Sitting of 9 December 1969

Preamble
The House met at half-past Two o'clock
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]
PRIVATE BUSINESS

  CALDERDALE WATER BILL [Lords]
  The Order of the day being read, for the Second Reading of the Calderdale Water Bill [Lords].
  Ordered.
  That he Bill be read a Second time upon Tuesday next.

ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
  TRANSPORT

    British Railways (Staff Pensions)
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenterasked the Minister of Transport whether he has yet received proposals that he should approve reductions in the pensions payable to the staff of British Railways in order to accommodate the Government's proposals in respect of National Insurance.
    The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport (Mr. Albert Murray): No, Sir.
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: Will the hon. Gentleman then give an assurance that he will in no circumstances authorise any reduction in railwaymen's pensions, already low, to accommodate national superannuation?
    Mr. Murray: My hon. Friend the Minister of State, Department of Health and Social Security has given certain undertakings on the new scheme, and I have no doubt that the trade unions will be consulting the British Railways Board about the whole matter of pensions.
    Mr. Michael Heseltine: The Parliamentary Secretary has not answered my
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    right hon. Friend's question. Will he give a clear answer to the specific point which was put to him?
    Mr. Murray: I am certainly not willing at the Box to give the undertaking sought. This is a matter for the British Railways Board, which has statutory obligations.
    Mr. Spriggs: Is my hon. Friend aware that this question is just another red herring?

    Preston-Blackpool South Rail Services
    Mr. Blakerasked the Minister of Transport if he will make it a condition of his approval of the capital expenditure involved that the British Railways Board shall improve the services which the Board proposes to introduce from May 1970 to stations on the coast line from Preston to Blackpool South.
    Mr. Murray: The Board tells me that no capital expenditure is involved.
    Mr. Blaker: Is the Parliamentary Secretary aware that this new service will be inferior to the service which exists both for commuters and for passengers using these stations? Will he look at the matter again, particularly since British Rail cannot give me an estimate of the alleged savings involved?
    Mr. Murray: That has nothing to do with the original Question about capital expenditure, which I have answered. We are satisfied that the new concentration on Blackpool North is a sensible solution to many problems in that area.
    Mr. Arthur Davidson: Is my hon. Friend aware that many of my constituents use this route, particularly in the summer? They regard this service as deplorable and the cuts as even more deplorable. Will he have another look at this?
    Mr. Murray: I am certainly prepared to look at anything that hon. Members may put to me on this. I shall be glad to answer any specific points if my hon Friend will write to me.

    A38 (Cambridge Road Junction)
    Mr. Kershawasked the Minister of Transport what estimate he has made of the cost of installing double white lines, and an island refuge. respectively, at Cambridge Road junction on the A38
    The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport (Mr. Bob Brown): Extending the double white lines and including "hatched markings", which are the possibilities being considered at present, would cost about £200. An island refuge is not possible in the present road width, and widening would mean buying expensive property.
    Mr. Kershaw: Does the hon. Gentleman propose to give us the white lines or does he not? Is he aware of the mulish obstinacy of his Department to do anything about this extremely dangerous junction, which has cost a number of lives in the last months?
    Mr. Brown: I have already told the hon. Gentleman that we are considering this solution. The solution which I believe he is pressing for is the provision of a central refuge. This would be an extremely costly scheme, which could not be justified in view of the proposal for the M5 to by-pass the A38 in 1971.
    Mr. Wilkins: This is one of the most dangerous roads in the country. It passes the comprehension of those who use it why the Ministry has not agreed to double white lines on the road, if only to indicate to motorists the opportunities for overtaking. Far greater consideration should be given to this dangerous road than has so far been given to it by the Ministry.
    Mr. Brown: The Question is not about the A38 in general but about the A38 where it passes through Cambridge. If my hon. Friend has any specific points on the A38 and will write to me, I will certainly look at them.

    Channel Tunnel
    Mr. Clark Hutchisonasked the Minister of Transport whether he has yet received the proposals of the interests concerned and whether he will now publish the up-to-date financial calculations with regard to the building of the Channel Tunnel; and if he will make a statement.
    The Minister of Transport (Mr. Frederick Mulley): Discussions with the prospective financing groups are still continuing. When their proposals have been received and a scheme for the finance and construction of the Tunnel has been agreed with the British and French Governments, I will consider with my French
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    colleague the need for a joint release of information about it.
    Mr. Clark Hutchison: Does not the Minister understand that this is a madly expensive project, years out of date, and that putting vehicles on flat railway cars is very clumsy? Would not it be better to concentrate our resources on roll-on/roll-off and on hovercraft and other modern inventions with export possibilities?
    Mr. Mulley: The purpose of the discussions with the financial groups is to go into the financial aspect of the proposal and, as I have said before, there will be final studies before any final decision is taken. While I know that a certain view is held about other alternative means, our considered view is that the tunnel is still worth while, despite these other suggested improvements.
    Mr. Costain: Is the Minister aware that in France people are not talking about whether the Channel Tunnel is built but the date of the opening? Will the Minister make it clear that the Government are not prepared to go on with it until these financial surveys have been produced, and will he hurry with them?
    Mr. Mulley: Speed depends largely on the groups making the financial proposals. I have already made clear in this House, and the French Government have made clear in France, that no final decision has been or can be taken until these further studies are completed.
    Mr. Michael Heseltine: Does the Minister understand that the detailed updating of the financial and factual trade evidence cannot take place until he has given the go ahead and that, even then, there will be a further delay of two years before the final decision is taken? This is all being held up because the Minister will not give the initial financial decision.
    Mr. Mulley: If the hon. Gentleman did his homework more thoroughly, he would know that until the financial groups come forward with their proposals there is no further step that I can take.

    M6—Fylde Coast Road Link
    Mr. Blakerasked the Minister of Transport if he has now received the project feasibility study about the line of the proposed road link between the M6

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    and the Fylde Coast; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Bob Brown: Yes, Sir. We have just received the final report on the project feasibility study. My right hon. Friend will announce a decision when the recommendations have been carefully considered.
    Mr. Blaker: Is the Parliamentary Secretary aware that the number of casualties over the next three years which could be saved if this link had been built by now is reliably estimated at 2,500, of which 78 will be fatal? Will he therefore give an undertaking to announce the decision very speedily?
    Mr. Brown: I should not attempt to confirm the hon. Gentleman's figures. I hope that we can give this decision in the spring, although I must also take into account the final decision on the boundaries of the Leyland Chorley new town.

    Breathalysers
    Mr. Peter Millsasked the Minister of Transport if he will make a further statement on his policy regarding the introduction of random testing with breathalysers.
    Mr. Mulley: I have not completed my review of the law on drink and driving and cannot, therefore, say whether new legislation is needed or, if it should be, what form it should take.
    Mr. Mills: Will the Minister accept that anybody caught who is drunk while driving should be punished very severely? Many people are deeply disturbed at the working of this law, even after what has happened in the House of Lords. Does the Minister also agree that random tests would be most unwise and that what is needed is more clarification of this law?
    Mr. Mulley: The recent decisions of the House of Lords and the Court of Appeal last week went a long way to clarifying the situation. Because of these decisions, I need more time to study the whole matter.
    Mr. Crawshaw: Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind that the impact of the breathalyser test has worn off to a great degree? He may be surprised to know that many motorists who drink
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    would appreciate a random test to save them from some of the madmen who go on the roads.
    Mr. Mulley: I understand the prospect of random tests, by which I understand that any motorist could be stopped at any time and asked to take a test, is, to say the least, a highly controversial proposal.

    Level crossings
    Sir Clive Bossomasked the Minister of Transport whether he will state his future intentions in regard to the introduction of half-barrier level crossings and give details of proposals made to him for the replacement of level crossings by bridges or tunnels.
    Mr. Murray: We will consider on their merits any applications made to us by the British Railways Board for the conversion of public level crossings to automatic half-barriers. Proposals for replacing public level crossings by bridges or tunnels are usually embodied in larger road schemes and details of all cases are not readily available.
    Sir Clive Bossom: Is the Minister aware that the motoring public are deeply worried about the near-misses on many of these half-barrier level crossings? As the minimum cost of a new half-barrier level crossing is about £13,000, can he say what would be the approximate cost of a bridge or tunnel, which is 100 per cent. safe, when the new and faster trains come out next year?
    Mr. Murray: As the hon. Gentleman knows, the British Railways Board is working hard on conversions as a result of the Hixon Inquiry. The minimum cost of a bridge in rural areas is over £100,000. Two that are to be built in rural areas will each cost over £250,000. so they are expensive propositions.
    Mr. Manuel: Will my hon. Friend consider making approaches to the British Railways Board with the idea that on the busier public level crossings keepers should be employed, because this is a 100 per cent. guarantee against accidents.
    Mr. Murray: Certainly, we will be prepared to put that point to the British Railways Board.
    Sir R. Russellasked the Minister of Transport if he will change the wording of warning notices at automatic level crossings to make clear to drivers the categories of vehicles to which the obligation to telephone the signal box applies.
    Mr. Murray: Mandatory signs are now being erected at all automatic half-barrier level crossings which make it quite clear which drivers must telephone the signal box for permission to cross.
    Sir R. Russell: I thank the Minister for that reply, which clarifies the point that I had in mind.

    New Roads
    Sir Clive Bossomasked the Minister of Transport whether he will state the average times between the decisions to build new urban and rural roads and the commencement of their construction.
    Mr. Mulley: On average, firm decisions to proceed with a scheme cannot be taken until it has been under preparation for some two to three years. Once a scheme has been accepted into the firm programme, commencement of construction can be expected in about 24 months for both urban and rural roads, subject to the availability of funds at the time.
    Sir Clive Bossom: Will the Minister try to speed up the decision-making and the compulsory purchasing starting next year, and also implement some of the recommendations in the Lofthouse Report?
    Mr. Mulley: We are anxious to proceed as fast as possible. We have schemes in hand, which means that there will be no delay subject to the total resources available. On the other hand, I must make it clear that I am obliged to go through some long and complicated statutory procedures.

    Articulated Lorries (Road Accidents)
    Mr. Laneasked the Minister of Transport how many people were killed in road accidents involving articulated lorries during the first 10 months of 1969, compared with the comparable period of 1968; and what further action he will take to reduce these accidents.
    Mr. Murray: 211 people were killed in such accidents in the first eight months of 1969; figures for September and October are not yet available. Statistics for articulated vehicles were not collected in 1968. We are studying the new accident returns to see whether further action is required.
    Mr. Lane: Whatever the statistics may be this year, is the Parliamentary Secretary aware that there has been an alarming increase in these accidents in the Cambridge area this year and that there is considerable public concern? Even if the Ministry is not prepared to legislate, could it not take more vigorous steps than it has so far to encourage the fitting of anti-jack-knifing devices to reassure the public?
    Mr. Murray: Naturally, the Ministry is concerned about any road accidents. But it should be pointed out that not all the 211 deaths were the result of jackknifing, but just with articulated vehicles. The Government are conducting operational trials, in conjunction with British Road Services, on literally dozens of anti-jack-knifing devices.
    Mr. Rankin: In view of the over-congested nature of our streets and roads, what inducements are given to these huge articulated lorries to travel overnight?
    Mr. Murray: I do not know that we give any inducements.
    Mr. Rankin: Then I think that the Ministry should.
    Mr. Scott-Hopkins: Does the Parliamentary Secretary agree that most accidents concerning these types of lorries take place on the M roads and that the speed at which they travel on the M roads is in excess of their braking power?
    Mr. Murray: Obviously this has to be taken into consideration, but the fact that we are holding operational trials with many of these devices shows our concern in the matter. We must certainly consider all the devices being put into our hands for testing.

    M1 Road Signs (Aldenham and M10 Junctions)
    Sir R. Russellasked the Minister of Transport if he will have signs erected

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    on the M1 at Aldenham and at its junction with the M10 warning drivers that the width of each carriageway decreases from three lanes to two for seven miles, as this is not immediately obvious in the dark.
    Mr. Bob Brown: Conspicuous direction signs, which are mounted on gantries and illuminated at night, already give warning of the reduced lanes available to through traffic on the approach to both junctions.
    Sir R. Russell: Is the Minister aware that those signs are not as obvious as he perhaps thinks? Will he have some sign as obvious as that on the M4, where the east-bound traffic comes to a four-lane overhead section, posted at both ends of the M1?
    Mr. Brown: The M1 signs were erected ten years ago. Many motorway signs have since been modified to comply with the Worboys recommendations. We intend to review all the signs on the M1, and there might possibly be a need for replacement. If there is any need for additional "Get in lane" signs, we will consider that in the review.
    Mr. Gwilym Roberts: Is my hon. Friend aware that I travel up and down this road almost daily? I find that there is even greater danger at the other end of this two-lane section where, quite frequently, I find myself nearly involved in accidents with drivers who have got into the wrong position and have had to come back to the two lane stage at the end of the three-lane section?
    Mr. Brown: I am grateful for the comments of a regular commuter on this stretch of road. I take note of the point made by my hon. Friend and shall look into this when we have the review.

    London Primary Roads Network
    Mr. Barnesasked the Minister of Transport what estimate he has made of the progress that will have been made towards the completion of London's primary road network by the end of the 1970s on the basis of the money which his department is planning to commit during this period.
    Mr. Mulley: Schemes in preparation could provide about 50 miles of new
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    primary roads during the 1970s. Improvements to the North Circular Road and some other existing primaries are also planned. I cannot at present say what other primary schemes might be completed during the period.
    Mr. Barnes: Does my right hon. Friend think that the money is ever going to be available to complete the network in anything like the time-scale envisaged by the G.L.C? Would not it be better to complete those parts of the network which are under construction, and then carry out a much more thorough reappraisal of the whole situation?
    Mr. Mulley: I think my hon. Friend knows that the Greater London Development Plan, which is the prime responsibility of my right hon. Friend the Minister of Housing and Local Government, has been submitted, and that inquiries will be made into its proposals. As at the end the Government will decide, it would be wrong for me to comment on the merits of the plan at present.
    Mr. Lubbock: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that if we had an adequate public transport system in Greater London many more people would use it instead of bringing their cars into the metropolis? Will he consider sympathetically the proposals which have been put to him by the Southern Region for greatly improving the services which it provides for the general public?
    Mr. Mulley: That is a rather different question, but I have been informed by British Railways of their proposals, and my officials are studying them in conjunction with the Railways Board. I am not at the moment able to make a statement about the Southern Region's proposals.
    Mr. Jay: As my right hon. Friend said in a recent answer to me that he does not yet know what these motorway projects will cost, will he undertake that his Department will at least find out and tell the House before he gives any approval to these extravagant projects?
    Mr. Mulley: As a leading objector to these proposals, my right hon. Friend would not want me to say anything which could be deemed as prejudicing the outcome of the inquiry for which he is agitating.

    A38/A370 Junction (East Brent)
    Mr. Wigginasked the Minister of Transport (1) how many prosecutions have taken place, and how many are pending, for traffic offences at the junction of the A38 with the A370 at East Brent between 6th November, 1968, and 6th November, 1969;
    (2) how many accidents have occurred at the junction of the A38 with the A370 at East Brent between 6th November, 1968, and 6th November, 1969.
    Mr. Bob Brown: In the period concerned there were 14 accidents at this junction which resulted in death or personal injury. 115 prosecutions for traffic offences have taken place and 139 were outstanding on 6th November, 1969.
    Mr. Wiggin: Surely these disastrous figures speak for themselves? Can the hon. Gentleman say what action he proposes to take, why he has not taken it earlier, and whether he will in future listen to the views of the local people who have long said that this junction is a lethal one?
    Mr. Brown: It is not true that I have taken no action. A "stop" sign was erected in July. Since the installation of street lighting in March there have been no after-dark accidents. The existence of the "stop" sign accounts for the large number of prosecutions that are pending. It is intended to provide a roundabout in time for next year's summer holiday traffic. We are therefore far from doing nothing.
    Mr. Arthur Lewis: Has my hon. Friend's attention been drawn to a report by a police officer that many of these accidents are caused by people unknowingly taking drugs which they think have no effect on their driving, such as aspros, aspirins, and so on? Will my hon. Friend look into this aspect of danger on the roads due to people unknowingly taking drugs?
    Mr. Brown: With due respect to my hon. Friend, I think that the nearest that I could get to Weston-super-Mare on aspirins and aspros would be Slough. I ask him to put down a Question on the subject he has raised.

    Ports Reorganisation (Milford Haven)
    Mr. Berryasked the Minister of Transport (1) how many prosecutions received from local interests in the Milford Haven Area regarding the Government's impending legislation on the reorganisation of the ports; and what replies he has sent.
    Mr. Mulley: The Milford Haven Conservancy Board, the oil companies, Swansea Chamber of Commerce and a number of local authorities, represented that Milford Haven should be excluded from the reorganisation; some have asked that if it is to be included it should be put under a separate port board. One expressed the fear that oil dues would be used to cross-subsidise other ports. I have replied that while Milford Haven is clearly within the takeover class, nevertheless I would give careful consideration to the views expressed. In particular, I can repeat the assurances previously given on cross-subsidisation.
    Mr. Berry: I am grateful to the Minister for his statement that he will reconsider this. Does he agree that this is one of the great harbours of the world because of its deep water? As it is carrying out this task of importing oil which is vital to our economy, it should be left undisturbed by threats of nationalisation, even when disguised as reorganisation.
    Mr. Mulley: It is because I regard it as a major port that it is included in the reorganisation. If the hon. Gentleman studies the Bill, he will note that we are not proposing to take over the oil installations, because they have a through transport facility; but the harbour must be classed as a major one.
    Mr. Roy Hughes: Does my right hon. Friend appreciate that the success of the South Wales ports stems from the fact that they are organised as a group, and that Milford Haven could gain from the point of view of profitability and efficiency if it was integrated with the other ports in South Wales?
    Hon. Members: Nonsense.
    Mr. Mulley: I think that that question will fall to be considered later, because it will be the responsibility of the

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    National Ports Authority to make arrangements for the respective ports.
    Mr. Michael Heseltine: Would not the right hon. Gentleman agree that the consistency of the White Paper depends on leaving Milford as a user port out of the National Ports Authority? Would he further agree that there is only one justification for including Milford, and that is that it would turn the Bill into a Hybrid Bill if it were left out, with the complication of getting the Bill through which would ensue from that?
    Mr. Mulley: I do not think that it is for the Minister to deal with the highly technical question what is or is not a hybrid Bill. Certainly I should not feel competent to do so.

    A440 (Bridge)
    Sir G. Nabarroasked the Minister of Transport, having regard to hazards arising from single track road traffic on the over bridge, A440 Pershore to Upton-upon-Severn, and trains beneath travelling at speeds up to 100 miles per hour on the Birmingham-Bristol main line, whether he will now reconsider his earlier decision that there is insufficient priority for rebuilding this railway bridge to accommodate three streams of road traffic, with appropriate steel safety fencing; and whether he will now make a further statement.
    Mr. Bob Brown: I have nothing to add to the reply I gave the hon. Member on 14th July last.—[Vol. 787, c. 1–3.]
    Sir G. Nabarro: Why is the Ministry prospecting at this bridge if the hon. Gentleman has nothing to add? Is he not aware that this is the most dangerous railway road bridge in the Midlands? [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] I said in the Midlands. Does the Minister want a calamity to occur before he stirs his shanks and does something about it?
    Mr. Brown: From the noises around me, it seems fairly clear that other hon. Members do not accept the contention of the lion. Member for Worcestershire, South (Sir G. Nabarro) that this is the most dangerous road bridge in the Midlands. Clearly the county council does not think it is, otherwise it would have pressed for the scheme to have higher priority.
    Mr. Wiggin: Having used the bridge thousands of times during the last two years, I support what was said by my hon. Friend. This is one of the most dangerous bridges in the whole of the Midlands, and I urge the Minister—
    Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Member must ask a question.
    Mr. Wiggin: I ask the Minister to reconsider his very disappointing decision.
    Mr. Brown: I have nothing to add to what I have said.
    Mr. Leslie Huckfield: While reassuring my hon. Friend that this is certainly not the most dangerous bridge in the Midlands, may I also assure him that I have never come across an instance of trains travelling at anything like 100 m.p.h. on that stretch of track?
    Mr. Brown: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his observation on train speeds, but frankly I do not think that train speeds have any bearing on this Question.
    Mr. Maudling: If the hon. Gentleman's argument is that there are other bridges which are more dangerous, may we be told which they are?
    Mr. Brown: If the right hon. Gentleman cares to put down a Question, unless the facts would be unduly expensive to produce, I shall endeavour to answer it.

    Lorry-Trailer Combinations
    Sir G. Nabarroasked the Minister of Transport whether he will make a statement upon the proposals made to him for 56-foot-long road, train-type, goods vehicles; and what representations he has received from motoring and pedestrian organisations against these proposals.
    Mr. Mulley: I assume that the hon. Member means 56 tons, not 56 feet, since a lorry-trailer combination up to 18 metres—59 feet—is already permitted.
    Sir G. Nabarro: On a point of order. I cannot be responsible for typographical errors.
    Mr. Mulley: All aspects of these proposals are under examination. I have received objections from a number of

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    organisations, including the Pedestrians Association for Road Safety.
    Sir G. Nabarro: Does the Minister realise that if we are to consider vehicles of this size, which may be economical and practicable in future, the user ought to be confined to roadways of the motorway type alone, and that they could not possibly be allowed to travel on normal A or B type roads in this country? Would it not require legislation before any progress could be made here?
    Mr. Mulley: I shall naturally have full consultations with the many interests involved before authorising any change of the present regulations. I can see an immediate difficulty in the hon. Member's proposal, because one of the points about road transport is that it enables unloading to take place at a place convenient to the user. We do not want to have factories and the like built along the side of the motorways. They must go from the motorways to some other point.
    Mr. Bessell: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether, in view of the alarming increase in the number of accidents involving heavy lorries, he will give an undertaking that he will resist any proposal for an increase in tonnage or length?
    Mr. Mulley: It is very easy for hon. Members to ask for this kind of assurance. When responsible organisations make proposals, the least that I can do is examine them carefully. An examination of the kind involved here entails questions such as power-weight ratio, braking and many other questions, including amenities.
    Mr. Ellis: Would my right hon. Friend agree that there are many different points of view on this? Whilst there are consultations going on elsewhere, will he see that before any firm decisions are made he consults Members of this House, who have various opinions on what is an important subject for our constituents? Does he realise that it is vitally necessary that we should take part in this discussion?
    Mr. Mulley: It would be rather difficult to have a lengthy consultation with the House as a whole, but I would welcome any observations from any hon. Member on this or any other aspect of my work.

    Local Authority Road Schemes
    Mr. Hall-Davisasked the Minister of Transport whether it is the intention of his Department to approve only those local authority road schemes submitted to them which provide for 24-foot carriageways and not those which provide for 30-foot carriageways.
    Mr. Bob Brown: What we approve is a road designed to accommodate the traffic which is predicted. In a case where the predicted traffic is likely to rise later to a level requiring dual 24 ft. carriageways we would approve a single 24 ft. carriageway in the first instance and accept a measure of overload until it is possible to provide a duplicate alongside. None of the Ministry publications on road design and layout quote a 30 ft. carriageway and in schemes where financial assistance is sought we would require good reason to support the adoption of that width before approving it.
    Mr. Hall-Davis: Will the hon. Gentleman take steps to see that the policy is made absolutely clear to local authorities? Is he aware that there have been cases recently where, at an advanced stage, it has been necessary to carry out considerable redesigning work because of a misunderstanding of what was likely to receive Ministerial approval?
    Mr. Brown: I am not aware of any such cases. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman would be good enough to write to me.

    Rural Bus Services
    Mr. Peter Millsasked the Minister of Transport what is the value of subsidies for rural bus services withdrawn by the National Bus Company as a result of the discretion granted to them under Section 54 of the Transport Act, 1968.
    Mr. Bruce Campbellasked the Minister of Transport what is the value of subsidies for rural bus services withdrawn by British Railways as a result of the discretion granted to them under Section 54 of the Transport Act, 1968.
    Mr. Mulley: I would refer the hon. Members to the answer I gave the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Eldon Griffiths) on 24th November.—[Vol. 792, c. 38.]
    Mr. Mills: When is the Minister planning to withdraw this subsidy to private operators? Will he bear in mind the very serious effect it will have on the operators and, more important, upon the passengers they carry?
    Mr. Mulley: This matter was very fully debated in the House on 27th November. The transfer from British Rail to the National Bus Service is a sensible arrangement and was provided for under the Transport Act, 1968. It is right that the pattern of rural services should be considered together and not strictly on the basis of whether a service was connected with a previous railway closure.
    Mr. Michael Heseltine: Would the Minister explain when he intends to approve the withdrawal of the subsidies from the private and municipal operators?
    Mr. Mulley: I cannot answer that without notice.
    Miss Quennellasked the Minister of Transport what provision he has made for the payment of rural bus grants for the calendar year 1969 and for the calendar year 1970.
    Mr. Mulley: I would refer the hon. Lady to the answer given to the hon. Member for Tavistock (Mr. Michael Heseltine) on 25th November.—[Vol. 792, c. 50.]
    Miss Quennell: Does the right hon. Gentleman not realise that it is not so much the private operators who matter but the bus passengers, who depend on these bus services in country areas and who are getting worried about the future of their transport?
    Mr. Mulley: The hon. Lady asked me about rural bus grants, and the only reason why I could not give more information is because a number of discussions are going on with local authorities and I cannot predict how many of them will avail themselves of the possibility of further grants under the 1968 Act. This matter was very fully discussed in the House, and I think that when the hon. Lady looks at the debate she will realise that much more money, around £11 million, is going into the bus services generally, a substantial part of that to rural areas.
    Mr. Michael Heseltine: Would the right hon. Gentleman not agree that he has told the House what is being provided for 1969, and that in his view it is an over-estimate? What the House wants to know is what the Minister thinks will actually be spent in 1969. Is he aware that that is the answer which he must give us?
    Mr. Mulley: The point is simple. As I said in answer to a previous Question, provision is made for the expenditure of £95,000 in the current financial year. There are still several months to the end of that financial year, and I would be happy if more applications came along. If they do not, then we will probably not reach £95,000.

    Motorways (Building Cost)
    Miss Quennellasked the Minister of Transport if he will publish the approximate average cost, excluding land acquisition, of building one mile of motorway through open country for each of the years from 1960 to 1968, inclusive.
    Mr. Bob Brown: Costs vary so much depending on the particular location that average costs are liable to be misleading. Over the years in question, the costs per mile for construction of rural motorways, excluding land acquisition, were in the following ranges:
    For dual 2 lane motorways £229,000 to £1,048,000 per mile.
    For dual 3 lane motorways £243,000 to £1,646,000 per mile.
    As the rest of the answer contains a number of figures, I will, with permission, circulate a table in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Miss Quennell: May I thank the Parliamentary Secretary for that extremely interesting and revealing answer. Can he give any indication whether interest rates have been reflected in the increased costs of motorway construction, or whether S.E.T., which contractors have had to bear, has added to the cost?
    Mr. Brown: Without going into specific details about extra costs, I can say that, taking all roads together, contract prices for road construction have increased by 60 per cent. since 1960.
    Mr. Fernyhough: Can my hon. Friend give the relative cost of land in 1960 as compared with 1968? Would it not be true to say that the soaring price of land has added considerably to these costs?
    Mr. Brown: I cannot give the specific facts that my hon. Friend has asked for, but I can say that something in excess of 5 per cent. of the cost is reflected in land costs. It is fair to say on the figures that I have quoted to the hon. Lady that the cost of land for a dual two-lane is in excess of £11,000, rising to £52,000 per mile.

    RURAL MOTORWAYS (ENGLAND) CONSTRUCTION COSTS PER MILE EXCLUDING LAND

    Year in which Contract let

    Dual 2 Lane Motorways £m.

    Number of Contracts

    Dual 3 Lane Motorways £m.

    Number of Contracts

    1960

    …

    …

    …

    …

    ·254 to ·308

    2

    ·253 to 1·194

    8

    1961

    …

    …

    …

    …

    ·229 to ·567

    4

    ·448 to ·576

    3

    1962

    …

    …

    …

    …

    —

    —

    ·243 to ·775

    6

    1963

    …

    …

    …

    …

    ·418 to ·892

    3

    ·541 to ·813

    4

    1964

    …

    …

    …

    …

    ·592

    1

    ·651 to 1·010

    2

    1965

    …

    …

    …

    …

    ·558 to 1·048

    2

    ·660 to 1·035

    6

    1966

    …

    …

    …

    …

    ·590 to ·633

    2

    ·728 to 1·646

    7

    1967

    …

    …

    …

    …

    ·529 to ·732

    2

    ·609 to 1·247

    5

    1968

    …

    …

    …

    …

    ·941

    1

    ·655 to 1·063

    14

    NOTES:
    1. Figures quoted are those ruling at date contract was let.
    2. Where costs are based on more than one contract, the range is given between lowest and highest
    3. Sections of elevated motorway not included.
    Mr. Crouchasked the Minister of Transport if he will publish the approximate average cost, excluding land acquisition, of building one mile of motorway through an urban area for each of the years from 1960 to 1968, inclusive.
    Mr. Bob Brown: Costs vary so much depending on the particular location, that average costs are liable to be misleading Over the years in question, the costs per mile for construction of urban motorways excluding land acquisition, were in the following range: for dual three-lane motorways, £905,000 to £4,300,000 per mile. As the rest of the Answer contains a number of figures. I will, with permission, circulate a table in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Mr. Crouch: Now that the Minister has had some notice of the information we want about the effects of S.E.T. and the Land Commission in this context, would he please let me know—if he cannot do so today, then by letter—what effect S.E.T. and the charges of the Land
    The cost of land for a dual three lane road is in excess of £12,000, rising to £82,000 per mile.
    Mr. Maudling: My hon. Friend asked two very specific questions about interest rate and S.E.T. The Minister has made no attempt to answer either. Will he try to do so?
    Mr. Brown: I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman realises, without putting on that synthetic indignation, that this is the type of question of which I should require notice.
    Following is the information:
    Commission have had on these escalating figures?
    Mr. Brown: Since the hon. Gentleman has been courteous enough to phrase his supplementary question in that way, I will write to him on the subject. If my hon. Friend the Member for Jarrow (Mr. Fernyhough) has a mind to write to me on the subject, I will write to him, too.
    Mr. Mapp: Considering the urban nature of the Question, would my hon. Friend outline the costs of motorway building including land? Would he agree that the overall cost would be considerably higher than the figures he gave in an earlier Answer about agricultural land?
    Mr. Brown: The costs in urban areas are, of course, decidedly greater than the costs in rural areas. Perhaps my hon. Friend would write to me if he has a particular point in mind.
    Mr. Jay: What is the cost per mile of the London motorway projects contained in the total given by my hon. Friend?
    Mr. Brown: I would require notice of that question.
    Mr. Michael Heseltine: In view of the galloping cost of motorway construction resealed by the figures which the hon. Gentleman has given, was not the Answer of his right hon. Friend about the amount of money being spent on road construction totally misleading and in truth the Government's increase in spending in this sphere is not matched by the increase in road building?
    Mr. Brown: I do not accept that the figures given by my right hon. Friend. particularly when he said that about £1 million a day was being spent, were misleading. If comparisons are to be made between the money that we have spent on motorway construction and that spent by the Tories when they were in office, we would see tremendous increases which they might well claim to be dishonest simply because hon. Gentlemen opposite were spending almost nothing.
    Following is the table:

    URBAN MOTORWAYS (ENGLAND) CONSTRUCTION COSTS PER MILE EXCLUDING LAND

    Year in which Contract let

    Dual 2 Lane Motorways £m.

    Number of Contracts

    Dual 3 Lane Motorways £m.

    Number of Contracts

    1961

    …

    ·745

    1

    1962

    …

    ·909

    1

    1964

    …

    ·905 to 2·492

    3

    1967

    …

    1·172 to 3·369

    4

    1968

    …

    ·995 to 4·300

    6

    Notes:
    1. Figures quoted are those ruling at date contract was let.
    2. No Ministry contracts were let for urban motorways for the years 1960, 1963, 1965, 1966.
    3. Where costs are based on more than one contract, the range is given between lowest and highest.
    4. Sections of elevated motorway not included.

    Road Schemes
    Mr. Crouchasked the Minister of Transport what was the mileage and value of road schemes in the preparation pool on 31st October, 1969.
    Mr. Mulley: The value of road schemes so far announced for the trunk road preparation pool, including schemes
    230
    likely to derive from feasibility studies, is estimated to be about £900 million, excluding those which will form part of the London primary network. The mileage involved will depend on the lines finally selected but the schemes under consideration represent about 1,200 miles of new or improved roads. About £60 million worth of these schemes have already been transferred to the firm trunk road programme planned for start of work in the next year or two.
    Mr. Crouch: While those sort of figures of the preparation plan sound impressive, what we really want to know is the figure to which the Minister is committed.
    Mr. Mulley: The figure to which I am committed, and which I fully intend to spend this year, is included in the estimate. In round figures, we are spending today and every day this year £1 million, which is approximately twice the amount that was being spent in 1964.

    Train Derailments
    Mr. Edward M. Taylorasked the Minister of Transport what was the total number of train derailments in the most recent 12-month period for which figures are available; and what were the comparable figures in each of the previous four annual periods.
    Mr. Murray: The provisional figure for reportable derailments on all railways in Great Britain for the 12 months ending 31st October. 1969, is 418. Comparable figures for the 12-month periods ending in 1968. 1967, 1966 and 1965 were 345, 317, 282 and 234, respectively.
    Mr. Taylor: What are the main reasons for this disturbing and steady increase, despite the reduction in track mileage? When can we expect to see some improvement in the position, particularly in view of the training schemes and safety measures introduced in June?
    Mr. Murray: Derailments occur for a variety of reasons. I could not give a date by which we may expect to see an improvement, because the British Railways Board has a continuing campaign involving various safety measures to bring down the number of derailments.
    Mr. Bessell: In view of the fine record of safety which British Rail has always

    231
    enjoyed, would the hon. Gentleman agree that these figures are surprising and alarming? Would he consider instituting a special inquiry into the matter?
    Mr. Murray: My right hon. Friend has powers to institute general inquiries, but we have no plans to conduct such an inquiry at present. The British Railways Board is paying particular attention to all the problems that bring about derailments, including the question of speed restrictions, the provision of hot axle box detectors and a variety of other measures.

  LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND REGIONAL PLANNING

    Environmental Pollution
    Mr. Gardnerasked the Secretary of State for Local Government and Regional Planning what inter-departmental machinery exists for the co-ordination of research and policy making concerning problems of environmental pollution.
    The Minister of State (Mr. T. W. Urwin): There is a wide variety of methods for securing co-ordination in this field. But, as the Prime Minister has announced, my right hon. Friend is conducting an urgent review of the machinery and it is hoped that a statement will be made before the end of the year.
    Mr. Gardner: While we all welcome the new responsibilities of my right hon. Friend, does not the Minister of State think that the problem is now so serious that it requires investigation by Royal Commission, to recommend action and the kind of machinery necessary to carry out such action?
    Mr. Urwin: I would advise my hon. Friend, who I know has deep and continuing interests in this subject, that a great deal of expert advice is already available to the Government. I am sure that the question of the benefits or otherwise of the establishment of a Royal Commission have not escaped the notice of my right hon. Friend. Having said that, I would ask him to await a statement soon to be made.
    Mr. Chataway: Since the Secretary of State for Local Government and Regional
    232
    Planning seems to be empowered to answer only two Questions, this one and another about the expected date of the Redcliffe-Maud White Paper, should he not, when either is asked, be encouraged to come to the House to answer them?

  NIGERIA (GENERAL GOWON)
  Mr. Barnesasked the Prime Minister if he will invite General Gowon to visit London to take part in talks with him about future British policy regarding the Nigerian civil war.
  The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Wilson): I have no plans to do so. As my hon. Friend is aware, my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs is at present visiting Lagos.
  Mr. Barnes: My right hon. Friend spoke yesterday of a choice between evils. Would he agree that one makes a choice between evils only when that is the only way to achieve a specific objective? Would he further agree that increasing the supply of British arms, which was presumably intended to help Nigeria win, has not brought a Nigerian military victory any nearer than a year ago?
  The Prime Minister: These matters were very fully dealt with in my speech yesterday and are likely to be debated at considerable length today. I do not think that the issues raised in my hon. Friend's supplementary question can be most appropriately dealt with by way of question and answer.
  When I referred to a choice between evils, I was referring in this context to a clash between, on the one hand, a prolongation of the war and all that that would mean in terms of malnutrition and so on, and, on the other, proposals for speeding relief supplies. I thought that that was a problem and dilemma which I should put before the House because we must all face it.
  Mr. Thorpe: Since the right hon. Gentleman referred in his Answer to the visit of the Parliamentary Secretary, may I ask him to say if it is the intention of the Government that that Minister should also seek to have a meeting with Colonel Ojukwu and visit Biafra?
  The Prime Minister: That is not currently proposed—[Horn. MEMBERS: "Oh? "]—but this is the sort of issue with which my right hon. Friend may wish to deal when he speaks in the debate later. I have said that we do not rule out contact at varying levels with the Biafran leadership. Indeed, I myself offered a meeting with Colonel Ojukwu last March in one of 10 possible African areas for a meeting. It is well known, of course, that there is a Biafran representative in London, and it is possible for us and others to have contact with him.

  PRESS AND PUBLIC RELATIONS
  Mr. William Priceasked the Prime Minister which Minister is now in charge of the Government's Press and public relations.
  The Prime Minister: Each Minister in charge of a Department is responsible for these matters as they affect his own Department. As I told the House on 4th November, the Minister without Portfolio will, among his other duties, answer Questions in the House about the coordination of home information policy.—[Vol. 790, c. 92—3.]
  Mr. Price: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the vast majority of my hon. Friends would not want him to make the sort of Ministerial appointment which the Tories made in this context when they were in office? As an alternative, would he perhaps consider sending the members of the Government Front Bench on a weekend course in basic public relations so that they may return better equipped to spell out the magnificent achievements of the Labour Government?
  The Prime Minister: The answer to the first part of my hon. Friend's supplementary question is, "Yes, Sir". I have always been opposed to using the taxpayers' money to have a Minister of Information, something which hon. Gentlemen opposite did for party purposes. [Interruption.] The answer to the second part of my hon. Friend's supplementary question is that I am more concerned that my Ministerial colleagues should continue, as they are doing, to add to the record of achievement, rather than go on weekend courses. I felt
  234
  that the publication of the balance of payments figures yesterday gave a fair indication—[Interruption.] A lot of stuff appeared on the front pages of yesterday's newspapers. I would rather my Ministerial colleagues spent their time increasing achievements like that than going on weekend courses.
  Mrs. Ewing: From the public relations point of view, may I ask the right hon. Gentleman to say if there is anything sinister in the fact that in a full-page Government advertisement of the right hon. Gentleman with some Members of his Cabinet the face of the Secretary of State of Scotland is missing? Does the right hon. Gentleman think that that is a matter for the Race Relations Board?
  The Prime Minister: Strictly speaking, this Question does not fall within my Ministerial duties, because this was not in relation to Government information services but in relation to a happy little picture taken when a few of us got together one Thursday morning. The Secretary of State for Scotland was not with us. He was in his proper place. He was in Scotland.

  MR. MAURER (DISCUSSIONS)
  Mrs. Renée Shortasked the Prime Minister if he will make a statement about his discussions with Mr. Maurer, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Roumania.
  The Prime Minister: I had cordial and constructive discussions with Mr. Maurer about East-West relations, in particular security in Europe, and the state of our bilateral relations in all major fields. I would refer my hon. Friend to the communiqué issued on 29th November, which is available in the Library.
  Mrs. Short: I thank my right hon. Friend for that reply. In addition to the problem of the security conference and the acceptance of post-war frontiers in which all of us are interested, would not my right hon. Friend agree that the Middle East is another area where the Roumanian Government could help us? They have managed to remain friends with both sides in this conflict, and are well placed to act as mediators. Will my right hon. Friend assure the House that he will maintain very friendly and close

  235
  relations with the Roumanian Government on these two problems?
  The Prime Minister: My hon. Friend will have seen in the communiqué the constructive references to a European security conference, on which it is possible that my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary may, if he catches your eye, Mr. Speaker, have one or two words to address to the House. The Middle East did come up in discussion, though I would not have felt that the Roumanian Government were in a particularly decisive position to influence what is an extremely, as we all recognise, difficult situation. A good deal of our time was spent discussing trade, and my hon. Friend will be extremely gratified to know that there was a substantial increase in trade over the last five years between ourselves and Roumania.
  Mr. Longden: In view of the success of the Roumanian visit, will the Prime Minister consider inviting the Prime Ministers of Bulgaria and Hungary to visit this country?
  The Prime Minister: All these questions are matters for consideration. The hon. Gentleman will be aware of a fairly substantial series of Prime Ministerial visits immediately ahead of us, but certainly the names he has mentioned are those of countries with whom we would like discussions.
  Mr. Crawshaw: Would not my right hon. Friend agree that the independent attitude of the Roumanian Government in difficult circumstances in the last few years deserves the respect of the House; and that while we ought to use every means possible to improve cultural and economic relations, on the long-term view it would be wrong to try to involve them politically with the West?
  The Prime Minister: The answer to the first part of my hon. Friend's supplementary question is "Yes, Sir". The answer to the second part is that we had very full discussions with them on all East-West problems. I think that these are matters that can be safely left to the wisdom and judgment of the Roumanian Government.
  Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop: Did the Prime Minister explain to Mr. Maurer that it was the United Kingdom Government's policy to increase production of home-
  236
  produced food and that we did not therefore need increased imports of temperate foodstuffs from Roumania?
  The Prime Minister: That seems a rather churlish kind of supplementary question in respect of a guest whose visit, I am sure, all hon. Member's welcomed. We explained the difficulties in the importation of certain things that he would like to supply us—for example, butter: the whole world is trying to throw butter at us—and we have taken what I think is a strict and sensible line. But I certainly did not speak to him in the language of the hon. Gentleman.

  PRIME MINISTER OF NORTHERN IRELAND (MEETING)
  Mr. Arthur Davidsonasked the Prime Minister if he will make a statement about his most recent meeting with the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland.
  The Prime Minister: I have nothing to add to the reply that I gave my hon. Friend on 18th November.—[Vol. 791, c. 1112–14.]
  Mr. Davidson: In his discussions with the Ulster Prime Minister, did my right hon. Friend make it quite clear that if the Ulster Defence Regiment is to serve any useful purpose in maintaining law and order the Catholic population in Northern Ireland must have sufficient confidence in the way it is run as to want to join it and serve in it; and that if it is merely to be the discredited B Specials under another name it would be utterly unacceptable to the House?
  The Prime Minister: I do not think that the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland is in any doubt about our feelings on the question. They have been fully put to him by my right hon. Friends who have been dealing with the matter. And, of course, the Northern Ireland Government will be aware of the statements made by my right hon. Friends and by my hon. Friend the Minister of Defence for Administration during the passage of the Bill through the House.

  PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (VISIT)
  Mr. Martenasked the Prime Minister when he next proposes to pay

  237
  an official visit to the President of the United States of America.
  The Prime Minister: I would refer the hon. Gentleman to my reply to a similar Question by my hon. Friend the Member for West Ham, North (Mr. Arthur Lewis) on 20th November.—[Vol. 791, c. 1509–12.]
  Mr. Marten: On the assumption that the Prime Minister will be discussing the Middle East with the President of the United States, will he tell the President about the mounting anxiety in this country, particularly in the light of recent events, over the Government's decision to make what is really a premature withdrawal from east of Suez?
  The Prime Minister: I will make it my business to draw the President's attention to that supplementary question, because I know that he always wants to see HANSARD every day to see what the hon. Gentleman is saying—[Interruption.] Well, if the hon. Gentleman wants this drawn to the President's attention, I can think of no better way of doing it.
  In my discussions with President Nixon, this matter has not come up from the American side, and did not come up from the American side when I visited President Johnson in February, 1968, immediately after the announcement in this House. There was far more controversy in this House on party grounds on this question than there was in the United States.
  Mr. Winnick: With reference to my right hon. Friend's visit to President Nixon in January, can he tell the House whether he read the editorial on Vietnam in today's Daily Mirror?
  The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir. I not only read that editorial with interest, but I read the editorial in yesterday's Daily Mirror—or was it in the Sunday Mirror?—immediately ahead of yesterday's debate, and I gave to the House yesterday what I thought was the right view for the country to take in present circumstances. It will be on that basis that I will discuss this matter with President Nixon, though I notice that since the debate we had yesterday President Nixon has come out very categorically indeed on certain questions on which anxiety was expressed here yesterday.
  Mr. Amery: Can the Prime Minister assure us that he will discuss with the President of the United States the implications of the change of Government in Libya?
  The Prime Minister: It is not usual to go into details, in advance, of the agenda. I can say, however, that I myself with the President, or my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary with the Secretary of State, will between us cover all the relevant aspects of world affairs, and I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that this is an important aspect.
  Mr. John Fraser: Will the Prime Minister discuss with the American President the impression the Americans have created on the Euro-dollar market, and the way in which this has pushed up interest rates in connection with social and commercial policies?
  The Prime Minister: Again, I take that supplementary question as a suggestion. It is contrary to precedent, or practice. to say what will or will not be discussed, but I had an hour's discussion with the American Secretary of State for the Treasury last Saturday morning, and my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer had a much longer talk with him, and all questions relevant to world monetary affairs were discussed between us.
  Sir R. Cary: To repeat a question that I put to the Prime Minister two weeks ago: would it not be to the mutual advantage of both countries if the President of the United States were invited to this country again?
  The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir. But the hon. Gentleman will know, and I think that this is almost without precedent in recent Anglo-American history, that the President of the United States has visited this country twice this year, and we were glad to welcome him on both occasions and had constructive talks with him. Obviously, he knows that he will be welcome if he comes at any time, but it is rather a burden on him to ask him to come three times in two years unless there is some indication that he would like to come, in which case he would be welcome.

  UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS (VISIT)
  Mr. Bruce-Gardyneasked the Prime Minister what plans he has for paying an official visit to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics during the lifetime of the present Parliament.
  Mr. Gregoryasked the Prime Minister if he will make an official visit to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
  The Prime Minister: I have nothing at this stage to add to what I said in reply to a Question by my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, North-East (Mrs. Renée Short) on the 10th July.—[Vol. 786, c. 1567]
  Mr. Bruce-Gardyne: That reply is reassuring as far as it goes, but would not the Prime Minister agree that it would be a little inappropriate for the head of a Government which profess to attach such importance to the U.N. Charter to visit the only country in the world which is in breach of the U.N. Charter so long as it retains an army of occupation in Czechoslovakia?
  The Prime Minister: All of us expressed our deep concern in the emergency debate on Czechoslovakia in August, 1968, but I do not draw from that debate or from what was said on that occasion the same conclusions as does the hon. Gentleman.
  Mr. Gregory: Following on that point, in view of the importance recently expressed by his right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary about European security, and the Budapest proposals, does not the Prime Minister feel that a visit to Moscow would be of great importance; and would he not look again at that possibility?
  The Prime Minister: As I said, I have nothing to add to the Answer I gave in July. I said yesterday—and this has been repeated in all my discussions with Premier Kosygin, whether in the Soviet Union or in this country—that we ourselves with the Soviet Union as Co-Chairmen stand ever ready to play our part in the solution of the Vietnam problem if the parties concerned with the talks in Paris—and both Russia and ourselves played some part in getting them there—wish us to do so.

  QUESTIONS TO MINISTERS
  Mr. Arthur Lewis: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. In deference to your wish I did not raise this as a point of order while Questions were being answered, but may I refer back to Question No. Q6? You will recollect that the Prime Minister referred the questioner to an Answer already given.
  My point of order is that it is well known that an hon. Member cannot put a Question to a Minister, including the Prime Minister, when that information is freely and readily available. This information was freely and readily available. With great respect to you, to the Table and to the hon. Member, the hon. Member should have been referred to the appropriate copy of HANSARD, which would have given him the Answer. This could have prevented all the supplementary questions being asked on this issue and further Questions to the Prime Minister could have been asked. I ask that you should look at this matter in future.
  Mr. Speaker: I am grateful to the hon. Member for postponing his point of order from Question Time. The position is that very often an hon. Member puts down a Question well ahead within the three weeks provided. If a similar Question is answered some days before his is reached it is either for the hon. Member to take his Question off the Order Paper or to leave it on; but the Table has no power to take it off.

  NEW MEMBERS SWORN
  Peter Derek Fry, Esquire, Member for Wellingborough, was sworn.
  Jeffrey Howard Archer, Esquire, Member for Louth, was sworn.

  BILL PRESENTED
    HIGHWAYS ACT 1959 (AMENDMENT) BILL
    Mr. Eric Lubbock presented a Bill to amend section 127 of the Highways Act, 1959: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time upon Friday next and to be printed. [Bill 64.]

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE (SUPPLY)
Ordered,
That this day Business other than the Business of Supply may be taken before Ten o'clock.—[The Prime Minister.]

STATUTORY INSTRUMENT AMENDMENT
3.35 pm.
Mr. R. J. Maxwell-Hyslop: I beg to move,
That leave be given to bring in a Bill to render Statutory Instruments subject to amendment by the House of Commons, upon passage of a substantive motion before third reading of a Bill that it should be subject to the provisions of the Statuotry Instrument Amendment Act 1969, and to lay down the procedure to be adopted pursuant thereto; and to redefine the period wherein certain Statutory Instruments may be annulled in pursuance of resolutions of either House of Parliament.
Each year—[Interruption.]—the House passes a large number of—[Interruption.]
Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Member must be heard.
Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop rose—
Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: On a point of order. Is the rule that one does not interrupt an hon. Member when introducing a Ten-Minute Rule Bill one of the Standing Orders rules, or a convention such as the one which suggests that only one hon. Member should have charge of a Ten-Minute Rule Bill?
Mr. Speaker: It is not a Standing Order. It is the practice of the House, and has been for a long time.
Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop: I was saying—[HON. MEMBERS: "Sit down."]—that each year the House passes—[Interruption.]—a considerable volume of legislation—[Interruption.]—and that this legislation—
Mr. George Brown: On a point of order. It is in the recollection of many of my hon. Friends that the Opposition Chief Whtip, when walking through the Chamber just now—looking unusually angry—said to somebody on this side of the House, "Very well, I will take it away now" meaning the Ten-Minute Rule Bill which the hon. Member
242
for Tiverton (Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop) is purporting to ask leave to introduce. Has the Opposition Chief Whip the right to take away something which presumably is in the hands of private Members?
Mr. Speaker: It is beyond the wit of Mr. Speaker to comment on sotto voce comments by the Opposition Chief Whip, or anyone else when he does not hear them.
Mr. Julian Snow (Lichfield and Tam-worth): Mr. Speaker, if your description of what happened just now is a description of someone speaking sotto voce your idea and mine of a quiet voice do not coincide. I think that perhaps what happened was that the Opposition Chief Whip had lost command of his emotions for a moment.
Mr. Speaker: What the Opposition Chief Whip meant, if he said that he would take it away, only the Opposition Chief Whip and God know.
Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop: I was observing—[Interruption.]—this will take rather more than 10 minutes if the interruptions continue—that each year this House passes a considerable volume of legislation by Act of Parliament. That legislation is subject to amendment both in Committee and on Report. In 1967, the House passed the amount of legislation contained in the two volumes I have here, which was subject to amendment. There were 2,166 pages. But during the same period the House passed the amount of Statutory Instruments contained in another six books I have here, comprising 5,488 pages, of which not one word was subject to amendment by the House.
There is no record of the number of Amendments made to Bills during their passage through the House in 1967. But it will certainly have been many hundreds, if not many thousands. Those Amendments were made for a number of reasons—bad drafting, or second thoughts, or consequences which the originators of the Bill had not foreseen. Is it not probable that this huge quantity of Statutory Instruments which passes through the House without capacity for Amendment contains many things which need to be amended?
The major purpose of my proposed Bill is to give the House the opportunity

243
—no more than that—when passing a Bill which confers new powers of delegated legislation, to determine, if it wishes, that the exercise of those powers shall be subject to amendment by the House. If such a Motion is passed, it will be necessary for the Minister to defend the contents of the Order when he lays it, instead of telling critics of the Order, "You must take it or leave it. I need not debate the merits of individual aspects of the Order". This is what Ministers are very apt to say.
A secondary purpose of my proposed Bill would be to amend what many hon. Members will doubtless regard as an anomaly in the present Statutory Instrument procedure, whereby the 40 days during which a Prayer can be moved against an Order include days when the House cannot entertain a Prayer—for instance, the three or four days at the beginning of a new Parliament which are occupied solely in swearing in Members.
Those four days may be critical to an Order. In the case of the Exeter Order, as I well recollect, the consumption of those three days when Members were being sworn exhausted all but one of the remaining days in which a Prayer could be moved. So the second portion of my proposed Bill would make a tidying-up operation to remove an anomaly which I believe was not intended by the draftsmen of the original Statutory Instruments Act.
My proposed Bill would give the House a power, which it should have, to exercise a more effective control over delegated legislation, whatever party is in
power, and to remedy a situation which is rapidly worsening as each year passes.
Mr, Speaker: The Question is that the hon. Member do have leave to bring in his Bill. As many as are of that opinion say "Aye".
Hon. Members: Aye.
Mr. Speaker: To the contrary, "No".
Hon. Members: No.
Mr. Speaker: I think the Ayes have it.
Hon. Members: Aye.
Hon. Members: No.
Mr. Speaker: Who will prepare and bring in the Bill?
Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop rose—
Mr. C. Pannell: I beg your pardon, Sir. I think that the Noes have it. Twice we said "No". If necessary, if I had thought it otherwise, I would have risen personally to make a case against the hon. Member's proposal. I do not know whether I can do it now. In my view, we want a Division.
Hon. Members: Hear, hear.
Mr. Speaker: I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman. I thought that the Noes had ceased to call. I will put the Question again.
Question put, pursuant to Standing Order No. 13 (Motions for leave to bring in Bills and nomination of Select Committees at commencement of Public Business):—
The House divided: Ayes 133, Noes 196.

Division No. 29.]

AYES

[3.44 p.m.

Amery, Rt. Hn. Julian

Campbell, B. (Oldham, W.)

Foster, Sir John

Astor, John

Campbell, Gordon (Moray & Nairn)

Fraser,Rt.Hn.Hugh(St'fford & Stone)

Atkins, Humphrey (M't'n & M'd'n)

Cary, Sir Robert

Fry, Peter

Baker, Kenneth (Acton)

Clegg, Walter

Gibson-Watt, David

Baker, W. H. K. (Banff)

Cordle, John

Gilmour, Sir John (Fife, E.)

Balniel, Lord

Costain, A. P.

Godber, Rt. Hn. J. B.

Beamish, Col. Sir Tufton

Craddock, Sir Beresford (Spelthorne)

Goodhew, Victor

Bell, Ronald

Dalkeith, Earl of

Gower, Raymond

Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torquay)

Dance, James

Grant, Anthony

Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gos & Fhm)

Dodds-Parker, Douglas

Gresham Cooke, R.

Berry, Hn. Anthony

Drayson, G. B.

Griffiths, Eldon (Bury St. Edmunds)

Biffen, John

Eden, Sir John

Grimond, Rt. Hn. J.

Boardman, Tom (Leicester, S.W.)

Elliott,R.W.(N'c'tle-upon-Tyne,N.)

Hall, John (Wycombe)

Bossom, Sir Clive

Emery, Peter

Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)

Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hn. John

Errington, Sir Eric

Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)

Boyle, Rt. Hn. Sir Edward

Evans, Gwynfor (C'marthen)

Hawkins, Paul

Brewis, John

Eyre, Reginald

Heald, Rt. Hn. Sir Lionel

Brinton, Sir Tatton

Farr, John

Hill, J. E. B.

Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)

Fisher, Nigel

Hirst, Geoffrey

Bruce-Gardyne, J.

Fletcher-Cooke, Charles

Hooson, Emlyn

Buchanan-Smith, Alick(Angus, N & M)

Fortescue, Tim

Hornby, Richard

Howell, David (Guildford)

Mott-Radclyffe, Sir Charles

Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir M.

Hunt, John

Nabarro, Sir Gerald

Summers, Sir Spencer

Hutchison, Michael Clark

Neave, Airey

Tapsell, Peter

Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)

Onslow, Cranley

Taylor, Edward M.(G'gow,Cathcart)

Jopling, Michael

Orr, Capt. L P. S.

Temple, John M.

Joseph, Rt. Hn. Sir Keith

Osborn, John (Hallam)

Thatcher, Mrs. Margaret

Kershaw, Anthony

Page, Graham (Crosby)

Tilney, John

Kitson, Timothy

Pardoe, John

Turton, Rt. Hn. R. H.

Lambton Viscount

Parker, John (Dagenham)

van Straubenzee, W. R.

Lane, David

Pearson, Sir Frank (Clitheroe)

Walker-Smith, Rt. Hn. Sir Derek

Langford-Holt, Sir John

Peyton, John

Walters, Dennis

Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry

Pike, Miss Mervyn

Ward, Dame Irene (Tynemouth)

Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)

Quennell, Miss J. M.

Weatherill, Bernard

Lloyd, Rt. Hn. Selwyn (Wirral)

Ramsden, Rt. Hn. James

Whitelaw, Rt. Hn. William

Longden, Gilbert

Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon

Williams, Donald (Dudley)

McAdden, Sir Stephen

Ridley, Hn. Nicholas

Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)

Macleod, Rt. Hn. Iain

Ridsdale, Julian

Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick

McNair-Wilson, Patrick (NewForest)

Royle, Anthony

Wood, Rt. Hn. Richard

Marten, Neil

Russell, Sir Ronald

Worsley, Marcus

Maudling, Rt. Hn. Reginald

Scott-Hopkins, James

Wright, Esmond

Mawby, Ray

Sharpies, Richard

Maydon, Lt.-Cmdr. S. L. C.

Silvester, Frederick

TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

Mills, Peter (Torrington)

Smith, Dudley (W'wick & L'mington)

Mr. R. J. Maxwell-Hyslop and

Montgomery, Fergus

Speed, Keith

Mr. A. W Wiggin

More, Jasper

NOES

Abse, Leo

Gardner, Tony

Mackenzie, Alasdair(Ross&Crom'ty)

Albu, Austen

Garrett, W. E.

Mackenzie, Gregor (Rutherglen)

Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)

Ginsburg, David

Mackie, John

Alldritt, Walter

Gray, Dr. Hugh (Yarmouth)

McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.)

Allen, Scholefield

Greenwood, Rt. Hn. Anthony

Mahon, Simon (Bootle)

Armstrong, Ernest

Gregory, Arnold

Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)

Ashton, Joe (Bassetlaw)

Grey, Charles (Durham)

Manuel, Archie

Atkins, Ronald (Preston, N.)

Griffiths, Eddie (Brightside)

Mapp, Charles

Atkinson, Norman (Tottenham)

Griffiths, Rt. Hn. James (Llanelly)

Marks, Kenneth

Bagier, Cordon A. T.

Hamilton, James (Bothwell)

Marquand, David

Barnes, Michael

Hamilton, William (Fife, W.)

Marsh, Rt. Hn. Richard

Bence, Cyril

Hannan, William

Mayhew, Christopher

Binns, John

Harper, Joseph

Mellish, Rt. Hn. Robert

Blenkinsop, Arthur

Haseldine, Norman

Millan, Bruce

Booth, Albert

Heffer, Eric S.

Milne, Edward (Blyth)

Bray, Dr. Jeremy

Henig, Stanley

Molloy, William

Brown, Rt. Hn. George (Belper)

Hooley, Frank

Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)

Brown,Bob(N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, W.)

Horner, John

Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)

Brown, R. W. (Shoreditoh & F'bury)

Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas

Mulley, Rt. Hn. Frederick

Carmichael, Neil

Howie, W.

Murray, Albert

Carter-Jones, Lewis

Hoy, Rt. Hn. James

Newens, Stan

Concannon, J. D.

Huckfield, Leslie

Oakes, Gordon

Conlan, Bernard

Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)

Ogden, Eric

Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)

Hughes, Roy (Newport)

O'Halloran, Michael

Crawshaw, Richard

Hunter, Adam

Orbach, Maurice

Dalyell, Tam

Hynd, John

Orme, Stanley

Darling, Rt. Hn. George

Jackson, Colin (B'h'se & Spenb'gh)

Owen, Dr. David (Plymouth, S'tn)

Davidson Arthur (Accrington)

Jay, Rt. Hn. Douglas

Owen, Will (Morpeth)

Davies, Ednyfed Hudson (Conway)

Johnson, Carol (Lewisham, S.)

Page, Derek (King's Lynn)

Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.

Paget, R. T.

Davies, Dr. Ernest (Stretford)

Johnson, James (K'ston-on-Hull, w.)

Palmer, Arthur

Davies, Rt. Hn. Harold (Leek)

Jones, Rt. Hn. Sir Elwyn(W.Ham,S.)

Pannell, Rt. Hn. Charles

Davies, Ifor (Gower)

Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)

Parker, John (Dagenham)

de Freitas, Rt. Hn. Sir Geoffrey

Jones, T. Alec (Rhondda, West)

Parkyn, Brian (Bedford)

Dewar, Donald

Kelley, Richard

Pavitt, Laurence

Dickens, James

Kerr, Dr. David (W'worth, Central)

Pearson, Arthur (Pontypridd)

Dobson, Ray

Latham, Arthur

Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred

Doig, Peter

Lawson, George

Pentland, Norman

Driberg, Tom

Leadbitter, Ted

Perry, Ernest G. (Battersea, S.)

Dunn, James A.

Ledger, Ron

Perry, George H. (Nottingham, S.)

Dunnett, Jack

Lee, John (Reading)

Prentice, Rt. Hn. Reg

Eadie, Alex

Lestor, Miss Joan

Price, Christopher (Perry Barr)

Ellis, John

Lewis, Arthur (W. Ham, N.)

Price, William (Rugby)

English, Michael

Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)

Probert, Arthur

Ensor, David

Lomas, Kenneth

Rankin, John

Evans, Fred (Caerphilly)

Luard, Evan

Roberts, Albert (Normanton)

Faulds, Andrew

Lubbock, Eric

Roberts, Rt. Hn. Gnronwy

Fernyhough, E.

Lyon, Alexander W. (York)

Roberts, Gwilym (Bedfordshire, S.)

Finch, Harold

Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.)

Robertson, John (Paisley)

Fitch, Alan (Wigan)

Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson

Robinson, Rt.Hn.Kenneth(St.P'c'as)

Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)

McBride, Neil

Ross, Rt. Hn. William

Foot, Michael (Ebbw Vale)

McCann, John

Rowlands, E.

Ford, Ben

MacDermot, Niall

Shinwell, Rt. Hn. E.

