Sitting of 8 December 1969

Preamble
The House met at half-past Two o'clock
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
  FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS

    Foreign Minister of Roumania (Discussions)
    Mrs. Renée Shortasked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement about his discussions with the Foreign Minister of Roumania.
    The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Michael Stewart): My discussions with Mr. Manescu were comprehensive and useful. They dealt mainly with international problems of common concern. Some questions of bilateral relations were also touched on. A copy of the communiqué which was issued after the visit of the Chairman of the Roumanian Council of
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    Ministers is available in the Library of the House.
    Mrs. Short: I thank my right hon. Friend for that reply. I have already seen the communiqué. In view of the lack of enthusiasm from my right hon. Friend and his Department about the security conference about which we are all concerned, does not my right hon. Friend think that it would have been better if he had taken more advice from Mr. Manescu and less from Mr. William Rogers of the United States Department?
    Mr. Stewart: No, Sir. I think that my hon. Friend has got this wrong. She will see from the communiqué that Mr. Manescu and I took a common view about such a conference. In any case, there is a later Question on this matter.

    European Economic Community
    Mr. David Howellasked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what commitments he has entered into with the European Free Trade Association countries regarding protection of their interests in the event of negotiations between the United Kingdom and the European Economic Community.
    The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Mr. George Thomson): I would refer the hon. Member to the agreed communiqué issued after the recent E.F.T.A. Ministerial meeting, the text of which is in the OFFICIAL REPORT for the 12th of November.—[Vol. 791, c. 97–9.]
    Mr. Howell: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that I have seen that communiqué? It still leaves unanswered a very difficult question. If the British Government sign the Rome Treaty and we adopt common external tariffs, what happens to the other E.F.T.A. countries which do not get in? Would we be obliged to raise tariffs against them?
    Mr. Thomson: As the hon. Gentleman knows, what happened at the E.F.T.A. Ministerial meeting was a reaffirmation of the position which the E.F.T.A. Council took up in London in April 1967, and this took account of the many differing objectives of the individual E.F.T.A. countries in the relationship with the European Community. I hope that the hon. Gentleman was reassured by one passage from the communiqué which came out of the Hague summit meeting, where those who took part in the meeting said that it was their intention that as soon as negotiations with the applicant countries had opened discussions would be started with the other E.F.T.A. members immediately afterwards.
    Mr. Wood: Can the right hon. Gentleman help us further? When the negotiations take place for British entry into the Community, will they take place in parallel with negotiations for the entry of the other three countries into the Community, or separately?
    Mr. Thomson: This is a matter for the Six themselves. The updated opinion of the Commission was that the negotiations for the applicant countries should take place in parallel, and there are important practical arguments in favour of that course.
    Mr. Jay: Does my right hon. Friend agree that it would be extremely undesirable that we should have to raise tariffs again against goods from the other E.F.T.A. countries? Can my right hon Friend give an assurance that that will not be allowed to happen?
    Mr. Thomson: My hon. Friend is asking a hypothetical question about how prolonged negotiations with a number of countries will end. A great deal will depend on what the non-applicant E.F.T.A. countries decide they wish to seek in their own interests.
    Mr. Barnesasked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a further statement on the progress of Great Britain's application to join the European Economic Community in the light of the outcome of the European Economic Community summit meeting at The Hague.
    Mr. Martenasked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a further statement on Great Britain's application to join the Common Market in the light of the outcome of The Hague summit meeting.
    Mr. Mayhewasked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement on Great Britain's application to join the European Economic Community in the light of the Community's summit meeting at The Hague.
    Sir G. de Freitasasked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether he will make a statement on recent developments inside the European Economic Community which have been notified to Her Majesty's Government because they affect the United Kingdom.
    Mr. Turtonasked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether he will make a statement on the progress of the United Kingdom's application to join the Common Market following the European Economic Community Summit Conference at The Hague.
    Mr. George Thomson: I would refer hon. Members to what my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said in answer to Questions on 4th December.—[Vol. 792, c. 1695–1703.]
    Mr. Barnes: Would he not agree that the entry of Britain could be instrumental in opening the way to a new phase of co-operation between the Common Market countries? Is it not important that the negotiations should be forward looking in this sense rather than that they should concentrate upon minor matters.
    Mr. Thomson: Yes, Sir, I am happy to find myself in general agreement with my hon. Friend. So long as we can negotiate acceptable terms for British

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    accession, I should have thought there was tremendous and perhaps historically positive advantage for countries both on the mainland of Europe and for ourselves.
    Mr. Marten: Would the Minister confirm that the present position about any supranational or federal structure in our relation; with Europe is that the Prime Minister for home audiences sticks to what he said in reply to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Battersea, North (Mr. Jay) on 6th February, that he is not in favour of a supranational structure and will give no support to it, whereas the position taken up by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary at the Monnet Committee on 22nd July, as reported by the leader of the Liberal Party, was that he had no objections to a federal solution?
    Mr. Thomson: I thought that the hon. Gentleman might have grown weary of trying to draw this erroneous distinction. What the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary have said on the matter is identical.
    Mr. Mayhew: Would my right hon. Friend agree that a more promising prospect in Europe is due not only to the robust attitude of the Government in the past two years, but also to the excellent work in Europe of voluntary organisations supported by hon. Members in all parts of the House? Would he not agree that the small subsidy paid to these organisations by the Government has been of great advantage to the national interest?
    Mr. Thomson: I agree with my right hon. Friend.
    Sir G. de Freitas: Is it not particularly encouraging that some of the statements at The Hague last week definitely recognised the fact that the present agricultural policy of the Six was most unsatisfactory both as regards surpluses and financial contributions?
    Mr. Thomson: Yes, Sir, I certainly believe that to be an encouraging feature of the results of the discussions at the Hague.
    Mr. Turton: Would the right hon. Gentleman make clear what the Prime Minister did not make clear, whether the then existing agricultural regulations
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    will be a precondition to negotiations, or whether it would be possible for Britain to negotiate for a change in agricultural policy and for a change in the method of financing?
    Mr. Thomson: The position about this matter is reasonably clear in the aftermath of the summit meeting. I do not wish to underestimate the difficulties associated with the negotiations, especially on agricultural matters. What the Six agreed at the summit was that they themselves should agree a definitive financial arrangement on agriculture, but they said specifically that this must be done in the context of seeking an enlarged community. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Kettering (Sir G. de Freitas) has just said, the Community also laid significant emphasis on the need to seek changes in common agricultural policies so as to reduce budgetary burdens. In addition to that it is widely recognised among the Six that the present common agricultural policy would place an inequitable burden on this country.
    Mr. Jay: If my right hon. Friend is expecting major changes in the agricultural policies of the Six, would it not be wiser to know what these are if any before we commit ourselves?
    Mr. Thomson: No, Sir. The right thing to do is to seek negotiation at the earliest possible moment. We have been waiting far too long as it is.

    Nigeria and Biafra
    Mr. Tilneyasked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what further action he has taken recently to bring the Nigerian civil war to an end.
    Mr. Barnesasked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement on his latest efforts to promote a cease-fire in the war between Nigeria and Biafra.
    Mr. M. Stewart: I would refer to the reply which my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State gave on 13th October. The Government continue to press both sides to negotiate for a permanent settlement. As the House knows, my hon. Friend is at present in Nigeria.—[Vol. 788, 12–16.]
    Mr. Tilney: Even if there were to be an international embargo on arms, does not the right hon. Gentleman think that this merciless war may drag on for a long time? As the O.A.U. appear to be powerless, will the right hon. Gentleman consult the United States and other powers to try to force a compromise on both sides and the acceptance of a peacekeeping force in the Ibo area so that they no longer need fear massacre?
    Mr. Stewart: When the hon. Gentleman speaks about ourselves and the United States forcing a compromise on both sides, that is not a realistic way of approaching it. We and many others have done our best to bring both sides together. There is the possibility now of further African attempts at mediation, and it is particularly to these that we should give our support.
    Mr. Barnes: Could my right hon. Friend say whether the Joint Under-Secretary has asked if he could visit Biafra? Is it not time that somebody in authority visited Biafra, especially if a cease-fire or relief are to be discussed?
    Mr. Stewart: I do not rule out a visit of that kind. The House will understand that there is a difference between a private person, however eminent, visiting Biafra and a member of the Government visiting Biafra. It has not been the practice, except with those few Governments which recognise Biafra, for members of Governments to go there.
    Mr. Frank Allaunasked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs how much relief sent by Her Majesty's Government has reached unoccupied Biafra to date.
    Mr. M. Stewart: Her Majesty's Government have given to the International Committee of the Red Cross £950,000 for use on both sides of the conflict. It is impossible, however, to say how much of the International Committee's expenditure in the rebel area is attributable to grants from Her Majesty's Government. As Parliament was informed on the 4th of December, we have decided, subject to Parliamentary approval, to make grants of £100,000 each to Oxfam and the British Council of Churches, also for use on both sides.—[Vol. 792, c. 351.]
    Mr. Allaun: Will the Government give really massive aid, comparable with that given by other Western European countries, to Joint Church Aid, which alone is still flying food into Biafra? Secondly, will he consider transferring the vast stocks of food at Kotoneu to San Antonio and from there into Biafra?
    Mr. Stewart: I have replied earlier about the difficulties attached to Joint Church Aid operations. I would point out that the help which we have already given is considerable and is available on both sides in the dispute.
    Mr. Dodds-Parker: Will the Foreign Secretary give some consideration to the request by U.N.I.C.E.F. for extra aid?
    Mr. Stewart: That goes a little wide of the orginal Question, but I will gladly consider it.
    Mr. Molloyasked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will seek to initiate a meeting with Nigerian and Biafran leaders and other organisations involved to assure the continuance of all relief and mercy flights, and to promote a cease-fire and subsequent negotiations.
    Mr. M. Stewart: I would refer my hon. Friend to the Answers given by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister in reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Salford, East (Mr. Frank Allaun) and to supplementary questions on 27th November.—[Vol. 792, c. 609–12.]
    Mr. Molloy: Will my right hon. Friend take it that, notwithstanding some of the ill-informed, unjust and vulgar attacks on him by some sections of the ill-informed British Press, many of us understand his humanitarian endeavours to end this war and to bring relief, and we understand his fears for the Balkanisation of Africa, but will he agree that an effort ought now to be made to have Ministerial contact with both sides, particularly in the light of the statement made by Sir Louis Mbanefo to the effect that they are concerned not so much about sovereignty itself as about what that would mean as it affects the Biafrans?
    Mr. Stewart: I am obliged to my hon. Friend for what he said at the beginning of his supplementary question. We are all anxious to secure, if it can possibly

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    be done, both relief and an end to the war. If it be a question of providing the actual mechanical things needed for relief, this country and a good many others would be prepared to do anything within reason. The real and genuine difficulty is that, in order to secure relief, one has to secure a measure of agreement between the two sides in the civil war, which, unhappily, has not yet been forthcoming. We shall continue to do the best we can.
    As regards the last point my hon. Friend made, I have seen the report of Sir Louis Mbanefo saying, in effect, that they are concerned not with secession or sovereignty but with security. I earnestly hope that that is true. It has been said before and, unhappily, denied. If it proves to be true, progress could, I believe, be made.
    Mr. E. L. Mallalieu: Have not my right hon. Friend and the Government done all they can at all times to bring relief to starving peoples in all parts of Nigeria, in spite of obstruction by the Head of State of that part of Nigeria still occupied by him, namely, Ojukwu?
    Mr. Stewart: I sincerely believe that that is and I assure the House that every time we debate this matter I listen most earnestly to see whether, from any quarter of the House, there comes any proposal which could be practicable either for bringing in relief or for ending the war. In my judgment, this country has acquitted itself well so far on both counts.

    Spain (Gibraltar)
    Mr. Tilneyasked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what discussions he has had recently with the Government of Spain over Gibraltar; and if he will make a statement.
    Sir G. Nabarroasked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether he will make a further statement on Gibraltar, following changes in the Spanish Government.
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenterasked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what relaxations have recently appeared of the measures being taken by Spain against Gibraltar.
    Mr. George Thomson: So far, there has been no lifting of the Spanish restrictions. We are, of course, in normal diplomatic contact with the Spanish Government and intend to explore through the diplomatic channel every possibility of improving the situation for Gibraltar, to the benefit of Gibraltar, Spain and this country.
    Mr. Tilney: Will the right hon. Gentleman confirm that these restrictions are damaging to the economy of Spain as well as to that of Gibraltar, and can he say anything about his conversations with Major Pelitza, the Chief Minister of Gibraltar?
    Mr. Thomson: I confirm that in our view there is a strong mutual interest in Spain as well as on the part of Gibraltar and this country to see these restrictions brought to an end. The present situation is sterile and is economically damaging on both sides of the frontier. There is a further question on the Order Paper about discussions with the Chief Minister of Gibraltar. I do not think I should anticipate that question.
    Sir G. Nabarro: Is it not a fact that the newly appointed Spanish Foreign Minister recently has been making highly conciliatory speeches, speeches of a different order from those made by his predecessor? Does this not signify a different tone and a change in policy, and are Her Majesty's Government not proposing to take advantage of this more conciliatory situation to try to lift the restrictions afflicting Gibraltar?
    Mr. Thomson: With respect, the hon. Gentleman must have prepared that supplementary question before he heard my Answer. I told the hon. Gentleman and the House that we were intending to explore every possibility of improving the situation for Gibraltar.
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: Does not the first sentence of the Minister's original Answer lead inevitably to the depressing conclusion that Her Majesty's Government policy in this respect has failed and should be reconsidered?
    Mr. Thomson: The right hon. Gentleman ought not to reach such a gloomy conclusion at this stage. Obviously the lifting of restrictions is an absolutely vital element in improving relationships, but it is very early days at the moment.
    Mr. George Jeger: Will the Minister confirm that there will be no talks with any representative of the Spanish Government until they have shown their good will by lifting some of the restrictions at the Gibraltar frontier?
    Mr. Thomson: What is important is to keep the interest of the people of Gibraltar in the forefront of our minds. Her Majesty's Government stand ready to talk, if holding talks seems likely to help the Gibraltarians in bringing a solution nearer. I am sure that is the right principle on which we should approach the problem.

    Middle East
    Mr. Martenasked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a further statement on the situation in the Middle East.
    The Joint Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Evan Luard): The situation in the Middle East continues to cause us serious concern. There is an urgent need for progress towards a political settlement. I am pleased to say that talks between the representatives at the United Nations of Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the United States of America resumed in New York on 2nd December.
    Mr. Marten: is there any sign that the resumed talks by the four Powers will be any more successful than in the past? Can the Minister say what has happened to the farcical situation over ships trapped in the Canal? Has there been any action by the Government on that matter?
    Mr. Luard: On the first part of the question, it is much too early to say how successful the resumed set of four-Power talks will he. We have had only two brief meetings so far, but we hope that we will achieve more success and that it may be possible to send Mr. Jarring back to the Middle East to seek a settlement. Regarding the ships in the Canal, there is nothing more to report at the present time.
    Mr. Shinwell: In view of the delay by the four-Power conference to reach some conclusion, would it not be more enterprising if they suggested to the Arab States that they should enter into unilateral negotiations with the State of
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    Israel with a view to settlement? Is it not extraordinary that one of the four Powers, the Soviet Union, is sending arms to the Arab States, while another, the United Kingdom, refuses to send arms to the State of Israel?
    Mr. Luard: On the first part of that question, it is certainly our hope that these four-Power discussions will reach an early settlement. On the question of direct or indirect negotiations, my right hon. Friend will know that there is an acute difference of view on this matter between the Arab States and Israel. One of the questions which has been discussed by the four Powers in the past, and which no doubt will be discussed again, is whether some kind of compromise may be reached by using Ambassador Jarring as an intermediary.
    On the second part of the question, it is the policy of Her Majesty's Government to maintain a balance of arms in the region. The fact that the United States is supplying arms to Israel or the Soviet Union to the Arab States does not affect our own policy on this question.
    Viscount Lambton: Are we to understand from what the Minister says that the negotiations to relieve the ships have broken down? Is it over 18 months since the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. George Brown) said that they were to be released almost immediately. What is happening about the question of insurance arising from the deterioration of the ships?
    Mr. Luard: It is not true to say that the discussions have broken down, because we are still continuing to make efforts to release the ships, in common with other countries which have ships in a similar situation. We are not omnipotent in this situation. We are still hopeful that we shall be able to make progress.
    Mr. Shinwellasked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what progress has been made in the four Power talks on the Middle East; when he expects a decision to be reached; and to what extent British proposals have proved acceptable.
    Mr. Luard: The four-Power talks resumed on 2nd December. We hope that the four will now make rapid progress in working out fresh guidance for

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    Dr. Jarring. As the talks are confidential, I am afraid I cannot give any information on the subject matter of these discussions.
    Mr. Shinwell: Does my hon. Friend need to be something of an intellectual to differentiate between hope and experience? Has he not reached the conclusion now that there is not the slightest hope of the four-Power conference coming to an agreement? But in any event, will he be kind enough to tell the House, and myself in particular, what are the British proposals, because nobody knows what they are?
    Mr. Luard: I have already explained in answer to an earlier Question that we certainly do hope that these discussions may lead to four-Power agreement on the new mandate for Dr. Jarring to go to the Middle East to seek a settlement among the parties. As for British proposals, there is not at present a British plan for settlement of the Middle East problem, but, in the light of discussions, we shall consider what proposals we may wish to make to bring about an agreement between the four on a new mandate for Dr. Jarring.
    Mr. Marten: Does the fact that it has been referred to the four Powers mean that the two Powers have reached some agreement which they have then referred to the four Powers?
    Mr. Luard: These is no substantive agreement yet between the two Powers. As I said earlier, discussions are still continuing and it is our hope that it may be possible for them to bring to the four agreement between themselves on certain aspects of a settlement.

    Aircraft (Hi-jacking)
    Sir R. Russellasked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what progress has been made by the International Civil Aviation Organisation with the drafting of a Convention to prevent the hi-jacking of aircraft.
    Mr. Luard: The special sub-Committee of the International Civil Aviation Organisation has completed a draft of the proposed new Convention against hi-jacking; it will be submitted to the I.C.A.O. Legal Committee in February. As my hon. Friend the Parliamentary
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    Under-Secretary told the hon. Member on 13th October, this draft Convention is designed to strengthen international measures to deal with hi-jackers.—[Vol. 788, c. 27–8.]
    Sir R. Russell: Does the hon. Gentleman agree that the detention of the two Israeli passengers by Syria until the package deal was arranged and the 13 Syrian prisoners released by Israel highlights the danger of this whole business? Can we wait until February, when the matter goes before a Legal Committee, before something is done?
    Mr. Luard: I entirely agree that the detention of the Israeli passengers by Syria was deplorable, and it is partly to deal with actions of this kind that urgent steps have been taken to negotiate this Convention. In fact, progress in reaching agreement on the Convention has been very rapid. Nothing more can be done until it has been ratified by a sufficient number of States.

    Arab-Israeli Dispute
    Mr. Mayhewasked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what consultations he has had with the French Government with a view to co-ordinating their efforts to secure a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
    Mr. Luard: We have had regular and close consultations with the French Government about the settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Details of these exchanges must remain confidential.
    Mr. Mayhew: In view of the disagreements between the Russians and the Americans, would my hon. Friend agree that there is no hope of a four-Power agreement unless there is strong and concerted action by the French and British Governments aimed at implementing the Security Council Resolution and inducing the Israelis to withdraw and working out and contributing to a security system on her frontiers?
    Mr. Luard: It is too early to say that the bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union have broken down. They are, in fact, continuing. But we are in close touch with the French Government about the means of securing a settlement, and if the appropriate

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    moment arose we might well wish to intervene in the way suggested by my hon. Friend.
    Mr. Dodds-Parker: What are Ministers doing beyond the suggestion to produce a European approach to this problem?
    Mr. Luard: The hon. Gentleman knows that this matter is being discussed by the four Powers in New York. That is the appropriate forum for it. Only the four Powers have power to authorise Ambassador Jarring to carry on his discussions in the Middle East. We regard this as the appropriate method of dealing with the situation.

    India (Lord Curzon Statue)
    Mr. Biggs-Davisonasked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether he is aware that the authorities in Calcutta have decided to remove the last statue of Lord Curzon still standing in India; what request he has received that Her Majesty's Government should seek to arrange with the Government of India to bring the statue to Great Britain for re-erection on some suitable site; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Luard: The authorities in the Indian State of West Bengal have recently moved a statue of Lord Curzon from Calcutta to the grounds of a residence of the State Governor. The statue is the property of the West Bengal Government. We have received some inquiries for information about this statue but no direct request for help in arranging for its return to the United Kingdom.
    Mr. Biggs-Davison: Is the new site of the statue one of dignity where it can be seen by those who, like many Indians, honour the memory of Lord Curzon, who contributed so much to the progress of their country and rescued its antiquities?
    Mr. Luard: As I told the hon. Gentleman, the statue has been moved to the grounds of a residence of the State Govnor. This is a site of appropriate distinction and is not in any way derogatory to the memory of Lord Curzon.
    Mr. Arthur Lewis: Is my hon. Friend aware that, as we would like the Government to cut wasteful expenditure, with-
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    out decrying Lord Curzon, many of us would not like money to be spent on bringing the statue back here?
    Mr. Luard: I make no comment on my hon. Friend's suggestion.

    Libya
    Sir G. Nabarroasked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether he will now open negotiations with the Governments of, respectively, Malta and Gibraltar for the purpose of establishing therein, on those territories, in existing bases the British troops and defence and military equipment to be withdrawn following the declaration of a republic in Libya.
    Mr. Luard: No, Sir. Existing facilities in Malta and Gibraltar adequately meet our requirements.
    Sir G. Nabarro: Does that Answer mean that the Government propose to scuttle ignominiously from Libya with all the British defence installations, or to tuck them away in Ulster or somewhere else, and thereby further reduce our strength in the Mediterranean? Why not use existing establishments in Malta and Gibraltar, both bases desiring added British strength?
    Mr. Luard: If the hon. Gentleman can draw that conclusion from my Answer, he has greater powers of imagination than I gave him credit for. As he must know, negotiations are beginning today between Her Majesty's Government and the Libyan Government about the facilities which we may retain in Libya. We hope that there will be a satisfactory outcome to these negotiations. But I assure him that facilities in Malta and Gibraltar would in no way be an adequate replacement for our facilities in Libya.
    Sir G. Nabarro: Why not?
    Mr. Biggs-Davisonasked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs to whom Her Majesty's Ambassador in Libya is now accredited; and what progress has been made with establishing the new relationship of co-operation on a basis different from the Anglo-Libyan Treaty of 1953.
    Mr. Shinwellasked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth

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    Affairs what progress has been made in negotiations with the Military Government in Libya; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Luard: Since his arrival in Tripoli on 12th September, Her Majesty's Ambassador to Libya has been accredited to the Government of the Libyan Arab Republic. We are beginning negotiations today with the Libyan Government; we hope that these will help to bring about the new relationship between our two countries which my right hon. Friend told the House on 17th November we want to achieve.—[Vol. 791, c. 848.]
    Mr. Biggs-Davison: With regard to the new relationship, have those who raped three British women been brought to justice in accordance with the assurances sought by Her Majesty's Government—
    Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member may not anticipate another Question; there is a Question on the Paper about this.
    Mr. Biggs-Davison: I beg pardon. I did not know that. Will the hon. Gentleman give the name of the Head of the Libyan State?
    Mr. Luard: I would rather like to have notice of the Question, but I think it is Mr. Qaddafi.
    Mr. Shinwell: Would the Joint Under-Secretary of State seek to persuade his right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary to vary his theme, as distinct from the theme in which he indulged in June last, when he declared the Libyan Government to be friendly disposed to this country? What is the position now? Are they a friendly Government? Is there any hole of a settlement? Is my hon. Friend aware of the declared intention of the Libyan Government, a military junta in control, who are responsible for a revolutionary coup, to make war on the State of Israel? Do our Government support that view?
    Mr. Luard: I have already explained that we propose to enter into a new relationship with this new Government of Libya, and we are, therefore, certainly hoping that our relations with them will be friendly relations. So far as their relations with Israel are concerned, they have, it is true, expressed sentiments somewhat
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    similar to those of other Arab Governments. This is a matter for the Libyan Government. It is not for me to comment here on their policies.
    Mr. Scott-Hopkins: Surely the hon. Gentleman must know the name of the Head of the State? Can he tell the House whether the question of the area for defence exercises by our troops has been included in the negotiations which it is hoped to conclude successfully?
    Mr. Luard: The hon. Member will be aware that there is a technical distinction between Head of State and Head of Government. I think the information required is the name of the head of Government. The name, as I said before, is Mr. Qaddafi. On the second part of the hon. Member's question, all matters of concern between our two Governments will be discussed in the forthcoming negotiations. These will certainly include the question of our training facilities in Libya.
    Mr. Shinwell: In view of the unsatisfactory Answer, I give notice that I will raise the matter on the Adjournment—but not today or tomorrow.
    Later—
    Mr. Eldon Griffiths: On a point of order. You will be aware, Mr. Speaker, that a few moments ago my hon. Friend the Member for Chigwell (Mr. Biggs-Davison) sought to raise a supplementary question about the raping of British citizens in Libya, and you said he could not do that because there was a Question later on the Paper concerning that matter. That Question is in the name of the hon. Member for West Ham, North (Mr. Arthur Lewis). At that time the hon. Member for West Ham, North was in the Chamber. He has subsequently left and, therefore, made it impossible for the House to deal with this matter, which is of public concern, and which my hon. Friend was prevented from asking about.
    Mr. Speaker: I have before asked the House not to raise points of order at Question time. The hon. Member's point is not a point of order for me.

    Chemical Warfare
    Mr. Macdonaldasked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs how many organisations have

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    made representations to him that the proposed Convention for the Prohibition of Microbiological Methods of Warfare should be extended to prohibit chemical methods of warfare.
    Mr. George Thomson: Since August, 1968, we have received ten letters mentioning both chemical and biological warfare. None made the specific proposal mentioned by my hon. Friend.
    Mr. MacDonald: Between the wars, successive British Governments took the view that the use of gas in international conflicts was banned by international treaty. If the Government have changed their mind because the use of CS gas in internal disputes is more humane than bullets, would it not be more straightforward to say so?
    Mr. Thomson: The question of CS gas raises a different point. I am aware, as my hon. Friend is, that the British position was laid down in 1930 following Questions in the House. But our present policy is to seek to make practical progress, and we feel that the best way of doing so is to concentrate on the draft Convention on biological warfare, which I hope enjoys my hon. Friend's support.

    Herbicides
    Mr. Dalyellasked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what proposals Her Majesty's Government have put to the Geneva Disarmament Conference on the inclusion of herbicides in the Geneva Protocol.
    Mr. George Thomson: None, Sir.
    Mr. Dalyell: Is there not an odd contrast between virtuous statements on biological warfare and remaining silent on certain immediate issues of chemical warfare?
    Mr. Thomson: No, I do not think so. I understand and sympathise with my hon. Friend's point of view. This is a difficult matter and it is hard to say the best way of making practical progress. We feel that the best way forward is to concentrate on the biological warfare convention because that form of warfare is at a sufficiently early stage to make good progress possible. My hon. Friend is an expert on the question of herbicides, and he knows that there is a dispute
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    about the existing legal position under customary international law.

    Rhodesia
    Mr. Farrasked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs how many countries still retain official national representation in Rhodesia.
    Sir F. Bennettasked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether he will list all consular, trade or other diplomatic missions in Salisbury, Rhodesia, and state to whom the heads of these missions are accredited.
    Mr. M. Stewart: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Switzerland, West Germany and the United States have official representatives or maintain offices in Southern Rhodesia. Some have been downgraded since the illegal declaration of independence. The accrediting of diplomatic representatives is a matter between States and, therefore, the question does not arise in relation to Southern Rhodesia.
    Mr. Farr: Does it not make absolute nonsense of our policy when apparently we are about the only civilised country which has withdrawn its representative? When will Her Majesty's Government wake up and face the facts of life and get back officially into Rhodesia before it is too late?
    Mr. Stewart: I made very clear in an answer some months ago the reasons for the withdrawal of our residual mission. No useful purpose could be served by keeping our mission there. If the hon. Gentleman will study the text of my Answer and the number of countries mentioned, he will realise that his definition of what is and what is not a civilised country is insulting to a great many States.
    Sir F. Bennett: I am not sure what the Foreign Secretary meant by that. I thought that the countries he had listed were civilised. However, he probably recalls that only a short time ago he said that to maintain any form of diplomatic representation in Salisbury implied a degree of recognition unacceptable to this country. Would he relate that to those

    21
    countries? Can he say what they are there for—to safeguard their national interests or to further their trade interests?
    Mr. Stewart: To deal with the various points, I was not suggesting, and if the hon. Member had listened to me he would have realised it, that the countries mentioned were not civilised. The implication of the hon. Member's question was that civilised countries consisted solely of ourselves and this list. The point I was making was that there are a large number of countries which no longer maintain representatives there. The main purpose of these countries maintaining representatives there is to look after the interests of their nationals. Her Majesty's Government have made it clear that subjects of this country who remain in a colony that is in rebellion must expect to do so at their own risk, and that we cannot condone this rebellion.
    Viscount Lambton: Will the Foreign Secretary say how many trading missions have been sent by other countries to Rhodesia?
    Mr. Stewart: Not without notice. That is a very different question.
    Mr. Snow: Could my right hon. Friend confirm that to the best of his knowledge the countries whose names he has read are loyally abiding, so far as they are signatories, to the sanctions resolution?
    Mr. Stewart: Yes, I have no reason to suppose that that is not so. The particular United Nations resolution referring to representatives is non-mandatory.
    Mr. Biggs-Davison: In view of the totally unsatisfactory nature of that reply, and the Government's failure to protect British nationals—
    Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman must give notice in the conventional way.
    Mr. Biggs-Davison: In view of the unsatisfactory nature of that reply, I beg to give notice that I shall seek to raise this matter on the Adjournment at the earliest opportunity.
    Sir F. Bennettasked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether he will list the duties he has carried out in his statutory capacity as Governor of the Colony of Southern
    22
    Rhodesia since the last Governor vacated his appointment.
    Mr. M. Stewart: I have not had occasion to exercise the executive authority of Southern Rhodesia as provided by Article 4(1)(a) of the Southern Rhodesia Constitution Order, 1965 since Sir Humphrey Gibbs received Her Majesty The Queen's permission to retire from Office.
    Sir F. Bennett: I am not surprised at that Answer. A few minutes ago, the Foreign Secretary gave a long list of countries which maintained diplomatic or consular missions in Salisbury at present. Can he tell us to whom these missions are accredited, and to whom they present their letters of credence?
    Mr. Stewart: They are not accredited at all. As I said in my earlier reply, the question of accrediting does not arise since Rhodesia is not a State.
    Dame Irene Wardasked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what invitation he has extended to the now retired District Commissioner, Mr. Allan Wright, to discuss problems in Rhodesia, having regard to his knowledge and experience; and if, in the formation of Rhodesian policy, he consults with those who have worked in the field in Africa.
    Mr. Luard: I have not yet extended any invitation to Mr. Wright. My Department is in touch with many sources of information and advice on Rhodesia, but the details of these are confidential.
    Dame Irene Ward: In view of the fact that that is a very unsatisfactory Answer, am I not right in assuming that the present Government really do not know a very great deal about Africa and that it would be a very good thing if more attention were paid to those who work in the field and know more about the situation than do the present Government?
    Mr. Luard: The Government have access to a great deal of highly expert information about the situation in Rhodesia, and we are aware of the writings of Mr. Wright, and have studied them with interest, and if he wishes to make any special representations to the Government we shall he very pleased to consider them.

    Chief Minister of Gibraltar (Discussions)
    Mr. Wallasked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement about his discussions with the Chief Minister of Gibraltar.
    Mr. George Thomson: I am glad to say that we were able to reach full agreement on a three Year Development Programme, designed to strengthen the Gibraltar economy, which in terms of British aid amounts to about £4 million. An agreed communiqué will be issued shortly to coincide with the return of the Chief Minister to Gibraltar this afternoon. I am arranging for a copy of the communiqué to be circulated in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Mr. Wall: Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether the financial aid will implement all the suggestions made in the Beeching Plan, and can he further say something about the constitutional future of Gibraltar? Surely it is impossible that it will always remain a colony? Is there not urgency about this because, according to the Treaty of Rome, if we enter the Common Market so does Gibraltar?
    Mr. Thomson: On the first point, the programme that I have just announced was agreed by the Government of Gibraltar and ourselves to be a full programme, to be carried out in a period of three years. It was generally accepted that any extra money could not have been used during that period. The programme includes a useful list of constructive projects inside Gibraltar. On the second point, we keep closely in touch with the Government of Gibraltar about the developments in Europe. It is only a few months ago since we had a very important constitutional development in Gibraltar, and the Preamble to that Constitution contains very solemn pledges on the part of Her Majesty's Government to the people of Gibraltar.
    Mr. Colin Jackson: Can my right hon. Friend say whether the Chief Minister made any representations to him about the air connections between Gibraltar and the United Kingdom, which have been decreasing lately, leaving no flights at all on Wednesdays and Thursdays?
    Mr. Thomson: We are aware of the concern in Gibraltar about air communications. It is a concern that has lasted for some time. There is no specific point about that in the communiqué which will be issued later this afternoon.
    Mr. Russell Johnston: Can I press the Minister a little on the second part of the Question asked by the hon. Member for Haltemprice (Mr. Wall)? The policy of the Chief Minister of Gibraltar is integration with this country. Are the Government yet in any position to make any statement about their attitude?
    Mr. Thomson: This was an important meeting that has just taken place, the subject of which was the development programme for Gibraltar in the light of the Spanish restrictions. On that subject we came to a very important agreement indeed. I have answered the question about constitutional change in reply to a previous Question.
    Following is the communiqué:

  GIBRALTAR TALKS (2ND DECEMBER—8TH DECEMBER)

    JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ ISSUED AT CONCLUSION OF CONSULTATIONS
    A series of talks under the chairmanship of Lord Shepherd, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, have taken place during the past week with representatives of the Government of Gilbraltar, comprising the Governor (Admiral of the Fleet Sir Varyl Begg), the Chief Minister (Major R. J. Peliza), the Gibraltar Ministers for Labour and Social Security (Mr. M. Xiberras) and for Information. Port, Trade and Industries (Major A. J. Gache) and the Financial and Development Secretary (Mr. E. H. Davis). The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Minister of Overseas Development also had talks with the delegation, and during their visit the Governor and Chief Minister, accompanied by Lord Shepherd, were received by the Prime Minister.
    In the course of these talks Gibraltar Ministers put before British Ministers Gibraltar's development proposals for the next three years, and repeated and made clear their views on a variety of other subjects, which included Gibraltar's relations with Britain, citizenship, Anglo-Spanish relations.
    The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary took note of the views expressed by Gibraltar Ministers and reaffirmed Her Majesty's Government's assurances to the people of Gibraltar in the Preamble to the Order-in-Council embodying the 1969 Gibraltar Constitution. He undertook to consider the resolution on citizenship recently adopted by the Gibraltar House of Assembly, while holding out no prospect at this time that amendments to United Kingdom legislation concerned would be possible.

    25
    The Gibraltar Ministers accepted that, in accordance with previous assurances by Her Majesty's Government there are in practice no obstacles in the way of Gibraltarians who wish to do so coming to the United Kingdom under the Commonwealth Immigrants Act.
    The Gibraltar representatives tabled a comprehensive Development Programme for the three years 1970–1973 drawn up with the object of counteracting the economic difficulties resulting from the Spanish restrictions and in the light of the recent report of the Manpower Mission (Lords Beeching and Delacourt-Smith). After full discussion it was agreed that Her Majesty's Government would assist the Gibraltar Government to carry out their Development Programme in the following ways.
    The British Government will support Gibraltar's proposals for about a further 750 housing units in addition to the current housing programme. The Gibraltar Government have expresses particular satisfaction that the British Defence Secretary is making available for this purpose, without charge to Gibraltar, the greater part of Viaduct Reclamation site which is the property of his Ministry.
    The British Government will finance the immediate construction of a hostel for temporary immigrant labour which is vital to Gibraltar at this time.
    Discussions took place on the Gibraltar Government's proposals to turn to a system of comprehensive secondary education, and the British Government will support this, subject to further details becoming available.
    Money will be provided for a Schools Sports Centre, for additional medical facilities and for port development. The British Government will also assist appropriate schemes for tourist development. These will include a number of amenities which will be available for the people of Gibraltar as well.
    To achieve this development programme the Government of Gibraltar have asked for expert advice in a number of fields and the British Government will make this available under Technical Assistance arrangements.
    The cost of British support for this programme in the next three years is expected to be about £4 million exclusive of Technical Assistanc.
    The Gibraltar Ministers indicated that owing to Gibraltar's present difficulties a deficit on the ordinary Budget was forecast for 1970 and that they had in mind to introduce into the House of Assembly measures to increase revenue from local sources in order to help bridge this gap. In these circumstances Her Majesty's Government are willing to assist Gibraltar to meet special expenditure attribuable to the consequences of Spanish restrictions by making available a further sum of £100,000 in addition to the £100,000 previously provided to the same end.

    Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement
    Mr. Wallasked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement on the
    26
    future of the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement.
    Mr. M. Stewart: As my noble Friend Lord Winterbottom, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence, Royal Air Force said in another place on 30th October, we have said all along that we shall have to reach a new understanding about the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement to reflect the changed circumstances after 1971. This was made clear in the Communiqué of the 1968 Five-Power Conference in Kuala Lumpur, and this is fully understood by our Commonwealth partners. There has been no change in this position.—[Vol. 305, c. 226.]
    Mr. Wall: As it takes two to make an agreement, was the suggestion of the right hon. Gentleman agreed to by the Malaysian Government, or would it be a unilateral abrogation of the Treaty in 1971?
    Mr. Stewart: What I have said is that we shall have to reach a new understanding. We hope that confidential discussions to that end will begin soon.
    Mr. Dalyell: Would my right hon. Friend take the opportunity of denying a headline that appeared in last Thursday's Daily Mail—"A Secret War"—to the effect that Britain was sending S.A.S. troops as a replacement on the Thai-Malaysia border?
    Mr. Stewart: That is a different question, which my hon. Friend should table.
    Mr. Wood: Can the right hon. Gentleman say what is the position of Singapore at present? Secondly, is it his definite intention that this agreement should be renegotiated in the lifetime of the present Parliament, or will it be left to his successors?
    Mr. Stewart: I hope that it will be possible to renegotiate this in the lifetime of the present Parliament. This is a matter depending not only on us but on the other parties concerned.

    N.A.T.O. Ministerial Meeting
    Mr. Frank Allaunasked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement

    27
    about the results of the December meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation meeting so far as his proposals for a European security conference are concerned.
    Mr. M. Stewart: The Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, which I attended, issued a Declaration on East-West relations on 5th December, which I will circulate in the OFFICIAL REPORT. Her Majesty's Government fully support the constructive line taken in this Declaration.
    Mr. Allaun: Is it not a delaying tactic to postpone for six months the next N.A.T.O. meeting? Would it not be better to test the genuineness of the Warsaw proposals by making Western proposals? Why not emulate the initiative of Herr Brandt?
    Mr. Stewart: I would want to put it to my hon. Friend and the House like this. I want to see a conference in which all members of N.A.T.O. and all members of the Warsaw Pact and the European neutrals can take part, a conference so prepared and with such an agenda that it could really reduce tension in Europe. The proposals we have so far emanating from the Prague Declaration would not, I am sure, be acceptable to any country in N.A.T.O.
    We ought not to regard that fact as a reason for returing a flat "No". This was why I was anxious at the recent conference to see that N.A.T.O. should get on with further consideration both to what the substance and the method of negotiations should be. I hope then that we shall be able to reach an agreed position which could in time lead to a conference of this kind.
    Mr. Eldon Griffiths: I agree absolutely with the way in which the Foreign Secretary has put his case, but will he confirm that the British Government would not attend such a proposed security meeting unless the Americans and Canadians were invited to be present, unless the German people as a whole were represented by the Federal Government, and unless, too, there were a clear advance understanding that the Brezhnev doctrine is not acceptable to N.A.T.O.?
    Mr. Stewart: On the first point, we have repeatedly made clear that we
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    would not attend a conference of this kind unless our transatlantic allies in N.A.T.O. were there; in fact, I think that that is fully understood by the countries of the Warsaw Pact. I would not go along with what the hon. Gentleman said about Germany, but I take his point about the Brezhnev doctrine.
    Following is the declaration:
    DECLARATION ATTACHED TO THE N.A.T.O. MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUÉ OF 5TH DECEMBER
    Meeting at Brussels on 4th and 5th December, 1969, the Ministers of the North Atlantic Alliance reaffirmed the commitment of their nations to pursue effective policies directed towards a greater relaxation of tensions in their continuing search for a just and durable peace.
    2. Peace and security in Europe must rest upon universal respect for the principles of sovereign equality, political independence and the territorial integrity of each European state: the right of its peoples to shape their own destinies: the peaceful settlement of disputes: non-intervention in the internal affairs of any state by any other state, whatever their political or social system: and the renunciation of the use of the threat of force against any state. Past experience has shown that there is, as yet, no common interpretation of these principles. The fundamental problems in Europe can be solved only on the basis of these principles and any real and lasting improvement of East-West relations presupposes respect for them without any conditions or reservations.
    3. At their meeting in Washington in April, 1969, ministers had expressed the intention of their governments to explore with the Soviet Union and the other countries of Eastern Europe which concrete issues best lend themselves to fruitful negotiation and an early resolution. To this end, the Council has been engaged in a detailed study of various issues for exploration and possible negotiation. Ministers recognised that procedure merited closer examination and, accordingly, requested the Council in permanent session to report to the next Ministerial Meeting.
    4. Ministers considered that, in an era of negotiation, it should be possible, by means of discussion of specific and well-defined subjects, progressively to reduce tensions. This would in itself facilitate discussion of the more fundamental questions.
    Arms Control and Disarmament
    5. Ministers again expressed the interest of the Alliance in arms control and disarmament and recalled the Declaration of Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions adopted at Reykjavik in 1968 and reaffirmed in Washington in1969. The members of the Alliance have noted that up to now this suggestion has led to no result. The Allies, nevertheless, have continued, and will continue, their studies in order to prepare a realistic basis for active exploration at an early date

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    and thereby establish whether it could serve as a starting point for fruitful negotiations. They requested that a Report of the Council in permanent session on the Preparation of Models for Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions be submitted as soon as possible.
    6. Ministers of countries participating in N.A.T.O.'s integrated defence programme consider that the studies on mutual and balanced force reductions have progressed sufficiently to permit the establishment of certain criteria which in their view, such reductions should meet. Significant reductions under adequate verification and control would be envisaged under any agreement on mutual and balanced force reductions, which should also be consistent with the vital security interests of all parties. This would be another concrete step in advancing "along the road of ending the ars race and of general and complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament."
    7. These ministers directed that further studies should be given to measures which could accompany or follow agreement on mutual and balanced force reductions. Such measures could include advance notification of military movements and manoeuvres, exchange of observers at military manoeuvres and possibly the establishment of observation posts. Examination of the techniques and methods of inspection should also be further developed.
    Germany and Berlin
    8. The ministers welcome the efforts of the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France in the framework of their special responsibility for Berlin and Germany as a whole, to gain the co-operation of the Soviet Union in improving the situation with respect to Berlin and free access to the city. The elimination of difficulties created in the past with respect to Berlin, especially with regard to access, would increase the prospects for serious discussions on the other concrete issues which continue to divide East and West. Furthermore Berlin could play a constructive rôle in the expansion of East-West economic relations if the city's trade with the East could be facilitated.
    9. A just and lasting peace settlement for Germans must be based on the free decision of the German people and on the interests of European security. The ministers are convinced that, pending such a settlement, the proposals of the Federal Republic for a modus vivendi between the two parts of Germany and for a bilateral exchange of declarations on the non-use of force or the threat of force would, if they receive a positive response, substantially facilitate co-operation between East and West on other problems. They consider that these efforts by the Federal Republic represent constructive steps toward relaxation of tension in Europe and express the hope that the governments will therefore take them into account n forming their own attitude toward the German question.
    10. The ministers would regard concrete progress in both these fields as an important contribution to peace in Europe. They are bound to attach great weight to the responses to these proposals in evaluating the prospects
    30
    for negotiations looking toward improved relations and co-operation in Europe.
    Economic, Technical and Cultural Exchanges
    11. Allied governments consider that not only economic and technical but also cultural exchanges between interested countries can bring mutual benefit and understanding. In these fields more could be achieved by freer movement of people, ideas and information between the countries of the East and West.
    12. The benefit of the alliance work in the field of human environment would be enhanced if it were to become the basis of broader co-operation. This could, and should, be an early objective, being one in which the Warsaw Pact Governments have indicated an interest. Further co-operation could also be undertaken, for example, in the more specialised field of oceanography. More intensive efforts in such fields should be pursued either bilaterally, multilaterally or in the framework of existing international bodies comprising interested countries.
    Perspectives for Negotiations
    13. The Ministers considered that the concrete issues concerning European security and co-operation mentioned in this declaration are subjects lending themselves to possible discussions or negotiations with the Soviet Union and the other countries of Eastern Europe. The Allied Governments will continue and intensify their contracts, discussions or negotiations through all appropriate channels, bilateral or multilateral, believing that progress is most likely to be achieved by choosing in each instance the means most suitable for the subject. Ministers therefore expressed their support for bilateral initiatives undertaken by the German Federal Government with the Soviet Union and other countries of Eastern Europe, looking toward agreements on the renunciation of force and the threat of force. Ministers expressed the hope that existing contacts will be developed so as to enable all countries concerned to participate in discussions and negotiations on substantial problems of co-operation and security in Europe with real prospects of success.
    14. The members of the Alliance remain receptive to signs of willingness on the part of the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries to discuss measures to reduce tension and promote co-operation in Europe and to take constructive actions to this end. They have noted in this connection references made by these countries to the possibility of holding an early Conference on European Security. Ministers agreed that careful advance preparation and prospects of concrete results would in any case be essential. Ministers consider that, as part of a comprehensive approach progress in the bilateral and multilateral discussions and negotiations which have already begun, or could begin shortly, and would relate to fundamental problems of European security, would make a major contribution to improving the political atmosphere in Europe. Progress in these discussions and negotiations would help to ensure the success of any eventual conference in which, of course, the North American members of the Alliance would participate, to discuss and

    31
    negotiate substantial problems of co-operation and security in Europe.
    15. The Ministers affirmed that, in considering all constructive possibilities including a general conference or conferences, they will wish to assure that any such meeting should not serve to ratify the present division of Europe and should be the result of a common effort among all interested countries to tackle the problems which separate them.

    North Vietnam (Swedish Proposal)
    Mr. Hugh Jenkinsasked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether he is aware that the Swedish Government have proposed a programme of aid to North Vietnam; and if he will do the same.
    Mr. M. Stewart: I am aware of various recent statements by members of the Swedish Government on this subject. So far as Her Majesty's Government are concerned, we have received no requests for aid from North Vietnam.
    Mr. Jenkins: If such a request were received from Hanoi, would my right hon. Friend respond to it in the same manner as the Socialist Government of Sweden have responded?
    Mr. Stewart: In the first place, that is a hypothetical question. However, if we did receive such a request, we should have to examine exactly what it was that was asked, the availability of funds, and the possibilities of supervising the aid. I should not rule out an affirmative answer.

    Dependent Territories (Entry Permits)
    Mr Albuasked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what advice he gives to the Governments of dependent territories on security matters affecting applicants for entry permits.
    Mr. Luard: The Secretary of State's responsibility for the dependent territories includes the giving of advice as appropriate, on a wide range of security matters. This may sometimes have a bearing on decisions concerning immigration matters, which are normally the responsibility of the elected Government of the territory concerned.
    Mr. Albu: In considering these matters, does my hon. Friend agree that membership for a few months, while at university, of the Communist Party
    32
    should not debar an established university teacher from going to teach in a Commonwealth university?
    Mr. Luard: I have explained to my hon. Friend that the decision on questions of this kin3 and immigration questions is entirely for the territorial Governments concerned. All we can do is give advice where this is requested or is necessary. We have already had correspondence on the particular matter about which my hon. Friend is concerned, and I do not think that he will expect me to comment on it here.

    Anguilla and St. Kitts (Postal Services)
    Mr. Dodds-Parkerasked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether postal services between Anguilla and St. Kitts have been resumed.
    Mr. Luard: I would refer the hon. Member to the answer my right hon. Friend gave on 21st July, 1969. It is not yet possible for an announcement of the official resumption of mail services from Anguilla to be made since certain formalities are required which have yet to be completed. I understand, however, that mail is, in fact, reaching St. Kitts from Anguilla.—[Vol. 787, c. 240.]

    Sinai Peninsula (Oil Drilling Operations)
    Sir Dingle Footasked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what representations he has received from the Government of the United Arab Republic regarding participation by British firms in proposed oil-drilling operations in the Sinai Peninsula and its offshore waters; and if he will make a statement regarding the policy of Her Majesty's Government to such participation.
    Mr. Luard: This country is only marginally involved in proposed oil operations in the Sinai Peninsula and its offshore waters since, according to our information, only one of the companies concerned is registered in England, and that company is a wholly foreign-owned subsidiary of an American company. We are, however, concerned about the legal implications of this development and are looking into them. We have received

    33
    representations from the ambassador of the United Arab Republic on the subject.
    Her Majesty's Government recognise that the Sinai Peninsula and its territorial waters are under the sovereignty of the United Arab Republic, even though at present military forces of Israel are in occupation and control of the peninsula.
    Sir Dingle Foot: I thank my hon. Friend for that reply. Does he agree that long-term projects of this sort initiated in occupied territory have the most serious implications, tending to show that the Israeli Government have no intention of complying with the United Nations resolution and leaving the occupied territory? Will he make clear that the British Government do not approve of any form of participation by a British firm in projects such as these?
    Mr. Luard: I agree with my right hon. and learned Friend that such a development does have serious implications. I have already told him that we are looking into the matter for this reason. As regards the legal rights and wrongs, my right hon. and learned Friend probably knows that this matter either is already or may shortly be the subject of legal proceedings. For that reason, I imagine that he will not expect me to comment at this time on the legal rights and wrongs.

    Hong Kong (Rights of Public Assembly)
    Mr. Rankinasked the Secretary of State or Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what consultations he has had with the Government of Hong Kong in order to increase the rights of public assembly.
    Mr. Luard: We have been consulted by the Governor in the preparation of a draft Bill to amend the Public Order Ordinance. One of the purposes of the Bill is to ameliorate some provisions of the Ordinance relating to the rights of public assembly.
    Mr. Rankin: Is my hon. Friend aware that that is quite good news? Can he say whether the discussions will reach a stage when we can say that three people are no longer a crowd and four have ceased to be a mass demonstration? Can we look forward to a situation of that
    34
    kind, with reasonable opportunity for people to gather together in this British dependency to enjoy a little British liberty?
    Mr. Luard: I have already told my hon. Friend that the provisions of the new Ordinance will in many ways improve the existing situation. It is designed to give better protection for the public against any misuse of powers or possible conviction of persons innocently involved in a situation which constitutes an offence under the Ordinance.

    South Africa (Mr. Philip Golding)
    Mr. Peter M. Jacksonasked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether he will instruct the new British Ambassador to South Africa to make further representations to the Union Government on behalf of Mr. Philip Golding.
    Mr. Luard: Representations have been made on behalf of Mr. Golding by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary to Dr. Muller on two occasions. The South African authorities have now said that Mr. Golding will be released after giving evidence at the trial which is taking place in Pretoria.
    Mr. Jackson: While thanking my hon. Friend for that reply, may I ask, nevertheless, whether he has had his attention drawn to the statement by Chief Justice Bekker on 1st December, that Mr. Golding would be released if his evidence were satisfactory? In other words, this young man is placed in an impossible position. If he gives evidence for the Crown he will be released. He is therefore intimidated. My second question to my hon. Friend is to ask him whether, in view of the comments recently made by Sir John Nicholls, our retiring Ambassador, he is entirely satisfied on the nature of the representations which have come from the Embassy?
    Mr. Luard: My attention has not been drawn to the first point which my hon. Friend referred to, and I will certainly look into it. As to his second point, we have had no evidence that there is any dissatisfaction with the representations which have been made on behalf of Mr. Golding.

    U.N. High Commission for Refugees
    Mr. Randallasked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what contribution Her Majesty's Government will make to the programme of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in 1970.
    Mr. Luard: I regret that I cannot make a definite statement today. Consideration is still being given to the level of our contribution for 1970.
    Mr. Randall: That is not an entirely satisfactory reply. Is my hon. Friend aware that, in the other place, when there was a debate on the European Refugee Commission, an undertaking was given by the Government spokesman that when the economic situation improved the High Commission's programme would be one of the first priorities? Will my hon. Friend keep this in mind for the pledging Conference next week?
    Mr. Luard: I very much understand my hon. Friend's concern with this matter. It is certainly our hope that we shall be able to make an announcement on this within the next few days and be in a position to make a pledge at the pledging Conference next week, and that it will not be such as to be less in the future. Perhaps I may be allowed to take this opportunity to pay tribute to the very valuable work which my hon. Friend has done in this Commission. We all know that it has done a great deal of good for refugees all over the world.
    Mr. Kenneth Lewis: Why is not the announcement made of the amount to be contributed, since it has to be announced in the next two or three days, as he has just said, and since it has got to be announced next week anyway? Why does not the Minister come to the House to give the answer to this or any Question?
    Mr. Luard: I cannot give the answer because no final decision about the amount has yet been reached.

    QUESTIONS TO MINISTERS
    Dame Irene Ward: On a point of order. I wonder whether the Minister
    36
    who deals with Common Market problems has shed part of his powers, in view of the fact that my Question to him about industrial relations with the Common Market has been transferred to another Minister, and I have not been told of this.
    Mr. Speaker: That is a serious point of order. Ministers have a right to transfer questions—
    Dame Irene Ward: On a point of order—
    Hon. Members: Sit down.
    Dame Irene Ward: Sit down yourself.
    Mr. Speaker: The hon. Lady must control herself. I was about to inform her that she had raised an important point of order and that when a Minister transfers a Question it is usual for him to let the hon. Member know at the earliest opportunity that it is being transferred.
    Dame Irene Ward: On a point of order. This is not the issue; I just put that in, Mr. Speaker. The issue is that on a matter affecting Common Market negotiations with which the Minister is concerned he has transferred my Question on that issue to another Minister. I am asking only whether his powers have been altered.
    Mr. Speaker: I have already answered that point of order. A Minister is empowered to transfer Questions.
    Mr. Biggs-Davison: On a point of order. In view of the refusal of an answer to my supplementary question on Question 40, and as the later Question No. 48 was almost accidentally not put and answered, and in view of the tremendous public interest in this Question and the extraordinary official advice given to our fellow subjects in danger in Tripoli, may I ask, Mr. Speaker, whether you have received any request from the Minister to answer Question No. 48?
    Mr. Speaker: I think that the hon. Gentleman knows that I have not received such a request. Had I received one, I would have called the Minister.

BILLS PRESENTED
  TRADE UNIONS
  Mr. Ronald Bell presented a Bill to amend the law relating to trade unions: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time upon Friday 30th January and to be printed.[Bill 61.]
  RHODESIA INDEPENDENCE
  Mr. Ronald Bell presented a Bill to repeal the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 and to recognise the independence of Rhodesia: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time upon Friday 30th January and to be printed. [Bill 62.]

FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Mr. Speaker: Before we start the debate, I think that it would be convenient to the House if I made an explanation of the procedure that will obtain today and tomorrow.
Today, we have a substantive Motion for the Adjournment of the House. I need not remind hon. Members that, according to Erskine May, page 296:
"…the substantive Motion for the Adjournment is in fact a technical form devised for the purpose of enabling the House to discuss matters without recording a decision in terms."
This, of course, does not preclude a vote being sought or a Closure being granted or withheld on the Question, That this House do now adjourn, at ten o'clock tonight. Traditionally, the Government have the duty of protecting the business of the day which follows and, in consequence, normally votes against that Question.
Although the Leader of the House, in announcing the business on Thursday last, spoke of two days for a foreign affairs debate, I understand that there may he tomorrow another and technically unrelated Question before the House, once again in the terms, That this House do now adjourn.
At the end of the second day, therefore, there might be an opportunity of voting on that Question and, again, the convention would require the Government to vote against the Motion in order to protect the remaining business which follows.
When a substantive Motion for the Adjournment is before the House, it is not possible for the Chair to restrict debate to a particular aspect of the subject under discussior. By general assent of the House the subject is a debate on foreign affairs. The Leader of the House has said that it might be for the general convenience if, today, there was some concentration on Vietnam and tomorrow on Nigeria, but he also indicated that Ministers might touch on other issues as well as those two subjects, and I now rule that such a course would in no way infringe the rules. It is a matter for the discretion of hon. Members and the general convenience of the House.
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr.Mellish.]
3.36 p.m.
The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Wilson): These two debates form a general foreign affairs debate, but they were arranged primarily in response to the deep concern of hon. Members about the situation in Vietnam, particularly following revelations about atrocities, or alleged atrocities, in Vietnam, and also about the situation in Nigeria.
For that reason, I propose to devote most of my time this afternoon to these two subjects, and not attempt a wider review of world affairs, which the House debated a few weeks ago. I know that some hon. Members will want to raise other equally important issues—the Middle East, for example, or problems and proposals relating to security in Europe, and to the prospects for Common Market negotiations. My right hon. Friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, who was, of course, in Brussels last week, will take the opportunity briefly to report further to the House on European questions and related matters, and he and my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster will hope to reply to other points raised in the debate today and tomorrow.
Before coming to the main issues of Vietnam and Nigeria and "Biafra" I think that it will be for the convenience of the House if I use the word Biafra in quotation marks—I should like to refer briefly to one other question which has caused concern, and that is Greece.
Later this week the question of the continued Greek membership of the Council of Europe will come up at the meeting in Paris of the Committee of Ministers. Our position is clear. We and our European colleagues have a right, indeed as members of the Council of Europe, a duty, to satisfy ourselves beyond all doubt that every member State is honouring the Statute of the Council, which is binding both as to the rule of law and to the maintenance of democratic rights. There can be no derogation from the clear rule that if any member remains in persistent and systematic violation of those obligations, the members of the Council have a duty to take the necessary action under the Statute, namely, suspension from membership.
What has happened in Greece has been an affront to every lover of Greece, of
40
the Greek people, of democracy itself; and we owe that very word and that way of life to Greece. We all look forward not so much to a return to the democratic forms of the past, but forward to whatever form of genuine democracy the Greek people choose for themselves. At this week's meeting, unless the Greek Government were to decide to withdraw voluntarily, or unless at this very late hour there is a sudden change of heart, expressed in a specific and short timetable relating to the restoration both of democracy and of human rights, then Her Majesty's Government will have the duty of voting for the suspension of Greece.
I come to the two great issues, the issues of peace and war, in Vietnam and Nigeria. Before I refer specifically to Vietnam, however, it might be helpful if I were to point out that hard and even bitter things will be said both on this and on the tragedy of Nigeria. These are issues on which there is deep concern, and honest and sincere differences exist on where Britain's duty lies and on what we should say and do.
Each hon. Member, in common with millions of our people and millions more in every other country, has formed his own view on these questions—not, I think, in most cases, easily or quickly, but after a great deal of heart-searching and agonising choice. On both issues it has been a choice between evils; a choice where there is no simple guideline and a choice where there is no single moral test. On both questions it has for every one of us been a choice made on grounds of the moral issues involved.
I trust that whatever may be said today and tomorrow each hon. Member will begin from the standpoint of attributing to those with whom he may disagree, perhaps deeply and profoundly, as to what British policy should be, the same degree of sincerity of motive and ideals as he has the right to claim for himself.
There are many issues of foreign policy which are, I feel, capable of a clear decision based on the ethical principles we hold, ethical principles we hold in common. I believe that this is true of the attitude that we have taken on apartheid, and its implications for British policy; on racial questions generally; on our refusal

41
to surrender principles laid down by all parties here; on the Rhodesian question; on. Czechoslovakia; and on the proliferation of nuclear weapons, even though we may disagree about how to make a reality of these principles.
The tragedy of Vietnam and Nigeria is that both involve issues where there is no automatically accepted categorical imperative—where, in policy terms, we face not only a choice of evils, but a clash of one fundamental moral principle with another. That is why each of these issues is a tragedy not only for the peoples of Vietnam and Nigeria. They pose a tragic dilemma facing everyone in public life, in this country and elsewhere, who must take an attitude on them.
We must consider whether one solution will lead more speedily than another to a peaceful settlement and whether it will save lives, either from direct military action or from starvation. If it will, then we must consider whether that will enhance or endanger freedom or create a situation in which new and more horrible atrocities will be likely to result. Peace, freedom and self-determination are all ends in themselves. But, in the tragic context of each of these two countries, they are ends that can conflict with one another; where judgment is necessary, but where there can be no certainty or finality of judgment.
Hon. Members will have seen from a report in The Times last Saturday that this dilemma—this choice between ends and evils—has arisen for the World Council of Churches—and there may be further controversy over this today when Joint Church Aid meets. The fact that they could even consider suggesting cutting off the food programme to Biafra as a means of shortening the war, with all the dangers that that could mean in terms of relief and starvation, highlights the agony of choosing between ends.
The immediate issue which led to this debate was the allegations of atrocities and of the systematic murder of Vietnamese civilians last year. In my immediate reaction, as soon as the news became known, when answering a Question from my hon. Friend the Member for Penistone (Mr. John Mendelson) I said that if they were one-quarter true they would be grave atrocities and we should express our horror.
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The figure of one-quarter was too high. As an editorial in one of our newspapers said the following morning:
"Even if they are substantiated to the extent of only 1 per cent., they would leave for ever a blot on American military honour".
Every hon. Member of this Parliament would agree in that condemnation. So, I believe, would every Member of Congress and of the American Administration. Indeed, this has been made clear.
It is not for us to carry out our investigation or to prejudge theirs. It is their duty, and that duty will, I believe, be fearlessly carried out. Rather, it is for us, given authentication of the facts, to seek whether there are any lessons for us. Has Pinkville changed anything? What has it changed? Would a ruthless probe and punishment of anybody found guilty be enough, of themselves, to deal with the situation? Is this, together with other alleged atrocities, an aberration? Is it an incident, an obscene incident, inevitable in modern war? Or is it endemic in this kind of war? And, if it is endemic, what does that mean for American policy as well as for British policy?
I know that Pinkville has not changed the attitudes of many of my hon. Friends who have opposed American and British policy for many years. They would claim that it has confirmed their attitude. Does it mean that those who all along have not felt that we should dissociate from American policy in Vietnam should now, because of Pinkville, feel constrained to do so?
It is not enough to say that all war brutalises. It is not even enough to say —as I have said, and I was right to say it—that there is firm evidence of corresponding, indeed, apparently worse atrocities on the other side—actions where no free Press and no free Parliament exist to bring the guilt home to their perpetrators. It is not enough to say these things.
Her Majesty's Government have always, where we have considered it appropriate to do so, expressed anxieties about American policies, and even dissociation from particular actions involved in the fighting of this war. More than four years ago my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary felt it necessary in Washington—not because the war was being fought, but because of the way in

43
which it was being fought—to recall the words of the Declaration of Independence, enjoining
"…a decent respect to the opinions of mankind".
I believe that this thought is appropriate today and I believe that no one feels that more deeply than the people and the President of the United States.
We dissociated—we had warned for months that we should do this—from the American decision to bomb Hanoi and Haiphong. It is our bounden duty, if the facts are true, not only to dissociate from but to condemn Pinkville and the other alleged actions, and we would be doing it in common with the American Government and the American people.
If the allegations were proved, and if Pinkville were to be condoned or brushed aside, this would lead to a crisis in Anglo-American relations and it would be a crisis from which no hon. Member in this House would shrink. But, on what both the Administration and significant sections of the American people have spontaneously made clear, this—that it should be brushed aside—is, in my view, unthinkable.
There is, however, a deeper question. I said that we must ask: is this incident, and the rest, just an incident, an obscene incident, inevitable in modern war? I do not believe that this will be claimed. But what we must ask is whether it is endemic in this particular war. We must ask whether such an atrocity is an aberration or whether it is part of a policy of atrocities, consciously followed as part of a strategic pattern.
I am certain that most hon. Members will reject any suggestion that it is, or has been, part of the top direction of war, at political or high strategic level. But if, at any lower level, systematic murder is established to be part of a policy, part of an attitude, combined with a conspiracy to conceal the facts from the Commander-in-Chief—that is, the President—in the White House, and if this were to be established as a necessary concomitant of this war, then I would agree—as I am sure would many other hon. Members—with an editorial comment I have read in our own Press, which stated:
44
"The Americans would deserve to be told that they had lost the war if they believed that they could not win it without the physical elimination of anyone who helps the enemy".
In my view, "lost the war" not because, as we have urged for years, there can never be a solution in this war through military victory by either side, but "lost the war" because every reason, every principle, which led the American people into this war, in terms of freedom, independence, and wider Asian considerations, would have lost its credibility.
This question must be asked and answered—answered, not by us, and not today. The reaction of the White House, and the United States Congress demand for the fullest investigation, suggests that it will be answered, and the answer left beyond all doubt. For that reason, while it is our right, our duty, to join with the mass of the American people who, with their leaders, have condemned this and any other incident where the facts can be proved, it is not for us to prejudge the wider, the deeper, question, which I have suggested is that relevant to any basic analysis, any basic decisions on policy.
And to suspend judgment on that is neither cowardice nor moral evasion on our part: it is common justice until the facts are proved. I do not regard it as the right reaction to what this is, an offence against decency, even of this magnitude, to jump to premature conclusions about a friend and an ally.
If this is right, it follows that until all the facts are known there is nothing to justify a change in policy—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] I have said that there is nothing to justify a change in policy because no one in this House, none of my hon. Friends, however deeply they feel, is able to answer to my satisfaction my question whether this was an obscene and ghastly aberration or whether it is endemic in the conduct of this war. When all the inquiries have been held we have to take a decision on this matter, and I shall be prepared to take my decision, as hon. Members will. I am not taking that decision this afternoon, or until those facts are proved one way or the other.
But the basic issues remain. It has been British policy for five years by every means open to us—and this includes our Geneva Co-Chairmanship—to do all in our power to bring the parties to the conference table. For, I repeat, we have

45
throughout urged that there will be no military solution, in terms of an imposed solution.
In seeking to transfer, as we have sought, the issue from battlefields and the contested hamlet to the conference room we have had disappointments—grievous disappointments on more than one occasion. There have been acute difficulties in terms of communication, though we have played our part, which we were able to do, in helping to establish communications, and in other ways. We have had the intrinsic problem that this is an international conflict superimposed on a civil war; a civil war of great brutality; a war where murder has played its part no less than pitched battles; a war conducted to a great extent in the dark; a fight not only for short-term territorial objectives, but for hearts and minds, and in conditions where there could be no finality and very little trust.
There is no need for a recital of the events that led to the Paris talks. I was repeatedly urged by many hon. Members, by many of my hon. Friends, to press on the former President that the road to the conference table required that the bombing, of North Vietnam be stopped. It is not always possible at the time to publish what is said privately, if one's advice is to be effective. We were not the only people to urge this, and as the House was urging, and it was an agonizing decision which had to be taken in the spring of last year by the former American president, against the background of a mounting price in terms of American casualties—a price that we did not have to pay or to share.
The decision was taken—first, to stop bombing over the principal populated part of North Vietnam, and, finally, to stop bombing totally. For 18 months the Paris talks have been in session—and, tragically, with so far no result; no apparent move. I believe that Her Majesty's Government were right last month to welcome the President's determination to seek an honourable negotiated solution; to welcome his plan for the withdrawal of all American ground combat troops and to fix a programme for final withdrawal, and to call for a response from the other side so that the frustrations of the Paris conference can be turned towards a stable and honourable peace.
Mr. John Mendelson: As my right hon. Friend is talking about a political solution, has he seen the latest statement by Mr. Townsend Hoopes, who was Under-Secretary of State for the Air Force in the United States Government from 1967 to 1969, in his just-published book "The Limits of Intervention"? He says:
"The American people would reawaken to the fact that they were still committed to the endless support of a group of men in Saigon who represented nobody but themselves, who preferred war to the risks of a political settlement, and could not remain in power more than a few months without our large-scale presence."
Is not that the reason why there is no settlement in the Paris negotiations?
The Prime Minister: As I have said more than once, I hold no particular brief for the Government of South Vietnam, but I think that my hon. Friend's intervention over-simplifies the issue here. After all, I listened to him—more than, perhaps, he thought—about the need to impress on the American Government the fact that if the bombing were to stop we could get the parties to the conference table. But we have got them to the conference table, and they have been there for 18 months, and I have not yet seen the evidence of a move from the other side. I hope that we shall—I hope that no one will be pessimistic about it—see a move sufficient to bring about a peaceful and honourable settlement, in which all the people of Vietnam can decide their own future without outside or foreign interference.
That is what we want, and I do not think that a quotation from what was said by a United States Under-Secretary of State of some years ago necessarily provides the right answer to this problem. What we need here is some give and take on both sides in Paris, and not an automatic taking of sides one way or the other on what is offered in the negotiations. As I say, the Americans moved a very long way to get to the conference table in Paris.
But the speed of withdrawal, the date when we can see a political settlement, honourable, lasting, allowing the people of Vietnam freedom to settle their own future—all this depends on ending the deadlock in the Paris talks. And I believe here—my hon. Friends may not all agree with me—that the advance that

