over backwards to accommodate the Government of Northern Ireland and have given certain ground which perhaps they had no intention of giving.
  I draw attention to the words of Major Chichester-Clark on this matter, as reported in the Belfast Telegraph on Thursday, 15th November. He said:
  "With the acceptance of these proposals at Westminster and Stormont, the U.S.C. as such will cease to exist. But its traditions of service will, I am sure, continue to live on in the new forces through the men who come forward to serve Ulster."
  He went on to say:
  "Many of us, I know, would have liked the U.S.C. to continue, but since circumstances made that impossible, let us at any rate be profoundly thankful that such thorough steps are being taken to ensure that Ulster remains secure."
  Major Chichester-Clark is there saying that the traditions of service will continue to live on in the new force, but at the same time that he is sorry to see the old

  1413
  B Specials go. It would appear that. Major Chichester-Clark had some idea that within the new force something very much like the old force could be rebuilt. I am not suggesting that this is wanted by my right hon. Friends, but at the same time as Major Chichester-Clark made his statement the advertisements were going out, the television programmes were being broadcast, and it was being suggested, indeed advocated strongly, that the old B Specials should join up with the new force, and, obviously, were being encouraged to do so on a large scale.
  The Cameron Report and all our knowledge and experience of the Northern Ireland situation prove beyond doubt that the minority in Northern Ireland for years considered the B Specials as a military wing of the Unionist Party. It was considered to be an instrument for enforcing Unionist policies in a military sense in Northern Ireland. If that is the fear, rightly or wrongly, of the people in Northern Ireland who are not in the majority, it is quite obvious that we in this House must do everything possible to ensure that that fear is completely removed, that the old image should completely disappear, and that, if there is to be a new force, it must not be tainted with the old concept of the purpose of the B Specials. We must get this point across to the people of Northern Ireland. Yet, at the same time as these statements were being made in this House, there were these comments on the other side of the water.
  I would like to say that we ought not to have a new force at all in Ulster. I would like the position to be that we could say that we were not going to have the B Specials replaced by the Ulster Defence Regiment. There has been a great deal of exaggeration of the need for such an organisation. The Hunt Report., on page 12, says:
  "Moreover, a realistic assessment of the capacity of the I.R.A. to mount serious terrorist attacks would perhaps not rate it very high, particularly as the Government of the Irish Republic has stated publicly that it is opposed to the use of force on the border."
  A little earlier, the report said:
  "It should not be inferred from this assessment of the possible threat from terrorism that terrorist attacks are likely."
  We are told that this new force will not be involved in riots or internal affairs of that kind. Nor, we are hastily as-
  1414
  sured, is it designed to deal with the Republican Government. It is designed against terrorist attacks. But, as the Hunt Committee clearly pointed out, there does not seem any likelihood of terrorist attacks on a large scale. So why do we need a force of 6,000 people?
  I know that, in Northern Ireland, over the years there have been attacks of a terrorist nature. I remind the House that my own City of Liverpool has had its water supply from Wales blown up six times. Yet we have not had a special force brought into being to deal with the Welsh Nationalists. The situation has been exaggerated, although, of course, there have been terrorist attacks in Northern Ireland. But if we had the equivalent size of force in this country in such a voluntary organisation, whatever it might be called. we would have a force of about 250,000, as my hon. Friend the Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme) pointed out. Even with the greatest of terrorist attacks, we in this country would not need a force of that size to deal with them.
  The whole situation has been greatly exaggerated, because, in the past, the force of B Specials has been used as part of the weapons of the Unionist Government in Northern Ireland to maintain their political control… I want to see that ended. I do not think it essential to have a force of this kind, but if we are to have a force, then the absolute maximum of numbers must be that laid down in the Hunt Report—no more than 4,000.
  I hope that there will not be any great hurry in recruiting for this new force. I hope that the Government will not encourage all the B Specials overnight to leave that force and join the new regiment. If they do that, the minority in Northern Ireland will not join the regiment—not even those who have served in the British forces—because they will still believe that they are being put in the position of people without equality of rights.
  Certainly, I hope that, in recruiting, the Government will look for noncommissioned officers who are in the minority part of Ulster's population but who have also been members of the British forces, and that these N.C.O.s will be given positions of responsibility in the new regiment. I hope that such

  1415
  men will be positively looked for. I suppose that here I am asking for positive discrimination, but I feel that it is essential to build up the full confidence of the people of Northern Ireland.
  I hope that the Government will reconsider the name of the regiment. Its very name—the Ulster Defence Regiment —is a provocation not only of the minority in Northern Ireland but of the people in Eire. We must ensure that there is no question of this type of provocation.
  I do not want to make a long speech, because other hon. Members wish to speak. I always feel that it is something of a scandal when hon. Members make long speeches, because I feel that, if they cannot put their basic points in a matter of 10 to 15 minutes, there is something wrong with them. Surely one can put one's main arguments in a short time without padding a speech out. We have had a few speeches tonight which have strained my patience, if no one else's particularly as I was trying to get into the debate myself.
  But there are many other questions we are concerned about. For example, my hon. Friend the Member for Belfast, West (Mr. Fitt) has urged the case for a special advisory committee and I hope that such a committee will be established.
  I also hope that we shall get some real concessions from the Government on the Bill. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State made an interesting speech, but he did not give us any real concessions—for example, on the question of arms being kept in people's homes. Why do we have to have this? I will quote a case reported in the Liverpool Daily Post and the Belfast Telegraph. It concerns a B Special who was carrying a gun and who fired it during an incident. He was finally brought to court and fined. His counsel told the court:
  "At the time of the incident his reaction was responsible in that he did not discharge the gun at the crowd, but fired a warning shot in the air."
  If one does not let the B Specials have the guns, they cannot carry them around. Incidentally, this man apparently had been given a Sterling machine gun. I want to make certain that in no circumstances can such a thing happen in future. I ask the Government for their
  1416
  assurance that members of the new force will not be allowed to have their guns at home.
  I do not want to be put in a position where we shall have to oppose the Bill. It is clear that we need concessions, however. I remind the Government that there was a Bill in this House which we did not like called the Parliament (No. 2) Bill. I remind the Government, also, that some of us learnt a great deal about parliamentary tactics as a result and that this Bill is to be taken on the Floor of the House. Therefore, I should like to point out to my right hon. and hon. Friends, without making any threat, what happened on that occasion. We want some tangible concessions. If we do not get them, then it will be a long time before the Houses passes this legislation.
  8.20 p.m.
  Captain L. P. S. Orr (Down, South): It would not be unreasonable to remind the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) that the precedent of the Parliament (No. 2) Bill is not a good one in this respect, because what he referred to was due to joint action by back benchers on both sides of the House.
  I welcome the tone with which the hon. Gentleman started. Indeed, I welcome generally the moderation of his approach. Fundamentally, he made the same points as most hon. Gentlemen opposite who have spoken and I will deal with them in due course.
  I found the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) very difficult to follow, because I was not clear whether he thought that there should be any kind of defence force. His solution seemed to be a total counsel of despair. But both he and the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. George Brown) had the common desire, as had the hon. Member for Walton, of not hurrying the matter. Their approach was, "Let us, if we can, delay the Bill. Let us delay its implementation".
  I am not sure whether they appreciate that by delaying the Bill—and this rather undermines the strength of the threat of the hon. Member for Walton to his right hon. and hon. Friends—the Ulster Special Constabulary will remain in being. The satus quo will prevail. Instead of being superseded by the Ulster Defence Regiment, properly under the command of the

  1417
  Minister of Defence and ultimately under the direction of this House, we will still have the Ulster Special Constabulary. Therefore, hon. Gentlemen opposite would be wiser to press this legislation through the House as swiftly as possible so that the new Ulster Defence Regiment can come into being.
  I thought the speech of the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull, North (Mr. McNamara), about the fears, suspicions and objections to the legislation, more moderate and compelling than any other. I hope that that accolade will not be the kiss of death to him and the people who support him. But it was quite true. We recognise from that speech, rather than from others, the sincerity of the fears and suspicions that may exist, and I hope, during the course of my speech, to deal with them.
  Mr. McNamara: Whether or not it is an accolade, I will grin and bear it. But is the hon. and gallant Gentleman suggesting that those of my hon. Friends whose speeches he would not regard as temperate are not honest and sincere?
  Captain Orr: I was not seeking to imply that. The hon. Gentleman gave us an example of how to express fears and suspicions without using words which can be inflamatory. I refer in this context to the hon. Member for Penistone (Mr. John Mendelson) who, throughout his speech, used words which were so irresponsible and inflammatory as to defeat the object of everything we are trying to do.
  What are we trying to do basically? We are on the second leg of an operation designed to take away from the Royal Ulster Constabulary, assisted as it has been in the past by the Ulster Special Constabulary, the para-military role which neither of them should have had to bear for so long. We are trying to restore a situation where the police carry out the proper police role, which we were debating on Monday, of a civilian police force with the confidence of all sections of the community.
  We are trying to devise a defence force to take on the former para-military functions of looking after the security of the State which the majority of people living in the State feel to be threatened. The hon. Gentleman recognised that there
  1418
  were fears amongst the majority, quite rightly so, just as I recognise with him that there are fears in the minority. We are now on the second leg of the operation which we started on Monday.
  There is not a great deal of virtue in looking back in the way that the hon. Member for Penistone did—
  Mr. John Mendelson: And the hon. and learned Member for Antrim, South (Sir Knox Cunningham).
  Captain Orr: I will accept that. I am willing to put my hon. and learned Friend and the hon. Member for Penistone in the same bracket as they are likely to appear in the same Lobby. If the hon. Member for Penistone likes the juxtaposition, he is welcome to it.
  Mr. Mendelson: Speaking for myself, I do not like the juxtaposition. I did not go into the past. I explained the political situation of the last few weeks and months which forms the background to this debate.
  Captain Orr: The hon. Gentleman tried to pre-empt the Scarman Tribunal. I and, I think, most responsible and sensible people prefer to await the verdict of the independent Scarman Tribunal, and this is what we do.
  I come now to the Bill, and I want to deal with the main objections which have been put forward from hon. Gentlemen opposite.
  The first point I regard as comparatively small in a sense. Several hon. Gentlemen—in particular, the hon. Member for Belfast, West (Mr. Fitt), but I will come to him later—have pointed out the difficulty of the name of the new regiment. My interruption of the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull, North was genuinely seeking information. I wanted to know what name he wished to put in place of the Ulster Defence Regiment. He sugge3ted the Northern Ireland Defence Regiment.
  Mr. Fitt: And the hon. and gallant Gentleman agreed with him.
  Captain Orr: I did not. I was acknowledging that he had made a constructive suggestion. I did not say that I agreed with him. I like the proposed name. Ulster Defence Regiment is a perfectly good name. Ulster, as I think the

  1419
  hon. Gentleman said, has a long military tradition. The Royal Ulster Rifles is a famous regiment. I have never heard of members of the minority in Northern Ireland objecting to serving in the Royal Ulster Rifles—presumably because the Royal Ulster Rifles is part of the British Army and is under British Army control. But this new regiment will be part of the British Army and under British Army control. I cannot see that the name "Ulster" is any more of a barrier—
  Miss Devlin rose—
  Captain Orr: The hon. Lady has no relevance to the debate. I am dealing with serious matters.
  I do not suppose that the hon. Member for Belfast, West objects to taking his milk from Ulster Dairies or travelling on Ulster buses or watching Ulster Television, or any of the other things. This point about the name is a silly and rather trivial point.
  Mr. McGuire: The hon. and gallant Member has made some valid points, but on the question of the Royal Ulster Regiment does not he agree that that regiment was formed when there was no dispute about what Ulster was? The Royal Ulster Regiment is much older than the formation of the Six Counties Government. Is not this the first time that this British sovereign Parliament in Westminster has given credence to the name "Ulster", and is not this what hon. Members like the hon. and gallant Member want?
  Captain Orr: That is not quite true. Successive Ministers of Agriculture in this sovereign United Kingdom Parliament have negotiated with the Ulster Farmers' Union. I do not see that we should make so much fuss about something which is really rather trivial.
  Mr. Shinwell: Forget it!
  Captain Orr: I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that we should forget it. It is not a point of very much substance. I am glad that the right hon. Gentleman supports me.
  Mr. McNamara: If the hon. and gallant Gentleman is saying that it is not a point of much substance and should be forgotten, why not forget it, agree with me, and then we shall all be happy?
  Captain Orr: That is one way of forgetting about it.
  Mr. Shinwell rose—
  Captain Orr: Oh, really!
  Mr. Shinwell: The hon. and gallant Member should not object. I was interrupted on ten occasions—three times by my own Front Bench; impertinent and impudent interventions—and seven times by hon. Members opposite. Why does the hon. and gallant Gentleman object?
  Captain Orr: I am not objecting in the least. I never object to the right hon. Member for Easington. The age limit to which he objected would allow him to serve in that regiment. He would be very welcome to do so.
  Mr. Shinwell: I was not objecting to the name. That did not matter to me. The primary consideration in my mind is that if we want to raise a force we must ensure that everybody gets a chance to get in. If people are security-vetted along certain lines, or are asked to take an oath of allegiance which they regard as objectionable, we shall never get the force we want.
  Captain Off: The right hon. Gentleman's two points concern people being required to take an oath of allegience, and vetting procedures preventing a minority section from joining the new force. It seems to me that the right hon. Gentleman has moved slightly from his earlier position. Do I take it that he would like to see a force in which both sections of the community would be interested?
  Mr. Shinwell: Yes.
  Captain Orr: That is good. I agree with him.
  I now come directly to the question: who should form the new force? Some play has been made upon the question whether it would be possible for anyone whose basic philosophy favoured a united Ireland, in the long run, to join the new regiment. I do not know. That is for the military authorities to judge, but in my opinion they should not base their judgment on a man's ultimate political philosophy. Some people believe in world government rather than government by States.

  1421
  The G.O.C. and those responsible for admission to the new force will have to consider whether the person seeking to join it is genuinely concerned, first, to defend the frontiers of the United Kingdom if they should be attacked and, secondly, to preserve the security of the State in which he lives. Those are the two criteria. But because of the peculiar circumstances of Northern Ireland the procedures should be strict. There should be strict inquiry.
  I do not know how this can be done. The task will be a very difficult one, because all people of good will want to see a new regiment which is representative of all sections of the community. I am not sure whether my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Antrim, South (Sir Knox Cunningham) would agree with me about that. None the less, I think that we all want to see the new regiment including people from all sections of the community.
  We are in a difficulty—certainly at the beginning—in that the people who are ready, able and willing to give such service are those who have done so for years. They would be the natural people to recruit into the new regiment. They would be expected to reply.
  Mr. Fitt: Does not the hon. and gallant Member agree that there does not seem to be any prospect of an immediate attack upon the Constitution or the border of Ireland, and that in the present situation many Catholic ex-Service men who have given service in Her Majesty's Forces would be just as well trained and capable of fulfilling the role required of this new regiment as would members of the special constabulary?
  Captain Orr: The hon. Gentleman may well be right. I should certainly welcome into the new force people who had given service in Her Majesty's Forces—people who had already shown that they were prepared to be loyal to the State. I am certain that they would be welcomed by any members of the present Ulster Constabulary who might join the new force. They would be welcomed as comrades.
  The hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Helfer) said that there was no need for this force. He said that the necessity for it had been greatly exaggerated. I profoundly wish that I could agree, but I do not. I profoundly
  1422
  hope that the need for the Ulster Defence Regiment will disappear, but it will not. The Hunt Committee did not support the hon. Gentleman's view that a new defence force of this sort was not necessary. In paragraph 174, it referred to
  "… the excellent services rendered to the Ulster Special Constabulary and the community at large by the permanent and full-time officers and members of that Force"
  and expressed the hope
  "… that they will find it possible to continue in office for as long as their services are required."
  In paragraph 170, the committee referred to protection of the border and the State against armed attacks. In other words, throughout, it is apparent that the committee, for whatever reasons, considers that we should have a defence force of this sort. I am prepared to accept, as I hope we all can, so far as the general principle is concerned upon which we will be voting tonight, the setting-up of the regiment, what Hunt has said—that we need it.
  The hon. Member for Belfast, West said that, in supporting this, he was displaying political courage. I agree with him: I think that he is. He is trying hard to be responsible. It is sometimes fascinating to listen to his speeches when he is trying to do so, because he has the greatest difficulty. But I appreciate the fact
  Mr. McNamara: I suggest that the hon. Gentleman should not be either so pompous or so patronising, when one considers the conduct of his party and his position over the years.
  Captain Orr: With due respect, that is unfair. I may be pompous—I am getting old and that cannot be helped—but I am not sure that I intended to be patronising. Considering some of the claims which the hon. Member for Belfast, West made in the past, one would never have suspected that he would come here and say that he would support an Ulster Defence Regiment. It is not in the least patronising to welcome that, as I do. Once again, I hope that it will not do him any harm that I should do so.
  Mr. Michael Foot: Would it not be much better if the hon. Gentleman left my hon. Friend the Member for Belfast, West (Mr. Fitt) to state these matters in his own way and not put a gloss on it, which could be extremely dangerous and

  1423
  which twists the situation, because what my hon. Friend called for was a series of guarantees about the Bill?
  Captain Orr: I was commending the hon. Member for Belfast, West. I recognise that he called for certain guarantees. These are precisely the things with which, if I were not interrupted so much, I would deal.
  What are the guarantees which have been asked for? The first is the basic one about recruitment. I have dealt with that. The second was the question of arms—
  Mr. Fitt: The numbers.
  Captain On: Very well, I will deal with numbers.
  I have no very strong view about the size of the force, provided that it is efficient. But could I say to those hon. Gentlemen who suggest that the present limit of 6,000—it is a ceiling and not a target, as the Secretary of State said—is too high, and should be lowered, that it might make it more difficult for the military authorities to recruit members from the minorities?
  One must base one's consideration of the numbers in the force upon the simple question whether 4,000 as a limit is sufficient to do the job which the Ulster Defence Regiment is intended to do. If the hon. Members do not think there should be a force of such a size, or do not think that there is a role for such a force, it makes sense to argue that the forces should be smaller and cost less. But if one accepts what the Hunt Committee has said, that there is a necessity for such a force, one really ought to see whether we are getting the right numbers. [Interruption.] If I may be allowed to develop this argument in my own way, I shall probably make a little more sense than if I make my speech in the form of a running exchange.
  Whether one calls it a ceiling or a target, the Special Constabulary as it stood had a paper membership of about 8,000. In fact, at any one time not more than about 4,000 were actually on duty. It is one of the facts of life that for every four-hour guard a strength of 25 men is required. This is one of the facts on which a working party—and this was a joint working party—came to the
  1424
  conclusion that there should be a ceiling of something over 6,000. I think that on the whole—although we can go into this in more detail in Committee 6,000 is about right as a ceiling. It might be that 6,000 would not be required. I hope that it would not be, but if we attempt to write into legislation a ceiling of 4,000 I think that we should get into great difficulties.
  The hon. Member for Belfast, West, referred to the cost of £1 million. It is as well to bear in mind, in view of the task which the Ulster Special Constabulary has carried out for so long, that the cost was about £300,000 a year.
  I now come to the problem of arms. Several hon. Members—and again I can understand it—expressed concern about the possibility that the members of the new Ulster Defence Regiment could store arms at home. So far as my colleagues and I are concerned, the fewer arms stored at home the better, but I hope hon. Members will accept that there are times when it would be proper for the G.O.C.—and remember that this decision will be placed in his hands—might say that because the nearest armoury was a long way away, the speedy defence of an installation in a remote area could not be carried out if the members of the force had to be brought to the armoury. I know of installations which are in that situation. Attacks come from all quarters and not necessarily from the I.R.A., and it might be dangerous to say that the arms must of necessity always be stored centrally because of something which is written into the legislation.
  There is a danger in having central armouries. My hon. Friend the Member for Antrim, North (Mr. Henry Clark) pointed out that the arms of a whole battalion were stolen from the barracks in Armagh, and they included the general's sporting rifle. The contents of an armoury at Magilligan were stolen. There are many instances of arms being stolen from armouries. Generally speaking, small arms have been safer in the hands of individual members of the forces concerned. But, in the general context, we want to get away from a situation where there are lots of arms about in Ulster. Everyone of good will wants

  1425
  to see a reduction in the number of firearms there.
  The Bill make it plain and everything that the Minister has said is to the effect that the arms will be issued under Military control. The people who are to have them will be subject to military law. They are not to be used except under military law. They are not to be kept at home except with the consent of the military authorities. That is not unreasonable, though we can argue about it at some length in Committee.
  I do not want to delay the House, but I must repeat the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Antrim, North, about training and the difficulties which might beset potential members of the new force. Northern Ireland has very large country areas where there are small farmers who are willing to give up their time for all kinds of activities, but who will find it extremely difficult to give the kind of time suggested in the White Paper. If we are to have an efficient military force, it is obvious that it must be properly trained, and no people are more keen to have proper military training than the present members of the Ulster Special Constabulary. However, there are genuine local difficulties and while no one asks for any firm undertaking, if the Minister could tell us that he recognises those difficulties, it would be welcome.
  It is suggested that an advisory committee might be set up to deal with matters of general policy concerning recruitment, though it is understood that it would not deal with individual cases. Will there be a representative of the Northern Ireland Security Committee on the advisory committee? If such a committee is set up, I think that it is important for the Ulster Security Committee to be represented on it.
  I will not detain the House any longer. I welcome the new regiment and support it wholeheartedly. I hope that those who have given good service to Ulster in the past will join, that it will be representative of the community, and that it will be a great success.
  8.45 p.m.
  Miss Bernadette Devlin (Mid-Ulster): Before beginning the main body of my speech, I want to state that, as the hon.
  1426
  and gallant Member for Down, South (Captain Orr) said that he did not wish to delay the House for long, and in view of the remarks he made to my good self, I hope that hon. Members will excuse me if I regard the Front Bench below the Gangway opposite as empty for the duration of my speech.
  Several hon. Members have welcomed the Bill, not welcomed it, or welcomed it conditionally. I want to state my own position on a number of grounds. I want to state my own position politically. Certain hon. Members opposite should have declared their interest, in that some of their ancestors—in fact, their grandfathers—founded the force—the B Specials—about which we are talking today.
  I make my own position clear. I believe in the Socialist Republic of Connolly. Therefore, I consider it an impudence on the part of the Secretary of State for Defence, or any other person on the Front Bench, to ask me in principle to advocate this force to anyone.
  The hon. Member for Orpington (Mr. Lubbock) said that he thought that I was wrong in accusing others of playing modern-day Redmondite3. For the benefit of my hon. Friend the Member for Belfast, West (Mr. Fitt), it should be made clear that, although he said that he accepted that the Bill would go through Parliament, he also said that he did not take it upon himself either to tell people to join or not to join the force. Such is my position. I will not at any point play the rôle of recruiting sergeant for the forces of the British Army in my country.
  Given that the Bill is going through Parliament, given that there will be a Defence Regiment in Northern Ireland, I do not want to spend much time on the title. There are much more important things in the Bill which need to be dealt with. Someone suggested that there may be other constructive titles for this force, and I cannot see anything wrong with "Local Territorial Forces (Northern Ireland) Bill" and with the regiment thereafter being known as "the Local Territorial Force". This would have no partisan bias and would offend nobody, of whatever political opinion or of whatever religion. It would also be just as short a title.

  1427
  To get on to more important things, let us consider the matter of defence. if we are creating a defence regiment in Northern Ireland, we must ask ourselves the question, as several hon. Members have done: defence of whom, and defence against whom? We have heard many things about whom this force will defend and against whom it will defend them.
  I submit in all honesty that the Bill is not designed to defend the inhabitants of Northern Ireland either against outside guerilla attack or inside guerilla attack. It is designed wholly for no military reason. It is designed to defend hon. Members who sit on the Front Bench in this House from the Northern Ireland Government.
  I will state my argument for why I believe that the force is being created to defend this House against Stormont. In the given situation of what has taken place over the past few months in Northern Ireland, it is obvious to hon. Members that the Ulster Special Constabulary is nothing more than the political armed wing of the Ulster Unionist Party. If this Government had been faced with the fact that they had to disband that force, what would the steps have been? They were faced with two prospects. Either, under Section 75 of the Government of Ireland Act, they assumed responsibility in the House and, on the authority of the Secretary of State for Home Affairs, disbanded the force from this House, or alternatively they issued a directive to the Northern Ireland Government to have that force disbanded.
  What would have been the situation? Would anybody in the Northern Ireland Government have accepted that order from this Government? Would they, on the order of the Home Secretary, have said, "Yes, the force must be disbanded "? Even if they had agreed to it, even if the Minister for Home Affairs in Northern Ireland had tried to enforce such an order, would the 8,000 B Specials have given up the arms which they had at home? I suggest to the House that they would not have done so and that we should have been faced with another Rhodesia situation. There were 8,000 armed men in Northern Ireland who would have defied the order of this House to lay down their arms. They would
  1428
  have been ably assisted by the Ulster Volunteer Force. They would have been ably assisted by a number of other armed para-military forces in Northern Ireland. And they would have received the assistance of a minority of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, also in possession of arms.
  That is why this Government could not take the step of doing what had to be done—simply disbanding the B Specials. Therefore a compromise had to be reached. I ask right hon. and hon. Members on the Front Benches, do they believe, in all sincerity, that there is any necessity for the force which they are bringing into being? Is Northern Ireland an integral part of the United Kingdom or is Northern Ireland a colony of Great Britain? If we are an integral part of the United Kingdom, then we have a right to the protection of the British Army. If there are not enough people in the British Army, it is better that the attention of the House be turned to recruiting members in Northern Ireland for the Regular British Army.
  Mr. Kenneth Lewis rose—
  Miss Devlin: I am not prepared to give way in view of the fact that there is very little time before the winding-up speeches. I apologise.
  If what we need is more people in the British Army, would it not be better, on the basis of the argument put forward by the Government in respect of the police—the beneficial nature of having policemen serve not only in Northern Ireland but also in this country—that any territorial force should also serve outside Northern Ireland? The basis of the argument for a force which will serve only in and which will be exclusive to Northern Ireland falls on the very argument advanced in respect of the police the other night.
  There were no military reasons for this force. We were faced consequently with the political reason, that unless the British Government were prepared to face U.D.I. almost immediately, they had to compromise with the Stormont Government and they had to adopt a "New Forces for Old" policy. I well understand why the Government felt it necessary to do this, and, looking at parts of the Bill, I well understand what the Government have attempted to do. They

  1429
  have attempted to appease the B Specials, they have attempted to appease the Stormont Government, and at the same time they have attempted to assert the authority of this House over that force.
  This is a compromise. While I personally do not agree with compromises, I can understand them. But having undertaken that compromise, the Ministry of Defence should have continued to adopt a firm line with the Northern Ireland Government. Had they said to them, "This is a compromise. You will have the frontier defended, though we find it unnecessary that it should be done in this way. But we will not tolerate the interference of your Government in the affairs of the Government of Westminster and we shall control this force", I could have understood the situation better.
  Indeed, I submit that that is the kind of thing which was said to the Northern Ireland Government and that that is why we had the advertisements in the newspapers and on television of which we have complained. That is why we had the advertisement on television, and, with all due respect to the right hon. Gentlemen on the Front Bench, I do not think that their wingeing, cringeing apology by way of a statement to this House tonight by any means explains or justifies their actions with regard to that advertisement.
  I do not want to spend much time on it, but I should like to quote from the television interview. The interviewer asked the lieutenant-colonel who was there:
  "What about guerrilla-type activity? "
  The colonel's reply was:
  "This would be dealt with by the Ulster Defence Regiment which is part of the Army".
  The Ulster Defence Regiment does not exist and therefore is nothing. He was then asked:
  " What would be the strength of this regiment? "
  He replied:
  "Up to 6,000 men."
  He was then asked:
  " Who do you want in the regiment? ".
  He replied:
  "The initial entry will of necessity come largely from the Ulster Special Constabulary but we shall want recruits from all sections of the community."
  1430
  That statement was not designed to encourage anyone else to join, because it implied that preference would be given to members of the Ulster Special Constabulary. It was therefore once again a case of this Government allowing themselves to be blackmailed by the Northern Ireland Government, because I am sure that they brought up the old threat that "the Right wing might split us and the Right wing might win".
  If there is a very strong right wing in the Unionist Party, my hon. Friend the Member for Belfast, West and anyone else in Northern Ireland can assure this House that its Left wing and its middle wing simply do not exist because they are all tarred with the same brush. Therefore, it would not matter who was Prime Minister of Northern Ireland because, just as the Northern Ireland Government is the tail that wags this dog, so are the ordinary people in the constituencies in Northern Ireland the tail that wags the Prime Minister in Northern Ireland, and they do as they are told, as their Right wing tells them.
  Right along the line we have had compromise after compromise. It can be seen in this Bill. I have not tonight, because much time will be spent on them in Committee, gone through the things in the Bill which need drastically to be changed. But we have been told that to be a member of the Ulster Special Constabulary will be an advantage in joining this new force on the basis of previous military training. Quite a number, in fact the majority, of hon. Members are totally unaware of what kind of training the B Specials have had. Therefore, is it in order that the Minister should say that they have training and expect this House to accept his word for it, being totally ignorant of the kind of training which they have had? I submit that they have not had either the military training or the military discipline which is usual for people who join the Regular Army. Therefore, because they belonged to a force used to lax discipline, they will be most unlikely to get into this force.
  I have seen members of the B Specials. I saw them in Londonderry during August. They have been seen on television coming out of the barracks on being called out. Is it military discipline, is it the policy of the Regular Army,

  1431
  to have people who were supposedly members of a military or para-military body walk out on duty and to take up their positions, however offensive I thought them to be, without even having bothered to button the jackets which they were wearing, some of them without even having bothered to put their caps on straight and very few of whom had bothered to polish their shoes?
  Mr. Fitt: Some drunk.
  Miss Devlin: I will not disagree with my hon. Friend when he says that some of them were, as I would say, not quite sober.
  This is not the basis of discipline in the Army. If those people could not even manage to do those things, they have no right to claim military experience. It is also a historical fact that in the early years of the war, quite a number of people joined the Ulster Special Constabulary to avoid military service. Are they the kind of people the Government now want to join the British Army?
  Therefore, I submit that when the Bill comes before us in Committee, hon. Members should be in full knowledge of the extent and type of training which has been given to members of the B Specials and that it should be left to us, the Members of this Parliament, to decide whether that can even be called military training.
  Allegations have been made against members of the Ulster Special Constabulary. I will quote one. This morning, a researcher of mine rang up a member of the Ulster Special Constabulary. His name is Mr. Derek Eakin. Mr. Derek Eakin is a special constable with the Tullintrain platoon.He had been accused—that is to say, allegations had been made against him—regarding the Burntollet Bridge attack. He has received a letter inviting him to join the Ulster Defence Regiment. This morning, by telephone, he told one of my researchers that he had not yet decided whether to take up his place in the Ulster Defence Regiment.
  That gentleman was given to understand by the letter he received that a place was waiting for him if he wanted it. Not only should he not have a place before 1st January—
  Captain Orr: Nonsense.
  Miss Devlin: It is not nonsense. I will produce the document for the hon. and irrelevant Member with the telephone number of the man in question.
  In the first place, that man has been led to believe that there is a place for him in what is now a non-existent force. In the second place, even were his recruitment possible, this man has been accused publicly, in a book called "Burntollet ", of particularly criminal activities at Burntollet Bridge. Nothing has been done to deny it. No charges of libel have been made against the author of that book and yet this man has been notified by the Northern Ireland authorities that he is totally welcome in a military force.
  It is my honest opinion that in view of the skulduggery which has gone on on behalf of the Northern Ireland Government and of all the backdoor methods they have used to try to prejudice what is going on in this House, the Bill should, in the interests of parliamentary democracy, be withdrawn until such time as the matter is cleared up. In my opinion, it should be withdrawn for good. Since, however, I accept that it will go through whether I like it or not, I think that it should at least be withdrawn until there is an investigation into what exactly the moderate Government of Major James Dawson Chichester-Clark, Squire of Moyola, constituent of mine, have been up to behind the back of the Minister of Defence.
  Mr. Speaker: Mr. Kenneth Lewis.
  9.3 p.m.
  Mr. Kenneth Lewis (Rutland and Stamford)rose—
  Hon. Members:Oh!
  Mr. Lewis: The reason I am participating in the debate is simply because I regard it as important that there should be a speech from a back bencher on this side other than from the Unionist Members for Northern Ireland. I have sat through a good deal of the debate and listened to much of what has been said.
  I would like, first, to comment on what was said by the hon. Member for Belfast, West (Mr. Fitt) in a pleasing and humorous speech which, I think, all of us enjoyed. The hon. Member talked

  1433
  about his attitude requiring courage in this House, and that is accepted. We certainly accept it.
  I want to put it to the hon. Member that it can equally be said of the Unionist Members in this House and of the Stormont Government at present that they themselves are engaged in a very courageous operation in what they are trying to do in Northern Ireland by means of the progressive measures which they have introduced and which they are speeding up and with the very support which they are giving to this Bill. It is no help to any Government if they have to deal with extremists, not only extremists opposed to them but also on their own side.
  The hon. Member for Belfast, West said one thing about the Union Jack and about the Queen in relation to this Bill. He said that it was a pity that volunteers under the Bill had to subscribe an oath to the Queen and that he thought that this was not necessary.
  Mr. Fitt rose—
  Mr. Lewis: I listened to the hon. Member's speech.
  Mr. Fitt: Yes, but—
  Mr. Lewis: That is what the hon. Member said.
  Mr. Fitt: On a point of order. The hon. Gentleman has charged me with saying that it was unnecessary for a man who joins this force to take an oath of allegiance to the Queen. I said absolutely nothing of the sort. The hon. Member misrepresents me.
  Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Sydney Irving): Order. The hon. Member must not use a point of order to continue to debate.
  Mr. Lewis: The hon. Member may read his speech in HANSARD tomorrow. That is what he said. I listened to him.
  There are a number of reasons why I support the Bill and this force. [Interruption.] I do not wish to add animosity to the proceedings. Plenty of animosity has been injected into the debate by Members on the other side. If they want some from me they can have it. I am quite capable of giving it, but I am trying to keep the temperature down. Hon.
  1434
  Members can have it which way they wish.
  I support the Bill for a number of reasons. The first is that whatever may be said about the dependence or the independence of Northern Ireland under the Stormont Government, and however that may be seen by hon. Members opposite, including the hon. Lady the Member for Mid-Ulster (Miss Devlin), the fact is that the British taxpayer has to pay a lot of money for this force, and has to pay very largely for the troubles there have been and are in Northern Ireland. We want to see an end of these troubles, and I think that this force can contribute towards bringing peace in Ulster. Otherwise, I would not support it.
  The hon. Lady the Member for Mid-Ulster has on more than one occasion come to this House and said that she is concerned more than anything else with the social problems in Northern Ireland —with jobs, with houses and the like. It is impossible to create jobs or build houses in Northern Ireland while we have the kind of disturbing situation which exists there. She and the hon. Member for Belfast, West should be contributing to reducing the temperature in her country, but I am not aware that the hon. Lady makes a great contribution towards that end. In fact, the speeches I have heard from her on two occasions have been somewhat inflammatory, not conducive to creating the kind of situation which will mean social progress in Northern Ireland.
  Statements have been made tonight by the hon. Member for Belfast, West and others to the effect that the new regiment should not be largely composed of members of the Unionist Party, and that it should be open to all; some doubt was expressed whether others would join. I want to put this to the hon. Member for Belfast, West and to the hon. Lady the Member for Mid-Ulster. It must be obvious that in their country the Unionist Party is in the majority. I remind the House that it is in the majority, in a parliamentary election, and that no complaint has been made about any difficulty with the franchise for parliamentary elections.
  That being so, perforce Unionists will make up the majority of this new force, as they did of the B Specials. I hope, however, that others will join, and that

  1435
  the new voluntary force will, with the co-operation of all, act for the good of Northern Ireland. In no country can the minority run the majority, and the minority in Northern Ireland has to come to terms with the majority.
  Finally, may I deal with the hon. Lady the Member for Mid-Ulster. She, of course, wants to be the Joan of Arc of Northern Ireland, but she does not want to go to the stake. She says that she does not intend to support the Bill. To? morrow, she is publishing a book—
  Miss Devlin rose—
  Mr. Lewis: I will not give way. The hon. Lady would not give way to me.
  Miss Devlin: On a point of order. Is it in order for the hon. Gentleman to continue reporting as facts statements which were not made on this side of the House?
  Mr. Lewis: I would point out to the hon. Lady—
  Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman is responsible for the accuracy of the statements which he makes, not the Chair.
  Mr. Lewis: The hon. Lady is tomorrow publishing a book and I wish to quote from it. She has said that she has no intention of acting as a recruiting sergeant for the new force. She would make a very attractive recruiting sergeant, so it is a pity. I would not expect her to support recruitment to the new force, because on page 204 of her book she says, in relation to recent events:
  " We leafleted the Free State Army, asking them to desert and come to our aid. We campaigned among the British troops, asking them to do the same thing."
  The hon. Lady said in the House tonight that she expected British troops to keep law and order in Northern Ireland—
  Miss Devlin rose—
  Mr. Lewis: —yet in her book she is saying that she did not wish that British troops or the police in Northern Ireland should keep order but that disorder should reign.
  Miss Devlin rose—
  Mr. Lewis: The best contribution that the hon. Lady can make to the present situation is to try to encourage this force to be a force for good in Northern Ireland. It is important for her, for every citizen in that country and in this country that the British troops should come out of Ireland as soon as possible. That is my aim, the British taxpayer's aim and it should be her aim, so that Northern Ireland can peaceably get on with its own affairs.
  The Clerk at the Table informed the House of the unavoidable absence of Mr. SPEAKER.
  9.14 p.m.
  Mr. James Ramsden: This has been, as I expected, an extremely lively debate. What has surprised me, although perhaps it should not have done so, is that it has also been, without exception, an extremely good humoured debate. In spite of the conviction with which disagreement between both sides of- the House has been expressed, I do not believe that any speech has been made which will fundamentally make more difficult the task of hon. and right hon. Gentlemen in taking this next proposed step in what we hope will prove to be the solution of the difficult position in Northern Ireland.
  It is perhaps natural that a great deal of the debate has been concerned with the political background to the Bill rather than with its military future consequences. I was very much in agreement with the opening words of the Secretary of State in his speech this afternoon. I thought that he had the matter absolutely right when he said that he recognised the anxieties aroused by the proposals in the Bill, but equally he was at pains to remind the House that entrenched attitudes, historical in origin—one could call them convictions or prejudices—are nevertheless the realities of political life in the present situation in Northern Ireland, whoever holds the responsibility there, and must be taken into account.
  I will not involve myself too much in the political and historical part of the debate. I wish to say nothing that might make the task of the Secretary of State more difficult. But there are certain comments I should like to make on the military aspects of the proposals and

  1437
  the problems underlying them, many of which have already been touched on in the debate.
  The Bill will establish a new defence force for Northern Ireland, and I hope that it will be passed speedily so as to enable the job of organisation and recruitment to proceed. Incidentally, I have heard some part of almost every speech made today. I do not believe a single hon. Member, with the possible exception of the hon. Lady the Member for Mid-Ulster (Miss Devlin)—but I am not even sure about that—has disputed the need for some auxiliary force of this character if security in Northern Ireland is to be promoted and sustained. Certainly nobody, whatever reservations they may have had about the Government's proposals, has made any suggestions about a clear or superior alternative.
  The right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. George Brown), in an intervention early in the debate, wanted a Select Committee. He wanted some delay until the problem was subjected to further examination. I do not believe he was right. No point raised in this debate today, from either side of the House, is beyond the capacity of the House to resolve in, I hope, a not too prolonged Committee stage.
  I will say why I agree with the Government that the Bill is necessary. Last week I visited Northern Ireland and I formed the following impressions. Admittedly, the impressions were fleeting ones, but I hope that they do not present an inaccurate picture of the needs of the security situation. The first impression was that there are not enough ordinary civil police there at this moment to do the job that we expect from the police in this country. The remedy for that is already in hand.
  Secondly, we need in Northern Ireland, and will continue to need, a military garrison of Regular soldiers. That garrison has been considerably reinforced. This state of affairs cannot be permanent, and will not need to be permanent, as the police forces increase in confidence and in strength.
  But there are other roles which will require to be discharged if the security of Northern Ireland is assured, and these are roles which cannot be discharged by
  1438
  the Regular forces—in the first place, because we have not enough, and never shall have enough, and, secondly, because, even if we had enough, these roles, as the right hon. Gentleman rightly said, are an uneconomic and wasteful use of Regular military manpower. Even now, I think, it is accepted that trained Regular soldiers are misemployed—though necessarily at the moment—doing jobs on the streets which would be far better discharged by ordinary police were they available.
  I think that the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) rather underplayed these other roles, however, and was wrong to describe them as grotesque. I do not agree with him. Driving around Northern Ireland, I had pointed out to me out of the car window a place in the water main to Belfast which had been blown up in a moment of tension. The need for adequate guards for designated key points and vital installations at a time of communal disturbance is surely incontrovertible, and I do not see who is to do this job unless it be some sort of auxiliary force of the type contemplated.
  At the moment, these jobs are being discharged by the B Specials. If it were not for what they are doing, the situation could not be contained. It has been decided that an alternative kind of force is preferable, however. That is the recommendation of the Hunt Committee and it has been accepted by Her Majesty's Government here and the Government of Northern Ireland. The sooner we can get on with passing this Bill through the House and raising and recruiting this new force and getting it into operation, the better for all concerned, as my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Down, South (Captain Orr) pointed out in his very able speech.
  Mr. Shinwell: I did not say what the right hon. Gentleman has attributed to me. What I was referring to was the idea, which I described as grotesque and fantastic, that when an act of sabotage happens men should be sent to the area. That is of no value. But if the British Government or the Government of Northern Ireland apprehend acts of sabotage, such as interference with electric installations and the like, surely they should assemble the necessary men at the