Forrester, John

Macdonald, A. H.

Shore, Rt. Hn. Peter (Stepney)

Fraser, John (Norwood)

McElhone, Frank

Short, Mrs. Renee(W'hamptDn,N.E.)

Freeson, Reginald

McKay, Mrs. Margaret

Silverman, Julius

246

247

Small, William

Urwin, T. w.

Wilkins, W. A.

Snow, Julian

Varley, Eric G.

Willey, Rt. Hn. Frederick

Spriggs, Leslie

Wainwright, Edwin (Dearne Valley)

Williams, Clifford (Abertillery)

Steele, Thomas (Dunbartonshire, W.)

Walden, Brian (All Saints)

Williams, Mrs. Shirley (Hitchin)

Stewart, Rt. Hn. Michael

Wallace, George

Winnick, David

Strauss, Rt. Hn. G. R.

Watkins, David (Consett)

Woof, Robert

Thomas, Rt. Hn. George

Weitzman, David

Wyatt, Woodrow

Thomson, Rt. Hn, George

Wellbeloved, James

Thornton, Ernest

Wells, William (Walsall, N.)

TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

Tinn, James

White, Mrs. Eirene

Mr. Ioan L. Evans and

Tomney, Frank

Whitlock, William

Mr. Terence Boston.

ORDERS OF THE DAY
  SUPPLY
  [4TH ALLOTTED DAY], considered.
  ADJOURNMENT
  Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Charles R. Morris.]

FOREIGN AFFAIRS
3.54 p.m.
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: When it was suggested some time ago that there might be a two-day debate on foreign affairs, the Opposition decided to give one of their Supply days in the hope that the debate would be largely concerned with Nigeria. We chose Nigeria because it is a topic of great interest to both sides of the House and to a great many people outside, and we hope that the Foreign Secretary, although he will, no doubt, wish to devote some of his speech to other things, will be prepared to answer the questions and points put to him on this important topic.
For my part, I shall devote, as did the Prime Minister yesterday, a large part of what I have to say to the Nigeria question, but, as there were one or two matters raised in yesterday's debate on rather different topics, I shall briefly mention three or four of them now.
I take it that the right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary will make some reference to the recent summit meeting of the European Community. The House will be glad to hear his assessment of the timetable within which negotiations may open with Britain and the other countries which are making application to enter the Common Market, negotiations, that is, on the main matters of substance as they will affect the Community after Britain and other members come in. The immediate significance of the summit meeting was the decision jointly taken by the Six that they were willing to expand the Market to include Britain and other countries. Without that declaration, nothing could have started at all.
The next process, as we understand it—this was touched on by a number of
250
right hon. and hon. Members yesterday—is that the members of the existing Community wish to agree upon the finance or agricultural support, and that agreement they will seek to reach in December, or, at the latest, January. This is an exercise to be conducted exclusively by the existing members of the Community, as distinct from consideration of the changes in price levels of commodities, which, we understand, can be taken at a slower pace and in which Britain and other applicants can be associated when they join.
The first operation, therefore, is that with regard to finance for agricultural support. This is immensely significant, because upon it will depend the sum from levies which Britain will be asked to pay across the exchanges. That payment, in my judgment, rather than the cost of living, will decide whether or not Britain can afford the cost of entry in the short term. So that exercise will be extremely important.
Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will tell us how the months from January to July will be filled, after the Community countries have fixed their plan for future years regarding finance for agricultural support. I take it that they will be filled by the Community itself trying to arrive at a Community view on the various questions which will come up in relation to British membership—agriculture, payments across the exchanges, the needs of New Zealand, and other such questions. But the House will be interested to know what is the machinery by which the right hon. Gentleman proposes to keep in touch with the negotiations which go on inside the Community during that time and before July next year.
A question was raised yesterday concerning N.A.T.O. The Foreign Secretary has just returned from the N.A.T.O. Council. The situation of N.A.T.O. today as an alliance is that the repercussions of events in Czechoslovakia still echo, and the anxieties posed by the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean have already led to a strengthening of N.A.T.O.'s southern flank. I forecast that N.A.T.O. will have to look further afield than that; it will need to focus on the supply routes to Western Europe, and particularly those routes relating to oil supplies. However, I shall not pursue that further now.

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Parallel to the questions raised by the actions of the Soviet Union in the military field, there is, too, a new flexibility in approaches between Western Germany and Eastern Europe. The German Government well understand the delicacy of the balance between maintaining the strength of N.A.T.O., on the one hand, and conciliatory functions towards Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, on the other. In the handling of this matter by the German Government, I feel that the allies will have complete confidence. In that knowledge, the talks which the German Government are at present holding with the Soviet Union will be welcome to the N.A.T.O. allies.
The question was raised yesterday of the security conference between the Warsaw Pact area and N.A.T.O. and other neutrals. There is only one test, and I think that one test will be enough, which will prove whether the Soviet Union regard this exercise as a serious contribution to the détente, or another dreary exercise in propaganda, and that is whether or not the agenda includes a discussion for a definitive plan for the thinning-out of forces, conventional and nuclear, on either side of the line of confrontation between the N.A.T.O. alliance and the Warsaw Pact. If so, in spite of the existence of the disarmament conference, the Russian mind sometimes works in mysterious ways, and it might be worth staging this additional conference.
I will say no more than was said yesterday on the subject of Vietnam. The Prime Minister asked yesterday whether incidents like "Pinkville" might be endemic in a war such as the war in Vietnam, or whether they might be similar to cases that we have known in previous wars, where the hideous strain of war means that the nerves of individuals crack. I doubt if that question can ever be answered satisfactorily by anyone. All we know is that all wars reveal that the veneer of civilisation is paper-thin, and that we had better take care that wars do not occur. Therefore, one must be careful to judge—[Interruption.] As the hon. Member for Penistone (Mr. John Mendelson) spoke yesterday, perhaps he will listen today.
We must be careful to judge these matters. As the Prime Minister said at Question Time, the President of the
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United States has said that he will see that judgment is made and that justice is done, but I prefer, on Vietnam, to judge the political intentions by the performance in the peace conference.
I note that the Americans have withdrawn troops and that they say that they are willing to withdraw more. I note, also, that they say they will withdraw all American troops from Asia, if only they can get in return some international machinery which will help South Vietnam to maintain a genuine self-determination. I prefer that to people sitting at the conference table and making no contribution whatever to the peace plan. I would hesitate for a long time before condemning the United States.
I have two more questions to ask. [Interruption.] If hon. Gentlemen opposite are taking up the suggestion that appeared in a newspaper that the Conservative Party refrained from voting last night so as to expose the other side—nothing of the sort. We do not have to vote every day to demonstrate our support for the United States.
Mr. John Mendelson Mr. John Mendelson (Penistone) rose—
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: There are two more questions—
Mr. Mendelson: Before the right hon. Gentleman leaves Vietnam, may I intervene? He referred to the question whether the Pinkville situation was endemic. The President of the United States said this morning that there was a massacre. Would the right hon. Gentleman address himself to the proposition that the instructions and strategy to search and destroy inevitably lead to the killing of civilians in the ratio 9 to 1?
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: I would prefer to wait, because I am quite confident that on this matter justice in the United States will be done and will be seen to be done.
There are two more questions which I would raise before I come to Nigeria. I do not press the Foreign Secretary now, in the middle of the four-Power talks on the Middle East, but the House should have the authority of the Foreign Secretary's and Her Majesty's Government's interpretation of the resolution they sponsored in the United Nations on Israel's

253
withdrawal from the occupied territories. It has been the curse of the United Nations that time and again resolutions have been passed which mean all things to all men. The House should be told whether or not this resolution requires the complete withdrawal of the Israelis. As I say, I will not press the right hon. Gentleman today, because I do not want to prejudice the four-Power talks, but at some time we shall return to this question.
The second question I might address to the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Duchy who, we understand, is to reply to the debate. I hope that the Government will not go to Strasbourg with a mind entirely closed to compromise on the question of Greece and its expulsion from the Council of Europe. [Interruption.] We listened to hon. Gentlemen opposite with some attention yesterday, although we disagreed with them. If hon. Gentlemen will keep quiet, I will explain why I say this.
As I understand, the Greek Government may well propose that the short programme of legislation which they intend to bring in during the next months or year will be a programme to restore the democratic process, and they may well say to the Council that it is their intention that this programme should be reconciled with the programme proposed by the Commission of the Council of Europe. If that is so, I hope the right hon. Gentleman will not be too hasty in turning down a proposal of this kind.
Very serious and severe implications would follow from the expulsion of Greece from the Council of Europe. Hon. Gentlemen may not wish to recognise this, but there will be implications on the N.A.T.O. alliance and on the security of Europe. It is surely reasonable to ask that the Foreign Secretary or his right hon. Friend should consider this proposal. It will have to be followed by a date for elections. A reconciliation between the programme of the Greek Government and the programme proposed by the Assembly of the Council of Europe might well provide a solution.
The problem which lies behind the civil wars both in Vietnam and in Nigeria is, politically, essentially the same. It is hard to reconcile local patriot isms and needs with the larger
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units of Government and administration which are necesary for efficiency and prosperity in the modern world. In tribal Africa these difficulties are particularly acute, and none of them has been resolved. For example, in the context of Nigeria, there is the question of who is to retain the balance of power at the centre, the Muslims or the other tribal representatives in Nigeria. These questions will take a long time to work out, and none yet has really begun to do so.
So deep are the feelings in Nigeria that we have seen one group of Africans take to arms, so deep is their distrust of their neighbour, and another group blockades, with all the horrors which we know in war are associated with a blockade. As always, it is not so much the combatants in the fighting line who suffer, but the innocent people in between who, inadvertently, get in the way of a war which they have done nothing to start and about which they understand very little. It is they who pay the penalty in hunger starvation and misery. Therefore, it is not surprising that outside Nigeria impatience and frustration grow in a situation in which apparently so little can be done to ease suffering, on the one hand, and to end the war, on the other.
In Britain, in particular, we reproach ourselves, sometimes to the point of unfairness, because we find it far more difficult than others to recognise that Nigeria is completely independent and that any decision on the future political structure of that country must be taken by Nigerians for Nigerians. They are jealous of this and no one else should intervene.
Neither we nor any other country can dictate or lay down the conditions for peace. This must be a matter for the Nigerians, as must be the future political structure which they must work out for themselves. All we can do and all any other country outside Nigeria can do—I hope that we can do this genuinely and generously—is to say to both sides that we offer our services as an anxious, sincere and, I hope, experienced peacemaker.
I turn again shortly to the question which has been debated many times in this House, whether Britain should continue to supply arms to Federal Nigeria—

255
arms traditionally supplied by this country to them as a Commonwealth country. I have always been able to appreciate, to respect, and to honour the motives of those who advocate a cut-off. Undoubtedly, they feel sincerely that somehow, by a cut-off, they would expunge a taint of guilt which they feel is associated with Britain in the sale of arms to this Commonwealth country. On this matter each must consult his own conscience. And, along with all other hon. Members, I have done my best to wrestle with the difficult moral problem.
So far, I have been unable to answer to my satisfaction two questions. The first is: would such action be just to the millions of Africans who compose Federal Nigeria? Would they in justice regard the cut-off of arms supplies as discrimination against those Africans who form the majority of that country? To that question I have so far answered: yes, it would be regarded as discrimination and would discriminate against them.
Would such action contribute in any way to peacemaking? Would it save a life? The answer to that question is: no. I say that for two reasons. First, the good will of Federal Nigeria and the majority of Africans would be irrevocably forfeited in future. The second reason is that the Nigerian armed forces inevitably would become more and more dependent on the Soviet Union, with all the implications for the future which would flow from that. Therefore, if this must be a consequence, I cannot take the view, however sincerely it is held, and however much I respect right hon. and hon. Gentlemen who hold it, that it is right, either in morality or in reality, to commend the unilateral cut-off of arms.
The international embargo is a very different matter. I find it not only possible, but right, to argue for that, as many Members have done who put their names to a Motion on this subject. I find it right in equity and in reality because it would restrict the scale of the war, and I find it right in reality because civil war should not be exploited by the great Powers, to use the Prime Minister's words yesterday, to superimpose international conflict on a civil war.
For some time past, from this side of the House, I and my right hon. and
256
hon. Friends have urged the right hon. Gentleman to use the United Nations to control the supply of arms from outside Nigeria through an arms embargo. The question arises, and was raised by the Prime Minister yesterday: should this question—I do not refer to the internal affairs of Nigeria since once the United Nations start interfering in the internal affairs of a country the United Nations is finished—with regard to the external supply of arms be inscribed on the agenda of the Security Council or the General Assembly?
The Prime Minister yesterday should not have quoted the opinion of the Secretary-General. It is the members of the Security Council, not the Secretary-General, who decide what ought to be inscribed on the agenda of the Security Council or the General Assembly. It is, of course, right that the Secretary-General privately should advise the Secretary of State on what the chances of success might be in such an operation. That is a different matter.
The House should not underestimate the difficulties in trying to reach an arms embargo and would not ask the Government to do the impossible. The French Government deny that France is sending arms to Nigeria. The Soviet Government seem to have given notice in advance to the right hon. Gentleman that they will not co-operate in any such operation. It is probably true, though it remains to be seen, that a great many of the Afro-Asian countries in the Security Council or the Assembly would vote against the inscription. But what is the proposition? It is that arms-supplying nations, including Britain, should halt the supplies by agreement because there is a danger that an international conflict will be superimposed on the civil war. If the Government believe—and from the Prime Minister's speech we must take it they do believe—that an arms embargo would be a good thing, then this question must be put to the test.
I confess that I am becoming not only tired but angry that people inside and outside this country should pillory Britain for continuing its traditional supply of arms when no one else will lift a finger to help us in the efforts we have made to limit this war. Who are these countries? Who would refuse this proposition? We have now come to the moment when the Foreign Secretary must

257
tell us who they are. He can do this at some future time, or he must go to the United Nations so that the countries concerned may stand up and be counted. One or the other must soon be done.
I now turn to the matter of relief. I have proposition to make—
Mr. Woodrow Wyatt: What could be the purpose of an arms embargo, even supposing the other countries agreed, because it would only pave the way to the most ghastly forms of smuggling which would not shorten the war? Indeed, the war might last longer if they had to fall back on using bows and arrows.
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: If there was the political will in the Soviet Union, France and Britain, then the arms embargo could be policed to a point where it would very much reduce the scale of war.
I turn now to relief. There will be civil wars and other wars. We know that the world is an imperfect place. But it is the suffering in Nigeria that gives such poignancy to the situation, particularly when simple people are being afflicted by the terrible hunger and starvation which is part of their country's lot.
It is essential that the House should be clear what proposals have already been made by the Federal Government and what are the objections of the Biafrans, our purpose being to create a supply of relief, and particularly food, which would break the back of the hunger and starvation. For the sake of accuracy, I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will interrupt me if I am wrong.
Daylight lifts have been proposed between the hours of nine o'clock and five o'clock; the cargoes to be inspected outside Nigeria; the flights to start from outside Nigeria; the Red Cross to select the personnel who travel on the aeroplanes, who may include neutrals; relief planes, with one exception, to overfly Nigeria; no military planes to be allowed on the routes during the hours of relief flights in transit. That is a formidable offer by the Federal Government, and people should think twice before it is turned down.
But now we must consider—because this is the reality of the matter—Colonel
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Ojukwu's objections, in spite of these offers, which, on the face of it, one would have thought should be accepted. The first—and this is the exception which I mentioned—is that a flight might be called down for inspection if it was thought that the original inspection had been faulty or that some other aircraft were, so to speak, coming in on the routes designed for the relief food flights
I cannot think that that is an objection which could not be overcome. It must be possible to overcome it by the scheduling of flights and by ground control. But the objection on which Colonel Ojukwu's rests is that the Federal air force might come in on the tail of relief flights and take over Uli Airport, which is the Biafran's one vital airstrip on which they rely for military supply and arms.
The question is: is there a method of relief which will find a way round these objections and break the back of the problem of starvation and hunger? I believe that there is, and I now make a proposal to the right hon. Gentleman which I hope he will seriously consider. It involves the use of aircraft carriers, or other suitable ships, and helicopters on a continuous programme of flights during an agreed period of time, which might last over a fortnight or three weeks.
The advantages will be apparent to the House. Helicopters do not have to land to deliver their supplies. Uli airstrip, which is a military target and is of military significance to Biafra, would not be involved at all. The supplies could be dropped in other designated areas. Neither side possesses helicopters, so there would be no difficulty about identification. The lift, I am told, could accomplish the delivery of 500 tons plus a week, so within a reasonable period a very large amount of food and medical supplies could be dropped. As no military targets need be involved, neutral observers could supervise the distribution and the Federal inspection could take place as easily on an aircraft carrier as at an airport outside Nigeria.
I hope that this proposal, or something like it, may be put with a sense of urgency to both sides. If the objection is that the British are suspect. I am quite certain that the United States and the Canadians would take on this task.

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But I was encouraged to hear the Prime Minister say yesterday that the British Air Force could be used if necessary. If this scheme should find favour, I take it that the necessary aircraft and helicopters could be supplied by this country. I do not think that this proposal has been tried before. I hope that it will be made. I think that it has a chance of success.
The core of the matter is the organisation of a meeting of the two sides in the conflict to arrange a cease-fire, a truce and a political settlement. It is difficult before a meeting of leaders is staged, because one has to get over the barrier of words—"What is meant by a united Nigeria?" Time and again, as we have seen before in international negotiations, it has taken a long time to break the barrier of words before people meet.
I felt for a long time—and I was sorry to see on the tape some discouraging news from Biafra on its views—that the Organisation of African Unity was the body most likely to find a formula for peacekeeping because of the jealousy that African problems should be solved by Africans. There are those in the Organisation of African Unity who speak for both sides. Therefore, given good will, it could probably find a formula for political settlement. It should be in the interests of all Africans that a formula for political settlement should be found and the machinery constituted for the political revision which will be necessary when the new Nigeria takes shape.
There are two particular ways in which Britain can help. First, the organisation of a Commonwealth force, if that should be required, to help to police a cease-fire. The Federal Government have accepted this. I hope that the Biafrans will do so. We have a man like Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, who, I think, has the sympathy of Africans generally—he understands them and they understand him—and we have people who have all the knowledge in the world of Nigeria among our civil servants who have always thought in terms of the benefit and future of Nigeria as a whole without holding any preconceived ideas about what the constitutional structure within the boundaries should be.
If the Organisation of African Unity has any success, we might be able to help
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in these ways. We shall perhaps learn more from Lord Carrington, when he returns, whether he has any fresh suggestions, and perhaps more from the Minister of State when he returns from Lagos. But I hope that meanwhile the persistent efforts of the Emperor of Ethiopia will be crowned with the ultimate success which everybody wants. I hope that the Foreign Secretary will consider with the greatest care my proposal for the relief of hunger and starvation which might bypass many difficulties. If we can relieve the hunger and starvation, at least many would not feel as uncomfortable as they do today. Although I can find no justification for cutting off the supplies of British arms, I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will give further thought to the organisation of an embargo.
If, as a result of this debate, some of these things can be pursued and followed up, our consideration of this matter will be justified and will not have been in vain.
4.28 p.m.
The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Michael Stewart): The right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) has spoken briefly and movingly. I shall try to reply to the points he has raised. I cannot hope to speak as briefly as he has done, because he referred—and I understand this full well—almost by name to three important subjects: our approach to the European Economic Community, and the problem of N.A.T.O. and relations between East and West. I shall have to return to those subjects at rather greater length. I will deal with them first as briefly as I can and then refer to the subject of Nigeria, in which the House is so profoundly interested.
I would say this about yesterday's debate. The right hon. Gentleman, in the main, expressed his agreement with the position of the American Government in the Vietnam dispute. I do not think that I am misrepresenting him when I say that. Some of us were a little surprised that that agreement was not manifested more plainly in the Lobby last night, if that is the view of the party opposite.
There is one other matter, apart from the three subjects mentioned by the right

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hon. Gentleman, to which I would refer. That is the Middle East. As I have explained before, there is reference, in the vital United Nations Security Council resolution, both to withdrawal from territories and to secure and recognised boundaries. As I have told the House previously, we believe that these two things should be read concurrently and that the omission of the word "all" before the word "territories" is deliberate.
I have made this clear already. I do not think that the House would expect me to go further on that matter now. We have now, with the resumption of the four-Power talks, to see whether the resolution can be turned into a workable package, calendar, or timetable, or list of parallel actions by all parties which would ensure that all the provisions of the resolution are carried out.
I should now like to take up the three subjects to which the right hon. Gentleman referred. The first is the recent meeting at The Hague of the countries of the European Economic Community. This is clearly a matter of the greatest importance to this country. We can say beyond doubt that, at that meeting, there was manifested the clear desire of all members of the Community that the Community should be enlarged and we can properly hope, in view of what was said At the end of that meeting, that negotiations will be opened, at the latest very shortly after 30th June next year, and possibly earlier.
In those negotiations, there are bound to be extremely difficult problems; the right hon. Gentleman referred to the financial arrangements for the agricultural policy of the Community, and how vital that was to Britain. I would put this matter as follows. We all know that the agricultural policy of the Community and the financial support for it presents a problem, a difficulty, if you like, a disadvantage to this country, which has to be weighed against the important and undoubted advantages which we should gain if we were a member of the Community and that vast market were open to our industries.
On the other hand, we must recognise that the agricultural policy presents to France a substantial advantage, and it would not be sensible for us to approach
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the negotiations on the assumption that the French could be expected to forgo every advantage they have in order to facilitate our entry. To do that would not be to approach the matter in good faith. Similarly, it must be understood that, if agreement is to be reached on this matter, this has got to be a question of reason and proportion. The agricultural policy presents certain substantial advantages for France and some other members of the Community and it presents certain problems for us. I believe that, given good sense on both sides, an agreement can be reached which would be advantageous both to the six present members of the Community and to ourselves. That is the spirit in which this has to be approached.
Similarly, in the approach to the Community, we have quite properly to bear in mind our obligations to our fellow members of the Commonwealth. I do not believe, looking at the history of previous negotiations on this matter, that it will be impossible for us to secure, in the negotiations, reasonable arrangements for our fellow members in the Commonwealth. I do not believe that it is the experience of any of the previous negotiations that it was on this matter that they were likely to break down. If there is the real will—I think that the importance of the discussions at The Hague is that they showed that there is the will—to reach agreement, I do not believe that negotiations would break down on the question of a proper regard for our fellow members of the Common wealth. Throughout the negotiations which will come, as in the negotiations which, unhappily, were not successful in the past, we would certainly have a proper regard for our duty to our fellow members of the Commonwealth.
My only other comment on this is to invite the whole House to remember that it still remains true, despite the many difficult problems to be solved in negotiation, that there are very great advantages to be secured, both for us and for the countries now members of the Community, if we can get the enlargement of the Community—economic advantages for our industry, political advantages for us and for all Europe. I believe that it is the general wish of the House that these negotiations will be attended with success.

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The second matter to which the right hon. Gentleman referred was that of relations between Eastern and Western Europe, with the particular example of East and West Germany. I spoke on this matter in the debate on the Queen's Speech a short time ago and what I said then are the guidelines of Her Majesty's Government's policy on this great question of reconciliation between East and West.
The right hon. Gentleman spoke of the delicate balance which one must preserve here. With this, I think that everyone is agreed. We must, unless we are to despair of mankind, approach with hope the concept of trying to get easier relations between—whatever term one likes to use—East and West, the Communist and the non-Communist worlds. One is obliged also, remembering Czechoslovakia and certain other incidents, to approach this with caution as well as with hope.
Quite recently, we have had proposals emerging from a conference at Prague. They were to the effect that we should engage in a conference concerned with two matters—trade and a renunciation of the use of force. I must say at once, without rejecting this out of hand, that this is a somewhat limited menu. We have plenty of opportunities for discussing matters of trade already. Indeed, I have never neglected, in any of the contacts which I have had with the countries of Eastern Europe, the opportunity of increasing trade, and there are many forms in which we can deal with this.
Renunciation of the use of force is something to which we are all pledged already, in the United Nations Charter. I think that we now have to notice this particular question. There has been put forward fairly recently what is known as the "Brezhnev Doctrine", which appears to me to he that, while countries which have different ideologies must scrupulously renounce the use of force against each other, there remains some kind of right for members of the Warsaw Pact, and particularly the Soviet Union, to take measures involving the use of armed force if the Soviet Union considers it necessary for the security of the Warsaw Pact as a whole. This is a doctrine to which we should find it very difficult to assent. So, I think, would many countries in Europe.
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We have, then, so far, a proposal for a conference about trade and renunciation of the use of force, with this rather unusual derogation from the doctrine that one does not use force against other countries. Naturally, as soon as the idea of a conference was raised, we and many others stated the point that, if there was to be a conference, the transatlantic members of N.A.T.O., the United States and Canada, should be present. As I understand, there is now no objection from the countries of the Warsaw Pact to this proposition, provided that East Germany should also be present at such a conference on the same terms as anyone else.
I would not object to that, provided it is understood that coming together in such a conference should not be regarded as a recognition internationally of the East German régime—[HON. MEMBERS: "Why?"] I am explaining why to my hon. Friends. Chancellor Brandt, of the Federal Republic of Germany, has recently put forward what seems to me a very sensible and reasonable proposition. He said, "If we are to go as far as recognising that there are two States in Germany, we in the Federal Republic cannot be expected to regard the other German State as a foreign State. If there are to be relations between us, they must be of a rather special kind." I do not think that anyone could quarrel with that as a statement of the Federal Republic's position.
If the proposition is a conference at which all members of N.A.T.O., all members of the Warsaw Pact, and the European neutrals, are present, but it is to be in such a context that it goes some way towards the complete recognition of East Germany and, at the same time, has an agenda which will not get us any nearer to solving the major problems, then there is no country in N.A.T.O. which could regard this as, by itself, sufficient, particularly if such a conference would, by its very meeting, underwrite to some extent the Brezhnev Doctrine.
That is why I say, and it was apparent when we met in the N.A.T.O. conference recently, that no N.A.T.O. country could accept this as it stands. But we ought not, because the first proposal is inadequate, to turn down the whole project. I want, as I said in answer to one of my hon. Friends yesterday, to see a conference so prepared and with such an

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agenda that we can relax tensions in Europe. Surely one of the things necessary for that is that it should be prepared to discuss the very topic which the West has put forward for some time and to which the right hon. Gentleman referred, that of mutual force reductions. This is a difficult, complex problem. I do not believe that for that reason it ought to be ruled out.
In this situation, what the countries in N.A.T.O. ought to do is to say that, while we cannot accept what is immediately proposed, we do not regard this as the last word; we will diligently study by what means contact can be achieved. For example, one view which has been put forward is that the whole thing cannot be done in one conference, but perhaps it can be done by a series of conferences If we begin with a conference on limited questions, can we have a guarantee that this would go on to questions of real substance? Another view is that one might have a kind of standing commission on East-West relations. These are the matters which N.A.T.O. should now carefully consider.
May I put this to some of my hon. Friends who may be doubtful about this? Supposing the position were reversed, supposing I had said, "I propose a European conference to be held on such terms as will give certain propaganda advantages to the West, I propose that it should discuss matters of trade, which we can do anyhow, and the renunciation of force, to which we are already pledged, but I do not propose to discuss real matters like a balanced reduction of forces", I wonder whether some of my hon. Friends would not have thought that that was a rather unreal offer.
Mr. John Mendelson: Surely my right hon. Friend knows that he would have the full support of the House if he insisted that, whatever the original agenda of such a conference, everybody, including Her Majesty's Government, must be free to raise any other subject, including the desirability of Soviet troops withdrawing from Czechoslovakia, if real progress is to be made.
Mr. Stewart: Indeed. I am glad to hear my hon. Friend say that. The point I want to make is that at the moment we have a proposal for a conference which by itself would not be satisfac-
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tory. But it is the job of N.A.T.O. to press on with this, both on substance and procedure, to see whether we can get to something real. If there is a genuine desire on both sides, I believe that we can get something real.
Mr. J. Grimond: I should like one further bit of information about the position of East Germany. The right hon. Gentleman has said that he has no objection to East Germany attending the conference. He also said that there would be an objection to her attendance being treated as recognition. Has there been any demand for recognition by the proposers of the conference as a preliminary condition?
Mr. Stewart: I think that the correct answer to that is "No", but it would be right for us to make clear that until there has been further progress in the talks between the Federal Republic and East Germany, we could not be supposed to have committed ourselves to recognition by attending a conference at which the East Germans were present.
I want particularly to refer to the fact that the Federal Republic of Germany is on the point of entering into discussions with the Soviet Union on the renunciation of the use of force and is endeavouring to seek a better relationship between the Federal Republic and East Germany and, I trust, discussions between the Federal Republic of Germany and Poland. It is the view of Her Majesty's Government that all these attempts by the Federal Republic are things which we ought to encourage and which we hope will succeed.
We have been asked from time to time to express an opinion on the frontiers between Germany and Poland. I want to make it quite clear that if, in any discussions between the Federal Republic and Poland, an agreement can be reached which is satisfactory to both those two countries, it would also be satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government. We believe that the Federal Republic of Germany is acting wisely in taking these initiatives. But we also believe that one of the tests to be applied before we can see whether it is sensible to have an all-European conference is what progress is made in the talks that have already begun, or are shortly to be begun. In this matter, as in so

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many others, salvation is to be secured by both faith and works. We want to see a bit of works in the talks already begun, or shortly to be begun, if we are to engage in a great act of faith.
Mrs. Renée Short: Will my right hon. Friend tell us what sort of time schedule he has in mind and is suggesting in connection with the proposed series of conferences which he has put forward as an alternative to an enormous conference bringing both sides together?
Mr. Stewart: I do not think that I could give a time schedule for that. I have no wish to delay about this, but I think that my hon. Friend will understand.
At present, the security of this country and of the other members of N.A.T.O. is bound up with the alliance itself. I am sure that we are right to try to proceed in agreement with all members of the alliance. It is a little more difficult to secure agreement among the members of our alliance than it is for the Warsaw Pact to reach agreement, for reasons which will be apparent to the House.
I do not want to give that as an excuse for delay, but I want to get on as fast as we reasonably can with genuine talks concerned not merely with words, but with substance. I believe that that is the wish of all members of N.A.T.O. There are some differences of opinion among them as to exactly the proportions in which we ought to balance hope and caution between the two. My own judgment is that we stand now at a moment when there is a greater chance for meaningful negotiation than there has been for some time, and the influence of Her Majesty's Government in N.A.T.O. will be exercised with that in mind.
There is one other European matter which I wish to mention before turning to Nigeria. The right hon. Gentleman referred to it. It is the question of Greece and the Council of Europe. The noble Lord the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Viscount Lambton), who wound up the debate for the Opposition last night, raised this matter. He asked about the voting in the Council of Europe. I believe that the correct answer is that any motion for a suspension requires a
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simple majority of members of the Council and a two-thirds majority of those who actually cast a vote.
The right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire was anxious that we should not reach a hasty decision without regard to what the Greek Government themselves might wish to do. We have already exercised a good deal of patience in this matter. I think that it was right to do so at the last meeting of the Council. Indeed, if we had not done so, I think that the view of the majority of the Council would have been that we were proceeding unreasonably.
I hope that the House will forgive me if I speak with some feeling on this matter. I believe that all of us feel a sense of distress that it should be Greece, of all countries, with her dazzling history, which is estranged from the democratic countries of Europe. In 1963, when my right hon. Friends and I were in opposition, I, together with some of my hon. Friends, visited Greece. We went there as tourists, but with the natural political interest that any hon. Member would have. I remember standing at that place in Athens where one can look down on the hill where the Athenian Assembly met, the fountainhead of European democracy, and, at the same time, can look down on the Theatre of Dionysus, the morning star of European dramatic literature, and on the Temple of Aesculapius, the day spring of European medical science. In the whole library of human achievement there is hardly a volume in which the Greeks did not write the first chapter. It is to many of us a sense of bitter distress that Greece should be estranged from those European countries who owe so much to her heritage.
If it is possible, even now, for the Greek Government to say something which will convince—and I use the words I have used earlier in public—any reasonable person that they intend to return to democratic governmnent, if they can spell out a clear timetable, including an undoubted date for genuinely free elections, there would be a chance of conciliation. Failing that, if it is the Greek Government's position, and this I believe to be their position, that they intend to return to democracy, but cannot give so explicit a timetable, is not their wiser course to withdraw from the Council of Europe;

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then, if they can demonstrate their return to democracy, return to the Council?
But if they cannot do either of these things, I do not see how the Council can do other than proceed to suspension. That would be the view of Her Majesty's Government. We should act on these lines with resolution, but, for the reasons I have expressed to the House, it would be with regret and not with rejoicing.
Mr. Eldon Griffiths: Mr. Pipindelis, the Greek Foreign Minister, was in Paris over the weekend. Was there any contact between British Ministers and that gentleman? Is there a chance of inviting him here to discuss with the right hon. Gentleman the important points that he is making?
Mr. Stewart: I assure the hon. Gentleman that we have been in regular diplomatic contact with the Greek Government. I have tried to spell out to the House the position we have taken and the position which the Greek Government know we have taken.
Mr. John Lee: Hon. Members will be warmly appreciative of the moving spirit with which my right hon. Friend has spoken and, in general, with the sentiments he has expressed. Does he appreciate that it is not only a question of spelling out a specific timetable for a return to democracy, but also of immediately releasing the prisoners who are languishing in their foul gaols?
Mr. Stewart: Yes, indeed. This is not only a question of a return to democracy, but of human rights, as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister made clear yesterday.
In coming to the subject of Nigeria, I think that all hon. Members would agree, as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said yesterday, that this argument should be conducted without any attempt to impugn the motives or sincerity of those who take different views on matters of policy. That was observed yesterday and I hope that it will be observed today.
There has been a suggestion that Her Majesty's Government should make a major change of policy. That was not the view of the right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire, who dealt with certain particular points; and, for
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reasons to which I shall come, I do not believe that it would be right for us to make a major change of policy. However, I would not want the House to suppose from that—and here I take up a point raised by the Leader of the Liberal Party yesterday—that Her Majesty's Government come to every debate determined merely to recite their position and go away without paying any attention to what is said.
I will listen, as will my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Duchy, with great care to every suggestion about policy that is made. If it can be shown that there is anything that was previously impossible and might now be wise, or even that we have not so far observed something that would now be wise, then we will certainly take that into consideration. But I must make it clear—and I will set out the reasons for this—that a major change in the whole nature of our policy would be profoundly wrong for this country, for Nigeria and for Africa.
What we must consider in this House is not how exactly we can order all the affairs of Nigeria. We must remember—the right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire brought this out—that we are dealing with an independent sovereign Commonwealth country. We must ask ourselves what action, within the limits of that, Her Majesty's Government can take either to bring the war to an end, or, meanwhile, to promote relief or mitigate suffering.
Although the right hon. Gentleman did not examine the whole basis of Government policy—because he does not dispute its main bases—I think that I should, in deference to feelings in many quarters of the House, mention again briefly the essentials of the position of Her Majesty's Government.
We believe profoundly that the attempt by Colonel Ojukwu and those with him to serve the needs of his people, the Ibo people, by secession was wrong, was a disastrous mistake and that everything that it was necessary to secure for the Ibo people could be secured within a United Nigeria and not by the process of secession.
We must remember the repeatedly expressed readiness of the Nigerian Government to negotiate anything on the basis that Nigeria remained one country. We

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must notice that the phrase "one country" includes many different kinds of political arrangement, great degrees of decentralisation and guarantees for the security of the Ibo people within that one Nigeria. The Nigerian Government have made clear—and have made clear again in the context of the visit to Africa of my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary—their readiness, provided their country is not to be torn apart, to go as far as any consideration of reason or justice would require to give proper security and a proper place for the Ibo people within Nigeria.
The willingness of the Nigerian Government in this respect is further borne out by the fact that we have had reports, with which hon. Members will be familiar, of the possibility of conversations in an African framework; and, in my view, if this problem is solved, it will have to be within an African framework. The Nigerian Government have already made clear their willingness to send representatives to those talks. I find, however, conflicting reports about the willingness to Colonel Ojukwu to send representatives to them.
I hope most earnestly, as I am sure will all hon. Members, that he will agree; and the House will be bound to judge that, if he is not willing to do so, then the blame for the continuance of the strife and the impossibility of reaching agreement cannot be laid at the door of the Nigerian Government, and certainly not at the door of Her Majesty's Government.
I have also seen reports that Colonel Ojukwu and those who work with him do not regard sovereignty as the absolute essential, but the security of their people. This has been said once, denied once, and is now being asserted again. I hope most earnestly that it is true. If this is the genuine view of Colonel Ojukwu and those who work with him, then this, I would have thought, could open the door to peace. We have still to see whether that is so, but here again, if that is not so, it will certainly not be the Nigerian Government who stand in the way of a settlement, still less Her Majesty's Government.
Mr. Eric S. Heffer: In view of my right hon.
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Friend's remarks about the uncertainty of Colonel Ojukwu's views, why have Her Majesty's Government never officially made any approach to the Biafrans to find out precisely what their views are? Up to now official approaches have been made to one side only. Surely we cannot get the full picture unless an approach is made to the other side as well.
Mr. Stewart: My hon. Friend is mistaken about this. There are representatives in London of Colonel Ojukwu with whom we have been continually in touch.
At the time of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference we particularly urged them to enter into conversation with representatives of the Nigerian Government who are willing to do so. Moreover, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has repeatedly offered to meet Colonel Ojukwu and other representatives of the Biafran authorities, as they are described. We have, through a great many channels—Members of this House and private individuals who have gone to Biafra and back—kept constantly in touch—[Interruption.] It cannot be said that we have not been in touch with the Biafran authorities.
I notice that the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, with whom we have also been in touch, on another aspect of this matter, said that he thought that it was imperative for Colonel Ojukwu to agree to the relief arrangements that have been organised. I wish that his advice had been followed. It cannot be contended that we have not kept in touch with the view of the Biafran authorities.
Mr. Jeremy Thorpe: The House knows that there are Biafran representatives and Federal Nigerians in London. It also knows that the Government have sent people to Federal Nigeria. Can the right hon. Gentleman give us one reason why anything would be lost if the Under-Secretary of State, who at this moment is in Lagos, goes on to Biafra?
Mr. Stewart: I think that it should be noted that, except for two occasions, for very special reasons, not only the British Government but no Government, except the few who recognise Biafra, have sent Ministers there. There would be great difficulty in doing anything which could

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be interpreted as recognition of the Biafran Government.
I should remind the House that at an earlier stage in this dispute we had very nearly reached agreement at Kampala. One of the main reasons why, at the last moment, that agreement was overthrown was the encouragement given to the Biafran authorities from outside that they could obtain support and could continue the struggle. I do not believe that it would be right for us to take any action at this moment which could encourage a continuance of resistance.
Mr. Stanley Orme: It is going on, anyway.
Mr. Stewart: On the point on which this question was raised, how do we know what the Biafran Government's views are—
Mrs. Renée Short: Ask them.
Mr. Stewart:—we have already, as is well known, any number of channels through which we are in touch with them?
Mr. Hugh Fraser: But we disregard them.
Mr. Stewart: The right hon. Gentleman says that we disregard them. He may be referring to the case of Group Captain Cheshire, who expressed the view that the Biafran authorities were not so much concerned with sovereignty as with security. I say again, if he is right, that if the Biafran authorities will make that good, we can get settlement—
Mr. James Griffiths Mr. James Griffiths (Llanelly) rose—
Mr. William Molloy Mr. William Molloy (Ealing, North) rose—
Mr. Stewart: I give way to my right hon. Friend.
Mr. James Griffiths: It is important whether the stage has been reached at which the Biafrans would regard the essence of a settlement as a system by which their people would be secure and not secession. In view of the importance o f this matter, in the third year of this war, may I suggest that a message be sent from Her Majesty's Government to Colonel Ojukwu saying that we would be prepared to send a Minister to dis-
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cuss this point with him if he would receive him?
Mr. Stewart: Before I answer my right hon. Friend, I think my hon. Friend the Member for Ealing, North (Mr. Molloy) wished to intervene.
Mr. Molloy: I am grateful to my right hon. Friend. He will recall that yesterday, at Question Time, I put to him that there had been a most encouraging statement by Sir Louis Mbanefo. Yesterday, there seemed to be some doubt as to exactly what he said, but it was an encouraging statement. May I ask my right hon. Friend whether he has investigated the accuracy of that statement, as it could be most encouraging if it turned out to be correct?
Mr. Stewart: We shall do our best to discover whether that statement reflects the genuine views of the secessionist authorities.
On the question put to me by my right hon. Friend, he will know that at this moment there is the possibility of talks under African auspices. I think that he will agree that it would be wrong for the British Government at this juncture to take any action which would upset what can be achieved there—[Interruption.] I wish that my hon. Friends, to whose criticisms I have listened patiently, would listen to a serious argument about the chance of obtaining peace.
I do not think that it would be right either for the British Government or for this House at this juncture to take any action which could be interpreted, not merely by the Nigerian Government but by the great weight of African opinion, as an attempt to take this matter out of African hands. I cannot stress too much the extent to which African opinion believes that this matter should be settled within an African framework. We have the possibility—
Mr. Peter Mahon Mr. Peter Mahon (Preston. South) rose—
Mr. Stewart: I would ask my hon. Friend to wait for a moment.
There is the chance now of the two sides meeting face to face in an African framework. I think that the whole House will agree that it is a good thing that the Nigerian Government have agreed to send representatives there. I

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think that the whole House will also agree that it would be right for Colonel Ojukwu to send representatives there. For us at this stage to take a measure that could be interpreted as recognition of a separate authority in Nigeria would damage the chances of agreement there. I am sure that that would not be a right step to take.
Mr. Peter Mahon: I am sorry to add to the many interruptions with which my right hon. Friend has had to contend. Both principal speakers have made terrific play of the independence of Nigeria. Tragically, this independence has become a mockery. In view of the tragic circumstances—the horror that is going on, lives being lost, people and young children being starved, the absolute position of genocide—can we sit back and complacently say that this is none of our business and that we should not intervene?
Mr. Stewart: I must profoundly disagree with my hon. Friend on two matters.
First, we cannot regard the independence of Nigeria as a mockery. If we attempt to behave as though Nigeria were still a British colony, nothing but disaster could result.
Secondly, as I will show shortly, the accusation of genocide cannot be borne out.
Mr. Michael McNair Wilson: The right hon. Gentleman is advocating the argument that if we send a Minister that somehow means recognition of the Biafran régime. But when we sent a Minister to Southern Rhodesia that did not mean recognition of U.D.I.—[Interruption.]
Mr. Stewart: I do not think that the hon. Gentleman will feel that that comment has received much support from the House. For a British Minister to discuss affairs with people who are British subjects in a British colony is one thing. For us to send a Minister to an area which claims to be in rebellion from an independent Commonwealth country is another. I am not ruling out, nor is my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, the sending of a Minister in any circumstances.
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I ask the House to consider whether, when there is the chance of bringing both sides together in an African framework, this would be the moment to do something which would certainly be interpreted in Africa as an encouragement for the continuance of the war rather than the making of peace. That is the issue which we have to decide.
I want to turn, now, to the particular proposition which has been put forward by some hon. Members, but not by the right hon. Gentleman, that this country should unilaterally cease its supply of arms. I was asked yesterday what that supply was. There has been the suggestion that the Government have been trying to camouflage from the House what the supply was. That is untrue. It remains, as I have informed the House, about 15 per cent. by value of the total purchases by Nigeria. It comprises, overwhelmingly, ammunition, spares, antiaircraft equipment, and a small number of armoured vehicles. I say that because that was the question that was asked, and because there have been allegations to the contrary.
The House must be clear about this. If we were to make a decision unilaterally to cut off this supply, this would be regarded in Nigeria and in Africa as approval of the act of secession. What is African opinion on this? Four African countries have recognised Biafra. More than 30 have refused to do so, and support the point of view of the Nigerian Government. I should perhaps tell the House that, in addition to the four African States which have recognised Biafra, there is one other. It is the Republic of Haiti, if the House considers that to be a recommendation.
It should also be noticed that in the latest discussions in the O.A.U., although there were some who abstained, there was no African State which voted against the resolution calling for discussions between the two sides on the basis of a united Nigeria. It is within the framework of that resolution, which the great majority of African States support, and to which none of them is opposed, that the Nigerian Government are prepared to negotiate, and I trust that Colonel Ojukwu will also be prepared to negotiate.

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It seems to me that if one has to make up one's mind on a major act of policy, such as a decision to cut off arms supplies would be, there are two questions that one must ask. First, what is the basic political moral principle involved? Second, what would be the immediate practical results of one's action? On the basic principle involved, it is clear that for this country unilaterally to cut off the supply of arms would be, in effect, an approval of secession, something injurious to Nigeria and to the welfare of Africa as a whole.
One then asks the second question: what would be the practical effect of such a decision? I believe that many people are attracted to the idea of our cutting off the supply of arms by the belief that this would shorten the war and end the suffering. The truth is the reverse. The practical result of such a decision would be to prolong the war, first, by the encouragement that it would give to the secessionists to continue the struggle; and, second, if anyone supposes that our cutting off supplies would put the Nigerian Government in a position where they could not continue the war, he is unhappily unaware of the facts.
The practical effect would be to put the Nigerian Government in a position where they would obtain the supplies from elsewhere. To put it plainly, they would be increasingly reliant on the Soviet Union for their supplies. I do not believe that that would be to the advantage of Nigeria, or Africa, or this country, or that it would produce a frame of mind in the Nigerian Government more disposed towards compassion and conciliation.
Mr. Peter M. Jackson Mr. Peter M. Jackson (The High Peak) rose—
Mr. Stewart: No.
If we examine the practical results of cutting, off supplies, we see that it would prolong the war, and it would estrange this country from Nigeria. It would estrange us from the great weight of African opinion, and since some hon. Members have felt that if we did not supply arms we could be a better mediator, I must tell the House that it would reduce our chances of any mediation. An action of that kind would make it quite clear to the Nigerian Government
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that we were hostile to them, and any possibility of mediation would disappear.
Those would be the practical results of such a policy, and I cannot recommend the House to pursue a policy which is wrong in principle, and the practical results of which would be to injure this country, Nigeria, and Africa, and to prolong the war and the suffering.
Mr. Frank Allaun: If, as I believe they do, the Government want to obtain a joint ban on the supply of arms, do we not put ourselves in the best position to obtain that if we give a lead? If we do not do that, are we not in the position of a drug pusher who says, "If I do not sell drugs to these poor victims, somebody else will?"
Mr. Stewart: I do not think that my hon. Friend can believe that. I am coming shortly to the question of the possibility of a general international embargo, but it must be apparent, as a matter of common sense, that if this country were to say now, "We are not going to supply arms at all in any circumstances" there would not be the smallest chance thereafter of persuading any of the others to modify their policy.
Sir Robert Cary: I put a question to the Prime Minister yesterday about the intrinsic nature of the arms which we are supplying to the Nigerians. I am grateful to hear the account being given by the Foreign Secretary of the modest range of armaments being sent to Nigeria. There have been rumours that heavier armaments have been sent, and I am glad to hear that, in fact, it involves only light armaments.
Mr. Stewart: I have given the House a clear account of what we are doing. I have said earlier that this policy would be reconsidered if two conditions arose. First, if it were clear that the Nigerian Government were pursuing a policy of genocide. No fair-minded person would any longer maintain this slander. It has been decisively disproved by the verdict of the international observers in Nigeria. Their presence there is some evidence of the good faith of the Nigerian Government.
The reports of the observers have shown clearly that the Nigerian Government are not practising genocide. The

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experience of what has happened in territories previously held by the secessionists and recovered by the Nigerian Government makes it quite clear that they are not practising genocide. Above all, the position of millions of Ibos in Federal-held territory makes it clear that genocide is no part of their policy. I hope that these allegations will no longer be made.
Secondly, I have said that we would reconsider this policy if it were clear that the Nigerian Government were determined on nothing but outright victory and were not prepared to negotiate. But, time and again, they have shown plainly where they stand. They are prepared to meet unconditionally. I repeat that I hope that at this very time we shall be able to get the talks started in Africa.
There is another aspect of the matter which must be considered. Hon. Members and the public generally have seen on television the dreadful record of starvation in the rebel-held territory. I know that this is one thing that moves people greatly to examine, to criticise and to question the policy of the Government. They ask: are the British Government supporting in Nigeria a Government which uses starvation as a weapon of war?
Let us look at the evidence. The Nigerian Government, some time ago, although they were in a position to impose a complete blockade, expressed willingness to have mercy corridors by land. It is the Nigerian Government who have reached agreement with the Red Cross on the possibilities of daylight flights. One of my hon. Friends yesterday said that Colonel Ojukwu did not object to daylight flights in principle. He objected to the particular package that had been agreed between the Nigerian Government and the Red Cross.
It is of some significance that the proposals for daylight flights are not merely those which please the Nigerian Government. They are those which the Red Cross, a body that I hope can be regarded as impartial has held to be reasonable. They are those on which the United States Government have asserted their emphatic judgment that they are reasonable proposals. More recently the Canadian Government,
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which has been under great pressure on this matter, have expressed their judgment that these arrangements are reasonable and just.
The position can now be described as follows. The Nigerian Government are prepared to agree to daylight flights on certain agreed terms with the Red Cross, despite the fact that this involves some military disadvantage to Nigeria. Moreover, Colonel Ojukwu is not prepared to agree to this package because he considers that it imposes a military disadvantage on him. I must ask the House to judge where the responsibility lies for the fact that these flights do not go through. No one can seriously maintain that it lies on Her Majesty's Government. Nor can it be maintained that any action we ourselves could take could relieve this starvation without the consent of Colonel Ojukwu.
The right hon. Gentleman put forward proposals about helicopters. His estimate of how much they could do is not quite accurate. I doubt whether they could do as much as he proposes. But I want to make it clear that if it is any question of material means—carriers, aircraft, helicopters—this country would do anything within reason. I have reason to suppose, having recently visited Europe, that there are other countries which would join in. But it will be a physical impossibility to do this unless we can achieve an arrangement agreeable to both sides.
I believe that at this moment, and connected with my hon. Friend's visit to Nigeria, the Nigerian Government are considering whether they can take an even further step in connection with one of the conditions of the daylight flights to see whether agreement could possibly be reached. But I do not believe anyone who reviews the whole story could conceivably say that any responsibility for starvation lies on the British Government, or that we have failed in our attempt to bring relief. We have given substantially. The very fact that there is an agreement between the Red Cross and the Nigerian Government on daylight flights is something for which we can claim credit.
There remains the question on which the right hon. Gentleman based his main case. I do not feel that I need to apologise to the House for the time I

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have taken, since I have been dealing with important matters on which the House wants to hear the Government's position. So far, on the Nigerian question, I believe that the basic position of the Government is right. It would be disastrous to encourage secession in Africa, with all the misery and backwardness that that would bring.
We have not been idle at Aburri, Kampala, and Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conferences in attempts to bring the two sides together. But so far as we could, consistently with not recognising the Biafran secession we have kept closely in touch with Biafran opinion. Indeed, it is no fault of ours that our consul is not still there. We were prepared despite the legalisms of the matter that he should remain. It was a Biafran decision to turn him out. It cannot be claimed that we have been idle.
On relief, we have been generous in money. We will give further help. We have striven in negotiations to bring about a reasonable answer to the problem of how to give relief while war still rages. We are not prepared to do anything that would involve recognition of tribal secession in Africa, which would cut us off from Nigeria, outrage African opinion and produce no useful result.
There remains the question which was raised by the right hon. Gentleman: can we get an international effective arms embargo? If such an embargo could really be made to work, the Government would be ready to take part in it, but it must be effective, and we should notice at the start that it is unlikely to be effective unless both Nigeria and Colonel Ojukwu join in to make it effective. This is partly because of the many unofficial, un-governmental supplies that it would be difficult to rule out unless the embargo were policed at the point of entry.
However, if it is felt that that is taking too rigid a view, we have examined whether it would be right to try to gel such an embargo through the United Nations. I think that it was entirely reasonable to ask the opinion of the Secretary-General. I agree that his judgment is not binding, but it would be extremely unwise to brush it aside. His view was that an attempt to put this matter, or any aspect of it, into the United
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Nations would, for plain reasons, attract the solid hostility of African and Asian nations, who would feel that it was an attempt by Europeans, in particular by a former colonial Power, to bring something which under the Charter is the internal affair of an African country into an international context.
I do not want the House to suppose that we stopped there. On three occasions we have approached the Russian Government about this, once at official level, once in the manner I described to the House a month or so ago, and once, very recently, when my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister put this question direct. The answer is plain. The Russian Government will not stop supplying arms to Nigeria unless the Nigerian Government request them to do so. We have not stopped there. The difficulty has been that it is not every country that admits supplying arms to Biafra, although some who do are not countries which wish very well to black Africa or who would normally commend themselves to some of my hon. Friends.
However, some months ago I raised this matter in Western European Union, when France was still playing an active part—as I hope before long she will again. But we have not been able to make progress, although it has not been for lack of trying.
I ask the right hon. Gentleman and the House this question. At this moment, when there is the chance of talks within an African framework, would it be right to try to make a gesture which all the evidence, unhappily, shows is unlikely to succeed, for the sake of making a gesture which would please us but would leave Africa with the belief that we had no regard for the rights or sovereignty of African countries, and to do this when there is a chance of the two sides meeting in an African framework? I cannot believe that it would be right.
We must all hope that both sides will attend the projected talks. I wish that I could be sure of that. If this does not happen, if the House still has to consider this problem, just as we have made repeated initiatives in the past to get either an international arms embargo or a settlement, we shall not be idle in the future. I shall be very willing to discuss with the right hon. Gentleman the wisest way of handling that matter.

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I hope that the House will believe, in this dreadful problem in which everyone has had to search his conscience, that this country has acted rightly and, that the accusations of cruelty and hardheartedness that have been made against it cannot be sustained. I hope that we shall have the support of the House in continuing to do whatever we can for relief, to encourage the end of the war and to pursue a policy that is in the long-term interests of the whole African Continent.
5.46 p.m.
Mr. J. Grimond: I am sure that no one will impugn the motives of the right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary. I am sure also that he is deeply unhappy about the situation in Nigeria, and, I believe, to his credit that he is not altogether happy about the policy of Her Majesty's Government which he is bound still to defend.
The House will be most disappointed that the Foreign Secretary will not respond to repeated suggestions that a Minister should visit Biafra. His first reason for refusing this request is that this is a matter for Africans. Certainly I agree with him that it would be much better if it could be left entirely to the Africans to settle; but we are not leaving it entirely to the Africans. We are supplying arms to Nigeria, and we have sent a Minister to the Nigerian Government. Had we done neither of these things, his argument would bear more force. But as we have a Minister at the moment visiting the Nigerian Government, I beg him again to consider why he should not go on and visit the Biafran Government as well.
Secondly, it is said that we must on no account give an impression of recognising Biafra. This is a situation in which millions of people are losing their lives, and I do not think that we can afford to be too nice about protocol and recognition.
I do not see why, if a Minister visits Biafra, he should not put very strongly to Colonel Ojukwu that he should go to the talks which have been called, and that he should be reasonable about any proposals which are there made. It may well be that, because we have supplied arms to one side, our capacity for mediation is small, but if we have any
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capacity at all, this seems to be the moment to use it to encourage the Biafrans to respond to the initiative of Emperor Haile Selassie.
The Foreign Secretary went on to deal with the supply of arms. I am not quite clear what the Government's arguments are here. It used to be argued, and is sometimes still argued, that we are under some obligation to supply arms to Nigeria. I believe that we were under a similar obligation to supply arms to Cyprus, but when the civil war broke out in Cyprus we stopped the supply. The next argument is that it would be taken by Nigeria as a hostile act and would decrease our ability to do any good; but I suggest that the supply of arms is the great obstacle to our being able to influence the situation. The right hon. Gentleman said that if anyone could show that the situation had changed he would consider it. The situation has changed—changed in that the policy of the Government has failed.
The Government believed that there would be a quick end to the war, and there has not been a quick end to it. The right hon. Gentleman talks about rebellion going on, as though it was likely to stop. It is going on now, and what information one gathers, and I have here a very recent report, leads one to believe that the determination of the Biafran people to continue the struggle until they achieve what they consider to be a just and secure settlement is absolutely firm.
It is then argued that we must on no account encourage secession. I stand open to correction here, but I rather think that we gave the Cameroons the right to opt out of Nigeria, and they took it.
Mr. Richard Hornby: The question of who should and who should not go into the Nigeria Federation was discussed at the pre-independence conference, and it was the wish of the Ibos, along with the Yorubis and the Hausas, that the minority commission Report should be set aside, as it would involve a two-year delay in achieving independence.
Mr. Grimond: The Biafrans are not a small tribe but a people of many millions in number. No doubt the Foreign Secretary has read what Mr. Nyerere has to say. He draws attention to the

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attitude of the British over Gibraltar. The British are not pressing the Gibraltarians to go into Spain because they must be part of a bigger unit immediately adjacent to them. On the contrary, we are upholding the right of the Gibraltar people to decide their own future. It is an entirely new and an entirely unfortunate departure of a British Government to deny to substantial nations—and the Biafrans are a substantial nation—the right of self-determination. I fully accept that it might be better if they had not chosen this path. It might have been better if the Czechs and the Slovaks had not revolted against the Austrian Empire. It is not in the hands of Britain to deny the right of self-determination to a nation.
Mr. James Johnson: Is it correct constantly to talk of a Biafran nation? There are 9 million Ibos, and there are a few minorities. There is not a Biafran nation.
Mr. Grimond: There are minorities in every European country. There are minorities here, but we occasionally talk about the British nation. I do not see why the Biafrans should be treated just as a tribe. There is talk of balkanisation. The trouble with the Balkans was not that comparatively small nations were allowed self-determination, but that they were not. That was the root of that trouble in Eastern Europe. We should be careful about using that threat in imposing unity. I do not deny that unity may be desirable, but, if people do not want it, it is not our business to attempt to enforce it.
There is on the Order Paper a Motion signed by a great number of hon. Members of all parties and supported today by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) urging the Government to take the matter to the United Nations. I cannot think why that has not been done before. The Government now say that this would be a bad moment to do so. At the end of his speech, the Foreign Secretary went some way to saying that this was a bad moment for taking it to the United Nations but that if the talks failed he would reconsider the proposition. I would like him to go further than that, and give the House
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an undertaking that he will take the matter to the United Nations and that he will there ask those who oppose it to stand up and be counted. The Government will then be seen in the international field as taking a definite step to putting an arms embargo on this war. I cannot think that the African nations will regard that as a hostile act, or as interfering with the affairs of another country. I believe that should include an embargo on foreign arms.
This is a civil war. We did not hesitate to take the internal affairs of our own colony of Rhodesia to the United Nations, and the Foreign Secretary had no answer when it was pointed out earlier this afternoon that a Minister from this country went to deal with the rebel so-called government in Rhodesia. We behaved there in quite a different way, and I should like an undertaking from the Government that if these talks fail the matter will be pursued at the United Nations.
But the Government are in the dilemma that there are some signs that they think it necessary for their policy of support for the central government that the supply of arms to Nigeria should continue. This is one reason for refusing unilaterally to cut off those arms supplies. But I think that the Nigerians would think it strange policy which said that we would not stop the flow of arms unilaterally but would do our best to get it stopped multilaterally. If it is thought desirable that arms should pour into Nigeria, why take any initiative to stop the flow at all? If the Government are faced with this situation it shows the whole insecurity of their policy. It shows the terrible consequences of the quick kill argument.
It is really astonishing that a Labour Minister should be defending the unilateral supply of arms for a civil war on the ground that someone else will do it if we do not. I remember the talk about the merchants of death and the encouragement of imperialism through the supply of arms—and now we have this from a Labour Minister. If the Government in South Africa can buy arms elsewhere, is that a reason for giving them arms? The South African Government will get them elsewhere, of course, but it is an absolutely indefensible argument. It would justify just about any crime in the world.