47
has been made from the American side calls for a matching advance on the other side. However that may be, Her Majesty's Government, as Co-Chairman, stand ready to help in any way we can, acting with the Soviet Co-Chairman if the parties to the talks wish us to do so.
I turn now to the other tragedy which has engaged the concern and the anxieties of this House—the tragedy of Nigeria. During the past few weeks the fighting has become more intense; so has the search for a peaceful settlement; and, equally, so has the renewed search for means to bring urgently needed mercy aid, food and medical supplies to the suffering areas.
Whatever our differences of approach, none of us will want today or tomorrow to do anything or to say anything which makes the task of peacemaking or the speeding of relief supplies any more difficult. But, once again, the parties to the fighting, and their peoples, and we here in Britain face a situation where every decision of policy is a choice of evils; where what is right—indeed, what to some hon. Members seems to be an overriding bounden duty—means a denial of what to other hon. Members will seem a categorical imperative which cannot be laid aside. That is the essence of the problem.
I referred earlier to the dilemma—the moral dilemma—which the World Council of Churches feels itself faced with on the question of relief supplies, and the possibility that there may today be divided views between the World Council of Churches, on the one hand, and Joint Church Aid, on the other, at their meeting. I do not think that anyone will question the dedication with which the council and other aid bodies, including the International Red Cross—or, I would hope, Her Majesty's Government —have pursued the task of getting food to the starving. And when Press reports and television screens bring to our own homes the tragic picture of hunger and malnutrition, of children dying, no one, whether in the World Council of Churches or anywhere else, would choose this moment to relax in their efforts. And yet even they have to set this undeniable, compelling, suffering in a context in which they have to ask whether there is not a danger of still greater suffering,
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through a prolongation of the war, and therefore, of the starvation itself.
I quote The Times of Saturday:
"The World Council of Churches today suggested that the food airlift to Biafra might be wound up as a means of bringing General Ojukwu, the Biafran leader, to the negotiating table…While expressing appreciation of the work of Joint Church Aid, the statement 'expresses deep distress at the ambiguous position in which the tremendous effort has put the Christian people, Churches and agencies because of its political side effects.'
These include 'exposing the Churches to the charge of prolonging the war and adding to the suffering of the people', the statement says, and goes on:
'The division raises the question whether the Churches and their agencies, especially through Joint Church Aid, should prolong the massive airlift in its present form.
'Likewise, should the Churches' major effort to meet this human need be the indirect means by which some Governments are enabled to pursue their own ends and thereby achieve their own goals?'."
The significant fact is that this question can even be asked.
Mr. Hugh Fraser: All by one man.
The Prime Minister: I believe that this same stark choice—a choice between real issues and principle—and I accept that the right hon. Member for Stafford and Stone (Mr. Hugh Fraser) believes this to be a great issue of principle; and I know that he accepts that our different views is a question of principle, because in this situation there is this clash of principle—I believe that this same stark choice, which is highlighted by the Churches, has been at the heart of the attitude both of Colonel Ojukwu and General Gowon—I will try to put the dilemma which each faces as fairly as I can—because their several basic positions are central to the question where Britain's duty lies.
For Colonel Ojukwu, the security of the Ibo people, their right to live their lives in their own way, is a fundamental principle overriding all others. I do not share—and many hon. Members do not share—his disbelief that these can be secured as part of a negotiated settlement, and as part of a united Nigeria, but what we may feel is not the point. The failure of every effort to secure peace, or to get to the negotiating table, still rests on the fact that Colonel Ojukwu and those around him have not yet been persuaded that the future of the

49
Ibo people can be safeguarded without further tragic conflict.
It is because this is for him an overriding imperative that he rejects daylight flights or other means of speeding relief supplies from within Nigeria from Governments, including this Government, or the International Red Cross and from the Churches. For the greater part of the outside world, the obvious solution of this problem is the mercy corridor, such as the road from Enugu into the Biafran enclave, but for Colonel Ojukwu it carries the risk of a military thrust into the heart of his defences.
We can argue about the reality of this threat. We can propose, and Her Majesty's Government did 18 months ago, possible forms of international assurances as guarantees against this. We were right then and we are right now to play our part in this, but precisely because Colonel Ojukwu insists on this conception of military security every effort, every mediator who has sought to open up the mercy corridor has been met with refusal. That is why the I.C.R.C. and many Governments have spent many months of effort and a formidable expenditure of money and resources derived from Government treasuries and private charity in trying to mount an airlift.
This has not been easy. I have said something of Colonel Ojukwu's position. It has not been easy for the Federal Government to agree to this airlift. It is not in the nature of those fighting a war and who have a vital and overriding principle as they see it, to be over-concerned about the welfare of the enemy's civil population. The whole history of blockade and economic warfare in wars between advanced nations bears testimony to this, including recent wars in Europe, but this is a civil war and throughout history, as we know, civil wars have been even more bloody and unrelenting than wars between nations.
The American Civil War, also a war between those who fought to preserve a union and secessionist people who sought to maintain their own way of life—[An HON. MEMBER: "There is no comparison."] I ask hon. Members to listen very seriously to what I am saying. If they do not accept the logic at the end, I hope that they will agree with what I am saying. Civil wars are the bloodiest in history. I am referring to
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the American Civil War, which was by far the most brutal and destructive war fought up to that date in modern history.
There were in this House at that time some who felt that those who fought to preserve unity were right, and there were those who felt that the secessionists who wanted to preserve their way of life against union interference were right. There is that parallel, but I equally agree that historical parallels easily break down if they are pushed too far. I am not trying to do that, but it is worth recording that Abraham Lincoln, as a fundamental strategy in his conduct of that war, so far from aiding the movement of food and other supplies to the secessionists, deliberately and systematically set out to deny and destroy every ton of food which might reach them. There was the scorched earth policy in the Shenandoah Valley, destroying grain and slaughtering herds; the 60-mile wide swathe which Sherman cut in his wide sweep through Georgia.
Hard words have been used inside and outside this House about General Gowon and the Federal Government and also about Her Majesty's Government. I have been through every aspect of these questions with him, just as I have studied this problem on the ground in Nigeria, indeed in the Ibo heartland, personally and through representatives such as Lord Hunt. I believe that history will pay this tribute, that, faced with a brutal and brutalising civil war, General Gowon felt that his duty lay not in denying but in facilitating the supply of food and medical supplies to those he was fighting —and, in the event, to agree to its being done in this way, that it even permitted the continued supply of arms to the beleagured and hard-pressed secessionist enclave. Not all my hon. Friends nor all hon. Members opposite will agree, but this is a fact. Those were arms urgently needed by Colonel Ojukwu and if they had been denied or not supplied the war could have ended more quickly.
History may well say that if the Federal Government had hardened their heart against our pressure and the pressure of other Governments and of civilised organisations the whole world over, this war might have ended a good deal earlier, perhaps with far less suffering, fewer casualties, and fewer deaths from starvation. I do not know, but the

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fact that this can be argued shows the nature of the dilemma that Nigeria, and we, and this House, have to face, and are facing, the dilemma now made newly articulate by the World Council of Churches.
I believe that we were right to press for what I regard and what the Federal Government accepted, and I hope we all accept, as the humane policy of allowing relief to go through, but at a cost in human terms greater or less than a policy based on a blockade as rigorous as it could be made. None of us can know. The House knows of the efforts made to get daylight flights in operation, the marathon efforts of the I.C.R.C., the patient persistence of Americans and others—and the outcome—and of the efforts of many Governments in Africa and outside, including Britain. A few weeks ago, when the chance of a scheme emerging from the I.C.R.C. negotiations seemed hopeless, it was my right hon. Friend's decisive weekend intervention which helped to get it moving again.
I understand the arguments of Colonel Ojukwu and his fear that Uli airstrip would lie open to a sudden military air strike. I recognise as a fact in the situation, even if I cannot support his demand, that on military grounds Uli should be kept open by day to mount the air strikes made possible by his acquisition of rocket-firing aircraft and other aircraft from Europe. Yes, he has what he considers to be military reasons for his refusal to allow daylight flights, and these stem from his unwavering military and political objectives. But it does not lie with those who take a different view from ours, and as I have said, different from over 30 independent Governments in Africa, with those who support Colonel Ojukwu on this—and I understand his position—to put the blame for hunger and malnutrition on the Federal Government or on Her Majesty's Government.
Daylight flights could end starvation in a very short time. This, I think, is not contested by anyone. Daylight flights are rejected by Colonel Ojukwu in support of objectives he considers overriding and which those who support him, including some hon. Members, also regard as overriding. I understand that.
Mr. Michael Barnes: Is it not the case that Colonel
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Ojukwu has not rejected daylight flights in principle? In fact, the Biafrans have agreed to daylight flights in principle. What they have rejected is the package which was worked out between the I.C.R.C. and the Nigerians.
The Prime Minister: Most people outside Nigeria, including a number of Governments who suspended judgment on this question—and I am thinking of the recent comments of the Canadian Prime Minister, who very much reserved his judgment—would not perhaps agree with my hon. Friend's assessment. But I intend to say something about the form of the daylight flights later.
As I have said, I recognise that the question of the military objectives determining Colonel Ojukwu's attitude to daylight flights—and daylight flights in this form—are a matter of principle for him and perhaps hon. Members who support him. But do not let them deny to those of us who take a different view about daylight flights a similar concern with principle. Do not let them claim that our policy is causing starvation. On the contrary, our policy would end the threat of starvation.
They may say—and I understand this if they say it—that the principle of full self-determination for the Ibos, whether outside or inside the Federation, is overriding. They may say—and I understand it if they say it—that Colonel Ojukwu is right to prevent daylight flights. They are entitled to say this. But, if that is what they say, they are not entitled at the same time to lay the blame for starvation at the door of the Federal Government or Her Majesty's Government. The logic of their argument—and I concede that it is a respectable argument in logic—is to say that this is Colonel Ojukwu's decision, as it is, and they should proceed to justify that decision on other grounds.
I trust that this relief issue will not be mixed up with the question of our arms supplies, which we have often debated in the House. I do not intend to go over the argument. There are those who deny Britain's influence in Nigeria. I agree that it is not decisive. I agree that it is not comparable with the ability of an imperial Government, which we are not, to give instructions to a colony, which Nigeria is not. But let those who have argued on these lines

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not underrate the importance of what, with alter nations, we have been able to achieve—the appointment of independent military observers, which is most unusual in modern war; the virtual ending of the bombing flights about which the House was so anxious earlier in the year, which was readily conceded after my discussions with General Gowon; the assurances secured at the same time about the future security, status and equality of the Ibo people which have been repeated from the record to my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State in Lagos this weekend.
I hope that they will not underrate the importance of this influence in the acceptance of relief flights by the Federal Government at a high military cost—no one will deny that it has been at a high military cost—and all from a Government engaged in a bitter internecine conflict.
Mr. Frank Allaun: How can the Prime Minister argue that we can act as an effective peacemaker when we are continuing to arm one side and we are not even asking through the United Nations for an all-round embargo, for which the Labour Party conference has twice asked?
The Prime Minister: I will deal with the question of arms control in a moment.
I have taken the view, together with, I think, everyone who has studied this question, that if there is to be mediation it must come from African countries—from the Organisation of African Unity presided over by the Emperor of Ethiopia, who has tried time and again, sometimes six weeks at a time, and who is trying at this moment.
I was dealing with relief questions and not with mediation when my hon. Friend intervened. While he may not agree with what I have said, I hope that, on consideration, he will feel that I have put a case to justify our attitude on relief. It is for my hon. Friends who support Colonel Ojukwu to make their case for saying why his military objectives trust require a refusal of this means of supplying relief which, in our view, could end the malnutrition.
I was about to come to the question of arms supplies when my hon. Friend the Member for Salford, East (Mr. Frank Allaun) intervened. Some hon.
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Members will press for an ending of our arms supplies to Nigeria as a moral gesture, to be done unilaterally, in the absence of an effective international embargo. In past debates in the House, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and I have said why we do not agree with this and, indeed, what, in our view, the cost would be. But, on the relief question, I do not believe that such a gesture on arms supplies by us would save one life from starvation. If we said that we would cut off the supplies of ammunition tomorrow—no bombing planes, no aerial bombs—I do not believe that it would save one life from starvation. Indeed, the opposite could be argued. It might be taken by Colonel Ojukwu as encouragement to prolong the fighting, with all that that means. Again, we disagree about this.
Therefore, the question of arms supplies is important; but it is a separate question, however much it may have become intermingled with the question of relief, and, to the challenge of starvation—we accept that this is a challenge—I have given my answer in two words, "daylight flights".
That brings me to the question of an international arms embargo through the United Nations Security Council.
Sir Robert Cary: Would the Prime Minister particularise about the supply of arms? Are the arms limited entirely to light armaments, small arms ammunition and rifles —no more than that?
The Prime Minister: That question has been answered many times in the House. If the hon. Gentleman wants it to be dealt with in greater detail, I will ask my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State to deal with it. But I have said what it does not include. However, as far as arms are concerned—I think that the hon. Gentleman will attach importance to this—there will be those who feel that a moral gesture by us, as they would put it—and I feel that there are more important moral gestures required—would make all the difference to the conduct of the war.
It would not, because the House knows that the Soviet Government are willing and anxious to supply every ounce of ammunition, every ounce of military supplies, which we, by such a moral gesture,

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would cut off. As my hon. Friend suggests, there are other Governments—I do not necessarily go along with the one which he mentioned—who supply to the other side.
I want to come now to the question of an international arms embargo—[Interruption.] I must get on. Hon. Members listened quietly when I was expressing the point of view of Colonel Ojukwu, and if some of the things I am now saying are not agreeable perhaps they will listen to them as well.
On the question of an international arms embargo, I ask right hon. and hon. Gentlemen to accept not only our sincerity, but our judgment, when we say that this is not a practicable proposition, at any rate in present circumstances, and, also, that it is not only a question of black market supplies, although the entry of airmen of fortune with their aircraft to aid Biafra in recent months shows that this question of black market supplies is not an unimportant issue.
Nor is the problem limited to the fact that no Government will admit to being the source of the supply of the many hundreds of tons of arms that Colonel Ojukwu has received in the last few months. They have been delivered, but no Government have admitted that they were the source of supply. This is quite a problem if we want an international arms embargo.
There is the further fact that there is no prospect of getting an item on Nigeria inscribed on the United Nations agenda. This is not just the view of this Government. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, has said publicly that there is no possibility of getting an item on Nigeria inscribed on the agenda of either the Security Council or the General Assembly.
I have confirmed with him over the weekend that this remains his firm view. If it were inscribed, I can hold out no hope of agreement on it. My right hon. Friend has told the House that the Soviet Union reject an arms ban categorically, and I had confirmed to me personally within the last week that the Soviet Government would refuse to co-operate in an arms embargo.
I know that it will be said—I think the right hon. Gentleman has made this
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point—that even if we are going to fail, let us have a go in order to highlight the identity of those who do not agree to it. That will be a gesture, I agree. It would certainly highlight the Soviet Union. But I think that what the House has to face is that if we were to make an attempt against the advice of the Secretary-General, against the clear position of the Soviet Union and against the clear position of France and others against sending any arms at all, I hope that hon. Members will remember the 33 independent sovereign African States who have voted for the integrity of a united Nigeria, most of whom, if not all, would regard such a move with deep hostility.
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: Why does the Secretary-General say that this cannot be inscribed? What authority has he for saying so? This is decided not by the Secretary-General, but by the Security Council.
The Prime Minister: I am as keen as the right hon. Gentleman to make progress. There is no difference between us on what we want. But this is a question of practicability. I am sure the right hon. Gentleman will have studied the reasons given by the Secretary-General in his public statement for believing that it could not be inscribed. I prefer to leave the right hon. Gentleman, with his great knowledge of these things, to study those words and to give the House his views. All I have said is that U Thant has reconfirmed what he said in public earlier on this question. I know that the right hon. Gentleman, if he looks at the composition of the General Assembly and of the Security Council, will take the view that I have expressed and that U Thant has expressed.
Here I make common cause with the right hon. Gentleman and many right hon. and hon. Members as to the desirability of doing anything we can to stop this general supply of arms, but not unilaterally. I have always taken the view—and I have had abundant opportunity to check this for myself in Nigeria, with the best military advice—that any embargo on arms supplies can only be made effective first in conditions of a cease-fire, and with the assent of both sides; and it can only be done at the receiving end by a strict control of the

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ports and airports controlled by the Federal Government, on the one hand, and of Uli airstrip, on the other. If this were agreed we should be more than ready to play our part, and I have no doubt that many other countries, African and non-African, Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth, would play their part as well. But the enforcement of the agreement could not be made real, at any rate, at the Uli end if fighting continued.
Just as I have argued that a cease-fire without a ban on new arms shipments could well be self-defeating, so an arms embargo without a cease-fire would be unworkable and perhaps highly dangerous to those involved in policing it. Not every Member would want to commit British troops to policing this if fighting were still going on.
Hon. Members whose sympathies are engaged largely on the side of Colonel Ojukwu—and I hope that I have shown that I understand what they feel—must ask themselves whether they agree that an arms embargo must be universal or unilateral. I must ask them whether, recalling the whole history of daylight relief flights, they consider that Colonel Ojukwu would agree to the neutralisation of Uli Airport so far as arms flights are concerned. I think that that is at the centre of the question, and it would need his agreement.
I share the interest of hon. Members, including the right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home), in some means of checking arms supplies, provided that it is comprehensive and effective. If there is a difference between the right hon. Gentleman and myself it is probably on the exact means by which it may be made effective, because I have given my reasons for saying that while an attempt at the United Nations may be satisfying from a public relations point of view, it has got to be on the ground in Nigeria if it is to be effective. However, my mind is not closed to making the necessary inquiries and contacts with a view to action at the receiving end, on the lines I have indicated.
I have not referred at any length to the central question of the Nigerian war, namely, the question of ending it by negotiation. The House will have seen the reports over the weekend that, following the initiatives taken by the Emperor of
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Ethiopia, there is now a hope of direct talks between the two sides, and this could be next week. This being so, I think it will be better, at any rate, for me to say little more on this question, because the House knows its delicacy and its extreme difficulty, arising from the deep clash of principle that I have described, and I would not wish today to say anything which would make the task of the Emperor more difficult.
Mr. Jeremy Thorpe: I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for giving way. May I ask him a question about arms? He will not be surprised if what he has said may sadden many hon. Members in the House who hope that there may be a fresh initiative. For the avoidance of doubt, will the right hon. Gentleman confirm that it remains the policy of Her Majesty's Government to continue to supply arms to the Federal Government and that at this moment they see no possible diplomatic initiative which can be taken to get an arms embargo?
The Prime Minister: No, I did not say that. That sounds like the days when the right hon. Gentleman was practised in asking questions in court.
I said that I do not accept a unilateral change of arms policy here, but I would work with the right hon. Gentleman or with anyone else for any system of international arms control which can be made effective. I gave my reasons for saying that I do not believe that an initiative by the United Nations would be effective. I quoted U Thant, whom the right hon. Gentleman usually regards as a great authority in these matters, who said that he thought that this would not be effective. It must be at the receiving end.
We are prepared to take any necessary steps with the two sides to see whether there could be an arms embargo at the one place where it could be effective, stopping them coming into Federal Nigeria, on the one hand, and Uli airport, on the other. Those who have supported the Biafran cause must state in this debate whether they support the closure of Uli airport for these purposes.
I have referred to the question of negotiation and said that I think it right to say little more about that now. The House knows the delicacy and the difficulty of the question, but I would just say this on the subject of negotiations. The rights of the Ibo people, one

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of the most civilised and sophisticated peoples of Africa, to live in peace and security and to realise their great potential for development should be one of the absolutes of any settlement.
I think that we all agree about that. But it is too easy to confuse this requirement with some of the Biafran claims which were based on suzerainty over the entire former Eastern Region. I have been, as many hon. Members have, to Calabar and Port Harcourt. I have seen for myself the non-Ibo areas which, under Biafran claims, would be under Ibo control. I was left in no doubt of the strength of feeling and the determination of citizens of the South-East and River States to reject this kind of proposal. In the territory claimed as Biafran, there are several million non-Ibos. Even hon. Members who support the Biafran claim to independence, total independence, with which Her Majesty's Government profoundly disagree, will agree that a State based on the Ibos alone would be of doubtful economic viability.
But there is another consideration. If the argument in this debate is that a minority has a right to secede to preserve its rights, might not a settlement, even if this were conceivable, which gave sovereignty to a Biafra controlling the former Eastern Region be followed with equal ligitimacy by a break-away group of non-Ibos, millions of them, claiming their own self-determination; and could they not then assert the right, which has been asserted and will again be asserted in our debate today and tomorrow in favour of any ethnic group powerful enough by force of arms to lay claim to it?
I conclude my reference to Nigeria with the subject with which I began—relief and starvation. The quickest way to end starvation and to begin the fight back against malnutrition is to end the fighting. Many hon. Members have seen, as I have, thousands of Ibos—in my case, in the Enugu area and Port Harcourt—being cared for and rehabilitated. We have seen the great care given to them by their Nigerian hosts, Ibo and non-Ibo, and by our own dedicated young people from the Save the Children Fund and other organisations and those of other nations.
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Those hon. Members will know that what I have described, what we have seen at Enugu and elsewhere in Ibo areas, is a pledge of wider concern on the part of the Federal Government for the future security and welfare of the Ibo people when peace is restored. But, because the right way to end starvation is to speed as quickly as we can an end of the fighting, that is a further reason why our full backing should be given to the Emperor as chairman of the O.A.U. Consultative Committee on Nigeria in the new moves for peace.
Meanwhile, emphasis must be on getting daylight flights following the tragic rejection of the I.C.R.C. proposal. I think that many hon. Members will feel that those proposals should be accepted. [Interruption.] My hon. Friend the Member for Penistone has expressed his anxieties about that.
Mr. Hugh Fraser Mr. Hugh Fraser rose—
The Prime Minister: If the right hon. Gentleman will allow me, I think that I may deal with the point which he wishes to raise.
Mr. Fraser: About flights?
The Prime Minister: It is about flights, yes.
Anxieties have been expressed by Colonel Ojukwu. Perhaps I should tell the House now that there is reason to hope that a clarification of Article 6(2) of the Agreement between the Federal Government and the I.C.R.C. may now soon be reached. Many right hon. and hon. Members will know that clarification is needed on that point, and it is one of the principal points on which Colonel Ojukwu justified his rejection of daylight flights. If it can be satisfactorily clarified—and there is reason to hope that it will be—we would then hope that Colonel Ojukwu would accept the I.C.R.C. agreement and the policy of daylight flights without delay.
Mr. Hugh Fraser: Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will state the number of flights which were proposed, and the duration. I understand that it was only six flights per day for three weeks.
The Prime Minister: I do not see why there should not be more flights. But the right hon. Gentleman must say in that

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case that, in order to have enough daylight flights, it will be necessary to close Uli airport to both the use of that airport as a source for the marauding flights by soldiers of fortune to which I referred and the shipment of arms for that period. Therefore, we have a clash between the best way of getting relief supplies in and the other objectives which I have mentioned and which everyone holds.
The suggestion has been made that a Royal Air Force operation be laid on, if necessary with a fighter escort to shoot its way through. The problem is not a shortage of aircraft; it is the opening of Uli to the aircraft now available, or which could be made available. With fighter aircraft one could not escort oneself on to an airfield the landing strips of which were blocked. But if the continued efforts of the O.A.U. and the International Red Cross should come to nothing—this is a crucial moment for peace negotiations and for relief supplies—and if a new move were needed to break the log jam, we for our part should be prepared to consider offering the help of the R.A.F. in flying in relief supplies. Such flights would have to be by daylight, and with the consent of both sides, and they could take place only under the most stringent conditions to ensure the safety of the operation and all who were engaged in it.
Although I have continued longer than I intended, I recognise that there are many more issues of world affairs with which I have not dealt but which will be raised by hon. Members in the debate and will be replied to by my right hon. Fiends. I thought it right to concentrate on the two issues of major concern. I hope that I have conveyed two matters to the House. First, I have tried to deal with the realities of the situation which we have to face, realities from which there can be no escape, whatever our different judgments about how to deal with them. I hope that I have been able to satisfy at least the majority of hon. Members that on each one of these issues—Greece, Vietnam and Nigeria—the decisions which the Government have taken have been taken on the basis of principles which must inspire Britain's moral judgment on questions which involve a deep moral challenge.
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I hope, too, that I have been able to explain to the House some of the considerations which arise in every major issue of decision-taking, when one moral principle conflicts with another and yet a decision has to be made, and often speedily. I know the extent of the feeling, indeed, the degree of commitment, of many hon. Members on both of the main issues which I have discussed. I hope that I have narrowed the area of disagreement—I do not know—and I hope that, at least, I have convinced most hon. Members that, where we part company in these debates, it is on an issue of judgment. It is not on an issue where any one of us can claim a moral superiority over those who disagree with us.
It is in that spirit that I commend the Government's policies to the House.
4.37 p.m.
Mr. Richard Wood: Last Thursday the Leader of the House forecast that the Prime Minister, in his opening speech today, would touch on the whole canvas of foreign affairs. If I may for a moment take up that painting metaphor, I think that history will judge that we have had a particularly serious work from the Prime Minister, though almost certainly of his final period.
In the past, all of us have been aware of the difficulties and dissatisfactions of widely ranging debates, with different speakers addressing themselves to affairs in different parts of the world. The Prime Minister's speech has illustrated the difficulty of concentration. Naturally, he spoke, as he must have done, on the two great topics of Vietnam and Nigeria. As he and the House know, we are to have a day tomorrow when we shall concentrate mainly on Nigeria. So I hope that he will forgive me for not following him in any way on that topic because it is, as he knows, to be the main burden of the speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home).
Today, although slightly less exclusively, I understand that we are to devote our main attention to Vietnam. Naturally I want to speak about the American involvement in that part of the world. On my way there I hope that I shall be forgiven if I make two short stops in Europe and the Middle East. I

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give the House the undertaking that they will be short, because I want to avoid for as many hon. Gentlemen as is possible the frustration that I have occasionally felt when I take home to bed some of the best speeches that the House of Commons has never heard.
I want to stop, first, in Europe and make three immediate reflections on last week's summit meeting. The Prime Minister was no doubt correct in suggesting, as he did last week to the hon. Member for Croydon, South (Mr. Winnick), that the negotiations themselves offer
"The best chance of assessing the prospect of success "—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 4th December, 1969; Vol. 792, c. 1697.]
The Prime Minister will understand that the certainty that the negotiations will take place greatly increases the interest of the House in the two proposed reviews —that promised shortly by the C.B.I. and, even more important, the review of the situation which he himself has promised, I think I am right in saying early next year. We shall await those with increased interest.
The second reflection is that the decision of the Six at the Hague last week seems to make even more delicate the balance which the Prime Minister and the rest of the Government, and indeed a large number of hon. Members, are trying to strike. On one side the Prime Minister must leave no doubt in the minds of our many friends in Europe that Britain's determination to enter the Community is wholehearted and sincere. On the other, he must make it clear that negotiations are negotiations and that our determination to enter cannot be unconditional.
The difficulty is that such balances, like all balances, withhold complete satisfaction from enthusiasts at either end of the spectrum; and only a very slight disturbance of the equilibrium can raise such doubts and provoke such fears that the balance may well be lost for ever. I have my fears even at this moment that the noises from Britain which are travelling south-eastwards across the Channel may sound in Europe a little more fainthearted than confident.
If this is so, it could be dangerous, because perhaps the most important contribution of the Hague Conference was that it largely restored confidence be-
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tween the States directly involved in West European integration, both the existing members of the Community and those which have applied to join. The veto of 1963 is now six years old. I think all will agree not only that it affected Britain but that it depressed the confidence of the other nations. Last week's conference has not dispelled all doubts and suspicions, but it has made a very important new start.
The third reflection is that the summit settled nothing; but undeniably the Community has already taken a decision of immense importance by being willing in principle substantially to expand itself early in the coming decade. Meanwhile, before negotiations begin, the Community will want to consider very carefully the new situation that will be created by the entry of Great Britain and possibly three other nations.
From our own objective position on this side of the Channel, many of us can already foresee the expanded Community as a significant nucleus of that European unity which a great many of us fervently want to see. This is a unity which men have sought, either by conquest or by other means, for more than a thousand years. We in this country have paid dearly for the failure of Europeans over the centuries peacefully or permanently to achieve it.
Here at long last the vision of a united Europe brought together by agreement, and not by force of arms, may be made reality; and we in Britain may have an essential part to play in it. The potential gain would be great, not only to Britain, not only to Europe, but to other continents as well, if the economic power of this continent were raised to, or above, that of the world's present economic giants, and if the continent of Europe became collectively able to defend itself against aggression.
We in Britain already have a large stake in European defence, and it would seem wise for us to ensure that our investment in men and equipment is effectively directed. Europe by itself cannot at present defend Europe. Europe, in any case, cannot be defended in Europe alone. The continent has many doors. It has a long and narrow lake to the south of it. It has a coastline of uncertain friendliness on the other side of the Mediterranean.

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Meanwhile, armed conflict rages in the most distant corner of the Mediterranean. Here the United Nations is directly engaged, and Great Britain has an undeniable responsibility to contribute towards a just settlement in that part of the world. It is now several months since the United Nations Secretary General warned of
"the almost complete breakdown of its ceasefire in the Suez Canal sector, and the virtual resumption of war there"
Time is emphatically, and all too obviously, not on our side. Each day the conflict continues, as the Foreign Secretary has several times made clear, the political situation of the contestants grows more rigid. Naturally, we all welcome the resumption of the four-power talks in New York. In our last debate the Foreign Secretary said that the two-power talks between the United States and Soviet Russia had
"made some progress but not yet that degree of progress which will produce a settlement"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 30th October, 1969. Vol. 790, c. 363.]
I assumed that this was a polite and diplomatic way of describing a dead end.
There is certainly a pressing need for the new ideas which may be thrown up by the four-power meeting. Relatively uncommitted as Her Majesty's Government are to partisan attitudes, our contribution could be useful. However, in this situation, as in others today, diagnosis is engagingly easier than cure. We all know the problems. We all agree that the problem is to marry the insistent and legitimate demand of Israel for peace and real security with the Arab demand, equally insistent and legitimate, for Israeli withdrawal, together with the demand for a settlement of the refugees.
The United Nations resolution was comprehensive enough, with all its ambiguity, but perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will tell us when he replies whether Her Majesty's Government are ready to put forward proposals in the four-power talks to try to put some flesh on the bare bones of the United Nations resolution. What ideas has the right hon. Gentleman about the establishment of demilitarised zones and the kind of security guarantees that could be given by outside powers? My right hon. Friend the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire made certain suggestions in
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an earlier debate. I hope that we shall be told that proposals, on this basis, will before long be discussed by the four Powers.
In Europe we seek to be, as I have tried to show, and as the majority of hon. Members agree, more closely involved. In the Middle East most of us realise that we cannot, for the reasons I have given, escape involvement.
In Vietnam we are involved, but in a different way. All of us, echoing what the Prime Minister said at the beginning of the debate, are profoundly disturbed by this ghastly, unending war. It would indeed be disturbing if this concern did not exist, but it would be a great deal more disturbing if our natural human involvement in the misery of Vietnam should drive us to dissociate ourselves from those whose aim is to achieve a just solution.
Any attempt to wish, or to wash, away our responsibility to find real solutions is no more a policy for us than it was for Pontius Pilate. The choice between a bad solution and an even worse one, whether in Vietnam or anywhere else, can never be attractive; but we are part of the world, we are still a powerful nation, we are a permanent member of the Security Council, and there is no honourable way in which we can slink away from responsibilities which belong to us.
The world, as the Prime Minister has naturally said, has been deeply shocked by the accusations of atrocities. The right hon. Gentleman has also said that it is, happily, not our practice to condemn men unheard, and it would surely be wise, and just, for us to await the result of the present investigations. But suppose that some of these things did take place, even were they exaggerated; they would cause the greatest distress. People would still ask whether the right of self-determination for the South Vietnamese was not being bought at too high a price if it involved such brutalisation of the defenders of freedom there and the cold murder of civilians, old and young.
Mr. Stan Newens: Does not the right hon. Gentleman agree that evidence already exists of tremendous destruction and damage to civilians by bombing? Does not the evidence that

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is available prove that too much is being paid for what the right hon. Gentleman wants to achieve?
Mr. Wood: If the hon. Gentleman had waited a moment he would have heard me try to put this into perspective, because I was going to say that the terms in which some may see this matter are not the terms in which I happen to see it. The problem, as the hon. Gentleman reminded us, is that many dreadful things have occurred in Vietnam, in all parts of that country, and I doubt, as the Prime Minister doubted, whether there is very much to be gained by our continuing a kind of long-range indictment of the Americans from across the Atlantic Ocean. In the past, as we are very conscious, we have had similar problems in this country and in parts of the Commonwealth, and we have dealt with them ourselves. The Americans, like us, have free institutions and a free Press, and they are well able to deal with this matter.
I think that it would be more profitable for us to remember and recall clearly the genesis of the American intervention, and why they went to Asia, as well as paying tribute to the search for peace which President Nixon is now conducting. The President has offered the complete withdrawal of all outside forces within a year. He has offered a cease-fire under international supervision. He has offered free elections under international supervision. But the only response from Hanoi is a demand for unconditional withdrawal of all American forces, or, as the President has put it, a demand "that we overthrow the Government of South Vietnam as we leave the country".
Remembering particularly that soldiers of the Commonwealth are still engaged in this war, is the outcome which the President has mentioned what the critics of American and Commonwealth policy really want? Do they want an unconditional American withdrawal and subsequent massacres in Vietnam? I believe that the President of the United States deserves our sympathy and our support, rather than our criticism, because it is for him to take decisions in the knowledge that free men everywhere largely depend on the strength and will of the United States to defend them.
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Meanwhile, if we here in Britain begin to lose heart, if the world struggle begins to seem unbearable because we are appalled by the misery and suffering in one or two parts of the world, how are we over the years going to keep our will to resist, and help others to resist, the successive attempts by men and nations to rob other men and nations of their freedom and to bring them into subjection?
I am profoundly thankful that the people of the United States have not lost that will. I am grateful that thousands of them, not only in Vietnam, but on countless battlefields across the globe, have been prepared to give much to resist oppression. There is no need to cross the world for evidence of that. One need only cross the Channel. There are plenty of Americans today who are still, fortunately, prepared to make sacrifices, whom I think we would be wise to support and not do our best to undermine.
From time to time our differences with the United States may be very serious, but even those differences will fade into insignificance against the light of the whole range of values which we and they have in common. It is difficult, to say the least, and particularly so after hearing the Prime Minister's review, to look across the world with a surge of optimism, but I for one would feel a great deal more pessimistic than I do if I foresaw a collapse of that close understanding and friendship which has bound, and I hope will long continue to bind, together the Governments and peoples of Britain and the United States.
4.56 p.m.
Mr. George Brown: I want to be as brief as I can, and to limit myself to the vexed question of Vietnam. I want to talk about our feelings on the subject, the attitude which I strongly feel, which is not shared by all my colleagues, and what should be the attitude of this country to the situation.
It is, as I have said, a vexed question, and I hope that I can carry everyone in the House with me when I say that the issue is not that put to me in abusive terms so often between those who condone murder and killing and atrocities, and those who do not. I think that it is unnecessary to take time to say that each of us is as aghast at atrocities, whether

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carried out in a war, in a civil war, or in any other conflict, as any other member of a civilised society.
I have had letters opposing me for what I am alleged to have said on the radio the other day. Interestingly enough, most of them, like some of the early comments in the House, came from people who, first, clearly had not heard the broadcast, and, secondly, had no chance to read it since it had not then been published.
Most of the letters are couched in irrational and abusive terms, on the assumption that anybody who tries to put a rational case, whether rightly or wrongly, for a war and the issues being fought for on the one side, and for what one understands by freedom and the right to make one's own choice, is thereby convicted of defending every horrible thing that happens, whereas those who find it possible, rightly or wrongly, to envisage the success of the Communist side are somehow absolved from being in favour of any atrocities committed by that side while being wholly against any atrocities committed by the other side.
Whether I am in conflict with hon. Members and very good friends, or in conflict with the majority of the Labour Party conference—
Mr. Frank Allaun: My right hon. Friend is.
Mr. Brown: Whether I am or not, I am trying to show that the total unfairness and impossibility of that approach to life, not merely for emotional reasons, but for rational ones—I have my share of emotion—is very much a matter of self-interest at the end of the day.
It is an axiom that wars brutalise. However, it is too late in the day for us to begin taking the attitude that we are against wars because they brutalise. There are pacifists in the Labour movement—but, then, hardly any of us in the movement has not been through our pacifist days. Not many of those who are attacking me are pacifists. They just do not think that we should fight—[Interruption.] I trust that my hon. Friends will give me a hearing. I heard an hon. Member say that it was possible to pay too high a price for freedom.
Mr. Eric S. Heffer: Who said that?
Mr. Brown: An hon. Member sitting near to me just said, "Hear, hear" to that statement.
Mr. Newens Mr. Newens rose—
Mr. Brown: I wish to be brief. It will help if I am not interrupted. There will be ample opportunity for my hon. Friends to reply later.
To put it in a non-controversial way, I do not believe that one can pay too high a price for freedom because I consider that there is nothing that one needs more in the world than freedom. However, we should not pay a higher price than we need to pay and we should discourage paying a price that is obviously irrelevant.
If Pinkville is proved, even reasonably proved, then—I said this on the radio, but I did not get a pat on the back for saying it—I would condemn that as terrible, as irrelevant to the issue and, as a result, as in every way debasing the currency of those of us who think that we are fighting for freedom.
Having said that, I am not prepared to go so far as to say that one should condemn those who are trying to secure freedom of choice because, in their name, some people commit unnecessary and indefensible attrocities. [Interruption.] I wish to make it clear how much I agreed with everything that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said on this subject.
Let us bear in mind and proclaim to the world that it is only on the democratic side that we ever know of atrocities that are committed in our name. The reason some folk in this country can get away with being tremendously moral about things that the Americans, South Vietnamese, South Koreans, Australians, or New Zealanders may do, or are alleged to have done, is because they are on the democratic side. We never hear what goes on on the other side. It will be a wonderful day when the North Vietnamese and Vietcong go into a village accompanied by American photographers, television interviewers and radio commentators. That day has not yet come. When it does come we may have a more rational and more balanced argument on the whole subject.
I hear it asked by what right anybody other than the South Vietnamese has to be in South Vietnam. Nobody ever asks

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by what right people other than the North Vietnamese are in North Vietnam.
Mr. Heffer: Who asks that?
Mr. Brown: If my hon. Friend does not know, he has no right to comment in this debate. The people in South Vietnam other than the South Vietnamese are there because of treaty obligations—
Mr. Heffer Mr. Heffer rose—
Mr. Brown: If only my hon. Friend would listen to me for a moment he would understand what I am saying. This is one of the problems in trying to put a case. I hope that my hon. Friend will allow me to make my case, after which I am sure he will have an opportunity to speak. After all, I have been abused for stating a case which I have not made.
Mr. Heffer: I have not abused my right hon. Friend.
Mr. Brown: I assure my hon. Friend that after I have stated my case I will allow him to intervene and to point out if I am wrong.
As I was saying, those who are in South Vietnam other than the South Vietnamese are there because, in their view, they have treaty obligations. Following on the Geneva accord and the understanding which the Americans attached to it, the Americans became involved, first, by sending advisers and then by sending troops. The Australians, New Zealanders and Asiatic countries fighting there went there because they interpreted their membership of S.E.A.T.O. and the obligations which they had undertaken under that treaty as obliging them to go there.
We, France and others used our right under S.E.A.T.O. to interpret our obligations as meaning the giving of help and support short of military war. I am saying that those who are aiding the South Vietnamese, in one degree or another, are doing it because of their interpretation of their treaty obligations; and they have a perfect right to do it, just as the South Vietnamese had a perfect right to ask them to do it.
Mr. Heffer: Is not my right hon. Friend aware that the Geneva agreement laid down quite clearly that the 17th Parallel
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was merely a military border for a temporary period so that, by 1956, free elections could take place? Those elections should have taken place, but they were never held and the Americans deliberately went out of their way to prevent the Geneva agreement from being carried out.
Mr. Brown: My hon. Friend phrased that question in an interrogatory fashion, which is usual in this House. He made a declaration of view, a view with which I do not happen to agree.
I remind my hon. Friend that there is another view. The North Vietnamese delegate signed the Geneva accord as it stood and was immediately disowned by the North Vietnamese for so doing. The Hanoi Government said that they had no intention of being bound by it; and they started military activity, contrary to the Geneva accord. If we are going to try to find one side guilty, then I beg my hon. Friends to read the whole history of this matter—it is available in the Library —and not just one part of it.
Mr. Heffer: We have read it.
Mr. Brown: I believe that those other than the South Vietnamese who are in South Vietnam are there as of right. I equally believe that there are vital issues of freedom involved in all this and that the South Vietnamese are, so far, the only people concerned in the conflict who, as pacification has proceeded—not as well as I would have liked, and it is in this respect that I am somewhat critical of the Americans; it has certainly not proceeded nearly as well as we managed to do it in Malaysia—have reached the point at which elections could be held.—[Interruption.]
I remind hon. Members that elections were held. [Interruption.] They may not have been as free as my hon. Friends would have liked—[Laughter.]—but they were held. I am not joking and this is not a laughing matter. I will be very serious when the North Vietnamese hold elections anywhere near as free as those that were held in South Vietnam. In North Vietnam, the people have not got anywhere near as close to that yet.
There are issues of freedom involved here and there are many people from North Vietnam who prefer it in South Vietnam, however bad South Vietnam

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may be by the standards which some people choose to apply to it. What are those who are arguing against this one-sided approach wanting? Those of us who are arguing in this way do not deserve to be attacked—[Interruption.] I wish that hon. Members would give me a reasonable hearing, so that I may slate my case clearly.
What is it we are saying? We want an honourable settlement. I have had the recording of the words I used on the radio. It was alleged that I had said that fie Americans should go on and win the war. I never used those words at all. Any hon. Gentleman who wants to check that recording may do so. [An HON. MEMBER:"Stop weeping and get on with it"] Yes, stop weeping. And many an American mother, many an American wife, many an American fiancée has had perfectly good reasons for weeping. I am entitled to say to my allies, "We have put up with murder and mayhem for years and, with great respect, we did not get a great deal of encouragement from you Americans". I do not see why I should not say to them, "Get on with the job".
What is the job? The job is to reach a situation where an honourable settlement can be arrived at. That means conditions other than a unilateral American withdrawal. That means conditions other than American policy being decided by the depth of emotion, unhappiness and frustration caused to them by the continuance of the war.
I am certain that a number of things would follow a unilateral pull-out so that the Communists were then left free for a take-over. I will just pick three vital areas. [Interruption.] If hon. Members regard my views as deplorable, as out of step with those held by social democrats, let us look at the views of Harry Lee—Lee Kuan Yew—who spoke only last week about the consequences to South-East Asia and other parts of Asia if the Americans just walked out without stability having been established.
It is easy for us when we are thinking about Asia, but it is not so easy for our comrades there whom we applaud. Harry Lee has only to appear anywhere near a Labour Party conference to take the cheers and applause, with people rushing to congratulate him as the one
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great Labour man or social democrat in that part of the world. Harry Lee last week said how unhappy and upset he was at the risk of the Americans pulling out unilaterally, after we ourselves have pulled out or are in the course of pulling out of that area.
Mr. Heffer: Know where your friends are.
Mr. Brown: I never bother myself where my friends are, or where my enemies are, come to that. I can face them both with equal solidity and fortitude.
Mr. Norman Atkinson Mr. Norman Atkinson (Tottenham) rose—
Mr. Brown: I will not give way—this is where I show a little fortitude. I am trying to make my argument without the aid of a written script and I am making it because it needs making.
I know that it is fashionable to decry the domino theory in Asia. I happen to be one of those who think that there is a lot of truth in it. If this one goes, then Laos, Cambodia, all the way through to Burma, and then to India. Do not let us "kid" ourselves, there is a great attempt at a Communist take-over in that vital area. The fact that the Russians and Chinese are not sure at the moment whether they love each other does not alter the facts. It could even make the matter notably worse.
That is the first reason that I believe the Americans, the Australians, the New Zealanders and the South Koreans who are fighting there should be encouraged to stay there until we establish a basis on which Hanoi will feel it has to do business, in Paris or wherever it may be. The reason that I said "Stop weeping" is that the more the Americans appear to be showing uncertainty, the more they seem to be baring their chests and going to the confessional, the more will Hanoi be encouraged to be obdurate and refuse any move.
There is a second area to which this argument will apply, and I beg my colleagues and, indeed, everybody to take note of it. Isolationism, especially under the present Administration, is not far below the surface in America. "Bring the boys back, not because we have succeeded in doing what we want to do

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there in establishing a free South Vietnam and a free North Vietnam, but because we do not like the war, because it is costing a lot of casualties and a lot of money. "That argument can be applied in other areas of the world, too.
I urge the House to pay a little attention to what was said by the leading article in The Guardian quite recently. Ii does not wholly take my view, but I think that it is with me on this point. It said that before we set out to condemn the Americans too wholeheartedly, we must consider how we in Western Europe would get on alone. Let us consider what would be the situation in Europe if a withdrawal for bad reasons from Asia were followed by a withdrawal from our own continent. That is the second area in which the consequences could be felt.
The third area would follow from that, namely, the effect on the Americans themselves if the situation developed in this way.
For all these reasons I want to see conditions established for an honourable settlement. I want to see conditions established in which Hanoi and their friends, advisers and mentors—there have been occasions when I would even say their masters—will recognise that this needs to be done and that awful things will happen until it is done.
The Prime Minister referred to efforts which he made and in which I had the privilege to play a part when we thought that we were getting within a hair's breadth of bringing the parties genuinely together. It is anybody's argument whether we knew all the facts, as we thought we knew them, at the time.
I am prepared to say—I will assert this from these benches, where I have the freedom to say so—that even though mistakes were made all round and misunderstandings arose, when that effort, like every other effort, broke down it did so because Hanoi would not move and because those who claimed to be able to influence them, those who were supplying them, would not encourage them to move. There is reason to believe that some of their suppliers even threatened to cut off supplies if they moved and that other sanctions would have been applied against them.
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Therefore, please acquit any of us of condoning murder, genocide, atrocity. Please face the facts of the argument. I believe it to be correct argument as I have put it. I should like to hear rational answers to that argument and not a mere exchange of abuse, which is the most Christian and decent thing hon. Members can do.
5.20 p.m.
Mr. Julian Amery: I hope that I shall not be doing the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. George Brown) or, for that matter, the Prime Minister any harm if I say that I find myself in general agreement with what they have said today about Vietnam. Their critics and those who criticise the Americans fail to distinguish between the symptoms and the underlying causes of the Vietnam war. The Vietnamese people are bearing the brunt of the suffering in the war, but the war is not wholly, or perhaps even mainly, about the future of Vietnam. It is not for me to give lessons in Marxism to hon. Members opposite below the Gangway, but they should recognise that the war is about rice and raw materials. It emerges from the basic hunger of China.
The Chinese have always been short of food; and the Communist agricultural policies and the Communist commitments to industrialisation and the nuclear weapon have made the Chinese hunger problem more serious than ever. Broadly speaking, there are only two restaurants in the Far East. One can eat bread in Siberia or one can get rice in South-East Asia—South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Burma. Whatever differences the Soviets have with the Chinese, the one thing that they want is to turn the Chinese south, not north. That is why there is a common interest between Moscow and Peking in pushing forward with the war in Vietnam.
I know, as the right hon. Member for Belper said, that there are plenty of people who deride the domino theory. If hon. Members bother to read what is written in Peking, Hanoi and Moscow, they will find that most of the Communist authorities are convinced domino men. They say time and again that the war in Vietnam is important because when it is won it will open the gates to South-East Asia and give the Communist world a chance to deny to the Western world the

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markets and raw materials on which it depends.
What is more, anyone who has been to South-East Asia, or, for that matter, to Australia and New Zealand, in recent years must have found it very difficult to discover any competent observer who was not a domino man. The Australians and New Zealanders are in the Vietnam war because they think that their vital interests are at stake. The Conservative Government of Kuala Lumpur and the Socialist Government of Singapore take the same view. Even if the obscene atrocities at "Pinkville" were confirmed, they would not of themselves change this situation.
It is easy enough for one country to be a good ally and friend to another when all is going well. The test of friendship comes when our allies are in trouble and their agents make mistakes. Our duty today is to give full support to the Americans, and I was glad to hear the Prime Minister speak in the terms that he did.
We could do more than give full support—and this is the only point on which I would join issue with the right hon. Member for Belper and the Prime Minister. What they said would be more convincing if they had not subscribed to the disastrous proposal to withdraw our forces from Malaysia and Singapore. Four Commowealth—two European and two Asian—Governments have asked us to stay. It is no secret that President Nixon has made it plain that for us to reverse that decision and to remain in South-East Asia would be the best contribution which we could make to helping him in his efforts to get peace in Vietnam without surrender. I hope that the Prime Minister will discuss this subject with President Nixon in Washington and will not close his mind altogether to a reversal of policy.
I turn to the affairs of the Middle East—
Mr. David Winnick: Before the right hon. Gentleman leaves the question of Vietnam, may I ask him two questions? First, were the French right M resisting the Vietminh from i947 to 1954? Would he have suggested that a greater effort should have been made to help the French? Secondly, as he considers Vietnam to be of such cardinal importance, does he believe that British troops should be sent to Vietnam?
Mr. Amery: I do not want to go into a disquisition on Franco-Vietminh relations, which would keep the House too long. The point is not immediately relevant to today's debate. I am not asking the Prime Minister to go as far as sending British troops to Vietnam; I am asking him to keep them in Malaysia and Singapore where they are making a contribution to the maintenance of stability, which would be the best help in our power which we could give to the President to achieve peace without surrender.
I turn to the situation in the Middle East. I make no apology for doing so because it is, in some ways, even more critical and even more dangerous for this country than what is happening in Vietnam. We have vital interests at stake in the shape of the oil of the Middle East. We are directly involved because, as we sit here, we have troops in the Gulf, in Cyprus and in Libya.
Here again, it is very important to distinguish between the symptoms and the causes of the crisis. The public debate about the Middle East is largely conducted in terms of the Palestine question. But the underlying cause is the conflict between the traditional Arab states and the military juntas which have taken power in many Arab countries. I do not underrate the importance of the Israeli-Arab conflict, but even if the Israeli problem did not exist there would still be a cold war situation between those Arab countries which look to the Communists and those which look to the Western world.
That is why I have the gravest doubt whether there is any future in the four-Power talks or the two-Power talks. These are a mirage which waste time while the Soviets take advantage of a deteriorating situation. If there is doubt about that, I remind the House of what has happened to the latest United States initiative. They put a proposal to the Russians. The Russians seemed to favour it. They passed it to Cairo, and, apparently in agreement with the Russians, it was rejected by the Egyptians. The Americans were double crossed and precious time was wasted.
The Soviets do not want war in the Middle East. I am sure of that. But I am equally sure that they do not want peace. They are busy exploiting the

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defeat of the Arab countries to entrench themselves, particularly in Egypt. The Foreign Secretary will know much better than I do the extent of the naval facilities accorded to the Red Fleet, of the presence of Soviet aircraft on Egyptian airfields, and of the number of advisers with the Egyptian armed forces and the Egyptian administration.
But what is clear to all of us is that the Egyptians recognise the truth of Napoleon's maxim that Egypt is strategically "the most important country in the world", that they have dug themselves in, and that Ambassador Vinogradov— with whom I used to shoot in France—is almost as powerful today in Cairo as Lord Killearn was in his heyday. They are using Egypt as a base for expansion westward down the Mediterranean, eastward down the Red Sea and southward down the Nile Valley. At the same time, through the medium of the Arab guerilla movement, they are setting up a state within the state in both Jordan and the Lebanon.
In attributing imperialist aims to the Russians in the Middle East, I am not simply expressing the view of someone who has long been an outspoken opponent of Communism. I am echoing a view commonly expressed these days in Belgrade and Bucharest, as the Prime Minister will no doubt discover when he goes there.
What are we to do in this situation? Precious time is being wasted. It would have been much easier to reach a solution last year than it is this year, but something can still be done. With some hesitation, I would venture to put forward one suggestion. Jordan is the country which has lost most from the June war. Jordan is still a pro-Western country. So is Israel. Is it beyond the resources of British, American and Western diplomacy to work for a reconciliation between these two countries, leaving aside the much more difficult problem of getting reconciliation between Israel and the pro-Communist countries like Syria and Egypt?
The elements of this reconciliation would have to be the establishment of a true peace between Israel and Jordan and the restoration to Jordan of most of the territories which she has lost. If for reasons of Israeli security they were not
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all restored there would have to be compensation, perhaps in the Gaza Strip. There would have to be a settlement of the refugee problem. We have talked in the House about aid. Surely we and the Americans would be well justified in making a major contribution to the refugee problem.
There would need to be an imaginative solution to the problem of Jerusalem, giving a special status to the Old City, perhaps some kind of Vatican status, in which the interests not only of the Moslems and of the Jews but also of Christians were taken fully into account. As for the Canal and the Golan Heights, it seems to me that as long as the Soviets are in quasi-colonial control of Egypt we have no great interest in seeing the Canal re-opened. As for the four-Power talks, if the Government want to go on with them, let them do so, but the times are too grave to take this charade very seriously.
I want to pass for a moment to the problem of Libya. The negotiations, I understand, are beginning there today. I would like at the outset to pay tribute to King Idris. He was our ally in the war, and a very staunch ally. He has been a very good friend in all the years in which the Anglo-Libyan Treaty has been in effect. He and his friends proved themselves good hosts to the British armed forces, as I saw in my time as a Service Minister.
What has happened to those who worked with him and who were our friends? There are reports that there are more people under house arrest and in prison without trial in Libya than in Greece. Can the Foreign Secretary enlighten us about that? We have no jurisdiction over Libya, but the fate of our friends must be of concern to us, and I seek an assurance from the Foreign Secretary that he will have that in mind during the negotiations. He will get no credit for forgetting our friends or letting them down, even from those who are their successors.
What has happened to the British subjects who were working out there? Have their contracts been terminated in many cases and, if so, has compensation been paid? What has happened to British companies? We hear that the tobacco company and Barclays D.C.O. will be nationalised. Has compensation been

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offered? Are the terms acceptable? What has happened to other companies similarly placed? What is the position about the flow of oil? I appreciate that the oil is mainly American-owned, but it it of great importance to Europe and could be more important if the Persian Gulf were denied us. Is the Foreign Secretary confident that we can rely on the free flew of oil from Libya?
I do not dispute the decision to recognise the new Libyan Government, though they are scarcely representative. Indeed, it was several weeks before anybody knew who they were. The right hon. Gentleman's ministerial colleague still did not seem very sure of the matter even at Question time today. It has been rumoured that when Ambassador Maitland received his letters of accreditation they were made out in blank as the right hon. Gentleman did not know to whom to make them out. I do not believe that rumour, but it would be pleasant to hear it denied. I presume that we now know who are the members of the Revolutionary Council. May we have that assurance?
What do we know about their affiliations? The members of the Libyan Cabinet whose names we do know seem to have Nasserite or Baathist affiliations or to have had them in the past. Libya seems to be taking a more extremist attitude in inter-Arab meetings. Is that so or am I misinformed? There has been talk of a union of Egypt, Sudan, Libya and possibly Algeria, and of a conference in Tripoli to discuss that matter. Has the Foreign Secretary any information about it? If it were so, would he contemplate it with equanimity in view of the Soviet involvement in Egypt? I do not want to judge what is going to happen in Libya too hastily, but to govern effectively means to foresee events, and the information which we have at present looks a little omnimous as a background to the negotiations.
This alliance between Britain and Libya has been a keystone of security in the Mediterranean over the last few years. Article 1 pledges the High Contracting Parties
"not to adopt in regard to foreign countries an attitude which is inconsistent with the alliance or which might create difficulties for the other party thereto".
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There are reports that the Soviets are seeking facilities at El Adem. Has the Foreign Secretary any information about that from the Embassy or elsewhere? Clearly, it would be inconsistent with the spirit of the alliance, as it would be inconsistent with our interests.
Article 2 pledges us to go to the defence of Libya if she is attacked. I agree that this is a hypothesis, but if Libya became more deeply involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict and this led to Israeli retaliation, what would be our position? Should we feel obliged to go to the support of the new Libyan Republic?
How much importance do we attach to the training rights? They were considered very valuable when I was a Service Minister. How much importance do we attach to the staging and over-flying rights? I do not see how we could maintain military communications with Kenya, Uganda or Tanzania if these were denied us. Under the military agreement we are committed to supply, within reason, military equipment to the Libyans. What is the position about the present contracts? The obligation to provide the material flows from the Treaty. Do we still want to sell? Do the Libyans still want to buy? When most of us accepted the decision to sell Chieftain tanks to Libya, it was because we thought that King Idris might need them to defend himself against the Egyptians. A new situation has arisen, and if we are to sell them to Libya how shall we continue to deny them to Israel?
Article 6 of the Treaty seems significant:
"This treaty shall remain in force for a period of twenty years except in so far as it may be revised or replaced by a new treaty…by agreement of both the High Contracting Parties …each of the High Contracting Parties agrees in this connexion to have in mind the extent to which international peace and security can be ensured through the United Nations".
International peace in the Middle East? Security in the Middle East? Secured by the United Nations? Surely the implications of this clause of the Treaty are clear—that if there were no peace or security, we should take a less relaxed view than otherwise about modifying its provisions.
The consequences of these negotiations could be momentous for this country and

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for the whole N.A.T.O. alliance. Libya has a very small population but great wealth. It has a long coastline. Its hinterland reaches deep into Africa, and surrounds Tunisia, meeting with Algeria. If Libya were to change sides in the cold war the consequences for the West could be very serious. May we have an assurance from the Foreign Secretary that we have established a common negotiating basis with the Americans over the matter of our bases? May we be assured that that subject will be on the agenda for the talks with President Nixon? Are we consulting our N.A.T.O. allies about what is to happen as an outcome of our negotiations over the bases? Our treaty rights in Libya continue until 1973. Much may happen in the intervening period. I am not urging the Government to take a rigid stand, but I do not see why we should be pushed around where we have clear, formal, legal undertakings and rights.
Hon. Members will have read about the advice given to the nurses in Libya by the consul—to accept rape rather than to resist. I was not in the least surprised to read that. It seemed typical of the advice which the Government have been giving to the House and to the country on foreign affairs ever since they came into power. But if the Foreign Secretary enters the negotiations in that spirit he must not be surprised if the Libyan officers and those who guide their hand regard him as a push-over.
Mr. Heffer: Send a frigate to Suez.
Mr. Amery: I hope that the House and the country have learned from what happened in Aden something of what may lie ahead of us in Libya. We on this side of the House warned the Government of what would happen if they pulled out of Aden. So did King Feisal and so did the Americans. Seldom has any decision led so quickly to such disastrous consequences. The port of Aden has been stopped; the people have been ruined; our friends have been driven into exile or into prison; our businesses have been confiscated—there is no other word for it, the compensation offered is so derisory —our advisers have been sacked, and Soviet advisers have their place.
The newspapers tell us there are now MiG squadrons flown and maintained by
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the Soviets. Can the Foreign Secretary tell us whether this is so? if it is, it seems to me a pretty serious development. Aden has become a base for Soviet expansion and subversion throughout the Arabian Peninsula. A major clash is going on at the moment with our Saudi Arabian friends. Aden is also being used as a base for the invasion of Muscat and is being used as a base for infiltration from the south of the Gulf as Iraq is used for infiltration of the Gulf from the north.
Yet the Government still talk about withdrawing from the Gulf by 1971. What will they leave behind? There is talk of a federation of Emirates, to become an international personality recognised by the United Nations. So far the talks on federation seem to have broken down. I do not blame the Rulers. It seems to me that the Ruler of Abu Dhabi has made great concessions to his neighbours to reach agreement.
But the problems with which they have to grapple are very difficult. Not least how to organise their Army—a problem which has led to the overthrow of many Middle Eastern Governments. Can we have an assurance from the Government that we would be prepared to second British officers to their forces after we have withdrawn? So far as I know we have not given such an assurance.
One would hope that Persia and Saudi Arabia would support the new federation if it were to come into being; but, like so many in this House—indeed, in the Government—they doubt whether it will come into being, and so they are anxious to stake out their claims. And they have claims, albeit very dubious ones, to Bahrain and to Boraimi. If the Government were to leave the Gulf without establishing a viable political structure, and without securing a settlement of these claims, they will invite chaos—and the chaos will not be a local chaos. Another vacuum will be created, and what reason is there to think that the Soviets will not fill it? Surely, the lessons of Egypt and of Aden should be plain by now?
Fifteen years ago in this House, when Britain was still in control of Egypt—I am not making a party point, because it was a Conservative Government which took this decision—we decided to withdraw from the bases we had in the Canal

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Zone. A few of us opposed that decision and we were derided at the time as old-fashioned imperialists. I hope the House will take a kindlier attitude today to the stand we took then. Our argument was a simple one. It was that, if we left, a vacuum would be created and that, from what we knew of Colonel Nasser and his political affiliations, the vacuum would be filled by the Soviets.
The Soviet presence in the Middle East is now the stock-in-trade of every armchair strategist. The right hon. Gentleman the Minister of Defence has to talk about it all the time at N.A.T.O. The Soviets are entrenched in key positions; but they are not yet in control of the most vital areas of all, Libya and the Persian Gulf. The danger to those areas is acute. There is still time to save the situation, but in the famous words engraved on the sundial, "It is later than you think".
5.42 p.m.
Mr. Patrick Gordon Walker: On the two great issues which have dominated the greater part of this debate I find myself in very close agreement with the Prime Minister in his closely argued speech, which I found extremely convincing. There was, in the speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. George Brown), although I would not, perhaps, express everything in exactly the same way he did, very great force.
On the question of the Pinkville massacre and the related massacres, I would like to make one point, or to ask one question. How did we become aware of it? We became aware of it because of the ruthless exposure of it in the United States. Indeed, the newspapers and the television behaved there in a way which we would not have found tolerable in this country, where our laws of libel and contempt of court, which are designed to give a man a fair trial, would have stopped it.
The only reason we know of this massacre, which, if the accounts of it are only partially true, is appalling, and we would have totally to condemn, is that the United States is a very radical democracy, and has behaved in that way.
I was very glad that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bridlington (Mr. Wood) touched on the question of
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the enlargement of the Common Market. It would be very regrettable if this issue were to be squeezed out of this debate by our concentration on the other two great issues which occupy our minds. This is, in fact, one issue where we can have an effective policy, a policy which will affect opinion one way or the other. If, in fact—I think that here my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper was right—there is a danger of American isolationism, then Europe is of even greater importance to us; indeed, it is all-important for us.
As a result of the summit conference, in spite of the obscurities of parts of the communiqué, I think that we can now at least start from the assumption that negotiations will begin. My own view is that they will begin in 1970 rather than in 1969, but that they will begin now in a new and finite, not a distant, obscure future.
In these new circumstances we have to consider the apparent extent of the swing of public opinion in this country against our entry into the Common Market. I think that it has been greatly exaggerated by the polls. I think that it is impossible for this issue to be put in a poll without loading the questions; and the questions which are asked are loaded. However, in any case, there has been a swing of opinion which could quite easily and quickly be reversed; but there has been some swing, and I myself think that one of the main factors is the fear, especially among many women, of a sharp rise in food prices.
Of course, there is some substance in this fear, though I think that it has been exaggerated, and has been based on a failure to observe two very important considerations. It is forgotten, for instance, that the prices of consumer goods in Europe, in the Common Market countries, are commonly lower than the prices here though the price of food is higher. Women find it hard to work out the distinction between the cost of living and the standard of living. The standard of living has been rising faster in the Common Market than here. Against rises in prices due to the cost of food must be set off the fact that people here would become better off at an even quicker rate.
Much more important, though, than the effect of prices on the cost of living

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would be the effect which they might have on our balance of payments through the high cost of food. It is very difficult now to calculate this, to calculate the effect of membership upon either the cost of living here or the balance of payments. All previous calculations were based on the assumption that agricultural prices in the Common Market were absolutely fixed and certain. That was, indeed, one condition which all members insisted upon whenever our membership was considered, but now, as is clear from the communiqué, there is general agreement, in the Common Market at any rate, that there must be some lowering of food prices so as to get rid of, or at any rate to reduce, the mountains of surplus foods, and also to reduce or mitigate the increasingly intolerable burden they impose on national Budgets.
All we can say at the moment is that no useful calculation of the effect on either the cost of living or the balance of payments can be made till we know more about the level of prices and the arrangements for paying into the pool. We can certainly assume that all previous calculations under this head are greatly exaggerated, and will have to be scaled down.
There is a tendency to overlook items on the other side of this balance of payments equation. There is one in particular. If we joined the Common Market we could expect our agricultural exports to increase. Our agriculture, in many respects, is much more efficient than agriculture in any Common Market country, and we could expect exports of cereals, beef, perhaps mutton, to increase very substantially, and to the extent that that were to happen the effect, of course, on the balance of payments would be offset. None the less, despite these considerations, which are important, joining the Common Market could well have a grave effect on our balance of payments, and it must remain a major British interest to reduce this burden as far as we can during the course of the negotiations.
This could be a stumbling block in the negotiations. The real test of the desire of the members of the Common Market to have us in is the extent to which, in reorganising the price structure of agriculture, they take genuine British
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interests into account alongside their own interests, and how far this happens we shall be able to see in the next six months or year.
In the end, the question of the enlargement of the Common Market will be settled by the balance of interests between the Common Market countries, ourselves and the other candidate nations. There is a very great mutual interest. The Common Market has a great interest in its enlargement by the inclusion of Britain and the other candidates. The exclusion of Britain has been one important factor in the stagnation and disarray of the Common Market. This was expressed very clearly by Herr Brandt, in his speech at the summit meeting, when he said:
"Exerience has shown that putting off the question of enlargement threatens to paralyse the Community."
In other words, the longer our exclusion continues, the worse the danger of paralysis. There is also now general recognition in the Common Market, which is shared by Germany, that the entry of Britain is necessary to create a better political balance within the Common Market to avoid the otherwise certain German over-dominance.
Membership is certainly greatly in our interest. The economic disadvantages, for the reasons I have given, will now be less than seemed likely two years ago. The economic advantages remain very great —access to a large market for manufactured goods and much greater scope for invisible earnings by the City of London. The paramount consideration remains as always, the political one. Only in the Common Market can we come close to a centre of power in which we can play an important part, and one which, in spite of what the right hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery) said, is consonant with our now natural rôle in the world as a Power that does not have interests in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere.
When negotiations start, we must not be a suppliant nation. We certainly need not be a suppliant nation. The Common Market is aware now that it suffers from our exclusion. Even more important, the negotiations, from their very nature, must be and will be balanced and even. The enlargement from six to 10 will not affect the treaties and instruments on which the

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Common Market rests, but must alter its nature, as was recognised by Dr. Mansholt in a striking passage of a speech which he made recently in London. He said that when the Common Market is enlarged to 10, not only Britain but also the six existing members will be entering a new Community.
None of the 10, and that means none of the Six, will be able to see ahead with complete clarity the effect of this enlargement upon itself and its own interests, and each of the 10, and not only Britain, will have to take certain important matters on trust, relying on the good sense and the solidarity of the other members. There will, therefore, be much scope for proper give and take and for mutual confidence. What we can look forward to when the negotiations start and continue is not so much hard-headed horse-trading, but rather an exercise in co-operation in which all the 10 members will be equally involved and equally interdependent.
5.55 p.m.
Mr. Douglas Dodds-Parker: I had thought that the debate would be primarily on Vietnam today and on Biafra tomorrow, but it is tending to go rather wide. I will try to resist the temptation to widen it, but I would first like to comment on what has already been said.
I agree with almost everything which the right hon. Member for Leyton (Mr. Gordon Walker) said, particularly what he said about agriculture in this country. I do not think this is sufficiently stressed when we consider association with Europe. I disagree with him on the part that Britain within Europe has to play in the outside world. Many of us have believed for some years that the N.A.T.O. area cannot he defended just in the N.A.T.O. area but must be defended outside. President Nixon said this when he came to Europe at the beginning of this year. The implication of his words was that the more we did to defend the free world outside the N.A.T.O. area the more the United States would do to defend it within the N.A.T.O. area.
In support of that, I ask the right hon. Gentleman to look at the series of reports coming out of the Western European Assembly, very often under the name of that great Social Democrat Franz Goedhart, who is known and respected by many hon.
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Members, advocating that Western Europe, Greece and Turkey should take a greater interest, for instance, in the affairs of the Mediterranean and the Middle East, from whence come the oil supplies of virtually the whole free world.
I am sorry that my right hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery) has left, because he mentioned Libya and King Idris. In the dark days of the summer of 1940 I was sent by General Wavell to see him to ask him where he would like to go if Egypt were over run. Things were not as dark as we thought, and he did not need to leave Egypt, but for 30 years he and his family and colleagues have been great supporters of friendship with this country. It is not out of place for my right hon. Friend and myself, and any others who wish to do so, to salute what he did to sustain friendship with this country.
Now that Libya has vast oil revenues, one wishes success to the successor Government and hopes that they will find in that source of wealth something that will set them on the way to prosperity. They have before them the example of other oil states in the Arabian Gulf.
I am surprised and gratified at how much interest is aroused at the position of Herr Hess. I asked the right hon. Gentleman last Monday whether he would approach the other three Powers to see whether Herr Hess could be let out to spend Christmas with his family, but the reply did not answer my question. I ask him to look at this again to see whether an exception could be made to enable Herr Hess to spend Christmas with his family.
I neither heard the broadcast nor had a copy of what the right hon. Gentleman said in his broadcast about Vietnam. I had great pleasure in hearing what he said today, and I am in general agreement with him. I hope that what he said will be reported on the other side of the Atlantic. When the hon. Member for Hammersmith, North (Mr. Tomney) and I were in the United States recently astonishment was shown that anybody else was supporting the stand made by the United States for small nations in various parts of the world. It is a pity that attacks on the United States are highlighted in the Press and elsewhere, whereas only seldom are friendly remarks

