Sitting of 29 April 1969

Preamble
The House met at half-past Two o'clock
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]
PRIVATE BUSINESS

  GREATER LONDON COUNCIL (MONEY) BILL
  To be read a Second time upon Thursday.
  LANDS IMPROVEMENT COMPANY'S AMENDMENT BILL [Lords]
  TWEED FISHERIES BILL [Lords]
  WHITGIFT CHARITIES BILL [Lords]
  BLACKPOOL CORPORATION BILL [Lords]
  Read a Second time and committed.

  KIDDERMINSTER CORPORATION BILL [Lords]
  To be read a Second time upon Tuesday next.
  NORTH EAST LINCOLNSHIRE WATER BILL (By Order)
  Third Reading deferred till Tuesday next.
  GREATER LONDON LOCAL RADIO AUTHORITY BILL (By Order)
  Second Reading deferred till Thursday.
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
  MINISTRY OF POWER

    Power Station Commissioning (Delays)
    Mr. Palmerasked the Minister of Power what action he proposes to take on the recommendations of the Committee under the chairmanship of Sir Alan Wilson, appointed to inquire into delays in the commissioning of power stations.
    The Minister of Power (Mr. Roy Mason): I am sorry that I have nothing to add to my reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Middleton and Prestwich (Mr. Coe), on 17th March.—[Vol. 780, c. 48.]
    Mr. Palmer: In view of the urgency of many of these matters, has my right hon. Friend set any time limit to action?
    Mr. Mason: Not at this stage. It is a lengthy Report, and it is having to be studied urgently with the Ministry of Technology and the C.E.G.B. As soon as I have further information, I will let the House know.
    Mr. Lubbock: Does the right hon. Gentleman recall that one of the Committee's recommendations was a long-term programme for the authorisation and construction of power stations? Is it not, therefore, a matter of extreme urgency to reach agreement with the Central Electricity Generating Board as to what stations will be authorised for this year?
    Mr. Mason: It is not as urgent as the hon. Gentleman suggests. He is aware of the present margin of capacity.

    Nationalised Industries (Chairmen's Salaries)
    Mr. Laneasked the Minister of Power, having regard to the National Board for Prices and Incomes Report, whether he proposes to increase the salary of the Chairman of the National Coal Board; and by how much.
    Mr. Kenneth Bakerasked the Minister of Power, having regard to the National Board for Prices and Incomes Report, whether he proposes to increase

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    the salary of the Chairman of the Electricity Council, and by how much.
    Sir G. Nabarroasked the Minister of Power whether he will now make a statement on the 60 per cent. increase in salaries, from £12,500 to £20,000 per annum, recommended by the National Board for Prices and Incomes for chairmen of certain State fuel boards.
    Sir B. Rhys Williamsasked the Minister of Power, having regard to the National Board for Prices and Incomes Report, whether he proposes to increase the salary of the Chairman of the Gas Council; and by how much.
    Mr. Ridleyasked the Minister of Power if he will implement the National Board for Prices and Incomes' report on the salaries of top people in the nationalised industries under his control.
    Mr. Roy Hughesasked the Minister of Power what plans he has to increase the salary of the Chairman of the British Steel Corporation; and if he will give an assurance that any increase will be in accordance with the Government's prices and incomes policy.
    Mr. Mason: Generally, I would refer hon. Members to the Answer given to the hon. Member for Honiton (Mr. Emery) on 22nd April.—[Vol. 782, c. 50.]
    As regards my hon. Friend's Question about the British Steel Corporation, I have now announced the reappointment of Lord Melchett as Chairman of the Corporation for a further period to 26th January, 1975, at a salary of £22,500 for the first year and £25,000 thereafter. At his own request, Lord Melchett has served so far on a personal salary of £16,000, considerably less than he was earning in the private sector and considerably less than the agreed range for the Deputy Chairmen.
    Mr. Lane: Although I welcome the Government's acceptance in principle of the Prices and Incomes Board Report, is the right hon. Gentleman confident that the one increase to which the Government have so far committed themselves for the Chairman of the National Coal Board will be enough to offset the discrepancy between the public sector and the private in the salaries of senior executives just below the top level?
    Mr. Mason: I have committed myself to most of the chairmen's increases, as recommended by the N.B.P.I. On the question of comparability, no doubt the hon. Gentleman knows that the Board did not go down that road. If it had compared public industry and the men in charge of these major responsibilities with those of private enterprise, its recommendations would have been in the region of £40,000 to £50,000 per chairman.
    Sir G. Nabarro: Would the right hon. Gentleman explain why the extraordinary disparity between the salaries of the chairmen of these boards has now been further aggravated? Why are the chairmen of coal, gas, electricity and the railways getting £15,000 a year whereas Lord Melchett, for no apparent reason, is getting £25,000 and an increase of 56¼ per cent. on his existing salary? Is that the right hon. Gentleman's idea of a prices and incomes policy?
    Mr. Mason: Because the N.B.P.I. recognised that the British Steel Corporation was a different industry. As my right hon. Friend the Minister of Transport said in 1967, it is a different industry. It is certainly very different from the nationalised domestic concerns of, for example, coal, gas and electricity.
    Mr. Baker: Would the Minister care to deny reports in the Press that when these increases are implemented the various chairmen and senior managers concerned may have some of their allowances cut and that that would, in effect, eliminate their increases?
    Mr. Mason: That is one recommendation in the Report on a subject which has still to be determined between the chairmen of the industries concerned—not all of them are concerned—and myself.
    Mr. Ridley: Would the right hon. Gentleman explain why the steel chairman is to get so much more than the other fuel industry chairmen? Is it because the steel industry is supposed to be competitive whereas the other fuel industries are not, which was the reason given by Lord Melchett?
    Mr. Mason: There are a number of reasons. The first is that steel is not a domestic nationalised industry like, for

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    example, coal, gas and electricity. Secondly, most of it operates alongside a large private sector which contains 100,000 men and up to 200 firms. Thirdly, it must be internationally competitive. Fourthly, it must compete, particularly from the point of view of higher management, with private manufacturing as well.
    Mr. Hughes: Does my right hon. Friend believe that patriotism should start at the top? What is the point of exhorting the likes of building workers and bus crews to stick to a 3½ per cent. norm while, at the same time, he sanctions increases of this character? Would not he agree that inconsistencies of this kind are resulting in the Government losing the support of thousands of working-class people throughout the country?
    Mr. Mason: No, Sir. That is happening because of ill-informed comment such as that I have heard in the House. [Interruption.] Patriotism in this respect did start at the op. The Chairman of the British Steel Corporation voluntarily took a cut in his salary of £4,000 a year and two senior deputy chairmen and two full-time members of the Board voluntarily took a cut of 12½ per cent. No other members of senior management have done that in the last two years.
    Mr. Palmer: On the question of comparability, does my right hon. Friend appreciate that the annual rate of capital investment in steel is very small indeed compared with, say, the electricity supply industry?
    Mr. Mason: That is so only if one makes a comparison between steel and electricity as a whole—the C.E.G.B. and the 12 area boards.
    Sir B. Rhys Williams: Would not the right hon. Gentleman agree that only by sharply reducing the rate of tax on earned income will the Government effectively be able to make sense of the salary structure of top management?
    Mr. Atkinson: Was my right hon. Friend aware that when he was negotiating with Lord Melchett he was to be the first Minister to increase a recommendation made by the N.B.P.I.? Was he aware, while he was doing that, that he would cause a national outrage, particularly in the Labour movement? Did the Cabinet approve his decision?
    Mr. Mason: I have, of course, noted the comments which my hon. Friend made during the weekend in which he referred to me as being too gutless to make a statement in the House. I have given him an opportunity today—
    Mr. Shinwell: Why not debate it?
    Mr. Mason: I should have thought that the salary of one chairman represented a subject on which I should not take up too much of the time of the House.
    The N.B.P.I. pointed out in its Report that the level of pay in the British Steel Corporation was substantially higher than in other State enterprises and reflected in part its recent past as a separate group of private enterprises. The Select Committee on Nationalised Industries also emphatically said last year that we should not refer the matter to the Board but should pay the rate for the job. That is precisely what I have tried to do.
    Sir J. Eden: Why has the right hon. Gentleman down-graded, by comparison, other chairmen of nationalised power industries in the face of the increase to the Chairman of the British Steel Corporation? What exactly are the criteria by which the right hon. Gentleman judges the degree of competitiveness of the industry?
    Mr. Mason: I have not down-graded them. I have given them increases in accordance with the Board's wishes. I have already explained the differences between the Corporation and other industries.
    Mr. Alfred Morris: What note, if any, do the Government take of additional paid employments held by the chairmen of nationalised boards? How many such additional employments do they now hold?
    Mr. Mason: Chairmen must receive my specific permission and consent if they wish to take up such employments. If my hon. Friend will table a Question on the subject, no doubt I shall be able to give him the information he requires.
    Sir G. Nabarro: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. In view of the very unsatisfactory reply given by the Minister to Question No. 7, I beg to give notice

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    that I shall raise this matter on the Adjournment.

    Steel Prices
    Sir G. Nabarroasked the Minister of Power whether he will now make a statement on increased steel prices.
    Mr. Dempseyasked the Minister of Power what assessment he has made of the economic effect of the proposed increase in steel prices; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Wingfield Digbyasked the Minister of Power what arrangements have now been made for the provision of steel plates and sections for the shipbuilding industry at special rates, as recommended in the Geddes Report, accepted by the Government; and when he received the report on steel prices by the National Board for Prices and Incomes.
    The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Power (Mr. Reginald Freeson): On all matters concerning steel prices, my right hon. Friend is awaiting the Report of the N.B.P.I., which is expected shortly.
    Sir G. Nabarro: Since this crucially important matter has been before the Board for many months, would the hon. Gentleman say what influence the Ministry has had on the final adjudication? Is the delay not unconnected with the recent rearrangement in salary for Lord Melchett?
    Mr. Freeson: The answer to the last part of the hon. Gentleman's supplementary is, "No, Sir". The answer to the first part is that we have not influenced any final adjudication, particularly as one has not yet been made.
    Mr. Dempsey: Is my hon. Friend aware that even in the present protectionist system Continental steel is doing much harm to our domestic market and that the proposed increase—I understand that it is in the region of 14 per cent.—will weaken our competitive ability still further? Would not my hon. Friend agree that the faster he stops the empire-builders from creating jobs for the boys at extortionate salaries, the faster he will be able to scale down increases of this character and make us more competitive?
    Mr. Freeson: The last part of that supplementary question is nonsense. The answer to the first part, about the reference to the Board, is that we are awaiting the Board's report.
    Mr. Peyton: Would the hon. Gentleman confirm that before the price increases were submitted to the N.B.P.I. they were examined by the Department and the Treasury? If they were, what on earth is the point of this totally unnecessary manœuvre and long delay? Can he give an estimate of the cost to the steel industry of delaying this increase in price?
    Mr. Freeson: I am not in a position to make such an estimate. To answer the hon. Gentleman's question about the grounds for the reference, I suggest that the Government would have been open to even more criticism had they not referred the price proposals to the Board. The best thing for us to do is to wait for the report, which will be coming forward soon, and see what that produces.
    Mr. James Hamilton: Is my hon. Friend aware that the steel workers are putting their best feet forward and are achieving a tremendous increase in steel production? Is he also aware that any further increase in the price of steel will have a serious effect on, for example, the construction industry? Will he particularly bear in mind that Lanarkshire is a development area and that there is every possibility that many jobs will be lost there if such an increase takes place?
    Mr. Freeson: Points of this nature will no doubt be borne closely in mind by the N.B.P.I. in reaching its conclusion To answer my hon. Friend's questions now would be difficult, since we do not yet know the recommendations that will be made by the Board.

    Electricity and Gas Industries (Financial Objectives)
    Mr. Emeryasked the Minister of Power what financial targets he has set for the electricity and gas industries for 1969–70; whether he will now announce the financial objectives for the next five years; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Mason: I will inform the House of the new objectives when they have been settled.
    Mr. Emery: Is it not time that the industry had these objectives from the Minister? Does he not agree that he should fulfil the recommendations in Cmnd. Paper 3437, which suggested that this information should already he in the hands of the chairmen, and that they should be for a five-year period, not just the immediate 12 months?
    Mr. Mason: As the hon. Member has suggested, Cmnd. Paper 3437 is determining our economic and financial objectives. To get the relevant data from the nationalised industries has taken a little time, but it is our intention to plan over a five-year period.
    Mr. Palmer: When the Minister fixes these targets, will he see that there is equality of treatment in the return expected from electricity as against gas?
    Mr. Mason: I cannot give that promise, but I shall certainly look at the suggestion.

    Advanced Gas Cooled Reactors
    Sir J. Edenasked the Minister of Power what consultations he had with the Central Electricity Generating Board before the ground rules for advanced gas cooled reactors were changed; and when the decision was taken.
    Mr. Mason: I have been aware since my early discussions with the C.E.G.B. in the summer of last year that a change was under consideration. The C.E.G.B. formally notified me of its decision last month.
    Sir J. Eden: In view of the strong argument and discussion which is now taking place between the Coal Board and the C.E.G.B. as to the costs of nuclear power versus coal-fired stations, does not the right hon. Gentleman think that it was disingenuous, to say the least, to have allowed the ground rules to be changed and go through as a footnote in Written Answer rather than making a proper declaration to the House and to the industries concerned?
    Mr. Mason: No, I did not think that was so. It has been under consideration for some time and could have been announced prior to the Seaton Carew decision, but if the C.E.G.B. had done it then and I had informed the House, it would have been charged with being
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    biased. There is always this difficulty over nuclear or coal-fired stations as to when the announcement should be made, but I did not think it warranted a statement to the House just before the Board had changed one of its ground rules.

    Fuel Industries (Prices)
    Mr. Ridleyasked the Minister of Power if he will seek statutory power to control the level of prices in the fuel industries, as recommended by the Select Committee on nationalised industries.
    Mr. Mason: I would ask the hon. Member to await the Government's reply to the Select Committee's Report.
    Mr. Ridley: Is the Minister aware that it is already eight months since that Report was published? If he is not to take power to control prices of fuel industries, will he give up trying to do so?
    Mr. Mason: The Select Committee Report was a substantial document, and a considered reply is being prepared. I hope that the point raised by the hon. Member will be considered in the reply.

    National Coal Board and British Steel Corporatoin (Regional Policy)
    Mr. Eddie Griffithsasked the Minister of Power if he is satisfied with the arrangements for consultation with the National Coal Board and British Steel Corporation on matters relevant to regional policy; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Mason: Yes, Sir. My officials are frequently in touch with both boards on regional matters, and have regular joint meetings with their officials. I discuss the main issues from time to time with the chairman. There is thus both close co-operation and a wide exchange of relevant information and experience.
    Mr. Griffiths: Will my right hon. Friend say whether a good relationship exists between the National Coal Board and the British Steel Corporation?
    Mr. Mason: Yes. A recent example of their co-operation, particularly in regard to the initial Question, is that they have jointly commissioned Political and Economic Planning to do research on methods of attracting industry to remote areas. Recognising that there may be some steel plant closures in areas where

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    coal mines have closed, both are eager to work together, to co-operate and to learn from each other's experience.
    Mr. Wingfield Digby: Have there been consultations with the British Steel Corporation in the shipbuilding areas about steel prices, which are vital to the future of the industry?
    Mr. Mason: So they may be, but this is not relevant to the original Question on the Order Paper.

    Home Refining
    Mr. Ron Lewisasked the Minister of Power if he is satisfied with the progress that has been made in implementing the Government's policy on home refining; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Mason: With the addition of 11 million tons of annual capacity in 1968 and a further 17 million tons under construction substantial progress has been made towards the Government's objective that home refining capacity should match in total inland demand and bunkers. Net imports of petroleum products are being reduced and by 1970 refinery capacity should be sufficient in total to allow some net exports.
    Mr. Lewis: How much of the new refinery capacity is owned by British companies?
    Mr. Mason: About 40 per cent.

    Pipelines
    Mr. Ron Lewisasked the Minister of Power if he will state the numbers of pipelines which have been constructed under authorisations granted in accordance with the Pipelines Act 1962, the total mileage covered, the number of compulsory acquisition orders made and the length of line included in those orders.
    Mr. Mason: 14 cross-country pipelines, covering 667 miles including the Thames-Mersey line. No compulsory purchase orders, and only six compulsory rights orders for 1¼ miles have been made.
    Mr. Lewis: What statutory rights has an individual to object to a pipeline?
    Mr. Mason: There can be no cross-country pipeline without my consent; a proposal must be advertised; and objectors must have an opportunity at hearings or public inquiries to put their case.
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    But, as I have already pointed out, we have built 667 miles of pipeline and there have been no objections of note. This is an excellent example of public relations by the industries concerned.

    Uranium Supplies
    Mr. Eadieasked the Minister of Power what study he has made of the survey of uranium supplies made by the European Nuclear Energy Agency and the International Atomic Energy Agency, a copy of which is in his possession; and whether he still expects nuclear power stations to be competitive with those using coal.
    Mr. Mason: I see no reason to change the assumptions about relative generating costs outlined in the Fuel Policy White Paper (Cmnd. 3438), and would refer my hon. Friend to the reply I gave to my hon. Friend the Member for Don Valley (Mr. Kelley) on 14th April.—[Vol. 781, c. 225.]
    Mr. Eadie: Does not my right hon. Friend agree that the expected world shortage of uranium supplies could affect our nuclear energy programme? Does not he further agree that it is, therefore, desirable to have a complete reappraisal of the use of coal, our own indigenous resource?
    Mr. Mason: Questions about the availability of uranium should go to my right hon. Friend the Minister of Technology and not to me, but I understand that stocks plus imports under existing contracts are likely to meet our requirements until well into the 1970s and that no significant increase in the price of uranium is expected over the next five years.

    North Sea (Energy Potential)
    Mr. Eadieasked the Minister of Power what consideration he has given to the future termination of concessions for the exploration of the North Sea energy potential; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Mason: I have no power to terminate existing concessions, unless there is a breach of the licence conditions, but after six years each licensee is required to surrender not less than half the area of each licence. No decision has yet been

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    taken about the terms and conditions on which surrendered areas may be re-licensed.
    Mr. Eadie: Is my right hon. Friend aware that a body of opinion in the country is anxious about the outcome and that the Labour Party has a policy in relation to the subject? Do the Government propose to implement Labour Party policy?
    Mr. Mason: I suppose that my hon. Friend is referring to the North Sea Gas Study Group—for example, the suggestion for a National Hydrocarbons Corporation. As the House has been informed, this is under consideration.

    Primary Energy Consumption
    Mr. Silvesterasked the Minister of Power what is his latest estimate of the effect on the relative consumption of different forms of primary energy in 1975, compared with the forecasts in the 1967 White Paper, of the abolition of the tax on fuel oil.
    Mr. Freeson: The estimates given in The Fuel Policy White Paper (Cmnd. 3438) remain valid.

  ELECTRICITY

    Supply Industry (Re-organisation)
    Mr. Palmerasked the Minister of Power if he will now make a statement on the reorganisation of the electricity supply industry.
    Mr. Laneasked the Minister of Power whether he will make a statement before the Whitsun adjournment on his plans for the reorganisation of the electricity industry.
    Mr. Bostonasked the Minister of Power when the expects to announce the results of his review of the structure of the electricity industry.
    Mr. Mason: I have had extensive consultations with those principally concerned with the structure and organisation of the industry. As soon as I have reached a final conclusion, I will inform the House.
    Mr. Palmer: Now that my right hon. Friend has received the Report of his Working Party, does he not think that
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    it would be useful to all concerned to publish it as a White Paper?
    Mr. Mason: I will certainly consider that, but first I must complete all the necessary consultations. So far, I have met the Electricity Council, the C.E.G.B., the 12 area board chairmen and representatives of the principal unions concerned.
    Mr. Lane: In any legislation which the Minister may be considering, will he bear in mind the possibility of including a provision that, in future, it will be wholly at the discretion of the Chairman of the Electricity Council to make any further changes in organisation which may be necessary?
    Mr. Mason: I will keep that in mind.
    Mr. Boston: Can my right hon. Friend give any idea when he will be able to say what his final findings are? What consideration has he been giving to creating larger areas?
    Mr. Mason: Larger areas are very much in doubt. On the first point, it will be some time before we can complete the round of consultations and firm up our ideas sufficiently to be able to determine when legislation will be necessary.
    Sir J. Eden: Could I press the right hon. Gentleman to consider tabling a White Paper on this matter? To what extent could some of the changes be made in advance of legislation?
    Mr. Mason: As I said earlier, I will certainly consider the publication of a White Paper at an appropriate time.

    Resale Price
    Sir J. Edenasked the Minister of Power whether he is aware of the present widespread evasion of the law laying down a maximum resale price of electricity; and if he will seek powers to publicise the statutory limit.
    Mr. Freeson: The steady volume of complaints I receive certainly suggests that there is widespread evasion. Publicity for maximum resale prices is already a statutory obligation of area boards under Section 29(2) of the Electricity Act, 1957.
    Sir J. Eden: In his consideration of the steps he should now be taking, will

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    the Minister concentrate on giving as much publicity as he can to the fact that there is this maximum limit and by means of the courts people can reclaim for over-charging? Has he given consideration to making overcharging a criminal offence?
    Mr. Freeson: On the first point, I am glad of the opportunity of giving the matter publicity and I hope that area boards will take note of the point that has been made. Certainly I have raised the question of publicity and considered it with the consultative councils. They are doing their best to help. The question of legislation is not a matter we would rule out. We are considering whether it would be feasible to make it effective, which is something we could pursue.
    Mr. Lubbock: Is it not completely unrealistic to expect the victims of overcharging, who generally are in poor circumstances, to take action in the courts to recover amounts of over-charging? Will the hon. Gentleman therefore take powers to enable local electricity boards to institute prosecutions against anyone alleged to be guilty of this offence and also to test the meters and advise consumers whether the meters are wrongly set?
    Mr. Freeson: The first point made by the hon. Member is a fair comment. It is difficult for many people who are suffering from this kind of thing to take necessary action in self-defence through the courts. On the latter point, I would not wish to comment at this stage as to the precise form which any legislation which might be considered feasible might take. It is a matter we wish to study.

    Generating Plant
    Mr. Tudor Watkinsasked the Minister of Power what was the capacity and the capital cost of new generating plant ordered by the Central Electricity Generating Board during the four years 1961 to 1964 and during the four years 1965 to 1968.
    Mr. Freeson: Twenty-four and six thousand Megawatts respectively, at a capital cost of approximately £1,240 million and £460 million. The lower rate of orders during the later period was to correct the over-ordering during 1961–64
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    as a result of over-estimation of future demand in those years.
    Mr. Watkins: Will the Minister tell the House what efforts have been made to bring capacity and demand into balance?
    Mr. Freeson: The long-term effect of power station orders—some units ordered before 1964 will not come fully into commission until 1972—precludes the short-term matching of plant capacity with demand, but the capital expenditure programme, as I have already said, has been adjusted downwards in the last years to try to achieve a balance in the future.

  GAS

    North Sea Gas (Security of Supply)
    Mr. Emeryasked the Minister of Power what steps he is taking to ensure either a stand-by capacity or a continuity of supply of North Sea gas in view of the number of accidents that have taken place in the North Sea during the last 12 months.
    Mr. Cantasked the Minister of Power what steps he is taking in view of the recent cut in North Sea gas supplies caused by the accident to the Shell-Esso production platform, to ensure that there will be no disruption of supplies to consumers as a result of further such accidents.
    Mr. Freeson: Consumers were not affected by the Shell-Esso accident. The loss of gas was made good by increasing supplies from B.P. and the Canvey storage, but mostly by switching town gas plant from natural gas to oil feedstock. Security of the North Sea supply will be ensured as facilities increase: like the newly-commissioned Leman Bank pipeline and plans for more trunk line storage.
    Mr. Emery: As the hon. Gentleman will realise, there have been a number of other accidents in the North Sea. If such actions should happen again, the North Sea supply would be in very great danger. Does the Minister actually mean that he is not making any standby proposals for meeting a shortage of North Sea gas, perhaps by 1973 or 1975, if there were further accidents?
    Mr. Freeson: I thought I had indicated in my main Answer that security is to be ensured as the storage facilities increase and fresh lines are brought in to bring the supplies ashore. One must make a sharp distinction between the present position and that which will obtain in the 1970s. Something like 15 per cent. goes direct to consumers at the moment, and the rest goes into the town gas plant. I do not think there is any need for fear in this respect.
    Mr. Ashton: Is my hon. Friend yet in a position to announce his decision as to setting up a national hydrocarbons corporation to control North Sea gas?
    Mr. Freeson: No, that is a different question.

    Investment
    Mr. Kenneth Bakerasked the Minister of Power what is his estimate of the amount by which investment in gas would be reduced on the basis that the test discount rate was raised from eight per cent. to 12 per cent.
    Mr. Freeson: No significant estimate can be given. Among many uncertainties are the effects which a higher return on new investment would have on tariffs—so affecting demand—and on investment to meet such demand.
    Mr. Baker: What is the Parliamentary Secretary's view on the comment by Sir Alec Cairncross that the discount rate should be raised from 8 per cent. to 9 per cent.?
    Mr. Freeson: I would not wish to make any coment on that statement at this stage.
    Mr. Ridley: Since interest rates for capital for the private sector have gone up by very nearly 50 per cent. in the last two or three years, why has the test discount rate not gone up by a similar percentage?
    Mr. Freeson: To answer that question I would have to deny the answer that I gave to the question asked by the hon. Member for Acton (Mr. Kenneth Baker), that I do not wish to make any comment at this stage.

    North Sea Gas (Reserves)
    Mr. Cantasked the Minister of Power to what extent the present large-
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    scale investment in transmission systems and appliance conversion for North Sea gas is based on the level of gas reserves.
    Mr. Freeson: This investment is based on the discovery of large supplies of natural gas in the North Sea and the decision to convert the whole system to its use. The new transmission system and appliances could be used for other forms of gas, if necessary.
    Mr. Cant: Will the Minister say what other sources could produce gas which would be usable in converted appliances?
    Mr. Freeson: The Gas Council has developed processes which can produce from oil high calorific gas which is interchangeable with natural gas. There is also a possibility of continuing the importation of natural gas, as has been done in past years, should the need arise for providing an alternative to North Sea gas, but this should not be necessary for many years. This can be done without reconversion.
    Mr. Eddie Griffiths: Does my hon. Friend see a future for coke oven gas as a means of domestic heating and cooking in competition with North Sea gas?
    Mr. Freeson: As my hon. Friend will know, even before the advent of natural gas, coke oven gas was on the way out and was being replaced by oil feedstocks in the gas industry.
    Sir Harmar Nicholls: What is the latest estimate of the life of North Sea gas?
    Mr. Freeson: That which has been published on many occasions. I remind the hon. Gentleman that the White Paper on Fuel Policy gave it as 25 years' life at three times the present rate of consumption. On the basis of the present rate of annual consumption, this will be equivalent to about 60 years' supply.

    North Sea Gas
    Mr. Patrick McNair-Wilsonasked the Minister of Power if he will give the latest forecast for the availability of natural gas supplies from the North Sea.
    Mr. Freeson: As my right. hon. Friend recently told the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries (Cmnd. 3996), present reserves should build up to a production rate of 3,500 million cubic feet

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    per day. Further recent discoveries reinforce the planning figure in the Fuel Policy White Paper (Cmnd. 3438) that 4,000 million cubic feet per day should be available by 1975.
    Mr. McNair-Wilson: Does not the hon. Gentleman agree that, since there is now some confusion in forecasting for North Sea gas, serious consideration should be given to whether we should press ahead with the domestic conversions and use up this precious indigenous fuel too quickly rather than put it into industry as near the shore as possible?
    Mr. Freeson: If there is any confusion it is confined to a few individuals, and I hope that the figures I have given today will correct it. The gas industry is doing an excellent job for industrial supplies but that does not mean that it should not attempt to get into the premium market as rapidly as possible. That is where it is most profitable for it to be active.
    Mr. Ogden: But we are going to increase consumption from the North Sea, are we not? It is just not going to last as long as we thought, is it? We are just going to have to convert back, are we not? Why, in these circumstances, import oil instead of using our own coal?
    Mr. Freeson: I congratulate my hon. Friend on the manner of his supplementary question, but I must disappoint him by pointing out that if he reads the OFFICIAL REPORT tomorrow he will find that I have already answered it. The industry had already been switching from indigenous coal to oil feedstock, and we are now going ahead with an even greater use of our home production of fuel. After all, North Sea gas is an indigenous fuel.

  COAL

    Opencast Working (North Warwickshire)
    Mr. Speedasked the Minister of Power how many objections, from organisations and individuals, he has re-reived so far to the National Coal Board's proposal for opencast working on the Anker site in North Warwickshire.
    Mr. Freeson: Twelve and 183 respectively.
    Mr. Speed: Since a number of those objections were made on behalf of thou-
    1146
    snads of people, does the hon. Gentleman realise the widespread concern about this proposal? Could be give a date for and the venue in which the public inquiry is to take place?
    Mr. Freeson: I am very much appreciative of the feelings expressed by many people in the locality. As I have indicated, numerous objections have been raised. It would not be right for me to do any more than I did in the debate last Friday and to comment on a matter which is sub judice. We have no date fixed yet, but we hope to appoint one soon.
    Mr. Hooley: Would my hon. Friend agree that the Opencast Executive would be better employed clearing up dereliction than creating it?
    Mr. Freeson: The Opencast Executive does an excellent job in clearing up dereliction.

    Pricing Policy
    Mr. Speedasked the Minister of Power whether he has completed his discussions with the National Coal Board and with other Departments on the National Coal Board's pricing policy; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Youngerasked the Minister of Power whether he is satisfied that the pricing policies of the National Coal Board are in accordance with the criteria laid down by Command Paper No. 3437; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Mason: I am not yet ready to make a statement, but I hope to do so soon.
    Mr. Speed: Was that not a disappointing reply? Is the Minister aware that the Treasury was expressing concern about this nearly 15 months ago and his predecessor started discussions in March, 1968? What positive action is the right hon. Gentleman taking?
    Mr. Mason: As I said in my reply, I hope to make a statement soon.
    Mr. Younger: Since Lord Robens said on 25th March that the Coal Board was making considerable losses in 1968–69, can the Minister assure the House that if there are to be price increases to comply with Command Paper 3437 these will be referred to the Prices and Incomes Board, as the Prime Minister promised in 1967?
    Mr. Mason: I am aware that if major increases come forward, they may have to be referred to the N.B.P.I. I have received proposals for selective price increases. They are under consideration, and the Coal Consumers' Council is considering them at the same time.
    Sir J. Eden: In the meantime, will the Minister confirm that it is his policy that the consumer, not the taxpayer, should pay for the products of these industries?
    Mr. Mason: It depends how far down the line one wishes to go on every product.