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One must make some moral judgment about civil wars. No one will say, I am sure, that it is never right to revolt. On the contrary, it has always been held that in the interests of self-determination it is reasonable for people to revolt against imperialism. I am sure that any hon. Member would have supported any revolt against the Nazis in Germany. But there are civil wars about which one makes a value judgment on the other side—I confess that I would have supported the Republican Government in Spain. It is not possible to say that one must always support the Government, and this seems to be a clear case in which, to put it at its lowest, it is extremely unlikely that all reason is on the side of supporting the Nigerian Government.
I do not impugn the motives and efforts of the Government to get aid through. I do not deny that they have met with great difficulties. I welcome the fact that they will look seriously at the suggestion put forward by the right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire. If they have not the capacity to lift the 500 tons a week of which we spoke, let them get in touch with other agencies and countries, if this is a peaceful way of doing it.
I am told also from a report that has been sent to us by Mr. Simmonds Gooding that if some guarantee from other powers were given that there would be no military follow-up in the corridors leading to the Uli strip, Colonel Ojukwu might reconsider his objections to that method, but let us bear in mind that one of the reasons for his previous objection was that, in the first place, it was a plan agreed between the Red Cross and the Nigerian Government in negotiations to which he was not invited. We are far more likely to do business by talking with him than by ostracising him, and pretending that he is a rebel who has just escaped a quick kill and whom, apparently, it is fair on the one hand to want to see defeated, but on the other ask to accept our mediation.
This is obviously a tragic and desparate affair. As I say, we must not impugn the motives of any of those involved in it. But it is also a moral question, if ever there was one, and I was glad to hear the Foreign Secretary
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say the same. It is a moral question upon which one has to make up one's mind—and I say this to the Conservative Party—whether one will stand up for the policy of the Government or whether one wants it changed. I trust that a great number of hon. Members will go into the Division Lobby to say that they want that policy changed, and changed in the name of humanity; and that they are totally unimpressed by the argument that by going on supplying arms, and thereby conniving at and prolonging this war, we are doing anything to bring it to an end or anything at all to brighten our image in the world.
6.0 p.m.
Mr. James Griffiths: I claim the indulgence of the House for a brief intervention in this debate. I should explain that it will not be through discourtesy if I do not stay to hear other speeches. That will be because I am suffering from a disability, but I felt that I had to make the effort to come here this afternoon and say a few words.
Recently I wrote to my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, and he kindly came to see me when I was more ill than I am now. I was grateful for his visit. I wrote to him afterwards and pleaded that he and the Government should take a bold, new initiative to try to bring this tragic war very quickly to an end. In that letter, to which he gave a very full and considered reply, I did not set out some of the ideas which I will put forward this afternoon. I told him that this is my last Parliamentary Session—in the language of a collier, my last "shift". If there is anything I should like to see happen in my last shift it is peace in Nigeria and an end to this tragic war.
I do not propose to go over the past, but from the very beginning grave miscalculations have been made by Her Majesty's Government and their advisers about Nigeria. When this trouble began in Nigeria their advisers thought that it was just a little bush rebellion which would be put down very quickly, and, therefore, our responsibility in supplying arms would be for only a very short period. They were wrong. No one in this debate has talked about a "quick kill". We talked about a quick kill in previous debates. This war is now well

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into the third year, and no one can foresee an end of it. I believe we have begun to realise that to General Gowon and Colonel Ojukwu, both of whom I have met and who I think are genuine people, it is quite clear that there will be no military victory for either side in Nigeria.
It is now within a week of 12 months since I was in Nigeria and Biafra. There have been 12 months of fighting and suffering and starvation, and who knows how many have died in those 12 months? There has not been any significant or decisive change in the military situation in those 12 months. Only two things of any significance have happened in this war—the Federals have captured Umuahia which at that time was the centre of the Biafran administration, and at the same time the Biafrans moved to Owerri. Here and there a mile or two of territory has been gained. During those 12 months there have been countless tragedies.
We may be coming back to this problem in 12 months' time, perhaps in a new Parliament. We ought to make up our minds that there is no military solution to this problem and that the war can go on for a long time. I will speak about some conversations I have had with old friends. Colonel Ojukwu and General Gowon I did not know until I went there, but I have had conversations with Lord Brockway and others who have been there and with people whom I have known for many years in Nigeria who served the Colonial administration. I have talked with people who supported the old political struggle.
I remember saying to one of them, a man in his sixties who rendered yeoman service to the Colonial administration—a Nigerian and an Ibo—"I want to put a question privately to you as one friend to another. Biafra may be overrun; what will you do then?" He said, "My dear Jim, I will go back to the bush."
These people believe that they are fighting for survival. They will not give in. They will fight to the bitter end, and that bitter end is what I want to avoid. Therefore, I say it behoves us all to realise that if we go on committing ourselves and arms to this war it will be a war which can go on endlessly. I say to my right hon. Friends that before long there will be a backlash revolt and serious consequences for this country and
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for the party to which I have given my life.
I hoped that there would be an acceptance that now we would take the matter of the supply of arms to the United Nations and seek an arms embargo. From the beginning I have held the view—and I have not changed it; I see no reason why I should change it—that we should never have started giving arms to one side in Nigeria. The moment we did that we sacrificed our greatest rôle in the Commonwealth, that of mediator when trouble breaks out. We are the mother of the Commonwealth. We have worked with these countries and sometimes quarrelled with them, but we have a great record. We have worked with them as each has come along towards the stage of independence.
I have always thought there was bound to be trouble, for one cannot establish democracy overnight. After all, it took a long time for us to do that in this country. I always thought that perhaps there would be trouble between different peoples. From time to time there has been trouble between the English and the Welsh, but I always thought that for our country, which is the home of the Commonwealth, the right posture should be that we do not take sides. Our policy and our aim should be to act as a mediator. Now we cannot act as a mediator because we are regarded by one side as the enemy.
Mr. James Johnson: My right hon. Friend knows that he is the last hon. Member I would wish to interrupt and disturb; but is it not a fact that we have intervened and helped other emergent countries of coloured people—Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia and Uganda—who have been in equally difficult positions?
Mr. Griffiths: I do not regard this as the same kind of situation. Those countries had constitutionally democratic Governments. There is no democratically elected Government in Nigeria. The Government are not elected by the people in Nigeria, neither is Colonel Ojukwu's administration. These are two military dictatorships. That changes the situation, and that is why I argue that we should do all we can to stop supplying arms to one side. That is my view, and I have not changed it.

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This war would have ground to an end months ago if it were left to Africans. This is a war in which Africans are killing Africans with white men's bullets. Let us speak frankly. I venture to make an estimate. I know that it is not far wrong concerning one side and I do not think it is far wrong concerning the other side.
Eighty per cent. of the arms used in this war come from outside Nigeria. My right hon. Friends, who have their military observers there, may challenge my estimate. Arms pour in from Russia and Britain to the Federal side; from France, directly or indirectly, through Gabon and Guinea to Biafra; to both sides from black markets organised from Europe. If this war had been left to the Africans, with no arms being supplied from outside, the war would have ground to a halt. So I plead with my right hon. Friends immediately to take steps to secure an international embargo. I have signed a Motion asking for this.
There are two things which bother me greatly. First, thinking of the future, this is a war within a country which is a fellow member of the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth seems to be powerless to do anything to help. No one mentions the Commonwealth. Are we writing off the Commowealth? Is this the end of the Commonwealth? Countries in the Commonwealth are so close together that they should join in seeking to bring this conflict to an end.
I remember the tremendous enthusiasm there was when the League of Nations was formed and how it was killed later by its creators. So the point which bothers me is: is the United Nations also to be killed by its creators? In this war the United Nations is apparently powerless. The question of the Biafran war does not figure on the United Nations agendas. Certainly the United Nations does not discuss this war and plays no part in it. Looking to the future, I am frightened if the United Nations is powerless and helpless to deal with the two wars which plague mankind today—those in Biafra and Vietnam.
So I plead with my right hon. Friends to take immediate steps. If the Russians turn down their request, let them do so. If the French deny that they are supplying arms, let them do so. We should stop
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arms from going to Nigeria, if we can. We should take every possible step through the United Nations. If we cannot do that, what is to prevent the Government from approaching France and Russia and asking them to join Britain in stopping supplying arms to Nigeria? If the supply of arms were stopped, I believe that the two sides would come together much more quickly. What is keeping the war going is the supply of arms from outside. It is said—it may be true—that the supply of arms to Ojukwu makes him more reluctant to settle. This may be true of those in Lagos, too.
My right hon. Friend, for whose personality and integrity I have a high regard, said that the war can be settled only within the African framework. He said that it is possible—we hope that it is certain—that Haile Selassie will bring the two sides together. The Emperor has been working for months on this. The Committee for Peace in Nigeria, on which I am privileged to serve under the chairmanship of Lord Brockway, has been in touch with the Emperor for many months. We have said how grateful we are for the efforts he is making and how we hope he will succeed in bringing the two sides together soon in Addis Ababa or somewhere else. I am sure that the House will wish to send the Emperor all the good wishes and our blessing.
If the conference is to be held next week or the week after, I hope that the Emperor will suggest that during the talks there should be a truce to the fighting. Let the talks take place with a truce on for a week, ten days, two weeks, or for however long the talks last, and then there is a chance that Gowon and Ojukwu will go to the talks.
Ojukwu will not leave his headquarters to go outside Biafra whilst the fighting is on. I think that he is right not to go, because he is the man entrusted by the Biafrans to conduct their operations. If there was a truce, he would go out. I appeal to him and to others to go out. Gowon would go. So I hope that there will be a truce.
Secondly, I hope that all the efforts at the conference, when it meets, will be concentrated on securing a ceasefire. So I urge that there be a truce for a week

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or two and a ceasefire for a long time. I put it to both Gowon and Ojukwu that, having got a ceasefire, it would be desirable to have a long cooling off period before sitting down to discuss Nigeria's future. There are big issues to be solved. A new Nigeria must be created. A new constitution must be worked out. Eventually, democracy must be restored there as well as in Greece. In Nigeria, too, some day the people must decide what form of government they want. That will take time.
Before the parties begin the task of creating a new Nigeria, it is vitally important that some of the hatred and bitterness should die down. Those of us who have visited both sides know how deep and bitter are these hatreds. The parties are not in the right mood now to sit down and discuss Nigeria's long-term future. This is why there should be, following a truce, a ceasefire—a long cooling off period.
What, then, is the problem for the future and for peace? I believe that it is how to reconcile the determination of the Federal Government to maintain one Nigerir with fears of the Ibos—I say "Ibos" not "Biafrans". I understand the Federal desire to maintain one Nigeria, but there would be no one Nigeria except for the Ibos. My right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster knows the history of Nigeria; so does his Department.
The driving force for one Nigeria came from the Ibos, from the East. The Ibos are gilled people who made a tremendous contribution to Nigeria. They were the real driving force. They were the people who tried to establish political parties over and above races all through Nigeria.
The fact that Ministers in the Federal Government and others with whom I spoke want one Nigeria and the Ibos want secession gave me special cause to think. So over breakfast with some old Nigerian friends on morning I said, "I have always known Nigeria as a great country. I have always known all of you as men who wanted one Nigeria, as men who recognise that Nigeria, with its ample resources, its large population, its gifted people, its passion for education, is truly one great country". We all know the passion for education—for school and for college—that exists there, particularly among the Ibos. So I said, "Do you
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still want to see one Nigeria, as I do?" They all said, "Yes, we do". What is the breaking point?
Here I come to the nub of the problem. They said, "After the massacre, we will never again entrust the lives of our people to the Federal forces". That was a very firm and frank statement, and, because of its importance, I repeat it—"We will never again entrust the lives of our people to the Federal forces". They told me that 30,000 of their people had been massacred in cold blood, and one million had been driven as terrified refugees from their homes. "We will not", they said, "be part of one Nigeria unless we ourselves have a place in that Nigeria in which we have our own internal security forces to protect our own lives".
I tell the House frankly that I am with them in that. I believe that they are right to ask for it. Suppose it had happened anywhere else; if 30,000 of my people were massacred, I should feel that I was betraying them if I said otherwise. Surely, it can be done. I put it to General Gowon and the rest: there will be a new Nigeria; the old Nigeria has gone. I had some part in creating the old Nigeria and the Federation. We realised that we had to have devolution, and the devolution we organised in the end was, first, the three regions, and then the four.
Now, General Gowon has more or less wiped out that old Nigeria and has proclaimed a Nigeria of 12 states. Chief Awolowo, who was a member of the Government, too, has gone on record, in print, as saying that he rejects Gowon's 12 states and he thinks that it ought to be many more. Anyway, there must be a reconstruction, with a Federal Government and regional governments, whatever they may be, and with power in those regional governments.
I am sure that it is not beyond the wit of man, not beyond my good friends in Nigeria and Biafra, eventually to work out a scheme by which they will all be in one Nigeria but in which the Biafrans, the Ibos, will have a place of their own and a security force of their own, able to protect themselves and not be subject to any more massacres. That is the problem.
As I say, I hope that the talks will succeed. Let there be a truce, a cease-fire and a cooling-off period, followed by

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negotiations and an eventual settlement under which the Ibos will feel that their security is safe. For Nigeria's sake, I hope that that will be possible. It will be a greatly impoverished Nigeria without the Ibos. Nigeria, with a wonderful future possible for it, needs their gifts, their talents, their energy, industry, drive and push. I know that they are sometimes called arrogant. As a Welshman, I can say that the English are sometimes called arrogant. Perhaps they have a bit of the English about them—and a bit of the Welsh, too, I am sure. But I confess that I like them. I want to see them have their right place—neither more nor less than that—and I hope that it will come.
What if the talks fail? The war will go on. The hawks will move in. There are hawks in Lagos as well as in Owerri. I know who the hawks are, and so does my right hon. Friend. When I discovered who some of the hawks were, I was shocked to know them. The hawks will win if the talks break down, and then the war will reach its final stages.
My emotions are deeply moved when I think of the last stage of this war in tiny Biafra, a Biafra shrinking all the time, mile by mile and yard by yard, with its people scattered, and every road crowded by night and day. They will fight on, but it will be a battle fought over the bodies of refugees crowding the villages and the roads, a battle fought with modern weapons supplied by us, by Russia, France and the black marketeers.
I ask my right hon. Friends, the House and the country to consider what that last stage will be if the talks fail. Leaving the past behind now, I urge my right hon. Friends: at that time, arms must be stopped. It would be intolerable otherwise if the war—I hope to God that it will not—ever reached its final stage. We wish Emperor Haile Selassie well in what he is doing to stop the war, but if that final stage comes and the battles are fought over starving bodies, it will be intolerable for me and, I hope, for the House if it should be conducted with British arms.
6.25 p.m.
Mr. Hugh Fraser: The whole House will have listened to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Llanelly (Mr. James Griffiths) with
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at least some of the emotion which he engendered in many of our hearts. I am glad that the right hon. Gentleman's name heads the Early Day Motion, signed by more than 151 hon. Members, asking, in the name of humanity and in the name of realism, that there be a change in Government policy towards the Nigerian civil war, a war which is now almost in its third year.
Yesterday, we had from the Prime Minister a speech of some sensitivity in which he talked about the difficulties and the moral questions which we sometimes face. He spoke of the lack of the categorical imperative and of the confusion of principles. It was a speech of sensitivity, though a speech, perhaps, better delivered by a minor professor of moral philosophy at a second-rate German university than by a British Prime Minister.
The issues before the House are simpler than that. They have been put by the right hon. Member for Llanelly. The question is whether there has been a change in Government policy. In fact, apart from a few trimmings, a few arabesques or grotesqueries—to call them that—round the central theme of Government policy, there has been no change whatever. Government policy remains exactly as it has been for two and a half years. It is to demand a unitary Nigeria, and to pursue the concept of a unitary Nigeria with arms and with every diplomatic means in the present Government's power. That is why we ask the House to divide tonight. That is why people in the country are annoyed, not just because of the sufferings being inflicted, but because of the meaningless sufferings inflicted upon millions of people in Nigeria. The suffering is meaningless for the simple reason that we are now embarking on a war that is unwinnable.
Yesterday, the Prime Minister made some reference to division of opinion among the Churches. He said that some churchmen cannot make up their minds. I do not know which pillar of the Church and fifth column of the Establishment he had in mind—unless it be the previous Archbishop, Lord Fisher—but he may have noticed that what he said yesterday about indecision regarding the sending of relief was totally denied by the Churches assembled yesterday in Oslo. Thirty-five Churches represented there on Joint

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Church Aid gave the Prime Minister the lie on his absurd suggestion that there is a division in Christian opinion. There can be no division in Christian opinion about the supply of arms and the starvation of a people.
There is only one thing that the Christian Churches can do, and they are doing it. I refer to the provision of aid. Considering the amount of aid being provided by Her Majesty's Government to assist the churches in this direction, we were not surprised when yesterday we heard of the gimmick that perhaps Royal Air Force aeroplanes might be used to supply aid.
I agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) that one thing is certain. At the moment when we are supplying arms, then to supply food in R.A.F. aeroplanes would be totally unacceptable to both common sense and the people and Government of Biafra. This is why we must appeal to use other aircraft supplied by other countries.
The lamentable fact is that there has been no change in Government policy. This is clear from the statements of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary. The Prime Minister is more of a pragmatist than a moralist. If it could be shown that the policy of Her Majesty's Government had succeeded—the death of 2 million people and the constant supply of British arms—in bringing about a unitary Nigeria, with all that that would mean for the flow of oil and the keeping out of Russian and French influence, something might be said for this policy. But on every count this policy has failed.
Some of my hon. Friends have business interests in this part of the world. Are the oil companies and their interests being protected? Shell has estimated that, in terms of the production that it could achieve, and has not, it is losing about £500,000 a day. This is the sort of protection that the policy being pursued by Her Majesty's Government is giving to our interests. This is the advantage that we are gaining from the continuance of this war.
I do not merely say that this is a policy of folly which must be changed, either with a new Foreign Secretary or a new Government. The policy pursued so far has made an ending of this war
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more difficult and, in pursuing that policy by every diplomatic means and otherwise, a settlement seems impossible. This is perhaps the most serious accusation that I can launch against the Foreign Secretary and his colleagues.
The right hon. Member for Llanelly spoke of a fundamental error of British policy in this matter. This fundamental error arose from our having made too rapid a decision to back the Gowon Government after the military coup of 1967. One need not look far back in Nigerian history to see the truth. The Prime Minister yesterday, and the Foreign Secretary today, were pleased to compare what is happening in Nigeria with the American civil war. This is a favourite analogy of theirs.
The Foreign Secretary now seems to have cast himself in the rôle of Abraham Lincoln. Sometimes that rôle is for General Gowon. Yesterday, according to the Prime Minister, General Gowon was proving to be more merciful in this situation than occurred following the march on Shenandoah because he was not going in for a policy of burning.
With each successive day the Prime Minister seems to cast himself in another rôle. In the mind of the Government there seems to be an absurd analogy between what is happening in Nigeria and what occurred between North and South America in the civil war there. I only hope that the Foreign Secretary will not attempt to cast himself in the rôle of George Washington, such is his mendacity, though even that could happen.
I need not say much to show why this analogy is incorrect. The United States had been established by its own heroic efforts and there was a great struggle against slavery. The country had been formed and all concerned knew for what they were fighting. This cannot be said of Nigeria, which was formed by British rule. Even as late as 1967 General Gowon, upon seizing power, hoisted not the Nigerian flag but the flag of Northern Nigeria; and he then said that unity was not possible.
Her Majesty's Government have pursued their present policy over Nigeria when it has been clear that it could not possibly work except in terms of blood, sweat, tears and death. One need only consider what happened after the Aburi

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Conference. Did we advise General Gowon to stand by the Aburi in some sort of loose federation? According to the information I have from civil servants who were there at the time, we did nothing of the kind.
Then came the crazy declaration of 12 States. That was designed to form 12 unviable States in Nigeria. Did we do anything about that? Not only did we do nothing but our influence was used in a contrary direction. What occurred on that occasion was the height of folly.
Then we must consider what influence we have used overseas to make a compromise possible. We have all along stood on the idea that a totally unitary State could emerge, but I believe that such a state of affairs is no longer possible. [Interruption.] I believe that some hon. Members are questioning what I mean when I refer to a "unitary State". I mean it simply in the sense of one individual national sovereignty.
The Prime Minister suggested yesterday that this war could be won if the power of the Nigerian Army were put to full effect. He suggested that it was only General Gowon advised by Her Majesty's Government who was standing back from finishing off the war. Frankly this is absolute and total nonsense. This war cannot be won. I speak as one who stood at Uli Airport while it was being bombed. The Nigerians do not have the air power to cut off supplies. Nor is the Nigerian Army able to win this war. Between 22nd October and 5th December, about nine brigades of the Nigerian Army made a major assault on the State of Biafra. As the right hon. Member for Llanelly said, no progress was made. The will to win is not there. The troops who are sent in do not know about what they are fighting and therefore they do not have the natural desire to win. This war is unwinnable. Once we accept that it is unwinnable the supply of arms becomes unforgivable. This is the issue to which I now turn.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire sketched out the possibilities of an arms embargo. The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary have made it clear that, in their view, this is an impossibility. They have indicated that they think it would be inappropriate at this time to raise such a question
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because of the conference in Addis Ababa. On the contrary, the fact of this conference makes it all the more important that the outside world should show that it is determined on a settlement and, if need be, by a compromise.
The Foreign Secretary suggested that there would be no support for this in African states. I question whether there would not be general support for bringing an end to the flow of arms from Europe into Africa. I ask hon. Members to look up the speeches made at the opening of the United Nations this year, the speeches made by the Uganda delegation, the speech made by Seretse Khama, speaking for Botswana, at the meeting on 24th December, and at what was said by Mr. Siarki Stevens of Sierra Leone, and Dr. Busia of Ghana. If they do so, they will find that there is a growing feeling among African States that it is wrong that Europeans should be sending in arms. I believe that this feeling is war wider than the Government have suggested.
What is more, the time has come for us to take an initiative. We have not taken an initiative for far too long. The only initiative open to us now is that put forward by my right hon. Friend the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire. It would scarcely be vetoed by the French, who have made it clear that they are not officially sending arms. It might be vetoed by the Russians. But has the Foreign Secretary thought what the continuation of the policy of sending arms means? We are just at the beginning of this war. When I talked to Mr. Lindt, the head of the Red Cross, on Uli Airfield, he said, "This is not a seven-year war. It may be a ten-year war".
We must make a move to stop the war. The Foreign Secretary has neither taken sufficient steps with the Soviet Union nor dared to call their bluff. Let us look at the local Lagos Press to see how well the Russians are received. Look at the mutiny of the troops against the Russian influence in Port Harcourt. What would happen if the Soviet Union could still continue to supply arms? There would be panic from Johannesburg to Washington if it was known that we were taking this question of an arms embargo seriously. What would be the attitude of the Americans and the O.A.U., who rest their consciences on our stupidity?

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Is this such an important area for the Soviet Union? The Soviet Ambassador, who is on such good terms with our Ambassador there, says that he sees no immediate future for the Soviet Union there. Pressure could be put on. These people are on the end of a limb. This is a policy worth striving to achieve. Some of my hon. Friends may smile—these great realists, with their business interests and business connections. Let me tell them that the pursuit of this policy is destroying British interests in Africa. It is destroying investments made by oil companies and the economy of Nigeria. The Governor of the Bank of Nigeria admitted that his country faced the fiercest form of inflation when the remission of profits is no longer possible. Let the realists realise that for once their bread is buttered on the same side as that of the idealists and the mass of the people of this country: we all want an end to this war. What we have heard from the Government indicates that there will be no change of policy.
I am glad that 150 Members have signed the Motion. I hope that most of them will go into the Lobby against the Government. I know that Members of my Front Bench will not be voting. [An HON. MEMBER: "Eunuchs."] On the contrary, they are near conversion, moving always in the right direction. I must remind them that baptism is free. If they come over to our side soon enough, they will be able to avoid total arid final immersion. As far as the rest of the Conservative Party is concerned, no longer is it just a question of a foible about the few people who may feel passionately about the unnecessary death of 2 million people or more. There is humanity on both sides of the House. But we on this side pride ourselves, I hope rightly, on a sense of national destiny and a sense of British interest. There is only one way in which that destiny and interest can be pursued, and that is by a radical change of policy, and a radical change now.
6.46 p.m.
Mr. Philip Noel-Baker: I wish to start with a general protest about the system of foreign affairs debates in the House and then to take up the remarks of the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grimond) and of my right hon. Friend the Member
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for Llanelly (Mr. James Griffiths), who, with his courage and passion, embodies all that is best in the nation of Wales.
The future of Britain depends, not on the balance of payments, but on whether we avoid a nuclear war. That depends on whether the world can return to a system of law and order; whether the binding force of the Charter, which was pretty strong at the time of Suez, can be restored; whether the poverty of the developing countries can be ended; whether world disarmament, promised after both world wars, can at last be brought about. Only Britain, with the Commonwealth, has the influence and power to rally the forces which can revitalise the United Nations. The United States and Russia simply have not a hope. That means that issues of foreign policy are of vital interest to our nation. If they are of vital interest to our nation, they are of vital interest to this House as well. We all care about old-age pensions, nurses' pay and children's meals, but, however much we hope for social progress in such matters, issues of foreign policy are of supreme importance.
I ask the House to consider the dates on which we last debated the burning questions of world affairs: Biafra, 10th July, five months ago; Rhodesia, 22nd October, 1968, 14 months ago; the Middle East, 17th May, 1968, 18 months ago; Vietnam, 23rd October, 1967, more than two years ago; the Common Market, 8th and 9th May, 1967, two and a half years ago; disarmament, which is the most fundamental question of them all, 26th July, 1960, nine years ago. On other great issues, like China, the United Nations General Assembly, the European Security Conference, we have had no debates at all, so far as I can discover.
This is a ludicrous situation, and it is a grave constitutional issue too. All the rights and powers of the House in foreign affairs are being rapidly eroded. For the first many years that I was a Member, Foreign Office Questions came first every Monday and Wednesday while we sat, and we debated foreign issues once a month and sometimes one a week. By the present lamentable practice, power is passing to the bureaucrats. I have the highest regard for the bureaucrats—I have lived eight years of my life in the Foreign Office—but on the great questions of world affairs Parliament

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must remain the master, and it cannot be the master if its voice is never heard.
I turn from my general protest to the Biafran war. My hon. Friend the Member for Ealing, North (Mr. Molloy) asked the Foreign Secretary yesterday whether he had read the statement by the Chief Justice of Biafra, Sir Louis Mbanefo, that security was more important to Biafra than sovereignty itself. The Foreign Secretary replied, as he did today, that he had seen the statement and that he "earnestly hoped" that it was true. If the Government had listened to Sir Louis in June, 1967, when he said precisely what he is saying now, the war might have ended then. The few scattered engagements which there had been might have been brought to a finish. But the Ministers in the Commonwealth Office refused absolutely to see Sir Louis at all. Nothing that I could do would change their minds. That is the bitterest and the most tragic memory of my public life.
But I do not want to recriminate today about the past. I want to urge on the Government that a policy of a universal ban on arms to both parties, proposed and executed through the United Nations, is practical and could quickly be made effective if the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary would take the action which is required.
Let me deal, first, with the argument that this civil war is quite outside the scope of the U.N., that, under Article 2(7), it is a matter of domestic juridiction for Nigeria alone. The Foreign Secretary came close to saying that this afternoon, I think. I know that some other eminent authorities have also voiced that view. None the less, I believe it to be wholly false. Recent practice and discussion have severely limited the effect which used to be attributed to Article 2(7). Certainly it cannot possibly be held to override the basic principle on which the institutions of the League of Nations and then of the United Nations have, from the first, been built.
That principle was best stated in Article 3(3) of the Covenant of the League:
"The Assembly may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League for affecting the peace of the world."
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The Charter of the United Nations reasserts the principle in a dozen places, and, indeed, in its very first words:
"We, the peoples of the United Nations, determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war …"
That is the basic purpose of the whole United Nations Constitution.
Article 1 defines the purposes of the United Nations, and sub-paragraph 2 says that the purpose is
"… to develop friendly relations among nations, based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace."
To suggest that, in a war which has lasted two and a half years, which has stirred the charity of 50 nations, in which two million souls have perished, to which a dozen foreign nations have supplied the arms, in which some of the foreign nations hope to secure influence and perhaps Atlantic bases for some future worldwide war—to suggest that the United Nations is prevented, by Article 2(7), from taking action to bring such a ghastly conflict to an end, is a narrow, obscurantist legalism which would frustrate the whole purpose for which the United Nations exists.
Of course, it is not only the right but the duty of every member to use the Charter, to use the Assembly or the Council, or to use them both, to bring such world disasters to an end. "Ah," said the Prime Minister yesterday afternoon, "But you cannot get the matter inscribed on the agenda of the Assembly or the Council. You could not get the votes". Very regrettably, as I think, he quoted the Secretary-General for that view. Of course, what one gets from any institution depends on how one uses it.
If the leading Power concerned—make no mistake: Britain is the leading Power concerned in respect of Biafra—shouts from the housetops, "This is a mortal danger to all Africans, we may Balkanise the Continent, every State has its Biafra, hands off, but help the Government of Lagos to prevail;" if the leading Power says, "This is no question for the United Nations, but is for the Africans to settle, hands off, leave the coast clear for the O.A.U." If we talk in that way, it is only natural that 40 African States, and perhaps even others, may vote as our Government propose.

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But let us consider these two propositions. "Every African State has its Biafra." I quote President Nyerere of Tanzania, the prophet and apostle of African peace and unity, when I say that that is nonsense. He told the O.A.U. Summit at Addis Ababa last September:
"Africa is learning the wrong lesson from the Nigerian tragedy. We must ask Nigeria to stop the killing."
How right he is. Suppose that every African State does have its Biafra. What does that mean? It means that it has some tribe or group who feel that their safety and their rights are not secure.
Do we want the Governments of Africa to think that the claims of such people must he suppressed by force of arms, and that Europe, Britain leading, will supply the arms? Do we want them to think that war, however bloody and protracted, is the right way to deal with civil claims and discontent? President Nyerere is right: this war is the most disastrous of all precedents for Africa as a whole. We should urge that claims like this of Biafra, and such claims in other States, should at any cost be settled by compromise and peaceful means.
The Government's second proposition, "Leave it to the O.A.U.", is quite as wrong. Of course, we all hope that the Emperor of Ethiopia will succeed. I have unlimited regard for the Emperor, but it is a long time that the O.A.U. has been dealing with this matter and peace has not come. If the Emperor fails, I hope that the Government will learn the lesson. Regional organisations are at a disadvantage when they deal with a war or a dispute. A world tribunal, just because it is a world tribunal, has far greater authority and prestige. I was in the General Assembly of the United Nations when the South Americans defeated the U.S. attempt to transfer the handling of the Bay of Pigs to the O.A.S. They did the same with the U.S. invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965. They knew that the United Nations, a world tribunal had far more h3pe of achieving real success.
The Government say that they have explored the hopes of an arms embargo to both sides. With great respect, I think that they have done everything just exactly wrong. The Foreign Secretary told us today that they had made three approaches to the Russians at different levels. Of course, if you ask him in
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private talk, and in the context of the power struggle now going on, the Russian will remember that his general staff has hopes of those Atlantic bases which I mentioned. They will try to use one's question to undermine one's influence in Lagos and to increase their own. But that is not the way to mount a great international U.N. operation to end a war.
If they want peace in Nigeria, and a universal ban on arms, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary must go themselves to the Assembly. They must gather with them all the Governments who share their views—the United States, Canada, the Scandinavians, Italy, the Belgians and the Dutch, India, Tanzania, Zambia and many more. They must make a joint proposal, with all those others, that every Government in the U.N. shall take the measures needed to stop all arms directed to either side, that every Government must control its arms factories and the private merchants' depots, and control its airports and its seaports, its railways and its roads. We must challenge Russia to say in public in the full Assembly that she will not come in, but will help the war to go on by sending arms.
We have seen much more difficult questions than this settled in the U.N. Assembly. The Congo settlement in 1960 has been a remarkable success and no one pleaded Article 2(7) then. To say that this cannot be done now, that the black marketeers are sure to win, is facile pessimism. It is worse: it is defeatism about the whole concept and efficacy of the U.N. But to have a hope, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary must go themselves, they must show the world that they think that this is what it is—the most important question that confronts mankind today. Do not let them say that they have not got the time to spare, that they are too busy. Let them do it, and, if they succeed, history will record their names with gratitude and pride.
7.5 p.m.
Mr. Nigel Fisher: I am inclined to agree with the right hon. Member for Derby, South (Mr. Philip Noel-Baker) and with my right hon. Friend the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) that this issue might well be referred to the Security Council. Frankly, I do not think

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it would make much difference in practice, but it would do no harm.
Today we are debating the Nigerian civil war for the fifth or sixth time in the past 18 months. This tragic war has now lasted for almost two and a half years. We all want it to end as soon as possible and, if possible, by a negotiated peace. I am sure that that applies to every hon. Member of this House. It must also apply to the vast majority of people in Nigeria.
I have not been there since I went with the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull, West (Mr. James Johnson) in August, 1968, but it was certainly the wish of General Gowon at that time that the war should be ended by a negotiated peace, and I believe that it is still his wish. He is a truly Christian man of great personal integrity, who is genuinely appalled, as we all are, by the suffering which this civil war has caused and is causing to his own countrymen on both sides.
General Gowon has gone out of his way to try to relieve that suffering. He has agreed to daylight flights with relief supplies—rejected by Colonel Ojukwu. He has agreed to a land corridor for relief supplies—rejected by Colonel Ojukwu. He has agreed to relief fights from a neutral territory, subject only to occasional inspection en route to make sure that the planes are not carrying in arms. He has agreed to teams of neutral observers to umpire the war to ensure that there is no genocide. No European country at war has ever made such generous concessions to the other side.
The response from Colonel Ojukwu has been nil, because it is not food and medical supplies that he wants to save his people from starvation, but arms to carry on the war. These are flown in at night, almost every night, mainly from French sources. But for these the war would have been over long ago, and everybody in his heart knows that to be true.
After the remarkable speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire, I need not say much more on the subject of relief for the starving lbos. The proposal which my right hon. Friend put forward, with all the authority of a former Prime Minister of Britain, and, I hope, its future Foreign
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and Commonwealth Secretary, was the most imaginative and constructive suggestion which I have heard made on this subject.
If it is logistically possible, in petrol and distance, for the helicopters to fly in supplies from aircraft carriers south of Port Harcourt, it should be done at once. Owing to the Government's deplorable decision to run down our carrier force, we may not be able to do it by ourselves, but I have no doubt that the Americans and the Canadians would join us in this humanitarian operation. It would involve no one in the war, but it would bring immediate relief to the starving women and children in the Ibo heartland.
This has been suggested by Group Captain Cheshire; it has been carefully checked by naval experts; and it has now been proposed and endorsed with all the authority of my right hon. Friend. Incidentally, as I have mentioned his name, it may interest some hon. Members who think of Group Captain Cheshire as being pro-Biafran to know that he told me the other evening that he is in favour of a united Nigeria and believes in the sincerity of General Gowon and the good intentions of the Federal Government of Nigeria. He also told me—a point made by the right hon. Member for Llanelly (Mr. James Griffiths), and I accept it absolutely—that the people of Biafra are behind Colonel Ojukwu almost to a man. I believe that to be true.
I once thought, and I know that the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull, West once thought, that this was a war of the élites on either side. I no longer believe that to be true. The external propaganda for Biafra by Markpress in Geneva has been so emotionally effective that I am sure that Colonel Ojukwu's internal propaganda to his own people has been equally effective. Indeed, I have talked, and the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull, West has talked, to refugees from Biafra and to Ibo prisoners of war in the southern sector, and they told me—and it was not in the presence of Federal officers or soldiers—that if they had only known how they would be treated by the Federals, the war would have been over a long time ago. That was said to me again and again in the Rivers State as long ago as August, 1968.

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It is Colonel Ojukwu who is causing the starvation of his own people by refusing food relief flights offered on reasonable terms. If he refuses the helicopter offer, he will stand condemned in the eyes of the civilised world. There has never been any question, as the neutral observer team has repeatedly reported, of genocide by the Nigerians, nor any question of genocide by starvation. It is not a case of genocide by the Federals; it is a case of suicide by the Ibos.
I turn now to the military situation. I have no special sources of information. I do not know whether The Observer was right when it reported on Sunday that the Federal offensive has petered out, or whether the Sunday Telegraph was right when it reported on Sunday that the Federal offensive has only just begun.
The Motion in the names of almost a quarter of the House of Commons, headed by the right hon. Member for Llanelly and my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Handsworth (Sir E. Boyle), both of whom I greatly respect and admire, urges an immediate and total embargo on the supply of arms to both sides. It urges this, I am surprised to find, in the name of realism. I have never read a less realistic Motion.
It may be just possible, owing to the recent improvement in Anglo-French relations, that the French would now agree to cease supplying arms to Biafra; I doubt it, but it may be just possible. But what about the Russians? Does anybody in the House seriously believe that Russia would make a major change in her policy, a policy which she believes to be in her own interest, merely because we had set her a moral example? It is laughable, pathetic, and naive beyond belief to imagine any such thing. That is not the way the Russians work.
The only outcome of a British embargo on arms to Nigeria would be an increase in Russian supplies. Russia would give her eyes to acquire a position of real influence in Commonwealth Africa. This is the whole purpose of her Nigerian policy. It would be an act of folly almost unparalleled in international politics to present her with this opportunity on a plate. Nevertheless, Her Majesty's Government could, of course, take this matter to the Security Council,
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as my right hon. Friend suggested, if only to show up the Russians. It might be quite a useful little exercise, but I do not believe that it would make any difference.
There are only three possible solutions to this war. The first, which we all want to see, is a negotiated peace. We all want that—there is no argument about that. But the prospects for it are still very poor, because the objectives of each side are still too far apart. General Gowon wants a united Nigeria and in this he is supported by the vast majority, almost ten to one, of the other African States in this African war. Colonel Ojukwu wants secession. There has been no lack of mediators between the two sides, no lack of attempts to mediate, but there has been a total lack of any basis for mediation. A negotiated peace—I do not like saying this, but I believe it to be true—is probably as far off today as it was last year, or the year before.
We are left, as we have always been left, with the prospect of a military solution. The Motion says that the war cannot be won by either side, but, with respect to those right hon. and hon. Members who drafted the Motion, I must say that that is absolute nonsense. Of course it cannot be won by the tiny enclave which still calls itself Biafra, but of course it can be won by Federal Nigeria. Fifteen months ago, it could have been won quite quickly, but two factors prevented this. One was the enormous increase in the supply of arms to Biafra from mainly French sources. The other was the deliberate policy of General Gowon, for the best of reasons, for the most humanitarian and most statesmanlike reasons—
Mr. Stanley Henig: Is not the hon. Gentleman saying that the war can be won by one side if other countries in the world join that one side and cease to give support to its opponent? Does not the Motion say that the Federal Republic and Biafra are wrong to fight it out on their own, or each with a motley array of others like ourselves ranged on one side or the other, for the war is then likely to drag on indefinitely?
Mr. Fisher: I have heard that stuff often expressed, and the hon. Gentleman has interrupted my argument to recite a case already made. I do not want to be

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diverted from my argument, and I am coming to all these points.
The other factor which prevented a quick military end to the war was the deliberate policy of General Gowon—for the best of reasons and for the most humanitarian and statesmanlike of reasons—he has fought this war with one hand tied behind his back, because lie wants a united Nigeria at the end of it. He can achieve that only if he can avoid the worst features of a civil war and reabsorb the East-Central State into a united, prosperous and peaceful Nigeria at the end of it.
I respect him for that policy, but I must honestly say that it has in fact prolonged the war and, because it has prolonged the war, it has meant that many more Ibo women and children have died of starvation in the last 15 months than the number of Ibo and Federal soldiers who would have been killed in battle. It has been the policy of the "slow kill". That was why, after touring the whole of Nigeria in August, 1968, I advocated the policy which came to be known as the "quick kill".
I did so in a television interview in Lagos at the end of my tour. My interviewer promised me that the interview would not be cut. It was a five-minute interview. The half-minute in which I advocated the quick kill policy was of course left in, because it was rather sensational, but the three or four minutes in which I explained why I had advocated that policy—to save millions of people dying of starvation—was edited out in London and was never shown on the television screen. I do not blame the interviewer, and I do not blame the London editor. Television interviews are always much shorter than the participants would like them to be!
But it did me a lot of harm. It made me sound a callous and inhumane man, which honestly I am not, and it has been used against me ever since, especially in my own constituency. As most hon. Members know, I have had a little trouble recently in my constituency because my views on race relations are not the same as those of my right hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Powell).
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The House is always very generous to a colleague in trouble, so I hope that, in conclusion, I may be allowed to make one personal observation. My opponents in my constituency are not much interested in Nigeria; I doubt whether any of them have ever been there. They are interested in immigration. But at the moment, any stick is good enough for them to use to beat the Member of Parliament for Surbiton; so they have made it one of their principal charges against me that I have advocated a cruel and callous policy in Nigeria. From the point of view of my opponents in Surbiton, to whom the Prime Minister referred as "skinheads"—I do not know quite what the word means, but I get the general drift—I have done something even worse than that. They have bitterly attacked me week after week in the local Press ever since July for not being a true Conservative because I voted in the Government Lobby when we last debated this subject in July.
My hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Wavertree (Mr. Tilney) and my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth, East and Christchurch (Mr. Cordle) did the same. So far as I know, and my hon. Friends will correct me if I am wrong, they were not criticised for that in their constituencies. We did so because we supported Federal Nigeria, and because we had the strange idea that it is sometimes not a bad thing for a back bencher to follow his voice with his vote. At least it is honest. But in this case it was not even disloyal to my own party to do so. There was no whip; we could vote on this side of the House as we pleased, and many did so. My constituency critics say that I voted in the Government Lobby in defiance of the advice given to my party by my right hon. Friend the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire. I heard his speech, and I have read it many times since. He gave no such advice.
I apologise to the House for having inflicted upon hon. Members this personal explanation, but it was important for me to do so because I have been made out to be an absolute brute.
Finally, especially in view of the speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire,

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which offers a genuine and practical solution to the human aspect, the human suffering, in this dreadful war, may I express the hope that at least on this side of the House those of my right hon. and hon. Friends who have signed this Motion will not vote in the Lobby tonight.
Mr. John Tilney: Before my hon. Friend sits down—
Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. I understand the hon. Gentleman to have resumed his seat.
7.24 p m.
Sir Geoffrey de Freitas: May I, as a political opponent of the hon. Member for Surbiton (Mr. Fisher) who has known him since we were both very young, confirm that he is essentially a humane man, even though he is often wrong-headed politically. In fact, the whole of his political life is wrong, but I can confirm that he is a very humane man.
As so many hon. Members wish to speak, I shall take up only one point on Nigeria and then take up the references to Greece made by the Foreign Secretary and the right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home).
When the Prime Minister referred yesterday to the dilemma facing the World Council of Churches, I was puzzled, because I was on the Social Responsibility Committee of that Council for some years and I could not see how this dilemma could arise. I then read an article in The Times on Saturday which developed the point that it was felt by some that the churches were being charged with prolonging the war and adding to the suffering. I do not want to refer to the rights or wrongs, but it is an undoubted fact that not only is there a need for relief but there will be an even greater need for relief when peace comes. There will be an urgent need for aid on a large scale, and we must begin to think about that now.
We have an obligation as an old colonial power to provide economic aid to our former colonies, including Nigeria. I certainly do not believe that we should act as if Nigeria were a colony, and I
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have been shocked by some of the interjections during the debate—which I have sat through but for a few moments—which implied that we had a particular status as if were a colonial power.
I believe aid to be not only good in itself but that it will set an example to our wealthy neighbours in Europe who have had no long colonial experience—and I am thinking particularly of Germany. Until a year or so ago, the countries with the best record in relation to their gross national product for aid to developing countries were the former colonial countries—Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Britain. Since then, wealthy European neighbours like Germany, Sweden and Switzerland have been catching up, and Germany has passed us.
In 1966, U Thant, speaking in Strasbourg, reminded us that Europe was very wealthy and begged us to do our duty to others and not to sink back into, as he called it, "our prosperous provincialism". A few weeks ago the Rev. Nicolas Stacey described in The Times how Oxfam, the Campaign for World Development, War on Want, the Third World First and others were now grouped in Action in World Development. They are active, but they are also very weak. It is big Government development aid that Nigeria will want. It wants it now, but it will want it much more when peace comes. Let us not be blind to that; let us be prepared.
I was pleased to hear the Prime Minister yesterday and the Foreign Secretary today refer to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and Greece. There is a great deal to be learnt from the way in which this problem of Greece has been handled in the Council of Europe. I agree with the Foreign Secretary and the right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire that, if the Greek Government come forward with a convincing timetable for a return to democracy, of course it should be accepted, but I do not agree with the right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire that the charge against Greece has been driven on too hastily. I do not believe that the facts justify that.
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: I did not quite say that the charge had been driven on too hastily. I was saying that if an offer is made to reconcile the timetable

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of the Greek Government with the timetable of the European Commission this should enable the Council of Europe to go a bit more slowly.
Sir G. de Freitas: I entirely agree with that. We have to go back over the last two and a half years to see what has happened. The Council of Europe has a good and clear record of trying to meet the Greek Government in every way. There was a successful coup d'etat in April 1967, but Greece had certain international obligations under the Statute of the Council and under the European Convention on Human Rights. The Statute lays down that every member State must accept the principles of the rule of law and of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Like all the other 17 member States, Greece was bound by these treaties, and the Consultative Assembly, which is the mouthpiece of parliamentary opinion, in these democratic countries, has among its tasks the duty of guarding the Council's "constitution", namely, its Statute and its fundamental principles. Immediately after the revolution the Greek Parliament was abolished and the Parliamentary delegation to the Council of Europe was withdrawn. In fact, we learned that some of our colleagues in the Assembly had been arrested.
Mr. E. L. Mallalieu: And imprisoned.
Sir G. de Freitas: Yes. But Greece remained a member of the Council of Europe, and it is greatly to the credit of the Council of Europe that the Greek Government appear to prize their membership and are doing everything possible to avoid being suspended.
After debates in the Assembly, on the most carefully prepared reports, the Assembly called upon Greece to restore parliamentary democracy. All this was repeated, again on carefully prepared reports, in session after session. Eventually, in January this year, after the Assembly's rapporteur had been refused permission to go to Greece, Greece still being a member of the Council of Europe, the Assembly recommended that the Committee of Ministers consider suspending her from the Council. This decision was supported by all members of the
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British parilamentary delegation, except one who abstained. The point is that the Assembly was most reluctant to come to this decision, and I think that everyone who voted really hoped that before it came to suspension the régime would restore democracy.
The Committee of Ministers considered the recommendation in May. After the meeting, Mr. Willy Brandt, who was then Chairman of the Committee, and I held a Press conference at Lancaster House at which Mr. Brandt, on behalf of the Committee of Ministers, said that in December the matter would again be considered after they had studied the report of the Human Rights Commission. Everything, according to the proper procedure, was going along. The Assembly had done all that it could. It was clearly then up to the Ministers and the Commission.
In June 1967, two months after the coup d'etat, the Assembly, through its Standing Committee, asked the Governments to refer the Greek case to the European Commission on Human Rights. Two months later, as a result of this request, the Danish, Norwegian and Swedish Governments lodged identical applications against the Greek Government. I am detailing these countries, because this is important. The Belgian, Icelandic. Luxembourg and Netherlands Governments supported these applications. The right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthsire referred to N.A.T.O. All these countries, with the exception of Sweden. are members of N.A.T.O.
Alas, to my regret, the British Government did not identify themselves with this application. I also regret that the Colonels were much encouraged by our inaction.
The countries of Northern Europe and the Low Countries appeared to our friends everywhere to be more interested in parliamentary democracy than we were. This was not a trial. This was to ask, according to the procedure, for the Commission to investigate.
The Commission is now ready. Even if it is only a tenth as critical of the Greek régime as our reports from the Assembly, there is no doubt that Greece should be suspended from the Council, unless she can produce convincing evidence and a convincing timetable for a return to democracy.

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I said, "should be suspended", but, as the Foreign Secretary explained this afternoon, such a decision requires a two-thirds majority of the Foreign Ministers casting a vote as well as a majority of the 18 members—that is, ten.
It looks as though the voting will be on these lines. For the suspension: Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Against or abstaining: Austria, Cyprus, France, Greece, Ireland, Malta, Switzerland and Turkey. This leaves Germany and Italy.
Viscount Lambton: Does this mean that the British vote is critical? The right hon. Gentleman gave the figures so quickly that I did not understand. Is the British vote decisive?
Sir G. de Freitas: I am coming to that. The noble Lord was too quick for me. The total I gave was eight plus eight, which is 16. That leaves two, and I believe that Germany and Italy are likely to follow us.
If Greece is not suspended, the Council of Europe and all that it stands for will be seriously discredited. If Greece is suspended, democratic Europe will enter the 1970s fortified in the knowledge that parliamentary democracy and human rights are now recognised as part of our very life.
Whatever happens, the tremendous diplomatic efforts made by the Greek Government to avoid suspension have shown the respect that the Colonels feel for the Council. After only 20 years, that means something in Europe. It has taken the Greek affair for us to realise this. Frankly, I think that we have been taking the Council of Europe a little too much for granted.
7.36 p.m.
Earl of Dalkeith: Seldom has any issue raised so much passion or so profoundly disturbed the conscience of so many people throughout the country, and, indeed, Parliament, as Nigeria. It is to that subject that I should like to devote myself. There has been evidence this afternoon of the passions which have been aroused in some of the excellent speeches that we have heard.
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Before proceeding to advance the proposition which I have tabled in the form of an Amendment to the all-party Motion, I should like to declare an interest. I am 100 per cent. impartial in my efforts to put forward a constructive and practical solution for ending the carnage and suffering in Nigeria. I believe that everyone is motivated by the same burning desire to bring relief to the acute suffering and starvation in Nigeria. But few seem to me to appreciate that stopping the war is an absolutely essential first step if we are to do this in an effective way. Even fewer still seem to recognise that nothing short of a combined Commonwealth peace-keeping force can do this speedily and, at the same time, provide the stable conditions needed for providing a just settlement of disputes thereafter.
Hence, the Amendment I have tabled which
"entreats the Prime Minister to take the only effective action for ending the war and creating a suitable climate for the just settlement of such disputes by convening an emergency meeting of Commonwealth leaders for the express purpose of forming a combined Commonwealth Peace-keeping Force for immediate despatch to Nigeria."
The all-party Motion to which I tabled this Amendment in many respects commands sympathy. I recognise the well-intentioned aims of those who have signed it. But, with great respect to them, I honestly believe that without my Amendment, in the form of an addendum to it, it could do more harm than good. I believe that it could prolong the war. It might help to comfort the consciences of those who signed it, but I do not believe that it will bring peace any nearer.
It is now clear that the policy of supplying arms for the purpose of a quick kill and a quick end to the civil war has failed, as some of us feared that it would from the very beginning. I may well have been open to the charge of being impatient when advancing the peacekeeping formula about 18 months ago, but I am sad to say that events have proved me correct.
It is true that the O.A.U. talks might have succeeded. But I become cynical. for whenever there is a House of Commons debate on the subject in the offing, we are told that the talks are on the verge of success and that something

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is about to come out of them. That is what we have been told again today, and so these talks go on. It is sad that so far the O.A.U. has failed in its efforts. Ideally they were the right people to solve the problem, but now, whether we like it or not, it has become a Commonwealth problem. I do not believe that the Commonwealth can sit back and watch what is happening.
I know that this provokes anxiety in the minds of many who think that it might smell as though we were embarking on the old colonial policy of waving the big stick ourselves. I know that there are others who feel that a Commonwealth move would be frowned upon for various other reasons, not least that of breach of protocol. Of course we accept that Nigeria is a sovereign independent State. Nevertheless, she is a member of the Commonwealth, and I believe passionately that it is the duty of the Commonwealth in the first place to do everything that it can to stop this war. Second, it must act with determination in providing the conditions, perhaps by means of some form of police force, whereby the future of Nigeria can be decided without bloodshed.
I think that we should not discount the possibility that secession should be examined, not just by ourselves—I do not think it right that we alone should be the judges—but that the Commonwealth should help to judge on this issue as a whole. It is interesting to note that even that arch advocate of African unity Julius Nyerere believes that there is a case for secession. I think that that is a matter which we should not dismiss.
Whether or not Colonel Ojukwu has a case for secession is not something on which I wish to dwell at the moment, but it is difficult to see how he can be expected to have confidence in the assurance that he is given in Addis Ababa, or anywhere else, about the security, status, and equality of the Ibo people unless there is some form of impartial police force available to protect the Ibos from the sort of troubles which they faced before secession, when Nigeria was united, and when 30,000 Ibos were massacred. Surely Colonel Ojukwu cannot be expected to forget that quite so easily. As a Scot with memories of how the English once behaved, I can
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appreciate his point of view rather more clearly than can the Prime Minister or the Foreign Secretary.
Mr. Tilney: Does not my hon. Friend agree that an international or Commonwealth peace-keeping force, which I should like to see, would also protect some of the minor tribes who are threatened by the Ibos, and who are being killed at the present time by some of the Swedish aircraft organised by Count von Rosen? Possibly the Minister will say something about the recent visit of Count von Rosen to the Foreign Office, which I understand was sometime ago, before that happened.
Earl of Dalkeith: I agree with my hon. Friend. Obviously the idea of having a police force is to protect the peoples of all races. We know that there are many groups which are vulnerable to reprisals from one side or the other. Unless we can create a climate of confidence wherein these people can live reasonably secure lives, we shall never come up with the right answer for the long-term future of Nigeria.
On the question of mediation, it is sad that the Government have forfeited the right, or the claim which they could otherwise put forward, to be considered as impartial mediators, simply because they are known by everybody to have been aiding and abetting one side in the civil war. Obviously the O.A.U. would be the logical and appropriate mediator, but it has failed so far, and I am becoming more and more doubtful about whether it can succeed in the future. That leaves only one possible alternative, and that is a combined Commonwealth effort.
Clearly, it would be better if the initiative for a Commonwealth effort came from the O.A.U. or some other uncommitted member of the Commonwealth, but, in the absence of anybody else putting forward that point of view, I believe that we would be failing in our duty to innocent victims who are entitled to expect our help and guidance if we were not to do so ourselves. For this reason I earnestly entreat the Government to give most serious consideration to this matter. After all, we cannot say that we have no responsibilities. It was we who created Federal Nigeria in the first place. As it has misfired in the way that it has, I believe that we have the

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strongest possible duty to act in what I believe is the one and only effective way open to us.
I suggest that that raises an even wider question of what the Commonwealth stands for in the modern world. If it is to have any meaning at all, its first task must surely be to represent a community with a model code of conduct for the rest of the world to copy; a club of nations whose rule number one is the abolition of strife, bestiality, and unnecessary human suffering, a club wherein one condition of membership is the automatic acceptance of a "fire brigade" force to restore law and order where a guilty member has failed to do this himself.
If it is argued that we have sufficient responsibility for affairs in Nigeria to give us a moral justification to supply weapons to one side, surely we have a far stronger moral obligation to take the initiative with our co-members of the Commonwealth in creating such a force. To wring our hands in despair as the months and years drag by, with intensifying human suffering, is in my view the flabbiest form of morality that one can find. If our sister nations of the Commonwealth are not prepared to support intervention in the name of humanity, I seriously ask whether there is any purpose at all in the Commonwealth continuing in existence? I believe that the matter is as serious as that.
Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: The hon. Gentleman has used the word "intervention" on a number of occasions when talking about a Commonwealth force. Is he suggesting that it should go in at the invitation of both sides by agreement, or is he saying that it should go in, if need be, against the will of either side?
Earl of Dalkeith: I think that I have already made that reasonably clear in what I have said. I have said that ideally the O.A.U. should make the suggestion for a Commonwealth force. It has so far failed to do so. I believe that it is incumbent upon us to make that suggestion, and I understand that the Federal Government would not be averse to that happening. I should like confirmation from the Government that that is so. I think that Colonel Ojukwu would probably jump at the idea, because I do not believe that anything else will
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convince him that he will get a fair deal after the dispute has come to the conference table. How else is he to be given any assurance beyond what he had before he seceded, when 30,000 Ibos were massacred, when he was inside the Federation of Nigeria?
To return to where I was, the Prime Minister in his speech referred to the difficulty of enforcing an arms embargo because of the need for inspection at the receiving end. I agree wholeheartedly with the Prime Minister about this, but may I suggest that one of the first functions of a peace-keeping force, and indeed the most important justification for it, is to do that very job, to police the ports, airports, and points at which arms would arrive.
I predict that in the years to come this unspeakable tale of tragedy will be regarded as one of the blackest blots in the long history of the British Empire and Commonwealth, simply because, by our own failure to take the effective action available to us, we are as good as conniving at the prolongation of the massacre of innocents.
For this reason, I earnestly beseech the Government to consider my Amendment and the Motion together, because I believe that offers a practical solution. We must stop this war, and I should be delighted to hear the Government when they wind up this evening suggest to the House a better way in which this can be achieved.
7.50 p.m.
Mr. E. L. Mallalieu: I agree with the noble Lord the Member for Edinburgh, North (Earl of Dalkeith) that everyone in the House has the same object in view, though I suggest that some go about it in a rather odd way. However, I give them credit for sincerity in desiring to achieve the end, we all want.
It is not surprising, after two and a half years of fighting, that there should be such great interest in the affairs of Nigeria. Nor is it surprising that many people on hearing the often emotional stories of atrocities, suffering from famine and all the other afflictions of this war suddenly exclaim, without any reason, "So-and-so is to blame". I believe that from the beginning of this appalling trouble in Nigeria Her Majesty's Government have behaved with singular

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propriety, with warmth and with a sympathetic understanding of the problem.
Personally, I regret the constant reference to the 30,000 Ibos who were slaughtered. Nobody justifies that slaughter, but a great many of us can explain it. It would be better if, instead of referring to that as a reason for Colonel Ojukwu's continued intransigence and for the ease with which he seems to have persuaded his people that they are in real danger of genocide, we tried to understand how these things have happened.
One must remember that there was an Ibo coup of great and provocative brutality. I have more friends among the Ibos in Nigeria than on the other side, because professionally I was more in touch with them. It is no use blinding ourselves to the way things went. No doubt, there was provocation of a serious order. Though it did not justify the massacre of however many Ibo people it was, it most certainly explains it. I believe the Government would have been most wrong not to continue the supply of arms to the Nigerian Government. Not to supply arms would have been a positive action against the normal, traditional policy since it would have been a positive taking of sides in favour of a rebellion.
Mr. David Crouch: Does the hon. and learned Gentleman not agree that as a result over 2 million people have died?
Mr. Mallalieu: Two million people would have died in any event. The hon. Gentleman and his right hon. or hon. Friends have yet to show how the stopping of the supply of arms to the Nigerian Government would have saved a single life. It obviously would not. At the same time it would have amounted to a demonstration against a Government which has behaved extremely well.
Mrs. Winifred Ewing: Does the hon. and learned Gentleman take the view that the Government in Nigeria are a legitimate Government, or are they a Government that came into power in some other way following a coup d'etat?
Mr. Mallalieu: Which Government or their predecessors did not originally come into being by force? I should like to
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hear of one. The fact is that it is the recognised Government of a friendly Commonwealth country. Like many others in the House, I believe that the Commonwealth still counts for something,—still has a considerable part to play.
Far from the Nigerian Government not being entitled to be supplied with arms because of their behaviour, I believe that from the start they have behaved extremely well. They were unprepared for the war, whereas Colonel Ojukwu must have prepared for it a long time. He was able to make a sharp jab across the country, almost took the whole of Nigeria into his hands, and at the same time began to bomb Lagos. The Nigerian Government were not ready. Hence, the immense amount of time they took to get moving and the great efforts they had to make to prevent Ojukwu being successful.
Since then the Nigerian Government have acted with incredible restraint. I was there last November and saw how a particular offensive was not mounted because they wanted to woo back into the fold in Nigeria the Ibo people who were still under Ojukwu's control.
One knows of the propaganda on both sides. The propaganda of the Nigerian Government is that of a Government who want reconciliation from the start and who have never conducted a campaign against the Ibo people. They have recently agreed to send food, and, indeed, have always been willing to do so. This is quite unprecedented. Who are we in this country to talk about not allowing food to go to our enemies? This is unheard of. The Nigerians will still allow food to go under reasonable conditions.
To the other Governments listed by my right hon. Friend this afternoon which believe that the conditions are reasonable one might add the Irish Government. When one considers the emotional stories put about by many of the missionaries in the east of the country who are mainly Roman Catholics, the Irish Government might easily have gone the other way, but they say that these conditions are reasonable. They point out that Ojukwu first agreed to allow the daylight flights to go in. Then the Red Cross went to Lagos and negotiated with the Lagos Government. They had some difficulty in getting them to agree; but no sooner had they agreed in September than Ojukwu

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backed out again. That does not look as though he is the sort of man some believe him to be. To my regret, I believe him to be the most intransigent man alive and that he always has been. I knew him when he was 16 years old, and he was the same even then. He said he wanted daylight flights, made his conditions with the International Committee of the Red Cross, and then suddenly backed out when he heard Nigeria would agree.
Mr. Michael Barnes: Those are not the same conditions.
Mr. Mallalieu: My hon. Friend says they are not the same conditions. I would refer him to other authorities than himself or myself. I have cited the Irish Government who said that they were substantially the same conditions. The fact is that from the start of the fighting Ojukwu has been the greatest single obstacle to peace.
If there is any criticism I have of the Government it is that they seem to apologise for not giving full and complete support, with all kinds of armaments, to the Nigerian Government. If this had been done, lives would have been saved. It is too easy to put labels on these things, such as "quick kill", but every Government must do their best to maintain their position and law and order. We should help the Nigerian Government to do that; that is, unless there is a strong moral reason, based on that Government's misconduct, which makes such a course inappropriate.
Mr. Henig: If there happened to arise a rebellion against, say, the Franco Fascist régime in Spain, would we supply the Spanish Government with arms to put it down, since that would be the logic of my hon. and learned Friend's argument, for we have diplomatic relations with that Government?
Mr. Mallalieu: I did not say that. I said that we should support a friendly Commonwealth Government who are not in moral error. It is easy to make jibes about Hitler and Spain, but totally different conditions exist in this case, for this is a friendly Commonwealth Government who are not in any way morally to blame for what has happened and who are not in misconduct over the
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way in which they have carried on a war which they did not start.
I am afraid that if we try to put conditions which are too unreasonable in our attempts to use our influence, which is still great in Nigeria, on the Nigerian Government, we shall give a certain amount of encouragement to the hawks; and there are hawks in Nigeria just as there are a great many doves. We should thank God fasting that General Gowon is such a dove and support everything he does which is designed to see his Government uppermost in Nigeria.
I do not want to give support to the hawks in Nigeria. Because of that and because I believe that the Ibos have an immense part to play in Africa, I wish to sustain Her Majesty's Government in the policy which they have followed hitherto.
We are discussing a rebellion caused by a military dictator who made his bid to seize the whole of Nigeria. Thank heaven that was unsuccessful. He has used his dictatorial powers to keep his people in ignorance about the nature of the war, about the whole struggle and about genocide. He is a dictator who is willing to use the starvation of his own people as a weapon to achieve his own ends.
I hope that Her Majesty's Government will not be deterred from carrying out the policy that they have followed hitherto and that they will do their utmost to support General Gowon in bringing this war to a quick and successful conclusion.
8.3 p.m.
Mr. John Cordle: I am in total agreement with the hon. and learned Member for Brigg (Mr. E. L. Mallalieu). I trust that the House will allow me to make some personal references about Nigeria before coming to the main burden of my remarks.
I have been going to Nigeria three or four times a year for the last eight years. One of the saddest things for me is that although I have formed hundreds, if not thousands, of friends in the eastern region among the Ibos, I have received not one but two letters, addressed to this House, threatening my life and written in blood. I have received them simply because I have come out firmly on the side of the Federal Government.