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made in this House reported there. Of course, none of us condones what is alleged to have happened at "Pinkville", but we have yet to hear the truth of this.
The right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. George Brown) put in perspective what has happened in the last few years in South-East Asia. I want to go wider than that and point out certain factors which, we hope, will encourage the Foreign Secretary and his colleagues not to make the same mistakes again in the 10 months during which they will remain on the benches opposite. Looking back to 1945, there have been 40 or so wars, none of them official. Practically all have been civil wars, the worst of all, fought in guerrilla conditions without any Geneva Rules. One of the factors in South-East Asia has been the emergence of armies of women and the very young, going around throwing grenades. Because of their uniforms it is difficult on occasions for the combatants to be identified as either men or women.
Since 1945, whether we like it or not, our country has been heavily involved in the Far East. I have always been in favour of the transfer of power, but time and again we have warned from these benches that this should not be over-rapid. I do not like the word "vacuum ", it has a certain arrogance about it. When power is transferred, we should be more careful to give help to the successor government to enable it to establish itself and to establish stability in its affairs. It always takes time in any country. Britain has contributed greatly to the instability of the area sometimes called East of Suez by the over-rapid withdrawal, going back to the day of India and Palestine, nearly 25 years ago, by pulling out too rapidly. We weakened our moral position and left greater problems than we had saved ourselves by lightening our burdens too soon.
The Commonwealth rallied round afterwards in Korea the United Kingdom took on Malaya and Vietnam in 1954. Sir Anthony Eden's greatest negotiating achievement and contribution to the peace and freedom of that area resulted from the negotiations at that time. If the United States had put in a bit more help then—we were not in a position to do more; we were committed in Malaya—
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we might have saved some of the subsequent difficulties. In the 1960s we had Malaysian confrontation, and India, Tibet, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Burma—all situations which have been and still are potential Vietnams, where the local people wish to live in peace—[Interruption.]—but are threatened from outside.
If I may interrupt hon. Members opposite, they are the ones who always seem to be against what this country is doing, whoever is sitting on the Government Front Bench; to maintain stability m these countries and give the successor governments a chance to run their own affairs in their own ways. It is one of the disturbing things that we have found in the House in the last 25 years, that they doubt the willingness or good will, even of their own side, to try to do the best thing for the people, and seem unwilling to look at the other side of the coin, the women and the children, the million refugees from North Vietnam who came into South Vietnam. The whole of this area is very much at risk in the 1970s.
The United Kingdom political situation, as I understand it, was that when five years ago the Prime Minister went to Washington he reached agreement about certain support for sterling, and in return agreed to buy United States aircraft and abandon the TSR2. This was a very great disaster for British technology. The jigs of this aeroplane were destroyed something which has never been done before when an aircraft has been can celled. Perhaps hon. Members opposite below the Gangway will cheer that action by the Government. The Prime Minister also agreed, we understand, to support the United States over Vietnam. I am delighted about that.
Mr. Winnick: I am sure the hon Gentleman is.
Mr. Dodds-Parker: The hon. Gentleman says that he is sure that I am delighted. I do not mind standing up for the Alliance. But for that he would not be sitting in this Chamber, in freedom, able to talk as he does. He will not be sitting here much longer but when the time comes he may think back—
Mr. Stanley Orme: Do not be so arrogant.
Mr. Dodds-Parker: —and remember that the Americans are the people to whom he owes more than he is prepared to admit in this Chamber.
I support what my right hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Pavilion said about the situation east of Suez. I am the last person to want to keep out dated bases I want to see power transferred with stability. It was quite clear from what we have said in this House for the previous two or three years that the way in which power was transferred in Aden would not give the people who took over the chance to maintain their independence. All the information, such as it is—because the Press has difficulty in getting there and finding out—tells us hat this is a new Soviet base, being prepared for the day, if it comes, when he Canal is opened and the Soviets can operate more freely in the Indian Ocean, into the Seychelles, Mauritius and other island groups, as well as getting round to the Gulf, from whence come the oil supplies of the free world.
There is still time to save this. The right hon. Member for Belper mentioned Mr. Lee. With the willing support and co-operation of such people, we will have time co save something in this area, and many of the people there wish us to make the effort. What is happening in Vietnam is being watched by the whole free world—still free, that is—east of Suez, to see whether the United States, and the British behind them, will be prepared to support small nations against the threat from the North. I sometimes wonder at the damage done to the morale of those who believe that we are prepared to help them, not only when they are dependent but as and when they become independent: and then they see us running out of all our commitments overseas, under this Administration.
One of today's problems is that it is very difficult to find out what is happening because, once we have abandoned these places, as we did Aden, few in the Press are able to report as freely as they once did. They may visit sometimes, but it is often a once-only report. As the right hon. Gentleman said, one of the tragedies and difficulties of the present situation in Vietnam is that while representatives of the mass media accompany the forces on our side, this is not equalled on the other side. We do not have records of the Vietcong atrocities which we know
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are being carried on, to the most appalling extent, deliberately encouraged from Hanoi.
We see "Pinkville" being held up as if it had been proven in court. It is a terrible accusation, and no one wants to diminish that. A great deal of publicity has been given to it while the whole matter should be regarded as sub judice. The events in Tibet, Laos, Cambodia, even Czechoslovakia and Hungary are practically forgotten—a year after the occupation of Czechoslovakia. When the history of the last few years comes to be written it will record the great damage that has been done to the morale of the free world by this sort of publicity, so often slanted against the forces in the free world.
Mr. Newens: Is the hon. Member against publicity being given to events and atrocities of this sort? Is he for covering them up?
Mr. Dodds-Parker: If the hon. Member had been listening to what I was saying, instead of talking, he would have heard me say that the whole of this campaign is one sided, and slanted against the forces of the free world who, in the opinion of millions of people in South-East Asia and elsewhere, are fighting for the rights of the smaller nations. If he will not take that from me, he should remember what his right hon. Friend the Member for Belper said—though that, too, may be unacceptable to him, as for 25 years sensible speeches like it have been unacceptable to hon. Members opposite below the Gangway.
I have no time now to report on what the hon. Member for Hammersmith, North and I found when we visited the United Nations. I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary and to my own Front Bench for selecting me to go there. I had not studied the situation there in depth for some 14 years. The political chaos is as great as ever, but after spending a little time in this place one gets used to that. Both politicians and diplomats rub each other's edges off and I found an even more friendly atmosphere than was noticeable before.
I am sure that my hon. Friend the Member for Hammersmith, North, who led us so splendidly, will agree with me when I say that a most tremendous job

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is being done by the specialist agencies, and by individuals like Paul Hoffman, Harry Labouisse and Mr. Robert McNamara, now of the World Bank. But the better they do the job, the more there is to be done because of the population explosion. It is a pity that we in this House do not have more time to discuss these great issues which will order the world until the end of the century. These great problems cannot be solved except in a context of freedom, self-determination and peace, which are the words used by the Prime Minister this afternoon.
I therefore end as I started by saluting the generosity of the United States. I commiserate with them in their present difficulties. We have had our difficulties in the past and have seen them through, and I am certain that the nerve of the American people is strong. I pray that it will so remain, not only for the sake of all of us in this country but for the sake of the small nations wanting to be free and live in peace.
6.13 p.m.
Mr. Richard Marsh: My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister this afternoon expressed the hope that it would be recognised that there were sincere and very big differences of opinion on both sides on the major issues with which we are dealing, and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bridlington (Mr. Wood) said much the same thing. With the greatest respect to the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Mr. Dodds-Parker), he is the first Member in this debate who has impugned anyone's motives.
Vietnam is a big issue on which there are many different views, and on which there are no conventional divisions into traditional groups either here or in the United States. On this occasion I find myself with somewhat unusual and strange bedfellows. My right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. George Brown), in a very typical and trenchant speech, attracted some support from the benches opposite which he does not always find available when he most wants it, and he probably did not particularly want it today.
To me, this issue is not between those who are pro-American and those who are anti-American. It is not an issue
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between the Left and the Right, however those terms are defined. I am in no way anti-American. I believe that the world has been saved from war on more than one occasion by the actions of the United States. Successive American Administrations have shown a fierce and genuine desire to use their massive power and wealth to make the world a better place.
During 26 years of politics I have been accused of many things, but I have never been accused of being a Communist sympathiser. Many of us on this side have perhaps had a rather closer battle with Communists than have some right hon. and hon. Members opposite. I have never found myself in other than active opposition to everything for which the Communist Party stands. It has never been a difficult choice. The treatment of Yugoslavia, Hungary and Czechoslavakia, the repression in East Germany, the long list of Communist political show trials over the last 40 years, leave me in no doubt of what I think worth fighting for in democratic politics.
That is the point of the debate. We face a big issue when we discuss Vietnam, because I believe that the war there has reached a stage when it is destroying the very principles and values in which we all believe. My reply to my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper is that it is a mistake to believe that we can defend freedom by destroying every decent civilised principle. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister raised the basic issue, and I agree with him, when he said that the question is whether what is alleged was an isolated atrocity or whether atrocity is endemic in this war.
That is the basic issue. The mistake my right hon. Friend made, if I may say so, was to relate this question to the recent allegations that have been made, because, strange as it may seem, those alleged atrocities—and I accept that they have not been proven, and I have no doubt that atrocities occur on both sides, if anyone should seek to say anything about what has happened on the other side—now being considered in the United States of America, are, at the same time, irrelevant and crucial to the argument.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Belper, in a broadcast which I heard, said that modern war is a bloody and

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brutalising experience, and that atrocities and the killing of women and children are inescapable in modern war. He was right. Ordinary decent men change rapidly when their friends are killed and maimed about them, and when they themselves fear for their lives. I have no doubt that many hon. and right hon. Gentlemen who have sat in this House must have nursed uneasy consciences about some of their own wartime decisions and actions. It is inevitable in any war.
Individual atrocities cannot be excused, but individual atrocities can be understood. But the war in Vietnam is the world's concern and not only that of the Unites. States; not because atrocities happen on both sides, not because in this case they are allegedly spectacular, but because the conscious escalation of atrocity in Vietnam is now the only way in which that war can be fought. After a continuous and growing attack by world Powers for a quarter of a century, a solution in Vietnam is as far away as ever.
With varying degrees of enthusiasm and of terrorism, the Vietcong is supported by much of the civilian population over very large areas of the countryside. In such a situation, nice, tidy distinctions between guerillas and the civilian population are just not possible. In such a war, the use of herbicides to eliminate cover and kill crops is inevitable. When that happens it just is not possible to starve the Vietcong while keeping women and children in the same areas alive and healthy. If there is no battle line there is no alternative, in the conditions in Vietnam, to the near indiscriminate bombing and shooting of civilians and soldiers alike. If, in the conditions in Vietnam, one supports the slogan "Search and destroy "with an infinite range of weapons, the margin of error is almost unlimited.
Recognising the special nature of this war the question then is: can we support it? Should we support it? No one expects a war to be pleasant or acceptable in the drawing room. I think that for some years Her Majesty's Government's attitude was coloured by the hope that we might be able to act as an honest broker. I accept that the crucial thing was to pay almost any price if one could provide a solution to this particular war.
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Loyalty to United States' policy was essential to that rôle if it were to have any chance of success. I do not accept for one moment the suggestion by the hon. Member for Cheltenham that any deal was done in exchange for American support for sterling, that in return we gave support for American policy in Vietnam.
The reason that Government support was offered to the Americans in Vietnam was that without the offer of that support any marginal hope of playing a rôle in the solution of this conflict was just "not on". My right hon. Friend and others tried sincerely and repeatedly to achieve some sort of settlement to assist in some way. My right hon. Friend the Member for Belper and others have said that there was at least one occasion when, despite the laughs and jeers which some of us remember and the reception by hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite of some of the more spectacular desperate attempts to achieve some sort of solution, we might have succeeded. It is not a criticism to say that we did not succeed. It is not a criticism to say that that possibility and that contribution is no longer open to us.
If we can no longer stand a chance of operating as honest broker, and no longer see the possibility of bringing the two sides together, we have to think very clearly about our particular stance because the one thing that this Government, no Government in the world, can say is that we oppose the uncivilised parts of this particular war. This is a war which cannot be fought on the normal rules of war by either side. The only justification for support would be if we could show that the ends justify the means, an unfashionable comment, and if those ends could, in fact, be achieved.
What objectives are we seeking to achieve? It is hardly the welfare of the Vietnamese people. There may be many arguments, but I do not think that anyone would suggest that this war arises out of a particular concern for the people in Vietnam itself. It can be argued that it is part of a much wider, global strategy, but certainly not for the welfare of the Vietnamese as such. I do not believe that the average Vietnamese peasant—and I have known few—cares a damn which side wins the war. The

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right hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery) implied that a quiet life and enough to eat are usually the only politics of peasants in underdeveloped areas.
Mr. John Biggs-Davison: Does the right hon. Gentleman not think that the million peasants, or mostly peasants, who fled from the north to the south care very much who wins this war?
Mr. Marsh: I think that the situation in North Vietnam is as intolerable as it is in South Vietnam at present. People are trying to find an area where they can be secure. I am surprised if this is not accepted. It may be suggested that this war has much wider, bigger strategic implications—the defence of freedom, someone said—but I do not believe that it can be argued that foreign troops have been in Vietnam for 25 years to protect the Vietnamese as such.
This is a point of view with which others may disagree. It may be argued that it is designed for the preservation of democracy and good government. I can think of many causes for which I would fight, but the present Government of Saigon is not one of them. The Prime Minister came very close to this, and said virtually the same.
Is it a fight to contain Communism? That is a point which, I believe, is made by a number of hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite. In the 'forties Communism had a simple meaning. Today, in different parts of the world Communism has a different meaning. Communism in Yougoslavia bears no resemblance to that in China and Czech Communism was totally intolerable to the Soviet Union. The extent to which Hanoi has sought to remain independent of physical involvement with Chinese or Soviet Union troops at least presents a possibility that the fight is based more on nationalism and anti-colonialism than global Communism in the cold war sense.
What conclusions are to be drawn from this? I do not believe that the South Vietnamese Government as now constituted can survive on their own territory by their own efforts, nor do I believe that they will ever be able to do so. At some stage—may be one year, three years
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or five years' hence—the United States will withdraw from Vietnam as sure as night follows day. It is important, therefore, that they shall not leave behind the kind of total chaos which none of us wants to see. Thirdly, I think that any Government, given the reality of the situation, must be a Left-of-centre Government if they are to have any hope of survival. I believe that the only realistic solution is for the United States to negotiate a new coalition Government in Saigon simultaneously with planned withdrawal Such a coalition would presuppose the release and involvement of many non-Communist opponents of the present régime who are at present in detention. It pre-supposes the replacement of the present Government in Saigon.
The United States should negotiate such a coalition because it seems dangerously naïve to talk of free elections in present-day Vietnam as if we were talking of municipal elections in a London borough. The situation is not such as lends itself to that sort of approach. I accept that it carries a major calculated risk, but I cannot see any realistic alternative which would not carry an even bigger and more fundamental risk to the very things we all started out to safeguard and to support.
It may possibly be said to my right hon. Friend when he is in Washington that this is none of our business and that we should join what the Vice-President calls, and what this morning's Daily Telegraph called, "the silent majority". On the first point, there can be no neutrality on an issue on this size. The British Government have to take a view one way or the other. Precisely because the United States is an ally, it is very much our business as well as theirs.
On the second point, there was, of course, a silent majority in Germany in the 'thirties. Their silence made possible the threat to every civilised value, and the world paid a very high price precisely because they remained silent for too long. I do not think that it can be described as disloyal or anti-American on our part to seek to avoid making the same mistake.
6.28 p.m.
Mr. Russell Johnston: I very much enjoyed the speech of the right hon. Member for Greenwich (Mr. Marsh)

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and I largely agree with almost everything he said. I do not, however, intend to follow him, because although it has been generally agreed that the debate today will be principally concerned with Vietnam and tomorrow with Biafra and Nigeria, I want to look at some of the general issues of foreign policy and, in particular, the question of Europe.
First, I want to ask a number of general questions about the broad objectives of foreign policy pursued by this country. The Prime Minister spoke of the search for acceptable, categorical imperatives and went on to emphasise the dilemma—this was taken up by successive speakers—as between ends and means in Nigeria and in Vietnam. These dilemmas exist even for the fairest and most reasonable among us, but there are a great many among us who are not all that fair and reasonable. Those two words show supremely the heinous consequences of war, but they highlight inconsistencies which have equally demonstrated themselves in other areas.
Precisely what are we seeking to do in our foreign policy? In large part, British foreign policy is concerned with safeguarding British commercial interests and promoting the stability in which alone these interests can properly flourish. There was a good example of that this afternoon when we were discussing Libya. The Minister said, in the way that Ministers have, that he hoped that our relations with the new Government would be friendly and amicable, and so on. Yet, just like the previous Libyan Government, the new one are not democratically based. As was pointed out by the right hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery), there may well be many people imprisoned there.
Secondly, in large part in theory, our policy is designed to advance the cause of democracy. There are a great many nations in the world—sadly, the number is increasing each year; the Argentine and Somalia are but the two most recent—whose form of government is based upon principles which we abhor.
What should we try to do about them? First, as a democratic country we should not differentiate in our attitudes and reactions between injustices perpetuated by autocracies of the Left and those perpetuated by autocracies of the Right. I
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agree with what the right hon. Members for Belper (Mr. George Brown) and Greenwich said, though I think that the right hon. Member for Greenwich was over-reasonable.
As a Member who has not played a very notable part in foreign affairs debates in the past, but who has often sat in and listened to them and who has often listened to Questions on foreign affairs, I have noted the very marked difference between the reactions of the two sides of the House—for example, when repressive actions take place in Spain, Portugal or Greece, there is a strong reaction on the Labour benches and a relatively muted one on this side; if there are repressive reactions behind the Iron Curtain, there is a strong reaction on this side and a relatively muted one on the Labour benches—[Interruption.]
Mr. Orme Mr. Orme rose—
Mr. Speaker: Order. There is no need for such a strong reaction now.
Mr. Heffer: The hon. Gentleman must be aware that the so-called Left wing on this side was unanimous in its condemnation of what happened in Czechoslovakia and has consistently fought the policies of the Communists in their repression; because, for the hon. Gentleman's understanding, it is usually Social Democrats like ourselves who are the first victims of Communist repression.
Mr. Russell Johnson: I did not mention Czechoslovakia and Hungary—[Interruption.] If the hon. Gentleman would be kind enough to stand if he wishes to interrupt, I will certainly give way, but I shall deal with that question later. Rude interruptions serve no purpose.
It remains broadly true that the Left-wing of the Labour Party does not take the lead in attacking the repressions of Left-wing autocracies and that the Right-wing of the Conservative Party does not take the lead in attacking the repressions of Right-wing dictatorships. I believe that both are to be equally condemned. People who seek to make distinctions or to exercise selective discrimination can only do harm to this country's policy of seeking to exercise an influence for peace and harmony throughout the world.
I come now to the question about which the hon. Member for Liverpool,

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Walton (Mr. Heffer) was concerned. People who, rightly, condemn the continuance, without any indication of the moment of relief, of dictatorship in Greece, will at the same time urge closer relations with the German Democratic Republic, a régime which builds a wall to keep people in and which shoots them if they attempt to get out. The inconsistency between the two attitudes damages the logic of both positions.
The Prime Minister began his speech by referring to Greece. As perhaps the House as a whole remembers—some hon. Members clearly do—the hon. Members for Sunderland, South (Mr. Bagier), Gatehsead, East (Mr. Conlan), and Colchester (Mr. Buck) and the late Mr. David Webster and I went twice to Greece last year at the invitation of its current Government. We were much criticised for going there.
I would go anywhere, from Cuba to China, from Haiti to Bulgaria. It would be a sad day if it were ever assumed that Members of Parliament who visited a foreign country were in some way associated with what happened in that country. It was wrong for people to criticise us for going. [An HON. MEMBER: "Spain."] I have never been to Spain for my holidays.
On our visit to Greece we received various assurances from a Government who we recognised were a dictatorship. We said they were a dictatorship. We said—we were greatly criticised for it—that it was not at that time as severe a dictatorship as had existed elsewhere. Nothing has since happened.
The Government are clearly correct in saying that the Council of Europe, as an association of democratic peoples, cannot any longer have Greece within its membership, unless there is a very clear indication of a timetable for a return to democratic government. Nevertheless, the question which must be asked here, as in relation to other dictatorships, is: what does one then do? Pakistan, a member of the Commonwealth, is ruled by a military Government. There was a military Government in Ghana. Admittedly, neither of these Governments has been particularly oppressive. [Interruption.] I am not referring to the Nkrumah Government. I am referring to the more recent
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military one. Ghana did return to democracy.
What is to be done about Greece now? The question must also be asked in very general terms. The right hon. Member for Leyton (Mr. Gordon Walker) rightly pointed out that, unfortunately, the influence that Britain can exert is very limited outside Europe. We greatly condemn things, but we would not contemplate any of the excessive things that can be done to purge bad régimes. We would not contemplate war in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, South Africa or Rhodesia. Yet all of these régimes, in their way, are reprehensible.
Therefore, what is to be done? In the end, I think, rightly or wrongly, channels should be kept open and communications maintained. There is nothing wrong with doing that, provided that we are clear in our attitude and provided that our attitude is communicated.
Mr. Eldon Griffiths: I am interested in the hon. Gentleman's point, which is a very good one, that it is important to maintain communications with oppressive régimes. Does this apply in Rhodesia and South Africa?
Mr. Russell Johnston: Rhodesia is a special case, because it is not an independent country. It is a colony of Britain which has not become independent. I do not think that my argument can apply there. Contact must be retained with South Africa.
Mr. Eldon Griffiths: Including the Springboks?
Mr. Russell Johnston: I did not say that, either.
I have no particular objection to people playing rugby, but I think that the M.C.C. clearly would be wrong to invite the South African team over in view of the fact that they refused to accept a coloured player in our team.
I want to make two or three remarks about Europe, which is again the main preoccupation of British people who, in opinion polls, seem especially suspicious of the enterprise. I wonder how it is that 45 per cent. of the British public, as reported in the Daily Telegraph poll, are now opposed to what is the official policy of the three main parties.
Mr. Neil Marten: With respect, may I point out that according to the November National Opinion Poll 59 per cent. disapprove, and, in the case of the Liberal Party, 69 per cent. disapprove?
Mr. Russell Johnston: That greatly reinforces what I am saying. It is an exceedingly odd situation when the vast majority of the population oppose the official policies of the three main parties. Are the majority of the British people saying that the main parties are hell-bent on driving Britain into a situation which would damage her economically and politically? This would be a peculiar thing to say.
I believe that the future of Britain lies in Europe. This does not mean that I would accept any conditions to achieve entry. It means that I believe that the advantages, and the disadvantages, of not going in are such that they will clearly result in an acceptable agreement being reached. The agricultural negotiations, which are still the most thorny ones, are vital. There may well be an argument for saying that Britain should probe the possibility of participation in preliminary discussions if only as an observer, because at the end of the day the 1947 Agriculture Act, on which our agricultural policy is based, and the 1957 Treaty of Rome have the same objectives of ensuring that the farmers are safeguarded, that the subsidy bill is not too large and that excessive surpluses do not build up.
Next, I think that we have got to start thinking about sovereignty and how it can be gradually fused, at the same time ensuring democratic accountability. This means the acceptance of ideas based on weighted voting within the Community. Opponents of the Common Market are always talking about our affairs being dictated from Brussels, Paris, or Rome. This is a very unfair way of projecting the Community.
Finally, linked to the question of sovereignty is the problem of trying to co-ordinate our foreign policies in Europe. On Biafra and the Middle East there is fundamental disagreement between the main partners in the E.E.C., and, equally, on the question of the co-ordination of our defence requirements a great deal of action has got to be taken. There are arguments for pur-
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suing parallel negotiations in respect of entry. To come together is always a difficult exercise, while fighting and arguing are easy. The challenge of unity in Europe is a difficult one, but it is one that we must meet.
6.43 p.m.
Sir Dingle Foot: I should like to take up one reference in the speech that we have just heard. The hon. Member for Inverness (Mr. Russell Johnston) referred to Ghana, a country which I happen to know well. We ought to acknowledge what has happened in Ghana. That country went through a period of repression and brutal dictatorship; let us make no mistake about that. Then there was a military coup and many people thought that the soldiers would continue to rule for an indefinite period. They have not done so. Ghana has just introduced a new democratic constitution. It has restored both representative government and civil liberties, and that is something which we ought to acknowledge in this House.
Before coming to the particular topic about which I want to ask one or two questions—the Middle East—I should like to say a word about Vietnam. I know that some of my hon. Friends will not agree with me here. Of course, we are all sickened and horrified by the reports of the massacre of defenceless villagers. That feeling is not confined to this country. It is shared, and I think equally shared, by the people of the United States. But we ought not on this account to join in a sort of blanket condemnation of everything that the United States has done or is now seeking to do in South-East Asia.
I believe that the Americans have made very serious errors in the political and military spheres. I do not think that a jungle war can be won mainly from the air. But because of the incessant attacks which are made in this country on American policy—attacks in which, I may say, I have always refused to join—many people are wholly misled about the American record in Vietnam. They suppose that the Americans were the aggressors and that the responsibility for continuing the war throughout the years has rested solely with Washington. That is entirely untrue. The war began from the North. It was continued from the North, and every attempt

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at mediation, whether it was made by the Commonwealth or by the independent countries which belonged to neither bloc, was accepted by Washington and turned down by Hanoi.
When we come to the subject of atrocities, there could be no greater atrocity than that at Hue. If reports are to be believed, not only were people shot but many of the victims, with their hands tied behind their backs, were buried alive. That in no way excuses the shooting of Vietnamese villagers by American soldiers. But there is this difference. What happened at "Pinkville" has been the subject of nationwide publicity and indignation in the United States. A Congressional inquiry is taking place to determine whether the allegations are justified. It may be that a trial or trials for murder will follow. There is no Press outcry against Hue or any other Vietcong atrocity in Hanoi. There has been no investigation. There will never be any trial for murder. That, it seems to me, is a vital distinction and one which we ought constantly to draw when we are considering these matters.
After all, that was the distinction which was drawn at Nuremberg and in the war crimes trials which followed. During the late war there were some excesses on both sides, but the question was where the responsibility lay. Of course, I am not trying to palliate for a moment what happened at "Pinkville", but there is all the difference between acts of individual savagery and atrocities which are the result of deliberate policy by the Government or movement concerned.
I want to deal shortly with the position in the Middle East, and I wish to raise with my hon. Friend the Joint Under-Secretary of State a matter which I raised with him at Question Time today. I refer to the project to drill for oil in the occupied territory of Sinai, Egyptian territory temporarily occupied by the Israelis. That project is being undertaken for Israel by an American investment group through an English-based affiliated company. I intended to refer to the company and its directors, but my hon. Friend informed me today that legal proceedings were in contemplation, so I will not mention any particular names.
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It must be obvious that activities of this kind have the most serious implications. We are dealing here with the commercial exploitation of occupied territory. When ventures of this sort, which must take years to develop, are undertaken in such circumstances, it must inevitably lead to the inference that Israel has no intention of complying with the United Nations resolution and withdrawing from the territories which were overrun in June, 1967. Therefore, I hope that the Government's attitude towards ventures of this kind will be made abundantly clear.
My second point has already been raised on one or two occasions in the House, but I do not think that any adequate answer has yet been given. The United Nations resolution of 22nd November, 1967, laid down certain principles. The first principle was
'the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict."
It was, I think, universally assumed at the time that that meant all territories. Indeed, my information is that representatives of the United Arab Republic sought reassurance of that point from the American representative in Cairo and from our own representative at the United Nations, and they were fully reassured.
It certainly appeared that that was what was meant in the speech in the debate on the Address by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary:
"I have stressed strongly that one part of any useful guidance to Dr. Jarring must be the doctrine of a just and lasting peace. Another part must be secure and recognised borders between Israel and her neighbours. Third—and this will be more welcomed on one side than on the other—there must be no doubt at all about the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the territories of her neighbours. It is on this point that the Arab countries have professed profound misgivings as to Israeli intentions."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 30th October, 1969; Vol. 790, c. 365.]
That was what my right hon. Friend said, and the meaning appeared clear enough on 30th October. Since then, the matter has been open to considerable doubt. On 17th November, the noble Lord the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Viscount Lambton) asked my right hon. Friend:
"What is the British interpretation of the wording of the 1967 resolution? Does the right hon. Gentleman understand it to mean that the

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Israelis should withdraw from all territory taken in the late war?"
My right hon. Friend replied:
"No, Sir. That is not the phrase used in the resolution. The resolution speaks of secure and recognised boundaries. Those words must be read concurrently with the statement on withdrawal."—[OFFICIAL, REPORT, 17th November, 1969; Vol. 791, c. 844–5.]
Having spent a considerable part of my life dealing with the construction of documents, I can only say that that seems to be a very strange construction. But, in any case, it is difficult to reconcile that reply with the statement which my right hon. Friend had made in the debate on the Address.
When the matter was raised with the Prime Minister on 27th November, in a long passage with which I shall not trouble the House, my right hon. Friend cast no further light—I say that with great respect—but talked simply about a package deal.
We ought to be clear, especially now that four-Power talks are starting up again, what the attitude of Her Majesty's Government is and what interpretation they place upon the resolution of 22nd November 1967. After all, it was a British resolution; it was framed by our representatives at the United Nations.
Mr. Heffer: Does not my right hon. and learned Friend agree that one part of the policy which the British Government should pursue is that they should get the Arab countries to agree that Israel should be accepted as an independent State, and that has not yet been accepted by any Arab country?
Sir Dingle Foot: Certainly, that is part of the resolution, and, if the resolution is to be carried out, as I hope—though I am not sanguine that it will be—there would have to be that recognition. What I say in answer to my hon. Friend is that the Israelis could have had this recognition two years ago. [An HON. MEMBER: "Nonsense."] I was told that myself when I went to see President Nasser in the autumn of 1967. He made it abundantly clear. He offered then that he would have talks with the Israelis provided that there could be an impartial United Nations chairman. That was turned down with contempt in Tel Aviv. Throughout this period, at every stage we had been up against Israeli intransigence.
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I am speaking now of an assurance regarding all the territories. It may be that some readjustment might take place in the boundaries between Israel and Jordan—that is a separate question—but on the question of the occupied Egyptian territories, that is, Sinai, one is dealing with wholly different considerations. It is not a question of drawing a frontier; it is simply a question of territories which were occupied in the war. May we, therefore, have further elucidation on that matter and what was intended to be meant by the resolution of 1967?
I refer now to only one other matter —I think that it has been mentioned only once so far in the debate, and by an hon. Member opposite—namely, the position in the Persian Gulf. I was one somewhat lonely figure at the time who opposed the withdrawal from east of Suez. Since then, various attempts have been made by the Sheiks of the Persian Gulf to enter into a federation. It is entirely in our interests that that federation should come into existence and that it should be effective and able to defend itself. Even though we may withdraw by the end of 1971—I think that circumstances will force us to reconsider that decision—we shall, nevertheless, still have vital interests in that part of the world, and not only our own interests but the interests of all the free world which draws so much of its oil supplies from the Gulf.
Even if we do not have troops stationed there as they are now, the Sheiks, if they have formed their federation or even if they have not, will still need considerable technical assistance. My right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. George Brown) referred to Mr. Harry Lee Kuan Yew. I have on more than one occasion discussed with Mr. Lee Kuan Yew the problems caused by our proposed withdrawal from Singapore. He said, "I can make up for a great many things. I can provide my own pilots for air defence, which is vital to Singapore, and I can provide my own aircrews. But there are certain technical staff in the operations rooms whom I cannot replace under about two years". He insisted that we continue to render that form of technical assistance. It may be equally important that we render technical military assistance in the Gulf even after the end of 1971.

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I do not expect the Ministerial reply to the debate to deal with that point in detail, but it is a question on which an assurance is needed, and urgently needed in the countries concerned.
6.58 p.m.
Mr. Neil Marten: I hope that the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Ipswich (Sir Dingle Foot) will forgive me if I do not follow him on the Middle East, a subject near to my heart, but I prefer to follow the hon. Member for Inverness (Mr. Russell Johnston)—whose hon. Friends, I see, have just departed as I rose.
I wish to bring the subject of my short speech home to a matter of concern to, I think, a wider group of British people than are at the moment concerned about Vietnam, though I recognise the importance of that. I refer to the Common Market. As the hon. Member for Inverness said, and as I emphasised in my intervention during his speech with reference to the National Opinion Poll figures, the British people's view about joining the Common Market reveals a curious situation. As I said, 59 per cent. of the British people disapprove—that is the word used by the poll—of joining the Common Market and only 26 per cent. are in favour. In the Conservative Party, 66 per cent. disapprove, while a mere 23 per cent. seem to approve. I therefore thought, as the next debate on foreign affairs is not likely to be until March next year, that it would be right, in this formative period, when the Government who are so keen on going in are making up their minds, that I should be allowed to say one or two things.
First, I want to correct the impression, which may be gained from the newspapers, that I am anti-Common Market. It is absolutely untrue. I am against Britain joining, which is very different: the Common Market can get on with its own affairs.
In the limited euphoria which the outcome of The Hague Conference seems to have generated, the advice from our wise men is that we should wait and see what the outcome is of the negotiations, certainly on the economic side, before we can make a judgment. That is a very fair attitude, because we shall not know what the agricultural terms or the tran-
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sitional arrangements are. We cannot really make a final judgment on what the balance of payments deficit will be until we know the outcome of those negotiations. Having agreed with that, there are two matters which are quite outside that economic disadvantage and which we can talk about regardless of the outcome of the negotiations.
The first is the political question. I raised this at Question Time and got what I thought was a rather abrupt answer from the right hon. Gentleman who answered and I propose to write to him about it and get a correction, because I think that what he said was wrong. I can understand those who say that they want to be a part of Europe and want Britain to be a part of Europe, that they are Europeans and they want one big happy family in a country called Europe. I understand that: it is honest and straightforward. But what I cannot abide is those people who fudge the issue.
Those of us who study the Common Market and keep it under fairly constant review, as I and a number of my right hon. and hon. Friends do, know that, whatever we are told by our political leaders, in the long run the way that the Common Market hopes to develop is as a Federal Europe, a united states of Europe, a country called Europe, with an elected Parliament which will have budgetary control—they are after that already—and with a President of Europe; and if we go in, Britain will, of course, be a State or a province in the country called Europe.
But there are some who try to lull us into a false sense of security—some of our political leaders, who say, "Do not worry. This will not be for a long time. It will merely evolve. We are not blue-printers. It has not happened yet, so why should it happen in future?" That is fudging the issue by trying to lull the population into a very false sense of security.
Mr. William Molloy: Would the hon. Gentleman not agree that it is quite wrong, if not dishonest, for some people to advocate that, if this country were to move into the Common Market, we should be moving into Europe, and that the question is always phrased, "Should Britain join Europe?" Would he not agree that it is wrong for

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the many supporters of our joining to submit the question in that way?
Mr. Marten: I agree. We are not talking about Europe at all, but about the Six, which is a "mini-Europe", the rich stockbrokers' belt of Europe, and nothing much more. It has to be expanded. What we are both in favour of is a much wider and more imaginative scheme of a free trade area between the Six and the Seven, out of which, over the years, will grow such political unity as the countries of Europe want. The hon. Member and I share that view, I think: we are not mini-Europeans. That is the point.
There, are some people, as the Economist said last week, who try to fudge this issue of sovereignty and supra-nationality; but, surely, once we are in the Common Market, we shall be so inextricably entangled in the web of the economic community that, if the economic community—enlarged as it would be by our joining—wanted to go federal or supra-national, could we extricate ourselves without causing grave damage? Could we honestly use our veto without busting up the Common Market?
We should come clean at this stage. There are some statesmen in our three parties—I am not one myself—and it is the job of statesmen to look ahead. When they answer questions or try to avoid answering them by saying, "This is a very long way away and we should not worry about it," they are not being very straight, because, as statesmen, they should have the ability to look further ahead.
We know where the Common Market is going. For example, when Dr. Luns was over here—he is the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the E.E.C.—and spoke at a Press lunch in his honour on 15th July, he said, according to the handout:
"Britain's application for membership of the Common Market would receive the full backing of the Dutch Government only if there was a firm British commitment to the idea of a Federal Europe."
That is the Chairman of the Council of Ministers; and I presume that he meant what he said. If he does, then we shall obviously not get in. On 6th February, the Prime Minister said:
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"I made it clear that we did not and do not support any federal or supranational structure for our relations with Europe."—(OFFICIAL REPORT, 6th Febuary, 1969; Vol. 777, c. 584.]
So there is this conflict.
I am sorry that the Leader of the Liberal Party has left the seat of the hon. Member for Knutsford (Sir W. Bromley-Davenport), in which he was sitting. I am thinking of an intervention of his on 22nd July when he had just returned from the Monnet Committee for the United States of Europe. He had heard the Foreign Secretary challenged at this meeting as to whether he had any reservations on the matter of political integration and federalism, and the right hon. Gentleman apparently said that he had none.
That was the point of my question—this great conflict about where we are going and the general fudging by most of our political leaders on this matter. So I hope that, when the Minister sums up or, if not tonight, tomorrow, we shall have a clear declaration from the Government about where they stand on the question of political federalism in Europe.
We are told that our heritage is European, that we are Europeans. I am not a continental European: I am British. My heritage is with my British kinsfolk across the world, in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, even, going back several hundreds of years, in the United States—and not with the Sicilians, the Walloons and the gentlemen from Perpignan.
The second point which is not affected by the argument about whether we can afford entry because of our balance of payments or the claim that there is not much point in arguing about anything until we know the results of the negotiations is that the Press, which appears, for reasons best known to itself, to be pro-Common Market, keeps on saying that we, the anti-marketeers, are reducing it to a question of the cost of butter. They say that only because they know that our arguments are too strong, so they try to reduce them in that rather scornful way. In fact, the argument has nothing, or very little, to do with the cost of butter. It is partly the cost of food, true, but only partly, and we cannot

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tell about that until we know the agricultural arrangements. What I want to do is question the validity of some of the economic arguments which are used, and have been used since 1961, for getting Britain into the Common Market.
The first is that we will sell more to the Common Market if we go in. Of course we will: any child could tell that. But, equally, is it not true that we will buy more? Of course we will. Therefore, what will the general effect be on our balance of payments? At the moment 20 per cent. of our exports go to the Common Market, and 80 per cent. to the rest of the world. If we are in the Common Market with our prices raised, I believe that our 80 per cent. of trade with the rest of the world will suffer because we shall price ourselves out of part of that world market. The overall effect of going into the Common Market will be to deteriorate our balance of payments, although we shall export more to the Common Market.
We are told that we must go in because the Common Market growth rate is so much quicker. I hope that when the Government publish their White Paper they will deal with that and prove that that growth in the Common Market countries is due to the Common Market itself. It is now slowing down, but, be that as it may, why we want to jump in now that the growth in the Common Market is slowing down I cannot understand when I think that ours should be increasing.
We are told that we must go in there to get the larger market. If one strips that argument down, one sees that it is arrant nonsense, because 20 per cent. of our exports are at the moment going to the Common Market; surely we have the market already? Why must we go into the Common Market to get that market? We are there already. That argument does not stand up. We are doing well in that market, because in the first nine months of this year our trade with the Common Market rose by 18 per cent. Even if we were in, I do not know by how much we would increase it. I think that we would get the same benefit, which is what our industrialists want, if we had a free trade area between the Six and the Seven. Our industrialists want our tariffs to come down, and to have free
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access. That is what the Government should aim at, and not just the idea of going into the Common Market.
We are told that great mergers will take place if we go into the Common Market. We are told, for example, that British firms will merge with German firms and there will be powerful units, and so on. In the whole of the 12½ years of the history of the Common Market there has been only one merger between companies in countries within the Common Market across the frontiers of those countries, and that was the German company of Agfa which merged with the Belgian company of Gaevert, the photographic people, and I do not think that that has been a great success.
We are told by the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. George Brown) that if we do not go in British companies will have to move there to manufacture within the Common Market. On 2nd May we were told in Parliament that 500 British companies—and most of the major ones—are already manufacturing in the Common Market.
We are told that we have to go in for technological reasons; for example, that the TSR2 was cancelled because it did not have a big enough initial order. We are told that we must have a market the size of the U.S.A., where 1,400 of the F111s were ordered. But is that a fair argument? We are now going ahead with the manufacture with Germany and Italy of a multi-rôle combat aircraft and the market that we are getting straight away with our initial order is 1,200, which is about the size of the American market. I think that that shoots down that argument for the Common Market.
On technological matters we have the supreme example of manufacturing Concorde with France, without going into the Common Market. We are going in for the gas centrifuge manufacture of rich uranium with Belgium and Germany, without going into the Common Market. So what is the argument for going in for technological reasons?
I think that we ought to question the quality of the E.E.C. I do not think that they are what their public relations have cracked them up to be. Look at the mess that the people who have been running it and advising it have made of

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agriculture. It was their idea. They have let it grow, and look at the shambles that it is in now. Are we really going to surrender our sovereignty to them to negotiate trade agreements with third countries, which is what we would have to do, to the very people who are capable of creating surpluses and utter chaos in agriculture?
I think that when these arguments, which have been trotted out since 1961, are put out, the same old arguments without any polishing up at all, we should strip them down and examine each one to see how far it is valid. We have been told many things since 1961. We were told that if we were not in the Common Market within six or seven years Britain would have the equivalent status of a country called Portugal, and that has proved to be wrong. Every reason put forward for going into the Common Market should be stripped down and re-examined, because in the past we have been told things that simply are not true.
7.17 p.m.
Mr. John Mendelson: My main concern in this debate is to bring to a point the long debate on Vietnam that has been going on in the Labour movement and in the country generally. I therefore hope that the hon. Member for Banbury (Mr. Marten) will accept that it is not indifference to his speech which makes me ignore completely what he said.
In opening the debate my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister focussed attention on a number of problems which go to the heart of the matter. His speech was in considerable contrast to some of the other contributions that we have heard, and I therefore intend to concentrate on my right hon. Friend's speech.
A fortnight ago, in reply to a Question from me, my right hon. Friend said that even if one quarter of the allegations of massacres and assassinations of ordinary peaceful village people were true he would express his horror and certain consequences would have to follow. Today, my right hon. Friend corrected that and said that if only 1 per cent. of the allegations were true certain consequences would follow. I accept that, because I think that that is right.
My right hon. Friend went on to say that we must go beyond that and deal
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with the question which Parliament has to answer. It is the question about which people in the country are most concerned, and which they want answered. If Parliament is a leader of opinion, then the House of Commons is duty bound this evening to express a definite opinion on the war in Vietnam, on the attitude of Her Majesty's Government to that war, and on the policies pursued by the President of the United States.
My right hon. Friend said that if it were found that the kind of action which has horrified us all is endemic in the Vietnam war, further consequences could follow, but he said that he could not at this stage say whether it was endemic in that kind of war, and whether the American forces had been pursuing such action over the last two years, and were pursuing it now. I believe that the evidence to show that they are is available, and that those who wish the House to express an opinion tonight are under an obligation to supply it.
First, I want to quote a statement by Senator Van Dong on 3rd December, only a few days ago, in Da Nang, in South Vietnam. He is a member of the three-man commission sent from Saigon to investigate the recent allegations. May I say in passing that this investigation has been mounted against the opposition of the Saigon Government and is in stark contrast to the statement made by the Saigon Government immediately after tie atrocities had been first reported in the Cleveland Plain Dealer. The Saigon Government's reaction, characteristically, was, "There is no truth in this. There was an ordinary battle and some civilians may have been killed in it".
But Senator Van Dong, on being questioned by the Press, had this to say:
"Senator Van Dong, who is a former defence minister and chief of staff, strongly condemned the concept of free fire zones in which he said American troops had the right to mount operations using artillery and air strikes even in populated towns without South Vietnamese permission. Although there have been improvements, he added, the practice continues. Similarly, Senator Van Dong condemned what he termed the continuing practice of allowing Americans to go into action unaccompanied by Vietnamese liaison officers or at least interpreters who might deal with civilians and protect them. All of the criticised conditions prevail in the search and destroy operation at Son Mai in which an undisclosed number of men, women and

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children varying, dependent on the source, from 145 to 567 were reported killed, the Senator said".
These are not criticisms of one single event. They are criticisms of the orders, instructions and strategy of the American high command in its search and destroy policy. These orders were responsible for what occurred in this village and in other villages. It is these instructions and that attitude and atmosphere which have created the situation in which Michael Terry, one of the privates in the United States platoon which is accused of having committed these massacres in Son Mai, said in an interview, after the first revelations had been made:
"Many of the boys do not believe that the Vietnamese are real people."
That is the heart of the matter. When referring to Vietnamese people, whether friend or foe, they call them not Vietnamese but dinks.
Mr. Orme: Or gooks.
Mr. Mendelson: The term "gook" was used after the Korean war and was carried into the Vietnam war, but, as anybody who has been there in the last 18 months knows, it has been replaced by the term "dinks". One American officer is reported to have commented, "You must accept that it is easier to shoot down dinks than Vietnamese people".
The conditions to which my right hon. Friend referred are endemic in the kind of war which the American forces are carrying on and in the instructions which they are given.
Mr. Eldon Griffiths: I do not dissent from what the hon. Gentleman is saying, but would he make it clear that the events he has recorded took place, I think, 18 months ago? Also, would he agree that the President of the United States has called off the "search and destroy" strategy?
Mr. Mendelson: These events took place 18 months ago, but I would add that there was a conspiracy of silence deliberately imposed by the head of the brigade involved in the area.
My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Ipswich (Sir Dingle Foot) made a mistake when he said that a Congressional inquiry into these events
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is going on at present. There is no Congressional inquiry, but there are two important inquiries being conducted. One is by the courts into the prosecutions instituted against one officer and one sergeant in the United States forces. The other is by the Pentagon, the War Department, into the allegation that when this massacre was first reported at brigade level the investigation was deliberately suppressed. It will be interesting to see whether the request made by 34 eminent lawyers in the United States two days ago that a war crimes commission should be set up to make a full scale inquiry into these events will be accepted. It has not been accepted so far. I read into the speech of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister that he is interested in seeing whether there will be a positive decision on this inquiry.
On the second question of the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Eldon Griffiths), it is not correct—and I use no other term because I do not believe in introducing acerbities which are not necessary—that President Nixon abandoned the policy of "search and destroy" until 4½ months ago. When he came to office, that policy continued in all its severity. Many Americans have been saying, "You are concentrating on this event. What about the many people killed from the air?" It is clear that under the "search and destroy" policy American pilots were shooting on defenceless villagers, and they knew them to be defenceless villagers.
That is the evidence for saying that the question which my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister rightly asked as to whether, beyond the immediate event, this is endemic in the strategy and instructions under which the American Army has been operating for more than 2½years can be proved. I submit that it can and that it has been proved both by a senator in the Vietnamese senate and by American opinion.
I turn to—
Sir George Sinclair Sir George Sinclair (Dorking) rose—
Mr. Mendelson: No. Other hon. Members wish to speak. I have given way once. I have no right to prolong my speech beyond reason.
Another piece of evidence which I have is an interview which the correspondents of the New York Times had on

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3rd December, a few days ago, in Kwong Hai with some of the people involved in the massacre at Son Mai. One of the boys who had been in the incident gave them an account of what had happened. They questioned the boy's father. I wish to quote only briefly what the father said:
"He"—
that is, the boy—
"lives with his father, who ran away when the shelling started, and his stepmother in Kwang Hai. The father told the Press, said Senator Dong yesterday, that he also found the body of another son aged 3 under a pile of corpses when he returned to the village after the American troops moved out the same day they arrived and the Vietcong returned. He said he buried his wife, his son, a grandchild and his daughter-in-law near where their house had stood".
It is not beyond reason to suggest that the evidence coming in day after day has made a deep impression upon many members of the United States Congress. In a session in the United States Congress, Senators and Congressmen, on seeing the evidence, could not contain themselves and left the room saying that they could not possibly sit there and look at the evidence without feeling sick. That is a quotation from Congressman Irons, and other members of the Congress made similar statements. Surely, in the name of evidence, if this is the view of senators in the South Vietnam Senate and a responsible member of Congress in the United States Senate, we are entitled to say that we start in this debate not in ignorance but from knowledge. There can be no question about that.
The Prime Minister also said that if the United States Government were not to proceed to a full investigation and consequential action, then there would arise a grave Anglo-American crisis, in which he knew every hon. Member would be involved. These were his words, as far as I can remember them. That is not the right question to pose. The Government are supporting the American war in Vietnam. It is not only a question of whether the United States Government decide to punish those who suppressed the original, attempted investigation at brigade level, and then set up a proper investigation. Everyone accepts that they will do that.
There have been many protestations here about relations with America.
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People have said that they have good relations with America, that they are not anti-American, but that does not need saying. We can take it for granted. Wherever I have been in America, either alone or with some of my hon. Friends, I have found that relationships were good. When I was in Washington the then Secretary of State, Mr. Rusk, discussed Vietnam with us. He said: "We know what you are saying in the House of Commons about this subject and I would like to discuss it with you." There was no need to establish any bona fide. It is clearly understood by people in America that we are concerned that the right thing should be done by a country with which we have such close relations.
This is relevant, because if this is the kind of war that is being carried on and if these events are endemic, to use the Prime Minister's phrase, of the situation in which the war is being carried on, surely the Government must pose the question—and answer it: Are we right, have we been right in the past and, above all, are we right today to continue supporting the United States war in Vietnam? The important point is that it is not only a matter of claim and evidence and action. It would be easy to make propaganda capital by saying, "They are there to defend democracy, and look what is happening!" That is not the point; it is far too simple. The point is that there is evidence supplied by United States sources and by South Vietnamese sources that out of 10 people killed, on the evidence of the last two and a half years one was a Vietcong and nine were ordinary civilians. That is the case which the Government have to consider.
It stands to reason that the intervention of 500,000 American soldiers in an internal conflict in Vietnam has created an atmosphere and a situation in which these actions are pursued in such a manner that they lead to the wholesale decimation of the population in Vietnam. One knows the narrow base of the Government in Saigon, which I described in a quotation from a former Under-Secretary for the Air Force in the United States Government, during my right hon. Friend's speech; we know the narrow basis and the unrepresentative character of the Saigon régime; we know that it is unconcerned for its own citizens as

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long as it can remain in power. Knowing that, how long can my right hon. Friend and his colleagues, and for that matter anyone else in the Government, continue to support the American policy in this war?
That is the question that has to be answered. If the Government are not prepared to answer it, then at any rate as many amongst us as are prepared to answer it tonight ought to do so in the most visible and public manner possible. That is the task of Members of the House of Commons, and I hope that they will do it.
I will try to link this debate to a Motion which we put on the Order Paper, which reads:
That this House calls upon Her Majesty's Government, in accordance with the decision of the Labour Party Annual Conference 1967, to dissociate itself completely from the policy of the United States Government in Vietnam; and believes that any settlement must be based upon the 1954 Geneva Agreement, which required the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Vietnamese soil, and the reunification of Vietnam under a government chosen by the Vietnamese people.
This was after three years' debate in the Labour Movement. There was a good debate at the conference, in which my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. George Brown) took part. His point of view, put to the conference, was defeated by a majority of over 1 million. Whatever might be said about his recent performance on the radio or his speech this afternoon, and however much the Opposition smiled upon him, one thing my right hon. Friend did not represent today was the opinion of the Labour Party and the Labour Movement.
That opinion is represented in this Motion. There were many people at the conference, not all of whom spoke, who had studied this problem carefully. They had found, as had many other observers, that the key to the situation in Vietnam is not to talk about wholesale defeat of one side or the other but to bring about a solution in which the Americans can honourably withdraw and in which the Vietnamese people can live peaceably together.
The case the Government have to answer, if they want to continue President Nixon's policy, and the question that hon.
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Members, those who take these matters seriously, have to answer, can be simply stated. There is a wholly unrepresentative military regimé in Vietnam. The evidence proves conclusively that the regimé suppresses, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich (Mr. Marsh) so rightly said, the opinions of those who are in between the two sides. To give one example, there was a vice-presidential election campaign about 18 months ago in South Vietnam. One of the candidates was a gentleman by the name of Dzu who got 28 per cent. of the total vote. I suggest that even to hon. Members opposite, very soon, in a few months' time, we might find that obtaining 28 per cent. of a total vote is a considerable achievement.
Hon. Members: Hear, hear.
Mr. Mendelson: I thought that would be one point on which I would carry hon. Gentlemen opposite.
This vice-presidential candidate obtained 28 per cent. of the vote. What happened to him? The next day he was put into prison, and he has been there ever since. Why has he been put into prison? Because he campaigned on a platform of opening negotiations with the North Vietnamese.
The world's Press was covering the campaign. I was in Washington shortly after the elections and was told: "We had 280 correspondents there, so you can see how fair the elections were". These 280 correspondents went back to the United States and the next day that candidate was arrested and put in jail. Not very long ago we had a delegation in one of the Committee rooms, comprising members of the South Vietnamese Parliament, and we put this point to them. We spent an hour on it but we got no change. They knew they were not in a position to promise not only that this man would be released but that his case would be considered.
That is why continuing support for President Nixon's policy means continuing support for a military regimé which makes it completely impossible to end the conflict. We are reminded here of the policy of Chiang Kai-shek. His policy, which has been condemned by history, was to assassinate all those who were liberals, so that in the end

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there would be Communists on one side and his military regimé on the other. Reams have been written in America by historians and others, showing the disastrous consequences of his suicidal policy. The same policy is now being pursued by Marshal Thieu and his people in Saigon. This is what the Government have to tell the House and the country—are they continuing to support this policy?
I take my information largely from Americans. Nobody has a right when the history of the period comes to be written to be more respected than the millions of young Americans, and the many senior Americans who are their fathers and mothers, who over a long period have expressed their opposition to this war. Nobody will have more of a right to be respected by future historians than some of those people, like Senator McGovern and Senator Fulbright, who when it was not popular to say so, warned and urged the American people to change their policy. It is time that we in this House honoured these people by mentioning their record and their contribution.
I take most of my information from American sources. We now have the evidence of a man who served in the United States Government as an Under-Secretary for the Air Force from 1967 to 1969. He has now written a book, which was published a few weeks ago. This is what he said:
"The American people would reawaken to the fact that they were still committed to the endless support of a group of men in Saigon who represented nobody but themselves, who preferred war to the risks of a political settlement, and could not remain in power more than a few months without our large-scale presence."
That is the real situation.
The charge politically against the Nixon Administration is that it is pretending that the sabotage of the talks comes from the National Liberation Front, when, in fact, President Nixon, after his last statement on 3rd November, was contradicted by the leader of the National Liberation Front delegation in Paris. The N.L.F. leader said that they would continue negotiations, but that the American negotiators had always refused, and refuse to this day, to accept the idea of a coalition government on the agenda of the conference.
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One knows that this idea was first mooted eighteen months ago by the late Senator Robert Kennedy, who said that the key to a solution was gradual withdrawal, stopping of the bombing, negotiations with the North Vietnamese and the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front, and elections in Saigon. The charge against my right hon. Friend and the Cabinet is that they showed no sign of condemning American policy in blocking any such development.
In these circumstances the policy of the Labour Party and the Labour Movement is a policy of wisdom. As often before in the history of this country, I remind the House of the period of civil war in 1860 and the attitude to the Labour movement throughout the land. They were right, and many people in this House were wrong.
The policy decided upon by the Labour Party and the Labour Movement is honourable and intelligent. Some of us will ask the House tonight, before the debate ends, to go on record in support of that policy. I invite as many right hon. and hon. Friends as possible to join us in that attitude.
7.44 p.m.
Sir George Sinclair: The hon. Member for Penistone (Mr. John Mendelson), who has just spoken, expressed doubts about representative government in Saigon. Can he give us much assurance about the representative nature of Governments, in that area of the world, in centrally controlled Communist countries? How far are those Governments representative and how far are they self-perpetuating dictatorships
I intend to speak mainly on the Far East, but I want for a moment to say something about Nigeria—an area of which I have some personal experience.
I join with those in this country and elsewhere who are deeply depressed by the suffering—suffering on both sides—in Nigeria. I should like to pay special tribute to the work of U.N.I.C.E.F., which uniquely works on both sides of the front in Nigeria. It has already spent £7½ million in the relief of hunger and of illness on both sides. It is now running out of funds and I hope that the Government will help to reinforce the funds at its disposal. The Government should, I believe, now make another major effort to persuade both sides

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in Nigeria to accept the opening of routes by air or road for increased supplies of food and medicine into Ibo country.
I accept the point that this carries some military risks and disadvantages to each side. But the civilian suffering in Colonel Ojukwu's area is now so great that these humanitarian needs must be met and the suffering must be relieved. I believe that, in the long term, this will be of advantage to both sides in this war and may help both, even in the short term, once a new relief movement gets going.
In particular, I should like to see a resumption of daylight flights and the opening of the "mercy corridor". But one fact is clear, though it is seldom mentioned, that Colonel Ojukwu could, if he gave this a high enough priority, relieve suffering among the Ibos without delay and have large relief supplies brought into his area by air and road.
I know something of the agonising choice which this may present to him. For this reason, we should not give up the search for alternative methods and alternative routes of supply which might be more acceptable to both sides. I believe that they can be devised. In this field I believe that the Government have not been as resourceful as they could have been.
But, in the end, I believe we should go on supporting the Federal Government and supplying them with arms. I have repeatedly made this point in the House. I support General Gowon in believing that a unified Nigeria will bring the best benefits to the peoples of the country, including the Ibos. The current civilised treatment of the Ibos in the areas administered by the Federal Government is the best proof in action of General Gowon's intentions for the reception of the Ibo people in a reunified Nigeria.
I come now to the Far East. Straight away, I would wish to pay my tribute to the robust speech made by the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. George Brown). I do not always agree with him. But, on this occasion, I was impressed by his argument and the conviction with which he spoke.
Whatever our immediate horror and distress at the reports from Pinkville in Vietnam, we must await the full
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examination of the facts. Perhaps we should also remember that we shall get no facts about the atrocities on the other side, which may make part of the background against which Pinkville happened. But, these things apart, I believe that the Americans have been right in their aims of trying to help South Vietnam against aggression from the North. I agree with Lee Kuan Yew's assessment of the threat to the rest of South-East Asia if the United States withdraw before a durable settlement is made in Vietnam.
In the face of the continuing threat from Hanoi and the prospect of United States' withdrawal, this is no time to leave Malaysia in the lurch, especially when Communist infiltration from Thailand has suddenly begun again after many years of quiet. This is no time to leave Australia and New Zealand in the lurch. They themselves are already in this war, meeting the threat to their future.
I therefore hope that the Government will now take two steps—first, halt the withdrawal of British forces from the Far East; secondly, offer to increase our efforts to help the free countries in that area to strengthen their own regional defence. I hope that, in particular, we shall keep forces on the ground in Malaya and arrange for them to be relieved at short intervals of, say, nine months. I am glad that my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition has declared that when we return to power we shall honour our obligations to Malaysia, to Australia and to New Zealand.
In view of the new situation in the Far East, I hope that the Government will now reconsider with our Commonwealth allies in that area their programme of withdrawal from the Far East.
7.53 p.m.
Mr. Frank Tomney: There is one point on which both Right and Left wing of the Labour Party can agree very firmly—that it has taken exactly four hours of the debate before the first back-bench Member has been called on this side of the House. One Privy Councillor has been called after another. What frightens me is the thought that if any more Ministers are sacked and revert to the back benches the rest of us might as well stay at home, as there will be no forum for us.

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This debate, which has been called on the insistence of the Parliamentary Labour Party—or at least of some of my colleagues—concerns an issue of worldwide importance, and it has been given added impetus by the revelations of what occurred at Pinkville. In the circumstances, it is right that we should be discussing the whole context of the Vietnam situation.
I listened very carefully to the Prime Minister. Indeed, I have long memories about the Prime Minister. I remember his resignation in 1951 and the reasons for it I remember the 1960 Labour Party conference and his support for the virtual abandonment of the nuclear bomb, which was an option for neutrality. Today, he struck for the first time a responsive chord. He could hardly be faulted, although he made his usual reservations about many of his statements and, as usual, left as many options open as possible. Nevertheless, he was very firm in his support of American policy in total in world diplomacy.
When President Kennedy committed the will of the American public to the struggle in Vietnam he did not commit wholly the will and might of the United States forces. Indeed, he did not know what he was letting himself into, although he had before him the experience of Dien Bien Phu. I understand thoroughly the doctrine and political pholosophy of Communism and what it means. Dien Bien Phu, in particular, showed it. It showed that where a nation such as the French, at that time, had not the will to meet a situation which demanded a unified command, they were bundled out of Vietnam. President Kennedy underestimated the situation. He committed the will of the American people, and since then it has been one long protracted struggle after another in a war which started 25 years ago.
We are faced with a situation in which agitation has been built up throughout the length and breadth of the United States, in the full view of Press, radio and television commentators, which is presented as the will of a united people for retreat in Vietnam. It is nothing of the kind, and it is nothing of the kind in this country, either. It is best that we should realise that, because if the United States goes home of its own voli-
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tion, or is forced home, the consequences for the rest of the world will be calamitous. We cannot ignore what would follow.
We all know that there is no truly representative government in the Far East. In his last speech as Minister of Labour in the House in 1951, Aneurin Bevan said that Communism had not and would not make any inroads into any technologically advanced Western nation. He was right in philosophy, but wrong in practice, as we saw in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. But an under-developed people is always ripe for any system of government, particularly Communism, which will do the essentials—and that has been the great strength of the Communist revolution, first in Russia, then in China, and then in other countries in the Far East. The American advisers should have appreciated what was going on when they committed themselves to Vietnam.
I am an unashamed supporter of the Anglo-American alliance and always have been. I am sick and tired of the continued denigration of the American nation, the American Government and the American forces by people in countries which have free expression of thought and action, which have liberty, and in which opinions can be heard and a forum can be held—and I am sick of the liberals who see themselves as commentators. I am sick and tired of the "24 Hours" programme on the B.B.C. and its Left-wing orientated commentators who never have a good word to say about the American position.
That ought to be said. We share a common tongue with the United States. It is their heritage from us. The decision was taken by only one vote at the first American Congress—and the decision might have been to speak German. The Second World War seems a long time ago, but 25 years is not a long time in history. We should not forget that had it not been for the great military, physical and technical support of the United States there might have been a different result to that war.
That was followed by the most generous act in the history of the world, the great "give away" of Marshall Aid which helped to put Europe on its feet again after the war, helped every single nation in Western Europe to establish a free society. The Americans have given

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enormous aid throughout the world, especially to India, without any thought of a comeback reward. Yet there is this constant denigration. It is time that it stopped and that the Western nations realised where they are. Because—let us contemplate it—what could be the consequences of an American retreat from Vietnam?
One million people did not flee from North Vietnam for nothing. They had no faith in their Government, and they fled for their lives to South Vietnam. Yet there are people who say to the Americans, "Go home.' If they did, the massacre at "Pinkville"—which has not been proved yet—would not compare with the great slaughter there would be. Every single politician in this assembly must think these things out for himself.
We cannot ignore, for instance, the repercussions throughout the whole of South-East Asia of such a retreat, the repercussions in Singapore, Malaya, even in N.A.T.O. It would rebound on us here.
The situation is by no means as flexible as we would like it. The history of the last 30 years, from 1936 to last year, in Czechoslovakia proves this. Here was a technological nation, a material nation, an engineering nation, which had its own democratic form of government and had a right to expect it. It was overturned at the time of Benes. Nobody has ever known whether he was murdered, or whether he committed suicide, but he went. Then the shackles were put on. Then they had their own assessment of what Communism might be. What happened? The shackles were put on again. This was a country which had its own Western democracy. So let us be careful what we are talking about, and of whom we are talking.
It is no good Mrs. Gandhi, with an oriental mind, trying to pair off both the United States and Soviet Russia against any possible aggression by the Chinese. That might not compel the Americans to pull out of the Far East, but I will tell the House what it would do. It would leave the possibility of conflict between the Russians and the Chinese wide open. Would it stop there? For the first time the United States and the Russians are talking—really talking—about disarmament and armament controls. It has
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taken a long time to get them there to the talks, but they are there.
This has meant that the Council of Four has virtually polarised the United Nations. It has to be. There is no opportunity to discuss it. Anyway, discussions at the United Nations have to start by flowing from here, and that is why I am hoping that something will come out of this debate, something which may be worth while, because the issues are great.
I do not know whether I should say this or not, but I think, on the whole, that it ought to be said, and I do not know whether I shall be doing anybody an injustice or not, but I want to deal with our representation at the United Nations and at Washington. I believe that men cannot divorce themselves from their actions, words, opinions. In youth, one can make many mistakes and have all kinds of opinions and take all kinds of liberties, but, nevertheless, I address myself now to our Ambassador in Washington, who was probably designed to represent us when another President was in office—but it did not happen.
I doubt whether he is the best possible man for us, great ability though he has, at the present time in Washington. One has only got to turn up, as I have, past issues, from 1955 onwards, of the New Statesman, which, be it remembered, members of the Diplomatic Corps read, or may have read, too. What is there discovered is not helpful to the situation.
I had the honour of leading a small delegation to the United Nations a few weeks ago. I saw the Russians at work at the assembly—and in the lounge. It was worth seeing. We could not match it. We have there a man who has done great service to this country, but I wonder whether he is our best representative at this time. One has to observe the backslapping Mr. Malik and Mr. Mendelvich, with their arms round the shoulders of the silk-suited Africans and their silky secretaries, the talks and conversations in corners, the cups of tea, and one says, "This is a good performance in public relations". It is that. There was a difference when Mr. Malik and I met face to face. There was a difference of philosophy and outlook. We resolved that. I think that we were winners on

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points. However, all these things are of importance to us, too.
I know that there are well-meaning politicians here who, when dealing with issues like Africa, show great humanity and feeling, but the fact is that there are few representative Governments in Africa now—very few, if any. Yet some people talk as though those Governments were representative and stable, and as though they will never be satisfied till every Hottentot owns a Rolls-Royce.
I look at Africa and its representatives; I look at the Governments they failed to get; the legacy left behind by the Westminster Government; and I listened to the Prime Minister this afternoon and on the radio a week or two ago, and I realised that he was afraid of something. What was he afraid of? He was afraid of fragmentation.
There are no clearly drawn and recognised boundaries in the issues in Africa. This was the great point of the speech by the hon. Member for Dorking (Sir G. Sinclair) about Biafra and Nigeria and this Government's backing the Federal Government in Nigeria. That is right. It is right in the context of the time, in the context of statesmanship, because if this kind of thing is allowed to go on, or encouraged to go on, of having secessionist States, where will it stop? Will it stop there? Could it not happen in Zambia and in Kenya? Because these have no democratic assemblies. They have one-party Governments. This process of fragmentation does not necessarily have to stop in Nigeria. In many African States, in the States on the West Coast, Russian and Chinese diplomacy is active.
My hon. Friend the Joint Under-Secretary of State knows as well as I do that Western industry runs on copper, and that the world supply of copper is running out. I know that some new mines have been discovered in Mexico recently. But in America it is running out. Coal from the Wankie coalfield goes to the coast by the railway which the British taxpayer owns. I have seen this stuff piled high at the docks in both places and it is mined in Zambia, smelted by coal from Wankie in Rhodesia, and transferred by the Bengela railway, which we the British taxpayers own, across Rhodesia to Beira and Lobito, and now the
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Chinese are to offer the Zambians a railway to the east. The hon. Member for Bodmin (Mr. Bessell) and I met the Zambian Ambassador, and I asked him if he thought it wise to put all his eggs in one basket and how he would pay for it. He said it would be paid for partly by barter and partly by the sale of copper. I asked him who would control the port, the Zambians or the Tanzanians. He said that the Tanzanians would, but they are firmly locked in the grip of the Chinese.
Some people may have a clear conscience about this, but I have not. The countries in Africa which have their own Government are entitled to all the help Britain can give in the avenues of government and diplomacy, but they should see our point of view and where their future lies. We left behind great examples of government which have not worked out. These issues are too big to let them go. We should retain our integrity and the political philosophy behind it. It is fragmented, along with the Far East and the Middle East.
There is only one possible solution to the Arab-Israeli problem, and that is for the two to meet face to face across the table, making their own peace and sticking to it and then for the United Nations to put the legal stamp on it. There is the threat of the Russian navy in the Indian Ocean.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich (Mr. Marsh) made an excellent speech, based on faith, hope and charity, but politics do not work like that and Moscow would not want to know. The Russians are a different kind of people.
To refer again to the Prime Minister's speech, hon. Members may remember his call at one time to renegotiate the Nassau Agreement, which was not done. We now have a bonus of one nuclear submarine which we did not expect. Long may he progress along this road; I will do nothing to stop him, but things could have been a lot happier years ago if lie had thought this way. I was a great admirer of the late Hugh Gaitskell, who stood at the edge of greatness when death took him away. I have seen adopted one by one the policies which he advocated. If we can keep on along these lines then at least we have a chance of getting the Foreign Office permanent service at one with Parliament.
Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Harry Gourlay): It may be a bit late to appeal for short speeches, but recent efforts have not helped the Chair in increasing the number of hon. Members who could participate.
8.12 p.m.
Mr. Eldon Griffiths: I will make a particular point of compressing my remarks, and I will not, therefore, follow the hon. Member for Hammersmith, North (Mr. Tomney) whose speech impressed and moved me considerably.
I want to start with the general proposition that at the centre of world affairs—by which I mean specifically the interface between the two great power blocs—there is a conspicuous and welcome but still tentative improvement in relations. Simultaneously, there can be seen on the flanks—by which I mean specifically the Middle East, South-East Asia and Africa—an equally conspicuous but a less welcome deterioration.
May I start with what I call the tentative improvement at the centre. Mr. Nixon in his inauguration speech put it very well when he spoke of his hope that we might now be starting to move from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation. Since then to some extent the negotiation has begun. There are the strategic arms talks in Helsinki which have got off to a moderately encouraging and certainly a businesslike start. There has been the American-Soviet draft agreement on the banning of nuclear weapons on the sea bed, and there is progress towards a chemical and bacteriological weapon ban on which I congratulate the right hon. Member for Sheffield, Park (Mr. Mulley) on the efforts he personally put into this matter in Geneva. Recently, too, there has been President Nixon's unilateral agreement to give up bacteriological weapons.
Alongside these one can place the marked slowing down on both sides of the quite alarming advance of the middle 'sixties towards the next generation of nuclear weapons. The Russians have deployed an elementary anti-ballistic missile screen around some of their major cities. The Nixon Administration has made a decision to build a limited antiballistic missile system to defend its
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second strike missile sites. Both sides are also moving towards multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles, at a fantastic cost.
Yet one cannot escape the impression that in most of these fields there is a slowing down in the pace, or at least in the acceleration, of the arms race. There is also, although we do not see it, for more and more we are excluded from the intricacies of American—Soviet talks, a whole series of bilateral discussions on the problems of space exploration, on Vietnam, on the Middle East and, I believe, on China. If these discussions do not produce spectacular progress they do at least go to a lowering of tension and the creation of a new kind of special relationship, this time, ironically, between the Soviet Union and the United States.
I must put two caveats. First, we do not know precisely who is in charge of Soviet policy. Secondly, we are entitled to judge the Russians by their actions rather than by their words; and their actions in the building up of their strategic missile capability, in the building up of their navy, in the supply of arms in the Middle East and in Nigeria, still contradict their words. But, with these caveats, I return to my main theme that there is an ostensible though still tentative improvement between the super powers, and I would like to show why this is so.
I begin with America. As I see it, the predominant pressure in the United States, from the Congress, from the Press and the public, is for a reduction in America's world commitments. The current cliché is that they wish to have a lower silhouette, a power profile, to be seen "hull down" on the horizon. I do now agree with the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. George Brown) that this is the onset of a new isolationism. I do believe it is a search for a lower American profile in world affairs.
One reason for this is Vietnam. Secondly, and we must face this, there is a feeling, justified or not, that the United States have been let down by their European allies. I can best illustrate this by a comment made to me by a senior member of the American Senate, when he said the other day—
"The trouble with you guys is that you want to come in out of the rain but you will not help carry the umbrella."