    Indigenous Fuel
    Mr. G. Elfed Daviesasked the Minister of Power whether he is satisfied that the present measures of protection for the coal industry enable advantage to be taken of the use of indigenous fuel; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Mason: Yes, Sir. The measures of direct assistance for the coal industry constitute a massive degree of protection which ensures that coal is used to the maximum extent compatible with the national interest. It is partly as a result that our economy is more coal intensive than that of any other major industrial country in the free world.
    Mr. Davies: Will my right hon. Friend give comparisons of coal utilisation between the United Kingdom and other major industrial countries?
    Mr. Mason: The proportion of coal in total energy consumption in the United Kingdom is 55 per cent., in Germany, including lignite, 47 per cent., in Japan 35 per cent., in France 33 per cent. and in America 21 per cent.

    Recruitment
    Mr. Alec Jonesasked the Minister of Power if he will give the figures for recruitment into the coal industry in the first quarter of 1969 as compared with the first quarter of 1968.
    Mr. Mason: 6,574 in 1969 compared with 2,782 in the first quarter of 1968.
    Mr. Jones: I thank my right hon. Friend for his reply, but is he able to say how many of those recruited were juveniles, and whether he is satisfied that the National Coal Board will be
    1148
    able to maintain the recruitment of juveniles at a sufficiently high level, bearing in mind that the traditional source of recruitment in the old mining areas of South Wales will be lost?
    Mr. Mason: It is necessary to keep the morale of the industry high to attract the juveniles we require. In the first quarter of 1969 we recruited 842, compared with 388 in the first quarter of 1968.
    Mr. Patrick McNair Wilson: Will the Minister say whether the figures which he has quoted are in line with the target laid down by the National Coal Board of 135 million tons production in 1975, or with the Ministry's target in the White Paper of 120 million tons?
    Mr. Mason: We are aiming to keep the manpower rundown within 35,000 per year, and the figure is well within that.
    Sir J. Eden: Does the Minister mean 35,000 per annum, whatever the total employment in the National Coal Board, and not 10 per cent. of the National Coal Board's employment figure at the beginning of each year?
    Mr. Mason: I did not refer to percentages. We are obliged within the four years special period of 1967–71 to see that there is a rundown of 140,000 men—a manageable figure of 35,000 a year. I think that the rundown was much higher last year, but this year it is running well within the figure.

    Consumption (Electricity Industry)
    Mr. David Watkinsasked the Minister of Power how much coal was used by the electricity industry in the first quarter of 1969, compared with the same period of the previous three years.
    Mr. Freeson: In the first quarter of 1969 about 23½ million tons were used by the electricity industry compared with 21¾, 18¾ and 20 million tons, respectively, for the corresponding periods in 1968, 1967, and 1966.
    Mr. Watkins: Does my hon. Friend expect this relative stability in consumption to continue?
    Mr. Freeson: It is not possible for me to say that the identical figures will be repeated over the period which still stands until the conclusion of the Act in 1971,

    1149
    but the figures for the first half of the current financial year will be an additional burn of 2·3 million tons of coal, and we will see how it goes towards the end of the year.
    Mr. Speed: Will the hon. Gentleman say how much extra coal would have been used if the rate of growth in the National Plan had been achieved?
    Mr. Freeson: Not without notice.
    Mr. Ogden: Has my hon. Friend seen the announcement last week about new technical developments made by the National Coal Board which enable coal to be burned in electricity generating stations more efficiently and more cheaply?
    Mr. Freeson: I imagine that my hon. Friend is referring to the fluidised bed technique which is being studied by the industry. We are fully aware of this research project, which is going ahead, and it has the full support of the C.E.G.B. It is still rather early to say what will be the outcome of the work, but we are watching it with great interest and, indeed, hope.
    Mr. David Watkinsasked the Minister of Power what extra tonnage of coal was used by the electricity industry in 1968–69 as a result of Government assistance under the Coal Industry Act 1967.
    Mr. Freeson: It is estimated that in 1968–69 additional coal totalling about 6½ million tons was burnt by the C.E.G.B. and the Scottish Electricity Boards as a result of Government assistance under the Coal Industry Act, 1967.
    Mr. Watkins: How does my hon. Friend expect these trends to develop in 1969–70?
    Mr. Freeson: I gave a partial answer to that in reply to the last Question. At present we expect in the first half of the year an extra burn of 2·3 million tons, and we will see later on in the year how far the extra burn will be authorised for the latter part of 1969–70. The Act continues until 1971, and this additional burn will be continuing.
    Mr. Emery: Will the Minister tell the House how much Government finance was necessary to obtain the extra 61 million tons? In other words, what was
    1150
    the subsidisation out of public funds to obtain the extra coal burn?
    Mr. Freeson: I am not able to answer that question without notice. The calculations are done after the flow of coal into the power stations, and after the C.E.G.B. has identified and agreed with us what allocation of its burn is required to be subsidised in this fashion.

    Manpower Rundown
    Mr. G. Elfed Daviesasked the Minister of Power if he will give the figures for manpower rundown in the coal industry in the first quarter of 1969 as compared with the first quarter of 1968.
    Mr. Mason: Manpower rundown in the coal industry in the first quarter of 1969 was 5,834, compared with 15,671 in the first quarter of 1968.
    Mr. Davies: I welcome those figures, but will my right hon. Friend tell the House what the annual rate of rundown of manpower has been during this year?
    Mr. Mason: The rundown rate so far this year is 23,000, which is well within the manageable figure to which I earlier referred of 35,000 a year.
    Sir C. Osborne: How many of the men who have lost their jobs through this rundown have found other jobs, and how many are still unemployed?
    Mr. Mason: I cannot give those details without notice.

  MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITIES
  Mr. Martenasked the Prime Minister what is the practice of his administration regarding Ministers answering points raised in a debate which cannot be answered during the course of that debate.
  Mr. Hugh Jenkinsasked the Prime Minister what is the practice of his administration regarding Ministers taking part in the work of non-Government political organisations.
  The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Wilson): Exactly the same as that of our predecessors, Sir.
  Mr. Marten: In that case, is the Prime Minister aware that questions which are now put specifically to Ministers during the course of a debate for answer after

  1151
  that debate are really being ignored? Is not this debasing the purpose of Parliamentary debate? Will he take action to put it right?
  The Prime Minister: I know the hon. Gentleman's expertise and concern about the subject which I think he has in mind—the Anguilla debate. On that assumption, I reread the debate and the answers given. The hon. Gentleman received a full answer to his speech in the March debate and the subject was debated again in April. It is the experience of all right hon. and hon. Members over many years that they are not always uniformly satisfied, particularly if they are in the Opposition, at any one moment with all the answers given by the Government. I thought that the hon. Gentleman received a fair answer.
  Mr. Hugh Jenkins: Is my right hon. Friend aware that his predecessor did not have any Ministers who were members of the National Executive of the Labour Party? Will he confirm that Ministers who are members of that body are free to follow and support the policies of the Labour Party as determined by the annual conference?
  The Prime Minister: It is a fact, as my hon. Friend has stated—no doubt after diligent research—that no members of the previous Government were also members of the Labour Party's National Executive. But it is also a fact—and it is not unusual in our history—that the Conservative Government included Ministers closely associated with the outside work of the Conservative Party, as, indeed, is the position today.
  With regard to the second part of my hon. Friend's supplementary question, the position is that collective Ministerial responsibility applies in all circumstances no matter what other organisation a Minister may belong to.
  Mr. Heath: Is there not a serious point here? The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, at the beginning of his reply to the Anguilla debate, said that there were naturally a number of detailed points to which he could not reply off the cuff. That was understandable, and it has long been the practice, particularly in the case of the Foreign Office, that Ministers read through debates afterwards and send factual replies to hon. Members who have
  1152
  asked questions which could not be answered immediately. I know from my own personal experience that the right hon. Gentleman himself takes great care in sending me letters about points I have raised. All he is being asked to do here is to ensure that his right hon. Friends do the same.
  The Prime Minister: I will certainly see whether, after the Anguilla debate, there are detailed points which could be dealt with in that way, and, indeed, if they are of more general interest, will also see that they are available to the House as a whole. I understand the right hon. Gentleman's concern but I remind him that in the Anguilla debate there were several questions about the discussions with Mr. Bradshaw which could not be answered because those discussions must be confidential. No Administration in those circumstances would answer. However, if there are detailed points which do not raise that difficulty I will certainly go into the matter.
  Sir W. Bromley-Davenport: What is the point in answering those questions [Interruption.]—kennel up!—when the "bug wits" in the Government either do not know the answers anyway or, as reported in every newspaper, have the greatest difficulty, like the Prime Minister, in giving the true facts?
  The Prime Minister: I shall naturally want to consider all the implications of that question. The hon. Gentleman will realise the difficulty of my colleagues in the Administration, in that their speeches are normally understood by Members of the House of average intelligence.
  Mr. Hugh Jenkins: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. In view of the unsatisfactory nature of that reply, I beg to give notice that I shall seek leave to raise this matter on the Adjournment.

  RHODESIA
  Sir C. Osborneasked the Prime Minister, what further proposals he has to secure a settlement in Rhodesia.
  The Prime Minister: I have nothing to add to the reply I gave to a supplementary question by the hon. Gentleman on 17th April.—[Vol. 781, c. 1325.]
  Sir C. Osborne: Is the Prime Minister not getting alarmed at the massive infiltration of the Chinese into South Africa through Dar-es-Salaam, and would not a settlement in Rhodesia be all the more urgent now?
  The Prime Minister: Attempted penetration by the Chinese in various parts of Africa has been a problem for many years. I remember a warning given to this House by my predecessor, the right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home). Of course, a settlement in Rhodesia is highly desirable, but a settlement which would involve a surrender of African interests would give the Chinese just the kind of push in Africa that they need.
  Mr. Blenkinsop: Does my right hon. Friend not feel that this is the precise moment when we should return to our original pledge with regard to N.I.B.M.R.?
  The Prime Minister: No, Sir. This matter was very fully discussed in the Commonwealth Conference, as my hon. Friend knows. The "Fearless" terms, which we still regard as fair, are available, and would not be invoked in practice unless the people of Rhodesia as a whole accepted them. There is nothing to stop those in Rhodesia accepting them tomorrow.
  Mr. Evelyn King: Is it not a fact that the internal constitutional position in Rhodesia is now rapidly reaching the point of no return, which it must reach in months? Is it Government policy to do nothing?
  The Prime Minister: Where those who have the chance of an honourable settlement—which would be of the highest advantage to Rhodesia and to all races in Rhodesia—refuse it, it may be that they wish to push themselves to the point of no return, with or without the hon. Gentleman's help. That does not mean that we for our part should change the terms which were rightly recognised in the House as fair.
  Mr. Michael Foot: Is it not the case that the plainest, most illegal and most scandalous form of penetration that is taking place into Rhodesia at present is that conducted from South Africa by South African forces? Will the Prime
  1154
  Minister say what is his latest information about this invasion and what the British Government propose to do?
  The Prime Minister: I am not entirely certain that even white Rhodesians are particularly happy about the infiltration referred to by my hon. Friend. I have reason for saying that. Of course this is illegal under the present constitution of South Africa. They have the excuse for it where there is terrorist penetration from the North, whether Chinese-inspired or inspired from anywhere else. The answer to all these problems is a constitutional settlement, acceptable to this House and to the mass of the people in Rhodesia. This is what we have laid on the table in Salisbury.
  Mr. Biggs-Davison: On a point of order Mr. Speaker. In view of the unsatisfactory nature of that reply, I beg to give notice that I shall seek to raise the matter on the Adjournment.

  DEPARTMENTS (COMPUTER AND RELATED EQUIPMENT)
  Mr. Moonmanasked the Prime Minister whether he will request from Government Departments a progress report indicating the use and management of computer and related equipment similar to that requested from the appropriate Departments by the President of the United States, details of which have been forwarded to him.
  The Prime Minister: This is not necessary, Sir. I have called for and received regular reports from Government Departments, and computerisation in the Civil Service is proceeding quickly.
  Mr. Moonman: While I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for that reply, may I ask him whether he would like to comment on the fact that it is reported that in the United States, partly as a result of the action taken, substantial savings have been made in government, running into several millions of dollars and it has also stimulated Civil Service, Government and industry to appreciate the use of management techniques?
  The Prime Minister: We started on this straight away in October, 1964. We now have a considerable installation of

  1155
  computers in Government Departments—190 compared with only 78 in September, 1964—with another 90 on order, and a very high proportion of them of British origin, contrary to the previously prevailing practice.
  Mr. Ian Lloyd: Would the right hon. Gentleman not agree that one of the most important decisions facing any Government in this country during the next ten years is the access which hon. Members are to have to the Government computer network?
  The Prime Minister: The hon. Gentleman is quite right. We are trying all the time to make more information available. No doubt he will have seen, if he studies, as I am sure he does, the bulletin put out regularly by the Central Statistical Office, what is being done to improve and extend the Government Statistical Service. I hope we can all agree on the need to make as much of this information available to all hon. Members as possible.

  PARLIAMENTARY BOUNDARY COMMISSION
  Mr. Onslowasked the Prime Minister, if he will place in the Library copies of the reports he has received concerning the probable consequences of the reports of the Parliamentary Boundary Commission.
  The Prime Minister: The reports to which I referred in the House on 17th April were oral reports. [Vol. 781, c. 1324.]
  Mr. Onslow: Since the sources of these reports are scarcely impartial, and since they seem to reach the improbable conclusion that the consequences would be highly marginal, is the right hon. Gentleman really asking the House and country to take his word for their validity?
  Hon. Members: Shame.
  The Prime Minister: The hon. Gentleman will know that reports of this kind are usually on the pessimistic side, and not as he has suggested. I mentioned this in the course of exchanges at Question Time last week because of a widespread legend to the contrary. I referred to oral reports I had received from someone with experience in this direction who takes a different view.

  CABINET PROCEEDINGS
  Mr. Thorpeasked the Prime Minister whether he is satisfied that proceedings in the Cabinet are adequately protected from public disclosure; and if he will make a statement.
  The Prime Minister: I would refer the right hon. Gentleman to the reply which I gave to a supplementary question by him on this subject on 15th April.—[Vol. 781, c. 986–7.]
  Mr. Thorpe: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman if he will now give some authority and precedent for the suggestion which he made on that date; namely, that any matter that is secret in the Cabinet may be disclosed to the world at large if it be the wish of the Cabinet? Is he aware that on 4th April the most detailed report of what happened in Cabinet was given in various newspapers, all of which were substantially the same? Can the Prime Minister give us any authority for disclosing voting figures or the attitude of individual members in the history of Cabinet secrecy?
  The Prime Minister: I take full responsibility for what the right hon. Gentleman has referred to. In my previous supplementary answer I said that where the Cabinet agrees to information being made available, then from that moment it is no longer regarded as an official secret. Without wearying the House for too long, I think that the history of Governments and Parliament would confirm, over a very long period of time, that there have been such disclosures in successive Governments. It is a matter for a Cabinet to decide whether, for example, a statement is made in one direction or another, or in a White Paper, or by Press briefing or in many other ways. Unauthorised leaks are a different matter, and this is a problem that has plagued all Governments in this country.
  Mr. Thorpe: Are we therefore to take it that it was the unanimous will of the Cabinet that the report went out that the Prime Minister was "skilful and resourceful and tough" in his approach and that the Home Secretary was "cocky" and suggested that there should be no disclosure and no further leaks? Do we take it that that was a matter of unanimous consent?
  The Prime Minister: No, Sir. That was a matter of Press construction, and I know the right hon. Gentleman's interest in all these matters. He was also wrong earlier in suggesting that there were other details given, apart from one statement which was given in full and made available. I take full responsibility for that. Other items of construction put upon it by the Press are not my responsibility.
  Mr. Emrys Hughes: Why should there be so much secrecy about these Cabinet meetings? Would it not be a step towards real democracy if the minutes of the Cabinet, and the points of view of its members, and whether they voted, were disclosed, so that we could have real democratic government and understand what is going on?
  The Prime Minister: That suggestion is one that would need a great deal of consideration before I could be ready to agree to it.
  Mr. Paget: Could the Prime Minister tell us whether the account in the Press, that before this proceeding took place, all the civil servants who usually attend were sent away, is correct? If this is true, how did the decision about publishing or not publishing come to be reported?
  The Prime Minister: There are abundant precedents for Cabinets meeting in whole or in part without civil servants being present. It is possible to take a decision, and even to record it, without civil servants being there to record it. After all, most Cabinets include a considerable number of literate persons.

  PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSIONER
  Mr. Molloyasked the Prime Minister what plans he has for a further extension of the powers of the Parliamentary Commissioner; and if he will make a statement.
  The Prime Minister: I have nothing at present to add to what I said in reply to a supplementary question by my hon. Friend the Member for Bebington (Mr. Brooks) on 25th March.—[Vol. 780, c. 1264–5.]
  Mr. Molloy: In so far as many of us are pleased at the extension of the Parlia-
  1158
  mentary Commissioner to Northern Ireland—an idea which should flourish in normal democratic soil—would my right hon. Friend assure us that he will see that it is not hindered in the not-too-democratic atmosphere of that part of the United Kingdom?
  The Prime Minister: I understand that a Bill to introduce a Parliamentary Commissioner in Northern Ireland is now before the Northern Ireland Parliament. That was done as part of an undertaking by the Northern Ireland Government to Her Majesty's Government, and I think that that is where we should now leave it.
  Mr. Maurice Macmillan: Is the right hon. Gentleman still bearing in mind the needs of the Health Service for a Parliamentary Commissioner or a special organisation of its own?
  The Prime Minister: I have nothing to add to what the Secretary of State said on 27th March. The point was also discussed in the Green Paper on Health Service reorganisation. There are arguments for its being dealt with not by the Parliamentary Commissioner but by someone with special responsibilities.

  EXPLOSION, CARDIFF
  Mr. E. Rowlands: On a point of order Mr. Speaker. In the early hours of this morning, an explosion occurred in my constituency—
  Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Member cannot, on a point of order, raise the question of something on which he has been refused a Private Notice Question.

BILL PRESENTED
  PET ANIMALS ACT 1951 (AMENDMENT)
  Bill to amend the Pet Animals Act, 1951; presented by Sir Ronald Russell; supported by Sir Frederick Bennett, Mr. Peter Bessell, Mr. Burden, Sir Beresford Craddock, Mr. John Hall, Mr. Bryant Godman Irvine, Sir Barnett Janner, Mr. Turton, and Mr. Ben Whitaker; read the First time; to be read a Second time upon Friday, 13th June, and to be printed. [Bill 144.]

FIREWORKS
3.32 p.m.
Mr. Gwilym Roberts: I beg to move,
That leave be given to bring in a Bill to restrict the sale of fireworks to those in possession of a licence.
It is important that the House should understand the magnitude of the firework injury problem. During each of the years for which I have figures, from 1962 to 1968—[Interruption.]
Mr. Speaker: Order. The House has decided that applications to introduce a Bill under the Ten-Minute Rule should be made at this time and it must listen to the hon. Member.
Mr. Roberts: During each of the years for which I have figures, from 1962 to 1968, 2,200 accident cases were treated in hospital resulting from fireworks, and in 1968 there were 2,537. If we assume that something less than a quarter of the total ever reach hospital, we must accept that about 10,000 people are injured each year by fireworks—and about 70 per cent. of these casualties are children. It is estimated that about 400 of these accidents are serious, and this usually means an injury resulting in the loss of the sight of one or both of a person's eyes.
Not only is it a question of injury; there is also the question of damage. Every year, at firework time, fire brigades are called out about 1,000 times to deal with firework accidents. It is suggested that, associated with this so-called festival, is a general increase in hooliganism affecting the sick and the old and that domestic animals are frightened. So this is a very serious problem.
My Bill would limit the sale of fireworks to those in possession of a licence, the idea being that we would confine the firework sale or demonstration to official or semi-official displays. It is only in exceptional cases that fireworks would then be in the hands of a private individual, and then only of someone who could guarantee to provide the necessary safety and fire precautions. This is not a killjoy Bill. What it aims to do away with is the back garden fireworks which are so dangerous and replace them with more organised and far more enjoyable official displays.
1160
This attitude to the forbidding of the use of fireworks to the general public is not only mine. It is that of the Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents and of many medical men, particularly those who have had to deal with firework accidents. I have received many hundreds of letters supporting the Bill, many from medical people and organisations of this type.
What are the arguments against the Bill? The first which is often quoted is that it represents interference with personal liberty. If one followed this argument to its logical conclusion, one might as well let people set off explosions in their back gardens. The other arguments are those raised by the Home Office about administration, but if the Home Office can suggest some other mechanism to limit the sale of fireworks I should be only too happy to accept it.
The other argument is that people would provide themselves with home-made fireworks. But the experience in Eire and in the 30 American States where fireworks have been banned is that there is no incidence of firework accidents of that type.
So we are left with the old, simple argument of money. Who stands to lose under a Bill like this? The ordinary retailer does not stand to lose, his representatives say, because for him fireworks are a once-a-year sale which can be largely replaced by books or toys, but the manufacturers estimate that they will lose about £5 million a year, or 25 per cent. of their total sales. This is really the only argument against the Bill. It is the old argument of people versus profits: it is as simple as that. I am very pleased that an hon. Member opposite has chosen to oppose the Motion, because that will give the House the chance to show that it puts people before profits.
It is in this spirit and the hope that, even if the Bill does not make any progress, the Government will, between now and next 5th November, decide to take some drastic action in this respect to prevent another 2,000 accidents on that date—[Interruption.]
Mr. Speaker: Order. We cannot have pyrotechnics on a Ten-Minute Rule Bill.
Mr. Roberts: It is in the belief that people must be put first and that the spate of accidents caused by fireworks

1161
must be prevented that I commend the Motion to the House.
3.38 p.m.
Mr. James Allason: I agree with the hon. Member for Bedfordshire, South (Mr. Gwilym Roberts) on one of his points, namely, that it is necessary to consider the individual. He should consider the harmless enjoyment of large numbers of families who hold well-conducted firework displays without giving any trouble to anybody. Fireworks give a great deal of pleasure provided that there is proper control. Fireworks should be safe when they are properly handled, but if they are used recklessly or maliciously they can be offensive and most unpleasant. Equally, it is unwise to allow small children to handle fireworks without supervision.
This is not a reason for preventing family firework parties. The House must be impressed by the serious casualties which take place every year at the time of the November firework displays. We have compassion for every single injury, but surely we must keep matters in perspective.
For every million fireworks set off there are approximately three serious casualties. One would wish that that number did not occur at all, but strenuous efforts are made to try to reduce the amount of firework casualties. The British Firework Manufacturers' Safety Association was set up in 1962 and it has steadily attempted to reduce firework casualties. It is developing safer forms of fireworks. It goes in for a great deal of safety publicity during November. This year it intends to have advertisements with no reference to the firms entirely dealing with safety precautions, to appear in local papers on 5th November. Leaflets are contained in all boxes of fireworks to ensure that people understand how to let them off safely.
As a result, there has been a downward trend in the casualties since 1962, when the Association came into existence. Serious casualties are down by no fewer than 60 per cent. Regrettably, there was an upturn in 1968 in the less serious casualties, but the general trend is downward.
We can take for purposes of comparison home accidents which are something
1162
that the House should consider. In 1967, the last year for which I have figures, the number of deaths from poisoning was 1,307, from falls, 3,890; burns and scalds, 688; suffocation and choking, 583; and other causes of home accidents resulting in death, 641. But as for fireworks, no deaths at all. There must be an enormous number of casualties, serious and otherwise, which do not result in deaths from these causes. We do not hear very much about that aspect.
The hon. Member suggests that there should be licensing, which would imply that only public displays can take place. This means that there must be large-scale displays of set pieces. It is difficult 'to estimate how many would be required on 5th November. Each hon. Member would have to make his own calculation for his own constituency. In my own constituency between 20 and 30 experts would be required to let off the fireworks.
These experts simply do not exist. There are a small number of trained men who are capable of going all over the world and setting off the most wonderful firework displays, but to think that one can multiply that number by hundreds or thousands in order to achieve a similar capability is ludicrous. Remember that all the training that would be necessary is for one night of the year.
The consequence would be that inexpert people would let off displays of quite sophisticated fireworks. Figures have been quoted about public and semi-public displays. The number of casualties in that respect amounts to 15 per cent. of all casualties. However, the sales of fireworks which are used in the displays represent only 2 per cent. of the total. This appears to indicate that these types of firework are far more dangerous and that there might be a danger of greater injury rather than less in the case of organised displays. Two hundred and fifty years ago last night there was a gigantic firework display to celebrate the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle which, unfortunately, resulted in the wooden stands being set on fire and burning down, and the panic must have been considerable.
The hon. Member mentioned the encouragement of home-made fireworks which would result from this ban on home fireworks. He is a little optimistic if he thinks that that would not take place.

1163
Unfortunately, there are already a number of attempts to make home-made fireworks. From the very nature of the material commonly used in making a home-made firework, a dangerous article is produced and it often results in serious casualties.
The hon. Member for Smethwick (Mr. Faulds) asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, on 12th December, 1968, whether he would
"review the existing legislation governing the sale of fireworks in the light of his Department's study of firework casualties."
The Under-Secretary of State, now on the Front Bench, replied:
"During the period 1962 to 1967, the number of accidents has fallen by some 29 per cent. and the number of serious injuries by some two-thirds. The Home Office will keep safety precausions under continuous examination in consultation with the trade; safety
publicity will continue to be issued; and shopkeepers will again be reminded of their statutory obligations relating to sale and storage. I am not at present satisfied that proposals to amend the law would be justified."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 12th December, 1968: Vol. 775, c. 561.]
That is the Government's attitude.
I ask the House to reject this Motion, first, because it interferes with the harmless enjoyment of well-conducted family parties, and, secondly, because it would result in large-scale displays being organised by inexpert bands which would probably result in worse casualties.
Question put, pursuant to Standing Order No. 13 (Motions for leave to bring in Bills and nomination of Select Committees at commencement of Public Business):—
The House divided: Ayes 120, Noes 136.

Division No. 172.]

AYES

[3.39 p.m.

Ashton, Joe (Bassetlaw)

Huckfield, Leslie

Noel-Baker, Rt. Hn. Philip (Derby, S.)

Atkins, Ronald (Preston, N.)

Hughes, Emrys (Ayrshire, S.)

Oakes, Gordon

Atkinson, Norman (Tottenham)

Hughes, Roy (Newport)

Ogden, Eric

Barnes, Michael

Hynd, John

Orbach, Maurice

Barnett, Joel

Irvine, Sir Arthur (Edge Hill)

Orme, Stanley

Benn, Rt. Hn. Anthony Wedgwood

Janner, Sir Barnett

Oswald, Thomas

Bessell, Peter

Jeger, Mrs. Lena (H'b'n & St. P'cras, S.)

Owen, Dr. David (Plymouth, S'tn)

Bidwell, Sydney

Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)

Owen, Will (Morpeth)

Bishop, E. S.

Johnson, carol (Lewisham, S.)

Palmer, Arthur

Bottomley, Rt. Hn. Arthur

Jones, Dan (Burnley)

Parker, John (Dagenham)

Brown, R. W. (Shoreditch & F'bury)

Judd, Frank

Pavitt, Laurence

Carmichael, Neil

Kelley, Richard

Pearson, Arthur (Pontypridd)

Coleman, Donald

Kerr, Mrs. Anne (R'ter & Chatham)

Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred

Dalyell, Tam

Kerr, Russell (Feltham)

Perry, George H. (Nottingham, S.)

Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)

Leadbitter, Ted

Prentice, Rt. Hn. R. E.

Davies, Rt. Hn. Harold (Leek)

Lee, Rt. Hn. Frederick (Newton)

Price, Christopher (Perry Barr)

Delargy, Hugh

Lestor, Miss Joan

Probert, Arthur

Dickens, James

Lever, Harold (Cheetham)

Rankin, John

Dobson, Ray

Lipton, Marcus

Roberts, Rt. Hn. Goronwy

Doig, Peter

Lomas, Kenneth

Roberts, Gwilym (Bedfordshire, S.)

Driberg, Tom

Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.)

Robertson, John (Paisley)

Dunwoody, Mrs. Gwyneth (Exeter)

McBride, Neil

Rose, Paul

Dunwoody, Dr. John (F'th & C'b'e)

McCann, John

Rowlands, E.

Ellis, John

McKay, Mrs. Margaret

Shaw, Arnold (Ilford, S.)

Evans, Fred (Caerphilly)

Mackie, John

Sheldon, Robert

Evans, Ioan L. (Birm'h'm, Yardley)

Maclennan, Robert

Steel, David (Roxburgh)

Fletcher, Raymond (Ilkeston)

McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.)

Summerskill, Hn. Dr. Shirley

Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)

McNamara, J. Kevin

Thomas, Rt. Hn. George

Foot, Michael (Ebbw Vale)

Mahon, Peter (Preston, S.)

Thornton, Ernest

Foster, Sir John

Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield, E.)

Thorpe, Rt. Hn. Jeremy

Freeson, Reginald

Manuel, Archie

Urwin, T. W.

Galpern, Sir Myer

Mapp, Charles

Wallace, George

Garrett, W. E.

Marks, Kenneth

Watkins, Tudor (Brecon & Radnor)

Ginsburg, David

Mayhew, Christopher

Wilkins, W. A.

Gray, Dr. Hugh (Yarmouth)

Mendelson, John

Wilson, William (Coventry, S.)

Griffiths, Eddie (Brightside)

Mikardo, Ian

Winstanley, Dr. M. P.