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I only wish that hon. Members—not just those who are taking part in the debate but all hon. Members—could listen to the people of Nigeria speaking for themselves. They might then, having seen the problem at first-hand, be able to appraise the situation and reach some conclusions, all of which I am glad to think Her Majesty's Government are firmly upholding in following General Gowon's policy to keep Nigeria one.
I will not speak at length because much of what I have in my heart has been so well said by hon. Members on both sides, and particularly by my right hon. Friend the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home).
General Gowon has been referred to as a sincere tolerant Christian man, and he is. When the casualty lists are brought to him—I saw him last July and I trust that I will see him within the month; I was talking to him on the telephone last Thursday—his whole physical condition changes. He cannot take his meals and he is greatly moved by the suffering and tragedy of the war. This man has introduced a policy which we must either accept as being right or reject.
It was suggested, I accept sincerely, by the right hon. Member for Llanelly (Mr. James Griffiths) and others that the "quick kill" concept is terrible. I assure hon. Members that this is not in General Gowon's mind. His whole attitude is to allow the people of this war-torn, rebel-held territory to defect. I have been right down to the line, under fire, on several occasions. I have spoken to Ibos who have come out of the area and my talks with them have occurred within half an hour of their coming out. I have seen them coming out, and I can tell the House that the Ibos are not afraid once they get out. They are terrified when they are in.
These Ibo people are now fraternising, back in their villages and towns, and working alongside the Yorubas. There is no problem and they are getting back their jobs. They are given their own houses back and they are receiving the rents that were due to them while they were still held in the rebel territories.
General Gowon's policy has simply been to go inch by inch around this small enclave on which the whole world has a vast magnifying glass. We have a dis-
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torted and perverted view of the situation because of the inaccuracies and shameful distortions put out by Markpress. Sincere people in this country believe the propaganda and muck which Markpress has put out about Nigeria.
My heart boils when I compare this propaganda with what the Nigerians say for themselves. They are behind General Gowon and his policy. The same can be said about the Ibos in this country, who last night presented to me, in this House, a document on behalf of 5,000 Ibos of Great Britain. It is the Manifesto of the United Nigeria Ibo Union of Great Britain and Ireland, an organisation which is recognised not only here but in France and Germany. There are more than 10,000 Ibos in Lagos alone, and hundreds of Ibos are back in Kano and Kaduna. I have stayed in their hotels in recent months, and I assure the House that they are not afraid. The manifesto produced by this Ibo Union states:
"This Union is born not out of persuasion, not out of enticement, not out of intimidation or imitation and not out of propaganda but out of the general, genuine and concerted belief of we Ibos in this Union that a United Nigeria is an ideal which must be upheld. It is born after a general and genuine self-criticism of ourselves and after re-evaluation and reapppraisal of our stand.
"It is born out of a general desire that peace must prevail in our country—Nigeria, and that peace must come through talks and not through the force of arms. It is born out of a profound belief that the onus for peace lies with us all (Nigeria and Ibos in particular). It is born out of our supreme confidence that we of this Union given 'Time and Facility' can produce enough atmosphere, conditions and material for a peaceful return of all Ibos to one Nigeria. Finally this Union is born out of our deep desire that this callous war must stop to save us all from utter destruction."
The manifesto goes on to declare its objectives which are:
"To assemble and give directions into a United Nigeria, the thousands of Ibos living abroad who are completely disenchanted by Colonel Ojukwu's hard line in this civil war. To persuade the Ibos both in 'Biafra' and abroad to come to reason as there is no sense in pursuing the civil war to its bitter end.".
—and so on.
Mrs. Ewing: As the hon. Gentleman says that he is able to go to Nigeria so frequently, may I ask whether he has an interest which he ought to declare to the House?
Mr. Cordle: That is a very fair question. I have had an interest in Nigeria

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over the years, through the Crown Agents. That interest has continued for the past 40 years. I have nothing to be ashamed of in that whatsoever. My interest is also through a company sending hospital and medical supplies to that country. It is with that in mind that one is so eagerly anxious to bring this war to a close in order that the suffering and the starvation that we see in this land shall be done away with.
Between four million and five million Ibos have now come out of the rebel-held territory. As I say, they are distributed throughout the whole of Nigeria, and are happily working, one with another, side by side. There is no sense of fear.
I hope that the suggestion put forward by my right hon. Friend the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire about helicopter drops of food and medical supplies will come to fruition. I do not believe that our own helicopters are anywhere near as big or as strong or as capable as those of the Americans, and it may well be that we should make a proper and formal suggestion to the Federal Government that they should invite the Americans, who are only too waling to help, to bring alongside their aircraft carriers and use their "Sea Lions". That, I gather, could double, if not treble, the amount of foodstuffs and medical supplies that could be dropped into the area.
It is often said: "Why has not the war come to an end quickly? Our patience is exhausted." As I have said, I have been in the front line. I have seen the commanders there. They have told me, "We have been kept at this particular point since last October, since a year ago, and we are fed up. We want to move on and get on with the job." But, again, General Gowon has said "No," in order to minimise casualties and to allow for the refection of people. The Ibos come out of this territory, and, as I have indicated, as they come out so there is this taking up of their jobs again with renewed vigour. They are now being rehabilitated. One of the happiest of sights is to see the rehabilitation that is going on, with the yams being planted, the people erecting their own houses and homes, and work going on apace.
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My only criticism of the Foreign Secretary's comment when asked why he did not send a Minister in to the other side is that he would have been more forthright had he said that it was because Ojukwu is the rebel man who has misled the nation and has brought so much tragedy and suffering to it.
8.15 p.m.
Mr. Colin Jackson: I was not able wholeheartedly to follow the hon. Member for Bournemouth, East and Christchurch (Mr. Cordle) in his description of tile Nigerian situation. We have to recognise that both the Federal Government and the régime in Biafra have defects. From all I have heard today, there is no doubt that General Ojukwu is an extremely stubborn man who insists on his point of view when the views of all of Nigeria might, perhaps, be better listened to. There is no doubt also that in some aspects the Federal Government is inefficient, and desperately inefficient. There is no doubt, too, that some of the generals are the most extreme form of hawks, who positively relish as much combat as there is.
I want to address my remarks only to the general question of security rather than of secession. My right hon. Friend the Member for Llanelly (Mr. James Griffiths) quite correctly emphasised the point that if we can enable that territory of Biafra to have its own security, then government of all the Federal territory may be a possibility. But without that recognition I cannot see, quick kill or otherwise, that we will ever get a settlement. Instead, we will only get a bigger drifting into bloodshed. Bearing in mind the mental and physical control that General Ojukwu has over the Biafrans, I do not think that the Federal Army, with its relative inefficiency—and, on balance, I am in favour of inefficiencies in armies—has enough about it to finish off Biafra. Therefore, I feel that the idea of total Federal control over the whole of Nigeria is not a possibility.
On the other hand, I cannot follow some hon. Members on both sides in their total espousal of the Biafran case. I have an immense admiration, as has my right hon. Friend the Member for Llanelly, for the Ibos. I do not want to see—as must be the logical conclusion

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of "Ibos for Iboland"—the Ibo people confined to an area of 2 per cent. or 3 per cent. of the whole of Nigeria. These people are immensely talented and able. They should be there to serve all of Nigeria, and beyond it. The hon. Member for Bournemouth, East and Christ-church has referred to the many millions of Ibo people now living and serving outside the area of Biafra. I want to see these barriers down and the Ibos taking a full part, particularly an economic part, in Nigeria. Separate territories of Biafra and Nigeria will never assume the former total Nigerian position of prosperity and ability.
It might be argued that Biafra would survive and flourish if it were allowed to take into its general control the minority communities—the "river people" sometimes referred to and others—but the Biafrans would then be doing to the river people the very thing that they complain the Federal Government want to do to them.
Unless we deal with the question of security I do not believe that we shall get a settlement. Most of the discussions this afternoon have gone away from this central issue. We must, after the cease-fire, have a very substantial cooling-off period, but I do not think that it would be sufficient just to have the policing of the area referred to as Biafra, controlled by the Ibo leadership. I do not think this would enable the leadership of Colonel Ojukwu to come to the conference table with any sense of soundness.
The suggestion by the noble Lord the Member for Edinburgh, North (Earl of Dalkeith) of a Commonwealth police force drawn from Africa may have some significance. On occasion when one mentions a Commonwealth police force certain people in the Foreign Office have a tendency to yawn, but let us be specific. Let us see if we can combine these ideas. I agree with the Foreign Secretary that the main initiative for peace in Africa must come from O.A.U. It cannot come from white or pink Westerners outside poking their noses in. Could we have a combination of a force from Zambia and Tanzania on the one side, sympathetic to Biafra mainly because they do not want it completely obliterated, and Kenya and Uganda on the other side, sympathetic
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to the Federal Nigerian Republic? This is a suggestion that Commonwealth nations in Africa, two on each side, should supply an additional security force for the vital cooling off period which the country will require.
We shall have to wait and see what possibility there is of new talks through the intervention of the Emperor of Ethiopia. I still insist that we must strive for the idea of a united Nigeria. One can have all the briefs in the world about Balkanisation. I had one from the British Biafra Society last night. Its history was not too good, but it was well written. As someone who is passionately sympathetic towards Biafra and who admires the Ibo people, I want to see a united Nigeria. Some of us are old enough to remember the struggle to prevent Katanga leaving the Congo. Some of us can imagine what would happen if the Nile Delta were split off as a rich part of Egypt or if the Copper Belt were taken from Zambia. Around the world one can see this kind of danger, if San Paulo left Brazil or the Djakarta region left Indonesia.
I am in favour of all efforts to keep the unity of Nigeria and not to allow the fragmentation of one part of Africa from another so that it would become a black slum. I hope that new initiatives and new peace endeavours in Addis Ababa will be successful, but we have to recognise that it must be a confederation and Biafra for a very considerable period must have its security under its own control. Otherwise, I am afraid it will not come into such a confederation.
8.24 p.m.
Mr. Richard Hornby: I certainly share the view expressed by the hon. Member for Brighouse and Spenborough (Mr. Colin Jackson) that the aim must be to try to see the re-emergence of a united Nigeria. I share a great deal of the thoughts the hon. Gentleman expressed about ways in which that might yet be achieved.
I suppose that running through the debate there have been three main fears which make up this picture. The first is the fear that the war may continue, the loss of life and the suffering and starvation continue, of which the cameras have told us so much and by which people understand the tragedy so clearly. That is

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the fear which everyone in this House wants to see ended and one which is easy to comprehend.
The second fear is one of which Governments rather than people are aware, that Nigeria as a whole might disintegrate with all that that might mean not just for the Ibo people in one corner of the territory, but for the whole 56 peoples in that area and many in areas surrounding it. The right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grimond) said that there were some circumstances in which secession was justifiable. I believe that in the circumstances of Nigeria it would be irresponsible to pursue that thought too far when looking at the consequences which secession in one place might add up to in other corners of the country.
The third fear of which many of us are aware, particularly Governments, is the fear that so long as the war continues—in the words of the Foreign Secretary—international conflict might be superimposed on a local civil war. That indeed is a fear which one should not lightly set aside at a time when Russia and Britain and France—although she may deny it Portugal and South Africa and who knows what other countries are involved in a conflict in a continent which has enough divisions of its own. There are 31 African States supporting one side and four States supporting the other. There is enough divisiveness in the world without looking for further divisions.
I want to concentrate on why I believe it is important that Nigeria should not disintegrate. The first reason is that about 90 per cent. of the country is actively expressing and trying to practise some unity at present. We talk of a civil war, but we forget that in geographical terms we are talking of a country four or five times the area of this country, fighting an area the size of a large English county. That is the scale of the conflict in terms which we should not lightly forget. If in trying to solve one tragic problem we produced a host of others in this area, we may have done more destruction than we have succeeded in healing wounds.
It is my belief that if secession were to succeed in one place that would lead
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to disintegration in others. If there were no hope of the Ibos being drawn again into the heart of Nigeria the Central Government would lose heart, the Yorubas would go their way and Nigeria would be left with a landlocked north whose people might say, "We shall not be cut off From the sea" and march to the south. I do not know what their choice would be, but the dangers of thoughts of that happening are very real.
We talk of the secession of Biafra, but what does it mean? This area now under the control of Colonel Ojukwu is not by any stretch of the imagination viable as an independent nation. I cannot imagine the Federal Government saying, "We shall draw back our troops and you will have more of the territory which is now ours". In that case a non-viable State would be asking for secession.
Alternatively, if by any stretch of the imagination or change of military fortunes the boundaries were to be drawn round a larger Biafra, it would not be an Ibo heartland but many other peoples who, more than most, fear the idea of an Ibo domination, just as the Ibos fear for their security in other areas. I went to the River State only recently. That is an area which was previously in the Eastern Region under Ibo domination. It is there that the fears of Ibo secession and of the re-creation of an Ibo State comprehending these minority groups are strongest. There are fears on both sides in this conflict, and secession will not solve them.
Only recently we debated the question of development. If this area of Nigeria is to prosper, is it better that the oil revenues of the area should be spread over the whole of the 56 million people, or that they should be snatched by a small proportion of the population, with the result that they would corner the lot and become an over-wealthy sheikhdom with all the dangers of smash-and-grab politics, resulting in further warfare in the area? I do not see peace coming from that source; only discouragement once again on the Continent of Africa, which needs a success story some time, and soon. There were many hopes not many years ago that Nigeria might be one of the success stories.
Those are the reasons why I see no hope for the future in secession with the probabilities, rather than the possibilities

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of the disintegration of these 56 million people.
But to say that is to state only half the case if one seems to ignore the genuine fears of the Ibos for their security. Although more than half of them are now living under Federal control, amongst the Ibos in Biafran-held territory the fears are genuine: they do not know what would happen to them if they were to return to their homes. This is a fear which by every means in their power the Federal Government, their friends, and others must try to break down.
I have seen the abandoned property schemes in other parts of the country. I have seen the refugee camps. I am convinced of the genuiness of the intentions of those in the Federal Government to whom I have spoken to ensure the safety of the Ibos on return. The international observers are convinced, too. The problem is to get the message through to the people living in Biafra.
I have three suggestions. I do not know to what extent they can be followed up. First, the more influence that can be brought to bear on representatives of the Federal Government here to make contacts, as they have done through Dr. Azikiwe, with Biafrans outside Biafra and persuade them to write home to their relatives and make contact in every way possible—through journalists and others travelling about, of whom there are many outside Biafra—the better.
Secondly, it remains crucial that no mistake should be made in the Federal areas about the security of those Ibos who are in those territories.
Thirdly, I suggest that, following the publicity given to certain distinguished Ibos who have re-emerged in Federal-held areas, it would certainly be worth trying, with the help of international guarantees, to arrange for groups of people—this would obviously be a subject for negotiation; it would be difficult for Colonel Ojukwu to accept this—to come out perhaps with international guarantors accompanying them, go to their homeland, see whether it was safe, and then return and report.
Finally, I come to the question of Britain's rôle which is what the House is concerned with in this debate. Despite
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the concern that has been expressed on both sides of the House about arms supply, I remain of the opinion that it is not a dirty thing to supply the weapons for internal security, and perhaps for external security, to a government who have not the means or who do not wish to expend their resources on building up their own armaments. If a friendly Commonwealth nation asks, at the time of independence or subsequently, "Will you provide us with the arms for our security forces?", it is not wrong for this nation to say, "Yes".
If that point of view is accepted, the leading article in The Times today becomes all the more ridiculous. It seems to suggest that, on the one hand, it is reasonable to agree to supply arms and, on the other, if anything happens to make it necessary to use the weapons, the facilities should be immediately withdrawn so that the country which was supplying the arms ceases to be a good friend and immediately tries to put itself into the position of being a potential conciliator. There could scarcely be a worse basis for successful international relations and trust. I am sorry to say that this attitude is not wholly out of keeping with the line that The Times has taken on more than one occasion in its judgments on this issue.
Next, if a unilateral cut-off is not seen as a satisfactory policy, is there much prospect of a multilateral one?
My view is that, although multilateral control is a worthy aim, there is not much prospect of its success unless there is proper inspection and control at the point where weapons are received. It is much easier to control them there—in Nigeria and Biafra—than at the point of departure. As to future needs, our policy should be concentrated on these points. First, wherever we can we should try to open the doors for negotiation and conciliation. The best point of contact is to try, against all hopes and recent experience, to get agreement with France. One of the tragedies of the situation is that the divisions in Europe, historically and more recently, have led to divided councils first in the Middle East and now in West Africa. The damage done is very great and I hope for better times.
Secondly, we should see if we can achieve a cease-fire so that talks can start, or even encourage the beginning of

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talks before the cease-fire starts. Thirdly, we must be ready with emergency aid on a substantial scale once any talks begin. It is vitally important if talks take place that nothing should happen to make firing begin again. We must immediately create a vested interest in less starvation and more security.
We should help whenever we can with administrative advisers, engineers and so forth to tackle all the massive problems of reconstruction that will follow the war. A great deal is at stake—the prospect of a part of Africa, more blessed economically than other parts of Africa, becoming an area of stability. This is being prevented because as yet the varying tribes, and it is not just the Ibos versus the rest, there are many others, have not yet succeeded in living together. There is just a chance that out of war may emerge a greater maturity, a considerable fear of pushing tribal divisions too far, and over the brink. Anything that can be done to help the two sides get together should be done, but it will not be achieved by unilaterally taking decisions to withdraw support from the Federal Government.
8.38 p.m.
Mr. Stanley Henig: What has worried many people in this continuing public debate has been the casual way in which it appeared that the initial decision was taken by the British Government, on the outbreak of hostilities, to supply arms. The tragedy is that because this decision was made at the beginning it has apparently become progressively more difficult to change it later. If this were an academic exercise we would like to look at the way the decision was taken originally, but I do not suppose that we are now likely to find out very much about it.
What we are entitled to ask is what changes have occurred since this initial decision? It seems that there are two essential changes. First, looking over history, it would appear that one of the qualifications for statehood or nationhood has tended regrettably to be baptism by fire. If this is the case, and it was in the last century with Greece, for example, surely now that Biafra has undergone two years of war, two years during which it has in many ways increased its cohesion as a country, it
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has entitlement to the same kind of recognition?
Secondly, this area which is now covered by Biafra is a homogenous one, in which the Ibos are in the overwhelming majority. If it is accepted that Biafra as it now exists should have national independence, there might be a problem as to whether it would be economically viable, but there would not be the problem of minority tribes. These are important facts which should be taken into account.
The chief worry among many on this side of the House about our Government's policy has been that we have taken sides. I am glad to see the Foreign Secretary has returned, because I would like to put this point to him. The curiosity of the debate is that when it is suggested that Britain mediates or takes some role in bringing about a settlement we are told that the O.A.U. will do this, this is an African matter. Is there a dualism about this—that it is for the Africans to make peace but for the Europeans to supply the implements of war? If so, this is the crudest form of neo-colonialism which I have come across. There is a further dualism about saying that Nigeria is an independent country and yet we are supplying arms to it. To my great shame we also have to listen to a succession of British Government spokesmen often giving the policy, not of this country, but of the Federal Government. When we see a small headline, perhaps an inadvertent headline, in The Times referring to the Parliamentary Secretary being briefed in Lagos, that increases our sense of shame. Surely our Government should be sufficiently independent of Lagos to take their own stand.
The question has been raised of the scope for initiatives. I feel strongly that, after two years of appalling massacre and with the danger of more deaths and starvation, the time has come for this country, which is regarded by the world as being deeply implicated, to take a stand and action. If General Gowon is as great a man as many hon. Members have said, and as Government spokesmen have often made out, we should perhaps take a slight risk with him. I have a suspicion that General Gowon would not like Nigeria to become completely dependent

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for its supply of arms on the Soviet Union. If he were faced with this as a possibility, he might well be more flexible in his approaches to the other side. The threat of our stopping the supply of arms might well help wonderfully to concentrate the minds of certain people in Lagos. We must use our influence.
Secondly, there has been talk of the difficulty of achieving an international arms embargo. There is the question of France not admitting that she is supplying arms. The formula which some of us would like to put to the Government is this. Why not ask these countries, not so much to cease supplying arms, but to join us in an internationally policed operation to stop all arms getting through? That would avoid awkward questions about who is actually supplying the arms.
My third point concerns the relief of starvation. It may well be that Article 27 of the United Nations Charter can be interpreted as suggesting that the international community have no right to interfere in the domestic affairs of individual countries. But I cannot accept the argument that if the United Nations intervened in a situation, which may be a terrible situation, it would be the end of the United Nations. I am sure that the argument can be put the other way. The League of Nations ended precisely because international statesmen washed their hands of a series of problems which were deemed to be domestic or internal to individual countries. Starvation is a world problem affecting us all. If the two sides cannot get together to find a way of solving it, it is perhaps for us and other countries to act independently and, if necessary, unilaterally.
Mr. James Johnson: Is my hon. Friend suggesting that we should invade East Nigeria unilaterally as a Commonwealth sister State of Nigeria? Surely not.
Mr. Henig: No. I would suggest, as a possible formula, that we could parachute in certain supplies of food and medical equipment which are needed. I doubt if our planes would be shot down by anybody if we tried to do that.
There has been much talk about who is to blame for the two sides not coming
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together. The truth is that we do not have exact information because the talks which take place are always through different people and by different mechanisms. The Red Cross and Biafra agree on something and the Nigerians turn it down; the Nigerians and the Red Cross agree on something else and the Biafrans turn that down. The Red Cross, by its nature, will agree on anything which deals with the fundamental problem of ending starvation. Its difficulty is to get the two sides to agree. Our rôle in this difficulty has not been totally creditable. It is of no value our saying that the Biafrans turn down certain proposals or one day make dove noises and the next hawk noises, or that one day they say, "Security is more important than sovereignty", and the next day say something different. What would be lost by our country asking whether a Minister can go to Biafra and at the same time making it clear that this involves no diplomatic recognition but is simply a fact-finding tour to try to help? I do urge my right hon. Friends to show a little flexibility on this one point, which is most genuinely suggested in many parts of the House.
It is sometimes suggested that moral considerations play no part in politics. I would not accept this line at all. On the other hand, it can be said that, if one simply sets up a row of moral standards, they might not be helpful in guiding us in major political considerations. One should not approach things that way. However this is a civil war which has dragged on for two years. For political reasons, we decided on a course aimed at safeguarding our influence and trying to bring the war to a speedy end. We have not brought it to a speedy end. We have not saved our influence, and I submit that, every month that this war goes on, the possibility of a united Nigeria in any meaningful sense becomes more and more remote. So our policy has failed.
But then we have the moral enormity of what we have been trying to do. We have been saying that a people numbering, seven, eight or nine million should not have the right to rule themselves, because that does not suit our convenience. To stop them getting that right, we have supplied the people from whom they are trying to win their freedom with the means of their suppression.

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Go back through all centuries and this country, with its mother of Parliaments, has never done a thing like this. Why was it that, in Italy, people looked always to Britain as their fighters for their independence when they were seeking it? Why do the Greeks always remember the way that this country helped them in their battles against the Turks? Now we are changing tradition, and to our great and eternal shame, it is a Labour Government, who should believe in the freedoms of all peoples, who are doing this. I plead with my right hon. Friends if they will remember nothing else, at least to think of their place in history and the way in which the great name of this country is being dragged in the mire through our action in this conflict. I urge them to show more flexibility and to change their policy before it is too late.
8.47 p.m.
Mrs. Winifred Ewing: I am one of the 151 M.P.s who have signed the Motion asking the Government to change their minds. One understands that it takes courage for a Government to change their minds when their course has been set on a specific policy for so long. I do not want to rehearse all the arguments in favour of stopping the supply of arms, but wish only to put some additional points.
First, I take the old argument that if we do not supply arms, Russia will. Which is the more likely—that Russia will go on supplying arms if we go on, or that Russia will go on if we stop? We know that if we go on Russia will go on: that is certain. What we do not know is what would happen if we stopped. If there is doubt about it, that must help to stop the war of containment, which would in itself reduce the number of lives lost.
I find the argument about British interests a rather sordid one. In particular, I think of a Question on 17th November, when the Secretary of State was asked:
"…whether he will make a statement on the current situation in Nigeria as it affects British interests."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 17th November, 1969; Vol. 791, c. 176.]
The answer was all about financial interests; so British interests, apparently, reduce to the sordid basis of being
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immediately interpreted as financial interests.
In this matter, I would quote what the hon. Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme) said in a previous debate, that it is not intelligent to think that one can do business in a cemetery. That was one of the most telling remarks ever made in any of our debates on Nigeria.
British interests, to me, mean the interest and attitude of mind of people. The Minister can surely be in no doubt that if he left this Chamber and went into almost any town or village in Scotland or England, he would find that an average sample of people were against this policy. As a fair man, he will admit this. The national opinion polls prove it, if proof should be needed and if one accepts that kind of proof. But I am sure that he is not basically in doubt about that. So his position, for his Government, must be that he is following a policy which he knows to be against the expressed wish of so many Members of this House and a majority of people outside.
On the Balkanisation bogey, it is clear that Britain is not simply an arms salesman. If this were so, we should be selling arms to anyone who asked us as a commercial venture. We do not sell arms to South Africa—I approve of that—so that means that we are introducing moral judgments. The moral judgment here, apparently, is that we know best and that we do not want balkanisation.
But is the opposite of Balkanisation sometimes all that attractive? Russia does not want Balkanisation. We know what is happening: she prefers satellite countries. I prefer free countries; so Balkanisation in itself will not do as a reason. One must look at the specific example only, because one can find just as many examples where the opposite is less attractive. Poland, Finland, Latvia and Rumania are all products of Balkanisation.
Then there is the argument that there is some virtue in size. By any standards, whether African or by comparison with European countries or even on a world basis, a people of eight or nine million represent quite a large country. As to the argument of viability, there are some countries with very poor soil and a small area—one could mention Israel—which

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survive against common sense. So I do not accept that one can say of a rich part of the country, as Biafran territory would be, that it would not be viable: that is absurd.
On the moral judgment again, the faults on both sides have been well rehearsed and there is no need to repeat them; but why are the Ibos fighting in such a determined way against the odds? If the case is that they are afraid of being exterminated, it is understandable. But the Government discount that argument and say that the Ibos are returning to their homes. That makes it even more difficult for them to explain what the Ibos are fighting for.
This brings me to what I believe to be the real reason why they are fighting. I quote a Church of Scotland missionary who has been a missionary in both parts of the country and who wants only to stop the war. He told me that he believes that Colonel Ojukwu has his people fighting for their survival as a people. That can be the only explanation, because the others are being gradually whittled away by evidence brought out in the House and elsewhere.
What is meant by "agreement"? Surely it means that each side gives something and takes something. It is not a matter of surrender. But some of the proposals seem to suggest the total surrender by one side in order to reach agreement. I should like to give two examples of this.
The Prime Minister's visit gave many of us some hope that perhaps as a result the war would be ended in some way. I certainly hoped so. I hoped that he would go to both sides, even though he had announced in advance that he would not do so, which detracted from the full value of that opportunity. Even if he had only refrained from saying what his intention was, he might have had a better chance of meeting both the main men in this sad story.
My right hon. Friend said that Colonel Ojukwu was unwilling to meet him while he was in Africa. Those of us who watched the shadow dance saw Colonel Ojukwu saying that he would not meet the Prime Minister in one place, while the Prime Minister said that he would not meet Colonel Ojukwu in another, and in
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the end they did not meet. We were given an explanation of this. The Prime Minister said that he did not go to Biafra because to do so would have meant its recognition. The diplomatic language of the 19th century ought not to be used in a 20th century war. Who cares about a word like "recognition"? We want to stop the war.
Who would have blamed the Prime Minister of Great Britain if he had said that he was not recognising Biafra, but wanted to meet Colonel Ojukwu and that was the only place where he could meet him? Who would have thought less of the Prime Minister if he had done that? If he had done that, perhaps the war would now be over. Who knows? Perhaps I overestimate the Prime Minister's ability, but should he not have tried everything he could?
I take my second example from what was said by the Foreign Secretary on 12th June, 1968:
"If we make the supposition that it were the intention of the Federal Government … to take advantage of a military situation in order to throw aside"—
and this is the phrase—
"with contempt any terms of a reasonable settlement, then the arguments which justified the policy we have so far pursued would fall, and we would have to re-consider.…"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 12th June, 1968; Vol. 766, c. 293.]
The phrase "reasonable settlement" means that something must be given. It is not a matter of Nigeria agreeing so long as the Biafrans give up their whole case and so long as the Biafrans start by agreeing that there should be a united Nigeria.
It would be better to start a meeting without any pre-conditions. Both sides are to blame. As the right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) has said, words are coming between them, but this is exactly what we should be trying to overcome. An agreement requires each of the two sides to give up something, and here is the Foreign Secretary admitting on a reasonable interpretation of his language of a year ago that this is the moment to reconsider.
The answer to the question of who is to be the mediator is that it is clearly not the country supplying arms to one of the two participants in the struggle. The Organisation of African Unity is

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a mediator. It is a pleasant idea that Africa should have all its problems solved by Africans, and on the face of it it seems completely logical, but when one examines the statements of the O.A.U., one finds that they call first for a united Nigeria and secondly for a suspension of hostilities. It is not acting as a mediator to ask that one side should give in its whole case before it starts. Would it not be better for the Government to look for other mediators? What is wrong with having many mediators? Anyone able to try to help should do so. I think that the solution would be for the Foreign Secretary to mediate, but why does he not at least find other persons who could try?
What is the Government's main object? Is it to stop the war or to continue with the doctrine that Nigeria must be one country? Which is more important? After all, not even the Foreign Secretary can know with certainty what the outcome will be, what will be produced in this part of the world 10 years from now. As he does not know and can only guess, should not his main object be to stop the war? If the war were stopped, and the sooner the better, these two States would find a way in which to live together, and in the end it will be they, and not the House of Commons, who will have to find the way.
The Government have pursued a policy of supplying arms to Nigeria and offering friendship to both sides and it has not worked. Is it not time to try a different policy? The Government are in a difficulty of logic. They argue that South Vietnam has a right to self-determination, according to what was said last night. It could be argued that Vietnam is on country, but the Government support American policy, which is to split that country and to recognise the right of self-determination of the bit. In Nigeria the Government support the Federal Government and say that Nigeria is one country and that the bit which is fighting for self-determination has no right to do so. The two cases are exactly opposite.
This war may last a long time. Many people from Scotland have served in this area on both sides, and I have tried to meet as many as possible. The view is that if the war goes on one thing is certain, and it is that the country called
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Biafra will be united by its experiences. What will happen to the rest is an imponderable. It may or may not find another formula, another confederation, but that is what people I have spoken to believe. I therefore add my voice to those who urge the Government to think again and change their course.
9.0 p.m.
Mr. A. H. Macdonald: I shall be very brief, less than five minutes. I am glad to have the opportunity to say a word, because I have never so far contemplated the Government's foreign policy with any enthusiasm. I think it has been pusillanimous in Rhodesia, totally misguided in Europe and in Vietnam almost criminal, and I was one of the 49 who voted against it last night. But on Biafra I think the Government are right.
In a speech for which I did not otherwise care very much the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grimond) suggested that we should have regard to moral issues, and it is precisely because I think the Government are morally right that I shall be voting with them if there is a vote later this evening.
We all join in sympathy for the agony and distress being undergone in Nigeria. I am astonished that we do not look at the plain and self-evident truth, which is that the Ojukwu régime has constantly refused to allow any alleviation of suffering. It refused to allow a mercy corridor and flights from Lagos, and it refused to allow the random calling down of flights of food coming from anywhere else. Is it not evident that the real reason for the refusal is that it might be discovered where the arms were coming from? This man is using the suffering of his people as a pawn to blackmail world opinion which is an act of unparalleled wickedness I am astonished and distressed that so many of my hon. Friends seem to be able to give aid and comfort to this man by placing him on an equitable level with the Federal Government.
If it were security that Colonel Ojukwu was after, the fighting could stop now. The Federal Government time and again has offered terms to give adequate security to the Ibos, including their own region with an Ibo governor, an Ibo council, Ibo police and an external force to protect them against aggression. But

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I suspect that it is, as he has always said, sovereign independence that he is after. He is a man I would not care to entrust with sovereignty. Apart from the sufferings of the people, which he contemplated with equanimity, there are the atrocities which he perpetrated on the Rivers tribes when they were under his control, a fact which has had curiously little publicity, rather to my distress.
I find no necessity to look for comparisons and parallels in America or Gibraltar. I see the most exact parallel in Katanga. When Katanga tried to break away from the Congo, many of us came to see that this was an ambiguous and undesirable development, and we resisted it. I cannot see any difference in the situation in Biafra now, except that the propaganda put out by Colonel Ojukwu is much more copious and more skilful. But the falsity of the propaganda is now being demonstrated. I was most deeply influenced in my thinking on this matter—and this is what made me come down in favour of the Government's policy—by that well-known article in the Tablet about a year ago, which was written by a man who went out there as a supporter of the Ojukwu régime and found to his astonishment that what he had been told about it was a pack of lies.
I am deeply impressed that so many of the States of the O.A.U. have been supporters of the Federal Government, and this should weigh heavily with us when the Africans come to a decision about this matter. The Federal Government have made one concession after another in an attempt to reach an agreement, but these concessions have not been met with any parallel concession by the tyrant of Biafra. I fear, if we continue with this process, we shall allow this man to set a precedent, so that in future usurping despots may rise up either in Nigeria or in other African countries and create a whole series of petty, tiny states which are not viable on their own. This man, particularly as he is responsible for and allows the suffering of his people to continue, seems a most monstrous despot. I am against this man. I am for those who want to bring the régime to an end. Therefore, I have warmly supported the Government's policy in this matter.
9.5 p.m.
Mr. David Crouch: We are discussing with great seriousness a moral issue about which we are divided among ourselves, but, more than a moral issue, if anything can be more than that, we are discussing a civil war. Civil wars divide houses and families and they divide this House.
I have listened to the arguments put forward by those who support the Federal Government. I have been struck by the sincerity and clearness of conviction with which they have put forward those views, particularly my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth, East and Christchurch (Mr. Cordle) However, I do not share those views.
Because I am divided from my hon. Friends and because I am faced with a searching moral decision, I am disappointed not that the Foreign Secretary has failed me by, as it were, being morally wrong, but that the right hon. Gentleman and the Prime Minister have shown us no initiative either yesterday or today.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) gave us an initiative. He suggested a change in Government policy not in airy-fairy moralistic terms, but in the factual and positive steps which we ought to take. He reminded the Foreign Secretary that an initiative was now necessary, that enough is enough on this moral issue after 2 million have died through war and starvation.
It may be that once we thought we were right—I do not agree that we were—to give diplomatic support to the Federation we had conceived, created, nourished and brought to life and did not want to see it disappear into anarchy and chaos, because we were justly afraid that such cracks would spread throughout Africa. But I feel that, for all the sympathy which the Prime Minister showed for the problems of Vietnam and Nigeria yesterday, he was wooden in refusing to show any initiative, and to give some leadership to this House and to those outside.
It is not only the arms that we have supplied to the Federal Government that have given them strength. More important, it is the diplomatic support

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which we have given. We have helped a warring nation fighting a tragic war. We have made such a nation respectable and we have pointed the finger of scorn at a nation. a people, a community, struggling for freedom. Are we, from this Chamber of freedom, to point the finger of sneer and scorn at a little people struggling for what they believe to be freedom?
It will be difficult to reach the negotiation table, but it is not beyond the wit and skill of our Government—not even this Government—if only they would stand and look again at the problems and realise that we need initiatives from here to create an approach to the negotiation table. I believe that my right hon. Friend the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire has given an idea of what those initiatives should be.
9.10 p.m.
Mr. Reginald Maudling: this has been a remarkable debate. I am only sorry that even now there are many hon. Members on both sides of the Chamber who would like to take part in the discussion but cannot.
I agree with a lot, though not all, of what my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury (Mr. Crouch) has just said. I think that this situation has the essence of tragedy. I was taught at school that tragedy is not a conflict between right and wrong but a conflict between right and right, and this is precisely what we are seeing today in this discussion. I believe that those on both sides, not of the House, but of the argument, which is different, have put forward their views with equal sincerity and conviction.
I think that I must also agree with my hon. Fiend that there is something a little lacking in what the Government said today. I must accept the logic of their argument, which I think is impeccable. but sometimes it is necessary to go beyond logic arid to employ a little more imagination. I am not quite certain whether more imagination could not be employed by the Government, and I believe that, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) said. there are certain avenues of approach which could be explored in a situation where it is possibly respectable to argue that nothing can be done, but where, on the whole, it is better in human terms to try to do
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something. At least doing something is better than doing nothing.
I will try, as best I can, to analyse the arguments, particularly on the question of arms supply, which I think is the practical argument before the House today. First, this is not, surely, a material issue alone. There are those who say—I have seen it in the newspapers—that the policy of the British Government is dictated solely by British economic interests in Nigeria. My right hon. Friend the Member for Stafford and Stone (Mr. Hugh Fraser) tried to suggest that many arguing on one side were arguing from the point of view of Britain's economic interest. This clearly is important. This House must never neglect the economic interests of the British people. It is part of our job to protect our economic interests, and they should not be neglected either by the House of Commons or by the Government, but they cannot be decisive in an issue where the whole question of moral decisions has been raised. We must not neglect the economic issues, but we must not, on the other hand, for a moment think that the economic factors are decisive. Nor do I think that spokesmen on either side of the House have argued from that point of view.
I think that most of us accept the policy of this country being a supplier of arms to other friendly countries, in particular to Commonwealth countries. I suggest that if we accept that policy we must accept the consequences of it. This does not involve to any extent those hon. Members who are against all sales of arms abroad. There are, I think, a number of hon. Members who say that it is wrong for this country to supply armaments at all. They are completely absolved from this argument. But those who believe in our supplying arms to friendly Commonwealth countries must accept the consequences of that supply.
The first consequence is that these arms will be used in a war, even perhaps in a civil war, when the State acquiring the arms is threatened by any form of insurrection, or believes itself so to be threatened. War inevitably involves hardship and suffering to the entire population of the country that is involved, and one must frankly accept that if we supply arms to any country they may be used in circumstances where dire

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results may follow, often, inevitably, for some of the civilian population as well, It is wrong to pretend, for example, that blockade is something new in warfare. Blockade has always been a method of war, no doubt a rigorous method, but one that has been used throughout the centuries.
We must recognise that the purchaser of British arms is entitled to expect that he can rely on the supply of those arms when he needs them. If he thought he could get those arms only when he did not need them he would not come to us. He must be entitled to say "I buy arms from you in the expectation that I can use them when I need them". If we cut off from him the supply of those arms in his time of need, inevitably he would regard that as an act of discrimination and hostility.
Mr. Grimond Mr. Grimond rose—
Mr. Maudling: I am sorry, but my time is short. I possibly will deal with the right hon. Gentleman's point in what I am about to say.
The argument that one provides arms to people who expect to be able to use them when they want them cannot be indefinitely extended without qualification. If the arms were to be put to a use wholly repugnant to the conscience of any civilised people, then clearly an entirely different situation would arise. One example would be if the arms were used for a deliberate policy of genocide. I would agree entirely with those who say that if it were to be shown that British-supplied arms were being used for such purposes, the supply should be cut off tomorrow. On that matter there should be reviewed if continuing slaughter could be no doubt at all.
Secondly, the supply of arms should be prevented by ending their supply. This is another condition. If by ending the supply of arms one could bring to an end a devastating war and massive human privation, once again one would be justified in saying to the customer "We cannot supply any more on moral grounds. We are not entitled to do so." I must add a qualification. If one withdraws the supply of arms from friends to whom one has been supplying them and if as a result the enemy of those friends obtains
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sufficient arms to do the thing that caused one to stop the supply of arms in the first place, then one is back where one started. There is that general factor in the computation.
These are the broad principles. I turn now to the practical factors in Nigeria.
First, it is very hard indeed to get the truth. There is no doubt about the scale of the tragedy, which is massive. But major details are obscured by a fog of propaganda emanating from both sides. I throw into the wastepaper basket those envelopes that come from somebody in Geneva. It is difficult to get the facts. I would stress the importance of the mission which is being undertaken by my noble friend Lord Carrington, who at the moment is trying to do the best he can to ascertain the facts on both sides. I am sorry that his report is not available at this stage since he is still in the course of his travels.
I am sorry that the Government have not sent anyone to the Biafra side to hear their point of view. The Foreign Secretary dealt with this matter conscientiously, but his answer did not entirely convince the House. It is a pity that the opportunity has not been taken to get the view of the Biafrans as well as that of the Nigerians.
The Foreign Secretary put forward the argument that it would be wrong at this particular moment, when there is a chance of important and valuable talks taking place, for the Government to make a move of this kind. I accept his argument on that one narrow point, but his argument about the immediate situation does not deal with the question why something was not done earlier. Nor did he deal with the question that, should the current initiative fail—and we hope that it will not fail, for if it succeeds the whole problem will be solved, and thank heaven if it does succeed—would he be prepared to send somebody from the British Government to listen to the arguments on both sides? The House, clearly, would like to know whether the objection put forward by the Foreign Secretary is purely temporary or lasting.
My first point, then, is that it is very difficult to get the facts on either side and that we should try to do more to get them.
The blockade has always been used as a means of warfare. One cannot,

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therefore, say to the blockading Power, "You should stop your blockade because it is becoming effective." That may be a hard thing to accept, but it is reasonable in the context of the history of human conflict.
I believe that it is unprecedented in the history of human conflict for a blockading Power to show a willingness to allow supplies of food to pass to those who are being blockaded. We must not forget this. Also, unless this offer—I understand it to be a genuine offer from the Federal Government—can be shown to be false, then I do not for a moment believe that the pathetic starvation of people in Biafra can be blamed on the Federal Government or in any sense whatever on the United Kingdom.
We would like to know more—I am sure that the Minister will explain this when he replies—about what is holding up the movement of food into Biafra. On the face of it, it seems that Colonel Ojukwu is the main obstacle; but what are his motives? We must be clear, as the Prime Minister said yesterday, in recognising the real and genuine fear that underlies so much of what Colonel Ojukwu is doing. It may be that his real motive is a genuine fear that by allowing these food supplies through he will endanger the security and future of his Ibo people, which he rightly holds so dear in everything he does. These are doubts which the Minister must do his best to resolve.
It is in such a situation, when one has a traditional blockade and starvation as a weapon of war, when the blockading power is offering to facilitate the supply of food and when the blockaded are apparently refusing it, that someone outside must break the deadlock, for there is no other way of solving the problem.
This is an opportunity for Her Majesty's Government to take an initiative, and I suggest that what my right hon. Friend the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire proposed earlier is precisely such an initiative. His suggestion of the use of helicopters to get over the tactical military difficulty of using Uli airfield could be a worth-while initiative.
With respect to the Foreign Secretary—who I know takes all these matters with deep seriousness and who has an intensive determination to do what he can to alleviate human suffering—I thought that
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he did not give all the weight that he might have given to my right hon. Friend's suggestion.
It was a practical proposal and, if the Americans would help, it would be infinitely bigger in total scale as a practical way of getting food supplies to Biafra in circumstances which could not, on the face of it, be objectionable to the Federal Government and which should not, on the face of it, create in the minds of the Biafrans the sort of suspicion which, naturally, arises from the use of Uli airfield by incoming aircraft which might, it could be thought, be a cover for Federal aircraft wishing to attack their installations.
I urge the Government to think once more about my right hon. Friend's suggestion, which, so far, seems the only imaginative and positive proposal to have been put forward as a means of bringing the deadlock which exists between the two forces to an end.
Next we must consider whether the Federal Government are engaged in genocide, which, of course, we could not possibly support. I agree with the Foreign Secretary that, on the evidence to date, the answer is, "No". That must be so when one considers the way in which they have treated the Ibos in the areas they have occupied, and the general conduct of the Federal forces, certainly in the last year or so, has given the lie to the argument of genocide.
However, as the hon. Lady the Member for Hamilton (Mrs. Ewing) said, if this is the case, then what are the Ibos fighting for? The truth is that unreal fears may be realities; that what matters is not what will happen but what people fear will happen. Naturally, what underlies the resistance of the Ibos, led by Colonel Ojukwu, is not what may happen but what they fear could happen in certain circumstances.
I have had some experience of colonial affairs, and I remember some attempts to set up new constitutions which would guarantee the safety of minorities. I have seen those constitutions torn up like bits of paper and the guarantees for the safety of minorities thrown aside. No doubt Colonel Ojukwu and the Biafrans have seen the same thing. We all know it; it is one of the tragedies of Africa. Constitutions cannot guarantee the safety of minorities and, that being so, it is not

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surprising that people should hold out for their own security by the means most immediately available to them.
But is there not an enormous possibility in the suggestion put forward of a Commonwealth force to deal with the short-term problem—and it is the short-term problem, involving all the bloodshed, starvation and misery, that needs to be solved. I do not believe that the Ibo people would be easily persuaded that, in the short term, constitutional arrangements would provide a satisfactory guarantee and, as I say, it is in the short term that the real problem has to be solved.
Can Biafra be economically viable as it stands? If it cannot be economically viable, is it sensible to look to its continuance as an independent State? I do not believe that the present Biafra can really be viable economically without access to the sea and without expansion into the area adjoining it. Many other tribes, non-Ibos, would not like to live under Ibo domination any more than the Ibos would like to live under Federal domination. That is a very important point that must be borne in mind in trying to be fair.
Can Britain attempt to mediate? I agree with the Prime Minister and with the Foreign Secretary that mediation in these matters is more appropriate to African countries, and probably comes more naturally and easily from them. More might perhaps have been done by British Governments in the past—I do not know—but the one thing of which I am absolutely certain is that the argument that we would be in a better position to mediate if we gave up the supply of arms is quite misguided. We might hope by giving up the supply of traditional arms to improve our position with the Biafrans but would lose all position whatsoever with the Nigerian Federal Government. So I do not think that this argument, though put forward from highly respectable sources, is practicable.
The final question is: should we continue to supply arms? What would happen if we stopped supplying the arms? This, surely, is what the argument is about. If we stopped the supply of these arms, would the Federal Government get the supplies elsewhere? I think that cer-
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tainly they would. They would get more supplies from Russia—and would that do any good to Africa, to Britain, to the Nigerians, the Ibos or anyone else? If we stop the supply of arms and if the Nigerian Government get more supplies from the Russians, it will do no good for the genuine long-term development of West Africa, it will make no difference whatsoever to the war situation, and it will lead to no reduction whatsoever in the number of deaths from starvation or war or anything else.
If, on the other hand, our stopping of arms supplies led to the Federal Government getting a smaller amount of supplies in total, the war would be prolonged, and the Biafrans might advance again as they did some time ago, occupying territory now held once more by the Federal Government, and the chance of making any contribution at all to the reduction of human suffering in Nigeria would in no way be increased.
I conclude that the unilateral cutting off of arms supplies is not an acceptable policy. It might enable us to wash our hands of the business: it would not enable us to wash our consciences. It might be the easy way out of problems of human sufferings and human rights, but I do not believe that, when viewed in a hard, cold, sober light, it is the right course for us to pursue. What we must do—and we must press the Government on this, because we are not satisfied—is to make a further effort to achieve some international agreement on the holding back of arms supplies.
The Foreign Secretary said that it cannot be done through the United Nations. I am sure we all agree that the word of the Secretary-General should be completely accepted in this matter, but why not try? We could only be rebuffed, and it would do no harm. Why not make an effort outside the United Nations to rally international opinion, with the Russians and the French? People say that they are not supplying arms; so they cannot object to agreeing not to do so in future. Let us say, "Can't you come together and agree on an international pact to stop the supply of arms to these two sides locked in mortal and apparently enduring conflict?" Why should we not do that?
The Government say that it would not work, but, for heaven's sake, why

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not try? This is our plea to the Government. We accept entirely the sincerity of the motives of hon. and right lion. Members opposite. We accept entirely that they share our view that an end to this slaughter, this bloodshed and starvation, must be found. But they should not sit back and say that these things are not possible. Let them for heaven's sake do something!
9.31 p.m.
The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Mr. George Thomson): This has been a serious, sombre and, in many ways, a harrowing debate. There has been deep feeling and deep conviction on the part of everyone in all quarters of the House. If I were to pick on any one speech, I think the House would be with me in picking the speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for Llanelly (Mr. James Griffiths). He explained why it was no longer possible for him to be present, because of his illness. I choose that speech because of his deep feelings on this subject. I do not agree with all that he said, but if anyone has the right to speak about Nigeria, it is my right hon. Friend who was a distinguished Colonial Secretary and one of the architects of modern Nigeria. We all respect what he said when he described how he was working to the end of his last "shift" in Parliament.
Before I come to the main theme of this debate, the question of the Nigerian civil war, I think I have a duty to answer one point made by the right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) on another subject which he asked about in his opening speech. He asked what was now developing from the decision at The Hague summit on the question of the expansion of the European Economic Community. As the House will know, the Six have said that they require some time to prepare themselves for negotiations with us. We hope, and it is clear I think that many of the Six hope, that they will not require so long a; six months for this, but at least we are assured that the process will not take longer than six months. We are in constant and very close touch with all the Six member countries and with the Corn-mission, and through the various diplomatic channels available to us we shall seek to secure that in the discussions in the coming weeks the Six will take
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account of the interests of an enlarged Community and avoid making that enlargement more difficult.
There is another point which I should mention on which the hon. Member for Banbury (Mr. Marten) put a direct question to me yesterday. I was perhaps a little abrupt with him earlier that afternoon. I wish to try to make amends by saying that of course there have been many occasions when the Government have explained their attitude towards the question of a political federation. There is no obligation of any political federation or any separate kind of political unity by signing or adhering to the Treaty of Rome, but, as the Prime Minister has said in this House on a number of occasions, many of us feel that there is a case for developing institutions towards political unity in Europe. We have made a beginning, even while we are not members of the E.E.C., with our partners in W.E.U., and we hope to continue these important discussions in W.E.U. in the rather critical period before negotiations actually open.
Now I come to the main theme of this debate, and I begin by giving some new information which has reached us during the course of the debate on the important subject of Nigerian relief. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister spoke yesterday about the fears which Colonel Ojukwu has expressed that the International Red Cross proposals for daylight flights might bring a danger of direct attack on Uli Airport. The International Red Cross has been negotiating patiently to try to devise clarification or assurances which would allay Colonel Ojukwu's fears and so perhaps enable the daylight relief flights to begin.
Late this afternoon, after my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs had finished speaking, we had a message by telegram from Lagos containing the text of an announcement which was made in Lagos this afternoon. In view of its evident importance, I think that the House would like to have it. It is headed:
"Daylight relief flights by the I.C.R.C. to Uli/Ihiala".
This is the message:
"It has come to the knowledge of the Federal Military Government that the provisions of Clause 6.2 of the Agreement of 13th September, 1969 concluded with the I.C.R.C. have been misconstrued and are being

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used by the rebels to refuse permission for the I.C.R.C. to commence daylight relief flights to the rebel enclave. The rebels have represented, for example, that the Nigerian Federal Government would take advantage of this clause, which says that this Agreement shall be without prejudice to military operations by the Federal Military Government to attack Uli/Ihiala when daylight flights operated by the I.C.R.C. are there."
I know that a number of my hon. Friends have been very anxious about this.
The announcement continues:
"As an earnest of the Federal Government's good faith and intentions in concluding this agreement with the I.C.R.C., the Federal Government hereby declares that it is not the Government's intention that the Nigerian Air Force should attack Uli/Ihiala when I.C.R.C. aircraft are there during the hours of daylight covered by the Agreement nor is it the Government's intention that the Nigerian Air Force should escort and follow the I.C.R.C. flights engaged in the relief operation. There is nothing in the Agreement intended to secure any military advantage for the Federal Government from the relief operations."
This is an important announcement in connection with our debate. I am sure that I speak for everyone in the House, whether or not they support the Government's policy in other respects, in voicing the most earnest hope that this new assurance by the Federal Government will enable Colonel Ojukwu immediately to agree to the inauguration of daylight relief flights so that there can be a substantial increase at once in the amount of food and medical supplies reaching the areas he controls. Surely with this clear undertaking by the Federal Government there can no longer be any rational fear that the airlift is to be used by the Federal forces to bring military advantage to the Federal side.
The right hon. Member for Barnet (Mr. Maudling), in a speech which I thought was, if I may say so without embarrassing him, a reasonable analysis of the situation, complained that we had not taken sufficient initiatives in regard to various aspects of the Nigerian problem. In the light of the announcement which I have just read to the House, I remind the House that in many ways the progress which has been made between the International Red Cross and the Federal Government on the question of day relief flights owes a great deal to the various initiatives we have taken continuously over a period of time.
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The right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire suggested that, if daylight flights continued to be blocked, we should consider sending in relief by helicopters operating from aircraft carriers. The right hon. Gentleman said that this might enable about 500 tons a week to be taken in.
We on this side are always ready to accept, and indeed are seeking, constructive ideas, and we much appreciate the spirit in which this suggestion was put forward. The right hon. Gentleman, with his considerable knowledge of these problems, will be the first to realise that his suggestion of 500 tons a week is a very small quantity in relation to the need, which is calculated as between 300 and 600 tons a day.
Equally, I recognise on my side that, if the main flow of daylight relief were to remain blocked—we must all profoundly hope that it will not, as a result of the announcement that I have just read—500 tons would be a useful addition to the night flow through Joint Church Aid and might, if there was continued obstruction, help to create a situation which made adequate daylight relief more likely.
In view of the announcement I have just read, it is tremendously important for all our energies to be concentrated on getting the daylight flights going. I will bear the right hon. Gentleman's suggestion very carefully in mind and in the meantime I will have it examined to discover what possibilities it offers.
Another main theme of the debate which came up in many of the speeches and was raised again by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Barnet in winding up is the question of arms going to both sides in the Nigerian civil war, the question whether an embargo could be imposed which would be effective, and the question whether the United Nations has a rôle to play in this. As I understand the debate, two rather different demands were made, one, that we should organise an effective embargo, the other that, even if we could not organise an effective embargo and even if, as my right hon. Friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said, the United Nations will not agree to organise one, we ought nevertheless to go through the motions of suggesting one so as to show

361
up the Russians. Perhaps I might deal with these matters separately.
On the first demand, as my right hon. Friend explained, other arms suppliers will not so far join in an arms embargo. We have tried hard to make progress on that. Equally, the United Nations will not agree to consider the problem. My right hon. Friend the Member for Derby, South (Mr. Philip Noel-Baker) spoke about this, and there is no hon. Member whose views I should respect more on United Nations matters, but I can only tell him that all the advice which we have received, after going into the question most thoroughly—I refer not only to the views of the Secretary-General, U Thant, though I must say that the views of the Secretary-General of the United Nations are entitled to be taken into serious consideration here—is that the United Nations would regard such a move as coming under the rule regarding internal matters.
The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire expressed the hope that in relation to such a move a distinction could be drawn between the internal affairs of Nigeria, which he accepted would be covered by Article 2(7), and external intervention by means of arms supply. I can only tell him that, again, we have gone into this most throughly and we do not believe that that distinction can be sustained. With his immense experience of dealing with the United Nations, I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman realises the difficulties in that respect.
The other suggestion made was that in any case, even though we could not secure an effective embargo and even though it could not be organised at the United Nations, we ought to go ahead in some way if only to produce the result of showing up the Russians. This is too serious a matter for that sort of approach. We are seeking here the end of bloodshed in a tragic civil war, not the scoring of a debating point against Mr. Brezhnev.
The other matter of great importance raised in the debate was the question whether the Government have done enough to try to find out more at first hand inside Biafra about the Biafran attitude. It is not really we in Britain who require to be satisfied about Biafran willingness to enter into the critical talks
362
which are being planned in Ethiopia. I think that we are inclined sometimes to presume too much to ourselves in the House on matters outside our borders. It is the African leaders who are seeking to arrange the talks who need to know whether both sides are willing to come to them.
What is of the utmost importance is that every possible encouragement and influence ought to be brought to bear on both sides to join in the direct talks which are at present being planned, and I should not like anything to be said or done by Her Majesty's Government which in any way discouraged the Biafran leadership from taking part in the talks.
Her Majesty's Government recognise the strong feeling in the House about this matter, and we recognise the force in the argument. I appreciated what the right hon. Gentleman said about accepting that at this particular time there were strong arguments the other way. Certainly, in the tragic event of progress not being made in the future within the African framework for a settlement of the Nigerian civil war, we should not rule out the possibility of considering sending a British emissary to Biafra at an appropriate time.
I do ask the House to recognise that in the present situation difficult and delicate talks, on which many of our hopes hang, are being prepared in Ethiopia. There is evidence from past experience that if a British emissary were to offer to go into Biafra at this moment it would bring the considerable risk of encouraging Colonel Ojukwu to hold his hand over attending this Ethiopian conference, to wait and see what might develop to his advantage from what would be an unprecedented move on our part. I am bound to say that if that situation occurred I can see some hon. Members in other parts of the House, different from those who spoke so vigorously on this subject, and certainly many people outside the House, especially in Africa, turning and blaming us for taking the kind of action that had prevented these critical talks in Ethiopia starting and making progress.
I turn now to some of the individual points raised by hon. Members. First, the right hon. Member for Stafford and Stone (Mr. Hugh Fraser) who made what

363
I thought was a most immoderate speech. He claimed quite forcefully that Her Majesty's Government stimulated the failure of the Abouri conference. I wanted to tell the House that on the contrary at that point Mr. Malcolm MacDonald—
Mr. Heffer Mr. Heffer rose—
Mr. Thomson: No. I will not give way. I have listened to two days of speeches—
Mr. Heffer Mr. Heffer rose—
Mr. Speaker: Order. The right hon. Gentleman is obviously not giving way.
Mr. Thomson: Dealing with the point raised by—
Mr. Heffer: On the point of these visits—
Mr. Thomson: The right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire paid a tribute to what was the moving spirit behind the Abouri agreement. It was tragic that it failed—one side now accuses the other of being the first to go hack on this—but it was Her Majesty's Government and Mr. Malcolm MacDonald who played a most distinguished part in very nearly producing a settlement at that time.
The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has explained the Government's belief that Nigeria can best develop her full human and material potential as a united country. My hon. Friend the Member for Brighouse and Spenborough (Mr. Colin Jackson)—
Mr. Heffer: Will my right hon. Friend give way? I am much obliged. I must first say that I did not speak in this debate, although I tried to do so today. Reverting to the point about visits, he says that if we allow a Minister to go at this stage it will be misunderstood. Can he explain how it could not have been misunderstood when my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister was earlier suggesting that he could have met Colonel Ojukwu, with others, outside Biafra and Nigeria? Surely this would have been a recognition in the sense that my right hon. Friend is now talking about.
Mr. Thomson: My hon. Friend will bear in mind that the two propositions are
364
quite different. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister offered to meet Colonel Ojukwu in ten different places outside Biafra.
An Hon. Member: At the last moment.
Mr. Thomson: I wish that there had been greater support from a number of hon. Members in this House for that initiative by my right hon. Friend. That is a different matter from sending a British Minister or British emissary inside Biafra.
Hon. Members: Why?
Mr. Thomson: I now return to the point that was raised by a number of hon. Members, including my hon. Friend the Member for Brighouse and Spenborough, about the future shape of any constitutional settlement as part of a peaceful settlement in Nigeria. I want to tell hon. Members who have raised this matter that we would not presume to tell the Nigerians what form of political organisation they should adopt. We would support and accept any form of solution which the people of Nigeria can agree among themselves. As the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said, there are many variations between a full federation and other looser forms of federation that could be gone into when that stage is reached.
The hon. Member for Edinburgh, North (Earl of Dalkeith) raised the question of the Commonwealth peace-keeping force. As the Prime Minister has made clear in the past, Her Majesty's Government would certainly be prepared to join in such a force if we were asked to do so.
Earl of Dalkeith Earl of Dalkeith rose—
Mr. Thomson: I have a number of points to answer. If I answer the noble Lord's question, I shall not be able to answer other points made in the debate.
The right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grimond) raised the question of the West Cameroons. It was an unfortunate example for him to choose. He was answered by the hon. Member for Tonbridge (Mr. Hornby), who had personal experience at the Commonwealth Office of that situation. In any case, this territory was never an integral part of the Federation of Nigeria. It was a United Nations trust territory which opted to join the French territory of Cameroon and never seceded from Nigeria.

365
The hon. Member for Liverpool, Wavertree (Mr. Tilney) asked about a visit by Count von Rosen to the Foreign Office. As far as I can discover, and to the best of our knowledge, no such visit has ever taken place.
The hon. Lady the Member for Hamilton (Mrs. Ewing) asked about the position of the Ibos inside Nigeria. She and I know of the close connections between the Ibo community in Nigeria and the various Scottish churches. I remind the hon. Lady that there are more Ibos living under the Federal Administration than there are in what remains of Colonel Ojukwu's enclave. Under the Federal Government, there are many Ibos in very high position indeed. I recommend the hon. Lady, whose interest in this matter I know to be sincere, to look at the most recent report of the observers on the borders of the civil war which I put in the Library of the House the other day. It contains some very encouraging information about the way in which the Ibos, under Federal control, are being happily resettled.
In many parts of the world conscience has been stirred by this tragedy of the Nigerian civil war. This debate has been repeated in Parliaments of nations which have never known any colonial link with Africa. They have had the same moving discussions as we have been having. It is a reflection, and a healthy reflection, of the moral sense that the world has shrunk in a way which makes the suffering of mankind, wherever it occurs, a matter which affects the whole human race. But as the matter comes up in one Parliament after another—and I follow these debates in the telegrams which reach us—I am struck in a number of cases by the common pattern which emerges. Governments who come fresh to the Nigerian tragedy but share the instinctive human revulsion at the suffering begin by suspending judgment and then come to conclusions broadly similar to those which Her Majesty's Government have sought to put to the House.
I was much interested by what the Prime Minister of Canada, Mr. Trudeau, told his House of Commons the other day. He said:
"The difficulty with the relief flights is based on the fact that the Biafran authorities do not permit daylight flights, that they are using the night flights of relief supplies in order to screen shipments of arms. The Biafran
366
authorities apparently have followed a course directed at making sure that they receive arms rather than food or other medical supplies for the starving people through the air space controlled by them. In these circumstances we can only continue to make our appeals, such as those made by the Red Cross…to Colonel Ojukwu, to be a little more humane and think of the starving people…".
My hon. Friend the Member for Chislehurst (Mr. Macdonald) very much echoed those words. This puts fairly and squarely the dilemma of relief versus resistance which faces Colonel Ojukwu. It is a real dilemma for him.
As my right hon. Friend the Member for Llanelly said, Colonel Ojukwu and his friends show all the signs of being ready to fight this matter to the bitter end. But, equally, I ask hon. Members to recognise that it presents a deep and moral dilemma for them, particularly those who criticise the Government's policy. Hon. Members must choose whether they are in favour of Biafran resistance or of Biafran relief. If relief is to go in on an adequate scale, clearly Colonel Ojukwu believes—and he must be the best judge of his case in this respect—that it would impair unacceptably his capacity for military resistance. If one is concerned, as I know every hon. Member is, by the suffering among innocent women and children, one cannot support Colonel Ojukwu in his insistence on putting his military requirements first. If, however, one is concerned, as I think some hon. Members are sincerely concerned, with Biafra's desire to establish her right to secession, and she can only do it by military means, they are inevitably involved in supporting the use of starvation of the Biafran people as a political weapon. I ask those in the House who sincerely and simultaneously hold both views to recognise that these views are mutually inconsistent. One simply cannot have it both ways. This was the terrible moral dilemma that some in the World Council of Churches have been courageously trying to face.
I would say, in passing, that there is not a shred of truth in the allegation in The Guardian today, accompanied by a quite unjustified comment on my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister that the World Council of Churches was prompted in any way in its attitude by the British Government. The right hon. Member for Stafford and Stone claimed that 35 churches had given the Prime Minister

367
the lie. The right hon. Gentleman used the word "mendacity" a good deal in his speech. I can only say to him that what he said is simply not true. What my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said was entitrely consistent with the statement which came out today from Joint Church Aid in Oslo.
For those who are concerned with human suffering, I would say, "I hope that you will recognise that, in all reason, as this debate has brought out, the moral responsibility for the starvation cannot rest with Her Majesty's Government or with the Federal Nigerians". I hope that those who take that view will feel that, given the grave issues which face this Government, and in what may happen tonight, the Government are entitled to their support in the Lobbies. For those whose concern is with Biafran resistance and not with relief, I do not pretend that it is an easy choice, either for those in Nigeria who hold that view or for those outside.
I believe that the record of history shows that it is a familiar stand to say, as presumably those in Biafra do, "I put my claim to nationhood, and what I regard as my military necessities for achieving it, before the sufferings of my people."
The Prime Minister yesterday referred to one comparison between the American and the Nigerian civil wars. Perhaps I can give another. The American Civil
War aroused a great conflict of emotions in this House, as we are experiencing now. It divided the parties deeply. The right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland said that we cannot deny to the Biafran nation the right of self-determination. He was following an honourable and appropriate tradition, because, in 1862, Mr. Gladstone used these words:
"There is no doubt that Jefferson Davis, and other leaders of the South, have made an army. They are making, it appears, a navy. And they have made—what is more than either—they have made a Nation."
I give that quotation to the right hon. Gentleman, because I gather that those who sincerely support the Biafran cause would no doubt say the same today, perhaps with the substitution of an air force for a navy.
Mr. Gladstone was overruled by his own Cabinet colleagues, and was proved wrong by history. Most people agree that it would have been a tragedy for the world if the American union had broken up. I believe that history will prove that the present Government have been right in their course and will one day recognise that it would have been a setback to the cause of progress in Africa if the Nigerian union, which can become a great modern African nation, had broken up through tribal secession.
Question put, That this House do now adjourn:—
The House divided: Ayes 84, Noes, 254.