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I found it difficult to answer that comment.
The third reason is the growing American concern with their balance of payments, and the fourth, perhaps the most important, their increasing preoccupation with internal questions. There is the problem of the cities, the complex of the ghettoes, crime and the negro revolt. There is the disaffection of youth, the sexual revolution. The United States is going through one of those periodic bouts of introspection for which American society is so famous. But I would say, particularly to hon. Gentlemen opposite, that I am confident that the great Republic will emerge from this period strong and confident, as it has done before. There is no doubt, however, that there will be—indeed, this is already happening — profound changes in America's outlook. These add up, in terms of policy, primarily to a concentration on domestic affairs and, internationally, to an objective to "cool it" with the Soviet Union.
It is difficult to identify all the pressures that are moving the Soviet Union. However, it is possible to identify some of them, and I begin with economics. The Soviet Union, with a very much smaller economy than the U.S., is trying simultaneously to compete with America in space and armaments, to develop a global navy, to provide capital to open up its Eastern provinces and to improve the miserable living standards of its people. In any normal economy this would undoubtedly lead to a classical case of overheating. I believe that the Soviets wish to reduce the pressures, and one way—perhaps the best way—to do this is to call a halt to, or at any rate a pause in, the escalation of arms.
Another Soviet concern is China. I find it difficult to assess to what extent the pressures of China are influencing Soviet diplomacy, but it is worth recalling that Mr. Kosygin recently called for an Asian security system to maintain the stability of, of all places, the Indian Ocean. It is also worth mentioning that there are rumours—I put it no higher—that some people in Moscow contemplate pre-emptive action against China's nuclear installations before the Chinese can establish an effective delivery system. Thus, as in the U.S., there are real pressures in the Soviet Union, if not for an
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across the board understanding with the Americans, then at least for a pause in the arms race.
In this context, where does Britain, and, more generally Europe, fit in? We should welcome anything that brings the U.S. and the Soviet Union closer together. But we must accept that it is more and more a twosome and not a foursome. It is primarily a bilateral affair. We are fortunate to have President Nixon's assurances that he will, in any negotiations with Russia, consult his allies before, during and after any agreement is reached. But I am not sure that is enough.
In my view, the security of Europe is too important to be left to the Americans and Russians. That is why, against the background of America starting to reduce its rôle in the world, Europe must unite; and that is the answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Banbury (Mr. Marten), who raised the question of the price of butter. The purpose of European unity is to ensure that we do not throw away our capacity to determine our own future. I hope my hon. Friend will accept that as an answer to his question.
But the unity of Europe is not simply a matter of pulling out of the rest of the world and concentrating on the affairs of our own backyard. A larger reason for the unity of Europe is to enable us better to discharge our duties and maintain our interests in the wider world.
I will mention—time dictates that I must be brief—three areas where I think that we ought to do this. One is Africa, which is too vast a subject to be dealt with in a backbencher's speech. My right hon. Friend mentioned Libya, and I will leave it there. But I would also mention South Africa. It is essential that we in Britain and Europe safeguard the sea routes around Southern Africa, joining the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic.
There were reports in the Press over the weekend that the Government have taken a new approach to the sale of Buccaneer aircraft to South Africa. Those reports are probably untrue, for I suspect that the Government have not changed their policy, though I would like to think that they would.
The second area to which I refer is Vietnam. I put three simple propositions which may not have the support of hon.

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Gentlemen opposite but about which I hope they will accept my sincerity as I accept theirs.
The first proposition is that there would not be a war and that the war would not have started if the Communists had not willed it.
The second proposition is that there could be peace tomorrow, an end to the killing, if only the Communists wanted it on any other terms than their annexation by force of South Vietnam.
The third proposition is that it is not the Americans who stand in the way of peace. Personally and politically, there is nothing that President Nixon and the great mass of the American people want more than an end to this war. I believe that the President has proved this. He has maintained the bombing halt, and as a result we have a situation tonight where there is no bombing of North Vietnam; yet there are still terror attacks and mortar bombardments on the cities of South Vietnam.
Similarly, the President has called off the American Army from its offensive "search and destroy" operations. This has cut the casualties on both sides, but the Communists have not called off their offensive operations.
Further, the United States has started to withdraw. About 60,000 Americans have gone, 35,000 more are on their way out, and the President clearly contemplates the withdrawal of double that number. But do the North Vietnamese follow suit? As the Americans board their ships and aircraft to go home, is there any sign whatever of the North Vietnamese pulling back from the battle areas? In fact, as the Americans move out the North Vietnamese are still moving in.
I cannot think of a more clear-out demonstration that the United States not only wants peace but is prepared to take military risks—risks with the lives of its troops—in the interests of achieving peace, while the Communists, whatever they say, are continuing to stoke up the war.
The Prime Minister made a powerful speech. It was a clever speech. He virtually claimed private credit for having helped to end the bombing. He im-
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plied that he had had some responsibility in bringing about the Paris talks. I hope that he is right on both counts, but I say bluntly that I do not believe it.
The right hon. Gentleman also by implication threatened that a crisis in Anglo-American relations would be brought about if following the investigation of "Pinkville" the actions of the American Government and the United States Department of Justice did not suit him. I tell the right hon. Gentleman solemnly that I hope that no British Prime Minister will threaten a crisis in Anglo-American relations because he disagrees with the mechanics or with decisions of the American judiciary. He ought not to have said that, and I think he will regret it.
But with one thing the right hon. Gentleman said I agreed. The Prime Minister was quite right to say that the issue which the House must face is whether "Pinkville" was an aberration or whether it is endemic in this kind of war. I do not know the answer—I doubt whether even the investigations and the judgment will provide the answer to that question. But I do know that for every example of such aberrations of which the Americans can be accused there have been a hundred examples of Americans having gone to the aid of the world's poor and hungry. I put it quite starkly: for every Asian child who has been killed by the United States Army, perhaps 1,000 Asian children have been kept alive in Pakistan and India by United States food and medicines. The Americans have killed their thousands, but they have saved the lives of tens of thousands. I hope that hon. Members opposite will never forget that.
I object very much to any country out-that over the next 10 or perhaps 15 years the centre of gravity of world affairs will move away from Europe and the Atlantic towards Eastern Asia and the Pacific. I have a number of reasons for thinking that this will happen. The first is the United States. More and more Americans are moving to their Pacific coast. California already has a gross national product greater than that of Britain. More and more Americans consider that the Pacific front is the main front, and though they will not turn their backs on Europe, they will turn their faces towards the Pacific.

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The second reason is the Soviet Union —more and more turning towards the East as it sees the loom of China.
The third reason is China, which is adding one Britain—55 million people—to her population every 15 years; China, which within the next 15 or 20 years will have, without any question, an intercontinental ballistic weapon and a thermonuclear weapon; China, which will be one of the prime movers of the world.
My fourth reason is Japan—a Japan which is already an economic superpower; a Japan which I believe will sooner or later create a long-distance navy to protect her oil supplies from the Middle East and to ensure the mineral supplies that increasingly she is obtaining from Australia.
The fifth reason for my belief that the Pacific more than the Atlantic will occupy the world's future attention is that growth of that necklace of smaller nations off the East Asian coast. Their economic progress is tremendous. Korea, Formosa, the Philippines, Hong Kong and Singapore collectively already are equal in their economic product to China. To that necklace one must add the developing lands of Indonesia and Malaysia.
My last reason is Australia—an Australia which, when I was at school, I was told might grow to perhaps 20 million this century but which is now overcoming the three limits to her growth. She lacked water: there is prospect that nuclear power and desalination will give her water. She lacked fuel: she has found fuel in abundance. She lacked foreign exchange: the metallurgical explosion of Australia, multiplied by the 200,000-ton ore carriers, will provide her with foreign exchange from the sale of her ores to the West Coast of America, to the western parts of Europe, and now to Japan and East Asia.
The growth of Australia, the movement of the Americans to their Pacific coast, the rise of Japan, the growth of China, the concern of the Soviet Union about what happens on her eastern borders, are some of the reasons why I believe that the centre of world affairs is likely more and more to move from Europe and the Atlantic to the great cockpit of Asia.
Yet we in this country say that it has nothing to do with us. I profoundly dis-
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agree. We live in a world in which the communications satellites are bringing the next generation much more closely together, in which the jet aircraft has already made Singapore as near in time to Britain today as Stockholm was in 1939. We are seeing the creation of a world economy where what happens on the Japanese stock exchange affects intimately the lives of our constituents. We are seeing a world in which the thermonuclear weapon has created a single military environment.
It cannot be right to say that this has nothing to do with us. We are involved, whether we like it or not. The only question is: what part can we play?
The Government say that our part should be confined to trade and aid and diplomacy. That was broadly the view that the Duncan Committee took in its report. I believe it was wrong, because there can be no trade and no aid unless there is peace and security. If we want to trade and to aid with Asia and the Pacific we have to do our part, limited as it may be, in maintaining the peace and security which alone make these things possible.
Our country no longer has the resources to take on an imperial rôle. But a modest, limited, though important, contribution undoubtedly lies within our powers. I say this as a European. I believe that the rôle of Britain is to serve as the hinge on which the door of the narrow Treaty of Rome will one day swing open to a very much wider conception, one which leans out to the Atlantic and recognises the responsibilities of all the European peoples for the security of the wider world. That is why, as a European, I believe that the Government's policy in abandoning our Asian commitment is a profound mistake. It is why I believe that a modest, limited, but still important, rôle for Britain east of Suez is in the interests of our country and the interests of world peace.
8.35 p.m.
Mr. Stanley Orme: I am sure that the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Eldon Griffiths) will forgive me for not following him on his world tour of foreign policy. The fact that we have had in this debate a certain amount of concentration on a single and important issue directs the mind of

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everyone, whatever his point of view, to look at this issue and to examine what is being done and then, for those of us who feel strongly about it, to take what action we feel is open to us.
The issue of Vietnam which the Prime Minister made the central issue, along with Nigeria, today is possibly the most important war taking place in the world at present. While the Vietnam war exists and while it develops on the scale it does at present, it hangs like a mushroom cloud over the world. It dwarfs all other events. It makes issues such as what is happening in the Middle East, Nigeria, Rhodesia, Greece and Czechoslovakia secondary events to what is happening in Vietnam itself.
Therefore, we have to examine what rôle Britain has if she can influence events, not only in Britain, but the rest of the world. I believe that they do. This has been confirmed not only by what the Prime Minister said, but what was said by my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. George Brown) with his impassioned support for the position of the American Administration. I did not think I would live to see the day when there would be reiteration of the Foster Dulles policy in this House. I thought it died with Foster Dulles, but unfortunately it appears that that is not so.
Much has been said about whether we are pro- or anti-American in this House. I do not know exactly where I stand on this. Many years ago, in British uniform, I served in the United States of America. I did part of my air-crew training there and worked alongside American troops. I have been back to the United States since. I was there two or three weeks ago. I have a great regard for much of the American culture and for what American people stand for. I have criticisms of them also. Nevertheless, we should examine, what is happening in the United States of America. I went to the U.S.A. to take part in the Moratorium demonstration in San Francisco. I spent about nine days on the West Coast in Los Angeles and San Francisco leading up to the building up of the Moratorium. I listened to the arguments among the American people, and not only those directly concerned with the demonstra-
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tion. I spoke to American businessmen, many of them Republicans, at the Beverley Hills Hotel on Sunset Boulevard in Hollywood. I spoke to strikers on the picket lines of the General Electric strike. I met Democrats for Peace. It would not be right, in California, perhaps, not to meet Birchites and Goldwaterites, and I did.
But what I found is that this war among all people has become a neurosis which is affecting all the American people. It dominates the life of the United States. I could tell the difference even since I was last there, only two years ago. I thought then that the issue was dominant, but on this is occasion the issue transcended everything else. As the build-up to the Moratorium went on, both for the Washington demonstration and for the San Francisco demonstration, every lever of the Administration was used to play it down. They played up the threats of violence. By means of their exposition on television and in the Press, they tried to discourage people from taking part. However, they failed for not just the young but people of all ages and all classes are prepared to stand up for democracy and an end to the war which they now recognise to be a blatant folly by their country, and to say so publicly in the most difficult circumstances.
It has been said that it is easy for us to criticise, because we have no troops in Vietnam, and that it was easy for me to go there and criticise, because we were not directly involved, but what inspired me is the fact that not hundreds and thousands but, eventually, tens of thousands of Americans—what I call the real democrats of the United States, who believe in the constitution and the workings of democracy, who want an end to the poverty and the racialism in their country—are recognising that they have the technology and the power to do these things and want to release these energies, but cannot do so while they are bound to a war which is sucking in not only their economy but half a million of their men in a distant land where they are making no impression and where, after all these years, they are no nearer resolving the war.
I admire the courage of these Americans, who are prepared, in the most

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difficult circumstances, and against all the pressures which we in the Labour movement know can be put on people, who have stood up to be counted. They go right across the board. They include Republicans, and Democrats like Ed Muskie and McGovern. The include trade unionists and some black people—perhaps not as many of either as we would like and perhaps they have the priorities the other way around—and they are coming more and more to realise that this issue must be resolved.
When I was there on 18th November, I got a copy of Look, which is a very popular magazine throughout the country. The Foreign Editor, who has accepted the Administration's policy up to now, wrote:
"We should get out of Vietnam immediately. That—bluntly and simply—is the conclusion I bring back from my most recent trip to South Vietnam, plus conversations with leaders on both sides of the negotiations in Paris. I have never been a dove on Vietnam, but I cannot close my eyes to these hard facts: We have failed to win the war in the fields. Even with 500,000 men there, we cannot win it"
This is not being said by people in Hanoi, or by the N.L.F., or by people in this country, or in France or Germany. It has been said by leading people in the United States who themselves had supported the war. I found that those people who had previously supported the war were now advocating the get-out policy within, so to speak, a matter of days, as opposed to a negotiated settlement.
I have heard the Foreign Secretary say so often that Hanoi has never made concessions and that it does not want a negotiated peace. My question is: what are the Vietcong doing at peace talks in. Paris? What are the N.L.F. doing there? I see that the right hon. Gentleman is laughing—
Sir Alec Douglas-Home Sir Alec Douglas-Home indicated dissent.
Mr. Orme: —but it is a very important factor that they are at the peace talks. What are the Vietcong doing at the Paris peace talks except to try to get a negotiated settlement? The function of the Paris peace talks is to allow the Americans to get out with some honour from a war in which they should never have been involved in the first place.
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In the Los Angeles Times there was an article by Joseph Kraft. He said:
"It is passing strange that so many people have made up their minds so quickly about the President's speech on Vietnam. For at the core of Mr. Nixon's argument there is a mystery—the mystery of why negotiations have gone sour."
He goes on to say:
"The uses of negotiation were plainly not lost on Mr. Nixon and his chief foreign policy adviser, Henry Kissinger. Even before they took office, they had opened a line of communication to the late president of North Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh.… So what went wrong? The President said in his speech that the 'obstacle is the other side's absolute refusal to show willingness to join in seeking peace'…he released an exchange of letters with Ho Chi Minh. But Ho's letter, dated three days before his death on September 2, does nothing to justify the President's staggering denunciation. The tone is conciliatory. The text refers to the need for 'good will on both sides'. It speaks of an American withdrawal, but without the usual demand that it be either immediate or unconditional. It mentions the 10-point programme of the National Liberation Front, not as the only basis for settlement in the manner of past demands, but more modestly, as, a logical and reasonable basis for the settlement of the Vietnamese problems'."
The previous French High Commissioner in Vietnam, Sainteny, a personal friend of Ho Chi Minh and of President Nixon, was sent to Hanoi, and Kraft came back after the funeral of Ho Chi Minh with these words:
"I saw Sainteny at the end of September, just after his return from the funeral of Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi. He had a long talk with Premier Pham Van Dong. He was persuaded that the other side was prepared to accept a settlement that would include an independent and non-Communist South Vietnam set in a neutralist South-East Asia."
Is this not what would have happened if General Eisenhower had allowed free elections to take place in 1956? Is this not what my hon. Friend the Member for Penistone (Mr. John Mendelson) said when he referred to Senator Robert Kennedy trying to broaden the base of the Saigon Administration? Is it not intolerable that this clique of people should be allowed to go on in this way, excluding as it does some Roman Catholics and Buddhists as well as Communists? Is it not fantastic that this siutation has been reached? I am sorry that we do not hear any criticism of this from my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary. All we hear from him is the immediate

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acceptance of every American statement, whether it comes from President Nixon or anybody else. It only matters who get the endorsement in first—Saigon or he.
A negotiated settlement is a real possibility, and the basis for such a settlement exists. When I was in the United States, arguments were going on about the possibility of negotiating an American withdrawal. What appalled the American people was the President's reference to Vietnamisation, but I did not hear my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. George Brown) speak about that: he did not have much to say about Vietnamising the war. The President wants, in other words, to continue the war by other means. That is an immoral and dirty thing to say, and I believe that it is wrong.
The American people were beginning to consider the basis of the war. They were beginning to see where it had got them and the effect it was having upon their nation. They were beginning to recognise that much was wrong.
On the Saturday morning, at the culmination of the Moratorium in November, I took part with ¼million people who marched through the streets of San Francisco, without violence, in a manner which, to me, was an expression of democracy within a democracy. At the polo ground I heard the speeches that were made by Senators and Congressmen, who were not by any means Socialist. They were people who believed in their own country and were prepared to say that a change of policy was essential.
I returned from the United States with a measure of optimism that the American people will rise above this difficulty and will see an end to this war. I returned also with a message. They want to see an expression of opinion from the British people and from the United Kingdom. It was sad to hear Senator Muskie say that there was probably more support in this House of Commons for the American Administration than there was in the Senate and in Congress. It is clear that to those Americans who care—they number tens of millions—what Britain says and does on this issue
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matters. People look to us to use our voice tonight.
Those of us who have campaigned on issues like Rhodesia, Northern Ireland, Greece, Czechoslovakia, Vietnam, have no double standards. We can stand here and say so proudly. We will oppose tyranny wherever it occurs. If we believe actions to be wrong, in whatever country and in whatever circumstances, we will say so. In that sense, I express no apologies and no qualifications for what I am saying. I call upon the House to make a stand and follow the terms of the resolution of the Labour Party conference.
If my right hon. Friends the Deputy Leader of the Labour Party, the Prime Minister, or the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had been in the United States on that occasion they would have expressed eloquently Her Majesty's Government's case for supporting the American Administration. I was able to stand on a platform and say, "I do not represent any bodies as such, but I can say that what I say represents the official policy of my party and of the Trades Union Congress". I was proud to say that.
The Opposition are not affected by this, because they have not been in it. It concerns the Labour Party. If we believe that people in this country are disillusioned because people are not expressing the views which they should express, and because nobody knows where anybody stands on some of the major issues, we should do something about it. It is not often that we get a chance to stand up and be counted, and I hope that we shall take the opportunity tonight to do just that.
It is not just a matter of influencing people in Britain. Our action will have effects far beyond Britain, and the most important effect will be on the millions of American people who are campaigning courageously for a just policy to be followed by the United States, which means ending the war in Vietnam, reaching a negotiated settlement, and bringing the troops home. If the United States Government are prepared to do that, their prestige will rise, and not be denigrated. I therefore urge my colleagues to support the Motion, That this House do now adjourn.
8.56 p.m.
Mr. Gwynfor Evans: I am pleased to follow the hon. Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme). I find myself in full sympathy with his fine speech. If there is one thing that will unite the House it is the decision to see that the war in Vietnam is brought to a speedy end, but after the speech of President Nixon on 3rd November the prospects of a quick end to the war appear to be rather bleak and we appear to be in for a prolonged war.
The war in Vietnam has touched the consciences of countries all over the world, but no major country has the same kind of responsibility outside the Unites. States as Britain has for what is happening in Vietnam. Our association with imperialism in Vietnam or in Indo-China goes back a long time. A quarter of a century ago we were associated with the efforts of the French to re-establish themselves in that country.
In considering the position in Vietnam today, we should keep in mind that the present phase of the Vietnamese struggle for national liberationx2014;and that is how I view it—begins with a failure—and it was not a Vietnamese failure—to hold a general election in both North and South Vietnam in 1956, although that election had been agreed to in Geneva. Instead, there was the bolstering up of the corrupt Diem régime. The consequence of that was that the country was kept divided, and American imperialism gradually took over from French imperialism, which had failed, and this war is a continuation of what was a French war in Vietnam, or Indo-China.
I object very much to any country outside Vietnam saying that it has the right to say what should happen in that country. I do not think that the Americans have the right to say what should happen in Vietnam. I do not think that the French had the right to say that. I have the same objection to this country saying what should happen in Wales. The people who run the country should be the people of the country, and those who run Vietnam should be the people of Vietnam.
The justification which has been put forward today for the American invasion is the necessity to contain Communism. It seems to me that this is no more than a facade, and that the war has very little
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to do with Communism. I think that almost the same thing would be happening in Vietnam today if China were still under the Manchu dynasty and Russia were ruled by the Tsars. It is a war in the old imperialist mould. Vietnamese nationalism is striving for national freedom and withstanding what is American imperialism, whose base is more than 10,000 miles away. In the same way, Czechoslovakia has recently been withstanding Russian imperialism. I do not think that America has any more right to be involved in Vietnam than Russia has in Czechoslovakia.
A man who should have some judgment on this matter is the head of the Cambodian state. Early last year, in the company of others, I was able to discuss this matter with him. He was sure that a free and united Vietnam would be the sturdiest bulwark against China or against China's Communism, if that is what is feared. He adduced the history of Vietnam in support of this view. The North Vietnamese call themselves Communists and so do the N.L.F. But they are in the first place nationalists, just as the U.S.S.R. is in the first place imperialist. In addition, the radicalism of the N.L.F. policy seems to have little in common with the brutal totalitarianism of Russia.
There may have been some idealism in American imperialism when it invaded Vietnam, but today it is hard to discern any now. It has disappeared from sight as the war has become more and more monstrously obscene. The character of the war has received a great deal of publicity because of the "Pinkville" massacre. This publicity is greatly to the credit of America. No totalitarian country would ever give this kind of publicity to that kind of atrocity. But what is not to America's credit, or indeed to Britain's credit, is that the war in Vietnam has long been known to be one long atrocity.
The American Friends Service Committee has a long and splendid history of service in Vietnam. That committee stated on 5th May, 1969:
"In our judgment the human situation in Vietnam today is worse than it has ever been. The cumulative result of United States involvement, on top of 25 years of warfare, borders not on Vietnam's salvation, but on its death. An entire nation is being physically, morally and spiritually destroyed."

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Nearly two years ago I drew attention in the House to what was happening and the kind of assault which was being made on the civilian population of Vietnam. I told how the civilians, and particularly the children, were being killed and maimed in great numbers.
I then quoted Frank Harvey's definitive study "Air War Vietnam", in which he described how if a forward air control or Huey Long helicopter found anything overtly suspicious the crew were entitled to stir up some action by dropping smoke grenades. If people ran from the smoke and explosion, they were entitled to assume that they had "flushed Charley" and to call in any means of destruction at their disposal. Another proved method of assault in forward bombing was to drop a canister of C.B.Us, which exploded a million or so pellets in a small area. The terrifying effect was called "rolling thunder". If people took evasive action and rushed into houses, they were barbecued with a bath of napalm. If they went into paddies, they were hosed with fire from mini-guns which could fire 6,000 rounds of ammunition a minute. This is the way the war has been fought.
The Prime Minister today said that he was suspending judgment about atrocities until he had final proof that there were atrocities like "Pinkville". I do not think that we need to suspend judgment about atrocities in "Pinkville". We know that it has been going on for years. The kind of attack on civilians that has been going on from the air over the years surely is as much an atrocity as that alleged to have happened in "Pinkville". There is no moral difference at all. Nor can a clear distinction be made between the moral responsibility of men on the spot who do these things and the politicians who send them there and supply them with arms knowing what is done.
It must be clear to the United States Government now that their hope of winning a military victory is just as slight as the French hope was in 1954. Their choice is between a withdrawal and keeping the war going as it is at present in order to keep the country divided and to keep the puppet government in Saigon. We in this country should use our influence, however small, on Washington and on world opinion to change this policy.
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If the Government cast aside their support for the policies of Washington and the Pentagon and backed the powerful radical and humane elements in American life, then they could again find themselves and exercise some degree of moral influence. I hope that the American Government will see their way clear to ceasing all offensive action in Vietnam and will withdraw their troops to the port areas for repatriation, and leave Vietnam to the Vietnamese, as it should be.
9.5 p.m.
Viscount Lambton: We have had a selective debate, rather more so than usual. More than half the hon. Members who have spoken have concentrated on Vietnam. We have had strong pleas for the Americans to get out from the hon. Members for Penistone (Mr. John Mendelson), Salford, West (Mr. Orme) and Carmarthen (Mr. Gwynfor Evans). Obviously the incidents are regrettable, and no one regrets them more than the American Government, but it must be admitted that there never has been a war, and never will be, in which the vicious circle of atrocity and counter-atrocity is not present.
I cannot help thinking it somewhat conspicuous that those hon. Members who are most vehement against the Americans in Vietnam kept remarkably silent during the time of the Egyptian atrocities in the Yemen. Neither did we really hear, despite the remarks that have been made, anything like the protests against what amounted to the Russian rape of Czechoslovakia—
Mr. Andrew Faulds: Absolute codswallop.
Viscount Lambton: —as we have heard against the Americans in this case. In any event these atrocities have not yet been proved. The Prime Minister went out of his way to talk about the alleged atrocities. I could not help noticing that certain hon. Members opposite seem to wish that the atrocity was a fact before it had been proved.
Before the U.S.A. is condemned we should wait and see whether "Pinkville" was, as the Prime Minister puts it, a momentary aberration or part of a deliberate policy of brutality. I have heard no evidence to suggest that this was more than a single, isolated incident.

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Before leaving the subject, it is only fair to remember that a nation has seldom if ever waged a war with such altruistic, some may say misguided, judgment as the Americans have in this campaign. They stand to gain not a single yard of territory. They now wait only for a settlement that will ensure the guaranteed viability of South Vietnam. While it is possible to argue about their wisdom, it is surely impossible to deny the sacrifices of their effort, and to call for their blood on account of one unproven incident is surely the height of folly, especially when, as the hon. Member for Hammersmith, North (Mr. Tomney) pointed out, it is entirely due to American protection that we are allowed to argue freely here today.
The Prime Minister made a somewhat surprising announcement this afternoon—that it is our intention to vote against Greece being a member of the Council of Europe.
Mr. Michael Foot: If the noble Lord is now to leave the question of Vietnam, which has been the main subject of the debate, will he tell us whether the Official Opposition agree with the statements and policies enunciated by President Nixon on 3rd November, even though it is evident on the testimony of many Americans that these policies will lead to an escalation of the war—not merely a continuance of it but an intensification? What is the attitude of the Official Opposition to this statement?
Viscount Lambton: It is not for the Official Opposition to associate itself with the policy of another country. A policy announced by a country is not a thing which this Opposition or any Opposition says that it agrees with in its entirety. It remains for the future to see whether one agrees or not with that of America. That intervention was hardly worthy of the hen. Member.
Let us get back to this question of Greece. We had this curious announcement this afternoon that we are to vote against Greece's membership on the Council of Europe this week. I should like to ask the Foreign Secretary what will be the effect of our vote, and whether the decision of the council has to be unanimous before it can take effect. This is a question to which we should like the answer either tonight or tomorrow,
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since it is very relevant. I am sure that all hon. Members regret the line which the Greek Government have taken during the last year—
Mr. John Lee: Oh, do not overstate it.
Viscount Lambton: To begin with, the Greek Government undoubtedly did much that was good. They did away with many parliamentary abuses, but, of course, the main mistake came when they decided not to have elections—
Mr. Lee: Very trifling.
Viscount Lambton: I think that everyone in the House is in agreement upon this issue, but what is most important, and what I should like to know, is why the decision has been taken to vote against the Greek membership on the Council of Europe now.
Mr. Heffer: Because it is a dictatorship.
Viscount Lambton: Was this decision made now after discussions with Mr. Pipinelis? Has Greece been told that our decision to vote against its membership will be reconsidered if the Government agree to the broadening of their Government within a defined period? Lastly, have the Government considered the special strategic importance of Greece, now that Libya and Turkey are no longer available, as one might say, to American forces and Czechoslovakia also has increased its importance?
But what, above all, is so striking, is the curious timing of this announcement by the Prime Minister. A study of difficult foreign affairs debates will show that nearly always an announcement is made in them. In one, the Prime Minister announced his intention to go to the United States of America, in another that he was to go to the U.S.S.R., in another that the hon. Member for Leek (Mr. Harold Davies) was going on a pathetic trip to the Far East, in another that we were going to withdraw our forces from the Middle East. In fact, it is either remarkably coincidental that these announcements come to be made at a time of a difficult foreign affairs debate for the Government, when the Left wing had to be placated, or else the Prime Minister is using Foreign Office decisions

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as weapons to still opposition in these debates. That would seem to be a very dubious policy.
One subject was, curiously enough, omitted from our discussion today, and it seems to me rather odd that the Prime Minister did not deal with it, concentrating as he did on two areas in which, although we may have great interests, we have very little power. There has occurred what is surely of the greatest relevance, the first sign for many years of an entente between East and West Germany. Yet we have heard no word at all from the Prime Minister on this subject, which is of the greatest importance to us, as it must be to the Minister who is negotiating with Europe.
It is far too soon even to hope that any agreement will be possible. At the same time, it is difficult to remember a period when Moscow has appeared so conciliatory and when Western Germany has appeared so mobile in its thoughts. If some agreement could be brought about between East and West Germany it is difficult to see how that would not lead to closer co-operation between East and West as a whole, while the possible establishment of a demilitarised zone, too, cannot be ignored.
It is far too early to be optimistic about the outcome of those proposals and their long-term implications. At the same time, when one considers how great would be the changes which would occur if this entente were to be reached and if there were an ending to the armed European confrontation, it is odd that the Prime Minister did not give more examination to this problem today. It offers more hope to Europe than anything has offered for a considerable time. It could be that it is one of the opportunities which suddenly occur and should be seized.
I turn to a different subject—our relationship with Libya. The Minister who is to wind up the debate seemed to confuse the House this afternoon when he did not make plain who was the present head of the Libyan State. If one is not certain who is the Head of State or who is the Head of Government, how does one recognise that Government? What process does one go through? Does one leave a blank and fill in that blank
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later when one finds out the name of the appropriate person? It seems to me very curious. As far as I can remember, it is the first time that we have ever recognised a Government without knowing who was the head of State at the time. When we recognised the Iraqi Government after the fall of Nuri many years ago it was done very quickly, but at least we knew that we were recognising the Government of General Kassem. But who is the Head of State of Libya today? We are told that this recognition is vital. We should be told who was recognised and what was the process of recognition.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery) asked whether it was our intention to continue to sell arms to Libya. This is a most important question to which we need an answer. Another question to which I should like an answer is: are we in these negotiations differentiating between the continuance of the base and the use of the training grounds in Libya, which I understand are irreplaceable? Whereas it may be impossible for us to argue that we should maintain the bases against the wishes of the Libyan Government, if we are to continue to sell arms to Libya it is important that the future of these training grounds should be negotiated closely. The Minister may not wish to discuss this, but we should be grateful for enlightenment about it.
Another point concerning our Middle East policy which I should like explained, and which has gone unexplained for too long, concerns a sentence in Resolution 242 which was presented by the United Kingdom and was later adopted at the Security Council meeting on 22nd November, 1967. That resolution was at the time hailed as a triumph of British diplomacy. What I should like to know is what this sentence in it means. As I understand it, it can mean two things to two different people. It says:
The withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict.'
This was to be brought about to fulfil the Charter principles required for the establishment of a just and lasting peace. I really should like to press the Foreign Secretary about what this sentence means, because when it was put forward it was only accepted by the Israelis because they

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saw that the word "all" had been excluded from before "territories", and it was only accepted by the Arab States because they believed it meant that all territories should be returned to them.
During the two years or so since the war finished, each side has taken up a very adamant position, and each believes that it is working within the resolution of the United Nations. It is time that our Government should say precisely what this sentence means. Is it the policy of the Government that this is meant to mean that the Israelis should withdraw from all territories, or only from certain territories? This really is a key question indeed, and I hope we shall get it answered.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) has put forward a certain scheme for the solving of the problem of the Middle East over a period of years. It is extremely doubtful that anyone now can suggest that any package deal will be acceptable to either the Arab countries or Israel at this time. Therefore, what we want to have is a part package deal which can be reached in certain stages. The propositions my right hon. Friend put forward are: first, that there should be Arab recognition of Israel; second, that there should be Israeli withdrawal to prearranged frontiers on a timetable alder supervision and international guarantee; third, the demilitarisation of the areas evacuated and the installation of an early warning system on the Israeli frontier of the Suez Canal; fourth, the provision of a United Nations police force, whose position is guaranteed by the four Powers; fifth, the resettlement of Arab refugees; and sixth, inter-Church agreement on the Holy Places.
If we look at the Middle East as a whole with all its troubles, I think it is impossible to deny that no settlement is likely to be made except in stages. One wonders whether the Government hold this sort of view, because I once again repeat that it seems to me rather odd that today we should in this debate have concentrated on areas which may be of sentimental interest to us but where we have no actual interests and very little power indeed, and I hope that tomorrow we shall have a more realistic appraisal of some of the areas which are of the greatest interest to us and far nearer
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home than those which have been discussed today.
Mr. George Brown: The hon. Gentleman said there was a proposition by his right hon. Friend to reach this package deal by stages, and he said, very deliberately, that stage one was the Arab recognition of Israel, and stage two thereafter would be the question of Israeli withdrawal. Is that really what his right hon. Friend has proposed?
Viscount Lambton: I did not say the order in which they should be taken. If there is any other method than approaching this subject in a piecemeal way, I do not know what it is. Surely this is better than to watch the situation gradually deteriorate, with the likelihood of a third Israeli war drawing nearer all the time.
Let me turn further afield in the Middle East to the Gulf area, which was also mentioned by my right hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Pavilion. The situation in the Gulf is, unfortunately, precisely what we on this side of the House prophesied it would be if an announcement of withdrawal were made. Already, in an area which has known almost absolute peace for 15 years, seeds of dissent have been sown. Our policy in this area where we have such vast oil interests should surely be that of stabilisation. How can it be said that we have done anything whatever to help the stabilisation of the area when our actions have already resulted in a confrontation between Persia and Saudi Arabia, the two powers in the area which, above all, should be united and friendly to each other, and which are now, to put it mildly, extremely distrustful of each other.
Then there is the shotgun federation of which we have heard so much. Only a year ago we were told that these six little States were comfortably working together and would soon unite in a federation which would be an example to the world. We have heard this about federations before, and I do not think that there has ever been a federation, even those which we ourselves put forward, that has had so little chance of success as the proposed Gulf federation which was absolutely out of the blue thrust on to the Trucial States by a Government who suddenly decided to withdraw.

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Also in this area there is the dangerous creation of private armies. Private armies always have been double-edged instruments. They can turn against the State as easily as they can defend it, and in an area with so little tradition of stability it is too much to hope that the creation of private armies will be advantageous. What is the policy of Her Majesty's Government towards the creation of these armies? Is it their intention that they should be staffed with British officers? Are we planning to make preferential arrangements for them, or will they have to recruit entirely on their own? What sort of relationships are we to have with them?
Are we still adamant about our determination to retire from the Gulf by 1971? This is an area where we have the greatest reserves of oil in the world, where more British capital is tied up than anywhere else overseas, and where our expenditure on the maintenance of peace was approximately £10 million to £15 million a year. As has been said, it is an area which we have vacated and left to almost inevitable chaos in the future. But it is not yet too late. The Government need not necessarily make the final fatal mistake. An opportunity still exists for them to retrieve some of the mistakes that they have made, as it does over the supply of arms to South Africa.
All along the line we have a most depressing view to look at. At no time before has this country ever appeared to be in such a period of decline, and I do not think that the contribution made by many hon. Gentlemen opposite has done much to raise us in the esteem of the world.
9.30 p.m.
The Joint Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Evan Luard): This has been a lively debate in which a number of strongly felt, though sometimes widely differing, views have been expressed. I will answer as best I can some of the points that have been raised, but I will devote my remarks primarily to the subject of Vietnam, which was the main subject for discussion today.
Before dealing with Vietnam, I will answer some other questions that were
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asked. I will not, however, deal with many of the other points, including the question of Europe, the issue of the European security conference or the new relations between East and West Germany, to which the noble Lord the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Viscount Lambton) referred, particularly since they will be dealt with in tomorrow's debate, when my right hon. Friends the Foreign Secretary and the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster will deal with those matters.
First, the question of the Middle East. The right hon. Member for Bridlington (Mr. Wood) asked if it was the policy of Her Majesty's Government to, as he put it, put flesh on the bare bones of Resolution 242 of the United Nations Security Council in the discussions of the Four in New York. In particular, he asked about our policy on demilitarised zones and guarantees for Israel.
The position is very much that Her Majesty's Government hope that one outcome of the discussions in New York between the Four will be that we shall be able to provide more detailed guidelines for Ambassador Jarring in his mission to the Middle East than he has by virtue of Resolution 242 alone; and it is on this basis that the discussions are now taking place in New York.
I do not think that the right hon. Gentleman would expect me to go in detail into the questions he asked about our policy on individual aspects of this matter, but it is certainly the case that we expect both of the questions to which he referred to be discussed at the meeting of the Four, and probably both of them will form an element of the new mandate which may be given to Ambassador Jarring.
The noble Lord and the right hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery) raised a number of points concerning Libya. In addition, the right hon. Member for Bridlington asked a large number of detailed questions. He will not expect me to answer them immediately tonight. However, I will take the opportunity to write to him with as full an answer as I can to some of the points he raised. In the meantime, I will answer some of the principal matters that were raised in this connection.

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I was asked about the identity of the Revolutionary Command Council, the existing Government and régime in Libya. It is true that for a short time there was a certain amount of mystery over this question. During the last two or three weeks, however, much more information has become available about the personalities involved. The right hon. Member for Bridlington will know that we are today starting negotiations with members of that Government and that inevitably, as a result of that, we are acquiring greater knowledge of some of the personalities involved.
I was then asked about the flow of oil from Libya. I can give the right hon. Member for Bridlington an assurance that, according to our information, oil is flowing more freely now than at any time in the past. We must also bear in mind the fact that the new Libyan Government told us, almost immediately after their formation, that it was their intention to respect existing contracts. It is our hope that we can maintain the existing position as far as the oil companies are concerned.
The questions of the negotiations which are now about to begin and the future of our military relationship with Libya also received comment. It is our object, as I think the House knows, to establish a totally new relationship with the new Government of Libya. The original agreement was intended primarily for the defence of Libya at Libya's request. If Libya no longer wishes that defence, then it is not for us to impose such a relationship on that country.
As for our military facilities, it is certainly our hope that, in these discussions, we may be able to arrive at mutually acceptable arrangements which will, as far as possible, meet the interests of both countries.
My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Ipswich (Sir Dingle Foot) and the noble Lord asked about the meaning of Resolution 242, and the reference in it to
"…withdrawal from territories occupied in the recent conflict …"
They asked me what Her Majesty's Government's position was. The simple answer is that the Government abide by the resolution, and by the formula used in it:
"…withdrawal from territories occupied in the recent conflict…"
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I was asked whether this meant all territories. The possibility of including the word "all" was considered when the resolution was passed, but, as the House knows, the resolution does not contain the word. It would not be sensible for me to give my own personal interpretation or, indeed, the Government's interpretation of that resolution, because these matters are at this very moment being discussed among the four Powers in New York. They are discussing exactly what type of withdrawal should take place, and it is for them to reach their interpretation on exactly how this should be applied in the case of the two territories concerned.
Viscount Lambton: Then the Government are not committed to the understanding that the resolution means withdrawal from all territories?
Mr. Luard: I have just explained that the Government are committed to the formula used in the resolution:
"…withdrawal from territories occupied in the recent conflict…"
My right hon. and learned Friend referred to what my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary said during the debate on the Queen's Speech. If he studies my right hon. Friend's speech, and the sentence in it of which he spoke, he will realise that the use of the word "the" could not grammatically be avoided in the sentence. It was not intended to imply any change in the policy of Her Majesty's Government.
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: The Minister has said that the Government stick by the formula which was used in the resolution, but he then says that it is open to interpretation by the four Powers and, perhaps, to adjustment. Is that the situation?
Mr. Luard: I did not say anything about adjustment. I said that the formula used was used deliberately in the original Security Council resolution, and was part of a package which included reference to other things, such as secure and recognised boundaries. It would have been quite impossible, perhaps, to have obtained passage of the resolution at all if everything had been spelt out in such detail as the right hon. Gentleman now suggests.
I move to the other point raised—
Mr. Edward Heath: The Foreign Secretary himself told the House the week before last, and the Prime Minister confirmed to me during Question Time last week, that the British Government's interpretation of the resolution was not withdrawal from all territories; that the Government's understanding was withdrawal from territories such as are compatible with secure frontiers. Why cannot the hon. Gentleman say so?
Mr. Luard: We are abiding exactly by the resolution, which says withdrawal from territories. It is true that that wording can be interpreted in more than one way. If the phrase "all territories" had been wanted, it would have been included in the resolution in the first place. It must be taken in the context of the resolution as a whole—
Mr. Heath: I must press the hon. Gentleman on this question. The House is entitled to know our own Government's interpretation. It is not sufficient to say that the resolution is open to a number of interpretations— we all know that, and it is from this that so much trouble in the Middle East has stemmed. We wish to know Her Majesty's Government's interpretation of the resolution.
Mr. Luard: I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman is aware that there are going on at this very time extremely delicate discussions on this question in New York. It is not for me to give a unilateral interpretation of the meaning of this crucial phrase in the resolution while those discussions are going on. I want to move on to the question raised by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Ipswich and others about the Persian Gulf—
Sir Dingle Foot Sir Dingle Foot rose—
Mr. R. T. Paget Mr. R. T. Paget (Northampton) rose—
Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Member must decide to whom he is giving way, if he is giving way to anyone.
Mr. Luard: I am not giving way.
We have had considerable discussion on that point and I want to move to the question of the Persian Gulf, which was raised—
Mr. Paget Mr. Paget rose—
Mr. Speaker: Order.
Mr. Luard: My right hon. and learned Friend asked what would be the position after 1971 and whether it was the intention of Her Majesty's Government to provide some kind of technical assistance to the states of the region. This is not a question on which any final decision has yet been reached, but I am sure that he knows that it is our hope to replace our existing relationship, which is based partly on the presence of our military forces in the area, by one in which economic relations will play a much more important part. If at that time there are requests for assistance of the kind my right hon. and learned Friend described, they will be considered by Her Majesty's Government.
Sir Dingle Foot: Will my hon. Friend deal specifically with the other point I raised, about participation by a British firm in oil drilling in occupied territory?
Mr. Luard: My right hon. and learned Friend knows that this was discussed at Question Time today. I have nothing to add to what I said then. The matter is being carefully considered by the Government who are concerned about this question.
I must now turn to the question of Vietnam, which is the main subject of this debate. When confronting the question of Vietnam we come up against problems similar in many ways to those which will be discussed tomorrow over Nigeria; some of the most important but also most difficult questions which are faced in the field of foreign policy. How can the influence of the Government best be used in the interests of peace? Does the mere fact that in both these issues we are clearly much closer to one party in the conflict than to another inhibit and weaken our influence for peace over these disputes, or give us a greater influence over the course of events than otherwise we would have?
Does the fact that incidents may occur which we deplore or methods of war are being used of which we disapprove mean that we should totally repudiate an ally engaged in a war of this kind; or, on the contrary, make it even more important that we should retain our capacity to influence and to restrain?

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Can peace best be secured and policies best be influenced by raising our arms in horror at certain aspects of policy and turning our backs altogether; or does this make it all the more important to retain the maximum possible influence with the parties to the dispute?
In what I say today I want first to consider some of the issues about which this conflict is being fought; secondly, to consider the policy of Her Majesty's Government and some of the criticisms of it raised today; and, finally, to look at some of the policies of some of the participants in the conflict, especially the United States and North Vietnam.
Much has been said in the debate about the horrors of the death and destruction in this war and, in particular, about certain incidents which have been very widely reported in the last few weeks. I think that all of us deplore those reports that have occurred.
I fully understand the concern that has been expressed in certain speeches in the debate, which reflects the anxiety widely felt in this country as a whole. But I suggest that the main conclusion to be drawn from these reports is that they indicate more clearly than ever the immediate urgency of trying to secure a ceasefire and peace in that war as a whole. If we want to bring incidents and methods of this kind to an end, the surest way to do so is to try to bring peace and an end to the conflict as a whole. If we were to be asked what is the principal issue about which this war is being fought, I think that most of us, and the parties to the war, would agree that the key and crucial issue is that of self-determination and whether the people of Vietnam are to be ruled by a Government of which they themselves approve and which they themselves think representative.
This, after all, is what the war is about Each side claims to be more representative of the people as a whole than the other. If we wish to resolve this conflict, the only way to do it is by testing, in a way that will be approved and evident to the world as a whole, what the wishes of the people are—that is, by finding some procedure by which the people of Vietnam can choose their own future, their own Government, their own political destiny, in a way which cannot be challenged either by those within Vietnam or by those outside.
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If the people of Vietnam are to be allowed this right, there are two conditions which must be fulfilled. First, peace must be restored in Vietnam. Secondly, some mutually acceptable procedure must be found, whether by a referendum or by elections—
Mr. Ronald Atkins: What about the Geneva Agreement?
Mr. Luard: I am coming to that question—whether by a referendum or by elections, through which the people of Vietnam as a whole can have the opportunity to express their views about their political future.
Those two elements are mutually interdependent. There cannot be an effective act of self-determination in South Vietnam unless there is also peace—not, for example, while different parts of the country are being held by different forces. There cannot be peace, certainly not permanent peace, unless there has been an act of self-determination which is accepted as valid by the people of South Vietnam as a whole, so that it no longer becomes possible for either element within the population to claim that the Government are not representative of the people as a whole.
If it is accepted that those two elements are essential in any satisfactory settlement in Vietnam, I would like to examine the policies of the British Government, on the one hand, and of some of the participants, on the other, against this test.
I do not believe that the most bitter critic of Her Majesty's Government could claim that they have not done everything within their power to bring a settlement to Vietnam and so to restore peace to Vietnam and to provide self-determination for Vietnam.
Mr. Thorpe: Will the Under-Secretary address himself to this situation? When war was previously waging in Indo-China, as it was, Britain, from a position of complete neutrality under Mr. Attlee, was capable of dissuading the French from using nuclear weapons at Dien Bien Phu. Likewise, under a Conservative Administration, Sir Anthony Eden, as Foreign Secretary, to his eternal credit, from an equal position of neutrality was able to bring about the Geneva Conference and get all the parties to the dispute round a table; because Britain

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was totally neutral and was, therefore, an honest broker. Is the hon. Gentleman suggesting that our position of total commitment has made us stronger or weaker?
Mr. Luard: The right hon. Gentleman has got his chronology somewhat wrong, because Mr. Attlee was not Prime Minister at the time of Dien Bien Phu, which occurred in 1954. However, on the general point raised by the right hon. Gentleman, I shall come later to consider the question whether we would have greater influence or less if we adopted a position of total detachment from this conflict. I ask the right hon. Gentleman to wait until I reach that passage of my speech.
I was saying that I do not think that it can reasonably be asserted that the present Government have not done everything in their power to try to bring about a settlement of this conflict. We have over and over again asked the Soviet Government, as the other co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference, whether they would agree to the reconvening of the Geneva Conference; and over and over again that request has been refused.
Almost as soon as this Government came to power my right hon. Friend the Member for Leyton (Mr. Gordon Walker) made a tour of South-East Asia to explore the possibility of a settlement. Only a few months after that my right hon. Friend the Member for Leek (Mr. Harold Davies) also visited the area to see whether we could obtain the entry of a Commonwealth peace mission to both halves of Vietnam. A year later my right hon. Friend the Member for Beler (Mr. George Brown) made his proposal for a settlement and introduced it in New York at the United Nations, based on the idea of a conference, of a cease-fire and elections for everybody in South Vietnam. A few months later at the beginning of 1967, when Mr. Kosygin was here, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister did everything in his power to bridge the gap between the two sides. At the same time, while discussions were taking place here in London with Mr. Kosygin, efforts were being made in Washington to bring the two sides closer together. Apart from these specific initiatives, my right hon. Friends the
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Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary have travelled to Moscow, Washington and many other places in an effort to arrive at a settlement.
Finally, we have given our support to a large number of initiatives of other kinds by other Governments designed to bring about a settlement and, above all, to try to involve the United Nations in bringing about a settlement of this conflict.
It is true that these attempts have not produced the results we hoped, but it is not true to say that our influence has never had any impact on the war. The Government made their views known clearly on the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong, and eventually that policy was stopped. Secondly, as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister mentioned earlier this afternoon, we have made known our views about the bombing of the north, and that policy also was finally changed. Therefore, it would be wrong to conclude that on specific points, as against the war as a whole, the expression of our views has been without influence.
Mr. Peter M. Jackson Mr. Peter M. Jackson (The High Peak) rose—
Mr. Luard: I am sorry, but I cannot give way now. I think that I am just about to come to the point which my hon. Friend was about to raise.
During this debate it has been suggested that we could increase our influence if we were to dissociate ourselves totally from the policies pursued by the United States in Vietnam.
Mr. Jackson: That is not the point that I was going to raise.
Mr. Luard: It is important to make a distinction here as to what kind of dissociation we are talking about. If what is intended is to make clear our views about specific actions or elements of policy—for example, the incidents which are reported to have taken place 18 months ago—it is always open to this Government to make clear their views. Indeed, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister made very clear how he felt about such incidents if they should prove to have taken place.
Mrs. Winifred Ewing Mrs. Winifred Ewing (Hamilton) rose—
Mr. Luard: No, I will not give way.
Mrs. Ewing Mrs. Ewing rose—
Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman is obviously not giving way.
Mr. Luard: Secondly, dissociation could be taken to refer to a particular policy over a particular period, such as the bombing of the north or the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong. Again the Government have expressed their views from time to time, and it would be rash to say that this has not had any influence.
But if what is meant—and I think this is what is meant by some of my hon. Friends—is dissociation altogether from the policies and objectives pursued by the United Nations in South Vietnam, that is an altogether different question. If what is intended is dissociation from the declared aim of the United States of allowing the people of South Vietnam to choose their own future through free elections with international supervision, as they have declared and demanded, certainly this Government could not dissociate itself from that objective because it is the objective of Her Majesty's Government.
Mrs. Ewing: Do I understand the hon. Gentleman to say that because the Government's policy has condemned some specific incidents which they could hardly do anything but condemn, this makes up for the fact that we are pretending to be neutral while we are actually supporting the policy of the United States?
Mr. Luard: I have made a distinction between different kinds of dissociation. If the hon. Lady was not listening, I cannot repeat what I have already said.
I want to move on to discuss the policies of the United States and North Vietnam, which is very relevant to the question of the policy which Her Majesty's Government should be pursuing. What offers have been made by these two parties—outside parties—to the conflict which seem likely to bring it to an end and to secure peace, a cease-fire and self-determination in South Vietnam? From which side have the main moves come which have been made in the last year or 18 months?
There is one immediate and glaring contrast which can be noted. The United
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States has already withdrawn a considerable number of forces—nearly 60,000 of its troops, I believe—from South Vietnam. It is continuing to withdraw a further number of troops, and it has announced that it will withdraw all its troops if it receives reciprocation from the other side, and in any case will ultimately withdraw all its combat troops from South Vietnam.
What has North Vietnam offered? It has so far not withdrawn any troops, so far as is known. It is not withdrawing troops at the present time. On the contrary, it appears to have reinforced its forces in the south within the last few weeks or months. Nor has it given any undertaking to withdraw troops in the future.
This is not a new change. The United States under President Johnson offered, three or four years ago, to withdraw its forces, provided that the North Vietnamese did the same, and offered free elections under international supervision. More recently, in April last year, the United States offered to halt the bombing of the north and to begin negotiations in Paris. During those negotiations it has made several unilateral concessions, including the beginning of withdrawal of its forces. Only a month ago, President Nixon reaffirmed these unilateral withdrawals of United States forces and announced that the United States would withdraw all forces if the North Vietnamese would do the same.
What have we had from North Vietnam in response to these offers? What has North Vietnam done either to reduce the intensity of the fighting in the south through withdrawal of any of its forces or to make any commitment about a free test of the wishes of the people under international supervision? This is the test by which we must judge the policies of the two outside contestants in this war.
What hope does the policy of North Vietnam in its own country give that it will allow a free and fair assessment of the wishes of the people in the south? What confidence does the policy of the slaughter of village leaders, which has been pursued by the North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces for a considerable time, give that they wish to allow the people of South Vietnam to choose their own future in peace?

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I am sorry to say that the evidence on all these points does not give much hope that the North Vietnamese are seriously interested in allowing self-determination by the people of South Vietnam as a whole. If some of my hon. Friends who have been eloquent in the debate today would use some of their eloquence to try to persuade North Vietnam to make offers of withdrawal by its forces from South Vietnam similar to those which have been made by the United States, they might do more in the cause of peace than by trying to induce this Government to change their policy.
Mr. John Mendelson Mr. John Mendelson rose in his place and claimed to move, That the Question be now put, but Mr. SPEAKER withheld his assent and declined then to put that Question.
Mr. Luard: Let us be realistic. The influence which this Government have is in any case limited. But if at this stage, just when the United States has modified its policy and is beginning to withdraw its forces, we were to repudiate the United States, we should totally destroy whatever influence we have. Let us be realistic—
Mr. John Mendelson Mr. John Mendelson rose in his place and claimed to move, That the Question be now put.
Question, That the Question be now put,put and agreed to.
Question put accordingly, That this House do now adjourn:—
The House divided: Ayes 57, Noes 196.

Division No. 28.]

AYES

[10.1 p.m.

Abse, Leo

Faulds, Andrew

Newens, Stan

Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)

Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)

Noel-Baker, Rt Hn. Philip

Ashton, Joe (Bassetlaw)

Foot, Michael (Ebbw Vale)

Norwood, Christopher

Atkins, Ronald (Preston, N.)

Gardner, Tony

Owen, Will (Morpeth)

Atkinson, Norman (Tottenham)

Gregory, Arnold

Park, Trevor

Barnes, Michael

Crimond, Rt. Hn. J.

Parkyn, Brian (Bedford)

Bidwell, Sydney

Hamilton, William (Fife, W.)

Perry, George H. (Nottingham, S.)

Blenkinsop, Arthur

Hooson, Emlyn

Price, Christopher (Perry Bar)

Booth, Albert

Jackson, Peter M. (High Peak)

Roberts, Gwilym (Bedfordshire, S.)

Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow Provan)

Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)

Rose, Paul

Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)

Johnston, Russell (Inverness)

Short, Mrs. Renée(W'hampton,N.E.)

Carter-Jones, Lewis

Kelley, Richard

Silverman, Julius

Davidson, James(Aberdeenshire, W.)

Kerr, Dr. David (W'worth, Central)

Steel, David (Roxburgh)

Davies, Ednyfed Hudson (Conway)

Latham, Arthur

Thorpe, Rt. Hn. Jeremy

Davies, S. O. (Merthyr)

Lee, John (Reading)

Winnick, David

Dickens, James

Lewis, Arthur (W. Ham, N.)

Driberg, Tom

Lubbock, Eric

TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

English, Michael

Macdonald, A. H.

Mr. Stanley Orme and

Evans, Fred (Caerphilly)

Mackenzie, Alasdair(Ross&Crom'ty)

Mr. Eric S. Heffer.

Evans, Gwynfor (C'marthen)

Mendelson, John

Ewing, Mrs. Winifred

Miller, Dr. M. S.

NOES

Albu, Austen

Dalyell, Tam

Forrester, John

Alldritt, Walter

Darling, Rt. Hn. George

Fowler, Gerry

Allen, Scholefield

Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)

Fraser, John (Norwood)

Armstrong, Ernest

Davies, Dr. Ernest (Stretford)

Freeson, Reginald

Ashley, Jack

Davies, Rt. Hn. Harold (Leek)

Ginsburg, David

Bagier, Gordon A. T.

Davies, Ifor (Gower)

Golding, John

Bence, Cyril

de Freitas, Rt. Hn. Sir Geoffrey

Gordon Walker, Rt. Hn. P. C.

Benn, Rt. Hn. Anthony Wedgwood

Delargy, Hugh

Greenwood, Rt. Hn. Anthony

Bessell, Peter

Dell, Edmund

Grey, Charles (Durham)

Binns, John

Dewar, Donald

Griffiths, Eddie (Brightside)

Boston, Terence

Dobson, Ray

Gunter, Rt. Hn. R. J.

Boyden, James

Doig, Peter

Hamilton, James (Bothwell)

Bradley, Tom

Dunn, James A.

Hamling, William

Brown, Rt. Hn. George (Belper)

Dunnett, Jack

Hannan, William

Brown,Bob(N'c'tle-upon-Tyne,W.)

Dunwoody, Mrs. Gwyneth (Exeter)

Harper, Joseph

Brown, R. W. (Shoreditch & F'bury)

Dunwoody, Dr. John (F'th & C'b'e)

Harris, Reader (Heston)

Buchan, Norman

Edwards, William (Merioneth)

Hart, Rt. Hn. Judith

Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)

Ennals, David

Haseldine, Norman

Callaghan, Rt. Hn. James

Ensor, David

Hattersley, Roy

Carmichael, Neil

Evans, loan L. (Birm'h'm, Yardley)

Hazell, Bert

Castle, Rt. Hn. Barbara

Finch, Harold

Healey, Rt. Hn. Denis

Concannon, J. D.

Fitch, Alan (Wigan)

Henig, Stanley

Crawshaw, Richard

Fletcher,Rt.Hn.Sir Eric(Islington,E.)

Hilton, W. S.

Cronin, John

Foot, Rt. Hn. Sir Dingle (Ipswich)

Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas

Crosland, Rt. Hn. Anthony

Ford, Ben

Howarth, Robert (Bolton, E.)

Howie, W.

Maxwell, Robert

Silkin, Hn. S. C. (Dulwich)

Hoy, Rt. Hn. James

Mayhew, Christopher

Skeffington, Arthur

Hughes, Rt. Hn. Cledwyn (Anglesey)

Mellish, Rt. Hn. Robert

Slater, Joseph

Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)

Milne, Edward (Blyth)

Small, William

Hunter, Adam

Mitchell, R. C. (S'th'pton, Test)

Snow, Julian

Hynd, John

Molloy, William

Spriggs, Leslie

Jay, Rt. Hn. Douglas

Moonman, Eric

Stewart, Rt. Hn. Michael

Jeger, George (Goole)

Morgan, Elyslan (Cardiganshire)

Strauss, Rt. Hn. G. R.

Johnson, Carol (Lewisham, S.)

Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)

Taverne, Dick

Johnson, James (K'ston-on-Hull, W.)

Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)

Thomas, Rt. Hn. George

Jones, Dan (Burnley)

Morris, John (Aberavon)

Thomson, Rt. Hn. George

Jones,Rt.Hn.Sir Elwyn(W.Ham,S.)

Mulley, Rt. Hn. Frederick

Thornton, Ernest

Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)

Murray, Albert

Tinn, James

Lawson, George

Oakes, Gordon

Tomney, Frank

Lee, Rt. Hn. Jennie (Cannock)

Ogden, Eric

Urwin, T. W.

Lestor, Miss Joan

O'Halloran, Michael

Varley, Eric G.

Lever, Rt. Hn. Harold (Cheetham)

O'Malley, Brian

Wainwright, Edwin (Dearne Valley)

Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)

Oram, Albert E.

Walden, Brian (All Saints)

Lomas, Kenneth

Oswald, Thomas

Walker, Harold (Doncaster)

Loughlin, Charles

Owen, Dr. David (Plymouth, S'tn)

Wallace, George

Luard, Evan

Page, Derek (King's Lynn)

Watkins, David (Consett)

Lyon, Alexander W. (York)

Paget, R. T.

Watkins, Tudor (Brecon & Radnor)

Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.)

Pannell, Rt. Hn. Charles

Weitzman, David

Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson

Parker, John (Dagenham)

Wellbeloved, James

McCann, John

Pavitt, Laurence

Wells, William (Walsall, N.)

MacColl, James

Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred

Whitaker, Ben

MacDermot, Niall

Pentland, Norman

White, Mrs. Eirene

McGuire, Michael

Price, William (Rugby)

Whitlock, William

McKay, Mrs. Margaret

Probert, Arthur

Wilkins, W. A.

Mackenzie, Gregor (Rutherglen)

Randall, Harry

Willey, Rt. Hn. Frederick

Mackie, John

Rankin, John

Williams, Alan (Swansea, w.)

McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.)

Roberts, Albert (Normanton)

Williams, Clifford (Abertillery)

McNamara, J. Kevin

Roberts, Rt. Hn. Goronwy

Williams, Mrs. Shirley (Hitchin)

MacPherson, Malcolm

Robinson, Rt. Hn. Kenneth (St.P'c'as)

Willis, Rt. Hn. George

Mahon, Simon (Bootle)

Rodgers, William (Stockton)

Wilson, Rt. Hn. Harold (Huyton)

Mallalieu,J.P.W. (Huddersfield, E.)

Roebuck, Roy

Woof, Robert

Manuel, Archie

Rogers, George (Kensington, N.)

Wyatt, Woodrow

Mapp, Charles

Ross, Rt. Hn. William

Marks, Kenneth

Rowlands, E.

TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

Marquand, David

Shaw, Arnold (Ilford, S.)

Mr. Ernest G. Perry and

Marsh, Rt. Hn. Richard

Shore, Rt. Hn. Peter (Stepney)

Mr. Neil McBride.