  1439
  point where they apprehend sabotage or attack and where this body can take the necessary action. Surely the right hon. Gentleman should be among the last persons in the world to talk in such a fashion, since he has been Secretary of State for War and knows something of military affairs.
  Mr. Ramsden: If I mistook the right hon. Gentleman, I apologise. I shall come to the question of the deployment of the new force in a moment. I am glad to hear that the right hon. Gentleman does not dispute the need for raising such a force.
  Reference has been made to the problem of where the arms of the force should be kept. The hon. Member for Penistone (Mr. John Mendelson) asked me directly whether I could produce any sound military reason for the decision that, in certain circumstances, some of the arms should be kept at home. My reply to him is that I believe that there is indeed in this case a sound military case for that decision by the Government. I believe that, in certain circumstances in the country districts, it would be impracticable to expect any effective action from the members of the force did they not have their weapons readily accessible. I believe that to be effective in certain cases would not be possible for members of the force had they to go to central armouries to collect their weapons.
  However, the House would be wrong to make too much of this point. I think that the practice will probably continue much as at present, with weapons centralised in the big cities, and that the dispensations from the military commanders to allow the keeping of weapons at home will be exercised responsibly and only in appropriate cases. Some of my hon. Friends made a point about the desirability of keeping the training obligation reasonably flexible. This was a good point, and I hope that we shall get a satisfactory reply.
  Some hon. Members opposite seemed to find a sinister implication in it, as though flexibility would lead to indiscriminate admissions to the force. I am sure that there is no such intention. I am sure that the degree of flexibility implied in the White Paper recognises that the force is bound to have recruits
  1440
  from country people, some of whom may have to milk cows seven days a week and for whom, therefore, an obligation of prolonged continuous training would create difficulties.
  Much has been said today about the requirements for strict security vetting of future recruits to the force. The fact that there will be a procedure of security vetting and that it will be strictly administered by the military authorities ought to be a reassurance to both sides in the argument. It is clear from what we have heard today that some reassurance is required, because genuine anxieties have been expressed.
  An operation on this scale is a considerable job. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman—I am sure he has—has the necessary personnel available to conduct the operation and that, important as it is, it will not subject the raising of the force to undue delay.
  Hon. Members, mainly on the other side of the House, have made a good deal of reference to the steps taken in Northern Ireland by the Northern Ireland Government—I suspect, in consultation with Her Majesty's Government—between publication of the White Paper and Second Reading of the Bill today. I thought that the Secretary of State was taken a little too much to task by some of his hon. Friends in this connection. I am inclined to look with some charity on the preparatory measures which were put in hand after publication of the White Paper.
  There was some apprehension, when I was in Northern Ireland, about the political effect which publication of the White Paper might have. It was felt that had the two previous reports been given the benefit of a little more preparation of public opinion, the danger of disturbances might have been avoided. Everybody concerned was at pains to make sure that the same thing should not happen this time. Therefore, as publication of the White Paper has gone reasonably smoothly, I would not reproach the Government too much for what has happened. On the whole, the operation has been successfully conducted.
  The right hon. Gentleman, when referring to pay, confused me somewhat. His hon. Friend may care to clear this up in his reply. I thought that the Secretary of State said that the rate of pay

  1441
  would be better than that now current for the Ulster Special Constabulary, but not comparable with that of the TAVR.
  Mr. Healey: Total emoluments.
  Mr. Ramsden: I am obliged. The question of pay is important, because many of these men will have to undertake these duties in their spare time, on top of a regular day's work. I understand that at the moment the ordinary man is getting about 9s. a hour. I have not worked out in hourly rates what the present proposals amount to, and any further information that the Government can give will be valuable.
  The House appreciated the concluding passage in the Secretary of State's speech, when he referred to the constructive part which a military presence can perform and is performing in the breakdown of barriers between communities. We can see this happening now in Northern Ireland, and there is obviously scope for it to continue. I therefore make one suggestion: I have talked to people in Northern Ireland, and one of the things that most of them have pointed out is the difficulty of the development of friendly communal relations when there is a strictly segregated system of education, and children go to different denominational schools. That happens here, and it is not an easy problem to solve. We can sympathise with the diagnosis of the consequences.
  In paragraphs 110 and 111 of its Report the Hunt Committee suggests a development in the form of a cadet force. The Committee suggests it in the context of the police, but whether in a police or a military context the idea is of value. I do not believe that this suggestion has been taken up by the Government in a police context, and I hope that it will receive some study from the Ministry of Defence, possibly on the lines of the Junior Cadet Force here.
  The House wishes to hear the hon. Member's reply, and I can now bring my speech to a conclusion. During a day of very lively debate, when strongly-held opinions have been forcibly expressed, as one who is not personally involved in Ulster politics, I have been trying to keep an eye on the ball and
  1442
  to bear in mind that the truth of the situation that confronts us is this. Violence has occurred in the last year, property has been destroyed, people have been killed, homes have been burnt and, as always, the sufferers have been ordinary, innocent people, on the whole quite apart from political considerations and political attitudes. Their security can be assured by the creation of a force such as the Government are proposing and I hope that the House, both tonight and in Committee next week, will give the Bill as fair a wind as possible.
  9.33 p.m.
  The Minister of Defence for Administration (Mr. Roy Hattersley): For over 100 years debate in this House on Ireland has been as much concerned with what has gone on in the past as with the proposals that the Government of the day were putting forward for the future. That has been inevitable today.
  The importance of the past in a debate about the future was clearly shown in the speeches of my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell), the hon. Member for Antrim, North (Mr. Henry Clark) and my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull, North (Mr. McNamara). But as we respond, as we must, to demands placed on us by the history of Ireland in general and Northern Ireland in particular, there is an obligation upon us to respond in particular ways. The first way is to understand that all the passions, fears, memories and—using the word in its best rather than its worst sense—prejudices that we have heard expressed today are genuinely reflected in the life of Northern Ireland, are genuinely felt in Northern Ireland and appear in the Province as the real fears of ordinary people who are genuinely concerned about their welfare, their safety and their lives ahead.
  We may disagree with their fears, we may believe them to be ill-founded or fantastic, but we should be very wrong to pretend that they do not exist. Were we to ignore in this debate the sort of fear which characterises a large part of Northern Ireland, we should produce a result which, in the short run, could lead only to riot and disturbance and, in the long run, could probably hold back the processes of reform and improvement to which all in this House and, I believe, the

  1443
  Government at Stormont are now committed.
  The other thing which we must make very clear, thinking about the history of Northern Ireland, as well as its future, is the role of the Army in Northern Ireland, as it is now, and as it will be when augmented by the new regiment which we propose to create. It is, of course, not the purpose or the intention of the Army, now or as it will be, to preserve security in Northern Ireland as an alternative to progress and change. It is, in fact, the very opposite. The Army which is now there and the new regiment which we hope, after Christmas, will augment it, is there to ensure that security continues, while reform goes on hand in hand. Nothing about our role and our presence in Northern Ireland can be more important than that.
  Certainly, no other formula for our presence there would be acceptable to the Secretary of State for Defence or to the Government as a whole. But, having paid proper deference to history, which is bound to cloud—"cloud" is the right word—the judgment of all of us about Northern Ireland, it is absolutely essential that the understanding of the history should not prejudice us against the hope that things can change—and things are indeed changing.
  One of the things which can change and will change is the organisation of auxiliary forces in Northern Ireland. I believe that all responsible people there, including those many responsible members of the Special Constabulary, welcome those changes and accept and are glad that there are fundamental differences between the force which we offer to the House this evening and the Special Constabulary. What is equally important—but what has been largely overlooked in this debate though it plays an important part in making our judgment about the regiment—they also accept that there is a fundamental difference between the Special Constabulary and the force which was debated in the House earlier this week.
  In fact, the fundamental proof of change is that the para-military force, the organisation to which my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington referred so often, is gone. There is no longer, or
  1444
  there will no longer be, subject to the wish of this House, a para-military force in Northern Ireland. There will be a military force, which will be part of the Army—not, I hasten to say, the British Army, if Britain does not include the entire United Kingdom, but an Army which is the Army of the people of Northern Ireland as well as the Army of the people of England, Scotland and Wales.
  There will be a military force and there will be a regular police auxiliary. I mean "regular" perhaps in the American sense of the word that it does the normal job rather than the jobs which, in the past, have been allocated to a police force but which were not appropriate for it. But there will no longer be—this is surely the fundamental purpose and crucial importance of the Bill —a force which is an unhappy hybrid between the police and the military.
  As a result, the hon. Member for Antrim, North cannot, I fear, have all his hopes realised. He asked for a number of assurances about the force, one of which was that the force which we discuss today, the regiment, should be made available for a variety of crowd control tasks. He mentioned football matches and other public functions. Of course, the Ulster Defence Regiment is not composed, is not intended, is not tasked to do that job. It is a military force doing a military job and the policing functions must be left to the police.
  Mr. McMaster: While agreeing that it is wrong that the police should do an Army job, there are certain cases where the police are almost overwhelmed and it is right that they should call on the Army to come to their aid. If the Regular Army is not available, would it not be appropriate that the Defence Regiment should come to the aid of the police?
  Mr. Hattersley: Of course, the Ulster Defence Regiment has the same liability as the Army has. It has the same liability as we all have under common law to come to the aid of the civil police in that sort of extreme circumstance. The point I make, and on which I must insist, is that the organisation and role of the force is such that it should not operate in a civil context. That is the most fundamental change of which I have

  1445
  to tell the House this evening. But there are a number of other changes which I must list to the House, although I do so in no sense of order of their importance or priority.
  Mr. McNamara rose—
  Mr. Hattersley: I cannot give way again for the moment.
  The second change—and in no way is this necessarily the most important—is that the new regiment is the responsibility of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State. That means that the money for it is voted by this Parliament. That means that questions can be asked and must be answered in this Parliament. That is a fundamental safeguard as far as the force is concerned.
  The next fundamental change is that it comes under the overall command of the General Officer Commanding British Forces in Northern Ireland, and its immediate commander is a brigadier of the Regular British Army.
  The fourth fundamental change between the Special Constabulary, which will go, and the Ulster Defence Regiment, which will come, is the nature of the recruitment to the force. This is one of the points on which I wish to dwell in some detail. I wish to make it absolutely clear that recruitment to the force will be carried out by the Army, and by the Army alone. Potential recruits will apply individually to the Army.
  Security screening will be the responsibility of the Army. To make sure that that inevitable and properly objective process produces a well-balanced result, we shall have the advisory committee about which my right hon. Friend told the House earlier today. My hon. Friend the Member for Belfast, West (Mr. Fitt) asked if we could give assurances that that advisory committee would be representative of all shades of opinion in Northern Ireland; I think he said, "all shades of responsible opinion".
  I gladly give him the categorical assurance that it will. I also give the assurance that the general remit of that committee will be to keep general recruiting policy under review. That, I believe, will not only show that the processes through which the Army go when recruiting are operative, but it will do
  1446
  a great deal to encourage confidence in and understanding of the force among the people of Northern Ireland.
  As a result of questions that some of my hon. Friends put this afternoon, and because of the misunderstandings on which their questions must be based, I have to make other points clear about recruiting. There can certainly be no question of the automatic transfer from the Special Constabulary to the Ulster Defence Regiment. There can be no recruiting before 1st January. Indeed, a Statutory Instrument is necessary to set this force in being. I hope that I do not breach privilege of the House when I say that the effective date of that Statutory Instrument is likely to be 1st January, the date stipulated in the White Paper.
  That naturally leads me to the question which the hon. Member for Orpington (Mr. Lubbock) and others asked about the leaflet which my right hon. Friend described as the so-called application form to join the regiment. I share the view of my right hon. Friend that the objective in the circulation of that leaflet was to ascertain the likelihood of response at one level or another amongst the existing members of the Special Constabulary. But I say to the House—and it seems to me the most dramatic reassurance which can be given about the general nature of the force—that the most important thing about that form is that. irrespective of what it said at the top of it, it is not a recruiting instrument for the new regiment. The recruiting instrument for the new regiment is the normal Army recruiting form. The regiment will be recruited in the normal Army recruiting fashion. There is very little value in spending the time of the House trying to allocate blame or opportion odium. The important fact is that the recruiting processes are those of the Army and are answerable to this House.
  It does not matter what other forms purport to do. My right hon. Friend referred to "so-called recruiting forms". They have no direct influence on the composition of the regiment.
  Mr. McNamara: Does not my hon. Friend realise that, although we accept that, the effect which the original form has had upon the good name of my hon. Friend and of Her Majesty's Government

  1447
  and their intentions is such that the attitude of the Stormont Government is cutting the ground from underneath our feet? The effect has been incalculable.
  Mr. Hattersley: If my hon. Friend's judgment of the effect of that form is right, it is a matter which the whole House will regret. The important constitutional conclusions to be drawn from the form is that the regiment will be so organised that it is answerable to this House, and forms which are not consistent with standards approved by this House are not a direct contribution to its recruitment.
  Mr. Roy Roebuck (Harrow, East): Does not my hon. Friend recognise that there is, here demonstrated, a most serious matter of indiscipline in the force for which the G.O.C. is responsible and for which, ultimately, my right hon. Friend is responsible? Will he assure us that the matter will be investigated thoroughly and that those responsible for this indiscipline will be dealt with in the appropriate manner?
  Mr. Hattersley: My hon. Friend asks for a rather total assurance. I can assure him that the circumstances of the production of that form will be investigated. But I say again that surely the spirit of the Bill is looking forward to the new force, rather than recriminating about the recent or distant past. The spirit of the new force is that it is controlled by Parliament in the way that other regiments of the British Army are controlled.
  Mr. Howie: I am eager to help my hon. Friend and keen to accept his assurances. We have seen instances where, apparently, application forms of a sort have been issued and where advertisements of a sort have been published without the authority of Her Majesty's Government. Is it not time that someone's ears were clipped?
  Mr. Hattersley: I pass over the elegance of the punishment which my hon. Friend suggests and, reiterating the words of my right hon. Friend, I assure him that we are unlikely to allow these unfortunate matters to occur again. I hope that the House will leave it there.
  I turn to the fifth distinction between the new regiment and the old force.
  1448
  It is one which has been raised on both sides of the House. It is that the new regiment will involve a substantial training liability. It is essential that the regiment, as part of the British Army, learns the military skills which it may need to employ, that it learns how to fulfil its proper tasks, how to live and work as a military unit and how to respond to the normal degree of military instruction.
  Hon. Gentlemen opposite have suggested that exceptions might be made. They have done that for reasons which I understand. However, I have to say, as my right hon. Friend said earlier, that there could not possibly be any general exception. There may be occasions from time to time when a man says that on this occasion, in this year, because of the circumstances which apply to him in, let us say, August, 1971, he cannot go to camp this month. That is one case, but we could not have a recruit who said to the force that, because of the nature of the job which he follows or the nature of his trade or employment, he can never go to camp, can never fulfil the training obligation and can never reach the levels of proficiency necessary in a general military unit. Despite the points which have been put to me with some force, I fear that that is how the position must remain.
  This is one of the points on which Her Majesty's Government at Westminster and the Government of Stormont disagreed. This is only one of the examples of disagreement between us over the contents of the White Paper. I feel that out of respect for the Government at Stormont as well as the Government here I ought to make it very clear that there was general agreement between them and us as to the contents of the White Paper, but that there were some occasions on which our mutual disagreements were registered.
  This is another point which it is necessary to make and it is one of the points which I hope my hon. Friends will understand. We were rightly anxious that there should be agreement whenever it was possible between Stormont and Westminster. We were anxious that there should be agreement whenever that agreement was consistent with the principles which we believe ought to characterise this force.

  1449
  My hon. Friends who seems to criticise the very principle of agreement should not do so on the basis that by co-operating with the Government of Stormont we are co-operating with some sort of Ulster extremism. Nothing could be further from the truth. The genuine voice of Ulster extremism was heard in the House this afternon when the hon. and learned Member for Antrim, South (Sir Knox Cunningham) described the Defence Regiment as a potential hotbed for I.R.A. infiltration. That was the genuine voice of extremism in Ulster. What we co-operated with and what we were right to co-operate with was the voice of moderation, and now the voice of progress, in Ulster.
  Mr. Rafton Pounder (Belfast, South): Will there be training links between the U.D.R. and the TAVR in Northern Ireland so that they will work in some sort of joint operation together?
  Mr. Hattersley: Because of the similarities between the two forces, it is easy to assume that there is great identity between them, but in reality there is not. There may be occasions when they train together and we will certainly give those members of the new regiment who want it an opportunity to come to England on some occasions to take part in training exercises, although there will be no compulsion on them to leave Northern Ireland. But hon. Members should not overestimate the similarities between the tasks or obligations of the two forces.
  I turn to three other fundamental matters of concern which have been mentioned today. Surely the first is the issue of whether arms should be kept, or must be kept, on some specific occasions at home. I well understand the concern which some of my hon. Friends have expressed in this matter. It is a concern which was created at a time and during conditions when large quantities of arms were kept in homes by individual members of the Special Constabulary, at a time before very strict limitations were placed by the present G.O.C., Northern Ireland, on the keeping of arms at home.
  When my hon. Friends express their concern, they are surely doing so not out of simple principle, but out of fear that by some sort of process, or some sort of irregularity, all the horrors and fears and terrors which my hon. Friend the
  1450
  Member for Kingston upon Hull, North outlined may come about again. The fears are not of principle but of practice, fears about what may happen on occasions when arms are kept at home. To my hon. Friends who share those fears, I say that to believe that on those rare occasions when aims are kept at home the sort of enormities which my hon. Friend described are likely to happen is to believe a series of things. It is to believe that our recruitment policy has failed. It is to believe that our vetting processes have failed. It is to believe that the control that Regular Army officers will properly exercise over these men has failed. It is to believe that the character of the force is not the sort of character which my right hon. Friend described earlier and which I have tried to describe in the last 25 minutes.
  Arms at home become a danger if they are held at home by dangerous men. It is our intention that such men should not be members of the force. But it is equally our intention that responsible men who are members of the force should have the opportunity to exercise to fulfil their duties in a practical and sensible way. On rare occasions in special conditions, special conditions which could hardly ever apply—could never apply—in towns it may be necessary for people to keep arms at home. I am sure that to make an absolute prohibition of such a process would be both irresponsible and likely to produce worse results than one could contemplate in rural districts of Northern Ireland.
  I have said, and I say again, that the permission to keep arms at home is something which must be given by officers of the British Army acting naturally in the capacity in which they act when they exercise the right delegated to them to call out the Force. This is the additional safeguard—powers which can be exercised only by officers of the Regular British Army. Of all the safeguards that I have listed the fact that there will be regular officers of the British Army and regular warrant officers of the British Army organising and supervising the Force is, perhaps, the strongest safeguard of all.
  Finally of the points of concern, I turn to the strength of the force. We have emphasised many times, but I think that we cannot emphasise toe frequently that the figure of 6,000 in the White Paper

  1451
  is essentially a ceiling figure. The White Paper makes that very clear. That is the ceiling which we will ask Parliament eventually to approve. That is the ceiling to which the force might eventually rise. But it is no more than a ceiling.
  I quote from the White Paper:
  "The actual size of the Force will be determined in the light of experience as the build-up proceeds, but in any case will not ultimately exceed 6,000 officers and men."
  I give the House a categorical assurance. Whilst it seemed to us, and continues to seem to us, prudent to have an establishment ceiling which is sufficiently large to meet any eventualities, there will certainly be no undue haste in raising the force to that level. I hope that this dilemma does not face us. But if we have to choose between raising the force to an immediate 6,000 or postponing a force of that size in the interests of getting a well-balanced force, we will choose a well-balanced force. Our natural hope is that that dilemma will not face us, but I think that the House would want to know that, if it did, we would choose to resolve it in that fashion.
  I remind the House once more that the Bill stems naturally and inevitably from the Report of the Hunt Committee, which was accepted by Her Majesty's Government here in London and by the Government at Stormont. It is the joint communiqué which expressed the joint acceptance of the report, published here in Westminster following talks held on 9th/ 10th October. It outlined our original plans to set up this force and put it into operation. It is also that joint communiqué which answers the crucial question asked by the right hon. and learned Member for Hexham (Mr.
  1452
  Rippon)—the continued existence of the force until both Governments—that at Westminster and that at Stormont—are convinced that its existence is no longer necessary.
  In paragraph 4(b) of that communiqué that exact assurance is given. Elsewhere in the communiqué we reiterate properly, as I must reiterate now, that the operation of the force has to be something which is done in close consultation, and one hopes co-operation, with the Government at Stormont.
  I said in my statement a week ago that the problems with which the force has to deal are problems of the most urgent and intimate concern to the Government in Northern Ireland. Therefore, the Security Committee, on which the G.O.C. either sits or is represented, will continue to meet and will continue to consider the nature, jobs and tasks of the force.
  I say again that the force is part of the British Army. The regiment is answerable, through the Secretary of State, to this House. Its funds are provided by this Parliament. It is organised and regulated as a regiment of the British Army. I believe that that is a substantial safeguard in any circumstances. Add to that the specific and special safeguards which the White Paper outlines or about which my right hon. Friend spoke today and I genuinely believe that the force can be commended to the House as an instrument for future peace and prosperity in Northern Ireland.
  Question put and agreed to.
  Bill accordingly read a Second time.
  Bill committed to a Committee of the whole House.—[Mr.Armstrong.]
  Committee Tomorrow.

  ULSTER DEFENCE REGIMENT [MONEY]
  Queen's Recommendation having been signified
  Motion made, and Question proposed,
  That, for the purposes of any Ad of the present Session to establish the Ulster Deface Regiment, it is expedient to authorise the payment out of moneys provided by Parliament of any expenditure incurred by any Government department which is attributable to the provisions of that Act.—[Mr. Hattersley.]
  10.1 p.m.
  Mr. Michael Foot (Ebbw Vale): I will not detain the House for more than a few minutes, but I feel that we should have some statement from the Government about the Money Resolution. Normally, Money Resolutions are drawn in terms which make it difficult for any debate to take place upon them. No doubt they are drawn to achieve other results, too, but normally they are drawn so narrowly as to make debate almost impossible. But this Money Resolution is drawn in the widest possible terms, and I should like the Government to tell us whether there is a full precedent for a Money Resolution to be drawn in such wide terms and whether there has been recent examples of Resolutions of this character since Money Resolutions were first drawn in more restricted terms.
  In my opinion it is all the more important that we should have a reply on this subject because during the debate today one of the questions uppermost in the minds of the House has been the paramountcy of this Parliament and whether this Parliament has fully established the authority over the Northern Ireland Parliament which most of us wish to see, in particular in the matters which we have been discussing today.
  One of the most telling parts of the speech of my hon. Friend the Minister of Defence for Administration in winding up the debate was his emphasis on the authority of this House. But throughout the debate-and it affects the Money Resolution in particular-questions have been raised about actions being taken elsewhere, and it is still not known whether those actions were authorised by this House. My hon. Friend re-
  1454
  ferred to the matter specifically, because he said that he would make sure that what had occurred in the last few days was unlikely to occur again, which seems to indicate that he has authority in these matters.
  If we are to ensure that such propaganda as has been issued is not issued again, we must know whether this Money Resolution authorises such action. As my hon. Friend emphasised in winding up the debate, under the Bill we are to have an arrangement whereby recruiting will not start before 1st January and the establishment of the force will not take place before 1st April. Does this Money Resolution authorise any money to be spent by this Parliament prior to this date? Secondly, is any money spent in Northern Ireland at all authorised under this Money Resolution? It is stated that the Resolution covers payments which may be made by any Government Department. Does it permit a single penny to be spent in connection with the force by the Northern Ireland Government? Does it permit the Northern Ireland Government to repeat what they have done in presenting their picture of what this force is supposed to mean?
  I want to make quite sure that the transference of authority from the Northern Ireland Government to this House is complete, for that is the only way in which we shall get peace in Ireland. Indeed, that is why some of us supported the dispatch of British troops to Northern Ireland and why some of us, despite serious misgivings which still prevail and which we hope to allay in Committee, have agreed to give the Bill a Second Reading. But we want to make sure what is permitted under the Money Resolution. We are dealing with a novel situation. The debate we have had today is a symbol of the changed relationship between Stormont and Westminster. In my opinion, Stormont will never recover from what happened last year. That Humpty Dumpty will never be put back on the wall in precisely the same way. We want to ensure that the transference is absolutely clear, that the lines are defined, that we know exactly where the money is to be spent, what it is spent for and who is authorised under this Resolution to spend it.

  1455
  If the situation arose that we had said in this House that authority had been transferred from Stormont to Westminster but in fact remnants of power were left at Stormont, many people in Northern Ireland would say that it was a trick. In order to assist peace there, we must ensure that the transference of power is known to everybody, even the Tory Members from Northern Ireland, even the hon. and learned backlash from Antrim, South (Sir Knox Cunningham). He must understand that power has been transferred.
  There will be a lengthy Committee stage to try to improve the Bill. But historic change has taken place in the relationship between Westminster and Stormont, between this country and Northern Ireland. The old situation will never be restored. We want to make sure that in this Resolution we are not surrendering any control over the finances which are to be provided by the people of this country. Too many millions have been spent already in sustaining Conservatism in Northern Ireland, and we do not think that the British taxpayer should be called upon to spend any more for that purpose.
  We want to ensure that no loophole is left in this Resolution for any such money to be provided. I hope that the Government will be able to give us assurances on this subject, as we have had assurances on the Bill, although in that respect we shall have the remedy of a Committee stage. Before proceeding to that stage, let us ensure that not a single penny raised by the taxpayers of this country, under the Bill, will be misspent by the people in Stormont.
  10.7 p.m.
  Mr. Stanley R. McMaster (Belfast, East): Much reference has been made to the similarity between the force we are discussing and the TAVR. I should like to make a serious suggestion to the Secretary of State for Defence. It would save money if members of the Territorial and Army Volunteer Reserve could easily transfer to the new force. Hon. Members have much experience of the mass of documentation necessary when joining a force such as the T.A. The Secretary of State[Interruption.] I should like to be able to make myself
  1456
  heard at least to you, Mr. Deputy Speaker. The Secretary of State, in opening the debate on the Second Reading, said that it would not be sufficient simply for people who were members of the Territorials to transfer directly to this force. He said that a similar type of vetting would be enforced by the new force as was done by the Territorials.
  Would it not save money if, instead of handing in their kit when they resign or when a Territorial unit is disbanded, and then going through all the formality and hullabaloo of filling up forms, vetting and being accepted again and drawing more kit, they could transfer the uniform direct. There are already two categories in the Territorial Army. Would it not be possible to make the new regiment a third category of the Territorial Army? It is a military force and it must be closely akin to the Territorial Army. There would be considerable advantage, I suggest, for the regiment—
  Mr. Kevin McNamara (Kingston upon Hull, North): I am interested in the hon. Member's line of argument, although I am not certain how relevant it is to the Money Resolution—but that, of course, is a matter for the Chair. If the hon. Member continues to draw these parallels with the TAVR, would he put the same responsibilities on the new regiment as on the TAVR—that is, emergency call, service anywhere and the like?
  Mr. McMaster: The hon. Member has anticipated my remarks. I suggest that similar responsibilities are imposed by the Bill.
  I should like to make some specific points concerning the White Paper and the Bill. Paragraph 16 of the White Paper provides that the bounty which is payable to members of the Ulster Special Constabulary will be taken into account when considering service with the regiment. If account is to be taken—
  Mr. McNamara: On a point of order. Is what the hon. Member is saying relevant to the Money Resolution, Mr. Deputy Speaker?
  Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Sydney Irving): If it had not been relevant, I would have intervened. I am listening carefully to the hon. Member.
  Mr. McMaster: I wish to keep my remarks completely in order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. if before they interrupt hon. Members opposite take the trouble to follow what I say and refer to the White Paper, in particular paragraph 16, they will find that it deals with emoluments and bounties. If anything other than emoluments and bounties comes within the Money Resolution, I should like to know what it is. It is provided that bounties will take into account be Special service. I would like to know whether the Minister intends that Territorial Army service will also be taken into account in estimating bounties.
  The provision of accommodation is another charge on the Revenue. I should like to know the Minister's intention concerning accommodation for the Ulster Regiment. As he will appreciate, it is a great advantage to a regiment to have its own accommodation. This was referred to in the Hunt Report. If at least the headquarters of the regiment could have its own separate accommodation, that would be of considerable advantage to the regiment.
  Paragraph 17 of the White Paper refers to the dress and formal wear of the regiment. I can only imagine that whoever drafted it must have had his tongue in his cheek when he said that parade dress for formal wear may be subject to some delay.
  On all these points, it would be of considerable advantage in the formation of the Ulster Defence Regiment, and in the interest of recruitment, if proper financial provision could be made, in particular concerning bounties, and that long-service awards, to which reference has been made in the debate, and previous service with the Territorial Army should be taken into account.
  10.15 p.m.
  Mr. W. Howie: I have very little to say, and I shall say it as shortly as I possibly can. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State will be pleased to hear that I do not share the misgivings which my hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Michael Foot) expressed about the Bill, but I must say that, apart from that, I agree with everything which he said in his remarks on the Money Resolution. My very short
  1458
  question is this. Regarding the question of moneys spent on recruiting this force, we have had occasion within the last day or two to notice that the authorities across the sea, if I may so call them, appear to be in the nature of a hair trigger: they seem to me to be recruiting with great rapidity and rather in advance of the due date on which they should do this.
  Mr. James Dickens: In advance of the money.
  Mr. Howie: In advance of the money, and what I want to ask is this. Are we to assume that when the Government of Northern Ireland expend money on this force—which, I may say, I approve entirely—that will be entirely under the authority of my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary? It is my opinion that it should be not only under the authority of the Home Secretary but under his approval, and not only in general terms but in particular terms, because in the last day or two we have seen that when we leave the recruiting of this force to the Government of Northern Ireland they go about it in what we may call their own way. I think that the recruitment of this force, of which I approve, should be gone about in our way, and the approval of the methods adopted by the Government of Northern Ireland and the approval of the moneys which they spend should be our approval.
  That is the very simple question which I want to put to my hon. Friend
  Mr. Roy Roebuck(Harrow, East): I share the concern expressed—
  Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Sydney Irving): Order. The hon. Member has not the Floor yet. Mr. Rafton Pounder.
  10.17 p.m.
  Mr. Rafton Pounder: I shall not detain the House for more than a few minutes, and not to make a speech but to ask direct and specific questions.
  I notice in the part of the Explanatory and Financial Memorandum to the Bill relating to the financial effects thereof a certain sum allocated for uniform and equipment, and this is fair enough, but then there is the sentence
  " further minor expenditure may be needed to adapt accommodation."

  1459
  What accommodation? Is one talking about adjuncts to existing barracks and such like? Is one assuming or not that the Ulster Defence Regiment will take over existing Special Constabulary drill halls? What are we talking about when we talk about expenditure on accommodation?
  There is also one other point. I am slightly confused by this, because what I thought the Secretary of State for Defence said in his speech this afternoon does not appear to be quite on all fours with the observations in the Explanatory and Financial Memorandum to the Bill that the cost so far estimated of £ 1 million includes
  " 100,000 for attached personnel of the Regular Army."
  Perhaps the Minister who replies to this debate will be able specifically to reply to this point, namely, are we to understand, when the Secretary of State says—I think I took his words accurately" officers and senior n.c.o's will be interspersed with British forces," that these men will be on secondment from their existing units rather than necessarily full-time, full members of the new regiment when it is formed?
  10.19 p.m.
  Mr. Roy Roebuck (Harrow, East): I share the concern of my hon. Friend the Member for Luton (Mr. Howie) and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Michael Foot) about this expenditure of the taxpayers' money, and I do not think we should let the legislation go forward without having the most specific and categoric assurance about how this money is to be spent.
  What concerns me is that apparently, according to the Resolution, anything that is attributable to the provisions of the Act is covered. Who is to pay for these advertisements which have been published in the Northern Ireland Press and for the printing of the forms which purport to be application forms? Does that sort of activity come within the provision of the Money Resolution? If it does, would my hon. Friend explain why? If not, perhaps he would explain how the money is to be expended if action is to be taken within the province of the Secretary of State.
  Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Sydney Irving): The hon. Gentleman can ask the first question but not the second one on this Money Resolution.
  Mr. Roebuck: I am grateful to you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, for that guidance. But perhaps, with respect, I could put it this way. I am seeking to establish whether my hon. Friend regards those activities which have been taking place as an essential part of the pre-development of this regiment? I think, with respect, that I am entitled to pose certain questions which might arise out of that answer, whether it be in the affirmative or in the negative. I wanted to know what view is taken by my hon. Friend as to whether this activity is authorised by the G.O.C. in pursuit of instructions received from the Ministry of Defence as a result of the White Paper which has been presented to the House. If not, it might also be in order to inquire what action my hon. Friend proposes to take? It ought to be established on what Vote—
  Mr. Deputy Speaker: The hon. Gentleman cannot question on this Money Resolution money which has already been expended from whatever source on matters which have been the concern of the House today.
  Mr. Roebuck: But with respect, Mr. Deputy Speaker, that is not the point I am trying to ask.
  Mr. Deputy Speaker: With respect, that is my Ruling.
  Mr. Paul B. Rose(Manchester, Blackley): On a point of order. Would it not be in order to decide whether we are to legitimise what was illegitimate activity in regard to the amount of money spent on that illegitimate activity?
  Mr. Deputy Speaker: The hon. Gentleman may ask that question but cannot elaborate further beyond what I have said to the House.
  Mr. Howie: On a point of order. I am not sure if I have followed exactly what my hon. Friend the Member for Harow, East (Mr. Roebuck) was saying, but does not the Money Resolution refer to expenditure incurred by any Government Department? Was my hon. Friend not asking under which Vote the money was to be spent?
  Mr. Deputy Speaker: The money has not yet been voted until the Money Resolution has been passed.
  Mr. Roebuck: Having established some of the points which are disturbing some of his hon. Friends, perhaps the Minister, if he cannot give attention to these points in this debate, will seek some other opportunity to pay proper attention to them.
  I agree with what was said by my hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale that this Money Resolution firmly establishes the control of the House over certain activities in the United Kingdom. Perhaps my hon. Friend in winding up will reassert that point and make it clear, lest there be anybody in Northern Ireland who thinks they have a right to set up a standing army of their own, or that with regard to the Armed Forces of the Crown they have a right to impose their own antiquated, centuries-old versions as to the proper role of the Armed Forces. I hope my hon. Friend will not neglect the points which I have raised, those which were in order, and that we shall have a full explanation from him on these matters, which are extremely disturbing to many of my hon. Friends.
  10.25 p.m.
  Mr. Albert Booth (Barrow-in-Furness): My hon. Friend, in winding up the Second Reading debate on the Bill to establish the Ulster Defence Regiment, went to great lengths to assure us that this House would have complete control over that body. It is, therefore, singularly inappropriate that we should now be asked to pass a Money Resolution which appears to give us no control whatsoever. The amount of money that can be spent under this Resolution is unlimited, and the Resolution is at variance with Money Resolutions connected with any military force under the control of this House.
  It would be more appropriate that this Money Resolution should ask for a limited sum for the purpose of taking the preliminary steps necessary to the establishment of the regiment, prior to consideration by the House of the normal Defence Estimates. If we are to be able to control this force, as we are able to control any other unit of the British Army, a Defence Estimate must be brought before the House at the proper
  1462
  time, otherwise there is a suspicion that this force is to be controlled financially in a completely different way and, if that is so, the House should be told how it is to be controlled financially before the Money Resolution is passed.
  No one wishes to make a great song and dance on a purely technical point, but it is our duty to ensure control by Parliament in financial terms, and in terms of the chain of command and all aspects of this operation. This cannot be so if we pass over the allocation of money to someone outwith the House. We are passing it to Departments, and we are placing no limitation on the amount. This is abnormal militarily and in terms of the powers of any Ministry, and I hope that my hon. Friend will assure us that there will be some limitation on the amount of money which may be spent and, if that limit is exceeded, he will come back to the House with explanations of how the money is to be spent. This would ensure the proper and normal control of the Ulster Defence Regiment by this House.
  10.28 p.m.
  Mr. John E. Maginnis (Armagh): I think it was the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Michael Foot) who said that the British taxpayer would not be too happy about the expenditure on the Ulster Defence Regiment. May I remind the House that taxpayers in Northern Ireland are also British taxpayers and, if the Government are not able to raise the necessary funds to get the defence force off the ground, we should not be too proud to go to America to raise funds.
  10.29 p.m.
  The Minister of Defence for Administration (Mr. Roy Hattersley): My experience of the House of Commons is appreciably shorter than that of the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Michael Foot), but this is the first time in my recollection, though perhaps not in his, that concern has been expressed about the width of a Money Resolution. I have been here on many occasions when there have been complaints about the narrowness of such instruments, but complaints of their width is a novel experience for me.
  I hope to convince those of my hon. Friends who thought they saw in the

  1463
  width of the Money Resolution some possibility that the total control about which I spoke might be eroded that that is very far from the fact. Indeed that it is simply not true.
  I will endeavour to put the position in perspective. We are asked tonight to authorise expenditure which will be the sole responsibility of this Parliament and of this Government, which will not be spent in any way or to any degree or to any amount before 1st January, which itself will need a Supplementary Estimate, the traditional method by which force levels and the conduct of the Army is controlled. The Supplementary Estimate I suspect, indeed fear, will be subject to debate in the House of Commons. We are in no way authorising expenditure by any authority outside this House and outside the Government Departments, and the terms of the Financial Resolution, and—if the description of my hon. Friend the Member for Barrow-in-Furness (Mr. Booth) is right—its width, should not be thought of as extending to any outside authority the powers which are properly and rightly ours and will remain ours.
  A number of points have been raised on what I will describe with respect as on the margins of order, though within those margins, of course. I will try to answer them while remaining within the boundaries of your Rulings, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Some were specifically concerned with the expenditure for the force. Of course, there will be the need for premises in which and from which the force can operate. Some of them will be accommodation taken over from the U.S.C.; some may well have to be new installations of one sort or another. Certainly, if our undertakings—
  Mr. Roebuck rose—
  Mr. Hattersley: No, I cannot give way. Certainly, if our undertakings that arms will be kept at home only in exceptional circumstances are honoured, we need to create some new arms stores in which they can be kept sufficiently securely. [Interruption.] It does not concern me whether I answer questions now or whether I read about it in the evening papers next week.
  1464
  There will be an area of proper expenditure which is necessary if the force is to be organised in the way that this House wishes it to be, including the provision of proper barracks from which these men can operate effectively and seriously.
  I was asked about the financial relationship between this unit and the TAVR and interchange between the two. The liabilities for service differ fundamentally between them and, therefore, the expenditure we hope to authorise under this Financial Resolution is different from that which we might hope to authorise in a Resolution concerned with the TAVR. We are asking the men to accept different forms of liability. We are consequentially asking them to accept different degrees of training because they are to do different things.
  I do not think it possible to have an interchange between one force and another on a casual basis. Looking at the Resolution and talking about the liability, it may well be that some members of the TAVR in Northern Ireland will choose to leave their traditional force and move to the new force. I hope that will not happen in great numbers, because I do not wish to see the successful TAVR units there depleted. But because of the levels of bounty and the obligations involved, that may happen.
  Mr. McMaster: Will the hon. Gentleman answer the point I made about taking account of the length of service already rendered to the TAVR when the bounty is being considered?
  Mr. Hattersley: I hope that we can do that, because certain of the men who have given honourable service to the TAVR may want to go over and to he regarded as people who have given appropriate service. I cannot give an absolute assurance on this now, but I do want to achieve that.
  Finally, I want to deal with the allegation that, by voting for the Money Resolution tonight. the House might be authorising expenditure which it would not wish to authorise. I think that I quote one of my hon. Friends exactly when I say that it would be legitimising otherwise illegitimate expenditure.
  I think that, even in terms of the Money Resolution, I must explain the

  1465
  nature of the relationship between Stormont and this Government. Were advertisements to be published in future—the rules of order prevent me discussing advertisements which have been published—on the sole authority of the Northern Ireland Government and carrying the imprint of the Northern Ireland Government, clearly any money that we vote tonight could not be expended to defray that cost.
  Mr. Rose: The question that I asked was whether we would be legitimising what has already been illegitimately spent in the past, not in future. This is what concerns us.
  Mr. Hattersley: I understand my hon. Friend's point. But to remain within the rules of order, I was hypothesising a situation in future.
  Mr. Roebuck: Will the Minister answer the question?
  Mr. Hattersley: I will continue to talk about advertisements. if advertisements which have already appeared in newspapers were to be charged to this Vote, it would be entirely improper, because those advertisements are the responsibility —indeed, they were demonstrably the responsibility—of the Northern Ireland Government. Since that is the situation, there is no case for asking the question that was asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Michael Foot), or another of my hon. Friends, namely, whether I could assure him that the effect of the Money Resolution would be that the transfer of authority was total. There is no question of transferring authority. The authority for this regiment is already total and is totally in our hands.
  That does not mean that the Northern Ireland Government do not have the proper obligation from time to time to express their opinions to this Government on the use of the force. Nor does it mean that there can be any question of expenditure authorised by the Northern Ireland Government being paid for as a result of the Resolution that I commend to the House this evening.
  The final question that I seek to answer is: if I am so sure about the authority remaining totally in the hands of this House, how have what I am alleged to
  1466
  have described as errors occurred in the past?
  I can reassure the House in this way. The Northern Ireland Government have substantial powers of their own. The Northern Ireland Government did a number of things by their own authority. Whether it was proper to do so in terms of their own expenditure is not a question either for me or for the House to answer. It is a matter for them.
  Mr. Fitt: I will ask l hem next week.
  Mr. Hattersley: My hon. Friend may get an answer next week. He will not get an answer this evening, because it is not a question which can properly be addressed to me.
  Concerning what my right hon. Friend and I have said about making sure that such embarrassments did not occur in future, that must be understood in the nature of the relationship between the two Governments.
  To take one of the matters which it was feared might be legitimised by the Resolution—the advertisements which have appeared in newspapers—although the responsibility of the Northern Ireland Government and although this Government had no opportunity to do anything else than to draw the attention of Stormont to the views of this House, the Northern Ireland Government agreed, of their own volition, to suspend those advertisements immediately. It was not within my power or that of any of my right hon. Friends—
  Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Sydney Irving): Order. The Minister is going beyond the terms of the Money Resolution on which I ruled against the hon. Member for Harrow, East (Mr. Roebuck).
  Mr. Hattersley: The authorisation of improper expenditure, about which my right hon. and hon. Friends worry, could not be covered by this Resolution. Hon. Members will have opportunities to discuss the provision of funding for the regiment when the Supplementary Vote comes before the House, as it must, before the end of the present financial year.
  Mr. Howie: Before my right hon. Friend sits down, can he reassure us on one point? I may be in error, but I understand that the Northern Ireland

  1467
  Government is short of money and is supported by substantial sums which are voted by this House. Am I to be assured—
  Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. We are discussing the Money Resolution. The money has not yet been voted. It cannot have been spent by the Government of Northern Ireland or any other Government.
  Mr. Howie: Mr. Deputy Speaker, I am laying the ground for something which you will certainly see is in order. If the Government of Northern Ireland take it into their head—and our experience of the last day or two leads us to think that this is not unlikely—to indulge in expenditure on items like advertisements and recruitment appeals of various sorts, does the presence of a very high-up Minister from the Home Office—
  Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. The hon. Member is out or order.
  Question put and agreed to.
  Resolved,
  That, for the purposes of any Act of the present Session to establish the Ulster Defence Regiment, it is expedient to authorise the payment out of moneys provided by Parliament of any expenditure incurred by any Government department which is attributable to the provisions of that Act.