Division No. 30.]

AYES

[10.0 p.m.

Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)

Foster, Sir John

Mackenzie, Alasdair(Ross & Crom'ty)

Alldritt, Walter

Fraser, Rt. Hn. Hugh (St'fford & Stone)

Maclean, Sir Fitzroy

Atkinson, Norman (Tottenham)

Goodhew, Victor

McNair-Wilson, Michael (W'stow, E.)

Baker, Kenneth (Acton)

Gray, Dr. Hugh (Yarmoutn)

Mahon, Peter (Preston, S.)

Barnes, Michael

Gresham Cooke, R.

Mahon, Simon (Bootle)

Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gos. & Fhm)

Grimond, Rt. Hn. J.

Mills, Peter (Torrington)

Berry, Hn. Anthony

Gurden, Harold

Montgomery, Fergus

Bessel, Peter

Hawkins, Paul

Nabarro, Sir Gerald

Biggs-Davison, John

Hay, John

Neave, Airey

Birch, Rt. Hn. Nigel

Heffer, Eric S.

Newens, Stan

Black, Sir Cyril

Hirst, Geoffrey

Noel-Baker, Rt. Hn. Philip

Boardman, Tom (Leicester, S. W.)

Hooson, Emlyn

Orme, Stanley

Booth, Albert

Hordern, Peter

Padley, Walter

Boyle, Rt. Hn. Sir Edward

Howell, David (Guildford)

Pardoe, John

Campbell, B. (Oldham, W.)

Hutchison, Michael Clark

Peyton, John

Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)

Iremonger, T. L.

Pike, Miss Mervyn

Crawshaw, Richard

Jackson, Peter M. (High Peak)

Quennell, Miss J. M.

Dalkeith, Earl of

Jennings, J. C. (Burton)

Rees-Davies, W. R.

Davies, Ednyfed Hudson (Conway)

Johnston, Russell (Inverness)

Renton, Rt. Hn. Sir David

Davies, S. O. (Merthyr)

Lane, David

Rose, Paul

Dickens, James

Langford-Holt, Sir John

Rossi, Hugh (Hornsey)

Drayson, G. B.

Latham, Arthur

Scott, Nicholas

du Cann, Rt. Hn. Edward

Lawler, Wallace

Sheldon, Robert

Emery, Peter

Lee, John (Reading)

Silvester, Frederick

Evans, Gwynfor (C'martnen)

Longden, Gilbert

Stainton, Keith

Ewing, Mrs. Winifred

Lubbock, Eric

Taylor, Edward M. (G'gow, Cathcart)

Thorpe, Rt. Hn. Jeremy

Walker-Smith, Rt. Hn. Sir Derek

TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

Turton, Rt. Hn. R. H.

Winstanley, Dr. M. P.

Mr. David Crouch and

Waddington, David

Wright, Esmond

Mr. Stanley Henig.

NOES

Abse, Leo

Garrett, W. E.

Mason, Rt. Hn. Roy

Albu, Austen

Ginsburg, David

Mawby, Ray

Allen, Scholefield

Golding, John

Maxwell, Robert

Armstrong, Ernest

Gordon Walker, Rt. Hn. P. C.

Mellish, Rt. Hn. Robert

Ashley, Jack

Greenwood, Rt. Hn. Anthony

Mendelson, John

Ashton, Joe (Bassetlaw)

Gregory, Arnold

Millan, Bruce

Bacon, Rt. Hn. Alice

Grey, Charles (Durham)

Miller, Dr. M. S.

Bagier, Gordon A. T,

Griffiths, Eddie (Bhghtside)

Mitchell, R. C. (S'th'pton, Test)

Beaney, Alan

Gunter, Rt. Hn. R. J.

Molloy, William

Bence, Cyril

Hamilton, James (Bothwell)

Moonman, Eric

Benn, Rt. Hn. Anthony Wedgwood

Hamilton, William (Fife, W.)

Morgan, Elystan (Cardiganshire)

Binns, John

Hannan, William

Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)

Bishop, E. S.

Harper, Joseph

Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)

Blenkinsop, Arthur

Harris, Reader (Heston)

Morris, John (Aberavon)

Boardmar, H. (Leigh)

Hart, Rt. Hn. Judith

Mulley, Rt. Hn. Frederick

Boston, Terence

Haseldine, Norman

Murray, Albert

Boyden, James

Hattersley, Roy

Neal, Harold

Bradley, Tom

Hazell, Bert

Oakes, Gordon

Brown, Rt. Hn. Gorge (Belper)

Healey, Rt. Hn. Denis

Ogden, Eric

Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, Provan)

Hilton, W. S.

O'Halloran, Michael

Brown, Bob (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, W.)

Hobden, Dennis

O'Malley, Brian

Brown, R. W. (Shoreditch & F'bury)

Hooley, Frank

Oram, Albert E.

Buchan, Norman

Horner, John

Orbach, Maurice

Buchanan, Richard (G'gow, Sp'burn)

Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas

Oswald, Thomas

Owen, Dr. David (Plymouth, S'tn)

Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)

Howarth, Robert (Bolton, E.)

Owen, Will (Morpeth)

Calaghan, Rt. Hn. James

Howell, Denis (Small Heath)

Page, Derek (King's Lynn)

Cant, R. B.

Howie, W.

Paget, R. T.

Carmichael, Neil

Hoy, Rt. Hn. James

Palmer, Arthur

Castle, Rt. Hn. Barbara

Huckfield, Leslie

Pannell, Rt. Hn. Charles

Concannon, J. D.

Hughes, Rt. Hn. Cledwyn (Anglesey)

Parker, John (Dagenham)

Conlan, Barnard

Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)

Parkyn, Brian (Bedford)

Corbet, Mrs. Freda

Hunter, Adam

Pavitt, Laurence

Cordie, John

Hynd, John

Pearson, Arthur (Pontypridd)

Craddock, Sir Beresford (Spelthorne)

Jackson, Colin (B'h'se & Spenb'gh)

Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred

Cronin, John

Jay, Rt. Hn. Douglas

Pentland, Norman

Crosland, Rt. Hn. Anthony

Jeger, George (Goole)

Prentice, Rt. Hn. Reg

Dalyell, Tam

Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)

Price, Christopher (Perry Barr)

Darling, lit. Hn. George

Jenkins, Rt. Hn. Roy (Stechford)

Price, William (Rugby)

Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)

Johnson, Carol (Lewisham, S.)

Probert) Arthur

Davies, Dr. Ernest (Stretford)

Johnson, James (K'ston-on-Hull, W.)

Randall, Harry

Davies, Rt. Hn. Harold (Leek)

Jones, Dan (Burnley)

Rankin, John

Davies, Ifor (Gower)

Jones, Rt. Hn. Sir Elwyn (W. Ham, S.)

Rees, Merlyn

de Freitas, Rt. Hn. Sir Geoffrey

Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)

Richard, Ivor

Delargy, Hugh

Jones, T. Alec (Rhondda, West)

Roberts, Albert (Normanton)

Dell, Edmund

Kelley, Richard

Roberts, Rt. Hn. Coronwy

Dewar, Donald

Kenyon, Clifford

Roberts, Gwilym (Bedfordshire, S.)

Diamond, Rt. Hn. John

Lawson, George

Robertson, John (Paisley)

Dobson, Ray

Leadbitter, Ted

Robinson, Rt. Hn. Kenneth(St. P'c'as)

Doig, Peter

Ledger, Ron

Rodgers, William (Stockton)

Dunn, James A.

Lee, Rt. Hn. Jennie (Cannock)

Roebuck, Roy

Dunett, Jack

Lestor, Miss Joan

Rogers, George (Kensington, N.)

Dunwoody, Mrs. Gwyneth (Exeter)

Lever, Rt. Hn. Harold (Cheetham)

Ross, Rt. Hn. William

Dunwoody, Dr. John (F'th & C'b'e)

Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)

Rowlands, E.

Eadie, Alex

Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)

Shaw, Arnold (Ilford, S.)

Edwards, William (Merioneth)

Lomas, Kenneth

Shore, Rt. Hn. Peter (Stepney)

Ellis, John

Loughlin, Charles

Short, Mrs. Renee (W'hampton, N. E.)

English, Michael

Luard, Evan

Silkin, Rt. Hn. John (Deptord)

Ennals, David

Lyon, Alexander W. (York)

Silkin, Hn. S. C. (Dulwich)

Ensor, David

Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson

Silverman, Julius

Evans, Albert (Islington, S.W.)

McBride, Neil

Skeffington, Arthur

Evans, Fred (Caerphilly)

McCann, John

Slater, Joseph

Evens, Ioan L. (Birm'h'm, Yardley)

MacColl, James

Small, William

Fernyhough, E.

MacDermot, Niall

Snow, Julian

Finch, Harold

Macdonald, A. H.

Spriggs, Leslie

Fitch, Alan (Wigan)

McElhone, Frank

Steele, Thomas (Dunbartonshire, W.)

Fletcner. Rt. Hn. Sir Eric (Isington, E.)

McKay, Mrs. Margaret

Stewart, Rt. Hn. Michael

Fletcher, Raymond (Ilkeston)

Mackenzie, Gregor (Rutherglen)

Stonehouse, Rt. Hn. John

Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)

Mackie, John

Strauss, Rt. Hn. G. R.

Foot, Rt. Hn. Sir Dingle (Ipswich)

McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.)

Tapsell, Peter

Foot, Michael (Ebbw Vale)

McNair-Wilson, Patrick (New Forest)

Taverne, Dick

Ford, Ben

McNamara, J. Kevin

Thomas, Rt. Hn. George

Forrester, John

Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)

Thomson, Rt. Hn. George

Fowler, Gerry

Mallalieu, J.P.w. (Huddersfield, E.)

Thornton, Ernest

Fraser, John (Norwood)

Manuel, Archie

Tinn, James

Freeson, Reginald

Mapp, Charles

Tomney, Frank

Galpern, Sir Myer

Marks, Kenneth

Tuck, Raphael

Gardner, Tony

Marsh, Rt. Hn. Richard

Urwin, T. W.

370

371

Varley, Eric G.

Wells, William (Walsall, N.)

Wilson, Rt. Hn. Harold (Huyton)

Wainwright, Edwin (Dearne Valley)

Whitaker, Ben

Woodburn, Rt. Hn. A.

Walden, Brian (All Saints)

White, Mrs. Eirene

Woof, Robert

Walker, Harold (Doncaster)

Whitlock, William

Wyatt, Woodrow

Wallace, George

Wilkins, W. A.

Watkins, David (Consett)

Williams, Alan (Swansea, W.)

TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

Watkins, Tudor (Brecon & Radnor)

Williams, Clifford (Abertillery)

Mr. Ernest G. Perry and

Weitzman, David

Williams, Mrs. Shirley (Hitchin)

Mr. William Hamling.

Wellbeloved, James

Willis, Rt. Hn. George

B.O.A.C. (BORROWING POWERS)
10.11 p.m.
The Minister of State, Board of Trade (Mr. Goronwy Roberts): I beg to move,
That the British Overseas Airways Corporation (Borrowing Powers) Order 1969, a draft of which was laid before this House on 17th November, be approved.
I hope it will be helpful to the House if I address myself now to the terms and purposes of the Order, and, at the end of the debate, to seek the permission of the House and of yourself, Mr. Speaker, to speak again briefly, when I will endeavour to clarify any points that may have arisen during the debate.
Hon. Members will see from the Explanatory Note on the draft Order that the aggregate amount outstanding in respect of the principal of any moneys borrowed or deemed to have been borrowed by B.O.A.C. (except moneys borrowed to redeem stock or pay off loans) and of sums paid to the Corporation by way of public dividend capital, is limited by Section 16(1) of the Air Corporations Act 1967 to £90 million or such greater sum not exceeding £120 million as the Board of Trade may by Order specify. This Order specifies the sum of £120 million.
Hon. Members will naturally wish me to explain how B.O.A.C. has spent the money it has raised so far, and why an extension of the limit by £30 million is now sought. The limits of £90 million and £120 million were settled during the passage of the Air Corporations Act 1966, which provided for B.O.A.C.'s capital reconstruction. The reconstruction took the form of reducing the Corporation's capital liabilities from £176 million to £66 million, which was divided into £31 million of loan capital and £35 million of public dividend capital, all deemed to have been taken up on 1st April 1965. So on that date, the sum of £66 million reckoned against the limit of £90 million in the Act.
Since then, hon. Members will be aware that B.O.A.C. has achieved great success in an intensely competitive international environment. Between April, 1965, and March, 1969, total traffic carried by B.O.A.C. on scheduled services increased by 31 per cent. Profits after payment of interest over the period
374
amounted in total to some £76 million, from which dividends totalling just over £31 million have been paid to the Exchequer, and £45 million has been put to reserves. This is a splendid achievement by any standard and I am sure the House will wish me to congratulate all in B.O.A.C. who have contributed to this signal success.
One consequence of this fine performance is that B.O.A.C. has had no need to draw on Government funds, by way either of loans or of public dividend capital, since early in 1965. All B.O.A.C.'s capital expenditure in sterling since then has been financed from its own resources; including progress and delivery payments amounting to £30 million on Super VC.10 aircraft and spares, investment of about £17 million in buildings and £14 million on engineering plant and commercial equipment, including £8 million on the Boadicea Computer complex. Furthermore, B.O.A.C. has repaid £12·7 million off the £31 million loan capital deemed to have been borrowed from the Government under the 1966 Act.
In accordance with the Government's policy of conserving official dollars, all B.O.A.C.'s borrowings since 1965 have been in the form of foreign currency loans—in dollars or Swiss francs—negotiated with banks and other agencies in the United States, with Swiss banks, and with a Canadian bank. The money has been used to finance aircraft purchases in the United States, mainly progress and delivery payments on Boeing 747 and 707/336C aircraft, and to meet expenditure on capital projects overseas, such as airport buildings, ground handling equipment and sales shops.
Mr. Eric Lubbock: While on the subject of aircraft purchases that have been made during this period, can the Minister tell the House how many Boeing 336C aircraft the Corporation has purchased and how this compares with the estimated capacity required in 1964 by the Corporation?
Mr. Roberts: I shall be glad to take note of that point later in the debate. It requires a little handling, as the hon. Gentleman will no doubt agree.
To continue the analysis of the expenditure engaged in by B.O.A.C., contracts for B.O.A.C.'s twelve Boeing 747

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aircraft were placed between September, 1966, and December, 1968. Deliveries are due to begin next April.
The House was told of the Government's approval in August, 1966, to the purchase of six of these aircraft, in November, 1967, to the purchase of a further five and a year later to the purchase of a twelfth. B.O.A.C. was asked to finance all but 20 per cent. of the cost of the first six aircraft by foreign currency loans in order to avoid drawing on official dollars. When my right hon. Friend, then the President of the Board of Trade, announced approval to the second batch in November, 1967, he said that the whole of the dollar expenditure involved was to be financed by B.O.A.C. through overseas borrowings, and went on to say that
"these borrowings may eventually necessitate an increase in the present statutory limits applicable to B.O.A.C. under Section 16 of the Air Corporations Act 1967. At the appropriate time the House will be asked to approve the increase."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 16th November, 1967; Vol. 754, c. 182.]
The four Boeing 707/336C aircraft, the purchase of which was announced to this House in August, 1966, May, 1967, and May of this year, are likewise to be financed by overseas borrowings.
B.O.A.C. has so far negotiated terms for foreign currency loans amounting to £89·7 million. A further £50·9 million will need to be raised to meet payments due between October, 1970, and October, 1972, on aircraft already ordered. So far B.O.A.C. has taken up only a part of the loans negotiated; and for some it is required to keep on deposit with the lenders a certain proportion of each loan in sterling.
After setting these compensating deposits against loans taken up, the balance currently outstanding amounts to £30·8 million. This sum, together with the £35 million public dividend capital provided for under the Air Corporations Act 1966, and the balance of £18·3 million outstanding from the Government loan deemed to have been made on 1st April, 1965—that was the loan for £31 million which I mentioned previously—brings the total amount counting against the statutory limit to roughly £84 million.
The existing limit of £90 million will allow B.O.A.C. to take up a further £6
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million of foreign currency loans, plus a further £1½ million when B.O.A.C. repay an instalment of roughly this amount at the end of this month off its loan from the Government. A sum of about £7½ million is due to be paid in the next two months in further progress payments on Boeing 747s and on associated spares, so the limit is likely to be reached early in the New Year, about mid-February I should expect. Thereafter, borrowings of £15 million will be required to finance delivery payments on the first three of these aircraft during April and May together with £4·4 million on delivery of two Boeing 707/336C aircraft. By the summer of 1970 there will also be requirements for further aircraft progress payments and payments for spares amounting to a further £10 million. These three items make a total of £29½ million so that the additional £30 million allowed by the Order is all expected to be taken up by that time.
It will be necessary to introduce a Bill for enactment by next summer to increase borrowing powers beyond the £120 million limit so that dollar expenditure on the purchase of aircraft can continue to be financed from foreign currency loans.
10.22 p.m.
Mr. Cranley Onslow: I have no wish to detain the House for long at this time of night, although it is rather a shame that this occasion, at this relatively late hour, is the first opportunity that we have had for a long time to debate the affairs of B.O.A.C. Our time tonight is limited. We are in a transitional situation because we know that legislation is impending which will have a radical bearing on the whole situation of the Corporations and of the aviation industry. Although there are many points which might, with your indulgence, Mr. Speaker, be brought within the compass of order, I think that it would be a mistake to attempt to anticipate matters on which we can expand at greater length when we debate the White Paper. I intend, therefore, to be original and to stick to the Order, and to be dull by talking mainly about money. This is not something which comes naturally to me, but I hope to make a fist of it.

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I understand the Minister to have reminded us that under the 1966 Act B.O.A C. was set up with liabilities in the shape of £31 million deemed to have been loaned to it by the Board of Trade at the useful rate of interest of 4 per cent.—those were the days!—and £35 million: of what is called occasionally public dividend, or Treasury equity capital, but which ought really in the interests of accuracy to be known as variable interest Government loan. Now its liabilities are composed of about £18 million of Board of Trade 4 per cent. Loan—12·7 per cent. of the loan having been extinguished in the interval—a variable interest Government loan amounting to a total of £50 million—the accretion over the original £35 million having come from the capitalisation of £15 million from reserves—and about £30 million in foreign currency loans at rates of interest of which I do not believe we have ever been informed. This gives a total liability of £98 million, of which £15 million does not count against the borrowing powers limit because it represents capitalization for reserve under Section 14(3)(b) of the Act.
I have three questions to put to the Minister arising from that. The House might like to know what policy has been and is being adopted regarding the replacement of the remainder of the £31 million notional Board of Trade loan. Are there any rules governing this? Is repayment being accelerated or deferred and what in general is the anticipated date by which the whole of that will have been paid off?
What is the policy with regard to the variable interest Government loan? Is it the intention that the total of this should be increased? I imagine that this is not the case, because as far as I can tee the foreign currency borrowing commitments now in prospect will consume the whole of the limit of £120 million. It is perfectly clear from the most recent report of B.O.A.C. that it will go beyond it, if realised to the full. On page 6 of the report the Corporation is shown to have arranged loans of 200 million dollars already.
We can see from the accounts on page 67 that it had, when the accounts were prepared, taken up 42 million dollars of that provision and this total
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must now have risen. If we take that figure it leaves 65 million dollars which it clearly needed. That, taken with the £75 million borrowing shown in the accounts, goes well over the top of the limit. I understood the Minister to say that this means that the powers which we are giving the Government tonight will be adequate for another six months. That is not particularly surprising—that we may have been overtaken by events—when we consider that the original figure was plucked out of the air in 1964–65, when it was probably rather difficult for anyone to foresee precisely how the borrowing pattern should go.
Of the money which B.O.A.C. will thus be empowered to borrow, most I gather will go on delivery payments of 747s. I imagine that an element must go on payments for the 707/336s. It was not clear whether there were to be more than the four which the House has been told have been ordered. Above and beyond that, I suppose that some must go on hatel buildings overseas, although I believe that the new terminal at Kennedy Airport, New York, has been financed on a different basis and does not count against these loans.
Not surprisingly, there is no provision in the borrowing powers which would take account of Concorde purchases. That is something we must come to later. Clearly the needs of B.O.A.C. for capital will be considerable. The White Paper on public expenditure makes this clear. We can see there that the forecast is that it will have capital expenditure in 1969–70 of £51 million, in 1970–71 of £84·5 million and in 1971–72 £70·7 million. Paragraph 7 at page 60 makes it clear that 1973–74 will see its expenditure peaking again. It is as well we should remind ourselves of the dimension of financing which a modern aviation industry involves.
I do not find the Explanatory Note to this Order particularly explanatory. It tells me nothing I have not already gathered from reading the Order. I would like to make the suggestion that by way of innovation it would be helpful on future occasions if the Minister's speech could be published in advance, in the form of an Explanatory Memorandum. It would save a great deal of Parliamentary time, and I am perfectly

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serious about it. The background to the Order would be before us in black and white and the debate could take place with all the information available. I make this suggestion with no discourtesy to the Minister, for it would improve the quality of debate and provide a little more time for speeches.
We are bound to legislate on this subject again. The Minister might, therefore, consider the desirability of not placing a ceiling in legislation of this kind. Instead, a clause could empower increases to be voted on a proportionate basis. In other words, an increase in the borrowing powers of, say, 10 per cent. on each occasion might be obtainable by Order and there would not necessarily be a ceiling. Further borrowing is likely to occur and there seems no need for new legislation every year, a pattern which has prevailed since I had the privilege of first coming to this place. If a system which allowed a request to be made for an increase of, say, 10 per cent. on—
Mr. Speaker: Order. I appreciate that the hon. Gentleman is striving to keep in order, but I remind him that we cannot amend the Order.
Mr. Onslow: I am seeking to improve future Orders. I have said enough to show that we could obtain closer supervision, and I hope that the Minister will consider my suggestion.
Given the importance, which we recognise, of maintaining healthy finances in this sector of endeavour in which B.O.A.C. has done so well, and appreciating the vast sums involved, do we really need the approval of the House for additional borrowing on each occasion? Should not B.O.A.C. go to the money market like any other business? As I would be out of order in developing this theme, I will leave it at that, in the hope that we may return to this suggestion on another occasion.
I echo what the Minister said about B.O.A.C. and I look forward to a longer and more detailed debate of these matters on another occasion at an earlier hour. In the meantime, I am happy to inform the hon. Gentleman that he and I will not fall out tonight.
10.30 p.m.
Mr. Leslie Huckfield: Like the hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Onslow), I will have to restrain myself to keep within the bounds of order imposed by this Instrument.
Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman must.
Mr. Huckfield: Studying the profit figures which the Minister gave, I, too, agree that since 1964 a substantial improvement has been made in B.O.A.C.'s overall financial position. It was in 1964 that B.O.A.C. recorded a deficit of £80 million. Turning a deficit of that magnitude into a profit of £21 million in the last recorded financial year has been no mean achievement.
Like the hon. Gentleman, I have been trying to fit into the context of the Order borrowing powers of a much vaster magnitude that I know the Corporation will require in future. It has been estimated that between now and 1978 B.O.A.C. will have a total capital requirement of about £680 million. I therefore agree that a change in the present procedure—of regularly coming to the House for increases—is needed.
We are, after all, in an age when to equip B.O.A.C. with just a fleet of Jumbos, 747s, will cost possibly £159 million. Of the £680 million to which I referred, it is estimated that at least £545 million will be required for aircraft, including the £386 million until 1978 for the Concorde.
When one re-examines the previous purchasing policies of the corporation, one is led to conclude more and more that with each generation of jet aircraft one is not replacing like with like. It is a policy of replacing one generation with a rather different generation. This is why I think this Order is so germane, although only for such a short period of time.
When B.O.A.C. equipped itself with a fleet of DC7s, the total purchase price was £30 million, and 32 Britannias cost £42 million. The 18 Comet IVs cost—
Mr. Speaker: Order. With respect, they cannot all be provided out of the £30 million in this Order. The hon. Gentleman must keep to the Order.
Mr. Huckfield: With respect, Mr. Speaker, I was trying to say that the magnitude of the finance which had been predetermined in the Order was a great deal larger than the amount of finance we had envisaged before. The point I was about to make was that it is therefore very vital that B.O.A.C. should be much more accurate in some of its depreciation forecasts and writing-down provisions and some of its market and revenue forecasts than in the past.
Some of the money made available under the Order is to go to assist B.O.A.C. by the purchase of Boeing 747s. When we talk of equipping the corporation with such aircraft, we are at the same time talking of every other major world airline making the same kind of calculation. I therefore hope that my right hon. Friend can tell us something of the detailed market analysis that B.O.A.C. has made in respect of the requirements for these aircraft. That information is very relevant to the Order.
What is also very relevant is the Government's policy towards some of the corporation's recent applications for routes on some services. We are told of the number of Jumbo 747s which will be purchased with the money made available by the Order, and we are told that they will fly on the North Atlantic route, over which we have already had some controversy and dispute recently engendered by the managing director of B.O.A.C. with regard to the Bermuda Agreement. One then wonders whether the Government ought not to be a great deal clearer about their policy for the corporation in respect of that agreement.
It seems to me now that the House ought to have, and the corporation certainly ought to have, at the same time as this Order a very much more definite statement of my right hon. Friend's Department's intentions with regard to the Bermuda Agreement, and the recent violations of it.
Mr. Speaker: Order. We have not got that statement here tonight. We are debating the Order.
Mr. Huckfield: Again, Mr. Speaker, the point I was trying to make was that the viability of the corporation and the marketing potential of these aircraft will be very much affected by Government
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policy with regard to transatlantic flights.
The type of policy which will be pursued by B.O.A.C. and B.E.A. and their capital requirements are also very relevant at this point. When one considers that we are now approaching the stage where the capital requirements of the two corporations are beginning to fit more and more into the pattern where each will have to receive a certain amount of Government assistance or a large amount of foreign borrowing, one wonders whether this kind of Order ought not to be made to bring the two corporations much more closely together.
It is proved that with the load factor which B.O.A.C. has achieved, the kind of aircraft purchasing it has followed since 1964 can be justified up to the present, but we are now getting to the stage of a brand new generation of aircraft purchasing policies. Since 1961 we have been living in an era when B.O.A.C. could count on replacing the Boeing 707 and the D.C.B. The kind of purchasing policy it will have to pursue starting with this Order will be one where its basic aircraft requirements will be a split demand, one part being fulfilled by the Boeing 747 and the other fulfilled supersonically, we hope by Concorde.
Bearing in mind this split demand, although I heartily support this Order I hope that we shall have much more accuracy in market forecasting and more adaptability to see that load factors are maintained and that there is a much more viable B.O.A.C.
10.40 p.m.
Mr. Eric Lubbock: I join with the hon. Members who have spoken in congratulating B.O.A.C. on its very much better profit performance in the last five years than prior to 1964, albeit that that is partly due to the capital reorganisation effected under the 1966 Act by which £110 million was written off so that the corporation will not have to bear interest charges on that money in future.
Looking back over those five years, we would be too optimistic in thinking that it can be maintained over the period covered by this Order and into the seventies. As the chairman said in his

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newsletter, although B.O.A.C. made a profit of £12½ million in the first half of this year, this does not indicate that the level of over £20 million achieved in the last financial year as a whole can be maintained in 1969–70. Perhaps when he replies to the debate, the Parliamentary Secretary will say a little about this because it is relevant in the sense that the higher the profits in 1969–70, the later is the point when these borrowing powers will be exhausted. I could not reconcile the £84 million which he said was the total amount outstanding against the statutory limit at the moment with the commitments which he mentioned up to the middle of next year and on the other side of the equation the profits plus depreciation which the corporation could expect in that period.
I rather agree with the hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Onslow), who said that on occasions such as this when we are debating rather complicated financial aspects of the corporation's management, it would he extremely useful if the House had the figures which the Minister was to use in his speech set out in the Explanatory Memorandum beforehand. Then he could deal with the policy issues and we could have the figures before us and see whether we accepted the views of the Government. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will bear that in mind. In default of having such a paper before us, I hope that he can say how he expects the corporation's profit plus depreciation to move during the 12 months up to the exhaustion of these borrowing powers.
I was rather alarmed at the rapidity with which this extra £30 million is to disappear. I understood that we still have £6 million left against the old limit of £90 million and the Parliamentary Secretary said that at the beginning of next year the additional £30 million will have been swallowed up by these payments, the £15 million required for the 747, £4·4 million for the 336 and £10 million for spares. In its annual report the corporation boasted about its forecast in 1964 of the needs of its fleet to meet its operational requirements. It pointed out that with the three V.C.10s which remained to be delivered at that time it would have exactly the fleet foreshadowed
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in 1964, in spite of the extra forecast traffic and expansion of route traffic dealt with elsewhere in the report. The corporation does not repeat this statement in 1969, because it has already had two Boeing 336s, and I think that the right hon. Gentleman said that there were another two still on order, making four, which are additional to the corporation's forecasts in 1964.
In that debate I predicted that the corporation would become short of capacity and would need to invest more money than it had planned before the 1970 date to which those figures referred. It is easy to be wise after the event, but I can at least say to the right hon. Gentleman that if Sir Giles Guthrie had listened to the warning that I then gave him, he would not have cancelled all the VC10s and he would not have been so short of capacity as he is now.
It is not an adequate defence for the corporation to say, as it does, that it is something of a triumph to have achieved an expansion of its turnover with the same fleet by having very high aircraft utilisation. This is not always the answer. It might have been better to have additional aircraft in the fleet to ensure a greater degree of reliability, something which all airlines find is a very valuable selling point if they can maintain it. I am not sure that the corporation has followed the right policy by pushing up its utilisation to over 10 hours a day in the case of the Boeing 707s.
Mr. Peter Bessell: Has my hon. Friend taken account of the fact that during the period in question from 1964 B.O.A.C. has had the misfortune to lose two 707s?
Mr. Lubbock: Yes, this is taken into account. Flight for 16th October, 1969, shows that B.O.A.C.'s present fleet consists of 12 VC10s, 17 Super VC10s, and 24 Boeing 707s of one kind or another—two more, in spite of the losses my hon. Friend mentions, than were predicted as being necessary by the end of 1969 in the corporation's forecasts of 1964. Perhaps the Minister of State will kindly verify the figures I have given and say how many of the 336s he mentioned additional to that forecast B.O.A.C. has in its fleet today.
The right hon. Gentleman said that £15 million is earmarked for payment on

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delivery of the 747s, which he said was scheduled for early next year. Originally B.O.A.C. was supposed to be getting these aircraft in February, 1970, but deliveries to all airlines have had to be put back as a result of defects in the engine, about which we are all very sorry to learn. Perhaps it hurts B.O.A.C. less than it hurts some other airlines, particularly Pan American, which will not have the advantage of being first in the field by as many months as it had hoped. From B.O.A.C.'s point of view it may not be a bad thing, because the aircraft will, I hope, come into operation in time for the beginning of its summer season.
Can the Minister of State assure me that the difficulties Pratt and Whitney have had with the engines will not result in any deterioration in the aircraft's performance compared with the brochure? Some anixety has been expressed about this in the American journals, that perhaps the engine would be down on specific fuel consumption and that the payload range characteristics of the aircraft would be adversely affected as a result of the modifications which Pratt and Whitney have had to make.
Again, this may not be so relevant to B.O.A.C. as to some of the other customers, but there has been discussion in the United States whether there would be grounds for making claims against Boeing, although the fault was not Boeing's, for late delivery of the aircraft. I should be very grateful if the right hon. Gentleman would deal with these two points.
In conclusion, I am sure that we all wish B.O.A.C. well. The corporation is coming into an era which, as the hon. Member for Nuneaton (Mr. Leslie Huckfield) said, involves the most enormous, almost astronomical, capital expenditure programme but one which is designed to secure for Britain an increasing share in world air traffic and a very substantial income in the form of foreign exchange, particularly dollar exchange, which will be of great value to us.
10.50 p.m.
Mr. Goronwy Roberts: If I may have the leave of the House to intervene once more, I wish to answer some of the points which have been raised during this useful debate.
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I much appreciated and enjoyed the speech of the hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Onslow). The hon. Gentleman made several attractive suggestions about the form in which the Order should appear, including the suggestion that the Explanatory Note should be made somewhat more explanatory. I join with him in that criticism, and, though I may not be able to join with him immediately on the way to meet it, I recognise that it is a matter which all hon. Members with experience of Orders and how they are discussed would wish to consider.
The hon. Gentleman and the hon. Member for Orpington (Mr. Lubbock) suggested that where there is a statement to be made in explanation of an Order which contains a good deal of statistical matter which cannot be extensively explained without, perhaps, encroaching on the time of other hon. Members, there might be some way by which such material could be made available to the House in conjunction with the Order. I do not know whether this can be done, but certainly that, too, is a substantial point which those concerned with the organisation of business may well take up.
The hon. Member for Woking spoke of the coming legislation and the possibility of a debate on the White Paper. It is not for me to give guarantees about it, but I am sure that it is the desire of the House that there should, if at all possible, be a proper debate on the White Paper, so perhaps I may be forgiven if I do not comment now on what one might call the White Paper points which have been raised tonight.
The honourable Gentleman suggested that the constant increases in statutory provision for borrowing—not confined to civil aviation—might well be looked at in the context of what kind of statutory provision we need and how to define it. He threw out the suggestion that it could be done in a proportionate way. I do not know how one could relate that to the needs of public corporations. I imagine that it could be done, and I should be interested to discuss it further.
I make no comment about the argument that B.O.A.C. should go to the market. There are two strong views about that—indeed, more than two views

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—and it would take too long to discuss them tonight.
Next, the hon. Member for Woking raised the question of public dividend capital, which he tended to describe as a loan. It is not a loan. It is not redeemable.
Mr. Lubbock: Save at the end of five years.
Mr. Roberts: It is a matter for decision whether it is carried on or not, but per se it is not a loan.
I was asked when the £31 million loan was repayable. It is repayable over 11 years from 1965, and will notionally be extinguished by 1976. Consideration has been given to accelerating that rate of redemption, but we have thought it advisable to defer decision till plans for the new airways board under the White Paper have been further advanced. This will form part of the decisions reached under the White Paper, and embodied in the new legislation which we hope to present to the House, as my right hon. Friend said when he introduced the White Paper, perhaps in April.
B.O.A.C.'s passenger terminal at Kennedy Airport has been acquired under a leasing arrangement, and no capital expenditure is involved.
It is right, as several hon. Members said, that we should remind ourselves on these occasions of the immensity of the capital needs of this major industry. My hon. Friend the Member for Nuneaton (Mr. Leslie Huckfield) gave figures about the need in a certain time scale which do not accord with other figures in other time scales. Substantial sums will be needed by the public corporations and even more in the industry itself between now and 1980 to carry forward this industry in the way that it should be carried forward.
My hon. Friend also mentioned detailed market analysis. I can reassure him here. B.O.A.C. makes a thorough analysis of what is a changing situation in regard not only to markets but to variables like load factors, seasonal and otherwise, and different routes. B.O.A.C., like other airlines, is properly alive to the need for proper minute analysis so as to be that much more able to frame future policy.
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I cannot give the hon. Member for Orpington complete clarification about the sums with which I have been struggling over the last few hours. No doubt reading the OFFICIAL REPORT will make this much clearer. Without going through this rather complicated calculation, which gives me the figure £84·1 million—although the hon. Gentleman did not think that the steps which I described should lead to that figure—I can assure him that when we have counted the various compensations and provisions and set them in this rather complicated way one against another, we do reach the figure I gave.
The hon. Member also mentioned the Boeing 707/336Cs. B.O.A.C. has ordered eight. These orders have been approved. It also wishes to order two 707/336Bs. The point of the hon. Member for Bodmin (Mr. Bessell) is relevant—that it was unlucky in regard to two. Its desire to order the further two is being considered urgently.
B.O.A.C. has regard to the possibility of the trans-Siberian routes. These discussions are proceeding in Moscow. I say this not without a certain measure of hope that some success may attend them. It is never wise to prognosticate too hopefully in such an area, but I think that we may allow ourselves just a little confidence on this point.
The hon. Member for Orpington also went pretty deep into the process of borrowing in order to engage in dollar expenditure without drawing on official resources. B.O.A.C. could use internal resources of profits and depreciation to meet dollar expenditure on aircraft, but Government policy is to dissuade too much drawing on official dollars and convertible currency and, therefore, to encourage the method of foreign loans. I do not think we should be too critical of this process. There are views about it. This has served the industry and the country well so far, and I personally would not favour a departure from this policy at present.
There are a number of other financial points—
Mr. Lubbock: I did not want to imply that B.O.A.C. would use profits and depreciation to buy dollars and thereby finance the 707, but what could happen is that profits and depreciation could be

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used to accelerate repayment of the £30·8 million owed to the Board of Trade and for it still to borrow dollars and be able to remain within its limits.
Mr. Roberts: It could happen that way. This is not our policy as of now but that process could happen and there would be nothing wrong with it.
It so happens that the preferable process is as I have described it, but I would not quarrel with the hon. Gentleman about the feasibility of the process he has described.
On the question of anticipating the movement of profits and what net depreciation and net assets will be next year, I cannot tell the hon. Member much more than this: he is right in expecting that over the next few years there may be a diminution in the net profitability for a number of reasons, some of which he gave. However, for the next year the success which has attended B.O.A.C.'s efforts in the first six months of this year—and a copy of a statement of what happened has been placed in the Library—should carry B.O.A.C. to a year comparably successful with 1968. How far it will improve on that I could not say, but at least I think it will come up to the standard of performance of 1968.
As everybody has said in this debate, B.O.A..C. is certainly to be congratulated. This is a highly competitive business in which it is engaged. There are complex questions of airline fares, and all this will bear hardly on its performance. So far, on the performance of the last four to five years, the House may be proud of what B.O.A.C. has done to serve the nation, and I feel a certain confidence of what it will do in future.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That the British Overseas Airways Corporation (Borowing Powers) Order 1969, a draft of which was laid before this House on 17th November, be approved.

DEFENCE POWERS (STRATEGIC GOODS AND MERCHANT SHIPPING)
11.5 p.m.
The Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade (Mrs. Gwyneth Dun-woody): I beg to move,
That the Defence Powers (Continuance) Order 1969, a draft of which was laid before this House on 13th November, be approved.
The Emergency Laws (Re-enactments and Repeals) Act, 1964, repealed certain Defence Regulations, re-enacted a number of them with modifications, and continued the Ships and Aircraft (Transfer Restriction) Act, 1939, until the end of 1969. The purpose of the Defence Powers (Continuance) Order, 1969, is to extend the validity of the powers covered by Sections 3 and 16 of the Emergency Laws (Re-enactments and Repeals) Act, 1964, which will expire at the end of 1969, for a further period of five years. It does not contain any new power.
I have no wish to detain the House, but I hope that I shall be forgiven if I explain a little of what is involved. The Board of Trade has powers under the Import, Export and Customs Powers (Defence) Act, 1939, to control imports and exports. These powers are used—through the issue of Export of Goods (Control) Orders—to control the export from the United Kingdom of arms, military equipment and strategic goods. These export controls are necessary if we are to carry out international arrangements on the supply of strategic equipment and materials to Communist countries. They are not, however, sufficient in themselves to carry out our international obligations, and Sections 3 and 16 of the Emergency Laws (Re-enactments and Repeals) Act, 1964, enable the Board of Trade and the Minister of Technology to exercise control in three additional areas.
Section 3(1) of the Act enables the Board of Trade to control the movement, transport, disposal and acquisitior of strategic goods situated outside the United Kingdom by persons in and certain persons ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom, and also the re-export of strategic goods from the United Kingdom. The present exercise of the powers is contained in the Strategic

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Goods (Control) Order, 1967, and in the Control of Goods (Import Certificates) Order, 1951, as amended. The former Order prohibits the disposal of strategic goods without a licence to the authorities of or persons in certain specified countries. The latter Order enables control to be exercised on any possible further movement of strategic goods which have been exported to the United Kingdom from another country and in respect of which an import certificate has been issued.
Section 3(2) continues the power of the Minister of Technology to control the construction of ships under Regulation 55 of the Defence (General) Regulations, 1939, applied by the Restriction of Construction of Ships Order, 1940.
The list of goods subject to strategic export control includes a narrow range of ships such as warships, fast fishing vessels, hydrofoils, fast sea-going vessels and vessels with hulls and propulsion machinery made of non-magnetic materials. Vessels incorporating equipment which is included in the list are also subject to control.
Control is exercised by means of a licensing system under which shipbuilders are required to obtain individual licences to build ships of 100 gross tons or over for a foreign owner. This is the stage at which to assess whether the ship is of a type which should be banned.
There are problems in controlling the export of secondhand ships. Some are sold abroad; some are strategic in themselves and others only when they have certain items of strategic equipment on board. This difficulty of precise identification would mean that to attempt to make ships subject to export licensing in the same way as other strategic goods, probably including specific clearance every time a ship left a U.K. port, would require controls which would be impracticable to operate, and they could not apply to ships abroad. We therefore rely on Section 16 of the Act which extends to the end of 1969 the powers under the Ships and Aircraft (Transfer Restriction) Act, 1939, to control the transfer and mortgage of British ships and the transfer of their registry. The powers were originally taken to control the transfer of ships in wartime.
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Section 4 of the Emergency Laws (Repeals) Act, 1959, provides that they may now be exercised only in the interests of national defence. The present powers forbid the transfer of any ship without the sanction of the Board of Trade. However, these strict provisions have been progressively relaxed by the issue of general sanctions. The most recent of these, issued by the Minister of Transport in 1959, permits the free transfer of all ships except former ships of war, ships on the COCOM list, and ships containing equipment on that list.
It is the intention to issue a revised general sanction shortly to take account of the revised COCOM list. Few applications for individual sanctions are received, and the powers presently administered are not burdensome either on the shipping industry or on Government.
Arrangements to control the export to Communist countries of goods of strategic importance are agreed internationally by a committee representing the N.A.T O countries, not including Iceland but including Japan. A review of the list of goods involved was completed earlier this year, and we are satisfied that it is necessary to renew these powers to comply with the new list.
11.10 p.m.
Mr. Charles Fletcher-Cooke: The hon. Lady has explained, with her usual clarity, the provenance and validity of this Order. This debate happens only once every five years, and is perhaps more important than the lateness of the hour and the sparseness of the attendance would indicate. Although one cannot fault the hon. Lady for what she has said, I would have hoped for a little more information about how the whole question of strategic control of goods and of shipping is working.
This is only half the picture. As she said, the powers for the export of strategic goods and for the sale of ships from this country come under a different Order. But, nevertheless, such powers would be futile and nugatory but for the Order we are discussing which stops up the gap of the third countries; that is to say, the control by persons in the United Kingdom of ships and strategic goods that are situated elsewhere and which might otherwise be moved from those third countries to destinations of which the United Kingdom Government

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disapproves. I will not needle or press the hon. Lady now, but some time, perhaps when the COCOM list comes to be revised, we would like to know how the whole system of strategic control is working.
Not long ago there was a good deal of dissatisfaction in the United States with the way in which the United Kingdom Government were operating this. There were complaints, for example, about the shipment of supplies and of ships from Hong Kong to Haiphong. There were complaints about shipments to Russia and to China. Although these complaints have in the last 18 months died down, they may arise again at any minute.
I suppose that it is partly under these powers that the whole executive machinery for the enforcement of sanctions against Rhodesia is operated. Perhaps the hon. Lady will confirm that. I imagine it is because of the powers under this Order, as well as under the other more direct Orders for the shipment of goods from the United Kingdom and for the control of merchant shipping in the United Kingdom, that we operate the sanctions against Rhodesia. If so—and this is no more than a minor complaint—we might have heard a little more from the hon. Lady beyond a mere list, albeit very clear, of the way in which the Government have operated these powers. It is a matter of public interest how they are operated and how watertight and effective they are. Unless they are effective, they are obviously futile.
Perhaps when we come to the debate on the COCOM list, and on a future occasion in relation to Southern Africa, we might be told a little more than the bare legal bones of the matter, and be told about the way in which, strategically and politically, we are able to control this important traffic.
11.20 p.m.
Mrs. Gwyneth Dunwoody: I beg leave of the House to speak again.
I understand the hon. and learned Gentleman's feeling that this Order carries political implications far beyond the simple genealogy of how we arrived at this point. However, I believe that some of the fears that he expressed are unfounded. This arrangement is working very efficiently.
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I do not want to go too deeply into the question on this occasion, but my impression is that the Order deals specifically with the provisions for COCOM countries; that is, those countries which are joined together in COCOM which are asking for this kind of protection for strategic goods to be normally exported to Communist countries. This is the whole point of the Order.
Whilst I take the hon. and learned Gentleman's point that there may be a wider implication and that possibly we could debate this on the COCOM list, it is true that the sanctions against Rhodesia are operated on the Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965, not under this Order, which is, in a sense, designed to carry out a limited and specific job.
My impression is that there have been no complaints about the working of this arrangement. The hon. and learned Gentleman will be aware that our inter-nation obligations carry with them the right of our partners in COCOM to express themselves extremly forcibly and to object to particular cases if they wish. Therefore, I am sure that he will accept that they are content with the way that we are carrying out our obligations.
Nevertheless, should the time come when the House would like a wider discussion on the whole question, the Board of Trade will be happy to take that opportunity. The hon. and learned Gentleman will realise that one difficulty in discussing—I was about to say "embargoes", but perhaps I should say "control"—control of some strategic goods is that we do not necessarily want to go too deeply into the exact details of the situation, because it carries with it certain difficulties.
I am quite confident that the system is working well and that the Board of Trade has the interests of Great Britain at heart. If the hon. and learned Gentleman wishes to go further into the question we shall be only too delighted to discuss it with him at any time.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That the Defence Powers (Continuance) Order 1969, a draft of which was laid before this House on 13th November, be aproved.

MR. PARGAN SINGH
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Dobson.]
11.18 p.m.
Mr. Brian Parkyn: I wish to bring to the attention of the House the case of a constituent of mine, Mr. Pargan Singh, and I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Minister of State for being here at this late hour to reply on behalf of the Government.
This is a complex affair. I shall attempt to recount the whole story as concisely as I can and hope to justify the grave charges that I shall be making in the course of my speech.
About one in six of the population of Bedford is not English-born, and Mr. Pargan Singh is one of many fellow Indians who live in Bedford. He has lived in this country for 16 years, and with him here are also his wife, two children, sister and mother and father. He is intelligent and hard working, and can speak and write English with some difficulty. Indeed, if there is any mitigating circumstance in this sorry story, it can only be that Mr. Pargan Singh's command of English is such that he could be easily misunderstood.
On 28th May this year Mr. Pargan Singh travelled from Bedford to London Airport, Heathrow, with his family to meet his brother, Mr. Ajit Singh, who had arrived from India by flight M.S.779 at 2.40 p.m. Mr. Ajit Singh had a return ticket, and had only come over to visit his brother, mother and father for a few weeks and was then proposing to return to India, where he runs a small farm. Mr. Ajit Singh also has a wife and three children in India.
Mr. Ajit Singh was detained by immigration officials for questioning and Mr. Pargan Singh was, in the meantime, seen by a clean shaven man of 20 to 30. Mr. Pargan Singh told me, "I was treated rather roughly and not even addressed as 'Mr'. I was told that I was lying and that my brother is coming here for good." He was even told that Ajit was not his brother. He was told to fetch his bank book, and so he travelled back to Bedford, found his bank book, and returned to London Airport at about 9 p.m. He was then seen by another immi-
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gration officer, who was fairer, and who had a beard, and who said that his brother could not recognise him. When he asked why, he was told that Ajit had been shown another man and he had said, "Yes, that is my brother." Mr. Pargan Singh considers that they were deliberately trying to bluff him.
The bearded official then examined the bank book and told him to go home and fetch his Post Office Savings Book and bring it back the next day. They said that they were holding Mr. Ajit Singh in the detention office, but that if they were satisfied with the Post Office Savings Book they would allow Ajit to return with him and remain in this country for this short visit. Mr. Pargan Singh was told to return to Heathrow at about lunch time on the 29th. He then made a request to see his brother. The request was granted, though his wife, two children, and sister had to remain outside.
Mr. Pargan Singh returned from Bedford to London Airport on the following day and arrived at the office at about 12 o'clock. He was told to sit down and that somebody would soon see him. At about half-past one or a quarter to two somebody came in, looked at his Post Office Savings Book, and said, "I am sorry. Your brother is going back today at 3.30 p.m."
I should now like to quote briefly from a short statement that Mr. Singh gave me:
"I asked the reason, he told me his income in India is not sufficient. Then I told him that I would like to see the solicitor of the Home Office. He told me you can see anyone you like, we don't care. In a short time I dashed to the welfare immigration office and I had to ask them could they stop my brother go back at 3.30 or get in touch with any solicitor who could do that. There was one Indian man, one Indian woman, and one Englishman. The Englishman tried to telephone. The Indian woman was very helpful and tried to tell the Englishman, couldn't he try to stop this man's brother going. In the meantime he was ringing somebody. From the other side he asked 'how long has he been in this office.' he said only a few months, since January. I think the man at the other end of the telephone then said, 'I think then that you are not very experienced.' I asked the welfare officer whether I could see my brother again, but he said, No it's too late'."
Mr. Pargan Singh told me that he had a letter from his brother in which he said that they told him, "Your brother and mother and father are outside. We are taking you to see him." But instead

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of letting the brother see them he was taken to the aeroplane.
Soon after this took place Mr. Pargan Singh told me all about this, and I put the facts before the Under-Secretary of State. In a letter to me of 30th June lie said that in view of discrepancies in replies to questions put both to Mr. Pargan Singh and Mr. Ajit Singh the immigration officer had concluded that there had been a deliberate attempt to mislead him, and he felt that he could put no reliance on Mr. Ajit Singh's statement that he had come here for a visit only, and so permission was refused.
The principal points of disagreement were as follows: Ajit Singh said that he wanted to visit his brother for 22 days, but his brother, when questioned, asked for a permit for his brother for three months. Ajit Singh told the immigration officer that the income from his farm was about £1,200 a year. On being re-interviewed he said that his income was nearer £500 a year. Finally, Mr. Ajit Singh told the immigration officer that he had not met his brother for 16 years, when his brother had visited him in India seven years ago. This was clearly a misunderstanding over the fact that Mr. Pargan Singh had left India 16 years ago to live in this country and had then returned to India seven years ago on a visit.
In my view these discrepancies are so minor as to be irrelevant when seen against the background of language difficulties and the all too common nervousness which we all experience when confronted by immigration officials.
I cannot believe that the decision to send Mr. Ajit Singh to India on a flight at 3.30 p.m. was taken only at about 145 the same afternoon. If it had been made earlier, why was my constituent asked to travel all the way back to Bedford to fetch his Post Office Savings Book? We know that the immigration officers must have a difficult time in administering the laws which we make in this House, but in this case, and perhaps others, they assume that a man is guilty, and telling lies, unless he can prove otherwise. This is not the kind of English justice which people throughout the world expect to find here.
Of course, my constituent could be telling lies. I believe that he is telling
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the truth, and his story certainly has the clear ring of truth about it. Hon. Members gain considerable experience in assessing people, and I would not present this case here if I did not believe fully in the bona fide of Mr. Pargan Singh, whom I have interviewed carefully on three occasions. Mr. Pargan Singh is an Indian-born British citizen who has made this country his home for 16 years. He is a part of the happy multi-racial society that we have in Bedford, which I have the honour to represent in this House.
I must therefore demand for him the same social justice and elementary rights as belong to all our people. I would ask my hon. Friend to do two things. First, I ask her to provide a return ticket, at public expense, to enable Mr. Ajit Singh to visit his brother and relatives in this country, and, second, I ask her to give an apology to my constituent for his treatment at Heathrow on 28th and 29th May when, to use his own words "they treated me like a dog."
11.27 p.m.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Mrs. Shirley Williams): First, I apologise to my hon. Friend for the absence of my hon. Friend the Joint Under-Secretary, who is unable to be present owing to illness. He wishes me to tender his apologies to my hon. Friend. Second, I thank my hon. Friend for the very reasonable way in which he put his case.
Before turning to the particular case concerning Mr. Pargan Singh, I would like to say a little about the operation of the immigration control into this country. Last year nearly 4 million aliens and some 500,000 Commonwealth citizens were admitted to this country in one capacity or another. It would be surprising if there were not an occasional complaint that an immigration officer had acted in a high-handed fashion.
The number of complaints is very small in proportion to the numbers of alien and Commonwealth citizens admitted. I do not think that I can begin my reply better than to quote the remarks in the report of the Committee on Immigration Appeals under Sir Roy Wilson, which is the report that led to the Immigration Appeals Act 1969. The committee says:
"The impression we have received in the course of our inquiry is that, generally speaking, immigration officers act with fairness and

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respect for the rights and feelings of other people with whom they have to deal. In questioning people about their intentions and family circumstances, the officers are only carrying out duties laid on them by Parliament. They have to be on the watch for deliberate attempts to evade the control …".
I must pause here because it is the need for immigration officers to be on the watch for deliberate attempts to evade the control which explains why they sometimes act as they do.
In the case in question Mr. Ajit Singh sought admission to visit his brother, Mr. Pargan Singh. Before going into details, let me quote from the Instructions to Immigration Officers on the admission of Commonwealth Visitors, which say:
"If a Commonwealth citizen satisfies the immigration officer that he is coming as a visitor for a limited period and can support himself and his dependants during that period, he and they should be admitted. Other genuine visitors, for example those coming to stay with relatives, should be readily admitted unless the immigration officer has reason to believe that their presence in the United Kingdom is likely to result in a charge on public funds."
The two points that the immigration officer has primarily to look for are, first, "Is the Commonwealth citizen a genuine visitor?" and, second, "Will he leave at the end of his permitted stay?". Finally: "Can he support himself or has he a sponsor who can support him while here?".
Unfortunately, we have some experience of Commonwealth citizens and aliens who claim to be visitors when really their intention is to stay in the United Kingdom permanently. If, therefore, after examining the passenger the immigration officer is not satisfied that he will leave the United Kingdom at the end of his visit it is his duty to refuse admission.
As my hon. Friend has said, Mr. Ajit Singh, who has a wife and three children in India, arrived at London Airport on 28th May and told the immigration officer that he wanted to stay for 22 days to visit his brother Mr. Pargan Singh. Mr. Ajit Singh said that he earned about £1,200 a year as a farmer. However, Mr. Pargan Singh, who was at the airport to meet his brother as his sponsor, told the immigration officer that his brother would be staying three months. On being re-interviewed, the
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following day, Mr. Ajit Singh agreed that his income was nearer £500 than £1,200 a year.
There were several discrepancies here. Moreover, it seemed improbable that a man with a wife and three children to support should spend something like half his annual income on an airline ticket if he were coming on a visit of only three weeks.
The immigration officer came to the conclusion that there had been an attempt to mislead him and felt that he could place no reliance on Mr. Ajit Singh's statement that he had come here for a visit only. After reference to a chief immigration officer, he consequently refused admission to Mr. Ajit Singh, who was then detained to await his return to India.
I would now like to deal with some specific complaints made by Mr. Pargan Singh, which my hon. Friend has raised quite reasonably and of which he has kindly given me advance notice. The first complaint is that Mr. Pargan Singh was asked on the evening of 28th May to produce evidence of his ability to support his brother. He says that the immigration officer promised that if this were satisfactory his brother would be admitted. We have had inquiries made but can find no grounds for thinking that such a promise was given.
Secondly, Mr. Pargan Singh complains that his wife and children were not allowed to visit his brother. We have been told that it was at 9 p.m. on 28th May that Mr. Pargan Singh and two of his cousins asked the immigration officer to be allowed to see Mr. Ajit Singh. They were given a written authority for a visit to give to the detention officer. Visitors are not allowed to see detainees without a written authority. If on arrival at the detention block they had asked whether Mr. Pargan Singh's wife and children could also see Mr. Ajit Singh, they would have been told that they could do so if they obtained a written authority from the immigration officer.
Thirdly, Mr. Pargan Singh complains that when he returned on 29th May with evidence of means of support he was kept waiting for an hour and a half or more. I have not been able to verify this, but if he was kept waiting for a while at a busy airport before he could be attended

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to, my hon. Friend would, no doubt, agree that this was, perhaps, understandable. I hope that my hon. Friend will understand that this was not deliberate and can sometimes happen on such occasions.
Fourthly, Mr. Pargan Singh claims that he had little opportunity to seek aid in presenting his case. The Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants was able to discuss the matter with him, however, and on taking it up with the immigration authorities the council was given details of the case and the reasons for refusal.
Fifthly, Mr. Pargan Singh says that he was not allowed to see his brother again before the latter was taken to the aeroplane returning him to India, and that later he had a letter in which his brother wrote that he was told that he was going to see his relatives but instead was taken to the aeroplane.
When refusal of admission is confirmed, the pattern is for the immigration officer to hand over the Commonwealth citizen an official of Securicor for safeguard pending his removal. At 2.20 p.m on 29th May Mr. Ajit Singh was taken to Terminal 3 by a Securicor official, and at 4.25 p.m. this official reported that he had left and that there had been no unusual incidents.
It is normal practice to allow relatives to see persons detained pending removal provided that this does not delay removal. If the relatives had asked to see Mr. Ajit Singh before his removal, the Securicor official would have reported this to the immigration staff for approval. There no evidence that such a request was received from Mr. Ajit Singh's relatives, nor is there a clear answer to his claim that he was told that he was being taken to see his relatives but instead was taken to the aeroplane. It is possible that he may have been confused owing to language difficulties, or there may be some other explanation, but I cannot offer one.
Mr. Pargan Singh lists three "reasons" which, he says, were those given by the immigration officer to the officer of the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants for sending Mr. Ajit Singh back. What is listed are some of the discrepancies which I mentioned earlier which led the immigration officer to the conclusion that Mr. Ajit Singh was not a
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genuine visitor. This was the reason for refusing him admission.
Mr. Parkyn: That is precisely the point that I was trying to make. Those three reasons concerning discrepancies are so minor as to indicate, to me at least, that the immigration officials are clutching at a straw to justify the conclusions which they had already reached at the outset.
Mrs. Williams: I appreciate my hon. Friend's feelings about this, but I can only repeat to him that very few genuine visitors to this country—that is, Commonwealth citizens—are stopped from entering. Therefore, this case must have been an exceptional one because it fell into that very small minority group of individual citizens who are refused entry.
I can only underline to my hon. Friend that the discrepancy about income, particularly the large slice of it that the ticket comprised of Mr. Ajit Singh's income, led the immigration officers to suspect his real motives for coming to this country.
I will deal with two other points. The evidence that Mr. Pargan Singh supplied was perfectly fair evidence of his ability to support his brother but it did not touch then on the three "reasons" for refusal. The reasons were the immigration officer's belief that Mr. Ajit Singh was not coming for purposes other than of settlement.
Finally, Mr. Pargan Singh says that he was treated discourteously, even to the extent of the immigration officer telling him that Mr. Ajit Singh was not his brother since he could not identify him and had identified someone else as his brother.
I am told that Mr. Pargan Singh was treated courteously at all times, and understand that he himself refers to the fact that Mr. Ajit Singh jumped up when an Indian arrival having no connection with the case entered the detention area but he realised his mistake when the other party did not respond.
I have tried to deal with my hon. Friend's constituent's points as fully as I can. I hope I have disposed of most of them. I appreciate Mr. Pargan Singh's unhappiness when his brother was refused admission, but I hope my hon. Friend will agree that the behaviour of

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the immigration staff concerned was correct and that their decision was justified and based on what they felt to be good reasons.
If Mr. Ajit Singh should wish to come to the United Kingdom again, I would strongly recommend him to apply to the British High Commission in New Delhi for an entry certificate so that the question of his admission can be fully gone into before he leaves India.
There are two points I should like to make in conclusion. First, while immigration officers have to be on their guard against bogus visitors, the very great majority of Commonwealth visitors are admitted without difficulty or delay at the ports. This is as true of Indians or Pakistanis as it is of Australians or New
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Zealanders. The numbers of refusals are a very small percentage of the total.
Second, the Immigration Appeals Act provides for there to be a right of appeal against refusal of admission in just such cases as my hon. Friend has described. The Government have not yet announced a date for the introduction of the appeal system, but we are pushing forward with our preparations as rapidly as possible, and recruiting the necessary staff. An advisory and welfare service to help passengers who are in difficulties, not least as a result of unfamiliarity with the English language, is to be part of the new arrangements.
Question put and agreed to.
Adjourned accordingly at twenty-three minutes to Twelve o'clock.