Mawby, Ray

Silkin, Rt. Hn. John (Deptford)

MILK MARKETING SCHEME
10.10 p.m.
The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Mr. James Hoy): I beg to move,
That the Amendment of the Milk Marketing Scheme 1933, as amended, a draft of which was laid before this House on 29th October, be approved.
The Milk Marketing Scheme—[Interruption.]
Mr. Speaker: Order. We still have more work to do.
Mr. Hoy: The Milk Marketing Scheme for England and Wales came into operation in 1933. Since then, all producers of milk for sale have been required to register with the Milk Marketing Board. The board controls the sale of milk off farms and ensures that it is sold so as to secure the best obtainable return for producers. It buys all milk produced for sale by wholesale and grants licences to those producers who wish to sell their milk by retail. Distributors and manufacturers buy from the Board.
My right hon. Friend controls both the board's first-hand selling price and the maximum retail prices of milk for liquid consumption in England and Wales, as well as the margins allowed by the board to distributors and depots; the board negotiates the best prices it can get for milk going for manufacture; these vary according to the product for which the milk is to be used.
Demand for the liquid market in England and Wales is steady at something over 4 million gallons a day. But milk production is highly seasonal, so that providing for this consumption in winter means that a surplus arises in spring and early summer. Further, the total output over the year cannot be precisely controlled. So it is essential to have a reserve of production over the requirements of the liquid market. At the seasonal peak, the flow of milk coming off farms can be so great that manufacturers may be hard pressed to deal with it. For all these reasons the board undertakes some manufacturing regularly, and also owns factories and plant which are brought into use at peak periods only.
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The board also has a large transport fleet and some wholesale and retail depots. Its transport consists, to a large extent, of tankers designed to collect from bulk tanks on farms; these tankers are specialised and expensive and the board has not found private hauliers very ready to invest in them. The board originally acquired retail businesses in settlement of debts for milk supplies: it then took a small interest in wholesaling and has since acquired more retail businesses to keep its wholesaling viable.
But these interests are small. Board wholesaling accounted in the year ended 30th September, 1969, for only 3·5 per cent. of all liquid milk sold by wholesale. The board is not empowered to issue shares on the market, though it may borrow. It therefore finances its capital investments by raising money from registered producers. Under the original scheme of 1933, the board could require each registered producer to contribute up to 1s. annually for every milch cow. From this, the board had to finance its investment, administrative costs and all other expenses.
In 1955, the scheme was extensively amended, with the approval of Parliament. One of the amendments abolished the original method of financing the board: instead, the board was empowered to finance its operations from its trading revenues. It could also require each registered producer to contribute up to one farthing for each gallon of milk he sold during a year. Both these provisions still apply. I will refer to the first, for convenience, as the revenue method and to the second as the levy method.
The board raises finance under the revenue method by reducing the price which it pays to producers for their milk. Its revenues from trading in milk are thus increased, but these, of course, are subject to tax in the hands of the board. Up to 1964, the board raised all the money it needed in this way. In 1964, however, the Inland Revenue ruled that money raised from producers by the levy method and used solely for capital purposes would not be subject to tax in the hands of the board. The principle governing the treatment of contributions for capital purposes is one of general application, but its relevance to the

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Milk Marketing Board levy was in doubt trail the Inland Revenue gave its ruling.
The board therefore began to raise finance from producers in this way, using the proceeds for capital purposes only. By this means, a given amount of board capital expenditure could be financed at a lower cost to the producers than would have been the case if the money had been raised by the revenue method. The board continued to finance its current expenditure by the revenue method. The board now needs extra capital for development.
I have already referred to the need for seasonal manufacturing capacity to supplement that available within the trade. The board has acquired seventeen new creameries and dairies and two cheese stores since 1961 and further developments are planned. Substantial re-equipment and modernisation is also proposed. In other directions the board's activities have also expanded in recent years. New transport depots have been set up and the number of lorries owned has increased. More tankers, also, have had to be added to the board's fleet as a result of the growth of bulk collection.
The board expects further developments in this particular field and in certain of its other interests, for instance, in artificial insemination. This is why it needs more than the £2¼ million yielded annually by the present farthing levy. The amendment now before the House would raise the maximum rate of levy to ½d. per gallon, which would produce on present sales a total of £4½ million annually.
The fact that the halfpenny has been demonetised is, of course, immaterial in this context, since the halfpenny is not to be paid over physically—in this connection it is merely a calculating factor. Nor does it follow that the full amount will be levied. This is the maximum rate per gallon which can be imposed on a registered producer in any year and the board has announced that it has no intention of proceeding to the maximum straight away.
In view of questions raised in another place I should perhaps also explain that the levy is not one of the items taken into account in calculating the cost of milk production for Price Review purposes.
I have already pointed out that the levy is used for capital purposes such
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as the provision of creameries and transport depots, and this is why it cannot strictly be regarded as a production cost.
In effect, dairy farmers co-operate by way of the levy to finance investments which will return profits. The fixing of the rate is, therefore, a transaction internal to the industry, and is unlike changes in the cost of wages or feeding-stuffs, for example, which arise from external factors beyond the industry's control. In this connection, it may be of interest to draw attention to the Milk Marketing Board's statement that over the four years to 31st March, 1968, the sum of £6 million was raised from the levy, while over the same period the board paid back to producers nearly £7¼ million in profits, mainly from its creameries.
It might be for the convenience of the House if I now explain the procedure for amending this scheme. The Agricultural Marketing Act requires that, in normal circumstances, a marketing scheme may be amended only on the initiative of the board concerned, and the board must first notify all registered producers of the proposed amendment. In the case of the Milk Marketing Scheme, if any 200 registered producers, within one month of being given notice of an amendment, request that a poll of producers be held on whether or not the amendment should be submitted to the Minister, the board must hold such a poll. It may submit the amendment only if not less than two-thirds of those voting are in favour of this course, and are together capable of producing not less than two-thirds of the quantity of milk which all those voting are capable of producing.
The present amendment was circulated by the board to all registered producers on 1st May, 1968. A poll was demanded, and held in October, 1968, and the necessary majority was easily obtained. The amendment was accordingly submitted to my right hon. Friend and, as the Act requires, he published it. Had no objections been made, my right hon. Friend could then have proceeded to effect the amendment by Order. Two objections were, however, made. These were not, in my right hon. Friend's opinion, frivolous, and neither could have been met by modification of the Amendment.
My right hon. Friend therefore directed that a public inquiry be held and he and

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my right hon. Friend the Secretary of States for Wales appointed Mr. David Stinson, barrister at law, now Judge Stinson, to conduct it. He heard evidence on 4th and 5th June, 1969, and reported to the Ministers on 4th July, recommending that the amendment be approved. The report was published on 4th September: copies are available in the Library.
In considering Judge Stinson's report and the objections, my right hon. Friends have recognised that, while the amendment would enable the board to increase its capital resources at the lowest possible cost to producers, it would also enable the board to take further advantage of a tax arrangement which does not apply to its competitors in the private trade. But it is the board's duty to carry out its functions at minimum cost to producers, and the board, unlike its trade competitors, has no power to issue shares on the market.
My right hon. Friends therefore concluded that they should recommend this amendment to the House. They were satisfied that to refuse to do so would hamper the board in its efforts to use producers' money to the best advantage. They also believe that consumers can benefit from an increase in the board's manufacturing capacity, in that the establishment of board creameries at places where seasonal surpluses arise avoids the need for milk to be transported long distances, at a cost which ultimately falls on the consumer.
To sum up, my right hon. Friends are, therefore, satisfied that this Amendment will conduce to the more efficient operation of the Milk Marketing Scheme and should be approved. I therefore seek the approval of the House for the Amendment.
10.25 p.m.
Mr. Peter Mills: I must declare an interest, as I am a milk producer and I shall have these deductions from my monthly milk cheque. No one likes deductions from his milk cheque. Nevertheless, I very much welcome the scheme and wholeheartedly agree with what the Minister said. This is a small sum of money to pay for a benefit which will accrue to the industry and to producers.
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Over the years the Milk Marketing Board has done a remarkable job for dairy farmers. The work of its various milk factories has been of great value. The private factories—there are three or four of the largest in the country in my constituency—have also done a first-class job, but the board has a special rôle to fill, particularly in dealing with the surpluses, and we in the South-West have benefited considerably from the board's factories in Cornwall. We know that large sums of money are being set aside for new factories to deal with surplus milk and that this will be of great benefit to many small producers in the South-West.
The board has a statutory responsibility—a heavy burden—to market all the milk that is produced. No matter how much is produced, the board has to deal with it by processing and marketing the surplus milk. That is a heavy burden, especially in the peak periods in spring. Consequently, the board must have capital to maintain and re-equip plant, and to extend its facilities to keep pace with the level of milk production. Every producer should realise how important is this function of the Milk Marketing Board. In 1959–60, 77 million gallons of milk were dealt with by the board's creameries alone. In 1968–69, the figure had risen to 178 million gallons, which is an enormous increase in 10 years and indicates the great work which has been done. There is no wonder that the board seeks permission to increase the levy to ½d. per gallon.
Not only are new factories required to deal with the surplus milk, but the board faces the important task of modernising its transport fleet. The Government have rightly laid down that lorries should be of a certain standard—plated lorries —which means that the board must modernise its fleet and bring it up to the requisite standard. Moreover, I hope that a fair proportion of this money will be used for the purchasing of bulk tanks for collection purposes, and that I am very much in favour of.
There is great advantage in this to the factory and to the producer, and also to the consumer because of hygiene. That must not be forgotten. It is obviously far more hygienic than using, if I may so call them, rather messy churns, to use bulk tanks, but these need a lot of

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capital, and this is where some of the money will go. It is also true that the board, having, as it were, its own factories, its own problems, and its own manufacturing difficulties, gains considerable experience and, therefore, is able to deal with the rest of the trade in a far better way.
Lastly, there is the whole programme of development by the board of the services it: gives to milk producers. I am thinking of artificial insemination, milk recording, and consultancy services. These have been of the highest order, and every farmer in the land must be grateful to the board for what it has done in this way. I can think of no other way which has increased more the quality of the cattle and the cows in our land than the A.I. service. To increase it, and to use the most modern techniques, means the board has to have enough money for research and improvements. I would welcome this scheme if it were only for just that one thing, that it may improve the A.I. service, because it is of tremendous value to the agricultural industry.
Then there is the business of milk recording and consultancy services. The Minister may not be very happy to hear me say so, but it is true that if ever there was a time when the industry needs some help and guidance, it is now, with the low price we are getting for milk, which is causing extreme difficulty at present for milk producers in trying to make both ends meet. Again, I speak from experience. Here we have the board trying to help the milk producers to become viable and to understand more of their costs and difficulties. This section of its work is absolutely vital. Prices have not increased, and that means farmers have to look at every single little detail of their costings. The board is doing a first-class job in this service.
It is for these reasons that we should support this amendment. It will be of benefit to the industry. With these new factories we get the best of both worlds, because even though there is a deduction, as the Minister has rightly pointed out, we do get the benefit of the profits which a re made through them, and this is a very good thing indeed. I cannot understand anybody in this House not welcoming this amendment. Certainly, if he were a milk producer, as I am, he
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would be thankful at this amended scheme being brought in.
10.34 p.m.
Mr. John Farr: I, too, welcome this Motion, although I should like to introduce a pinch of salt into the argument, because, let us face it, the board has been established by the producers to give them services, which, by and large, have been adequate over a number of years. I accept the argument which has been put forward from both sides that the board's costs have increased considerably in recent years, but do not let the House forget for a moment that the producers have also had to face the same financial problems over the same period.
May I give one or two figures to underline my anxiety about the 100 per cent. increase in the levy. As the Parliamentary Secretary said, the scheme was first introduced in 1933 on the basis of 1s. per milch cow per annum. In 1955, this was changed to ¼d. a gallon, and 14 years later we are suggesting it should be changed to ½d. a gallon, an increase of 100 per cent. During this period the price which the producer has received for his milk has gone up by only about 20 per cent. It has increased from 3s. 1·2d. per gallon in 1955 to 3s. 9·26d. per gallon today.
If the levy goes up by 100 per cent. and the gallonage price to the producer has gone up by only 20 per cent., taking into account that the value of the £ in the same period has dropped to under 14s., or 33⅓ per cent., it will be seen that many milk producers have great difficulty in making financial ends meet. This is a problem which is faced by small and large producers, with the result that almost daily the smaller producers go out of business and amalgamations have to take place.
The Parliamentary Secretary said that the revenue to the Milk Marketing Board will increase by over £2 million—I think by £21 million—if the House approves the amendment, and that the 100 per cent. increase would be introduced gradually. Will he assure the House that the increase to this maximum figure will be as gradual as possible? I do not mean by that that it should go up just a little next year and then by the full 100 per cent. in the year after. Every extra penny

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that a milk producer has to pay can make the difference between financial success and failure.
I cautiously welcome the Amendment, and I hope that the board will implement the powers which the House will give it as cautiously as possible, bearing in mind the grave difficulties of many milk producers.
10.38 p.m.
Mr. Bryant Godman Irvine: I thank the Parliamentary Secretary for his careful and full opening speech which dealt with most of the difficulties. I am sure that he will be glad to have on his side my hon. Friend the Member for Torrington (Mr. Peter Mills), especially as he was speaking as a milk producer. For many years my wife and I had a dairy herd, but I no longer have to declare an interest.
The vital point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Torrington is that the Milk Marketing Board has to accept the surpluses, and this is essential if we are to have the milk which we need at various times of the year.
My hon. Friend the Member for Harborough (Mr. Farr) expressed anxiety about the Amendment, but he will recall that 81·26 per cent. of the registered producers were in favour of the scheme and 18·74 per cent. were against it. Whatever anxieties my hon. Friend may have, at least the registered producers who bothered to vote had a fairly good idea of what they wanted. There were 27,051 in favour and 6,240 against.
The Chairman of the Milk Committee of the N.F.U., Mr. Paul Francis, said, after the vote had been taken:
"..the strength of the vote would show any opponents of the Board's plans the solidarity of the producers' front".
The Minister can feel, therefore, that this Motion is well supported.
When the inquiry was held, only two objections were raised, and the Minister dealt with them. One was more substantial than the other, as the Minister pointed out, and it was dealt with with the greatest care by Mr. Stinson, now Judge Stinson, and there is no need for me to go over that ground again.
However, I draw the attention of the House to a leading article in the
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Farmers' Weekly of 12th September, 1969, which said:
"As a rider to his report, Mr. Stinson called attention to the M.D.C. 's continuing' nervous, not to say hysterical, attitude to the board. 'His suggestion that the Minister, the board and the council should get together to hammer out better relations in the industry is as sensible as his recommendation that the board should get the levy powers producers demand. The time to work out a better understanding between milk producers and milk processors and sellers is now. Sales have had one knock after another: dearer welfare milk, cutting off free secondary school supplies, the impact of the susbtitutes and, lastly, the Ministry-ordained penny-a-pinta increase. Political heat will not sell a single bottle of milk"—
a factor which, I am sure, the Minister will bear in mind—
"nor will nightmare fantasies about the big bad monopoly bogey under the dairyman's bed. The biggest promotion drive yet, which starts this month, needs the backing of a united dairy industry if the producers' money put into it is to pay a dividend".
I hope, therefore, that that spirit is now being increasingly accepted in the industry.
In commending the Motion to my hon Friends, there are certain points I urge hon. Members to bear in mind. The Minister quoted certain things that the Milk Marketing Board had done. They were somewhat different from the points I had intended to cite, but they are none the worse for that. If, as is the case, the industry has been working on the basis of a farthing levy for many years, it is not for us to complain if a little more is sought.
According to the figures I have, since 1961 the board has put in 33 new transport depots, 98 new lorries, 452 bulk containers costing £6,000 each and has made an increase from 1 per cent. of milk going away in bulk in 1960 to 36 per cent. in 1969. It appears, therefore, that the board has been making real strides.
The Minister referred to 17 creameries having been acquired by the board. I wish to refer to only one, and that is the creamery at Alfreton, in Derbyshire, which was set up to deal with surpluses, but in a way not designed to appeal to members of the trade since it was established purely for that one purpose. As my hon. Friend the Member for Torrington pointed out, it is good for the board to have experience of the difficulties involved in running creameries and vehicles

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connected with them. But there is no need for worry over the amount being taken by the board. It cannot be considered too high a percentage of the total trade because the retail trade done by the board is only 1·3 per cent. of the total.
We cannot have a debate on agriculture without referring to efficiency. Mr. Stinson referred to two things about efficiency to which reference might usefully be made now. In page 6 of his report he said that the result of efficiency in the milk industry is that there is an
"…increasing surplus in time of surplus."
That is why this draft amendment is so important.
In page 10, he states:
"The larger the surplus over the standard quantity the lower the producer's overall price is depressed. The more efficient the producer the greater his loss."
That is one of the reasons why I feel that the work being done by the board at present is so important.
I remind the Minister that there are two ways in which this surplus could be increased. I do not think that we on this side were ever entirely convinced that either is working as perhaps the Minister had hoped. We have been told from time to time that there is to be an increase in the beef herd, and we on this side have on many occasions asked the Minister how he will have an increase in the beef herd without an increase in milk. Again, I am not entirely persuaded. The problem of dealing with surplus milk will be increased.
Another matter to which we ask the Minister to give his attention is import saving. If we are to have a selective expansion programme which enables us to save imports, the only way is by having more milk, and if we have more milk and can save imports it will mean that these surpluses will be increased.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Torrington emphasised, the really distinctive factor about the Milk Marketing Board is compared with the trade is that the board has to take all the milk that is produced. Those who are dairy farmers—and, indeed, those who are not —must be aware that however one lays one's plans it is not always that the lactation starts on the day one hoped that it would. Equally, it does not always
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happen that the available food is at its maximum in the month one thought it would be.
Those are just two of the factors which make it difficult to forecast exactly how we will get the level production of milk that we would like. If the general public do not get the milk they want and there are shortages, they will complain. If there are surpluses with which the Milk Marketing Board cannot deal, there will also be complaints. So, for that fourth and last reason, I commend the draft Amendment to the House.
10.48 p.m.
Mr. Hoy: I am very grateful to the hon. Member for Rye (Mr. Bryant Godman Irvine) and the hon. Member for Torrington (Mr. Peter Mills) for the part that they have played this evening. I will not be too grateful to the hon. Member for Harborough (Mr. Farr), who was really looking for an excuse to oppose; but perhaps I ought to be grateful to him, after all, because he was trying so very desperately to dissent from the unanimous opinion of the House that he resorted to the exaggerated tactic of saying, "I warned them there would be a 100 per cent. increase in this levy."
What the hon. Member did not say was that the increase which he is trying to equate with 100 per cent. amounted to only ¼d. a gallon. I ask him to believe that the producer will not pay any attention to it—
Mr. Farr: The Minister refers to a farthing as though it were nothing—
Mr. Hoy: Oh, no.
Mr. Farr: —but when that is multiplied by some hundreds of millions of gallons it is a very considerable sum a year.
Mr. Hoy: With all respect, I know equally well that 1d. on a gallon of milk means £9 million. We were being a little taunted tonight for only putting up the price of a "pinta", as I think the hon. Gentleman called it, by 1d. but, as I say, that represents £9 million to the consumer. On the other hand, to use emotive language about this increase, saying that it is a 100 per cent. increase after 14 years, is going too far.
I agree with the hon. Member for Torrington that the ¼d. is a very small

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amount to pay. Although £6 million was raised from the levy, in the same period producers received back £7¼ million. The hon. Member mentioned that. Producers have been dealt with fairly. I agree with the hon. Member that the Milk Marketing Board has done a very good job for the industry. I am sure the chairman did not think that he would get such praise when this debate started, but he and the board are entitled to it. Whatever deficiencies there may be, I beg hon. Members opposite to compare the record of our industry with that of neighbours whose industries are not in such a good position as ours.
In answer to the hon. Member for Rye, this increase was overwhelmingly supported. This proved that those who have to pay the ¼d. are in support. As to better relationships, I can assure the hon. Member that if there is any way in which the Ministry can help to put them right, we shall do all we can. I agree that efficiency is the keynote. I only wish that certain other industries were as efficient as the agricultural industry. Then perhaps we would not have so many economic problems confronting us.
I will not reply to the comment he made about beef from the dairy herd. We have had all this before, but the present Motion merely puts up the levy by ¼d. to a permitted maximum of ½d. The hon. Member for Torrington spoke about import saving. For this the industry is grateful. I read in the Scotsman recently that the chairman of the Scottish cheese industry said how grateful he was to the Government for the arrangements made to get agreement both on cheese and butter imports. It has been of great value to the industry.
I am grateful for the reception given to this scheme and to all hon. Members who have taken part in the debate. I express the hone, I am sure on behalf of all hon. Members, that the Milk Marketing Board will continue to do as well in future as it has in the past.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That the Amendment of the Milk Marketing Scheme 1933, as amended, a draft of which was laid before this House on 29th October, be approved.

SCOTLAND (WINTER KEEP SCHEME)
10.54 p.m.
The Joint Under-Secretary of State for Scotland (Mr. Norman Buchan): I beg to move,
That the Winter Keep (Scotland) Scheme 1969, a draft of which was laid before this House on 27th November, be approved.
This scheme, which applies only to Scotland, will enable us to continue to pay grants to Scottish hill and upland farmers for growing crops during the next five years for the winter feeding of their livestock. It replaces the present Winter Keep Scheme, which expires at the end of this year, and has allowed cropping grants to be paid for the last three years. The scheme now before the House differs in only two minor respects from the present one, apart from having a duration of five instead of three years.
In the first place, we have provided that an applicant shall, on request, give us such information as we may require to verify his application, which is a provision common to subsidy schemes. This is intended to give statutory backing to our present practice of asking applicants for winter keep grant to provide us later in the year with a statement of the crops they have harvested.
Secondly, we are bring the scheme up to date by extending the provisions which enables us to restrict grant where land has been improved with a grassland renovation grant to land which has been improved with a hill land improvement grant.
As I said earlier, the scheme allows grants to be paid on an acreage basis for the next five years. Powers enabling this to be done were taken in the Agriculture Act, 1967. In that year we introduced the alternative winter keep grants payable in the form of supplements to hill cattle and hill and upland sheep subsidies. Since then the number of applications each year for acreage grant has fallen, but we think that this decline has now started to level out. This year it is estimated that acreage grant will be paid in respect of over 4,000 applications, representing about 185,000 acres of crops and a total amount of grant of £680,000. These figures we consider to be a reasonable indication of the level

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of demand for this type of assistance and justification for its continuation.
I commend the scheme for the approval of the House.
10.56 p.m.
Sir John Gilmour: The early onset of winter this year, which I feel rather acutely, having just returned from a much warmer clime, underlines the need for an efficient Winter Keep Scheme.
Mr. Thomas Oswald: Lovely weather.
Sir J. Gilmour: I returned on Saturday to see the whole of the Highland hills covered with snow, which underlines the fact that Britain's farmers need winter keep. We therefore welcome the scheme. However, as it is extended from three years to five years, we want to ensure that it will meet the conditions which the industry will encounter in that period. It may be claimed that the scheme has worked satisfactorily up to now. But, although the number of cattle has increased, the number of sheep has on the whole tended to fall.
Of the crops listed in the schedule, many of them in the crofting areas—from which the majority of the applications come—are decreasing. The figures for the last few years show that the turnip crop in the crofting counties is falling, the oat crop has fallen, and cabbage and kale have decreased. The only crop that has increased is barley—one of the crops not eligible under the scheme.
It is necessary to ensure, if the scheme is being promulgated for the next five years, that developments in livestock feeding, are being taken into account. If this is not done, will value for money be obtained from the expenditure of nearly £¾ million of the taxpayers' money?
When this matter was last debated the Minister of State, Scottish Office, said that a new crop qualified under the scheme, namely, fodder radish. Can we have some information about the amount of fodder raddish now being grown? I return to the question of barley and oats. If plant breeders are doing more to grow an efficient crop of barley in the areas where the winter scheme operates than they can for oats,
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it may not be right to go on excluding barley.
The last two lines of the Explanatory Note say that the scheme
"provides for the obtaining of information to verify applications."
This is new. As farmers have to make full returns on 4th June and 4th December, I hope that the extra information that is required will be dovetailed in with this if it is at all possible.
I notice that paragraph 6 of the scheme states:
"The total grant payable under this scheme for any year in respect of land comprised in an agricultural unit shall be restricted to the amount payable in respect of such acreage of land as would, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, have been reasonably sufficient to provide adequate crops for the winter feeding of the numbers of sheep and cattle likely to be maintained by the occupier on the unit throughout the following winter."
This apparently means that one is not in any one year able to store any surplus. I wonder whether this is an essential practice. It may be that in a certain year, particularly in the making of silage, it should be possible to make more silage than the actual number of stock on the unit could consume. This would enable the farm to carry more stock in the ensuing year. This is surely the sort of thing that we wish to provide for.
The scheme is to continue for five years, and during that time we are committed once again to negotiations for entry into the Common Market. I take it that this scheme would fall within the requirements of the present rules of the European Economic Community, and in assisting marginal land this scheme might be thought to qualify better than some of the other schemes for helping production in the Highlands. If this is so, I hope that it will be possible to modify this scheme.
In general, I am sure that we can all welcome the scheme because it is in those areas of marginal land where the greatest assistance is needed if we are to get the maximum production from our hill country. I hope, therefore, that the scheme will be approved.
Mr. Oswald: Before the hon. Gentleman resumes his seat, could he explain why there is such a fall as he said in the production of turnips, cabbage and other root crops, and why we should have this

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scheme, providing a subsidy for barley crops?
Sir J. Gilmour: I think that this is probably a matter of what is the cheapest possible crop to produce.
Mr. Oswald: Oh, I see.
Sir J. Gilmour: I think that is probably how it comes about. The Under-Secretary said that what we need is an efficient industry, and an efficient industry produces feedingstuffs at the lowest possible feeding unit cost.
Mr. Oswald: Mr. Deputy Speaker, may I—
Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Harry Gourlay): Order. I understood the hon. Gentleman the Member for Fife, East (Sir.J. Gilmour) to have resumed his seat.
11.3 p.m.
Mr. Alasdair Mackenzie: There is very little difference between this scheme and the previous one, apart from the fact that this one is to be continued for five years instead of three. This is a very good thing because it gives confidence to the farmer and it shows that the Government intend to support this sector of the industry, irrespective of whether we go into the Common Market or not.
Since the numbers of stock on upland farms and hill farms depend largely on the amount of winter keep available, I think that this sort of scheme has given a very good return indeed in relation to the amount of money involved. In the Highlands, in particular, it has certainly enabled the stock-carrying capacity of many of the upland farms to be increased substantially over the past four or five years.
At the same time, it is important to bear in mind that the acreage payments have not varied for a considerable number of years, and the Under-Secretary should bear in mind that where a scheme is designed for a four or five-year period the time has come to revise the rates per acre. Increases in the cost of seeds and fertilisers have continued year by year since the scheme was first introduced, and we are still working on the same figures of £2 10s., £3 10s. and £5. I hope that the Minister will bear that in
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mind when a fresh Price Review comes along.
There is also a case for reviewing the classification of holdings. I know of several examples which show how necessary this is. There can be two holdings side by side, with land of more or less equal quality, but, because one is well farmed and shows a high degree of productivity due to good husbandry, that holding is excluded, whereas the neighbouring holding which is farmed in a much inferior way will be seen as a poor holding by the visiting inspectors and be brought into the scheme. This is to deprive the farmer who is industrious and has improved his holding of the benefit of the grants.
I know that many farmers have applied year by year to be included in the scheme, and I hope that the Under-Secretary of State will advise his technical officers, when applications come in and they deal with cases of the kind which I have described, that they should give the benefit to those who have farmed their land well all along and who are showing increased production even without the winter keep grant.
A good many farmers are not clear about the distinction between the two optional schemes. Those of us who are familiar with these things know that there is an option open to the hill farmer to apply for the headage payment, which gives him £5 additional to the cow subsidy if it is not claimed under winter keep. This is a good thing because on the hill farm where the amount of cropping land is limited, it is a much better arrangement to give the £5 additional to the standard rate of subsidy and so enable the farmer to buy the winter fodder from the arable areas. This aspect of the scheme should be explained further, as there is still some doubt in some people's minds as to which is the better way or which of the options is best suited to their area.
This scheme, which took over after the marginal agricultural production grant scheme, has done a great deal to increase production. There is still great scope for increased production, especially in the Highland counties. An extension of the scheme, by an increase in the rate per acre and the inclusion of many more holdings, would give a very good

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return. However, I compliment the Under-Secretary of State on introducing the scheme at this stage and I give it a warm welcome.
11.9 p.m.
Mr. Hector Monro: I, too, welcome the scheme, but, first, may I say what a great privilege it is to take part in debate with the hon. Member for Edinburgh, Central (Mr. Oswald), who has such great knowledge of hill farming—perhaps on the Mound or even Arthur's Seat. It is a thrill to hear him speak on agriculture, with his great skill and knowledge.
I am interested to note the change to a five-year period for the scheme. But I hope that this does not mean that the rates will remain the same for five years: I hope that they will progress with the annual Price Review. With the heavy increases in costs in hill farming, this is essential. I should like to know from the Under-Secretary why the ploughing grants are being done away with under Clause 29 of the Agriculture Bill at present before the House, yet the Winter Keep Scheme is being retained as an individual entity—
Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Harry Gourlay): Order. The Under-Secretary would be out of order if he answered that question.
Mr. Monro: I bow to your opinion, Mr. Deputy Speaker.
May I reverse the question and ask why the scheme is being given a different status from other agricultural grants which are important to farmers, and why, when this and other schemes are side by side in the Price Review White Paper, this one has been singled out for individual attention?
I have always been pleased that the headage option was brought in, after great pressure from hon. Members on this side. It has been a very valuable addition to the income of hill farms. I am surprised that the hon. Gentleman says that this has begun to level off. I think that most people now take the optional £5 headage payment, as more advantageous than the Winter Keep Scheme, particularly in the Grade C farms where there is little opportunity for cultivation.
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Lastly, how frequent are changes from Grade C to Grade B or from Grade B to Grade A? Do farmers find such a move a penalty, after they have improved the drainage or pasture on their farms? This may be a very rare occurrence, but what proportion of winter keep farms get this "promotion"? I suppose farmers might feel that they had been demoted, because of the financial penalties.
Overall, of course, we welcome the scheme, and look forward to some much-needed financial benefits for hill farmers, who are having a very hard time at the moment.
11.13 p.m.
Mr. Alick Buchanan-Smith: My hon. Friend the Member for Dumfries (Mr. Monro) asked about the number of farms changing between the different grades. I should like to know how many farms, originally outwith the scheme, still have the opportunity to come into it? I have mentioned to the Under-Secretary in correspondence farms in my constituency which his officials decided were not eligible, and which, on appeal to the winter keep panel, which is independent and has discretion in these matters, have been turned down.
The Minister has said that, where there is a substantial change of circumstances, these farms can be reconsidered for eligibility. Where there has not been such a change, can a farm which was originally turned down as ineligible be reconsidered, after a period, and go through the appeal procedure? I am thinking of a particular farm in my constituency, which the Minister knows about, which has been turned down. Can such people ever reapply?
There may not be a tremendous change in the physical circumstances of the farms in these hill and upland areas, but, because of economic and other circumstances outside their control, they find it difficult to get a decent living. They would like to know whether, if they have been ineligible in the past, they can now become eligible. Perhaps the Minister can deal with that and reassure the farmers whom I have mentioned.
I welcome the scheme. It helps those areas of Scotland and those sectors of farming where help is most needed. It

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is a good scheme, but I should like clarification of the matters that I have raised.
11.15 p.m.
Mr. Buchan: I am pleased that the scheme is generally welcomed, both from the point of view of the extension to five years and the purpose of the scheme itself.
The question of fodder radish is a thorny problem. I have no figures available, but I shall look into this. I should not, however, like to predict a massive amount. I shall see whether we can find an amount for the hon. Gentleman.
Mr. Anthony Stodart: Does not the Minister remember the great case which his right hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh, East (Mr. Willis) made about the vital importance of fodder radish to the Winter Keep Scheme? It has not proved the success that he prophesied.
Mr. Buchan: It is not a matter of prophecy. I have been asked a question, and my answer is that I shall look into the matter and give the figures. This has nothing to do with whether predictions were accurate.
Barley is a crop which usually arises in these discussions. I think that the usual answer that is given is that this is a cash crop. I do not think that we can use the winter keep grant to encourage the growing of barley on unsuitable farms, and in general these are unsuitable farms. Also, they have the benefit of the cereals deficiency payments scheme. There have not been many representations about this problem, but it seems to be raised every time we discuss agriculture in the House.
I have been asked about the storage and carry over of crops. We interpret as reasonably as possible what constitutes an adequate crop, but the scheme provides grants for livestock likely to be maintained throughout the following winter, so there is that recognition for a carry forward.
I cannot go into the matters which have been raised about the Common Market, but I take the intriguing point made by the hon. Gentleman about whether the grant would be retained if we went into the Market. I think that, in effect, the hon. Gentleman is asking how we can extend it. This is an interest-
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ing point, but it may be better if we do not follow it up now. However, I have noted it.
The hon. Member for Ross and Cromarty (Mr. Alasdair Mackenzie) raised the matter of options. I understand the difficulty that is sometimes created for people who are trying to work out how the scheme might help them. Most farmers know that if they are unlikely to get a reasonable crop yield from their own land, they are better off with the headage payment, but in the spring of each year we provide an explanatory leaflet for every eligible farmer.
This sets out the rates quite clearly and it also provides a comparative table from which farmers can work out the alternatives which might best suit their circumstances. There is no guarantee that they will make the right decisions in the long run. This is as far as one can go. The rest must be left to individual farmers.
Looking ahead to the Annual Price Review, the hope was expresed by the hon. Member for Dumfries (Mr. Monro) that the five-year period did not mean that the rates would not be changed. This is a problem for the Review, and should be left until then.
The hon. Members for Ross and Cromarty, North Angus and Mearns (Mr. Buchanan-Smith) and Dumfries, raised the question of classification. There is a written-in safeguard in that winter keep appeals panels have practising farmers and also a farmer from another area on them to ensure some standardisation throughout the country. We believe that the panels are on the whole accepted as working reasonably and fairly in Scotland. It seems to be a good system. As far as I can understand from discussion with farmers, it is accepted as fair and just.
I take the point that promotion from C to B to A may be taken as demotion. It is rather curious that a farmer should so thrive as to move himself out of eligibility. I cannot say that I know of any such case because grading is based on the potential of the land rather than on competent husbandry. A farmer may make a further appeal against regarding, but unless there has been a change in circumstances, the appeal will not be likely to succeed.

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The short answer to the hon. Member's question is, "Yes. It can be done", but the hon. Member knows that if the same criteria exists when the farmer reapplies there is unlikely to be a change in the decision unless the earlier decision was wrong. It is open to the farmer to reapply. There is, however, interesting work going on and we may see that kind of rejected application coming forward again, because it is a question of potential of the land rather than the competence of the husbandry of the farmer.
On the ploughing grant scheme, Mr. Deputy Speaker said that we were not to pursue the point. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] I am willing to debate it, but Mr. Deputy Speaker would not allow me to do it. The point is that the ploughing grant scheme is virtually a reclamation grant and not a capital grant.
On specific numbers of rejections, the hon. Member for North Angus and Mearns (Mr. Buchanan-Smith)—
Mr. Michael Jopling: Will the hon. Member give way?
Mr. Buchan: With that beautiful Scottish accent? Yes.
Mr. Jopling: I am sorry to intervene in a Scottish debate. The hon. Gentleman has said about the ploughing grant—
Mr. Deputy Speaker: I have already ruled that we cannot discuss the ploughing grant on this scheme. I allowed the Minister a little latitude so that he could reply to the point raised earlier.
Mr. Jopling: I think that my hon. Friend the Member for Dumfries (Mr. Monro) asked why the scheme had been singled out for exclusion from the provisions of Clause 29 of the Agriculture Bill and when you did not intervene, I understood that you implied that it was in order to raise it at that time. My hon. Friend asked why it was that the Winter Keep Scheme was excluded whereas the ploughing grant scheme was included. The hon. Gentleman has just said that the ploughing scheme is regarded as reclamation and not as a capital scheme, but this is completely against the tone of Clause 29 of the Agriculture Bill.
Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman has made his point. I allowed incidental reference to be made by the
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hon. Member for Dumfries (Mr. Monro) and by the Minister, but we should leave the matter there.
Mr. Buchan: I accept your Ruling, Mr. Deputy Speaker. It is a matter we shall do doubt discuss upstairs from tomorrow onwards.
I have dealt as fairly as I always do with most of the points raised by hon. Members. This is a scheme which has had general approval on both sides. There is general recognition that it contributes to solving the problem of the hill sheep farmer in Scotland. The unique aspects of the Scottish scheme have more than proved their worth.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That the Winter Keep (Scotland) Scheme 1969, a draft of which was laid before this House on 27th November, be approved.

MEDICAL SCHOOL (SWANSEA)
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Harper.]
11.25 p.m.
Mr. Ifor Davies: I welcome very much the opportunity to put before the House the case for a medical school at Swansea, covering the South-West Wales catchment area. This is not the first time that the claims of Swansea have been put forward. I would remind my hon. Friend that in 1965 I had the privilege of leading a deputation of South-West Wales Members to the then Secretary of State for Education. I was supported by my hon. Friends the Members for Swansea, East (Mr. McBride) and Swansea, West (Mr. Alan Williams) who are also most interested in this matter.
A great deal has happened since. The most significant development was the Royal Commission Report on Medical Education, published in April 1968. It was under the chairmanship of Lord Todd. The case for Swansea was put before the Commission by a Committee led by Mr. Roy Thomas, Dr. Duncan Davies and Principal F. Llewellyn Jones. I take this opportunity of paying a tribute to them for their excellent work, which I am sure, was instrumental in getting the Royal Commission to make a recommendation in favour of Swansea.

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It is this recommendation which is the basis of my case. I refer to paragraph 390 of the report, which says:
"The medical school capacity available soon after 1975 could, we think be further increased by the establishment of a new medical school at Swansea, where conditions are very suitable. The University College there has already more than 3,000 students, most of whom come from outside Wales, and offers substantial relevant academic resources. A big new hospital, which in our view could be adapted without great difficulty for undergraduate clinical teaching, has been built immediately alongside the College and land is available for expansion; this hospital, with other hospitals in the district, could meet the needs of a reasonably large medical school on the assumption that the population drawn upon will be not only that of the immediate area (under 600,000 at present) but for many purposes that of the whole of south-west Wales, which is over 850,000 at present and is likely to expand as industrial and commercial development proceeds."
I am glad to see the Minister of State, Welsh Office, in her place. I am sure, knowing her close interest in education and health, that she will agree with my argument. I am also glad to see present my hon. Friend the Member for Swansea, West, to whom I have referred. The Commission has recommended Swansea, where the conditions, to use its own words "are very suitable."
I was also very glad last Friday to be present at the opening of the Postgraduate Medical Centre at Morriston Hospital, Swansea, opened by Sir Max Rosenheim, President of the Royal College of Physicians. I was gratified to hear him express support for a medical college at Swansea. The all-important point I want to stress is that the Government's acceptance of the recommendation is now a matter of urgency because there is so much detailed advanced planning necessary, involving at least three parties.
In the first place, there is the University College. The Royal Commission had made this clear in paragraph 386. when it said:
"The modern medical school must be an integral part of a university which can be expected to provide in due course a full range of opportunities for instruction and research in those biological, physical and behavioural sciences which are relevant to medicine. The general scale of the university's development must be big enough to allow a medical school which is established within it to reach the desirable size without causing imbalance and distortion in the pattern of the university's activities."
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The University College needs to know where it stands before it can plan further its future educational policy.
Secondly, the Welsh Hospital Board, and the Glantawe Hospital Management Committee, in particular, are both deeply involved. Since the first comprehensive review of medical education by the Goodenough Committee in 1944, medical education has been accepted as an integral part of our hospital service. The Government also recognise this in the White Paper, The Hospital Building Programme, Cmnd. 3000. Paragraph 15 reads:
"The teaching hospitals will play an increasing part as district general hospitals serving the communities around them;".
The Royal Commission has expressed the view that about 2,000 teaching hospital beds would be needed for the 150 to 200 students which it considers is the minimum required for a new medical school. That appears in paragraph 386. The Commission says that these beds need not all be found in a single hospital provided that they are located in hospitals reasonably close to the university with which they are associated. In the case of Swansea, the new Singleton Hospital, which is alongside the university, will be ideal as a base hospital. But plans for its development, as well as for that of the neighbouring hospitals, are all being held up pending the decision on the medical school, as my hon. Friend the Minister of State well knows. The hospital authorities are therefore faced with a serious problem.
There is the vital interest of the local authority, which has already been extremely helpful. I pay tribute to the authority, but it needs to know where it stands, as it is very much involved, because of such questions, among others, as location, land acquisition and access. It is, therefore, clear that the University College, the hospital authorities and the local authority are all in a state of uncertainty and cannot plan ahead.
I turn to the all-important question of manpower targets. I note that in reply to a Question on 6th February this year, the Minister stated that
"The establishment of further new schools will depend on decisions on manpower targets."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 6th February, 1969; Vol. 776, c. 575.]
This, it appears, is the crucial issue confronting us.

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In paragraph 389 the Royal Commission recommended that the present intake of approximately 2,600 places per year be increased to 3,700 intake places up to 1975. On 14th April the Minister indicated that this target—the target raising from 2,600 intake places to 3,700 intake places by 1975—had been accepted and would be achieved by expanding the existing medical schools, together with new medical schools at Nottingham and Southampton. That is reported in column 222 of the OFFICIAL REPORT of 14th April.
Tonight, I am concerned with the target for 1975 onwards. The Royal Commission has given its views on this subject too, and these are to be found in paragraph 363, Table 5. The Commission recommends an increase in the annual intake from 3,700 a year in 1975 up to 5,000 a year over a period of 15 years. If this target is to be reached—and the Swansea recommendation is included—there is no time to lose in making the preparatory arrangements.
May I refer to the position in Wales? The situation is that 55 per cent. of our junior hospital doctors are from overseas. I do not wish to be misunderstood in this matter. I pay very sincere tribute to these doctors for their magnificent work. Indeed, our hospital service would have faced a crisis without them, but this state of affairs is clear proof that we should be doing far more to provide medical education for our own students who are desperately anxious to train as doctors.
We have only one medical school in Wales, and that in Cardiff. It has a wonderful record, but up to last year its annual intake was only 65. This figure, of course, has now been increased to about 107 by some expansion, but I can say to my hon. Friend that the number of applicants was 10 times higher than the number of places available, and that situation is not good enough. I hope that he will agree that out of the present annual intake, which is approximately 2,600 students a year throughout the United Kingdom, a figure of only 107 per year intake in Wales is completely unsatisfactory.
In this very short debate my time is very limited, but I hope that I have succeeded in convincing my hon. Friend that the time has come for a second
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medical school to be established in Wales as a matter of urgency. I am very glad indeed to be able to give this assurance, that on this issue, at least, Wales is united in approving the recommendations of the Royal Commission itself that Swansea, from every point of view, is ideally suitable as the best centre. I would ask the Government tonight, therefore, to give their approval without further delay, or at least to make a declaration of intent, if I may use a popular phrase.
It may be said, of course, that the delay in any announcement regarding future plans is due to the question of capital expenditure involving the universities building programme, and if it is said that the University Grants Committee, too, is involved, I must say to my hon. Friend that the Government should give some clear indication as a matter of policy. After all, we are dealing with public funds. I am second to none in my appreciation of what the Government have achieved already, despite the most difficult economic circumstances, and I agree that in any future expenditure programme the question of priorities is absolutely essential, but I am convinced that the highest possible priority should be given to the provision of medical education. This would not only be a case of money well spent, but it would be a sound investment in safeguarding the future health of the nation, as well as giving new hope to a large number of young students whose one ambition is to follow the noble profession of medicine.
I trust that my hon. Friend will provide that new hope tonight by giving a favourable reply regarding the future of a medical school in Swansea.
11.38 p.m.
The Minister of State, Department of Education and Science (Mr. Gerry Fowler): I well know the zeal and the vigour with which my hon. Friend the Member for Gower (Mr. Ifor Davies) has campaigned for the establishment of a medical school in Swansea. He himself referred to the deputation which he led to see the then Secretary of State in 1965. With him on that occasion was the hon. Member for Swansea, West (Mr. Alan Williams), now Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Technology. I am delighted to see that he, too, is here tonight to support by his physical presence the plea for the provision of a

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medical school in Swansea and that the Minister of State, Welsh Office, is here.
I know the depth of feeling in Wales on this subject which my hon. Friend has put to the House tonight, but perhaps he will forgive me if I set this plea against the wider background of the history of the possibility of the provision of further medical schools and the need for a greater output of doctors.
Medical schools are an example of the universities' direct contribution to the community, and they are a side of the universities in which provision can be related particularly closely to ascertainable manpower needs. In this sense, they are rare birds. Much of university provision cannot be related in any direct sense to the manpower needs of the community, and university education in this way has traditionally been non-vocational, but the medical schools are different. Their growth has been related to the need for doctors.
This is the explanation of the discrepancy to which my hon. Friend pointed when he said that for a particular medical school applicants numbered ten times more than the permissible intake. I do not think he would go so far as to suggest that we should be wise to make such provision for medical education that we were grossly over-providing ourselves with doctors.
Medical schools have suffered from this special position in the university world, since for many years it has precluded them from sharing in the general expansion of university facilities and numbers. An assessment of medical manpower needs made by the Willink Committee in 1957 resulted in the universities being asked to reduce medical intake, and the Robbins Report in 1963 followed this by calling for only a minimal increase in medical places.
"The best laid schemes o'mice an' men Gang aft a-gley."
We are all now in favour of more modern methods of statistical forecasting. But the history of the forecasting of medical manpower needs over the past twelve years reveals the pitfalls which lie ahead if we place an excessive reliance upon such forecasting methods.
The effects of the action which followed these reports are only now being over-
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come in the medical schools. The position in the schools is now being vigorously retrieved as a result of the efforts of the U.G.C. and the universities, with some special funding from the Government, and the annual intake to the schools has risen from just over 2,000 in 1960 to about 2,700 this October.
May I say a word about Ministerial responsibility for medical schools. A medical school is a university faculty, and the university is responsible for financing it, with the aid of Exchequer grant, and for staffing it and running it. The pre-clinical part of the school is generally within the university precinct, built with university money, again with Government grant, as a charge on the universities' building programme as allocated by the U.G.C.
The clinical part of the school is in a teaching hospital provided for in the hospitals' building programmes controlled by the Secretaries of State for Health and Social Security, for Scotland and for Wales, although the teaching facilities in it are financed by the university with the aid of a grant from the U.G.C. A wholly new school is thus a co-operative venture, but the fundamental decision as to location is primarily an educational one dependent on U.G.C. advice.
I must stress here the part played by the U.G.C. in the decision as to the location of a new medical school, but perhaps I may put the matter in a broader context. As my hon. Friend is probably aware, the greatest headache I have inherited in the Department of Education and Science is the expansion which will be necessary in higher education as a whole for the next decade.
Decisions as to which sector should expand and where expansion should take place, and by how many, will have to be taken in the near future. I am not yet in a position to be able to take these decisions, but the whole question of medical education must, of course, be seen against this general background. One cannot take decisions about the expansion of medical education in the university sector without looking at the broader background of the expansion of university education as a whole.
I am well aware—if I had not been I would have become so considering the pressure that has been put on me in

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recent weeks—of the urgency of these decisions which affect, in some degree, the decisions about the further provision of medical education in the universities; and I am pressing on with the action that I deem necessary in this area as rapidly as I can.
When it became apparent that the Willink Committee had under-estimated the future numbers of doctors needed, a general effort was made to regain lost ground, but it was clear that the position was serious enough to warrant special consideration. The Royal Commission on Medical Education was, therefore, set up to define more closely the needs of the medical profession, in terms of both numbers and the nature of the education and training they received, and to examine the problems of expanding and adapting medical faculties to meet these needs. By the time the Commission reported, not one or two but 17 universities had expressed a wish to establish medical faculties.
There was then some competition for the establishment of a new medical faculty. As my hon. Friend knows, the report of the Royal Commission called for a considerable increase in medical school provision. In the first phase, it suggested, as an immediate practicable target, that the number of entry places might be increased to 3,700 by 1975, and this the Government have already accepted.
The case for an increase after 1975—the report suggested 5,000 entry places by 1990—must be looked at carefully because of its major implications for finance as well as manpower. This is a matter for my right hon. Friends the Secretaries of State for Health and Social Security, for Scotland and for Wales and also for the Chancellor of the Exchequer, bearing in mind, in the context of the national resources likely to be available, the cost not only of providing the extra medical school places, but also of employing the extra doctors who would be trained.
I am not suggesting that we should make inadequate provision for our manpower needs in the medical sphere, but I am suggesting that we must look carefully at the financial implications and ensure that we get the numbers right—flat we match provision to need—because
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it would be expensive if we were to over-provide.
In the matter of providing additional places, the Royal Commission made a number of suggestions and these cannot be wholly dissociated from other of its recommendations, and not least those regarding the organisation of medical faculties. It saw a case for bigger medical schools. Hitherto, many, although crammed to capacity, have been able to admit only about 100 students a year. On grounds of economy of teaching staff of facilities and of educational benefit for students, the size suggested was an annual intake of at least 150 to 200 students.
Against this background, bearing in mind the necessary expansion which the Royal Commission saw of existing medical faculties, it suggested the establishment of five new schools—in addition to the one approved at Nottingham in 1964—at Southampton, Leicester, Swansea, Keele or Hull, and Warwick. The subject of this debate is one of these, Swansea. Whilst I have every sympathy with the anxiety of those directly concerned in Swansea and elsewhere, the problem of any one cannot be considered in isolation from developments over the whole field of medical education.
As my hon. Friend knows, of these five the Commission suggested that Southampton and Leicester should start in time to contribute to the 1975 expanded intake, with the others following in the period from 1975 to 1990. By the time the report was published, the establishment of the school at Southampton had already been agreed.
Establishing a new medical school is a very costly business, and a lengthy business in terms of academic planning and provision of buildings, and the U.G.C. was satisfied that the rest of the expansion down to 1975 could be achieved more economically and speedily by expanding existing schools. In this way, it sought to bring the size of the existing schools nearer to the size suggested by the Commission. Apart from Southampton, all the new schools suggested in the report, including Leicester, are therefore related to the post-1975 period and, as I have already said, decisions as to expansion then have yet to be reached. And I have talked of some of the factors involved.

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I am conscious that what I have said about length of time for planning makes it all the more desirable for any decisions about new medical schools to be given in principle as far ahead as possible, and I am very well aware of the factors to which my hon. Friend has drawn attention when he spoke of the difficulty of planning locally in other medical areas which is posed by doubt as to whether or not there will be a medical school at Swansea and, if there is to be such a medical school there, when it is to be established.
We are very well aware of this. I realise that the position is especially difficult for sonic hospitals where building is already in progress, and Swansea, of course, is a model example in this respect. But it would be wrong to attempt to reach conclusions until decisions have been taken about the scale of manpower needs in the relevant future years, and until we have the advice of the U.G.C. on how this can best be met.
So what I have to say to my hon. Friend tonight is that there is no complacency about this matter, and I can certainly assure him, and undertake, that there will be no unnecessary delay. But we have to take first things first—
Mr. Ifor Davies: I accept the argument of the difficulty of relating a medical school in Swansea to the national position in general, but I would ask him to pay
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special consideration to the point I emphasised, which is that there is only one medical school in Wales, with an intake of 65 last year and now 107. That is completely unsatisfactory. I know I had better reduce my estimate of ten times, but I must say that 107 for the whole of Wales is most unsatisfactory. Will he take that fact into consideration when thinking of the overall position?
Mr. Fowler: Yes. I am very well aware of that point. This is, in my view, one of the most powerful arguments for the establishment of a medical school at Swansea. I hope that we can take a decision on Swansea and other areas as rapidly as is feasible. Such decisions relate, as we know, to a later phase than the 1975 developments, but the departments which have responsibility here are now considering these longer-term developments as a matter of urgency.
I can assure my hon. Friend that I will try to instil into them a yet greater sense of urgency in taking these decisions. The Government as a whole are keenly concerned to reach the necessary decisions at the very earliest opportunity. I am determined that there shall be no unnecessary delay, and I am very grateful to my hon. Friend for drawing this most important matter to the attention of the House tonight.
Question put and agreed to.
Adjourned accordingly at six minutes to Twelve o'clock.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS
  Sultan of Brunei (Talks)
  Sultan of Brunei (Talks)
  Bulgaria (British Citizens)
  Bulgaria (British Citizens)
  Rhodesia
  Rhodesia
  Duncan Report
  Duncan Report
  Trinidad and Tobago
  Trinidad and Tobago
  Guyana (Boundary Dispute)
  Guyana (Boundary Dispute)
  Aircraft (Hi-jacking)
  Aircraft (Hi-jacking)
  Vietnam (Massacre Allegations)
  Vietnam (Massacre Allegations)
  South-West Africa (Trial)
  South-West Africa (Trial)
  Libya
  Libya
  Zambia (Deported British Subjects)
  Zambia (Deported British Subjects)
  Sinai Peninsula (Oil Drilling Operations)
  Sinai Peninsula (Oil Drilling Operations)
  European Free Trade Association (Iceland)
  European Free Trade Association (Iceland)
SOCIAL SERVICES
  Dental Treatment and Prescription Charges (Exemptions)
  Dental Treatment and Prescription Charges (Exemptions)
  Prescription Charges (Advice to Chemists)
  Prescription Charges (Advice to Chemists)
  Supplementary Benefits (Investigations)
  Supplementary Benefits (Investigations)
  East Ham Memorial Hospital (Patient)
  East Ham Memorial Hospital (Patient)
  New Hospital (Redditch)
  New Hospital (Redditch)
  Royal Victoria Infirmary, Newcastle (Waiting List)
  Royal Victoria Infirmary, Newcastle (Waiting List)
  Drug L-Dopa
  Drug L-Dopa
  Statistical Surveys
  Statistical Surveys
  St. Bernard's Hospital (Boy Patient)
  St. Bernard's Hospital (Boy Patient)
  Stainless Steel Products (Fixed Price Contracts)
  Stainless Steel Products (Fixed Price Contracts)
  Pharmaceutical Industries Representatives
  Pharmaceutical Industries Representatives
  Medicines
  Medicines
  Medway Towns Hospitals
  Medway Towns Hospitals
  General Practitioners (Medway Towns)
  General Practitioners (Medway Towns)
  Radiographers (Pay)
  Radiographers (Pay)
  Pay Beds (Manchester Region)
  Pay Beds (Manchester Region)
  Male Hospital Matron (Title)
  Male Hospital Matron (Title)
  Industrial Injuries (Appeal Procedure)
  Industrial Injuries (Appeal Procedure)
  Matrons (Recruitment)
  Matrons (Recruitment)
  Social Security (Fraudulent or Unjustified Claims)
  Social Security (Fraudulent or Unjustified Claims)
  Social Services Department (Special Investigators)
  Social Services Department (Special Investigators)
  Fraud
  Fraud
  Civil Servants (Official Secrets Acts)
  Civil Servants (Official Secrets Acts)
  Social Services Department Employees (Staff Rules)
  Social Services Department Employees (Staff Rules)
TECHNOLOGY
  Nuclear Power Stations (Faults)
  Nuclear Power Stations (Faults)
  Energy Sector (Financial Assistance)
  Energy Sector (Financial Assistance)
  Industrial Liaison Centre (Sunderland)
  Industrial Liaison Centre (Sunderland)
  Automation Centre (Sunderland)
  Automation Centre (Sunderland)
  Mexborough and Wombwell Area (Jobs)
  Mexborough and Wombwell Area (Jobs)
  Reclaimed Rubber
  Reclaimed Rubber
  Concorde Aircraft
  Concorde Aircraft
  Plastic-Coated Steel
  Plastic-Coated Steel
  European Economic Community
  European Economic Community
  Electricity (Generation)
  Electricity (Generation)
  Computer Aided Design Committee
  Computer Aided Design Committee
  A.E.A. Employees (Radiation Hazards)
  A.E.A. Employees (Radiation Hazards)
  Steel Industry (Coking Coal Supplies)
  Steel Industry (Coking Coal Supplies)
TRANSPORT
  Roads For the Future (Plan)
  Roads For the Future (Plan)
  M4 (Liddington-Maidenhead Sections)
  M4 (Liddington-Maidenhead Sections)
  Road Safety Act, 1967
  Road Safety Act, 1967
  A30, Exeter-Launceston (White Lines)
  A30, Exeter-Launceston (White Lines)
  British Railways
  British Railways
BOARD OF TRADE
  Oil Leakages at Sea (Liability)
  Oil Leakages at Sea (Liability)
  Pigs
  Pigs
  Tug Stability
  Tug Stability
  Romania
  Romania
  U.S.S.R. (Trade)
  U.S.S.R. (Trade)
  Companies Act 1967
  Companies Act 1967
  Chinese Rabbit Meat (Imports)
  Chinese Rabbit Meat (Imports)
  Pergamon Press Ltd., and International Learning Systems Corporation Ltd.
  Pergamon Press Ltd., and International Learning Systems Corporation Ltd.
OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT
  Ex-Colonial Civil Servants (Pensions)
  Ex-Colonial Civil Servants (Pensions)
  Cheap Book Scheme (Extension to Pacific)
  Cheap Book Scheme (Extension to Pacific)
  Floods, Tunisia (Aid)
  Floods, Tunisia (Aid)
  Zambia
  Zambia
  Technicians
  Technicians
CIVIL SERVICE
  Foreign and Commonwealth Service (Pensions)
  Foreign and Commonwealth Service (Pensions)
AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD
  Sheep (Louping-III)
  Sheep (Louping-III)
  Rabies
  Rabies
  Quarantine Kennels (Regulations)
  Quarantine Kennels (Regulations)
DEFENCE
  Multi-rôle Combat Aircraft (Press Conference)
  Multi-rôle Combat Aircraft (Press Conference)
  B.A.O.R. (Personnel)
  B.A.O.R. (Personnel)
  Servicemen, Northern Ireland (Emergency Allowances)
  Servicemen, Northern Ireland (Emergency Allowances)
  Land, Scotland
  Land, Scotland
EDUCATION AND SCIENCE
  State School Teachers (Years of Experience)
  State School Teachers (Years of Experience)
  Transport Museum, Clapham
  Transport Museum, Clapham
EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY
  Professional and Executive Register
  Professional and Executive Register
  Women Employees (Night Shift Working)
  Women Employees (Night Shift Working)
  Domestic Service (Scotland)
  Domestic Service (Scotland)
HOME DEPARTMENT
  Childrens' Departments (Staff)
  Childrens' Departments (Staff)
HOUSING AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
  Rent Tribunals (Chairmen)
  Rent Tribunals (Chairmen)
  Betterment Levy (Mining Leases)
  Betterment Levy (Mining Leases)
LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND REGIONAL PLANNING
  Prevention of Pollution (Gateshead)
  Prevention of Pollution (Gateshead)
HOUSE OF COMMONS
  Taxicabs
  Taxicabs
  Members (Free Postage Facilities)
  Members (Free Postage Facilities)
POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS
  "The Times" (Radio Receiver)
  "The Times" (Radio Receiver)
PUBLIC BUILDING AND WORKS
  New Government Office Building (Display)
  New Government Office Building (Display)
SCOTLAND
  Secondary Schools (Teachers)
  Secondary Schools (Teachers)
  School Building Programme
  School Building Programme
  Shotgun Certificates
  Shotgun Certificates
  Livingston New Town (Jobs)
  Livingston New Town (Jobs)
NATIONAL FINANCE
  Motor Vehicles (Tax and Duty Receipts)
  Motor Vehicles (Tax and Duty Receipts)
  50p Coin
  50p Coin
  Gold Coins
  Gold Coins
WALES
  Welshpool (By-pass)
  Welshpool (By-pass)
  Timber (Company Sales)
  Timber (Company Sales)
  River Dulas Valley (Inquiry)
  River Dulas Valley (Inquiry)

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the Clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR On the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Manchester.

NIGERIA: PROPOSED MEDIATION BY SWISS GOVERNMENT
LORD SORENSEN: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they have been approached by the Swiss Government in regard to the reported request to that Government to mediate on the present protracted hostilities in Nigeria.]
THE MINISTER OF STATE, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (LORD SHEPHERD): No, my Lords.
LORD SORENSEN: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend whether there has been any kind of contact with the Swiss Government regarding mediation, and if this is at all related to the report that Emperor Haile Selassie is engaged in yet another attempt in this direction?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, we have, of course, close relations with Switzerland, and naturally exchange views. The Swiss Government have themselves said that if they were to mediate it must be on the basis that both sides would welcome it. So far as the Emperor of Ethiopia is concerned, I have seen the reports in the Press but would not wish to make any further comment.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, in view of my noble friend's reference to the initiative of Emperor Haile Selassie, may I ask whether our Minister in Lagos, during his visit there, has been encouraging this hopeful step towards peace?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, the views of the Federal Government are well known: that they are willing and anxious
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to talk with Biafran authorities if there is any meaningful chance of bringing about a peaceful settlement. Therefore there is no reason for us to press the Federal authorities. I think this is now a matter which we should leave with the Emperor of Ethiopia.
LORD SORENSEN: My Lords, if I may follow with a further supplementary question, may I ask my noble friend whether, according to his information, the attempted mediation by the Swiss Government has now lapsed?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, so far as I understand it, mediation was considered by the Swiss authorities, but I have no information whether it went any further.
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: My Lords, following the answer which my noble friend gave before the last supplementary question, may I further ask him: how can we except the Biafran authorities to mediate or discuss matters with us at all while we continue to provide their enemy with arms?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I think the noble Baroness will see that I was answering a rather different question. It was in regard to mediation by the Emperor of Ethiopia.

MARINE SEARCH AND RESCUE
2.38 p.m.
THE EARL OF KINNOULL: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether the Committee set up to inquire into the Marine Search and Rescue Organisation in the United Kingdom has yet reported, and whether the Report will be published.]
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, the Committee has not yet reported, but is expected to do so by the end of this year, or soon after. When my right honourable friend the President of the Board of Trade receives the Report he will consider whether or not it is desirable to publish it.
THE EARL OF KINNOULL: My Lords, while thanking the noble Lord for that reply, may I ask him whether he cannot go further at this stage in view of the widespread interest in this matter, particularly in summer time, and give an assurance that the Report will be published?
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, I cannot give a categorical assurance that it will be published, but I can see the merit of publication and I will certainly see that the noble Earl's view is taken into account.
THE EARL OF KINNOULL: My Lords, could the noble Lord advise us whether the Committee's terms of reference included the question of the reimbursement of the Royal Air Force by the Home Office for the costs involved in civilian rescue?
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, the terms of reference were quite broad. They were to look into the marine search and rescue organisation, and to make recommendations. There is nothing within those terms which precludes the Committee from making a recommendation in the sense referred to by the noble Earl.

URANIUM ENRICHMENT SCHEME
THE EARL OF BESSBOROUGH: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what progress has been made in the formation of the two companies which will operate the proposed tripartite uranium enrichment scheme for the United Kingdom, West Germany and The Netherlands.]
THE MINISTER OF STATE, MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY (LORD DELACOURT-SMITH): My Lords, the tripartite Prime Contractor and Enrichment Company could not be formed while certain negotiating issues remained unresolved. I do not wish to anticipate the Statement which my right honourable friend expects to make
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shortly about the collaboration, but I can say that the way will soon be clear to set them up.
THE EARL OF BESSBOROUGH: My Lords, while thanking the noble Lord for answering that Question, may I ask him whether he could not now tell us the names of the firms involved in each country? I understand from The Times Business News that in Germany and the Netherlands the companies have been named. They were named some time ago, and their percentage participation agreed. Am I not right in thinking that Britain is delaying the scheme largely because our own Fuel Corporation has not yet been formed? Would not the noble Lord agree that the House should be fully informed, in view of the detailed and, I might say, semi-official statements which have been made both in Bonn and Amsterdam? Moreover, in view of American progress in their own uranium enrichment scheme, does the noble Lord not agree that we in Europe should proceed with all speed in this matter?
LORD DELACOURT-SMITH: My Lords, the noble Earl has asked a number of questions. I can certainly agree with him that it is desirable to proceed with all possible speed; but there are a number of matters which have had to be settled, and there are still some points which remain to be resolved. The position is that the British shareholder in both companies will be the Atomic Energy Authority, which, provided that Parliament approves the necessary legislation, will be succeeded in due course by the proposed Nuclear Fuel Company. The Dutch Government and several Dutch companies have formed a group which will hold the Dutch shares; and German industrial groups have similarly formed two groups, one to hold shares in each of the tripartite companies.
So far as a further statement is concerned, as I have said, my right honourable friend hopes to make a statement soon upon this matter; and it will of course be appropriate for the statements to be co-ordinated in the three countries concerned. But I would draw attention to the fact that before they can sign the agreement our Dutch and German partners must, under the Euratom

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Treaty, communicate the terms of it to the European Commission.
THE EARL OF BESSBOROUGH: My Lords, I am sorry to press the noble Lord, but is he satisfied that we are proceeding with sufficient despatch in this matter? I should like to ask him this additional question: can he confirm that the capital expenditure will be of the order of some £625 million, but that the annual saving as a result of our not having to buy this enriched fuel from the United States may be as high as £162 million?
LORD DELACOURT-SMITH: My Lords, I can confirm that all outstanding issues have now been settled. We hope soon to make, in co-ordination with our partners, a comprehensive statement, which will, I hope, cover, among others, the points which the noble Earl raised about capital cost.
THE EARL OF BESSBOROUGH: My Lords, would not the noble Lord agree that the other two countries concerned are ready and that it is Britain that is delaying the scheme?
LORD DELACOURT-SMITH: My Lords, I could not accept that.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, could my noble friend give confirmation of the statement that the uranium will be used only for peaceful purposes and not for nuclear weapons?
LORD DELACOURT-SMITH: My Lords, I hope that my noble friend will be prepared to await the fuller statement which, as I have said, my right honourable friend will be making soon.

GOODS VEHICLES AND ROAD SAFETY
LORD MOYLE: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what they propose to do to restrict the alarming increase in the number of both large and heavy vehicles on our major and minor roads which is becoming a serious danger to other road users.]
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, in order to make the movement of goods in the heavier and larger vehicles as safe as possible to other road users. Her Majesty's Government have recently taken a series of measures; namely, the introduction of an annual test of commercial vehicles, the reintroduction of heavy goods vehicle driving licences and the forthcoming institution of operators' licensing. The first of these is directed to the improvement of the maintenance of the vehicle fleet, and the other two measures will further increase road safety by excluding operators and drivers who do not reach the required standards. We should give these measures a chance to work before calling for further restrictions.
LORD MOYLE: My Lords, while thanking the noble Lord for that reply, may I ask him whether there is any truth in the report that the Government are contemplating permitting a further increase in the weight, size and length of heavy vehicles, not merely on the motorways and trunk roads but even on the secondary roads?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, proposals by the industry for increasing the gross weight of goods vehicles are now under consideration by Her Majesty's Government. I cannot give any indication of when a decision will he arrived at.
LORD MOYLE: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord whether he will press the Government to give serious consideration to the growing unrest among road users other than heavy vehicle drivers?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I am wed aware of the unrest among motorists. On the other hand, I am certain that my noble friend will agree that we are now in the latter part of the 20th century, that we need to earn our living, and that the movement of goods is an important factor in our ability to do so.
LORD MOYLE: And so, my Lords, is human life.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, is the Minister aware that it is not only other road users who are endangered but the fabric of our ancient towns and villages? Is it really a sign of being

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alive to the requirements of the 20th century to destroy such places as York?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, the noble Lord is quite correct; all these factors have to be taken into account. But the local authorities have power even to-day to restrict the movements of vehicles if they are causing harm.
LORD POPPLEWELL: My Lords, would my noble friend do everything possible to promote the view that these heavy loads that are cluttering up our highways should be encouraged back to different methods of transport—to rail or to waterway? There is an overwhelming need for this. For many years the general idea has been to get traffic on the roads. Will my noble friend discuss with his right honourable friend the possibility of reversing that trend and getting back to alternative means of transport?
LORD SHEPHERD: I agree with my noble friend that we should see that goods are moved by rail as much as possible.
BARONESS EMMET OF AMBERLEY: My Lords, could the Minister tell me whether the question of the protection of the wheels of heavy vehicles with proper flaps during wet weather is being considered? I asked a question about this some time ago and I was told that inquiries were being made. I should like to know whether any conclusions have been reached.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, that is clearly in the realm of safety. I will certainly see that that point is considered by the appropriate committee.

GIBRALTAR
THE EARL OF BESSBOROUGH: My Lords, I beg leave to ask a Question of which I have given Private Notice; namely,
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will make a Statement about the discussions with the Chief Minister of Gibraltar.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, with permission I will answer that Question at about 3.30 this afternoon.

RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION BILL [H.L.]
2.48 p.m.
Report of Amendments received.
Then, Standing Order No. 41 having been suspended (pursuant to Resolution of December 4):
THE MINISTER OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY (BARONESS SEROTA: My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a third time. During the Committee stage of the Bill the noble Earl, Lord Bessborough, asked what proportions of financial support will be given to the Board from the Health Ministers, the Atomic Energy Authority and the Medical Research Council. I have since given him this information but he has suggested that I should give it to the whole House at this stage of the Bill. With permission, I shall do so briefly.
The estimated current gross revenue expenditure for the financial year 1969/ 70 will be divided as follows. For the Radiological Protection Service, the Secretary of State for Social Services will contribute £365,000, amounting to 45 per cent. of the total. The Secretary of State for Scotland, will contribute £46,000, some 5 per cent. of the total; and the Medical Research Council, £161,000, 20 per cent. of the total. For the relevant parts of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority Health and Safety branch, the Atomic Energy Authority will contribute £250,000, some 30 per cent. of the total. That makes a total budget of £822,000. For the first few years the contributions from these four sources to the new Board will be worked out on proportions calculated approximately on the basis of current expenditure. Afterwards the proportions will be reviewed, and revised, if necessary, in the light of the situation at the time. I hope that that information is satisfactory to the noble Earl and to the House.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 3a.—(Baroness Serota.)
THE EARL OF BESSBOROUGH: My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Baroness for that additional information about the proportion of financial support

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to be given to the new Board not only by the Health Minister but also by the Ministry of Technology for the Atomic Energy Authority, the Department of Education and Science and the Medical Research Council. These figures give a much clearer picture of the scope of the work. As I see it, we shall this year be spending on these services, something of the order of £822,000, of which about half will come from the Votes of the Secretary of State for Social Security and the Secretary of State for Scotland, and the remainder from the M.R.C. and the A.E.A. I understand that for the first few years the contribution from these four sources will be worked out in similar proportions, but that they will be reviewed from time to time and, if necessary, revised.
The Bill certainly seems designed—and I think this is most important—to promote the efficient use of the radiological protection staff by concentrating them under one Board. However, in the case of the Atomic Energy Authority only a small theoretical section appears to be involved. It would appear that the practical sections doing research, that is to say, the health, physics and medical division at Harwell, will continue—I hope I have this right—to parallel similar work by the Board. I do not know whether the noble Baroness can say whether I am right on this point. I should have thought that here was an opportunity substantially to reduce the A.E.A's. work on radiological protection.
There is one further point on which I am still not quite clear. As I understand it, there are in existence a number of hospital-based film monitoring services on which no information is given concerning their future. I think that the largest is the Liverpool Radium Institute. It seems to me that advantages should accrue if their work were transferred to the new Board and displaced staff were employed on essential medical work. If the noble Baroness does not feel in a position to comment on these points this afternoon, I have no doubt that they will be raised by my honourable friends when the Bill is considered in another place. Apart from these points, and certain considerations which I raised on Second Reading and the Committee stage and which I do not propose to recapitu-
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late now, I agree that this is a useful Bill which should be given a Third Reading.
BARONESS SEROTA: My Lords, I think I can reassure the noble Earl on the two points he has raised. It is not intended that the creation of the new Board should have any immediate effect on the activities, including research activities, which are now being undertaken by the component parts of the new organisation. It will of course be for the Board itself to assess the work it has in hand and to bring about a co-ordination of the various research activities being undertaken at present. It is not possible to predict at this stage whether any saving of the staff engaged in research would be possible, or in fact effected, by such a process, but I have noted the point the noble Earl has made and I am sure that it will be borne in mind.
With regard to his question relating to the future of the film badge monitoring services, it is true that these are at present undertaken by the radiological protection service, and the Atomic Energy Authority provides its own film monitoring service. I think, my Lords, that it would be reasonable for the new Board to provide a national service, probably on an automated basis in due course. I have no doubt that were this to be the case the Board would discuss with other organisations, such as those mentioned by the noble Earl, the extent to which the Board itself should provide a service for the particular organisations involved in this need. I hope that with these two assurances the House will agree to give the Bill a Third Reading.
On Question, Bill read 3a: an Amendment (privilege) made; Bill passed, and sent to the Commons.