  RURAL WATER SUPPLIES AND SEWERAGE (SCOTLAND) BILL
  Order for Second Reading read.
  Motion made, and Question put (pursuant to Standing Order No. 62 (Public Bills relating exclusively to Scotland)) That the Bill be committed to a Scottish Standing Committee. — [Dr. Dickson Mahon.]
  Question agreed to
  Bill (deemed to have been read a Second tune) committed to a Scottish Standing Committee.

  RURAL WATER SUPPLIES AND SEWERAGE (SCOTLAND) [MONEY]
  Queen's Recommendation having been signified…
  Resolved,
  That, for the purposes of any Act of the present Session to increase the limit on the contributions payable to local authorities in Scotland under the Rural Water Supplies and Sewerage Act 1944, it is expedient to authorise the payment out of moneys provided by Parliament of any increase attributable to the said Act of the present Session in the sums payable by way of such contributions or in the sums payable by way of rate support grant under the enactments relating to local government in Scotland.—[Dr. Dickson Mahon.]

  CONSOLIDATION, &c., BILLS
  Ordered,
  That the Lords Message [18th November] relating to the appointment of a Committee on?—

  (i)all Consolidation Bills whether public or private;

  (ii)Statute Law Revision Bills;

  (iii)Bills prepared pursuant to the Consolidation of Enactments (Procedure) Act 1949;

  (iv)Bills to consolidate any enactments with amendments to give effect to recommendations made by one or both of the Law Commissions;

  (v)Bills prepared by one or both of the Law Commissions to promote the reform of the Statute Law by the repeal, in accordance with the Law Commission recommendations, of certain enactments which (except in so far as their effect is preserved) are no longer of practical utility, and by making other provision in connection with the repeal of those enactments, together with any Law Commission report on any such Bill;

  be now considered.—[Mr. Armstrong.]
  Ordered,
  That a Select Committee of Twelve Members be appointed to join with the Committee appointed by the Lords to consider the following classes of Bills:—

  (1)all Consolidation Bills, whether public or private;

  (2)Statute Law Revision Bills;

  (3)Bills prepared pursuant to the Consolidation of Enactments (Procedure) Act 1949;

  (4)Bills to consolidate any enactments with amendments to give effect to recommendations made by one or both of the Law Commissions;

  (5)Bills prepared by one or both of the Law Commissions to promote the reform of the Statute Law by the repeal, in accordance

  1469
  with the Law Commission recommendations, of certain enactments which (except in so far as their effect is preserved) are no longer of practical utility, and by making other provision in connection with the repeal of those enactments, together with any Law Commission report on any such Bill:

  Ordered,
  That any Memoranda laid pursuant to the Consolidation of Enactments (Procedure) Act 1949, and any representations made with respect thereto, and any reports containing recommendations by the Law Commission be referred to the Committee: and the Committee was nominated of Mr. Peter Archer. Mr. Tom Eoardman, Mr. Bruce Campbell, Sir Barnett Janner, Mr. John Lee, Mr. Edward Lyons, h4r. Gordon Oakes, Mr. Ian Percival, Mr. David Waddingon. Mr. William Wells, Mr. Donald Williams, and Mr. William Wilson be members of the Committee.
  Ordered,
  That the Committee have power to send for persons, papers and records and to sit notwithstanding any adjournment of the House.
  Ordered,
  That Three be the Quorum of the Committee.—[Mr. Armstrong.]
  Message to the Lords to aquaint them with such of the said Orders as are necessary to be communicated to their Lordships.

  TURNHOUSE AIRPORT
  Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Armstrong.]
  10.43 p.m.
  Mr. Tam Dalyell: At three hours' notice, I thank my right hon. Friends from the Scottish Office and the Board of Trade for coming here to discuss the problems of Turnhouse Airport. I do not want to use time to go into the vagaries that have resulted in a loss to B.E.A. of traffic and that have, more importantly, involved considerable disadvantage to Scottish industry, especially in West Fife—and I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline Burghs (Mr. Adam Hunter) will catch your eye, Mr. Deputy Speaker, so that he can elaborate this point—and also considerable difficulty to pilots of the aircraft involved, both of B.E.A. and B.U.A., and, indeed, to the very patient and helpful staff at Turnhouse.
  I am not greatly interested in using time to try to pinpoint whose fault it is.
  1470
  or to sort out the triangle of blame among the Board of Trade, the Edinburgh Corporation and the British Airports Authority. Personally, I think that the blame rests heavily with the Edinburgh Corporation, because the Scottish people have lost patience on this issue.
  I want, first, to raise the issue of finance. Many of us would like to see money diverted to facilities—if money has to be found somewhere—even from industrial grants, because we think that expenditure on good communications such as Turnhouse is even more important than industrial grants in bringing in industry. The irritation caused to potential executives is a significant disadvantage to the excellent work of my hon Friends.
  I have a constructive proposal. It Edinburgh Corporation is going to be this parsimonious, it would be justified in appealing to industry and to local authorities like West Lothian. Fife, parts of Lanarkshire and Midlothian to cooperate in meeting some of the expenses which accrue to the State.
  I have read the OFFICIAL REPORT Of the Adjournment debate initiated by the hon. Member for Edinburgh, West (Mr. Stodart), when terminal buildings were virtually promised by the Board of Trade. I do not think that this expenditure is necessary. The buildings for passengers are adequate. What are needed are better facilities for the staff.
  The top priority is the radar, especially in low cloud. The pilots are amazed and irritated that Turnhouse is not fitted with what most European airports regard as part of the ordinary equipment of modern aircraft life. This should be done before the Commonwealth Games of July next year. One can imagine the fiasco of diversion after diversion brought about by low cloud and fog. as we have had in high summer. My hon. Friends' next meeting should be with the pilots, who will then be able to tell them what they want better than at second hand, through me.
  What runway facilities are now in view? Is it to be lengthened? What is the effect on payload restrictions? Some of us who travel regularly were astonished at the reply of the former Minister of State, Board of Trade, on 23rd July, that only one per cent. of traffic was affected by cross-winds. Some

  1471
  of us must have been extraordinarily unlucky in our travelling habits.
  Precisely what conditions are necessary—I have given my hon. Friend notice of this question—for the Trident to use its automatic landing gear on which B.E.A. has spent several millions of pounds installing for use in fog and low cloud? Edinburgh, where these East Coast conditions prevail, must be next on the list for this kind of use. Since I have promised other hon. Members time to speak, I will simply repeat my question: what is the present situation over staff conditions at the airport?
  10.48 p.m.
  Mr. Anthony Stodart: I thank the hon. Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell) for his courtesy in telling me, at slightly short notice, that he was raising this matter. Turn-house Airport lies in my constituency, but this is not a parochial matter. It is used by hon. Gentlemen from different parts of Scotland. This subject generally receives a bi-partisan approach. Unfortunately, as so often happens, particularly for Scottish hon. Members, one finds that one's papers on a subject are either in London when one is in Scotland or vice versa. Therefore, I am speaking entirely from a memory which, as the advancing years creep on, is getting less good than it previously was. But certainly my impression of Turnhouse and its problems is one of terrible delay and prevarication by a succession of Ministers whose responsibility it has been. I can recollect taking a delegation—I was allowed to lead it—consisting of Members of both parties in 1964. I can remember that the hon. Member for Fife, West (Mr. William Hamilton) was on it, and we were received with great sympathy and kindness by the present Chancellor of the Exchequer. He said that we would almost certainly—he made no promise and I do not pin him down to this—get a new runway for Turnhouse in the early 1970s.
  I speak from memory of a letter that received from the Minister of State, Board of Trade in August in which he said that discussions were going on on the two subjects—whether or not we should have a new runway or whether the existing one should be extended, despite the fact that it runs in the wrong direction in view
  1472
  of the prevailing winds, or whether there should be a central Scotland airport and therefore presumably not develop Turn-house Airport at all.
  As to radar, I think questions of mine elicited the information that it is the only airport of its size and importance in the whole of the United Kingdom that does not have this essential equipment. Again my recollection is that I as assured that this would be installed long before the moment of which we are now speaking. Therefore, I add my voice to those who have called for some action at Turnhouse.
  I think that patience is almost exhausted. I do not know—I would not attempt to judge—who is responsible, and whether Edinburgh Corporation has been lazy about this. I would go as far as to think that there have probably been faults on every side. But for goodness sake, let someone take a lead and let us get a move on.
  10.53 p.m.
  Mr. Adam Hunter: I thank my hon. Friend the Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell) for raising this subject on the Adjournment tonight.
  This has been a longstanding problem and I have on a number of occasions attended on deputations to try to get the problem resolved. In fact, the hon. Member for Edinburgh, West (Mr. Stodart) was with me on one occasion. A deputation from the local authority in my constituency, which is quite some way from the airport, mentioned the subject to the Board of Trade about two years ago, when the importance and the need for the improvements suggested by the two previous speakers was stressed.
  The hon. Member for Fife, West (Mr. William Hamilton), and my hon. Friend the Member for Kirkcaldy Burghs (Mr. Gourlay) and I received representations from the Glenrothes Corporation who had evidence from almost every industrialist in Fife, and almost every one to a man agreed that the improvements required at Turnhouse should be made as soon as possible. This group of industrialists represent most of the industry in Fife, and I am sure that their views should impress the Minister of State.
  It has been arranged that my hon. Friends the Members for Fife, West and

  1473
  for Dunfermline Burghs should interview the President of the Board of Trade or the Minister of State on 3rd December on this pressing problem.
  On occasion—in fact, almost every year—I go on an all-in package holiday and I find that in order to do so I have got to go to Glasgow Airport or Prestwick Airport. I know that many people who live in the eastern and central parts of Scotland would take these holidays to the Continent if Turnhouse Airport operated such holiday flights.
  The future of Turnhouse is very important, and I have great pleasure in adding my contribution to the debate.
  10.55 p.m.
  Mr. David Steel(Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles): I am grateful to the Minister of State for allowing me a minute in order to add another voice to what has been said on this important subject. I congratulate the hon. Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell) for seizing the opportunity of raising it tonight.
  The hon. Gentleman referred to one per cent. of traffic being diverted because of cross-winds. Even if that figure is accurate, it is not the percentage which matters but the loss of confidence and the uncertainty which any appreciable degree of diversion causes. I speak as an hon. Member who comes from a part of Scotland which has lost its rail service in the past year and, as a result, is even more dependent on air services between Edinburgh and London. It is most unsatisfactory for businessmen arranging visits or humble Members of Parliament arranging timetables if they cannot be certain that aircraft will land and take off at advertised times. It is a disincentive to travelling by air.
  I have heard it suggested that, to surmount the problem of cross-winds, perhaps a shorter than normal runway might be considered which could be used only in conditions of strong cross-winds. Has that point been explored fully?
  I want to support what the hon. Gentleman said about the terminal. We have had statements from the Board of Trade in the past which might have led one to believe that a new passenger terminal had high priority in its thinking. I hope that that is not so. It is uncomfortable to have an overcrowded
  1474
  terminal, especially in the event of flights being delayed, but that is an inconvenience which can be endured. The other matters must have a higher priority, and I hope that the Government will attend to them.
  10.57 p.m.
  The Minister of State, Board of Trade (Mr. Goronwy Roberts): My hon. Friend the Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell) has been generous enough to commiserate with me on the shortness of notice for this debate. I can assure him that, in my short tenure of office at the Board of Trade, my attention has been drawn several times already to the problems which attend the development of Turnhouse Airport. Indeed, so much time has been devoted to the subject that there can be few hon. Members, whether or not directly interested in aviation or in the problems of the Edinburgh area, who have not been made aware that a major problem exists.
  I know that it is a subject on which hon. Members on both sides of the House hold strong views, and they are very understandable. Let me assure them at once, as did my predecessor earlier this year, that the Government recognise the role that Turnhouse is playing and can continue to play in providing good and speedy air communication to Edinburgh and much of eastern Scotland to the benefit of industry, commerce and tourism.
  The case for a speedy and major development has been peat tonight with great force and skill. But so much has been said on the subject already that I find myself in the difficult position of being able to add little that is new. However, there are one or two points to which I will draw the attention of hon. Members.
  I will not take up time by repeating the history of our negotiations with Edinburgh Corporation or the circumstances which led to their breakdown. Much as I regret the situation in which the Corporation, unlike many other local authorities in Great Britain, has found itself unable to assume much of the burden of management and ownership, we must deal with the situation as it exists at the end of 1969.
  It is common ground that there are two distinct problems at Turnhouse. The

  1475
  first is the need to provide, against the situation which we expect to exist in a few years' time, a new terminal complex to ease passenger congestion in the terminal building proper, to provide more space for aircraft, and generally to facilitate movement in the terminal area. We accept that need.
  I used the phrase "distinct problems" a moment ago because it is sometimes suggested that by deferring work on the new terminal complex, or by engaging in a cheaper and perhaps nastier job, more money would be available for a solution of the second problem, that of runway development. This is a false alternative. We shall, of course, be glad to secure any proper economies that can be obtained within our present estimates, but we do not intend to descend into public squalor. On the contrary, we intend to develop a terminal complex which will not be unworthy of Scotland's capital city. I know that all Scottish Members are equally concerned that, whatever we do at Turnhouse, it will be not only to the benefit of Scotland as a whole, but will express their pride in particular in its capital city. But if some savings prove to be possible, it does not follow that they should be used in aid of expenditure on a runway solution which might not be justified in its own right.
  I turn now to the runway problem. Although my hon. Friend the Member for West Lothian has been good enough to say that he rates it second in importance to the provision of radar, the need for a major new runway is the development most frequently, persistently, and I would say vociferously, advocated. It is not an investment that could be justified, any more than the alternative of a runway extension, or, for that matter, a new terminal complex, in strictly commercial terms. Turnhouse airport is already losing us money and even on the most optimistic assumptions of traffic growth, aided perhaps by greater regularity of operation, the extra revenue would fall well short of servicing the extra capital required, and this is a tidy sum.
  Mr. Daly ell: Could it not be that the reason Turnhouse is losing money is precisely that uncertainties and vagaries
  1476
  cause people not to use an airport like that?
  Mr. Roberts: I do not think that my hon. Friend can have seized the point I was making, namely, that the amount of extra capital involved, running into some millions of pounds, might well affect the charges in future and not be overtaken by even the most optimistic estimates of the extra traffic. It is a matter of judgment, but I am bound to put the point to the House.
  Certainly nobody who has studied the problem, such as the Edinburgh Chamber of Commerce or the British Airports Authority, sees any prospect of Turn-house becoming viable within the next decade, given the major new investment that is needed. This is a large sum of money projected to the future in terms of charges which will have to be met and set against the most optimistic estimates of new traffic.
  But I hasten to add that a commercial approach, while important to Government and to trading activities, is not the only factor, and the Government fully recognise, as many of my hon. Friends have repeatedly urged, that good and reliable communications bring benefits that are not reflected in narrow aerodrome accounts. That is why, as my predecessor told the House earlier this year, we are subjecting the problem to a thorough cost-benefit study in which the wider benefits of an improved runway system could be set against the substantial Exchequer costs involved, and this, of course, means the cost to the taxpayer.
  Our study on this wider basis has now been completed, and it certainly has produced more attractive results. We are convinced that greater runway length is necessary to avoid severe payload or range restrictions on the new jet aircraft that B.E.A. will be bringing into service. It does not, however, suggest that a new runway, as opposed to a runway extension, would be justified for this purpose. Nor does the difference appear to be made good when allowance is made for the costs, direct and indirect, to airline and passengers of diversion and cancellation of flights due to cross-wind—a problem which admittedly a runway extension would do little or nothing to cure.
  We fully recognise the great inconvenience that these incidents entail and

  1477
  the depressing effect on traffic generally—a point made by the hon. Member for Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles (Mr. David Steel)—the financial effect of which we have also tried to assess. It is the case that crosswind diversions represent only a small proportion of total diversions. We may argue about the percentage. I have a few figures here. I take from this debate, among other things, a desire to look at this point a little more closely. It is a miniscule proportion. That is not to say that it is unimportant. 1969 has admittedly been exceptional: only 16 cross-wind diversions have occurred so far. The cure for the major cause of diversions—poor visibility—will be long and slow.
  Against this background it may be asked why the Government do not come to a firm decision now, as we are repeatedly pressed to do, and announce firm dates, both for the terminal complex and the runway extension.
  I can assure the House that the absence of a decision does not derive from the lack of a sense of urgency or out of a lack of concern for the problems of Scotland as a whole and of Edinburgh and Eastern Scotland in particular. On the contrary, we are very mindful of both, and while an early decision is important it is even more important that the right decision should be reached. We are, therefore, reappraising the cost-benefit study to make sure that no relevant factors have been neglected and that proper weight has been given to them all. 1 am hopeful that a decision will be reached before the end of the year.
  I turn now to one or two particular points raised in the debate. My hon. Friend the Member for West Lothian referred to the need for radar. I hope that he and other hon. Members will be pleased to know that an order was placed last April for delivery by the end of December, 1969. We hope that works services will also be completed in December, allowing us to begin the task of installing the equipment early next year. This work, together with flight trials and acceptance tests, will take approximately five months. The radar should, therefore, be in operational service in July, 1970, which is a very important date for Scotland, but there is always the possibility of unforeseen snags which may prevent us from meeting this time-
  1478
  table. I feel reasonably hopeful that this will be in operation by July, 1970.
  I should perhaps add that the functions of the radar include traffic marshalling and sequencing to the primary landing aid—the instrument landing system—the control of traffic in and around the airport control zone, and the provision of a radar approach aid to aircraft landing at Edinburgh as far as two nautical miles from touchdown. The radar is thus primarily intended to reduce to a minimum delays inherent in the present procedural system of control. It is not intended to facilitate approaches in lower weather minima. Some concern has been expressed about labour relations at Turnhouse. In fact, these relations are good and operations are efficient. It is a good and efficient team. We are looking forward to setting up a formal Whitley Council there without much further delay.
  To sum up, the Government recognise the importance of, and the need for, early decisions in respect of the development of Turnhouse, with consequential benefit to the parts of Scotland concerned, which we are determined it will continue to serve well. At the same time, we are anxious that the right decisions are taken and are recognised to be right by responsible Scottish opinion. I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for West Lothian and to other hon. Members, both inside and outside this debate, for their continuing assistance in ensuring that there is riot the smallest danger of the interests of Scottish business and commerce or of the ordinary traveller being overlooked when the final decision is taken. I come fresh and new to this matter, and indeed to my present office, and I can assure my hon. Friends that I will take from the debate a renewed desire to study the problem again and to do everything in my power to do the utmost which will benefit Edinburgh and Scotland.
  Mr. Dallyell: Before my hon. Friend sits down, will he turn his fresh and new critical faculties to the assumption by his advisers that a catchment area of 14 million people cannot support a viable airport? Such an assumption seems very strange in view of the experience of many countries in Europe, quite apart from that of the United States—for example, Dayton, Ohio. How can it be argued that

  1479
  an operation in Edinburgh would be unprofitable when other people seem to find it profitable? I hope that my hon. Friend will turn his fresh and new attention to this issue.
  Mr. Roberts: This is a matter of judgment arising from expert examination of the circumstances. Edinburgh is not the only centre of substantial population where this situation arises. It is not unique. As I said, we have instituted a cost-benefit study and we are engaged in examining the situation afresh. I am
  1480
  personally engaged in it. We shall continue to examine it with a view to reaching as early a decision as possible and one which—
  The Question having been proposed after Ten o'clock and the debate having continued for half an hour, Mr. DEPUTY SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.
  Adjourned at thirteen minutes past Eleven o'clock.

SCOTLAND
  General Practitioners
  General Practitioners
  Western General Hospital, Edinburgh (Orthopaedic Treatment)
  Western General Hospital, Edinburgh (Orthopaedic Treatment)
  British Standard Time
  British Standard Time
  Alnwickhill Area, Edinburgh (Zoning)
  Alnwickhill Area, Edinburgh (Zoning)
  Farmers (Break Crops)
  Farmers (Break Crops)
  Beef
  Beef
  Springbok Football Team (Sports Facilities)
  Springbok Football Team (Sports Facilities)
  Unqualified Teachers
  Unqualified Teachers
  Car Ferry Service, Barra and South Uist
  Car Ferry Service, Barra and South Uist
  Dairies (Legislation)
  Dairies (Legislation)
  Home Loans
  Home Loans
  Forth and Severn Road Bridges (Financing)
  Forth and Severn Road Bridges (Financing)
  Nurses (Salaries)
  Nurses (Salaries)
  Teachers (Salaries)
  Teachers (Salaries)
  Schools (Practical Subjects)
  Schools (Practical Subjects)
  University Students (Grants)
  University Students (Grants)
  British Petroleum Works, Grangemouth (Disturbances)
  British Petroleum Works, Grangemouth (Disturbances)
  Scottish Economy (White Paper)
  Scottish Economy (White Paper)
  Wheatley Report
  Wheatley Report
  Health Services and Public Health Act, 1968
  Health Services and Public Health Act, 1968
  Rent Rebate Schemes
  Rent Rebate Schemes
  Multi-Storey Blocks of Flats
  Multi-Storey Blocks of Flats
  Local Authority Houses (Rents)
  Local Authority Houses (Rents)
  General Teaching Council
  General Teaching Council
BOARD OF TRADE
  Trawling Industry (Safety Precautions)
  Trawling Industry (Safety Precautions)
  British European Airways (BAC 111 and Trident 3B Aircraft)
  British European Airways (BAC 111 and Trident 3B Aircraft)
  Companies Act, 1967
  Companies Act, 1967
  Weights and Measures (Exhibition)
  Weights and Measures (Exhibition)
  Pet Animals (Advertisements)
  Pet Animals (Advertisements)
  Airport Employees (Wages)
  Airport Employees (Wages)
DEFENCE
  Protection of Shipping (Cape Route)
  Protection of Shipping (Cape Route)
  Chemical and Bacteriological Warfare
  Chemical and Bacteriological Warfare
  Army Units, Ulster (Tours of Duty)
  Army Units, Ulster (Tours of Duty)
  Services (Strengths)
  Services (Strengths)
  Retirements
  Retirements
  Beaucette Quarry, Guernsey (Pay and Allowances)
  Beaucette Quarry, Guernsey (Pay and Allowances)
  Servicemen (Discharges)
  Servicemen (Discharges)
  United Kingdom Service Hospital Beds
  United Kingdom Service Hospital Beds
  B.A.O.R. (Winter Clothing)
  B.A.O.R. (Winter Clothing)
AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD
  Wines (Labelling)
  Wines (Labelling)
  Contaminated Milk (Disposal)
  Contaminated Milk (Disposal)
  Farm Amalgamation Scheme
  Farm Amalgamation Scheme
  Farms (West Country)
  Farms (West Country)
  Agricultural Mortgage Corporation (Interest Rates)
  Agricultural Mortgage Corporation (Interest Rates)
  Agricultural Holdings (Purchase)
  Agricultural Holdings (Purchase)
PUBLIC BUILDING AND WORKS
  Palace of Westminster Kitchens (Tiles)
  Palace of Westminster Kitchens (Tiles)
  Building Industry (Bankruptcies)
  Building Industry (Bankruptcies)
  Broad Sanctuary Site
  Broad Sanctuary Site
  Queen Square House, Bloomsbury
  Queen Square House, Bloomsbury
NATIONAL FINANCE
  Publication (" A Scottish Budget ")
  Publication (" A Scottish Budget ")
  Simplified Customs Arrangements
  Simplified Customs Arrangements
  Credit Expansion, Scotland
  Credit Expansion, Scotland
SOCIAL SERVICES
  Cigarettes (Health Hazards)
  Cigarettes (Health Hazards)
  Parliamentary Constituencies Orders (Printing)
  Parliamentary Constituencies Orders (Printing)
  Hospitals (Waste Disposal)
  Hospitals (Waste Disposal)
  County Populations
  County Populations
  Water Supplies (Fluoridation)
  Water Supplies (Fluoridation)
  Expectation of Life
  Expectation of Life
EDUCATION AND SCIENCE
  Art Education (Committee)
  Art Education (Committee)
  School Meals
  School Meals
EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY
  Construction Industry Training Board
  Construction Industry Training Board
  Agricultural Training Board (Levy)
  Agricultural Training Board (Levy)
  School Building, Sheffield
  School Building, Sheffield
TECHNOLOGY
  Marine Science and Technology Expenditure (Scotland)
  Marine Science and Technology Expenditure (Scotland)
  Nuclear Power Stations
  Nuclear Power Stations
  Investment Grants
  Investment Grants
  Departmental Expenditure, Scotland
  Departmental Expenditure, Scotland
  Industrial Investment
  Industrial Investment
  Industrial Development Certificates
  Industrial Development Certificates
  Petro-Chemical Plants, Scotland
  Petro-Chemical Plants, Scotland
  Shipping (Investment Grants)
  Shipping (Investment Grants)
POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS
  Television Licences (Deaf and Dumb)
  Television Licences (Deaf and Dumb)
TRANSPORT
  Roads (Expenditure)
  Roads (Expenditure)

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR On the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Chichester.

LORD ROBERTHALL
Sir Robert Lowe Hall, K.C.M.G., C.B., having been created Baron Roberthall, of Silverspur in the State of Queensland and Commonwealth of Australia and of Trenance in the County of Cornwall, for life—Was, in his robes, introduced between the Lord Plowden and the Lord Cole.

FAR EAST DEFENCE: FIVE POWER CONFERENCE
2.45 p.m.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what were the conclusions of the Five Power conference on the defence of Malaysia and Singapore.]
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE, R.A.F.(LORI)WINTERBOTTOM): My Lords, my noble friend the Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House made a full statement on July 2 about the conclusions of the Five Power Conference on Far East Defence held in Canberra on June 19 and 20. Officials of the five countries represented at the Canberra Conference met in Kuala Lumpur from November 4 to 6. They examined at some length the requirements of an air defence system and agreed upon the vital need for the various elements to be knitted together. The officials also considered a number of matters affecting naval co-operation. Material progress was made in both these areas which will enable further detailed work to proceed in the joint-service and single-service
914
Advisory Working Groups and facilitate the further study of a number of matters by the five Governments. The meeting was also briefed on the good progress made with the planning of the Joint Commonwealth Exercise in 1970.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, while thanking my noble friend for that very full reply, I should like to ask him this question. Does not this new Agreement rather complicate the position of defence in South-East Asia? Does it not overlap with SEATO? In view of the irrelevance of SEATO in all the recent situations in Indo-China, and the indifference in Pakistan, has not the time come to discuss whether the continuation of SEATO in this complicated situation is still necessary?
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, if the noble Lord wishes to know about SEATO, I suggest that he puts down a Question on the subject.
LORD BLYTON: My Lords, is my noble friend aware that some of us have just come back from Malaya and Singapore, and that I hope that, when we evacuate that area in 1971, the British Government will always make a defence programme to help those people, because of the infiltration of Communism from the Thailand border?
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for his helpful comments.

HILL SHEEP SUBSIDY PAYMENTS
THE DUKE OF ATHOLL: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government for how many ewes hill sheep subsidy was paid in 1964, 1968, and 1969 in England, Scotland and Wales.]
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, the number of ewes qualifying for the hill sheep subsidy in 1964 in England was 1·1 million, in Scotland 2·4 million and in Wales 1·4 million, a total of 4·9 million. For 1968 hill sheep subsidy was paid to 7·1 million in England, 3·0 million in Scotland and 2·2 million in Wales, totalling 6·9 million, an overall increase of

915
40 per cent. over 1964. No figures are yet available for 1969, as the qualifying day falls in December. I should add that at the 1967 Annual Review the subsidy was extended to cover a wider area, and the number of ewes in consequence increased.
THE DUKE OF ATHOLL: My Lords, I should like to thank the noble Lord for that reply. Perhaps he will let me know when the figures for this year are available, and I can put down another Question on the subject.
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, the noble Duke need not put a Question down, for I will let him have the figures.

WAGES INCREASES IN 1969
LORD BALOGH: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what the increase in average weekly earnings is estimated to be in each quarter of 1969 (the fourth quarter forward estimate), over the same quarter of 1968.]
THE MINISTER OF STATE, MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY (LORD DELACOURT-SMITH): My Lords, for the industries covered by the monthly index of average earnings for all employees compiled by the Department of Employment and Productivity the percentage increase for each of the first three quarters of 1969 over the corresponding quarter of 1968 was:

1969:

Per cent.

1st Quarter

…

…

+7·2

2nd Quarter

…

+7·7

3rd Quarter

…

…

+7·8

Information is not available on which to calculate forward estimates.
LORD BALOGH: My Lords, I should like to thank my noble friend for his Answer. Does he not think that a greater pressure on prices ought now to be exerted in order to contain the rising costs?
LORD DELACOURT-SMITH: My Lords, I should not like, on the strength of the Answer which I have given, to speculate upon that subject.
LORD BALOGH: My Lords, would not that speculation be very useful?
LORD DELACOURT-SMITH: My Lords, there is always room for debate about the usefulness of speculation.
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend whether that applies equally to both sexes?
LORD DELACOURT-SMITH: My Lords, I take it that my noble friend is referring to the reply which I gave. The figures collected for the purpose of this index of earnings do not distinguish between men and women, a fact which I am sure will be a great satisfaction to her.

THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
LORD SORENSEN: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what is the present position in the Falkland Islands.]
THE MINISTER OF STATE, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (LORD SHEPHERD). My Lords, I cannot for the moment say more than that the discussions with the Argentine authorities are continuing, and that the talks are being conducted strictly in conformity with the assurances which have repeatedly been given to Parliament in this matter.
LORD SORENSEN: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend whether that Answer implies that the Argentine Government has modified its previous demands in any way?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I think my noble friend knows that these discussions are being carried out in private and are confidential. Therefore it would be wrong for me to speculate and give the noble Lord an answer to his supplementary question.
LORD CARRINGTON: My Lords. is the noble Lord aware that there is on the tape a report that there will be an announcement about the negotiations on Friday? If that is so, will there be a

917
Statement to his House at the earliest possible opportunity?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I have seen that report on the tape. As I have said, I cannot go further than what I said in my original Answer. If there is anything that the House should be informed about, I will make certain that the House is so informed.
LORD INGLEWOOD: My Lords, has the noble Lord managed successfully to dispel the idea widely held among the Falkland islanders—which I remember he tried to dispel in this House—that the Falkland Islands to-day are really more of a burden than an asset to the British Commonwealth?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I do not think I have ever attempted to do that because I do not think that was understood or put forward in the Falkland Islands.

OVERSEAS REPRESENTATION: THE DUNCAN REPORT
2.56 p.m.
THE EARL OF SELKIRKrose to call attention to the Report of the Review Committee on Overseas Representation 1968–69 (Cmnd. 4107); and to move for Papers. The noble Earl said: My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name. I think that anybody who looks at the Report on Overseas Representation will be immediately struck by two things. The first is the remarkable expedition with which the work has been completed. Even a most casual glance at the range of evidence and places visited will show the astonishing application with which the Committee have set about their work. Whether it was necessary to do it quite so quickly or not is, of course, another question altogether. The second point is that the Report bristles with new ideas. Nothing seems to escape the Committee's attention. Their eagle eyes noticed all sorts of things: electric typewriters, the shape of passports and the manning of various departments in the Board of Trade. I shall attempt to refer to only a few of the points which have been raised.
There is a third point we must remember, and that is that there was a review of the Overseas Service five years ago.
918
Nobody would wish that a quinquennial review of our Overseas Service should become a routine matter in the machinery of government in this country. It would not serve any useful purpose at all Following that review there was a very substantial reorganisation, in which three departments were drawn together. That was conducted under the guidance of three noble Lords whom we are to have the great advantage of hearing speak to us this afternoon. I believe that that reorganisation went through very smoothly, and the only slightly indigestible morsel with regard to it was the continuance of the dependent territories.
This Report has received rather a mixed reception. Indeed, the Chairman felt constrained to write a rather long letter to The Times explaining some of the matters on which he thought comment had gone astray. He made two points in particular. The first was that the terms of reference tied the Review Committee to certain lines of thought. To me, I must say, the terms of reference look rather like a treaty of peace after a long guerrilla war conducted in the dark corridors of power. In any case, I think it speaks volumes for the sense of public duty of the Committee that they were prepared to continue under those terms. The second point which the Chairman made 'was that, with a relatively short Report on a very big subject, it was quite possible, by changing the emphasis, to draw different interpretations. That is true; but what really matters from the point of this Motion is what conclusions the Government draw from it and what they propose to do about it.
If I may shortly summarise what the Committee said, it is this. First of all, in dealing with overseas representation they found it necessary to include the overseas broadcasting service of the B.B.C., and the British Council, besides the Diplomatic Service itself; and the total cost of that to the country is …105 million, or roughly 1 per cent. of the national expenditure. Secondly, so far as the foreign currency element is concerned, it is believed roughly to balance with what foreign missions spend in this country. Thirdly, they have not been able to establish a yardstick by which cost effectiveness could properly be judged. That is inevitable. Much of diplomacy consists

919
in trying to prevent things from happening. One may truly say,
"What's done we partly may compute.
But know not what's resisted".
Fourthly, they found that the condemnation of the cult of the generalist amateur, which was mentioned in the Fulton Report, has no place here at all. Finally, they are impressed with the quality of the Service and the dedication which those in the Service show to their work. They considered that if there were to be a reduction in numbers it must be accompanied by a reduction of the work to be carried out. They were a very businesslike Committee and they had a look at the arrangements in the Foreign Service. They quickly saw that there were quite a number of improvements which might very reasonably be made. They emphasised the need for more training—particularly on certain tasks connected with the Home Department—and said that there should be more telegrams rather than fewer. That is perhaps rather a formidable proposal, considering the number that are used at the present time. They emphasised that there should be more buildings, better adapted for the purpose for which they were intended. There should be a 10 per cent. manpower margin; improved conditions for retirement—particularly for those who may be forced to retire on pension—and improved conditions for retirement of local employees overseas. There should be an entertainment allowance for commercial counsellors, in particular. Also matters were to be dealt with frequently at a higher level, which meant a higher grade staff. A new Foreign Office was to be built, and there was to be possibly an increase in the British Council, and no change in the B.B.C. It is clear that if they are to get the 10 per cent. economic cut which I think they set out to get, the items I have mentioned—which I think are very desirable in themselves—do not make its achievement any easier.
The first matter to receive their attention was the Information Section, which they recommended should be cut in half. I would only say that, from reading the Report, the work of the Information Section does not seem to have been brought out very fully. The second matter to be considered was the Service attaches, and they were to be cut by a third. I have
920
always found that Service attaches have not been very conspicuous until something has happened, but when something has happened, it is surprising how extremely useful their knowledge and contacts are.
However, there is one other point want to make; and this applies also to Commonwealth liaison officers. One of the strong points of the Commonwealth—I do not want to go into this problem of illusions of grandeur, which we are all said to be suffering from; I do not know who is particularly—is that when it comes to action between the Armed Forces of the Commonwealth, the common structure, the common command organisation, is of enormous advantage, for instance, in United Nations' operations. This is very clear of course in Cyprus, where it is happening at the present time. I hope therefore that this point will certainly be borne in mind. Liaison officers are a fountain-head but they play a very definite part.
But clearly these cuts did not go far enough and so we come to perhaps the major cut, which is rather the rub. This is the sharp division between what is called an "Area of Concentration" and the "Outer Area". The Outer Area consists of 3 billion people: about 1 billion Communist and about 2 billion outside. The catch phrase "Outer Area" is certainly unfortunate. One can overlook it, but the idea behind it runs right through this Report. It does not really matter whether one is dealing with the political side or the commercial side, the same idea is present; and it does not greatly matter if one makes it slightly more digestible by calling it a comprehensive mission or a selective mission.
I will not for one moment accuse the Committee of being worthy of the words of scorn which Kipling used about people who thought of
"Lesser breeds without the law"
I do not think that that was in their mind at all. Equally, I do not think it is quite fair to say that this represents the difference between someone playing centre forward and perhaps outside right. But what I do think is fair is to draw a comparison with the attitude of the Emperor of China to George III when he tried to set up an Embassy in Peking at the end of the 18th century. The answer that he received from the Emperor

921
was: "No, it is against the law." His letter went on:
"Above all, upon you who live in a remote and inaccessible region, but have shown your submissive loyalty, we have heaped benefits far in excess of those accorded to other nations."
This was just to tell the King that he ought to be thankful for the benefits he had already received. I think the attitude reflected there, and indeed reflected in the Report that we are discussing, is a selfish one, a self-centred one; and it is one which we are tending to fall into at the present time. It arouses every single form of emotional antagonism: the haves against the have-nots; the industrialists against the non-industrialists; the European races against the non-European races. This, in fairness, comes out of a document presented to Parliament by order of Her Majesty the Queen, and is said to be a lesson in diplomacy to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
We have just had a Report from Lester Pearson, the Pearson Report, which deals with aid to developing countries. It is an encouraging Report and he emphasises the need for "developing relationship based on mutual understanding and self-respect." He says that this development of aid is not simply a moral question; it is a question of enlightened self-interest which will undoubtedly bring benefits of far-reaching character to the international trade of this country.
The Duncan Committee calculate that, as I said, about 2 billion people are increasing the gross national product by 5 per cent. a year. But I think it is a fair point to make that the Report, in saying that the biggest return of our export effort must come from the Area of Concentration—that is, Western Europe and North America—may be expressing only a short-term view, and that in due time the consumption of the Outer-Area—the 3 billion people—may be of the most far-reaching character.
There is another point that I must make to the Government. I hope that they will not take this Report as an excuse for sliding from the Statement they originally made on January 16, 1968, when they announced the withdrawal from East of Suez; because those areas to-day, according to this Report, do not fall in the area of special importance to this country. We therefore assume that, according to this Report, the Gulf, India,
922
Malaysia and Singapore are not of special importance to this country. I do not know what investments there are, but they are said to be worth half a billion pounds in Malaysia and Singapore; and in the whole area there are probably well over a billion pounds of investments, of one kind and another, which are certainly of economic importance.
Nor has this any direct bearing on our entry into the European Economic Community, whether we go in or not. If we do go in, we hope that we shall be a force for broadening the outlook of the area, rather than making it more insular. Indeed, our value will be the contact we have all over the world which could enrich the European Economic Community. If we were to become insular in outlook, "small Europeans", half our value to Europe would, I believe, be destroyed.
The Duncan Report makes a great deal of the commercial side; indeed, the Committee were instructed to do so. I myself cannot help wondering whether they do not go rather too far in this direction, though it is true (and no one would question it) that a growth in our export promotion is the only way in which we can expand the economy in this country. The Report states that "Their primary purpose"—of the Service—" is export promotion." The Committee make reference to security, but then pass it by. The Report suggests that the Service should enter very deeply into what really is salesmanship: they must understand market research; they must be more aggressive, initiate business, persuade British businessmen to realise their opportunities. They do not actually sell the goods; they do almost anything else. I suppose that I have done some of these things myself once or twice, on special occasions, but I think the overlap here is carried too far. There are two distinct tasks: for the salesman, on the one hand, and for the official, on the other. There is a certain overlap, I agree; and within that overlap I believe more energy should be exercised by both sides. But I should not think it wise if that overlap were further extended.
It may be said to a firm, "Why don't you trade in this area?". The first time the reply is polite; the second time it is you are told, "Well, you know, I must less polite; and the third time you say it