TRANSPORT
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EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY
  Bank Employees (Overtime Pay)
  Bank Employees (Overtime Pay)
  Government Training Centres (Northern Region)
  Government Training Centres (Northern Region)
  Wage Rates and Average Earnings
  Wage Rates and Average Earnings
  Professional and Executive Register
  Professional and Executive Register
  Agricultural Training Board
  Agricultural Training Board
  Unemployed Dockworkers, Tilbury
  Unemployed Dockworkers, Tilbury
  Unemployment, Brighton
  Unemployment, Brighton
  Unemployed Persons, Grays and Stanford-le-Hope
  Unemployed Persons, Grays and Stanford-le-Hope
  Forestry Workers, Scotland
  Forestry Workers, Scotland
  Wages and Salaries (Increases)
  Wages and Salaries (Increases)
  Commonwealth Immigrants (Work Vouchers)
  Commonwealth Immigrants (Work Vouchers)
  Industrial Advisers to the Blind (Exhibition)
  Industrial Advisers to the Blind (Exhibition)
  ROAD ACCIDENTS (COMPENSATION)
  ROAD ACCIDENTS (COMPENSATION)
AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD
  Quarantine Kennels
  Quarantine Kennels
  Farm Machinery
  Farm Machinery
  Annual Price Review (Assumed Costs)
  Annual Price Review (Assumed Costs)
  Experiments on Live Animals
  Experiments on Live Animals
  Temperate Foodstuffs
  Temperate Foodstuffs
  SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY (SPEECH)
  SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY (SPEECH)
  PRICES AND INCOMES (C-ORDINATION POLICY)
  PRICES AND INCOMES (C-ORDINATION POLICY)
  ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
  ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
  FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN (DEPARTMENTAL CO-ORDINATION)
  FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN (DEPARTMENTAL CO-ORDINATION)
DEFENCE
  Servicemen Overseas (Foreign Exchange Cost)
  Servicemen Overseas (Foreign Exchange Cost)
  British Forces Education Service Schools, Germany
  British Forces Education Service Schools, Germany
HOME DEPARTMENT
  Public Documents and Records (Access)
  Public Documents and Records (Access)
  Sporting Events (Demonstrations)
  Sporting Events (Demonstrations)
  Legal Aid
  Legal Aid
  Newly-qualified Voters Kingston upon Hull
  Newly-qualified Voters Kingston upon Hull
POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS
  Postage Stamps (Decimalisation)
  Postage Stamps (Decimalisation)
  Television and Radio Licences (Lancashire and Cheshire)
  Television and Radio Licences (Lancashire and Cheshire)
  Pensioners (Television Licences)
  Pensioners (Television Licences)
SCOTLAND
  Police Force Establishments
  Police Force Establishments
  Police (Personal Radios)
  Police (Personal Radios)
  School Auxiliary Aides (Lanarkshire)
  School Auxiliary Aides (Lanarkshire)
  Motorists, Edinburgh (Blood Alcohol Tests)
  Motorists, Edinburgh (Blood Alcohol Tests)
  Western General Hospital, Edinburgh
  Western General Hospital, Edinburgh
  Schools (Gaelic Language)
  Schools (Gaelic Language)
BOARD OF TRADE
  Runway Arresting Systems
  Runway Arresting Systems
  Airlines (Liability to Passengers)
  Airlines (Liability to Passengers)
  Forestry Workers
  Forestry Workers
  Third London Airport Site (Foulness)
  Third London Airport Site (Foulness)
  B.O.A.C. and B.E.A. (Annual Reports)
  B.O.A.C. and B.E.A. (Annual Reports)
  Supersonic Commercial Aircraft
  Supersonic Commercial Aircraft

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR On the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Manchester.

RECRUITING FOR SCOTTISH REGIMENTS
LORD KILMANY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether, in recruiting for Scottish regiments, it is permissible under the law to give preference to men of Scottish origin or connection.]
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, Section 3(1) of the Race Relations Act 1968 makes it unlawful to discriminate on the ground of colour, race, ethnic or national origins in considering applications for employment. The requirements laid down for enlistment to the Scottish Division, which are not restricted to persons of Scottish origin, do not fall within any of these categories.
LORD KILMANY: My Lords, I had hoped to be able to thank the noble Lord for a helpful reply, but I am in doubt as to whether his reply is entirely helpful. Will the noble Lord bear in mind that in the past national identity has been found to be an important factor in regimental morale, and also in recruiting? Therefore, would he be at pains to remove any obstacle that may exist to endeavours by those connected with Scottish regiments to recruit a large proportion of Scottish manpower to those units?
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, I face a very formidable Scottish array. I am sorry that my reply was not considered helpful it was intended to be. I would say to the noble Lord that I accept that the Scottish Division has a Scottish tradition that it is basically for men with Scottish connections. I hope that
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that will satisfy legitimate Scottish pride. But I hope, too, that there is no Scot in this House, or outside, who will say that this statement means that anyone with Scottish connections would be turned down for reasons of creed, colour, race or ethnic origin.
LORD BYERS: My Lords, will the noble Lord confirm that there is absolutely nothing to stop a coloured person born in Scotland from joining a Scottish regiment?
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, if the noble Lord will read what I said—and I tried to be as careful and clear as possible—he will find that that is precisely what my reply amounted to.
LORD KILMANY: My Lords, will the noble Lord bear in mind that in my Question I specifically said not only "men of Scottish origin", but also "or connection". That covers the coloured man connected by birth or residence with Scotland.
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, I accept what the noble Lord has said. I know that he is trying to be helpful. I only wish that some of the others who looked at some of these advertisements were equally helpful. There are some words in the Standing Orders of your Lordships' House that are relevant. Standing Order No. 29 might be borne in mind when some of these advertisements are considered. Standing Order No. 29 says:
"… as nothing offensive is to be spoken, so nothing is to be ill taken."
In that spirit I think we should go a long way.
BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER: My Lords, in view of the confusion arising in this matter, will my noble friend give his attention to the difference between national origin and racial origin, because the two are by no means identical?
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, that is precisely what I have tried to say. There is absolutely no reason why a Negro with Scottish connections should not serve with pride in a Scottish regiment.
LORD BLYTON: My Lords, is my noble friend aware that this argument is purely fallacious? When we are at war and we need coloured men we do not care whether they are in a Scottish regiment

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or in the Durham Miners' Regiment. Why should we discriminate in peace time over something that we do not do in war time?
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, I am not sure to which argument my noble friend is referring: but I am quite sure I agree with what he says.

IMMIGRATION CONTROLS AND COMMONWEALTH VISITORS
2.40 p.m.
LORD CLIFFORD OF CHUDLEIGH: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government why they have permitted half a million people from a non-Commonwealth country to enter the United Kingdom in the past ten years yet continue to impose the present restrictions on Australian and New Zealand visitors.]
THE MINISTER OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY (BARONESS SEROTA): My Lords, I think that the noble Lord is referring in the first part of his Question to entry from the Republic of Ireland. There is no control on the entry of Irish citizens from within the common travel area. Control on Commonwealth immigration is applied without discrimination to the citizens of Commonwealth countries, but no bona fide visitor need expect to encounter difficulty on arrival.
LORD CLIFFORD OF CHUDLEIGH: My Lords, while thanking the noble Baroness for that reply may I ask two supplementary questions? Are there not many countries with common frontiers that operate immigration laws, and do not the large numbers of Irish involved make a nonsense of our present immigration laws? Secondly, are the Government not aware of the damaging consequences of the abrupt cancellation of the traditional right of access of Australians and New Zealanders to what they used to consider their mother country?
BARONESS SEROTA: My Lords, noble Lords will be aware of the discussions
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that took place at considerable length in both Houses on this question of control over land frontiers in relation to the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962. This admittedly presents very difficult problems; and Parliament came to certain decisions. On the second point, I would assure the noble Lord that visitors from the Commonwealth are admitted freely; and normally for periods of six months in the first instance. If he has any examples that he would like to send me of difficulties encountered I shall be happy to go into them with my right honourable friend.
THE EARL OF BUCKINGHAMSHIRE: My Lords, may I ask the noble Baroness this question? Is she aware that nations such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand, founded and settled by our forbears, are rising Powers and that in the world of to-morrow they will be richer and more influential than most of our neighbours across the Channel?
BARONESS SEROTA: My Lords, I am not sure how that point falls within the scope of the Question put by the noble Lord, Lord Clifford of Chudleigh, and perhaps I should be treading on other people's ground if I were to comment on it.

CERTIFICATE OF SECONDARY EDUCATION
LORD BELSTEAD: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether it is yet possible to assess the success of the Certificate of Secondary Education examination, and how this year's results compare with results obtained previously.]
BARONESS PHILLIPS: My Lords, since 1966, the first year in which examinations were offered by all the Regional Examining Bodies for the Certificate of Secondary Education, the number of subject entries has risen from 520,000 to 836,000. This is an indication of confidence in the examination on the part of teachers and of virtually all universities and professional bodies, who recognise the achievement of a Grade 1 in the examination as equivalent to a

429
pass at "O" level in the General Certificate of Education. Also, employers and further education institutions increasingly rely on the achievement of Grades other than Grade 1 as indications of the pupil's level of attainment. The figures for this year's results are not yet complete. In 1968, 14·9 per cent. of the entries achieved Grade 1 and 94·8 per cent. achieved Grade 5 or over, compared with 13·6 per cent. and 93·9 per cent. in 1966 and 14·3 per cent. and 94·3 per cent. in 1967.
LORD BELSTEAD: My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for her reply, which seems to be encouraging. I wonder whether I may ask her a supplementary question. Has the noble Baroness any statistics of the number of pupils who decide to stay on for an extra year, or two years, in full-time education and who have taken this Certificate of Secondary Education examination? May I ask the noble Baroness a second supplementary question, not so encouraging? There was information in the pamphlet Education of the Associated Lancashire Schools Examining Board, and the North Western Board reported that in fact the results were not going to be so good this year. Does the noble Baroness know whether the Department has any further information about this matter?
BARONESS PHILLIPS: My Lords, I am sorry that I have not the up-to-date figures and I have not the other figure for which the noble Lord asked. I have figures of my own which I feel that I must get in—
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Hear, hear!
BARONESS PHILLIPS: Well, I hope that meets with your Lordships' satisfaction. This information, I feel, may gladden the heart at any rate of my noble friend Lady Summerskill. It is that 13 per cent. of the boys took Grade 1, and 15 per cent. of the girls; and in Grade 4 it was 83 per cent. boys and 85 per cent. girls.
LORD BELSTEAD: My Lords, the noble Baroness will know that that will gladden the hearts of noble Lords on this side of the House, because this examination was first thought out at the time when the Party on this side of the
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House happened to be in power. May I ask one more supplementary question of the noble Baroness? I think that on the tape to-day there is the news that the Schools Council of the Standing Conference on University Education has made recommendations which may lead to the abolition of the G.C.E. and the taking of new examinations at ages at which hitherto they have not been taken. Is this in any way going to affect the Certificate of Secondary Education examination?
BARONESS PHILLIPS: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, is quite correct about the news that he has heard. I have only just received this news and should not like to comment on it, other than to say that Her Majesty's Government are always very open-minded about looking at any improvement in any examination.
LORD BELSTEAD: My Lords, may I ask the noble Baroness whether she will allow me one more supplementary question? She has given a lot of information and I am grateful. On October 24, as reported in The Times the following day, the Minister of Education and Science, Mr. Short, when opening a new comprehensive school at Washington, County Durham, called for an end of examination "tyranny"—that was his word—in secondary schools. Those words might have run a very receptive bell for us when we were at school, but I must ask the noble Baroness whether this was a statement of Government policy.
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (LORD SHACKLETON): I should say "Put down another Question".
BARONESS PHILLIPS: My Lords, I am sure the noble Lord would agree that it is never quite fair to take a sentence in a speech out of context. Therefore I would rather not comment on it without discussing the whole speech.
LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY: My Lords, would the noble Baroness not agree that the figures showing an advantage for girls in these examinations probably reflect the smaller proportion of girls taking G.C.E., and therefore they are not so favourable to girls as she has made out?
BARONESS PHILLIPS: My Lords, perhaps I was unwise to give those figures,

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but I could not resist doing so. I do not think that this is necessarily true. I have not the figures regarding the G.C.E. available, but what I will give the noble Lord is that in total there were fewer girls taking the examination to which I referred. Nevertheless, they had quality.
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: My Lords, in view of the fact that it appears to have been finally established that women's intelligence is a little higher than that of men, does not my noble friend think that it is a great pity that girl students are discriminated against in medical schools?
BARONESS PHILLIPS: Yes my Lords, I would tell my noble friend that when I have visited a hospital I have never missed an opportunity to make the point which she has made so gallantly many times.
LORD LEATHERLAND: My Lords, leaving sex aside, may I ask my noble friend whether it is not a fact that facilities for education have improved so remarkably under the present Government that in the next few years there will be far more students qualified for university places than is the case to-day? And what are the Government going to do to increase the number of university places available for them?
BARONESS PHILLIPS: My Lords, much as I like the noble Lord's support, I must says that that is another question.

NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE AND PRIVATE SCHEMES
2.49 p.m.
LORD INGLEWOOD: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether the criticism of private insurance schemes expressed by the Secretary of State for Social Services in his Herbert Morrison Memorial Lecture represents the views and policy of Her Majesty's other Ministers.]
BARONESS SEROTA: My Lords, in the lecture referred to, my right honourable friend dissociated himself from the
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argument that it would solve the financial problems of the National Health Service if there were to be a very large increase in the number of members of these schemes even at the cost of tax concessions to them. He added that these schemes could not provide an alternative to paying for the Service out of taxation—without under-mining the principle of the free Health Service. This is the view of Her Majesty's Government.
LORD INGLEWOOD: My Lords, may I thank the noble Baroness for that reply, which I think was meant to be the "soft answer that turneth away wrath." Is she not aware that in the course of that lecture her right honourable friend referred to these admirable institutions as being a disturbing element within the Service, and accused those who were members of them of "queue jumping"? Would she not consider that rather an irresponsible statement, coming from a Minister who is himself responsible for health services?
BARONESS SEROTA: My Lords, we have already had reference this afternoon to the danger of taking words out of context, and I think that if the noble Lord will read the whole lecture which my right honourable friend delivered last May, and which has only just been published in a Fabian Tract, he will see the whole case that my right honourable friend was trying to put.
LORD INGLEWOOD: My Lords, would the noble Baroness take it from me that I have read the lecture and, furthermore, that I have taken to heart what her noble friend said earlier about Standing Order No. 29? But the particular chapter in the lecture to which this refers has in fact been noticed by the Press and elsewhere by many people as an extremely unfortunate lapse on the part of a senior Minister.
BARONESS SEROTA: My Lords, certain of the Press reports which I have seen were, I think the noble Lord will agree, somewhat exaggerated. All my right honourable friend was trying to point out in the words he used was that if the private sector were to increase to a considerable size, it could become a serious competitor for scarce resources. It is in this context that we should see the words "queue-jumping."
LORD BLYTON: My Lords, would not my noble friend agree that all this argument is a question of payment into these schemes in order to jump the queue for hospital beds so that poor people are left at the end of the queue?
LORD PLATT: My Lords, while thanking the noble Baroness for the point of view she has put before the House, may I ask whether Her Majesty's Government are aware that although it is easy to make allegations that private patients get undue priority, there is in fact a compensatory gain in the opposite direction for hospital patients; namely, that hospital patients benefit greatly by the experience which consultants gain in private practice?
BARONESS SEROTA: My Lords, I am sure that the last thing my right honourable friend would wish to do is to undervalue in any way the professional skills of doctors and of nurses that are available to the National Health Service. One of the difficulties is that we do not know the exact scope and size of private practice.
LORD BROOKE or CUMNOR: My Lords, would the noble Baroness say whether it is or is not the opinion of Her Majesty's Government that private patients are queue jumping
BARONESS SEROTA: My Lords, in 1966 my right honourable friend Mr. Kenneth Robinson, then the Minister of Health, initiated a survey of the use of pay beds in hospitals. No doubt the noble Lord is aware of that. As a result of that survey, there was a reduction of some 24 per cent. in the number of pay beds made available. I have looked more recently at the figures of use and find that although the number of beds is less, the number of patients has increased by some 2,000, but not to too great an extent. Since that review we are referring to the standard waiting list those patients who have a private consultation and then need in-patient admission.
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR: My Lords, is the noble Baroness aware that she has not answered my question?
BARONESS SEROTA: My Lords, I was trying to indicate to the noble Lord that the words "queue jumping" in this context have been used to mean access to hospital treatment by patients who otherwise would have to wait. Those who
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know the Health Service will, I think, agree that it is a magnificent service in times of emergency and that no one is denied treatment. The problem arises when patients need treatment which is not urgent and have to go on a waiting list. The term "queue jumping" is used in those situations where, by payment of fees, patients are admitted to National Health Service beds.
LORD POPPLEWELL: My Lords, is my noble friend aware that it is generally accepted that if a person is sick and goes for benefit under the N.H.S., he often has to wait a long time before he gets a bed in hospital, whereas if he is prepared to pay the specialist's fees his admittance to hospital is considerably quickened up? Is this not evidence of queue jumping in the terms used by my right honourable friend in his lecture?
BARONESS SEROTA: My Lords, that is the very point I was trying to make.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, could the noble Baroness make clear to me, because I really wish to follow the Government's policy in this matter, whether she thinks that the B.U.P. Association is a desirable or an undesirable association for people to join?
BARONESS SEROTA: My Lords, I would suggest that the noble Lord puts that down as a separate question.
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: My Lords, would not the noble Baroness agree that probably all the members of the present Government are insured for private medical attention?
BARONESS SEROTA: My Lords, as a member of the present Government, I can state categorically that I am not.
LORD THORNEYCROFT: My Lords, does not the noble Baroness think it somewhat extraordinary that at this moment in our economic fortunes a Minister of the Crown should describe such an important source of private saving as these private insurance companies as a disturbing element?
BARONESS SEROTA: My Lords, I would beg the noble Lord who has just put that question, if he has not already done so, to read the whole of my right honourable friend's lecture. The statement that has been under discussion was one part of a lecture on how to pay for the social services.

GAME BILL [H.L.]
LORD DERWENT: My Lords, I beg leave to introduce a Bill to amend the Game Act, 1831. I beg to move that the Bill be now read a first time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 1a.—(Lord Derwent.)
On Question, Bill read 1a and to be printed.

SUNDAY ENTERTAINMENTS ACT 1932
BARONESS SEROTA: My Lords, I beg to move that this Order be approved.
Moved, That the Order made by the Secretary of State for the Home Department for extending section 1 of the Sunday Entertainments Act 1932 to the Urban District of Burnham-on-Crouch be approved.—(Baroness Serota.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

EXPIRING LAWS BILL
Read 3a, and passed.

POLICE BILL
House in Committee: Clauses agreed to.
House resumed: Bill reported without amendment Report received.
Then, Standing Order No. 41 having been suspended (pursuant to the Resolution of December 4):
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a third time. Unless noble Lords wish a debate, I propose to move it formally.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 3a.—(Lord Shackleton.)
On Question, Bill read 3a, and passed.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN SCOTLAND
3.0 p.m.
THE MINISTER OF STATE, SCOTTISH OFFICE (LORD HUGHES)THE MINISTER OF STATE, SCOTTISH OFFICE (LORD HUGHES)rose to move, That this House takes note of the Report of the Royal Commission on Local Government in Scotland 1966–69 (Cmnd. 4150). The noble Lord said: My Lords, it is somewhat tragic that in this first Scottish debate for some time we should have come here with the sad news of the death of Lady Horsbrugh. While we have rather strict rules in this House about paying tributes, we also have ways of departing from them when it appears necessary. I think it is not only the Scots in your Lordships' House who would agree with me about the appropriateness of paying tribute to Lady Horsbrugh on this important Scottish occasion. Even if she was not the first woman Cabinet Minister, she was certainly the first woman to obtain that rank in a Conservative Administration, and her list of other firsts is quite a formidable one. She was the first woman to move the Address in another place, the first woman Privy Counsellor, one of the first Life Peeresses, and certainly the first Life Peeress who came to us from another place. Because of my own home connection, I am also aware of the fact that she was the first woman to represent Dundee in Parliament and I believe—though I am not absolutely certain of this —that she was the first Conservative to represent that constituency since the passing of the Reform Act in 1832. She just missed making it a centenary by getting there a year too soon.
But I wish to-day to dwell, briefly, less on her political career, greatly distinguished though that was, and more on her personal courage. Many of your Lordships will recollect how during the last few years, even though she was greatly in pain—and I think it would be correct to say that she was seldom completely free from pain—Florence Horsbrugh continued to attend and participate in all the activities of the House. In paying tribute to her to-day, we mourn not only the passing of one of the pioneers of the representation of women at Westminster in both Houses, but also the passing of a great woman.
My Lords, it is now two and a half months since the publication of the Report of the Royal Commission on Local Government in Scotland under the chairmanship of Lord Wheatley. On the day of publication I repeated to your Lordships a Statement made in another place by my right honourable friend, and in the brief subsequent discussion the important issues were touched upon and the interest of your Lordships was made clear. The extent of this interest is not at all surprising; this Report is one of the most significant documents for Scotland that has been produced this century.
The Royal Commission had a distinguished membership. Presided over by an acute and learned judge, it numbered among its company two Members of another place, several persons with long service on local authorities either as elected councillors or as officers, and others with wide experience in varied aspects of public life. Its Report is long—well over 400 pages, with many maps and charts. Such length is unavoidable, given a subject of such weight and complexity. The Report is comprehensive and thorough; and I am sure that noble Lords who have read it through will want to thank the Commission for the care and the objectivity with which they have approached their task, and for the valuable public service which they have performed.
As we approach the last quarter of the 20th century many of us can look back and see how much patterns of existence have altered, how rapidly technology and communications have developed over the years. The changes in the system of local government have not kept pace with this progress; the local government structure, which has been put together piece by piece in a rather haphazard fashion, is now held together only by the experience, skill and application of elected members and officials. It is this problem of structure which Lord Wheatley's Commission was faced with—how to create a framework in which local democracy can work effectively, in which the potential of the existing resources can be fulfilled, in which the needs of communities and individuals can be quickly and efficiently met. In the conclusions and recommendations of the Commission lies an opportunity to shape Scotland's future.
As my right honourable friend said on October 14, this is an opportunity which the Government gladly accept. We have already welcomed the Commission's fundamental approach to the problems. We accept that reorganisation is necessary, that the number of authorities with executive powers must be reduced and that the division between town and country should be ended. But—and I cannot emphasise this too strongly—on no more than this have we already made up our minds; we want to ponder the Report ourselves and at the same time to learn what other people think. To this end we have sought the opinions of the local authorities and other interested bodies and individuals on the basic proposals relating to the structure of local government and the division of functions between regional and district authorities.
Thus, as the Government are them-selves considering the Report at present and have invited observations from out-side interests, it would not be appropriate for me to comment at this stage on the Commission's specific recommendations. My function here to-day is one that I am happy to have, although it is one that does not often fall to a Minister to perform. I do not have to state, explain or defend the Government's policy. What I have to do here to-day is to listen, as dispassionately as anyone with a deep interest in this field can, to the views expressed by noble Lords from all parts of the House. All that I wish to do now, therefore, is to draw attention to various points raised in the Report which the Government regard as of special significance and on which we should be particularly interested to hear noble Lords' opinions.
Through the Wheatley Report runs a consistent thread, the Commission's general philosophy of the purpose of local government: the Commission identify the objectives to be aimed at and go on to recommend a structure to realise these objectives. In considering the Report, the temptation for us all is great to pass over the objectives and basic principles and instead to jump straight to the proposed new structure. This is very understandable: functions and areas are probably closer to our own experience and perhaps easier to express views on than

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is the general philosophy of local government. Nevertheless, my Lords, the philosophy is of fundamental importance; our concept of local government naturally conditions our views on how it should be organised to do its job well: and it is right that our underlying thoughts on these matters should be brought out into the open, clarified and if necessary criticised.
I hope that to-day there will be some discussion of the objectives which the Commission suggested a new system of local government should achieve—power, effectiveness, local democracy, and local involvement. I hope also that noble Lords will consider the scope and purpose of local government within society and in relation to the central Government. Practical considerations are obviously involved, such as the provision of services and the representation of local interests. and these in turn raise questions of power, scale, and finance: how much power does local government need to operate effectively? How much power can central Government give it? Where does one strike the balance between effective administration, suggesting large areas, and the need for local people to understand and to feel involved in the operation of the system?
May I turn now to finance? Since the Report was published the opinion has been widely expressed that a new structure of local government will be meaningless and incomplete without a new system of local government finance. My Lords, this we accept, We recognise the fundamental importance of finance, and Government Departments are at present engaged on a special examination of the subject. This internal method of inquiry seems to us to be the right approach. No outside inquiry could probe deeply into this subject and report within a reasonable time, having regard to the fact that it could not be considered in isolation from the national system of taxation. An internal Government inquiry can achieve this aim. Although these studies are now under way, however, they cannot be brought to a conclusion until the structure itself is decided. For the present, therefore, with the assurance—which we have already given and which I gladly repeat here: that we mean to equip the new local authorities with
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the needed power and financial viability—I think people have a sufficient lead to develop their views on structure and make them known to the Government.
I do not intend to say much about the Royal Commission's proposals for the new structure of local government. Everybody has views on the two-level organisation of seven regional and thirty-seven district authorities, and on whether the number of authorities and allocation of functions recommended by the Commission are right or should be modified in some way. In the consultations which are going on at present, the Government have asked interested bodies, local authorities in particular, to concentrate on this aspect of the Report, and noble Lords' opinions also will be welcomed. in inviting comments we have emphasised that we are concerned with the general framework at this stage and that local authorities and others should not be preoccupied with points of detail; for instance, with the definition of individual local boundaries. Most of the local authorities from whom we have already received comments have succeeded in adopting this broad approach and in looking at the proposals from a general point of view. This is not to say that their particular experience has not conditioned their response. I am sure that noble Lords will agree that our debate this afternoon will be particularly helpful and useful if we likewise do not get bogged down with minor details.
To date, observations on the Commission's recommendations have been received from 50 local authorities and from 11 other bodies and individuals. This is a good response, but by the end of January, the date specified by the Secretary of State for the submission of 'observations on the general structure proposed, this number can be expected to increase very considerably. We have not yet received any more than preliminary comments from the local authority associations, with whom we shall be holding discussions in due course.
My Lords, it is my intention to read every letter we receive from local authorities. I have looked with considerable interest at the observations which have already come in, but there is no point at this stage in trying to summarise them; perhaps all that I might say is that their main characteristic,

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not surprisingly, is diversity. I have, however, been very much impressed by the constructive approach most authorities have adopted. May I give an example of that? One that I remember well, without naming the burgh concerned, starts off with the statement:
"It is recognised by everyone that the small burgh is the most effective and the most efficient form of local government. However, if this view does not prevail, we suggest …".
And then they go on to a very reasonable set of proposals.
The Report had much to say about the membership and internal organisation of local authorities. Local government has served us well, and in Scotland we have a heritage of which we can be justly proud. Let us, my Lords, not forget that. Because we recognise that change is necessary, it does not follow that we are saying that what has happened has been bad. What has happened is that the machine has perhaps outlived its usefulness. But it is clear, and I think it follows from what I have just said, that local government operates successfully, where it is completely successful, in spite of and not because of its own system. Noble Lords may wish to indicate whether they consider that we need to reappraise and revise the present methods of doing business within local authorities. This raises questions about the committee system, about delegation, about devolution. about the payment of councillors, and the respective responsibilities of elected members and officials and indeed it is worth thinking about the whole concept of local democracy which these methods embody. Democracy, we should remember, my Lords, connotes not only government by the people, but powerful government.
The Government are already committed to the view that radical reform of local government is necessary. This obviously means considerable disturbance and the loss of some hallowed traditions. When as individuals we have to alter our settled way of life, few of us are keen to abandon our well-tried habits and routine and to take a leap into the unfamiliar. But, my Lords, in this case the Government are not confronted with a uniform resistance to change. There is wide agreement that the alternative—to let things go on as they are—is quite unacceptable. There is agreement, for example, that many of the traditional
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boundaries perhaps have a historical validity but are quite out of line with the reality of the patterns and needs of modern life. At the same time there is recognition that within a new system there should be scope for preserving traditions, privileges, and dignities which are cherished by local communities.
My Lords, if there is to be change, it is vital, as the Wheatley Report states, that the period of uncertainty must be kept to an absolute minimum. It is important that there should he no long delay, either in the Government's reaching conclusions on the main issues, or in the transition between the old system and the new. Local authority members and officials must be spared prolonged doubt about their future, and the standard of local services, and the planning of projects must not be prejudiced by any unnecessary delay. That is why the Government are pressing on with consultations as quickly as is consistent with having all the issues properly considered. We hope to announce decisions on the main proposals concerning structure and division of functions in a White Paper to be issued in the spring of next year. There will then be further consultation and discussion on the many matters of detail before it is possible to prepare and introduce legislation.
It is not always that a debate in your Lordships' House can properly be described as a form of consultation. I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, who, when I repeated the Statement on publication, hoped that those consulted would include Members of your Lordships' House. I am very glad, therefore, that to-day we are going to have, I hope, a debate which will fall exactly into that category of consultation. I believe it will be extremely valuable in assisting the Government to consider the many issues involved: and, my Lords, I shall listen with the greatest interest to all that noble Lords have to say. I beg to move.
Moved, That this House takes note of the Report of the Royal Commission on Local Government in Scotland 1966–1969 (Cmnd. 4150).—(Lord Hughes.)
3.20 p.m.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, the friends of Florence Horsbrugh will be grateful to the noble Lord for the very graceful and appropriate tribute

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which he paid to her at the beginning of his speech. The first time I met her was more than forty years ago, in 1928, when she came to speak for me at an open air meeting in Kirkcaldy, where was a candidate. I can see her now, standing on a platform in the street replying to hecklers with infallible accuracy, as she always did. We got into the House of Commons in the same year and remained there for fourteen years, from 1931 to 1945. We were colleagues as junior Ministers in a pre-War Government. She got hack again to the House, and although I was not a member of it when she became a Cabinet Minister I always deeply admired the selfless devotion with which she applied herself both to her Ministerial and to her Parliamentary duties. She would not wish a long tribute, or many tributes, to be paid to her, but her departure will leave a gap in many hearts.
I should like to thank those who arrange the business of the House for enabling this debate to be held before the Christmas Recess, and I am very glad that it should take the form of a Government Motion. The reason why I put my Motion down on the Order Paper on the first day of the Session was that I knew many of your Lordships were anxious to express your views in Parliament on the future structure of local government in Scotland before the White Paper to which the noble Lord has referred had been issued, and before the Government had made any decisions from which they might find it difficult to recede or which they might find difficult to modify later on.
The noble Lord has asked us not to become bogged down in too much local detail, and I do not intend to enter at all in this debate into local detail—not because it is not important, but because I do not expect that the White Paper will seek to prejudge the local questions which may arise out of this Report. I shall try to concentrate my own remarks on those general proposals of the Report which I hope may be rejected by the Government, and I shall not say very much about those parts of it with which I agree, because I so often notice that any prolonged Parliamentary display of acquiescence in any Scottish debate is equally unprofitable and unpopular.
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However, before making the few criticisms which I have to offer, I should like first to say that I think the fundamental recommendation of the Wheatley Commission, that for the major purposes of local government Scotland should be divided into a small number of large regions, is right. The opposition which has been so far expressed to this idea in Scotland is not well founded; I do not believe it will be sustained for very long. If that is so, we ought to try to get this fundamental recommendation implemented soon.
Of course, any revolutionary change like this must take some little time to carry into effect, but I hope we are not going to think of it as the Redcliffe-Maud proposals sometimes appear to be thought of, in terms of four or five years, because local government reform in Scotland is an urgent matter. We need this change very soon, for many reasons, one of which is that it is essential to our economic growth. While we must take the greatest trouble to get it right, we ought not to tolerate any avoidable delay.
Having said that, I have three adverse criticisms to submit to your Lordships. One of them is concerned with the regional boundaries. I think that the area of the proposed Highland Local Government Region is much too big. From reading chapter 23 of this Report your Lordships may perhaps infer that there may have been some idea in the minds of the Highland Development Board, which they may have communicated through their evidence to the majority of the Wheatley Commission, that there is some substantial advantage to be gained from making the area of the Highland Local Government Region coterminous with the area of the Highland Development Board. But the more I look at this idea, the more fallacious it seems to be. The Board will be able to do their work much better if they have to deal with a compact, efficient local authority whose area is homogeneous and whose constituents are willing to be combined with each other, which I think the other six proposed regions, upon the whole, probably will be. But the proposed Highland Region will certainly not be.
I would not offer any objection if the Western districts of Moray, Nairn and

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Banff were put, as is proposed in the Report, into the new Highland Local Government Region, provided that the inhabitants were not against it; and if it were proposed to include these very Highland parts of Moray, Nairn and Banff in the area of the Highland Board, so that they might qualify for the receipt of economic benefits which the Board can dispense, again I would not offer any objection, and I expect the inhabitants would probably welcome it. But these two questions—whether these three districts should go into a new local government region, and whether they should be in the area of the Highland Board—are quite different. The answer may be "Yes" to both, or "No" to both, or "Yes" to one and "No" to the other. There is no interdependence, and there ought not to be interdependence, anywhere in the Highlands between these two questions. What I most decidedly object to is the proposal by the Commission that the proposed Highland Local Government Region should include the Shetlands, the Orkneys, the Outer Hebrides and the County of Argyll.
Suppose that the island of Malta had been politically integrated with the United Kingdom, which very nearly happened in the 1950s. I think there was a 57 per cent. Maltese vote in favour of it, which was not considered quite enough. if it had come off we should now have had one or two Maltese Members of the House of Commons, but no one in his senses would have proposed that Malta should be combined with South East England for local government purposes. But anyone who has travelled both to and from Malta and to and from Shetland will tell you at once that the journeys between Heathrow and Malta are much more frequent, much more easy, much more comfortable, much more reliable and much less likely to be postponed for days by bad weather than the journeys between Shetland and Inverness.
We all understand that a very small all-purpose authority with a population of only, perhaps, 17,000, and very small economic resources, would need a high percentage of Government grant for its social services, whereas our general purpose in Scotland as a whole is to reduce this percentage. But we must consider geography, too, and we must also pay
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attention to the local patriotism, the pride of achievement, the distinctive traditions and the culture of people like the Shetland islanders, who have far more in common with the faroe Islanders and the Scandinavians than with the Scottish Highlanders, and who have never at any time spoken Gaelic. If we try to compel them, against their strong desires, to be dominated in their local government affairs by the mainland, we shall create the most bitter resentment and there might easily be a serious movement for political secession.
I know the cynics will say, as they always do "Oh, there is no fear of that. They will never get as much money out of any Scandinavian country as they get out of us. They will grumble a little and then they will come to heel. "But money is not everything in this world. There are some people who prefer local independence to having more money. The facts of geography and the facts of history lay upon us the obligation to suffer a few small local government anomalies round the North and West coasts of this island in order to ensure the political contentment and happiness of a small number of people who have been politically associated with us for so many centuries. I would have one all-purpose local authority for Shetland, another for Orkney, another for the Western Isles. As for Argyll, I am not going to stick my neck out this afternoon by claiming to judge whether Argyll ought to be amalgamated with the Western Region or whether it should become another little anomaly of its own. What I am clear about is that it ought not to be included in the Highland local government region.
That is all I have to say about regional boundaries, although I might mention in passing that I rather wish the Commission, in publishing in the Appendix and elsewhere their maps showing these boundaries, had also put in the rivers and inland lochs, which would have made it so much easier to see which places are supposed to be in which regions. Chapter 17 of the Appendix, which describes the boundaries of the East Region, clearly states that the southern boundary of this region will be the watershed between the Forth and the Tay river systems, then the Ochils, then the Cleish Hills, and then the Fife Lomonds—all very simple and easy to

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understand. Then the Report itself states, in paragraph 750:
"We are satisfied that the Western district of Perthshire, which lies within the basin of the Forth, should' be excluded from the region."
Again, that is perfectly consistent and easy to understand; but when you come to compare the Commission's map with an Ordnance Survey map, after two hours of painful and tedious labour with the aid of a magnifying glass, a protractor, a pair of dividers and a ruler, and having completely ruined your first two copies of the Appendices, you find at last, at the third attempt, that without any doubt whatever it is not only the basin of the Forth that has been removed from the East Region and from Perthshire but about 200 square miles of the Tay basin —the whole great area of Glendochart from Killin to Tyndrum, and further North the whole area of Glenlochay, all of which drains into Loch Tay and all of which is separated from the Forth basin by a range which includes two of the highest mountains in Scotland, Ben More and Stobinian.
When you compare the map with the other regional maps in the Report showing the existing regional boundaries for existing purposes, you find that this region of the Upper Tay in Glendochart—this 200 miles of the upper Tay basin—is still included in the East Region in Perthshire for the purposes of the regional fire service, the regional water boards, the hospital boards and the river purification boards, all of which purposes are assigned in Chapter 16 of this Report to the new regional local authorities. It is all very puzzling, my Lords, and there is not a word of explanation about it in the Report. But this might be described as a relatively local piece of the jigsaw puzzle, and I shall not press for the solution this afternoon.
My other criticisms can be stated together, because they are argued together in the Report itself. I think the most serious error which the Report has made is the proposal to divide planning functions so as to give strategic planning to the regional authorities and district planning to the district authorities. I think they have made another error in choosing what the Report terms the "shire level" rather than the locality level for the
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second-tier authorities. Your Lordships will find the reasons given by the Commission summarised in paragraph 714. They say:
"It is important that the second tier of local government should have worthwhile functions … We do not consider that the environmental, amenity and other miscellaneous functions that could be assigned to the locality' scale of authorities would by themselves form a sufficient range of functions."
Then they say:
"The picture changes completely when the second-tier authority's range of responsibilities is extended to include such functions as local planning, …"
And then in the next sub-paragraph but one they say:
"Those who wish second-tier authorities to be a credible part of local government must face up to the issue and make them bigger."
Surely the Royal Commission are here arguing in a circle. When they are asked why it is necessary to split planning, their answer is, "You must split planning in order to have big secondary authorities". When asked why it is necessary to have big secondary authorities, they say, "You must have big secondary authorities so that you can split planning". I am not impressed by that kind of argument, because I am decidedly opposed both to the splitting of planning functions and to the choice of the larger area for the second-tier local authorities.
I think the strongest argument we have against splitting planning is to be found in paragraph 217 of the Report which quotes the evidence of the Scottish branch of the Town Planning Institute. According to this evidence, there are not enough qualified planning staff in Scotland now and there will never be enough qualified planning staff in Scotland to man more than one branch of local government. I think that makes sense. The more people employed in looking after other people's business, the lower their standard of efficiency is bound to be, and the less easy it will be to get the number of people required. In order to get the best results, what we want is less planning, but of a higher order and at a higher level, with fewer people of greater skill; and that is the reason why I think it is wrong, as this Report recommends, to split planning. It is not a boast but a fact, that the average level of competence is probably higher in Scotland than anywhere

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else. Yet I do not think anybody could take offence if we said that the present planning authorities in Scotland are not planning very well. And it is not their fault: it is our fault for imposing upon them duties for which they are not constitutionally well fitted, and it is often their public duty to deal with matters which they do not properly comprehend.
Some years ago I had to act as a guide to a planning sub-committee surveying an area which happened to be in the Highlands. To get a comprehensive view of the area you had to walk for about two miles up the side of a hill. The members of the sub-committee—excellent people, anxious to do their public duty properly—arrived punctually, attired in bowler hats and patent leather shoes, with brief cases in hand. After the first 20 minutes all except one suddently recollected that they had to attend an important meeting in an hour and a half in a certain town for which they could not be late, and they had to withdraw from the hillside. But one member of the party endured to the end—he had remembered to bring a pair of gumboots. When we got to the top the sun shone; we had an excellent sandwich lunch and a most delightful chat about public affairs in general.
I think the case against split planning could hardly be stated better than in that very well informed and closely argued Note of Dissent on page 281 of the Report by two honourable Members of another place, belonging to different Parties but both with great and unrivalled experience of local affairs in Scotland. I would most earnestly warn the Government that if they accept this recommendation to divide planning between two sets of authorities, both with the right of appeal to the Secretary of State but neither with an adequate staff who understand the subject, it is simply asking, with both arms wide open, for the maximum of frustration, delay and inefficiency.
If we are wise enough to confine planning functions to the regional authorities, then I think the Commission's chief argument for the large shire level second-tier authorities disappears. The modern county is too small a unit for modern local government but too large for intimate association with the mass of the people which is greatly to be desired, even if the mass of the people do not always bother to vote in local government elections.
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Since I am very anxious to see the main regional proposals of this Report carried into effect soon, it is only with the greatest reluctance that I feel bound to advocate a course which will probably take a little longer than if we accepted all the recommendations in the Report as they stand; because the 37 districts are fairly well defined, while the 101 localities are much less well defined; and I confess that if the thing was done ideally, as it should be done, there would probably be a good many more than 101 second-tier authorities at locality level. I think they should not be uniform either in size or in function. Some, of course, are identifiable communities which are anyhow large enough to carry out the functions listed in chapter 24, and others are not; and I think they should all have what is termed in the Report "a general competence." You do not want uniformity. You do not want to supply your customer with a ready-made standard suit into which he has to squeeze his unsymmetrical limbs. You want to supply him with a measured tailor-made suit which will tit him.
I would particularly ask, in conclusion. that the Government should try to see whether we cannot make the best use of the material which already lies to hand in the shape of the Scottish burghs, large and medium and small. I know that there are an awful lot of them, some 270 I believe, but the smaller ones do not have very extensive functions now, and it is not necessary for all the second-tier authorities to have exactly the same kind of work.
The roots of the Scottish burghs are far deeper in our history than those of any modern county or any modern county council. These burghs have worked for Scotland and fought for Scotland, some for six centuries, some for seven, some for more than eight and some probably for longer. They were always specially represented in the three Estates of the Scottish Parliament before the Act of Union. They have always been proud of their connection with the Crown and they have always had a tremendous sense of their own worth, which has often aroused admiration, sometimes amusement, but always affection.
After the great Reform Act of 1832, a huge banquet was held in London to celebrate the event; Liberals were invited I from all over Britain, and one of them

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was the Provost of Peebles, who was a leading Liberal in the Border Country at that time. When the Lord Chancellor, Lord Brougham, asked this great gathering to drink to the health of the majesty of the people, the Provost, who was a little hard of hearing, sprang to his feet and thanked the Lord Chancellor for his kindness in proposing the health of the "magistrates of Peebles". It did not seem odd to him that this should be done, and his error was greeted with loud and sympathetic applause.
The noble Lord, Lord Hughes, has been Lord Provost for six years of a great City which is also a Royal Borough, an office which he has fulfilled with unusual distinction and success. He knows better than anybody else here what the small burghs mean in the life of Scotland, how active they are in serving the country, how eager they are—sometimes more eager than the large burghs—to help the National Trust, or the Historic Buildings Council, to preserve their little gems of architecture for the delight of future generations, and how they foster in a humble way, but over a scattered area, the civic virtues which are so badly needed in this age. Do your Lordships think it will be quite the same if we take away from these little towns the small amount of civic authority which they still have, and leave them with nothing but an occasional voluntary pageant?
Chapter 35 of the Report refers sympathetically to these small Royal burghs which it cannot bring into its recommendations. It suggests that they should be used to bring some ceremonial interest into the areas in which they may be situated, but that is not what I am asking the Government to do. I am asking the Government whether these little ancient authorities, who are often extremely modern in their outlook, cannot be used to advance the progress of modern local government by bringing into it the historical traditions of public service which they have always upheld.
3.53 p.m.
THE EARL OF SELKIRK: My Lords, I should like to express to the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, my sincere thanks for what he said about Lady Horsbrugh. She will be greatly missed, both here and in Scotland. Her personality, modesty
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and resolution made her welcome in all companies, and certainly in this House.
I should also say that I cordially endorse what the noble Lord has said about this Report. It is a statesmanlike document, of a very far-reaching character, and it has frankly faced up to the nature of the problems which we have to look at. That does not mean, of course, that one agrees with every emphasis the Wheatley Commission have put in it, but I think we are greatly enriched by having it in front of us. I have only one criticism to make, and that is that when they ran into difficulty they fell into the use of the categorical imperative: they said what people "should" do, and gave what was indeed an exhortation. I think that we have had enough of exhortation. But the fact that they resorted to exhortation emphasises they found it extremely difficult to give a structural answer to this problem. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, for the way he has presented this case, and particularly for the emphasis he has made that we should ponder on it. I think this is the right attitude, and I am glad that he takes this view.
There are a number of things which enormously embellish this Report. The Minority Reports were extraordinarily interesting, and at the moment I am bound to say that I am inclined, on balance, to accept all the Minority Reports. The Report itself is extremely radical, and I wonder a little whether perhaps some members of the Commission felt it a good thing to make an extremely radical report, in order to present a challenge to every body to consider just what we do want with local authorities.
I should like to take up the first point which the noble Lord. Lord Hughes. made: what are our objectives? What is it that we expect of a local authority? Here I should like to read one passage from the shorter Report, because I think it puts the matter rather nicely. On page 1, paragraph 5 says:
"Local authorities have come to accept, and even rely on, a large measure of direction and control from the central Government. The electorate are aware of this. They are increasingly sceptical whether local government really means government. The question is being asked—and it is a serious question—whether, as an institution, local government is worthwhile maintaining at all."

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I was extremely glad that the noble Lord brought out the question of finance, which is of course part of that. But the fact remains that at the present time, unless we are going to put this point right, I am not sure whether an enormous reform of this character is necessary. if we are going to continue to make local government more or less like marionettes dancing to the tune of St. Andrew's House, assisted by the Treasury, it is not necessary to turn us completely upside down to do so.
May I take an example from the discussions on the Rent (Control of Increases) Bill last night? The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, replying, said that certain local authorities might not exercise discretion reasonably. If local authorities cannot be trusted to set the rents for their own houses, it seems to me rather doubtful whether the Government sincerely expect anything of a really positive nature from local government. I had a discussion earlier with the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, on the Highlands Development Board, as to whether it was given enough authority, and I was interested to see that the Chairman recently gave evidence to a Parliamentary Committee, more or less endorsing the arguments I used: that the Board had not enough freedom, and that there was too much delay in getting money from the Scottish Office and hence from the Treasury.
This is the major point, I think, because the Report goes on—and I quote from Chapter 32, at page 243. Paragraph 1013 says:
"… the kinds of control exercised by central Government have in total a damaging effect on the independence and initiative of local authorities."
It is very doubtful whether this criticism can be answered by what the Commission ask for—that is to say:
"possible self-restraint by central Government in dealing with local authorities."
They must have some real independence. I am sure the noble Lord—and I dare say whoever speaks on behalf of the English Commission—will say the same thing: we want the local authorities to be responsible; we want them to exercise their responsibilities. It is here that my anxiety arises. Because how will that happen? The only way that can happen is by piling the burden on to the rates, with the result
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that housing, which as the Report correctly says is the scourge of Scotland, will become an even more serious problem. Indeed, I have doubts whether, unless the burden on housing as a subject for taxation is seriously reduced, we shall ever get a solution to the housing problem in Scotland. That is the nature of my anxiety.
I was delighted to hear the noble Lord say that he was looking at this question of finance. I believe that it is fundamental. Unless we get something of that, we shall not get local authorities with a sense of responsibility, and holding the confidence and interest of the electors, as such. It is interesting to note that this thought must have passed through the minds of the members of the Commission, for in a small footnote at the bottom of page 175, Chapter 23, they use the words, "So long as rating remains …"—indicating that it must have passed through their minds that a time probably would not come when rating was quite so significant. Indeed, I hope that this will be the case some time.
I think we must face up to the fact that there is really no popular clamour for a radical change in local government. In itself that is not an answer, but there is no demand for it. What is suggested is a complete abolition of the whole existing structure—that is to say, the structure administrative and, to some extent, legal: the boroughs, the counties. To some extent that will mean the sheriff court, and not least the provost. The noble Lord must have some regard for the office of provost or of lord provost. Does that mean this office is going for ever? Is it really worth while? Is it to be made purely a dignitary office, with no sort of authority—shall I say just a nice little chap put up for the afternoon to receive some foreign delegation? I really think this is a matter that should not be lightly looked over. Cities have their dignity, and it should be expressed in an adequate way.
May I also make this point? If we are going through with radical changes of this sort we must be sure that they are worth while, because the period of evolution is bound to be extremely uncomfortable for everybody. These Reports, or even half of them, will take from six to ten years to get working smoothly. if we go all through this manœuvre without

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gaining very much from it it will be very unfortunate indeed.
My Lords, I should like to make a comment on the system of election. I am not wholly happy about one-member constituencies elected all together every four years. I wonder whether this is really the best way of getting people interested in local government as such. It means one of two things. First, it means an absence of continuity. I wonder whether the Government; if they want to adopt this basis, would consider that half the council should be elected every second year, so that there would not be a complete change-over. As I think the noble Lord will recognise, when a change takes place it takes those responsible from six months to a year to understand their jobs properly; and in local government, a more administrative matter, we do not want to have that break. There is a second point. With a complete change every four years there will be a stronger tendency for the candidates to adhere to one or other of the big national Parties. This is a disadvantage. National politics have only a relative interest in local politics and, on the whole, local political Parties have not been very successful or very strong. Finally, I say that it is all very well to compare this set-up with the Houses of Parliament, but in local government there is no Dissolution, no means of dissolving a council. The members, once elected for four years, stay there.
I would add one other thing, I thought the chapter on the control inside councils was extremely interesting. I will not go into it now, but on the whole I am against the Cabinet system, and I should have thought the management committee system would probably be best suited for most councils, though I agree entirely with the Commission that this is a matter which must be settled by the council itself. I am not going to follow the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, on the question of size. There are some very odd things to be noted. Half of Scotland goes into one region and half the people of Scotland go into another region. You can make lots of funny jokes like that. How on earth someone elected from the Mull of Kintyre can expect to go up to Muckle Flugga, in Shetland, to fulfil his duties as a regional councillor I do not know.
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This is the matter which I believe is supportive to the first point I made, that the local authorities should have responsibility.
Secondly, I do not really think it is possible to get round this problem by having community councils. I should have thought our experience of democracy was that representative assemblies which were not responsible were not likely to be very useful or very popular. I would not be in favour of community councils with nothing more than debating qualities. The test of whether the organisation works or not is whether you get quality—quality of men both in the elected representatives, on the one hand, and in the officials, on the other. I suggest to the Government that attaining both those qualities is the prime object of the structure and organisation which we should go for in local government.
4.4 p.m.
BARONESS ELLIOT OF HARWOOD: My Lords, I should like to thank the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, for his tribute to my great friend Lady Horsbrugh. I was very glad that he referred to her at the beginning of his speech. By great good chance for me, I spent Friday morning with her in Edinburgh, and although very frail she was extremely interested in everything I could tell her about Parliament and what was going on. She had been invited to the ceremony of the unveiling of the statue of Sir Winston Churchill—she had a special invitation because she was one of his Cabinet Ministers. She said to me as I left, "I shall see you on January 20." It was a great shock when I heard of her death only 24 hours later. On the other hand, it was wonderful to think that she suffered so little at the end and was keen and anxious and ready to return in January. She will be greatly missed by all of us. I feel a great personal loss, as I knew her intimately and she worked for many years with my husband when he was Minister of Health and she was his Under-Secretary.
I take part in this debate with the greatest possible pleasure and interest. Lord Hughes has opened the debate in exactly the way I hope he would, namely. by saying, "I want to know what all of you think", rather than by saying, "This

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is what I think and this is what I am going to do." It is obvious that the Government are anxious to know what those of us in local government—and having been a member of a county council since 1946 I have had some experience—are thinking about the Wheatley Report. In general I am in favour of the larger areas which are recommended in this Report. In the first instance, financially it is obvious that if you have a large catchment area from which to raise funds you will be able to do far more for that area than if it is only a small area, or in the case of rural areas, one of very low rateable value. I am therefore in favour of the larger areas financially.
I should like to ask the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, whether he can give us any indication of how these schemes will be financed. I agree with the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, that if local government is to be really effective it is most important that it should be much more independent of grant aid than it is to-day, and to have larger authorities and larger areas ought to help very much indeed in that way. How often, when sitting as county councillors, have we wanted to reduce the rates and been unable to do anything about it because half of our expenditure is on, let us say, education, where the salaries of teachers are absolutely and completely outwith any influence we may have, apart from other considerations. It would therefore be a great strength if in the financial arrangements which come as a result of the Wheatley Report some form of finance could be devised which was not completely outside our influence as local government people. I would ask whether the noble Lord can give us any indication of what the Government are thinking. It would be an enormous help. I also think that the larger areas would bring in a greater variety of services for more people, and this would be very valuable indeed. Furthermore, easier access to those services would be a great help. I am thinking particularly of eliminating country and city boundaries for services such as education.
It is difficult to decide what the best regions would be, because so much depends upon finance; but for the moment I am going to discuss the regions as they are outlined in the Report. Presumably this is at the present
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time simply tentative. I am in favour of the two-tier system. I think this is a good proposal, as opposed to the Maud proposals which are different. I should have preferred rather smaller areas in order that local government people might be more in touch with their localities; but again, without knowing about finance, it is difficult to suggest anything else, for I think finance is the real key to the whole of regional division. I see the point of bringing the cities and the rural areas together, since that is also going to give a larger catchment area for financial support. I agree with my noble friend Lord Dundee about the Highlands and Islands; more particularly about Orkney, the Shetlands and the Outer Isles. Whatever regional division you make, these areas are obviously still going to need a great deal of aid of one kind or another. It would be better to recognise this and to allow the Islands to be separate regions.
As there are, I think, 16 speakers this afternoon, perhaps I should keep my general remarks to the minimum. I should much prefer to speak about the area I know best, the one in which I have been a county councillor for so many years, and that is the area comprising the four Border counties—East Lothian, part of Midlothian, Edinburgh and the southern part of Fife. I would exclude the southern part of Fife. I should like the boundary to be at the Firth of Forth. I think it is a good idea to bring Edinburgh into this area. This would be of great assistance to the Borders, and would make for a more comprehensive and important region. I am against the recommendation to exclude the small villages of Castleton and Newcastleton, which are the southernmost towns of Roxburghshire, and to put them into the Western Region. They have always been part of Roxburghshire and I should not like to see them allocated anywhere else.
As I do not want to discuss the boundaries of the other regions, the question which next arises is the allocation between the top tier and the second tier. I am speaking now for myself, but I have had the opportunity to discuss this matter with some of my colleagues on my county council. There has been no meeting at which the whole county council could discuss their views, so the opinions I am expressing are the views of a certain number of key people on the county council,

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but not the whole county council. We agreed that education should be a top-tier function, in view of the need to include in the area education starting at the primary school and ending in some cases with the university and in other cases with technical colleges and other educational establishments. Obviously, it is of enormous value to have the whole range of educational services in one region.
We did not agree, however, that the social services should be a top-tier function. These services are essentially personal. They are concerned, in the main, with detailed and often intimate arrangements for social case work, whether with children or with families, with the aged, the sick or the mentally ill. It is essential, in my opinion—and I am chairman of our County Social Work Committee—that the administration and the working of those particular services should be carried out at the second-tier level. Looking through the regional divisions which are given in the Wheatley Report, it seems to me perfectly clear that the second tiers could provide all the services needed for social work, and it would be a very great pity indeed if those social work services were given to the region rather than to the second tier. That has been argued in the Report, in paragraph 392, 393 and 395.
I well remember, when the Social Work (Scotland) Bill was going through your Lordships' House, begging the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, to make the areas for social work the same areas as we had for probation, and not to split them up into the large burghs as well as the counties of cities. Now, in my opinion. the recommendation is swinging too far the other way, and I should like to see the social services dealt with by the second tier for the reasons I have given; namely, that provision can be made in the second tier for all the services required for social work.
Recently, on October 15. the National Institute for Social Work Training organised a conference in the Peebles Hydro of directors of social work in Scotland. Of the 60 people who attended. 47 were directors of social work and 11 were members of the Social Work Services Group in the Scottish Health and Welfare Department. In their report a
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plea is made for treating the social services as something of very great importance. There is a reference in the Wheatley Report to social work as a minority service, which quite obviously it is not; and I am sure that the people who were at that conference were anxious that the social services should be administered as near to the recipients of social work as possible, and yet in the second tier.
As to the housing recommendations, those of us who discussed this subject agreed that the provision of housing could be divided as has been recommended in the Wheatley Report; that is to say. that the top tier should have responsibility for overall planning and the second-tier authority should be able to provide housing accommodation in a more intimate and closer relationship to the electors. However, we thought that in the event of a clash of interests on housing, instead of an appeal to the Secretary of State there should he an appeal to an independent tribunal, which would decide between the second tier and the first tier on the question of housing.
We also thought that there were certain matters which would be better dealt with by the second tier than by the top-tier authority but which, in the Wheatley Report, have been given to the top-tier authority. We thought, for instance, that those subjects which are grouped under consumer protection should be given to the second-tier authority. These are weights and measures; refuse collection and disposal; the registration of births, deaths and marriages; the registration of electors and tourism—because we felt that that, too, was something which was very intimately associated with areas. We thought that it would be better if the second-tier authority were given those matters to care for. On the question of the water arrangements, as we know, the new water authorities have only just begun their work, and we felt that it would be better if the water authorities were allowed to operate on the present basis for, say, about ten years, to see how their work was carried out.
We then discussed the question of the community councils—and here I agree with my noble friend Lord Selkirk. I do not think that there is any point in setting up councils which have absolutely no statutory powers at all. They

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are just going to be small discussion groups, feeling highly frustrated if they cannot get any of their views accepted. For myself, I think that if we are going to have community councils then those councils should have statutory powers. I am not very enthusiastic about the idea of community councils. I should like to see the second-tier authority with a sufficiently small electorate to have a good number of elected representatives. It will be their job to keep in close touch with their constituents. I do not think that community councils would be really necessary.
On the question of payment of councillors, clearly those who sit on the regional authorities should be paid, and paid on a level basis throughout the country. We did not think that the second-tier authority people should be paid. We thought they should be given their expenses, as we are now, but, I should hope, on a slightly more generous basis. I think that regional government should cover those services which do not require an intimate knowledge of the electors. Then there is the question of division of planning. Obviously, there must be overall planning from the regions, but I do not see why there should not be also local planners working in close contact with the regional planners. I do not feel that this is impossible, although it would require tact and understanding as between one group and another.
Finally, in the Appendices there are two or three proposals about the type of administrative organisation that is recommended. I prefer the type outlined on page 108—the council with a policy committee and then the committees below it—rather than the type which incorporates the management board. I think that the council with its policy committee, and stemming from that the other committees, would be more effective. I think that that is what we, having studied the Report, should recommend.
When the noble Lord is gathering up everybody's ideas and discussing them, I hope that those are the points that he will consider. The question of the allocation between the top tier and the second tier is of vital importance. I hope very much that the more intimate and simple services which apply to everybody who lives in an area will be given to the second-tier authority; and
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that the overall powers of the regional authority will be reserved for those administrative parts of the organisation which are, in a sense, not so closely allied to the electors. I would thank the noble Lord for allowing us this opportunity of putting our views to him. I hope he will find some of our proposals are at least helpful at the very beginning of this important debate.
4.24 p.m.
LORD STRATHEDEN AND CAMPBELL: My Lords, having been closely connected with this subject since 1963, I am only too well aware that I do not know the complete answers to the problems. The difficulties became very obvious to me when, as President of the Association of County Councils in Scotland, I had to try to produce an agreed and coherent statement first for the Working Party and the Steering Committee of which I was a member (which was set up by the late Government in 1963) and later when preparing the written evidence for the Royal Commission and when giving evidence before it. Now, however, I am speaking solely as an individual.
When we were considering this problem in 1963 it became very obvious (and perhaps its unnecessary to state it) that Scotland is divided into three parts: the Highlands, the Central Belt and the rest. The rest have a very large number of individual problems. Then, of course, there are the Islands. It became very doubtful whether any one solution could serve the whole country. In fact, I think I can remember saying at one of the meetings of the Steering Committee that it would be like trying to put Scotland in a straitjacket if exactly the same solution were imposed over the whole country.
It seemed to me in 1963, and again when preparing the evidence for the Royal Commission, that our suggestion of 14 top-tier authorities was going quite a long way; but as time went on and once began to see something of the workings of the Royal Commission I must confess to having doubts as to whether that was really going far enough. Then came the Commission's Report. Here I should like to pay a very sincere tribute to the Royal Commission—to the Chairman, Lord Wheatley, and to all the members—for the enormous care they

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took in going into everything in the greatest detail, for having absorbed that enormous volume of evidence which covers three or four pages of the Report and also for the trouble that they—not necessarily the entire Commission, but some of them—took in going round and interviewing a complete cross-section of the local authorities in Scotland. In that way the Commission acquired a direct and valuable knowledge of the feelings of the various authorities.
My Lords, I think the Report is on the right lines. A two-tier system makes complete sense, and I think that seven top-tier authorities are just about right. If there were many fewer it would become really full-scale regional government and I do not think anybody really wants that. If there were many more—I stress the word "many"—it would be merely tinkering with the subject. That does not mean that I entirely agree with everything in the Report about the top-tier authorities. I have already mentioned the Highlands and Islands, which, as I said early on, I found to be an almost insoluble problem. I think there is a great deal to be said for splitting up that very big regional authority, with Shetland and Orkney, as suggested by the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, being autonomous areas with special roles and with special financial arrangements. Then the Highlands and Western Islands would go together. There is a case for splitting the Outer Hebrides. The area is so small that I do not know how it would work; but I think it is something that should be carefully examined. I realise that I am on dangerous ground in mentioning these problems in this House, but so far as Argyllshire is concerned possibly it looks more towards Glasgow than towards the Highlands. That comes on to the other areas of the South-West, the West and the Central.
As has been mentioned, the Western Region takes in half the population of Scotland and is also, I think, a great deal bigger than what is considered to be the population limit for an efficient top tier authority, which is about 1 million. Here we have 2½ million. It might be worth while to take those three to pieces again and see whether the jigsaw cannot be reassembled to give a better balance. The South-West area, though admittedly
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it includes a traditionally autonomous collection of counties, is a good deal smaller than the standard for viability laid down in the Report. I think that area certainly ought to be looked at in some considerable detail.
I do not propose to go into further detail regarding the boundaries. If one meets assembled together in Scotland two or three people who have any connection with local government, one will certainly hear an argument about why this or that bit of country is included in someone else's area, and why the boundary ought to be changed. There is a good deal of interest about such matters and a great deal of discussion goes on. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Elliot of Harwood about the South-East corner of Fife. Whether Fife should be divided is not for me to say, but it seems odd that it should come South across the Forth rather than go West towards Grangemouth and Stirling. East Fife does not join with Dundee, one would think. It is quite close to the Tay, but, despite the bridge, the Tay is a formidable obstacle.
So much, my Lords, for the Regions, the top tier. In the second tier there are 37 district authorities. On the whole, I think that number is too few, and that some of them are too large. The functions of these authorities include planning, which is the most important function, and it seems that to a large degree planning has influenced the boundaries of the top tier. There is no doubt at all that the major or strategic planning must go to the top tier, but I am very doubtful whether there is any need to divide planning at all. There are all sorts of reasons for not doing so. There is the question of staff which, obviously, should not be the final decider although it is important. It is quite clear that there will not be sufficient staff to man this very large number of planning offices, but there will be enough to get a really efficient organisation in the regional authorities.
My Lords, I believe it to be extremely important that the second tier, the districts, should be fully consulted in any planning problems, and I am also aware that leaving it to the top tier could make for unacceptable delays, partly because of congestion and blocking the pipeline. I think that problem could be solved by

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filtering the detailed planning which sometimes clogs the machine—minor and quite uncontroversial matters, like the alteration to a cottage or minor change of use in a burgh—back to the district authority to be dealt with under building regulations or by some other means which would have to he devised to enable that to happen and to prevent possible long delays.
The right number of district authorities is very hard to arrive at. There has to be a balance between area and population. One of the notes of reservation gives it as 101, but I think that is too many. I should have thought that it could probably be got down to about 50, instead of the 37 mentioned in the Report. I will not go through the other functions. Housing has been mentioned. I know that that is extremly important, and I think it is dealt with correctly in the Report. The policy on housing should be left to the regional authority, and the detailed work—housing improvements and functions such as that—to the district.
There are a number of smaller matters which I do not think need be dealt with by the regional authorities. Weights and measures could be dealt with by the districts. Refuse is an unsavoury matter, but it is becoming of vital importance in the landward areas. I cannot see why that function has to be forcibly divided between collection and disposal, because a number of existing county councils have, I know, joined up and are using very efficient modern plant to deal with the whole thing. I do not see why that should not go on. It could be left to the good sense of the regional authority to decide how much and where it ought to be combined and how much could be decentralised.
I think that registration of all sorts, births, deaths, marriages and the registration of electors, is a district matter. It would be much easier done in that way and it is a very local affair which should be dealt with locally. The community councils have been mentioned, and I am inclined to agree with what is said about them. They have no powers and no "teeth" of any sort. But there is another form of small committee mentioned on page 233 of the Report, the local
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committees which the Report envisages should have some powers. I know that this is very small-scale stuff—in fact, parish pump stuff. But it is important that the parish pump should be kept working, otherwise the huge superstructure will not get fertilised and will easily wither. I think it is important that there should be something which is really down to earth. That may sound absurd, but these bodies do work. I am chairman of a district council in a very thinly populated area. We never have a vacancy on that council. Great interest is taken in its work. Its powers are minimal but it has a great advantage in that in general ordinary people are much more prepared to talk to somebody who is in the parish, who is well known to them all and walking about among them the whole time. Such a person can bring forward a problem that is quite beyond the scope of a district council, and advice can be given about how the problem may be dealt with. That type of thing may not be according to the rules, but it is a way in which things are eased along and the machinery oiled, and the very heavy structure above kept working.
The management, or the internal organisation of councils, has been touched on this afternoon. There are three methods set out in the Report. Although saying that it is a matter entirely for the regional councils to decide for themselves, the Report undoubtedly reveals a preference for the policy committee. My Lords, I do not agree. I think that the policy committee is far too like the existing committee system on county councils. Although, as the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, has pointed out, it has been shown that this system can be made to work by the efforts of the members and staffs, it is not a good way, and I think it would be a mistake to put it up again with a completely new set-up in local government. The Cabinet system is going too far, and I should not welcome that. The management board I like, but I prefer the variety suggested by Sir Andrew Wheatley, in his reservation to the Redcliffe-Maud Report, which is quoted fully in the Wheatley Report that we are discussing. It has the advantage that both councils and committees have powers to do the job for which they have been elected.