Griffiths, Rt. Hn. James (Llanelly)

Miller, Dr. M. S.

Woodburn, Rt. Hn. A.

Hamilton, James (Bothwell)

Molloy, William

Hannan, William

Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)

TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

Herbison, Rt. Hn. Margaret

Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)

Mr. Albert Booth and

Hobden, Dennis

Newens, Stan

Mr. Edwin Brooks.

Hooley, Frank

NOES

Astor, John

Baker, W. H. K. (Banff)

Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torquay)

Atkins, Humphrey (M't'n & M'd'n)

Balniel, Lord

Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gos. & Fhm)

Bacon, Rt. Hn. Alice

Bell, Ronald

Biggs-Davison, John

Black, Sir Cyrll

Hastings, Stephen

Nott, John

Blaker, Peter

Hiley, Joseph

Orr, Capt. L. P. S.

Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hn. John

Hirst, Geoffrey

Osborne, Sir Cyrll (Louth)

Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. Sir Walter

Hogg, Rt. Hn. Quintin

Peel, John

Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)

Holland, Philip

Peyton, John

Bryan, Paul

Hordern, Peter

Pink, R. Bonner

Buchanan, Smith, Alick (Angus, N & M)

Howell, David (Guildford)

Price, David (Eastleigh)

Burden, F. A.

Howell, Denis (Small Heath)

Pym, Francis

Campbell, B. (Oldham, W.)

Hunter, Adam

Rawlinson, Rt. Hn. Sir Peter

Campbell, Gordon (Moray & Nairn)

Hutchison, Michael Clark

Rees, Merlyn

Carlisle, Mark

Iremonger, T. L.

Renton, Rt. Hn. Sir David

Channon, H. P. G.

Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)

Ridley, Hn. Nicholas

Chichester-Clark, R.

Jenkin, Patrick (Woodford)

Rodgers, Sir John (Sevenoaks)

Cordle, John

Jennings, J. C. (Burton)

Roebuck, Roy

Crawshaw, Richard

Kerby, Capt. Henry

Russell, Sir Ronald

Currie, G. B. H.

King, Evelyn (Dorset, S.)

Scott-Hopkins, James

Dance, James

Kitson, Timothy

Sharples, Richard

Davidson, James (Aberdeenshire, W.)

Lambton, Viscount

Sinclair, Sir George

d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry

Lancaster, col. C. G.

Smith, John (London & W'minster)

Dempsey, James

Langford-Holt, Sir John

Speed, Keith

Dodds-Parker, Douglas

Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry

Stoddart-Scott, col. Sir M.

Doughty, Charles

Lloyd, Rt. Hn. Geoffrey (Sut'n C'd field)

Tapsell, Peter

Drayson, G. B.

Lloyd, Ian (P'tsm'th, Langetone)

Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)

Eden, Sir John

Longden, Gilbert

Taylor, Edward M. (G'gow, Cathcart)

Edwards, William (Merioneth)

Lubbock, Eric

Thatcher, Mrs. Margaret

Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)

MacArthur, Ian

Tinn, James

Elliott, R. W. (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, N.)

Mackenzie, Alasdair (Ross & Crom'ty)

Vaughan-Morgan, Rt. Hn. Sir John

Emery, Peter

Macmillan, Maurice (Farnham)

Vickers, Dame Joan

English, Michael

McNair-Wilson, M. (Walthamstow, E.)

Wainwright, Richard (Coine Valley)

Eyre, Reginald

Maginnis, John E.

Walker-Smith, Rt. Hn. Sir Derek

Fisher, Nigel

Marten, Neil

Walters, Dennis

Glover, Sir Douglas

Maude, Angus

Weatherill, Bernard

Glyn, Sir Richard

Mawby, Ray

Whitelaw, Rt. Hn. William

Goodhew, Victor

Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J.

Wiggin, A. W.

Gower, Raymond

Millan, Bruce

Williams, Donald (Dudley)

Grant, Anthony

Mills, Stratton (Belfast, N.)

Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)

Grant-Ferris, R.

Monro, Hector

Worsley, Marcus

Griffiths, Eldon (Bury St. Edmunds)

Morgan, Geraint (Denbigh)

Wylie, N. R.

Grimond, Rt. Hn. J.

Morrison, Charles (Devizes)

Younger, Hn. George

Hall, John (Wycombe)

Munro-Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh

Hall-Davis, A. G. F.

Murray, Albert

TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

Hamilton, Lord (Fermanagh)

Nabarro, Sir Gerald

Mr. James Allason and

Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)

Neave, Airey

Mr. Oscar Murton.

Haseldine, Norman

Nicholls, Sir Harmar

POST OFFICE BILL

As amended (in the Standing Committee), considered.

3.50 p.m.

Mr. Speaker: As is my custom, and after much cogitation this time, I have posted my selection of Amendments. The first one that we shall be taking is new Clause 1.

Brought up, and read the First time.
The Postmaster-General (Mr. John Stonehouse): I beg to move, That the Clause be read a Second time.
Mr. Speaker: With the new Clause, I suggest that we take sub-Amendments (a) in line 1, leave out from '(1)' to 'before' and insert:
1168
'The Post Office shall require the Minister's approval
(b) In line 1, leave out 'a subsidiary of its' and insert 'any of its subsidiaries'.
(c) In line 6, leave out 'it shall similarly be requisite' and insert:
'the Minister's approval shall also be required'.

1169
(d) In line 15, leave out 'subsection' and insert 'section'.
(e) In line 22, leave out 'in such manner as he thinks fit'.
(f) In line 25, leave out 'subsection (1)' and insert 'subsections (1) and (2)'.
(g) To leave out lines 37 to 39.
Amendment No. 23, in page 6, line 38, leave out 'construct, manufacture, produce,'.
Amendment No. 25, in page 7, line 9, at end add:
(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section the postal and telecommunications services operated by the Post Office shall remain in what is commonly called public ownership.
and Amendment No. 60, in page 13, line 29, leave out Clause 13.
Mr. Paul Bryan: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. May I give notice that, in addition to voting against the Clause, we shall probably want to vote against sub-Amendment (a)?
Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman must ask whether Mr. Speaker will allow a separate vote against sub-Amendment (a).
Mr. Bryan: I apologise, Mr. Speaker. May I humbly ask whether we may have a separate vote on sub-Amendment (a)?
Mr. Speaker: It is not necessary for the hon. Gentleman to ask humbly. However, I had been given notice of this request and I have given it consideration. I am prepared to allow a separate Division on sub-Amendment (a) when we come to it.
Mr. John Peyton: Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. May I draw your attention to sub-Amendment (b)? Your careful perusal of the Bill will have caused you to notice, I do not doubt, at various intervals the occurrence of the objectionable phrase "a subsidiary"—
Mr. Speaker: Order. We are not debating sub-Amendment (b) at the moment. The hon. Gentleman may debate it when we come to the debate on the Clause and the Amendments, of which this is one.
Mr. Peyton: Mr. Speaker, I was appealing to your mercy that, despite the fact that this is only a drafting Amend-
1170
ment, the phraseology concerned is so abominable that I hope that you will be indulgent enough to permit a separate Division on this one as well.
Mr. Speaker: News of the hon. Gentleman's view had reached me. I have given it consideration, but, unless something terrific happens, I am not prepared to allow a Division on sub-Amendment (b).
Mr. Tom Driberg: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. You have not selected my sub-Amendment (h), to leave out lines 1 to 36 and insert:
'The Post Office and any of its subsidiaries shall, after consultation with the Minister, have power to construct, manufacture, or produce, for and relevant purpose, things of any kind to an extent which may be necessary in the public interest at any time, and to engage in any activities related thereto; and shall further have power to construct, manufacture, produce, or purchase for supply to outside persons things for use by such persons otherwise than in connection with services provided by the Post Office or a subsidiary of its;'.
However, since it stands on the Notice Paper and may be read by hon. Members, perhaps I might be allowed to point out two misprints.
The first of them makes nonsense of one line of the sub-Amendment. In the third line, the first word "and" should be "any". The second misprint relates to—new Clause 6—(Questions to the Minister)—which is shown on the Notice Paper to be supported by a number of my hon. Friends. The same names should appear before my sub-Amendment (h), but were omitted owing to a misunderstanding.
Mr. Speaker: The hon. Gentleman has raised what is almost an academic point. He wants the wording of an Amendment which is not selected to be corrected. HANSARD will note that, and I imagine that it will emerge from the debate on new Clause 6, since some of the hon. Members whose names were omitted from his sub-Amendment will want to speak in it. However, it will not affect sub-Amendment (h), because that has not been selected.
4.0 p.m.
Mr. Stonehouse: I think that it will be useful to the House if I paint in the background and the context in which the new Clause is being considered.
The Post Office is engaged in a tremendous and dynamic expansion programme.

1171
About eight or nine years ago the investment programme was under £100 million a year. Last year, the investment programme reached £333 million. Next year, this will rise to £360 million. This tremendous programme has largely been successful because of the excellent co-operation that has been established between the Post Office and its main suppliers.
The expansion has, however, meant that in certain areas there has been a shortage of supplies and delay in supplying equipment, which has been somewhat embarrassing to us. The Post Office accepts partial responsibility for this, because the enormous expansion in the programme has meant that suppliers have had to gear themselves to it in a very short time indeed.
The expansion programme for the current five years is even more dramatic in its impact. During these five years we are spending £2,000 million on development of the old, and, indeed, a new, communications system in Britain. This is double what was spent during the previous five years which, in turn, was double what was spent during the five years before that. So the House will appreciate that the expansion programme is dynamic, that it is greater than any other Administration have engaged upon, and that it will provide a tremendously successful communications system in Britain.
Of the £2,000 million about £660 million—about a third of the total—will be spent on exchange equipment and about £340 million will be spent on trunk and junction circuits. It is obvious that if the Post Office is to successfully implement this immense development programme it must have a smooth flow of equipment from the suppliers. As I have said, we have a very friendly and co-operative arrangement with our main suppliers, so we hope to achieve that.
The Clause will give the new Post Office Corporation reserve powers in case it becomes clear, in course of time, that the major and minor suppliers of equipment that the Post Office requires, are unable to supply the quality of equipment at the price that the Post Office is willing and feels able to pay. The suppliers of the Post Office, through a series of amalgamations, could establish a virtual
1172
monopoly position. In that event, the Post Office would be faced with the stark choice of having to buy at an excessive price from a monopoly supplier, or buying its essential supplies from abroad. In these circumstances, the Post Office would consider establishing manufacturing facilities for its own supplies.
This is a reserve power. It is not the intention of the Post Office at this point of time or, indeed, during the next year or so, to enter into any such manufacturing investment, because it is satisfied with the relationship that has been established with its main suppliers. But it is essential for the Post Office Corporation, in its new commercial rôle, to have the power to establish manufacturing facilities to meet its own requirements. The Clause is designed to give the Post Office that power.
Under subsection (1) the Post Office would have to consult with the Minister before any development of its facilities was embarked upon. This is a very important safeguard, because it will enable the Minister to consult the other Departments concerned, particularly the Ministry of Technology, which is the sponsoring Ministry for the supplying firms. It ensures that the supplying firms are not faced with a fait accompli decision on the part of the Post Office, but will have time to adjust themselves to any change in plans by the G.P.O. The consultation will also enable the sponsoring Minister, if he so wishes, to join in the discussions between the Post Office and its main supplying firms to iron out any problems of principle that may exist between them.
Last week, I met a deputation from the C.B.I. to discuss this very question. I undertook to the C.B.I. that before the Post Office Corporation is set up—we hope on 1st October next—the Postmaster-General will meet it and the new board of the Corporation to discuss the kind of problems that could arise in the interpretation of the new Clause if the House sees fit to pass it.
Moving on to subsection (2), the House will notice a distinction between the treatment of supplies for internal requirements and supplies for persons outside the Post Office. In this case we believe that not only should the Minister be consulted, but that the Minister's approval must be provided before the Post

1173
Office enters into the construction, manufacture, production or purchase for supply to persons outside. This is important to control the activities of the Post Office in diversification for supply outside its normal range of activities.
Under subsection (3) we undertake to allow the Minister to publish, in such manner as he thinks fit, particulars of any approval given under subsection (2) and to send these details to the C.B.I. and to the T.U.C.
Subsection (4) provides that any activities in which the Post Office engages under subsection (2) shall be carried out
"as if it were a company engaged in a commercial enterprise, and it shall so exercise its control over a subsidiary of its that carries on any such activities as to ensure that the subsidiary so acts."
This is to ensure that there is no possible doubt that the Post Office Corporation is not engaging in cross subsidisation of activities in supplying persons outside the G.P.O.
The House will realise that, as the Post Office is being given sharp financial objectives, it would be unwilling to enter into manufacturing activities unless it was sorely pressed to do so. It would naturally prefer to obtain its major supplies from well-established outside suppliers, because it is reasonable to expect that they would be obtained at the cheapest price in those circumstances. If the Post Office were to engage in a large-scale investment programme to meet its own requirements, it would no doubt have to incur a greater expense in production than by buying from outside. I emphasise that this is essentially a reserve power. There is no intention at this time of the Post Office establishing any large-scale production facilities.
There are other subsidiary points I should like to draw out here, not only in relation to the major supplies to which the Clause is applied, but which can also apply to relatively minor pieces of equipment required by the Post Office and which are absolutely essential to the fulfilment of its responsibilities. If the Post Office is not able to get its supplies from existing suppliers on the time scale required, it will be able quickly, and with the minimum amount of bureaucratic delay, to set up the facilities required. As the Post Office has these broad financial objectives which it must meet, it is un-
1174
likely that it would want to carry on such activities unless it was essential for it to do so.
The House may be concerned about the extent of Ministerial control over these activities. I am sure that hon. Members are aware of the dangers, which were discussed in Committee, of cross-subsidisation between the various activities within the Corporation. The Government are anxious to ensure that the Post Office does not engage in cross-subsidisation, and that is why, in the last White Paper "Post Office Prospects 1969–70", the uneconomic services of the Post Office were fully identified. It was done so that it would be easy for the public, and for the Post Office itself, to note the activities which involved a loss, and to which special attention must be paid. It obviously would be unwise for manufacturing activities in the Post Office to be carried on at an uneconomic rate which would inevitably be a burden on the consumers of the main services of the Post Office who would have to pay more for those services to subsidise manufacturing activities which could be carried on outside.
It is not the intention of the Clause to encourage that sort of activity. The intention is to enable the Post Office to set up its own manufacturing facilities to obtain supplies if, in the circumstances which I have been describing, it requires either major supplies or minor equipment which it cannot obtain from outside at a fair price, and within the time-scale that they are required.
Mr. Edward M. Taylor: How does the right hon. Gentleman envisage preventing cross-subsidisation within the manufacturing concern if part of the market is repair and maintenance, for which there is a guaranteed market, and part is new work in which it is in direct competition? How can the right hon. Gentleman prevent overheads being heaped on to repair and maintenance?
Mr. Stonehouse: The Minister will be able to call for information about those activities. As the Post Office will have sharp financial objectives placed upon it, it will naturally be most unwilling to have uneconomic activities carried on either in the factories or in the procurement of the supplies which I have been describing.

1175
I think that the Post Office will be given a dynamic and commercially objective board. There will be no anxiety for the Post Office to engage in activities which are a drain on its resources. I appreciate that in some parts of the supplying industry there may be some concern about this Clause, but I am satisfied that in all the circumstances the Clause provides the best way of meeting the requirements of the Post Office Corporation, which we expect to be fully commercial in the way it does its job. It must be able to obtain the supplies that it requires, particularly the essential equipment that it needs to meet its obligations. It must also be able to get these supplies at a fair price. It must be given the powers embodied in the Clause if it is to fulfil all the obligations put upon it.
Several Hon. Members rose—
Mr. Speaker: Order. May I remind the House that there are many debates ahead of us on the Bill, and that reasonably brief speeches will help.
4.15 p.m.
Mr. Bryan: The Postmaster-General started by saying that he intended to explain the background to the Clause. For the first five minutes of his speech he proceeded to throw a shower of irrelevant sand in our eyes in the form of investment statistics over the next few years. I should like to explain what I consider to be the background to the Clause, and I believe that it will be a background more easily recognisable by those who sat in the Committee upstairs.
I think that my explanation might possibly provide the reason why the Postmaster-General delivered his speech without his usual elan; why he adopted a rather embarrassed, shamefaced sheepish attitude. The right hon. Gentleman is short of friends. The last time he made a major speech from that Box he did so without one hon. Member on the benches behind him. In Committee his troops constantly deserted him, and time and again we had to keep a quorum.
Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Member will not be out of order if he speaks to the Question, That the Clause be read a Second time.
Mr. Bryan: Mr. Speaker, it was at that moment that I was coming to the Clause.
1176
It was when we came to Clause 13 in Committee that the right hon. Gentleman's supporters voted against him, and we saved the situation. The right hon. Gentleman could not face that situation on the Floor of the House. We have not heard a word about Clause 13, and yet this Clause is supposed to take its place. I am sure that nobody on either side will deny that. Tucked away on page 3870 of the Notice Paper we find an Amendment to leave out Clause 13.
The right hon. Gentleman has run away from the position. He has not retired in the face of a devastating argument in debate. In fact, in Committee there was only one speech of any length, let alone of any merit, on this subject, and yet the right hon. Gentleman ran for cover at about the same speed, and against about the same scale of danger, as another Minister scurried away from the Anguillans.
Clause 7 is vitally linked with this Clause, because it is this Clause which puts the restrictions on Clause 7. One has only to look at Clause 7 to see why these restrictions are necessary. That Clause gives the most enormous powers to the Postmaster-General. It gives him the normal powers for postal services, communication services, the giro, and so on, but it also gives him power to run computers. It gives him powers about which many people do not know. It gives him the power to construct, manufacture, produce, purchase, take on hire or hire purchase, install, maintain and repair anything that is required for the purpose of the Corporation's business. It also gives power to construct and manufacture for others, to provide consultancy services, to acquire land—
Mr. Maurice Orbach: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Are we discussing the new Clause, or the Second Reading of the Bill?
Mr. Speaker: The Chair will call the hon. Member to order when he is out of order.
Mr. Bryan: The Clause gives the Minister power to acquire securities. It sets out the scale on which the Corporation can invest in other things. The Corporation can become almost an I.R.C. in its own right. The Clause talks about all sorts of other strange happenings, such as carrying for hire or reward passengers

1177
in vehicles, providing hostels and houses, and making loans.
It would be fairly frightening to give those powers to any Corporation, but when they are being given to a Socialist Minister the whole situation becomes even more terrifying. Under the Bill we are losing a tremendous amount of parliamentary accountability. As the last Postmaster-General but one said, the Corporation will be "freed of the apron strings of Parliament". In other words there will be no Questions, and so on, and if this Corporation is to be presided over by a Socialist Minister we need an even closer examination of these powers than would otherwise be the case.
I think that it was the hon. Member for Glasgow, Provan (Mr. Hugh D. Brown) who was instrumental in changing Clause 1 for the old Clause 13. The hon. Gentleman quoted from "Labour and the Scientific Revolution", which said:
".. these new organisations must be ready to go beyond the research and development stage … They must be free to engage in production in their own establishments … The State, local authorities and nationalised industries must also be prepared to create undertakings in which new products and modern management techniques can be pioneered. These publicly owned or jointly owned enterprises will be particularly appropriate in those sections of British Industry where the public sector is the dominant purchaser."
Then quoting, as a number of hon. Members opposite have quoted, the last Postmaster-General but two, he said:
"Unless you give the Post Office, with its vast resources and enormous rate of growth the kind of freedom and the right to enterprise now enjoyed by other nationalised industries, it is simply not going to be possible to develop its resources to the full."
From what I have read today it is absolutely obvious that some kind of safeguard against these powers was certainly required. That safeguard was provided in the Bill as it stands now by Clause 13. The great factor of that Clause is in its very first sentence:
"except under an authorisation in that behalf granted by the Minister the Post Office shall not

(a) manufacture for the purposes of its business …

(b) manufacture for supply to outside persons …"

I will not go into further details except to underline that these things could be
1178
done only under authorisation. When we debated this upstairs and this was duly passed we found it completely satisfactory. In short, the restriction on the manufacturing powers of the Post Office and its subsidiaries seemed to be contained there in a thoroughly satisfactory way. But it was the hon. Member for Cirencester and Tewkesbury (Mr. Ridley), who very often is the first to suspect things, who suspected the possibility that there was a snag in this. He raised the question with the Postmaster-General, who wrote him a long letter which was much quoted in the Committee because it took a very important part in our considerations.
Mr. Peyton: I would ask my hon. Friend whether that letter is generally available. As far as I am aware from reading the OFFICIAL REPORT it was not quoted, at any rate in full. Could my hon. Friend say whether the Minister has ever offered to make it available? It is very difficult for hon. Members on this side of the House who did not have the privilege of being on the Standing Committee to participate in the discussion when we have not the essential material in front of us.
Mr. Bryan: I am under the impression that the letter was circulated to all members of the Committee upstairs, Mr. Speaker, but I cannot go further as to what has happened.
Mr. Peyton: Would my hon. Friend read the letter?
Mr. Bryan: Since there has been a strong demand for me to read the letter out I will read the relevant passages.
Mr. Speaker: I would remind the House of what I said at the beginning, that this is the first of many debates on the Bill.
Mr. Bryan: I do this advisedly and after careful thought because I believe that this is a very important factor in our debate.
In his letter which was, in fact, a description of the manufacturing processes of the Post Office, the Postmaster-General said to my hon. Friend the Member for Cirencester and Tewkesbury:
"In the first place, the Post Office Factories Division, although it is primarily a research organisation, has for many years done small

1179
scale manufacturing work in its eight factories. The total number of staff … employed on manufacturing work at the moment is about 400. The total expenditure in these factories on manufacturing, including overheads, in the last full financial year was £1½ million. There may possibly be a small expansion of this work between now and the Vesting Day of the new Corporation but in terms of value it would be unlikely to take the total above about £2 million per annum. The manufacturing work which these factories do is of a kind closely allied to their primary experience in the repair field. They make spare parts for obsolete equipment.… They do occasionally tender in competition with, and on the same basis as, outside industry for small orders for things which outside industry makes."
The right hon. Gentleman goes on in the next paragraph to speak about research at Dollis Hill and the manufacture of electronic repeaters; and he ends by saying:
"We buy and supply hearing aids on behalf of the Department of Health and Social Security (of the order of £½ million worth per annum. … We also sell souvenirs at the shop in the Post Office Tower."
The whole atmosphere of the letter is shown by the way the Postmaster-General ends:
"If there is any more we can do to help please do not hesitate to let me know."
But he was also hoping that this information would quieten the hon. Gentleman.
My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Down, South (Captain Orr) received a similar letter on the 29th January, similarly playing down the whole manufacturing operation of the Post Office. If this was meant to pull the wool over our eyes it certainly succeeded in doing so. When it came to the debate my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Down, South, who had received these letters, said:
"I had expected that I should have to say a great deal on this Clause. … But the Postmaster-General very promptly produced what I requested. The information is contained in a letter which he sent me. All members of the Committee have copies. I should like the Assistant Postmaster-General to tell his right hon. Friend how much I appreciate that. It has been exceedingly useful and it will save a great deal in debating time on the Clause."
That is precisely what it is. These two letters completely cut down the debate for these very good reasons. My hon. Friend the Member for Totnes (Mr. Mawby) made remarks in exactly the
1180
same tone, but did not develop his speech further. What happened—this is why this letter is so relevant—is that the whole of the debate upstairs was cut short by what has turned out to be a subterfuge. Following that, we got the Assistant Postmaster-General—because for obviously good reasons the Postmaster-General was not present that day.
Let me quote what the Assistant Postmaster-General said, for it is very important:
"The hon. Member for Totnes (Mr. Mawby) who opened the debate, asked for an undertaking on the Government's intention about manufacturing by the Post Office. I cannot do better than remind him of what my right hon. Friend said in the debate on Clause 7."
He quoted that at length, but on this very point the Assistant Postmaster-General said:
"This is why we are taking the detailed powers in Clause 13.
Before we agree to a substantial extension, the Government would give the most careful thought to all the factors involved. It is these repercussions of industry which made it impossible for the Government at this juncture to accept the New Clause 1."
What happened to those consultations?
"The Government's function could be reduced by that new Clause to consultation, whereas we believe that in this case the decision must remain with the Government."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing Committee D, 30th January, 1969; c. 528, 553–4.]
What has happened to those considerations, which seemed so powerful to the Assistant Postmaster-General on that day?
We come to the new Clause which, although one would not be aware of it from the Postmaster-General's speech, is the replacement of, the surrender, to the whole of Clause 13. The new Clause is half the length of the old and has less than half of its reassurance. The key difference between the two is that whereas we talked of authorisation in Clause 13, this time the Clause starts with the words:
"Consultation with the Minister by the Post Office shall be requisite before it or a subsidiary …"
In fact, there is always to be consultation. What kind of safeguard can that possibly be in comparison with the Clause 13 which we passed upstairs? It really means that the Post Office can do exactly what it likes. What is the Postmaster-General going to do if, after consultation, the Post Office says, "We do not mind.

1181
We shall make something if we want to do so"? If I am wrong in assuming this, I would like to know from the Postmaster-General what is the reason for this change.
4.30 p.m.
In his assurances to us the Postmaster-General said at one stage:
"It certainly is not the intention that the Post Office should be engaging, in its own right and separate from the main activities of the Post Office, in a whole range of activities which take it well out of the spheres which we discussed under Clause 7(1)."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing Committee D, 12th December, 1968; c. 297.]
How can the right hon. Gentleman give that assurance any more, because the Post Office will make what it wants, no matter what assurances the right hon. Gentleman gives to us. So the new Clause is in every way unsatisfactory to us.
Subsection (a) says:
"the approval of the Minister may be given for the purposes of this subsection subject to such conditions (if any) as he may deem fit."
Will the Minister give us an idea of under what conditions he thinks he may deem things fit? Subsection (3) says:
"The Minister shall publish, in such manner as he thinks fit, particulars of any approval given under the last foregoing subsection by him, and shall send them to the Confederation of British Industry and the Trades Union Congress."
Why is this information not to be sent to both Houses of Parliament?
As you said, Mr. Speaker, many hon. Members will want to speak on the Clause. The Postmaster-General is no doubt pleased with the reaction that will come from the Government benches to his surrender. The P.O.E.U. pamphlet says:
"The Union had gained its point by the P.M.G.'s concession re Clause 13 of the Bill; it must now campaign strongly to persuade the P.O. to make maximum use of their new manufacturing powers … The Union urges the P.O.:

(a) to extend its repair facilities;

(b) to build new factories in the development areas;

(c) to purchase a controlling interest in existing firms.