923
make profits, and my profits pay your salary." There is a limit to the extent to which officials can properly press other people to do work of this sort. In any case, I have always held the view that British businessmen in proper condition can conduct their work anywhere, provided that they have stability; provided that they have free movement of personnel, of goods and money. In those conditions British businessmen can do work anywhere in the world, and it is largely that work which the official Service have to handle.
My Lords, I should like to mention one or two things in this Report which I welcome. The first is the extension of regional travel from missions. At the present time, in most cases, an Ambassador can visit his neighbouring British Embassy only at his own expense. I believe that this is wholly wrong. More and more policy is lying in the regional character, and if one is to understand the policy of the region one must be able to visit neighbouring Embassies. This is extremely important. I suggest that all Ambassadors in neighbouring countries should, in one way or another, meet once a year. I do not think it is unreasonable and I think this is what the Duncan Report is recommending.
Another point is discretion in approving longer postings. and indeed promotion in postings. I am of course aware that a matter of this kind clashes with career structure, but there are many cases in which it is desirable that a person who is fitting in a post well should remain longer. I give the example of someone who is posted to a country of which he knows nothing. I will not give precise instances, but suppose that a man arrives there and finds no one on his staff who has been there for more than two years: it is difficult for him to know what happened three, four or five years ago, yet it may be very relevant indeed to what is happening at the present time.
One of the most interesting suggestions is in regard to the tenure of property overseas, and the Report brings out two powerful economic arguments for changing the basis of that tenure. The first is that we are spending nearly three times as much in renting property as we are in buying property. I believe that is quite wrong. The Report goes on to say that
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no one has an interest in selling property anywhere overseas. I had the experience of selling part of the dockyard in Hong Kong, and it ran into millions of pounds. I had hoped that that would have some effect on the Navy Estimates for that year, but no; the money disappeared completely into the great maw of the Treasury, and I never saw anything more of it. This means that, as the Report says, no one has the incentive to buy or sell well in growing capitals throughout the world. If we had an organisation doing that, according to this Report there is no reason why in due course it should not be self-financing. I think that is an important suggestion and I very much hope the Government will give it extremely close scrutiny. I am always surprised that the Foreign Office does not have a rather more flexible organisation for co-ordinating with Foreign Office requirements than it has at the present time.
There are many distinguished speakers on the list to-day and I do not wish to detain your Lordships any longer, but I would mention just two points, one on the British Council. I am glad that the Report has placed emphasis on the work of the British Council. I hesitate to deal with the question whether it is desirable to concentrate on Europe instead of on the areas of Africa and Asia; I think that that is a very doubtful move. I believe that the value of the British Council is far more in a wider field. In regard to the B.B.C., I agree entirely that the important thing is for us to be heard. That is the emphasis of the Report. I should like the B.B.C.'s overseas broadcasts—and they are now probably better than many of their home broadcasts—to be steered to the seven parts of the world, instead of having one broadcast for the whole world. What is interesting for Patagonia may not be quite so interesting to Vietnam or Cambodia.
There are many other subjects, but I will not refer to them. I should, however, say that I greatly appreciated what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, in the course of the debate on the Address. He was perhaps allowing his mind to run a little freely, but he said that Britain had a great role to play in the affairs of the world—a role suggestive rather of persuasion than of power. We shall not play that role by retiring into

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the Area of Concentration. I think sometimes that we are worried as to what our role is, but it is not all that difficult to get a clear picture.
There is one point where we can help a great deal. In the 60-odd countries which have started life independently since the war there has been great difficulty in building up any form of reliable Diplomatic Service. One can never be sure that anything said to a new country's diplomat will be reported properly to his own country. I believe this is a field where, both by example and by persuasion, we can do a great service to fellow-nations in the world, most of them being heavily engaged in internal organisation. In helping the growth of this service I believe we shall be helping the world as a whole. I will go further and say this: if other countries could claim, as I believe we can claim, to have a Foreign Service which was efficient, sensitive and intelligent, this would be a safer world in which to live. I beg to move for Papers.
3.15 p.m.
LORD GLADWYN: My Lords, I think we can all agree that this Report is a remarkable piece of work, produced, by order, in absolutely record time and containing many quite admirable proposals for bringing our Foreign Service into line with modern realities, cutting unnecessary expenditure, eliminating much redundant work, and promoting greater efficiency generally. It appears, however, that even if all the proposals are agreed to—which I think would be doubtful— the net saving would only be about …5 to …10 million a year. This, comparatively speaking, is chicken feed. It is therefore hardly the cost of the Service that we are discussing, to-day, so much as the extent to which it represents a machine well adapted to further the interests of this country abroad. That is what we are really discussing.
On the whole, I would accept almost all the conclusions which are conveniently set forth at the end of the chapters, save only those of Chapter IV, which deals with political work, and Chapter VI, which deals with commercial work. If I may, I will come to those matters later but, broadly speaking, 1 sympathise to a large extent with what the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, has said in this regard. Before going on to examine them I should
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like to make certain observations on certain suggestions on the Report which seem to go hardly far enough, and also to touch on others which may possibly have given rise to misapprehension on the part of some who may have read the Report only rather cursorily.
To start, let us look at Chapter II, which deals with career structure and redundancy. Here the Report rightly suggests that in future promotion should be more closely linked to talent than to seniority, it being possible for the best officers to reach Grade 4 by the mid-thirties, Grade 3 by the early forties and Grades 2 and 1 from the late forties onwards. All this would have to be dependent, of course, on inducing the Treasury, in the first place to agree to generous pensions for those members of the Service in their fifties who have not entirely made the grade, and in the second place to accept the principle that,
"there should be more flexibility about keeping on up to 65 those whose outstanding abilities show no signs of flagging".
Here all I would say is that neither of these excellent proposals seems to have been pressed hard enough by Sir Val Duncan and his colleagues. One of them—that is the second—does not even appear in the Conclusions, and the other mentions "fair compensation" rather than "generous pensions"; and there is a considerable difference between these two conceptions.
There is a strong case for generous pensions. It is not as if present members of the Service, whether they were in the administrative or executive grades, had entered the Service knowing that, through no fault of their own, they were quite likely to be pensioned off in their fifties. Not at all. On the contrary, they believed that, like the home Civil Service, they would. if they did not blot their copy book, have security of tenure for life. That was the condition on which they entered the Service—or so they thought. Both these reforms are still the most important in the whole of the Report. Nevertheless, if you are to get this flexibility (as it is called nowadays) immense pressure will have to be brought on the Treasury. Indeed, I very much doubt whether this particular reform will go through at all unless the Chancellor of the Exchequer, with the explicit approval and support of the Prime Minister, is prepared to overrule his own

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officials. Yet it is essential if we are to avoid situations in which, as like as not, the local representative of Her Majesty is a man, no doubt with an impeccable record, but yet past his prime, perhaps with a chip on his shoulder, incapable of taking real responsibility or decisions; in other words, unfit for the job.
As for the present rule of compulsory retirement at sixty, it has always seemed to me to be idiotic, and the fact that apparently we alone among all the nations in the world apply it makes it all the more indefensible. It is not, I hasten to say, that I consider myself to have been a martyr to this rule. Nearly seven years in a post, as I was in my last one, is quite long enough: and, after all, if one is thinking at all in terms of alternative employment in one's later years, as I was, it is no doubt a very good thing to retire at sixty. But to get rid of people who may be really outstanding and who actually want to stay on until they are sixty-five, or even, I should say, until seventy, is absurd and self-defeating. After all, Talleyrand, perhaps the best diplomatist who ever lived, was an excellent Ambassador at the age of eighty. I hope that all your Lordships who intervene to-day will strongly press this simple point.
There is another reason for proceeding with this all-important reform of pensioning off some blameless but not particularly effective Foreign Service members in their late forties or early fifties. On page 22 we see that there are no less than 400 officers in the Administrative Class serving at home, presumably for the most part in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office—which I agree was outside the terms of reference of the Duncan Report—though some reports have nevertheless been able to deal with things outside their terms of reference. This goes with 700 abroad; that is to say, 1,100 in all, in the Administrative Class, and it is to be compared with the 2,600 required for the entire home Civil Service.
I cannot avoid the suspicion that a large number of these officials—that is Ito say, those in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office—spend a good deal of their time writing letters to each other and to their colleagues abroad which are not absolutely necessary. In any case a
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good deal of their work could, I suggest, be properly undertaken now by the so-called Executive Grade. The Report itself suggests that a number of posts which came under the old Commonwealth Relations Office ate considerably over-staffed and will have to be reduced anyhow. Admittedly there must be some reserve to guard against unforeseeable contingencies, but here again the moral to be drawn is that pensioning off a very considerable number of members of the Service is the only satisfactory solution.
There is another direction in which the campaign against the Treasury, if I may so describe it, surely needs to be waged with great energy. On page 148 we read that nearly £6 million is still being spent in foreign exchange annually for renting accommodation overseas; and on page 152 that the most urgent requirement of all is to
'improve the management of accommodation for the overseas representational services; and, as a first step, to increase the proportion of owned to rented property."
What the Report does not say, though it might well have said, is that had the Treasury allowed the Foreign Office to pursue this obviously sensible policy since the war, since 1945 let us say, we might be owning substantial and permanent overseas assets which by this time would have trebled or even quadrupled in value and the capital cost of which would have been much less than the price which we have paid out in rents over the years with nothing whatever to show for it. Indeed, it has been calculated, very roughly, I believe, that if we had embarked on a really energetic purchasing and building programme soon after the war, we might have saved the taxpayer something between £25 and £30 million in foreign exchange. Now that, as we are told, every penny we can spare of foreign exchange is of almost vital importance, it really is high time that we took the advice of the Report and proceeded to establish the Overseas Diplomatic Estate Board which it recommends. Here again I hope that your Lordships, all of you who speak this afternoon, will strongly urge the Government to get a move on without any further delay.
Then I turn to the chapter on civilian attachés of various sorts. Few impartial people, I think, who read this chapter

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with attention—and I speak with all deference to what the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, has said—can arrive at any other conclusion than that a large number of these attaches ought to be abolished, their duties being taken on by members of the regular Foreign Service. In these days of quick travel, there seems no inherent reason why the Home Departments concerned should not normally collect all the information they require by depending on regulars in the Foreign Service, plus the occasional despatch, of course, of a specialist from London. On the face of it, it looks, from what the Report itself says, as if, given energetic action on the part of the Government, we could easily save here at least another half a million pounds a year in foreign exchange. But shall we in fact shortly arrive at such a saving? Most unlikely, I fear. For whenever a civilian attaché post is created it becomes a sort of perquisite of the Home Department concerned, which fights to the death for its preservation. Often when asked to advise, long ago now, on possible economies when I was in Paris, I recommended, among other things, the abolition of one or two civil and military attaches, and I never, of course, obtained the slightest satisfaction.
Having said all this, might I perhaps add, before coming to my major criticism, that while I entirely accept the conclusions of Chapters V and VIII relating to economic and information and cultural questions, I have a few reserves to make about Chapter VI, which deals with commercial matters. I think the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, also had such reserves. Of course, I recognise the great importance, as I am sure we all recognise the great importance, from the point of view of our still critical balance of payments, of having a machine which is as well adapted as it possibly can be to help in pushing British exports. But I think that there is a tendency in the Report to suggest that this is as it were more important than anything else. After all, what British salesmen abroad really want is not, perhaps, so much expert advice on the actual process of selling British goods, such as shall we say, motor cars, as hints from the commercial Minister, and indeed from the Ambassador himself, on the sort of way in which they ought to go about things, given the political set-up of the country concerned, the prospects of
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any change of government or régime, and indeed the general feeling about the United Kingdom.
If any real technical help is required, then I should have thought that there was something to be said for having, as it were, chamber of commerce experts, who would not necessarily be attached to the Mission itself but would work in close harmony with it. I do not say that the commercial Minister or the Counsellor and his staff should not learn as much as possible about the techniques of the actual marketing and selling operations; but I do think that local experts with lifelong experience of the country concerned might often be of greater use than diplomats in the conduct of day-to-day negotiations.
As for Chapter VIII, while repeating that I consider its conclusions are splendid, I would only add, as it were, a footnote on the alleged inaudibility of the B.B.C. When recently in Warsaw and Bucharest, I found that in spite of the fact that the Ambassadors there had the most powerful possible receivers, I was not myself able to get the news from England. Maybe this was due to exceptional conditions or to the sets not being completely in order—I do not know. I mention this fact in case it should be considered necessary to increase the power of the transmitter.
I turn now to the main criticism that I have of this intelligent Report. This relates to the "Role of Overseas representation", dealt with in Chapter I, and, to a lesser degree, to Chapter VI, which is headed "Aid Administration". It might be supposed that I, more perhaps than anybody else, would welcome the great stress laid by the Report on concentrating on Europe and, of course, accepting the fact that we must take account that we shall shortly not be present, in a military sense, East of Suez; and so, of course, I do—just as I welcome the courageous and realistic statement that nowadays Britain is a major Power, albeit of the second order, and must not attempt to become a Power of the first order.
But to draw from this premise the conclusion that all overseas countries should be divided up into two categories seems to me to be much too logical, and in any case the use of such terms as

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"Areas of Concentration", and so on, inevitably creates the impression that what we want to do is to cultivate the rich industrialised countries to the detriment of the poor developing countries.
I know that this is not the intention. Indeed, I have been assured by the authors of the Report that it is not the intention; that what is really meant to be implied is that there are, after all, certain countries—for instance, those recently formed, of virtually no political significance, whose aid is perhaps organised by another Power and where we might well be content with purely notional representation, or indeed with no representation at all. I would not know. But inevitably the theory, if it is rigidly applied, would give rise to misapprehensions.
Besides, is it really true that we shall for long want our Embassies in some minor Western European countries to be organised like miniature Washingtons? Surely, if we do come into the European Economic Community, co-ordination of foreign policies, at any rate, will tend more and more to take place in some European centre, of bodies coming directly under the control of the eventual Council of Foreign Ministers. And surely, too, in another direction, we may often want to reinforce our representation in certain developing countries to meet certain political emergencies and in any case to assist the whole process of aid which includes, of course, not only financial aid, but also help with such things as education, technical co-operation and industrial training.
I know that the Report is conscious of this important aspect, and I understand and accept what is said in Chapter VII, together with the disclaimer of any desire to accept "Eurocentric" notions, as they are called, which appears in Chapter I. Nevertheless, as I have said, the mere establishment of categories, which will inevitably be imagined to be "inner" or "outer", to say the least, gives rise to misunderstandings.
The House may recall that in February, 1967, I took the lead in contesting the action of the Government in raising the fees paid in this country by overseas students. Since then, I have been interested in this field, and my attention was
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recently drawn to a Board of Trade Report entitled, Exports and the Industrial Training of People from Overseas. The Report itself—I advise your Lordships to read it if you have time—is excellent, and it actually proposes something which should have been established long ago; namely, a large scale, direct exchange scheme for industrial trainees with Germany and France to begin with, which might then be extended to other industrialised countries.
The trouble here is that such proposals, excellent in themselves, may well now, in the light of the Duncan Report, be believed to be of general validity, and interpreted as determining our total policy in training overseas nationals. This would be wrong. It remains as urgent as ever not only to get European trainees into our industries, but also to get trainees into our industries from developing countries. For years, unforunate students from our ex-Empire have been unable to complete their studies here owing to their inability to acquire any practical training. That is a fact. And yet, as we all know, many of them would be very good ambassadors for British goods if they went back to the infant industries in their countries with the necessary know-how.
In our anxiety to develop trade in Western Europe we should not, therefore, forget the developing countries. Indeed, as I see it, one of the main advantages in our joining the European Economic Community would be the possibility of establishing some coherent and sensible policy for aid from the whole new entity to the developing countries as a whole. Clearly, for this purpose, we must maintain our links with our ex-Empire, and the French must maintain their links with their ex-Empire.
Let me just add that I think it is a bit of a libel on the Germans to suggest (as the Duncan Report does) that they are unduly Eurocentric. On the contrary, the Germans provide more aid than we do, and their system of industrial training for foreigners is far superior to ours.
But having said all this, let me end by congratulating most heartily all the authors of the Report on a splendid piece of work, which I believe should be of the greatest assistance to my old Service. Certainly we are entering into a dangerous period so far as our external relations

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are concerned, and we must, if we can, have a Service which both attracts the brightest and the most vigorous of our young men and women and gives them all the necessary inducements to stay in it. The pull of business, and even of politics, on such young men as they enter the thirties will be tremendous. This is, above all, a field in which any Government in this country should be able to recruit and retain the best talent available.
3.38 p.m.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, I think it is time that we debated this important Report. and I am indebted, as we all are, to my noble friend Lord Selkirk for today making this debate possible, and indeed for his pungent comments. I must confess that I am not altogether happy at this particular moment. As a junior. defrocked ex-diplomat. I am only too conscious of that all-star cast, that plethora of Permanent Secretaries, which is perched around us this afternoon. Moreover, I find this Report rather a difficult one to discuss.
It is no mere polite figleaf of speech when I say that, like the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, we are all indebted to these three distinguished, perceptive and experienced men who produced the Report. As my noble friend Lord Selkirk remarked, it is really something of a miracle, that this mettlesome troika produced an agreed Report, and produced it with such astonishing speed. More important, their Report is a rich quarry. My noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, have already excavated a great many of the good things, such as the need for our diplomats to stay longer en paste and the need to accelerate the advance, the present slow and most frustrating advance, which the real "flyers" have at the present time within the Service; the need for a more liberal attitude towards travel and so on. With that, and with a very great deal else, I cordially agree. More important, I very much hope that the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, in all the majesty of his Civil Service purple, and having subdued the Treasury dragon, will be able to agree, too.
It is also right that from time to time, perhaps not too frequently, we should examine the fundamental reasons for our representation abroad and look at the
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basic structure as a whole. No one can accuse the authors of this Report of having failed to get down to basic tacks. No one who knows them could have thought that they would fail to do so. But, my Lords—and here I should like to make my dissent plain—I frankly find the framework, the carriage, which the troika have constructed, too rigid. I do not—though I am doubtless completely wrong—consider myself completely square: I accept that we are not now a world Power, in the old sense, and that we are right to accord a very high priority in our scheme of things to our relations with Western Europe and within the Atlantic Alliance; and I agree that national power is meaningless unless it is underpinned by real economic strength. At the same time I cannot accept, any more than the two speakers who have spoken before me could, the rigid distinction, the almost doctrinal distinction, drawn in the Report between the Area of Concentration and the Outer Area. I also cannot accept the rigid differentiation which the Report draws out from this distinction between the comprehensive Mission suitable for the magic circle within, and the selective Mission, the model for the unfavourcd Outer Circle. Quite frankly, all this part of the Report strikes me as far too stark and too schematic. The rigid differentiation between the Area of Concentration and the rest is really pretty artificial. One sees this as one sees the Area changing shape within the pages of the Report itself. It is a differentiation, in my view, which ignores the fact that the world in which we live is increasingly small and increasingly interdependent; which makes far too little allowance for the endless variety in national postures within the world, for the element of unpredictability in international relations and, of course, for the vast potential of major countries outside the magic circle.
So far as representation is concerned, I find myself very much in agreement with what the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, was suggesting about the trend of diplomatic representation within a more integrated Europe. I trust, therefore, that the noble Lord the Leader of the House will be able to confirm that the Government, in their approach to our representation abroad, will be more flexible than the Committee and will not

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seek to apply these general doctrinal rules of thumb. The essence of the matter, to my mind, is discrimination. The test in staffing should be what is required in any one place at any one time properly to reflect and meet the requirements of British interests. In this sense, of course, all posts, even the biggest, should be considered selective.
I have, I trust, made it clear that much though I agree with many of the practical recommendations in this thorough and thoughtful Report, I dissent from a lot of the theology (if I may so term it) embedded in it. I agree that the critics may have misrepresented and misread the Report, and I am very glad that Sir Val Duncan, in his letter to The Times last summer, has corrected the record. Equally, I readily concede that under their terms of reference the authors were working under twin restrictions—the need for speed and the need to produce economies—which gave them an almost impossibly difficult task.
The Report, of course, suggests certain economies, totalling at most some £10 million, and many of these—the proposed reductions in information staffs, in our Service representation, in certain civil attaché posts, in our security guards, and so on—I personally find pretty acceptable. I trust, however, that in this area the Government will retain a sense of proportion. Our total representation abroad totals only about one per cent. of our expenditure overseas. It amounts to only three-halfpence for every pound raised in taxation; and it is balanced by what we recoup from the expenditure of foreign missions in this country.
Economy is of course important, but it cannot be the sole, or indeed the most important, criterion here. A far more important reason for diplomatic slimming, in my view, is the need to keep our representation lean and muscular. This comment may come ill from me, but if we have too much fat on our Missions abroad they will not be as efficient or as responsive as they should be. Indeed, if economy is really our aim there is a spot or two on which the Report could have perhaps placed a sharper finger. I will mention only one; it is the one which the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, mentioned—the Foreign Office itself. I am inclined to wonder whether, following the amalgama-
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tions, there may not be some real overstaffing at the centre. Do we need 65 separate departments? Do we need 26 Deputy and Assistant Under-Secretaries?
I offer that as a possible field for economy, free, to the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton. But I do so subject to certain provisos; we are as a nation more dependent to-day on our wits and we living on a narrower margin than we were in our more spacious days. We are, therefore, if anything, more dependent nowadays on first-class and efficient representation abroad. Accordingly, any economies that we may wring from our staffing at the centre or abroad must not be wrung at the price of the efficiency or the morale of the Service. That is why I hope that we may secure certain clear assurances from the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, this afternoon.
First, there is the reserve of manpower—the planning margin—for training, for travel, for leave, and so forth. The noble Lord, Lord Plowden, recommended 10 per cent. The Government accepted that. But we have still to get it. Indeed, in the critical ranks of First Secretary there is now not a surplus but a negative margin. I must ask for an assurance from the noble Lord that it is the intention of the Government to do everything possible to attain the 10 per cent. margin soon and then to retain it.
Next, there is the need, which was stressed in the Duncan Report and again this afternoon by the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn (he asked for support in this, and I will give it), to ensure that those officers who are obliged, through no fault of their own but as a result of reorganisation, to leave the Service prematurely are treated generously. That has not been the case with the 30 senior Foreign Service officers prematurely retired earlier this year. Further premature retirements are, I believe, inevitable if we are going to trim the Service to size and if the younger brighter people, many of whom are frustrated at the moment, are to be encouraged to break through. But the Report has emphasised that the morale of those on the way up will be crucially impaired if those on the way out are not fairly, indeed generously, treated. I hope that the noble Lord will be able to give us assurances here regarding the Government's intentions that the "golden bowlers", or the "silver bowlers", for

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the prematurely retired will not be delayed until the new general superannuation arrangements for the Civil Service are ready, and that any arrangements made for those retired prematurely in the future will also apply retrospectively to the unlucky 30.
The third proviso is the need for speed and stability. The present uncertainty is bad for decision-making, bad for efficiency, and bad for morale. I trust, therefore, that the Government will take, announce, and carry out their decisions on Duncan as quickly—but of course thoroughly—as possible. When they have done so, I trust that this public review, unlike Mr. Healey's non-stop Act, will not be the first of a continuing series. Duncan has stimulated thought and possible action, and that is no bad thing. But any further reviews—and I accept that in this sense it is a continuing process—should in my view be internal. It can properly be left to the buffed-up inspectorate recommended by Duncan.
My Lords, I turn now from the general to the commercial and economic side. Here, again, I readily admit that the troika have a great deal of value to say and there is a lot that an amateur like me would accept. But like those who have spoken before me, I find the authors' treatment too stark and too schematic. For example, in introducing their new model for the Diplomatic Service, the authors stress the "towering" importance of a balance of payments surplus, and few of us would dissent. But the reductio ad absurdum of that policy is that if we could only achieve a substantial and continuing surplus we might not require any representation abroad.
Here, again, I find the doctrinal distinction between the Area of Concentration and the Outer Area to be overdrawn. Most of us have noted the shift in our export pattern towards North America and Western Europe, but we must not allow ourselves to be mesmerised by our nearer industrial neighbours. Excluding oil, three-quarters of our investments at the present time lie outside the Area of Concentration, and many of the countries in the Outer Area—the Brazils, the Irans, the Indias and the Indonesias of this world—may well constitute some of our greatest markets in the future.
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And surely all the activities, the initiative work, to which the Report refers and about which my noble friend Lord Selkirk was doubtful; this work of searching out for export trends and possibilities, and all the rest, are just as necessary for our missions in the Outer Areas—in Buenos Aires and Rio, in Cairo and Rabat, in Kuwait or Teheran, in Karachi or Djakarta—if the work is necessary at all, as for those within the magic circle, be it in Paris or in Prague, in Sydney or in San Francisco. Indeed, my Lords, when we come to staffing we must remember that it is in some of the places outside the Report's Area of Concentration where our exporters may need the most help. The noble Lord, Lord Stokes, for example, doubtless knows his way about Sweden. But Mr. Shanks may not know the right plugs to pull in South Korea.
That said, I should like to ask the noble Lord one question and to float a suggestion with him. The Report is clearly worried about the focus of our export effort at the centre in Whitehall and in and around the Board of Trade. We read in paragraph 47, on page 84, for example, that:
"Again and again we felt the lack of a meaningful dialogue on export policy."
Again, in paragraph 55 the authors of the Report
"… detect a certain lack of central direction in the export effort commensurate with its importance to the future of Britain."
The Report makes a number of suggestions for reorganisation within the Board of Trade and for the strengthening of its export side, and I shall be grateful to learn, either from the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, or from the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd—as, apparently, we cannot have the noble Lord, Lord Brown, to-day—what are the Government's views on those recommendations. I understand that the Board of Trade have been having a mini-Duncan of their own, under Sir Hector McNeil. Can the noble Lord tell us whether the recommendations of McNeil dovetail, for example, with those of Duncan?
Now for the suggestion. The Report pays a tribute to the work of the Export Credits Guarantee Department and I am glad to echo it. The E.C.G.D. does essential work. It does it well and its credit terms compare, I believe, well, or

939
at least equally, with those of our competitors. If I am critical of anything in our set-up here, it is of delay—the delay which can mean in certain instances the loss of a precious export order. If there is sometimes delay here—and there is—it is due primarily, I believe, to staff shortages. Those shortages, in their turn, may very well stem from the difficulty of a Civil Service Department which needs to recruit just the sort of man or woman as the City is on the look out for.
I should like to suggest that the time may well have come for us to have a new look at the staffing policy to be followed in the E.C.G.D. It is, I believe, virtually self-supporting financially, and there might be a lot to be said for allowing it a far greater autonomy in certain spheres, including staffing. In short, what I suggest is that, since the E.C.G.D. operates in the commercial sphere, it should be able to recruit its staff on commercial terms rather than on a Civil Service basis. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, will at least say that the Government are prepared to look at this possibility.
May I lean, in conclusion, on two points on which my noble friend Lord Selkirk and the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, have already touched? First, the British Council. I was delighted to see that the Council got such a good chit in this Report. I believe its work to be well conceived and well directed, and the £12 million or £l3 million a year which the nation spends here—which is quite a lot less than the Germans spend, and a great deal less than the French spend—is a sound national investment, although, like forestry, it is a long-term one. I believe, indeed, that there is a case for increasing our expenditure in this general area.
That said, I trust that the noble Lord when he replies will be able to resolve a dichotomy in the Duncan Report. We read, for example, in paragraph 26 on page 106:
"As Britain turns from politico-military relations towards other ways of making her presence known to other countries, especially outside Western Europe and the North Atlantic area, it will be necessary to develop more fully the other forms of contact with governments and peoples."
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The Report goes on to express the hope that
"… the British Council … will be in the forefront of this approach."
Personally, I share this view, and that being so it was rather surprising to me to read a few pages later, on page 114, the recommendation that
"There is now a strong case for shifting the balance of British Council activities towards Western Europe."
I personally dissent from that view, although I recognise that some exchanges With Western Europe—for example, youth exchanges and scientific exchanges—could well be stepped up. There seem to be two possible interpretations here of the Duncan Report. I should like to know which of the two interpretations the Government accept.
Then there is the question of estate management abroad, the property question which I am glad has already been more than touched on in this debate. I entirely agree that it is really nonsensical for us to pour some £6 million a year down the drain and across the exchanges by renting properties which we could very well buy. What has not been mentioned in the debate so far this afternoon is that the Plowden Report emphasised the nonsense of this continuing practice in 1964, the Estimates Committee drew attention to the very same thing three years later in their Report in 1967, and, apparently, here we are in 1969 no further down this road.
I do not think we can properly expect the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, to give us the Government's precise views on the precise mechanism which the Duncan Report has recommended. But can he at least tell us that the Government accept the main principles here—that purchase is the preferred course; that sensible incentives to buy and sell official property should be built into the system; and that all concerned should be encouraged to handle these transactions on a realistic commercial basis, so that we can take advantage of the opportunities which come up all the time for intelligent purchasing abroad?
I should like to conclude with a brief word about the Service to which I once belonged and for which I enjoyed working. I may have voiced some criticisms of this Report. If so, I should like to

941
make it plain that, theology apart, there is a vast amount in it with which I personally agree. And there is nothing with which I agree more than the considered tribute which the Report pays to the Diplomatic Service:
"We have been impressed by the quality of the Diplomatic Service and by its team spirit".
My Lords, it was that quality which impressed me when I saw much of the Service from within, and it is the quality of the Service, people and performance, which has impressed me since, when I have seen at least something of the Service from without. I personally believe that this country has a far better Diplomatic Service than it probably realises, possibly than it deserves. I am sure that it will be the aim of all of us—I know it was the aim of this Review Committee whose Report we are discussing this afternoon—to see that that quality is maintained.
4.2 p.m.
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (LORD SHACKLETON): My Lords, I think it was that controversial but very great diplomat the late Lord Vansittart, no doubt quoting Voltaire or somebody else, who used to say, "I have no time to be short". To-day, I shall try to find the time to be as short as possible; and I should like first to thank the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk. Both he and the noble Lord, Lord Plowden, have both been interested in mounting this debate, which I think is peculiarly suitable for your Lordships' House. I think it would be a mistake for me to attempt to answer the various points already made, partly because the object of the debate is to enable the Government to hear what your Lordships have to say; but also because I want to set out, so far as we have gone, what the attitude of the Government is on a number of the major issues raised in the Duncan Report.
In this debate we are fortunate in a number of respects. The noble Viscount, Lord Hood, is to make his maiden speech (it sounds rather unfamiliar to refer to him as "the noble Viscount, Lord Hood"; certainly the Foreign Office would find it strange), and I am sure we all very much want to hear what he has to say now that he has been given his freedom. I notice, too, that we have, as the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, said, a distinguished galaxy of mandarins (I
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think that is the right word) to advise us. Their knowledge, their experience, their involvement, their contribution, is enormous: but I hope they will not sound quite so heavyweight as the mandarins did in the debate on the Fulton Report. On that occasion, I remember, the cumulative effect of their authority was such as even to scare my own Treasury officials in the Box; and I remember the noble Lord, Lord Fulton, having to stand bravely up at the end. The fact remains that there is a certain similarity between Reports like the Duncan Report and the Fulton Report (and I shall point to certain analogies), and it is very easy, if I may say so, to pick on particular areas which the authors, perhaps with hindsight, might have written in a different way; and it is also sometimes easy to mistake the underlying meaning and purpose.
I should like to begin by setting this Report in the perspective of recent history. As the House knows, during the last few years, since the war, there has been a steady amalgamation of the instruments of government which Britain has evolved to meet her overseas requirements; and the same sort of progress has gone on with regard to the machinery of government at home. So far as overseas is concerned, these changes are directly related to the dramatic changes in the world at large and the increasing complexity of the management of our external relations. I need to mention only the extraordinary post-war revolution in communications—and I note what the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, had to say about stepping up the power of communications; part of the answer is probably satellites—the increasing interaction and interdependence of international economic and political affairs, the process of decolonisation, and so on. I need not go through the list because we all know it, but it led to the inevitable decision that it was anomalous to maintain separate overseas services and separate Departments of State dealing with Foreign, Commonwealth and Colonial affairs. My Lords, I fully accept that these changes were of a painful kind, although I think most of us would agree that they were right and inevitable.
The Plowden reforms led to the creation of the new, unified Diplomatic Service, and this was one of the most

943
important steps leading ultimately to the present position where we have one single Secretary of State responsible for our relations with all overseas territories. The Plowden reforms are, as noble Lords have indicated, a very important backcloth to this debate. They resulted in extremely important structural changes, and they have improved efficiency. Since 1965 the Diplomatic Service has been able to reduce its establishment by about 500, despite all sorts of increasing ranges of activity, including the reinforcement of our commercial staffs, the opening of new Missions in newly independent territories and new commitments such as immigration control. I believe the decision, following Plowden, to create the Diplomatic Service has fully justified itself, and the Duncan Committee once again have been able to confirm what I think those of us who are familiar with the Service would unquestionably accept: that the quality of the Service is very impressive. The Duncan Committee also found that it is well adapted to its present tasks and has the capacity to adapt to new roles.
But even as the new Service was being formed, Britain was undergoing a period of great economic stringency, and we all know the crucial importance of trade for Britain and her influence abroad. We are reminded now, as we have been so many times, that the economic, commercial and political motives in our overseas policies intertwine and interact.
The House will remember that it was the decisions taken by the Government on foreign and defence policy and announced in January, 1968, in conjunction with our balance of payments situation, which led the then Foreign Secretary to invite Sir Val Duncan, Sir Frank Roberts and Mr. Andrew Shonfield— "the troika" is perhaps the most convenient way to refer to them—to review urgently the functions and scale of our overseas representational effort. It would in any case have been worth while, notwithstanding the dangers of too many inquiries, to conduct an inquiry into the Diplomatic Service at this time as a practical testing of the efficacy of the Plowden reforms; but I think the Report shows that it was right to extend the inquiry to include the whole of our representational staff and the nature of their work overseas. In essence, the
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Committee were invited to report on the means of obtaining the best value for money from our official representation overseas in the light of the changing international role of the United Kingdom and the desirability of reducing costs and making economies where they could properly be made.
It is obviously right for me—and I am sure your Lordships would clearly agree with this—to express our gratitude to the troika for the very prompt and imaginative way in which they responded to the invitation. Not the least satisfactory part of it, if I may say so, in a Government Report—and there are other Government Reports which have been less bold—was their courage in setting out proposals, some of which were bold, some of which were controversial and some of which were clearly very open to misrepresentation. The misinterpretation, if I may say so, has not been predominantly the fault of the Duncan Committee. Certainly some of the Press comment—and this has not been echoed in this House, although I could have argued a little with the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, on certain points—lost sight of the context in Which the Committee carried out their survey.
There have been allegations that the Duncan Committee were obsessed with economies. It was said that their horizons were limited to making money and that they envisaged our opting out of our responsibilities in the world in favour of "European isolationism". I agree with the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, that Sir Val Duncan's letter to The Times gave a comprehensive answer to some of the unfairer criticisms. We found the same thing with the Fulton Report. People will pick on particular areas and will criticise passages out of context.
It is impossible to expect any Report ultimately to solve every problem or to produce an answer on everything. All that Fulton did was to indicate, not only in a broad way but also in a great deal of detail, the way in which we should go on, or at least we might go on. I am bound to say that I think that Duncan, like Fulton, will be very largely fulfilled; but, none the less, there are certain qualifications that it is right to make. We have to-day the opportunity to look beyond the phraseology of the Report. The main

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issue is whether or not the Duncan Committee's view of Britain's role in the world over the next five or ten years is acceptable as a broad basis for organisational planning.
There are three broad principles upon which the Duncan Report stands or falls and upon which its series of interlocking recommendations must depend. These are, first, the importance of recognising that Britain, while still a powerful and influential member of the international community, no longer has any claim to the role of super-Power on the United States or Soviet model—indeed, it is arguable that that kind of super-Power is in fact a new development in history; secondly, the urgency of getting and keeping Britain's balance of payments right; and, thirdly, the fact that with some countries we are more engaged and have more interests at stake than with others.
I should like to say firmly that the Government believe that these principles are sound. The lesson that we should draw from them is that our overseas representational effort should be judged by its relevance to British interests in their widest sense—I stress "in their widest sense"—and not in a narrow sense. This is certainly not to say that Britain is opting out of its international responsibilities—which I regard themselves as a British interest. The British Government have no intention of abandoning their interests and responsibilities in the Commonwealth and in the world beyond Europe and North America.
Many commentators have noted that the Report makes no mention of this country's position on the Security Council of the United Nations. I am glad of this opportunity to put on record and to reaffirm that our position on the Security Council and in the United Nations is one of the key elements in the overseas policy of this Government. For this and for other reasons there will be clear limits beyond which it would not be prudent to cut back our overseas representational effort.
There has never been any suggestion that Britain's voice should cease to be heard in the councils of the world; and the honest description of this country as a "major power of the second order" in no way implies acceptance of a tame
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role in the world or any diminution of our contribution to the maintenance of international stability, peace and cooperation. Indeed, the opposite is the case. We have advantages which still make it possible for us to play a greater role in international affairs than our numbers, or even our gross national product, would by themselves suggest.
May I here take the opportunity to explode one of the theories that I have heard propounded in recent years; namely, the theory that because of the relative decline in Britain's power in the world a good Diplomatic Service is no longer so necessary for us. I believe the opposite is the case; and I think this is the view of the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe. The fact that we are not so powerful in relation to our neiehbours makes it all the more necessary for us to use our brains (or wits, as the noble Earl said), skill and experience. In this context our brains are to a large extent those of our diplomats.
Another factor which has in my view increased the importance of having competent diplomats is the simple fact that every year the extent to which our interests become interlocked with those of other countries increases. This is most obvious in the ever-increasing proportion of our economy which depends on international trade. But it is equally true in the political, social, scientific and technological fields; and this is not a trend which is likely to be reversed.
Much interest has been generated by the emphasis which the Duncan Committee gave to the commercial role of the Diplomatic Service. It is worth while recalling that the Plowden Report said that commercial and economic work must be regarded as "a first charge on the resources of the overseas services" and that it should be recognised by members of the Diplomatic Service as an important although not exclusive specialisation. It has been said that we are more than a nation of shopkeepers and that there are other national objectives besides making money. The Government entirely agree with those who make such remarks. Your Lordships also will agree that our whole international standing, and thereby all the rest of our foreign and defence policies, is compromised unless our economic strength is restored and maintained.