CUSTOMS (IMPORT DEPOSITS) BILL
2.56 p.m.
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, the purpose of this Bill is to give effect to the Government's decision, announced in this House on October 21, to seek power to extend the operation of the import deposits scheme for a further period of twelve months from December 5, 1969. The powers proposed are precisely those given under the 1968 Act except that

289
the rate of deposit is reduced from 50 per cent. to 40 per cent. The power to collect the deposit under the 1968 Act expired at midnight on December 4, 1969. It may be of interest to say that by that time about £1,120 million had been collected and £580 million repaid. But for the necessary Ways and Means Resolution, which covered the situation that exists until the passing of this Act, £540 million would have been repaid over the next 180 days, at the rate of £90 to £100 million a month, without any offsetting new deposits. The financial effect of this Bill will be to reduce the rate of repayment from the £90 to £100 million a month to a net rate averaging some £20 million a month between December, 1969, and May, 1970.
Since the 1968 Act went on to the Statute Book there has been a very marked improvement in the financial position of our country. This is confirmed by the figures published to-day for the balance of payments surplus for the third quarter of the year. But even with this improvement, which has set in during 1969, it would be exposing the convalescent patient to an unnecessarily cold wind if he was exposed to this sharp blast of repayments at the rate of £90 to £100 million a month. This, then, is one justification of the renewal of the import deposits scheme, that it avoids any abrupt impact on our reserve position.
Equally, if not more important, the continued requirement of a 40 per cent. deposit means that the control of credit expansion is assisted and not frustrated. Sometimes in the course of economic policies, extending back beyond the lifetime of the present Administration, we have had a situation in which fiscal measures have run counter to monetary policy. Here we have a proposal which ensures that they run in harmony.
There is another good, complementary, reason for the Bill: it directly discourages certain imports. By the nature of things it is not possible to quantify this discouraging effect but available evidence suggests that the previous rate of increase of imports has been markedly slowed down by this deposits scheme. In any case, where an importer decides that, despite the deposit, he must buy foreign goods, there is a consequential monetary advantage to the economy.
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I believe the case is made for the extension of the deposits scheme, at this reduced rate and for a limited period. But, of course, there are arguments against the proposal, and maybe I could help the noble Lord, Lord Erroll of Hale, and save the time of the House if I dealt with some of them in advance. First, there is the argument that undertakings were given when the scheme was first put before the House for approval in 1968 that it would be temporary. That is true. It was intended to be temporary and it is intended to be temporary. I know of no dictionary which defines "temporary" as one year and "permanent" as two years. I agree that the original intention was to limit the scheme to twelve months, but the effort to shift resources into the export market has been harder than was originally estimated and results have been slower in making an impact on the balance of payments figures. I put it to noble Lords opposite (and I see before me now the hardest-headed and clearest-minded members of the Opposition) that it would be just plain silly to deny ourselves this further use of the deposits scheme until our recovery was more firmly established.
I might add that our friends abroad recognise that this is so and recognise it more clearly than do some compatriots at home. Other countries, fellow members of EFTA and the I.M.F., accept the fact that we are applying this scheme because, and only because, of the balance of payments position, and that it is in their interests and in the interests of international trade generally, as well as in Britain's interests, that we get that position right beyond doubt—and beyond the doubt of the currency speculator. Given that, I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Erroll of Hale, will not play politics in this House and talk about broken international commitments.
There is another argument, more fairly put, and which has to be met; namely, that lack of liquid resources, and credit restriction generally, will result in complete company failures in some cases and inadequate capital development elsewhere. This argument has to be taken very seriously. But it is a matter of judgment, and in a wider context than this one measure. In the New Year there will be additional strains. I know, arising

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from tax demands, but the total evidence available does not suggest, in the considered judgment of the Chancellor and his advisers, that now is the time to revise policy on credit restraints.
There is one further point that I should like to make before inviting your Lordships to give this Bill a Second Reading. There is probably room for more than one opinion upon the merits of this import deposits scheme but I hope the noble Lord opposite will be able to join with me in paying a tribute to the Customs and Excise Department who have had the responsibility of administering it. The procedures adopted were simple and they have been successful. East desposit is repaid separately from a Customs office at Southend-on-Sea. Some 25,000 orders are sent out each week, and from the beginning of the scheme to the beginning of this month 650,000 have been sent out. About 350 early repayments in respect of goods which are exported are despatched each week, and usually within one week of notification that the goods have in fact been exported.
It is not often that the victims of imposts find it possible to pay tribute to the officers responsible, but individual firms, the C.B.I. and other trade organisations have been complimentary. The British Chemical and Dyestuff Traders Association, for example, said:
"I need hardly tell you what the views of this Association are about the scheme in general … but everyone has been very impressed with the prompt and efficient way in which repayments have been made …".
In view of the Christmas spirit, I hope that, on that charitable note, your Lordships will agree to give this Bill a Second Reading.
Moved, That the Bill now read 2a—(Lord Beswick.)
3.5 p.m.
LORD ERROLL OF HALE: My Lords, in rising to take part in the debate on the Second Reading of this Bill, I should begin by declaring a personal interest, as I did during the Second Reading of the Bill a year ago. I am chairman of a company which imports a great deal of Swedish engineering products and we are considerably affected by the present Bill, as we were by the last. However, I should hasten to add that anything I say
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this afternoon has nothing to do with this private interest, although perhaps I speak with rather greater knowledge of the subject than might otherwise be the case. In regard to my own company, we had made proper arrangements to deal with the import deposit financial problems. We have imported more than ever in the last twelve months and our Swedish principals have bought far more from Britain than they have ever done in the past. So, from the point of view of my personal interest, I assure your Lordships that I have no axe to grind at this Box this afternoon.
The noble Lord, Lord Beswick, in an admirably brief speech, sought to answer my arguments before he had heard them—quite a legitimate tactic when you have very little to say in support of your case, but it would have been more appropriate if he had waited until he had heard my speech and then answered the points when he came to wind up. However, I do not wish to spoil his fun. He will find that there are a number of points which he did not succeed in anticipating and to which I hope to receive full and adequate answers before your Lordships grant a Second Reading to this Bill.
First of all, the noble Lord, Lord Beswick, referred to the temporary nature of the scheme and said that "temporary" did not necessarily mean one year, nor did "permanent" mean two years. But the noble Lord might refresh his memory with what he said on the occasion of the Second Reading of the previous Bill, on December 5, 1968. In opening the debate then and giving details of the Bill, he said:
"It fulfils the outline"—
given—
"the 50 per cent. rate of deposit, which may be reduced but not increased by Treasury Order; the repayment period of 180 days; and the twelve months maximum life of the Scheme, which may be reduced, but not increased …".—[0FFICAL REPORT, 5/12/68; col. 309.]
Not the Bill, but the scheme. The scheme was to have a twelve months' maximum life. There was no question of the word "temporary". So much for what the noble Lord, Lord Beswick, said in your Lordships' House.
On Committee stage in another place, on December 3, 1968, the Financial Secretary, referring to the subsection dealing

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with the period of the Bill, said that the Act
"shall cease to be in force at the expiration of a period of one year beginning with the date on which this Act is passed, or at such earlier time as the Treasury may by order …"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, 3/12/68; col. 1484.]
decide. It is clear from what the Ministers in both Houses said at the time that it was their intention that this scheme should last for a maximum period of one year. That was why it was called a temporary import deposits scheme, and industrialists and traders in this country thought that it would last for the maximum period of one year. But we are now to have a second year, and doubtless we shall be told that it may not last the whole of the second year, only to Lind at the end of that year that we get the Mark III Bill.
That may not matter very much in this country. The noble Lord said that no firms are likely to go bankrupt or be unable to pay up on due dates. It is not that which really concerns me; it is the effect abroad. The noble Lord made some reference to the understanding co-operation of our partners in Europe, but I can assure him that the continuation of this twelve-months measure has caused a considerable degree of disillusionment abroad. At the time of the introduction of the scheme, a number of my friends in Europe, not only in Sweden but also in France, Germany and Switzerland, and some who came to see us in England at the London Chamber of Commerce, asked about this import deposits scheme, and we were all able to say—and I make this point strongly because I did so a great deal myself—that this was a scheme which was going to last for a maximum period of one year; that the British Government themselves had said so.
I think noble Lords know me well enough to know that I always defend the British Government abroad, and whenever I can at home, in front of foreigners. I felt completely confident that the maximum life of the scheme was twelve months. So it was difficult when I saw visitors here from Europe, or when I saw them in their own countries, who said: "Oh, your Government will think up another scheme as soon as this one has run out." I said: "No; I do not think so; not this time. I have listened
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to Ministers, and I have heard their assurances. This time I am sure that the scheme is only going to last for a maximum period of twelve months." They said: "Freddie"—those who knew me well enough—"you will believe anything that your Government tell you. There will be something else in its place." I said, "No; I am quite sure this time that they mean what they say."
So the noble Lord has, in fact, let me down personally by his bland assumption that "temporary" does not mean twelve months but can mean any period that you like. It does not matter that I feel that I have been let down in my defence of the British Government abroad; that is of little concern. What really matters is that the British Government, for continuing this scheme without any previous warning or notice, are slightly more in disrepute than they were before, in view of the categorical assurances that were given at the time of its introduction, two examples of which I have already quoted to your Lordships. That does a lot of harm. It induces scepticism about the intentions of the Government.
A week or two ago we were discussing the effect of the £50 travel allowance. I do not intend to refer to that to-day, except to say that it produces a bad effect abroad. it does not make much difference to the balance of payments; and I do not think that this scheme makes much difference to the balance of payments. It is the fact that Her Majesty's Government changed their minds. Having given what everybody understood to be categorical assurances, they blandly throw them overboard and put forward arguments about keeping international money speculators at bay, strengthening the pound et cetera. I regard it as a very unfortunate affair that Her Majesty's Government should have taken this step at the present time, when there was, in my opinion, no need to renew the scheme at all.
Indeed, the difficulty is to find out whether the scheme has been of value or not. It has certainly been an inconvenience to many people in this country. It has probably caused difficulties to some small importers. But the Government themselves are not sure. They say that while it is impossible to quantify—and I accept that it is—they seek authority on the basis of the fact that imports did

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not grow as much as they have done in previous years. But then imports are unlikely to have grown in the last 16 months because of the Government's credit squeeze and restraint on the money supply. That in itself was sufficient to damp down the demand for imports, and even for domestically produced goods. At the outset of the scheme the Chancellor of the Exchequer on November 22, 1968, in the other place, said:
"The scheme is not one which can or should be kept in being for more than a limited period, but it will have a powerful effect over the next few months…"
But his own Financial Secretary, Mr. Lever, reported in Hansard six days later, said:
"The whole point of the scheme is that it is to have a marginal effect."
So Ministers were not clear about it at the time. As the months passed, it was interesting to see again this curious dichotomy of view. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, at a meeting with insurance officials in May, 1969, reported in the Financial Times, said:
"The Imports Deposit Scheme without producing dramatic results has by no means been without its effect"—
a rather elegant form of double negative, of which he, as a great literary expert, will appreciate the full value.
So, as the months went by, it was interesting to see that it was not clear whether the scheme was having much of an effect or not. If it was not having much of an effect, then there was no point in continuing it; but if it does have an effect, then that ought to have been brought out. British Industry Week, as opinion was crystallising last summer, said on May 30, that:
"As far as can be determined the effects of the scheme have been minimal. A wide cross-section of industry quizzed only last week could find no evidence of imports being curbed since the scheme's introduction. It has certainly caused difficulties, but no more than that."
Then, as one goes on through the year, one finds that the Board of Trade Journal—surely a publication which the Government accept as authoritative—say on August 6, 1969, that the scheme
"may have affected the level of certain imports among industrial materials. There is no clear evidence of any marked effect, however, since imports of semi-manufactures, which were largely subject to the scheme,
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increased a little by volume between the second half of 1968 and the first half of this year."
Perhaps I may be allowed to quote from the London Chamber of Commerce—and here I must declare an interest as one of its Vice-Presidents. In its News Letter of October 24 of this year it said:
"The scheme has, however, involved importers in special and expensive financial arrangements which in some cases will have been passed on to the consumer in the form of increased prices. But the evidence we have been able to obtain from a broad cross-section of importers is that the scheme, while it has had some initial success in checking imports, has not over the period of its operation resulted in a material reduction in the volume of goods chargeable to the import deposit."
So it is very doubtful whether the scheme has been worth all the pain and effort that has gone into its conception.
While I should be the last to say anything against the Board of Customs and Excise, for whose body of officials I have a great admiration, nevertheless, I do not think they need have unctuous praise, because they are merely doing what they ought to be doing. Indeed, they should repay these monies properly: and I wonder whether they would have been so prompt if it had not been for the great outcry at the time that they would not be prompt. Grave fears were expressed by commerce and industry that there would be substantial delays in repaying these import deposits by the time the repayment became due, because so many people have had experience of customs and excise delays in repaying deposits of customs duty in the normal course of business. So if we are to thank them for doing what they ought to do, we should also remember that they probably did it because they knew that there would be a very proper public outcry if they hung on to the money a day longer than they should have done.
We turn next to some of the temporary effects which have been so unsatisfactory. One of those has been the way in which interest has been denied to those who have had to make the deposits. I submit to Ministers that it is a very bad precedent for the Government to establish; namely, the compulsory collection of deposits without the payment of any interest. Noble Lords may remember that

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with post-war credits there was for a long time an outcry because no interest was payable on those that were not repaid. That was put right in the Budget of 1959. since when the deferment of payment of post-war credits has been acceptable. The Government pay interest on money held by the Board of Trade in connection with the insolvency of companies; the Government pay interest on tax reserve certificates. It is a well accepted and proper principle that when the Government hold monies owned by the individual the Government pay a rate of interest. I am not suggesting that it should necessarily be the going rate of interest, but it does acknowledge the principle that interest should be paid.
It is a particularly bad feature of this scheme that these monies should be held without payment of interest. It is particularly exacerbating for those firms concerned when interest rates are so high. I am not making that as a principal point; I just think that it is a bad principle that the Government should take money from people and not be prepared to pay interest. It means that people, recognising how manifestly unfair it is, may be tempted to take it out of the Government in other directions; they may be tempted into delaying paying company taxation by a little longer than they would otherwise do. They say: "You take our money away and will not pay us interest, so we will hold on to what is due to you for as long as we can before you take us to court."
This is where the scheme is so bad. It is destroying what remains of mutual confidence between individuals and Government departments. I have seen it stated in a Sunday newspaper that the best way of living to-day, if you are a company, is to find a means of tax dispute of a sufficiently big sum of money and to take it to court. So long as the matter is before the courts no money is payable and no interest is payable. In fact, if the sum of money involved is large enough, it costs less to bring the case up to your noble Lordships' House for a final decision, pay the legal fees and have use of the money, than to surrender the money earlier to the Inland Revenue, thus losing the interest on it. This is the state of affairs which is induced by the unfairness of Her
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Majesty's Government in refusing to pay interest.
If that were not bad enough, where the Government has been so petty in this matter (it is perhaps a rather technical point, and I hope I am not taking up too much of Your Lordships' time) is that they said at the inception of the scheme that if foreign exporters to Britain provided the money to the British importer, while it did not take money out of the British economy, it would help the British balance of payments in the short run. That is an ingenious argument, and I thought so at the time. A number of foreign firms have done this and provided the money, and thus helped the British balance of payments. The mean part of the Government's action was that it would not allow the British importer to pay interest across the exchanges, at his own expense, to service the loan from the foreign exporter to this country. That is quite indefensible and leads only to a degree of bitterness out of all proportion to the small amount of interest so saved.
When funds from abroad are deposited in Britain in almost any other context, interest at the going rate is permitted. In this one case, where the transfer of funds can be identified as a loan to meet an import deposit, interest across the exchanges is denied to the lender, and the borrower is not allowed to transmit it. Of course, what happens, inevitably, is that ways and means are found of getting round this ban because it is so unfair. If only Her Majesty's Government could realise that when they do these things which are so manifestly unfair they build up far more than any small saving to the balance of payments could possibly justify! For these and many other reasons I deplore the continuation of this legislation, albeit at a slightly reduced rate. I appreciate, too, that the rate can go down from 40 to 30 per cent.: it can be reduced. But it has not been reduced in the past twelve months, and I would ask: is there much likelihood that it will be reduced in the coming twelve months? I think the likelihood is very small indeed.
There are arguments which can be used for exempting different classes of products. I would not wish to waste your Lordships' time on devising refinements to the scheme, which I personally believe

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should be abolished. There are some very strange anomalies in it. For instance, certain steel products are now allowed into this country, temporarily, duty-free because domestic industry cannot provide them; but import deposit still has to be paid. The Government help the user, on the one hand, but handicap him, on the other hand, by still insisting on the payment of import deposits. Plywood is urgently required for packing cases, and the like, for export goods, yet that also is subject to the import deposit scheme. I merely mention some of these anomalies and stupidities of temporary legislation, and say that if this had shown any signs of becoming permanent legislation we should want to see written into the Bill means for dealing with anomalies and absurdities of that sort.
Reading behind the Bill, the real question in my mind is, what is Her Majesty's Government's attitude towards imports. A noble colleague of mine on this Front Bench said to me a few minutes ago: "Nobody is speaking about imports to-day because 'imports' is a dirty word." But why should it be a dirty word? After all, our exports are another country's imports. We live by trade in both directions. I should hope that Her Majesty's Government, in the last few months of their lives, would spend a little time in rationalising their ideas on imports and on trade.
I should like to take your Lordships back to a very important policy speech made by the then Leader of Her Majesty's Opposition, now the Prime Minister. I refer to the famous Swansea speech of January 25, 1964. He spoke very clearly then, and said:
"Import-saving industries needed to be developed, and this should be tackled with at least the same urgency as the exports drive."
He said that he was appalled at the big increase in machinery and semi-finished manufactures that came into Britain in the past few years. Then he went on:
"If I were President of the Board of Trade"—
and he had been, so he should know—
"I should sit down and work out in detail from the trade returns all those imports which rise sharply—Then each would be examined to see whether we could, economically and competitively, find means of producing them in our own factories.
"The next job would be to discuss with industry … the prospect of developing home
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produced substitutes. This would be one of the priority tasks of our new economic planning machinery."
That was said on January 25, 1964, in Swansea. There have been many changes since then. While, on the one hand, we are told about the evils of importing, there seems to be another mood growing up, particularly in the Government's economic Ministries, and among leaders of key sections of British industry.
The Financial Times reports on the meetings of the National Economic Development Council. Perhaps I might mention to your Lordships that reports of these meetings are not exactly inspired leaks, but no official communiqué is issued: a spokesman gives the gist of what was discussed. That is intended to be an authoritative but informal summary of the discussion that took place. So I think it right that I should quote one report, which appeared in the Financial Times, because at this meeting of the National Economic Development Council it was revealed that Government economic Ministries are cutting down sharply on the attention directed to import substitution and the "Buy British" approach. The report continues:
"At an all-day meeting of the National Economic Development Council and heads of seven Economic Development Committees in London yesterday it was agreed that in important sectors, such as engineering, electronics, chemicals and machine tools, the emphasis should be on equipping industry with the best products from whatever source …"—
that is to say, from abroad as well as domestic.
"The interesting point about the views expressed yesterday on imports substitution"—
the point made so eloquently by the then Leader of the Opposition in his Swansea speech—
"is that for many years the desire for import substitution as an aid to the balance of payments has often outweighed the more economic considerations of international competitiveness. Indeed, examination of areas where import substitution might provide savings has taken up a significant proportion of certain Economic Development Committees' time. While these considerations are hardly going to disappear from official policy, it is clear that the United Kingdom's post-devaluation situation has reduced the pressures on this front."
So it seems clear that at least inside Whitehall, if not overtly, there is a change of mood on import substitution and policy. If the report that appears

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to come from the National Economic Development Council is true, I welcome this change. The best way of helping British industry to become more efficient in terms of world competitiveness is for its products to be bought on merit, and not for patriotism or on patriotic grounds. The best way for British firms to become efficient is for the products of other countries to be equally available in this market, as they are in other markets of the world where British firms have to compete. The best way for British firms to re-equip themselves with the most modern capital equipment is to buy British or foreign, depending upon which is the more suitable for their purpose, regardless of what flag may be attached to the packing case delivered to the works. That is why I deplore the continuation of this measure. I think it is inappropriate to our time when, I hope and believe, economic recovery is on the way. I think this measure is one which the Government should have abandoned when the Act came to an end three or four days ago. If it continues, it will be one part of the clutter which at present surrounds Whitehall and slows down the work of industry in the country. I would urge the Government to clean up something of this clutter, and make a start by scrapping this measure within the next few months.
3.30 p.m.
LORD MOYNE: My Lords, if I may speak, although I have not put my name down, I should like to begin by saying that I think I have no interest to declare because, although my firm manufactures in Ireland and imports to England, the Irish Government, I believe, makes up the interest on the sums borrowed to pay the deposits. So I think I have no interest to declare. But, if I have, I declare it. I will speak very briefly, just to ask a question of the noble Lord, Lord Beswick, because I think we are behaving meanly and against our treaty obligations. When we imposed these deposits, in plain breach, as I see it, of our special treaty obligations to the Republic of Ireland, it was argued, with some cogency, that the deposits, which weighed very heavily on the economy of that small country, would be less harmful than quotas, for which at the time we should have been entitled, undoubtedly, to apply to the inter-
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national authority. Does the noble Lord, Lord Beswick, now say that, in spite of the improvement in our balance-of-payments position, we would still be entitled to apply for the more drastic method of quotas?

GIBRALTAR: DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME
3.31 p.m.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, with the permission of the House, I would now reply to the Private Notice Question asked earlier by the noble Earl, Lord Bessborough.
I am glad to say that we were able to reach full agreement on a Three-Year Development Programme designed to strengthen the Gibraltar economy, which in terms of British aid amounts to about £4 million. An agreed communiqué was issued at 3.30 p.m. to coincide with the return of the Chief Minister to Gibraltar this afternoon. I am arranging for a copy of the communiqué to be circulated in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
Following is the text of the communiqué referred to:

GIBRALTAR TALKS: (DECEMBER 2-8)
Joint Communiqué Issued at Conclusion of Consultations
A series of talks under the chairmanship of Lord Shepherd, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, have taken place during the past week with representatives of the Government of Gibraltar, comprising the Governor (Admiral of the Fleet Sir Varyl Begg), the Chief Minister (Major R. J. Peliza), the Gibraltar Ministers for Labour and Social Security (Mr. M. Xiberras) and for Information, Port, Trade and Industries (Major A. J. Gache) and the Financial and Development Secretary (Mr. E.H. Davis). The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Minister of Overseas Development also had talks with the delegation, and during their visit the Governor and Chief Minister, accompanied by Lord Shepherd, were received by the Prime Minister.
In the course of these talks Gibraltar Ministers put before British Ministers Gibraltar's development proposals for the next three years, and repeated and made clear their views on a variety of other subjects, which included Gibraltar's relations with Britain, citizenship, Anglo-Spanish relations.
The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary took note of the views expressed by Gibraltar Ministers and re-affirmed Her Majesty's Government's assurances to the people of

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Gibraltar in the preamble to the Order-in-Council embodying the 1969 Gibraltar Constitution. He undertook to consider the resolution on citizenship recently adopted by the Gibraltar House of Assembly, while holding out no prospect at this time that amendments to United Kingdom legislation concerned would be possible. The Gibraltar Ministers accepted that, in accordance with previous assurances by Her Majesty's Government there are in practice no obstacles in the way of Gibraltarians who wish to do so coming to the United Kingdom under the Commonwealth Immigrants Act.
The Gibraltar representatives tabled a comprehensive Development Programme for the three years 1970 to 1973 drawn up with the object of counteracting the economic difficulties resulting from the Spanish restrictions and in the light of the recent report of the Manpower Mission (Lords Beeching and DelacourtSmith). After full discussion it was agreed that Her Majesty's Government would assist the Gibraltar Government to carry out their Development Programme in the following ways.
The British Government will support Gibraltar's proposals for about a further 750 housing units in addition to the current housing programme. The Gibraltar Government have expressed particular satisfaction that the British Defence Secretary is making available for this purpose, without charge to Gibraltar, the greater part of Viaduct Reclamation site which is the property of his Ministry.
The British Government will finance the immediate construction of a hostel for temporary immigrant labour which is vital to Gibraltar at this time.
Discussions took place on the Gibraltar Government's proposals to turn to a system of comprehensive secondary education, and the British Government will support this, subject to further details becoming available.
Money will be provided for a Schools Sports Centre, for additional medical facilities and for port development. The British Government will also assist appropriate schemes for tourist development. These will include a number of amenities which will be available for the people of Gibraltar as well.
To achieve this development programme the Government of Gibraltar have asked for expert advice in a number of fields and the British Government will make this available under Technical Assistance arrangements.
The cost of British support for this programme in the next three years is expected to be about £4 million exclusive of Technical Assistance.
The Gibraltar Ministers indicated that owing to Gibraltar's present difficulties a deficit on the ordinary budget was forecast for 1970 and that they had in mind to introduce into the House of Assembly measures to increase revenue from local sources in order to help bridge this gap. In these circumstances Her Majesty's Government are willing to assist Gibraltar to meet special expenditure attributable to the consequences of Spanish restrictions by making available a further sum of £100,000
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in addition to the £100,000 previously provided to the same end.
THE EARL OF BESSBOROUGH: My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lord for having repeated that Statement, which I warmly welcome. I wonder whether the noble Lord could, none the less, give us a little more of the detail of this Three-Year Development Programme on which we are going to spend some £4 million. For example, can he say how many houses are to be built and where the land is coming from on which to build them? Can he also say something about Gibraltar's probable deficit on her ordinary Budget in 1970 and how the gap is to be bridged? Further, may I be assured that in these recent talks the question of sovereignty was not discussed, and that there is no question of our yielding to pressure in this matter, when the people of Gibraltar have made it abundantly clear that they wish to remain British?
I wonder whether the noble Lord can also tell me if Gibraltarians really want the system of comprehensive secondary education, which I think is included in this package deal? Will it be "comprehensive" in the same sense as we use the term here?
LORD BYERS: My Lords, I, too, should like to welcome this Statement and to thank the Government for the efforts which they have made on behalf of Gibraltar. May I nevertheless ask them whether the Gibraltar delegation who were over here were fairly satisfied with the results of their talks? Does this £4 million represent something like the assistance they were hoping to get?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, perhaps I may reply first to the noble Lord, Lord Byers, who asked whether the Gibraltar Ministers were fairly satisfied. All I can say is that the delegation left me this morning with smiles on their faces, and I think that is an indication that they were satisfied. It was not a question or problem of money; it was a question of how much could be spent by Gibraltar in terms of the Three-Year Programme. It may be a fact—I hope it is—that Gibraltar can proceed faster on her development programme than we foresee at the present time. In terms of sovereignty, we reaffirmed, as we always do when we see Gibraltar Ministers, the position of

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Her Majesty's Government over Gibraltar; and this is perhaps best spelt out in the preamble to the present Constitution.
In regard to a probable deficit, I think that this is very much for the Gibraltar Government themselves to announce in Gibraltar, when they announce what steps they themselves are going to take to deal with the deficit. Our contribution was made in the light of the facts and figures they provided to us in confidence.
In terms of comprehensive education, there is a feeling that special need exists in Gibraltar for greater technical education in order to meet the dockyard needs and all the other developments that are needed in Gibraltar. Whether it will be comprehensive education as we know it in this country is for them themselves to decide. As the noble Earl knows, our own form of comprehensive education covers a very wide area.
The principal feature of the development plan is housing. We are undertaking to assist in the building of some 750 units on top of what is already planned. This of course cannot be achieved in the first three years, but this is a commitment to this long-term building project. On the question of land, I am very pleased that the Ministry of Defence have been able to give us one of the (I think the phrase is) "choice pieces" of land in Gibraltar—some reclaimed land by the sea—and it is this new piece of land that has become available to us which makes housing a real starter in Gibraltar. We are also going to help in the field of emergency housing for immigrant workers, and in the field of tourism communications. We shall help, too, with a special feature, which I think is very much needed in Gibraltar. It is that special development projects should be undertaken to increase the opportunity of leisure and recreation for the young people of Gibraltar.
LORD MERRIVALE: My Lords, I should at the outset like to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, on the part he played in reaching agreement with the Ministers of Gibraltar over here. As he knows, I had the pleasure of meeting the three gentlemen last week. Can the noble Lord say whether Her Majesty's Government accept in its entirety the Manpower Mission Report
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—that is, the Beeching/Delacourt-Smith Report—and whether they propose to implement its recommendations which concern Her Majesty's Government: for instance, that work study specialists should be sent to Gibraltar? As the noble Lord said that Her Majesty's Government would be assisting in the supply of better communication facilities, may I ask whether they will give this matter top priority, because I believe there is very great difficulty in travelling to and from Gibraltar either by air or by sea, over the weekends in particular?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, whether Her Majesty's Government accept the Beeching Report in principle is neither here nor there. This is a matter for the Gibraltar authorities. If they were to ask for specialists—as they have done in certain fields—in work study, to which the noble Lord himself referred, we should be only too willing to assist them. In the field of communication, such as air services and the ferry between Tangiers and Gibraltar, this has been a considerable problem both financially and otherwise to the Gibraltar Government; but I think that the assistance we are now giving to Gibraltar should overcome most of the problems.

CUSTOMS (IMPORT DEPOSITS) BILL
3.39 p.m.
Second Reading debate resumed.
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, I wonder whether I may first refer to the brief but very relevant contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Moyne. He asked me about the position of the Irish Free Trade Agreement. There is a special case here which I recognise. Certainly Her Majesty's Government wish to do nothing at all which will impair the good relations between this country and Ireland, especially as manifested in the Agreement which we reached with them. But the noble Lord should not talk about bad faith here. The Government of Eire have never charged Her Majesty's Government here with bad faith. They have never said we were acting contrary to the Agreement. Certainly they expressed their disappointment; of course they did. We, too, were disappointed in

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having to do this. But there was no question at all that we were breaking any undertaking. The noble Lord says, quite rightly, that under the Agreement it would have been possible to impose quotas, but I think that, on reflection, he will agree, and most others would agree, that quotas would have been far more mischievous than this import deposits scheme. So I hope that his fears with regard to trade between this country and Ireland—which I hope will expand—are not well founded.
To the noble Lord, Lord Erroll of Hale, I think I owe an apology, and I am always ready to apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Erroll. It seemed that I spoilt his fun a little by anticipating the kind of arguments which he would put up. Apparently I did not foresee two which he has listed, but otherwise it was rather interesting that I had not only got the arguments that he had down in his speech, but I had them in the right order—which I must say was rather lucky. The noble Lord referred to the fact that I had used some words twelve months ago about the scheme being for a maximum period of twelve months. I said then in good faith—and he will recognise this—that Her Majesty's Government had put before Parliament a scheme which had a legal life of twelve months. Parliament agreed that they should have powers to implement the scheme for twelve months. We have found that the economic situation is not so secure now as to justify our withdrawing this scheme, so we have come to Parliament again for a renewal of those powers, although, as an earnest of our good faith, we have suggested that the powers should be given at the reduced rate of 40 per cent. rather than 50 per cent.
The noble Lord also said that I had tried to make some reference to international reactions. I did not try to make any reference; I succeeded. I specifically referred to reactions from overseas, and I said that not in any case had there been any question of any country overseas charging this Government with breaking any international commitment. Why then should the noble Lord, who is every bit as loyal to his Queen and country as I am—and I would never say one word to the contrary—spend his weekend in
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devising a speech attacking this Government for having broken international agreements? It really is not good enough. He speaks about disrepute. The only disrepute really is when people read in the newspaper or in Hansard that across the floor of the House this kind of charge is bandied about. Let us, I suggest to the noble Lord, forget it. It really is not worthy of him.
The noble Lord mentioned the point that I tried to deal with the extent to which imports were frustrated directly by the import deposits scheme. I noticed that some figures were given in the other House, but they proved to be too much for the Opposition there to assimilate, and I did not intend—and I do not now intend—to quote those figures about the way in which the trend went before the scheme and has gone after the scheme. The evidence suggests that the rising tide of imports was halted to some extent, and in so far as the imports have not been frustrated there is this other advantage: that an amount of money—50 per cent. of the proposed imports in value—shall be deposited with the Government. and this of course has a useful effect upon the volume of credit. This, then, is a sort of Morton's Fork—either you catch it on that prong or on the other prong. In either case it is something to the advantage of the economy of this country.
The noble Lord spoke about its being mean not to allow across-the-exchanges interest to be paid on those deposits which were financed by the overseas supplier. Well, the noble Lords says we were mean. Sometimes I believe he really thinks that moneys collected in this way are put directly into the pockets of the individual members of the Government. What we were trying to do was to help the economy of the country—our country—and had overseas suppliers been allowed to finance the deposits at a rate of interest, to that extent the objectives of the scheme would have been frustrated or hindered. We hoped that the scheme would be successful and that it would be possible to end it within the period of twelve months.
If there is any other question which the noble Lord put to me, I have no doubt in good faith, I will certainly write and answer him. But may I end my appeal that this House should give the

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Bill a Second Reading by saying this? I said at the beginning, and I repeat it, despite the noble Lord's rather fractious posture at the Opposition Box, that he is a man of considerable judgment in commercial and financial affairs, and I put it to him that he does not really believe that this is the point of time at which we could end this scheme abruptly. It is much better to phase it out. Possibly in the course of the next twelve months—I do not know—it may be considered wise to reduce the 40 per cent. to a lower percentage. It may be wise and possible to end it completely. But right now, until we are more certain, it would be irresponsible to end this scheme; and I do not believe that in his heart the noble Lord, Lord Erroll, considers that it would be sensible to end it.
The noble Lord ended his speech with quite an eloquent plea about the benefits of international trade. Of course I agree with almost everything he said. We want a situation in the world where we can have the freest possible exchange of trade. That is the situation in which this country does best, and that is what we want. And it is because we believe—I believe, certainly, and I think the noble Lord believes—that the financial situation we had before, with "Stop—Go" policies and difficulties and doubts about the pound sterling, was contrary to the best interests of international trade that it was necessary to take quite ruthless measures to put the situation right. All the evidence goes to show, and the most recent evidence supports it, that our balance-of-payments position is improving, and this scheme has helped to improve it. It would be wrong to end it now. Therefore I hope that your Lordships will agree to give this Bill a Second Reading.
On Question, Bill read 2a: Committee negatived.

ULSTER DEFENCE REGIMENT BILL
3.49 p.m.
TILE PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE, R.A.F. (LORD WINTER-BOTTOM): My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a second time. When the House discussed the Police Bill last week my noble friend the Lord
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Privy Seal and Leader of the House reminded your Lordships of the very full and valuable discussion of the situation in Northern Ireland that took place a few weeks ago in your Lordships', House; and he recalled the circumstances in which both that Bill and the one before us to-day were conceived, following the report of the Advisory Committee chaired by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. It is a measure of the weight which the Government, and I believe the whole country, attach to the Committee's work that not only have the main recommendations of their Report been accepted, both by the United Kingdom Government and by the Government of Northern Ireland, but they have been followed within two months by two Bills to give effect to them.
The Bill which is before your Lordships this afternoon authorises Her Majesty to establish and maintain a part-time military force for service in Northern Ireland. Command of the Armed Forces is the prerogative of the Crown, and thus there are a number of matters with which this Bill does not deal, notably the tasks of the new force, its organisation and the pay and detailed conditions of service of its members. Legislation confines itself broadly to granting authority to the Crown to raise a force, and to establishing its discipline, and prescribing the conditions in which it may be used. Thus the Bill does not give a comprehensive account of the new force, and it was for this reason that my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Defence presented a White Paper on November 12 which gave a detailed account of his proposals. In the light of that White Paper, I believe that it will be unnecessary for me to detain noble Lords with a general description of the proposed force. Discussion in another place and public comment generally have however concentrated on certain key issues, mainly related to Clauses 1 and 2 of the Bill, and to these issues I should like to draw your Lordships' attention.
Clause 1(1) prescribes the title of the force. It has been suggested, I know, that the word" Ulster" is inappropriate. My Lords, let us be quite clear that there is no deep constitutional significance in this. Of course we all know that Ulster has nine counties and not six. But the new force is to be a part of the Army,

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and Army units have used and continue to use the word "Ulster" in their titles. Many of them have been formed since the partition of Ireland. Among reserve units, there is, for instance, the 40th (Ulster) Signal Regiment, which was formed in 1967. It has been the practice, when forming new units, to incorporate names which have been used before and, in using the word "Ulster" on this occasion, we are simply following this practice.
My Lords, Clause 1(1) of the Bill also provides for the force to have a numerical ceiling; and, as the White Paper explains, this ceiling will be 6,000 officers and men. The Report of the Committee under the chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, did of course suggest a strength of about 4,000, but the Committee did not have the time or the means to go into this in detail. After most careful consideration of this point, we have concluded that a ceiling of 4,000 would be too low. This does not mean that we shall aim at recruiting 6,000 immediately: the figure of 6,000 is a ceiling and not a target. It would however, be very foolish to handicap ourselves with a ceiling which there is a good reason to believe may be too low. Noble Lords will not expect me to go into the details of our calculation of the figure of 6,000. One consideration to which I would refer, however, is that in a part-time force it is impracticable to expect a man to turn out for duty too often. This means that it is essential to have enough manpower.
Having discussed the size of the force, I should now like to say something about its task. As stated in the White Paper, this will be to support the regular forces in Northern Ireland, should circumstances so require, in protecting the border and the State against armed attack and sabotage. It will fulfil its role by undertaking guard duties at key points and installations, by carrying out patrols and by establishing check points and road blocks when required to do so. I must emphasise that it is not the intention to employ the new force on crowd control or riot duties in cities. The need for such a force in Northern Ireland is, regrettably, all too apparent against the backcloth of a history of violence and terrorism. The Hunt Report referred to
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this and to the more recent campaign of terrorism from 1956 to 1962 when several hundred raids were made, including thirty on police stations.
This year there have been a number of attacks on public utility installations in Northern Ireland. Several of these were mentioned recently in another place. I repeat them now to emphasise the need for an effective defence force. There was the attack on March 30 on the electricity sub-station at Castlereagh, when two transformers were damaged by explosion; there were two separate attacks on April 20, when an electricity pylon at Kilmore was severely damaged, and the main supply from the Silent Valley reservoir was broken by explosives which broke two pipes of 30 inches in diameter; then on April 24 a 48-inch water pipe was blown up at Dunadry.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, for the benefit of those who are not so well informed as the noble Lord, would he agree that the attacks between 1956 and 1962 were known to be the work of the I.R.A.? The attacks this year appear to be the work of very different extremists.
LORD WINTER BOTTOM: My Lords, I suppose that General Freeland will be very glad to know exactly who caused these outrages. Nevertheless, from wherever the extremists come, these points have to be defended. That is the object of this Bill.
LORD KILBRACKEN: My Lords, could the noble Lord make clear that they do not come from the Republic of Ireland, that they come from within the Six Counties?
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, no; I cannot make that clear.
To resume what I was saying, quite apart from any cold assessment of the possibility of terrorist attacks, there is, as the Hunt Report pointed out, a very real fear of them, and public anxiety will not be allayed unless precautions are taken, and are seen to be taken. It is the view of Her Majesty's Government and of the Government of Northern Ireland that it is essential that the threat should be met by a properly constituted military force, trained specifically for its task and under military control and discipline. This is not a task for the police, or for a reserve

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police force such as the Ulster Special Constabulary, despite the considerable part that that force has played in helping to deal with past campaigns of terrorism.
The essential characteristic of a military force is its subjection to military law. This distinguishes it from any other body of citizens. For although codes of discipline exist in many walks of life that serve the community—for example, the police, the Civil Service, and the medical profession—the discipline of the Armed Forces is not only more rigorous and more comprehensive than any other, but it alone is enforced by penal sanctions. The extent to which military law should apply to members of a part-time force is thus a question to be considered with care.
LORD WIGG: My Lords, would the noble Lord allow me to intervene? One of the clauses of this Bill puzzles me. Will he be good enough to indicate where in the Bill before the House provision is made for this new force to be made subject to military law? In other words, at what point in the Bill are those who serve in it made amenable to the conditions of the Army Act?
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, may I suggest that this is a very important Committee point; and I propose to say more about it later.
LORD WIGG: My Lords, with respect, this is surely not a Committee point; it is fundamental. If the case for the Government is that the new force is part of the regular forces and subject to military law, then the Army Act 1955, as amended, must apply. There is no provision in the Bill at all for that to happen, and I am completely puzzled by it.
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, my noble friend who is to reply tells me that he will deal with this point. But I think that if the noble Lord studies the Bill a little more carefully he will see that this is not forgotten.
As I was saying, the extent to which military law should apply to members of a part-time force is thus a question to be considered with care. In general, the pattern is that officers are subject to military law at all times, but that other ranks are subject only when called out for service or undergoing training. That is the pattern that was established for-
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merly for the Territorial Army, and now for the Territorial and Army Volunteer Reserve; and Clause 1(2) of the Bill applies the same provisions to the Ulster Defence Regiment. I hope that that satisfies the noble Lord to a certain extent.
There is, however, one significant departure from the traditional pattern to which I should call your Lordships' particular attention. Much concern has been expressed about the practice of the Ulster Special Constabulary in keeping arms and ammunition at home. My right honourable friend the Home Secretary, in an apt phrase which has been widely quoted, said that there are too many guns about in Northern Ireland; and the Report of the Committee under the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, criticised the general issue and carrying of firearms by the Royal Ulster Constabulary. It is certainly not the practice for members of our Armed Forces to keep arms and ammunition at home, at any rate in peace time; but my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Defence recognises that there will be times and places, particularly in remote rural areas of Northern Ireland, where the central storage of arms will be incompatible with operational efficiency if the force is to be capable of quick reaction to a sudden emergency. He intends, however, that the possession of arms at home shall be very closely controlled; and there are two ways in which this will be done.
First, my honourable friend the Minister of Defence for Administration made clear, while the Bill was in Committee in another place, that permission to keep arms at home would be given only by an officer authorised to call the force out for emergency service under Clause 2(2) of the Bill. Second, Clause 1(2)(b)(ii) of the Bill provides that when a member of the force is in possession of military arms and ammunition, he is subject to military law, whether he is on duty or not. This is a most important safeguard, because it means that members of the force in this situation do not merely have a duty to look after such arms (and in this context it has often been said that the Ulster Special Constabulary had a remarkable record in the safe custody of arms; there is no complaint on this score) but are answerable under military law for the use to which

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they put them. In these conditions the irresponsible, negligent or disobedient use of arms, even if it had no serious consequence in itself, would be liable to penalties of imprisonment. By this means we are confident that, so long as it continues to be necessary for some members of the force to keep some arms at home, their number will be severely limited, and their use strictly controlled.
My Lords, one of the principal matters which the Bill determines is the liabilities for service which members of the force undertake. There are three distinct liabilities, set out in subsections (2), (3) and (4) of Clause 2. The last two will be familiar to noble Lords who are conversant with the affairs of the Reserve Forces; they are liabilities for permanent service in circumstances, broadly speaking, of general war, which are shared by all members of the Regular Army Reserve and the Territorial and Army Volunteer Reserve, though in the case of the Ulster Defence Regiment the liability is only for service in Northern Ireland. Actual or apprehended attack on the United Kingdom, covered by subsection (3), is generally considered to mean a warlike act by another Power, and is to be distinguished, for example, from raids across the frontier by the I.R.A. Imminent national danger, to which subsection (4) refers, is declared by Order of Her Majesty, and is also considered to apply in the context of general war, though it might conceivably be invoked in circumstances of natural disaster. Neither of these liabilities is specifically directed to the tasks for which this force is designed. It is desirable that they should apply to members of the force, however, because they are nationwide liabilities addressed to circumstances—which we must all hope will not occur—in which all the resources of disciplined manpower will be mobilised. But the special circumstances in which this force is designed to operate are covered by the liability in subsection (2).
There are important implications in the wording of this subsection to which I must direct your Lordships' attention. The first is that the authorised officer (and I should like to discuss the question of authorisation in a minute) may call out the force,
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"if, and for so long as, it appears to that officer to be necessary or expedient."
This gives the authorised officer unhampered discretion in the exercise of his own judgment. We are thinking here not of crises on a national scale, but of local emergencies, involving a few men for a short space of time. Speed of reaction is essential, and to achieve it the process of call-out must be simple and swift. The formula to which the authorised officer must address his mind is,
"the defence of life or property in Northern Ireland against armed attack or sabotage.…"
This is designed to emphasise two complementary aspects of the force's role; it is not intended to be used in crowd control or riot duties, and it is designed to meet what the Hunt Report described as "the threat of armed guerilla-type attacks". The formula is also qualified by the words "whether actual or apprehended". The authorised officer must be free to use initiative. In local, irregular operations of this kind, or sporadic incursions, intelligence is sometimes defective, and sometimes timely action prevents a threat from materialising. The power to call out the force will not be hampered by having to wait until something has actually gone wrong.
Noble Lords may well feel from this brief account that the power to call out the force for emergency service is very wide. It is important that there should be safeguards against the indiscriminate use of such a power. These safeguards are provided in subsection (1) which deals with the authorisation of officers. First, the power to authorise stems from my right honourable friend, so that the use of this power is accountable to him, and through him to Parliament. Second, authority can be given only to officers of the regular forces, who will be fully integrated in the military chain of command. Third, they must not be below the rank of major. Fourth, such authority may be made subject to limitations—we are thinking here of limitations in respect of the units a given officer may call out, or the area his responsibility covers, or the period during which he may exercise his power. In this way we have tried to ensure that the force can be called out in fulfilment of its tasks quickly and effectively but without any sacrifice of constitutional responsibility or military control.

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My Lords, I should now like to say something about enlistment into the Ulster Defence Regiment. As is explained in the White Paper, enlistment will be open to all male citizens of good character of the United Kingdom and Colonies normally resident in Northern Ireland, whatever their denomination or faith. Her Majesty's Government will do their utmost to see that this objective is achieved. Enlistment into the Ulster Defence Regiment will be entirely the responsibility of the Army. Application forms, for which the detailed provision will be made in the Regulations to be laid before the House when the Bill becomes law, will be available from January 1 to all sections of the community. There will be as many distribution points as possible—post offices, public libraries, Army recruiting offices, Regular Army and T. & A.V.R. units, police stations and so on. All completed application forms will be sent direct by the applicants to Headquarters, Northern Ireland. Every application will then be dealt with, in exactly the same way, under the arrangements of the General Officer Comanding, Northern Ireland, and on the lines of the general procedure for enlistment into the Army.
I do not wish to take up the time of the House by going into the detail of the normal Army enlistment procedures; but, since the noble Lord, Lord Byers, drew attention on November 12 to the important question of security vetting, it may be the wish of your Lordships that I should say a further word about this particular matter. Security screening will be an essential and integral part of the enlistment process. The object will be to ensure as far as possible that the applicant for enlistment is of good character, is not himself an extremist or an active supporter of any extreme political or religious group, and is likely to act in the best interests of the people of Northern Ireland as a whole. The suitability of all applicants will be checked against all information available to the General Officer Commanding, Northern Ireland. He will also have the assistance of members of the Army security vetting organisation, who will supplement his own resources and, in particular, will undertake such personal inquiries as may be necessary. The decision on the individual applica-
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tions will be vested solely in the General Officer Commanding, Northern Ireland.
Her Majesty's Government will do all they can to see that the Ulster Defence Regiment is representative of the community of Northern Ireland as a whole. There will, therefore, be no automatic transfer to the Regiment of the present members of the Ulster Special Constabulary. Their applications will be dealt with on their merits and all will be subject to the same degree of scrutiny.
Recruitment publicity will be directed towards all sections of the Northern Ireland community. In addition, in order to make doubly sure that the interests of the minority community are fully protected in this context, General Sir John Anderson, who is the Colonel Commandant designate of the Ulster Defence Regiment, will be taking special steps to make contact with leaders of the minority community with a view to encouraging its members to apply to join the Regiment—and especially ex-Servicemen because they can the more readily become immediately effective. Arrangements will, of course, be made to check the recruitment performance during the period of the build-up.
Her Majesty's Government have decided that there will be advantage in making available to the General Officer Commanding, Northern Ireland, a source of advice on the administration of the Ulster Defence Regiment, especially on recruitment policy. Accordingly, as part of the administrative arrangements for the new force, an Advisory Council will be set up in Northern Ireland with appropriate terms of reference. It is not intended that this should be a very large body. The aim will be to obtain the services of a suitable number of persons of experience and standing who will be representative of all shades of responsible opinion in Northern Ireland.
As I have said, the responsibility for the Ulster Defence Regiment will be vested solely in the General Officer Commanding, Northern Ireland; but his Advisory Council will have an important part to play, for example, in helping him in his recruitment campaign, advising on mothods of improving recruitment in difficult areas or in minority communities, advising on regimental matters, and generally helping to encourage confidence

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in and understanding of the new force among the people of Northern Ireland as a whole. Your Lordships will, I am sure, understand that I am not able this afternoon to say more about the composition of the Advisory Council, but an appropriate announcement will be made as soon as is practicable.
My Lords, the Bill before us to-day is a short and simple measure, drafted on traditional lines, to establish a small, part-time military force. Some may see the force as an unimaginative off-print of the Reserve Army; others may hold that it is only the B Specials in another guise. Opinion on this subject is strong, divisions are deep, and too often fear and prejudice close men's minds to argument. But it is our belief that the Ulster Defence Regiment will convince the people of Northern Ireland that it serves their interests loyally, efficiently and impartially, and represents them all. To do this it need do no more than show, in fact as well as in name, that it is a regiment of the British Army. My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a second time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Lord Winterbottom.)
4.12 p.m.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, we are grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, for the clear way in which he has introduced this Bill to your Lordships this afternoon. It is my intention to be fairly brief, and I should like to say straight away and without equivocation that we on these Benches, who have given our support to the Government's general approach to the razor-edge problems of Northern Ireland, support this specific measure. As I see it, it stems in line direct from the Report of Lord Hunt's Advisory Committee. That Report was endorsed, with a striking degree of unanimity, by your Lordships in the debate in mid-October, and since I did not have the opportunity to participate in that debate I should like now, if I may. to nay my tribute to that Report from the noble Lord and his associates—a striking Report, going very much to the root of the matter which they were asked to look into and produced with striking speed.
On the question of speed, I note that we are, it would seem, being asked to
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take this Bill with a very fair degree of speed, since I believe that the Committee stage, and indeed all the other stages, are down for this coming Thursday. I realise that we should get on with this matter but, given the interest in it which the number of speakers would seem to betoken, I wonder whether we are in fact not taking it a little too swiftly. But we can come to that later.
My Lords, one consequence of Lord Hunt's Report, the Police Bill, received its Second Reading here last week. It was welcomed by my noble friend Lord Derwent. The Bill before us this afternoon is a second consequence, another pendant of the Hunt Report, and it is therefore only logical and also right for me to welcome it. The noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, has explained the reasoning behind this Bill and the creation of the new force, and in essence it seems to me to rest on four linked principles. In the first place, there is the sad fact that, for historical reasons of which we are all aware, the problems of internal peace and of internal security in Northern Ireland are, in the terms of the noble Lord's Report, "peculiarly difficult". We have only to remember the tragic disturbances of the early 'twenties, the I.R.A.'s terrorist attacks in the late 'fifties and the early 'sixties, and indeed the acts of sabotage earlier this year, from wherever they came. As the Committee themselves stated—and I quote their words:
—although the threat of terrorist attacks may not be great, the fear of them is very real, and public anxiety will not be allayed unless precautions are taken and are seen to be taken."
Secondly, my Lords, there is the recognition that, while the final responsibility for military security should rest with the Regular Army and vest in Westminster, it is equally right that the deep and legitimate interests of the Stormont Government and of the people of Northern Ireland in their own security and protection should receive due recognition. It would not be right, in my view at least, even if it were practicable over a long period of time to rely exclusively on our regular forces stationed in Northern Ireland. There is "great merit", to quote again the words used by the Hunt Committee,
"in the continuing presence of a local force, with local knowledge, capable of being at instant readiness …"

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But, my Lords, if that is so, I think we should all subscribe to the third principle: that such a force, whose job it will be to deal with military problems—the defence of key points, coping with guerrilla and terrorist attacks, and so on—should not also have police duties thrust upon it. That is why we on these Benches welcome the decision to relieve the Royal Ulster Constabulary of its military duties. That is why we welcomed last week, in the debate on the Police Bill, the establishment of a purely Police Reserve to support the Royal Ulster Constabulary in those duties. And, by the same token, that is why we welcome the decision to establish this local force, the Ulster Defence Regiment, with purely military duties, under the command of the G.O.C., Northern Ireland, as an integral part of our Regular Army, with a strong admixture of Regular Army personnel—officers. N.C.Os., civilians and the like—subject to the authority of the Secretary of State for Defence and, ultimately, the control of Parliament.
Having said that, I should like to go on to pay my tribute to the way in which the Royal Ulster Constabulary—and, let me add, the Ulster Special Constabulary—have over the years discharged their responsibilities. They have had appalling difficulties to face. They have been burdened with an unduly heavy burden of roles—that dichotomy of the military and the police role—and although some can understandably criticise the conduct of a minority, no one can doubt or has the right to question the patriotism or devotion of the great majority of that force.
My Lords, I should like now to turn briefly to the organisation of the new force, the Ulster Defence Regiment, with which the noble Lord has dealt in some detail. He mentioned the question of its title—a matter which gave rise to a very long discussion in another place. It is not for me, of course, to say that there is not, or cannot be, a lot in a name. I remember very vividly being on the wrong end of a long argument in your Lordships' House five or six years ago over the fairly short word, "Admiralty". I must say that I was secretly rather pleased at the result, although I would have assured my noble friend Lord Thorneycroft, had he still been in the House, that I did my best
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for him. On this particular title, all I can say is that I do not feel passionately either way, although I fully recognise that others do. My own feeling, however, is that, the Government having chosen this particular title, it would be a mistake for them to go looking for another one now.
So far as size is concerned, the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, recommended a force of some 4,000 men; and the Government, as the noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, has explained, have chosen a ceiling of 6,000. As he also explained, this figure was the offspring of a Joint Working Party, representing Westminster and Stormont, and both civilian and military. I referred earlier to the Hunt Committee's strong urge that the fears of the population of Northern Ireland about their security are real. If we accept this view, we should not, I believe, skimp on numbers.
But of course, the fears of those in Northern Ireland are twofold. On the one hand, the Protestant community fears a recrudescence of I.R.A. or other terrorism. On the other hand, there are those in the Catholic community who fear that the new Regiment may be only the old B Specials writ more efficient. It is clear that in its initial stages the Regiment will need to draw heavily for recruitment on the present members of the Ulster Special Constabulary. It is equally clear that there are some members of the present B Special force whom the new force will be best without, if it is to win the confidence of moderate Catholic opinion, as indeed it must. But the guarantees here which the noble Lord explained seem adequate to me. The negative side of the coin, the necessary, albeit limited, exclusion process, can safely be left to the military—from the G.O.C., Northern Ireland, downwards—in whom the responsibility for recruiting is firmly vested.
But it is the positive aspect of recruitment which may be more intractable here. Many of the Northern Ireland regiments contain a high proportion of Catholics, but only 11 per cent. of the composition of the R.U.C. is Catholic and there are no Catholics at all to be found among the B Specials. Clearly, we need to attract both communities to this. new force. I have been very glad to

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learn that its commandant, General Sir John Anderson, is actively promoting such recruitment with the full support of Stormont. I feel that a valuable source for recruitment could be tapped among Catholic ex-Servicemen in Northern Ireland. I hope too, with the noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, that the Advisory Council can play a useful part in laying the necessary foundation of confidence which is the essential pre-requisite to recruitment for this force among the Catholic community. But, above all, there seems to be here a real opportunity and a challenge to the leaders of Catholic opinion in Northern Ireland, and I hope very much that they will use all their influence to encourage recruitment to this new local force. It is they, above all, who can help ensure that within it there is due balance between the two communities.
Finally, my Lords, I should like to ask the noble Lord the Leader of the House who is to wind up a question or two on training and equipment. Perhaps they may be Committee points, but it looks as if our Committee stage is likely to be upon us very shortly and that it may be rather a quick one. If I do not ask these questions now I may not get the opportunity to do so later. First, training, on which the Hunt Committee and the White Paper rightly laid considerable emphasis. I recognise that this new force will have a different role from our Reserve Forces, such as the TAVR II in this country; although, parenthetically, I must remark that its creation is in part a justification for much that we have been saying about TAVR III. But althoupgh its role would be different, I should have thought that the membership of the new force, the officers and the N.C.Os, would benefit considerably by training in this country with our Reserve Force and, indeed, with our Regular Forces. I hope that this is visualised.
Next, equipment. I agree that this force should be lightly armed and that its chief weapon should be the rifle. I also agree that in certain isolated, remote districts it is reasonable, subject to watertight safeguards, that members of the force should be permitted to keep their rifles at home. It seems to me that the safeguards envisaged here are adequate. I have two questions on actual armament. I think
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the question of the security of armaments highlights the importance of secure armouries. It is my understanding that the Government are pressing ahead with the programme of seeing that secure armouries are established where they are not at present. I hope that this is the case.
Secondly, I hope that the noble Lord can assure us that the rifles with which the force will be supplied will in fact be modern F.N. rifles. Again on equipment—and this is my last word on equipment and indeed on organisation—the White Paper stresses the importance of mobility and good communications for the force. Paragraph 17 of the White Paper refers to the mobile element in the force. Could the noble Lord explain what is intended by this; how the mobile elements will be organised and what will be their means of mobility? Could he also give us some inkling at least of what is proposed by way of communications? It is hardly necessary to stress the importance in isolated areas of good wireless communication down to sub-unit level. I hope that this is also envisaged.
My Lords, may I say just this in conclusion? I hope that I have made my belief clear that with this Bill, with the establishment of this new, local, part-time military force in Northern Ireland coupled with the establishment of the new police reserve for the R.U.C., the two Governments, both Stormont and Westminster, are working along the right lines. But, important though this may be, important though it may be for all of us to get the organisation of the police and the security forces in Northern Ireland on a sounder basis, we must not delude ourselves that by so doing we are going to the root of the problems in Northern Ireland. As we all know, the roots go far deeper in politics, in history, in race and in religion. During these past months I have sometimes felt a certain sense of hopelessness and despair, and indeed foreboding, at the deepening problems in Northern Ireland and the suspicion and fear and hatred surrounding it.
But despair and pessimism, here as elsewhere, are poor counsellors. In the post-war era we have seen other communities riven by very deep differences of racial origin and culture. Some of these problems are problems not entirely

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dissimilar to—although, I would agree, not entirely analogous to—the problems of Northern Ireland, and they fell, like Northern Ireland, within the narrow confines of Western Europe. There was the problem of Trieste and Venezia Gulia; there was the other racial and cultural problem on the northern borders of Italy, the problem of the South Tyrol; and there was, and is, the intensely difficult problem of the two communities, Greek and Turkish, in Cyprus. At one time or another during the last 20 years, all of these problems have appeared to be virtually insoluble. But with none of them to-day is that the position.
So let us hope, and persevere in the hope, that the same may prove to be the case with the problem of Northern Ireland. Of course, that hope must rest on one absolutely essential pre-condition which did not obtain in the years before the First World War—a broad unity of approach at least to the problems of Ireland among the major Parties in this country. It is in that spirit, and also because I believe that it stands on its own feet, that I welcome this measure.
4.30 p.m.
LORD BYERS: My Lords, I should like to endorse the concluding words of the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe. I am glad that he ended on a note of guarded optimism. I spent Friday and most of Saturday of last week in Northern Ireland. It was a short visit but it enabled me to form one pretty sharp impression. I visited Derry and Belfast and listened to a number of extremely well-informed people, and it certainly served to remind me to approach a problem of this nature with the deepest humility. I was horrified, as other people have been, at the devastation and destruction which has taken place in this not very remote part of the United Kingdom. I was horrified at the hatred and suspicion which still pervades the place, despite the obvious senselessness of the violence and the destruction which one can see all around. I was horrified to find that everywhere I went people were convinced that the trouble was by no means over and that the undercurrents of tension were still running very high. There is the ever-present fear that extremists will fix on some minor incident and blow it up into a riot. There are rumours and rumours and rumours, un-
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fortunately often believed, and there is an atmosphere of hypertension in which the police and the Army have to operate. I do not think that we should underestimate the fears that organisations like the U.V.H. and the apprentice boys cause in perfectly normal civilians in Northern Ireland, and it is against this background that we ought to consider the proposals in this Bill.
My Lords, before I went to Northern Ireland I asked myself the usual questions which have been referred to to-day, and I had some deep misgivings in asking them. I asked, first: was the new force really necessary? What was it meant to be defending, and against whom? Why is it to contain 6,000 men when the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, estimated that 4,000 would be required? Why did it include the name "Ulster" in its title? Is it in fact a political face-saver and really only the B Specials in disguise? These were the things that worried me anti as a result of what I was able to see—I know that my visit was only a short one—I am a great deal more convinced than I was about the merits of this force and this Bill. I do not want to sound any note of complacency; I am not suggesting that we are hitting on a solution to the problem, but I am convinced that there are better safeguards in this Bill than I thought there were when I went to Northern Ireland.
As I have said, there is certainly a very real sense of fear on the part of the population there; and in the light of the general atmosphere which prevails I would only hope that I may do a little tonight to try to allay some of the misgivings which people genuinely hold on this question of the Ulster Defence Regiment. I think the best way to start is on the military case rather than the political one. As I see it, the military case is simply this: there are a considerable number of vulnerable points in Northern Ireland which, because of the tension—and the tension is there—have to be guarded. These are such things as Ministers' houses, reservoirs, police stations, power stations, public utilities and so on. These duties require approximately 550 men each night to carry them out, spread all over Northern Ireland. I should like to say, in parenthesis, that I hope this number may be reduced, but at the present moment this is about the measure

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of the task. If you are going to ask members of a volunteer force to be on duty one night a week, and no more, then you need a force of seven times the figure of 550, which is roughly 4,000 men. But that is only a force to carry out the duties, and you need an additional number to back up that force with administration. The point I had missed is that this is a properly worked out military programme on the estimate of what is required at the moment; and that one requires an administrative tail to handle this particular force. Also, I do not think I had appreciated to the full that 6,000 is the ceiling and may never in fact need to be achieved.
Then I asked myself: why a resident domestic defence force? I think the military answer is that if these duties had to be undertaken by Regular British troops it would need several battalions to do so, and we simply cannot afford to withdraw them from our overseas commitments at the present time. Therefore, in the circumstances I think that the right idea is a domestic volunteer force and that this is about the right ceiling for it; although I hope that as peace returns and tension diminishes we shall not have to go to anything like the ceiling of 6,000 people.
The next question which worried me was whether or not this force would be the B Specials in another form. I think there are safeguards here which should prove adequate. As was said by the noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, the force will be under the command of the General Officer Commanding, Northern Ireland, whose direct responsibility will be to the Minister of Defence in Whitehall. It will be trained by Regular British officers and, as I understand it, have a cadre of ex-Regulars. What I think is more important is that while it will, naturally, be composed of a number of selected B Specials who have the appropriate qualifications—certainly at the beginning—it should also attract a number of ex-Regular Northern Irish soldiers, and some, one would hope, would be Catholics. I was glad to hear when I was over there that people are beginning to write in already, saying that they were in the Royal Inniskillens, or some other force, that they were Catholics, and asking whether there would be a place for them in a force
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of this sort. It is only an inquiry, but I think it is a healthy one and a trend which we ought to encourage. I would reiterate what was said by the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, and hope that the Catholic leaders who have shown great responsibility in this matter will encourage people to join this force and make it the mixed force which it ought to be. Unless we can get more Catholics in, it is not going to be the force for which we all hope.
A further safeguard is that the training requirements will be far more rigorous than anything the B Specials were ever asked to do. The people in this force will have to be fairly fit and alert and be able to learn new systems and communications. In themselves, these things will cut out a number of the present B Special force, many of whom are rather older than would be required to undertake this type of training and service. In addition, I think the mere fact that this will be an efficient, alert force—and as I have every confidence in the General Officer Commanding I am certain that it will be—will attract the sort of ex-Regular soldier that you want to get into a force of this nature.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, surely in another place an effort was made to reduce the age of joining for the new force, with precisely the point in mind that the noble Lord has just emphasised, and that was turned down by the Government spokesman.
LORD BYERS: My Lords, I am not speaking for the Government, if the noble Earl will understand me. What I am saying is that, despite the attitude of the Government, there are natural forces at work which will lower this age. I think that there is a great deal to be said for lowering it, but this is a political matter, as I see it. What one can hope for is that people will have to pass a medical examination which in itself will preclude some people of my age from joining. I am sure that I could not pass a medical examination in order to join a force some members of which will have to go up and down in helicopters. That in itself will rule out quite a number of people. I think it a serious point that the rigorous nature of the training and the duties will reduce the number of B Specials who will

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be able to qualify. But it is important that we should pay particular attention to ensuring that some of the very high positions should be seen to be undertaken by Catholics, at least in the first year. I think this is very important and that it presents a special problem.
The third point that worried me before I went to Northern Ireland was the name of the force. I shared the fear of many of my colleagues in another place that including the word "Ulster" in the title would make it more difficult to get a mixed force. I discussed this with a number of Catholics in Northern Ireland and the answer I got was that this should not be a major issue; that there was enough trouble without raising the name of this regiment into a large political issue. I believe that if sufficient encouragement were given, Catholics would join the force. I cannot believe that the name would be the one thing which would prove a stumbling block to getting the balanced force that we want.
Regarding where the arms should be kept, a question which occupied so much time during the discussion in another place, I think this is a matter of practical geography and common sense. No army commander is going to take the risk of losing arms if he can help it. In towns, it would be the obvious thing to have central armouries and to distribute the arms as required. In the outlying districts, where only a few men may be required for particular duties, I do not think that central distribution would be on. Apart from anything else, to do that would probably require two trucks, one to guard the truck conveying the arms, and this would create a bigger military problem than was really necessary. Although I have heard a number of horrifying things about the B Specials, losing arms was not one. The B Specials appear to have a better record at the moment in this respect than the Regular Army, although I must say that the Regular Army has not lost many weapons.
My conclusion is that we are dealing with an exceptional situation and that exceptional measures have to be taken. I believe that we shall need British regular troops in the country for quite a long time. We are going to need the reduced police force and the auxiliary police force, and we are going to need
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something on the lines of this Ulster Defence Regiment. It is a tragic necessity, which arises out of the situation. But I hope that we shall not try to build this up into a bigger political problem than we need to do. All kinds of different factors need to be balanced against each other. Let us give the new force a chance. To-day, Northern Ireland is fortunate to have men of the calibre of General Freeland and Sir Arthur Young, who is in charge of the police. They are, I believe, the last men who would allow any of these forces to develop into a threat to the peace in Northern Ireland. Nevertheless, in supporting this Bill, I want to echo the sentiment that has been expressed: that in the long run it is only the Northern Irish themselves who can solve this problem.
4:41 p.m.
LORD HUNT: My Lords, the recommendations in my Report which led to this Bill were the most difficult of all our problems, even though the answers to the questions we asked ourselves were fairly straightforward. Once we had answered those questions in what I hope was a straightforward way, the further details fell outside our terms of reference.
We were quite confident that most of the recommendations we considered necessary for the Royal Ulster Constabulary would be acceptable to a substantial majority, not only within the R.U.C. but outside it; and not only outside it, but across the communal boundaries. We recognised that the radical changes in principles and arrangements for defending the Province from armed guerrillas would be bitterly opposed, not only by virtually the whole of the Ulster Special Constabulary but also by a majority of the Protestant population. We were aware that our recommendations would be opposed as ardently by these people as they were demanded by most Catholics. But we could not ignore the opposing effects of public opinion on this issue, and in particular the risks that would be entailed by extremist opinion and, possibly, extremist action.
I recall vividly a visit I made, quite impromptu, to a drill hall in the depths of the country some miles out of Bally-mena, in County Antrim, in order to see where and how the U.S.C. were training.