The Union suggests that the P.O. should concentrate on the manufacture of electronic equipment."
The Postmaster-General has at last got some friends, but he has certainly chosen a not very gallant way to buy them.
Several Hon. Members rose—
Mr. Tom Boardman: On a point of order. I seek your guidance, Mr. Deputy Speaker, on a point which I had intended to raise on the Amendments to Clause 7. However, as Clause 7 and new Clause 1 are so closely linked, it is perhaps right that I should raise it now and that you should direct me on whether this is the appropriate time.
The point which I wish to raise is how these new powers—they are new powers, because the Postmaster-General made it clear that the new Clause, coupled with Clause 13, would give him new powers to enter into new business—can be reconciled with the Long Title of the Bill. The Long Title refers to the abolition of
"the office of master of the Post Office".
There is nothing there to do with manufacturing.
Then the Long Title speaks of distributing
"the business conducted by the holder thereof amongst authorities constituted for the purpose and"
the making of
"provision consequential on the abolition of that office".
There is nothing there to do with the new business of manufacturing.
Then the Long Title says:
"and the distribution of the business so conducted; to amend, replace or repeal certain provisions of the enactments relating to posts, telegraphs and savings banks".
Again, there is nothing there to do with the new business of manufacturing; nor does the Amendment of the law relating to stamp duty or the disposal of interest in the shares of Cable and Wireless Limited have anything to do with the new business of manufacturing.
If I rightly understood the Postmaster-General to say that he required these new powers to carry on the new business and additional business of manufacturing facilities, how can this be reconciled with the Long Title? Perhaps you will give me your guidance, Mr. Deputy Speaker, on whether this is the right time to raise this point and, if it is, allow me to develop my argument.
Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Harry Gourlay): I am obliged for the detailed manner in which the hon. Gentleman has

1183
raised his point of order. The Clause is in order and is in compliance with the Long Title of the Bill.
Mr. Driberg: I agree with two things, at any rate, that have so far been said from the other side. I agree strongly with the point which was made about accountability. Although I think that any prolonged discussion of accountability would not be in order on this new Clause, I hope that on new Clause 6 right hon. and hon. Members opposite who are interested in accountability will vote for that new Clause, to which some of my hon. Friends and myself have put our names.
Secondly, I agree very much also with the—I suppose—semantic point made on a point of order earlier by the hon. Member for Yeovil (Mr. Peyton), who queried this peculiarily uncouth and ugly locution, "its". I am slightly ashamed to say that I included the locution in my own sub-Amendment to the new Clause—which has not been selected—because, in my innocence, I thought that it must be some obligatory law of Parliamentary draftsmanship nowadays. I am very glad if it is not, because I agree entirely with the hon. Member who thought it appalling.
Apart from that, I do not agree with anything which has been said by hon. Members so far. I am not at all as happy about my right hon. Friend the Postmaster-General as hon. Members opposite seem to think that we on this side should be. Of course, the new Clause is a considerable improvement on Clause 13, which will vanish in due course; but to my mind it does not go nearly far enough. It is still hedged about with apologetic qualifications. I thought that my right hon. Friend was also a bit too apologetic in his speech. He should not be frightened of the stage army opposite. It is not his business to reassure them or to defer to the evil outside interests of these great monopoly or quasi-monopolistic corporations of which he is, unfortunately, the best contomer.
It is not the function of the party to which my right hon. Friend and I belong, and it ought not to be the function of any Socialist Government with guts, if I may quote a phrase used eloquently last
1184
week from these benches by a newcomer, to reassure these massive industrial giants which have been exploiting the people for so long. It is our function either to take them over into common ownership, or, if necessary, gradually to squeeze them out of existence. The more that the Post Office can do in that way, by manufacturing its own goods and the goods that it can supply to other people, in accordance with the half-hearted, hedged-about proposals in the new Clause, the better. None of us on these benches loves G.E.C. and Co. as hon. Members opposite naturally do: that is their métier. It is not ours. I beg the Postmaster-General to be a little more defiant of the interests represented opposite and less apologetic.
In any case, even pragmatically these giant industries which he appears to be so anxious to appease are not doing their job effectively. Much of the chaos which we all know exists in the telephone service, for instance, may be attributable to the very inadequate and unsatisfactory record of delivery dates by these supposedly efficient giants of private industry.
That is all I want to say. I wanted to make only a short speech, in accordance with Mr. Speaker's request; and I hope that all other hon. Members who speak will make short speeches. Inadequate as it is, we support the new Clause as a slight gesture in the right direction.
Mr. Peyton: My joy at hearing the hon. Member for Barking (Mr. Driberg) supporting me in one Amendment which I shall come to in a moment was somewhat diluted by the further content of his speech.
We are in some difficulty. My hon. Friend the Member for Howden (Mr. Bryan) referred very properly to two letters which were sent to members of the Standing Committee and which, we are told by my hon. Friend, considerably and substantially influenced the course of discussion in Committee.
I have always objected to communications by Ministers to individual Members without their being widely circulated. I accept that the Minister did his best for the Standing Committee. But what about the House? A number of us did not have the privilege of serving on the Standing Committee and our enjoyment of the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Howden was tempered

1185
by our not having an essential document before us. Ministers should be careful when circulating documents to committees to ensure that those documents find a place on the record so that others who subsequently take part in a discussion on the same point may be fully versed in what has gone before.
My hon. Friend the Member for Howden used some fairly strong words. He said that this manoeuvre had pulled the wool over the eyes of members of the Standing Committee. He went on to denounce it as a subterfuge. That brought not the slightest reaction, physical or mental, from the Postmaster-General, or the Assistant Postmaster-General, which was very odd. Even the Government react slightly when faced with subterfuges of this kind, and I am sorry that the right hon. Gentleman was so heavily weighed down by his conscience that, clearly, he was confessing that an answer was not available.
I pass to a remark which the Postmaster-General made. He prophesied that the Post Office would provide a tremendously successful communications system. My experience on the telephone this morning in trying to make one or two local calls leaves me with a feeling that the right hon. Gentleman was talking of the future. I only hope that his prophecy will be fulfilled.
Mr. R. F. H. Dobson: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that a lot of telephone equipment is still on order and is not being supplied by the manufacturers whom he is apparently supporting?
Mr. Peyton: For the hon. Gentleman's benefit, may I point out that I am not supporting anybody. I am dealing with the Clause. If he wants to engage in an argument, I suppose that I should go outside and try to inform myself of the situation from the manufacturers who are so criticised by the hon. Gentleman. I have a feeling that they may have some reply to make on their own behalf. For instance, they might allege that ordering had not be carried out efficiently and that the forward planning was not adequate. I did not propose to go into that point. The Postmaster-General clearly said that there was fault on both sides. That seems to take the rug from under the feet of the hon. Gentleman.
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The Postmaster-General said that the powers in the new Clause were simply reserve powers. I endorse what my hon. Friend the Member for Howden said: we should be very careful before giving such powers to Socialist Ministers. When they say, "We shall not use them", our natural reaction should not be sleepily to lean back and say, "Have them on the basis that you will not use them". If they do not wish to use them, they should not have them.
Mr. Stonehouse: The hon. Gentleman must understand that it is proposed to give these reserve powers to the Post Office Corporation and not to the Minister. That is the whole point of the new Clause.
4.45 p.m.
Mr. Peyton: I understand that. One of the Minister's famous sentences is that the Corporation will be freed from the apron strings of Parliament. How much more careful and jealous should we be of conferring such reserve powers on a Corporation over which, admittedly, Parliament will have abdicated a great deal of control?
I very much regret that the Postmaster-General has not seen fit to put in the Bill the limitations on these reserve powers which one might expect. One of my Amendments proposes that the approval of the Minister shall be obtained before
"the Post Office … constructs, manufactures or produces … things of any kind to an extent substantially greater than that to which the Postmaster-General constructed, manufactured or produced, for the corresponding purpose …"
The necessity to obtain the Minister's approval would provide some safeguard before the Post Office exercised the powers given in subsection (1) of the new Clause.
The Postmaster-General said that the Post Office would be unwilling to undertake manufacture unless it was sorely pressed to do so. One of the main anxieties of many of my hon. Friends is that the pressures on nationalised industries are not as sore or as heavy as those on private industry. It is easy for a statutory corporation of this kind, with the encouragement of a complacent Minister, to increase its activities to an unhealthy and dangerous extent.
The Postmaster-General referred to the sharp financial objectives put before the

1187
Post Office. It is constantly said by Government Departments that the financial objectives put before nationalised industries are sharp and very burdensome. I do not believe, and I have never believed—this is one reason why I oppose the system of nationalisation—that it is possible to find a form of discipline to take the place of the pressure of shareholders. The Government may say that it is inadequate, but it is a form of healthy pressure on privately-owned companies which is totally lacking in nationalised industries. The sharp financial objectives about which the right hon. Gentleman spoke will not cut very deep.
I will not weary the House by dealing at length—[Interruption.] I am not sure whether the hon. Member for Stockport, South (Mr. Orbach) wishes to intervene. I congratulate him on the splendid way in which he chooses to advance the passage of the Bill. However, it is not normally considered to be a successful way of intervening.
Mr. Orbach: I cannot congratulate the hon. Gentleman on the way he is advancing his case.
Mr. Peyton: I am obliged.
It does not seem to have dawned on the hon. Gentleman or the Government that it is they who have to make the case. So far, they have totally failed to make the case for this objectionable Bill. Although I welcome the hon. Gentleman's intervention, and realise that he always does his best, it is kind to say that he has not made a very notable contribution to the expedition—
Mr. Orbach: I rose to speak after the speech of the hon. Member for Howden (Mr. Bryan). I hope that I shall be called during the debate.
Mr. Peyton: So do I. I was commenting only on the hon. Gentleman's intervention in my speech, which I recognise was as civil as he could make it.
Subsection (1) requires only consultation, which can mean anything or nothing. All that the Post Office is obliged to do is seek the Minister's views, which it may then totally disregard. Consultation provisions of this kind should not be written into Statutes when
1188
they are so meaningless. The Minister's approval is the minimum which should reasonably be required before such an extension of the Post Office's powers.
A matter which brings me into a short period of cordiality with the hon. Member for Barking is the phrase in line 2, "a subsidiary of its". The House should sometimes pause to contemplate the revolting things which it passes into legislation. This is one of the nastiest and most offensive phrases. I asked Mr. Speaker, on a point of order, whether he would permit a Division on this point. I cannot remember his exact adjective, but he said that he could not, unless something very dramatic occurred, on a drafting Amendment. I regret that, because if the Minister cannot give way on a point like this, that is an obstinate defence of the totally intolerable.
This phrase recurs a number of times in the Bill and I hope that the Minister will show some regard for the English language and a desire to avoid this filthy cacophony of language, that he will accept the Amendment and assure us that he will substitute something less offensive wherever else the phrase occurs. I see no reason why the English language should be constantly dirtied by this kind of treatment by Ministers.
Most of the other Amendments hang on the first. As to the phrase in line 22, referring to the Minister publishing "in such manner as he thinks fit", why should he not just "publish"? Those words, if they mean anything, are an excuse for him to do anything, with no one else being the judge of the adequacy of the publication. I see considerable objection to Ministers being made the judges of their own actions. A simply duty to publish would be sufficient and I hope that the Minister will agree, on reflection, that those words could be left out.
I repeat the main objection, which will be echoed by others of my hon. Friends—this is a marked extension of Post Office powers over those given in the original Bill. Without going into the question of whether, at this late stage, the extension accords with the Long Title, I do not feel that the Minister has done anything to justify it. I hope that the House will throw out the new Clause.
Mr. Sydney Bidwell: It is known to my right hon. Friends on the Front Bench that members of our party

1189
vary a great deal in their zeal to carry out Clause Four of our Constitution:
"To secure for the workers by hand or by brain the full fruits of their industry … upon the basis of the common ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange …"
In consequence of this continuous progressive discussion in our movement, and nowhere else, we have evolved ideas as to the way in which we should proceed to carry out this historic mission. Part of that is that we would not expect overnight takeovers of giant capitalist monopolistic enterprises, but we would expect, in enactments of the Government, developments along that road.
This is why members of the Post Office unions were a little dismayed when the Clause connected with this matter was somewhat watered down. They have written to hon. Members, on this side at least, expressing that dismay. I have received letters from constituents who are members of the Post Office Engineering Union, concerned about their future and the possibilities of a Tory Postmaster-General running down some of the workshops in which they are employed. They will be pleased, even if the new Clause is not quite so dynamic as was hoped, that it is coming into being.
This is a classic political discussion. Atlhough it has, so far, been conducted in barbed language, it is a Socialist versus anti-Socialist discussion. The House and the public should be reminded that the hon. Member for Howden (Mr. Bryan) would qualify to let it be known that he has substantial interests in private enterprise. Since our backgrounds are considerably different, as well as our political education, which stems from many of these considerations—both philosophical and material—it is not surprising that we take a different view. Some of his considerable interests in private enterprise were outlined by my right hon. Friend in Standing Committee on 28th November, 1968, so I will not refer to them in detail; they are there if anyone cares to look them up.
The same hon. Gentleman, thinking, I suppose, that he was making a substantial criticism of the Minister, gave us a quotation—I do not know whether it was from a union journal—which said that the P.O.E.U. was thinking in terms of the extension of publicly-owned enterprises
1190
within the service of the Post Office in what the union calls development areas.
5.0 p.m.
I have previously raised with the Prime Minister the possibility of establishing public enterprises in areas where private enterprise is shy to go. That would enable us to utilise workers who are becoming redundant as coal and other industries are run down in consequence of the advance of technology. Many of these workers find it difficult, if not impossible, to transfer their homes to the South. In any event, we do not want the whole population to move to the South of England. We want to see the redeployment of industry, and I support measures to that end.
I am not opposed to assisting private enterprise to establish itself in certain parts of the country which need industry. For example, Northern Ireland would be an ideal place for the establishment of private industries, particularly since I believe that the difficulties there are economic rather than religious. Why not establish one or more Post Office factories in Northern Ireland if private enterprise will not go there? Certainly, private enterprise is failing the nation because it is not delivering the goods which, for example, the Post Office services require.
Mr. Stratton Mills: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that private enterprise, in the shape of Standard Telephones and Cables Ltd., has a factory in Northern Ireland employing about 8,000 people?
Mr. Bidwell: I am delighted to know that. Many more such factories should be established there. But if private enterprise is not sufficiently enterprising to do that, public enterprise should be encouraged to play a larger part of the establishment of new factories.
The Minister need not be shy about the new Clause, for I assure him that he will get major support for it from my hon. Friends and me. One thing that unites this side of the House is its opposition to Tory humbug, and for that reason we welcome the Clause.
Lieut.-Colonel Sir Walter Bromley-Davenport (Knutsford): I will not detain the House for long, although I am glad of this opportunity to speak following the hon. Member for Southall

1191
(Mr. Bidwell). What is the object of the Bill—and one can take any Clause one likes?
Mr. Driberg: No.
Sir W. Bromley-Davenport: Is the hon. Gentleman ill? Does he want a pill?
Mr. Driberg: I said that the hon. Gentleman cannot take any Clause he likes at the moment.
Sir W. Bromley-Davenport: The hon. Gentleman obviously still has the remains of his lunch inside his face. I could not hear a word he said.
Mr. Driberg: I am sorry if I was inaudible, although the hon. and gallant Gentleman's remark was uncalled for and untrue. I was referring to his statement that he could take any Clause he liked. He cannot. He can take only new Clause 1 at the moment.
Sir W. Bromley-Davenport: The hon. Gentleman is no doubt raising quite a good point. If he will do me the justice of listening to my speech I am sure that the facts will gradually dawn upon him like a timid flower being kissed by the sun. I assure him that the benefit of lending me his ear will emerge. I will continue slowly, easily and gently on all six cylinders to the end of my speech, I hope without interruption.
The Bill will give the Post Office immense power to carry out almost any business it likes. The hon. Member for Southall said that it was another step towards the aim of Clause Four of the Labour Party's constitution, which is designed to nationalise all means of production, distribution and exchange.
Mr. Bidwell: It is a teeny weeny step in that direction.
Sir W. Bromley-Davenport: Be it teeny weeny or itsy bitsy, what will be the result? The small businessman and, in some instances, the larger businessman in private enterprise will gradually be killed off, which is the object of the exercise. I recall that when my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition said in the Budget debate of 1968 that that Budget would kill the small businessman, there was a chorus of applause from hon. Gentlemen opposite and the remark, "A good thing, too", from
1192
the Government Front Bench did not go unnoticed.
When addressing a meeting in his constituency of Stockport, South—perhaps it was another constituency where it does not matter so much—the hon. Gentleman who represents those unfortunate people there (Mr. Orbach) told small businessmen—if I am wrong I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will correct me; I have his words in black and white printed in an itsy bitsy book—
"The small shopkeeper is wasteful and you must go. I am very sorry for you, but you must go."
Did the hon. Gentleman say that?
Mr. Orbach: I did.
Sir W. Bromley-Davenport: The hon. Gentleman should be ashamed of himself.
We see why hon. Gentlemen opposite want to extend the powers of the Post Office. There is another reason; they want to decrease the gigantic losses of the Post Office. Is it right that a tremendous monopoly of this type should have such gigantic losses, particularly when one bears in mind the way in which the prices of its services have been increased?
I need not burden the House with examples. Some years ago one could post a letter in my constituency using a 1d. stamp and it would arrive in London from Knutsford that night. Now, using a 4d. stamp, one is lucky to have one's letter delivered by the end of the week. Using a 5d. stamp, it may be delivered the next day, although a great many letters never arrive at all.
Why cannot the Post Office stand on its own feet? One of my hon. Friends gave the example of the American telephone and telegraph services, which are the finest in the world. If hon. Members go outside the Chamber and pick up a telephone in the Lobby they will see how long it takes to contact the switchboard. They will also note how many wrong numbers they get, so wasting their time in having to contact the operator. We have a disgraceful service in this country. I have had the advantage of speaking with many Americans on this subject. They constantly tell me that one of the worst things that strikes them about this country is our disgraceful telephone service.
What will be the result of turning the Post Office into a corporation, containing

1193
a number of morons who have never run a business in their lives? These people will not be able to be booted off the board by shareholders who have money in the company. They will have the Patronage Secretary and the power of the Government behind them to keep their office seats warm while they are drawing gigantic salaries.
The object of the Bill is to move towards nationalising all means of production, distribution and exchange. The next move of hon. Gentlemen opposite will be to kill the small and larger businessman, and so destroy private enterprise. I bring my brief, conciliatory remarks to an end by pointing out that the Post Office will become, if this is possible, even worse than British Railways, with their dangerous and dirty trains.
Mr. Orbach: The House will forgive me if I do not follow either the hon. and gallant Member for Knutsford (Sir W. Bromley-Davenport) or the hon. Member for Yeovil (Mr. Peyton). Both made a contribution to hilarity, but very little to our consideration of new Clause 1.
I wish to take to task the hon. Member for Howden (Mr. Bryan), who was a little ungracious in attacking hon. Members on this side of the House who had to depart from the Committee to attend to their correspondence. The hon. Member is able to get other people to do that for him, but my hon. Friends on occasion had to be out of the Committee Room. They were, however, present whenever it was necessary for them to be present. The hon. Member was a frequent non-attender of Committee sittings.
Mr. Bryan: I do not think there is the slightest doubt that attendance from our side of the House was very much better than from the other side. Otherwise, why did we constantly have to keep a quorum although we have to answer letters just the same as hon. Members opposite do?
Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Harry Gourlay): Order. Hon. Members are pursuing the Committee proceedings too far on this new Clause.
Mr. Orbach: This was started by the hon. Member for Howden, not by me. He referred to an occasion when the bells rang and the Committee room immediately filled.
Mr. Bryan: Time and again when hon. Members opposite wanted a quorum we had to warn them.
Mr. Orbach: There was no need for that. Hon. Members opposite could have walked out if they had wanted to do so. Obviously, they wanted the Bill to proceed as rapidly as possible, and for that all hon. Members should be grateful.
The hon. Member for Howden, after paying tribute to himself and his hon. Friend, started attacking our side. He said that he would deal with the background to the Clause, but, of course, he did not touch on the background. I propose to do so, as I did in Committee. The hon. Member also read a letter and suggested that it dealt with reserve powers that the Postmaster-General wanted for the future, but it did not. It dealt with the existing manufacturing position.
Captain L. P. S. Orr: At that stage the Bill did not propose to extend the existing position, but now it does so.
Mr. Orbach: It does so to a very slight extent. If the hon. and gallant Member looks at Clause 13 and this Clause, he will see that there is a slight change in emphasis. I considered that Clause 13 ought to have gone further. This Clause goes a little further, but not quite so far as I would have liked. I am prepared to accept it, but I do not think it is the ideal solution to deal with the situation.
The hon. Member for Yeovil (Mr. Peyton) spoke about something of which he could not be aware. We were not speaking about manufacturing powers which might be available to the Corporation if this Bill became an Act. My right hon. Friend was replying to questions raised in Committee and said that this was the present position in regard to manufacturing within the Post Office at present. On that score, there was some attempt to mislead the Committee; hon. Members in the Committee were, in fact, mislead. The hon. Member said there were other reasons why manufacturers did not have manufacturing capacity and why they could not produce the telephone equipment required by the Post Office, but he was not aware of the reasons.

1195
New Clause 1 is refreshing. The first Postmaster-General after Labour came to power gave orders that telephone equipment was to be supplied by manufacturers. My right hon. Friend is now giving consideration to the whole question of manufacturing should it be necessary in future. I will give the House some historical information. I speak as one who has been engaged in this industry and associated with it from a manufacturer's point of view as long perhaps as any hon. Member. I am not a director of any particular firm, but I made clear in Committee that I was an export consultant to Plesseys following my engagement for many years as export consultant to Automatic Telephones and Installations, which was taken over by Plesseys.
5.15 p.m.
I received no advice from them, from a manufacturer, or manufacturers' association, or the trade unions about what I should say on this Bill. I think that it was well known by those who have had any connection with the industry that for over 10 years no new orders were placed for major telephone equipment by the Postmaster-General of the day. Sole responsibility for that lies on the Tory Party because hon. Members opposite believed in the status quo.
They wanted things to stay as they were and were afraid of being disturbed. This was at a time when engineers in the industry believed that it was possible within five or 10 years to have the electronic exchange system operating. In the meantime, there had been invented and there was being marketed abroad an intermediary system between the Strowger system, used over much of the country, and the cross-bar system and halfway to the electronic system. The Post Office was urged time and again to purchase cross-bar equipment, not only because it was needed for internal communications and our own equipment was 30, 40 or 50 years old and was going to seed, but because to get export orders we had to have a home base.
The Post Office, to the discredit of the Tory Party, refused to give any orders for cross-bar equipment. Not until my right hon. Friend's predecessor became Postmaster-General were orders placed for cross-bar and electronic exchange
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equipment in this country. No one on the Tory side who thinks that he believes in enterprise should forget that. This new Clause gives reserve powers to my right hon. Friend. He does not say, "I will wipe G.E.C., English Electric, Standard Telephones and Plesseys off the map" He says that if for any particular part of the equipment required for the Post Office existing manufacturers are not able to assist we shall have the power, subject to the Minister having consultation with the Corporation, to manufacture such equipment as we need so as to phase the end equipment within the manufacturing circuit.
My right hon. Friend is perfectly right to ask for those reserve powers, not because manufacturers will let him down. I do not agree with any hon. Friends who think that manufacturers in this country are anything but enterprising and desirous of getting orders. Naturally, they need to satisfy their shareholders, of whom I say unashamedly I am one, but they want to remain as manufacturers in their big industries as long as they can. Apart from the possibility, which the Postmaster-General outlined, of mergers having to take place and the Post Office Corporation being faced with a private enterprise monopoly, which I do not envisage in the near future, there are other dangers. Some hon. Members opposite will be prepared to admit that.
One of them said with great glee that Standard Telephones had opened a factory in Ulster. Why did not a British manufacturer open a factory there? Standard Telephones, which is an American company, has factories everywhere under the name of I.T.T. [Interruption.] What British manufacturer has opened a factory in Ulster?
Captain Orr: I understood Plessey.
Mr. Orbach: It has one in Eire, which is a foreign country.
Captain Orr: And in Ulster.
Mr. Orbach: We have factories all over the place, but I know of none in Ulster. I think that the hon. and gallant Gentleman is wrong. I have visited the factory outside Dublin, at Swords, but I have not visited any Plessey factory in Ulster. Perhaps I shall be fired tomorrow because I have made a misstatement here that does not help the organisation.

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Let me make quite clear what I want. I want to stop what the hon. and gallant Member for Knutsford referred to—
Sir W. Bromley-Davenport rose—
Mr. Kenneth Baker rose—
Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. Only one hon. Gentleman at a time.
Mr. Orbach: The hon. and gallant Member for Knutsford compared the telephone service neglected by his party for over 10 years with that in the United States, which is run by Bell Telephone or its subsidiaries. I spend a great deal of my vacations in the United States, because most of my family are there. In the United States I did what I do here. I called the telephone service and asked to be rung at 6 o'clock the following morning because I had to be at John Kennedy Airport by 8 a.m. and wanted a shave and breakfast first. I was rung at 6 o'clock the next morning, but my hosts had to pay 1½ dollars for that call. [An HON. MEMBER: "The hon. Gentleman did not pay 5s.?"] It is not 5s. The hon. Gentleman has no understanding of the charges made in the United States for the telephone service there, and of the fact that run side-by-side with it, it has the worst postal service probably in the world.
Mr. Kenneth Baker: The hon. Gentleman has given great credit to the American telephone system, which is privately-owned, and now condemns the American postal service, which is Government-owned. Does not he think that there is a relationship between the fact that the American telephone system is privately-owned and the postal service is Government-owned?
Sir W. Bromley-Davenport rose—
Mr. Orbach: I shall give way to the hon. and gallant Gentleman eventually But I am making a brief statement.
The hon. Member for Acton (Mr. Kenneth Baker) said that I should compare two industries, one privately-owned and a monopoly, and one owned by the State. If he knew anything at all about the United States, he would know that all the jobs in the Post Office are within the command of the Postmaster-General, who was the chief heeler of any political party at any time. With four years' experience in the United States, where I
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have participated in the elections, I can tell the hon. Gentleman that although political appointments to judgeships and other local offices used to be the rule, the only patronage powers apart from those of the President are those of the Postmaster-General, who appoints all the Post Office staff throughout the land.
Even a sub-postmaster must be a good member of the Democratic Party or Republican Party, depending on which is in power. At one time this was also true of teachers, and my wife had to join the Democratic Party to obtain a teaching job in New York.
Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. This is very interesting, but I hope that the hon. Gentleman will relate his remarks more to the new Clause.
Mr. Orbach: I think that what I have said is sufficient to impress upon the House when there is a dialogue between the two sides as to private enterprise and public enterprise, that private enterprise as exemplified by the Tory Party does not exist, and never existed. For hon. Members opposite, private enterprise is maintaining what they have, doing as little with it as they can, establishing that something is traditionally done in a certain way, and saying that therefore it is best, whereas in this case we have a little of the dynamism of which we spoke in 1964 spreading in another sphere.
I believe it to be absolutely essential that the Post Office Corporation shall have the power to manufacture relays, transistors and any components it may require to see that there is no stoppage in the final product required by the consumer, the exchange equipment or telephone instruments about which my hon. Friend is so concerned.
I strongly hope that the House will agree with the Minister and accept the Clause.
Sir Henry d'Avigdor-Goldsmid: In one respect at least I can agree with the hon. Member for Stockport, South (Mr. Orbach). I am certain that no one—not his trade union, his employers, nor any branch of the British Electrical and Allied Manufacturers' Association—put him up to make his speech. I do not know whether they put him up to make a different speech, but in any case it is clear that

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it would be a dangerous thing to issue the hon. Gentleman with riding orders.
I want to draw the attention of the House to what I consider to be a very grave defect. My hon. Friend the Member for Howden (Mr. Bryan) described it as a subterfuge, but I think that it is a good deal worse. When Clause 13 was discussed in the Committee it was not given the treatment that it would have had if it had appeared as it is now as the new Clause. I do not think that it is any coincidence that in moving the Clause the Postmaster-General did not at the same time draw attention to Amendment No. 60, which my hon. Friend found lurking at page 3870 of the Notice Paper, and which says simply, "leave out Clause 13".
It should have been made very clear that the omission of Clause 13 was the price exacted from the right hon. Gentleman by his friends. On the Question, "That the Clause stand part of the Bill", five members of the right hon. Gentleman's party voted in the "No" lobby in Committee on 30th January. He himself was not present. The Assistant Postmaster-General, the Minister's Parliamentary Private Secretary and the Whip voted in favour of the Clause standing part, and we took that as meaning that the Government had decided to abide by the Clause they had put down. I should like to quote what my hon. Friend the Member for Howden said in summing up for the Opposition. He said:
"To us, the letter dated 29th January from the Postmaster-General is of the greatest possible importance. It gives us assurances, spelt out in the plainest possible terms, which we would have sought in this debate. Frankly, our Amendments might have been phrased in a slightly different way had we had this letter before us when we were drafting them."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing Committee D, 30th January, 1969; c. 559.]
The net result was that this very important Clause was got rid of in two hours in Committee when, if it had been phrased as new Clause 1 is now phrased, it would have taken a great deal longer in discussion and we should have wanted to tie the right hon. Gentleman to the terms of the letter.
5.30 p.m.
This, to me, is an abuse of the processes of the House. The Minister should not take back in this way a Clause which
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he has put down and for which he had official support of his party, through his Whip, his Parliamentary Private Secretary and the Assistant Postmaster-General. The right hon. Gentleman has taken the Clause back in private. He has treated the House with contempt. Despite what my hon. Friend has said, I hope that we shall vote against new Clause 1 in order to show our total disapproval of the way in which it has been introduced.
Mr. William Molloy: The contributions of the hon. Member for Walsall, South (Sir H. d'AvigdorGoldsmid) are usually well worth listening to because of his wide experience both as a politician and in matters connected with the subject of the Bill. But I part company with him on the unjustified and almost abusive attack he made on my right hon. Friend the Postmaster-General towards the end of his speech. If, in moments of partisan feeling, we hurl such epithets about, then, in practice, we are saying that decisions can only be made by Members of this House without listening to anyone outside.
I am not suggesting that any pressures have been put on my right hon. Friend but, in a democracy, it is right and proper for people to put pressure on Ministers, Members of Parliament, councillors and anyone else they have elected to carry out their will. Indeed, even if they have not subscribed to the election of certain Ministers, Members of Parliament or councillors, that does not mean to say that they have no right to exert such pressure. On that aspect of political philosophy I part company with the hon. Gentleman.
Mr. Bryan: No less than three hon. Members on this side said in their speeches in Committee that they would cut down the length of the debate following the assurance they had received. Not all of the three are fools, although I am one of them. Undoubtedly we were deceived. There is not the slightest doubt of it. There was no move by the Postmaster-General or by the Assistant Postmaster-General to put us right in this respect.
Mr. Molloy: Hon. Members opposite want it both ways. Towards the end of his speech, the hon. Member for Walsall. South pointed out what had happened in the Division. He said that this had

1201
given him a certain message. It appears that he has more prescience and understanding than the hon. Member for Howden (Mr. Bryan).
Whilst, to a certain extent, I compliment my right hon. Friend, I am sorry that the drafting of new Clause 1 is not of such a nature as to fill the benches opposite with hon. Members seething with frustrated anger because he proposes a full-blooded Socialist measure. I say that after acknowledging that we are talking about a serious issue—the telecommunications of the future.
It would have been much better if my right hon. Friend had drafted new Clause 1 in a way which would have been so repugnant to hon. Members opposite that it would have filled their benches and led the Opposition Front Bench to draft an Amendment which would equally have filled these benches. If the Opposition Front Bench are paying heed to the fifth-rate vaudeville performance of the hon. and gallant Member for Knutsford (Sir W. Bromley-Davenport) and the hon. Member for Yeovil (Mr. Peyton), they should be bitterly opposing new Clause 1. The whole concept of this Bill held by the two hon. Members is that none of it should take place.
If the Conservative Party had cared to carry out what it declares to be its philosophy, then, during its 13 years of office, it could have denationalised the Post Office, not to mention the coal mines, the railways and other publicly-owned industries. But in fact the Conservatives are as half-hearted in their philosophy as, I regret to say, my right hon. Friend is in his. It would be better for this House and for politics in general if we made it clear to people at large that there is and should be a massive difference between the philosophies of the two sides of the House.
In this so-called "mixed" approach, it is the Conservative Party that comes off best because, even when it is in power, when something goes wrong with a publicly-owned industry it has not got the guts to denationalise it but it can still criticise it. As has been said, its philosophy has been one of slow strangulation. The neglect which the Post Office suffered under the Conservative Government was enormous.
I am happy and proud to be associated with the members of the Post Office En-
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gineering Union, who are so proud of their craft and their industry and of what they are trying to do for the country. They are not seeking shares in the new set-up. They are not seeking some method of getting a large private nest-egg in it. They want to see it an efficient and worth-while organisation which will make its contribution to uplifting the standard of life for everyone in the country. Here again, there is a fundamental difference between the philosophy of hon. Members opposite and ours It is worth reiterating that it would be much better to make it clear where both sides stand in our legislation on these issues.
I have grave apprehensions that much of what has happened up to now with the Post Office might be repeated in the new organisation. One of the difficult features of the public ownership of the Post Office has been that it has had to do many things which are not directly remunerative. It has provided the basic essentials and then has allowed private enterprise to nip in and cream off the profits. We say that is wrong. We do not have to convince hon. Members opposite because they do not believe it anyway. But it is a tragedy that we have to make the case to my right hon. Friend that the things which we said in Opposition are still true now that we are in Government and that we should carry out these things in a much more forceful and Socialist manner, for we have a mandate to do so.
I should prefer to have the support of the Post Office engineers and other Post Office workers than the support of any shareholders in any form of private enterprise, because the fundamental difference between them is that, as trade unionists, the former are concerned about their industry and its contribution to our nation and to the millions of others not directly affected.
For too long in public ownership we have made a grave error. Private enterprise has left organisations almost moribund, for example the mines and the railways. Now we are doing it again. We have seen the ignorance displayed by hon. Gentlemen opposite about the modernisation of the Post Office—if it was not ignorance, if it was done deliberately, then it was worse. We have to come along and pick it up. Time and again we have made the mistake of not doing