947
Both the Plowden and Duncan Reports rightly argued that the problem of earning our living in the world was a major preoccupation influencing all our international actions and attitudes and that no matter how alert and efficient our Diplomatic Service and other services overseas are, they cannot operate effectively from a base of prolonged economic weakness. That was why the Plowden Committee made the statement to which I referred.
In this context, although it is not strictly speaking an aspect of the Duncan Report, I should like to mention what the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, called the "mini-Duncan" in the Board of Trade; that is, the plans which the Board of Trade have for strengthening their export promotion organisation following the Report which they commissioned from the Review Committee which I have always tended to call the Jacques Committee rather than the McNeil Committee. That is largely because I saw in it much of the managerial hand of my noble friend Lord Brown; and Elliot Jacques worked with him with great distinction at Glacier Metals before he went to Brunel University. The committee consisted of Sir Hector McNeil, Professor Jacques and a senior Board of Trade official —an anonymity which always seems to crop up in one's brief, although everyone knows that his name was Nichols.
In this context, the concentration of the Board of Trade, as a result of the recent machinery of Government changes, will, I think, be a further help. The Report of the Review Committee has been considered urgently by Board of Trade Ministers and is still under consideration by Ministers; and I understand that the President hopes to make an early announcement about a substantial strengthening of the staff at all levels, especially in the Regions, and a major reorganisation of the export side of the Department's work. The Duncan Report identified the need for "a meaningful dialogue" between Government and industry, and the new Board of Trade organisation will be designed to achieve this in the most speedy and effective way possible. So the essential prerequisite to the emphasis which the Duncan Report rightly places on commercial and economic work will, we hope, be firmly
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under way by the New Year; and it is very much a part of the general package of machinery of Government changes.
But, my Lords, this is not just a matter of commercial work in the narrow sense of export promotion. Important though this is—and here is the next general qualification; or, shall I say, correction in interpretation of Duncan that I should like to make—we do depend on sound assessments of commercial policy; and we need a thorough understanding of the economic interests of Governments; and, above all, we need from our Missions overseas the insight which they acquire into the political and economic circumstances generally in the world where they work. Clearly, political, commercial and economic work is indivisible or, at least, markedly inter-dependent.
I should like, therefore, to sum up my view, and the Government's view, of the Duncan Committee's main recommendations. These do not imply fundamental changes in the Government's objectives. Our overriding aim must be the preservation of peace and security, but, as I have said, our economic strength is a condition of this and consequently the Government accept the broad principles underlying the Duncan Report to which I have already referred.
My Lords, I should like to say something, as briefly as possible, about the manner in which we shall interpret the particular recommendations of the Report, and I start with the references to the Area of Concentration, and Outer Area in the Report. This is a rough rationalisation of a proposition which none of us would challenge; namely, that in some countries the range of British interests is wider than in others. But Her Majesty's Government believe that the division has been too sharply drawn. We do not underrate the political as well as the economic and commercial importance—and especially the potential growth importance—of very many countries outside the so-called Area of Concentration.
As I have already said, we propose to concentrate on the job to be done in pursuit of British interests, again in the widest sense, wherever it is to be done in any part of the world. It follows from this that some of our diplomatic Missions will have to be comprehensive in their activities. For others a more selective approach is appropriate. But here

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let me say that we intend to maintain and to do all that we can to consolidate the Commonwealth partnership, and there is no question of reducing our commitments towards the remaining dependent territories which are still part of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's responsibility.
Although the terms "comprehensive" and "selective" provide a useful broad guide for a description of the activities of our Missions overseas, a much more refined scale will be required in practice. Any such refinement must, of course, go hand in hand with a continuous review both of the nature of specific British interests and of the Missions which are concerned with protecting them. Planning studies, if they are to be pursued realistically, will also need detailed inspection on the ground. It is already normal practice for inspections to be made at regular intervals of our Missions overseas and the Duncan principles will be an essential background to all future inspections.
The Government have every expectation that the continuous task of re-shaping the instrument of our overseas representation will result in due course in certain useful savings, and I should like to stress here that I distinguish between re-shaping the instrument of our overseas representation and the particular institutions of the Diplomatic Service itself, where I think stability, about which I shall have a word to say in a moment, is important.
My Lords, economies are a major aim in themselves and it is our policy to achieve them, though we have to beware of short and irresponsible cuts. This is particularly relevant to the question of immediate increases in expenditure arising from some of the Duncan Committee's proposals. The Report points to some reduction in out overseas representation, and I shall have a word to say about the fields in which the Duncan Committee thinks that this might be achieved. But the Report also strongly recommends that there should be a marked improvement in the generosity of the compensation terms available to those whose careers are prematurely ended through no fault of their own, and that there should be satisfactory superannua-
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tion arrangements for all locally engaged staff in countries overseas.
Officials are at present urgently reviewing the problem of compensation for redundant civil servants within the general framework of the revision of the superannuation legislation, and while I entirely accept that there is a special problem relating to the Diplomatic Service we ought not to ignore the fact that the Fulton Report is working through in the home Civil Service, and that there has to be a certain parallelism. None the less, this is a matter of great urgency for the Foreign Office and for the Diplomatic Service, and I realise that until this matter is satisfactorily resolved there will continue to be some anxiety on the part of members of the Diplomatic Service whose work, and indeed prospects of continued employment, may be affected over the next few years because of the manner in which the Government may carry out the recommendations of the Duncan Report.
I hope that the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, will forgive me if I do not go deeply into the question of compensation rates. I know something about it; it is a matter of great concern to the Government. It is a matter on which there are apt to be different points of view and in which any comparisons with industry can at times be somewhat misleading. I would just mention, however, without specifically forming a judgment as to whether it is right or wrong, that the treatment given to the officers whose careers are being terminated is as follows: they will, of course, receive the superannuation benefits to which they are entitled under the Superannuation Act 1965. Great care was taken to give the officers concerned as much notice as possible so that they had some opportunity of re-ordering their lives. In addition to at least a year's notice and the immediate pensions to which they would be entitled, arrangements have been made, irrespective of whether some of them have passed the notional retirement age, for boarding school allowances for children to be continued for a short time in cases where there would be disruption of a child's academic career at a particularly critical stage in his or her development. All those who are being retired from posts overseas, again irrespective of whether

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they have passed their notional retirement point, will benefit from six months' resettlement leave on full pay. My Lords, I would not wish to underestimate the difficulties facing a senior civil servant whose career is unexpectedly cut short. I can only say that the Government will continue to look at this matter as one of great urgency and importance and we shall certainly take note of what has been said in the House.
The Duncan Report also recommends increased expenditure to provide, for example, for a larger manpower margin, for training for staff increases in certain areas and for an Overseas' Diplomatic Estate Board, as well as emphasising the question of our cultural representation overseas. All these suggestions for increased activity and increased expenditure form part of the same set of proposals and will have to be considered at the same time as the proposed savings. The Duncan Committee estimated that it should be possible to achieve savings of some 5 to 10 per cent. in expenditure over the whole range of our overseas representation. This was on the basis of rough estimates and also on the assumption that the Committee's recommendations would all be accepted. But we need to remember that the total sums are relatively small, compared with our commitments and expenditures on other Government activities both at home and abroad. They represent only about 1 per cent. of our total expenditure. I think that the noble Lord also quoted this figure. Although the foreign exchange element, at about £50 million, is about 10 per cent. of what the Government spend in foreign exchange, this is roughly balanced by the corresponding income from foreign and Commonwealth representation in Britain. I should say that these comparisons sometimes cause a certain amount of scepticism in my mind. I always feel there may be a snag in them somewhere. Nevertheless, I believe these figures to be broadly correct.
There are other important aspects of the Duncan Report with which I should have liked to deal. There are the questions of export promotion work, political reporting, the information services and consular activities. We share the Duncan Committee's view on the importance of export promotion. We envisage no major changes in our over
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seas representational service dealing with this aspect of the work. There may have to be some redeployment of staff, and we realise that there is a limit to what Government services can do in the export field. In the last resort, only British industry and its agents can actually sell British goods. Therefore, we support the Committee's view of the importance of developing a "meaningful dialogue" between industry and the Government services. The Duncan Report identifies the increasing volume of intergovernmental business which is dealt with in multilateral bodies. It is also true that there are certain countries with whom there is a spectrum of continuous interchange, in addition to the exchanges conducted by our resident Missions. These new dimensions of inter-governmental activity have been called the "new diplomacy". But the professional expertise found in the Diplomatic Service and the local knowledge that only resident diplomatic representation can provide remain an essential component both in the "new diplomacy" and in the conduct of our relations in the countries outside the so-called Area of Concentration.
The Duncan Committee has suggested that the amount of political reporting should be reduced. Those of us who have the pleasure of reading dispatches from Ambassadors—sometimes there are rather a lot and one wonders whether one ought to read them all—would agree with me, I am sure, in paying tribute to the excellent style, wit and scholarship which they display. They are a good indication of the quality and intellectual ability of those who do the reporting. It may be that some savings can be made in this field but whatever is done has to be of first-class order, and its importance will be no less than in the past. Our Missions overseas cannot be relieved of the task of acquiring expert and detailed political and economic information.
The Government will be considering what economies can be made in our overseas information services, but I am sure that there will continue to be a requirement for an official voice overseas to put the British point of view on matters of policy to local Press and broadcasting services. With regard to the B.B.C., I would not entirely agree with the Duncan Committee about certain aspects of their proposals for overseas broadcasting: for

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example, about the desirability or the feasibility either of trying to concentrate on an elite audience or of trying to improve broadcasts in English by cutting back those in vernacular languages. However, here again a review is being put in hand.
On the British Council, I should have liked to pay a much fuller tribute than I am able to do, had I the time. We are considering what steps should be taken to expand the Council's activities in Europe while not losing sight of the important role which the Council must continue to play in the rest of the world. I have not time to deal with the interesting problem of our consular work, except to point out that there is a vastly increasing number of British people travelling abroad and whatever we do, it is important that when services are supplied in a particular place, they should be adequate. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office are now reviewing the Duncan proposal in the consular field to determine the actual needs which must be met.
I should like to end on a personal note. There still seems to be too widespread a view that the job of a diplomat provides him with a rather cushy, idle life, with a surfeit of cocktail parties. It may be that there are too many cocktail parties, but I should not have thought that this was a particularly good incentive for joining the Foreign Service, from what I have heard about cocktail parties from members of the Service. Cushy or idle the life of our diplomats is not. Not only do they work, in many cases, exceptionally long office hours, as well as at weekends, but they are liable to be on duty practically all the time abroad. As a visiting fireman (so to speak) my own experience, as a Minister, of foreign posts is that in practically every case I received a quality of support and service of an ingenuity and personal involvement which is unsurpassed in the British public service, and that means to me unsurpassed anywhere in the world.
Nor are the lives of our diplomatic representatives abroad as comfortable in other respects as we sometimes imagine. I have had an opportunity of seeing some of the stresses and strains and actual dangers that confront members of the Diplomatic Service. I know no other body of men, other than the Armed
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Forces, who have had to carry a personal weapon for their own protection, as members of the Foreign Service had to do in Aden, where they maintained their high standards of responsibility in an atmosphere that reeked of impending disaster, where they were separated from their families, but where they were willing to accept the challenge—as the noble Lord, Lord Trevelyan, did, coming out of retirement to do so. The dangers are not always as great as in Aden but it is not nice either to be battered about by Red Guards or to have your Embassy burned down or to be expelled from a post at 24 hours' notice when diplomatic relations are broken. All this is slightly disturbing to family life!
There are, of course, great attractions and interests, and indeed rewards, in the life of a diplomat. But do not let anybody think that the rewards are more than adequate financially. It is no longer the position, as it was in my youth, that one had to have private means in order to go into the Foreign Service; and the life of a diplomat's family can be very difficult. It is often the wives who carry the brunt. They do not always have the interest and fascination of the work, but they do have the disruptions of family life and of children's education that are involved in pulling up roots and making new homes every three or four years. Although we are rather apt to pay many tributes in your Lordships' House, I cannot forbear to pay this tribute not only to our diplomats but also to their wives. I think we must face the fact that there are personal anxieties among many diplomats at the moment about their careers and their personal futures, and we do them and the Service no good by pretending that these do not exist. The various mergers and examinations that have taken place in the past five years or so have had a further disturbing effect, and I think it is important for the morale of the Service that it should be allowed to digest these changes with as few further upheavals as possible, and to preserve as much stability as possible. I hope, my Lords, that what I have been able to say about the attitude of the Government to the Duncan Report, though not answering many of the important points that have been made, will command the general acceptance of your Lordships' House.
EARL JELLICOE: Before the noble Lord finally resumes his seat, I should like to ask him whether he can say anything about the property point. I have less compunction than usual in pressing this because, not only has a troika of speakers alluded to it, Selkirk, Gladwyn and Jellicoe, but also a 'troika of reports, Plowden, Estimates Committee and Duncan.
LORD SHACKLETON: I said at the beginning that I would not try to answer all the points made so far by noble Lords in detail, but would give what information I could in the areas where the Government have taken decisions. My noble friend Lord Shepherd may be able to say something more. I would only say that this matter is under urgent consideration—this is not just a form of words that I am using—and I am not able to announce anything now.
4.41 p.m.
VISCOUNT HOOD: My Lords, I crave the indulgence which your Lordships traditionally afford to a speaker addressing the House for the first time. And I say this with deep feeling, because I have been a Member of this House without speaking for over one-third of a century, and this has only magnified the terror of breaking silence. It is a tradition, too, that a first speech should be uncontroversial. In this I am helped by the subject we are discussing, because it is clear already that there is no controversy about the need for having an efficient Diplomatic Service. Certainly this is not a matter of Party dispute. Of the two Reports on the Foreign Service which have been undertaken in this decade, the first was commissioned by a Conservative Government and the second by a Labour Government.
As a member of the Foreign Service at that time, I shared in the deep gratitude felt by all the members of the Service for the work and findings of the Plowden Committee, and I am glad to have the chance of paying my tribute publicly to the noble Lord, Lord Plowden, and the members of his Committee, several of whom sit in this House. The Duncan Committee did not have the advantage of having any noble Lord as a member. Despite that handicap, I believe that they have produced a most interesting and impressive Report, and I should only like to echo the tributes which have
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already been paid to the members of that Committee.
I want this afternoon to touch on only one or two points in their Report. First, by way of general comment, it did not seem to me that the Report gave sufficient prominence to what I believe to be a basic task of diplomacy; that is, the cultivation of friendly relations. That phrase, which I think comes from the Plowden Report, is quoted at one point in the Duncan Report, and is there defined as:
"partly an aspect of inter-governmental relations and partly an aspect of public relations work."
I believe that there is more to it than that. To my mind, it covers the whole range of human relations—the contacts and friendships which the diplomat builds up with the people of the country in which he has the honour to serve.
Many of these contacts certainly are in the official world; but there are even more outside—your neighbours in the city, the people you meet as you go around the country. It is those human relations which help to give the knowledge and the insight on which to base sound advice to the Government at home. And, of course, those friendly relations help enormously in the transaction of business and in the performance of one's daily task. The cultivation of friendly relations is a gradual but also a continuous process, and for that reason I believe that it can be more successfully done by someone living in the country rather than by a visitor. This fact needs to be weighed against the financial attractions, to which the Report draws attention, of relying more on visiting officials and less on residents.
Next, of what kind of officer should the Diplomatic Service consist? Here I find myself in full sympathy with the approach of the Duncan Report. I think he should be a professional generalist, but this should certainly be combined with judicious career planning, so that in the course of their career officers will come to be at least semi-specialists in a certain area or in a certain subject. If this approach is accepted, then I think there are other recommendations in the Report which should follow—for instance, the elimination of some of the civilian attachés.

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I should like to say a word about the recommendation for dividing the world into an Area of Concentration and an Outer Area, and dividing Missions into "comprehensive" and "selective"—what terms of art those words are becoming! This recommendation by its very clarity invites criticism in detail. I do not want to engage in that, and I would only say that I share the view expressed by previous speakers, that in practice there will have to be some blurring of the sharp dividing line suggested in the Report. The world cannot be divided into black and white; there are intermediate areas of varying degrees of grey.
But I hope that in determining the future organisation and deployment of the Diplomatic Service we shall hold fast to three propositions, which I think are well brought out in the Duncan Report. The first is that two central commitments of British foreign policy are the Atlantic Alliance and the development of an increasingly integrated Western Europe. Those two commitments will fall to be fulfilled increasingly through multilateral diplomacy. Secondly, the majority of our Missions round the world should not be reproductions in miniature of the Paris Embassy, let alone of our Embassy in Washington. Thirdly—and this point has been made by other speakers—if there are to be economies and streamlining, there must be the ability to reinforce readily; and that in effect means that the 10 per cent. manpower margin must become effective.
Finally, my Lords, I should like to say a word about accommodation. In the chapter on information work the Report speaks of the important role of the Foreign Office News Department, and suggests that it should be given extra facilities, including better accommodation. I yield to no one in my admiration of the Foreign Office News Department. I think they have done sterling work over the years under a succession of extremely able chiefs. If there is any way of enabling them to do even better in the future than they have done in the past, I am all in favour of it. But I would utter a word of warning about accommodation. I believe that one of the reasons for their success has been the central location of their rooms in the Office. They are close to the front door, so that they are readily
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accessible to their clients. They are at the foot of the main staircase, so that they themselves have easy and quick access to the seats of power. If, in order to get better accommodation, they have to leave their present premises, I believe that they will not be better off.
What goes for the Foreign Office News Department seems to me to be equally true of the Foreign Office itself. A new building would, I am sure, bring benefits and savings, but if it means moving it further away from No. 10 Downing Street I think the influence and effectiveness of the Foreign Office will suffer. This I think, is implicitly recognised in the Duncan Report, since their recommendation is that the Foreign Office should be reconstructed on its present site. But that is part of a wider problem, that of how to make the best use of this end of Whitehall and reconcile the conflicting claims of Government Departments, and even of Parliament. So I do not expect that Her Majesty's Government will be in a position to take a very quick decision on that particular recommendation.
But I would echo what has already been said, and say that I hope an early decision will be taken on the recommendations about accommodation overseas. I hope that the Government will take a hard look quickly at the proposals in the Report for remedying the present situation. If this should lead to the early establishment of an overseas diplomatic estate board, or something like that, I believe that it would be welcome in the Service, and very welcome to Sir Val Duncan and his colleagues as a sign that their Report is receiving the close attention which it deserves.
4.51 p.m.
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, I know you will wish to join with me in offering congratulations to the noble Viscount, Lord Hood, on his thoughtful and authoritative maiden speech. We have had, for obvious reasons, to wait a long time before we were able to listen to it. We can only hope that he will address us frequently in the future, and we know it will be with the same care and thought as he has spoken to-day. It was a welcome speech. I am happy for personal reasons that it falls to my lot to congratulate him. I wish particularly to invest in his good will, for he happens,

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by coincidence, to be my next-door neighbour. His flat is directly below mine in the block in which we live in North-West Pimlico, and if my bath overflows he gets it.
I am also grateful for the opportunity of following him because I wish to speak primarily about American affairs, and it was in America that the noble Viscount, Lord Hood, was last en poste. I should like to concentrate on the conclusions in the chapter on commercial work, and in particular on this passage:
"Subordinate posts have an important potential for promoting British exports, and they should be more actively used, especially in growth markets like the United States."
The noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, referred briefly to these consular and consular general posts and to trade posts. I should like to expand this theme. I do so from the background of a three-year stint (now coming to the end) as chairman of the American Committee of the British National Export Council. In the course of that duty, I have visited nearly all of our 20 posts in the United States—most of them more than once—including two visits to Honolulu. This involved no particular hardship, although on our way back we experienced what the pilot rather charmingly described over the intercom. as a "considerable amount of slight turbulence." I was also happy to find in Honolulu a rare animal, a commercial officer there who made a practice of reading the Board of Trade Journal every week from cover to cover. He must be quite unique.
I am an exporter, and your Lordships may therefore be surprised to hear that I join with the distinguished diplomats who have already spoken—and I suspect will speak—in expressing doubts about the over-emphasis that the Report places upon the commercial aspect. One might expect a diplomat to take that view, but take it also as a businessman. I agree with the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, and others who have spoken, that there is a risk that too much concentration on commercial activity, to the detriment of political influence, may in the long run actually do damage to our commercial interests.
On the face of it, the consuls general in San Francisco and Los Angeles—and I mention those two particularly because
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they are going to be involved in the big Californian trade drive which we are now initiating—are obviously more important than, say, our Embassy in Ruritania. As the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, pointed out, Ruritania may be behind the Iron Curtain, and intelligence brought back to us from that Embassy may be of great importance. There may also be economic interest suddenly developing to our advantage there; or they may be a sudden crisis. Consulates, moreover, do not talk as Government to Government; but Embassies do. Nevertheless, the consular posts in America are of great importance, both commercially and politically. It is the political side of consular work (and I believe this applies to other countries as well as to the United States) that the Duncan Report tends to underplay.
In America, business is politics—the two are the same. Therefore. a commercial officer in America must have a political nose, and he must have diplomatic experience. Think of the things with which he has to deal. Supposing he is consul general in Seattle or Atlanta, he must be constantly in touch with Boeing and Lockheed; and that it is a highly political job. Or he might be dealing with the safety regulations for motor-cars, or the fire regulations for ships. Those are political dynamite, and in them the whole problem of protectionism is wrapped up. Or he might be trying to sell the Chieftain tank, which is ten years in advance of its time but, for political reasons, will meet great difficulties in the market, particularly from Germany and America. All these of course require commercial acumen, but they call for a political nose as well.
May I now consider how the posts in America are doing? I say at once that they are doing a very good job—some of them an extremely good job indeed. With them politics is no longer a dirty word: they are very commercially minded, and becoming more so. They are also politically competent. This has not happened overnight. I should like to pay tribute to the work of Mr. Freeman, the present Ambassador; Sir Patrick Dean, his predecessor, and the many other predecessors whom I see sitting around me in the House this afternoon. This, as I say, has not happened overnight, and the Foreign

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Office and the Board of Trade are to be congratulated in having performed the difficult task of bringing these consular posts up to a high standard of commercial activity.
May I suggest one or two ways in which they could be enabled to do even better? First, there is a need for better communications; many businessmen simply do not know what the capabilities of consular posts are. The consul is not just there to retrieve your passport or your traveller's cheques if you have been stupid enough to lose them. Nor is he primarily there to get out of gaol a merchant seaman who might have misjudged the potential of some local striptease artist. This is how people usually think of a consul's work; but it is not so. In any case, much of this work can be more suitably clone by honorary consuls, and I am glad to see that the Duncan Report recommends this. Nor are the consuls and consuls-general merely providers of hospitality for visiting firemen—which is a tiresome chore. All the same, it is not a bad thing, solely from the point of view of manners, if you are at some far distant place to go and touch your hat to Her Majesty's representative and pay your respects.
Consuls should be commercially minded, of course, but they are not there to act as wet nurses for British exporters. They are not there to act as sale representatives for lazy businessmen who will not bother to visit the market themselves. In America you simply cannot carry out commercial negotiations at the end of the telephone, or by post. You must have what the Americans call an "interfacial involvement"—which is American for the meaningful dialogue to which Duncan refers. You have to go there yourself.
Nor is it any good sending the office boy: you should send the chairman. And if the chairman does not fancy himself as a salesman, then get a new chairman. Those are certainly not the functions of the consular posts. The functions of these posts are to be the door openers; to be the providers of information about potential growth markets; to provide, in case of trouble, an early warning system; and to tell commerce when opportunity may knock. This is the correct function. May I suggest one or two ways in which this function can be enhanced? I should
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like to see more home refresher courses: consular officers brought back more frequently; seconded to industry, to do tours of industry, and to find out what new thoughts and processes are about. And if they are to come back frequently, one way at least should be by sea.
I also think that in reverse more British businessmen should visit the consular posts. Frequently I have said to people with whom I have been in touch through B.N.E.C., "Are you going to call on the consul or the consul general?" They have replied, "No, of course not! I know my job." But I have said to them, "It is quite likely that he may have some piece of information about which you do not know which could be of use to you. It is equally possible that your presence there, up-to-date and authoritative, will help him to do his own job better. It will add to his authority if it is seen in the markets where he works that he is in constant touch with important British businessmen".
I should like also to see more cross-fertilisation between the consular posts, the Board of Trade, the Foreign Office and industry. I should like to see closer liaison with the overseas representatives of the British Broadcasting Corporation, British Travel Association, British Council, English Speaking Union, Central Office of Information—all these peripheral interests which could, working as a team with the consular post, make a more powerful contribution than they sometimes do. I cannot avoid the feeling that occasionally some little local jealousy occurs between them.
I am glad that several noble Lords—the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, in particular—have emphasised the personal difficulties, the personal worries, particularly about children's education and housing. I cordially endorse everything that has been said about housing. I would add the request that the Treasury, or whichever Government Department is responsible, should be more generous and more broadminded in the loan of pictures and furniture from national collections for the proper furnishing of diplomatic homes abroad.
Too frequent postings is a difficult matter. A man is sent to Ruritania; Ruritanian is a difficult language but

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as soon as he becomes proficient in Ruritanian he is posted to Seattle. On the other hand, if he is not posted he fears he will be stuck in Ruritania all his life merely because he has taken the trouble to learn Ruritanian. It is indeed a difficult problem.
I was glad to hear the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, pay a tribute to wives. It is difficult to speak about this subject without sounding pompous and patronising. One runs into the same trouble with the vetting of candidates' wives at political elections. But we must not forget that often the wife in a consular post, particularly if it is a long way from home, is an acting, unpaid and very efficient ambassadress herself. We get a great deal of work out of wives for nothing. I therefore hope that the Government, and we the taxpayers, will be as generous as possible in this respect. I would also have been a little more generous with this 10 per cent. float. I personally do not think it is enough. I think it should be nearer 15 per cent.
As I have said, much has already been done. Posts are becoming increasingly effective, and I believe, although I am speaking specifically of the American posts, that the same applies to consular posts elsewhere. I was interested to hear the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, refer to the possibility of chambers of commerce taking over some of the commercial work of some of the posts. I do not think the Government share that view because they are about to withdraw the subsidy paid to the four British American chambers of commerce in America. This will happen within three years, because the Government believe that the posts are able to do this commercial work themselves. I will not refer further to this matter because it is sub judice at the moment and I am personally involved, but this decision has caused, as the noble Lord knows, a great deal of unhappiness. There has also been reorganisation of some posts in America: the post of New Orleans, for instance, has been closed down. If possible, I should like the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, to tell us whether in the foreseeable future any other reorganisation, other than that which has already been announced, is contemplated.
The basic question we must ask on reading the Duncan Report is: Are we
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getting proper value for our money? It is not, as the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, said, the object of diplomacy merely to save money on diplomacy. If we are in any doubt whether we are getting good value for our money, we have only to ask the diplomats of other countries. I was in Tokyo a few weeks ago attending British Week. I had taken there several Americans from San Francisco to show them what a British Week looked like, so that they would be able to help us when the British Week comes to San Francisco in October, 1971. They were full of praise, and rightly so, for the efficiency with which the whole of our Embassy in Japan had joined with B.N.E.C. and thundered into action over this great project. And it was a tremendous success. Of course, everybody else worked hard, but the principal burden rested upon the British Ambassador and his staff; and I should like to pay them a tribute.
I think we have been a little harsh on Duncan. He has a large number of good recommendations, which I hope will be put into effect in the near future. We have all concentrated on the one or two questionable ones. The noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, said that we were more than just a nation of shopkeepers, and being a sort of tradesman myself I agree with him. Of course, commerce is of vital importance. Making ourselves financially viable is of paramount importance. But I hope I am not belabouring the point too much. The political side is equally important. Even so—and I say this, with respect, to all the distinguished ex-Ambassadors sitting round about me—I still think the best British Ambassador in the world is a punctual delivery date.
5.5 p.m.
LORD GORE-BOOTH: My Lords, I should like to associate myself very warmly with the noble Lord, Lord Man-croft, in congratulating the noble Viscount, Lord Hood, upon his breach of silence. I can hardly bid him welcome here, but at least I can say that and I can also say, having heard the noble Viscount give advice and speak in many capacities, that I know he will bring to our deliberations that great knowledge and calm wisdom which he has always displayed in advising Her Majesty's Governments.

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This is a special occasion for another reason which has not yet been mentioned. In the last few days, and particularly at this very moment, some very new "new diplomacy" is being exercised a quarter of a million miles from here. I think our hearts and minds will be a little with those special envoys at that distance who are now practising this new art. Thirdly, it is a special moment because one of my oratorical nightmares has always been that one day I should have to speak immediately after that brilliant orator the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, and your Lordships and I are now enduring that nightmare.
A great deal of what has to be said on this important subject has now been said, and my best contribution may be to supplement from personal experience certain of the points on which there is already very much in the way of consensus. Perhaps the best way of doing this is, with deference to the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, in what I might call a lightweight as opposed to a heavyweight manner.
In view of all the generous things that have been said, I do not need to go back to Chapter II, paragraph 5, the verdict on the Diplomatic Service. I would simply say that the Service must be particularly grateful for one word, "present". That paragraph says that the Service is "well adapted to its present tasks". Much of the misunderstanding about the Service has been derived from the rather lazy assumption that it was mainly suited to past tasks. We now know that that is not the case.
I should like to say a word first about the general problem which has already been much discussed—the question of comprehensive and others. Then I will go on very briefly to a few particular items in the chapters on "Administration" and the chapters on "Functions", by which I mean politics, commerce and information; and then perhaps suggest an idea of what this is all about, what we are really trying to do.
On the main subject of controversy, I would put in this word for the Duncan Committee. They produced a serious and very high quality Report in nine months, which then had to be published and to be commented on by a number of people in, at the most, nine hours.
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With great forethought they produced summaries to help these people; and of course when one produces summaries, as the noble Viscount, Lord Hood, said, one turns everything that is grey into black or white. This, unhappily, is what happened, and so many people who were generally favourably disposed to the Committee's doctrine in fact were much upset by the effects of the summarised accounts that were given. Now I think that everything is very much clearer.
But there was a mistake which added to the misfortune, and that was the use of the word "outer". Curiously, this does not seem to have happened in the first classic statement of the aims of the Committee; it crept in as a verbal convenience and a diplomatic disaster. Your Lordships will remember that when the European Free Trade Association, the EFTA, was created, the people writing about the EFTA would call the members the "Outer Seven". This had the awful consequence that the more success the EFTA gained, which it did, the more this had to be described as a disappointment because otherwise it was not consistent with "Outer". So may I, as a practical suggestion, suggest that Her Majesty's Government now bury the word "Outer" and simply do not use it at all in this context. This may be inconvenient, but I am sure it is diplomatically important that the word "Outer" should disappear.
May I now go on to the functions and speak for a moment about just one or two of the most important items, first in the chapter on "Administration" and then in the chapters on "Functions". Most of the administrative recommendations are clearly quite admirable and everything depends on their being implemented just as quickly as possible. The Committee criticise the Service for being over-administered, and I think that is right. The reason for it is that in rather less than seven years there have been two major investigations and three major mergers, and when you are implementing at that rate you do not have much time to inspect your own administration. I believe this inspection is now proceeding and I hope that in the process outside advice will be called in. It will not all prove applicable, but such calling in of outside advice as we were able to do during the last merger was both stimulating and extremely helpful.

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Everybody will endorse what the Committee say on training, even if it costs more money. As noble Lords have said, it will need a margin of 10 per cent. at least, but it is essential. If I may take one concrete instance, we were able, when I was in the Service, to achieve a rate of participation in the excellent Treasury administration course of nearly 50 per cent. of those going to do diplomatic jobs. My own view is that 100 per cent. of the members of the Diplomatic Service who are going to do diplomatic jobs ought to have a serious course in the economics and the economic machinery of this country, because if they do not understand it they cannot effectively help exports and the economic policy, whereas if they do, they can. It is unfortunate that there is a pause in this progress at the moment owing to the necessity arising out of the Fulton Report, but I hope that this will soon be changed.
I am truly delighted at the tributes which have been paid to wives by the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, and the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft. I should like to pursue the positive line on this. It is not only that wives have a difficult time in difficult posts but that it is very hard to measure the immense contribution that wives make, both as partners to members of the Service and in their contribution to the morale of individual posts and to the Service as a whole. I wish they could have had a little more equality of space in the Report, but this was perhaps not practicable.
In the matter of people, I then come to one question which has been considerably dealt with but which is of such importance that I feel I must refer to it again. It is the question of compensation and retirement. Perhaps I can add something a little new by insisting that this is a matter of principle. There are in fact two principles. The first is that the present system of retirement, while it is helpful, is in fact on a basis that is not wholly fair. That is because part of it depends on the 1949 Act, now collated into the 1965 Act, by which the choice of an official to retire depends to some extent on the posts which he has occupied. This is obviously not a fair basis for an instrument of management, though it has proved helpful. It has
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always had the feeling of unfairness. It is urgent that this should be rectified.
Then in the case of the 30 Ambassadors who have retired there is a very special point. The noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, made what has been done sound fairly good by adding a certain number of small things together, but there is a point of principle here. It is that the 30 people who have been made redundant this time, and others who may be made redundant in years to come, would not and could not have been retired under the existing legislation. They are something quite different, and anything which savours of giving them terms under the 1943 or 1949 Acts would be a failure to differentiate between cases. This would be extremely unfair. As noble Lords have said, the treatment of the people who will be so unfortunate as to have to retire at this time will affect beneficially or adversely those who remain.
May I now add a word of comment on what the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, has said? He advocated very strongly retirement at 65 for some members of the Service and early promotion for "flyers". It will be obvious that if you are going to do both you will have some difficult and complicated mathematics to do to see how you can keep some people on for longer than before and promote the younger ones more quickly. I am sure this matter will have to be studied, but it is not as easy as all that. Indeed, if I may say so, I think the noble Lord tended to over-simplify these personal questions. Personal questions are never simple; and if the noble Lord really thought it was simple to slash £5 million or £10 million out of the Budget and call it chicken-feed, I must suggest that there would be an awful lot of "dead" chickens coming home with nowhere to roost.
There are two things, as opposed to people, on which I might say a word. They have both been mentioned before and I need not spend time over them. The first is that I would join with the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, and other noble Lords in strongly advocating action of some kind to change the present system for handling our purchases and rents of properties overseas. Under the present system our purchases are based on two principles: one is the annual Budget,

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which is rigidly observed, and the other is that you cannot use local funds as it were inter-dependently. You sell something and, as the noble Lord has said, the money disappears, or you buy something and that is a single transaction. These two together are the perfect recipe for missing opportunities. Therefore I am sure it is urgently necessary to do something such as is suggested in the Report, such as setting up an Overseas Diplomatic Estates Board. The difficulties will speak for themselves and there will be vested official interests opposing this idea. But I hope that on this matter the Government will show courage and imagination.
There is an even more urgent case, which was referred to in, I thought, very conciliatory terms, as was no doubt appropriate to the occasion, by the noble Viscount, Lord Hood. I refer to the case of the Downing Street site. The Committee say there could "scarcely be a more compelling case" for re-developing that site. These are strong words, my Lords, but they are not nearly as strong as you will hear anywhere round that building any day. It will be argued that there are other things to do, there are competing priorities, and so on. But I must put it on record that next year this will have been a most urgent matter for a quarter of a century. It was known in 1945 that there would need to be a new office. There has been one proposal, which was, I think rightly, shot down with the utmost brilliance by the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft; and I believe that everybody has been so scared of the noble Lord ever since that no further scheme has been produced. Governments have announced repeatedly the right policy, but still nothing has happened, and the penalty for that is that the Diplomatic Service in London work in 17 different obsolete or obsolescent buildings, and those buildings are, if I may say so, a monument to parsimony and procrastination. The Service is constantly urged to think modern, be modern and act modern, and it goes round and round the Monte Carlo Rally course in Lord Palmerston's slightly improved and very dignified horse and buggy. I hope soon the Government will be able to state not only a policy but also a date for doing something about this very urgent matter.
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Perhaps I may now go briefly into functions. On the political work the noble Viscount, Lord Hood, has said already what needed to be said, namely, that a great part of the political work is the question of cultivating personal relationships. Indeed, it is the matter of "representing", which is what the Report is all about. I think that if the Committee had put that category into its list in Chapter I, it would not have allowed itself to get quite so obsessed with this self-generating obsession about political reporting. Political reporting for its own sake stopped in 1939 and has never been resumed. Longwinded-ness will probably continue for ever, but it can be controlled and is controlled as far as possible.
But one thing of which I am quite sure is that political information does not come in carefully ordered, tidy categories at carefully designed periods which can be classified. It comes by good work, by seizing opportunities, by an accidental remark. It comes in all sorts of ways, and no two heads of post treat it the same, though in the end they will convey it to where it should go. So while I am sure that we need to take very seriously the rationing of information coming to London and also the priorities which different countries and regions have to this country, we should not seek to tidy the whole thing up into too exact classifications or we shall lose the personal richness and thoughtfulness which comes from individual diplomatic representatives. It is possible that this would have been better understood if the Committee had had opportunities to inspect the Foreign and Commonwealth Office as well as the overseas posts, because I think there they would have been able to see that the planning section of the Office keeps a very careful eye on the proportions of policy in different directions. But I think the Committee's idea of a policy inspector who would have the continuous job of relating postings to policy is an interesting and good one which could well be followed up.
I come to information. There are some good suggestions here, too, particularly audibility for the B.B.C., which I regard as the culmination of a thirty-year crusade. There is also the very good suggestion of expanding the new department

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of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and also of course the commendation of the work of the British Council. But I have a feeling that in one way the Committee did not really understand about public relations, and I speak here not as a dignified official but as an ex-public relations officer. I would make the same point as made by the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton. It is possible that the B.B.C. and the serious newspapers may be more, as the Committee says, credible, but what any mission, even a secondary mission, needs is not what Her Majesty's Government are said to have said and are said to mean; what they want is what Her Majesty's Government did say and what they do mean; and you can only do this through an official channel. It means that at the other end you must have the human resources and machinery available to pass that information on, because there are still plenty of people who are interested in it. I think that this outlook perhaps unbalanced the recommendation on information. There is room for some economies, but the philosophy must be right first, which is that the evaluation and dissemination of information is in some degree a professional job, even if you acquire it on the job.
On commercial matters, there is no dispute about the great importance of this activity. I wish that the long and informative chapter on this subject had made it clear that this is not something which has been discovered overnight. There has been a conscious effort over a dozen or fifteen years inside the Overseas Services to turn the attention of the members more towards the importance of this sort of work and to the degree of interest which must be taken in at all levels. This was much encouraged by the report of the noble Lord, Lord Plowden; and this process has been going on, so that now we have a fair degree of skill in this matter throughout the Service. Of course, it can be increased even further and no doubt will be.
I also think that there was one ingredient lacking—and it is one which has been supplied in the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft—and that is that we are, as a country, very greatly indebted to the work of many people from business who have sacrificed time from their duties to their companies to take
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part in leading our export drive. Several Members of your Lordships' House have taken part in this, including the noble Viscount, Lord Watkinson, and the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft. What they have done is not only to teach the Service what it can do for industry, but, exactly as the noble Lord said, to teach industry that the Service can help it and how the Service can help it; and that is a very beneficial mutual activity.
I need not labour the point which many noble Lords have made about the nature of ambassadors. There is a passage in the Report about trade ambassadors. Anyone who has been a head of post knows that when the chairman of a company or the chairman of one of the great industrial or commercial organisations visits you at the post, he does not ask you how to sell an automobile or sanitary ware. He says, "Is this country stable? And is Doctor X, the Minister of Trade whom I am seeing tomorrow, on the way up or on the way out?". If you are a trade ambassador and not a political ambassador in some degree as well, you are precious little use to British trade.
So we have a Report which has great force on the administrative side, has a little unbalance on the political side, but none the less contains the elements of the way in which our diplomatic affairs and organisation are moving, and it contains the material for a degree of economy. The terms of reference say, inconsequentially, that we must get the best value for British representation overseas and there is a "consequent" desirability for less expenditure on British representation abroad. The word "consequent", of course, means nothing. None the less, I think we can get as good value for somewhat less in the way of expenditure on things, and by cutting down somewhat, but not too desperately, on people, always remembering that some of the good things suggested in the Report are going to cost more and not less, and they should, because they will give value.
So, finally, as one must, one stands back and says, "What is this all for?". The noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, said that we still have certain advantages in the world which we should use this diplomatic machine to maintain and promote. We take the Committee's slogan,

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if I may call it that, which they have recommended on information: We are a trading partner. Yes, certainly, we shall still remain that. Perhaps the balance of payments will not tower over us for ever in the way it does now; but it will always be there, and we shall always have to work to beat it. We have a great culture, said the Committee. Yes indeed, and we must meet the demand for it as best we can. The Committee say that we have a democratic tradition. My Lords, I suppose we here are a tradition, but we are also very much alive. I think the thing that is missing in our objective as set out in the Report is that we must in some way, if only modestly, satisfy the interest all round the world in the ability of this country, which I hope will continue for ever, to run itself with government by consent, with an honest Administration and an independent judiciary. That still remains a fundamental British contribution to the world, and in a world where these basic things are having a difficult time. I am sure that if we can go on exemplifying that, the Diplomatic Service, which will be at your service, will not fail in any new tasks the country may ask it to do.
5.30 p.m.
LORD WALSTON: My Lords, it is a great pleasure for me to be the first from these Benches to congratulate the noble Viscount, Lord Hood, on his maiden speech. I first met the noble Viscount some 50 years ago, when I remember going to a tea party at his house and among the entertainments provided were certain sports, including a race. The noble Viscount won the race, but such was his politeness that he gave up the prize to the runner-up—myself. It was a fine penknife, with corkscrews and all sorts of exciting things. I think that episode shows that, even at that early age, the noble Viscount was already imbued both with skill and with success. In the intervening years he has given ample proof of both those two qualities. Two other qualities also, he showed on that occasion, those of modesty and of generosity, and his speech to-day has once more shown exactly those same qualities. We have had to wait a long time for his speech, but it was worth waiting for.
I hesitated for a long time before deciding to take part in this debate, be
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cause I knew that there would be a large number of highly qualified people who would be able to contribute far more than I could possibly hope to contribute. But I finally decided to take part because during the fairly recent past I have been a Minister, at the Foreign Office and at the Board of Trade, and therefore concerned both with what is called normal diplomacy and with exports. Moreover, I have since the war visited partly in a private capacity and partly officially, something like a hundred different countries, having the opportunity in the great majority of them of visiting our Missions and of talking not only with the heads of Missions but with junior people there, too.
I studied the Duncan Report with a great deal of care and interest and, in common with other noble Lords who have spoken, I was enormously impressed with the amount of information which has been acquired by the three gentlemen concerned in such a short space of time; by the clarity with which they have expressed it and, in many cases, with the extremely reasonable and sensible views and recommendations that they put forward. So when I come now to points on which I disagree with the Committee's recommendation I hope that it will not be taken as meaning that I disregard the whole Report. I believe that the majority of it is of enormous value, and I hope that its recommendations will be speedily followed.
I disagree principally on two important points. The first is what has been called in the Report itself, and also in this debate, the division of the world into Areas of Concentration and Outer Areas. It is not with the fact of the division of the world into two areas that I disagree. One can divide the world into any number of areas, and I think it is quite useful for the purposes of this Report so to divide it into these two areas. I disagree, as does the noble Lord, Lord Gore-Booth, with the actual naming of the Outer Areas—but that, although important, is perhaps a detail. But the two reasons why I disagree with the thesis which stems from this division is. first of all, that it tends to stratify the division of the world into these two areas, whereas in fact the division is bound to be extremely fluid, changing from year to year, from decade to decade. If we think

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too much in terms of the two areas (which for the sake of convenience I will continue to call "Areas of Concentration" and "Outer Areas") it will be much harder for us to recognise the changes which take place. That is one reason why I disagree with the Report as it now stands. The second reason is in regard to the different methods of treatment of these two areas defined as they are at present. In that connection, there is between the authors of the Report and myself a fundamental disagreement.
Then, again in common with other noble Lords who have spoken, I disagree with the emphasis which is placed in the Report on the commercial as opposed to the political activities of our Missions overseas, and the implication that these two activities can he conveniently divided and kept, if not in watertight compartments, at least to a large extent separate from each other. To take this latter point first, none of us would deny that trade is of paramount importance; and to-day it is of far more importance than such matters as military treaties or defence bases—the sort of things with which often in the past our overseas Missions had to concern themselves. I was glad to hear the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, say so forcefully that trade must be primarily the responsibility of the traders themselves. Diplomats, whether they come from the Board of Trade or from the Foreign Office, whether they have had refresher courses at home, whether they have been seconded to businesses or to banks, can never do the job of the trader for the trader. But they can, and do, do a most important job.
The type of help which they can give, and are giving, is, in the first place, to have such contacts with Governments (and by "Governments" I mean not only central Governments but also governments at local and at municipal level) so as to know when big contracts are coming up, what municipality wants a new fleet of buses, when a new dam is to be built in a certain area, and matters of that sort, so that they can give advance warning to our potential exporters of what is afoot. Secondly, they must be able to advise the businessmen who come to their "country" as to the likely legislation concerning foreign investments, the treatment of foreigners, tariffs and so on; who are the influential people at the
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present time, and who they are likely to be in the next ten years; whom the businessmen should approach, and in what manner they should be approached; and, in many countries, what are the prospects of Government stability: whether the particular Government will remain or is likely to be replaced by another Government of a slightly different complexion, or of a fundamentally different complexion, and having an entirely different attitude towards foreign countries and foreign traders.
Thirdly—and this is one of the important points which the noble Viscount made—the diplomats themselves must be on sufficiently friendly terms with the key people in their district, so as to predispose those people in favour of British businessmen; so as to give a general impression of this country that is favourable and fertilises the ground for business contacts. This is something which our Embassies in the past have done most effectively.
I would refer your Lordships to a letter in the Business Section of The Times to-day from Mr. Bond-Williams, President of the Birmingham Chamber of Commerce and Industry. There he writes:
"No one in industry would quarrel with the Report's overall view that our diplomats overseas should give increased assistance to exporters in the future, but it is difficult to see how this aim can be reconciled with the Report's recommendation that the information work of our Embassies and High Commissions should be cut by 50 per cent. This Chamber has benefited greatly from this public relations service overseas, both from the publicity obtained for our outwards missions and from publicity for our member firms' products. We have ample evidence of the effectiveness of this service. …"
He goes on:
"Nor should sight be lost of the need for a continuous effort to get across an overall picture of Britain as a successful industrial nation. This is an essential background to the selling efforts of individual firms."
I think these are very important words, and those activities are something which can best be done by the general service officer, by the general service diplomat, particularly with some experience of public relations in its widest sense.
Fourthly, and the fourth job. to my mind, of the diplomat in the business sphere, is to decide when the services of some Government expert or specialist would be useful, so that then—and here I think the Duncan Report makes a very

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sound and useful suggestion—the specialist based in the United Kingdom can fly out and deal with that particular matter, rather than to have a large number of such specialists permanently in the country itself. All these things can best be done by the general service officers. The specialist should be home-based, and I believe that there there could be a considerable saving in cost.
In smaller countries, and in countries which are highly centralised, this work can be done mainly in the capital city, but in larger countries, such as the United States, as the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, pointed out, our consuls and our consuls-general play a vital role. The personal contact of the consul with local officials, with local politicians and businessmen, is of paramount importance, not only for gaining the big contracts, not only for selling the large quantities of capital goods, but also for the promotion of retail trade and the British Weeks which, in so many provincial centres, do so very much to help our general export effort.
On top of that, the consul in many countries can play a vital role in political reporting. We know only too well that there are some countries where Governments can be overthrown by movements which have started in distant provinces. To have political reporting from our consulates in those provincial areas is of very great political help, quite apart from the commercial help.
These are jobs which have to be done throughout the whole world, whether in the Areas of Concentration or in the Outer Areas. But in the Areas of Concentration, as defined by Duncan, it is often easier to get the information that is needed without any missions at all, and it is often less important to get it. After all, businessmen already visit the United States and France; they have their contacts there and their Government policy changes slowly. Our newspapers are full of what goes on there, and our broadcasts tell us the latest news from those countries. We, as ordinary citizens or as businessmen interested in those areas, do not need diplomats to tell us what is happening and what is likely to happen.
However, there are few business visitors to—shall we say?—Indonesia or to
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Bolivia, and there are few newspaper reporters. Little space is given in our newspapers to what is going on in those countries. But those are the countries where Governments and their policies may change very rapidly, and we shall know nothing about them at all because they are of no interest to the general readers of the newspapers. It is only from our diplomats that the Government here, and the businessmen, can possibly know what is going on in such countries. It is in those areas, too, that personal contact with the head of State, or with individual leaders of Government, counts for so much more than it does in the larger countries.
We could, if we are honest, send a monkey to Moscow or Washington; we could send a chimpanzee to Copenhagen or to the Hague; we could send a baboon to Bonn or to Paris, and it would not make the slightest difference to our relations with those countries. We shall continue to be friendly with them if they wish to be friendly with us and if our interests bring us that way, and we shall continue to know what is going on there through the Reuters correspondents, The Times correspondents, the Daily Telegraph and the Guardian correspondents, and so on. But the quality of our ambassador in Cambodia, in Cuba or in Iran makes all the difference in the world, not only to our trade and our relations with that country in general but to their political attitude and outlook and actions towards us, and to the actions and attitudes that they may take in the United Nations and in matters of world importance.
Let me give an example from a specific country—not from Barataria or from Ruritania, but from Ethiopia. Great change has taken place in that country in the last two decades, and still greater change will undoubtedly occur when the Emperor, Haile Selassie, dies—which I hope will not be for many years. He is a very great man and a very great friend of this country, but there is no blinking the fact that those changes will take place within the foreseeable future. There is great scope in Ethiopia for business. Already some progressive firms have started there. It has a large and growing population and a growing standard of living. Politically it is one of the most important countries in Africa.