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One of the important parts of this proposal is that the actual carrying out of local authority jobs will go through the chief executive officers, if that is to become the new title of the clerks. I regret that the name "clerk" may go by the board, because county clerks and town clerks are old-established names: but it cannot be helped. It is a good plan that the actual work to be done should go through the chief executive officers, because it means that there will be one person to whom chief officers can refer about how their work should be carried out and who can assure that priorities are kept in the correct order.
As the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, pointed out, the timing of the Government's request for local authority views has been fairly quick and associations of local authorities have been able to send in their preliminary observations by the required time. They have had time to give responsible replies. But, even so, I hope that the Government, after they have considered those replies, will not make the error of thinking that, because a long time has passed since this began, and because of cries that "We cannot have any more delay", it is necessary to rush through to the end. After all, this matter has been under consideration for nearly seven years and things have not dried up. Local government is still working as efficiently as it ever has before, which is extremely efficiently.
I would suggest that the Government, when they have considered the replies from the local authority associations, should not publish a White Paper, on which they will have to stand pat, laying down that this or that is what will have to be done, but should produce a possible solution. The Report of the Royal Commission has produced a broad outline of how a possible solution can be arrived at. I think that the Government should produce the actual possible solutions, send them out to local authorities again for discussion and then come to a final decision. It will take a little longer. but as it has already taken seven years, and as it is all too clear that it will take several more years, that is not so very important.
Finally, I would say a word on finance. The noble Lord, Lord Hughes, in his
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comments, has taken away some of the things I was going to say as a finale to my remarks, but I still wish to stress the importance of this question of finance. It is the greatest pity that finance was not dealt with much earlier, as was requested of both the last Government and the present one by the Association of Municipal Treasurers and County Treasurers, who said that we could not really get down to the reorganisation of local government without knowing how finance was going to work. I would put is strongly that, unless some way is found by the Government—and a way can undoubtedly be found—to make the local authorities financially solvent, no reorganisation, of whatever kind, will in the long run succeed, and we shall not get the members and the officials of the quality required.
4.46 p.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I should like to start by associating myself with the tributes that have been paid to Lady Horsbrugh. She was in another place with my mother-in-law and remained a very close friend of the family. Her decisive comments and wise advice were always of the greatest value and she was a very good friend. I am sure that that goes for very many of us.
We are having a debate of a rather unique character to-day. The noble Lord, Lord Hughes, started it by speaking and he is going to do a lot of listening. If it is true that the Government have not made up their minds on the Wheatley Report, it is equally true that the Opposition have not made up their minds either. That leaves us an opportunity to let our Parliamentary hair down and to speak frankly among ourselves as we think fit. What is striking is the remarkable measure of agreement that has emerged so far. I very much agree with the wise speech just made by my noble friend Lord Stratheden and Campbell and with what my noble friend Lord Selkirk said on the matter of finance.
I also agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, that this is an opportunity for considering the structure of local government as a whole. One of the things I have always found fascinating, in government and out, is that trends of opinion seem to go in opposite directions at the same time in England and in Scotland.

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We have had unitary authorities in Scotland, certainly so far as the Landward areas are concerned. Now it is suggested that England should adopt unitary authorities and we should go to a two-tier system. There may be good reasons for this. I doubt whether it would be possible to arrive at unitary authorities of such a size for the whole of Scotland that would remove the necessity for a second tier at least in some places, and the Government will have to make up their minds on how much uniformity we want to have throughout Scotland.
My noble friend Lord Stratheden and Campbell has already asked whether any one pattern can be expected to fit the whole of Scotland, and I think that that is an important question. Incidentally, what I intend to do is to ask a number of questions which I think the Government have to ask themselves and which we equally shall have to ask ourselves as time goes on. There is considerable agreement that the sort of changes that are needed are those which first of all will recognise the inter-dependence between region and region, between county and county and between burgh and surrounding rural areas—I lay a lot of stress on inter-dependence, and I will come back to that—secondly, changes that will provide an adequate and appropriate basis for the economic and efficient administration of various services, that will be flexible enough to be adapted to the diverse needs of different areas and circumstances and will be as closely in touch with people as possible; and thirdly, changes to retain for the individual citizen a sense of belonging to a locality and a sense of participation in government in his own locality. I do not think mere involvement is enough. We cannot help being involved. But there is unquestionably a seeking after participation, not only in Scotland but in many parts of the world.
There is always one essential consideration in making changes in the system of government— a consideration, I would say, the observance of which has accounted for this country's reputation for political genius—and that is to maintain continuity through change. I suggest that, to be acceptable and to work well, changes must be in keeping with the instincts as well as the interests of the people.
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On this I should like to say a word on independence and inter-dependence of local authorities. Inter-dependence applies both as between functions and as between authorities. The sense of responsibility for the welfare of those living in their areas is one of the great virtues of our local authorities. But it does not follow that they themselves should necessarily provide the services. It is their job to ensure that the services are provided, for example, if necessary, by a neighbouring authority better placed to provide them. It is the welfare of the individual that should always take precedence over tidiness of organisation. To my mind, this is something that was not perhaps always present to the minds of the Commission: that is my reading of the Report, although I may be quite wrong. At any rate, failure on the part of local authorities in the recognition of inter-dependence has stimulated demands for increasing the size of authorities, and to that extent authorities have themselves to blame.
Parliament has recognised this truth perhaps to a greater extent than local authorities. For example, it has provided that one authority may arrange for children to be educated at a neighbouring authority by agreement between the authorities concerned. But such arrangements are relatively seldom made, even where the absence of any such arrangements may mean that the children have to travel miles and miles to school in their own area, although schools in the neighbouring area may be just down the road from their homes. This lack of inter-dependence is not going to disappear, it is not going to be cured, by re-drawing boundaries.
I suggest that it needs deliberate and continuous pressure from above and below to see that regard is paid to those minority interests and that they take precedence over bureaucratic tidiness. The answer may sometimes be minor adjustment of boundaries. This may be right provided that the population transferred really feels that it belongs to the area to which it has to be transferred rather than the existing area. But the population may feel strongly—some do— that it belongs to its present area, but still would rather that certain services, and particularly education, should be provided for their children by a neigbouring area. The same inter-dependence, I

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suggest, exists in services. Of course it is true, as the Wheatley Commission say, that health and welfare are closely connected with housing. But surely it by no means follows that for that reason both are necessarily to be dealt with by the same tier of authorities.
There is one other general consideration that I should like to put. As the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, mentioned, the Commission state four broad objectives: power, effectiveness, local democracy and local involvement. They add two more conceptions in this section which they seem almost to elevate to principles: concentration and consistency. I would far rather see inter-dependence given this status than concentration, which is closely linked with power. Concentration of power presents great dangers to freedom and to the independence both of individuals and of communities. As to consistency, this must be tempered by the recognition of the need for diversity. There should be variations and exemptions to meet different circumstances. Consistency is only a virtue if you are right, and what is right for one area may be wrong for another. A better formulation, I should have thought, was coherence and diversity. I would dispute that power should be an objective at all. I would emphatically substitute duty; and I believe that duties will still have to be defined. The duty is to see that defined common local services are provided. The powers that are exercised by local authorities over individuals must be carefully controlled by Parliament. Power comes from the people; powers are conferred by Parliament on behalf of and for the benefit of the people.
The Commission seem sometimes to accept that local authorities should be able to do what they like. This idea has no place in a free society. The mere fact that a division of duties between two tiers is proposed means that the local authorities are to be elected to carry out these defined duties allocated to them. They may have powers to do other things conferred on them. I am quite sure that we shall be doing a great disservice to democratic freedom if we abolish the ultra vires rule so far as local authorities are concerned. Their independence lies in the ways in which they
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are to carry out their powers and duties, not in the choice of powers they are to exercise and the duties they are to perform.
There seems to have been a large extent of general agreement, first, that there should be two tiers of local government, and secondly, that local government should be as local as is consistent with economy and efficiency—as local as practicable; and what is practicable is a matter of judgment and varies with different services. It is, for example, a matter of judgment how local government should be, and on this there was disagreement within the Commission itself.
But as the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, suggested, the big question is how to reconcile continuity and the recognition of local loyalties and local wishes with economy and efficiency. The noble Lord said that the Government were in no way bound to the seven regions and the 37 districts which the Commission have proposed. How will these proposals fit into the broad structure of democratic government in Great Britain as a whole? This, I think, is a question that has to be asked. Is it right to confine the role of existing communities in Scotland to a purely consultative one? Each community is to be allowed, and I quote:
"To do anything to improve its area."
In Scotland it is proposed that the communities should be denied the right even to precept. This is in sharp distinction to what is proposed for the communities in England. It is not clear what the communities in Scotland are to do for money to pay for any such improvements, nor is it clear what their constitutional status would be. We might even have to have them as limited liability companies, or companies limited by guarantee. There does not seem to be a status to fit them at all, if they are to be allowed to spend money.
Then again, how many elected bodies are we to have in Scotland? In England there are to be provincial councils, each province containing roughly the same population as Scotland. Five of the eight provinces have between 4½ million and 6 million population, one with less and two with more. The provinces are initially to have councils, the majority of whose members are to he indirectly elected by the councils of the unitary local

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authorities. Eventually, it is envisaged that they should be directly elected by the people in each province. Well, then, is Scotland to have an assembly initially indirectly elected by the top tier authorities and later by the people of Scotland? If so, that will mean that there will be five sets of elections: the communities, the districts, the regions, the Scottish assembly, convention or council—whatever you call it— and the national Parliament. One wonders whether this is not rather overdoing it. The proposed Scottish regions cannot conceivably be treated, in my view, on a par with the English provinces, because the proposed powers are so very widely different. Inter-dependence cannot stop with the Border, so it will be the border regions of Scotland that will have to work with the border unitary authorities of England—Cumberland, Westmorland, and Northumberland.
Again, one has to ask whether it is really necessary to have as few regions as seven for Scotland. The noble Lord, Lord Stratheden and Campbell, was doubtful whether this was few enough, if I understood him correctly. The size and number of the regions and districts is bound to influence the pattern of services to be provided by regions and districts respectively. If there are to be seven regions and 37 districts, it seems to me to be wrong to give housing to the regions. Surely such districts are large enough to be entrusted with the housing functions. The lower tier is clearly more local than the upper tier; indeed, it is questionable whether regional government on the proposed scale is really local government in the presently accepted meaning of the term. One cannot define local government by a negative; one cannot say that it is simply all government that is not central government. Nobody would suggest that government by States or provinces is local government. Nothing, I would suggest, is of greater or more enduring local interest than local planning and housing. I wonder, therefore, whether we ought to put housing into the top tier. I should have thought rather that given a need for housing in a particular area—and housing needs will inevitably have to be co-ordinated at a higher tier, whether at Scotland level or regional level—it is essentially a matter for the locality as to where the houses are to be built, what size they are to be, what they
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are going to look like and to whom they are going to be allocated.
I grant that the strategic plan has to be settled under the proposals by the upper tier, and where resources are scarce, priorities may have to be agreed by the top tier. But just as Maud would give the provinces in England,
"… a reserve power to undertake development if ever such action becomes necessary to give effect to the provincial plan …"
so in Scotland should not the strategic planning authorities, that is to say the regions, be given similar powers, leaving general housing functions to the second tier?
I do not want to deal with the functions in detail, but there is one allocation which has puzzled me particularly; that is, the allocation of weights and measures. This happens to be a subject I have learned something about in the past four and a half years. The curiosity is that the local authorities, in their evidence, put weights and measures in the top tier. The Commission seem simply to have followed, with hardly any discussion, the suggestions of the local authorities on this subject. I think it was my noble friend Lady Elliot who said that she thought this ought to be in the lower tier, and I heartily join with her. The only valid reason that I can think of for putting them in the top tier is that so few local authorities take very much interest in them.
What is quite incomprehensible is that food, drugs and milk functions, but not weights and measures, are by common consent allocated to the second tier. I should have thought that the sensible thing would be to put all those overlapping enforcement functions together in the second tier authorities. Weights and measures functions, which include the enforcement of the Trade Descriptions Act, are essentially local. The inspectors have to be in the closest day to day touch with local traders, local newspapers and local consumers. I think this goes for the authorities themselves, too. It is really a very personal job, not something that you want to decentralise down from Regions. You can, if I may say so, decentralise registration down, which is an information collecting job. But I should have thought that 37 authorities for weights and measures are none too many, and seven would be far too few.

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But, of course, the seven regions may be far too few. Neither the local authority associations, nor the working party, seem to have recommended as few as seven. Fourteen to 24 was the kind of figure generally suggested, and map 23·2 of Appendix 23 of the Report makes it 17.
The Highlands have been mentioned. I should have thought that there were some good reasons for the Highlands forming one region, although I am inclined to doubt whether Orkney shares any real common interest with the Highlands. I feel fairly certain that Shetland does not. I would agree with my noble friend Lord Dundee that these might be made all-purpose authorities on their own—and this applies particularly to Shetland—each authority making such arrangements with such other authorities as it saw fit to provide for it the services which it could not reasonably provide for itself, such as further education. If it is envisaged that the Highlands region should ultimately take over the functions of the Highlands and Islands Board—if this is in the mind of the Government—then I should be inclined to favour a single authority, despite all its disadvantages. If not, it seems to me that it will be better to have Argyllshire with Lochaber, the Islands and Kyle of Lochalsh as a separate region. Although the population would be less than 100,000 the geographical and economic difficulties are such as to justify a separate region.
As for the Western Region, I would agree that it is really intolerably large. One reason why Ayrshire is included, I suspect, is that unlike Maud, Wheatley proposes to confer responsibility for new towns on the top tier. Surely, this is essentially a national function and should be left with the Secretary of State. It looks as if Ayrshire. with its population of 355,000, has been included in the Western Region because of the possibility of one or more new towns being developed there. Surely Ayrshire should be a region on its own. I should have thought people there were in many ways different from the people of Glasgow.
I would also ask: is there not a much stronger case than the Commission allows for the cities being regions on their own? Even if they are not to be, why should not the device adopted by Maud for
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Liverpool, Birmingham and Manchester be adopted? That is to say, these metropolitan areas should be divided into districts which would run the main services—education, social welfare, health, housing and many other local functions. Why should the territories of the cities, particularly Glasgow and Edinburgh, be extended to cover so much of the surrounding area? Is there any reason to think that a city will run the affairs of the small towns and rural areas round about them to the liking of their inhabitants? After all, many of the inhabitants have deliberately left the cities. Is it reasonable to claw them back? Of course. most of these have retained links with the cities, but they no longer feel they belong to them. If It is conceded that the procedures for extending boundaries have proved too cumbersome, is that not a reason for changing the procedures, rather than arbitrarily extending the boundaries?
But, whether or not the territories in the cities are to be enlarged to form districts, surely these cities themselves should retain all their present powers with very few exceptions—middle-distance transportation might be one. The idea that the existing cities, in so far as they retain their identity at all, may be degraded to community status seems to me both abhorrent and absurd.
My Lords, if there are to be more regions, then plainly there should be more districts. And how many more? I am not sure we need accept the suggestion of the two Members of Parliament on the Commission, that there should be as many as 101 districts based on the locality concept; nor do I imagine that implementing their recommendations would stifle all demand for communities. Neither 37 nor 101 need, I suggest, be the right number; compromises are often the best solution. But, whatever the number of districts should be, they would inevitably vary greatly in both density and population. And I ask again: need they all have exactly the same powers? If they must, then would it not be better to start off with 101 and encourage them to work together and to grow together. so that in due course the number would be reduced? Leave it to natural diminution instead of natural growth.
The one thing I think we should avoid is to try now—and this seemed to be

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suggested by Wheatley—to fix a pattern that will last for ever. No pattern will do that. If it lasts a generation it will do well, especially in these rapidly changing times. What is important is that the services should be administered as close to the people as considerations of efficiency permit; and, above all, that they should be administered for the convenience of the people and not of the authorities themselves, nor the Government.
5.13 p.m.
LORD STRATHCLYDE: My Lords, I join with those noble Lords who have already spoken in thanking the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, for having initiated this debate, thus giving us an opportunity of discussing this most important subject. Speaking for myself, and unlike my noble friend Lord Dundee, I would rather that he had postponed it until after the Christmas Recess; but, on the other hand, I have to acknowledge that the fact he put the Motion on the Order Paper has forced me, and perhaps other noble Lords as well, to study the Report of Lord Wheatley's Royal Commission.
Here, let me again join with those noble Lords who have already spoken in congratulating Lord Wheatley and his colleagues on the excellence of their Report, on its comprehensive nature, and also on its clarity. The Commission deserve the thanks, not only of this House but also of all our fellow countrymen for the pains they have taken in inquiring into every part of local government and for stating so clearly the arguments, as they saw them, for and against change, and finally for presenting their solution with the reasons for their decisions. Whether we agree or not with these reasons, their work has been long and arduous, and their study of the functions and pattern of local government in the past, and also as it is to-day and as they suggest it should be in the future, has been meticulous in every respect.
The Report has taken some three years to prepare. It is the outcome of a very great deal of investigation, much travel, many meetings, and the absorption of much evidence, both verbal and in writing. For the time, energy and thought that the members of the Commission have devoted to it. they arc entitled to and deserve not only our thanks but also our gratitude. In this connection, I am
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sure that we in this House also recognise the devoted work of those who have served the Commission in a secretarial capacity and otherwise.
To assimilate the contents of this Report and its Appendices would entail a very serious study occupying many weeks. I regret that I have been unable to spare that time to make such a study, but if your Lordships will bear with me for a few minutes I should like to comment on a few matters which have impressed me. I hope that I am not here going to fall into all the pitfalls which the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, mentioned to us.
The extent of the Highlands and Islands Region appears to me, as it has appeared to other noble Lords, to be far too widespread to be administered under a system of local government. John o'Groats and the Mull of Kintyre are 260 miles apart—that is, as the crow flies. I do not feel that the people of Campbeltown and those of Wick can have a great deal in common, except that both live in the crofter counties. Here I must say that the same thought struck me as struck my noble friend Lord Dundee (I think it was): that perhaps the inclusion of Argyll in the Highland area had something to do with the setting-up of the Highlands and Islands Development Board. I should have thought that that part of Argyll from, let us say, the Mull of Kintyre to Oban, and then along the Southern shore of Loch Etive and through the Pass of Brander and on to Tyndrum, and thence following the Dumbartonshire boundary southwards to the head of Loch Long, has a much closer connection in every description with Glasgow and with the West Region than it has with the rest of the Highlands. And here I would observe that I consider that the West Region is already much too large.
In relation to the Highlands and Islands Region there is another matter which has struck me—and it has already been mentioned by other noble Lords. Why must the Orkneys, the Shetlands and the Western Islands be included in this Region? That is, of course, a question which is dealt with fully in the Report, but I am far from being convinced by the arguments leading up to these Islands' being given second-tier responsibilities and not those of an all-purpose authority.

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When I refer to the functions which the regions are to exercise I am still further from being convinced. It is not as though the Highlands and Islands Region is ever likely to be financially viable and able to carry the financial burden of the Islands; and I think it has been admitted that the Orkneys and Shetlands have a considerably closer connection with Aberdeen than with the more adjacent mainland. As for the Western Islands, they are attached to Glasgow far more than they are to the Highland Region. My feeling is that which is shared by other of your Lordships: that these Islands should be all-purpose authorities, responsible not to any region but to St. Andrew's House direct.
I do not propose to comment upon the North-East, the East or the South-East Regions but, as I have already said, I think that the West Region is too large. If consideration were to be given to it, then changes in the Central and the South-West Regions might well be appropriate. From North to South the West Region is 115 miles long. It may be that the northern part of the Region has an affinity with Glasgow, but that is not the case so far as South Ayrshire is concerned. I feel that much of the southern part of Ayrshire—possibly the whole of the South Ayrshire constituency, or even that part of it lying South of the River Doon or South of the River Girvan—could well go into the South-West Region; and that would certainly make that Region stronger than it is at present.
The heart of the West Region is of course Glasgow, surrounded by the great industrial complex of which it is the centre. But the West Regional Council is going to be the authority, not only of the industrial area, hut of very large areas which are purely agricultural. While I am in agreement with the Commission that no longer should the cities and burghs be treated administratively as apart from the country by which they are surrounded, I feel that to take in with a great industrial area large areas of open agricultural land, stretching 70 miles to the South of its centre, 30 miles to the South-West and 40 miles to the North-West is a very different proposition.
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Another aspect is the extent to which Glasgow would dominate the West Regional Council. To man its various committees—if the committee system is to be followed—and to provide reasonable representation, a council of some 91 or 134 members might be appropriate, and of these numbers the share of Glasgow would be 40 in one case and 59 in the other. South Ayrshire, which is so far away from the centre, would have either seven or ten members, some of whom would represent places as far to the South as Barrhill and Ballantrae. And these are so far from Glasgow as to make it, if not impossible, certainly unreasonable to expect attendance at other than fairly widely spread intervals. As a councillor in the City of Glasgow, with my place of business within a quarter mile of the City Chambers, I find it difficult to give the time to my work in the Corporation—work which I think probably would be more or less on a par with the regional council—and to meet the requirements of my business. In fact when I am attending meetings of committees I frequently have to run both to the municipal buildings and back again.
If young, active men and women are to be attracted to local government, the work of the councils will have to be most carefully organised, and transport will need to be provided for those members living at a distance from rail and bus services. While I in no way decry the services which retired or semi-retired people can give, I anticipate that there will be a great deal of difficulty in finding people of the quality desired to man the councils, both regional and district. My hope is that both industry and business may find it possible to release some of their personnel to undertake the duties of councillors. Reference was made by the noble Baroness, Lady Elliot of Harwood, to the payment of councillors. I sincerely hope that if they are to be paid they will be paid a fixed salary and not simply be compensated for loss of earnings.
My Lords, I feel it is almost an impertinence to pick out one or two points from this excellent Report, particularly when the Report shows that the Commission have not failed to take those points into account, and indeed have given them much consideration. However, the Report also emphasises the difficulties which

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the Commissioners have found in reaching certain of their decisions. It is for that reason, and also because of the invitation of the noble Lord opposite, that I have ventured to intrude into the debate. While welcoming the Report, and agreeing that a two-tier system will add greatly to the efficiency and also to the status of local government, I have to record, like other noble Lords, that I do not like the community council, and I feel that further consideration should be given to the size and composition of the West Region and to these other matters that I have ventured to mention.
5.25 p.m.
VISCOUNT STONEHAVEN: My Lords, I want first, if I may, to pay a tribute to Florence Horsbrugh, and I do so also on behalf of all her many European friends, who I am quite sure would wish me to do so. I was with her when she led the British delegation to the Council of Europe. I gained a great deal of experience in working with her and was guided by her advice and knowledge. My memories of her are very pleasant. She will be a great loss. I wish to thank the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, for the tribute he paid to her—far better than any I could pay.
I would also thank the noble Lord for putting this Motion on the Order Paper to-day, and thus giving us the opportunity of expressing some preliminary views. I stress the word "preliminary", because in my part of the world we have had rather unfortunate experiences of expressing preliminary views which were taken as being authentic views after full consideration, whereas in fact they were nothing of the sort. We were then faced with a fait accompli, and a Parliamentary political decision was taken with which none of us agreed. It was forced down our throats. We were told that we had had our chance and ought to have expressed our views then. In fact we did not know at the time that it was our final chance. I am referring to the case of the water board. The noble Lord, Lord Hughes, knows all about it. With the exception of making that point, I shall endeavour not to transgress or to go into detail. The noble Lord has quite rightly asked us not to do that, and I think it would be futile if we did. However, there are one or two small points in regard
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to boundaries which I must venture into if we are to discuss the Report at all.
As noble Lords have said, the Report is a wonderful piece of work, but I must admit that I find that some of the details which have not been discussed (and which I do not mean to discuss now) have a dreamlike quality about them. In fact, some of them have quite a nightmarish quality. Local government deals with people, and not with punched holes in cards to feed into a computer; but with certain of the details one gets that kind of feeling. Certainly in the district of Kincardineshire, where I come from, our experience of the working of regionalisation has not as yet been happy, and therefore many people are highly suspicious. We have had experience of the regional water board. In one borough our experience has been that exactly the same water, coming out of exactly the same wells, down exactly the same pipes, which used to cost fivepence per thousand gallons now costs the people two shillings per thousand gallons, and they are asking what benefit regionalisation has been to them, the ratepayers. That question is not particularly easy to answer, but in time I agree that it will "come out in the wash". At the moment it is not a very good advertisement for regionalisation.
Again, turning to large-scale administration, we find that the East of Scotland Water Board recently accepted a tender for quite a large piece of engineering work, and then had to submit the tender to Edinburgh. It was the lowest tender. Edinburgh sat on it for so long that the time for acceptance, which was two months. ran out and a very large increase in price was demanded by the contractor and agreed to as being reasonable by Edinburgh. If one appoints a water board and official engineers and instructs them to invite tenders in the proper way and accept the lowest tender, I do not agree that it is reasonable that there should then be this further delay. I do not think it is good; and if the regionalisation we are discussing now is going to result in this kind of thing, we have cause to be jolly careful.
Again, there is this point to consider, if one abolishes the small borough administration. Small boroughs have part-time clerks and officials. and they share the services of the county council

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officials, engineers and so on. The cost of that is probably in the order of £800 a year. You will not be able to do without an official at all, and you will certainly have to appoint a permanent official to look after those functions which are now done by part-time people and delegated authority. You will certainly not get the quality of man you want for less than twice that sum. I feel that before one can really consider the Wheatley Report on a reasonable basis one must have a cost-benefit and a cost-effectiveness forecast of what the new setup will be, and I hope the noble Lord's departmental inquiry will come up with something of that sort. We are in the dark. We are very suspicious on the grounds of the experience we have already had, and I think that with that experience we are entitled to be suspicious.
I should like to know also what services which are not already supplied will be provided, who will benefit, who will pay for them and how much. As a local example, we have in our county two deaf children. It costs us £2.000 a year for two taxis to send those children to a centre. We very willingly pay that and it is quite right. But regionalisation is not going to alter it; we shall still have to do exactly the same thing. It is the local problems of that sort that worry us. This is a matter of geography, and that is not going to be altered. I agree with the Municipal Public Service Journal of October 31, where they say of the large units proposed by Wheatley that they are
"no more likely to create effectiveness but tending rather to result in increased bureaucracy."
This is a danger upon which we want reassurance.
Should the cost-benefit cost-effectiveness show any improvement over the existing system of maximum cooperation with neighbouring authorities and regional bodies carrying out certain functions, only then, I maintain, is the Wheatley system a valid system to impose. It is unrealistic to consider what functions should go to which tier authorities until you know the numbers of each authority and, broadly speaking, their size. What may be a good solution for Glasgow and the greater Glasgow area need not necessarily be good for the Highlands, or Aberdeenshire and the North-East.
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The unanimous conclusions of the Kincardineshire County Council are stated in a letter—quite a short one—to the Association of County Councils. It says:

"(a) the four Cities should continue as all-purpose Authorities, their problems being quite different from those of the rural areas;

(b) no County should be split between one region and another unless there are very good reasons;

(c) there do not appear to be such reasons in the case of Kincardineshire where an arbitrary line has been drawn based apparently on geology;

(d) the County of Kincardineshire should form on its own a lower-tier authority in a region comprising, broadly speaking, the area of the North-Eastern Counties Police Board. In this connection it is noted that two members of the Commission favoured the creation of 101 second-tier authorities as against the majority of the members' 37;

(e) the proposals for setting up community councils are regarded with disfavour;"—

and as I was at that meeting I can tell you it was more than disfavour—
"(f) the Council renews its protest on the inadequate time allowed for considering the Report.
As regards (c), reference is made to paragraph 747 of the Report, where it is stated, 'The whole forms a well-defined region, already recognised for various purposes such as economic planning. police, fire, water and hospital administration', but it is the whole of Kincardineshire which is in this well-defined region (i.e., the North-East Region), for all these purposes except water. Other services in which the whole of Kincardineshire shares with other local authorities in the North-East Region are social work, valuation and civil defence.
Paragraph 748 of the Report states: 'The County of Kincardine is most often regarded as falling wholly within this region' (the North-East) 'but physically it is cut in two by the eastern extension of the Grampian massif'. This is only true in a very limited sense and important other considerations lead to a different conclusion.
In Appendix 17 of the Report it is stated that
'South Kincardine is included in the region' (East) 'by virtue of its physical continuity with Strathmore in Angus and its economic links and communications with Dundee'. It has also economic links and communications with Aberdeen and it is believed that these are by far the more important and stronger. Splitting a county between one region and another is setting aside arrangements built up over many years. To take one example in Kincardineshire—a new senior secondary school was opened recently in Stonehaven which serves the whole of the South of the County. But under the Commission's proposals, the South of the County goes into the Eastern Region and Stonehaven into the North-Eastern

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Region. In the same field of education, it is to Aberdeen that the South of the County looks for University, College of Education, College of Commerce, College of Domestic Science, theatre and cultural interests generally—not Dundee. Such examples could he given in the other fields of local government administration."
I am sorry to go into this detail, but I must do so to state our claim.
There remains the matter of water. Her Majesty's Government having just divided Scotland into water boards and regions and got their organisation going, surely it is folly to put the whole lot again into the melting pot. And I suggest that water is controlled by gravity and not by politics. I therefore consider that political considerations are not valid when dealing with water, or at any rate only to a very limited extent. I hope the noble Lord will not produce a White Paper, because anything in a White Paper is very difficult to get out; but if he could produce a working paper before he produces the White Paper, then I think it would be of very great value.
My own opinion on planning and housing is that provided you can delegate the detailed work to a lower-tier authority, they should stay in the upper tier authority, but you must have that local delegation. I fully appreciate the fact that planning staffs are hard to come by, and also that a great deal of the detailed work does not really require a highly qualified planning officer and can quite well be done by the authorities as they are doing it at this moment. The size or number of districts I feel should be, so far as possible, decided on population, on area of country, and on how the problems will be financed. I do not think you can come to a uniform answer all over Scotland, nor do I acknowledge that it would be desirable.
5.41 p.m.
THE EARL OF HADDINGTON: My Lords, I shall be extremely brief. The noble Lord, Lord Hughes, in his excellent speech, asked us not to go deeply into detail. My very few remarks will concern one subject, and one subject only—libraries. This may be a detail in the Report, but I think it is of such tremendous importance that I hope the noble Lord will excuse me. In the first place, I think it slightly unfortunate, and it has created perhaps rather the wrong impression, that in the Report library services
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are placed under the heading of "Amenity Functions". It seems to me that they are treated by the Commissioners in what I might call a slightly cavalier fashion. Surely public libraries are an essential service. They are, or should be, educational, cultural and informative.
Secondly, if libraries are to be administered by the second-tier authorities, the districts, as is proposed in the Report, and not by regional authorities, and if the minimum population figure regarded as having adequate resources to provide the ground services is envisaged as 100,000, I am afraid that there will be a dearth of efficient services, because more than half of the district authorities will fall below this population figure. I hope the noble Lord sees the point I am trying to bring out; we feel that the figure is too low. Many of these districts are bound to be unable to maintain effective central libraries.
It is very important too that libraries should be able to meet the needs of the Open University, which is now being set up, and particularly that the remoter areas are able to get all the information, and plenty of good and adequate books. I certainly agree with the Report that there should be only one authority responsible for library provision in each area. As the noble Lord knows, the town council have the responsibility for administering the Public Library Acts, and the counties have responsibility for the Education Acts. This, of course, makes for overlapping, and it would be far better if only one authority were responsible.
The cities, I think, are well endowed with library resources, and I do not think they need be touched; but it seems to me that the larger the unit, the greater will be the resources available, and therefore the better services it will be able to provide. On balance, therefore, I should have preferred libraries to be the responsibility of a regional authority, always provided that the structure allows for some local participation and control. This is a difficult and a highly technical matter, but I believe it to be highly important in an age when so much emphasis is being placed on education. However, I am quite sure the Government will give this matter very earnest consideration.
THE EARL OF LAUDERDALE: My Lords, like other noble Lords I should like to start by saying a word about Florence Horsbrugh, of whom one's only thought is of personal kindness, and in my case personal kindness, plus gratitude for one or two gentle but very shrewd rebukes, in season, for my ebullience. When she did rebuke me it was to my advantage, and it was done with such sweetness and courtesy that I should like, even now, to put on record my gratitude to her. One remembers her also as an intrepid politician. My first sight of her was making a political speech, standing with her shoes two inches under water at a Conservative fete, when the rain simply pelted down, but she went on.
Like other noble Lords I should like to thank the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, for this opportunity to debate the Wheatley Report, and I should add that if it had not been for the generous and liberal manner, if I may put it like that, with which he introduced the debate, my strong inclination to withdraw would indeed have overcome even my taste for loquacity. But the noble Lord asked us to look frankly and constructively at the broad philosophy of the proposals in front of us, and in particular at the balance between central and local government which we are considering. I find this Report so confusing, so difficult, so complex and, I must confess, at points contradictory, that I would begin by seeking to underline the point of the noble Viscount, Lord Stonehaven, when he asked the Government, before a White Paper is published, to produce a working paper to give us more time to look at the implications of what is proposed.
It seems to me that the Royal Commission might have approached their task in any one of three ways. They might have begun with the idea of a regional top tier, and then asked how well that would fit the facts. I think that possibly they might have been better advised to start at that end. Alternatively, they might have taken the facts of physical and human geography: watershed by watershed, commuting focus by commuting focus, and then asked how sovereign each resulting unit could have been. In fact, they began with an abstract idea of functions, and then sought to
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create bodies to perform them. This seems to me to have resulted in an heroic endeavour to face both ways; and while I too am grateful for a brilliant study—but brilliant in its complexity as well as in its scope, something that has produced a textbook for debate for a considerable time to come, something that will influence debate on the Redcliffe- Maud Report South of the Border—I am bound to say that it provokes various anxieties and puzzlements in my mind.
It would seem, surely, that frustration in local government is due as much as anything to lack of clear definition of function, and my first question is whether the Wheatley Report gets the functions right or, having begun with functions, has ever had a chance of getting the facts of central Government right when finance was excluded from the terms of reference. I believe that the heart of the matter lies in the balance between central and local government, and I believe that the clue may well be found rather in the scope given in the planning operation for the free inter-play of market forces than in some of the lines of thought that have been developed so far this afternoon.
The city region, or a rural area focusing on a town, is itself a behavioural system of great complexity, and one is bound to ask whether the Report focuses decisions that are functionally relevant to the behavioural context in question in each case. The Report seems to take the citizen largely as a consumer of welfare services, be it in housing or health. Yet the citizen is also a householder, maybe an employer. He may be an employee. He is bound to be a consumer. He is certainly a shopper, and very often a smoker. He may be a commuter and from time to time she could be a baby sitter. He will be a member of a trade union no doubt, and possibly a member of some football supporters' club. He may be a bingo player or a churchman, or both. He may be an apostle of righteous causes; or he may be one who indulges in unworthy pleasures.
All this being so, there are two possible bases of analysis. One can look at the locality as a place where people live and join clubs, or go to pubs for that matter, or as a locality that is a centre of earning

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and activity—in other words, fundamentally as a market. The Wheatley emphasis is on the first. I personally would prefer the second, for I believe that the goal of good planning should really be to create the maximum choice for a consumer, and that because choice in itself is an exercise in life and growth, whereas provision without choice is in itself to provide for stagnation.
I believe that planning should provide the environment for the maximum interplay of free choice, and that is why I welcome the fact that redevelopment has been placed with the top tier. We are told that redevelopment is one of the biggest problems that local government has to face. But surely it is no use allocating land for a shop development if private developers will not risk their capital at that spot, or if shopkeepers will not risk the rentals that such a spot would require. It is the private enterprise developer who is likely to give the public what they want and what fits the behavioural complex in which they live rather than the well-intentioned planning officers who think it good for them. My comment, my Lords, is that the Wheatley Report really dodges this market facet of the localities altogether.
Planning is so important that at the structure level it is of course placed with the top tier, but the goal of the planning operation is not clear from the Report and once again one seems to see it facing both ways. At points it reads like an exercise in urban land use planning; elsewhere it reads like an exercise in economic planning within the context of some Scottish national plan. We are told that the local authorities' powers to attract industry should not only be retained but enlarged; and here again we have the Report facing both ways. For these powers are to be enlarged without usurping the powers of the Board of Trade—in turn described as powers to lure the movement of industry from one part of Britain to another. But if that is so, what is the purpose of the powers to attract industry that are to be given in enlarged form to the local authorities? Surely, my Lords, merely to say that local government must have power to give industry an extra shove at the taxpayers' expense is not to say anything very serious at all.
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In paragraph 225 we are told that there must be "imaginative steering" by the top tier which must take a
"comprehensive view of land use, redistribution of population and the provision of employment."
We are also told with regard to the air services that
"it is as a co-ordinating and planning agency that local government can make the most valuable contribution."
With the greatest respect to the eminent persons who served on this Commission. with the greatest respect to the skill of those who drafted the Report, and to those many unseen servants who did research by the yard and by the year. I must say that those phrases are verbiage and nothing else.
We are told that local authorities should be able to raise ample revenue to be able to stand up to Whitehall, but in paragraph 1014 we are told that Governments and Parliament should
"retain overall control over the shape and direction of major services".
So here we have the Royal Commission aiming, it would appear, at partnership, but really trying to have it both ways once more.
In the planning activities of the top tier we are not reminded, as I think we might well have been, that planning sovereignty at that level is really bounded on every side. There are critical prior rights to which little or no reference is made—the National Coal Board, the G.P.O., British Rail, Gas and Electricity Boards all have a capacity for undertaking development. They have this capacity which they may exercise exempt from the development levy like the New Towns, and so they bring, and must bring, a certain distortion into the whole planning operation to which, as I say, no reference is made.
Nor, surely, can the whole proposition of planning be considered even superficially without some reference to land values. Yet the very heavy hand, the very Mortmain of the Land Commission, is ignored altogether. However valuable it may be to have a body able to challenge silly planning without waiting for a developer and able to assemble sites in advance of the opportunity for development; however valuable in that respect the Land Commission may be, the fact is that its powers have had the

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effect of land being held off the market and therefore being kept grossly under-used—another major distortion of the planning process. So as with other distortions, one is bound to ask in what respect—it is not clear from the Report—the top tier exercising its planning functions would be able to deal with these distortions.
My Lords, worse contradictions follow with regard to housing. This was called in such an effective phrase by the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk "the scourge of local government in Scotland." Without a blush we are told in paragraph 425 that some 40 per cent. of householders are tenants of the State, and of the 1968 house completions the figure is not 40 per cent. but 74 per cent., if one takes paragraphs 425 and 428 together. Yet the argument elsewhere is that because housing is the big spender, therefore housing must be with the top tier. It would seem that this state of affairs is one which the Commission approve of and expect or want to continue. In other words, local government must stand up to the State but keep the citizen in his place as a fief and tenant of the local authority.
Yet, my Lords, this is another contradiction, because in paragraph 432 we have a wind of change. It says:
"… a new perspective is essential"
in housing policy, and
"a broader view"
is wanted, both of housing needs and of ways to meet them. Then I quote from paragraph 431:
"… the time has come for a new approach"
with local authorities acting
"not only as the providers of houses for letting, but also as the co-ordinators of all efforts"
to establish housing for the whole community. Finally, we are told—and it is interesting that this comes from a Government of the noble Lords opposite (it is something which should have been said by my side years ago, but they never had the courage to say it):
"'Further increases of the housing stock,… have become less important than renewing the existing stock, either by replacement or rehabilitation'".
My Lords, the logic of that flies in the face of the Wheatley argument itself.
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There is a Gresham's Law about housing: that subsidised drives out unsubsidised, so that the more subsidised State shelter is available, the more rent control is enforced, the less private enterprise will provide housing to let and the more the demand for council housing builds up until, with absurdly low rents in some parts of Scotland, we are ashamed to have to admit that we have some of the worst housing in the whole of Europe.
The answer to the Wheatley quest is surely a new look along these lines: giving rent subsidies in money terms direct to the needy; finishing with rent control; reviving the free market in rented accommodation; charging economic rents in the public sector and selling council houses to sitting tenants at a 10 per cent. discount; and generally doing everything possible (and this is surely implicit in the wind of change of which Lord Wheatley has given just a little whiff, to encourage us) to stimulate owners to keep up and even redevelop their own property. Whether or not such a policy would commend itself to noble Lords and right honourable gentlemen of the Party opposite is not for me to say. But any policy along these lines removes house construction from the public to the private sector and dismisses, therefore, the biggest spender of the lot. So the Wheatley objectives are contradicted by the unspoken logic of the Wheatley remedy.
In that case housing can be taken down from the top tier, along with management and related personal services, and put on the second tier, closer to the people. This second tier could then be more in number—say 100, or more still: I do not know—and we could save at least half, at any rate one-third, of the burghs, as I know my noble friend Lord Dundee would wish to do; and I with him.
My Lords, against that background I would leave regional planning (with all its limitations and the distortions to which I have referred corrected), transport and industrial location in the top tier. I would lop off future housing as a mini-spender; and then of course we could come to a very different pattern of local authority, still within the context of the philosophy of the Wheatley Commission. It would then be quite possible and logical to have a smaller Highland area, leaving the

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Islands alone, as most noble Lords who have spoken would like. It would be possible to put the Borders together without incorporating them in the estuary of the Forth.
Having said that much, however, I would suggest that in the area where land-use planning is the most difficult, and is critical to the prosperity and industrial development of the whole of Scotland, there should be created a mammoth, super-strong planning tier for the Forth-Clyde land bridge to replace the absurd fragmentation which is now proposed for it. Like other noble Lords, I should want to see metropolitan areas made of Glasgow, Edinburgh and Dundee, with local planning powers; and I should want to see the Economic Planning Council, as we now know it, replaced by a Strategic Planning Agency for the whole of Scotland, on which top-tier authorities would be directly represented.
My Lords, at heart this is a debate, as the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, said when introducing it, about power and scale, rather than about boundaries; about areas of economic activity rather than about areas of residence; about whether or not we can create the environment for market forces. I believe that only by freeing market forces can property ownership be restored to its social rather than an artificially socialised function, and then the top and second-tier authorities can be kept small enough in either case to escape the ravages of that new Parkinson's Law of the bureaucrats, that in any hierarchy a man will rise to the highest level of his incompetence, so that proxime accessi is much better than achievement. Only so, I believe, can the gulf between governors and the governed, which so defies participation, be to some extent narrowed and bridged, and the citizen's inherent gift for communication be restored and set free; and we can take a further halting step, I pray, towards a society that is strong and efficient, a society compassionate and fair, where none shall walk in want and none shall be stalked by fear.
6.8 p.m.
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN: My Lords, I should like first of all to associate myself with those noble Lords who have paid tribute to Baroness Horsbrugh. In common with my noble
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friend Lord Stonehaven, I was a member of her team at the Council of Europe for a considerable time, and I can certainly confirm exactly what he said about her great qualities of leadership and, even more, testify to the many kindnesses that she did me personally and, I think, all those who ever associated with her.
I should also like to add my gratitude to that expressed by other noble Lords to the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, for giving the House this opportunity to-day to debate this Report. I think it is extremely valuable to do so, even though the noble Lord may be getting, as he probably anticipated, a great variety of comments and suggestions and many different points of view. So far he has been able (I do not know whether it is an advantage or a disadvantage) to see all the speakers who have spoken to-day, and it struck me that possibly he might be interested to have a little commentary from behind him as well. Perhaps he has been getting that in private.
I think that on any view the Wheatley Report is an exciting document, and it presents an inescapable challenge. To my mind it also has the additional merit of being well written. In tracing so clearly the history of local government in Scotland, and in presenting so clearly and forcefully its merits and its defects as we see them at the moment, noble Lords are left in no doubt at all by the Report that local government in Scotland must be fundamentally recast, for if not it will lapse slowly but surely into complete ineffectiveness and will become. to all intents and purposes, not local government at all but more and more an administrative agent of the central Government.
It is this process that the Report is at pains to attempt to counteract. To my mind it succeeds in doing so, partially at any rate, in the suggestions and recommendations. At any rate I think there is little disagreement in the House that the Report starts by pinpointing one essential factor in local government in the future: that is, that the two-tier system is the best for local government. That is why the Report has suggested the setting up of the seven regional authorities about which noble Lords have spoken so much this afternoon. I personally have no quarrel in general with

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this proposal. I think that all noble Lords have different ideas on the sizes of the different regions. With the exception of the Highlands and Islands region and, possibly, the Western region, I have no quarrel with this; but I should like to support those noble Lords who think that for geographical, economic and social reasons the problems of the two island groups should be considered further. I think there is a good case for treating them separately as all-purpose authorities.
These regional authorities must be sufficently large to enable them to function and, more important, to finance themselves with maximum efficiency. At the same time there is always a risk that they may become too impersonal, too bureaucratic, too divorced from the people that they are representing and the people the services for whom they are trying to administer. This, in itself, implies that the second tier must be as genuinely and democratically local as possible and, in particular, must be seen to be so.
I think it is here that the recommendations of the Report are open to criticism. There are proposed 37 different district authorities with responsibility for lesser local authority matters which I need not go into now. These districts have been drawn up to conform with the concept of the shire level and to fit in, on the whole, with general community interests, topographical factors and so on, rather than on a purely population basis. The Report openly admits that there are anomolies in the boundaries and that further consideration is going to be needed before a final decision is come to. This I think is perfectly true. Speaking of my own area on the Borders, I personally feel that the proposal to combine the four Border counties is a sensible one; but I know that there are other places where boundary adjustments can and I think must be made.
In common with my noble friend Lord Dundee, however, I think that the real controversy in this matter centres around the burghs and whether, as under the proposals, they should lose their status as separate authorities and become part of the district authority. This is a very difficult problem, because while I appreciate the economic and administrative
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arguments I cannot convince myself completely of the wisdom of this recommendation. I realise that it is desirable that town and country should become more and more integrated; but at the same time this proposal means, I think, that by removing the burghs' power to run their own affairs we are in danger of causing a marked falling off in local pride, local patriotism and interest; and this, in the end, must cause a loss of administrative efficiency. Apart from the great historical traditions of the burghs (which have been referred to) they tend to be separate entities who know their own problems intimately; there exists in them a healthy spirit of competition with their neighbours; and I think much of this is going to be lost under the Commission's proposals.
The Commission were obviously sensitive about this point because I think the recommendation for community councils was designed, to some extent, to get over this difficulty. In common with my noble friend Lord Selkirk, I am personally doubtful whether it will do so; for experience has shown how little influence a body without power or authority can really exert. Of course, in some areas we already have such organisations as ratepayers' associations which, to some extent, would seem to fulfil the same kind of function.
My Lords, I wonder whether there is still a case for dividing the second tier into two parts and allowing the burghs, or at any rate burghs over a certain size, to retain their status as local authorities. Even if there is some reduction in bureaucratic tidiness, and there would certainly be financial problems to get over, I think there might be an over-compensating gain in local human interest and in responsibility, on the desirability of which the Report time and again rightly insists. If this is not possible, then I agree that it would be sensible to have smaller and more districts so as to ensure that this local participation is not lost sight of.
Among other suggestions—and this has been touched on already to-day—the Report makes one very revolutionary one, and that is that councillors should be paid. I should like to support this entirely. I would support my noble friend Lord Strathclyde who said that they should be paid sufficiently. It has not

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been stated exactly how payment for councillors is going to be assessed, but possibly we shall be told that when the White Paper comes out. I am sure that it is right that they should be paid; for local government cannot rely any longer on the spirit of voluntary service, especially now that we are getting these new, larger local authorities which will give a far greater work load to councillors. I do not think it is right that they should be asked to bear this load for nothing. I was interested to hear what the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, said about the financial aspect of the Report, because it seemed a pity that this aspect of the new structure was left so much in the air. As he says, it is vital to the whole operation. I was glad to hear that studies are already taking place in the various Departments in this respect, and I hope that the studies will be brought to light before too long.
The Report covers a great deal more than any of us have time to discuss to-day. It does not claim to have found the perfect or ideal solution yet; but one theme runs through it which I think all noble Lords would endorse: less Government interference, more genuine local control. I think that this aim is one that would appeal to anyone, even if the word "local" is, as it is, susceptible of many different interpretations. One thing is certain: if these proposals are adopted and legislation is put through, the ballot box is going to become much more familiar to people in Scotland than it has been in the past. That is something that may take a little getting used to. I do not think that for that reason it is a bad thing: but I have heard criticisms made that these proposals are going to mean that we shall endlessly have elections of one sort or another. That is why I do not entirely agree with my noble friend Lord Selkirk who wanted to have elections staggered every two years. I would finish by saying that in my view the Report points, broadly, the right way for the future of local government in Scotland; not only for its survival but for its survival as a useful, essential, and indeed vital, element in the life of our country.
6.20 p.m.
LORD BALERNO: My Lords, I ask for forgiveness if I have to leave before the end of the debate, as I have an
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engagement of a Scottish educational nature. I had the privilege of working with Florence Horsbrugh for several years as her chairman when she campaigned in the constituency of Midlothian. The more hopeless the cause and the more beset by adversity, the more courageous she became. She was indeed indomitable.
My Lords, I should like to join with other noble Lords who have congratulated Lord Wheatley and his colleagues on the Commission, and the staff, on their Report, much as one may disagree with certain of its conclusions. The parts that I think will prove the most valuable for the future are the written evidence, of which there are something like 24 volumes. If you delve into them you find a most interesting series of bits of information. I think it documents Scotland, as at last year, 1968, for all time and will be invaluable to historians.
I wish to take up the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, about having a fresh look and trying to be frankly constructive. I shall confine my remarks particularly to education because I think that the Royal Commission have missed a very great opportunity in this respect. A major upheaval is about to take place and under the circumstances it is reasonable to expect a very long and hard look to have been taken at the problem of education as a whole. Should school education be a function of local government? Is it right that school education should be divided into regional compartments? Boundaries for areas of education are not, and are unlikely ever to be, co-terminus with those essential for other functions of local government.
The noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, drew attention to the anomalies resulting from this policy, and with its evidence the Scottish Education Department has drawn a map of Scotland showing the desirable areas. These are not co-terminus with the areas laid down by the Wheatley Commission. The vision of what is possible is worth considering. What the Commission should have considered is whether the co-ordination of all education in Scotland, from the nursery schools through to the postgraduates of the universities, is not only desirable but also feasible. Some will say that this would put the Scottish Education Department in a position of great

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power in dealing direct with ad hoc authorities; and of even greater power in controlling the expenditure in the universities. I very much doubt this, unless the education authorities are composed of pliant members of the community. The oversight of education is a very special matter. Many persons of expertise and understanding, and many parents with these qualities, would most willingly come forward and give their services freely in this cause. But such persons are unwilling to get involved with what they consider to be the mundane problems of local government. They are unwilling because they lack understanding of the problems; or perhaps because they are are not interested in them; or again, because they have not the time to devote to them. To cut education away from local government will result in better and more personal contacts at the local level.
My Lords, I know it will be said that ad hoc education authorities did not work in the period from 1918 to 1929. I would question whether they really did all that badly under the difficult financial circumstances in which they had to work. In some cases they did extremely well and better than their local government successors. But I envisage a completely different set of circumstances; nominated boards consisting in part of representatives of local authorities and at least an equal number of persons selected for their special interest in, and knowledge of, education. Certainly such boards would have to be financed by the Exchequer. But, my Lords, the Exchequer is already financing about two-thirds of the cost of school education in Scotland. Surely it would be a perfectly simple matter for the Exchequer to pay the last one-third, using the grants they are making at present to local government for other purposes. Thus we would get a much more clean and tidy way of doing things than the financial "dog's breakfast" that we have at present. The local authorities would achieve what the noble Baroness, Lady Elliot of Harwood, wants them to achieve and has advocated for them, a substantial measure of financial independence and freedom from grant aid. That could be done in the one operation.
If anyone would like proof of how just is my description of the present expenditure and finances of local
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authorities, I suggest that they study the figures of local government expenditure in the Report as set out in the table on page 245 and then compare it with the table set out on page 300. The figures in both tables are derived from official statistics. Both draw on the Local Financial Returns (Scotland). In the first table the Commission also use Rates and Rateable Values in Scotland, and in the second Miss Betty Harvie Anderson uses Local Taxation Returns (Scotland). The difference between these tables regarding both income and expenditure for each year are so large and, so far as I can make out, so inconsistent, as to make a nonsense of the whole subject.
My Lords, I have read with care what the Commission say about finance. Some of it is most alarming, not least the frank admission in paragraph 1029 that the effect of the Commission's proposals will be to increase expenditure. This is followed, in paragraph 1037, by this quotation:
"…it is absolutely fundamental that local authorities should be enabled to raise a much higher proportion of the money they spend."
This presents a rather bleak prospect for the local ratepayers, especially as that statement is reinforced by the ominous statement:
"Where there is a political will, there is a financial way."
The noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, talked about categorical imperatives. I beseech the Government to take this opportunity to get education out of the financial morass of local government. The present financial situation is so confused that there is little wonder that we are having instances of excessive over-expenditure, due to lack of supervision, by the elected members and by officials. It seems to me that neither can grasp the complexities of local government finance and I for one sympathise with them.
The Commission give three reasons against an ad hoc body for education. The first is that an education authority which lacks an independent source of revenue would be handicapped in implementing its own policies. I doubt whether this would be the case. The reins of financial control can be drawn very tight by the Scottish Education Department over the existing local authorities. I question whether the Department would even wish to ride a properly constituted ad hoc

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education authority with as tight a rein. The Government would find themselves up against a much more vocal and effective body. To divorce the administration of education from that of social work and health, the Commission concludes, would
"be bound to disrupt the working coordination which is so necessary amongst all those services ".
My Lords, "disrupt" is a very strong word for the Commission to use in this connection, and I question very much whether they are justified in so doing. They might have said "a possible cause of friction" but it cannot be put higher than that. My own experience is that we are likely to get friction between departments of the same authority as between individual departments.
The third reason given by the Commission against an ad hoc education authority is that it would take much of the interest out of local authority work. That I would dispute. There is plenty of other work to be done; and people standing for election would better know what was to be expected of them. Nor do I think there is any justification for the fear that if education is made ad hoc, other services will want to follow and local authorities will exist, but without any work to do. I consider that to be an extremely thin argument to put into the Report.
The evidence submitted to the Commission must be considered. With one exception, the well-recognised bodies dealing with education come out very strongly in favour of central Government finance for education and as strongly in favour of ad hoc bodies to administer it. There is the one exception, and that is, predictably, the Scottish Education Department. All the rest come down in favour of ad hoc. I will not give a whole list, but they include the Educational Institute of Scotland, the Scottish Secondary Teachers' Association, the Scottish Schoolmasters' Association and, in this connection perhaps the weightiest of them all, the Association of Directors of Education. The arguments they put forward are to my mind quite overwhelming, and many of us regret that the Commission have done very much less than justice to their evidence. I hope that this vital subject will be fully discussed in Scotland.
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At the other end of Scottish education, the top end, I suggest that the time has come to set up a separate University Grants Committee for Scotland. I am firmly of the opinion that the problems of the Scottish Universities will be better understood, and their problems more adequately dealt with, by a committee of Scotsmen sitting in Scotland and fully conversant with the eight Scottish Universities. What is more, the present threat to the independence of the universities posed by the increasing power of the English Ministry of Education and Science over the English-dominated University Grants Committee will be averted for the Scottish Universities. if we are to lose any degree of our academic freedom, let it be to a Scottish and not to an English Government.
Time is short, my Lords, and I will not dilate on the other advantages to Scotland. But I must say that I can see no financial difficulties here. It will not be difficult to work out what should be Scotland's share of the Exchequer cake for university education. Research grants would continue to come, as at present, from a variety of sources, including the United Kingdom Ministries, Departments and Councils. Benjamin Disraeli said in another place that:
"Upon the education of the people of this country the fate of the people of this country depends."
Disraeli was no great lover of the Scots, but he most certainly recognised us for a distinctive and peculiar people. On its system of education, the future of Scotland depends. We cannot leave it to the remoteness of these large regional authorities; nor should our universities be run from London.
6.35 p.m.
THE EARL OF CROMARTIE: My Lords, I should like to start by adding my tribute to the late Lady Horsbrugh. I do not think this House will forget her kindness and her splendid and pungent wit. We shall all miss her.
We are grateful to the Minister for giving us the opportunity of discussing an event of major significance, not only to every Scottish Peer in your Lordships' House, but to every man, woman and child who has the privilege of living in our country. We have before us a very large subject, with infinite ramifications,

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covering every aspect of organised and civilised existence. I will confine my observations to the Highland Region, which covers an area larger than any other in the country—indeed, almost half the area of the whole of Scotland.
We all realise that we speak this afternoon under a major handicap. We do not know how this great change is going to be financed, and we must remember that size in itself is no criterion of either financial viability or ability to influence the corridors of power. Seven poor areas joined together will equal one poor area. Having said that, I would add that I myself and the great majority of people in the far North welcome, and realise the necessity for major change in local government. There is no need to repeat the reasons why this is necessary, except perhaps the two main ones. I refer to the inability of rural counties to finance themselves to any appreciable extent, due to the astronomic rise in all public expenditure. This leads to the second reason—namely, the weakening of local democratic government and the very undesirable drift to bureaucratic control, which is the antithesis of bureaucracy and, indeed, can develop into a form of dictatorship.
The objectives of the Report are that local government should be able to play a more important, more responsible and more positive part in the running of the country and in bringing this reality nearer to the people. Local government should be equipped to provide really efficient services from the point of view of the people receiving these services. Local government should constitute a system in which power is exercised through the elected representatives of the people, those elected being locally accountable to their electors. It is of the greatest importance that local government should bring the people into the process of reaching decisions as much as possible and that those decisions should be made intelligible to the people.
I agree that the areas of the present local authorities are too small and too numerous, that the new authorities should be made autonomous, that the resources should be commensurate with commitments and that the staffs should have greater facilities for promotion.
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Turning to the structure, here I must voice disagreement, as I can see that all-important word "local" disappearing from the following word "government". In my view, and indeed in that of the Northern Counties, a region that stretches from the Northern point of Shetland to Campbeltown, in the far South of Argyll, is far too large, having regard to the Wheatley distribution of functions as between region and second-tier district authorities. In the Wheatley Report, we already have the making of a three-tier authority—namely, region, district and community centres.
In my view, the first tier should be a provincial overall authority, with defined and limited power. These should be, first, strategic planning, which could cover the whole Highland area, in view of its importance in social and economic development, including tourism in its widest sense; secondly, transport; and, thirdly, development and control of industry. There are some other functions, such as the Fire Service, which at the present moment in the Highlands are dealt with over the whole area, and this state of affairs could continue.
With regard to the second-tier authorities, I submit that the major functions should be allocated to these authorities and that there should be 14 to 16 of these in Scotland. These second-tier authorities should be known as regional authorities, and for the Highlands their number should be three or four. In view of the size of this vast Highland area, to these authorities should go the functions of education, planning, roads, water, sewerage, river purification, flood prevention, police, civil defence, housing, countryside recreation and control of tourism. The Wheatley Report, on page 190, paragraph 776, says:
"Local government must on no account become hard and impersonal. Its object must be, as we remarked in Chapter 7, to provide public service with the greatest possible satisfaction to those receiving them."
Without suggesting that any authority would be hard, I think it is surely self-evident that if such personal functions as education are to be controlled by a remote top tier over such a wide area they are bound to become impersonal, if for no other reason than the geographical structure of the Highlands.
I would suggest that the remaining services, mainly environmental, should be