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the job thoroughly in a Socialist manner. Instead we have left some elements free, as if we have a responsibility to private enterprise to provide some sustenance for it by sucking at the teats of the State to survive. This is wrong. Hon. Members opposite should realise that if they take the reins of office again there will be no Post Office, no Postmaster-General, the whole lot will be given to private enterprise.
My hon. Friend the Member for Stockport, South (Mr. Orbach) has spoken about the Post Office services in New York State being absolutely appalling, while the telephone service is first-class. The telephones are run by private industry, the Post Office by the State, and we all know the feeling of United States administrators towards any form of State ownership. They have committed the same crime over there, their postal service is something that they dare not allow private enterprise to take over. Yet the cost of the ordinary telephone subscription is rising and is enormous. A great deal of money has been ploughed back. In the State of New York alone those who now control the telephone system have ploughed more back in one year for research than the Tories did in the last 10 years when they held office and were operating a national Post Office.
We are talking about a new era in mankind, and there is a direct relationship between new Clause 1 and this new era. The choice is simply whether there shall be large monopolies of immense power within the private sector running these concerns, or whether they should be run by the people for the people, by Parliament. This is a great issue and in such an area as telephone communications it would be a grave disaster if the bankers and private entrepreneurs of the future could completely control the industry. The extension of public ownership is right for me because I am a Socialist, but in the interests of mankind there ought to be an international organisation for controlling such an industry.
While I am not 100 per cent. happy with new Clause 1, I am thankful for small mercies and glad that my right hon. Friend has sought to delete the old Clause 13 and to substitute this new one. I hope that before long that we can do something better to move towards this
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opportunity of genuine and real public ownership which has proved itself to be of supreme benefit to the people.
5.45 p.m.
Mr. Ray Mawby: Hon. Gentlemen opposite have taken the opportunity to philosophise about this new Clause, and there is nothing to complain about on that, because it points to one of the basic differences between the two sides. I do not complain that the Postmaster-General has decided that he will give the Bill more teeth, but I do complain about the way in which it has been done. Far from the Postmaster-General being guilty of subterfuge, I think he has simply been got at. We have only to look at the record to see the proof of this. If we take the discussions on Clause 13 in Standing Committee it will be apparent that there was only one Amendment.
We made it clear that not only were we satisfied with the letter that the right hon. Gentleman was good enough to send to my hon. Friend the Member for Cirencester and Tewkesbury (Mr. Ridley), but we were happy with what the Assistant Postmaster-General had said. It is important to see what happened after that Amendment had been discussed and the Question was put, "That the Clause stand part of the Bill." Only the payroll vote on the Government side voted for Clause 13. All the other Government supporters voted against the Clause being in the Bill. It was only because hon. Members on this side supported the right hon. Gentleman that the Clause was carried. Obviously there must have been a very good reason for my hon. Friends to support the right hon. Gentleman.
That reason was that we thought he had been very conciliatory, that he had accepted the position of the Post Office with respect to manufacture, that the Post Office would still be prepared to go into manufacture if it felt that someone was capable of twisting its arm. We would expect a large organisation to be like this. Now, on Report we find this new Clause.
I have a number of questions. The Postmaster-General said that these were only reserve powers. Unfortunately where manufacture for its own purposes is concerned, the new Corporation will be required only to "consult" the new

1205
Minister for Post and Telecommunications. Yet where it has to manufacture to supply someone else it has to get "approval". Why should the Corporation be given virtually carte blanche to enter into manufacture of any kind? What does "consultation" with the Minister really mean? In some cases it has been ruled that if a letter is written and enough time is allowed for a reply this constitutes consultation, and this could be the attitude of the new Corporation. At present we are able to ask the Postmaster-General questions in the House, but this will not be so when there is a Corporation, which will be as difficult to get at as British Rail.
Mr. Driberg: If new Clause 6 is accepted then it will be possible to get at the Minister.
Mr. Mawby: We shall come to Clause 6 later. The new Clause has a laudable objective and, if sufficient thought were given to it, it may be that it would take away the worries of hon. Members about not being able to get at the Minister to ask questions which they consider should be raised on the Floor of the House. I hope that the debate on new Clause 6 will be interesting and that the hon. Gentleman will be successful.
I cannot understand why, if approval is necessary for the manufacture of supplies for someone else, manufacturers will be able to manufacture for their own purposes merely after consultation. If the new Clause remains as it is, even the new Minister of Post and Telecommunications may have his arm twisted. The Post Office Corporation could decide to lay down expensive equipment to produce products for its own use. On working out the economics it may be found that to get repayment on the capital employed it is necessary to produce the product in much greater numbers, which could be disposed of only by selling them to someone else. If the Minister refused approval for the manufacture for sale to someone else the operation would then become uneconomic. This would not be anything new for a nationalised industry, but the Minister would have to take this matter fully into account, and he would no longer be master of the situation.
Hon. Gentlemen opposite are continually arguing about Clause 4 and whether or not it should be fully implemented.
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That is their business, and it is for them to continue that discussion, but until now the House has believed that undertakings given and accepted in Committee would be honoured, and that the House would not expect on Report to find an entirely different situation. If only for this reason, I hope that my hon. Friends will oppose the new Clause.
The right hon. Gentleman might be able to retrieve his fortunes by accepting sub-Amendment (a), which would ensure that the Minister's approval would have to be obtained for manufacture for any purpose. This would soften the blow. I hope that, if the right hon. Gentleman is not prepared to take back new Clause 1, he will at least accept sub-Amendment (a).
Mr. Dobson: Although I have listened carefully to hon. Gentlemen opposite, they have lamentably failed to persuade me that I should not support the new Clause. Two substantial charges have been made, which I should like to answer.
The first charge is that my right hon. Friend has misled the Committee, that he has been under pressure from groups of hidden persuaders and that he has used subterfuge in putting down the new Clause. These accusations should be answered. The hon. Member for Acton (Mr. Kenneth Baker) was experienced enough to know what he was being asked to agree to in Committee although, with one exception, he was the hon. Member with the least experience in the House. The hon. Member for Howden (Mr. Bryan), who leads on Post Office matters for the Opposition, did not appreciate what we were talking about upstairs. The experience of the hon. Member for Acton is much to be admired. He said:
"The hon. Members for Glasgow, Provan (Mr. Hugh D. Brown), Stockport, South (Mr. Orbach) and Westhoughton (Mr. J. T. Price) all said that this is an ideological point, as if it were an academic discussion between one set of academic economists and another set. I do not agree. We are discussing the 'guts' of politics, because politics, in my view, is about ideologies, policies and principles. This is yet another occasion on which there is a clear and definite distinction between the two sides of the Committee and the two parties in the House of Commons."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing Committee D, 30th January, 1969; c. 548.]
The hon. Member is absolutely right, and he must have known, as the hon. Member for Howden must have known,

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that my right hon. Friend would not receive support on the Question, That the Clause stand part of the Bill, from the Labour Members sitting behind him. This was made clear to my right hon. Friend in later discussions and by other means. There was nothing hidden in this persuasion; it was in the open. The discussion was clearly understood and recognised by the hon. Member for Acton for what it was, an ideological discussion on which the two sides would separate. I understand my right hon. Friend's dilemma; he was obviously under some form of stricture, and I am pleased that he has been able to get away from it and to introduce the much more manageable new Clause 1.
The second charge which was levelled in Committee, partly by the hon. Member for Totnes (Mr. Mawby), was that the Post Office has been given unlimited powers to manufacture. This is the gravamen of the Opposition's case. They are worried that the Post Office can operate as a commercial enterprise, without having to get agreement, but merely by consulting the Postmaster-General. They are afraid that it will steal the legitimate markets of private manufacturers and therefore make them commercially less secure. I do not think that I am over-stating the case. This has been precisely the point throughout. I see the hon. and gallant Member for Down, South (Captain Orr) nodding agreement—he appreciates this point.
The famous letter of 29th January, which has been quoted so many times, contained the following:
"As a Minister of the Crown, I have inherent power to do anything which the subject can do unless there is any legislation to stop me. I can manufacture anything I like."
That was written against the background that the Postmaster-General's power under the Post Office Act, not under the Bill, is that he can now manufacture anything he likes, subject only to restriction of legislation. This was well known to the Committee upstairs.
Mr. John Hay: The hon. Member ought to quote the next couple of sentences, as indeed did the Assistant Postmaster-General when quoting the letter in the Standing Committee, in relation to the financial power of the Postmaster-General in this connection.
Mr. Dobson: It does not depart very much from his powers. The Postmaster-General has no restriction upon him, except in relation to his financial powers, which are laid down. There is no inherent restriction upon his powers. The hon. and gallant Member for Down, South nods. The restriction is wholly in relation to his ability to obtain finance to manufacture. The powers do not need to be specifically laid down, and this was clearly understood in the Committee. The hon. Member for Henley (Mr. Hay) was not a member of that Committee and I did not wish to mislead him in my quotation. In the present situation the only restriction is a financial limitation if my right hon. Friend wishes to manufacture. If he has the money, he can go ahead and manufacture.
The hon. Gentleman posed the hypothetical point as to what would happen under the new Clause if the Post Office Corporation has the power to manufacture. The answer is precisely the same. It can go ahead and manufacture. In other words, exactly the same situation obtains with the Corporation as operates at present. The only change in regard to both the Postmaster-General and the Corporation is that they have to have the money to enable them to manufacture. This is the sole limitation which is placed upon them.
These alleged substantial changes—I do not believe that they are substantial—were dealt with in the Committee upstairs. I am pleased that my right hon. Friend has seen fit to withdraw Clause 13 and substitute new Clause 1. It goes a great deal of the way, if not all the way, to meet all the points which have been put to him.
I wish to comment on one or two matters. I should like to deal with some of the comments about telephone delays. There are four basic reasons, or a combination of any one of them, or several of them, which cause telephone delays, and the hon. Gentleman must know this. The first is that the equipment supplied, whether it be telephone exchange equipment, the lines, or the headphone sets in people's houses, is not adequate. The second is the way in which the telephone operator deals with the calls on the exchange—whether or not he or she picks up the call quickly enough or connects it to the wrong number. The third is the lack of capital

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equipment used to attain service for its customers. It is the Government's responsibility to supply money for the capital equipment and to think ahead. The fourth reason which might cause delay in telephone calls is customers misdialling, as frequently happens. Any one of these reasons, or any combination of them, can cause delays. It is as simple as that.
I should like to take up the charge which was made by the hon. and gallant Member for Knutsford (Sir W. Bromley-Davenport) against my right hon. Friend, a charge which cannot be correct. We have seen during the period of office of my right hon. Friend the Postmaster-General, a tremendous increase in the amount of capital which he has been prepared to authorise for the use of telephone exchanges. A cut-back in the capital was a feature of the period of office of the previous Administration. Their whole aim in telephone policy was to stop development. There was continual criticism of the Post Office by the public at large as well as by Questions in the House, and the chickens have come home to roost some five years afterwards.
My right hon. Friend is to be congratulated. He knows that there is a need for a continual flow of capital equipment into the Post Office on the telephone side. This afternoon he gave the House some idea of the amount of capital equipment which he has put into the telephone service and outlined his projections a few years ahead. Hon. Members opposite should recognise this fact.
I should like to come to a few brief, gentle criticisms of my right hon. Friend, whose speech I thought a little apologetic. He said that he had reserve powers, and then went on to say that it was not intended that the Post Office would enter into manufacturing in the next year or so. That is an unfortunate statement. I can understand that my right hon. Friend is under pressure from the Telephone Engineering Manufacturing Association so that manufacturers may have an idea some time ahead as to how they should gear up their factories to increase output. If my right hon. Friend was basing his statement on the purely short-term to help them so that they will not have to face redundancy in staff, I accept it. But if he meant to give a categorical assurance that in no circumstances would the Post
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Office enter into manufacturing before the next year or so, I hope that he will think again about the matter and give us some words of encouragement when he winds up on the new Clause. It is most important. It would be quite wrong to give the Telephone Engineering Manufacturing Association the word today that in some cases it can fail to meet contract dates or the obligations of the Post Office in the knowledge that for several years at least, if my right hon. Friend's words are taken literally, the Post Office will not enter into manufacturing.
The new Clause refers to consultations with the Minister, and I would ask my right hon. Friend to say a further word about this matter. He said that the purpose was to safeguard the Minister and to have consultations with other Ministers. I hope he will agree that he cannot use it as a device for delaying commercial decisions by the new Post Office Corporation. It would be most unfortunate if either party when in power were to use this particular Clause to delay decisions against the commercial advice of the new Corporation.
Secondly, my right hon. Friend said that he wanted to join in the discussions and to have meetings with the C.B.I., the new Minister and the Post Office Board. But he did not mention—and he ought to have mentioned—that he will include in that meeting representatives of the T.U.C. If he is going to give guarantees about jobs and security of tenure in the manufacturing industries, it is as much the right of the trade union representatives to know what their future might be.
Mr. Driberg: More.
Mr. Dobson: As my hon. Friend the Member for Barking (Mr. Driberg) says, it is more their right. It is an equal right that people on both sides of the table should know precisely what they are talking about and what their future is in their jobs.
I support the new Clause, as in Committee upstairs I opposed the old one, for one substantial reason which hon. Members opposite have not yet brought out. It is that if we try to change the future outlook of the Post Office to that of a more commercial organisation which is dynamic, forward-looking and able to compete, the Corporation should have full powers to develop in the way that

1211
it wishes. The new Clause gives it the opportunity, if it wishes to do so for commercial or other reasons, to enter into manufacture even on a small scale. I believe that that is right, and that is why I support the new Clause.
Mr. Tom Boardman: I want first to draw the attention of the hon. Member for Bristol, North-East (Mr. Dobson) to the difference between the financial sanction which applies today and that which is to apply under the new Clause. The hon. Gentleman referred lightly to the fact that the only control on manufacture at the moment was the little side issue of financial sanction. However, in Committee the hon. Gentleman referred to his understanding that, even if Clause 13 were not in the Bill, the Minister would still be concerned because of the power in the 1961 Act, and the Assistant Postmaster-General replied:
"No. I said that this had been overtaken by the other Act. He must get financial sanction through Parliament if he wants money to carry on this form of operation."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing Committee D, 30th January, 1969; c. 555.]
That makes the very important distinction between the powers which now exist and those which are to be granted by the new Clause. At the moment, it is necessary for the Minister to get the sanction of Parliament to carry on these operations.
I turn now to the speech of the Postmaster-General, one section of which caused me particular concern. He said that the Clause is put down in case suppliers are unable to supply at the right price or the Post Office is unable or unwilling to buy at such a price. The gist of what he said was that the Post Office reserves the power in case it does not like the supplier's price or does not wish to go to a certain supplier.
I am sure that we all welcome competition. However, this is not competition. One cannot have a monopoly buyer who is also a potential supplier. I believe that the monopoly buyer is a menace to our economy. He is at least as dangerous an animal as the monopoly supplier. He encourages an attitude of complacency, and that attitude permeates down through the system.
6.15 p.m.
Worst of all, the supplying firms are put in an extremely vulnerable position.
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No manufacturer in his right mind, if there is an alternative, will put all his production into supplying one buyer. He will not invest in research and development and new plant when, at the drop of a hat or a change of the Postmaster-General's mind, any firm which has invested substantial sums in plant, research and the like can be cut off from its only customer; and we have seen how, since 30th January, the Postmaster-General's mind has changed under pressures which have been brought to bear upon him by hon. Members behind him.
The monopoly buyer does more harm to our telephone system and to our advance in research and development than any other facet. Right hon. and hon. Members opposite are fond of talking about monopolies. I would ask them to look at the other side of the picture and consider the position created by the monopoly buyer.
Hon. Members on both sides of the House have referred to the competitiveness of the American system, and various views about it have been expressed. I heard today about the chairman of a leading firm who went to the States and wanted to see one of his representatives who had arrived there two days earlier and taken up residence in some fairly remote place. He contacted the local telephone exchange and asked if a person who had been there only two days was likely to be on the telephone. He was told that his house will be fully equipped. When he called to see the man, he said how delighted he was to find that he had been connected within two days of arriving. The man told him that not only was he connected in two days but that he had been recommended to have a telephone in his bathroom, another in the bedroom and others in different rooms—
Mr. Speaker: Order. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will link what he is saying with the debate.
Mr. Boardman: I apologise, Mr. Speaker. I was allowing the competitiveness of the American system to carry me away into realms which are outside those dealt with in the new Clause.
The trouble with the monopoly buyer who retains the power to manufacture is that there can be no true comparison

1213
between relative costs. The Postmaster-General said that he wants this power in case a supplier is not prepared to sell at a price at which he is willing to buy. The Post Office may have served up costings and supplied details of what it considers would be the production costs of a given project. However, they can never be compared fairly with the manufacturing costs of an independent supplier. It is easy to reduce the costs of any unit, given a guaranteed outlet which will take 100 per cent. of one's production. Any manufacturing firm which could guarantee to dispose of all its production could bring down its costs substantially. At the moment, supplying firms face a position where, with one buyer, they cannot be sure that their whole production will be taken. In this way, any comparison of costs between a Post Office manufacturing unit and that of a private enterprise firm could be distorted severely and would provide a poor guide to the Post Office when it was exercising its discretion as to where it should buy. The creation of competition by manufacturing which is capitalised by public money is a dangerous and wrong practice.
As other hon. Members have pointed out, the debate in Committee was abridged, and hon. Members were unable to develop their arguments as fully as they wished because of the letter to which reference has been made. When the Postmaster-General introduced the new Clause today, I was surprised and disappointed that he made no reference to Clause 13. That was a remarkable omission, and I imagine that those hon. Members who were not members of the Committee must have thought that the new Clause made some special concessions, not recognising the great change that has been made. It is extremely regrettable. The change of emphasis in the new Clause and the pressures that have been applied to bring it about indicate the dangers with which we are faced. I shall join my hon. Friends in voting against the new Clause.
Mr. Hugh D. Brown: I will be brief. I am heartened by the fact that this is a healthy situation for the Government to be in with unanimous support from this side of the House and total opposition from hon. Gentlemen opposite. I should not like to claim
1214
all the credit for having engineered this situation, although the hon. Member for Howden (Mr. Bryan) tried to put the blame on me. It is most unfortunate that the hon. Member for Totnes (Mr. Mawby) should use such language as "Somebody has been got at". It is not a simple matter—there is more to it than that—but I am reasonably satisfied that the Government have made the right decision and that the wording of the Clause is satisfactory.
I was surprised by some of the points raised by hon. Members who were on the Committee and who are here this afternoon. They should recognise that the argument put in Committee was not necessarily an ideological one. It was that, under the Bill as anticipated, the Post Office Corporation would have certain powers. We were arguing that somewhere along the line discussions and negotiations had taken place that had changed what most of us assumed would be the position in the powers of the new Corporation. I regard what the Government are doing as going back to the original intention. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] All right. When I say "the original intention", I am not arguing about consultation and approval; I am merely arguing the broad case that the Corporation, if it wishes, should be able to indulge in the manufacture of equipment without too many strings attached, such as having to go to the Minister and being tied by what was manufactured in the period from 1961 when lion. Members opposite made sure that it did not have any great opportunity to manufacture anything of substance. Therefore, this is not just an ideological argument.
I remind hon. Members opposite that the Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General contained in the Post Office Report for 1967–68 is not a biased document. Dealing with this great efficient industry of private enterprise, the Report states that of 41 major orders due for completion in March, 1968, none was completed in time. So where is the ideological argument?
Mr. Kenneth Baker: Will the hon. Gentleman continue reading from the Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General? While he rightly attacks and criticises the firms for not delivering on

1215
time, he also attacks the management in the Post Office for not being on the ball and chasing up these deliveries much earlier. This is a two-pronged affair. It is not private industry which is always to blame; it is often the Post Office.
Mr. Brown: I know the bias that the hon. Gentleman has in defence of private enterprise. I will not follow him in that direction. I am not arguing that everybody in Post Office management is efficient and top class. I am merely trying to get hon. Members opposite to recognise that neither is everybody in private enterprise. It is no use blaming the clerk of works because he does not chase up the contractor when the contractor has failed to deliver the goods. Hon. Members opposite are doing a disservice to the Post Office if they do not recognise this.
In the limited efforts that the Post Office has made to try to get a certain percentage of its requirements from outside the ring—and the Comptroller and Auditor General refers to this—some of the manufacturers would not tender because they wanted it done within the sheltered system that had been operating under the bulk agreements. Therefore, if I am to take the credit for it, I am delighted, although I think that a lot of the credit goes to my right hon. Friend the Postmaster-General and to the Assistant Postmaster-General, who was on a rather sticky wicket in Committee when we were arguing this point because of the absence of my right hon. Friend. I think that this is a healthy thing. I am not arguing on ideological grounds.
Some of my hon. Friends may not agree with me, but those who know anything about the manufacture of telephone and exchange equipment cannot imagine that overnight, through some wild revolutionary Socialist Postmaster-General—I do not see one in office at the moment—there will be a mushrooming of Post Office factories with workers' control involved in them. To imagine that this will happen overnight is a fantasy of imagination. I should like to think that it is possible, but, recognising the practical difficulties, it will be a long time—and in this context the time scale of my right hon. Friend makes sense—before we see that happy position. However, if the
1216
unions involved and the public will give us the backing, we now seem to be making it possible to have that opportunity if we think it is desirable. Having removed the restriction that many of us thought was unreasonable, my right hon. Friend certainly deserves the full support of all hon. Members on this side.
Mr. Hay: I think that the hon. Member for Glasgow, Provan (Mr. Hugh D. Brown) is unique among those who have addressed the House today in thinking that there is little difference between the new Clause and Clause 13, which a later Amendment seeks to remove from the Bill.
Not having been on the Standing Committee, I have found considerable difficulty in trying to understand the differences between the two Clauses with which we are concerned. In any event—and I am prepared to be guided on this matter, at any rate by my hon. and right hon. Friends who have followed the progress of the Bill through all its stages so far with the greatest care—it seems to me that the Postmaster- General is faced, as has so often happened in the past with Ministers concerned with nationalisation Measures, with the problem of defining how far it is right and proper for an industry in public ownership to carry on activities which may compete with private enterprise.
It is evident that many hon. Members opposite are hot and strong in favour of the widest possible extension of manufacturing and similar powers being conferred upon the new Post Office Corporation. It is equally apparent that most of us on this side of the House resist this extension.
I should like to make one point, which has not fully been made, why we on this side do not favour the wide extension that hon. Gentlemen opposite seek. My hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, South-West (Mr. Tom Boardman) touched on this in his speech. When a Government Department like the Post Office or a nationalised industry undertakes manufacture and sale, it does so on uniquely favourable financial terms. Private enterprise is not only obliged to compete one firm with another, but it must raise its money from the market. Therefore, its prices must reflect the cost of money as well as the cost of raw

1217
materials, labour and everything else. Government Departments and nationalised industries are in a privileged position, because they can often obtain their money at less than the market rate. They have their obligations underwritten by the Treasury, and in some cases, as has frequently happened in the past, if accumulated debt arises it can be, and is, written off.
None of those things happens in the case of private enterprise, and this is why we are strongly sensitive about any attempt to expand the area of activity of a nationalised industry, particularly in the context of an operation like this, where a Government Department is being divided and its commercial operating side is being set up as a new industry. That is the main observation that I should like to make relating to the debate between the two sides of the House on the ambit of the Clause.
6.30 p.m.
When I turn from the merits and look at the text of the Clause, I am horrified. In Amendment (b), which has not been selected for Division but which it is in order to discuss, my hon. Friend the Member for Yeovil (Mr. Peyton) has drawn attention to some unpleasant words which appear throughout the Bill in a number of places, and which are repeated in two or three places in the Clause. I am referring to the expression, "a subsidiary of its". I hope very much that the Postmaster-General felt equally revolted by that expression. If he did, I cannot understand how these words got through the various Cabinet Committees and to this stage of the Bill without having been spotted.
I am not quite clear what the draftsman is trying to do, whether he thinks it clever to use a double genitive, or whether "its" will be taken in this context as an abbreviation for "itself". All I know is that this is an unpleasant animal, and I hope, Mr. Speaker, that you will reconsider your opinion—I was not present when you gave it—that we should not have a Division on this Amendment.
It may be that the Postmaster-General will concede that something needs to be done about this wording at a later stage. If he is thinking about that, I urge him not to be blinded by science by the draftsman, who may argue that these words are necessary in this form because
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they have some special legal implication. I urge the Postmaster-General not to believe that. The words proposed by my hon. Friend, or any other form of words which gets rid of this absurd double genitive, will be equally effective from a legal point of view.
I come, now, to the Clause as a whole. This is one of those jungle Clauses. The great advantage that I saw in Clause 13 was that it was much simpler to follow. I defy almost anybody to make any sense out of this Clause, unless he spends many minutes struggling through the undergrowth of language to distinguish what it is the Corporation will be empowered to do after consultation with the Minister, and what it will be able to do only with the Minister's approval and consent.
One thing that is clear, however, is that under the Clause as drafted the Corporation will have powers to go far beyond manufacturing. We have been talking this afternoon about powers of manufacture. If one looks at the Clause in detail, one sees that it goes beyond manufacture. It goes to supply as well, and it is this aspect of the ability of the Corporation to supply, even perhaps by retail, which we on this side of the House at any rate should look at with the greatest care.
I have tried to understand what exactly the Postmaster-General was doing in the celebrated letter of 29th January. If one reads the letter, at first blush one gets the impression that all he was doing was giving a bit of information about the extent to which the manufacturing and similar powers are carried on by his Department at the moment. It may be that the right hon. Gentleman will reply on that argument when he answers the debate. He may say that all he was trying to do was to be helpful and tell hon. Gentlemen what his Department did. He may say that this is a housemaid's baby, only a little one, and that there is nothing very much to worry about.
If that is what the right hon. Gentleman intends to say, he is hoping that the House is much more disingenous than it is, because if one reads the Standing Committee proceedings, and if one listens to the speeches of my hon. Friends who attended those debates and were concerned with the negotiations and discussions that went on, one realises that

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that letter was written to make it apparent that the Government's intention with regard to the Corporation was not to go outside the ambit of what was laid down there. If that was the right hon. Gentleman's intention, the letter is perfectly clear. If, on the other hand, as some of my hon. Friends have suspected, the intention was to come pretty close to misleading by implying that there was no intention of going beyond that, but in fact, all the time, because of pressure from the benches behind him, and from outside for all we know, the intention was to produce a much tougher, much wider, and much more powerful Clause—I sincerely hope that the right hon. Gentleman will confirm that that was not his intention—
Mr. Stonehouse: At the time of the debate I made it clear that it was not the intention to go beyond what my hon. Friend said in Committee. It is since then that we have given further consideration to this question, and it is in the light of that further consideration, and in the light of what was said in Committee, that the Government have decided that we must bring this Clause forward in place of Clause 13. There is no question of my hon. Friend misleading the Committee during the discussion on Clause 13, because at that time it was our intention to stick to that Clause. It is since then that we have reconsidered the question.
Mr. Hay: I am sure that the House is grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for that clarification. I am sure we all accept that the right hon. Gentleman had no intention deliberately of misleading the Committee, but something—
Mr. Bryan: Will the right hon. Gentleman explain why he did not say that in his opening speech, and why he did not even mention Clause 13?
Mr. Hay: This is a good way to make a speech. I do not know whether the right hon. Gentleman would care to intervene again to answer that.
Mr. Stonehouse: No.
Mr. Hay: In that event we had better wait until the right hon. Gentleman replies to the debate. What the right hon. Gentleman has said has made the matter more significant, and I think we are en-
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titled to know what representations have been made—other than those made during the debate in Committee—which have led to this sudden change of heart and to the extension of the proposals which have been incorporated in the Clause.
Which hon. Members and which organisations have required the Government to change their mind? The speeches from the Government side in Committee were not all that violent in their tone, or so threatening, that any Minister with an ounce of courage would not have stood up against them. Something must have been going on between the Committee stage and this stage of the Bill, and we await with the greatest interest—
The Assistant Postmaster-General (Mr. Joseph Slater): We are hearing a lot of repetitive speeches from hon. Members who were not on the Committee, and I think that it would be as well if we were to get on with the Bill.
Mr. Hay: That is a new doctrine. If the hon. Gentleman thinks that those who were not on the Standing Committee are not entitled on Report to put forward arguments and ask questions about what the Minister has done, to ask about something which looks a bit shady, then the hon. Gentleman, who has been in this House for many years, indeed for longer than I have, needs to think again about the functions of this House on Report.
I do not propose to take much longer, because I have made my main point. Having been interrupted by the right hon. Gentleman who made a statement of some importance in this connection I feel that it is perfectly legitimate and right to have asked him further questions about this and I hope he will come completely clean with the House when he comes to reply to this important debate.
Captain Orr: As the recipient of the celebrated letter, perhaps I might say a word or two about this. Perhaps to begin with I might say to hon. Members opposite that I make no complaint whatever of them for the success with which they have done their log-rolling. It has obviously been a highly successful piece of work. I congratulate them on having captured their Minister. They believe in a certain political philosophy which is different from mine and they have had a success. I make no complaint about