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But it is essential for a new businessman who is thinking of going out to Ethiopia to know what is likely to happen not only next year but in the next five or ten years. After all, businessmen are being asked to make a considerable effort, a considerable investment, in that country, so they must be informed about the prospects there. We, as a Government, must be informed about the prospects there, and we must be informed not only about the thinking in the highest ranks of to-day's Government but also about the thinking and the activities among the students and intellectuals, among the middle ranks of the Army, among the hereditary leaders, among the provincial governors. This can be done only with a fully staffed Embassy and with several consulates throughout the country, and it can be done only if the men at all levels there are of the highest calibre.
Contrast this with the position in the United States. I think it is safe to say that whoever is the next President of the United States makes little difference to our trade. In any case, the newspapers will give us plenty of warning and information and forecasts as to who he will be, and, with no disrespect to our mission in the United States, I do not believe that those forecasts will be any less accurate. That does not in any way mean that I disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, about the political importance of what is going on in the United States when it comes to business contracts, but this information can be given primarily by the political officers in the Embassy and by our consulates in different cities.
To sum up, I believe that we could well reduce some of our numbers in the Areas of Concentration and rely to an increasing extent on home-based experts visiting those countries as required. We should increase the numbers and the quality in the Outer Areas. Above all, we should ensure that the people who go out to these rather more remote countries, which in terms of population, though not of area, are often relatively small countries, should be of the highest calibre and the best men in the Service for that job. Those are the ones who should be sent there, rather than sent to what at the present time they and others
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may think they deserve—the more prestigious posts.
We must not use such countries, as is sometimes done at the present time—and I say this with thought, for I believe it to be true—as the dumping grounds for decent chaps who have got towards the end of their career, who are not quite up to the higher grade posts but are not down enough to be made of no more use. Those are not the people we need in those vital countries in the Outer Areas. We need the best the Service can provide, which does not by any means, automatically mean the oldest—
LORD GORE-BOOTH: My Lords, while I have much sympathy with what the noble Lord has said about the posts around the world, especially the smaller posts, does he really feel that selection for a big post need not depend on the quality of our Ambassador? Even if the noble Lord feels that a good Ambassador cannot advance matters very much, would he not agree that a bad Ambassador could make them very much worse?
LORD WALSTON: No, my Lords; I do not think I would. Thinking back, I find it very hard to recall any of these main countries where there has been a bad Ambassador. It is therefore hard to give a completely clear-cut answer. But had it been the case that in the last twenty years there had been a bad Ambassador in Bonn, in Paris or in Washington, I do not believe our relations with those countries to-day would have been any worse than they are at the present time. I would make a plea, coupled with the second point in my summing-up, that we should consider increasing the trend, as I am happy is now being done, of sending to the more remote countries relatively young men who are not normally considered to be at this stage of ambassadorial status, and who may well come back to a more junior post later. So long as they are good they do not have to be senior in the hierarchy, but they must have the quality which is needed for these posts.
The third point in my summing-up is that we should increase our consular representation, both in the Areas of Concentration and in the Outer Areas. Fourthly, and only in certain areas, we

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should consider the desirability of increasing specialist resident attachés. I have in mind here some of the Central American countries, and the countries of Latin America in general, where the army is a very important factor in governing the country. What we want to know is not who is governing the country to-day, but who is going to govern it in five or ten years' time.
If we can make good contacts with such people, we shall be doing our own country a very great service, politically, economically and in terms of trade. To have the right type of military attaché with membership of the officers' clubs, mixing in friendship among the people, can pay very great dividends. Similarly, we want to have one or two general service officers who are specially interested in, or have even received special training in, the educational aspects of the countries to which they are attached, so that they can mix with the student body and the young intellectuals who, in many countries, are also vital for future political development.
Finally, in spite of the difficulties to which other noble Lords have referred, I believe that we should be far more prepared to leave people longer in posts where they are being successful, where they have gained personal contacts, where they have gained a knowledge not only of the language but also of the way of thinking and of the political setup of the country. We should have no hesitation at all, as the Report so rightly suggests, in giving promotion in the post itself, rather than making people wait for transfer to another post before promotion can be achieved. I believe that in this way our Diplomatic Service will be able to continue to serve the needs of the country; that at the same time, as it has always done in the past, it will attract the most suitable people for this job; and—what it is not always doing at the present time—retain them for the full length of their service. We shall therefore avoid the somewhat disturbing disappearance from the Service of the 35-year-olds and 40-year-olds who show so much promise, because they feel that their prospects are better elsewhere.
5.56 p.m.
LORD GARNER: My Lords, I am sure that many of your Lordships will be most grateful to the noble Earl, Lord
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Selkirk, for introducing this discussion, which has been a very far-ranging one and, still more important, if I judge it aright, has led to a pretty broad consensus of opinion in all parts of the House. Some trepidation was expressed earlier at the sheer numbers of the alleged galaxy of talent that was to address this House. I cannot believe that any words of mine are likely to alarm the noble Lord, Lord Shack leton, and his advisers, and I should be sorry to think that they would do so. But I assure your Lordships that I intend to be brief because, making a mathematical calculation, I saw that at least eight former members of the Diplomatic Service will be addressing your Lordships. As one of them—the only one, incidentally, who spent most of his life in the Commonwealth Service—I propose to confine my remarks to one topic; namely, the third word in that rather cumbersome title "Foreign and Commonwealth Office".
Before I do so, may I say a word about the Report itself, although I think that I am merely echoing what has already been said by many speakers. I should like to pay my tribute to the troika, as they have been described. They carried out an extremely thorough investigation; they brought a very fresh mind to bear on the problems, and their Report will, I believe, prove to be a great stimulus to the Diplomatic Service as a whole. Certainly in all their comments on management, on conditions of service and on staffing they showed an extremely sure touch; and I thought, from a good deal of experience of these problems in the past, that their recommendations were extremely valuable.
More broadly, many of your Lordships have cast doubt on the wider policy implications of some of the comments in the Report; notably the by now, no doubt, notorious areas and what has been talked of as the undue concentration on Britain's role as a shopkeeper. I share some of these reservations, and take the view that they apply with special force to our handling of Commonwealth relations. Of course the concept of the Commonwealth has changed a good deal in recent years, and it will no doubt continue to change. The creation of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is itself a manifestation of that change, and

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it poses the question of what Britain's future posture should be in the handling of Commonwealth relations.
Of course the Commonwealth will not stay put. We all know that many regard its future with a good deal of disillusionment. I suppose, if one is frank, that there are two broad alternative courses lying ahead. There are, on the one hand, the pessimists who would argue that we should not strive officially to keep alive something that is a heritage of the past, and that we should concentrate on our other objectives. On the other hand, the more optimistic and, as I would think, more positive and constructive view is that we should build on the very remarkable achievement of international co-operation which has developed over the years, believing that the association can be of value to us all and, above all, can sustain, and need in fact in no way impede, the achievement of Britain's interests, whether in Europe or elsewhere.
But, precisely dealing with the Commonwealth, the Duncan Report seems to speak with more than one voice. In the opening chapter it says quite firmly:
"We shall continue to be concerned in the welfare of the Commonwealth….
Later on, it includes, within "broad aims",
"… the sustaining of Commonwealth links in a form appropriate to contemporary requirements …".
But there is little elaboration of this in the rest of the Report, and virtually no guidance on how the newly-merged Department, which was in fact in the course of being set up while the mission was in progress, should handle the specific problem. Indeed, some comments imply that the Committee would perhaps not be unduly distressed if the more pessimistic view which I mentioned earlier were to be followed. For example, although this is a quotation that may perhaps unfairly be taken a little out of context, they express the view:
"… outside the Area of Concentration and Eastern Europe … the long-term prospects for exercising political influence … by this means"—
namely, political propaganda—
"are poor and the need is slight".
I think it would be very difficult to sustain a case that in most Commonwealth countries, at least, the chances of exercis-
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ing influence were poor and, still more, that the need was slight.
Later on, they assume that the size of British Missions in Commonwealth countries should be equated to the size of those in foreign countries. No one is opposed to reductions where this is reasonable and advisable, and it may very well be that some Commonwealth Missions can be reduced. But why should Britain's relations with a country with whom she has had perhaps the closest connections for two centuries, with a country with whom to-day she is associated in the Commonwealth, with all the myriad links that that implies, be equated with her relations with any other country, however friendly, to whom none of that applies? Because the truth is that for a host of reasons—history, language, personal contacts, professional links—our relations (and not only at Government level; it runs right through) with people in Commonwealth countries are different in kind and greater in depth than those with almost any other country in the world excepting, of course, the United States, where the dimension is totally different.
In discussing political work the Committee, when talking of selective posts—and, by definition, posts in most Commonwealth countries would undoubtedly be selective—say:
"Selective Posts, … should not normally have much if any intergovernmental work outside their specialised fields …"
It is significant, perhaps, that in the Report there is very little reference to the massive apparatus of Commonwealth machinery that exists. The Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meetings, for example; the regular meetings of the Commonwealth Finance Ministers, Education Ministers and so on; the whole range of other committees and bodies; and, of course, the Commonwealth Secretariat, which was recently established in London. All these involve Her Majesty's Government in considerable diplomatic activity, and call for constant consultation between Governments at a high level. If I may quote outside the Government sphere—and I mention this example only because I am familiar with it—the Commonwealth Scholarship Plan provides for over 1,000 scholars, scattered throughout all the Commonwealth

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countries, to be receiving further education, of whom we have well over 600 in this country alone.
Now it seems to be, broadly, that the Committee were so tied down by their terms of reference (and I personally would very readily recognise the limiting nature of those terms) that they do not seem to have explored the intangible, for by nature intangible things cannot be quantified—and, of course, this covers a good many of the best and most valuable things in life. For example, my Lords, I suppose that if someone were to carry out an analysis of the cost-effectiveness of marriage it could produce some very misleading results, and probably none of us would embark upon so highly expensive a venture on the basis of such an analysis. Similar considerations are true of education, the arts and, of course, diplomacy.
I was very much impressed by what the noble Viscount, Lord Hood, had to say in his remarks about the importance of human relations in diplomacy, and I should like to take this opportunity to pay my tribute to what I think all your Lordships will agree was a most thoughtful contribution in his maiden speech. But the Commonwealth experience certainly is very widely made up of intangibles. I think the Commonwealth can continue to play a healing role in the world; not in any sentimental hankering after a past that has gone, but in practical application to contemporary problems by men of good will, able and ready to work together in partnership and not in strife. But this will continue to call both for a distinctive political basis and for leadership from Britain—and I was delighted to hear from Lord Shackleton's remarks earlier in the debate that, in acting on the Duncan Report, it is indeed Her Majesty's Government's intention to act on this basis.
My Lords, before I sit down, may I add two further things? We have heard a good deal of misunderstanding about the implications of sotne of the remarks in the Report by the Duncan Committee. May I make two personal statements, lest there be any misunderstanding about my personal attitude on all this? In the first place, nothing that I have said or feel is in any way opposed to the merger which has taken place of the Common
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wealth and Foreign Office, or indicates any regret at the disappearance of the Commonwealth Office, over which I presided for so long, as having a separate existence. I suppose I can claim that I worked as hard as anybody for the success of the Diplomatic Service in the early days, and in preparing for the eventual merger of the two Departments; and my conscience and my record on this point are quite clear. Before I retired I advised Ministers, and I told the Commonwealth Office staff, that it was my firm view that merger should take place and that it would be right that it should do so. Of course, I did not know at that time that it was going to take place, owing to the political decision, in a matter of weeks, in fact, after I left. So far from criticising, I am supporting the merged Department. All I am asking is that the identity of the Commonwealth is not lost sight of, and that the merged Department, as I am sure they will, should continue to draw on the fund of good will and experience that permeates the Commonwealth relationship.
My second point is that I should like to make it clear that, in urging a place for consideration of the Commonwealth, I am not in any way starry-eyed or ignorant of many of the Commonwealth problems. Indeed, when I sat at my desk in Whitehall for some six years I suppose I was as aware as anyone else of the strains and frustrations in that very difficult period; but I hope that some of these agonies are beginning to pass already and may prove to be no more than temporary. Certainly the more tolerant and more constructive meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers held earlier this year seems to point in this direction. But in any case the Commonwealth rests on far firmer foundations than can be upset by temporary quarrels. I suppose that, above all, it rests on the fundamental fact that the old Commonwealth is composed largely of our own people and that in the new Commonwealth we have left an imprint of British influence as surely as Rome has left its mark on our civilisation. The Commonwealth association is respected and supported by the United States; one can only guess that it is the envy of the Communists who might well give their eye teeth to have, ready made, such built-in advantages as we enjoy in so many

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countries round the world. My sole point is that we simply cannot afford to neglect this very valuable asset.
6.12 p.m.
LORD TREVELYAN: My Lords, I apologise if I am unable to stay to the end of this debate on my old Service, since I and a number of other noble Lords will be participating in an official engagement to-night solely by virtue of the dates of our retirement from the Diplomatic Service. I should like to add my congratulations to the noble Viscount, Lord Hood, on his impressive and civilised first contribution to our debates. I feel that we should pay our respects to the hereditary principle for having provided so able a reinforcement to your Lordships' House. I would also take the opportunity now to thank the noble Lord the Leader of the House for what he said during his speech about my staff in Aden. I should like particularly to commend those members of the staff, of all ranks, who, after British troops had left, volunteered to stay behind in circumstances which could he described only as highly uncertain.
I shall try to confine myself to a few practical points from a non-Mandarin point of view, as one who has served outside this country almost the entire time he spent in the Service. First, however, I wish to make one comment on the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Walston, about the qualities required of an Ambassador. As an ex-Ambassador in Moscow, I would not in any way wish to counter his statement that a chimpanzee could do the job very well: I believe that the chimpanzee is a very intelligent animal. But I should like to inform your Lordships of the most authoritative statement on the qualities required of a British Ambassador. M. Francois Poncet told me that the Foreign Office was so well organised that a man of moderate intellectual qualities could be a good British Ambassador; but that the Quai d'Orsai, on the other hand, was so badly organised that it needed a man of really superior intellect to become a good French Ambassador.
My Lords, in listening to the debate this afternoon I have been reminded of the old saying that one can find a quotation from Lenin for any possible point
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of view. I think that perhaps the Duncan Report qualifies in this way. There are obviously many very good and practical proposals in it, but none of us agrees with all the proposals. Nevertheless, I believe that the Report will be generally helpful to those who are shaping the future of the Service. It is possible to criticise the Committee's terms of reference, but there is no ground for criticising the Committee for doing what they were asked to do.
On the important point of reviewing the functions and scale of our representation overseas, I think that we cannot get away from the following two principles. First, we should make sure that the work which an Embassy is required to do is necessary to support British interests. I do not believe that any principle can usefully be laid down in general terms as to what British interests are: they will vary from time to time and from place to place. Commercial interests, obviously, are of increasing interest; but, as the Report says, the security of the country is a paramount interest, and I was glad to hear the noble Lord the Leader of the House to-day make it clear that, while the power situation has radically altered, there is no intention that we should opt out of international discussions which will decide the sort of world that we are going to live in. What is important, since the Report is really about mechanics and not about policy, is to establish the necessary machinery to review on a continuing basis what our essential interests are from time to time and from place to place. The Committee have suggested the means of doing this, and I am glad to hear that their proposals in this respect are already taking shape in new machinery for this purpose in the Foreign Office.
Secondly, we should make sure that each Embassy has the staff of the right number and quality to do the work which we want it to do. To say that country "A" is an area of special interest, and that therefore we should have a full-scale Embassy in it, and that country "B" is of less importance to us, and that our representation should therefore be reduced to two men and a boy, may turn out to be right. But I doubt whether it helps to generalise in this way. It does not necessarily follow that the size of an

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Embassy should be directly related to our interests. It is desirable that it should be related to the job which the Embassy has to do.
We cart take two examples. A great deal of trade may pass between this country and a Western European country without the Embassy knowing anything about it; but it will take a lot of hard work by the Embassy to sell capital goods to the public sector of developing a country. In another country our commercial and political interests may not be of the greatest importance, but for half of the year the country may be full of British tourists, a proportion of whom will have to be got out of the clutches of the local police. I am doubtful about the wisdom of the proposals in the Report to cut down consular functions of this nature. But the Committee are of course perfectly right in saying that we should not have a rigid Embassy pattern in each country, and that we can cut down in many places. Many Ambassadors have speculated at times whether to do this to their Embassies would really harm British interests; and every Ambassador should know that the recipe for a happy Embassy is that everybody in it should feel that he is a little overworked.
I accept that there is a new diplomacy in Europe; but, as the Report itself states, this diplomacy will be carried out largely by teams of Home civil servants from various Departments guided by inter-Departmental committees. The more closely we become integrated in Europe, the more our links will be by direct participation in European government and the old Embassies may have a diminishing role. Here again the second principle to which I have referred applies.
My Lords, the Report concentrates, as it is required to do, on the commercial functions of an Embassy. It is of course important to be objective about the way in which an Embassy can help our export trade. We do not want to exaggerate an Embassy's commercial functions from an unconscious desire to compensate for loss of political power. As we all know, the Embassy is engaged on trade promotion. It cannot sell the goods; that is for the commercial salesman. Its operations in trade promotion have been described, perhaps not unfairly, as marginal but essential. The commercial staff can help to put
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the businessman on the right track; they can keep him from making mistakes through lack of local knowledge; they can provide a useful check on candidates for agencies—all the kind of work described by the report as "responsive". I believe that the great majority of British business men will testify to the help they have received from Embassies in this way.
I am more doubtful about the scope for what the Report describes as "initiative" commercial work; that is to say, bringing to the notice of businessmen opportunities for investment or a new market for his goods. I would not absolutely exclude this, but the Embassy staff cannot know most of the financial and technical considerations which govern a company's decision in these matters. Nor am I convinced of the desirability (to quote the Report) of:
"an effective dialogue about export strategy between Posts abroad and Departments at home",
since from my superficial experience in British industry I am not sure that the concept of "export strategy" has any practical meaning.
But there are two aspects of commercial work, which are perhaps covered by this phrase, in which the Embassy has an important part to play. First, nowadays in the capital goods field the businessman with the right goods at the right price cannot sell them unless his efforts are supported by a credit structure, often a credit-aid combination, which will match the financial terms offered by his overseas competitors. In such cases the Embassy must try to ensure that the Home Department realises in time what terms are necessary to secure the contract, and must support the businessman in his efforts to get the necessary financial conditions from the Government at home. Secondly, the C.B.I. seems to me to be quite right in its memorandum to Government, in which it stresses the importance of the Embassy's work in dealing with the Governmental aspects of British investments overseas: advice, guidance and help at the time the investment is made; protection against arbitrary and discriminatory action by foreign Governments, and the securing of prompt and adequate compensation in the event of expropriation—though I must add that the best Embassy in the world cannot in these days be blamed if it is unable to protect British firms against arbitrary

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action or expropriation without adequate compensation.
The Embassy is also sometimes required to protect British businessmen from arbitrary expulsion or even physical violence. I recall being rung up in the early morning and hearing a voice saying, "I am surrounded by my workmen with crowbars and ropes to hang me—please help!". It may also have to undertake most frustrating negotiations lasting often for many years, to settle the claims of British businessmen whose personal property has been expropriated, as will have been clear to the six noble Lords present at a recent discussion in your Lordships' House on the continuing plight of British subjects formerly resident in Egypt. These functions, which are essential and by no means marginal to those affected, are in the category of the main work of an Embassy dealing with Governments and are likely to be required principally in the developing world, outside the Report's main Area of Concentration. British exports will not flourish if the British businessman cannot carry on his business without risk to person or property.
On the trade promotion side one word of caution seems to be necessary. Embassies, full of zeal in their commercial work, sometimes go too far in complaining of British firms' decisions on local representation, or in supporting foreign firms' complaints of late deliveries or inadequacies in quality or service, without a full knowledge of the facts. Diplomacy has to be exercised by an Embassy in its contacts with British business as much as in its contacts with foreign Governments.
I believe that the proposals in the Report on information are generally on the right lines. Here, too, we have to beware of the well-known tendency of Governments to increase information work as a substitute for power. I particularly welcome the importance placed on the News Department's connection with the London correspondents of foreign newspapers, since it is their reports which influence opinion abroad on our policies. I also welcome the value placed by the Report on the B.B.C. Overseas Services and I know from personal experience what a great effect they have. But I
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also, as well as the noble Lord, the Leader of the House, have doubts in one particular. I do not think that we should adopt as a general principle that foreign language broadcasts should have a lower priority than English language broadcasts. The requirement will vary from place to place and from time to time. A decision should be taken in the light of a continuous examination of the B.B.C.'s experience in each individual case. But I know also from experience that whereas the principle of the B.B.C.'s independence must he rigorously maintained if it is to have real influence abroad, general political considerations in the matter of where the effort should be directed must sometimes override the views of the broadcasters, since they can be influenced by the legacy of the past and by the administrative difficulty of a change in priorities.
I have also, like the noble Lord the Leader of the House, some doubts about the proposal for a change in British Council policy. My own experience is that in the last ten years the Council has become a much more efficient organisation based on sensible and practical policies, particularly on the educational side, giving people what they want and not what it is thought they ought to want. The Report concludes that the proportion of effort directed towards cultural manifestations is rather low, and suggests the change, which has been referred to, in the balance of activities towards Western Europe. I am not clear what is the basis of the argument. Is it that because Western Europe is important to our interests, we should subsidise large doses of British culture for Europeans? I do not think that this will help us to increase our trade or to get into the Common Market. I should have thought that an improvement in our hotels and standard of cooking would have done more in that direction. But I do think that it will affect our trade if people throughout the developing world regard English as the universal language which they must know and the qualification of a British examination as the best avenue to a career. I suggest that we want to be very sure of what we are doing before we alter the direction of an institution which has made a great deal of sense in recent years. There is doubtless some untidiness which needs

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shaking out, particularly in the overlapping of aid administration in the educational field, but in general Council has been doing a sensible and practical job in the right places.
Some of the fiercest criticism of the Report has come from those concerned with overseas aid. I think that much of this criticism is misdirected. I doubt whether our aid will be more effective if we greatly increase the staff engaged in administering it. Nor do I believe that it is desirable to build up a specialist cadre of aid administrators. I believe, as we all do, in the importance of aid and of its being properly used, but I suggest that the results would be better if aid administration is regarded as an important part of the Embassy's normal responsibilities.
Over a wide field the Committee's recommendations should surely be welcomed as being on the right lines, especially those on management of the Diplomatic Service, commercial policy and economic work, civilian and Service attachées, accommodation and political reporting. I note that the Committee expect the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to be progressively reduced in size —a tactful way of presenting a recommendation outside their terms of reference and from which not everyone will dissent. The Report will stimulate argument and action. I have no doubt that it will be used constructively to make the Service more efficient and that any tendency towards over-rigid schematisation will be converted into a flexible instrument for the modernisation of our diplomatic missions abroad.
One practical conclusion may be drawn from the Report. We can streamline the Service to some extent, but the Treasury will not be able to look upon it as a milch cow. It is more practical to regard it as essential animal feeding-stuff for British interests of all kinds. We do not want to waste the stuff; we want to be sure that it has the right nutritional value which will enable us to reduce the bulk; but there is a point beyond which further reduction in quantity or quality would be bad animal husbandry.
6.27 p.m.
BARONESS EMMET OF AMBERLEY: My Lords, I was born into the Diplomatic Service and though never officially belong
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ing to it, my long connection with it perhaps justifies my intervention which will, as usual, be a very short one. I want to make three short points. My first is that I think there is an omission in the Report, in that there is not one word about the employment of women in the Diplomatic Service. This may be due to the fact that non-discrimination has reached such a stage that it is not necessary to mention it—although somehow I do not think that is the case—or it may be that because the question raises such problems it has therefore been avoided. However, I think it much more likely to have been the usual reason, that of the question of the employment of women having been totally overlooked.
I would never question that there is a great problem in the employment of women in the Diplomatic Service. It presents great difficulties. There are, of course, single women who have sacrificed a home life for their career, which cannot be very satisfactory for them. Unfortunately, there is not an adequate supply of widows of the proper age who might fill the bill extremely well, and a happily married woman may not be able to find a suitable "prince consort"; indeed, she must, of course, always consider her husband's position, and therefore it is a very great problem. What is to be done? I am persuaded that a feminine element in the Service is of value. After all, the Service is there to strengthen the understanding between countries, and especially as the noble Viscount, Lord Hood, so rightly said, to cultivate friendly relations —and I would congratulate the noble Viscount very heartily on his maiden speech. The population of a country is, after all, 50 per cent. women, some of them in highly responsible positions in these days. I think there are some helpful suggestions in the Report which might be followed in this respect.
The Report talks a great deal of flexibility; of short appointments of specialists; and I think one may take the United Nations as an example of where there have been very successful short-term appointments of women who have done remarkably good work. Perhaps the British Council could also consider this question of short-term appointments as could the B.B.C. and the C.O.I. These organisations have been given great importance in the Report. There is also

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the suggestion that wives of diplomats might be economically used in certain countries. One suggestion that struck me as of great importance was the employment of local people in certain directions. This is valuable, because it seems to me that we could find women who are socially suitable to help in making contacts and receiving visitors from abroad. I hope that Her Majesty's Government will look at these points, and I recommend them strongly to the Minister who is to reply to the debate.
My second point is this. Like other speakers, I deprecate this division into what sounds like inner and outer space and the derogation, especially of South America, as it were, to the moon. It is mentioned only once in the whole Report. The world, after all, is one. And how do we know that the status quo is going to last and where our trade is next going to develop in this very technical age. I should have thought, like the noble Lord, Lord Walston, and others, that Europe could be largely served from London by telephone and that our Embassies there should become largely staging points and record offices. Is it really necessary or wise to have three Ambassadors in Paris —I suppose that they have now migrated to Brussels—and none in Chile and Mexico? If those countries we cut out then cut out their embassies to us, there would be no connection at all. I think that the Report gives the impression of setting up an industrial organisation and not a service to humanity. Even then, is it wise to concentrate on what we have got instead of expanding where there are new opportunities?
I read in the Daily Telegraph this morning a report on the Argentine, which says that our influence there has declined to the extent that our share in the Argentine market is now only 6 per cent., or rather less, instead of 30 per cent., which was the case a few years ago. There are distinct signs, the article adds, that an official attempt is going to be made to stage a "come back". I should like to remind your Lordships that there is to be a British exhibition and British Week in Buenos Aires next October, which I hope the Government will do their best to support.
My last point is that I strongly deprecate this reiteration that we are no longer
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a first-class Power, especially in a Government Paper. Instead of being proud of the old Pax Britannica and what we have given to the development of backward countries in the past, we have been injected with a colonial guilt complex. I think that here history will judge us more fairly than we do ourselves. Now we are to look upon ourselves as a second-class nation. I cannot see what encouragement this will be for our younger generation.
After all, what makes a first-class nation? Is it the number of bombs it has and the number of people it is able to kill? Or is it a nation that has courage, strength of character, industry, uprightness, humanity and imagination? I think that we must really get rid of this inferiority complex and this running ourselves down in public, otherwise the public will begin to believe what we say. I should like to see our young people going out again to conquer the world, with honest trade, art, music and all that makes life worth living, and our Embassies abroad, especially those labelled in this Report as in "outer space", being missionaries of the greatness of our people.
6.35 p.m.
LORD CACCIA: My Lords, I must start with an apology for not being here at the beginning of the debate, for reasons which I explained to the noble Lord the Leader of the House and to the noble Lord who initiated the debate: reasons which involved an engagement made many months ago involving other people which could not be altered. Indeed, I should not have intervened even now (because the voice of my old Department has already been raised and is going to he raised again), were it not for the fact that Mr. Bevin, when Foreign Secretary, appointed me as his chief administrative officer to carry out the so-called Eden-Bevin reforms and at a later stage, when I was Principal Under-Secretary, the Plowden Committee was sitting and reporting and it was my first duty to see those reforms brought into effect. So I felt some obligation to say something.
Now we have another Report, from a Committee under a most distingushed Chairman, and one can but congratulate the Government on persuading anyone so deeply involved in the exports of this

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country and its economic and financial welfare to undertake this job, assisted by two such able coadjutors. Having said that, and I shall come later in what I say to plead for many of the administrative things which the Report recommends, I have one plea to make, which I think has already been met by the noble Lord the Leader of the House. My plea is please do not throw out the baby with the bilge water; because there is a lot of bilge water in this. This has been referred to already by many speakers, but I should like to pick out one or two points.
I would start with the phrase, "A national Power of the second order" to which the noble Baroness has not referred. This is repeated more than once. It is one of two things: it is either a blinding statement of the obvious or misleading. If your base is an island, and the number of people on the island is only 50 million, plus a few, and your resources are as restricted as they must be on this island, then you cannot say that you are the same kind of major Power as one based on a population of 200 million and occupying a continent. This is just saying something that is obvious. So what! Alternatively, are you saying that there was some moment in our history when this was quite different? If so, when was that? When we were finding it almost as difficult, and in the end impossible, to discipline a few distant American colonists, just as they are now finding it difficult in Vietnam? Or, at a later period in our history what should we infer from the difficulty we had in dealing with the Boers in South Africa at the end of the last century and the beginning of this. So, to my mind, either this phrasing is something blindingly obvious or it asks us to infer something which I do not think to be either true or helpful, particularly when we are thinking against that background of organising a Service to protect and further the interests of this country.
There are other phrases which have been picked up by previous speakers. The one about "comprehensve and progressive missions" and about, "Areas of Concentration" and "Outer" darkness. Of course it is perfectly true that we have areas of concentration. The noble Baroness referred to the fact that we have three Ambassadors in Brussels or Paris—or both. But that is just a statement of fact. Our interests compel us to
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belong to NATO, to have a Mission to the European Community and an Ambassador to the Belgians, and we keep these people there for these purposes. It is a statement of fact, if that is what it is meant to be. But if it is meant to be more than that; if from this we are to derive the basis for setting up a whole new structure of the Service, then I think that it is greatly misleading.
Again, we find the authors of this Report getting into this kind of difficulty when they get on to our information and consular work. They say, on page 98, that:
"…the overseas information services … should … project Britain as a trading nation with a great culture and democratic traditions, rather than as a world power of the first order."
Then I go back and find a little earlier, on page 96, that the Report says that the information services should not merely explain British policy overseas, but should also:
"project as actively as possible Britain's culture, language and achievements."
What were these achievements—that we were not a power of the first order? Or what? Once again the Committee are using phrases which lead to a great muddle. So I was not the least surprised to find that at the end of the first month after the Report was published the Chairman had to write a three-column letter to The Times saying that when he was accused of saying one thing, he had not meant that at all, and that if you looked at the fine print and the notes you would see that something else had been said.
In the irreverent days of the early part of my service, when Sir John Simon was Foreign Secretary, this is what we used to call "doing a Simon". That meant that this extremely learned and powerful man would say something about foreign affairs, and later, when questioned, would then have to say, "when I said this, what I really meant was that". But that did not help very much, because after a few days he had to say again that when he had said the other thing it was really a combination of the two. So I think that the authors of this Report, by creating a number of catch-phrases, have really confused their own arguments. I hope, therefore, that the one thing that I was going to ask for may be granted; namely,

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that the baby should not be thrown out with the bilge water.
There are, I would suggest, three main things to which anyone who administers the Foreign Service in this country must always pay attention. The first is the unpredictability of future events. We are a very exposed country. We depend on our trade to keep our industries going and to feed ourselves. These are straightforward and well-known facts. Therefore, if in the administration of your Foreign Service you were to concentrate too single-mindedly on the objectives of one epoch, you might find yourself in great trouble in a later epoch. The recruits of 1969 are the Ambassadors of 2000.
How do you set about this? What is the next principle? The second requirement is adaptability. You must for this purpose, I suggest, be able to attract high quality candidates, whether men or, as the Baroness, Lady Emmet of Amberley, argued, women to this Service. Here, of course, the Foreign Service gets it both ways. Sometimes it is accused of having nothing but dumbbells in high places, and at another time the attack is that it gets far too many of the first-class honours candidates from the major universities. I do not know what the figures are like now, but I used to know, because it was my duty to do so. I think the figure then (and I imagine that to-day it might be something of the same order) was just over 0·6 per cent. of the first-class graduates of the universities of this country in arts and social sciences. If you take the other subjects, which are not arts and social sciences, the figure is well down below 0·6 per cent., and probably even below 0·2 per cent. So I would reject that argument, and say again that in order to achieve adaptability you must be able to recruit high quality staff.
How are you going to do that?—and that is the third requirement. The terms of service must be right. Here again I come to the point that has been made by other speakers: that service abroad for men and their wives is not the same as service at home. It is a different kind of career, and this was well understood by those who were involved in the Eden-Bevin reforms, and of course by the noble Lord, Lord Plowden, when he came to make his
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Report. As I say, I think the third point is that you must always keep in mind—and see it is protected—that the terms are right to attract the right kind of people to do the job you want. When you come to what those terms are, I am bound to say that I think many of the recommendations of this Report have a solid basis and sound reason behind them, and I merely hope that the Government, and succeeding Governments, will carry them through. The noble Lord, Lord Gore-Booth, mentioned training. This is an essential. It began as a result of the Eden-Bevin reforms; it was carried a further stage by the Plowden Report; and I am only too glad to hear that the prospect is that it will be carried still further.
We have all had our say in earlier debates about the inadequacy of the present Foreign Office building, and we stand by what we said, although I know that many noble Lords will regret that the vista from the bridge in St. James's Park may not be quite the same as it was in the past. Similarly, I would particularly support the recommendations made on accommodation abroad. Successive Governments are always telling industry that they ought to run their businesses with regard to economy and cost effectiveness. Anybody who reads this Report can see what has happened as a result of our not purchasing properties in time, but continuing to lease, and so forth. They will see at once that the board of any business would have to resign if it went before its annual general meeting and was submitted to questioning on this score.
It is the most appalling story of waste of money over the years. Whether this Report's suggestion is the way to change the policy, or whether there is another method to carry out these reforms under the Ministry of Works, I do not know. But that it needs to be done, in the general interests not only of the service, but of saving money for this country, is unanswerable; and in coming years I hope that this may be possible.
Those are the three main points that I wish to make, my Lords. But I would add one last comment on the subject of political reporting. I do not think this Report makes the position over this, or over reporting as a whole, clear. The

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noble Lord, Lord Plowden, and his Committee got on to that very quickly. What has happened over the period of our own lives is the arrival of the typewriter, the stenographer and the wireless on the roof. When it was a case of writing a despatch in your own hand with no more than ten lines on any one page, in a good round hand, of course people were costive in what they wrote down. But if all you have to do is to press a bell, and a stenographer comes in and you just pour out your memoirs to her, and you have a wireless on the roof which can send it all off, it is irrelevant whether you send a newspaper or a two-line telegram. Then you arc in for trouble, and it is difficult to get back to another age when these facilities were not available. I am all for the Report insisting that Missions should know what is happening without necessarily reporting it. It is, of course, important that they should know.
Perhaps your Lordships will allow me, even at this hour, to detain you with a story that will illustrate this aspect of the Diplomatic Service as it was at the end of the 'twenties. In those days, in small posts in Latin America there were not always these facilities available, and certainly not a wireless on the roof. We had a remarkable Ambassador, who was more concerned with developing a deciphering machine than with most other things. He happened to live in a dictatorship, and the New York newspapers came out with a story that in their country, where oil was important, there had been a strike at the oilfields, with all production brought to an end, and foreign nationals in great danger. We looked to find what the latest reports from this post were, and we discovered that the Head of Mission had not reported on the political situation for a year. So we mildly remonstrated on the basis of this newspaper report. His reply was that the general who was the dictator of the country was in complete control of the situation a year ago; he was still in complete control; there was no truth whatever in the report, and he would report again when it looked as if he was ceasing to be in control. That degree of constraint is all very well. My Lords, if in London it can be accepted, and if Ministers can accept, that they need not always be informed in detail about every country so as to answer Parliamentary Questions, then it is possible to cut down reporting
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a great deal. In conclusion, I must ask the Government again to assure us that they will not throw away the whole of the Report for these catch-phrases, which I am sure mislead rather than guide.
6.51 p.m.
LORD RITCHIE-CALDER: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, for introducing this debate and giving us the opportunity of discussing this matter. I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Caccia, for he has disembarrassed me of a very heavy weight that I was carrying, as I recognise that as a maverick member of the Foreign Office during the War I certainly did not have enough diplomacy to be polite. He gave me a very good lesson about how forthright I could be with regard to this Report. I have no axes to grind, except to look at it fairly and squarely as something which has done a great deal of damage. I do not agree with what the noble Lord the Leader of the House said about the damage having been undone by Sir Val Duncan and his lengthy letter.
I read the Report before there was any newspaper reaction. If I had been a journalist working on it my reaction would have been precisely what was said to be the misunderstanding of this Report. This went all over the world, and it reduced our status, without any question. I have had reactions from my sympathetic friends in many countries overseas. Nobody here is going to suggest for one moment that I go around in my life waving a large Union Jack, but I think it is a bit hard when the lion is struggling for at least dignity in its old age that it is turned into a doormat, as it was by definition in this situation.
I cannot think of anything more deplorable from my point of view, as one concerned with international relations, than trying to promote—as we are all trying to do—the future of this country, particularly in terms of responsibilities to what is now described as the Outer Area. This is really a quite disastrous concept. If anybody says that this was a misinterpretation, all I can say is that it was a Freudian slip, and they gave away in this Report all that was latent in their thinking. They were writing us off. I must blame them as individuals; but the error was in the original remit, because over the past few years we have