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Although we had given no notice of our visit we were astonished on arrival to find ourselves confronted with a large crowd of people, who packed the hall—people of all ages, from children to grandmothers and grandfathers, with current members of the U.S.C. and past members, and even a gang of roadmenders who had parked their steamroller outside and had come in to meet us.
We had a remarkable half-hour, in which every member of that community urged us, warned us, and indeed instructed us, not to touch their men, the B Specials. It was an impressive demonstration of a deep and abiding fear. We were confronted by a combination of emotions which amounted to a wall of resistance to change. The emotions included fear of the I.R.A.; loyalty to Ulster; comradeship and tradition, in which long memories play a very significant part; doubts about the concern of the United Kingdom Government to protect the Province, in contrast to the faith in the Unionist Government in Stormont to do so. And the greatest of these emotions, my Lords, was fear: it was very real, very widespread and very deep.
We based our decisions and our recommendations on two simple considerations. The first was principles, and there were two principles. Where should the responsibility for defence against this kind of threat lie? We were quite clear that this should lie, and indeed by the Constitution does lie, with the Government at Westminster. What kind of operations were involved and who should conduct those operations and the training and preparations for them? We were equally clear that these were military operations and the job of the Regular Army. To associate them with the police any longer would prejudice the civil image of the R.U.C., which was a cardinal point in our recommendations for the police forces. Inevitably so long as the two were controlled by the same Government, the U.S.C. image (and I use the expression in no pejorative sense at all) would continue to rub off on the R.U.C.
Secondly, we based our recommendations on facts. What foundation was there for the kind of threat to-day and its eventual recurrence in the future
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which so many people fear? Here we were confronted by a singular lack of convincing intelligence, but we were satisfied from recent events alone, some of which my noble friend Lord Winter-bottom has recounted, that to discount such threats would be irresponsible. They must be taken seriously. Nor does this threat come only from the I.R.A. I am convinced that for some time to come, there is substance in the fears, not only of Protestants but of Catholics, and the threat, whatever its motivation, is not only a threat but a challenge to every decent citizen in Northern Ireland. We spoke on the subject to Cardinal Conway and I venture to hope that his views on the recommendations which have led to this Bill are not antipathetic. He seemed sympathetic to the general thesis that we put before him.
So, my Lords, in the light of my remarks, I have two reservations about this Bill, and I feel that I must make them. Given that the role of the new force is to protect not one section of the community from another, but all decent citizens against attacks by violent and fanatical men on life, property and amenities; given that this role should commend itself to anyone and everyone, including those who have wider hopes for a United Ireland but who abhor the use of violence to achieve it, I regret that this force has been given a name which, despite what the noble Lord, Lord Byers, said, is anathema to many Catholics, who might otherwise be disposed (perhaps they will, nevertheless) to do their civic duty and join the force.
Ulster, as we know, is a fact, a historic fact, but a fact which has strong Party political and partisan connotations, whereas Northern Ireland is simply a geographical fact of life. I am sorry that that name has not been attached to the force. I realise, of course, the difficulties with which the Government have to deal in this matter, and I am not going to press it. But I cannot help wishing that my Committee, who felt that this subject was outside their terms of reference, had not strayed outside those terms to suggest a name for this force.
My second reservation concerns the time factor. This force is to be operationally effective by April 1, 1970. This

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presupposes a pretty rapid and successful recruiting campaign. I imagine that, despite certain breaks in hallowed traditions, many members of the B Special Constabulary will come forward readily enough; and I would say that this is a splendid thing. But the first force—and I would stress that the figure we suggested was a calculated figure—is appreciably smaller than the U.S.C., and I suppose that recruits from this force could easily till the ranks of the new force, to the exclusion for the time being of all other men from other communities. If that were to happen, it would be a tragedy and would make something of a farce. So I would ask the Minister to say, when he winds up, whether April 1, 1970, is really the deadline or whether the timetable could be extended to give time for Catholics, in particular, who might be more reluctant and need more persuasion, to come forward.
Secondly, can the Minister say whether, in the new force, any percentage will be reserved for Catholics? We felt that there should not be a percentage reserved as there had been hitherto in the R.U.C., but I think that special considerations may apply here, in view of the importance—I would say the crucial importance—of ensuring that the task is shared on the spot by men of both named persuasions, by all men of good will. I was relieved to hear what the noble Lord, Lord Byers, had to say about the steps being taken to safeguard the possibility of Catholics coming in. I have the greatest regard for and confidence in Sir John Anderson and the G.O.C., General Ian Freeland, and I realise that they are well alive to this problem and danger. I have a few other queries, but I am confident that they will be mentioned by other noble Lords. I naturally support this Bill.
4.51 p.m.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, for obvious reasons I do not want unnecessarily to lengthen this debate, because I hope to initiate a discussion about European security later, but I think that the doubts and disquiets which many of us feel about this Bill should be expressed. In doing this, I want to pay the highest possible tribute to the contribution which the Home Secretary has made in this matter: it has impressed me as quite remarkable in the difficult circumstances
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of Northern Ireland. I would add to that my tribute to the conciliatory behaviour of the British troops there under conditions of extraordinary difficulty.
I am not going to reflect the criticism at any length, because other speakers will be taking part in this debate, but I think it honest to say that I am not convinced of the necessity for this Bill. Its purpose is not to control riots and disturbances in Northern Ireland itself. It is, in the words of my noble friend Lord Winterbottom:
"To assist the Regular Forces in the case of armed attack from outside or from sabotage."
In relation to armed attack, there is the very definite statement of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Ireland that there will be no attempt to change by force the frontiers between South and North. With some knowledge of Southern Ireland, I believe that when he said that he reflected not only the view of the Opposition, but of the great majority of the people of Southern Ireland. Secondly, there is the fear that the I.R.A. might make some forceful intervention in Northern Ireland. But I think we are inclined greatly to exaggerate the importance of the I.R.A. to-day. They made boastful claims at the time of the riots on Belfast and Derry, but in fact their presence and their influence was minimal. I am not convinced that it is necessary to create a force of 6,000 men to meet these two problems, and it seems to me that it will be some provocation if this force is created.
I do not intend on the Second Reading of the Bill to deal with other matters which disturb us, but I want to give notice that I shall be moving an Amendment to change the Title of the Bill. I would add that I am strengthened in my view about that by what the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, has said. I apologise for not making comment upon his speech, but it is because I want to be short. However, as he knows, I have the highest respect for all that he has done in his Report on these issues, as well as in other respects. Therefore, on the Committee stage I shall move an Amendment for the alteration of the Title, and on different clauses of the Bill I shall

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raise a number of issues which I do not want to detain the House by mentioning now.
4.56 p.m.
LORD RATHCAVAN: My Lords, before dealing with the new force which is to be set up under this Bill, I should like to say a word or two about the future role of the British Army in Northern Ireland. The Government have made it quite clear that the defence of this part of the United Kingdom is the responsibility of the Army. In the past, I do not think that the Ulster people have ever been too sure about that. Now, however, I feel that the Border and the existence of Ulster as a self-governing Province of the United Kingdom has never been more secure.
With regard to the actual contents of the Bill, first of all I should like to reecho what has been said by so many noble Lords in this debate and express gratitude and thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, for the wonderful work which he did, and for the most admirable Report, which he produced in record time. We should also pay tribute to his two colleagues, Sir James Robertson and Mr. Robert Mark. Their terms of reference included the examination of the Ulster Special Constabulary, and they were charged to recommend any change in its composition which they thought necessary. As noble Lords know well, the Ulster Special Constabulary is colloquially known as the B Specials, and was formed in the early 'twenties when the newly created Ulster Constitution was being subjected to violent attacks, accompanied by assassinations on the part of the I.R.A.
It is a purely Protestant force, and for that reason it has never commanded the support of the Roman Catholic minority. It has been maligned a great deal by many people, but, on the whole, with possibly small exceptions, the Ulster Specials did their duty with impartiality. Referring to the Report of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, one finds that it says in Chapter 9, paragraph 170:
"We know that to a man, members of the U.S.C. are devoted to the cause of Ulster and that they and their forbears have done gallant service, and we recognise the value of the anti-guerrilla patrols and armed guard duties they have carried out, particularly in times of emergency. We consider, however, that the
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protection of the Border and the State against armed attacks is not a role which should have to be undertaken by the police, whether they be regular or special."
Under this Bill, the former Ulster Special Constabulary will cease to exist and will be replaced by this new Ulster Defence force. As has already been stated, opponents of the Bill say that it is only the B Specials under a different name, but, as has been explained already by the noble Lord, Lord Byers, and other noble Lords, this is not so. It is part of the British Army; it is not confined to Protestants; it is under the General Officers Commanding, Northern Ireland. It is, therefore, completely different from the B Specials. Something has already been said about the fact that in exceptional cases arms are to be kept by the new forces at their own homes. This was done throughout the whole period of the B Specials, and I have heard of very few, if any, cases where it was abused. Much has been said by noble Lords who have already spoken about the necessity that this new force should contain a large number of the Roman Catholic minority in Ulster. That, in my view, is absolutely vital.
When the scheme was first announced, if I remember rightly there were many words of welcome for the new force from the leaders of the minority. I trust that that is still their opinion, although I am afraid I have not heard so much of a welcome for it from that source in recent times. It is in the highest degree desirable that they should join, otherwise the whole object of the new force will be damaged. The old B Specials had in the past to deal mainly with raids over the Border by the I.R.A. But the new force may have to deal also with an underground militant Protestant organisation recently formed, which is supposed to have been connected with various sabotage efforts shortly before Captain O'Neill ceased to be Prime Minister. If the new force, therefore—and I hope it will not—has to deal with sabotage of that kind, it may be dealing with sabotage not only from the I.R.A., if that happens, but also from the extreme Protestant organisation to which I have referred.
Something has been said about a change of name of this new force. I notice that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, was inclined to favour a change. It

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was made quite an issue in the debate that took place at the Committee stage of the Bill in the House of Commons. So far as I am concerned, I do not see that the name matters at all. If, by changing the name, the force will be made more acceptable to the minority, well and good, then let us change it.
I should like to ask the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, who is going to reply, a couple of questions on details. In the White Paper dealing with this force, on page 5, there is set out the amounts of the bounties to be paid to members of the new force. The White Paper states that a member of the Ulster Special Constabulary who joins the new force will be entitled to take into consideration the years he has served in the Special Constabulary in order to qualify for the bounty in the new force. Does that mean that a man who has served five years in the Ulster Constabulary will automatically qualify for a bounty of, I think, £35? It seems to me that he will. Another question I should like to ask is: are there sufficient drill halls in Northern Ireland for carrying out training which will be so necessary in this new force?
As I have already said, I welcome this Bill which has been welcomed by nearly every noble Lord who has spoken except the noble Lord, Lord Brockway. I hope very much that it will lead to better times, and particularly to a diminution of the communal feelings which exist in that part of the United Kingdom.
5.7 p.m.
Loan BOOTHBY: My Lords, I strongly support this Bill, and also the Report of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, which gave rise to it. I do not propose to detain your Lordships for more than a couple of minutes, and my remarks will concern themselves solely with one aspect which has already been touched upon in several speeches; namely, the Title of the Bill.
The use of the word "Ulster" is evocative of a past that is best forgotten in this particular connection. The borders of the Province of Ulster are not co-terminus with those of Northern Ireland and the Free State. Although I do not go all the way—or even a very large part of the way—with Miss Devlin, I thought that some of her arguments on this point in the long debate which took
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place in another place had considerable point. I am old enough to remember the days of the First World War when I was a small boy at a private school in Rottingdean and Sir Edward Carson lived at the end of the village. At intervals he used to drive past in a car under the slogans, "Ulster will fight" and, "Ulster will be right". "Ulster" was a flaming word in this country in those days. The memory of all that has faded in this country, but it has not altogether faded in Ireland, as anybody who visits either North or South will know. "Ulster" is not only an evocative but a rather provocative name. I want to suggest to Her Majesty's Government this afternoon that they might give serious consideration to a title which I should have thought would be acceptable to Stormont—the Royal Defence Regiment. They would like the word "Royal", and it is a good name. It is not, alas! an original idea on my part. Last week I thought I would make this suggestion to the delighted surprise of your Lordships, and of Her Majesty's Government, but unfortunately on Saturday the Economist came out with precisely the same suggestion, which proves, as I have had no contact with them whatsoever, that great minds think alike. I still think that the name Royal Defence Regiment is not a bad idea.
I remember very well when the Local Defence Volunteers were formed in 1940. It was just no good. It did not work; it did not catch on. Immediately the title was changed to "Home Guard" the thing caught fire and worked for the rest of the war. So titles do matter. If it comes to that, "Home Guard" would not be a bad title for this new Regiment. I am frightened of the word "Ulster" for this single reason. It is not simply a revival of the B Specials; it is not intended to be by anybody, and it is not wanted to be. This is part of the British Army, and, so far as possible, we all hope it must be non-sectarian. Every speaker, I think without exception, has emphasised the importance of persuading the Catholics to enlist in this Regiment.
I would conclude my remarks by saying to Her Majesty's Government: if this is to be achieved, and the title is found to be a difficulty; if they come to the conclusion that it would be easier to

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make this defence Regiment what we all want it to be, then do not let them hesitate to change the Title—if it is not found possible before the remaining stages of this debate, then at a later stage. I am greatly fortified in the remarks I have made by the weighty opinion which has been delivered to your Lordships by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt.
5.11 p.m.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, I strongly support the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, in his objection, which was also voiced by other speakers, to the term "Ulster". Before I come to my own observations, I hope that it will not be otiose once again to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, on his Report, and of course on his speech to-day. And I hope also that it will not be impertinent to single out the noble Lord, Lord Rathcavan, on the sheer moral honesty with which he faced certain facts that must have been particularly unpalatable.
The last time, in the middle of October, that we debated the question of Northern Ireland the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor pointed out, as he was entitled to, that the Government appeared to be criticised by no one. Well, that was true. But, of course, there were many criticisms that could be made, could have been made then and could be made now, of the records of all British Governments in this connection in the last fifty years: the fact that there has been this deplorable discrimination against a minority; the fact that the Catholics have been treated as second-class citizens in the United Kingdom for fifty years. Of course, these facts have been the ultimate responsibility of British Governments, and as one who has served in British Governments for nine years, and as an Irishman, I must bear my share, and if you like more than my share, of the blame.
But, as last time, so today we are anxious so far as possible—it is not altogether possible—to put aside the past and concentrate on the future. The last time that I ventured to raise my voice—I do not flatter myself that it carries very far in Northern Ireland—I expressed the hope that as many Catholics as possible would join the various police and
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security forces, including the one we are discussing this afternoon. I repeat that hope today, but with a good deal less optimism. I should be lacking in candour if I did not say that very clearly to your Lordships straight away.
A famous Oxford philosopher, Dr. Bradley, was once asked his opinion of a Fellowship thesis. He replied that he was on the whole favourable. "It is nonsense, of course," he said, "but I am inclined to think it is the right kind of nonsense." That reflects my attitude to this proposed force. I am not convinced by the eloquent arguments of the noble Lord, Lord Byers—although he put them, if I may say so, extraordinarily well—in favour of a military necessity. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, in believing that the military necessity is of the slightest; and certainly that there is no need for a force of this size and type.
I look upon this as an exercise in collective psychiatry. I cannot believe that, if the B Specials did not exist already, anybody would think it necessary to create a force of this kind. But the fact that I call it a psychiatric exercise, does not mean that I regret it; it does not mean that I think we ought not to persevere with it. But it does mean that, unless we get the psychology of this right, it will turn out to be a curse and not a blessing to Northern Ireland. So the psychological factors are all-important. Although other speakers have not been quite so blunt, their arguments in fact come to very much the same thing. Of course, one cannot separate here the presentation from the actuality. One hopes, one wants, to see this idea sold as diplomatically as possible. But what will matter will be the actual composition of the force, say, six months or a year from now. It is the composition of the force in the early days that will determine its influence for years to come. I was very much interested by the idea of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, that there should be some postponement in bringing the force into operation. I had not myself thought of that, but I think there is a great deal in what he said.
There is one point of which I have given the noble Lord the Leader of the House some slight notice—and I am glad that he is going to reply to the debate, because he himself has a background of

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Southern and Northern Ireland. Indeed, he can be said to have been attacked in the past for the liberality of his Irish beliefs. The point of which I have given him slight notice is this. We are told in the White Paper (and this follows something analogous in the Hunt Report), in paragraph 7:
"The battalion commanders will be local members of the force; during its early life these appointments may be filled by present County Commandants of the Ulster Special Constabulary".
It does not say they must be filled; it says they "may be filled". I do not want to press the point. therefore, unduly. But there was very much force in what the noble Lord, Lord Byers, said: that if this is going to be a balanced force, it must not be a question of all the leading people being Protestants, and the Catholics being all the private soldiers. That would make a nonsense of it. There must be balance at all levels. I do not know whether my noble friend the Leader of the House will be able to comment on this paragraph in the White Paper and explain how the Government here and the Government in Stormont propose to try to cope with this admitted problem.
As is well known, a number of Amendments were moved in another place and pressed to a Division. They affected, for example, the name, the number, the age, the membership, the composition, and other matters. I have no doubt that if I had been a Member of another place I should have voted for all those Amendments. My ambitions, of course, in respect of the other place were terminated 25 years ago by Mr. Quintin Hogg, who, incidentally, made a notable speech in Dublin on Saturday in which he set out a whole programme of friendship between these two islands. I do not wish this afternoon to deal with those aspects, some of which I understand will be brought up at the Committee stage, but to discuss the matter in more general terms.
We all agree—it has been said by every speaker—that the image of the new force as an impartial body is of supreme importance if it is to win any kind of acceptance from the minority. The Secretary of State for Defence, in introducing the Bill elsewhere, laid impressive stress indeed not only on its military role, not only on its immediate effect in that direction, but on its role in healing
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divisions. I think that he was looking rather far ahead, but let us accept that as part of division. I am afraid—and I must speak from what I hear—that great harm, perhaps irreparable harm, has already been done by such muddles (if you like to call them that) as the circulation of documents headed "Application form" to the members of the B Specials, and by the stress that appears to have been laid on the fact that the new regiment will be substantially composed of B Specials.
I am aware that Government spokesmen in another place have made earnest efforts to correct those mistakes. It remains doubtful whether the ground thus lost can be recovered. I am using words deliberately, after making adequate inquiries, and I repeat that I am all the more impressed in these circumstances by the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, that one should not bring this force into operation so quickly that there is not a chance for these impressions to be set right. I should have thought it was now generally accepted that the danger of subversive explosions is greater at the present time from the extreme Protestant side. They are more numerous; they are better armed, and they are much more hostile to what is going on. So I think it is generally conceded that the main danger comes from there. That does not mean that I wish to do anything but deplore the activities or the very existence of the I.R.A. They have been a handicap to all sorts of causes, and perhaps most of all to the cause of those who want one day to bring about a united Ireland by peaceful means. I think most people agree that the explosions last April were caused by the U.D.F. and not by the I.R.A. This underlines the supreme importance of the force being mixed and balanced.
I recognise that the difficulties are considerable, and it would be a total failure in experience not to place oneself here in the shoes of the Government and to recognise, with them, that this is no easy problem. Yet I must record the widespread feeling among Catholics in Northern Ireland that more attention has been devoted in recent weeks—not so much here, but in Northern Ireland—to making the U.D.F. appear palatable to the B Specials than to making it appear

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welcome to all sections of the community. I say that because in this House it is right that those who feel they have any knowledge about widespread opinion should record it. I am sorry that it should be in this atmosphere, but it is right to place that before the House. I am the spokesman for nobody, and I am bound to say that I should speak a great deal more sharply about many of the activities of various parties and groups in Northern Ireland if I did not still cling to the hope that the original purpose set out in the Hunt Committee's Report, that of a balanced force, could be achieved.
I should just say this, since I seem to be talking in terms of woe. Since we last discussed these matters, and following the debates in the House of Commons, the Government have announced the establishment of an Advisory Committee, which was referred to by the noble Lord who introduced the Bill. I think the fact which was all along in the mind of the Government, that all that goes on there is to be brought ultimately to Parliament in this country, must be set on the encouragement side of any ledger. The noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, is well qualified—if anyone in the Government is—to say words of reassurance to the minority who have been very much disturbed by the events of the last six weeks or so, and I hope that he will go as far as he feels he can in view of his obligations in a number of directions.
My Lords, I will end with one slightly more general thought. The attitude of the Protestants in Northern Ireland towards the Catholics is not exhibited by Protestants in England or Scotland, where they are also in a large majority; it is not exhibited by Catholics towards Protestants in Southern Ireland, where the Catholics are in a majority. When we discuss this problem we are told that it is due to a deep-seated historical fear, and I have no doubt that in a sense that is true. The fear goes back a long way beyond 1920. It goes back 300 years beyond that, to the time when Protestants in Ireland (including, incidentally, my own family) were in a minority. It was the fear of a minority in Ireland as a whole which produced this particular attitude that has lingered on.
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It arose in days when religious toleration was nothing like we know it at the present time, among either Protestants or Catholics. For fifty years the Protestants in Northern Ireland have been in a large majority in their own area, and all the most intelligent members of their community are now well aware that there is no possible danger of armed attack from the South. Apart from anything else it would be a physical impossibility. No intelligent person in the North—Protestant or Catholic—supposes that such an attack is remotely likely. All intelligent Protestants in Northern Ireland are perfectly well aware that they will never be what is called "betrayed" by this country. That is a lurking hysteria among the less intelligent elements of the community.
Nevertheless, these fears are human. They do not disappear overnight. I pay my special tribute to the relative of the noble Lord, Lord Rathcavan—I am referring, of course, to Captain Terence O'Neill, who sacrificed everything in his power and who went down with his ship. His name will always be held in honour on the roll of history. I also pay tribute to all, including the Church leaders of the various denominations, who are trying to cure this historic fear. I myself believe that the world-wide Ecumenical movement, and gradually also the European movement, will supply a large part of the answer. Meanwhile, I will only say this: if this new force can help to eliminate fear—and I believe that this is still a possibility—it will have earned the gratitude of all who seek peace and harmony in human relations.
5.27 p.m.
THE EARL OF CORK AND ORRERY: My Lords, I understand that it is the least coveted place on a music hall bill to follow one who is undoubtedly a star. Without wishing to compare your Lordships in any way to a music hall, I find myself in difficulty in feeling that I ought to follow the speech made by the noble Earl, Lord Longford, who is undoubtedly a master in this subject and who has ranged widely, with great authority and with great civility and courtesy, if I may say so, over almost the whole of this enormous field. I hope, therefore, that he will forgive me if I do not follow him precisely, as that would leave me panting somewhere in the rear. I hope he may

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find that some of the things I have to say (which are few) will link up with his remarks.
My only other feeling is one of recollection going back to a day in the war against Japan when I came upon six Burmese soldiers sitting by a path. They were sitting on a wooden box which they had found under a culvert. The box appeared to contain some kind of rations. Food was somewhat scarce at that time and I was interested to see what it was they were so contentedly chewing. It appeared to be all right and they evidently found it quite palatable. It was in fact gelignite. It is of the utmost importance that your Lordships should not be tempted to swallow this Bill without making certain that it contains no explosive. I confess that I think it does.
That is not an original thought; it was touched on by a number of speakers in another place, and very much more forcibly than it has been this afternoon. I refer to the matter of the name, and I am not thinking particularly of the name "Ulster". There have been references by various noble Lords this afternoon to the word "Ulster" by itself. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, regretted having had to allow that name to go forward without some other recommendation. We know that there are few people who really care whether or not the name "Ulster" is used instead of "Northern Ireland". In fact in the debate in another place on the Committee stage of the Bill, the Minister replying for the Government actually said this:
"… the Government consider that the use of the word 'Ulster' is, frankly, unimportant. There are respectable military precedents for the use of the word in other regiments of the British Army. It is for this and the other reasons I have given that the Government have decided in favour of using this word."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, 1/12/69, col. 1041.]
That is not a reason which could very well be allowed to overcome a very strong opposition, I suggest. If you do not care, is it not reasonable to defer to those who do? I think I would go a little further than my noble friend Lord Jellicoe—or perhaps I would not follow him at all—when he said that, the Government, having chosen this name, it would be a mistake for them to go looking for another one now, and I noticed
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sage nods of agreement from the noble Lords, Lord Shackleton and Lord Winterbottom. This seems to me a fairly outstanding non sequitur. It certainly is no reason for not looking for another name now. The mere fact that the Government have chosen this name and printed and published it, I hope is not going to overweigh any other considerations and close their minds to any possibility of changing it.
What reasons are there for changing the name? I have indicated already that the fact that "Ulster" is not synonymous with the Six Counties is not all 1 have in mind. I have in mind something else. What I am attaching importance to is the fact that many people cordially dislike the words, "Ulster defence"—and I do not think those words have been mentioned: together in the debate this afternoon. What is more, I have some sympathy with them. In these words they still find—and here I join very closely to what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Boothby—echoes of the voice of Carson. "Ulster will fight; Ulster will be right", said Lord Randolph Churchill. And who was Ulster going to fight? "Home Rule is Rome rule", said Carson, as quoted by the noble Lord, Lord Boothby—and Carson was a fighter, if ever there was one. And from that time on the words "Ulster defence" have meant to many defence against Rome.
Some have used and still use this notion—a factitious one in the first place—for political ends. Thus we have now to name but one body only that uses these words, the Ulster Constitution Defence Committee, which was formed by Mr. Paisley and governs the Ulster Protestant Volunteer Force, an extremist militant body whose membership is open only to those who were actually born as Protestants. Is it illogical for Roman Catholics—and perhaps even some moderate Protestants—to look with suspicion on something called the Ulster Defence Regiment, to suspect it of standing for something of that same militant anti-Catholicism that Ulster defence has stood for in the past and still in the person of such people as the Paisleyites stands for to-day? Is it illogical? If it is, what of it? Does it matter one hoot if it is illogical or not? What does matter is the fact, surely, that some people can and do look on these words

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with suspicion of that sort. So why do it? Why use it? Why insist on a name which, while incapable of inspiring passion in its own defence is bound to arouse resentment and hostility in at least some of those on whose good will and support the success of this Bill so largely depends?
In some ways the Government seem to have gone almost out of their way to deepen suspicion and mistrust. I will mention one example only, already touched on by the noble Earl, Lord Longford, though perhaps in not quite the same way. The White Paper says that:
"The battalion commanders will be local members of the force; during its early life these appointments may be filled by present County Commandants of the Ulster Special Constabulary."
You disband an irregular police force and raise battalions of soldiers in its place, insisting as you do so that there is no connection or similarity between the two. And then you flatly contradict yourself by announcing that the battalions may be commanded by officers from the disbanded police. Can you seriously believe that nobody will suspect the new regiment of having any connection with the old police? There is another thing. Are these officers qualified by training or experience to command a battalion of this kind? Yes, I think they are, for reasons that are mentioned in the White Paper. Then by all means let them be so appointed but for that reason, and not merely stating that they are being appointed because they are experienced policemen.
To return to the question of the words "Ulster Defence", in the course of the Committee stage in another place there was a long debate on this subject and the point that I have tried to make in objection to those words was made with very considerable force. But in his reply the Minister ignored it, as indeed it was ignored, I think, by the noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, this afternoon. He made a spirited and in my opinion misguided and unnecessary defence of the word "Ulster". Of the two words which were really under fire, "Ulster Defence", he said nothing at all.
To sum up this point, if I may, the name "Ulster Defence Regiment" is not sacred, good name though it may be,
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political considerations apart. So why cling to it in the certain knowledge that to do so will arouse suspicion and hostility in some of those persons whose good will we chiefly need? Why can we not have some other name—the Northern Irish Regiment perhaps—of which everyone can approve? I am not so sure about the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, for one reason which may perhaps not appeal very much to everybody: that there is a certain feeling in Royal regiments that they have acquired the name "Royal" as some kind of accolade or distinction in the past. One does not always look entirely kindly on a regiment which is raised with that prefix ab initio. However, that is something aside. What I suggest with the greatest possible respect is that in this matter of the name a little common sense is required and really that is all it comes to.
I have spoken at some length on that matter because I believe it is very important indeed, and now I shall be brief. I should like to refer to only two other points, one of which arises in Clause 1(2)(b)(ii). Here we find that any member of the force (and, incidentally, why "force" which is a police word, and not "regiment", which is what we are talking about?):
"…shall be subject to military law …at any time … when he is required or authorised to be in possession of … any prescribed description of equipment belonging to Her Majesty."
I find that a little puzzling, and the words that puzzle me are, "any prescribed description of equipment". It is a matter of common observation that soldiers often wear an arrangement of straps that is known as "web equipment" or "equipment" for short, a kind of military foundation garment on which can be suspended all kinds of containers and receptacles, and they are also classified under the general heading of "equipment". I find it reasonable to suppose that equipment of this sort will be prescribed or issued to members of the regiment and that they will keep it at home. Are they all for that reason to be permanently subject to military law? I do not suppose so. It seems more likely that in this case "prescribed" must be intended to mean prescribed for the purposes of this clause. But even if that is so, it still means that a man can be

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brought under military law by a minor regulation made (under Clause 4(1)) by the Secretary of State, and that seems to me, to put it mildly, to be of somewhat dubious propriety.
It is of some importance to a man to know whether or not he is subject to military law, and I have no doubt that he will understand that he must be so if in possession of arms or ammunition. In any case, that is clearly stated in the Bill. But equipment? Suppose he is ordered by an officer to take into his possession, say, a wireless set or a motor bicycle. If he objects to being placed under military law when neither called out nor undergoing training, can he refuse on the ground that he is not subject to military law and that, therefore, the order is not a lawful command? Apparently not, because although he was not subject to military law before the order was given, the giving of the order has made him subject to military law. I feel that this subsection is capable of causing a great deal of difficulty if it is not tightened, or possibly changed, and I must say it is possibily not the only one about which that can be said. Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, will say something about this matter when he comes to speak at the end of the debate.
I turn finally to Clause 2(2) relating to the powers of officers to "call out the force or any part of it." Here, I must say, I experience a rather more complicated sense of bafflement, which I can perhaps explain most briefly by means of a series—not a very long series—of questions. What does "call out" mean? How is it done? Do you have to issue an order in writing through the usual channels, or can you do it by knocking on a man's window as you go past and saying, "Come on Fred!"? The point is of some importance, since the fact of calling a man out both places him under military law and entitles him to be paid.
Then, how small can "any part of" the force be? Can it be a single man? A single man is certainly a part of the force, and therefore can presumably be called out on his own in case of some sudden and local emergency, such as an attack on the police station. But on page 2 of the Bill, in line 34, Clause 1(5) says that members of the force shall not be required,
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'to give whole-time service except during any period during which the force or the part of it to which they belong is called out …"
What does that mean? When can a man be said to have been called out? When can it be done, and how? For the purposes of law it can be vitally important to know—and it is important to the man himself—whether a man has been called out or not. Surely it ought to be made clear in the Bill. The act and the procedure of "calling out" must be defined. How about a man who has his rifle at home—a rare but possible thing? Is he being ipso facto under military law, already in a state of having been called out? Presumably not, because otherwise he would have been paid. If he is not, can he legally fire his rifle in an emergency? What will happen if he does? If he cannot, what is the point of having it? Here again I think that we need rather more definition and a great deal more precision. Perhaps here also the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, will give us the benefit of his views.
That is about all I have to say, my Lords. I believe that it is, on the whole, a good and necessary Bill, and I wish it well. Above all—and speaking particularly as a former Ulster or Northern Ireland soldier—I wish the Regiment well. But, wishing it well, I am particularly anxious that it should not find itself unknowingly lunching on dynamite; and for that reason I greatly hope that your Lordships will look with considerable caution on the Government's anxiety to get this Bill on to the Statute Book by Thursday.
5.44 p.m.
LORD WIGG: My Lords, may I add my voice to those of your Lordships who have already expressed their appreciation and thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, for his excellent Report. My thanks are underlined by the fact that when I spent many hours in the last few days trying to understand the Bill and relate it to its military background, I reached the same conclusion as his Committee that in approaching the problem it is evident one must start from the principle that it can be dealt with only by military methods. When, some months ago, the Stormont Government was on the verge of ceasing to be a de facto Government the maintenance of law and order passed into the hands of the Armed Forces of

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the Crown, and the responsibility then rested with Her Majesty's Government and with the two Houses of Parliament. Having reached that point, I wonder why we should try to rush this measure through your Lordships' House as it was rushed through another place. It reached its concluding stages in the middle of last week after an all-night Sitting; we have the Second Reading on Monday and a Committee stage on Thursday. This is a measure of great constitutional importance and it needs to be seen against the background not only of the events that led up to it but of the general situation in the military field which faces this country at the present time.
The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, is right when he refers to military solution by the Armed Forces of the Crown, and this new force is to be part of those Regular Armed Forces. I noticed that the Minister of State in another place, in the concluding words of his speech on Third Reading, said, in speaking of this new force:
"It will become part of the regular forces, subject to military law …it is now integrated into the regular forces of the Crown."—[Official Report, Commons, 1/12/69; col. 1254.]
My Lords, that state of affairs is not brought about by a Minister making a statement in another place. We operate under the rule of law, and the juxtaposition of authority in the Armed Forces and the Houses of Parliament has been a vital and delicate matter down the centuries in first asserting and then maintaining the rule of law.
The Bill of Rights asserted that it should be not lawful to maintain an army in time of peace unless it be with the consent of Parliament. That conception now includes the new force. If one looks at this Bill, I must confess—and I am wholly at one with the noble Earl who has just spoken—that I have my doubts about it. I tried this afternoon to elicit a reply about the application of military law because I wanted to save your Lordships time, and I hoped to clear up the obscurity which exists in my mind on this subject. The Minister who replied at the Despatch Box suggested that I should go away and read the Bill again. Well, I have done just that, and I can now almost repeat it like a parrot. I sat for two and a half
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years on the Select Committee which produced the Army Act. It may well be that my intellectual stature, or my memory, has declined since that time, but I have spent this weekend again trying to relate what is in this Bill with the functioning of the Army Act, as I understand it.
Let me take an example, a very simple one, which I am sure will be familiar to everyone who has served in the Army. A man is in possession of his weapons and is at home; so there is no doubt, according to all that we have been told, that he is subject to military law. I must mention, in parenthesis, that Ministers change their tune, and I am not absolutely sure that they recognise when they have changed their tune. Sometimes it is "military law", sometimes it is "military discipline", and sometimes it is "military control"; and it seems to me that, poor dears, they think those things are one and the same, but clearly they are not.
To take discipline first, obviously under Clause 4 of the Bill it is possible for the Secretary of State for Defence to make regulations which would make the Queen's Regulations apply—although I noticed that when the Secretary of State for Defence was questioned on that point in another place he did not answer it but promised an answer later on and no answer was ever given. But I will now, under no greater authority than what I think myself, say that I believe that as far as the Queen's Regulations and discipline are concerned it is all right; but I must point out that if that is so it is unlike the Territorial Army, because they have regulations of their own.
Let us assume that the effective control is exercised by the G.O.C. Northern Ireland through the presence of the 200 officers, warrant officers, and N.C.O.s in the force. Now we come to military law. Our soldier, our member of the force, has his rifle at home; he commits some offence, and he is charged under Section 69 of the Army Act with conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline. We all know that one. He is wheeled in, and he says, "You cannot try me, for you are trying me under the Army Act, but the definition of those who are liable under the Army Act to military law is contained

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in Section 205, and the definition of 'regular forces'"—of which the Minister in another place said this force was a part—"is contained in the definitions in Section 225 of the Army Act and expressly excludes the reserve forces, the Territorials and the Home Guard." So I hope that when the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, comes to reply he will be able to deal with this. Obviously, there is some confusion here, and it is not clear from the Bill as drafted exactly what the position is. I must confess that it seems to me that it will be necessary to amend the Army Act if in actual fact this force is to be subject to military law and is to be considered a part of the regular forces. Does the noble Lord want to interrupt?
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (LORD SHACKLETON): My Lords, I do not want to interrupt the noble Lord, whom I regard, as he knows, as a tremendous expert in this field, and with whom, therefore, I should always hesitate to argue. But I find some difficulty, and it may be that I have missed his point. Subsection (2) of Clause 1 declares members of the force to be members of the Armed Forces of the Crown, and specifies the circumstances in which they will be subject to military law. As I understand it, this means that they will be subject to the Army Act 1955. I am really seeking information, because I suspect that I may have missed some part of the noble Lord's argument.
LORD WIGG: I am sorry. If that is so, if the words in Clause 1(2)(a) mean what the noble Lord says they mean, then indeed this is most surprising, because why does the clause not say so? As I understand it, the Army Act is itself something more than merely a code of military law. It is all-embracing; and if you have a list of definitions of those who are subject to that Act, and if you have in that Act a definition of "regular forces" it seems to me that the common sense thing to do, to remove any possibility of doubt, is to amend the Army Act in both those two places, and not to leave it as it is now, because otherwise those who are responsible will one day face the possibility that this point will be decided in the courts.
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The point I am making, if I may repeat it, is this. If the roles of the Home Guard, the Reserve Forces and the Regular Forces are defined, and if it is spelt out just who is liable to military law, it seems to me very odd that, when you introduce a new method—and by common consent this is something quite new—you should leave the position quite obscure. But I am quite content to leave it to the noble Lord. He can perhaps reply this evening, or he may care to engage in correspondence with the noble Earl who has just spoken, in which case perhaps he will let me know what he thinks. But at the moment it is anything but clear, and in the interests of what I would regard as law and order and good military discipline it seems to me that it ought to be cleared up.
But I want now, if I may, to move on to something much more important. What led up to the introduction of this Bill? It was not, I suggest, exclusively Northern Ireland. Once the decision is taken that the responsibility for the situation in Northern Ireland is the responsibility of the Army, then obviously the units in Northern Ireland—two battalions and a squadron of the 17/21st Lancers—had to be reinforced, and we have now stepped it up to nine major units. If I may say this to noble Lords on this side of the House, never in their worst days of scraping the barrel did they ever scrape it quite as it is being scraped at the present time. Of course, the Secretary of State for Defence is in an appalling dilemma; and there has been nothing like his conversion since the Journey to Damascus.
In every speech that I have made in this House since I ceased to be a Minister I have stressed the need for the Territorial Army—not for military reasons (that has been the difference between noble Lords on that side of the House and myself) but for just the reasons which the Secretary of State now advances: that it is absolutely essential in a modern society to give young men the opportunity, if they so desire, as volunteers, to give service to society, to the Crown, and prepare themselves for the defence of their country. This has always seemed to me an essential requirement, and it seems to me that it is a highly civilised requirement. I congratulate the Secretary of State on recognising, at long last, the wisdom—of

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course, in the face of events—of this principle, and that it is a sound one. He has been generous enough, not necessarily specifically to recant—that would be asking too much—but to say that ever since he became Secretary of State for Defence he has always recognised the healthy social need for integrated forces. Well, my Lords, we live and we learn.
But the facts are (and I will not do more at the moment than touch on the general defence question) that last week the Secretary of State was in Brussels. Of course he is on pretty thin ice, because his NATO partners really know what the situation is. Members of this House or Members of the House of Commons can be refused information about what the establishments of units are or what their strength is—as if this information is unknown to the Russian Intelligence Service or to our NATO partners. But of course they know what the figures are, and they see the Canadians fading out next year. What they want is the return of the Sixth Brigade, which at the present moment is counted as being part of the Rhine Army although it is sitting around Colchester. If the Secretary of State takes it back then he will be under pressure in Northern Ireland. This is the measure of his difficulties. So we have this hurried, ill-thought-out measure brought before the House of Commons, rushed through and brought to your Lordships to-night.
I do not oppose the principle of the Bill, given the situation in which we find ourselves, subject to certain conditions. The first condition is that the Bill is designed and worked in such a way as to make a solution possible. I, too, like the noble Earl, do not worry very much about the title of this force, but there are those who fight on the difference between Fulham and Chelsea or, in my part of the world, between Port Vale and Stoke-on-Trent or Wolverhampton and West Bromwich Albion. These things really matter; and when I listened to the debate in the House of Commons the other night on this very point—and I read it again—it was perfectly clear that tremendous importance is attached to the name of the force. It therefore seems to me that the Government would be wise if, in the interests of getting general agreement and of giving their own measure a fair chance, they had
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second thoughts. I understand that the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, and perhaps the noble Earl and the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, are going to put down Amendments. I will not follow them, but I shall choose which Amendment is best and give that one my support. For I think it essential that the Government should give their own measure a fair chance.
I should like now to turn for a moment to the very difficult question of whether or not the members of this force should have arms at home. This evening the noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, gave us a long catalogue of attacks which have been made by the I.R.A. at different times -not only perhaps by the I.R.A., but by other subversive forces, and one must recognise the fact that it is regarded as a danger. Anyway, whether it is true or not, the myth is, as it were, for practical purposes, a reality. There are those deep apprehensions against the possibility of these attacks, and therefore the Government say: "So far as the towns are concerned, we will hold the arms in central armouries; and so far as the country is concerned we would hold in central armouries, only we have no central armouries." I noticed that that point was not made to-day; and it was not made by the Secretary of State for Defence; but it was made at the end of the debate in another place by the Minister of Defence for Administration. One of the things that puzzles me—and it puzzled me when I read the White Paper the first time—is the talk about rifles. What rifles? Are these 303 Short Lee-Enfields?
LORD SHACKLETON: Yes.
LORD WIGG: The noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, says, "Yes". Very good. So we have the interesting situation that the Regular Army to-day is armed with the F.N. 762 m.m. self-loading rifle; while the forces with whom they are working are armed with different weapons using different ammunition. This seems to me to be rather quaint—surely a rather odd military arrangement. If you are going to have men in selected cases who may themselves have to face automatic or repetition fire, it seems to me that they should be given the most modern weapons, that they should train in the most modern weapons and they ought to be using the same weapons as the

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Regular forces with which they are engaged. This seems to me to be common sense. But to-night, for the first time—it has not been mentioned before, either here or in another place or in the White Paper—we learn that these men are to be armed with what is, after all, a personal weapon that is obsolete.
I notice another point; it fell from the mouth of the Secretary of State for Defence. He said that the reason for these men possessing these weapons was the need to protect dispersed vulnerable spots. That was not the case made by the Minister of Defence for Administration in the other place. He made the case that these men were really in danger of their lives; that they wanted them for personal protection. Which is it. If they are engaged in the important role of protecting public utilities, then they must be armed with modern weapons. If, on the other hand, it is a deeply apprehended fear for their lives and safety, then there may be a case for the 303. But the Government cannot have it both ways. The House needs to make up its mind which it is. Another point which has been quite often made is that few weapons have been lost. I miss the significance of this point.
I was also deeply puzzled by a remark of the Secretary of State for Defence to the other place. He made what I thought was a truly remarkable statement. During the Second Reading of the Ulster Defence Regiment Bill in another place, he said:
"It is not the general custom for members of Army reserves to keep arms at home, and it is our intention that as a general rule, and to the greatest possible extent, the arms of the Ulster Defence Regiment shall be kept in central armouries."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, 19/11/69; col. 1325.]
Note the words "it is not the general custom". That means, I suggest, that if it is not the general custom it is the practice of some sections of the Army Reserve to keep weapons. If I am unfair in that interpretation I should like to be told so. If I am right and that statement was intended to convince the House of Commons that there are those serving in the Reserve Forces who keep their arms at home, I should like the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, when he comes to reply, to tell us who they are—because I will now say that that statement is completely false. No section of the Army Reserve keep their weapons at home. The Secretary
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of State must have known that when he made that statement. That is a serious thing to say, but I am quite confident of my facts.
This leads me to my second point, the question of recall. This is of fundamental importance. Under the Reserve Forces Act, when a national emergency is apprehended the Sovereign can call out the whole of the Reserve. But notice what must happen. If the Reserve is called out, the House of Commons, the Houses of Parliament, must be informed at once. If they are not in Session they must be recalled for that purpose. It is true that under another section of that Act men serving in Volunteer Reserve units can be recalled merely by the Secretary of State giving notice to them in writing. But these are definitely controlled procedures. They are controlled procedures in the interests of democracy itself. They have been jealously guarded down the centuries and under different Administrations as a check on the Executive—not, perhaps, any of those living to-day, but down the centuries. From the Bill of Rights onwards this right of control by the Houses of Parliament has been safeguarded.
Now we have a situation in which we are told—I am not convinced that it is right, although I am open to conviction—that men who are members of the Armed Forces can have their arms at home and can be called out under procedures which, as the noble Earl who spoke before me said, are ill defined. Somebody can knock on the door and (to use his words) say: "Come on, Fred. Come out!" This can be done by an officer not below the rank of Major or by anyone whom that officer delegates—and the Houses of Parliament remain in complete ignorance. Obviously, if some trouble is apprehended and you have to call Fred out, always assuming that the procedures are clearly laid down and adhered to, that is all right. Nobody in his senses would expect the Secretary of State for Defence or his subordinate to come immediately to the Houses of Parliament and inform them. But some procedure ought to be worked out—even if only a procedure that at monthly intervals or quarterly intervals both Houses of Parliament are informed of the number of occasions on which these men are called out under these Acts. Because the principle of Parliamentary control over the

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Armed Forces of the Crown is absolutely vital and is the basic safeguard of our democratic procedure. I think that that is self evident.
My Lords, we have dealt with the title; we have dealt with the weapons. I have my doubts as to whether this measure deals with the difficulties of this force falling within the scope of the Army Act. And we have dealt with the question of the call-out. It now remains for me to say this. I wish this Bill well. But I am old enough, I regret to say, to remember being attached to a Regiment of the Line which had two detachments in Ireland during "the Troubles". I remember that it was a matter of months from the time the Black and Tans arrived in Ireland in 1920—and note that the original forces were described by Winston Churchill, as he then was, as men of high intelligence—before the situation deteriorated. Before the year ended they were supplemented by the Auxiliary Cadets, and from then until 1921 the situation got worse and worse. For both Black and Tans and Auxiliaries were out of control. They left behind a memory which took a long time to disappear.
I think that the control by the Army is right, but the Army have a very difficult job to do. They have to recruit, and they are to have the assistance of an Advisory Board, which is good. I happen to know, as a result of part of my Ministerial experience, the state of security in the Army when the present Government asumed office in 1964. Let us put it very modestly and say that a number of administrative changes were made, and the situation has greatly improved. I wonder sometimes that some Minister of this Administration does not draw attention to the fact that during the five years of the Labour Government there has been no major security scandal. But perhaps that would be taking a bit of a risk, because one never knows what the future may hold. To those who remember the circumstances, the last five years contrast very favourably with the previous five years—but I will not press on old wounds.
I would personally vouch for the ability and integrity of those men who are engaged in a very difficult task of security vetting, but they will have to rely on fairly "dodgy" sources in Northern Ireland. Security vetting in Northern
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Ireland is going to be a different proposition from security vetting in this country, and therefore there is one thing that I should like to see—and here I want to choose my words with great care. I think that the Prime Minister should institute certain procedures; not novel ones and certainly not by burdening the Security Commission. The Security Commission is working well, and I think that it would be wrong to seek to alter its terms of reference. The Prime Minister has around him men who are wise and good and of great ability. That is why I sometimes find my temperature rising a little when I see stones cast at the security services. During the three years when I came anywhere near them I can vouch that there were no more patriotic, devoted, liberal-minded, intelligent and good men to be found anywhere in these Islands than those who comprised our security services. They have a difficult job to do, and they can make mistakes—indeed, I am surprised that they do not make more. But I think that the country is well served.
Whether Northern Ireland is to be turned into a "Hell's kitchen" or whether we are going to move forward—as Mr. Quintin Hogg hoped in his very able speech in Dublin this week-end—into a concept where civilised men respect the law and the rights of others depends very largely on how this force is recruited. There is suspicion on both sides; there is hatred on both sides. We have to find a bridge. I am now speaking over the head of the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, but I hope that the Prime Minister will heed my words. What he should do is to draw on those who are near him—he could do it quite easily—and set up a small committee, answerable to him, which would ensure that the vetting procedures in Northern Ireland are carried through strictly, fairly and with a supreme concern for the objects which this Bill seeks to advance. If that were done, I do not think that the Minister of Defence, or the G.O.C., Northern Ireland, or the Stormont Government, would lose cast. The people I am talking about are men of the greatest experience, and in these critical times they could render a service not by breathing down somebody's neck or leaning over somebody's shoulder, but by making their expertise available whenever it becomes necessary.

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My Lords, if the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, either by correspondence or during this debate, can clear up my doubts about the Army Act; if he would go as far as the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and the noble Earl, Lord Cork and Orrery, and do something about the title of the force; if he would clear up some of the points made during the debate (I have not by any means exhausted my list of statements made in another place which are completely devoid of fact), I do not think we shall have any difficulty during the Committee stage. But I believe that the noble Lord would be serving the House, and serving the purposes of the Government, if he postponed the Committee stage from this week to next week to allow us all an opportunity to give this Bill the further careful consideration it needs.
6.16 p.m.
LORD KILBRACKEN: My Lords, I listened with extreme interest to every word the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, said. I must say that I share a great many of his apprehensions and would support his suggestion that the Committee stage should, if possible, be postponed. The noble Lord will forgive me if I do not follow him into the intracacies of his argument. I want to commence by considering something that I think highly relevant but has not so far been raised in this debate; that is the greatly changed political situation, compared with a year ago, that will be faced in Northern Ireland by the proposed new Regiment when it comes into existence.
My Lords, what is the position there at present? I think that the great majority in the North is not politically active. Those people do not take part in parades or demonstrations, they want to live their own quiet lives peacefully and succeed in doing so. But those who are active politically are, unfortunately, still very bitterly divided between two great extremes. I suggest that the religious side of this division has always been over emphasised. We have on the one hand representatives of the Unionist majority who are wishing to maintain the dominant position, the position of ascendancy, that they have held since the plantation; and, in general, to remain part of the United Kingdom. On the other hand is the Nationalist minority of
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which the number is growing larger every year, and which in my belief will not remain a minority for ever. Throughout this last year, indeed throughout the last ten years, this minority has sought an end to the discrimination it has always suffered; discrimination in jobs, in housing and voting rights. It is a minority which, in general, hopes for integration with the Republic by constitutional means—and I emphasis "by constitutional means".
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: Hear, hear!
LORD KILBRACKEN: It is no more than an historical accident, the fact that the plantation of Ulster came after the Reformation, that most of the former, but by no means all, are Protestants, and most of the latter are Catholics. My own family, like the family of my noble friend Lord Longford, have lived in Ireland, and in what is now, thank God! the Republic of Ireland, for several hundred years; I am not quite sure how many. My family, like my noble friend's, has formed part and parcel of the Protestant ascendancy. I have not learned to "dig with the other foot" as has the noble Earl; I am not quite sure that I dig with any foot.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: You are young yet!
LORD KILBRACKEN: But despite my background, I fully support the Nationalist movement and the Civil Rights Association, and look forward to a united, independent Ireland as a nation once again.
My Lords, I ask: Where does the main danger of civil disturbance in the Six Counties of Northern Ireland now lie? The Stormont Government have agreed, they have been forced to agree—and this is a measure of the success achieved by the oppressed minority—to a series of reforms which, if they are fully implemented, would remove to a great extent, or could remove entirely, the grievances suffered by that minority and lead to the possibility of peaceful co-existence. The only real danger to such co-existence is that full implementation of the reform programme will be opposed by force by the extremist members of the unionist majority. I shall name no names.

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Therefore, I suggest that the real problem is whether the proposed Regiment would be suitable and effective in countering such force, in dealing with civil disturbances provoked by Protestant extremists to prevent the implementation of the proposed reformed programme. I very much fear that it will not so prove. It is essential to be realistic. I say, with regret, that I believe that this Regiment will end up by being almost exclusively a sectarian force. I was most interested in the remarks on this matter by the noble Lord, Lord Byers, and I hope that he is right. I accept that the Government are completely sincere in the hope they have expressed that large numbers of the minority will join the Regiment. But that minority, rightly or wrongly, believes, and they have considerable justification for believing, that the main function of this Regiment will be to see that they remain an oppressed minority, to deny them the rights they have been promised, to impede peaceful demonstrations, to harry and terrorise them.
The noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, pointed out that not a single Catholic was among the 8,500 members of the U.S.C. I hope, as my noble friend Lord Longford hoped, that 2,000 Catholics will now come forward to form one-third of this new Regiment. But it is going to be so closely identified in the minds of that minority with the Specials that I see little possibility of that hope being fulfilled. We have to remember that it was originally intended that 30 per cent. of the R.U.C. should be Catholic, and that even in the R.U.C. the figure has always remained at 10 or 11 per cent.
I want to emphasise that it is the unhappy dichotomy between Unionist and Nationalist within Northern Ireland that has been responsible for all these terrible disturbances, for which nobody is sorrier than I, and which now lead to the proposed formation of this Regiment. I believe that it is merely fanciful to imagine that any threat exists to the integrity or internal harmony of Northern Ireland from outside—that is to say, from the Republic of Ireland. That suggesttion was given rather undue emphasis in the otherwise excellent Report of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. In his opening remarks, my noble friend Lord Winterbottom
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began to enumerate a series of acts of terrorism in the North and, when I intervened, he said that he could not state whether these had come from across the Border. I maintain that there is no evidence whatever that they did so come. The only act of cross-Border sabotage was the completely unsuccessful attempt by a Protestant extremist to blow up the dam at Ballyshannon in the Republic.
It is true, and no one can deny it, that from 1956 to 1962 there was a series of serious armed raids from across the Border by the I.R.A., which is an illegal organisation in the Republic of Ireland and which has been denounced in the Dáil over and over again and by the leaders of both Churches. No one deplores more than I do that these took place but, as the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, says in his Report, their campaign of terrorism "gained no public support and was defeated." There have now been no such incidents for over seven years. I live seven miles from the Border, on the right side, and I believe that it is most unlikely that there will be a recurrence.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend what he means by being "on the right side"? It would really help us.
LORD KILBRACKEN: My Lords, I wondered if anyone would rise to that fly. I meant on the Republican side of the Border but in Ulster, in one of the three Ulster counties in the Republic of Ireland.
On the question of the functions of the Regiment, on Committee stage in another place the impression was most definitely given by the Government, whether intentionally or not, that the Regiment would be used almost exclusively for the guarding of vital installations. This can be inferred from the mathematics used by the Minister, Mr. Ivor Richard, to justify the ceiling of 6,000 men. He argued that at times of greater tension this year a maximum of 800 men a night was needed for this duty of guarding installations. Members of the Regiment could not be expected to serve more than one night a week. By multiplying 800 by the number of days in the week and allowing for wastage, Mr. Richard reckoned that up to 7,000 might be needed for this purpose.

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If this ceiling might be required at times of great tension for guarding vital installations, that would leave nobody available for any other duty. If this were the case—that guarding these rather mythical installations was to be the Regiment's nearly exclusive function—I should have no objection to it, though there would be little for it to do if the reform programme goes through. But my fear is that this will not be the only duty.
How else will the Regiment be employed? An assurance was given in another place that it will not be employed in industrial disputes and that this will be included in regulations. The assurance was also given in another place on Committee stage that the Regiment would not be engaged in crowd control. I myself do not want the Regiment to come in contact in any way with unarmed members of the public. I do not think it should be used for breaking up peaceful demonstrations. I do not think that it should ever enter the Bogside or the Catholic districts of Belfast. I do not think that it should operate road blocks, except on cross-border roads if there were a resurgence of armed terrorism from Republican bases.
I do not want the Regiment to be used on riot duty. My noble friend Lord Winterbottom said today that it was not intended that it should so be used. But when this matter was considered in another place on an Amendment of my honourable friend, Miss Devlin, the Minister, Mr. Roy Hattersley, gave an important assurance on this point, and then greatly qualified it for a reason that seems to me invalid. The Minister gave an assurance that
"… it is essentially the intention of the Secretary of State …"
that the Regiment should not be used for riot duties. If he had stopped there, as my noble friend Lord Winterbottom did, well and good. But the Minister went on to say that the Regiment, like any other body, had a common law obligation to protect life and property and added that it would be fantastic to "write out" such an obligation by including such a provision in the Regulations. That was his only reason for not agreeing to do so.
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I cannot see the validity of his argument. If the Regiment has been called out, if armed members are despatched each night on specified assignments (which, in my view, should consist of guarding vital installations or patrolling the border), and on the way to these assignments they happen to encounter a body of extremists of either persuasion which seems to constitute a threat to life and property, they can surely be expected—in fact, they would be duty bound—to fulfil the common law obligation to which the Minister referred, even if it were written in the Regulations that they should not be employed on riot duties, as is, after all, the essential intention of the Government, because the common law obligation would remain. Such circumstances would be a very different matter from being specifically despatched by their commanding officer to undertake riot duties. The undertaking of such duties, I believe, would be disastrous. Whenever the Royal Ulster Constabulary, and in particular the B Specials, were called in during the disturbances this year, it always had the effect of exacerbating the situation. It was only when the British Army intervened, and were at once accepted as the first representatives of impartial law and order ever seen by the community, that peace was restored.
There is a further point concerning which I feel serious apprehension. The mathematics used by Mr. Richard to justify a ceiling of 6,000 men were based on the Regiment being a part-time force, as it will be, in principle, its members serving not more than one night a week. But under Clause 1(5) it is clear that full-time service may be required. I would ask: in what circumstances would that full-time service be required? It would clearly never be necessary to have 6,000 armed men on duty at the same time for guarding vital installations. Can we have any assurance—or, better still, can it be written into the Regulations or into the Act itself—that full-time service will be required only if there is a threat from outside to the integrity of the Province?
I say the "Province", but it is, of course, only two-thirds of a Province. I cannot avoid mentioning the proposed name of the Regiment, although it has been mentioned already here several times and at length in another place,

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because, as I have indicated earlier, it happens that I myself live in the other one-third of that Province. I woke up this morning in Ulster—I flew across from Dublin this afternoon—and was at the same time happily within the borders of the Republic.
LORD SHACKLETON: Why happily?
LORD KILBRACKEN: I am afraid I did not hear my noble Leader.
LORD SHACKLETON: The noble Lord keeps using interesting phrases. He said that he was "happily" in the Republic. I feel that there must be some particular reason for this.
LORD KILBRACKEN: Well, I was happy that I was in the Republic, otherwise I would not live there. I said that I was happy to wake up there this morning, and I am sorry to be back here now. I do not think the Regiment will ever come to defend me—in fact, I am sure it will not, and I am grateful that it will not—in County Cavan. Indeed, I may say that I consider it no less than an insult to the Republic that the Regiment should by inference claim to defend an ancient and well-defined Province of which one-third, no less, is within the borders of the Republic, which is a neighbouring, sovereign State.
I will say no more on this occasion about the name of the Regiment, because it has already been mentioned so fluently by the noble Lords, Lord Brockway, Lord Hunt, Lord Boothby and Lord Cork and Orrery, and because I will be putting my name to an Amendment in my noble friend's name that the title of the Regiment should be changed. But I must ask noble Lords to accept that the word has special significance; that it is a kind of password, almost a secret sign; and that it is, in fact, an indication that this will be predominantly a Unionist force. Call the Regiment what you will, it is unlikely that many Catholics will come forward to join it. Call it the Ulster Defence Regiment, and it is sure that practically none will. In principle, I am opposed to the establishment of this force. I accept that it will be established, but I am deeply apprehensive of how it will be employed, and hope that some of these apprehensions will be removed in the course of my noble friend's reply.
6.35 p.m.
VISCOUNT BARRINGTON: My Lords, I apologise for not having put my name down to speak in the debate, but I hope to be not more than five minutes. I want to speak on only one subject, which has been touched on by many noble Lords, and that is the Title of the Bill. My only justifications for speaking are that I have a Northern Irish title and I am speaking from a Back Bench, and opinion seems to have been divided on the subject of the Title in a way that I do not entirely understand. It has been argued here, and was argued at length in another place, that the Title was so unimportant that it was a waste of time to discuss it. It was also argued that it was so important that to introduce an Amendment on it, or to pass an Amendment, would wreck the Bill itself. I am prepared to believe either of those propositions, but I am not prepared to believe both.
It seems to me, having listened to this debate, that there is a division of opinion as follows. Those who believe the Title to be supremely unimportant sit mainly on the Front Benches, and those who believe it to be important seem to sit on the Back Benches. I should like to express solidarity with those who sit on the Back Benches, that it is important. I understood the noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, in his extremely fair statement, to say that we all know that Ulster consists of nine counties and not six. I may be wrong, but I thought I heard a murmur from the Front Bench saying: "You mean six counties and not nine". There are a great many in the country, though not in your Lordships' House, who are a bit doubtful whether Ulster does mean nine counties which include six counties, or six counties which include nine, or what. It is sufficiently ambiguous to raise doubt in people's minds.
From another point, the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe—and I agreed with almost all his remarks—said that he had doubts about the Title; but he added, as the noble Earl, Lord Cork, said, that he did not feel that we ought to alter it "now". I think there are only three choices: to alter it now, to alter it never, or to alter it in Committee. We cannot alter it now, we shall not alter it "never", and if any-body proposes to alter it in Committee I

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would certainly vote for the alternative that I thought best for the purposes.
I was able to agree with everything that was said by my noble friend Lord Byers. But, to be quite fair to the Back-Benchers, my only difference—not disagreement—with him is that I did not think he went quite far enough, in so far as he said: "We ought to give every encouragement to Catholics to join the new force". I believe this Title is not one of the things that will encourage them. He also said: "I cannot believe that the name, Ulster Defence Force, will be the one thing on which the new force will founder." I entirely agree with that, but it might be one of the things which would help it to founder.
I do not want to keep your Lordships, but I should like to touch very briefly on the Back-Bench view. I was interested in the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, whom I think we can regard as entirely impartial and who is perhaps the person whom most of us have come to hear. He did regard this matter as important. I do not know whether the noble Earl, Lord Longford, does, because, owing to a failure of timing, I was not in the Chamber when he spoke. I know that the noble Earl, Lord Cork and Orrery, made the point which I should like to reiterate: that it is not only the word "Ulster "or Defence", but the juxtaposition of the two, which is crucial. In conclusion, I will illustrate this by saying that I do not object to being called British—although I like to sign my name as "English" in the hotel book. I do not object to the name "humanist". Like the Archbishop of Canterbury when he was interviewed by Mr. David Frost, I would say I am a humanist, although I hope a Christian one. I should resent being called a British Humanist, not because I have any doubts about the idealism of the British Humanist Association, but because they are apt to argue in a way which I think has been employed in this case, by attempting to get the best of both worlds. I mean that if you produce a logical argument they are apt to say, "That is all academic and pedantic". If, on the other hand, you produce an emotional argument, they say, "Oh, that is emotive".
A great deal of emotion is felt about this subject on both sides, and there is no reason why it should not be voiced;
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but when one is trying to be impartial and has to judge between the two emotional attitudes, one can only listen to the arguments. The arguments I have listened to and read in another place, and which I have heard here tonight, convince me that the Title is important. I believe an Amendment which alters it would help the cause which all your Lordships have at heart, which is a peaceful Ireland.
6.42 p.m.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, this debate has gone rather wider than I had expected and, indeed, some noble Lords—in particular my noble friend Lord Kilbracken—took the opportunity, which they were entitled to do, to make the speech which they might have made when we were debating Northern Ireland a few weeks ago. It is interesting to see the emergence above the Bishops' Bench of almost an "Irish Bench". To judge by what the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, covers I think it is also sometimes a "Biafran Bench", or an "Irish Bench ", or even a "Rugby Union Bench" as it was on the last occasion.
It will be difficult for me to cover all the issues that have been raised, although there are a number of small points, and some rather tricky points—particularly those from my noble friend Lord Wigg—which I will endeavour to answer rather quickly, and then return to some of the central issues. In speaking, I am very conscious of what my noble friend Lord Longford said (and I appreciate his reference to myself) and I should like, indeed, to speak in the same tone as he did. I hope we are all deeply anxious—and this is the purpose of the debate—to arrive at decisions which will contribute to peace in Northern Ireland, and not the reverse.
I particularly appreciated—as I think did the House—the moderation and understanding in the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Rathcavan. I can give him one piece of information, and that is that a man who has served for five years in the U.S.C. will reckon that service for bounty in the new Regiment, and will go straight on to the £35 rate of bounty. I will give answers to a number of the purely military points now. The noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, asked a number of points on wireless equipment. Each battalion will have some transmitting and

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receiving stations, including some vehicle mounted stations in the mobile patrol element. Perhaps I should have dealt with that first. There will be a small mobile element in each battalion equipped with both troop carriers and small four-wheel drive vehicles—which seems to me to be a longer way of saying Land Rovers, but the military talk in these terms, and I assume it is a Land Rover. Some vehicles will be equipped with wireless. The mobile element will carry out patrols and enable check points and road blocks to be set up quickly.
On the subject of armouries, I can only say that the G.O.C. is giving special attention to the provision of the necessary armouries, and a preliminary survey of the accommodation that is likely to be available for the Regiment, including that available for armouries, is now being undertaken. There will be opportunities—but essentially on a purely voluntary basis—to undertake training in the United Kingdom.
The noble Lord, Lord Wigg, and other noble Lords, referred to the kind of rifle. I am happy to be able to give him the information that it will be a single-shot Lee-Enfield, though I cannot remember which Mark. I feel extreme diffidence, almost amounting to nervousness, debating with somebody who is as well informed as the noble Lord, Lord Wigg. The rifles they are having are their personal weapons, they are not status symbols, and the simple fact is that they do not need the F.N. rifle. It has been my experience, and it must have been the experience of the noble Lord. Lord Wigg, that it is still not unusual, particularly on guard duties (and I have seen this in recent years in various parts of the world) for particular people, say the R.A.F. guarding a particular installation in Aden, not to be armed with F.N. rifles. The rifles these men will have are considered suitable for the purpose for which they will use them.
LORD WIGG: My Lords, I understood—perhaps I am wrong—that the common rifle now is the 762 mm. self-loading rifle, and that the Mark IV Lee-Enfield, to which the noble Lord referred, has now been re-barrelled, so that it took the NATO bore. As I understand it, these chaps will have the old Mark IV Lee-Enfield with the 303 ammunition.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, this is the point at which I have gone as far as my certainty goes. I promise to give the noble Lord any further information on this point. It is the single-shot rifle and not the F.N.
Also on the subject of equipment, the noble Earl, Lord Cork and Orrery, who always speaks so reasonably, but seems sometimes (I hope he will not mind my saying it) to make very heavy weather with relatively small points, is obviously worried that a member of this force, if he takes his webbing—I think he called it his "foundation garment"—home would immediately have a prescribed piece of equipment, and, therefore would come under military law. The noble Earl really need not have worried. The Army may at times appear to be rather silly to some noble Lords—and the noble Earl was himself a soldier, so perhaps he is prejudiced on this—but they do know what they are doing. The purpose of including equipment is to cover circumstances in which a member of the force might be authorised to take home a Service radio or vehicle whose loss or misuse would be a serious matter. It is not meant to apply to uniform or personal equipment. Hence—and this is the beauty of the Bill—the equipment is to be prescribed for the particular purposes of this provision. I hope that the noble Earl will now cease to worry on this point.
THE EARL OF CORK AND ORRERY: My Lords, if the noble Lord will forgive me for intervening, I entirely appreciate the point about the "foundation garment". I think I made that point myself.
LORD SHACKLETON: Yes; the noble Earl did.
THE EARL OF CORK AND ORRERY: I did not think it really meant that. Apparently it does say that. But it does not say—does it?—that the equipment is to be "prescribed for the particular point of this section". If you look in the definition you find that it is to be prescribed. Prescribed equipment is prescribed equipment. So all the Bill need say is that it is "prescribed for the particular purposes of this section", which is to define how a man comes under military law.
LORD SHACKLETON: I am very sorry, my Lords. I think the noble Earl is still worried. I have done my best. It is to be prescribed—he is quite right—and it will be prescribed in a sensible way.
I should like now to come on to a difficult area; namely, the question of call-out. "Call-out" is a term which is, as noble Lords know, frequently used in reserve forces legislation; and I could quote a number of Acts. It means summoned from civilian life to military duty, and it is not defined in any Statute. A part of the force generally means a unit or sub-unit, but it could be any group other than an individual. A man who has his arms at home is subject to military law under the provisions of Clause 1(2)(b)(ii), but he is not thereby called out for service. That is to be done by specific order; namely, that he must turn out for guard duty at such-and-such an hour. And he is not to use his arms except as ordered. I hope that this answers the noble Lord's points. This has some bearing on what the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, said later.
It is not going to be easy, I think, for me to answer some of the technical points in this debate. These are early days in the formation of the force, and before it becomes operational these matters will have been thoroughly examined; exact procedures will have been devised, and instructions will have been written. But this is a very unusual force, and both the matters raised by the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, and the noble Earl point the difficulties of organising a military force of this kind; of reconciling both the legislation and the military precision to which we are accustomed with the flexibility and informality needed for a really rather unusual part-time citizen force. We are very conscious of the difficulty, and the Ministry of Defence are, I am sure, studying it with great care in the context of the regulations. And I am sure they will be reinforced in their determination to do so thoroughly by some of the remarks that have been made.
It is worth pointing out that the role of the Ulster Defence Regiment is quite different from that of any of the other reserves. I have already made that point, but it applies even if we compare it with TAVR, which could be called out for
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home defence service only under the liabilities of actual or apprehended attack or imminent national danger. They could not be used on emergency service of the kind which this force will undertake under Clause 2.
Perhaps I might deal here with the point of military law. I suspect that we may have an opportunity even to continue this discussion further. But, as I understand it, subsection (3) of Clause 1 (and I am quite certain that the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, will not have missed this) seems to have the effect of applying the relevant parts of the Army Act 1955; and by this reference to them this has the effect, not of amending the Army Act 1955, but of bringing these forces within the relevant sections of that Act. But I want to look very closely at what the noble Lord said, because he always argues his case in a very closely and tightly reasoned way, and I want to make sure that I have covered the points to which he was referring.
I should now like to turn to another aspect—an important point which seems to raise what could be an important libertarian issue. It relates to the control of Parliament over the Army. This is a matter to which Parliament has always attached the greatest importance, and the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, has probably been the most active Parliamentarian in this field, certainly in my generation. I always regarded him in this respect as a somewhat Cromwellian figure, although Cromwell himself subsequently disposed of Parliament. The point of reporting to Parliament in the case of this particular force is, I believe, quite other than the point of reporting to Parliament in the case of a call-out of reserves in the circumstances with which we are familiar. It is certainly true that it was pointed out in another place—and the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, has done the same here—that there was no provision for reporting to Parliament any exercise of the power. My honourable friend the Under-Secretary of State has undertaken to see whether machinery could be devised in this connection.
I think the House will agree that the routine guarding of vulnerable points or the call-out of a few men to meet a local threat would not realistically justify a Parliamentary debate. But the call-out of the whole force raises a quite different

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issue; and if they were called out on permanent service, under subsection (3) or (4), provision already exists for a report to be made to Parliament. The call-out of the whole force on emergency service does not depend on a prior decision in Parliament. This would destroy its speed of action, and it would be inconsistent with Clause 2(2) of the Bill. But if there were a need for a general call-out undoubtedly the Government would expect—and I think we must face that Governments must be prepared—to give an assurance and to report to Parliament and, if necessary, arrange a Parliamentary debate.
LORD WIGG: My Lords, if I may intervene, I do not think the noble Lord quite understands the importance of this. When the Army Act was revised, both Houses agreed to the amendment of the Bill of Rights. I understand this has been done only once before. This was a pretty serious step to take, and it was taken—this was the last item the Select Committee left to themselves—on the absolute and specific understanding that Parliament would have an opportunity, not necessarily to debate but to be kept informed. If this is an extension of a regular forces requirement, it seems to me necessary, not, again, that a debate should take place, or that the Houses of Parliament should be informed the next day, but that they should be kept informed in some way.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, I am not sure in logic. It is a question whether within the spirit of the under-taking a force is unusual and is carrying out a different type of role. But I fully acknowledge that there can be an important constitutional point here. I do not believe that anyone would expect that the call-out of this force for the particular duties which, for instance, the B Specials are performing now, in the way of guarding, would warrant a report to Parliament. But I think it would be desirable for us to look a little further at this—and it may be that there is some further assurance I can give on this point. I have taken the point off the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, and so have the Government, but I do not think it is quite as serious for the routine activities of this particular force as he implies.
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Concern has been expressed about the officer who has the power to call out these particular men. This power can be delegated only to a regular officer. He must not be below the rank of major, and at all times it is within the control of the G.O.C. Northern Ireland, who is directly answerable to my right honourable friend the Secretary of State, and so to Parliament. I hope that this very carefully thought out arrangement provides the assurance that this will not be some irresponsible force.
Let me add that, despite what may have been said about the B Specials in the past (and I am familiar with the problems, as the noble Earl, Lord Longford, knows; and I have heard the arguments for many years), I do not know of any recent cases, except within the context of the particular troubles just recently, when in fact in ordinary circumstances there have been reports of irresponsible action. But the important thing—and I stress this to my noble friend with anxiety in this matter—is that this force is now being brought within the control of the British Army. This is the most decisive argument in favour of the Bill and of proceeding with it in the way we are doing.
My Lords, I should like to mention one or two other points. The G.O.C. Northern Ireland will aim at the selection of the best qualified applicants for appointment as officers in the Regiment. This point was raised by my noble friend Lord Longford. There will certainly be no automatic appointment to the Regiment of officers of the Ulster Special Constabulary, but it is likely to be found that the present county commandants, provided they meet the other requirements, will be best qualified to be battalion commanders during the early life of the Regiment. I appreciate that this is a source of anxiety to some of my noble friends.
That brings me to the points about security vetting. I gladly echo the tribute paid by my noble friend Lord Wigg to the security services. He knows that I also have had some experience of them. Obviously we shall consider closely what he has said. The security screening of applicants to determine their suitability or otherwise to be members of the Ulster Defence Regiment will, of course, be

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entirely the responsibility of the G.O.C. Northern Ireland. This process will be done entirely by the Army. But as my noble friend knows, this is perhaps a matter which I ought not to pursue further, beyond saying that it is obvious that the advice of the security services is available to any proper Government institution. The greater part of the screening will be done by the Army, and the purpose will be to ensure that applicants are of good character and are not extremists in the context of the general situation in Northern Ireland.
My Lords, I should now like to say something about the Advisory Council. The purpose of the Council is to achieve a proper balance in the force, and clearly it would be important that in arriving at the total numbers of this force some regard should also be had to the balance. It could be argued that if we had a lower number it would almost automatically be filled up with eager applicants from the old Ulster Special Constabulary, but there will need to be an appropriate balance of experience as well as of community background. Although an applicant's religion is not normally a relevant consideration for entering the Army or for determining technical competence, applicants for the Ulster Defence Regiment are being asked to state their religion on their application form, so that during the progress of recruitment Her Majesty's Government can watch this question of the balance as applicants come in.
I should have liked to go on and discuss the question of the size of the force. I would only emphasise again that the figure of 6,000 is a ceiling and not a recruiting target. The policy on the actual size of the force will be determined in the light of experience as the build-up proceeds, but in any case will not ultimately exceed 6,000 officers and men. In my view it would be foolish to set a ceiling figure lower than 6,000 which is, as I have said, based upon a broad assessment of the military operational requirement. Noble Lords who have had experience in military planning on occasion may doubt the precision of military operational requirements, but the Army have done this pretty thoroughly, and the noble Lord, Lord Byers, having recently visited Northern Ireland, has come to the view that this is a reasonable figure. In all these matters the Government can
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only, in a very difficult area of judgment, make the best judgment that they can.
This brings me to the highly contentious question of the title of the Ulster Defence Regiment. Powerful arguments have been put forward by nearly every noble Lord who has spoken. Even the noble Lord, Lord Rathcavan, said that if this was important he would in fact be prepared to see a change. I must say that this is important to both sides in the argument, and the Northern Ireland Government have shown, I believe, a great deal of courage—although one may have criticised them in the past—in accepting a number of measures which will provide a large-scale programme of fundamental reforms in Northern Ireland. Two of these Bills stem from Westminster, and the Police Bill we debated in this House only a few days ago. Responsibility for other legislation lies with the Northern Ireland Government, and they really have recognised fully the extent of the problem posed by the existence of the two communities.
My Lords, they have gone much further than we have in this country in a number of respects regarding the freedom of the individual. They have not only set up a Community Relations Commission but there is comprehensive machinery for the making and investigation of complaints—and this does not consist merely of our own Parliamentary Commissioner acting in a similar capacity for the Northern Ireland Government, but takes the form also of the Commissioner Complaints Act which is already on the Statute Book. Your Lordships know the range of advance in difficult circumstances that the Northern Ireland Government have made, under very heavy pressure and, if I may say so, in an inflammable situation—and the Government, having considered all the aspects and having considered the very arguments that noble Lords have put forward, of which I myself am only too well aware, have come to the view that in the circumstances it was right to agree that this should be called the Ulster Defence Regiment.
When noble Lords suggest that the name should be changed, are they suggesting that some of the other Ulster units should now change their names—that the 6th Battalion the Royal Ulster Rifles (which is in fact a TAVR

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cadre) or the 40th Signals Regiment, or the 102nd Ulster and Scottish Light Air Defence Regiment should change their names? I think the noble Earl put his finger on a crucial point—and this is the only one that gave me doubts. It is the association of the word "defence". I want to urge that, although this is an important point, we can make too much of it; and I would beg your Lordships now to let this Bill go forward. I have listened to all the arguments; I have been disturbed by them. But I am bound to say that I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Byers, who only last week—he will not mind my saying—expressed strong criticism to me of the title of the Ulster Defence Regiment. Having been over there, under no influence of mine, he has come back and believes that we ought to leave the title as it is. I would appeal to my noble friend Lord Brockway and ask him to consider—and this is a dangerous argument even to use because it can be used as an argument against freedom of discussion—whether in moving an Amendment on Thursday he is making a contribution to peace in Northern Ireland. I hope very much that we will now let this Bill go through.
I appreciate what the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, has said, that one would like more time to consider these technical matters, and if the House wished to put off the Committee stage beyond Thursday, of course we would consider it. If we are to proceed with measures of this sort at this moment, however, we do seek the co-operation of the House in getting them through, and I hope that we shall be able to take the Bill on Thursday. I shall certainly not complain if the noble Lord decides to proceed with his Amendment, but I would ask him to consider that in this situation, where people in all Parties will acknowledge that the Government have done the best they can—they have had difficult judgments to make and they have made those judgments—after all these discussions we should now go ahead with the Bill. I am grateful to your Lordships for the moderation, and indeed the helpfulness and the detailed reasoning, that has been used in this debate, and I hope that we shall be able to pass this Bill into law fairly soon.
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord one very short question? Have the Government considered the practicability of laying down as a condition of recruitment to this new force that a certain percentage of it must be Catholics, say roughly corresponding to the adult Catholic population of Northern Ireland?
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, I really do think it is a little late for the noble Viscount to join in the debate.
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: My, Lords, I was simple saying that we have heard a great deal from the Southern Irish Bench over there of the supposed fears of the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland. If we had such an arrangement as I suggest it would calm their fears. But I think their fears are highly exaggerated.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

RENT (CONTROL OF INCREASE) BILL
7.14 p.m.
THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF HOUSING AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (LORD KENNET): My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Kennet.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[The LORD DOUGLAS OF BARLOCH in the Chair.]
Clause 1 [Restrictions on increases in local authority rents]:
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR moved Amendment No. 1:
Page 1, line 18, at end insert (" or
(d) the tenants of such houses are effectively safeguarded against hardship liable to arise from rent increases by the local authority operating a rent rebate scheme which conforms with the principles recommended for this purpose by the Minister of Housing and Local Government in Circular 46/67 dated June 29. 1967.")
The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 1. The object of the Government in this Bill, so far as one can tell, is to prevent hardship arising to individual tenants through rent increases. My Amendment suggests a better and a fairer way of accomplishing this object. That is by bringing in the principles which were not only stated but recommended by Ministers to local authorities in 1967, essentially the principles of a fair and effective rebate scheme. If I may remind the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, of the circular to which my Amendment refers, it was in fact a joint circular issued by the Ministry of Housing and Local Government and the Welsh Office. The final paragraph of that circular read:
"The Ministers hope that the advice contained in this circular will enable local authorities to review their rent policies and to construct effective rebate schemes which direct help to those who need it most."
If a local authority acts on the principles that are set out in that circular, surely it will then be complying with the Government's desire to give help to those who need it most.
The proposals in the Bill are, as I have said, designed to prevent hardship. The proposals in the Amendment will do exactly the same; they will prevent hardship. What the proposals in the Bill will also do, however, is to keep down artificially the rents payable by council tenants who could well afford to pay fair rents without receiving rent subsidy from the ratepayers. That is the weakness in the Bill. The proposals in my Amendment will enable local authorities to charge fair rents, subject to an effective rent-rebate scheme. I do not imagine that the Minister has withdrawn from the circular of 1967. It has been Government policy of successive Governments to try to get local authorities to adopt effective rent rebate schemes. Indeed, the noble Lord will recollect that the circular of 1967, issued in the time of a Labour Government, replaced a circular on the same subject issued by the Conservative Government in 1956. Why, therefore, should not these principles which are set out in policy approved by the present Government be implemented to solve the problem to which the Government's Bill is addressing itself?
If the Bill goes through unamended, ratepayers in certain areas are going to
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be hit very hard indeed by it, and I hope that the Government are honest enough to admit that. Those who are likely to be hit hardest are those in Greater London, principally because, over many years when the Labour Party held control of the London County Council, council rents were kept low at the expense of rate contributions from the ratepayers, and now, unless an Amendment of this kind is carried, those rate contributions will have to rise to enormous figures. In fact the Greater London Council has stated that if the Bill goes through unamended it will have to subsidise the rents of G.L.C. tenants by £9 million in the year 1970-71; and it is well known that many of those tenants would suffer no hardship if they were called upon to pay a full fair rent. Perhaps when I say "fair rent" I should explain how I am using that term.
The Greater London Council's desire is to raise the rents of Council property to the levels at which those rents for those properties would be fixed if they were private property, and the fair rents were fixed under the 1968 Rent Act by a rent officer or, on appeal, by an independent rent assessment committee. That appears to be a perfectly reasonable course of action—
A NOBLE LORD: No.
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR: A perfectly reasonable course of action, because in every place where any hardship is liable to accrue through charging fair rents the Greater London Council applies an extremely generous rent rebate scheme, a scheme much more extensive and generous than the Labour controlled County Council used to do.
The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, on Second Reading of the Bill, asked "Why does the Greater London Council not solve its problem by applying to the Minister for special increases under Clause 3?" Well, I can only give the answer which I should certainly give if I were an elected member of the Greater London Council: that that would be far too risky a thing to do. The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, himself said, in his Second Reading speech, that the Ministers expect that they will be justified in permitting such increases only in quite exceptional circumstances. By "such increases" he meant increases under Clause 3.