1221
them at all but I do complain about the Postmaster-General. The history of this matter is simply that it was apparent, in the way the Bill was originally drafted, that Clause 13 strictly limited the powers of manufacture of the Post Office to those things which it was already manufacturing during the relevant period. Those are the words that matter.
In order to cut down debate and to ascertain exactly what the Post Office did manufacture during the relevant period, I invited the Postmaster-General, in Committee, before we reached Clause 13 and so as to speed up our deliberations on that Clause, if he would let me have a list of the things which the Post Office then manufactured during the relevant period. He was kind enough to do so. His letter was extremely useful. He set out the extent of his powers and it is true, as one hon. Member opposite has said, that he had the power of any subject to manufacture anything, subject to legislation, but it is also true, as my hon. Friend qualified it, that his powers are strictly limited by the financial control of this House. What we were dealing with here were not Ministerial powers but the powers of a new public Corporation without Ministerial control. The Ministerial control was there in the Bill over the extension of manufacture. We took that for granted.
When the discussions on Clause 13 took place in Committee we took it for granted that the Government meant what they said in their Bill; and they themselves at that stage, defied their back benchers and stuck to their opinion. We, therefore, did not debate the matter at the length we might have and the Minister got his Clause. Since then the Minister has changed his mind. But in my view, what has happened has amounted to a deception. I acquit him of deliberately deceiving the House, but what has happened has amounted to a deception, because during the course of that debate I asked several questions and one in particular. I asked about the question of relays. Winding up the debate, the Assistant Postmaster-General said:
"The hon. and gallant Member for Down, South asked whether the Minister could control any large-scale expansion of the Post Office manufacture of relays."
The Assistant Postmaster-General went on to say:
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"Of course he could. That is what Clause 13 provides. The Minister is the judge of what is 'substantial', as Clause 14(5) makes quite clear."—[OFFICIAL RFPORT, Standing Committee D, 30th January, 1969; c. 556.]
The whole attitude of that Ministerial reply was that the Government were going to stick to Clause 13 and that all our fears were unjustified. That was the answer, but something has happened in the meantime. The Government have changed their mind. They have done away with Clause 13. No longer does the new Corporation have to come to the Minister for approval before an extension of its manufacture. No longer is the Assistant Postmaster-General's undertaking to me valid. In other words, the Assistant Postmaster-General has gone back on what he said. He may have had to do so under pressure, but that is what has happened.
6.45 p.m.
I suggest to the House that it is a breach of faith with those of us who took part in the debate in Committee on the understanding that the Government meant what they said. The Government have now gone back on their word. I am not going over the whole political, philosophical argument. It is perfectly plain that there is a difference of opinion between us about whether or not the new Corporation should be permitted an extension of its manufacture. I do not at all object to the extent to what the Post Office at present manufactures. I would not object if the Post Office under its present form, with Parliamentary control, were to seek to extend certain parts of its manufacture. Indeed, it might well be in the public interest that it should do so.
What we are dealing with now, however, is not the Post Office but a new public Corporation without Ministerial control. All that is in this new Clause is the obligation to consult the Minister, that is all.
Mr. Driberg: And secure approval.
Captain Orr: No, with great respect, the hon. Gentleman who usually reads things so well, has misread this. Approval is required only when there is manufacture for supply to others. In the case of manufacture for the Post Office's own use, the obligation is simply to consult the Minister.
Mr. Driberg: I believe that in subsection (2) it should also be "consultation".
Captain Orr: I agree that we have a basic difference of opinion. I believe that subsection (1) should require approval, and I hope that perhaps even now, at this late stage, or perhaps in another place, we might get a provision that Ministerial approval is still required. I still want the decision as to whether the new Corporation shall go into—to use the Postmaster-General's own phrase—"a substantial increase in its manufacturing powers" to be a decision reserved to this House of Commons, and not to this Corporation we are setting up.
Mr. Driberg: As I said in interrupting a previous speaker on the hon. Gentleman's side, accountability to Parliament is the main thing and that will be achieved if the new Clause 6 is carried.
Captain Orr: Yes, I sympathise with that, but at present we are looking at the Bill without the new Clause 6, without any guarantee that that Clause is to be in the Bill. We have to accept the position as it is. If the Postmaster-General were to give us an undertaking now that he is going to accept his hon. Friend's [Interruption.]
Mr. Speaker: Order. In this debate the hon. Gentleman cannot debate new Clause 6.
Captain Orr: I appreciate that, Mr. Speaker, and I am glad that you have called attention to it; but it is very sad that we cannot do so because it might alter our attitude to this Clause. But I quite understand. It is exceedingly unfortunate. I am greatly disappointed in the Postmaster-General. I did not think he would allow himself to go back on undertakings in the way he has done in this case. He has gone back on undertakings which he gave to the Committee. He has been guilty of a breach of faith with those of us on this side who served on the Committee, and supported him against his own supporters: and he has done it without explanation and without telling us what is behind it or to exactly what pressures he has been subjected. I hope we will resist this new Clause and that when it comes to the House a later Amendment to delete Clause 13 will be resisted too, so that we show a consistency
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which the Postmaster-General himself has failed to show.
Mr. Kenneth Baker: Although many Clauses and Amendments have been selected for debate over the next two days, there are probably two or three basic important issues which divide the Labour Party and the Conservative Party and which are fundamental to why we are in politics. On this new Clause we are discussing the extension that many hon. Members opposite would like to see in the manufacturing powers of the Post Office. Hon. Members opposite are in politics and supporters of their party to promote those interests. We are in politics to oppose the promotion of those interests. That is why this is an important and fundamental debate.
There has been a substantial change from the original control which was to be imposed by the Postmaster-General. Clause 13 is to be deleted, rather surreptitiously. It is a similar exercise to that which occurred when the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in introducing the Budget, told us what the pension increases were to be without telling us what the cost would be in the autumn. Clause 13, which is to be deleted, said that the Post Office Corporation was not to be allowed to extend its manufacturing powers except under authorisation granted by the Minister—that is, the Minister had the say-so. Under new Clause 1 the Minister does not have the say-so, because it will be consultation between the Minister and the Post Office. "Consultation" is a wide phrase. It can mean a nod and a wink. If a really Socialist Postmaster-General were to be appointed—
Mr. Driberg: Unthinkable.
Mr. Baker: As the hon. Member for Barking (Mr. Driberg) says, it is unthinkable. We certainly have not got one at the moment. If one were to be appointed, he would be able to nudge the Post Office Board into substantially extending the manufacturing powers of the Post Office. This is what worries us. This is a major change from the original Bill.
The only limitation in the new Clause is that in subsection (4), which relates specifically to the trading activities of the Post Office—that is, when it manufactures things that it does not want for itself and sells them generally. The limitation is that when the Post Office does

1225
that sort of thing it must act as if it were engaged in a commercial enterprise. That, again, is a very loose phrase. It means just what one wants it to mean. We on this side submit that a commercial enterprise must make profits. If it does not, it should go bankrupt. That clearly could not happen to the manufacturing section of the Post Office. Hon. Members opposite would not want that to happen. We would expect a commercial enterprise to pay dividends, but the manufacturing side of the Post Office is unlikely to do that.
It is impossible to discover how it is acting, whether it is acting commercially or not, because no separate accounts exist for the manufacturing operations of the Post Office. We managed to wring out only one major concession in Committee—that was to have separate accounts for the National Data Processing Service, because we wanted to know how it is operating. We have not managed to wring out the other concession of having separate accounts for manufacturing activities. It is therefore impossible to know whether they are operating commercially.
We contend that the Post Office is mainly concerned with doing two things—running an efficient postal service and running an efficient telephone service. It should stick to doing those two things and should not extend its activities into manufacturing. There are good reasons why it should not do so.
The Postmaster-General says that these powers are reserve powers and that he does not want to use them. What are they in reserve for? Does he have in mind anything in particular which he thinks the Post Office should be manufacturing? Should it be manufacturing telephone apparatus, or exchange equipment, or the new Post Office vans that are to be battery-powered? Should it go further and start manufacturing postmen's equipment and uniforms?
Mr. Driberg: Certainly.
Mr. Baker: Let us go a little further for the hon. Gentleman. If we are short of telegraph poles, should it buy up a few acres of forest in Scotland? There is no end to what the Post Office could do under the new Clause. We want to know what specific activities the Postmaster-General has in mind.
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Hon. Members opposite contend that if the Post Office had manufacturing facilities it would be able to test the costings of its suppliers; it could go to a little factory of its own and say, "Is this a fair cost from Plessey" or "from Standard Telephones"? This is absurd. Marks & Spencer does not have to own clothing factories and textile mills to know that its suppliers are competitive; nor does any good service industry.
Another argument put forward for extending the manufacturing powers of the Post Office was that it would be a good thing for the Post Office to get into a profitable industry. I certainly agree with that, but I think that the Post Office, which cannot even run the telegram service without losing 5s. for every telegram sent, is very unlikely to be able profitably to run a factory making telephone apparatus.
Mr. Dobson rose—
Mr. Speaker: Order. Interventions prolong speeches.
Mr. Dobson: I think that the hon. Gentleman is being grossly unfair to the Post Office in his criticism of the telegraph service. With his financial background he knows that the Post Office cannot make a profit on that service unless the price of telegrams is swingeingly increased. The more the Post Office increases the cost the fewer telegrams are sent and the more the service goes into the red.
Mr. Baker: I absolutely refute that. I have put to the Postmaster-General on other occasions, and I hope within the next 48 hours to do so again if I can get it in order on an Amendment or a new Clause, ways of making money out of telegrams.
Mr. Speaker: Order—not in this debate.
Mr. Baker: I think that it can be done, but I will not develop the point at this time.
A third argument advanced by hon. Members opposite for extending manufacturing activities is that it would bring employment to, or protect employment in, areas like Ulster. Hon. Members need only compare the activities of other nationalised industries to realise how

1227
fallacious that argument is. I would not have said that the National Coal Board was protecting employment. The Steel Corporation is in the process of laying off 50,000 workers.
The last and most important argument advanced by hon. Members opposite is that an extension of these activities would protect the Post Office's own supply line: if it had factories manufacturing telephone apparatus and exchange equipment, it would be able to protect its own supply line and would also be able to buy in the most competitive markets. This is a false argument. If the Post Office wants to protect its own supply line and buy in the most competitive market, it should allow more deals like G.L.C. buying the Ericsson exchange. That is the way to get the prices of the domestic telephone equipment manufacturers down—by opening up the whole purchasing of the Post Office to greater competition.
This afternoon the right hon. Gentleman said that these are reserve powers and that he does not want to use them. Hon. Members below the Gangway are breathing heavily down his neck because they want these powers to be used. The Post Office Engineering Union has produced a pamphlet. I have not seen a copy, but I saw the review of it in The Times. The union has urged the Post Office to do three things when new Clause 1 has been approved by the House—first, to extend its repair facilities. I would not disagree with that. The union has urged the Post Office, secondly, to build new factories in development areas. It would be absolutely disastrous if the Post Office were to embark upon that course. The union has urged the Post Office, thirdly, to purchase a controlling interest in existing firms—straightforward nationalisation. These are the sort of powers that the Post Office will have when the Clause is passed.
My objections to the Clause are, first, that it will increase the monopoly powers of the Post Office, and the Post Office is insulated from market forces and does not have to respond to competitive pressures. Secondly, the Clause is a blank cheque to the Post Office to buy almost any company in the country without recourse to the House. Thirdly and lastly, I believe that the Post Office should stick to what it is doing.
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I return to the basic difference between the two sides of the House. Hon. Members opposite are basically in politics to extend the rôle of the State and State corporations like the Post Office. We in the Conservative Party are in politics to run down the rôle of the State and to limit its expansion. That is the issue in the new Clause, which I hope will be defeated.
7.0 p.m.
Mr. Peter Hordern: I was surprised that the Minister should castigate my hon. Friend the Member for Henley (Mr. Hoy) for intervening in the debate, particularly because my hon. Friend managed to extract from the Postmaster-General a most important statement, namely, that he had changed his mind since Clause 13 was dealt with in Committee in such a way that it was necessary to introduce this obnoxious new Clause.
It is most important that the Postmaster-General or the Assistant Postmaster-General should give us the reasons and evidence for this change of mind. I do not wish to refer to what happened about Clause 13, but it is essential that the Government should divulge the evidence which came into their possession which caused them to introduce the new Clause and the substantial extra powers which it gives. As is clear from the new Clause, the responsibilities of the Postmaster-General will be very heavy because the new Corporation will have to consult him about permission to manufacture for outside bodies.
The Minister must have known during the debate on Clause 13 what the scale of expenditure by the Post Office in capital investment would be. We have been told today that it is to be about £2,000 million over the next five years. This knowledge has not suddenly become available since 29th January. What evidence is there that the supply and contracting companies have suddenly become incapable of supplying this material? That is one construction of the reasons which brought about the Minister's change of mind. Is it conceivable, with a capital expenditure programme over five years, that the Minister suddenly discovered that he had no faith in the suppliers to produce the essential equipment? If that is so, let us have the evidence for it.

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If the reason for the Government's change of mind is that they feel it necessary to safeguard their interests by having manufacturing capacity, what manufacturing capacity will be introduced? It is inconceivable that the Government should have introduced the new Clause with powers to manufacture on the basis that the existing suppliers could not meet their commitment unless they had firm ideas about the equipment which is to be manufactured. I hope that we shall have precise answers on these points.
It is extraordinary that on an investment programme lasting over five years it should be suggested that we cannot count on companies like Plessey, Standard Telephones and G.E.C. to provide this equipment. I cannot believe that that is what the Government suggest. This ignores completely supplies from suppliers abroad. Companies in the Free Trade Area like Ericsson will perfectly legitimately be quoting for the supply of equipment to the Post Office. An incursion by the Post Office into manufacturing equipment will be extraordinary in the circumstances of the total supply available.
What are the manufacturing criteria for the new Corporation? What possible financial criteria can it put forward? The Postmaster-General said that there would be a sharp financial objective. I do not know what the financial objective of the Post Office is. I think that it is to earn a return of about 10 per cent. on its assets, but I should like to be advised on that point. Whatever the level, it cannot be comparable with the discipline which supplying companies must face when supplying equipment to the Post Office.
The purpose of subsection (4) of the new Clause is that the Corporation shall act as if it were a company engaged in a commercial enterprise. It is impossible for it to engage as a commercial enterprise. Are we to believe that the Corporation, when it is in existence, will have precisely the same and no better access to banking facilities than its competitors in private industry? Are we to believe that bank managers will say, "We are sorry, but we cannot allow you overdraft facilities because of the credit squeeze"? Are we to believe that it will get no better interest rates than those
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offered to private companies? Will it have to pay, as first-class companies do, over 10 per cent. to borrow money in the market? What criteria will it have to establish compared with private companies in industry?
It is impossible to believe that a corporation, functioning for a monopoly buyer, will not be supported by the State far more than any private supplier. This is the most objectionable feature of the Corporation manufacturing its own equipment. The uncertainty which must have been introduced among suppliers and in industry must be intense. The Postmaster-General, by his intervention, brief though it was, must have caused serious disturbance in the industry, and I hope that when he winds up the debate he will do his best to put it right.
Mr. Stonehouse: With permission, I should like to speak again. This has been a useful and long debate and I am grateful to hon. Members who have contributed to it.
The hon. Member for Acton (Mr. Kenneth Baker) drew attention to the gulf between the two sides of the House. He is absolutely right. There is a difference in the philosophical approach to this matter of the two sides of the House. We on this side believe that a public enterprise like the Post Office should have broadly the same opportunity as private enterprise to develop its manufacturing facilities to meet its requirements. This is important because circumstances in the market may change tremendously in the next ten or 20 years. By the Bill, we are setting out the position not just for next year or the year after but for ten years' time when the circumstances of the manufacturing and supplying industry will be vastly different from what they are now. It is important that the House should consider possible eventualities.
I do not propose, and the Post Office Corporation when it is set up will not propose, immediately to embark on a whole range of manufacturing activities. Our relations with the suppliers are very helpful and co-operative and it is not our wish to upset them. I have paid tribute to the way in which they have responded to the increased demands made upon them.
The Opposition are objecting because the new Clause is new. If a new proposal

1231
is right, it should be applauded. I am extremely surprised that, of all people, hon. Members opposite, who in Committee made dozens of suggestions to me for improving the Bill, should complain that I have changed my mind. There was no point in their putting forward the points which we debated in Committee unless they thought that there was a possibility that, on reconsideration, I would change my mind. It makes nonsense of our Standing Committee proceedings and the purpose of the House of Commons if Ministers are not prepared to reconsider matters in the light of debates in Committee.
After the debate in Standing Committee, I carefully considered what had been said. I was unable to attend that debate, but I read the OFFICIAL REPORT with great care and I thought that many of the observations of hon. Members on my side, particularly those of my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, Provan (Mr. Hugh D. Brown) were extremely valuable.
I took the Report of the Standing Committee to the Post Office Board, of which I am Chairman, and debated the subject with it. It reconsidered its position about the powers which it thought that the Post Office Corporation would require and advised me that it would be appropriate if it had powers to increase its manufacturing capacity to meet its own requirements, after consultation with the Minister, rather than having to have the Minister's approval in each case.
It was for these reasons that I brought forward the new Clause, and it was obvious that this would lead to the deletion of the original Clause 13, which I am persuaded now is not the best way to deal with the question—
Mr. Kenneth Baker: Would the right hon. Gentleman not agree that asking the Post Office whether it wants increased powers is like asking a greedy man whether he wants to be a glutton?
Mr. Stonehouse: We must appreciate that the existing Post Office Board and the future Corporation must have a responsible attitude to their responsibilities. These bodies are, after all, being given monopoly powers and responsibilities to the business community and the country and it is very important in the building up of this highly technological
1232
and advanced communications system that the Post Office should be able to have access to all the advanced equipment that it requires and that it should be able to guarantee the smooth supply of that essential equipment. It is in the light of those responsibilities that the Post Office asked the Minister concerned for the new Clause.
It was the Government's decision that the new Clause would be appropriate in all the circumstances. I appreciate that I have not been able to go as far as my hon. Friends would have liked. They would have preferred no restriction at all on the Corporation's activities and that it should be able to engage in wide-scale manufacturing activities, even in supply outside. I have been unable to go that far, but it is important that the Post Office should be able to manufacture for its own requirements.
Mr. Bryan: We still cannot find out from the right hon. Gentleman why it was only when my hon. Friend the Member for Henley (Mr. Hay) spoke, three-quarters of the way through the debate, that he told us what had happened. We were bound to think it was subterfuge when he presented the new Clause without the slightest mention of Clause 13, which is the whole subject of this discussion.
Mr. Stonehouse: The allegation of deception, although made in a kindly way by the hon. and gallant Member for Down, South (Captain Orr), is something which I tried to refute because it was unworthy. The idea of deception is that at the time of the Committee proceedings my hon. Friend knew what we were intending to do on Report. This suggestion is absolutely wrong. Neither my hon. Friend nor I at that time had any knowledge that the new Clause would be brought forward. The assurances given in Committee, I agree, related to the then Clause 13, but they were made in a fully honourable spirit and there is no question of any deception applying to those proceedings.
Captain Orr: I did not make that charge. What I said was that what had happened in the long run amounted to a breach of faith, because, for whatever motives, the various undertakings were given by the Assistant Postmaster-General—I fully accept his good faith and I have

1233
not suggested otherwise—but for whatever reasons—
Mr. Speaker: Order. We are not in Committee. Interventions must be brief.
Captain Orr: Indeed, Mr. Speaker, but the right hon. Gentleman has made a serious charge, that I have charged him and his hon. Friend with something dishonourable. I did not do so. What I said was that the effect of putting down the new Clause without proper preparation amounts to a breach of faith and of the undertakings given in Committee.
Mr. Stonehouse: All I can say is that if Ministers are not going to be influenced after consideration of proceedings in Standing Committee, then those proceedings need not take place. My hon. Friends made some valuable contributions to that debate. It would be ridiculous if I did not consider what they said and make revised proposals. Hon. Members opposite also made helpful speeches which my hon. Friend and I have studied carefully. If we changed our minds in the light of their points, would they then accuse us of bad faith because we had adopted their points of view? Ministers must be prepared to be flexible, and I have admitted today that the stand of my hon. Friend and myself on the original Clause 13 in Committee was incorrect. We have done our best to change it through the new Clause.
My hon. Friend the Member for Barking (Mr. Driberg) gave some tepid support to the new Clause. I am grateful to him and to the hon. Member for Yeovil (Mr. Peyton) for their observations about Amendment (b). I have been thinking about this during the afternoon and I agree that their form of words seems strictly more attractive, but I am advised that the form in the new Clause is more appropriate, and applies in the case of one subsidiary, whereas their words assume that the Corporation will have plural subsidiaries. My advice from the draftsmen is that it would be more appropriate to stick to the present wording. I regret that this is my advice, because I agree that, at this stage of our proceedings, it would be very attractive to give way to the felicitous arguments of the hon. Member for Yeovil.
Mr. Peyton: I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will not persist in accept-
1234
ing that deplorable advice. Of course we will not be dogmatic. If he would only say that he would find a more attractive form of words than this appalling ugliness I should be glad to accept that.
Mr. Stonehouse: As I say, I am sorry that I cannot give way on that. Nor can I advise the House to accept Amendments (a), (c), (d), (e), (f) or (g).
Mr. Hay: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the advice that he has been given is nonsense because the plural always includes the singular? As he will be under heavy pressure in another place to alter the wording of the Clause, will he give an assurance that the necessary alteration will be made in another place and that he will consider the matter between now and that stage?
Mr. Stonehouse: I am always prepared to give further consideration to matters at any stage. I must, however, advise the House of the position as we see it, and that is the position to which I stick. Some of the legal drafting may seem clumsy, but I am advised that this is the right way to proceed.
I must also advise the House to reject the other Amendments to which I referred because they would be tantamount to going back to the original Clause 13, which insisted on Ministerial approval for the extension of manufacturing activities. That, for the reasons I have explained, would be unwise.
Amendment (e) urges us to delete the words
"… in such manner as he thinks fit".
The hon. Member for Yeovil wondered what this provision meant. The answer is that it must be open to the Minister to decide how this information is conveyed. There may be a large number of quite minor examples about which it would be inappropriate for the Minister to issue a White Paper. A major change might represent an issue on which it would be appropriate for such a document to be published, but there might be many minor changes about which it would be more appropriate for the Minister to answer a Question in the House or to find another way of informing Parliament.
The fact that the House of Commons and the House of Lords are not referred

1235
to in the new Clause is no disrespect to Parliament. It is merely a convenience because there may be minor items which the Post Office intends to manufacture—for example, transistor valves which it requires for certain circuits—which would not concern the House of Commons because it would not be a question of principle, although it might be an important matter on which advice should be given to the C.B.I. directly so that it could advise the constituent firm most closely concerned. As I say, on major questions the Minister would find some way to advise Parliament.
Captain Orr: What about the right hon. Gentleman's earlier assurance?
Mr. Stonehouse: We must consider each case on its merits. I should not like to anticipate what the Minister might think at a particular time about a particular item.
Captain Orr: I had in mind what the right hon. Gentleman said in Committee, which was an undertaking based on the existence of the original Clause 13. Does that undertaking still stand?
Mr. Stonehouse: Yes. I think that it would be the intention of the Minister to take a close interest in the extension of the activities of the Post Office in this respect and to ensure that the interested companies, particularly competive firms, were advised of what was going on. This is the purpose of the consultation called for in the new Clause. The Minister would obviously want to act on the information made available to him.
Amendment No. 55 provides for the Minister to call for information in relation to
'… the construction, manufacture of production of articles in …"
the particular financial year. This provision is being included to ensure that the public at large will be aware of the activities of the Post Office so that the cross-subsidisation danger to which I referred can be avoided.
This has been a useful discussion which has clarified the intention behind the new Clause. I have done my best to answer the questions that have been asked. The
1236
new Clause is valuable for the Corporation, and I therefore commend it to the House.
Mr. Patrick McNair-Wilson rose—
Mr. Speaker: Order. On Report it is usual to debate formally, although I cannot prevent the hon. Member from speaking. Mr. McNair-Wilson.
Mr. McNair-Wilson: I appreciate your remark, Mr. Speaker, and I promise to be brief.
The right hon. Gentleman's reply has been most unsatisfactory. I am particularly unhappy about his refusal to talk more enthusiastically about Amendment (a) to the new Clause. The right hon. Gentleman says that it is the intention of his Department and the Government to give public corporations the same facilities as exist in the private sector. The new Clause does nothing of the sort, for it goes far beyond anything that would be expected of a private company.
This provision would give complete freedom to the Corporation to engage in a whole range of costly manufacturing and other businesses. We are told that consultation will take place, but nobody has defined "consultation" in this context and certainly I do not know what it means. I cannot understand why the right hon. Gentleman runs away from the word "approval". If we could see in the Clause at least a figure beyond which nothing should be spent without approval we should be happier.
Hon. Gentlemen opposite may dislike this line of thought, but do they realise that the new Clause will allow the Corporation to go into a whole sphere of activity even unthought of by the Post Office now? I cannot understand why it is not possible to put real target figures in the Clause and why the provision should be left in a completely open-ended way which will enable the Post Office to look attractively at any industry.
We have been here before. We have had this type of blanket provision before. We recall recent transport legislation. This is an attempt to introduce legislation as a form of creeping nationalisation, and when the Postmaster-General talks encouragingly about the effect on

1237
supplies we know perfectly well that as the level of Government intervention in industry increases, so the risk to the supplier increases because nobody can compete with the man who has his hand in the taxpayer's pocket.
Mr. Keith Speed: I, too, will be brief—
Mr. Driberg rose in his place and claimed to move, That the Question be now put:—
Question put, That the Question be now put.
The House divided: Ayes 233, Noes 150.

Division No. 173.]

AYES

[7.28 p.m.

Albu, Austen

Grey, Charles (Durham)

MacPherson, Malcolm

Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)

Griffiths, Eddie (Brightside)

Mahon, Peter (Preston, S.)

Alldritt, Walter

Griffiths, Rt. Hn. James (Llanelly)

Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield, E.)

Anderson, Donald

Griffiths, Will (Exchange)

Manuel, Archie

Ashley, Jack

Hamilton, James (Bothwell)

Mapp, Charles

Ashton, Joe (Bassetlaw)

Hamilton, William (Fife, W.)

Marks, Kenneth

Atkins, Ronald (Preston, N.)

Hamling, William

Marquand, David

Barnett, Joel

Hannan, William

Marsh, Rt. Hn. Richard

Bence, Cyril

Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)

Mason, Rt. Hn, Roy

Bessell, Peter

Hart, Rt. Hn. Judith

Mayhew, Christopher

Bidwell, Sydney

Haseldine, Norman

Mendelson, John

Bishop, E. S.

Hattersley, Roy

Mikardo, Ian

Blackburn, F.

Hazell, Bert

Millan, Bruce

Blenkinsop, Arthur

Henig, Stanley

Miller, Dr. M. S.

Booth, Albert

Herbison, Rt. Hn. Margaret

Mitchell, R. C. (S'th'pton, Test)

Boston, Terence

Hobden, Dennis

Molloy, William

Bottomley, Rt, Hn. Arthur

Hooley, Frank

Morgan, Elystan (Cardiganshire)

Boyden, James

Horner, John

Morris, Alfred (Wythensnawe)

Bray, Dr. Jeremy

Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas

Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)

Brooks, Edwin

Howarth, Robert (Bolton, E.)

Moyle, Roland

Brown, Rt. Hn. George (Belper)

Howell, Denis (Small Heath)

Murray, Albert

Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, Provan)

Huckfield, Leslie

Neal, Harold

Brown, Bob (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, W.)

Hughes, Emrys (Ayrshire, S.)

Newens, Stan

Brown, R. W. (Shoreditch & F'bury)

Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)

Noel-Baker, Rt. Hn. Philip (Derby, S.)

Buchan, Norman

Hughes, Roy (Newport)

Ogden, Eric

Cant, R. B.

Hunter, Adam

O'Malley, Brian

Carmichael, Neil

Hynd, John

Orbach, Maurice

Carter-Jones, Lewis

Jackson, Colin (B'h'se & Spenb'gh)

Orme, Stanley

Castle, Rt. Hn. Barbara

Janner, Sir Barnett

Owen, Dr. David (Plymouth, S'tn)

Chapman, Donald

Jay, Rt, Hn. Douglas

Owen, Will (Morpeth)

Coe, Denis

Jeger, George (Goole)

Page, Derek (King's Lynn)

Coleman, Donald

Jager, Mrs. Lena (H'b'n & St. P'cras, S.)

Paget, R. T.

Corbet, Mrs. Freda

Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)

Pannell, Rt. Hn. Charles

Crawshaw, Richard

Johnson, Carol (Lewisham, S.)

Pardoe, John

Crostand, Rt. Hn. Anthony

Jones, Dan (Burnley)

Parker, John (Dagenham)

Crossman, Rt. Hn. Richard

Jones, Rt. Hn. Sir Elwyn (W. Ham, S.)

Parkyn, Brian (Bedford)

Davidson, Arthur (Accrington)

Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)

Pavitt, Laurence

Davidson, James (Aberdeenshire, W.)

Jones, T. Alec (Rhondda, West)

Pearson, Arthur (Pontypridd)

Davies, G. E'fed (Rhondda, E.)

Judd, Frank

Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred

Daves, Dr. Ernest (Stretford)

Kelley, Richard

Pentland, Norman

Davies, Rt. Hn. Harold (Leek)

Kerr, Mrs. Anne (R'ter & Chatham)

Perry, Ernest G. (Battersea, S.)

Davies, Ifor (Gower)

Kerr, Russell (Feltham)

Perry, George H. (Nottingham, S.)

Delargy, Hugh

Lawson, George

Prentice, Rt. Hn. R. E

Dempsey, James

Leadbitter, Ted

Price, William (Rugby)

Dewar, Donald

Lee, Rt. Hn. Frederick (Newton)

Probert, Arthur

Diamond, Rt. Hn. John

Lee, Rt. Hn. Jennie (Cannock)

Rankin, John

Dobson, Ray

Bees, Merlyn

Doig, Peter

Lee, John (Reading)

Richard, Ivor

Driberg, Tom

Lestor, Miss Joan

Roberts, Rt. Hn. Goronwy

Dunwoody, Dr. John (F'th & C'b'e)

Lever, L. M. (Ardwick)

Roberts, Gwilym (Bedfordshire, S.)

Eadie, Alex

Lewis, Arthur (W. Ham, N.)

Robertson, John (Paisley)

Edwards, William (Merioneth)

Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)

Rodgers, William (Stockton)

Ellis, John

Lomas, Kenneth

Rogers, George (Kensington, N.)