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learned the dangerous mistake of confusing the balance-of-payments situation with something we are trying in diplomacy to correct. I know that we are obsessed by it; but the mere fact that you say you are looking at this subject in order to secure economies, instead of looking at it and saying that you are wanting to achieve efficiency, means that you are bound to get this cheeseparing attitude which will reflect itself in this kind of view of the diminished instead of the genuine and important future and moral influence of this country.
I do not believe that in this Report, apart from the housekeeping details, we have anything except a regrettable Report. I hope the Government will make it quite clear that the implicit weakness of this Report is reflected in attitudes and not in details. The noble Lord, the Leader of the House, has made it quite clear that this is not a Government pronouncement. I sincerely hope that that will be made as abundantly clear as the original "misapprehension" in the first instance.
There is one point on which I feel some responsibility to speak and it is something which has not been fully ventilated. I am referring to the information services. I may appear to have a vested interest, for I am a card-carrying journalist and have been deeply concerned with information services. The one thing in this Report—as in most of the approaches to information—that the Committee have not understood is the true significance of an information service. Even in the Report there is a confusion in what one would call "intelligence" (I do not mean secret intelligence) that is, information which is required and reported back, in the political reporting process, which is very important indeed. It does not have to be an avalanche of paper, and you do not need a transmitter on the roof. From my point of view the extrovert function of policy is more important. What is it that you are trying to explain, and why are you trying to explain it? If it is simply an operation in which you are trying to hand over information to somebody else for them to use as they see fit, then that is one thing.
I hope your Lordships will not misunderstand what I am going to say, and
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call it, invidiously, propaganda, but information has to work for its living. Facts have to work for their living. You have to make it quite clear that what you are distributing is reflecting an attitude and the policy of the country without indeed boasting the policy of the country. In fact, you are making the point by doing what you are doing, and not necessarily by the content of the case you are making.
I deplore the Report's suggestion about the information service. If I looked at the information service in this case I might find a great deal wrong with it, but you cannot say you are going to cut it by 50 per cent. That is absolute nonsense.
I was called in by a United Nations Agency's Director-General once to look at the information services to see what was wrong. I will tell you what was wrong. The information services had been underestimated originally, and had been under financed. The first report on the service said that it was bad and therefore the information service should be cut. The next year they said that the service was worse and so it should be again cut. The next year they said that the information service stank, and they recommended that it should be got rid of. The reason why the information service was bad, why it stank, was that every time they looked at it they cut it. They themselves were destroying it.
I have been on three newspapers which have died—I do not know how far I was responsible for this high mortality—and the first sign of morbidity on a newspaper is the fact that it starts closing down its foreign bureaux. That is the first economy. The moment you start doing that you are on the skids. That is the first admission that you can no longer afford to fulfill the job that a newspaper should do. The functions of the bureaux, wherever they may be, are to keep the newspaper not merely supplied with something which appears in the paper, but intelligently informed of the background of what is going on. Then the newspaper is in a position to cope with a crisis when it happens. The alternative is implicit in some of the things that have been said to-day: that you should have a strategic reserve, a Scotland Yard flying squad, and that you are going to send people out to meet

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the situation when it arises. Newspapers have done that. You will notice that if any high-powered newspaper correspondents—and they are extremely intelligent people—move into a situation, they can get the situation completely wrong because they are dealing with the crisis without knowing any of the circumstances why it developed. They are not able to put the matter in balance, and they are simply caught by their own headlines. That is what is going to happen in the Diplomatic Service if we begin to look upon it simply as a modern, streamlined slimming down or cutting down for the sake of economy, when in point of fact the situation which is developing over the world, as the noble Lord, Lord Caccia, has very properly pointed out, is a changing one.
The noble Lord, Lord Gore-Booth, has reminded us that to-day there is a new diplomatic service on the moon. I do not know what treaty they are negotiating with H. G. Wells' selenites but at any rate they are there. This is what I have been lecturing about in the London School of Economics this session—I survived it, by the way. I have been lecturing in part on something which I call "satellite diplomacy". This is not just communication. It is the fact that diplomacy has moved into a new dimension, a new orbit. Once you get this idea, which might be called quantum diplomacy, where the jump is made from one electronic orbit to another in terms of orbits of magnitude, you have the new diplomacy. That is to say, you are moving into a situation in which you must be prepared to accept and recognise the nature of the opportunities, say, of communication, of using your wireless on the roof to get there by Telstar. But it is not just that. New factors are altering the whole pattern.
I have a great amount of sympathy for those who have been practising the old diplomacy; the change requires a lot of adjustment. But the point is that it does not excuse one from getting down into the grass roots of the problems. It certainly does not entitle us to throw into outer darkness the developing areas of the world. I have insisted many times, and I keep on insisting, that those areas which we now call the developing areas, the areas of Duncan Report darkness, are the areas where the future of this coun-
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try will lie. It is not, as has been pointed out here, simply in gaining access to markets with which we are entirely familiar, even if we cannot get there; it is not in producing mini-cars to sell to buy Mercedes' cars. We are not going to find the answer in taking in each other's washing in the advanced countries. The answer must be in the opportunities that are opening up, and must open up, in the whole of the developing world; and that is where our listening posts, our early warning posts, and the whole of our influence for good must lie —in the areas which in this Report have been called the Outer Areas. We need to understand that this is the age where we bring enlightenment, and we are in this Report dimming the lights.
7.3 p.m.
LORD INCHYRA: My Lords, I feel that I really must apologise for being one more of the mandarins or phalanxes, as I think we were called by the noble Lord the Leader of the House. My only excuse for speaking is that I had a certain amount to do with the administration of the Diplomatic Service, both before the War and for the last five years when I was Permanent Under-Secretary. Also, I had the privilege of being a member of the Committee under the noble Lord, Lord Plowden. In many ways I should have much preferred not to speak tonight, because practically all the points I should have liked to make have been made already much more eloquently than I can hope to make them. But it gives me the opportunity of adding my tribute to the noble Viscount, Lord Hood, on his maiden speech. All of us who have worked with him before knew that we should hear a thoughtful and constructive contribution from him; and we were not disappointed. I am only glad to think that now that he has managed to shake off the shackles of Government service we can count on some more contributions from him.
I hope your Lordships will agree from the speeches from my former colleagues which you have heard this afternoon that we are not all dyed-in-the-wool reactionaries or arch-Conservatives, as we are sometimes accused of being; that, on the contrary, we are fully aware that times have changed, and are still changing, and that the Diplomatic Service has to alter and bring itself up to date in

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order to meet the challenge with which it is now faced. Just for that reason, I would certainly welcome the Report of the Duncan Committee. I should like respectfully to add my congratulations to its authors, who contrived in a remarkably short space of time to produce not only a series of very far-reaching and well-thought-out conclusions, but also a great number of recommendations on points which look of minor importance but are in fact of very great value to the day-to-day working of the Service and which will, if they are adopted, as I hope most of them will be, materially affect the manner in which the individual members of the Service can function.
I am bound to say, having said that about the Report, that I must admit I have serious reservations about some of its more general conclusions. I will not go into any detail about them because they have been voiced—ad nauseam, I was almost going to say—this afternoon. But I think that in that part of the Report the authors were really seeing things too much in black and white and were much too definite in their conclusions. They tried to systematise and simplify everything to far too great an extent without making nearly enough allowance for the intangible factors and the necessity for treating all these problems flexibly and empirically.
However, I will not repeat all the arguments about the two areas; the impossibility of treating countries in the Outer Area as all of equal or little importance, or indeed of treating all the countries inside the Area of Concentration as of the same importance. I think that that is a non-starter. On the other hand, there is a great deal of value in the Report in what it says about the new diplomacy; the importance of making fuller use of inter-Governmental exchanges other than through the Foreign Office and diplomatic channels, and the growing importance of the multilateral agencies. I felt, however, that the Report, for the reasons which other noble Lords have given this evening, rather overstressed the importance of the commercial and economic factors. We have lived with the problem of the balance of payments for many years now and we have always realised that if we are going to have an effective foreign policy we must
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have a sound economic base at home, which means that we must have a flourishing export trade. Mr. Bevin used to emphasise that point repeatedly when he was our Chief in the Foreign Office twenty years ago.
The corollary, however, is not necessarily true. It does not follow that, even if we have a sound economic base and are exporting to the maximum, we shall then necessarily have an effective or an influential foreign policy. Many other factors are involved. I will not repeat them now; the noble Lord, Lord Gore-Booth, referred to them in his speech. But I rather think the authors of the Report forget these intangibles and concentrate too much on purely material and promotional aspects.
My other reservation about the Report in general was that, no doubt owing to the way in which the Committee's terms of reference were drafted, rather too much emphasis was paid to the economy side of things and the cost effectiveness of everything. After all, it does not necessarily follow that, because something can be done slightly cheaper one way, that is really the most efficient way of doing it—and by "efficient" I mean efficient in its wider term; not only the actual end result of the operation but the effect it has on the morale of the staff concerned and, very often, of the local governments concerned.
There is one particular example in the Report I would find it difficult to agree with; namely, where it is suggested that an official coming out from Whitehall once a month and staying for a week or so in a place could be as effective and as useful as an individual permanently based in the capital concerned. I find that very hard to take, because it seems to run quite contrary to what the Report says in another passage, that one must always remember that the average diplomat has to work practically round the clock and much of his work is done out of office hours. As the noble Viscount, Lord Hood, said, a great deal depends on personal relations. One cannot expect someone coming out from London for a few days to get to know the local personalities and to understand the different peculiarities of the local papers. I can only say, from personal experience

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of the years I have been in Washington, that much the most useful work I did was outside the office altogether, at the Metropolitan Club or on the golf course. One cannot expect people coming out from London for a few days to be able to do anything like that.
My last criticism of the Report in general is that it rather gives the impression, perhaps unwittingly, that the Diplomatic Service has been a completely static organisation for the past fifty years. That is really quite untrue. There have been enormous changes since I joined it 46 years ago, and there have been very great changes, too, in the last twenty years. One has only to think of the great developments in the information work, the commercial work and on the economic side. But it is quite true that things are changing now, and changing fast, and clearly the Diplomatic Service must be able to accommodate itself to these changes and fit itself to meet the new task before it, and for that I believe the Report gives valuable guidance. But I would hope that in considering or implementing the Report, the Government will regard it as providing general guidelines and not as laying down hard and fast rules or a blue print which must be followed at all costs, or a straitjacket into which the Diplomatic Service must be fitted. It seems most important that the recommendations in the Report should be treated flexibly and with full understanding of the extraneous circumstances involved. From what the noble Lord the Leader of the House said, I was encouraged to believe that that is the way in which the Government are approaching the matter.
If I may now for a moment turn to some of the more detailed recommendations in the Report, I would support nearly all of them wholeheartedly. However, there is one point on which I feel some doubt—in fact a good deal of doubt —and that is on the question of political reporting. I will not repeat what the noble Lord, Lord Caccia, said about it, but it seems to me quite wrong for the Report to suggest that there is no need for any further political reporting from any of the countries in the Outer Area, because, after all, some of these countries are of enormous size, with enormous British investments and highly important
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potential markets for British exports—to put it at its lowest. The average British investor, before putting money into one of these countries, or the average trader before deciding whether or not it is worth his while to try to establish an export outlet there, is bound to want to know what the political situation is, what the probabilities of the next few years are likely to be and the chances of stability, and so on. I think a certain amount of political reporting must go on from practically every country except some of those in which we have virtually no interest, and I do not think that we can draw anything like the hard and fast line between the inner and outer circles that the Report suggests.
One point I should like to bring particularly to the attention of the Government is one which has already been mentioned several times; namely, the importance of providing adequate retirement allowances for the individuals who will have to be retired prematurely if the recommendations of the Report are accepted. I have no doubt that a decision on these lines will be accepted loyally by the Service as a whole, but inevitably it is bound to weigh heavily on the individuals concerned. Most of them, I imagine, will be in their late forties or perhaps fifties; many of them with very little private means who have made all their plans for their future and the future of their families on the assumption that they will continue to be employed for several years to come; and being that sort of age they will probably find it difficult to obtain outside employment. It seems that here there is a strong case for special treatment being given to these people, even if it creates a precedent for the other Services. I think they can be treated as special cases.
Here I might perhaps just add that some thought ought to be given to the situation which will arise a little later on after the retirements consequent upon the adoption of the Report have been effected; that is to say, in five or six years' time. As several noble Lords have pointed out, if we are going to allow people to stay on rather longer than the age of 60—as I think we certainly should —and if at the same time we are going to select and give early promotion to the "flyers", we really ought to find some way of making it easy for what I might

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call the "non-flyers", that is to say, the people who, through obviously no fault of their own, are never likely to get to the top. We ought to find some way to make it possible for them to retire at a reasonably early age, say between 40 and 50, rather than keeping them on, as now happens, until they are nearly 60. I should think it is much kinder to allow a man to go when he is about 40, when he has a reasonable chance of getting a good job in civil life, than to let him carry on until he is nearly 60, when he will find it difficult to get proper alternative employment. That is a point which has always worried me because there is no proper facility, as there is, I think, in the Armed Forces, for retiring people with reasonable and proper superannuation allowances about the age of 40 when it is obvious that they are not going to get to the top.
Another point which is rather connected, which I would like to emphasise and which is brought out strongly in the Report, is the importance of doing something generous for locally employed members of our missions abroad. There are large numbers of such persons who perform really very valuable work. Many of them are in quite responsible positions. Many of those individuals are working on the information side, and if the proposals in the Duncan Report are adopted many of them will have to retire prematurely. Here again I would urge that as generous as possible treatment should be given to these locally employed people who have to be retired prematurely.
It is not only those who have to retire who require a considerate treatment. I am sorry to see in the Report that the recommendations which the Plowden Committee made about proper pension schemes for locally employed employees being worked out has got only part of the way. It seems desirable that proper schemes for pensioning all categories of local employees would be worked out as soon as possible. This seems only common sense, because not only do we not want to get a reputation abroad for being a bad employer but, if we do not take care, we shall find it increasingly difficult to get local employees to work for us.
ft is quite clear from what is said in the Report that there will be a growing
1012
need for local employees, in commercial work particularly, and therefore it is really in our own selfish interests to treat these people properly, not only in pay, but also doing what we can to improve their status. There is always bound to be a gap between U.K.-based staff and locally engaged ones, but it is very important that the gap should be as small as possible. I noticed in the Report several references to the fact that commercial representatives who had given evidence attached importance to the raising of the status of these local employees, and I hope, therefore, that it will be possible to do it fairly soon.
I was glad to see what was said about administration. I think it is true that there is a considerable amount of over-administration, both in London and at our missions abroad. I have seen it in operation really only at our missions abroad. I think it is a pity that in the comfortable, easy posts abroad people are not left to fend for themselves a little more. Under the present system, where they are practically hand-fed by the administrative officers at the Embassy, they do not make as many contacts as they should with the local inhabitants. But much the most important recommendation about administration was, I think, that there should be more devolution of authority. The Report suggested that this was particularly desirable as between Whitehall and missions abroad. I am not myself quite so sure whether it is not between the Treasury and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London that more devolution and more delegation of authority are required. Certainly that used to be the case. We in the Foreign Office always felt that we could have been allowed a little more discretion by the Treasury in the matter of administration and such problems.
I will not say anything about the question of information, except that I would agree that a good deal of the work could be cut down in some posts. But it must be looked at post by post, and not treated generally, because the problems are different in different parts of the world. I believe that there has been a tendency to scatter or to try to put out our information too broadly, and that we should do better to concentrate on those people in the different countries who

1013
have some influence over local opinion rather than on broadcasting information to the general public.
As regards attachés, I certainly agree that there might be some reduction in both civilian and Service attachés. But I would point out that these attachés very often serve a very useful purpose, quite apart from their particular job, in broadening the contacts between Embassy and various sections of opinion in the country in which they are serving. Certainly I know that in Germany, for example, the labour attaché was invaluable in establishing contacts not only with the trade union leaders but also with various sections of the business community. Again, I think I am right in saying that in Washington the admirable labour attaché there at the time was the only member of the whole staff who gave the result of the 1948 Presidential Election correctly, which shows that he had rather better contacts than the Ambassador.
I should like to say one thing about the accommodation. I would certainly endorse everything that has been said about the importance of buying accommodation rather than renting it. I do not think I need emphasise that point. I agree, too, that there is a lot to be said for selling many of the existing offices and buying or building more modern ones. Some of our existing offices are either in the wrong part of the city or very out of date. On the other hand, I am rather disturbed—perhaps it may have been an unfair suspicion on my part—that there is a sort of suggestion in the Report that some of our historic and perhaps architecturally rather splendid old Embassy houses should be sold just because they would fetch a good price. I hope that is not the case.
On the subject of accommodation, I cannot resist endorsing what has already been said about the Foreign Office building. I suppose that I should not say that, because I ended up in what I suppose is the best office in Whitehall; but I have spent most of my working life in that Office. I am probably one of the few Members of your Lordships' House who actually lived in it, because I was Resident Clerk for some time, and I am very fond of the building. But it really is the most terrible place to work in; it is a scandal. It is all right for the "top
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brass", but it is absolutely terrible for the juniors, and particularly for the clerks and typists. In fact I cannot understand why any girl ever goes to work in the Office it is so bad. However, I will not go on about this point because it is, I know, a very painful subject.
There is one thing that struck me. There is rather an odd omission from the Report. There is very little reference to the clerks, what we used to call the Second Division clerks. I should have thought it fairly clear that they are going to be an even more important part of the whole machine in the future than they are now, and that some arrangements ought to be made to provide for their training, so that the good ones can be selected. I am glad to see that it is recommended that promotion in the Second Division should be by merit rather than by seniority, as it has been. But certainly it seems very important that proper attention should be paid to the training of these Second Division clerks, merely from the point of view of recruitment, because many of them (perhaps I should not say many; but there is a growing tendency in this direction) are now university graduates; and if you want to get them you have to provide them with a useful career. I am glad to think that the discrimination between the "A" and "B" branches of the Foreign Service is gradually being abolished, and I should like to think that the prospects of promotion for the clerical officers to the senior ranks will be increased.
I would say one last word, my Lords. I was glad to see that the Report staled that the Committee saw no reason why the existing arrangements whereby the Diplomatic Service is quite separate from the Home Civil Service should be altered. But for some reason the Report described the present system as being an administrative convenience. It is really much more than that: not only do the members of the Diplomatic Service do work which is very different from that done by the average civil servant at home, but they—and their families—have to do it in quite different conditions. Really they are quite a different—I will not say animal, but a different species, and it is not just for administrative reasons that they are separate.
Finally, I would make one plea. I would urge the Government, in whatever

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they do to implement the Report, to pay every attention to the morale of the Diplomatic Service. Those in the Service have been going through a very difficult time lately. They had, first of all, the merger with the Commonwealth Service; now they have had the two Offices brought together, and they feel that they are saddled with the responsibility for some of the outlying parts of the British overseas territories. They have had this inquiry coming on top of Plowden. Some of them are threatened with premature retirement, and life in missions abroad is no longer nearly so pleasant as it used to be. Much of the glamour has gone out of the Diplomatic Service. In spite of all that, they do a jolly good job and they deserve all the help they can get. I hope that in implementing this Report everything will be done to maintain the morale of the Service and, if possible, not to subject them to yet another Report, at least in our lifetime.
7.30 p.m.
LORD GRIDLEY: My Lords, at this late hour I do not wish to detain your Lordships for long with what I have to say. May I first pay my tribute to the maiden speech of the noble Viscount, Lord Hood. I hope there will be many occasions in future on which your Lordships will have the pleasure of hearing him. I should also like to thank my noble friend Lord Selkirk for introducing this debate. The subject we are discussing is of immense importance. I have never forgotten from my service overseas that the decisions that we in this House and Parliament take affect not only ourselves but people resident in many areas all over the world; and in my opinion, our abiding concern in the speeches that have been made tonight is for the overseas individual.
This is an extensive Report on overseas representation, covering many aspects of the Service. I will confine my remarks to our representation overseas in the area of South East Asia, which I know fairly well. I feel that a lack of importance has been accorded to our Commonwealth connection in that area. In general terms, the lack of attention given to the Commonwealth area was expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Garner, to whose speech I listened with the greatest of interest.
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I am critical of the Report in that it is lacking in consideration of our Commonwealth connections. I am aware of the ability of the distinguished members of the Committee who produced this Report. Therefore, though critical, this criticism is intended to be constructive. In general terms, the Report cuts down on our overseas representation, or alters it. Judging by its recommendations, it seems to have assumed, albeit tacitly, that imperial rule was an exercise in noninvolvement. Of course, the reverse was the case. By concentrating its recommendations for the future on an Area of Concentration—that is to say, about a dozen countries in Europe plus North America—and segregating countries such as Malaysia to the Outer Area, it is, in my view, deserting friends within the Commonwealth.
Trade seems to have been the motivating force behind the Committee's recommendations. Trade is important, but it can never be the sole arbiter. We are dealing with people as well as with goods. Our accumulated overseas experience, stretching back over decades into the past, is obviously quite unrivalled. Whether we like it or not, we are involved in sustaining the world order; and, with this experience, I would say, in all humility, that our duty is to shoulder that responsibility. Therefore, we should not cut down upon our overseas representation anywhere. In due course we shall probably have to increase it.
The tendency to-day is for bigness, if I may put it in that way. Takeover bids are an example of it. If we enter Europe, or join up with some other association, it seems certain that we shall increase our power to trade and our technological base. We shall need a strong and efficient Overseas Service in order to maximise the opportunities that will be open to us. We shall also need new friends. We have a ready-made association in the Commonwealth, powerful if used correctly, to sustain a world order, of benefit to Europe if we go in, and of ultimate and immense benefit to the Commonwealth itself. If this conception ever crossed the minds of the Committee, no mention of the fact appears anywhere in the Report. In fact, the Commonwealth receives scant consideration.

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If I understand the position correctly from Annex N, at page 197 of the Report, in an area of Malaya which I know well, the High Commission in Singapore is to be abolished. If I correctly understand the position envisaged in the Report, Kuala Lumpur in the Federation is to have a visiting officer from the Foreign Office here, who will fly out occasionally to the Kuala Lumpur mission overseas. Of what value can this possibly be, as compared with a resident officer living on the spot in Malaya? He would be in a far better position, if instructed to make any report required of him to London. In that situation, being resident on the spot, he is far more likely to be cognisant of all the relevant local facts. That could be of great importance.
The poignancy of the situation beocmes more apparent in part of a speech made by the Malayan Prime Minister at the Lord Mayor's Banquet in London, in January of this year. At the end of his speech he said:
"Without effective leadership in the Commonwealth it follows there can be no real feeling of togetherness and common loyalty to a cause."
I am fully aware that we have fallen over backwards to avoid leadership and to respect the individuality of individual nations; but I think that sometimes people who live and work overseas expect us to take more positive action in connection with the Commonwealth. That speech by the Malayan Prime Minister was made in January, and the Committee published its Report in July. The words of the Malayan Prime Minister would appear to have had little consideration in the minds of the Committee when they made their Report.
Before I go on to consider whether we are wanted anywhere, or whether there is a value to ourselves in an overseas presence, let me for once explode the idea that imperial rule was one of dominance and non-involvement. Administrators from this country lived for years in the countries they served. They studied the language, customs and cultures, and became absorbed in the lives of the people where they lived. That is of importance, even at the present day. That accumulated experience must not be lost. It is an experience which has not received
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the recognition so necessary if we are to be of any worthwhile influence in the world, and it can be exercised only by increased overseas representatives living overseas. It is my submission that that representation must be maintained.
On this point may I quote the Singapore Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew. Incidentally, as I stated, if what is suggested in the Report is accepted, he is to lose the Singapore High Commission. Speaking to the Royal Commonwealth Society in London in January, he had this to say:
"It is difficult to take an optimistic view of the future of the Commonwealth if we look only at the immediate present. But let us look forward a few decades and perhaps backwards a few centuries, to see what indiciation they can give from past performance of future expectations. The last 400 years provide a picture of the capacity and quality of a unique island civilisation. This is not an exercise in nostalgia; I have no desire in recounting these events to try and revive a sensation of past grandeur. The fact remains that no island-nation has ever before in history created an Empire oveseas so vast and so powerful. At the end of Empire, there were centres of civilisation in North America—United States and Canada combined—five to six times bigger in population than Britain, six to seven times larger in industrial capacity; in Australia and New Zealand there were civilisations which could grow as big."
Surely, my Lords, in face of that, it is quite wrong to withdraw into ourselves in these Islands. We have an expertise and knowledge which it is our duty to use, and even more so in the Commonwealth if we go into Europe, as I have already stated.
Then Mr. Lee Kuan Yew continued. Talking of the Commonwealth ties he had this to say:
"There is a more sober assessment of the value of these ties. It is not just sentimental values. One advantage is that of not being overwhelmed in an unequal partnership or association with Americans or Russians. Commonwealth members may find it less stifling if, despite their proximity to the gravitational pulls of these countries with very big gross national products, they have at the same time some connections with the British in their economic, educational, and social fields. But the danger is that by the time this realisation sinks in it may be too late, because Britain may have dropped out of the top technological lead, or because, disgusted with the excesses of language and postures of Commonwealth members, she may have allowed her special knowledge and expertise of former administrators, merchants, bankers, technicians, to be lost as they age and pass away."

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Yes, my Lords, all I can say is that I hope that those words of the Prime Minister of Singapore are not lost on your Lordships in this debate to-night.
The final words Mr. Lee Kuan Yew had to say were as follows:
"The moral, both for Commonwealth members and for Britain, is that whatever the present disputes and quarrels, in the end the former dependencies may find the British and their technological and industrial power the most valuable and the most comfortable to make use of, provided, as the Russians and the Americans race to the Moon and Mars and beyond, Britain is able to keep abreast with the new frontiers of science and technology. It would be a great pity if and when the moment of truth arrives Britain has already dismantled the organisations and lost the expert knowledge and skills acquired through decades, and sometimes centuries, of association. Many people will be that much the poorer off if the knowledge and expertise now in the files of the Colonial Office, in the memories of former colonial administrators, in the engineers, technicians, merchants and bankers, are allowed to be lost."
My Lords, you have been patient, and I have spoken with the utmost sincerity. Somehow in the political sense this Report for me failed to rise to the occasion. I ask Her Majesty's Government, whatever the outcome of the debate this evening, to give careful consideration to this aspect of our Commonwealth affairs and to the words that have been spoken in what I consider to be a most inspiring speech, by Mr. Lee Kuan Yew. There are many countries overseas who greatly value the British connection, and if other Prime Ministers perhaps could have been as articulate as Mr. Lee Kuan Yew I am quite convinced that they would have expressed similar sentiments. I say that there is nothing incompatible with a strong and united Commonwealth and our entry into Europe. In my view both are desirable, but in that event it would probably be necessary to strengthen our representation overseas and increase the manning of the posts in these areas.
7.44 p.m.
LORD SHERFIELD: My Lords, as the ninth ex-Excellency to address your Lordships this evening I shall try to be brief and also not to be repetitive, though the last may be a little difficult. As has been said, there are two aspects to this Report; the framework in which the recommendations are placed, and the recommendations themselves. The frame
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work was at least partly conditioned by restrictive terms of reference. I agree with those who have criticised the theme of the Area of Concentration, but I do not propose to enlarge on it because I was reassured by the interpretation which the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, put on this theme on behalf of the Government.
I also agree with those who consider that too much emphasis has been laid on the role which the Foreign Office service officer should play in overseas trade and export promotion. That the Foreign Office should support, as one of its prime functions, British trade and investments overseas is a truism. But, first, politics and trade are still inseparable in most countries; and, secondly—and I think this does bear repetition—it is essential not to lose sight of the fact that, whatever else the Foreign Service can do, it cannot sell British goods. Only the manufacturer can do that, and it is undesirable that any other impression should get around, or that the British Foreign Service should be expected to substitute for British business.
Not long ago I visited a consul-general in the United States. He told me that he had received instructions to visit one of the most advanced electronics companies in the United States with the object of interesting them in some printed circuits of British manufacture. I begged him to do no such thing, but to wait until the manufacturer's representative came out and then to bring him together with the managing director of the firm; otherwise the attempt, difficult enough in any case, would lose all credibility. Now this may be an exceptional case, but if the Committee's recommendations are taken too literally the practice could spread. As regards the United States, I strongly agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, had to say; and for some of the reasons that he gave I am myself very dubious about the proposal to transform some of our consulates-general in the United States into trade commissions.
Having made these two general comments on the frame of reference of the Report I find myself in agreement with the great majority of the specific recommendations which are made in it. Here I will confine myself to one series of recommendations, those in Chapter 12, on Accommodation, and especially to the conclusion that the proportion of owned

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to rented property is too small and that an overseas development estate board should be set up to own, administer and manage overseas diplomatic accommodation. This subject has been more than touched on in this debate, but I make no apology for stressing it, and I gave notice of my intention to do so.
The policy of renting accommodation has always been favoured by the Treasury, partly because it causes less noticeable fluctuations in the Estimates than capital expenditures, and partly because, though expensive, it is riskless in the sense that there is no danger of being stuck with a capital asset overseas. It also creates less administrative trouble, and is free from possible errors in purchase, or political and other changes in overseas countries. To be fair, there is a case to be made on these lines, but I often wonder what this country has lost on balance by this policy. Let me give one example from my own experience.
Those of your Lordships who have been to the Embassy in Washington will know that its land ends in a peninsula between Massachusetts Avenue and Observatory Circle. The plot at the extremity of this peninsula was once owned by the Government of Panama. When I first went to Washington, in 1931, our Embassy was negotiating with the Panamanians for the purchase of this plot, but the negotiations broke down because the Treasury said that 20,000 dollars was an absurd price to pay for a plot of land in North West Washington.
When I returned to the Embassy towards the end of the war, I found that negotiations had been reopened with the Panamanians for the purchase of this plot, but they broke down again because the Treasury said that 80,000 dollars was an absurd price to pay for a plot of land in North-West Washington. When I went back for a third time in 1953, six years and one sterling devaluation later, I found that negotiations had again been resumed with the Panamanians for the purchase of their plot. And it was a case of third time lucky! I had the pleasure of personally signing a contract in the sum of 180,000 dollars. I do not vouch for the exact figures; only for their relativity. But this is only one example of the many opportunities that the British Government have missed in Washington alone in the last forty years.
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The Plowden Report, in paragraph 541, specifically recommended six years ago that Her Majesty's Government should own a far higher proportion of the living and working accommodation occupied by members of the Diplomatic Service overseas. The fact that the Duncan Committee have now repeated this recommendation, with rather stronger emphasis, seems to me to suggest that not too much has been done to implement the Plowden recommendations. I do not know whether this is a fair inference, although the inability of the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, to say anything on the point aroused some suspicion in my mind. I have indeed little doubt that the Treasury will oppose the recommendations of the Duncan Report as resolutely as they have opposed similar recommendations in the past, and I hope that on this occasion my old Department will have no success.
Arising from this is the need, stressed by both the Plowden and the Duncan Reports, to give adequate allowances for proper accommodation to officers serving overseas. The belief that diplomats live "the life of Reilly" and should have their standard reduced is an old one and dies hard. It was repudiated by the Plowden Report. I am encouraged by what the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, said on this subject to think that the Duncan Report has finally given it its quietus.
I should like to stress very briefly a couple of broad points to which the Committee referred but with which they were not able to deal at length, and which have been touched on very little in the course of the debate this afternoon. The Committee rightly draw attention to the changed, the diminished, role of British foreign policy in the contemporary world, and to the consequential change in the requirements of our representation. Our diplomacy—the Committee refer to the "new diplomacy"—now and in the future will be increasingly deployed in international negotiations and in comprehensive questions involving a wide range of departmental interests. Obvious examples are the Common Market and EFTA, Space, the Seabed and environmental problems. These questions require a very high degree of interdepartmental co-operation.
There is nothing new in the concept of a member or members of the Foreign

1023
Office leading a team of departmental officials in international negotiations: I did it myself many times in different fields. The idea that members of the Foreign Service are incapable of understanding, and therefore of negotiating, technical subjects is often held but is quite unjustified. There is a technique of negotiations which stands in its own right, and the most technical subject gets entangled in politics once it is internationalised. Until recently this type of problem has been dealt with in part by specialist attachés under the general guidance of the head of a mission. The Duncan Committee—quite rightly, in my opinion —recommend that most of these specialist attachés should be suppressed and their functions brought within the general work of the chancery. For example, the labour attachés have been sacred cows for some years now and it would be much better if Foreign Service officers were required to perform their duties in the future as the Committee recommend.
I am sure that the method of dealing with these comprehensive subjects needs more attention than the Duncan Committee were able to give to it. It particularly involves the relationship of the Foreign Service to the rest of the bureaucracy, and demands a very close understanding between them. The fact that the Home Service is now being "Fultonised" makes this even more important. This understanding could be fostered, as the Committee indeed recommend, by the interchange of personnel between Departments. But it also requires acceptance by other Departments of the idea that the Foreign Office should take the lead in international negotiations, and puts a corresponding duty on the members of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to study and understand the problems and the points of view of other Departments.
In addition to the normal process of intercommunication, some special steps probably need to be taken to provide for an emerging negotiation—for example, on the sea-bed—through some kind of interdepartmental task force under Foreign Office leadership. That would be nothing new. It was the pattern of the negotiations for setting up and running the O.E.E.C. in its early days, as the noble Lord, Lord Gore-Booth, will remember. But perhaps now it needs to be further
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systematised. My Lords, the "new diplomacy" as defined by the Committee is not so very new, but it is right that the changed requirements of our representation abroad should have been spelled out in the specific recommendations of the Committee, and in general I welcome them.
7.56 p.m.
LORD FULTON: My Lords, I wish to join in thanking the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, for making this opportunity available to us for discussing the Duncan Committee's Report. The Committee dealt with the Foreign Service in the large, it dealt with the British Council, and it dealt with the Overseas Services of the British Broadcasting Corporation. The Addison rules inhibit any Governor of the B.B.C. who is a Member of your Lordships' House from speaking on the Corporation's affairs. Therefore, I can assure the House that it will hear nothing from me at this late hour on that subject. But no such obstacle is put in my way as Chairman of the British Council. Having declared my interest, I am glad that I am free in that capacity to say that we are grateful to the members of the Duncan Committee for their labours, and welcome what they have had to say about the British Council's work and future.
The noble Earl in opening the debate, and other noble Lords who have followed him, expressed doubt about the phrase,
"Shifting the balance of the Council's activities towards Western Europe."
I think we read this at the Council in the context that the present ratio of activity in Western Europe, as opposed to the Council's work in the rest of the world, is between one to three and one to four. We did not suppose that they were suggesting the substitution of one share for the other, but that more should be done in Western Europe than is the case now; and that they were proposing to restore some of the work which suffered in Europe by the Drogheda Committee's recommendations—very much welcomed at the time—to increase the weight of the Council's work in the developing countries, as a result of which a cut-back took place in Europe.
We noted with satisfaction the recognition in the Duncan Report that to

1025
increase what is done in Europe might involve increasing the Council's resources to enable them to do it. As I see it, there is a strong case for doing more in Europe without losing momentum elsewhere. We cannot, as it seems to me, he fully credible as a nation offering itself for membership of the European Economic Community so long as our young people—I take this as only one illustrative example—turn their eyes, when they plan their post-graduate intellectual pilgrimages, so overwhelmingly across the Atlantic. Much more could be done to build cultural bridges to Europe, so long as it does not impair the work which the Council does in the rest of the world.
We greatly welcomed the Committee's recognition that the work of the Council is long-term. It is, in the broadest sense of the word, educational. Such work, if it is to be effective, has to be seen (and carried out) on a long time-scale. Thus "stop and go", taking away in lean years in the hope of giving back when times are better, could not be otherwise than a wasteful way of doing the Council's work. It would be bad education and, as your Lordships will realise, bad politics, too.
We welcome the acceptance by the Committee of the Council's need for independence. The Council is grateful for the encouragement and assistance it receives in London from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Overseas Development, as it is for the generosity of the help and co-operation given overseas by Ambassadors and High Commissioners and their staffs. These debts are wholeheartedly acknowledged. Yet it remains one of the greatest assets of the Council that its officers in the overseas field stand outside the inevitable ups and downs which must from time to time affect the relationships between States and Governments. The career of the young man or woman who joins the British Council offers a splendid opportunity to win overseas what so many of them have achieved—a unique measure of trust and the privilege of being consulted on many of the matters most closely touching the future wellbeing of the countries in which they serve.
It is, my Lords, one of the pleasant duties which are laid upon the Chairman of the British Council to travel to some
1026
of the 70 countries where the Council is represented. It was very heartening to have heard in all those countries which I have been privileged to visit, from Heads of State, Ministers, heads of Government Departments, Vice-Chancellors of Universities and leading professional men and women of every kind, their testimony to the kind of special relationship that the Council (as they see it, in large part as a consequence of its independence) enjoys.
One final point at this late hour—and I hope it will not be thought to be special pleading. There are everywhere great numbers of unsatisfied potential customers of the Council, if I may be permitted to use that word. What do they want? They want our help with the language: most of them, of course, not as a first language but in the harder and complex task of teaching and learning English as a second language. I have no doubt that fifty years on, or even less, the English language will be even more dominant that it is to-day as a vehicle of communication, across the barriers of oceans, race, religion and nationalism between groups of like-minded people who share together concerns and interests vital to the survival and progress of humanity. We cannot refuse the right sort of help which it is in our power to give, as the creators of the language and so much of the literature which sprang from it, to so many people who have chosen it to be their window on the world. They want, too, a selection of their young people—the future leaders of their countries—to have a chance to share our educational experience and expertise; to absorb some of our talent in science and technology and our skills in public and industrial administration and organisation.
The longer I have been privileged to watch the work of the Council from my point of vantage the more I am convinced that, whatever may have been the case when Empire and Colonial responsibilities were being shed, a great opportunity awaits this country now. We are a people who have shown over a long history a polhical stability unequalled in the history of the world; we have been able to innovate without laying waste what has gone before; we can create new solutions from our differences and differ without fracturing the basis of our common life;

1027
and we have handled with some success what appeared to be, and what have been proved by others to be, intractable social and economic problems. In short, we have, perhaps, a gift for the highest forms of social engineering which is not guaranteed even to those who possess material resources far larger than our own. The origins of our virtues, if we may call them so, lie deep in our history. If there are those overseas who wish to understand what lies behind them and what lies behind their questions, our biggest single task is to help to enlighten them.
I wish to thank those noble Lords, from every part of the House, who have spoken with such insight about the Council's work, and have given such a welcome encouragement to those whose careers are being devoted to its objects overseas.
8.5 p.m.
LORD BETHELL: My Lords, I have been daunted during this debate by so much diplomatic talent and experience that I shall be briefer than usual, especially as the hour is now late. First of all, I should like to draw your Lordships' attention to and to concentrate my microscope on a small part of the Duncan Report—that part which concerns the external services of the B.B.C. In doing so, I am hoping that many of my remarks will prove to be superfluous, because I was very encouraged when the noble Lord the Leader of the House said in his speech that he personally did not agree with many of the conclusions of Sir Val Duncan and his troika. But I must add my voice to what I hope is the Government's, and argue against cuts in the foreign language broadcasts of the B.B.C., which seem to be suggested by Sir Val Duncan. He seems to have had a brief to improve the audibility of the B.B.C., which is thoroughly necessary, by providing a larger sum of money which would be obtained from cuts in the foreign language services of the B.B.C.
In that part of the Report which deals with this matter, I find a sentence which contains so many doubtful statements that I must refer to it in particular. It is on page 103, and it reads:
"It seems fair to predict that in many countries the B.B.C.'s external services will have
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the greatest effect upon the educated and professional classes, for whom English will often be the main lingua franca …"
This is true, of course, but I am disturbed by the use of words like "many" and "often", because this does not really draw one to a logical conclusion. It rather implies the idea of, "All right, but what about the others?" What about North Africa, where English is not the lingua franca; what about South Africa, where English is not the lingua franca; what about South-East Asia, Central and Eastern Europe? These parts of the world also deserve our attention and the attention of the B.B.C. These parts of the world also have educated and professional classes, and it would be a terrible mistake to neglect them.
The Report goes on to say, in the same paragraph:
"We consider that the long-term advantage lies with broadcasting in the English language, and that broadcasting in foreign languages is of lower priority. We have the impression that a broadcast in the vernacular makes the educated listener, with whom we are dealing here, feel that it is being specially slanted to him, and that he is therefore likely to be that much less receptive."
I really see very little logic in that sentence. In the first place, why should an educated professional man feel, simply because a broadcast is in his own language, that it is being specially slanted to him? I really do not see much merit in that argument. But, even if it were true, why should he therefore be that much less receptive to a broadcast which is being specially slanted to him? These are several of the many points in this paragraph which have puzzled me and which I hope puzzle the Government as well.
The Report goes on to speak on two or three occasions about the influential few who, to judge by the main gist of the Report, one assumes speak English, and to whom we should direct the bulk of our information and the bulk of our broadcasts. I really do not know whether this is a good idea. So often the influential few are a doubtful commodity. Who decides who are the influential few? Who knows who they are? And how often, my Lords, do the influential few turn, through some drastic turn of events, into the extremely uninfluential few, into the imprisoned few or the dead few? These things happen in countries with which