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allocated to the third-tier authority, which should be increased in number to, say, about 30, spread over the Highland area, and these should be known as district authorities. To these authorities the following functions should devolve, with the funds and status necessary for their implementation: building control; housing improvement and ancillary housing functions; civil defence in its local aspects; parks and recreation; community centres; environmental functions, such as refuse collection and disposal; food and drugs; clean air; regulation and licensing; licensing courts and the administration of justice. My own county council are of the view that there is a case for the establishment of local community centres for the purpose of correlating local public opinion. It is, I think, self-evident that the Highlands and Highland Development Board should remain until such time as the new local authorities are fully operative.
I would suggest, as I said before, that the second-tier authorities, which I have referred to as regions within the Highland Province, should number three or four, and that the Northern Isles of Orkney and Shetland should be an autonomous authority. To my mind, it is against all common sense to equate these Northern Isles with either the mainland or the Western Isles. Apart from the fact that they are islands, the Northern Isles have little or no connection, culturally, linguistically or racially, with the Western Isles; any connection that there may be is with Aberdeen, in the Wheatley North-East Region.
If the Western Isles are not to be a separate autonomous authority—as might indeed be desirable—then I submit that the following areas would constitute viable local authority units for the remaining part of the Highlands: (1) Caithness, Sutherland, Ross and Cromarty, the Western Isles, Skye and the Glen Elg district of Inverness; (2) Argyllshire and Inverness-shire, excluding the Western Isles, Skye and Glen Elg. It is of mutual benefit and importance to mainland Ross and Cromarty and the Western Isles that adequate communications and transport should be maintained between them via Stornoway. This would be the most beneficial way to implement the underlying aims of the Wheatley Report
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without in any way weakening the all-important local aspect of local government.
My Lords, if I have gone on longer than is my wont, I crave your indulgence. but this is a matter of vital importance to Scotland and that thinly populated but immense part which makes up the Celtic Highland area. There are many other important considerations, such as how the hospital administration will fit into the new scheme of things, and how the historic burghs can be saved to Scotland. But, with co-operation, this and other important matters can and will be solved. Meanwhile, I hope that all concerned with local government will do their utmost to bring up to date and improve what in the past has worked so well, thanks to generations of devoted councillors and officials.
6.45 p.m.
THE MARQUESS OF AILSA: My Lords, I have read and studied with great interest the Report by Lord Wheatley on Local Government in Scotland and his suggested proposals for its reform, and I should like very much to welcome these proposals. Though in his Report Lord Wheatley lays great stress on the value of local involvement in the local administration of government, he appears to go on to evolve a system which excludes this involvement. I am well aware that whenever this suggestion is put forward great play is made of the formation of local committees and community councils by the regional and district authorities within the various district and regional associations. But it seems to me that it has been made quite clear from subsequent statements of Lord Wheatley and other members of his Commission that it is intended that the proposed regional and district authorities will decide what is in their opinion best for the communities, and implement these decisions regardless of the wishes and desires of the communities.
This was forcibly put forward by Mr. Imrie during a lecture given on Monday, December 1, when in answer to a question he replied:
"There will not be the same close connection between members of the public and councillors. The most important thing is to promote economic health and so improve amenity environment. The Commission were faced with making a choice between a modern

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business approach to the problem and the present unsatisfactory and inefficient system of councils. There cannot be effective organisation if there is complete access by people."
Surely this is a complete reversal of the present situation, in which communities are very much involved in the local administration of government. I use this terminology deliberately, as this is really what we are talking about, because the majority of the work carried out by the local authorities is the execution and implementation of the will of Parliament and central Government; it is the local administration of government. This deals with people.
At present, as we know, there is a very close connection between the local representative and those whom he represents. I am well aware that Lord Wheatley has made great play with the percentages of the populace voting in local elections, and has suggested that this implies a lack of interest. I think that there are many county councillors and burgh councillors who wish that their electorate were not quite so interested. They do not hesitate to bring their problems to them. But surely this is what we need, because by being able to go to a representative, he can go to the official responsible for whatever the problem is and get an answer, and the matter is dealt with regularly and quickly. It appears to me that under these proposals these arrangements will go. They will be replaced by regional and district authorities, each with their elected members and paid staffs.
But I gained the impression that the elected members are to be concerned only with laying down the policies to be followed, leaving their implementation to the staff, thereby taking away the present situation by which both elected representatives and the staff are involved, and the elected member is responsible to those whom he represents for the carrying out of whatever the policy is. I gain the impression that under the proposals this responsibility will lie nowhere. But I would again remind noble Lords that what we are dealing with are people, however modern and forward-looking we have to be, and whatever is done has to be acceptable to the people.
I want now to turn quite shortly to the proposed regions, and specifically to the Western Region. I am of the
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opinion that the inclusion of Glasgow in this region is unwise. I feel strongly that Glasgow and its own immediate problems will dominate the region to the detriment of the remainder. It somehow appeared to the Commission that all the good things in the West flow from Glasgow. Personally, I do not agree, because those of us in the West who are not in Glasgow have always been well able to look after our own affairs. I am very much of the opinion that Glasgow and its surrounding parts and industrial complex should be made a region on its own. I dislike, also, too much power being placed in the hands of the local authority staffs. While I am very much aware of the valuable and high standard that is upheld by local authority staffs, I know also too well of instances where members of the staffs have assumed far greater power than they should ever have been allowed to obtain. While I accept the case for there being a regional authority, I feel that so far as the districts go I would be far more agreeable to the suggested 101 district authorities, as mentioned in the Minority Reports. By retaining these it should be possible to retain greater contact with people which is essential when administering government to a locality. Finally, I should like to remind your Lordships that the real strength of Scotland, and England as well, comes from small communities being prepared to shoulder the responsibility of running their own affairs in a manner that they feel best suits themselves.
6.52 p.m.
LORD BELHAVEN AND STENTON: My Lords, my reason for a brief intervention in this debate is that I am, as I foresaw, the only speaker to-day who lives in the province of Galloway, and I thought that this ancient province should not go unrepresented and unspoken for in such an important debate. I confess at once that I am not a member of any local council, and I never have been, but I have taken the trouble in the past week to inquire around and get some idea of what people and local councillors are thinking. Of course, I am not a walking Gallup Poll. I can only give my own impressions of what I have heard. I came to one conclusion, which I received from the local people, and I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, has disabused us of

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this idea to-day: they seem to think that the Wheatley Report is a fait accompli. I said that I think the Government are still willing to listen, and they said, rather doubtfully, "Well, we hope so." I am very glad that the noble Lord is still open to suggestions.
In the South-West, in Kirkcudbrightshire and in Galloway, there seems to me to be a general acceptance of the South-West Region of Dumfries and Galloway. Dumfries and Galloway have hung together for a long time and we are all very relieved that we are not being flung in with Glasgow or anywhere else. I think that, on the whole, the majority of the people in the province are pleased with the recommendation for the South-West Region. We have gathered that some people in the rural district of South Ayrshire would like to join us rather than the rest of their compatriots in Ayrshire, and I gather that there is a general welcome for them if they can find their way in. Where I found a great deal of disagreement, not only with the Commissioners but among the people themselves, was in regard to the second tier. Most of the county councillors I spoke to seemed to like the idea of doing away with the small burghs—I suppose because they looked upon them as something of a nuisance. From my point of view I am entirely in favour of the small burghs continuing as they are. My noble friend. Lord Dundee, said almost everything I would have said, and a bit more, and said it a great deal better. It would be a great tragedy if these small burghs, some of which I think are older than the Westminster Parliament itself, had their graves dug for them by the Westminster Parliament. They have a great deal of civic pride and cohesion and form distinct communities, some of them relatively isolated, and I think they should be allowed to continue.
The only other point I want to make is about the division which has been put across the province of Galloway. Granted that the Wheatley Commissioners wanted to divide it into two districts rather than three, the counties of Wrytown, Kirkudbright and Dumfries, they have put the boundary in a rather curious place—along the summit of the Kells range, which puts one district as Wrytown-shire, and in a small part of Kirkudbrightshire, and the other district as the whole of Dumfries-
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shire, practically the whole of Kirkudbrightshire, and a part of Roxburghshire. I should have thought that for the lowest tier of local authority this was demonstrably too large, and that if you are going to divide the province in two, it should be divided along the Nith so that half the province was Dumfries-shire and the other part was the ancient province of Galloway, which has always been recognised as a distinct area. As an inhabitant of the Stewartry I would rather we went in with Wrytown-shire if we have to do away with our own county and be Galloway, than to be cut up between Dumfries-shire and Wrytown.
6.58 p.m.
LORD BURTON: My Lords, I also should like to thank the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, for this debate. I hope that from the barrage from these Benches, not always unanimous but providing many constructive points, he has got some useful ideas. It seems a pity that there has been no speech this afternoon from the other Benches, as I am sure that many of us would have liked to hear some other views. As there have been many speeches, I will not try to speak to the Wheatley Report as it affects the whole of Scotland. On the other hand, I feel that I shall not be accused of being parochial if I speak about it largely as it affects the proposed Highlands Region, for this area is indeed not only nearly half of Scotland, but one-sixth of the whole of Britain.
After nearly 21 years on the county council—not quite so long as my noble friend Lady Elliot—and having also the reputation of being somewhat controversial, I should like to start by saying that I certainly disagree with the opening remarks of the Report. It says:
"Something is seriously wrong with local government in Scotland."
Perhaps the Commissioners were thinking of the Glasgow City debt, or something like that. I feel that in the North overall the authorities have been basically sound and effective. I am not saying that there should not be any change, but in all the deliberations on the Report, the point which has struck me most is the remarkable loyalty of people to the local authority in their own particular areas, and the huge community spirit which exists at the moment. Maybe this is just a case of "Better the devil

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you know than the devil you don't "; but, whatever it is, the fact remains that these loyalties do exist. The Inverness-shire islanders, though they may not always be unanimous among themselves as to the best solution to the problem, are—and I should like your Lordships to mark this particularly—always begging Inverness-shire not to throw them away to Stornaway. Several times this afternoon we have heard that they would like an outer island completely autonomous body, but I would beseech you, my Lords, that this should not happen.
Though one hears of constant bickering between the Lewismen and the mainland of Ross-shire, when there is any threat of one or other being put somewhere else it appears that they immediately close their ranks. I believe that Caithness is somwhat frightened of being dominated by Ross-shire. However, there are certain quarters in which there appears to be a substantial desire to work together, perhaps the most surprising being between Argyll and Inverness—surprising in view of the fact that this is largely a question of Camp-hells working with Camerons and Macdonalds, and also on account of the extremely difficult transport communications.
Nairn has always wanted to co-operate with Inverness. The Findhorn has always been the dividing line between two different types of people, so that Nairn looks much more to the West than to the East. Moray and Nairn have had a joint county council, but this has never been a very happy association. For some reason, however, Ross-shire has no desire to work with Inverness, in spite of the fact that they lie well together. I see that my noble friend in front of me is laughing, but I believe this to be the case. Indeed, at the present time one has to go through parts of Ross-shire to get into another part of Inverness-shire, and it seems extraordinary that there is this lack of desire to co-operate.
If one looks at the broadest aspect (I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, will agree with me from the memoranda so far submitted to him), in spite of all these loyalties there has been remarkable unanimity that the
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Highland Region, given the powers suggested by Wheatley, is far too large. This seems to have been perhaps the most unanimous point which has come up from speaker after speaker this afternoon. It is perhaps scarcely surprising when the proposed region is not only half of Scotland, but that half with the poorest communication, stretching from the Mull of Kintyre across the stormy seas to the North of Unst.
There is, however, another alternative to dividing the region. This is to leave the area of the top tier as proposed by the Commission, but very markedly to reduce its powers and give these to a very much enlarged second-tier authority. I think that my noble friend Lord Cromartie was making rather the same point; and I think that on this all the Northern authorities are agreed. From what has been said to-day, it would appear that a good many other parts of Scotland also are thinking along the same lines. I think that particularly my noble friend Lord Stonehaven said that this was an idea which appealed to Kincardine. Inverness-shire County Council are to discuss this on Thursday, and at present, therefore, I can have only a guess at what their findings will be; but I think I can make a fairly inspired guess.
When I put the proposal to our District Council that this upper tier should have its powers reduced and that the lower tier should be increased in size, it was accepted unanimously, and I was surprised that in fact there was practically no discussion on it at all. The District Council was unanimous. From the newspapers it would appear that practically all the Northern counties hold very much the same view. Generally I think we are agreed regarding the more impersonal services, such as major roads and overall planning, along with the fire services and police (though I am not quite sure that I agree with all my noble friend's list that he read out just now), that it would be possible to operate these on the top region, as proposed by the Commission.
However, for the more personal services (I think my noble friend Lady Elliot made this point), such as education, health, housing and the more detailed aspects of planning, second tiers covering bigger areas are essential. For

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instance, the Wheatley proposals would mean that there would be 516 schools in this region. I cannot see how any director of education could possibly effectively manage 516 schools. Indeed, if the powers of the region were reduced it could well be that the region would still have to have an aeroplane—perhaps two aeroplanes—to get around the region if they were not going to waste an enormous amount of time of their officials. As my noble friend Lord Cromartie said, I think this must completely dispense with the idea of having a local authority; the word "local" just comes completely out of it.
I am not quite sure that I agree, and I do not believe that Inverness County Council will agree, with my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn on weights and measures. I could not quite follow his reasoning on this. It seems that this responsibility could be administered from the upper tier. I agree with him that there is a great deal of local business in this, but I do not see why it should be a second-tier responsibility. However, to give the personal services to a second tier covering the areas suggested by the Commission would be unworkable, as the areas would be far too small and one would not be able to obtain officials of the right calibre if the areas were as suggested by the Report. A suggestion has been put forward that the second tier should be somewhat similar to existing county council areas. I think that this point has been mentioned by a number of noble Lords. If I mention boundaries I am bound to run into trouble—like my noble friend Lord Cromartie here, who tried just now to "pinch" a bit of Inverness-shire for Ross-shire. On the other hand, I feel that it is necessary to stick one's neck out to some extent.
I gather that Argyll County Council, with one exception, were unanimous in thinking that their existing area would make a good second-tier authority. I am sorry that on this particular point Argyll County Council seem to be at loggerheads with my noble friend Lord Strathclyde. But this is apparently the County Council's views, as they appeared in the Press. I do not know which is right. The case of Inverness is rather more complicated, as there is this problem, which I have already mentioned, of the Islands. Unlike most other noble
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Lords who have spoken, I should hate to see the Inverness-shire Islands being thrown away to the Stornowegian wolves. There would be Nairn to add to Inverness, and the two small areas of Moray and Banff, as proposed by the Commission. There is also the question of South-West Ross. It seems rather ridiculous that one has to go through part of Ross to get from one part of Inverness-shire to another. And South-West Ross, I feel, with their loyalties, would not want to go to Inverness. But it might be possible, perhaps, to divide this district in two.
Moving further North, the remainder of Ross-shire, Sutherland and Caithness would appear to make up quite a good second-tier authority. This leaves only Orkney and Shetland, who have a vexed problem about which we have heard several times to-day. It may be that they should go to the North-East mainland, to which communications are easier. I think the Far North would be the least desirable, in view of what we heard when the Water Board was proposed. Quite possibly, as many noble Lords have said, the best solution would be that they should have an all-purpose authority on their own. If this occurred they would need substantially greater subsidies than any other part of Scotland. This means that they would be very much more tied in many ways to St. Andrew's House. We have heard this point about subsidies tying one down and that it would be a disadvantage. This would leave, I suggest, for the Highland Region a first tier with reduced powers, the impersonal services, and three, four, or possibly five, second-tier authorities.
The only other feasible method of operating the personal services over these vast areas is to divide the Northern Region into two. This has substantial drawbacks. It creates a greater number of problems in the Islands on the West; and in the East it means that the Burgh of Inverness would completely dominate the surrounding rural areas. I know that this is contrary to Government policy, and in England I think it has been proposed that there should be the maximum integration. But we heard from a speaker from another part of Scotland just now that they were hoping they would not be dominated by Glasgow. I think there are disadvantages in having a large urban conurbation sitting with a

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fairly large, sparsely populated rural area surrounding it. Their problems are somewhat different. I feel that this point should be looked at.
I had intended to say that possibly the greatest problem that would arise would be that different powers would have to be given to different tiers in the North from those proposed throughout the remainder of Scotland; but as this debate has progressed, it seems there is a considerable desire throughout the whole of Scotland for the second-tier authorities to be increased and given more powers. It is to be hoped that the Government will reduce the powers of the upper tier proposed by the Commission and increase the powers of the second tier.
My noble friend Lord Dundee was not happy about the division of planning, but I feel that this is essential. There must be overall planning—and I think everyone will agree with this—in the upper tier, but there are local considerations, such as whether a house looks attractive or not, which are not really a question for an enormous region. I think we must have some sort of lower-tier planning.
Another point I should like to make is that if these lower tiers were enlarged it would be possible for them to have water and drainage. I feel it is important that the purification board should not be on the same tier as the body which is the biggest polluter, as is the case at the moment. The local authorities pour their sewage into the rivers and do things which they would never allow private enterprise to do, and it is only when the purification board is a separate body or on another tier that this can be checked. One further advantage of increasing the size of the second tier is that it makes the second tier a more worthwhile undertaking for a councillor to operate. At the moment I feel that the Commission's proposals really do not give their councillors sufficient to do. There was the question of community councils, and it appears that most of your Lordships are opposed to this, although apparently some places would like them. I think this is quite a small matter.
There is one other point I should like to raise. At the moment all county
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councillors sit on their district councils. This seems to be an excellent system and I should like to see it perpetuated. It leads to better liaison, co-operation and cohesive thinking throughout local government as a whole, and I hope this will be continued. My noble friend Lord Haddington made a plea on public libraries and I know this will be a point which will come up from the Inverness County Council. They are very anxious that this should be a top tier responsibility; it is impossible to have really good libraries without it. The sending out of the books can be delegated but the top tier must bear the responsibility.
Finally, I should like to enjoin the Government to think seriously as to what are the objects of reorganisation. The principal object is obviously to increase efficiency. This is all very well and good, but if that is the case will they ensure that they do not allow any political expediency to creep in, and will they ensure that they do not allow the officials any Empire building? So far as Empire building is concerned, I am thinking, like my noble friend Lord Stonehaven, of what happened when the water authorities were reorganised. Has it not, basically, been the practice for all the existing officials to be employed by the new Boards and for new positions to be created for overlords? Then, having hived off water from the local authorities they have had to appoint drainage officers and departments. It would be interesting to know, throughout Scotland, what has been the increase in officials as a result of setting up these Boards.
If one takes the simple case of valuation, presuming that each valuation officer is gainfully employed at the moment and has as much work as he can manage, what will happen with amalgamation into the regions? Will there be an overlord, and perhaps a deputy or two? I can see that that is what is going to happen. Will the bigger authorities reduce cost, or at least make more money available for their own area? There is a grave doubt on this, my Lords, and I think this should be looked at very carefully.
7.13 p.m.
THE EARL OF PERTH: My Lords, I hesitate to speak this evening because my knowledge of local government is, I am

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afraid, rather superficial, but I have perhaps four reasons why I might do so. One is that I want to say, "Thank you" to the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, for introducing this debate and for giving us all the chance to discuss the Wheatley Report before it took any concrete form. My second reason is because, as the noble Lord, Lord Burton, said, he had only heard people speak from one of the Benches and I speak as a Cross-Bencher. My third reason is because I have read the summary of the Wheatley Report and I have listened to all your Lordships speaking in to-day's debate. My fourth reason is that I promise to be very brief.
It seems to me that there are three main points arising from the Report and from the debate to-day. One is on finance; the second is on planning, and the third is on structure. Of course the key to all this is finance. We all know that without the power of the purse we get nowhere. It is interesting to read that for each man, woman and child £80 per year is spent on local government in Scotland. That is a large sum, and I am worried when I read at page 5 of the summary that for local government to play a more important part involves accepting a greater share of the financial burden. Then in brackets it says, "leaving less to be contributed by the taxpayer". I know that the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, said he would look into the question of finance. It is very worrying if, as a result of this local government reform, we are to get, as it were, double taxation in Scotland, accepting a greater share of the financial burden with less to be paid by the taxpayer. I hope that this does not mean what it says. It seems to me that the answer is not that there should be a greater burden on the local ratepayer, but rather that St. Andrew's House and the Treasury in particular should think how much more they can subscribe to local government in Scotland not only in money but also, I think, in functions.
I come now to the question of planning. I think it was the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, who said how tremendously important it was that planning should be of the highest quality but not divided. I can only say that I entirely agree with him and I think we should look carefully at the proposed division of functions to make quite sure that planning is in one hand and can be performed in the best possible way.
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Lastly, may I say a word on structure. The Report comes out quite firmly in favour of the two-tier system—or so it says. They say that there should be a two-tier structure, and then they are really rather frightened and say also that there should be community councillors. I think they have "funked" the issue and we are given here what is in effect a three-tier structure and not a two-tier structure, because they come out in favour of the community councillors. I think this is the fault of suggesting that there should be 7 regions, 37 districts and the community councillors. If they had followed the advice of the Minority Report, as the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, has suggested; namely, that there should be a considerably greater number of districts—the Minority Report said 101, and I have no great knowledge whether it should be 101 or a compromise between the two—to that extent the need for community councillors would disappear and the reality of the local government would be stronger in a two-tier form.
When I look at what should be the various functions of the two-tier structure, I have a curious feeling at the back of my mind that those functions which have been given to the regional authority have been given in some degree because they are afraid that the regional authority will not have enough work to do; otherwise I really cannot see why they are having to take on such things as the registration of births, deaths and marriages; the registration of electors; refuse disposal; weights and measures, and several other things. So I wonder whether they have attempted in their Report and recommendations to give these functions to the regional bodies because they are afraid that they will not have enough to do.
That brings me to my last thought. At the very beginning we are told that something is seriously wrong with local government in Scotland. Then we are told that at the root of the trouble is the present structure of local government. I do not agree with that, because it does not go far enough. That is not the root of the trouble. If you added the words, "and its relation to the central Government", then I think it makes sense. But what we have at the moment is a Report on Local Government, and there is really nothing which says: "This is

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what should be local government functions and this is what should be central Government functions". I do not believe that you can have a Report which is in the water-tight compartments which we find here.
The noble Lord, Lord Balerno, made a very powerful plea in relation to education and how it should all come out of the one and be put into the other. I would ask the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, when he considers the whole of this Report, the debate to-day, and representations that have been made, that in addition he should also most seriously consider the functions and the responsibilities of St. Andrew's House and Whitehall as well as those of local government.
7.20 p.m.
LORD HUGHES: My Lords, we have been discussing Wheatley now for four hours and twenty minutes. I have accumulated twelve pages of notes, and if I were to follow my usual practice in an ordinary debate and reply to the points raised—because I have fairly copious notes of every speaker—I should have very great difficulty in compressing it into 30 minutes. But this is not an ordinary debate. It is not incumbent upon me to find instant rebuttal for proposals of one kind or another. I said at the beginning that what I wanted to do was to hear the views of noble Lords, and because of what I have already read about the views of local authorities I should have been astounded if I had not had in these four hours and twenty minutes conflicting views. But one thing that is quite certain is that when the Government eventually produce their proposals for the reform of local government in Scotland some of your Lordships must be disappointed, because we should have to divide Scotland into 16 different types of local government to be certain that each of you had somewhere exactly what you wanted.
I am quite certain that Lord Wheatley and his colleagues did not expect for one moment that the result of their endeavours would be a Bill which implemented to the last comma the proposals they put forward. It does not in any way diminish the value of what they have done that we should be contemplating, every one of us, whether inside Government or out-
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side Government, the possibility of some changes in some of their proposals. What we have heard to-day will help the Government in making up their mind.
I think there were only two cases where I was asked a question. I do not propose to answer even those, because, believe me. the greatest difficulty I have is keeping firmly to the resolve that I am not going to make up my mind about what is going to be done until I have heard all those, or read the comments of all those, who are entitled to put proposals forward. I think I could fairly state what the Government hope to do in this way—that we should much prefer at the end of the day to put into operation a system which was not on paper 100 per cent. perfect but which could achieve the maximum degree of co-operation.
I am not an engineer, but I understand that no boiler, for instance, is ever operated at its maximum efficiency; one gets a percentage of operation. If we get that in a system of local government—and I am not putting forward percentages to which I wish to adhere—it seems to me that something like 80 per cent. efficiency with 80 per cent. acceptance would be very much better than perfection to which 90 per cent. of those who are going to be governed or going to do the governing objected. I hope that out of all the discussions that have taken place and will take place we shall produce something which, on the face of it, ought to work better than what we have got at the present time, and which, on the face of it, is something which those who will be the elected councillors and who will be the appointed servants will wish to make work; a system into which they will go with enthusiasm to get the best possible results.
I would close by saying that of course we accept that the reform of local government implies the reform of central Government, in the sense that you cannot completely have a better working local government unless it means a certain devolution or transfer of power from the centre to the local authorities. All this is implicit in what we are looking at; and I hope that at the end of the day we shall at least have satisfied your Lordships that this afternoon has been time which you have well spent.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

GREECE AND THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE
7.27 p.m.
LORD MERRIVALErose to ask Her Majesty's Government: What will be their attitude towards Greece at the forthcoming meeting in Paris, of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, bearing in mind past Anglo-Greek friendship, our good trade relations, and the importance of Greece within NATO. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name. From the Prime Minister's remarks yesterday in another place Her Majesty's Government present attitude would unfortunately appear to be only too clear. When the Prime Minister says (OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, 8/12/69, cols. 39-40):
"What has happened in Greece has been an affront to every lover of Greece, of the Greek people, of democracy itself …"
is he not overlooking the disarray of the political life of the country which existed prior to April, 1967, and also the rapid succession of Governments over the previous 23 years, a total of 41 Governments? When the Prime Minister says (col. 40):
"We all look forward not so much to a return to the democratic forms of the past, but forward to whatever form of genuine democracy the Greek people choose for themselves …"
is he not overlooking the results of last year's Referendum?
Before coming to the present situation, I should like to refer briefly, and that is in view of the wording of my Question, to past ties between our two countries. In 1824, Lord Byron, spokesman of a large body of sympathisers and active helpers in this country, landed at Missolonghi during the Greek war of independence. In the early 1860s, according to Stanley Casson, in his book, Greece and Britain, friendship with Britain was "complete and unruffled" with the cession of the Ionian Islands. Around the same period, in a plebiscite on the succession to the Throne, out of 244,202 votes cast by the Greek people 230,016 votes were given to Queen Victoria's second son, Prince Alfred.
In 1917, Greece entered the First World War on the side of Britain and France. In the early 1930's, when a
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serious rising took place in Cyprus, Eleftherios Venizelos restrained the Greeks from any step which might alienate British friendship. In 1941, Anglo-Greek forces were fighting together in Macedonia and Northern Greece. In 1944–45 British troops were suppressing Communist guerrilla forces in Greece, and I think we should remember that it was only in October, 1949, that the Communist rebellion ended.
To turn now to trade (and I welcome the arrival of the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, because I think this is an important aspect, perhaps more important than past history) between our two countries, taking one year with another, the United Kingdom sells to Greece three or more times as much as she buys from that country. Last year, our share of the Greek market was 10·3 per cent.; that is, we were sharing second place with Italy. I understand that our exporters are hoping to secure a share of the large capital projects, including nuclear power contracts, on which Greece will be concentrating in the next few years.
At this point it might be realistic, therefore, to remind the House that at the beginning of last week, Mr. Makarezos, the Minister of Economic Co-ordination, hinted at possible economic sanctions during the course of a meeting with our Ambassador. The Envoys of six other European countries were also summoned, but I think it is significant to note that the representative of France was not included in the seven. I would add that the London Chamber of Commerce, in their Report last year, after a trade mission to Greece, said this:
"The Greek market offers good prospects for Britain in projects connected with tourism, shipping and other forms of transport, mining, telecommunications, electrical (and other) engineering, processing of crops and much else. Owing to Britain's difficulties over foreign investment she must go flat out to sell plant and machinery, 'know-how', royalties and after-sales service; also she must examine all forms of joint ventures, i.e. on tourism and hotels, co-operation between British tour operators and contractors in association with Greek capitalists and hotel owners."
I would mention that this year, between January and September, a total of 1,112,432 tourists visited Greece—a record—and that was an increase of 30·3 per cent. over last year and an increase of 43 per cent. in so far as British tourists are concerned.

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Again in October this year a strong delegation from the London Chamber of Commerce visited Greece, and I understand that the prospects were then still most promising. I would therefore ask Her Majesty's Government whether their present political attitude is helpful if this country, for one, is to take advantage of the opportunities offered regarding the development of mines, hotels, and other industries in the Western Peleponnesus and certain regions of Crete, for instance.
To turn now to NATO, I am sure the Minister will agree that from a strategical point of view Greece has always held a key position on the South-Eastern flank of Europe. Perhaps at this stage I might quote C. M. Woodhouse, from his book, The Story of Modern Greece. He says:
"Although the new military government in 1967 consciously modelled their policies on Gaullism they were careful also to reaffirm their loyalty to NATO."
According to the Institute of Strategic Studies, all the Greek Army is assigned to, or earmarked, for NATO, and seven tactical squadrons, plus one transport squadron, are assigned to the Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force. The Greek Navy also co-operates in NATO naval exercises. If the technique of NATO is to interlock the political as well as the military structures of the contracting parties—that is, "An attack on one entailing an attack on the rest"—is it not a little ungenerous for one of the parties, namely, Her Majesty's Government, not to support our ally, Greece, regarding membership of another organisation, the Council of Europe? For instance, in 1936 when General Metaxas came to power the road back to a true Parliamentary democracy may have looked hard and long, but it came about.
Some people, too, tend I think to disregard certain facts. Boris Litvinoff, in his article headed, "What are the real facts concerning the Communist danger in Greece?", puts the case very well. This article appeared in the August/September, 1969, issue of the publication Nato's 15 Nations, and I quote from that article:
"Too many Western critics tend to underestimate or even completely to ignore the unfortunate experience of Communist subversion in Greece immediately after the end of the Second World War. They forget the massacres, the torture, the violence and extor-
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tions of every kind. Too often the Western critics disregard the conditions special to Greece."
My Lords, regarding next Friday's meeting, the Committee of Ministers will have before it the Report of the European Commission of Human Rights. I think two points come to mind. One, I understand that Mr. Pipinelis, the Greek Foreign Minister, has stated that the Report has no standing in law. Two, an article in the Guardian of December 1 states:
"According to Scandinavian Government lawyers, the Committee of Ministers is prevented by the Human Rights Convention from taking action on the Commission's Report until three months after it has received it."
If that is the case, will it not be curious if the Committee acts on it next Friday to suspend Greece from the Council of Europe? I should like the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, if he can, to comment on these two points. I should be most grateful to him if he does so when he comes to wind up.
LORD GIFFORD: My Lords, if the noble Lord is leaving the question of the Report of the Commission of the Council of Human Rights, would he say whether or not he accepts the conclusions of that Commission as reported in the Sunday Times on November 30?
LORD MERRIVALE: My Lords, my only comment there would be to express regret that there should have been a leak which enabled the Sunday Times to quote. as it says, extracts from that Report. I am not saying that Her Majesty's Government are in any way responsible for that. I read an article to the effect that the leak came from a Scandinavian country. I do not wish to comment any further at this stage, except to express regret that there should have been a leak before this Report is considered by the Committee of Ministers, if it is to be considered next Friday.
I have yet to refer to the leaks. I think they are both regrettable, but it might be worth recording that the International Red Cross, following an agreement of November 3 last, announced on December 5 that its delegates had enjoyed absolute freedom of movement during visits to 13 detention sites for Greek political prisoners. They were able to meet detainees of their choice without

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any time limitations. On May 20 this year, the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, said in the House:
"In the question of Greece … we are interested in the dignity and quality of life of human individuals. That will be at the heart of all our considerations in the matter of Greece and the Council of Europe."— [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 302, col. 301.]
At this point I should like briefly to refer to one or two of the things that have been done in Greece to raise the standard of living of the Greek people. With regard to the farmers, I would quote from a recent publication called Greece Today. The publication says:
"To give farmers financial relief arid assistance the Government wiped out all their debts to the Agricultural Bank. These amounted to 7·380 million drachmae in respect of farmers and 384 millions in respect of their co-operatives. In addition the Bank made loans to farmers amounting to 14,339 million drachmae in 1968 compared with 11,491 millions in the previous year."
In view of that statement, last July when I was in Greece I visited one afternoon a little village north of Athens called Afidne. There the local farmers were pleasantly and quietly enjoying a chat, drink, or a game at the outdoor tables of the cafés as they would do in any Continental village. I spoke to one of the farmers, and he said that he had been personally affected by this measure, to the effect that his debt had been written off by the equivalent of £400. In Athens, too, I spoke to businessmen, taxi drivers and so on. They recognised that there was now greater security in work, reduced unemployment and improved incomes.
That same month—that is, last July—Mr. George Papadopoulos, the Prime Minister in an interview he gave to Mr. Fabian Lacombe of the French News Agency, said:
"We shall bring back the country into the full exercise of the constitution. Preparation of the institutional laws will be achieved at the earliest possible time giving priority to the laws regarding the Press, the constitutional courts and other laws to secure the freedoms and obligations of the citizen."
He also mentioned that he sought to reorganise the economy of the country, the social services and the administration before holding elections. Noble Lords will certainly be aware of the degraded Parliamentary systems which existed up to April, 1967, with constant changes of Government and corruption, so I think noble Lords might consider these reforms
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to which the Prime Minister referred as being reasonable. In October this year, Mr. Papadopoulos announced progress in the fields of restoration of Press freedom, the abolition of special courts-martial, the restoration of individual liberty and in the drafting of institutional laws.
To conclude, my Lords, should we therefore not trust and support Greece, our ally and friend, and leave the timing, procedures and machinery involved in a stable return to Parliamentary democracy to the Greek Government? It would appear from an article in the Sunday papers that Her Majesty's Government have reviewed their policy on the sale of arms to South Africa; therefore could they not review their present attitude towards Greece? I trust it is not too late in the day for Her Majesty's Government to have, in the words of the Prime Minister yesterday, "a sudden change of heart", and that they will be influenced by to-morrow's speech to the nation of Mr. Papadopoulos. Perhaps I may end by reminding the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, that at the moment we are rightly seeking a greater degree of understanding with France. Could we not then consider aligning our policy, within the Committee of Ministers, with France's, namely, support for Greece or abstention?
7.46 p.m.
LORD HENLEY: I cannot help thinking, in view of everything that has been said about Greece from all quarters in the last week or so since the noble Lord, Lord Merrivale put down his Question, that he would have been better as their champion to have said nothing and withdrawn it. He has divided his Question into three parts. The first concerns past Anglo-Greek friendship. I wonder whether the noble Lord is not confusing Anglo-Greek friendship—friendship with the Greek people—with friendship with the Greek Colonels, the régime. The noble Lord will remember that on the occasion of Mr. Papandreou's funeral, half a million turned out to protest against the Colonels' régime.
LORD MERRIVALE: I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord so early in his remarks. But I would mention that there was a letter which appeared, written by the widow of Papandreou, which expressed support for the régime.
LORD HENLEY: I cannot answer for what Papandreou's widow said, but I am saying that half a million people in Athens turned out to protest against the Colonel's régime, and that seems to me very significant.
The noble Lord mentioned the referendum at the time of the 1968 Constitution. But does he also remember that there were more abstentions at that election than there were at the free election before—and that in spite of the dreadful and savage penalties put upon anybody who either abstained or did not vote pro. Does the noble Lord also not bear in mind the non-co-operation of the Greek Civil Servants, who up to now refuse to help the régime; and does he not also bear in mind that although some of the régimes, like the Spanish one in 1936, were supported by Conservative elements, this one in Greece never was. This régime is supported by no one in Greece. The noble Lord shakes his head, but this is true; there is no support other than the terror that the Colonels' régime promotes. This is where it seems to me that the noble Lord is making a confusion between the friendship with the Greek régime and friendship with the Greek people.
The noble Lord speaks about our good trade relations, and says there is a Greek threat to the continuance of those relations. I would dismiss that threat for what it is worth. I cannot help feeling that, in so far as we have got a favourable balance of trade with Greece, that small balance of trade is not a suitable argument to use in supporting a régime of this nature. With regard to the nuclear power station, it seems to me, and I am advised, that it is extremely likely that this order will go to France anyway; and that the Greek Government is merely stringing us along in this respect.
Thirdly, the noble Lord based his argument upon the importance of Greece within NATO. First of all, let us get the record clear on this. There is no suggestion at the moment of expelling Greece from NATO, and there is no possibility, so far as I know, that Greece will leave NATO. But it seems to me that the Armed Forces of Greece are becoming a liability to NATO, not an advantage to it. Look at the Army. The Army has lost one-third of its best officers, either dismissed or in prison, and
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the remainder are discontented and disaffected and are kept sweet only by bribes, The kind of bribes I mean are that they get preferential loans and first offers of goods which are in short supply, or goods which are available only for export. They are demoralised by mutual spying and distrust within their own ranks; and they are concentrated around Athens itself, being used as a political police force. I cannot quite see that this makes for a very useful military force for NATO. Lastly, they are losing the good will of the people. without which no Army is worth anything.
As to the Navy, my Lords, it is even more disaffected than the Army. I do not know whether it is commonly known that at the major Greek naval base at Scaramanga there was no admiral available to command it because the admirals would not "play up" with the régime; a military officer had to be found to do this. With regard to the Air Force, the position is much the same as with the Navy. They are extremely disaffected, and I understand they have no petrol. I am told that when Mylonos escaped from one of the prison islands in the Aegean in a private yacht the Air Force had not enough petrol to feel that it was worth their while to chase him.
LORD MERRIVALE: They fly jets, my Lords.
LORD HENLEY: Be that as it may; this is the on dit—that they were unable to follow Mylonos because they had no petrol. I do not imagine that you would follow a private yacht in a jet: you would follow it in something much more modest, but you would still need petrol, or whatever it is, to do it. In fact, so far from being a value to NATO it seems to me that the Armed Forces are a liability; that they are of no military use whatever on NATO'S South-East flank. Furthermore, I would suggest that they are an embarrassment to NATO in that there is a feeling—and this can be played upon by the Russians—that it is to the discredit of NATO that they can employ the Armed Forces of so disgraceful a régime. The Prime Minister pointed out yesterday—and the noble Lord quoted this—that we are under obligations, as signatories of the European Statute, to suspend Greece, which has broken the Statute so

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flagrantly. We should stick to those rules, because if you start breaking rules internationally it does not help international life and it does not help international organisations. So much for the three points which the noble Lord raised—our friendship, our trade and NATO.
What will happen if the Government do not stand firm? I think that the first thing that will happen is what happened in May. When Greece was given a second chance last May at the Council of Europe, the immediate reaction was the arrest and the torture of hundreds of people. I think that that would happen again. Secondly, I think there would be a drift away from the non-co-operation which is taking place at the moment. After all, people need jobs; they would have to go back. At the moment the country is leaderless and is not being administered at all. This is having economic and social consequences; but people cannot hold out indefinitely, and there will come a time, if they are forgotten, if we do not stand firm, when they will have to go back to work and co-operate with the Colonels. If we make a wrong decision on the 12th, I think that in six months this would mean a wholesale return of the sort of people I have in mind—the people who have been non-co-operative—and this would perpetuate the state of affairs which was revealed in the Sunday Times and reported by fifteen jurists after an examination over two years. All the noble Lord had to say about that was that he was sorry there was a leak. I wish he was sorry for a bit more than just that there was a leak.
LORD MERRIVALE: My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Lord? It was also discounted by the International Red Cross, so I think that all these allegations of torture are highly exaggerated.
LORD HENLEY: My Lords, I simply do not accept that, and where the noble Lord gets his information that this was discounted by the Red Cross I do not know. No doubt the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, will comment on that.
Thirdly, it will mean the extinction of the democratic opposition. They will be imprisoned; they will be terrified; they will be squeezed out—and this can only lead to a free field for the Communists. The Communists are not active at
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present. It is interesting that their absence was notable at Papandreou's funeral protest. What is also interesting is that Russia has given the O.K., the go-ahead, to the Greek Communists to operate in about a year's time. They do not want them to do anything now: they want them to do it in a year's time, when they feel that the liberal elements, the bourgeois, democratic set-up, will all have been destroyed. If we allow that opposition to be squeezed out and forgotten, it will, as I say, leave a free field for the Communists.
I said to the noble Lord when I was discussing this with him this evening that I felt that this was almost like a free benefit society for the Communist Party. It is almost designed for what they want to try to do. In the years before 1967 their vote, their influence, was dwindling. Between 1958 and 1964 their vote dropped by half, and they have been totally inactive. But what they know is that they can flourish when they are conducting an underground struggle against an unpopular régime, and this is what they are waiting for. What will happen if they get what they are waiting for? As I say, the democratic opposition will be squeezed out, will be forgotten. One will be left with an ultra-Right wing régime, with the Colonels on the one side, being attacked by an ultra-Left wing of underground Communists on the other side—and what good will that do us in Western Europe?
Next among the things that will happen if we do not bring down this régime is this. At the moment, this conflict, unlike that in the Middle East, which is already an international affair, still has not escaped from the confines of Greece; but if it goes on for a year or two, believe me, Russia will be in on the act. In view of what I have said I cannot see that it can possibly be in our interests to support this régime, and the first step towards damaging the regime is to expel the Colonels. I think they show how much they mind being expelled by the frantic efforts they have been making, by various devices, to show that they should not be expelled. I hope they fail. There is no chance of their mending their ways. I do not think they can. If they were to attempt to try to liberalise their régime it would fall down; and they know this as well as we do. So they are in the position

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that, whatever they say—and they said this in May—they can do nothing. They must go on maintaining this extremely repressive régime because that is the only way they can stay in power.
We must stand firm in Europe. This is one of the occasions, I think, on which we can really give a lead. What we say in Europe is going to matter in this context; and this will be the first step towards getting rid of this distasteful régime. I am sorry to have to say this because I know how much the noble Lord, Lord Merrivale, cares for Greece—quite genuinely so. His survey of our past history with Greece was interesting and, indeed, convincing. But this is not the Greeks; this is the Greek Colonels. It is an odious régime, and this is the only way we can get rid of it.
LORD MERRIVALE: My Lords, the noble Lord talks about oppression. Who, in effect, are the present régime oppressing?—certainly not the people. I have been there a number of times. They are certainly not oppressed.
LORD HENLEY: My Lords, the first thing that any dictatorship does when it gets into power and starts to oppress is to take all the people who might be leaders, who have any degree of expertise, any degree of a liberal way of thinking, any degree of education, and see to it very quickly that they are imprisoned. What the Greek régime is doing is systematically to torture people. I think that the evidence of this is absolutely incontestable. They are maintaining a régime of terror so to frighten the sort of people who might oppose them that they will not dare to do so. It is extremely unlikely that anyone will be able to prove that that is not so as far as the Greek Government is concerned.
My Lords, this is an Unstarred Question and I have spoken too long. I think there are signs that the Government mean to stand firm and to vote for the expulsion of Greece. I hope that they will do so and that they will not be bamboozled at the last minute by protestations from the Greek Government that they can and will do something.
8.3 p.m.
LORD GIFFORD: My Lords, the Question of the noble Lord, Lord Merrivale, concerns the Council of
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Europe. The Council of Europe is an organisation which I believe to have been established to protect and to further the principles of freedom, the rule of law and the rights of the individual for which we in this country and the other signatory countries are supposed to stand. I find it significant that in the whole of his speech there was scarcely a mention of the fact that freedom, the rule of law and democracy are quite unknown in Greece to-day. There is no disputing this; the Colonels themselves do not try to dispute it; they have been crushed in the interest of "saving the country", as they say. There was a programme on television last night, "Panorama", which I hope the noble Lord saw. In it, ex-Prime Minister Kanellopoulos, who is no Socialist, said that saviours are apt to become tyrants. The noble Lord knows full well that that is what is happening inside Greece.
Like the noble Lord, I have been to Greece. I have been twice since the Junta took over power. I have talked to Ministers of the Junta and I have talked to some of the victims of the regime. I was told, incidentally, by Mr. Pattakos that I should beware of the House of Lords because of the threat of Communist subversion in the House of Lords. I never knew that the work of my noble friend Lord Milford had been so successful. I should mention the fact that on my second visit I got no further than Athens airport. Clearly, my questions were not to the Colonels' taste.
All of us, with the exception of the noble Lord who put this Question, know that what has happened in Greece is a great tragedy. It is a tragedy; but at the same time it is a challenge. It is a challenge to all who believe in the ideals which the free world is supposed to embody. I say "supposed", because I believe that the vote which will be taken in the Council of Europe is a test of the sincerity of the democratic countries in the West, whether they are prepared to go along with or to say, alternatively, that they will have no part of a régime which tramples the rule of law and the rights of the individual under foot.
I believe that the Council of Europe is an organisation of great importance. The signatories to the Council of Europe believed in the ideals of human rights and the liberty of the individual. They knew

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from the experiences of the war years and the pre-war years that those rights are too fragile sometimes to be left to the governments of individual countries. They signed a Statute. Let us read some of the words of that Statute. By Article 3, every Member of the Council of Europe must accept the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
The signatories of the Statute of the Council of Europe went further. They defined what were human rights and fundamental freedoms in a Convention. They went even further than that. They set up a Commission and a Court so that for the first time in history one Government could complain to the Commission of the violation of human rights by another Member-Government and individuals whose human rights had been violated in their own country could complain against their own Government in that Court. If ever there is to be any kind of world order, if ever human rights are to be protected against the vagaries of tyrannical governments in the world, that world order must be founded on some such model. It is a model which I find most inspiring.
When on April 21 the Colonels came to power, the organs of the Council of Europe set about their work and they have done their work in the most impressive and authoritative way. The Assembly of the Council of Europe, the European Parliament, has consistently, by the votes of Conservatives, Liberals and Socialists, condemned what has happened in Greece. They have been guided in their deliberations by reports which if the noble Lord has not read he should read. I should like to pay tribute to Dr. Max van der Stoel for the work that he has done on this matter. Finally, the Commission have investigated complaints made by the Governments of Scandinavia and the Netherlands. It may not be in order for the Ministers at the end of this week to discuss that Report; but whether there has been a leak or whether it is in order is quite immaterial. The noble Lord has read his Sunday Times and he knows full well that not only did those lawyers—who are not hot-headed Left-Wing figures—find conclusively that the Junta has produced no justification for its usurpation of power, but they found
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after many months of painstaking investigation, using legal standards of proof, that torture was practised in Greece "as an administrative practice".
LORD MERRIVALE: My Lords, would not the noble Lord agree that prior to the take over by the present régime, in effect the Communists were the only coherent political force in existence in Greece at the time?
LORD GIFFORD: My Lords, I ant glad the noble Lord has raised this point. The coherent political force was the Central Union Party which would have come to power, led by Papandreou. As the noble Lord knows, the Communists in the last elections achieved 13 per cent. of the votes. I do not know whether the noble Lord is saying that the danger of Communism overthrowing the State justified the usurpation of power by the Colonels. If he is, I should like to know who he is to put his judgment not only against the lawyers of the Council of Europe but against such figures as ex-Foreign Minister Averoff, a conservative man, who said(again on "Panorama" last night) that there was no such justification. Prime Minister Kanellopoulos said the same thing. Perhaps when he spoke of the degraded Parliamentary system he has the same contempt as the Colonels of all politicians Right or Left. I happen to believe that politicians in a democracy are people who should be given the freedom to vote a means of change, and there is no freedom of that kind in Greece to-day.
My Lords, I am pleased that our Prime Minister said yesterday that Britain would vote for the suspension of Greece from the Council of Europe unless there were some dramatic last-minute change. I regret that the British Government were not a party, together with the Dutch and the Scandinavians, to the action in the Commission on Human Rights Convention; but even so, it is welcome that they should now realise what is their duty. I would only urge this upon the Government, and I urge it with the utmost seriousness. They should not be led into the path of appeasement by any kind of last minute promises which representatives of the Junta may make. It is clear that the Greeks are alarmed at the prospect of exclusion from the Council of Europe.

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They have resorted to what I feel to be pathetic threats of economic blackmail and during the course of this week they may well come out with some soft words. The record of the Junta shows that soft words should be treated with contempt.
The Junta has had more than enough time, and during that time it has done nothing but consolidate its power. Sometimes, my Lords, to ascertain what are the intentions of the Junta one may do little better than to listen to what they say and I should like to refer to some of the statements made by Mr. Pattakos on the "Panorama" programme last night. I took them down as I listened. He was asked about the suspension of the rule of law and he said, "All laws were put to sleep so that one supreme law could reign". He was asked how long the Junta would continue to rule, and he said, "The danger will continue so long as those who have been shouting continue to shout". When asked if there was any timetable for a change, he said it would begin, "one year after people from abroad stop shouting".
LORD MERIVALE: My Lords, that was said with his tongue in his cheek.
LORD GIFFORD: My Lords, if the noble Lord thinks that the next statement was said by Mr. Pattakos with his tongue in his cheek I should like him to say so. He was asked about the Constitution, which the noble Lord, Lord Merivale, vaunted as something which had been approved by the Greek people. Even accepting that that were true, which of course it is not, he said, "If the country is in danger, it does not give a second glance at the Constitution". And that pronouncement is justified, of course, by the action which the régime took when the Council of State this year protested against the dismissal of the judges.
My Lords, these were not off-the-cuff remarks by some junior personage; this was the Deputy Prime Minister of Greece making remarks in front of the television cameras of a country which, presumably, he wishes to impress. The duty of the Government is quite clear; to cast this vote and to treat any last minute so-called promises with the contempt that they deserve. Of course, it is possible for the Junta to survive expulsion from the Council of Europe. But in addition to
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what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Henley, the vote will, first of all, give to the Greek people the heart which they sorely need in their days of trial. Further than that, I hope that ostracism from the Council will be clear notice to other Western Governments, and particularly to the Government of the United States on whom the future of the Junta depends, that Europe does not tolerate this régime in an organisation which is designed to protect democracy and freedom.
I have always felt that the Greek tyrants could be removed by sustained international pressure, and particularly pressure from those who are her friends. If they are not toppled in that way, they will most certainly be toppled by civil war, and that is not a prospect which I would wish on the people of Greece. My Lords, I ask the Government to do their duty in this matter and help to push these Colonels into the history books forever.
8.15 p.m.
LORD MILFORD: My Lords, I do not want to repeat what other noble Lords have said. I was told that this debate would be at a late hour because the debate on Scottish affairs was going on for a long time. I cannot think what has happened to Scotland this afternoon. I got into the Chamber only just in time to hear the noble Lord, Lord Gifford, but I gather that we are seeing once again what happened 30 years ago in Europe and over the world. The good old Red bogy is being raised up to encourage Fascism to put it down. We remember what happened about appeasement before the last war; how people welcomed Hitler and the other Fascists against the Red bogy of Communism. Now we have a noble Lord bringing up the whole thing again.
I was in Greece when the election campaign was on, a few days before the Colonels took over. There were no Communist candidates. The Left had a broad front called E.D.A. At the end of that election they expected, on the most optimistic reckoning, that they might get 30 seats. Was that a Communist threat so that the elections had to be abandoned for the whole Junta dictatorship to come in? About a year ago, when this question of the Council of Europe was coming

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up, I put down Questions in your Lordships' House. I asked Her Majesty's Government to expel Greece because I thought, and put forward, that if she were not expelled, the Colonels would take great heart and go on torturing and having trials and putting down the people of Greece. That is exactly what happened. They were encouraged by the breath we gave them. They started their vicious trials straight away, cocking a snoot at all of us.
The noble Lord, Lord Merrivale, belongs to the Tory party. May I just tell him what the chief Tory leader in Greece, the Leader of the Tory Party, has said in Greece? He has put three points forward. First, the struggle to overthrow the tyranny with all available means must be intensified; this struggle must be coordinated as broadly as possible. Second, the Government of the transitional period must be composed of representatives of all anti-dictatorial parties and of all resistance organisations. Third, the programme of this Government must include the abolition of the 1968 pseudo Constitution, all the Fascist laws of the Junta and all the extraordinary laws and measures upon which the Junta has based its régime of terror and intimidation. The holding of free elections in the shortest possible time for a constituency assembly and with the participation of all political Parties guarantees that the Greek people will be able to express themselves freely without the interference of foreign Powers. That is the noble Lord's Party, speaking in Greece on the situation of the people of Greece.
What has happened to the trade unions and co-operative movement? Trade union branches cannot hold meetings without getting leave from the police, who have to go to the local military authorities and bring back their permission. In elections to the unions candidates have their names sent in to the police, and through the local Army authorities these go up to the Junta and down again; and the candidates are "O.K." only if they do not show any fight against the Junta. I suppose that that is claimed to be free election to the trade unions. It is the same with the co-operative party. The co-operative party was very strong among the peasants and it gave protection to their interests, helped them to market their produce and to buy their fertilisers and other
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goods. To-day it has been taken over by the Junta and is now working for the interests of the big private farmers.
I expected the question of NATO to be raised by the noble Lord opposite. I have been in Holland and Denmark recently and have talked to people about what an example Greece is as an ally within NATO. The Scandinavians especially are very worried about having a Fascist ally, and I was told and have read—I cannot vouch for its being true and perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, can tell us—that the Danes say that if the Greeks are not expelled from the Council of Europe, they are unwilling to take part in NATO manœuvres. I gather that the supporters of NATO want really strong allies. The Army in Greece to-day is held in absolute contempt by the people, and that is not a good background for any national army. The Greek Army has also been purged of its best officers, leaving Fascist officers only.
I have seen in the Press that America has been trying to exert pressure on Her Majesty's Government and on West Germany on this question of expelling Fascist Greece from the Council of Europe, and I should like to know whether this is true. There are two Americas on this question of Greece: there is the Pentagon, which fully supports the Junta, but would rather like to see a more reliable ally, and there are real progressive Americans, like Senator Fulbright and Senator Penn, who are all for getting the Greek Junta out of the Council of Europe. I should like the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, to answer me on that question.
I noticed in the statement made in another place yesterday that there is still a loophole. If the Greek Government make certain statements, we may not decide upon expulsion. But who on earth is going to believe this gang of Colonels, whatever they say? Surely we all agree, except perhaps the noble Lord opposite, that we cannot believe these people in power in Greece to-day. I hope that Her Majesty's Government do not believe them, either, and I hope that we shall now take strong steps to get rid of the Fascist Greek Government. I am interested in the political prisoners in Greece and in their wives and families, and try to help them in several ways. I

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would put a special plea to Her Majesty's Government to do all they can to get an amnesty for all the political prisoners in Greece, so that Greece becomes a free country for all its people, whatever their politics.
8.25 p.m.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, may I first apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Merrivale, because I was not in my place when he rose to put his Question. Like the noble Lord, Lord Milford, frankly I anticipated that the Scots would use their day perhaps to greater advantage and keep your Lordships to a much later hour than they did. I am told that my noble friend Lord Hughes made one of the shortest speeches in his own record. So if the noble Lord or I have any complaint we should see my noble friend tomorrow. But I gather that the part of the noble Lord's speech which I missed was his historical survey of the long connections between the United Kingdom and Greece.
If I may, I would express my sincere compliments to my noble friend Lord Gifford for one of the warmest and most notable speeches that I have heard in your Lordships' House. I think that he spoke, like so many of his age, with a sense of despair at seeing countries that have had long traditions of democracy falling by the wayside. He asked how long this will last and what steps could be taken to change the direction of these developments and bring us back, I hope, to a safe haven.
I do not dissent from the noble Lord, Lord Merrivale, as to the importance of our export trade and of our long connections with Greece. But I must remind him that to-day there are some 1,600 Greeks who remain under arrest, with or without trial; and while we welcome last month's agreement between the Greek Government and the International Committee of the Red Cross, I must say on behalf of Her Majesty's Government that the régime's treatment of its political prisoners continues to give us very deep and very grave concern. The Greek Government are well aware of our views.
The noble Lord, Lord Merrivale, asked me a question about the European Commission of Human Rights.
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Their Report arises from an application brought by the Scandinavian and Netherlands Governments against Greece in 1967, alleging that Greece was in violation of certain Articles of the European Convention of Human Rights. Under the rules of the Convention the Report may not be made public for at least three months after it has been transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. I share the regret that this Report has been prematurely leaked. The Committee of Ministers, who received the Report last month, may not take a decision on the Report for three months after its receipt. But they are entitled to discuss it, and I can assure the House that Her Majesty's Government, and I believe our colleagues in the Ministerial Council, will take due account of that Report at the Paris meetings. We must not, however, allow action against the Human Rights Convention to divert attention from the proper discharge of Ministerial powers under the Statute—and this I will deal with in a moment.
The House will remember that on May 7 I repeated a Statement made in another place by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. That Statement made it clear that the resolution which the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe had adopted the day before had set a clear time limit—this week's meeting of the Committee—for the Greek Government to convince European opinion that they were prepared to make an early return to democratic practices and the rule of law. That time limit has very nearly expired; and unless the Greek Government, by the time of the meeting, can show that they are in a position to conform to what is required of membership of the Council of Europe, or unless they voluntarily withdraw from the Council, the Committee will later this week have to consider Greek membership of the Council.
The question they will have to answer is whether Greece is at present fulfilling the obligations imposed by Article 3 of the Statute of the Council, which I should like to quote. It reads:
"Every member of the Council of Europe must accept the principles of the Rule of Law and of the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and collaborate sincerely and effectively in the realisation of the aim of the Council…"

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There can be no doubt, my Lords, as to what those words mean to us in this country or to Europe. Nothing would please Her Majesty's Government more than that the Greek Government should give unqualified undertakings before or at this week's meeting that they will take within an acceptable time-limit steps to fulfil these obligations. In saying this, I am not suggesting that it is for us to tell Greece, a sovereign State, how to run her own affairs. But I do suggest that it is our right—indeed, our duty—to satisfy ourselves that our fellow members of the Council of Europe are abiding by the Statute. The Council is unique among international organisations in that its whole purpose is to bind together those European nations sharing the ideals and practice of democracy.
LORD MILFORD: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord whether, if the Greek Junta did make these promises, he would believe them?
LORD SHEPHERD: I wish that my noble friend would let me complete what I am saying. Clearly I am using most careful words, and I think that perhaps when I have completed my speech the noble Lord will have an answer.
The fact is that the present situation in Greece cannot in our view be reconciled with her continued membership of the Council. The noble Lord, Lord Merrivale, asks that we should bear in mind past Anglo-Greek friendship. I am very conscious of the historical and cultural links between the British and Greek peoples. Indeed, this is the reason for the acute awareness and concern in this country that democratic practices have now been suspended in Greece for more than two and a half years. We earnestly hope that the traditional warmth of Anglo-Greek relations may soon be restored. Meanwhile, I hope that, for their part, the Greek people will reflect that if Britain, with all her sympathy for Greece, concludes that the present situation in Greece is not compatible with her membership of the Council of Europe, there must be some force in that conclusion.
The noble Lord also points out that we enjoy good commercial relations with Greece. I am well aware of this, and I hope that they will not be affected by the
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outcome of the meeting of the Committee of Ministers. In our view, trade and politics should not be confused; we enjoy good trading relations with many countries who do not conform to the ideals of the Council of Europe. Noble Lords will be aware that the Greek Government have uttered warnings to several members of the Council of Europe about possible commercial reprisals against nations who oppose continued Greek membership of the Council. Of course we do not wish to lose exports. But the fundamental consideration here, both for us and for our European colleagues, must be our respect for the ideals of the Council of Europe. I am sure that noble Lords would not expect us to ignore our duties under the Statute.
As to the role of Greece in NATO, I fully share the noble Lord's view that this is important; Greek membership is of value to NATO. And Greece, I am convinced, attaches importance to the benefits she herself derives from that membership. It would be wrong to do anything that would weaken NATO. But I think that the role of Greece in NATO and her membership of the Council of Europe are separate matters. NATO is an organisation for defence. The Council of Europe, on the other hand, is an ideological organisation, and is the correct forum in which to pursue moral and legal issues, although clearly these in themselves arise in NATO.
The noble Lord, Lord Milford, asked me about Denmark. I am not aware of anything that the noble Lord himself suggests as to the attitude of the Danish authorities in this matter. There are some who believe that Greece has gone some way to meet the concern of Europe. We have naturally welcomed progress in Greece towards the restoration of human rights and democracy, including the agreement of the Greek Government which was concluded last month with the International Committee of the Red Cross, under which representatives of the latter have free access to the political prisoners in Greece. But this agreement is limited in its context, and the measures as a whole do not, in our view, match up to the requirements for membership of the Council of Europe.
Before concluding, I would say again to the noble Lord, Lord Milford—and

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it may also be of use to the noble Lord, Lord Merrivale, and to those who look with concern at the attitude of the United Kingdom in this matter—that the British Government have not sought to take a lead in the Council of Europe on this matter. We have perhaps been open to criticism that we have sought for time in order that Greece could make its moves, make the changes that we all desire. It would be wrong for us to say that we have taken a lead in this matter nor have we had the pressure of the United States upon us to change our view on it. The countries in the Council of Europe will have to make their judgment on the information and facts that are before them.
So far as the British Government are concerned—and I believe so far as Parliament is concerned—the position was put forward by my right honourable friend the Prime Minister in another place yesterday when he said:
"At this week's meeting, unless the Greek Government were to decide to withdraw voluntarily or unless at this very late hour there is a sudden change of heart, expressed in a specific and short timetable relating to the restoration both of democracy and of human rights, then Her Majesty's Government will have the duty of voting for the suspension of Greece."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, 8/12/69, col. 40.]
At the same time, of course, we greatly hope that Greece will soon be able to resume, if this becomes necessary, her place in the Council. My right honourable friend the Prime Minister said yesterday, in speaking of democracy (col. 40) that:
"… we owe that very word and that way of life to Greece. We all look forward not so much to a return to the democratic forms of the past, but forward to whatever form of genuine democracy the Greek people choose for themselves."
I believe that this is something which your Lordships' House will endorse.

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  EUROPEAN SECURITY: PROPOSED CONFERENCE
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