English, Michael

Luard, Evan

Rose, Paul

Ensor, David

Lubbock, Eric

Rowlands, E.

Evans, Fred (Caerphilly)

Lyon, Alexander W. (York)

Ryan, John

Evans, Gwynfor (C'marthen)

Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.)

Shaw, Arnold (Ilford, S.)

Evans, Ioan L. (Birm'h'm, Yardley)

McBride, Neil

Sheldon, Robert

Finch, Harold

MacColl, James

Shore, Rt. Hn. Peter (Stepney)

Fitch, Alan (Wigan)

MacDermot, Niall

Short, Rt. Hn. Edward (N'c'tle-u-Tyne)

Fletcher, Raymond (Ilkeston)

Macdonald, A. H.

Short, Mrs. Renée (W'hampton, N. E.)

Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)

McGuire, Michael

Silkin, Rt. Hn. John (Deptford)

Foot, Michael (Ebbw Vale)

McKay, Mrs. Margaret

Silverman, Julius

Forrester, John

Mackenzie, Alasdair (Ross & Crom'ty)

Slater, Joseph

Fowler, Gerry

Mackenzie, Gregor (Rutherglen)

Small, William

Freeson, Reginald

Mackie, John

Spriggs, Leslie

Galpern, Sir Myer

Mackintosh, John P.

Steel, David (Roxburgh)

Ginsburg, David

Maclennan, Robert

Steele, Thomas (Dunbartonshire, W.)

Greenwood, Rt. Hn. Anthony

McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.)

Stonehouse, Rt. Hn. John

Gregory, Arnold

McNamara, J. Kevin

Taverne, Dick

Thomas, Rt. Hn. George

Watkins, Tudor (Brecon & Radnor)

Willis, Rt. Hn. George

Thomson, Rt. Hn. George

Weitzman, David

Wilson, William (Coventry, S.

Thornton, Ernest

Wellbeloved, James

Winstanley, Dr. M. P.

Tinn, James

White, Mrs. Eirene

Woodburn, Rt. Hn. A.

Tomney, Frank

Wilkins, W. A.

Woof, Robert

Wainwright, Richard (Colne Valley)

Willey, Rt. Hn. Frederick

Walden, Brian (All Saints)

Williams, Alan (Swansea, W.)

TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

Walker, Harold (Doncaster)

Williams, Alan Lee (Hornchurch)

Mr. Joseph Harper and

Wallace, George

Williams, W. T. (Warrington)

Mr. John McCann.

Watkins, David (Consett)

NOES

Allason, James (Hemel Hempstead)

Godber, Rt. Hn. J. B.

Page, Graham (Crosby)

Atkins, Humphrey (M't'n & M'd'n)

Goodhart, Philip

Page, John (Harrow, W.)

Awdry, Daniel

Gower, Raymond

Pearson, Sir Frank (Clitheroe)

Baker, Kenneth (Acton)

Grant, Anthony

Peel, John

Baker, W. H. K. (Banff)

Griffiths, Eldon (Bury St. Edmunds)

Percival, Ian

Balniel, Lord

Gurden, Harold

Peyton, John

Batsford, Brian

Hall, John (Wycombe)

Pink, R. Bonner

Bed, Ronald

Hall-Davis, A. G. F.

Powell, Rt. Hn. J. Enoch

Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torquay)

Hamilton, Lord (Fermanagh)

Price, David (Eastleigh)

Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gos. & Fhm)

Harvie Anderson, Miss

Pym, Francis

Biffen, John

Hay, John

Quennell, Miss J. M.

Biggs-Davison, John

Heald, Rt. Hn. Sir Lionel

Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon

Birch, Rt. Hn. Nigel

Higgins, Terence L.

Ridley, Hn. Nicholas

Black, Sir Cyril

Hiley, Joseph

Rossi, Hugh (Hornsey)

Blaker, Peter

Hornby, Richard

Royle, Anthony

Boardman, Tom (Leicester, S. W.)

Hutchison, Michael Clark

Russell, Sir Ronald

Body, Richard

Iremonger, T. L.

Scott, Nicholas

Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hn. John

Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)

Scott-Hopkins, James

Boyle, Rt. Hn. Sir Edward

Jenkin, Patrick (Woodford)

Sharples, Richard

Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. Sir Walter

Jennings, J. C. (Burton)

Silvester, Frederick

Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)

Joseph, Rt. Hn. Sir Keith

Sinclair, Sir George

Bruce-Gardyne, J.

Kaberry, Sir Donald

Smith, Dudley (W'wick & L'mington)

Bryan, Paul

Kerby, Capt. Henry

Smith, John (London & W'minster)

Buchanan-Smith, Alick (Angus, N & M;

Kershaw, Anthony

Speed, Keith

Bullus, Sir Eric

Lambton, Viscount

Stainton, Keith

Burden, F. A.

Lancaster, Col. C. G.

Stodart, Anthony

Campbell, B. (Oldham, W.)

Lane, David

Summers, Sir Spencer

Campbell, Gordon (Moray & Nairn)

Langford-Holt, Sir John

Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)

Carlisle, Mark

Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)

Taylor, Frank (Moss Side)

Chichester-Clark, R.

Lloyd, Ian (P'tsm'th, Langstone)

Thatcher, Mrs. Margaret

Clark, Henry

MacArthur, Ian

Tilney, John

Clegg, Walter

McMaster, Stanley

Turton, Rt. Hn. R. H.

Costain, A. P.

McNair-Wilson, M. (Walthamstow, E.)

van Straubenzee, W. R.

Craddock, Sir Beresford (Spelthorne)

McNair-Wilson, Patrick (NewForest)

Vaughan-Morgan, Rt. Hn. Sir John

Crouch, David

Maddan, Martin

Vickers, Dame Joan

Crowder, F. P.

Maude, Angus

Wall, Patrick

Currie, G. B. H.

Mawby, Ray

Walters, Dennis

d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry

Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J.

Ward, Dame Irene

Dean, Paul

Mills, Stratton (Belfast, N.)

Weatherill, Bernard

Deedes, Rt. Hn. W. F. (Ashford)

Monro, Hector

Whitelaw, Rt. Hn. William

Digby, Simon Wingfield

More, Jasper

Wiggin, A. W.

Donnelly, Desmond

Morgan, Geraint (Denbigh)

Williams, Donald (Dudley)

Doughty, Charles

Morgan-Giles, Rear-Adm.

Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)

Drayson, G. B.

Munro-Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh

Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick

Elliott, R. W. (N 'c'tle-upon-Tyne, N.)

Murton, Oscar

Woodnutt, Mark

Farr, John

Nabarro, Sir Gerald

Wright, Esmond

Fortescue, Tim

Noble, Rt. Hn. Michael

Wylie, N. R.

Foster, Sir John

Nott, John

Younger, Hn. George

Gilmour, Ian (Norfolk, C.)

Onslow, Cranley

TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

Gilmour, Sir John (Fife, E.)

Orr, Capt. L. P. S.

Mr. Reginald Eyre and

Glover, Sir Douglas

Osborne, Sir Cyril (Louth)

Mr. Timothy Kitson.

Question put accordingly, That the Clause be read a Second time:—
The House divided: Ayes, 237, Noes 155.

Division No. 174.]

AYES

[7.38 p.m.

Albu, Austen

Bishop, E. S.

Brown, Bob (N'c'tte-upon-Tyne, W.)

Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)

Blackburn, F.

Brown, R. W. (Shoreditch & F'bury)

Alldritt, Walter

Blenkinsop, Arthur

Buchan, Norman

Anderson, Donald

Booth, Albert

Cant, R. B.

Ashley, Jack

Boston, Terence

Carmichael, Neil

Ashton, Joe (Bassetlaw)

Bottomley, Rt. Hn. Arthur

Castle, Rt. Hn. Barbara

Atkins, Ronald (Preston, N.)

Boyden, James

Chapman, Donald

Barnett, Joel

Bray, Dr. Jeremy

Coe, Denis

Bence, Cyril

Brooks, Edwin

Coleman, Donald

Bessell, Peter

Brown, Rt. Hn. George (Belper)

Corbet, Mrs. Freda

Bidwell, Sydney

Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, Provan)

Crawshaw, Richard

Crosland, Rt. Hn. Anthony

Jeger, George (Goole)

Page, Derek (King's Lynn)

Crossman, Rt. Hn. Richard

Jeger, Mrs. Lena (H'b'n & St. P' cras, S.)

Paget, R. T.

Dalyell, Tam

Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)

Pannell, Rt. Hn. Charles

Davidson, Arthur (Accrington)

Johnson, Carol (Lewisham, S.)

Pardoe, John

Davidson, James (Aberdeenshire, W.)

Jones, Dan (Burnley)

Parker, John (Dagenham)

Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)

Jones, Rt. Hn. Sir Elwyn (W. Ham, S.)

Parkyn, Brian (Bedford)

Davies, Dr. Ernest (Stretford)

Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)

Pavitt, Laurence

Davies, Rt. Hn. Harold (Leek)

Jones, T. Alec (Rhondda, West)

Pearson, Arthur (Pontypridd)

Davies, Ifor (Gower)

Judd, Frank

Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred

Delargy, Hugh

Keller, Richard

Pentland, Norman

Dempsey, James

Kerr, Mrs. Anne (R'ter & Chatham)

Perry, Ernest G. (Battersea, S.)

Dewar, Donald

Kerr, Russell (Feltham)

Perry, George H. (Nottingham, S.)

Diamond, Rt. Hn. John

Lawson, George

Prentice, Rt. Hn. R. E.

Dobson, Ray

Leadbitter, Ted

Price, William (Rugby)

Doig, Peter

Lee, Rt. Hn. Frederick (Newton)

Probert, Arthur

Driberg, Tom

Lee, Rt. Hn. Jennie (Cannock)

Rankin, John

Dun woody, Dr. John (F'th & C'b'e)

Lee, John (Reading)

Bees, Merlyn

Eadie, Alex

Lestor, Miss Joan

Richard, Ivor

Edwards, William (Merioneth)

Lever, L. M. (Ardwick)

Roberts, Albert (Normanton)

Ellis, John

Lewis, Arthur (W. Ham, N.)

Roberts, Rt. Hn. Goronwy

English, Michael

Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)

Roberts, Gwilym (Bedfordshire, S.)

Ensor, David

Lomas, Kenneth

Robertson, John (Paisley)

Evans, Fred (Caerphilly)

Luard, Evan

Rodgers, William (Stockton)

Evans, Gwynfor (C'marthen)

Lubbock, Eric

Rogers, George (Kensington, N.)

Evans, Ioan L. (Birm'h'm, Yardley)

Lyon, Alexander W. (York)

Rose, Paul

Ewing, Mrs. Winifred

Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.)

Rowlands, E.

Finch, Harold

McBride, Neil

Ryan, John

Fletcher, Raymond (Ilkeston)

McCann, John

Shaw, Arnold (Ilford, S.)

Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)

MacColl, James

Sheldon, Robert

Foot, Michael (Ebbw Vale)

MacDermot, Niall

Shore, Rt. Hn. Peter (Stepney)

Forrester, John

Macdonald, A. H.

Short, Rt. Hn. Edward (N'c'tle-u-Tyne)

Fowler, Gerry

McGuire, Michael

Short, Mrs. Renée (W'hampton, N. E.)

Freeson, Reginald

McKay, Mrs. Margaret

Silkin, Rt. Hn. John (Deptford)

Calpern, Sir Myer

Mackenzie, Alasdair (Ross & Crom'ty)

Silverman, Julius

Girnsburg, David

Mackenzie, Gregor (Rutherglen)

Slater, Joseph

Greenwood. Rt. Hn. Anthony

Mackie, John

Small, William

Gregory, Arnold

Mackintosh, John P.

Spriggs, Leslie

Grey, Charles (Durham)

Maclennan, Robert

Steel, David (Roxburgh)

Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)

McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.)

Steele, Thomas (Dunbartonshire, W.)

Griffiths, Eddie (Brightside)

McNamara, J. Kevin

Stonehouse, Rt. Hn. John

Griffiths, Rt. Hn. James (Llanelly)

MacPherson, Malcolm

Taverne, Dick

Mahon, Peter (Preston, S.)

Thomas, Rt. Hn. George

Griffiths, Will (Exchange)

Matron, Simon (Bootle)

Thomson, Rt. Hn. George

Grimond, Rt. Hn. J.

Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield, E)

Thornton, Ernest

Hamilton, James (Bothwell)

Manuel, Archie

Tinn, James

Hamilton, William (Fife, W.)

Mapp, Charles

Tomney, Frank

Hamling, William

Marks, Kenneth

Wainwrjght, Richard (Colne Valley)

Hannan, William

Marquand, David

Walden, Brian (All Saints)

Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)

Marsh, Rt. Hn. Richard

Walker, Harold (Doncaster)

Hart, Rt. Hn. Judith

Mason, Rt. Hn. Roy

Wallace, George

Haseldine, Norman

Mayhew, Christopher

Watkins, David (Consett)

Hattersley, Roy

Mendelson, John

Watkins, Tudor (Brecon & Radnor)

Hazell, Bert

Mikardo, Ian

Weitzman, David

Henig, Stanley

Millan, Bruce

Wellbeloved, James

Herbison, Rt. Hn. Margaret

Miller, Dr. M. S.

White, Mrs. Eirene

Hobden, Dennis

Mitchell, R. C. (S'th'pton, Test)

Wilkins, W. A.

Hooley, Frank

Molloy, William

Willey, Rt. Hn. Frederick

Homer, John

Morgan, Elystan (Cardiganshire)

Williams, Alan (Swansea, W.)

Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas

Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)

Williams, Alan Lee (Hornchurch)

Howarth, Robert (Bolton, E.)

Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)

Williams, W. T. (Warrington)

Howell, Denis (Small Heath)

Moyle, Roland

Willts, Rt. Hn. George

Huckfield, Leslie

Murray, Albert

Wilson, William (Coventry, S.)

Hughes, Emrys (Ayrshire, S.)

Newens, Stan

Winstanley, Dr. M. P.

Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)

Noel-Baker, Rt. Hn. Philip (Derby, S.)

Woodburn, Rt. Hn. A.

Hughes, Roy (Newport)

Ogden, Eric

Woof, Robert

Hunter, Adam

O'Malley, Brian

Hynd, John

Orbach, Maurice

TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

Jackson, Colin (B'h'se & Spenb'gh)

Orme, Stanley

Mr. Joseph Harper and

Janner, Sir Barnett

Owen, Dr. David (Plymouth, S'tn)

Mr. Alan Fitch.

Jay, Rt. Hn. Douglas

Owen, Will (Morpeth)

NOES

Allason, James (Hemel Hempstead)

Biffen, John

Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)

Atkins, Humphrey (M't'n & M'd'n)

Biggs-Davison, John

Bruce-Gardyne, J.

Awdry, Daniel

Birch, Rt. Hn. Nigel

Bryan, Paul

Baker, Kenneth (Acton)

Black, Sir Cyril

Buchanan-Smith, AIick (Angus, N & M)

Baker, W. H. K. (Banff)

Blaker, Peter

Bullus, Sir Eric

Balniel, Lord

Boardman, Tom (Leicester, S. W.)

Burden, F. A.

Batsford, Brian

Body, Richard

Campbell, B. (Oldham, W.)

Bell, Ronald

Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hn. John

Campbell, Gordon (Moray & Nairn)

Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torquay)

Boyle, Rt. Hn. Sir Edward

Carlisle, Mark

Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gos. & Fhm)

Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. Sir Walter

Chichester-Clark, R.

1242

1243

Clark, Henry

Kerby, Capt. Henry

Rippon, Rt. Hn. Geoffrey

Clegg, Walter

Kershaw, Anthony

Rossi, Hugh (Hornsey)

Costain, A. P.

Lambton, Viscount

Royle, Anthony

Craddock, Sir Beresford (Spelthorne)

Lancaster, Col. C. G.

Russell, Sir Ronald

Crowder, F. P.

Lane, David

Scott, Nicholas

Currie, G. B. H.

Langford-Holt, Sir John

Scott-Hopkins, James

d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry

Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)

Sharples, Richard

Dean, Paul

Lloyd, Ian (P'tsm'th, Langstone)

Silvester, Frederick

Deedes, Rt. Hn. W. F. (Ashford)

MacArthur, Ian

Sinclair, Sir George

Digby, Simon Wingfield

McMaster, Stanley

Smith, Dudley (W'wick & L'mington)

Donnelly, Desmond

McNair-Wilson, M. (Walthamstow, E.)

Smith, John (London & W'minster)

Doughty, Charles

McNair-Wilson, Patrick (New Forest)

Speed, Keith

Drayson, G. B.

Maddan, Martin

Stainton, Keith

Elliott, R. W. (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, N.)

Marten, Neil

Stodart, Anthony

Errington, Sir Eric

Maude, Angus

Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir M.

Farr, John

Mawby, Ray

Summers, Sir Spencer

Fortescue, Tim

Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J.

Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)

Foster, Sir John

Mills, Stratton (Belfast, N.)

Taylor, Frank (Moss Side)

Gilmour, Ian (Norfolk, C.)

Monro, Hector

Thatcher, Mrs. Margaret

Gilmour, Sir John (Fife, E.)

More, Jasper

Tilney, John

Glover, Sir Douglas

Morgan, Geraint (Denbigh)

Turton, Rt. Hn. R. H.

Godber, Rt. Hn. J. B.

Morgan-Giles, Rear-Adm.

van Straubenzee, W. R.

Goodhart, Philip

Munro-Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh

Vaughan-Morgan, Rt. Hn. Sir John

Gower, Raymond

Murton, Oscar

Vickers, Dame Joan

Grant, Anthony

Nabarro, Sir Gerald

Wall, Patrick

Griffiths, Eldon (Bury St. Edmunds)

Noble, Rt. Hn. Michael

Walters, Dennis

Gurden, Harold

Nott, John

Ward, Dame Irene

Hall, John (Wycombe)

Onslow, Cranley

Weatherill, Bernard

Hall-Davis, A. G. F.

Orr, Capt. L. P. S.

Whitelaw, Rt. Hn. William

Hamilton, Lord (Fermanagh)

Osborne, Sir Cyril (Louth)

Wiggin, A. W.

Harvie Anderson, Miss

Page, Graham (Crosby)

Williams, Donald (Dudley)

Hay, John

Page, John (Harrow, W.)

Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)

Heald, Rt. Hn. Sir Lionel

Pearson, Sir Frank (Clitheroe)

Wolrige-Gurdon, Patrick

Higgins, Terence L.

Peel, John

Wood, Rt. Hn. Richard

Hiley, Joseph

Percival, Ian

Woodnutt, Mark

Hornby, Richard

Peyton, John

Worsley, Marcus

Hutchison, Michael Clark

Pink, R. Bonner

Wright, Esmond

Iremonger, T. L.

Powell, Rt. Hn. J. Enoch

Wylie, N. R.

Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)

Price, David (Eastleigh)

Younger, Hn. George

Jenkin, Patrick (Woodford)

Pym, Francis

Jennings, J. C. (Burton)

Quennell, Miss J. M.

TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

Joseph, Rt. Hn. Sir Keith

Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon

Mr. Reginald Eyre and

Kaberry, Sir Donald

Ridley, Hn. Nicholas

Mr. Timothy Kitson.

Clause read a Second time.
Mr. Peyton: On a point of order. Mr. Speaker. You were good enough earlier on to deliver a provisional ruling on sub-Amendment (b), which represents an attempt, no matter how forlorn, on both sides of the House to remedy a piece of really abominable and offensive drafting—the insertion of the words
"Post Office … or a subsidiary of its".
Everyone who has commented on the wording has thought it to be abominable. If the Minister persists in his unsatisfactory attitude over this it would be very acceptable to those of us who dislike this wording to vote against it. I hope that you will be good enough to reconsider—
Mr. Speaker: I informed the hon. Gentleman earlier that I did not propose to allow a Division on Amendment (b). He may have one on Amendment (a).
Mr. Bryan: Further to that point of order—
Mr. Speaker: Order. This is a matter for the Chair.
Mr. Bryan: I do not wish to question your Ruling, Mr. Speaker, but I wonder whether you were in the Chair when the hon. Member for Barking (Mr. Driberg) raised very good arguments about this Clause which perhaps, if you had heard them, might have led you to reconsider.
Mr. Speaker: That submission still delicately questions the selection I have made. I have selected Amendment (a) for Division but not Amendment (b). Will the hon. Member for Yeovil (Mr. Peyton) now formally move Amendment (a)?
Amendment proposed to the proposed Clause: In line 1, leave out from '(1)' to 'before' and insert:
'The Post Office shall require the Minister's approval'.—[Mr. Peyton.]
Question put, That the Amendment be made:—
The House divided: Ayes 155, Noes 237.

Division No. 175.]

AYES

[7.50 p.m.

Allason, James (Hemel Hempsted)

Gower, Raymond

Pearson, Sir Frank (Clitheroe)

Awdry, Daniel

Grant, Anthony

Peel, John

Baker, Kenneth (Acton)

Griffiths, Eldon (Bury St. Edmunds)

Percival, Ian

Baker, W. H. K. (Banff)

Gurden, Harold

Peyton, John

Balniel, Lord

Hall, John Wycombe)

Pink, R. Bonner

Batsford, Brian

Hall-Davis, A. G. F.

Powell, Rt. Hn. J. Enoch

Bell, Ronald

Hamilton, Lord (Fermanagh)

Price, David (Eastleigh)

Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torquay)

Harvie Anderson, Miss

Pym, Francis

Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gos. & Fhm)

Hay, John

Quennell, Miss J. M.

Biffen, John

Heald, Rt. Hn. Sir Lionel

Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon

Biggs-Davison, John

Higgins, Terence L.

Ridley, Hn. Nicholas

Birch, Rt. Hn. Nigel

Hiley, Joseph

Rippon, Rt. Hn. Geoffrey

Black, Sir Cyril

Hornby, Richard

Rossi, Hugh (Hornsey)

Blaker, Peter

Hutchison, Michael Clark

Royle, Anthony

Boardman, Tom (Leicester, S. W.)

Iremonger, T. L.

Russell, Sir Ronald

Body, Richard

Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)

Scott, Nicholas

Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hn. John

Jenkin, Patrick (Woodford)

Scott-Hopkins, James

Boyle, Rt. Hn. Sir Edward

Jennings, J. C. (Burton)

Sharples, Richard

Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. Sir Walter

Joseph, Rt. Hn. Sir Keith

Silvester, Frederick

Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)

Kaberry, Sir Donald

Sinclair, Sir George

Bruce-Gardyne, J.

Kerby, Capt. Henry

Smith, Dudley (W'wick & L'mington)

Bryan, Paul

Kershaw, Anthony

Speed, Keith

Buchanan-Smith, Alick (Angus, N & M)

Kitson, Timothy

Stainton, Keith

Bullus, Sir Eric

Lambton, Viscount

Stodart, Anthony

Burden, F. A.

Lancaster, Col. C. G.

Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir M.

Campbell, B. (Oldham, W.)

Lane, David

Summers, Sir Spencer

Campbell, Gordon (Moray & Nairn)

Langford-Holt, Sir John

Tapsell, Peter

Carlisle, Mark

Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)

Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)

Chichester-Clark, R.

Lloyd, Ian (P'tsm'th, Langstone)

Taylor, Frank (Moss Side)

Clark, Henry

MacArthur, Ian

Thatcher, Mrs. Margaret

Clegg, Walter

McMaster, Stanley

Tilney, John

McNair-Wilson, M. (Walthamstow, E.)

Turton, Rt. Hn. R. H.

Craddock, Sir Beresford (Spelthorne)

McNair-Wilson, Patrick (NewForest)

van Straubenzee, W. R.

Crowder, F. P.

Maddan, Martin

Vaughan-Morgan, Rt. Hn. Sir John

Currie, G. B. H.

Marten, Neil

Vickers, Dame Joan

d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry

Maude, Angus

Wall, Patrick

Dean, Paul (Somerset, N.)

Mawby, Ray

Walters, Dennis

Deedes, Rt. Hn. W. F. (Ashford)

Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J.

Ward, Dame Irene

Digby, Simon Wingfield

Mills, Stratum (Belfast, N.)

Whitelaw, Rt. Hn. William

Donnelly, Desmond

Miscampbell, Norman

Wiggin, A. W.

Doughty, Charles

Monro, Hector

Williams, Donald (Dudley)

Drayson, G. B.

More, Jasper

Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)

Elliott, R. W. (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, N.)

Morgan, Geraint (Denbigh)

Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick

Errington, Sir Eric

Munro-Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh

Wood, Rt. Hn. Richard

Eyre, Reginald

Murton, Oscar

Woodnutt, Mark

Farr, John

Nabarro, Sir Gerald

Worsley, Marcus

Fortescue, Tim

Noble, Rt. Hn. Michael

Wright, Esmond

Foster, Sir John

Nott, John

Wylie, N. R.

Gilmour, Ian (Norfolk, C.)

Onslow, Cranley

Younger, Hn. George

Gilmour, Sir John (Fife, E.)

Orr, Capt. L. P. S.

Glover, Sir Douglas

Osborne, Sir Cyril (Louth)

TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

Godber, Rt. Hn. J. B.

Page, Graham (Crosby)

Mr. Bernard Weatherill and

Goodhart, Philip

Page, John (Harrow, W.)

Mr. Humphrey Atkins.

NOES

Albu, Austen

Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, Provan)

Delargy, Hugh

Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)

Brown, Bob (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, W.)

Dempsey, James

Alldritt, Walter

Brown, R. W. (Shoreditch & F'bury)

Dewar, Donald

Anderson, Donald

Buchan, Norman

Diamond, Rt. Hn. John

Ashley, Jack

Cant, R. B.

Dobson, Ray

Ashton, Joe (Bassetlaw)

Carmichael, Neil

Doig, Peter

Atkins, Ronald (Preston, N.)

Castle, Rt. Hn. Barbara

Driberg, Tom

Barnett, Joel

Chapman, Donald

Dunwoody, Mrs. Gwyneth (Exeter)

Bence, Cyril

Coe, Denis

Dunwoody, Dr. John (F'th & C'b'e)

Bessell, Peter

Coleman, Donald

Eadie, Alex

Bidwell, Sydney

Corbet, Mrs. Freda

Edwards, William (Merioneth)

Bishop, E. S.

Crawshaw, Richard

Ellis, John

Blackburn, F.

Crosland, Rt. Hn. Anthony

English, Michael

Blenkinsop, Arthur

Crossman, Rt. Hn. Richard

Ensor, David

Booth, Albert

Dalyell, Tam

Evans, Fred (Caerphilly)

Boston, Terence

Davidson, Arthur (Accrington)

Evans, Cwynfor (C'marthen)

Bottomley, Rt. Hn. Arthur

Davidson, James (Aberdeenshire, W.)

Evans, Ioan L. (Birm'h'm, Yardley)

Boyden, James

Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)

Finch, Harold

Bray, Dr. Jeremy

Davies, Dr. Ernest (Stretford)

Fletcher, Raymond (Ilkeston)

Brooks, Edwin

Davies, Rt. Hn. Harold (Leek)

Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)

Brown, Rt. Hn. George (Belper)

Davies, Ifor (Gower)

Foot, Michael (Ebbw Vale)

Forrester, John

Lomas, Kenneth

Perry, Ernest G. (Battersea, S.)

Fowler, Gerry

Luard, Evan

Perry, George H. (Nottingham, S.)

Freeson, Reginald

Lubbock, Eric

Prentice, Rt. Hn. R. E.

Galpern, Sir Myer

Lyon, Alexander W. (York)

Price, William (Rugby)

Ginsburg, David

Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.)

Probert, Arthur

Greenwood, Rt. Hn. Anthony

McBride, Neil

Rankin, John

Gregory, Arnold

McCann, John

Rees, Merlyn

Grey, Charles (Durham)

MacColl, James

Richard, Ivor

Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)

MacDermot, Niall

Roberts, Albert (Normanton)

Griffiths, Eddie (Brightside)

Macdonald, A. H.

Roberts, Rt. Hn. Goronwy

Griffiths, Rt. Hn. James (Llanelly)

McGuire, Michael

Roberts, Gwilym (Bedfordshire, S.)

Griffiths, Will (Exchange)

McKay, Mrs. Margaret

Robertson, John (Paisley)

Grimond, Rt. Hn. J.

Mackenzie, Alasdair (Ross & Crom'ty)

Rodgers, William (Stockton)

Hamilton, James (Bothwell)

Mackenzie, Gregor (Rutherglen)

Rogers, George (Kensington, N.)

Hamilton, William (Fife, W.)

Mackie, John

Rose, Paul

Hamling, William

Mackintosh, John P.

Rowlands, E.

Hannan, William

Maclennan, Robert

Ryan, John

Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)

McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.)

Shaw, Arnold (Ilford, S.)

Hart, Rt. Hn. Judith

McNamara, J. Kevin

Sheldon, Robert

Haseldine, Norman

MacPherson, Malcolm

Shore, Rt. Hn. Peter (Stepney)

Hattersley, Roy

Mahon, Peter (Preston, S.)

Short, Rt. Hn. Edward (N'c'tle-u-Tyne)

Hazell, Bert

Mahon, Simon (Bootle)

Short, Mrs. Renée (W'hampton. N. E.)

Henig, Stanley

Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield, E.)

Silkin, Rt. Hn. John (Deptford)

Herbison, Rt. Hn. Margaret

Manuel, Archie

Silverman, Julius

Hobden, Dennis

Mapp, Charles

Slater, Joseph

Hooley, Frank

Marks, Kenneth

Small, William

Horner, John

Marquand, David

Spriggs, Leslie

Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas

Marsh, Rt. Hn. Richard

Steel, David (Roxburgh)

Howarth, Robert (Bolton, E.)

Mason, Rt. Hn. Roy

Steele, Thomas (Dunbartonshire, W.)

Howell, Denis (Small Heath)

Mayhew, Christopher

Stonehouse, Rt. Hn. John

Huckfield, Leslie

Mendelson, John

Taverne, Dick

Hughes, Emrys (Ayrshire, S.)

Mikardo, Ian

Thomas, Rt. Hn. George

Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)

Millan, Bruce

Thomson, Rt. Hn. George

Hughes, Roy (Newport)

Miller, Dr. M. S.