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we are very closely concerned the whole time and I do not see any point in concentrating too much on it.
Having said that, I must confess that I agree with the Report when it emphasises the need to improve audibility. A friend of mine who was recently employed in the High Commission in Delhi had as part of his job to listen to the overseas service of the B.B.C. For this, he had to provide himself with an extremely expensive wireless set which cost £150. I do not know whether he paid for it or whether the High Commission paid for it; but he had to have such a set. Even so, and getting up at 8 o'clock in the morning, he found great difficulty in hearing the news in English. One would imagine that Delhi was an important town from the British Information point of view. The audibility in India in general is clearly very poor and needs improvement.
But in my submission this does not mean that audibility should be provided for by money raised from cutting the foreign language service. I am hopeful that this Report has been overtaken by events and I am encouraged in this hope not only by what the noble Lord the Leader of the House said to-day but also by what he said on May 21 in the debate on broadcasting, when in reply to pleas that I made for better facilities for the B.B.C. external services he was good enough to say that I need not assume that my remarks would pass entirely unnoticed. More than that, he went on to say that it may well be that in this area circumstances will demand further increases. He used the word "increases". Now that is an entirely different kettle of fish from the Duncan Report where we seemed to be reading about cuts. Still I am glad to say that it is the Government's voice which counts, and I am confident that the Government will do what they think to be right. I look forward with eagerness to the increases to which the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, referred on May 21. I know that these things take time, but I hope that the Government will not postpone matters too much.
Now, my Lords, to relinquish the microscope and return to the Report in general, I must say that I am disturbed by the problem of recruiting and keeping the most talented graduates of our major universities in the Diplomatic Service. I
1030
recall that when I graduated from university in 1961 very many of the most talented undergraduates applied to join the Service. I do not know the exact figures; there might be 1,000 applicants and 20 would be selected. So the Diplomatic Service really got the pick of the bunch. The trouble is that those people, now in their early 30s, are faced with a very difficult situation. Large numbers of them are either thinking of leaving the Service or have left the Service.
This is a very serious matter. It is all the more serious because I have the impression that it is the best people who are leaving the Service. In the nature of their duties they come into contact with prospective employers in other lines of business in the City and in foreign trade. They meet businessmen who consult them while in foreign missions; and these senior businessmen are quick to spot talent and quick to take out their cheque books and take them on—especially when they may be young men in their early 30s, perhaps married and with young children. A man of that age may have just reached the rank of First Secretary. He knows that there is a long haul ahead, perhaps as much as 15 years, before any further promotion can be considered, and he is very susceptible to a lucrative offer from a commercial! concern. That is why I am encouraged by the suggestion in the Report—and I hope that the Government will take it seriously —that the most talented of the younger diplomats should be promoted on merit and that there should not be the rigid promotional structure which seems to have been a facet of the Diplomatic Service till now.
The main deficiency in this Report, it seems to me, is the implication that cuts can be made without reducing the effectiveness of the Foreign Service. In consular work, for example, it seems obvious that the work will increase in future years —that the number of tourists will increase. They have their problems when they are abroad and they will need more help and attention from our consular representatives as they travel abroad in greater numbers. Of course, Parliament is only too ready to take up the matter of British subjects who have not received the proper consular treatment when they have got into difficulties abroad—and rightly so, because this is

1031
one of the services which the taxpayer expects as part of the return on the taxes he pays.
A number of noble Lords have, rightly, corrected the widespread image that there seems to be abroad of the Foreign Service as a sort of cocktail-party set of aristocrats, men who buy their whisky at 8s. the bottle and their cigarettes at 9d. for 20, and who lead a social, gay, Lord Curzon type of life. That is nonsense, and I am delighted that it has been corrected by so many Members of this House who have addressed your Lordships to-day. The fact is that members of the Foreign Service have for a number of months felt "got at", pinched and harassed. They have the feeling that it is always their Service which is the subject of inquiries—two in five years—and that they are the ones who are going to be hit; that it is they who are going to be contracted if contraction happens—which the Report says should happen.
That brings me to my final point, which is a basic one and concerns the relevance of this Report in general. I know that it was commissioned in August, 1968, and that the three compilers of the Report were asked by the Foreign Secretary
"to bear in mind, in the light of the current need for the strictest economy, the importance of obtaining the maximum value for all British Government expenditure and the consequent desirability of providing British overseas representation at lesser cost:".
Here, again, I see a certain non sequitur. Does it mean that if we provide British overseas representation at lesser cost we get better value for British Government expenditure? Not necessarily. That is one of the things which is the most doubtful about this Report. But again I am hoping that the Report has been overtaken by events. It was commissioned nearly 15 months ago and I wonder whether it is now so urgent that we should save £5 million or £10 million. Maybe it is not, Certainly, to judge by what the leaders of the Government have told us, our position is much better.
We are in a very optimistic state of mind, so do we need to make these savings? I should like to believe the Government's optimism and to make the logical assumption that these savings are no longer needed. If that is so, no one will be mere pleased than I. The trouble
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with this Report, objectively, is that it recommends cuts in real terms in two of our institutions which are most admired abroad, the Diplomatic Service and the external services of the B.B.C. To dismantle them is easy and it could be done very quickly. To build is so much harder and takes so much longer.
8.21 p.m.
LORD PLOWDEN: My Lords, I should like first to join noble Lords in congratulating the noble Viscount, Lord Hood, on his constructive maiden speech. I hope it means that he will speak often in your Lordships' House. Perhaps I ought to declare an interest, as Chairman of a former Committee of Inquiry into the Foreign Service. If I am somewhat critical of some parts of the Duncan Report, I can assure your Lordships that it is in no sense of rivalry.
I want to begin by paying a tribute to the work of the Committee. They covered a great deal of ground, both physically and metaphorically, in a very short time and they produced a most concise and constructive Report. It is an example to all Committees, though I suspect that few will be able to achieve the same rate of working. In Chapter II of their Report the Committee, after describing some of their recommendations, go on to say in paragraph 12:
"The methods and manner of applying these principles should be so far as possible left to the Diplomatic Service itself to devise. … Once the necessary adjustments have been achieved, we hope it will be possible to allow the Service an adequate 'settling down' period undisturbed by further major changes or enquiries."
Then they go on to say:
"No plant can be expected to be healthy if its roots are constantly being pulled up to see how they are growing."
The expressions set out in that paragraph, I submit, applied before the Committee was set up; indeed, what I am suggesting is that the Committee should never have been set up—there should have been no Committee. After the traumatic experience of amalgamating the Commonwealth Relations Service with the Foreign Service, the Service should have been given an adequate settling-down period and should not have been subjected to another inquiry, no matter how friendly and how constructive. Any organisation, if it is constantly being looked at, and "pulled up by the

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roots", to use the Committee's expression, is bound to have its morale affected. I fear that this is another example of how Governments—all Governments; it is not a Party matter—when they do not know quite what to do, set up a Committee and hope that something may happen, or at least that they need not do anything for a time.
But, having said that, I would go on to say that, if there had to be a Committee, one could not have asked for a better one. I feel that the Committee have been unfairly criticised in two respects. First, there is their suggestion of dividing the world into two areas, the Area of Concentration and the Outer Area. Of course, the choice of words was unfortunate, and I think it may have even done some harm. But, my Lords, the division is only the recognition of a fact. Even when we were the centre of a great Empire there were some areas of the world which were of greater interest to us than others; and to-day, of course, the situation has changed again.
I welcomed the remarks of the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, and the noble Lord the Leader of the House, in saying that discrimination was needed but that the difference was drawn too sharply. For these reasons I welcome the recommendation of the Committee that we should be represented in all countries, and that they did not allow themselves to be seduced into saying that we should be represented in only one country and that the Embassy there should cover a number of other countries; because that, I submit, is quite a false idea. It cannot be done.
The other matter about which I think the Committee have been unfairly criticised is the emphasis they have laid on commercial work. Any of us who have had to deal with the balance of payments since the war know how important it is that we should pay our way—indeed, all our interests, diplomatic, military or anything else, depend on that. Although the noble Lord, Lord Caccia, said that we all understood that, I think it is an over-simplification. I think that the country at large, and indeed some parts of Whitehall, have in the last 25 years been willing to take risks on the balance of payments, thinking that it would all come right in the end. Well, my Lords,
1034
it does not always come right in the end. Therefore, I think it is right to emphasise the commercial side of the work. None the less, there is a great danger in trying to differentiate between commercial and political work. Various noble Lords have already made this point this afternoon.
In many countries of the so-called Outer Area what industrialists most want to know is the political state of the country. How stable is the country? Who is going to form the next Government? What is going to happen? They can assess the commercial risks for themselves, but the political information they can get only from our representatives in the country itself. For that reason I do not think that one can draw this distinction between commercial and political work. Again, in various countries of the so-called Outer Area there are vast British investments, some dating perhaps from before the war and others since the war. In those countries we need the Embassies and High Commissions to be adequately staffed so that they are able to give advice and guidance to industrialists about what they should do to protect those investments; to advise and help when discriminatory action is taken by Governments against the investments, and indeed, in the worst case, when expropriation comes, to be able to take quick and appropriate action.
There are a great many subjects touched on in the Report which were touched on by the Committee of which I had the honour to be Chairman. There is the perennial subject of reporting. As some noble Lords have said, the amount of reporting you can do is limited only by the facilities which you have for doing it. That means, I think, that there must be some kind of mechanism for controlling it. Both Committees recommended machinery for doing this. Whether such machinery exists or not, I do not know. I suspect not. One of the first things Ministers have to accept is that they cannot have reports on everything whenever they want them; and if they will ration themselves in this respect we shall get some economy in the amount of reporting done from overseas posts.
Both Committees recommended that there should be a 10 per cent. margin of staff to allow for travel, training, sickness and so on. I think I am right in saving

1035
that the Government accepted only 7½ per cent. on the recommendation of our Committee, but I doubt whether even now they have as much as that. I urge the Government to accept that this is a sensible thing to do. It is not a waste of resources; it is an effort to get the best out of existing resources.
Then, my Lords, there is the question to which the noble Lord, Lord Sheffield, referred, of accommodation. This is a perennial question; it is something that everyone has "had a go" at, and still nothing seems to happen. I think that the recommendation of the Duncan Committee to set up a Crown Corporation—I wish that we had been able to think of something like that—offers some way of starting to do something. And remember the amount of money which has been wasted through renting accommodation which could have been bought for a fraction of what we paid in rent.
There is also the question of travel. Both Committees recommended that there should be greater liberality in travel on official business. I do not think it is any secret that at the present time it is extremely difficult for officers in the Foreign Service in London to get permission to travel to the countries for which they are responsible in London. This is absolute folly. No business of any worth would put an embargo on its people from head office going to visit people in subsidiary companies overseas. This is absurd. Yet this happens with our Overseas Service operating from here in London.
I should like to come to the question of conditions of service. This is a subject on which our Committee spent a great deal of time. We found that this was an extremely vexed (if that is the right word) question. Morale was low in the Service. Various noble Lords have referred to the burden that falls on wives. They are unpaid; they have a job to do which goes on all the time. We found among officers who had no private means that many of them were in financial difficulties. Mothers of young children were unable to afford to have their children out to see them more than once a year, which was the regulation. It was said that in the days of the Indian Empire people did not see their children for a very long time. But we are not
1036
living now in the days of the Indian Empire. Aeroplanes exist; and it is difficult when those in Embassies overseas see the families of commercial people able to come out and see them.
Because of this state of affairs, these difficulties, we made comprehensive recommendations about the conditions of service. As noble Lords will understand, families of diplomats inevitably feel, during the course of their service, strain, frustration, upheaval, and even danger. Everything must be done to try to get them as normal a family life as possible. Parents must be able to see their children; and the children must have a normal education, which usually means going to a boarding school in England.
Over and above that there is the question of specialisation. Many of the specialisations mean that the diplomats and their families have to live in areas which are either politically or climatically difficult; that is to say, behind the Iron Curtain or in South-East Asia. This can be made more bearable only by making the conditions of service reasonable. I stress this point because I fear that attempts will always be made to cut back on this kind of service. In Chapter II of their Report the Duncan Committee say:
"The conditions of service prescribed for the Diplomatic Service in the Plowden Report represent a kind of charter which has established confidence and set the standards necessary for an efficient Service. These standards should be preserved as an essential basis for the future well-being of the Service."
I warmly endorse that paragraph, and I hope that the Government will pay great attention to it.
In conclusion, my Lords, I would say that, although I do not think a further Committee should have been set up, the results of the Committee's inquiry show that we have a really good Foreign Service; and the Committee have pointed the way to various modifications which will better enable it to adapt itself to a changing world.
8.35 p.m.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: My Lords, I should like at the outset of my remarks to congratulate the noble Viscount, Lord Hood, on his excellent maiden speech. He is an old friend of mine. It was a great delight to listen to him, and I hope that we shall have

1037
the pleasure of hearing from him often in the future. We have been debating the Duncan Report for something like six hours, and in my opinion it has been a debate which has shown your Lordships' House at its very best, fulfilling a function which it is best fitted to fulfil. We have had a series of speeches from men of vast experience: heads of the Foreign Office, heads of the Commonwealth Office, a colonial officer, businessmen, ambassadors and Ministers who have been at the Foreign Office and at the Commonwealth Office, and all have had important contributions to make.
I am particularly pleased that the noble Lord, Lord Plowden, should have immediately preceded me, for I am entirely of the same view that he expressed in his opening remarks; namely, that this Committee should never have been set up. Only one noble Lord has referred in detail to the terms of reference which were accepted by Sir Val Duncan and his two courageous colleagues. The noble Lord in question was Lord Bethell, and I should like to congratulate him on an excellent speech. The noble Lord reminded us of the circumstances when this review was called for, and if your Lordships will bear with me for a moment, I will just go over the ground. It was called for seven months after Her Majesty's Government had devalued the pound, at a time when our economic difficulties were very severe indeed, and when our balance of payments troubles were appalling. As the noble Lord, Lord Bethell, has said, times are better now.
The terms of reference are rather extraordinary. It starts with the words, "To review urgently". It is almost as though the Treasury had imposed this review in a state of panic; and I believe it would not be too much to say that this review was called for in a state of panic and was produced prematurely. Her Majesty's Government insisted that, if possible, it should be produced in six months. I think the remarkable thing is that it is as good a Report as it is. My impression on reading the Report, as I have many times, is that the authors all the time had real distaste for what they found them. selves engaged upon. For whenever they were putting forward suggestions, in accordance with the request of Her Majesty's Government, to curtail the costs, they always qualified them; they
1038
went towards the thing, put forward their suggestions, and they quickly recoiled, realising, I think, that many of the suggestions were just cheeseparing and were things that would do harm to a great Service.
At the end of the day what were we going to gain out of this?—a saving of perhaps £5 million or £10 million. I submit to your Lordships that this is not the way to correct the problem of our balance of payments. I believe that there are many directions in which Her Majesty's Government could turn their attention far more profitably than by tinkering about with a great Service that does not need to have its functions and its skill curtailed. Your Lordships will allow me to remind you of the terms of reference of the Plowden Committee. They were:
"To review the purpose, structure and operation of the services responsible for representing the interests of the United Kingdom Government overseas, both in Commonwealth and in foreign countries; and to make recommendations, having regard to changes in political, social and economic circumstances in this country and overseas."
Broadly speaking, the terms of reference are similar, but where there is the greatest dissimilarity is that in the terms of reference for the Duncan Review tile emphasis is all on lesser cost and,
"to report within six months in order that the benefit of any savings may accrue as rapidly as possible."
Surely, there is an element of panic in this. There has been criticism of the emphasis put on the commercial side. This was called for, this was enjoined upon the Committee, particularly on the furtherance of British commercial and economic interests overseas. So naturally the authors of this Report had to give emphasis to the commercial interests overseas, because that is what they were asked to do.
I have noticed throughout the debate a tendency to assume that this Report is going to be implemented. Why should this be so? We have had many other Reports. We have had the Plowden Report, and that has not been implemented. We go on having Reports. They are not all implemented, so why in pity's name should this one he implemented? I believe there are many sensible things in this Report, but I must say that I

1039
find the central theme of it utterly wrong utterly misdirected and terribly shortsighted.
We have built up over the years a great Service to which this country owes so much. One of the great assets we possess is a grasp of world affairs. If I may use a German expression, we have a weltanschaulich in this country. This is something which is special to the British people. If we are eventually accepted into the European Economic Community I believe that this will be one of the principal assets that we can bring to that Organisation. I think there is a tendency for them to be a little inward-looking. Perhaps it will be a good thing if we get into the European Economic Community if, through the know-how and experience we have, we can bring to them a sense of the world and not just of Europe. This seems to me to be a priceless asset. If I have understood the Report, the suggestion is that we should reduce our activities in many parts of the globe and concentrate on what they call this Area of Concentration—I do not say let the rest of the world go hang, but have less information about it than we have at present. This is a very grave error.
I was considerably encouraged by the speech of the noble Lord the Leader of the House. He assured us that Her Majesty's Government felt (and I made a note of his words) that the divisions had been too sharply drawn between what the Report describes as the Area of Concentration, and the Outer Area. Here I so much agreed with the noble Lord, Lord Gore-Booth. For heaven's sake! let us bury once and for all this expression "Outer Area". It is utterly distasteful. Let it be forgotten and never used again.
I thought that the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, although he was able to reassure us on this point, was disappointingly vague on another point which a large number of your Lordships referred to, and all agreed upon. I made a note—which is possibly incomplete—of all those noble Lords supporting the Overseas Diplomatic Estates Board. First, the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, to whom we owe such a debt of gratitude for introducing this Motion. I should say in fairness that the right honourable gentleman
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the Foreign Secretary, when he announced the laying of this Report before Parliament, invited comment and discussion. One must be honest and fair about that. He did not just accept it; he said that it needed a great deal of discussion and thought. I am very glad that the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, took up his invitation.
Noble Lords who supported O.D.E.B. (as I think it might be called) were Lord Selkirk, Lord Jellicoe, Lord Gladwyn, Lord Hood, Lord Gore-Booth, Lord Caccia, Lord Inchyra, Lord Sherfield, Lord Plowden and probably some other noble Lords whom I did not note. That is a pretty formidable forum of opinion in favour of some idea of this sort. I think some noble Lords qualified the matter a little, but they thought that an idea of this type was valuable. Unfortunately, the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, was able to give us only a rather vague reply. He said that if the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, who is to reply, was able to give any more information, he would do so. I hope that the noble Lord is in a position to give more information on this point. If he is not, I hope at least he will faithfully report to his superiors the weight of support in favour of this idea.
I did not feel at all happy about Lord Shackleton's observations concerning superannuation and premature retirement. He said that Her Majesty's Government looked upon this as a matter of importance and urgency, but he did not give us any idea about what Her Majesty's Government intended to do. We have heard what the 30 senior officers of the Service, who have already been prematurely retired, are going to get. I must say that I am far from satisfied by what I have heard. What is to follow for the others? This is a very important matter: it is not only a question of being fair to people who have served their country, it is also a question of not discouraging young men who are going into the Services. It is a very important question of morale, and I beg Her Majesty's Government to think seriously about it, to think quickly and act. This seems to be a matter of absolutely cardinal importance.
There is another aspect of the Report which I find utterly distasteful. I have the feeling—I hope wrongly—that its

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authors really have lost faith in the value of being British. This is something which I say with great diffidence, because I have the greatest respect for the authories of this Report, but somehow there seems to me to run through this Report a devaluation of the currency of Britishness. I hope I am wrong, but that is the impression which I drew from the Report. There is nothing very frightening or alarming about facing up to the fact, as the noble Lord, Lord Caccia, said, that this country is now no longer in the first line. We know that perfectly well. It is perfectly true, but we still have an influence. From the Report, it seems to me that there is a misconception—I think a very serious one—that if you do not have power you do not have influence. This seems to me to be a very old-fashioned idea. The power that the British people have is in their welldeserved—I think I know what the noble Lord is saying to his noble friend: that I have contradicted myself. But I am not speaking about the power of guns, or about the power of money; I am speaking about the power of persuasion, the power of influence and the power of a high reputation in the world. We still have this. The noble Lord will have ample opportunity to reply when I sit down, and I will sit down very soon. As I say, this power is something we still possess.
I believe that we still have a vital contribution to make in the councils of the world. I was so pleased to hear the noble Lord the Leader of the House assure us that, in so far as the Security Council is concerned, there is no question of curtailment or cheeseparing there. If we cut down on our services overseas, if we cut down on our political reporting, we are going to throw away one of our great assets; we are going to throw away our knowledge and understanding of the whole world. When we go to the conference table, whether it be in European conferences, in international conferences or supranational conferences, we should be, and remain, well informed so that we can make fair comment and so that our observations are respected because those present understand that we know what we are talking about. If we follow some of the advice which seems to me to be in this Duncan Report, I should have thought there would be a
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very grave risk that this great asset will be thrown away. I hope that, now that we have achieved a better economic situation, many of the ideas contained in this Report, which are there solely to save money, will be reconsidered very carefully.
Like many other noble Lords who have spoken, I agree with a great many of what I may call the "nuts and bolts" suggestions in this Report. Noble Lords with far more knowledge and experience than I have welcomed them and congratulated the authors on putting them into this Report. I have nothing to say on that score, but I hope that when it comes to cutting down on the scale, cutting down on the activities of the Foreign Service, we shall not think that this is the right way to correct our imbalance of payments. I do not believe this to be so.
One or two points came out in the course of the debate to which I should like to refer before I sit down. One very important point, I thought, was made by the noble Viscount, Lord Hood; and it was repeated by two of his former colleagues. It is the question of friendly personal relationships. I am sure that one cannot exaggerate their importance. Friendly personal relationships are not achieved, in my submission, by just getting into an aeroplane and flying over to foreign capitals for short visits. This is not the way in which these friendly relationships are achieved. One of the functions of Her Majesty's Diplomatic Service is of course to establish these friendly relationships, to get on terms with the people in the country concerned, so that they know what is going on; so that when the commercial gentlemen come out they are able to give them a clear picture of the political situation in the country, and the businessmen can then take the necessary steps and necessary decisions.
It will not have escaped your Lordships that we had two very interesting speeches one after the other: one from the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, speaking as a businessman, immediately followed by the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Gore-Booth, speaking as a former professional diplomat. So far as I could see, they were in complete agreement that the function of a diplomat is not to be a trade; that his function is to explain to

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the trade, the businessman, the situation and the political background, and then to let the businessman get on with it. I am convinced that this is right. I have a little experience of it myself. I have travelled extensively throughout the world, at the taxpayers' expense, and this was the impression I most certainly drew. Although the Overseas Service can help very much in this respect, it is not the job of the Overseas Service to try to act as travelling salesmen. Indeed, I think what the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, said was perfectly true: that they might even hinder the export drive.
I do not want to detain your Lordships, but there is one other point upon which perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, could give us reassurance. There was the question of the 10 per cent. margin. I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, is able to help us over this. I did not think that the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, was able to give us absolute assurance that it would be the determination of Her Majesty's Government to ensure that the 10 per cent. margin is achieved and maintained. I should like the noble Lord's help on that point.
One other point has hardly been touched on this evening, and that is the question of overseas investments. I think the noble Lord, Lord Trevelyan, mentioned it, and also the noble Lord, Lord Plowden; but not very much has been said about this subject. It seems to me that we must take into account the very considerable investments that we have in those areas which are not in the Area of Concentration. It is essential that the posts in those areas should be adequately and properly staffed so as to take care of these investments. I have a great many figures here; I am not going to read them to noble Lords, who are aware of the very large volume of investments in this area, which will increase.
As the noble Lord, Lord Ritchie-Calder, said in his interesting speech, it is surely desperately short-sighted to think only in terms of those areas which are shown in this Report as being the areas to which at present we export most. Nobody denies that what is in these diagrams is perfectly true. But this is what is going on to-day. Surely we must look ahead. The tempo of development in South-East Asia will accelerate very considerably
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in the next thirty years; the tempo of development in Latin America will accelerate very considerably. Yet we are urged to concentrate on those parts of the world where at present we are able to have our biggest exports. My Lords, we have got to go out and get others; we have to look ahead for the future. On this point, I am entirely with the noble Lord, Lord Ritchie-Calder.
I have spoken at greater length than I intended. Perhaps the words of the noble Lord, Lord Plowden, encouraged me to be a little more aggressive than I should have been. I regret that this Report was ever called for. I think it is a thousand pities, because what was needed was already set out in the Plowden Report. This Report has been called for only in order to make economies where economies should not be made.
8.58 p.m.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, we have had what I think will be generally accepted as a stimulating and, from the Government's point of view, a very useful debate. It has certainly been an excellent opportunity of hearing the views of your Lordships' House, which the Government will be taking into account in their further detailed consideration of the problems connected with the Duncan Report. I should like to join with other noble Lords in congratulating the noble Viscount, Lord Hood, on a very notable maiden speech. My first experience of the noble Viscount was as a new Minister in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office when I came across his very acute mind and great knowledge of a special Board which dealt with promotions; and from that I had a greater understanding of the problems within the Service.
I very much took the point of the noble Viscount. There are some of us who think of the Diplomatic Service as though it is some machine that ticks; it needs a little priming but it ticks—a kind of computer producing the information that Ministers or other diplomats may need. The Diplomatic Service is really based in the main on the men and the women who staff it. I have found it one of my great privileges during the last two and a half years of travelling in many parts of the world, to see many Embassies and many High Commissions of varying sizes, but I have always come away with the dominating thought of the great service that

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those men and women, particularly the wives (to whom credit has rightly been given) give to this country. I do not think my friends in the Diplomatic Service would wish it to be thought that their service overseas was a bed of nails. In some stations life is difficult, but in many stations life is good. It is good for this reason: that they are meeting men and women of a different service but in the same profession. They are also being involved in the life of the country, and I think that is a stimulating and satisfying experience for them. Therefore, my Lords, if I were asked to give one of the greatest qualities of a diplomat, I should reply that it would not be how he explains our case to another country but how he understands the other country and conveys that understanding to us.
My noble friend the Leader of the House has already dealt with the broad principles underlying the Duncan Report: the nature and the importance of commercial work, the Area of Concentration —comprehensive and selective—as well as the difficult but important problems of compensation for premature retirement. At this late hour I will not ask the House to let me go over all that ground again. Rather, if I may, I will pick up some of the points made during the debate which perhaps were not covered by my noble friend. I must say I did not agree with the noble Marquess, Lord Lansdowne, when he complained about the setting up of this Committee and this Report. I was given a note by my noble friend Lord Brown, and therefore I cannot take credit for it, but I think it is worth reading to the noble Marquess. My noble friend wrote this:
"Organisation is a function of the work which it is set up to do. If the work changes, then the organisation requires adaptation. Does anyone suggest that the world is not undergoing increasingly rapid change? If this is accepted, then there is need for constant adaptation of the organisation. Yes, even in the Diplomatic Service. It is therefore nonsense to suggest that it is wrong to examine the need for adaptation of the organisation at frequent intervals."
My Lords, perhaps one of the curses of British industry to-day is that it did not adapt itself with the movement of time.
LORD PLOWDEN: My Lords, does the noble Lord then reject the suggestion of the Duncan Committee that from now on the Service itself could investigate its
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own organisation and adapt itself to a changing world?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I will certainly come to that point, but I would not accept that at all. I believe that as we have been doing in the past we shall continue, but perhaps with greater expertise the re-examination, within the Service, as to the changes that are necessary.
LORD RITCHIE-CALDER: My Lords, does the noble Lord think it is a good idea to go on pulling up the potatoes to see whether they are growing? There are too many damned inquiries—I beg your Lordships' pardon; that is not Parliamentary language. I believe that in fact we have overdone this.
LORD SHEPHERD: The noble Lord may think so, but there are others who feel that we should look at all our life on a continuing basis to see whether it can be adapted.
My Lords, may I repeat that Her Majesty's Government are determined to ensure that the country gets full value for its money that is spent on our services overseas. The important thing is to look at what needs to be done first, and I am grateful for the various suggestions that have been made by noble Lords in this debate. I think it is true that if we decide that a task needs to be done, we must do it properly. I am sure the House would agree that, once the right levels of activity of our overseas representation have been decided upon, we should not be niggardly in making provision for it. We shall therefore be looking carefully at the objectives of our policy throughout the world to decide what are the proper scales and priorities. I believe it is a cardinal principle in establishing a system of overseas representation that it must be flexible enough to meet not only detailed changes in the tasks at particular posts overseas, but also more fundamental and lasting changes in the priorities of British policy and the style which it is appropriate for our representatives to assume in any particular period of our history.
At present Sir Val Duncan and his colleagues have rightly emphasised that the balance of payments must be the first priority of our foreign policy and our overseas representational services must be

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designed to make every possible contribution towards the solution of that problem. We have every confidence that this country is now set on a course which will enable us to strengthen our economy and to repay our debts accumulated over many years. We shall then have reached the position where anxieties about the exact state of our overseas payments in any period are no longer, in the words of the Report, "of towering importance".
We should not assume, however, that our overseas services could then afford to relax the efforts they are making to help our trade figures. It is noteworthy that overseas competitors, like Germany and Japan, attach great importance to the role of their diplomats overseas in the field of trade. But the resolution of our present difficulties will enable us to regain some of the flexibility which necessarily is denied to our external policies to-day. This, in turn, will enable our overseas services to give other objectives the importance they merit.
My Lords, we hear much of the new diplomacy: the expertise of the Diplomatic Service and their local knowledge and contacts overseas are an essential element in the conduct of intergovernmental business, described in the Duncan Report as "the new diplomacy". The growth of the multilateral context, to which the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn referred, will certainly continue in the economic field, and it will assume even greater importance for us if Britain joins the European Economic Community. At that stage commercial policy and economic work will acquire a new dimension for the United Kingdom.
It would, however, be wrong to assume that the new diplomacy will leave no room for the traditional diplomacy. Multilateral discussions and negotiations do not obviate the need for close bilateral relations. The new and often technical problems must be handled in the context of our general political relations with the country concerned and our wider international commitments. Thus the new diplomacy does not diminish, and may well increase, the positive role which the Foreign and Commonwealth Office must continue to play in all matters affecting external relations.
As the Duncan Committee pointed out, the speed of modern communications is
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very relevant to the way in which we conduct international relations. It is now possible for Ministers and experts from London to participate in international meetings and bilateral discussions. These should reduce the need for resident representation, staffed and equipped overseas, to handle these aspects of our international business. But I do not believe that the full value can be obtained by these visits of Ministers or experts unless the ground is properly prepared and their discussions are properly followed up. The Government will therefore be examining how far efficiency and economy can be served by making the maximum use of modern communication for face-to-face diplomacy while at the same time preserving essential continuity. We are also examining ways and means of decreasing the stringent restriction on travel by members of the Diplomatic Service to which the Duncan Committee drew attention.
I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Garner, drew attention to the continuing importance, both politically and economically, of the Commonwealth. The British Government will continue to play its full part in maintaining the Commonwealth relationship. I was surprised that the noble Lord, Lord Gridley, took from the Report, or thought that the Government was giving any support to it, the closing of the High Commission in Singapore. I can assure the noble Lord that that is not so. In this connection, and perhaps in view of my particular responsibility in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, I should repeat that the Government have no intention of reducing our commitments towards the remaining dependent territories, for which we have special responsibilities to enable them to take their rightful place in the world community.
In discharging our responsibilities towards those territories with whom we still have close links we are not unmindful of the poorer two-thirds of the world whose living standards are in such sharp contrast to those of Britain and the rest of the richer one-third. As regards the administration of aid, we accept the Duncan Committee's view that this is a generalist function and that the present level of work and the existing number of staff dealing with it is about right for a programme of the present size. In

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many ways, I think that some of our best diplomats (if I can bring it in at this particular moment) are those young Voluntary Service Overseas officers, those young graduates who go overseas, earn very little money, but do a tremendous credit to us in this country, apart from giving great help in the countries in which they serve.
I should now like to say one or two words about accommodation, both at home and abroad. Several noble Lords raised the question of the Overseas Diplomatic Estate Board, and the noble Marquess, Lord Lansdowne, rather chided my noble friend. It is certainly true that the offices, houses and flats occupied by our representatives abroad together constitute a very considerable estate and its proper management is an important subject. The proposal for setting up this Board raises a number of difficult and technical issues, and, as my noble friend indicated, we shall need to consider it further before deciding whether this or some other variation of our present arrangements would be the best practical method of achieving both efficiency and economy. It is perhaps open to question whether it would be wise at this time to increase capital expenditure abroad, although we certainly accept the economic justification in the long run of building or buying more of our accommodation instead of renting it. As far as the subject of accommodation required for our representatives abroad is concerned, we shall ensure that where there is representational work to be done the means to do it properly will be provided.
Some noble Lords, particularly those who have served in the Foreign Office, have drawn attention to the conditions in the present Foreign and Common wealth Office, and to the manner in which our staff is spread over some 17 different buildings. A new building would bring very great advantages indeed. In fact, I wonder, if the Shops, Offices and Railway Premises Act were applied to Government buildings, which person would have to accept the summons. But the House is aware that account has to be taken not only of economy and efficiency but also of the important problems of design and general amenity. I hope that some step might be taken towards rectifying the conditions in the Foreign Office to-day, but I think we shall have to
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discuss this on another occasion, in the context of the Whitehall Redevelopment Plan.
The noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, had some thoughtful and pertinent comments on commercial and consular work in the United States. In particular, he referred to the conversion of some posts from consular into commercial offices. Following an inspection which took place two years ago, measures are being taken to reorganise the commercial work which is the main task of our consular posts in the United States. On the other hand, we are making arrangements adequately to meet the need for other traditional consular services in the areas concerned. The bulk of the adjustments have already been completed, but there may be some further measures in the course of 1970. I have no precise details with me, but I will write to the noble Lord about them.
Much has been said about export promotion work, and I entirely agree with those noble Lords who have said that it is not for the Diplomatic Service to replace the chairman, the director or the salesman of the firm concerned. But undoubtedly, as the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, said, the Diplomatic Service and the Consular Service can provide important information which can make or break a contract. But there is also a time when the Consular Service can help the manufacturer or salesman, when he is perhaps in some difficulty in terms of export credits. We pay special attention lomatic Estate Board, and the noble to this particular side of the Diplomatic Service. I am glad that there is recognition among your Lordships (because I fear that among manufacturers it is not so) that it is not the job of the diplomat to be a salesman.
Some noble Lords have referred to the importance of ensuring that our missions are so adequately staffed that they can effectively protect Britain's overseas investments. With this I entirely agree. This applies equally to the protection of all other commercial interests, including such services as banking, insurance, shipping, aviation and so on, upon which we depend so much for our investment income from abroad. Our standing instructions to posts stress the part which they are required to play in being alert for any indications of discrimination, and for doing everything possible to protect

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British interests. That this is, and will continue to be, reflected in our staffing policy was implicit in what my noble friend the Leader of the House said at the beginning of this debate.
We do not accept a sharp division between "Areas of Concentration" and the "Outer Area", between the comprehensive posts and the selective posts. We need a more refined scale, and in working this out we shall be reviewing the nature and the extent of all British interests in the countries concerned, including the level of British investments. In this connection, we agree with the Duncan Committee that our posts have an important supporting role to play in the protection and the promotion of invisible exports. We are consulting with the Committee on Invisible Exports, on the further help which our posts can give in the promotion of these invisible exports where promotion is appropriate and help is needed. The noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, suggested that there might be a new look, in commercial terms, at the recruiting policy of E.C.G.D. I am not in a position to make any comment on this situation, but I take note of it and, if I can, I will write to the noble Earl.
The noble Lords, Lord Inchyra and Lord Gore-Booth, and several others, have drawn attention to the structural problems of the Diplomatic Service. I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, who complained that it was wrong that those who reach 60 or 65, who are still hale and hearty and have great service to give, should be retired. On the other hand, there were other noble Lords who wanted to see the "flyers" promoted. This is a highly complicated matter; it gets down to a stage when even the computers baulk at the problem. But we are very conscious that these young men or women who have great prospects in the Service should go forward as quickly as possible and should not be held back.
LORD GLADWYN: My Lords, would not the noble Lord agree that, however complicated and difficult, the keeping on of certain people up to 65, or even to 70, is a problem that has been solved by every other nation in the world except us?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, those nations may not have the problem of bodies that we have at the present moment within the Foreign and Commonwealth Service.
The noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, and the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, and others referred to the need for longer postings overseas of members of the Diplomatic Service. The Diplomatic Service seeks to ensure a proper balance between the need for continuity and the management considerations affecting the Service as a whole. It is right that all members of the Service should get the right degree of specialisation, and that they should spend a sufficient time at a post to develop and make use of contacts, and to exploit the depth of experience which they acquired. Against this, however, there is a real need for officers to have a variety of experience, especially during their early years of service. This applies particularly to those destined for posts of the highest responsibility. In any world-wide service, unexpected factors, such as a political crisis, or sickness, will arise which may cause the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to remove officers before they have completed a full tour. This is normally somewhere between three and five years, though the time may be shorter in countries which are climatically trying or for other reasons particularly difficult.
Various noble Lords have drawn our attention to the recommendation for an adequate manpower margin. As the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, pointed out, the position is not straightforward. Within its current overall margin of 7½ per cent. the Diplomatic Service suffers from an imbalance in its margin in the various grades. The Plowden Committee recommended not 7½ per cent. but 10 per cent. There is no margin at all at the level of Grade 5A, or First Secretary, a grade at which the brunt of the work tends to be borne.
In considering the future margin the Diplomatic Service must bear in mind the general career structure. It will be necessary first to determine where the most effective levels of activity are and then to achieve an adequate manpower reserve in the grades where it is most needed. I can, however, assure the House that we shall not neglect in our further studies the most important points which

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have been made. The noble Lord, Lord Inchyra (he is not now here), raised the question of local staff. We have now some 7,000 local staff in our Service, and I would pay a great tribute to them for what they do for us in our overseas missions. Since the Duncan Report was written we have made further progress in the introduction of local pensions schemes in individual posts. We are also looking into the possibility of making some improvement in the terms offered on premature retirement for reasons of redundancy.
My noble friend Lord Walston referred to the specialist attachés. The future need for the employment of these specialists will be determined again on a post-by-post basis, in consultation with all the Whitehall Departments involved. We shall look carefully at the whole range of work of each post to see whether against the wider background a particular specialism is required. Having said that, I would add that I am conscious of the good work done by the specialist attachés at our posts abroad. With the increasing complexity and the great expansion of exchanges—for example, in the scientific field—the contributions made by specialist attachés to the effectiveness of our representation abroad is very real.
The noble Baroness, Lady Emmet of Amberley, touched on the question of women in our Diplomatic Service. Today, I think 3 per cent. of the Administrative Branch are women. I assure the noble Baroness that the Diplomatic Service welcomes women among its new recruits and there is no inherent bar to advancement on merit. I think that one of the main reasons why we do not see women at the very highest reaches is that when they come in as girls they are bright and attractive and they get married; although we have a number who give great service in the counsellor grade. Perhaps there is another reason for the shortage. It was only in 1945—and I hope the noble Baroness will give a Labour Government credit for this—that for the first time we introduced women into the Administrative Grades of the Diplomatic Service. It may be that women are taking a little longer to get to their rightful position in this Service.
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My Lords, there are a number of points which I clearly have not touched on, but it has been a very wide-ranging debate. We in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, particularly those who hold high positions in the Diplomatic Service, will be examining in the course of the next weeks and months—and, I expect, over the years—on a post-to-post basis how best the Service can continue to render high service to this country. I do not think this does harm to the Service. I think that those who have seen the inspectors at work in an overseas post know that from time to time their inquiries cause a little bit of a shock. On the other hand, a lot of gains come from it because not only is greater knowledge and expertise brought in, but on occasions standards have even been raised within a post.
Finally, may I thank the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, for initiating this debate. We in the Government will carefully consider every point that has been made, and perhaps we shall have another look at this problem at a later date.
9.23 p.m.
THE EARL OF SELKIRK: My Lords, I should like to add a word of congratulation to the noble Viscount, Lord Hood, on a maiden speech of real quality which gave the House great pleasure and will, I know, be remembered. I should also like to thank all noble Lords who have taken part. I do not remember many debates in which there has been a score of speakers none of whom has retired, and every one of whose speeches has been well worth while making. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, for saying that the Government found the debate useful. I hardly know of anywhere where they are likely to get so much high-grade advice in so short a time, and with such a very substantial measure of agreement. I agree with the dictum of the noble Lord, Lord Brown, that you must have constant adaptation: but does that not happen without Reports made on behalf of the Government? Of course it does. The only result of this Report of which I know—and the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, has not been able to tell us one result that has flowed from this Report—is that Mr. Wade-Gery, a Joint Secretary, now has a job with the Bank of England. I take it that that is one of the forms of secondment which directly flows from this Report.

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The Report has one value in that it gives a justification to the Treasury to provide a "golden bowler". I am sorry that we have net been able to get information on that subject. Ten years ago we had the Grigg Report about the Armed Services. That Report formed a perfectly good model for a basis on which to proceed. The noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, said that he leaves the House with anxiety on this subject. I hope he continues to have anxiety, because there are officers whose position is uncertain and may remain uncertain for an unlimited period. I hope that the noble Lord's anxiety will also extend to the thirty or so who have been rustled out of the Foreign Office for exactly the reason for which the Duncan Report recommends a reduction of services. I will not trespass further on your Lordships' time I am delighted to know that there will be an opportunity to discuss some of these points in the future. I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

  EDUCATION: MAINTAINED SCHOOLS
  EDUCATION: MAINTAINED SCHOOLS
  LONDON COUNTS OF PEOPLE SLEEPING ROUGH
  LONDON COUNTS OF PEOPLE SLEEPING ROUGH
  FOREIGN EXCHANGE CONTROLS
  FOREIGN EXCHANGE CONTROLS