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The arrangement, so far as I understand it, is that if under Clause 3 the local authority submits proposals for increases beyond the limits allowed by the Bill, the Minister can either accept those proposals or reject them; he cannot amend them. Therefore, if the Minister does not accept them in full and in detail, the local authority is back to square one, all that time having been lost. And the authority then has to submit a new and revised set of proposals which again it cannot tell whether the Minister will accept or reject. For every week that the local authority would in this manner be prevented from raising rents, it would be suffering a loss of revenue of £60,000, and I certainly do not see how any responsible local authority could take that risk, in view of that sharp warning given by the Government in the noble Lord's speech that it would be only in exceptional circumstances that the Minister would be prepared to act under Clause 3.
However, we are not discussing only the Greater London Council; there are other local authorities which will undoubtedly, if this Bill goes through unamended, have to place on their ratepayers excessive demands for rate contributions to keep down the rents to tenants who could well afford to pay the full fair rents. That is why I am moving this Amendment. I am of course well aware that the Amendment is worded in terms most suitable to England, and if the Government accept it there will be no difficulty about the Government's moving an Amendment on Report to get the wording precisely right for Wales, and also for Scotland.
Perhaps the most powerful of all the speeches made against this Bill on Second Reading was made by my noble friend Lord Molson, who has explained to me that unfortunately he is prevented from being here this afternoon. My Amendment would meet in full his strong objections to Part I of the Bill. The noble Lord. Lord Kennet, will recollect that the Bill received no support at all from his noble friends behind him; he alone was left to try to defend this almost
indefensible Bill. I suggest that by accepting this Amendment he would meet the case of those local authorities who otherwise will have to act unfairly to
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their ratepayers and would at the same time bring the Government's action into consistency with its own circular which, as I have said, suggests the reasonable method of solving the problem before us. I beg to move.
7.26 p.m.
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: I should like to support this Amendment very warmly. The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, may remember that this summer I asked him a question regarding the incomes of council tenants, and speaking from memory I think the noble Lord told me that there were 64,000 council house tenants in this country earning incomes of £2,000 a year and over. When I further questioned him as to whether any council house tenants were earning incomes of £4,000 a year and over, he told me that he could not give me the reply, but that he thought there were probably quite a few thousands who did have incomes of £4,000 and over.
This Bill is really just a Bill for subsidising. It is a hidden subsidy for subsidising council house tenants. Of course, it is a vote-catcher. It is quite iniquitous that some ratepayers who are far poorer than some council house tenants should have to subsidise their so much richer neighbours. I will not delay the Committee, but I should just like to make that point. This is an unfair Bill.
My noble friend's Amendment covers the poorer council house tenants. The rich council house tenants—and, as we know, there are probably two or three hundred thousand of them; perhaps four hundred thousand, perhaps more—are well able, on the whole, to pay these small increases. If we take the amount of their income which is now used in rent, compared to that of a similar family before the war, there is no comparison. The percentage of the income of some of these council house tenants now used in rent is infinitesimal. I doubt very much whether it is 5 per cent. of their income, if that: it is probably 3 per cent., or even 2. I therefore warmly support this Amendment of my noble friend on the Front Benches.
7.28 p.m.
LORD KENNET: The broad intention of the noble Lord's Amendment is clearly to exclude from control local authorities

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who operate a rebate scheme not less generous than the illustrative scheme in Circular 46/67, the present Government circular. It would not be easy to assess in practice whether a rebate scheme was in fact as generous as the illustrative scheme. The alternative would be to insist that the authority must adopt the illustrative scheme in toto. But this would be against the policy adopted in the circular itself on which the noble Lord relies and which makes it clear that it is for each authority to decide what adjustments, if any, are needed to meet local needs and conditions. I would point out to the Committee that the circular introduced in 1956, when the Opposition party were in power, did not go even so far in recommending an illustrative rent rebate scheme as the 1967 circular. The policy in the circular which the noble Lord seeks to build into the Bill reflects the statutory position, because under Section 113 of the Housing Act 1957 local authorities are given discretion in the matter of rent rebate schemes. All this Tory legislation the noble Lord seeks to go back on.
My main objection to the Amendment is that it would allow authorities with a sound rebate scheme to make any increase, however large, for unrebated tenants. The noble Lord said that the circular was designed to direct help to those who need it most, and indeed it is; but those who need it next most may also need tiding over and gentling along in relation to these rent increases, and that is the Government's purpose in the Bill as drafted. Any reasonable rent rebate scheme would ensure that tenants of small means or with large family commitments would either not be affected at all by a rent increase or only to a small extent, and that I freely admit. But that is not taken by the National Board of Prices and Incomes to be a sufficient reason for doing what the noble Lord wants. In their Report they recommended that if local authorities wished to increase average standard rents by more than 7s. 6d. a week in a 12-month period they should be required to seek the permission of the Housing Departments. The Government have adopted this advice, and Clause 2 of the Bill incorporates it precisely. The National Board of Prices and Incomes also recommended that the principle of moderation should be observed for individual households—and
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this is the 10s. individual maximum provision.
An average weekly rent increase of much more than 7s. 6d. in a year would often take away from a man the whole, or nearly the whole, of any increase in take-home pay in that year. Here I am not speaking of rent-rebated tenants but of the average run of tenants. It would therefore have an inflationary effect, and provoke larger pay claims which, if granted, would necessitate more stringent fiscal or monetary measures on the part of the Government. The agreement with the local authority associations recognises the cost of introducing or improving a rent rebate scheme as a legitimate cost towards which rent increases averaging up to 7s. 6d. a week may be made. And it was the present Government, I would remind the Committee, who were the first ever to recommend local authorities to adopt rent rebate schemes at all and to use subsidies for this purpose.
It is not true that in every case the only alternative to a rent increase averaging more than 7s. 6d. a week is an increase in the rate fund contribution. I am not speaking of any individual authority at the moment. But there may be other alternatives; for instance, the reduction of housing account balances. But even where the alternative is a rate fund contribution, it does not follow that it is better to increase the rents of unrebated tenants by a very large amount suddenly in order to avoid that rate fund contribution. The National Board of Prices and Incomes recommended that rate fund contributions should be used to avoid average increases of above 7s. 6d. a week. A rate fund contribution can be repaid in any of the nine subsequent financial years. The poorer domestic ratepayers can obtain rate rebates, and next year all domestic ratepayers will receive rate relief of 1s. 8d. in the pound in England and Wales and 3s. 4d. in the pound in Scotland.
The picture painted by the noble Lord, therefore, of bleeding the ratepayer on behalf of the council tenant is one which appears to the Government to be an exaggerated one. I hope the noble Lord will not press his Amendment, but if he does I would ask the Committee to reject it for the reasons I have given and, above all, for the reason that you simply cannot

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build an illustrative circular into Statute Law.
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR: I am grateful to the noble Lord for having taken this Amendment seriously and for having given a considered reply to it, though his reply does not convince me. Nevertheless, he paid me and your Lordships' Committee the compliment of examining the effects of the Amendment carefully. At one point I thought he feared that if the Amendment was carried some local authorities would really sting some of their tenants whom they thought could afford to pay by swingeing or unreasonable increases of rents. But I think he will agree that, at any rate so far as Statute Law is concerned, it is still the duty of a local authority to fix reasonable rents. I grant that by this Bill the Government are proposing to prevent local authorities from doing so, but I believe I am right in saying that it is still their duty. Certainly the noble Lord indicated in his Second Reading speech that that remained the fact, and one of my difficulties about the Bill is that local authorities are told in one Statute to fix reasonable rents and, if this Bill goes through, will be prevented in many cases from doing so.
The noble Lord rested the greater part of his case on a Report from the Prices and Incomes Board. Some Reports from that Board have been impressive documents. This one is the least impressive of all that I have seen, and I think that that view is very generally held among local authorities who are particularly affected and particularly interested in it. I found it a completely unconvincing document, written entirely from the standpoint of the interests of the tenants and not at all from the standpoint of the interests of the general public. I appreciate the point that the noble Lord made, that it is difficult to write a circular into a Bill. I do not think it is impossible, though it may be it passes my drafting skill to do so. I do not consider that my Amendment would compel all local authorities to accept as their actual rent rebate scheme the illustrative scheme which forms the appendix to that 1967 circular. It would compel them to adopt the principles on which that illustrative scheme is based, but they would certainly receive freedom to be more generous, if
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they wished, than that scheme itself would indicate. I was surprised when the noble Lord said that the Government were the first to recommend local authorities to adopt rent rebate schemes, because I personally remember often doing that in speeches when I was a Minister; but I may not have published a new circular, following so soon after the 1956 one, which was sent out on the authority of my immediate predecessor.
My real concern here is that the local authorities are asked to do something which is unreasonable. They are asked by this Bill to keep down artificially rents to tenants who could well afford to pay higher rents, and they are thereby compelled to place that extra burden on the shoulders of the ratepayers. After taking into account the domestic rate relief, the individual rate relief that can be obtained by individual ratepayers and everything else, it still remains unreasonable for a local authority to be compelled to place on its ratepayers in general the extremely heavy costs which it will incur through being forced by this Bill to subsidise tenants who do not need subsidies.
In normal circumstances I would press this Amendment. If I do not do so tonight, it is in part due, frankly, to the fact that I have had difficulty in writing a circular into an Amendment. I know that we are dealing with this Bill under pressure of time, because if the Bill is to be passed at all it must be passed before both Houses rise for the Christmas Recess; and as the noble Lord has indicated that it is not acceptable in principle to the Government, it does not sound as though I could hope for his assistance in getting the wording right. I withdraw the Amendment with great regret, because I believe this is the proper and sound method by which the Government could have solved this problem; but, for the reasons that I have stated, I am willing to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
7.40 p.m.
LORD WINDLESHAM LORD WINDLESHAM moved Amendment No. 2:
Page 2, line 12, after (" him ") insert (" and was, in the opinion of the local authority, entitled to succeed to the tenancy ").
The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 2. The effect of Clause

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1(5) is that when the tenant of a local authority house either dies or moves out, a relative who has been living with him is entitled to pay the same rent as the previous tenant even though it is a new tenancy. It is easy to see what the aim is here, and no one would quarrel with it. Clearly, a member of the former tenant's family with a moral right to succeed, such as a widow or widower, should not have to pay more than before their bereavement, simply because there has been a legal change of tenancy. But as the clause is drafted at present it goes a good deal wider. It could benefit any member of the former tenant's family who had come to live in the dwelling only shortly before the death of the tenant and who might not be considered to have any great claim to take over the tenancy.
There are also cases where the former tenant moves away, and therefore a vacancy occurs not through death but through the tenant moving elsewhere. He too may leave a member of his family in occupation. An example is a widower who marries again and vacates the dwelling leaving adult offspring in occupation. The granting of a new tenancy in these circumstances will normally be considered by the housing authority on the merits of each case. It is true that the housing authority need not grant the tenancy to the relatives of the outgoing tenant. It is within its discretion whether a relative is granted a new tenancy or not. If the housing authority decides not to allow a relative to succeed, it could put the rent up for the incoming tenant, provided he was not a relative living in the house of the outgoing tenant. On balance it may be sensible housing management to allow the relative to remain in the dwelling. But if the rent cannot be put up, there might be a disincentive in marginal cases to the housing authority leaving a relative in occupancy.
The Minister probably knows that the Greater London Council has already expressed its concern on this matter to his Department, and I understand the Council fully supports the terms of this Amendment. If subsection (5) of Clause 1 is amended by the addition of the words on the Marshalled List, the relative's right to protection from rent increases would be retained, but local authorities would be allowed some dis-
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cretion in deciding on the cases in which the protection would operate. I beg to move.
LORD KENNET: Let me first welcome the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, to the cockpit of Committee stages on Housing Bills. I hope that we shall hear more of him on this subject. The Housing Act 1957 gives a local authority very wide discretion in selecting tenants and no one has a legal entitlement to succeed to the tenancy of any particular council house. An authority could therefore readily decide that the wife or daughter of a former tenant, who was living with him in the house, was not entitled, on the death or departure of the former tenant, to go on living in the house. Under the Amendment the authority could, without reference to the Minister, increase the rent payable by the wife or daughter by any amount whatsoever as a condition of becoming a tenant of the house in which they were formerly living.
It is true that most authorities could be expected to exercise reasonably the discretion which the Amendment seeks to give them. But others might not exercise this discretion reasonably. They might, for example, decide that the wife or daughter of the former tenant ought to move into another dwelling—maybe a smaller one—and might therefore declare that she was not entitled to succeed to the tenancy of the dwelling in which she had been living. She would then no longer be protected by the Bill either if she became a tenant of her old house, because of the Amendment, or if she moved to another house, because under Clause 1(5), as drafted, a new tenancy in a different dwelling is exempt from the control in the Bill. This situation would be unfair, because she would have been as much a sitting tenant of the council as her husband or father, even though he happened to have signed the tenancy agreement. The whole object of the Bill is to protect sitting tenants from sharp rent increases—not, I would remind the Committee, from any rent increases; but from sharp ones.
The Amendment may be designed merely to deal with the case of the member of the tenant's family who moves into a council house a few days before the tenant leaves. The noble Lord did not mention this; but it is something

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often mentioned in housing legislation of this kind—for Instance, someone who moves in to nurse the dying former tenant and who then claims the right to live in the house as tenant at the same rent. But Clause 1(5) already specifies that the member of the tenant's family must have been residing with the tenant and the local authority would be entitled to distinguish between residence which implies a degree of permanency and of factual community and a visit. Local authorities are familiar with this distinction. I would say that my right honourable friend the Minister of Housing has no reason to suppose that they will not be able to continue exercising common sense about this distinction as they have under existing legislation if the Bill goes through as drafted. I hope that with this explanation the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, may be prepared to withdraw his Amendment.
LORD WINDLESHAM: That is an, extraordinary answer because there were two contradictory replies given. The first was that if local authorities are left with discretion to decide whether or not a relative has a moral claim to succeed they might not, in all cases, use this discretion wisely. Then, in the second part of the answer, concerning the interpretation of residence and length of stay, the Minister says that local authorities can be trusted to use their own judgment. I am sure that his second answer is a good one. These things have to be looked at in the circumstances which apply in each case; how long somebody may have been nursing a dying relative, or whatever other circumstances apply.
As the purpose of the Amendment is to give housing authorities some discretion to decide whether or not a wife or daughter should succeed (the wording of the Amendment is somebody who "was in the opinion of the local authority entitled to succeed to the tenancy") there will be an element of judgment. But that judgment will be used sensibly and responsibly. So it seems to me that the two legs of the noble Lord's answer contain an internal contradiction. I do not want to press this Amendment this evening.
VISCOUNT ADDISON: Will the noble Lord pardon this interruption? It seems to me that the noble Lord, Lord Kennet,
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made the point in the discretionary matter which was referred to by the noble Lord as the second part of the answer; that is, that it was only to deal with the odd local authority and not local authorities in general. I wonder whether the noble Lord followed that argument. That is how it seemed to me. Perhaps the noble Lord might be willing to make that clear.
LORD KENNET: There may have been apparent discrepancies in what I said, but if one observes the way these things have been going under existing legislation, I believe that the way I put it will in practice not be found discrepant to those who run these things.
LORD WINDLESHAM: I do not want to extend this discussion. As I mentioned, the Greater London Council does not share the noble Lord's view, and of course it has very wide and extensive experience in this field. Clearly, therefore, there is room for some difference of opinion. The matter has been aired and ventilated; and I and others interested in this point will want to look carefully at the terms of the noble Lord's reply. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 1 agreed to.
Remaining clauses agreed to.
Schedule [Phasing of rent increases]:
7.52 p.m.
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR moved Amendment No. 3:
Page 7, line 5, leave out ("two years") and insert (" one year").
The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 3. The Committee will probably perceive that Amendments Nos. 3 to 11 inclusive are all linked, and it may be convenient if we discuss them all in one debate. I apologise for the number of these Amendments and the complication of them, but it is really no more my fault than that of the Government. The Schedule is an exercise in the new mathematics; and whether the professional advisers will succeed in advising their clients as to what the whole of the Schedule means, I do not know. I have such respect for Parliamentary draftsmen that I must suppose that the Government's

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intentions could not have been set out more simply. But I think that the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, and I will probably be at one on this, at least; that the Schedule is a bit of a brain-teaser.
To come to the Amendments which I seek to incorporate in the Bill, these all deal with the subject of fair rents. As the Committee are aware, under the Rent Act 1965, which is now consolidated in the Rent Act 1968, fair rents are fixed for privately owned tenanted property by a rent officer. On appeal they may be finally determined by a rent assessment committee which is independent. Therefore, when a fair rent is fixed it must be presumed to be genuinely fair. At any rate, in terms of the Statute and Parliament's intentions it is a fair rent. The purpose of Part II of the Bill and this Schedule is to prolong the payment of unfair rents—I have no hesitation in saying that—because once a rent has been determined as a fair rent then, clearly, any other rent, either higher or lower, must be an unfair rent. This is my criticism in principle of Part II and the Schedule as a whole. I am seeking these Amendments to mitigate the unfairness.
On the general point that I have been making, I am backed by no less a body than the Committee of the Chartered Land Societies, headed by the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, a highly respectable body. I know that that Committee has told the Minister that it regards the fair rent system as the best machinery yet devised in the country to achieve an equitable basis of rent assessments; that much of the present housing problem is attributable to the artificial restrictions imposed by legislation since the war and that the Rent Act 1965 was a welcome move towards a system of fair rents for all. The Committee said that in this context the proposal in the Bill to defer the payment of the full fair rent could only be regarded as retrograde. That is what was said by myself and by the noble Lord, Lord Molson, and others, on the Second Reading of the Bill.
My Amendments do not seek to do more than mitigate the application of Part II and the Schedule and to reduce the period during which a rent remains unfair, Under the Bill, if I understand it right, if a fair rent is registered at some date in the year 1970, two years
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are to elapse before the tenant can be required to pay the full fair rent. If the fair rent is registered in 1971, one year is to elapse. These periodical provisions in the Schedule are, presumably, based on the assumption by the Government that if a rent goes up a whole year must elapse before the tenant can be asked to adjust himself to a further increase, even though the rent he is paying is, by an independent standard, less than fair.
The purpose of the nine Amendments in my name is to halve the periods in the Bill. They are based on the belief that where a tenant is paying less than the independently fixed fair rent of the house or flat in which he is living it is not unreasonable to expect him to adjust himself to upward steps at six-monthly intervals, instead of twelve-monthly intervals, as the Bill proposes, until the fair rent is reached, when of course the increases stop. I repeat that these Amendments are not designed to undermine and destroy Part II and the Schedule. They are based on the conviction that the fair rent stage should be reached as early as is reasonably possible once the rent has been determined to be a fair rent, and that it is not unreasonable for a tenant to be expected to adjust his arrangements to upward steps from the present rent to the full fair rent at intervals of six months. I beg to move.
LORD KENNET: As the Committee know, the object of Part II is to protect tenants of regulated tenancies against steep rises in their rent following the registration of the fair rent. Of all the registrations involving increases over the previous rent made in the first half of 1969, 52 per cent. were of more than £1 a week and 17 per cent. of more than £2 a week. The Government therefore consider that increases of this order registered in 1970 should be spread over two years by means of three annual instalments, subject to a minimum annual instalment of 7s. 6d. per week. The size and frequency of such instalments are certainly no less than is required to be consistent with the average increase to be allowed in one year without reference to the Minister for local authority rent increases under the Bill as drafted.
By making the phasing period basically six months per instalment, but leaving the size of each instalment unlimited, this

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Amendment would allow rent increases to be charged twice as quickly as is envisaged in the Bill. In the context both of the prices and incomes policy and of hardships that would be caused to tenants and their families, the Government consider that such increases would not be sufficiently spread out. We feel that the Bill as drafted holds the balance fairly between landlord and tenant. To introduce changes in the permitted rent level, with service of notices of increases, and so on, at six monthly intervals would be a departure from the pattern established by the Prices and Incomes (Regulated Rents) Regulations 1968 and by the Housing Act 1969, both of which were based on increases at annual intervals. It would be confusing to both landlords and tenants to introduce a different system in this Bill from that now operative under the Housing Act 1969. "Phasing" is complicated enough without having to have a different system, depending on whether one Act or another applies.
In conclusion, I would remind the Committee of the noble Lord's phrase that the purpose of Part II of the Bill is to prolong unfair rents. Since all legislation is designed to rectify something which is perceived by Parliament as an injustice, it seems to me to follow from what he has said that all transitional provisions are provisions which prolong injustice. I hope that with that explanation, especially about the 6-monthly phasing which I have given, the noble Lord will be content not to insist upon his Amendment.
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR: The inference from the noble Lord's ingenious final argument is that he would have been better pleased with me if I had suggested that there should be no phasing at all and that all increases should come into effect at once. He should thank me for my moderation.
LORD KENNET: If that is what the noble Lord had wanted, no doubt that is what the noble Lord would have moved.
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR: I can certainly say that it would have taken me much less time to draft an Amendment of that kind than to find my way all through that arithmetic. I am relieved that at
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least I have not been told that I have got my arithmetic wrong.
What the noble Lord's speech amounts to is that there is a difference of judgment. The Government think it is not possible for people to adjust themselves to higher rents except at 12-monthly intervals. I do not believe that this is so. I believe that people should be prepared to adjust themselves at 6-monthly intervals in cases where the ultimate rents have been fixed as fair by an independent authority. The noble Lord's argument, based on existing Regulations, seems to me to be a thin one, because I am sure that I am right in saying that these Regulations are going to lapse on December 31 and we must be prepared to have a change some time. I would agree that there was more substance in the noble Lord's point that there would seem to be some conflict between the Schedule with my Amendments in it and the Housing Act 1969. I do not myself think that that is sufficient reason for rejecting my proposal.
The only consideration which leads me not to seek to divide the House is that I am aware of the pressure of time and I am in an especially reasonable mood this evening (as I have already shown in my comments on the noble Lord's speech) and what he has said gives me no hope that if we send this Bill back to another place on this one point, wiser thoughts would prevail there. Those are the circumstances in which I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Schedule agreed to.
House resumed: Bill reported without amendment.
Then, Standing Order No. 41 having been suspended (pursuant to the Resolution of December 4), Bill read 3a and passed.

EUROPEAN SECURITY: PROPOSED CONFERENCE
8.6 p.m.
LORD BROCKWAY LORD BROCKWAY rose to ask Her Majesty's Government: What decisions have been reached regarding the proposal to hold a conference to further European Security. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg leave to

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ask the Unstarred Question in my name on the Order Paper. I regret that it should be at what is a late hour for this House that this important issue is being discussed tonight. I will say only that I gave notice of it many days ago and that I postponed the discussion in order that my noble friend Lord Chalfont might be here. I appreciate the fact that he is in New York on urgent business but, without disrespect to my noble friend Lord Shepherd, I regret that the Chief Whip's Office have made arrangements by which this important debate should be taken so late and that the Minister mainly responsible is unable to be here to participate in it.
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, I think that it ought to be made clear that the Whip's Office have made no arrangements at all. If other noble Lords tend to speak longer on other subjects than was anticipated, I am afraid that we have no control over that.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I am not going to respond to that, except to say that I think it deplorable that an issue of this great importance, of which long notice was given, should be arranged at a time when there is a small attendance and when those of us who have been in the House since half past two this afternoon are a little tired when approaching the subject. Despite the late hour, and despite the circumstances, I propose to deliver the speech which I have prepared because, fortunately, even if the arrangements in this House are such that after due notice an important debate of this kind cannot be discussed in the presence of a sufficient number of Members, debates in this House are reported in other countries and will have some influence on decisions which are reached.
I appreciate the fact that when we are discussing the proposal for a European Security Conference it cannot be seriously considered in a political vacuum. It was first proposed at a conference of the Soviet Union and Communist countries at Bucharest in 1966. I think then it was a propaganda enterprise. Now it has become a practical issue. For two reasons, the situation is now favourable to a European Security Conference. The first reason is the new climate which is in Europe itself. Since the Second World
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War Germany has been the critical and dangerous sphere. Western Germany has now changed from being a menace to peace to being a hope for peace in Europe. This is largely due to the fact that the last elections in Western Germany returned a Social Democratic and Liberal Coalition Government, and that it is under the leadership of Herr Willi Brandt. I may say that I have been an associate of Herr Willi Brandt ever since the days of the Spanish Civil War, when both of us opposed not only Fascism in that country, but also the tyranny of the Stalinists. Since then, I have on many occasions been able to retain my association with him. I regard him at this moment as the greatest statesman in Europe and the greatest hope for the peace of our Continent.
When I say that the change in the climate in Europe is largely due to the new Government in Western Germany, I have these facts in mind. First, to-day there are conversations in Moscow between representatives of West Germany and of the Soviet Union to renounce force in their future relations. This is an historical occasion which may mean for Europe more than we immediately recognise. Secondly, the new West German Government has had similar discussions with other Eastern European countries and is building up an association with them. Thirdly, that Government is having discussions with the Government of Poland regarding the borders of their two territories. Fourthly, it has given de facto recognition to the State of East Germany. Fifthly, West Germany has now signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. That these great changes should have taken place in a few weeks means a change in the whole climate of the sphere which was most critically dangerous in Europe. When we add to those contributions which the West German Government has made the fact that talks are now to take place between the United States, France and the United Kingdom with the Soviet Union about Berlin, it indicates the extraordinary developments that have occurred.
I appreciate that even changes in Germany and in Europe would be of little significance unless there was a background of international reconciliation between East and West. But here, too, we may take hope. There

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are the talks about strategic weapons between the United States of America and the Soviet Union in Moscow, which appear to have begun well. There are the four-Power talks on the Middle East, about which I am sorry to say one cannot immediately be so optimistic. There is the fact that both the United States of America and the Soviet Union have encouraged the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty on Nuclear Power. Then there is the consideration at the Geneva Disarmament Conference both of the limitation of modern weapons on the seabed and in relation to biological and chemical warfare. I recognise that there are factors on the other side, but I do not propose to mention them, because I do not want to be controversial in this speech. To sum up on this first point, a climate has now been created for an historic advance to peace in Europe.
The second reason why the situation has changed from propaganda to practicality is this. In the case of the Soviet Union and its allies there is now a far more conciliatory tone and a realism of what can be achieved. I have a vast file on this subject, and I have taken the trouble over the weekend to read the declarations of the series of conferences which the Soviet Union and its Communist allies have held, beginning with Bucharest in 1966, Karlovy Vary in Czechoslovakia in 1967, and during this year at Budapest in March, Prague in October, and Moscow as late as last Thursday. A study of these documents shows two very significant developments. First they are more conciliatory in tone. At the Bucharest Conference in 1966 a declaration was issued making a polemical attack on the United States of America, on NATO and on West Germany. There is a complete absence of that tone in the last declaration which has been issued from the conferences held this year. This significant change in approach has been recognised by Herr Willi Brandt and others.
But, secondly, there is the more realistic approach. At Bucharest, and at the earlier conferences, it was suggested that the conference should deal with the recognition of Eastern Germany, the border line between Poland and Ger-
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many, the dissolution of both NATO and the Warsaw Military Alliance in favour of a security pact. At the conference at Prague in October, reaffirmed by last Thursday's conference at Moscow, only two proposals are now made for the agenda. The first is an agreement on renunciation of force by both sides and by all European Governments; and, second, a discussion on economic and scientific co-operation between the Soviet Union, the Communist countries, the West and the neutral nations. The very practical proposal is made that if anything further is proposed for the agenda of the conference it should be made through diplomatic channels.
As a consequence of this more conciliatory tone by the Communist countries, and by their realism, there has been an extraordinary support in Europe for the Security Conference. There was the first meeting of the Western European Union, its Ministerial Conference at The Hague in June, where it discussed this proposal in detail. At the end of it Dr. Luns, the Foreign Secretary of the Netherlands, who was chairman of the Conference, stated that a European Security Conference might well come about during the latter part of next year. Secondly, there was the meeting of NATO at Brussels, only last Thursday. I think I am fair in summing up the reports of its proceedings by saying that it was receptive to the idea of a European Security Conference. It insisted on careful preparations and the prospect of concrete results. It had reservations and proposals for the agenda and (I will refer to this later) insisted upon the presence of the United States of America and Canada.
Thirdly, we have had this quite extra-ordinary event in European affairs, the initiative by President Kekkonen, of Finland. He has suggested that the European Conference should be held at Helenski and he has toured both the Communist countries, the countries of Europe and the countries of North America to invite them to attend. The response to this initiative has been quite overwhelming. We not only have the earlier declaration by Willi Brandt, the head of the West German Government, of positive support for the proposals; we now have support from Canada and from

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21 European nations, including Italy, The Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Switzerland and the Vatican. The support of the Vatican is especially significant, because it influences the Christian Democratic parties in Europe. Yesterday the Christian Democratic Party in Western Germany modified its attitude towards this proposal as a result of what the Vatican has decided.
There are three controversial points which have to be settled if the European Security Conference is to meet. The first is the question as to whether the United States of America and Canada, as members of NATO, should be invited. The Western' European Union, NATO and President Kikkonen of Finland, have urged that they should. The Soviet Union has now responded by saying that it accepts the presence of representatives of the U.S.A. and Canada at the convening conference, when the procedures shall be decided. It has asked on its side that representatives of East Germany shall be present, and West Germany has now accepted this proposal. Therefore, on this issue of the representation of the conference, there is less danger of disagreement.
The second point of controversy was raised by the American Secretary of State, Mr. William Rogers, in a statement reported yesterday. He said that America would not join any European East/West Security Conference that recognised Moscow's doctrine of limited sovereignty in the Soviet bloc. I might rather mischievously remind Mr. William Rogers that there is a place called South America. I will refrain from developing that point. I hope, however, that no one will assume that presence at the conference implies recognition of the Soviet invasion and domination of Czechoslovakia. But can there be any doubt that a lessening of the confrontation in Europe would give a greater opportunity for those who claim democratic rights in Czechoslovakia and stand for liberty of thought and expression? It is in circumstances of insecurity that authoritarianism thrives.
There is a third point of controversy regarding the proposed Conference. France, on the Western side, and Roumania on the Communist side, have objected to agreements between blocs, and both have urged that it would be better
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that bilateral discussions should take place. I hope that bilateral discussions will take place. Those which are now taking place between Western Germany, Poland and the Soviet Union, and between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., will all prepare the atmosphere for a successful European Conference. But there will be overall issues for Europe which cannot be settled by bilateral discussions and which should be subject to an All-European Conference.
The fundamental issue now is of the sponsorship of the Conference. It has so far been assumed that it would be by NATO and the Warsaw Military Alliance. I want to suggest, for two reasons, that a European Security Conference cannot be left only to NATO and the Warsaw Military Alliance. The first reason is that this Conference will be attended by neutral nations which are not members either of NATO or of the Warsaw Pact. Herr Brandt, in an interview which appeared in our Tribune of August 1, used these words:
"We start from the assumption that, in addition to the members of NATO (including America and Canada) and of the Warsaw Pact, the Conference would also be attended by the neutral and non-aligned European countries."
The list of those countries which I have already given shows how the neutral and non-aligned countries would be prepared to co-operate. Secondly, this Conference cannot be left to NATO and the Warsaw Military Alliance, because it will discuss political issues as well as military issues. The Times of Saturday last said:
"NATO would not be a suitable body for talks on European security and détente."
I want to conclude with suggestions of a constructive kind to resolve these points of dispute. First, I hope that diplomatic exchanges will proceed regarding the agenda of a Conference. The West as well as the East have put forward many proposals. In fact, the subjects are similar, although the conclusions are different—Berlin, access to Berlin, East Germany. I hope that they may all be included upon the agenda. But there is one important omission in the proposals made from the East but which is included in the proposals made from the West. It is that there should be discussion of a mutual reduction of the forces on both sides. I regard this as the most

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important issue which should be discussed. Psychologically, if East and West decided mutually to reduce their forces, the effect would be greater than anything else, and it would be an indication of serious purpose. I hope that the West will continue to press for the inclusion of this item upon the agenda of the Conference.
I suggest that the diplomatic exchanges regarding the agenda of the Conference should be followed by calling a meeting of representatives of all the accepting Governments. I do not suggest that all these complicated issues can be discussed at one conference. I should hope that at the first Conference there would be an agreement on the broad objectives of seeking peace in Europe, and a declaration of the renunciation of force in settling all problems. I would suggest that at that first Conference future proceedings might also be arranged, perhaps by working parties reporting to the Conference on particular issues.
On the question of the presence of the United States of America and Canada, they would not be directly interested in all the problems which would arise—for example, on economic co-ordination and cultural relations. They would, however, be interested as members of NATO in the military problems. Therefore, thirdly, I would suggest that there should be a reference of military matters to NATO and to the Warsaw Military Alliance acting as a working party to the fuller conference. The Times has remarked that NATO is the right body to talk about troop reductions, even if it is not the right body to speak about security and détente.
My Lords, I do not know whether I ought to apologise for making this detailed speech on this important subject. I hope the suggestions which I have made will be considered, not only by Her Majesty's Government but in other spheres which a speech in this House will reach. I want to conclude by saying this. Fifteen years ago there was a great hope in Europe, a great hope in the world. We had the Geneva Conference. Everyone spoke of the "spirit of Geneva" as meaning the opportunity for peace in the world. That peace was destroyed by the intensified conflict between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.,
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and particularly by the Vietnam war. I believe that we now have an opportunity to recover the spirit of Geneva of fifteen years ago—it may be called "the Helenski spirit".
There are very big difficulties in trying to solve the problems of Europe which I have tried to describe, but we should have in mind a determination to overcome these difficulties because of the incomparable aim of peace which is the object. We must not allow this opportunity to pass, and if this opportunity is seized we must not allow what destroyed the Geneva spirit to destroy the Helenski spirit. My hope is that if the Conference meets it may, with expanding agreement, progress to justifying the name of European security by ending the division of Europe into opposing military blocs and replace NATO and the Warsaw alliance by a comprehensive Pact of peace. I believe that this is now within our reach. I beg our Government to take every possible action to further its realisation.
8.41 p.m.
LORD ST. OSWALD: My Lords, I join the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, in regretting the lateness of this debate and the emptiness of the House, but it has had the effect of considerably reducing my speech, and thereby perhaps reducing its weight and force. It seems to me fairly appropriate as a day for this Motion set down by the noble Lord. There are factors inside and outside the field of military defence which make it so. Factors and opportunities, however, we have to recall, have often seemed fortuitous in the past, yet we can think of many saddening occasions and setbacks.
At the Summit Conference in Geneva in 1955, to which the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, referred in his closing words, President Eisenhower began his speech on behalf of his country, and also on behalf of civilised mankind, with these words:
"We are here for a simple purpose: to find a basis for accommodation which will make life safer and happier, not only for the nations we represent but for people elsewhere."
It is that same endeavour which I am sure, the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, has in mind to-day, in his own diligent and indefatigable efforts on behalf of all

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those who suffer in many ways and in many parts of the world. It is a simple purpose, as President Eisenhower said, because it is a natural purpose. But I doubt whether anyone can claim that we are closer to its achievement than on that date fourteen years ago.
It has not been the fault or the failing of the Western democracies that the credibility in success has withered rather than flourished in the meantime. That particular Summit was killed as much as anything by Marshal Bulganin's stern rejection of any raising of the question of the Central and Eastern European countries. Earlier he had praised the idea of a European security system, but when this point of the Eastern European countries was raised he called it "interference in the internal affairs of those countries". My Lords, we have lately seen how tenderly Russia respects the internal affairs of those countries; how free of interference she is prepared to leave them.
Now, as the noble Lord has reminded us, we have a new proposal from the Russians for a European Security Conference. The NATO Council had an opportunity in Brussels last week, on Thursday and Friday, to study that proposal, and they have responded cautiously. I think that caution was wise. It was described thus in the statement of the Foreign Ministers after the final meeting. They affirmed that the fundamental problem of Europe could be solved "only on the basis of sovereign equality, political independence, territorial integrity of the States, the right of each people to forge their own future, peaceful settlement of differences, non-interference in the internal affairs of one State by another, regardless of their political and social systems, and renunciation of the use of force".
There could scarcely be a clearer catalogue of conditions which Soviet Russia has savagely breached in the immediate or recent past. There was something inauspicious, to me even sickening, in the choice of localities from which these Soviet proposals officially came. The revived idea of a general Conference on European Security was first floated, for the world to observe, on March 17 in Budapest. That meeting lasted only two hours. The proposals were actually issued from a subsequent Warsaw Pact meeting held in Prague. There were the two
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capitals of two countries whose attempts at winning sovereign equality, political independence and the right of a people to forge its own future had been crushed by tanks and troops and war planes, invading upon the orders of Moscow, in one case only seven months before the Budapest meeting.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, may I just interrupt the noble Lord for one moment? Does he forget that the chairman of the first Conference which made this proposal was Mr. Dubcek, of Czechoslovakia?
LORD ST. OSWALD: And does the noble Lord know where Mr. Dubcek is now?
LORD BROCKWAY: I do.
LORD MILFORD: My Lords, is the noble Lord leaving out American interference in Vietnam, in Cuba, in South America and in the Far East?
LORD ST. OSWALD: I am sorry, but if the noble Lord really equates all those then he is speaking with considerable prejudice.
My Lords, they were the capitals of two peoples against whom the Soviet Union, so far from seeking a peaceful settlement of differences, so far from adhering to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of one State by another, so far from renouncing the use of force, had rejected peaceful settlement, had interfered with crushing and overwhelming force in the internal affairs of another State. To complete the irony, they were also countries whose territorial integrity had been plundered after the war by Soviet arms.
There is small wonder in my mind that the NATO Ministers, in their statement on Friday night, from which I have already quoted, should have concluded that conditions were not yet right for real and lasting improvement in East/West relations. Having said that, I also think it was proper for the British Foreign Secretary to suggest to the meeting, as he did, that NATO diplomats should study whether a general European conference would be the best way of dealing with Europe's future, and report to the next meeting in Rome in May of next year. I am glad that his colleagues accepted Mr. Stewart's suggestion, and I agree with his reported statement that

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such a Conference would have to be at the appropriate time, with the appropriate agenda and appropriate participation.
It has to be the duty of every Western leader to press on in the search for possible, tenable solutions to the slow agony in which Europe finds herself to-day, to the undoubted danger of world peace. My right honourable friend, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, when he was Foreign Secretary, and later Prime Minister, sought areas, however small, of possible agreement, due to mutual advantage, with the Communist powers. That was right then. It must be right now. Almost all the Ministers at last week's NATO Council Meeting stressed again the importance of proposals put forward earlier by NATO, of a possible balanced, mutual reduction of forces in Eastern and Western Europe. The invitation to study such proposals was put forward by NATO in June of last year and repeated in April of this year. So far as I know, there has been no response from the Warsaw Pact Government. In the face of this indifference, NATO is pursuing the task it set itself in the April meeting, to draw up and examine a list of items which might be profitably negotiable between East and West. This list of 26 items, as I understand, was to be examined last week. I have seen nothing very specific about its discussion, and I wonder whether the noble Lord who is to wind up this debate could say some-thing about some of those items.
My Lords, I am not so sanguine as the noble Lord, Lord Brockway. The record of Soviet Russia in Europe does not encourage me. It seems to me it could well be that the true purpose of this proposed Security Conference may be another step in the Soviet effort to split the United States of America from her European partners, and to split off West Germany from the rest of the Treaty Organisation. Success in either of these intentions would leave Europe debilitated, and largely submissive even to the threat of Soviet attack. As General Lemnitzer, that thoughtful and experienced strategist has said,
"We do not know what the Soviet leaders have in mind. Perhaps they themselves do not know what they intend, in the near or distant future. Intentions can and do change over
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night. It takes years to develop and refine military capabilities."
The Soviet armies, as they stand to-day, have the capability for further moves, without serious redress. Yet there are always people, good hearted people as often as not, who would prefer to ignore those capabilities and their implications. A kind of euphoria settles over the Free World at the very mention of détente, without any clear appreciation of why that mention may have been made at that particular time. Even if talks were to begin now, or at some future date, on balanced reductions of forces, there would have to be considerable thought as to how an initial balance, a valid starting point, was to be obtained; and here is a factor that is often ignored.
Apart from the major and overwhelming crime of crushing a fine nation, the invasion of Czechoslovakia gave Soviet Russia a military advantage which she did not possess when these proposals were first visualised at the NATO meeting in June of last year. I will name some of the advantages outlined by General Lemnitzer. Soviet divisions are in Czechoslovakia, on the borders of NATO, a position they have not occupied since 1945. This deployment, superbly carried out in military terms, has placed large and immediately responsive forces further to the West than at any time in recent years. An extensive mobilisation of men, communications and transport has been marshalled to sustain forward deployed forces. Those forward divisions are there in strength, at a high state of readiness, sustained by continuous practical exercises. These are facts and not phantoms. The military balance in Europe has been, and remains, very significantly altered to our disadvantage.
So I would say, in the light of this, for every reason, human, political and military, that I hope a prerequisite of talks on troop reductions would be a complete withdrawal of Soviet forces from the soil of Czechoslovakia. That was, your Lordships will recall, the demand made by both Houses in this Parliament, by speaker after speaker, when we were very properly recalled in August of last year. There has been no sign or hint of such movement by the Russian occupying forces. Instead, their presence has been used to inflict further and further humiliation on the people

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they invaded. Last week it was learned that 400 journalists had been dismissed from their jobs on Government orders, including 30 editors. The International Federation of Journalists passed a strong resolution condemning this persecution. But the Russians dare not permit the circulation of truth in the countries they have conquered, or in their own. Earlier of course we have seen, more dramatically, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Hejek, dismissed, the Minister for the Interior, General Pavel, arrested and dismissed, the Economic Overlord, the brilliant Otto Sik, dismissed; and we have seen the heroic secretary of the Party itself, Mr. Dubcek, dismissed and humiliated.
It may be argued that these are not strictly matters of military security. But they are part of a wider aspect of security and they concern the need for security and caution. If that is the way that Soviet Russia treats her own allies, who pledge themselves to the Communist cause, what sort of treatment could we look for for the despised bourgeois democracies if we went too trustingly to the conference table? Negotiators from the West would have to ask themselves, I believe, whether if a Security Pact such as the noble Lord visualises, and such as I would welcome, were signed, it would be treated with any more reverence than was given to Czechoslovakia as a signatory of the Warsaw Pact Agreement.
That leads to another reason for approaching the Soviet proposals with consummate prudence. It was Lenin's dictum that any deceit was permissible in dealing with the bourgeois enemy. His successors and disciples have observed that dictum most faithfully in all political dealings, not simply outside but even inside their own sphere of influence. Last week I listened for two hours in London to Anatol Kuznetsov, the young writer and poet, lionised and privileged in Moscow, who defected and abandoned it all because, as he said, "I could no longer write, no longer sleep, no longer breathe". In that room in Kensington he described how the total deceit of life in Moscow had stifled him; that deceit which everyone in official or semi-official position was forced to promote, to which all were victims.
With controlled passion he declared, "Nobody dares to tell the truth to any-
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one else in Russia, unless they are close relatives or friends from childhood; and seldom even in those cases". When the question was put to him, on my behalf, what had been the reaction of the Russian public to the news of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, he replied that the people had been told that Soviet forces had gone in to ward off an invasion from Western Germany. if the leaders of the Russian nation cannot trust or be trusted by their own people, what sort of negotiations would they conduct with an organisation they are intent to undermine, dismember or destroy?
This morning, only a few hours ago, I spoke at some length to Petr Vodrazka, the Czech youth who last Thursday knowingly risked his life to smuggle himself out of Prague to London by stowing away in the freezing baggage hold of an airliner. He had taken into account the discomfort and the risk, but he found that he could no longer live in the climate of falseness and injustice which exists in Czechoslovakia since the invasion of his country.
As an example of the way in which lies are used at the highest level to support policy, there can be nothing more apposite than the speech of Mr. Malik to the Security Council on August 21 of last year, when he blandly declared:
"The armed units of the Socialist countries as is well known, entered the territory of the Czechoslovak Republic on the basis of the request of the Government of that State, which had applied to the allied Governments for assistance including assistance with armed force."
My Lords, anybody who could believe that could believe anything. But this is the official pretence still maintained within the country itself. The present rulers have even gone to the extent of compiling a so-called "White Book" of spurious documents to support this fiction. Fortunately, there also exists, smuggled out of Czechoslovakia, a batch of the true documents, bound into what is I suppose mockingly entitled the "Black Book". I have here the English translation. It makes painful reading as one follows the extinction, amid courageous protests, of Czechoslovakia's endeavour to attain liberty even within the Communist world. To-day many of those whose utterances are recorded in this book have been obliged to swear that

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they said no such thing and to swear approval of the Soviet invasion. It is a strange kind of morality to bring into international dealings.
Yet dialogue there has to be. It cannot be easy. I do not envy anyone engaged in it. The very survival of our civilisation may depend on the good faith of all the negotiating Governments. Good faith is, unhappily, an element which Communist Governments, or at least Soviet Governments, have by calculation all too often eschewed in the conduct and promotion of policies. But in these days, when a great effort is being made to bring Europe together in one partnership, we cannot suffer that some of the noblest and finest nations in Europe's evolution should be excluded from the Europe to which they belong as rightly as do we ourselves. If their inclusion is one day to be accomplished, it is with the Russians that we have to talk. We must talk watchfully, though not furtively, with our eyes on a happier horizon, on a day when all nations may contribute freely and valuably to peace and advancement. That is my goal. It is I know also the goal of the noble Lord, Lord Brockway.
9.0 p.m.
VISCOUNT HOOD: My Lords, like the rest of your Lordships who have persevered and stayed here so late, I was deeply impressed by the sincerity with which the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, spoke. I was a member of the British Delegation at the Conference in Geneva in 1954, and it is precisely because I share his disappointment at the outcome that I should like, before embarking on another conference, to have some assurance, or at any rate reasonable hope, that it will achieve positive and worth-while results.
The first test, I suggest, is this question of American participation. I do not see how new arrangements for security in Europe can be sensibly discussed or agreed in the absence of the United States, who are so active and so major a participant in the present arrangements. If the Russians were to continue to make difficulties about United States participation, I should take that as a sure sign that they were not taking the Conference seriously and that they regarded it simply as a device to sow dissension among the West. As the noble Lord said, the recent
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pronouncements from Warsaw have only been silent on this point, but at any rate I had entertained reasonable hope that this meant that if the West stood firm for the inclusion of the United States and Canada in any conference, this would not meet with objections from the other side.
I submit that the second test is whether the Conference will be able to discuss what I believe to be the real causes of insecurity in Europe, and notably what I regard as the unnatural features of the situation in Germany. The first unnatural feature is the line running first along the Elbe and then southward, which divides Germany and Europe. That line was drawn for purely administrative convenience during an exceptional and what was thought to be a purely temporary period of military occupation. It was never intended to be an international frontier, and the efforts to make it such are responsible for many of the strains and stresses in Europe to-day. One of them—and this is what I regard as the second unnatural feature in Germany—is the position of Berlin, an essentially western city situated 100 miles to the East of the dividing line, and itself divided by the Wall. These are the problems which need to be resolved, or at least eased, if European security is really to be furthered.
The Western Powers have on a number of occasions made proposals for resolving those problems. There have been two constant themes; the first, in accordance with the principle of self-determination to which we all subscribed in the United Nations Charter, is that the Germans in both parts of Germany should have the opportunity to express their views freely on the future of their country. The second constant theme has been that this process of reunification—because we in the West believe that that would be the outcome of a free German vote—should be accompanied by new arrangements for European security, political and military. These Western proposals offer a comprehensive solution, but I am sure it is not the intention of the Western Powers to make the best the enemy of the good. If it is still impossible to talk with the Russians about a comprehensive plan for reunification, there are still grounds for useful talks: talks about ways of bringing the two parts of Germany closer together, ways of improving the situation in and around

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Berlin. These essentially are problems of the access to and from and within that city. Moves are already on foot, as the noble Lord said, to explore these possibilities, and I hope very much that the Eastern response will be positive.
Other topics for discussion at a conference are the military measures which I mentioned. Those range over a wide selection of arms control and disarmament measures to be applied in Europe, or in parts of Europe. Many of those ideas will, or may, run up against the obstacles which are all too familiar to those who followed disarmament discussions in Geneva or New York, and notably the problem of verification. But even if that continues to block the more ambitious plans for reduction of forces or armaments in Central Europe, it may still be possible to reach agreement on measures which are capable of being verified nationally—and by that I mean about systems at the disposal of either the West or the East—without the need for on-site inspections, or measures which do not call for verification at all in the sense that they are less measures for arms control and more measures for building mutual confidence, exchange of information, exchange of observers, and so on. This field, I understand, is now being studied by a group in NATO, and until they have come up with specific recommendations—and one knows what the likely Eastern reaction to that is—it is too soon to say whether these will produce worthwhile results.
I should like to take a brief look at the proposals of the Warsaw Pact to which the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, referred. The first was a declaration renouncing the use of force. My Lords, we have all done that in the United Nations Charter, and some of us did it again in the North Atlantic Treaty; and Germany, because she is not a member of the United Nations, made a special declaration to this effect in 1954. Repetition seems to me only to depreciate the value of the assurance. If such a declaration were part of a wider package which included agreements of substance, that would be one thing. But by itself such a declaration seems to me a pretty puny infant, not worthy of having a conference convened for it.
The second subject mentioned was economic, technical, scientific and cul-
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tural co-operation. My Lords, the British Government and other NATO Governments have been striving for some time precisely to develop such co-operation with the countries of Eastern Europe, and they have done so with some success. There are trade agreements and there have been technical exchanges. I was reading only over the weekend of Polish art treasures coming here for exhibition at Burlington House. Certainly it would be nice to have freer exchanges of people and ideas as well as trade; but would a conference really help to do that? A declaration would not get us much further; and if a conference attempted to deal with the practical problems involved in developing such co-operation and attempted to put this into a multilateral agreement to which all would subscribe, I believe the result would fall far short of what has been and what may in future be achieved bilaterally.
This brings me to my final point. When this Conference takes place it is bound to be preceded by a great concerting of policies within NATO covering all the issues likely to come up at the Conference. Exactly the same process will take place among the countries in the Warsaw Pact, and possibly even among the neutrals, if they aspire to operate at the Conference as a group. The Western Powers, I suspect, will still, within their unity, display a measure of diversity when they get to the Conference, but the Soviet Union will insist on their allies speaking with one voice, or in very well orchestrated harmony. Indeed, the opportunity to enforce discipline may be, in the eyes of the Soviet Union, one of the great attractions of this Conference. In order to arrive at common positions there will be a tendency on each side to revert to traditional and fixed positions, and we may thus forfeit the opportunities which seem to be opening up for developing closer relations bilaterally between individual States of Western and Eastern Europe. This may be a price worth paying if we are confident that the Conference would produce worth-while results, but it points to not rushing into a conference simply for the sake of having one.
9.6 p.m.
LORD MILFORD: My Lords, I, too, am sorry that Lord Chalfont is not here

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to-night, because a few weeks back, when we had a Defence Debate in your Lordships' House, Lord Chalfont presented a picture which I thought showed tremendous hope and really was constructive about what could be done in the near future now that the whole situation in the world has changed. Since that speech I have been disappointed in the way that Her Majesty's Government have not followed up the enthusiasm which Lord Chalfont seemed to express in this House. but have been dragging their feet on the whole, wonderful vista which is now on the horizon if we take our chance to work in it. Since the Second World War we have lived through tremendously dangerous moments. We have had the vicious cold war, nearly breaking into hot war; and we have had the ghastly invention of more and more weapons. I must say here that I have never heard a stronger or more vicious cold war speech than I have just heard from Lord St. Oswald; and I am very glad that that speech is going down on the record to show the people of Britain what the Tory Party stand for if they get into power.
Some years ago the Rapacki Plan was put forward by Poland for nuclear-free zones in the centre of Europe, and Mr. Gaitskell and Mr. Wilson, in Opposition in those days, welcomed that Plan very strongly. To-day even bigger proposals have been put forward to bring security to Europe. The Gaitskell-Wilson Party is now in power, but it does not seem to be coming forward to grasp the nettle and carry forward this security idea wholeheartedly. All over Europe to-day and in the European Press in these last two days the description of our Foreign Office is that of a sort of grey ghost at a feast, pulling things back, with no enthusiasm, no imagination at all, on this vital question of peace. Our Press is focusing all its doubts and innuendoes on the Soviet Union: "Are they serious?" "Is it a trap?" "Is it merely propaganda?".
Success for such a wonderful possibility for a European security pact depends on the attitude of both sides—we on this side, the NATO side, the West European side, and the Eastern side. I put this attitude as one of the biggest
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priorities for to-day. The noble Lord, Lord Brockway, put forward priorities with which I thoroughly agree; but I think that what is of vital importance, if we are to get forward at all, is the attitude of people in this country and of our Government: do we want a security pact or do we not? If suspicion (in speeches like that just made by the noble Lord, Lord St. Oswald), is what Britain stands for, we shall not get anywhere at all.
LORD ST. OSWALD: My Lords, I wish that the noble Lord would put more precisely what he thinks I stand for instead of making these vague generalisations.
LORD MILFORD: My Lords, we this evening should concentrate on Britain. The people of Britain are sick of suspicion, of arms bills, of nuclear bombs, of more and more chemical warfare talk and all that. They want peace; they want security; they want the arms bill cut down so that there is more money for social services. But this, apparently—I may be wrong—is not right in the forefront of the Foreign Office, or of the picture that the Foreign Office is giving. Cannot the Foreign Office be a little more imaginative and give out a better image of themselves? Can they not produce an atmosphere more free from smog, pollution and poison and go for careful preparation on questions on which agreement is possible?
While the possibility of a conference on European security is in the air, why must our Defence Minister go on talking about tactical nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons for first strike, more troops for Germany and so on? It does not help this vitally important position we are now in. Only a few years ago the Defence Minister himself was saying that if nuclear arms are used this island will be completely destroyed.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, dealt with the history of these proposals for a security pact and how in 1966 the Scandinavians supported it. Three members of NATO supported it, Denmark, Iceland and Norway, and Finland offered itself as host. There have been 23 acceptances and only Albania has refused; Italy, a NATO country, is very interested indeed and Yugoslavia, a neutral, is also interested.

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So what are the Warsaw proposals? They say absolutely clearly that the conference should be prepared by preliminary discussions of all States—I repeat "preliminary discussions". So far as I can see, we are even dragging our feet on that. They suggest a preliminary meeting as early as possible of all interested European States to establish, by mutual agreement, procedures for calling a Conference—I repeat "procedures" for calling a Conference.
When this was received with a cool, dubious attitude by the West they then, in October, offered talks first in the form of bilateral or multilateral consultations. Is this not really the voice of somebody who wants to try to get a Conference and wants to try to get forward to some security? The Warsaw Pact countries themselves suggested two items on the agenda: ensuring European security and the renunciation of the use of threats by force, and the extension of trade, economic, scientific and technological relations. That was their suggestion. Cannot we start a conference? Why not go forward on what we can agree? Surely we could agree to talk about these things instead of cold-shouldering them. If you get round a table you are far more likely to arrive at an understanding and a real desire to get to grips with things than by shooting away verbally at one another when you are thousands of miles apart.
In passing, my Lords, I would say that it is odd that none of the British capitalist Press printed the text of the March or the October communiqués of the Warsaw Pact. I wonder why they did not. To-day the British Press picture the British Government as less enthusiastic than the others of the West and as more wary and suspicious than the others, and particularly claim that Britain applied the brakes in NATO. The great thing that our Foreign Secretary seems to go on saying is that the agenda must be carefully prepared. But the Warsaw Pact countries also say that, and they ask us to come together to discuss that agenda and to prepare it together. Somehow the Foreign Office seem determined to drag things on or to "shoot down" the conference. For some reason, they seem to fear it like the plague. The Secretary of State goes on talking about more nuclear tactical weapons and first
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nuclear strike in Europe, and that kind of thing.
The British people want this Pact. If you went to the country to-morrow and asked, "Pact or no Pact?" you would find that they want it. They want peace, and they see this as a new, wonderful hope on the horizon: the possibility of getting rid of the present military obligations; or even their increase as is now being suggested, with the proposal that we should have more troops in Germany. They are sick of all this military expenditure which only brings on more and more financial crises and which means cutting down on the social services. "For heaven's sake!", they say, "stop this idea of first nuclear strike which means the total destruction of Britain". The working people are told that wages must be held down and the squeeze continued. Our Defence Ministers pour more and more money down the drain over more and more troops and weapons for Europe and Germany.
9.19 p.m.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, although the hour is late I have found this an interesting debate. I listened to the noble Lord, Lord Milford, with his known views and support for the Soviet Union and the Communist Party, and the calm, cautious words of the noble Viscount, Lord Hood, who spoke after many years of service in the Foreign Office, and then the forthright words of the noble Lord, Lord St. Oswald. I am not quite certain whether the noble Lord, Lord St. Oswald. was speaking for his Party or for himself, but I will attribute his views to him so that he will not be in difficulties with his Party tomorrow.
LORD ST. OSWALD: My Lords, I hope that the noble Lord did not find me vicious.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I never find the noble Lord, Lord St. Oswald, vicious. Sometimes I think he may be off-beam, but never vicious.
We have had the speech of my noble friend, Lord Brockway, which had a great deal of historical content in it, with most of which I would agree although there were certain aspects with which I would disagree. I thought that my noble friend Lord Brockway was less than fair to my

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noble friend the Chief Whip. I know that this is an important debate and that it is a matter to which Lord Brockway attaches very considerable importance. I must say that there is no one who has used this House for the interests which he has at heart more than my noble friend Lord Brockway. He asks perhaps more Starred Questions than any other noble Lord and certainly he asks more Unstarred Questions than any other noble Lord. On this occasion, when the hour is late and the Benches are empty, I think it is wrong to blame my noble friend the Chief Whip. It is due to the fact that other noble Lords also have matters of great interest to them which they wish to debate, and our earlier debate went on a little longer than was anticipated. I think that on reflection my noble friend will regret his remarks about the Chief Whip.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, may I interrupt my noble friend? I did not mean any attack on the Chief Whip at all. What I reported was that several days ago I indicated that I wanted to raise this matter. I had a discussion with the Chief Whip's Office and my arrangements were made with them. This date was particularly suggested in view of Lord Chalfont's return. I doubt whether the Chief Whip himself knew anything about these discussions at all, and I was not making any attack on him.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I am glad. My noble friend Lord Chalfont should have been back but matters in New York have kept him there. Therefore it falls to me, another Minister of State in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to reply to my noble friend.
As my noble friend and the House will know, there was a full and useful discussion of this subject at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council which my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs attended in Brussels on December 4 and 5. I agree that we all wish peace, but we also wish to maintain our freedoms. The noble Lord, Lord Oswald, read out paragraph 2 of the declaration attached to the Ministerial communiqué of December 5, describing the purpose of the coming
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into being of NATO. A communiqué was also issued after the Brussels meeting and I have arranged for a copy to be made available in the Library of the House. The communiqué recalls that,
"Since the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty twenty years ago, the Members of the Alliance have dedicated their efforts to the preservation of their freedom and security and to the improvement of East-West relations in the aim of reaching an ultimate peaceful solution of outstanding problems in Europe. They will continue to do so".
These are the twin aims of the Alliance, defence and detente.
On the basis of these two concepts of defence and detente, the Ministers issued a Declaration, in which they set forth their views on the future development of relations between East and West. With permission, I will circulate this Declaration in the OFFICIAL REPORT.*
The first essential point that is made clear in the Declaration is that the West is ready for constructive East-West talks on practical matters. As the House knows, the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session has drafted a list of concrete issues for possible negotiation between East and West. This list was presented to Ministers last week. It is an exercise which has led the Alliance into a very full study of the areas where real progress is possible. In the meantime, members of the Alliance, both individually and collectively, have pursued practical initiatives towards a reduction of tension.
These initiatives have been aimed at the central problems of European Security: the problems of Germany and Berlin, and the problems of the arms race. My noble friend Lord Brockway mentioned some of these initiatives and there is no harm in repeating them. Her Majesty's Government, together with the Governments of the United States and France, as my noble friend Lord Hood told the House, have been conducting exchanges with the Soviet Union to improve the situation in and around Berlin and the access to that City. This is a question which is not only at the heart of European security but also has a determinant effect on the simple day-to-day freedom of movement of people in Berlin; our objective, surely, must be to improve their welfare. The Federal German Government has already begun
*See col. 544.

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exchanges with the Soviet Union on mutual declarations on the non-use of force and non-intervention in internal affairs; and hopes to have similar discussions with her other Eastern neighbours.
On the arms side, there are the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks—the most important talks that have begun between the United States and the Soviet Union on the possibility of the limitation of strategic armaments. There is also NATO'S invitation to the Soviet Union and the other countries of Eastern Europe to join in discussion of mutual force reductions. This invitation was first issued by NATO Ministers at Reykjavik last year. It has never been answered: but it remains open, and, indeed, NATO Ministers reiterated and reaffirmed it in their meeting last week, and requested that a report of the Council in Permanent Session on the preparation of models for mutual force reductions be submitted as soon as possible. An important point here, brought out in the Communiqué and Declaration, is that the vital security interests of all parties should be maintained. We are most anxious to promote regional disarmament, but must guard against de-stabilising the situation. Equality of security is what we need. And in this process it is all the more important that NATO should not reduce its overall defensive strength until an agreement on disarmament has been obtained which preserves the vital security interests of all parties.
In the passage in their Declaration about mutual and balanced force reductions, NATO Ministers quoted a phrase from the communiqué of the Moscow Meeting of the Warsaw Pact Powers on December 4. The Ministers said that an agreement on this matter would be another concrete step in advancing
"along the road of ending the arms race and of general and complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament."
We must hope that this evident coincidence of interests can be translated into practical results.
This brings me to the question of a conference. The communiqué of the Moscow Meeting (a copy of which I have again placed in the Library of the House) made only a passing and general reference to the question of a conference. The Warsaw Pact's proposals for a conference are set out more fully in the
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Declaration following their meeting at Prague on October 31. They are somewhat vaguely formulated and are limited, so far as the agenda is concerned, to agreements on the renunciation of force and of interference in internal affairs on the one hand, and increased economic, scientific and technological co-operation on the other. Except the two parts of Germany (and this is what my noble friend Lord Hood stressed), we are, of course, all signatories of the United Nations Charter, which enshrines the principles of non-interference and non-use of force; and, as I have said, the Federal. German Government has already made initiatives on this question. And discussions on economic and scientific co-operation are continuously under way, both bilaterally and in international organisations. It is hardly appropriate to convene a full-scale conference for these two items.
The difference in approach between the West and the East is this. We are talking about the problems of European Security; the Soviets and their friends are talking about procedure, or, rather, about one possible method of procedure. There is no evidence that they have done the essential homework that NATO has done with its list of issues. The noble Lord, Lord Milford, stressed the need for carefully prepared work in this matter. This is not to say that we reject the idea of a conference out of hand. We are willing to pursue all practical means of reducing tension and resolving outstanding problems. We have made certain proposals for negotiation, which I have outlined, on the most important of these problems.
It is quite plain from this and from the Declaration issued in Brussels last week that there is, on the part of the West, a genuine will to negotiate. But a genuine will to negotiate does not put one under the obligation to accept without qualification the first proposal that is put forward by the other side as to how it should be done. We are entitled to say that their proposal seems to us in some respects to be unsatisfactory and inadequate, that it should be modified in this way or that way, and see how we go from there. Above all, we have the right to decline to be rushed into a conference before we know that it has a reasonable chance of resolving the major problems. I am sure that noble Lords would not want Her Majesty's

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Government to enter a conference whose sole purpose would be the ratification of the status quo in Europe, with all that that implies—for instance, a highly questionable doctrine of sovereignty.
So, my Lords, where do we go from here? Well, so far as a conference is concerned, as the Declaration records, Ministers agreed in Brussels that progress in the bilateral and multilateral discussions and negotiations that I have mentioned, which have already begun, or could begin shortly, and which relate to the fundamental problems of European Security, would make a major contribution to improving the political atmosphere in Europe and to help to ensure the success of any eventual conference. We look for evidence of a constructive Warsaw Pact approach in connection with these practical initiatives towards détente that the West has already taken.
We shall also seek, in our bilateral contacts with the Warsaw Pact Powers, to probe their intentions for a conference further and discover whether they would be willing to agree a meaningful agenda. There have been some signs that they are geuinely interested in progress. I have mentioned the exchanges on Germany and Berlin that have already taken place. Noble Lords will notice that the Moscow communiqué shows some signs of a rather greater open-mindedness towards the Federal German Republic.
So far as NATO'S own initiatives are concerned, Ministers, on the suggestion of my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary, instructed the Permanent Representatives to look closely into the question of machinery and to report to the next Ministerial Meeting in May. We are doing our homework. The NATO Ministers also recorded their belief that progress is most likely to be achieved by choosing in each instance the means most
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suitable for the subject. This is a prudent and practical task, and an indication of our continued seriousness of purpose.
Here I might add one essential point which Ministers in NATO have already made clear; namely, that the North American members of the Alliance must participate in any conference and in the preparations from the outset. Their right and interests as members of the Alliance entitle them to an equal rôle from the very beginning. I am sure that from what I have said the House will agree that NATO countries and Her Majesty's Government, in particular, are moving, as President Nixon himself said, into an era of negotiation in the right spirit of determination to achieve practical results and to prepare a way thoroughly in order to make this possible.
My Lords, we are entering a decade which could see great changes in Europe. As I said, NATO pursues the twin aims of defence and détente. We shall still need all our determination in defence of our freedom. In addition, we shall need firmness, flexibility and imagination, We shall need the courage to talk with the other side where it seems that progress can be made, and courage to refuse offers of talks, no matter how they may look, whose motivation may be far removed from any intention to negotiate about things which matter. This is why we and our allies agree that the defence of the Alliance must be fully maintained during any period of East-West negotiations. We have to strike the right balance between our firmness to defend and our readiness to negotiate and to conciliate. The two are not incompatible. They indeed go hand in hand. My Lords, I certainly will take note of the suggestions my noble friend made in his speech, as we always do.
House adjourned at eighteen minutes before ten o'clock.