Thornton, Ernest

Hunter, Adam

Mitchell, R. C. (S'th'p ton, Test)

Tinn, James

Hynd, John

Molloy, William

Tomney, Frank

Jackson, Colin (B'h'se & Spenb'gh)

Morgan, Elystan (Cardiganshire)

Wainwright, Richard (Colne Valley)

Janner, Sir Barnett

Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)

Walden, Brian (All Saints)

Jay, Rt. Hn. Douglas

Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)

Walker, Harold (Doncaster)

Jeger, George (Goole)

Moyle, Roland

Wallace, George

Jeger, Mrs. Lena (H'b'n & St. P'cras, S.)

Murray, Albert

Watkins, David (Consett)

Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)

Newens, Stan

Watkins, Tudor (Brecon & Radnor)

Johnson, Carol (Lewisham, S.)

Noel-Baker, Rt. Hn. Philip (Derby, S.)

Weitzman, David

Jones, Dan (Burnley)

Ogden, Eric

Wellbeloved, James

Jones, Rt. Hn. Sir Elwyn (W. Ham, S.)

O'Malley, Brian

White, Mrs. Eirene

Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)

Orbach, Maurice

Wilkins, W. A.

Jones, T. Alec (Rhondda, West)

Orme, Stanley

Willey, Rt. Hn. Frederick

Judd, Frank

Owen, Dr. David (Plymouth, S'tn)

Williams, Alan (Swansea, W.)

Kelley, Richard

Owen, Will (Morpeth)

Williams, Alan Lee (Hornchurch)

Kerr, Mrs. Anne (R'ter & Chatham)

Page, Derek (King's Lynn)

Williams, W. T. (Warrington)

Kerr, Russell (Feltham)

Paget, R. T.

Willis, Rt. Hn. George

Lawson, George

Pannell, Rt. Hn. Charles

Wilson, William (Coventry, S.)

Leadbitter, Ted

Pardoe, John

Winstanley, Dr. M. P.

Lee, Rt. Hn. Frederick (Newton)

Parker, John (Dagenham)

Woodburn, Rt. Hn. A.

Lee, Rt. Hn. Jennie (Cannock)

Parkyn, Brian (Bedford)

Woof, Robert

Lee, John (Reading)

Pavitt, Laurence

Lestor, Miss Joan

Pearson, Arthur (Pontypridd)

TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

Lever, L. M. (Ardwick)

Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred

Mr. Joseph Harper and

Lewis, Arthur (W. Ham, N.)

Pentland, Norman

Mr. Alan Fitch.

Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)

Question put, That the Clause be added to the Bill:—
The House divided: Ayes 242, Noes 164.

Division No. 176.]

AYES

[8.0 p.m.

Albu, Austen

Boyden, James

Crosland, Rt. Hn. Anthony

Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)

Bradley, Tom

Crossman, Rt. Hn. Richard

Alldritt, Walter

Bray, Dr. Jeremy

Dalyell, Tam

Anderson, Donald

Brooks, Edwin

Davidson, Arthur (Accrington)

Ashley, Jack

Brown, Rt. Hn. George (Belper)

Davidson, James (Aberdeenshire, W.)

Ashton, Joe (Bassetlaw)

Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, Provan)

Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)

Atkins, Ronald (Preston, N.)

Brown, Bob (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, W.)

Davies, Dr. Ernest (Stretford)

Barnett, Joel

Brown, R. W. (Shoreditch & F'bury)

Davies, Rt. Hn. Harold (Leek)

Bence, Cyril

Buchan, Norman

Davies, Ifor (Gower)

Bessell, Peter

Cant, R. B.

Delargy, Hugh

Bidwell, Sydney

Carmichael, Neil

Dempsey, James

Bishop, E. S.

Castle, Rt. Hn. Barbara

Dewar, Donald

Blackburn, F.

Chapman, Donald

Diamond, Rt. Hn. John

Blenkinsop, Arthur

Coe, Denis

Dobson, Ray

Booth, Albert

Coleman, Donald

Doig, Peter

Boston, Terence

Corbet, Mrs. Freda

Driberg, Tom

Bottomley, Rt. Hn. Arthur

Crawshaw, Richard

Dunn, James A.

Dunwoody, Mrs. Gwyneth (Exeter)

Kerr, Russell (Feltham)

Parker, John (Dagenham)

Dunwoody, Dr. John (F'th & C'b'e)

Lawson, George

Parkyn, Brian (Bedford)

Eadie, Alex

Leadbitter, Ted

Pearson, Arthur (Pontypridd)

Edwards, William (Merioneth)

Lee, Rt. Hn. Frederick (Newton)

Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred

Ellis, John

Lee, Rt. Hn. Jennie (Cannock)

Pontland, Norman

English, Michael

Lee, John (Reading)

Perry, Ernest G. (Battersea, S.)

Ensor, David

Lestor, Miss Joan

Perry, George H. (Nottingham, S.)

Evans, Fred (Caerphilly)

Lever, L. M. (Ardwick)

Prentice, Rt. Hn. R. E.

Evans, Gwynfor (C'marlhen)

Lewis, Arthur (W. Ham, N.)

Price, William (Rugby)

Evans, Ioan L. (Birm'h'm, Yardley)

Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)

Probert, Arthur

Finch, Harold

Lomas, Kenneth

Rankin, John

Fitch, Alan (Wigan)

Luard, Evan

Rees, Merlyn

Fletcher, Raymond (Ilkeston)

Lubbock, Eric

Richard, Ivor

Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)

Lyon, Alexander W. (York)

Roberts, Albert (Normanton)

Foot, Michael (Ebbw Vale)

Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.)

Roberts, Rt. Hn. Goronwy

Ford, Ben

McCann, John

Roberts, Gwilym (Bedfordshire, S.)

Forrester, John

MacColl, James

Robertson, John (Paisley)

Fowler, Gerry

MacDermot, Niall

Rodgers, William (Stockton)

Freeson, Reginald

Macdonald, A. H.

Rogers, George (Kensington, N.)

Galpern, Sir Myer

McGuire, Michael

Rose, Paul

Ginsburg, David

McKay, Mrs. Margaret

Rowlands, E.

Cray, Dr. Hugh (Yarmouth)

Mackenzie, Alasdair (Ross & Crom'ty)

Ryan, John

Greenwood, Rt. Hn. Anthony

Mackenzie, Gregor (Rutherglen)

Shaw, Arnold (Ilford, S.)

Gregory, Arnold

Mackie, John

Sheldon, Robert

Grey, Charles (Durham)

Mackintosh, John P.

Shore, Rt. Hn. Peter (Stepney)

Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)

Maclennan, Robert

Short, Rt. Hn. Edward (N'c'tle-u-Tyne)

Griffiths, Eddie (Brightside)

McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.)

Short, Mrs. Renée (W'hampton, N. E.)

Griffiths, Rt. Hn. James (Llanelly)

McNamara, J. Kevin

Silkin, Rt. Hn. John (Deptford)

Griffiths, Will (Exchange)

MacPherson, Malcolm

Silverman, Julius

Grimond, Rt. Hn. J.

Mahon, Peter (Preston, S.)

Slater, Joseph

Hamilton, James (Bothwell)

Mahon, Simon (Bootle)

Small, William

Hamilton, William (Fife, W.)

Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)

Spriggs, Leslie

Hamling, William

Mallalieu. J. P. W. (Huddersfield, E.)

Steel, David (Roxburgh)

Hannan, William

Manuel, Archie

Steele, Thomas (Dunbartonshire, W.)

Harper, Joseph

Mapp, Charles

Stonehouse, Rt. Hn. John

Hart, Rt. Hn. Judith

Marks, Kenneth

Haseldine, Norman

Marquand, David

Taverne, Dick

Hazell, Bert

Marsh, Rt. Hn. Richard

Thomas, Rt. Hn. George

Herrig, Stanley

Mason, Rt. Hn. Roy

Thomson, Rt. Hn. George

Herbison, Rt. Hn. Margaret

Mayhew, Christopher

Thornton, Ernest

Hobden, Dennis

Mendelson, John

Tinn, James

Hooley, Frank

Mikardo, Ian

Tomney, Frank

Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas

Millan, Bruce

Wainwright, Richard (Colne Valley)

Howarth, Robert (Bolton, E.)

Miller, Dr. M. S.

Walden, Brian (All Saints)

Howell, Denis (Small Heath)

Mitchell, R. C. (S'th'pton, Test)

Walker, Harold (Doncaster)

Huckfield, Leslie

Molloy, William

Wallace, George

Hughes, Emrys (Ayrshire, S.)

Morgan, Elystan (Cardiganshire)

Watkins, David (Consett)

Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)

Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)

Watkins, Tudor (Brecon & Radnor)

Hughes, Roy (Newport)

Morris, Charles R. (Openhaw)

Weitzman, David

Hunter, Adam

Moyle, Roland

Wellbeloved, James

Hynd, John

Murray, Albert

White, Mrs. Eirene

Jackson, Colin (B'h'se & Spenb'gh)

Neal, Harold

Wilkins, W. A.

Janner, Sir Barnett

Newens, Stan

Willey, Rt. Hn. Frederick

Jay, Rt. Hn. Douglas

Noel-Baker, Rt. Hn. Philip (Derby, S.)

Williams, Alan (Swansea, W.)

Jeger, George (Goole)

Oakes, Gordon

Williams, Alan Lee (Hornchurch)

Jeger, Mrs. Lena (H'b'n & St. P'cras, S.)

Ogden, Eric

Williams, W. T. (Warrington)

Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)

O'Malley, Brian

Willis, Rt. Hn. George

Johnson, Carol (Lewisham, S.)

Oram, Albert E.

Wilson, William (Coventry, S.)

Jones, Dan (Burnley)

Orbach, Maurice

Winstanley, Dr. M. P.

Jones, Rt. Hn. Sir Elwyn (W. Ham, S.)

Orme, Stanley

Woodburn, Rt. Hn. A.

Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)

Owen, Dr. David (Plymouth, S'tn)

Woof, Robert

Jones, T. Alec (Rhondda, West)

Owen, Will (Morpeth)

Judd, Frank

Page, Derek (King's Lynn)

TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

Kelley, Richard

Paget, R. T.

Mr. Walter Harrison and

Kerr, Mrs. Anne (R'ter & Chatham)

Pardoe, John

Mr. Neil McBride.

NOES

Alison, Michael (Barkston Ash)

Blaker, Peter

Clark, Henry

Allason, James (Hemel Hempstead)

Boardman, Tom (Laicester, S. W.)

Clegg, Walter

Atkins, Humphrey (M't'n & M'd'n)

Body, Richard

Costain, A. P.

Awdry, Daniel

Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hn. John

Craddock, Sir Beresford (Spelthorne)

Baker, Kenneth (Acton)

Boyle, Rt. Hn. Sir Edward

Crowder, F. P.

Baker, W. H. K. (Banff)

Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. Sir Walter

Currie, G. B. H.

Balniel, Lord

Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)

Dance, James

Batsford, Brian

Bruce-Gadyne, J.

d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry

Beamish, Col. Sir Tufton

Bryan, Paul

Dean, Paul

Bell, Ronald

Buchanan-Smith, Alick (Angus, N & M)

Deedes, Rt. Hn. W. F. (Ashford)

Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torquay)

Bullus, Sir Eric

Digby, Simon Wingfield

Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gos. & Fhm)

Burden, F. A.

Doughty, Charles

Biffen, John

Campbell, B. (Oldham, W.)

Drayson, G. B.

Biggs-Davison, John

Campbell, Gordon (Moray & Nairn)

Elliott, R. W. (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, N.)

Birch, Rt. Hn. Nigel

Carlisle, Mark

Errington, Sir Eric

Black, Sir Cyrll

Chichester-Clark, R.

Farr, John

1250

1251

Fortescue, Tim

McMaster, Stanley

Russell, Sir Ronald

Foster, Sir John

McNair-Wilson, M. (Walthamstow, F.)

Scott, Nicholas

Gilmour, Ian (Norfolk, C.)

McNair-Wilson, Patrick (New Forest)

Scott-Hopkins, James

Gilmour, Sir John (Fife, E.)

Maddan, Martin

Sharples, Richard

Glover, Sir Douglas

Marten, Neil

Silvester, Frederick

Godber, Rt. Hn. J. B.

Maude, Angus

Sinclair, Sir George

Goodhart, Philip

Mawby, Ray

Smith, Dudley (W'wick & L'mington)

Goodhew, Victor

Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J.

Speed, Keith

Gower, Raymond

Mills, Stratton (Belfast, N.)

Stainton, Keith

Grant, Anthony

Miscampbell, Norman

Stodart, Anthony

Griffiths, Eldon (Bury, St. Edmunds)

Monro, Hector

Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir M.

Gurden, Harold

More, Jasper

Summers, Sir Spencer

Hall, John (Wycombe)

Morgan, Geraint (Denbigh)

Tapsell, Peter

Hall-Davis, A. G. F.

Morgan-Giles, Rear-Adm.

Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)

Hamilton, Lord (Fermanagh)

Munro-Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh

Taylor, Frank (Moss Side)

Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)

Murton, Oscar

Temple, John M.

Harvie Anderson, Miss

Nabarro, Sir Gerald

Tilney, John

Hay, John

Nicholls, Sir Harmar

Turton, Rt. Hn. R. H.

Heald, Rt. Hn. Sir Lionel

Noble, Rt. Hn. Michael

van Straubenzee, W. R.

Higgins, Terence L.

Nott, John

Hiley, Joseph

Onslow, Cranley

Vaughan-Morgan, Rt. Hn. Sir John

Hornby, Richard

Orr, Capt. L. P. S.

Vickers, Dame Joan

Howell, David (Guildford)

Osborne, Sir Cyril (Louth)

Wall, Patrick

Hutchison, Michael Clark

Page, Graham (Crosby)

Walters, Dennis

Iremonger, T. L.

Page, John (Harrow, W.)

Ward, Dame Irene

Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)

Pearson, Sir Frank (Clitheroe)

Whitelaw, Rt. Hn. William

Jenkin, Patrick (Woodford)

Peel, John

Wiggin, A. W.

Jennings, J. C. (Burton)

Percival, Ian

Williams, Donald (Dudley)

Joseph, Rt. Hn. Sir Keith

Peyton, John

Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)

Kaberry, Sir Donald

Pink, R. Bonner

Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick

Kerby, Capt. Henry

Powell, Rt. Hn. J. Enoch

Wood, Rt. Hn. Richard

Kershaw, Anthony

Price, David (Eastleigh)

Woodnutt, Mark

Kitson, Timothy

Pym, Francis

Worsley, Marcus

Lambton, Viscount

Quennell, Miss J. M.

Wright, Esmond

Lancaster, Col. C. G.

Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon

Wylie, N. R.

Lane, David

Ridley, Hn. Nicholas

Younger, Hn. George

Langford-Holt, Sir John

Rippon, Rt. Hn. Geoffrey

Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)

Rodgers, Sir John (Sevenoaks)

TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

Lloyd, Ian (P'tsm'th, Langstone)

Rossi, Hugh (Hornsey)

Mr. Reginald Eyre and

Longden, Gilbert

Royle, Anthony

Mr. Bernard Weatherill.

MacArthur, Ian

Clause added to the Bill.

FIREWORKS
  New Clause 2

    REIMBURSEMENT BY THE POST OFFICE OF THE MINISTER OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS
    The Post Office may reimburse the Minister the whole or any part of a sum paid by him by way of contribution towards the expenses of an international organisation of which Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom is a member, being an organisation concerned with activities which the Post Office has power to carry on.—[Mr. Joseph Slater.]
    Brought up, and read the First time.
    Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Sydney Irving): It may be for the convenience of the House if, with this Amendment, we also discuss Amendment No. 29, in Clause 7, page 8, to leave out lines 5 to 11.
    Mr. Joseph Slater: I beg to move, That the Clause be read a Second time.
    As a result of discussion in Committee, we shall be moving Amendments to Clause 7(2) to clarify the relationship between the powers that are set out in Clause 7(1) and (2). The way in which
    1252
    the re-drafting has been done means that the original sub-paragraph (j) no longer fits into Clause 7(2), which will now specifically cover activities ancillary to the main activities in Clause 7(1).
    The new Clause is not of the same kind, because it empowers the Post Office to pay part or all of Her Majesty's Government's contribution towards any international organisation concerned with the Post Office's activities. The power is needed as a direct result of the reorganisation.
    International organisations for postal and telecommunications purposes are commonly organisations of which the members are Governments. Examples are the Universal Postal Union and the International Telecommunications Union, which are agencies of the United Nations, and the new Commonwealth Telecommunications Council. These bodies deal with matters ranging from issues affecting international policy to detailed technical studies. At present the Post Office, as a Government Department, fulfils the duties of the United Kingdom as a member of these organisations. In future, the

    1253
    Minister will be responsible for fulfilling the United Kingdom's obligations in this respect.
    The new Post Office will play a full part in the work of these organisations. It will, for example, be a recognised operating agency for the purpose of the International Telecommunications Union. Representatives of the Post Office will be included in the United Kingdom delegations, and will serve on technical subcommittees. Because the Government is a member of these organisations, the Minister will be responsible for paying the United Kingdom contributions. But, as the Post Office will take a prominent part in their activities, many of which are of direct benefit to the postal and telecommunications services, the Post Office must be able to make a payment towards the United Kingdom contribution.
    Amendment No. 29 deletes sub-paragraph (j) of Clause 7(2).
    8.15 p.m.
    Mr. Mawby: The hon. Gentleman has explained why the new Clause should be in the Bill, and none of us complains about that. Amendment No. 29 deletes Clause 7(2)(j). We are debating the replacement of that paragraph by the new Clause. Paragraph (j) lays upon the Corporation the duty to reimburse the Minister and continues in exactly the same words as the new Clause. The new Clause differs only in the opening words—
    "The Post Office may reimburse the Minister"
    whereas paragraph (j) confers power on the Post Office—
    "to reimburse the Minister."
    It may be that it is felt that the powers contained in paragraph (j) appear in the wrong place in the Bill and it is merely a case of switching those powers from one part of the Bill to another, but I do not understand why it is necessary to do so, because Clause 7 lays down a list of powers and duties, and I should have thought that this duty should be included with the others.
    Is there a basic difference between the new Clause and paragraph (j) to be deleted? The only difference appears to be in the few words at the beginning. Instead of providing that the Post Office has a duty to reimburse, the new Clause
    1254
    provides that the Post Office may reimburse. As I understand it, the words "the Post Office may" are to be construed in the Bill as "the Post Office shall", so I am puzzled about this slight difference in wording.
    If there is no basic difference between the two, there is no reason why we should oppose it. If there is a good reason why this provision should no longer be included in the list of duties but should appear in a separate Clause to emphasise that it is a special duty over and above the duties in Clause 7, I should not disagree with that, but I have an inquiring mind and would like the Assistant Postmaster-General to answer this point.
    Mr. Stratton Mills: The Assistant Postmaster-General explained fully the work of the international organisations and why that work should be supported, and we are not entering into debate on that. He also told us why the new Post Office should reimburse the Minister, and again that is perfectly reasonable and we are not entering into debate on that. What he did not explain was the real purpose of the new Clause, as my hon. Friend the Member for Totnes (Mr. Mawby) has said. I can see virtually no difference in substance between the new Clause and Clause 7(2)(j). I do not understand why it is necessary to make this alteration.
    The Assistant Postmaster-General gave the House some very quick references which seemed to me to be total double-Dutch. I could not understand the point behind what he was saying. I do not wish to be rude or to raise the temperature of the debate, but I feel that the matter should be explained to hon. Members so that we may follow the reasoning. Could the hon. Gentleman also indicate whether there is any real change in substance brought about by the new Clause?
    The Minister referred to discussion in the Committee. I have looked up the HANSARD proceedings of the Committee, and it did not seem that the particular point was discussed, though I appreciate that it may well have been referred to on an earlier Amendment. I am sure the House would be obliged if the Minister would refresh our minds on the point and explain a little more fully the reasoning behind the Clause.
    Mr. Hay: With respect to my hon. Friend the Member for Totnes (Mr. Mawby), I do not think that the matter is quite so simple. I should like to know a little more about the reasons for this change. If one looks at Clauses 7, 8 and 9 of the Bill one sees that they appear under a part of the Bill entitled "Powers and Duties of the Post Office." Powers and duties are not necessarily synonymous. It does not follow that because one has a power to do something that one has a duty to do it as well.
    Clause 7 sets out, in the same way as a commercial company would set out matters in its memorandum, what the Post Office has power to do. That is not the same thing as placing upon the company, or in this case upon the Post Office Corporation, the duty to do something. On the face of it, the new Clause does not place upon it such a duty or obligation. It simply gives the power to the Corporation to reimburse the Minister in respect of these particular expenses.
    I am completely baffled. I feel that it would have been in order to leave the Bill as drafted, and then, if at a later stage it were considered necessary to place an obligation on the Post Office to reimburse the Minister, it could appear after Clause 9, since Clause 9 sets out the general duty of the Post Office to carry out the functions conferred upon it by Parliament.
    I should be grateful if the Minister could explain the matter more clearly. With all respect, when the Minister began his speech he read out the part of the departmental memorandum which had been submitted to him. I hope now that he will try to clear up the point.
    Mr. Joseph Slater: I am indebted to the hon. Gentleman for raising this matter. I have made further inquiries, and if my remarks were not clear enough

    New Clause 3

    POWER OF THE MINISTER, PENDING TRANSFER TO THE MINISTER OF TRANSPORT FROM COUNTY COUNCILS OF FUNCTIONS CONNECTED WITH ISSUE OF VEHICLE EXCISE LICENCES, TO DIRECT THE POST OFFICE TO ISSUE SUCH LICENCES

    5

    (1) The Minister may, at the request of a county council and after consultation with the Post Office, give to the Post Office a direction that, during such periods as may be specified in the direction (which shall not begin before the appointed day nor end after the day immediately preceding the transfer date), it shall, in normal business hours, issue on behalf of the council licences under the Vehicles (Excise) Act 1962.

    (2) Subsections (4), (5) and (6) of section 12 of this Act shall apply for the purposes of the foregoing subsection as if any reference in those subsections to subsection (2) of that section included a reference to the foregoing subsection.

    when I was seeking to read the brief which was given to me on Clause 7(1), I should now like to add this. The reason is that new Clause 2 will not fit into Clause 7 when it has been altered by Amendment No. 22. There is no difference between the old Clause 7(2)(i) since the new Clause 7(2)(a) relates to a power. It does not create a duty. That is the advice which I have received, and I hope that it meets the hon. Gentleman's point.
    Mr. Hay: If we are seeking to place on the Post Office an obligation, should it not create a duty to reimburse the Minister? Should the Clause not say in line 1 that the Post Office shall reimburse the Minister, not that the Post Office "may" reimburse him? The use of the word "may" simply repeats the fact that the power vested in the Post Office is not a duty.
    Mr. Slater: There is something in what the hon. Gentleman says, but personally, as between a power and a duty, I would every time go for a power in an issue of this kind.
    Mr. Stratton Mills: The hon. Gentleman has referred to Amendment No. 22, to which we shall come later. I do not follow the reason why the addition of the words in Amendment No. 22 necessitate the removal of this matter to an entirely different part of the Bill. It would appear that a different point of much wider significance arises upon Amendment No. 22.
    Mr. Slater: Amendment No. 22 is involved with many other Amendments, and perhaps the hon. Gentleman would raise this issue when we come to deal with it.
    Question put and agreed to.
    Clause rend a Second Time and added to the Bill.

    10

    (3) In consideration of its complying with a direction given under this section with reference to a county council, the Post Office shall be entitled to receive payment from that council (of an amount to be determined, in the event of a dispute's arising as to the amount thereof, by the Minister).

    15

    (4) In this section the expression 'county council' shall be construed in like manner as if it were contained in the Vehicles (Excise) Act 1962 and 'the transfer date' means the date which, by virtue of subsection (2) of section 1 of the Vehicle and Driving Licences Act 1969, is appointed by the Minister of Transport for the purposes of subsection (1) of that section.—[Mr. Stonehouse]

    Brought up, and read the First time.
    Mr. Stonehouse: I beg to move, That the Clause be read a Second time.
    Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Sydney Irving): It may be for the convenience of the Committee if, with this new Clause, we also discuss the Amendment in the name of the hon. Member for Yeovil (Mr. Peyton), in line 6, leave out subsection (2).
    Mr. Stonehouse: The Clause is related to the Vehicle and Driving Licences Bill, which will transfer to my right hon. Friend the Minister of Transport the functions in connection with vehicle licensing which are at present the responsibility of the municipal authorities. The work of issuing licences at post offices will be work carried out for the Government and will accordingly be subject to the direction by the Minister of Posts in Clause 12(1) of the Post Office Bill. But the transfer of licensing functions to the Minister of Transport is not likely to occur until some time after the vesting day of the Corporation. In order to safeguard the position of the local authorities during this period, the new Clause will give the Minister of Posts the power to direct the Post Office to issue licences on their behalf during that period. That power is similar to the one in Clause 12 in respect of various other types of licence.
    Mr. Peyton: In the grey world which contains such horrors as "a subsidiary of its" I suppose one ought not to be overwhelmed with surprise when one comes across subsection (2) of this Clause, which reads:
    "Subsections (4), (5) and (6) of Section 12 of this Act shall apply for the purposes of the foregoing subsection as if any reference in those subsections to subsection (2) of that section included a reference"—
    the House will never guess it—
    "to the foregoing subsection."
    I do not suppose that the right hon. Gentleman would claim or even admit to parenthood of this very nasty little trifle.
    1258
    Nevertheless, he stands at the Dispatch Box saddled with the responsibility. I must admit that anyone who is a sufficiently toughened campaigner to come through carrying "a subsidiary of its" with him perhaps has had his sense of shame battered to such a state of uselessness that he can expect to get away with wording such as this without a blush.
    I am not being flippant, but I believe that the House of Commons has a duty to protest against drafting when it becomes unnecessarily unpleasant and does violence to what is still a rather splendid language, despite the constant desecrations of Whitehall upon it. In blaming Whitehall for its assaults on the English language, it is only fair to admit that Westminster perpetrates a few of its own from time to time. But I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will give the House some encouragement to believe that there languishes in the ranks of Government some respect for the English language, elemental and residual though it may be, and some remnant of life out of which new hope may burgeon in the future.
    The right hon. Gentleman is responsible for a nauseating piece of drafting, and I am sorry for him. I hope that he will tell us that it is his intention to take an early opportunity to remedy it.
    8.30 p.m.
    Mr. Dobson: I rise on one point which causes me some concern. In line 4, the Clause says that the Post Office
    "… shall, in normal business hours, issue on behalf of the council licences under the Vehicles (Excise) Act, 1962."
    I hope that my right hon. Friend will say what he means by "normal business hours". I suspect that what he has in mind is the normal hours of business, which are now 8.30 or 9 until 5.30 or 6, depending on the location of the post office.
    There is a difficulty in this connection, and it is that there is an agreement

    1259
    between the Post Office and the unions concerned with the transaction of vehicle excise licence business to the effect that such transactions shall take place on Saturdays only when the county council office is open. As it stands, the Clause suggests that a wider sale of vehicle excise licences will be possible in future, and I shall feel extremely distressed if the Clause means that post office counters will be supplying vehicle licences when the county council offices are closed. That would be contrary to the existing agreements and would cause consternation to post office staff.
    The agreement was reached after a long period of discussion. I hope that my right hon. Friend will reassure me on this point because if the Clause went through without qualification it would cause a great deal of controversey.
    Mr. Hay: No doubt the right hon. Gentleman will listen to what the hon. Member for Bristol, North-East (Mr. Dobson) has said. In the other scale, however, I want to place the convenience of the public. It is all very well to work out a series of agreements relating to the hours during which post offices shall transact this kind of business, making sure that they coincide with times when council offices are open. However, I hope that the convenience of the public will be taken into account.
    I want to deal with two other matters because, like my hon. Friend the Member for Yeovil (Mr. Peyton), I am an admirer of the English language and I am horrified to see so many blemishes in the Bill. My hon. Friend draws attention in his Amendment to a jaw-cracking subsection which I will not repeat. I have found another gem.
    In line 11 of the new Clause, in the middle of a subsection dealing with the possibility of a dispute arising, for some extraordinary reason the draftsman has used the words
    "… in the event of a dispute's arising …"
    That is novel. One sees the same horror perpetrated in line 36 of Clause 12. At the beginning of subsection (5), the draftsmen say:
    "In the event of a dispute's arising …".
    Here, again, is a horror. Indeed, there is yet another on page 8, line 23, which is even worse because there is a reference
    1260
    to the prosecution of research and the advantages which may accrue to the Post Office
    "… as a consequence of research's being prosecuted into them",
    "research's" being spelt "research" with an apostrophe "s". I think that the draftsman is genitive mad. This is another example of the double genitive that we had earlier.
    I cannot understand why this not only inelegant but downright ugly language is being used. It would have been perfectly simple, good English, absolutely comprehensible to everybody, if line 11 of new Clause 3 simply said,
    "(of an amount to be determined, in the event of a dispute arising as to the amount thereof, by the Minister)."
    I ask the Postmaster-General to have a look at some of this drafting. We are not raising silly, niggling little points. It behoves this House to try to keep some kind of control over the use of language, not just because it happens to offend the susceptibilities, but because—and this is the point—these horrors, when they creep in, are repeated in later Acts because they are taken as precedents.
    Another point on which I am not clear from the Postmaster-General's explanation is why it is necessary to take power in subsection (1) of the new Clause to give the Post Office a direction. This is the customary way that the Minister would exercise a reserve power, but I remind the right hon. Gentleman that the power to give a direction is usually kept very much in reserve; it is a sledge hammer. Although I cannot speak from memory on the context of this very long and involved Bill, I think that there is a provision that the Minister has to report to Parliament the occasions on which he has given a direction. This is well precedented in a number of the other nationalisation statutes. But I wonder why, in the context of the matter that the right hon. Gentleman mentioned in moving the new Clause, it is necessary for the Minister to take the power to give the Post Office a diretction to do this comparatively minor and unimportant piece of business. It would be equally easy for it to read,
    "The Minister may, at the request of a county council and after consultation with the Post Office, request the Post Office, during such period as may be specified … in normal business hours, to issue, on behalf of the council, licences under the Vehicles (Excise) Act 1962."
    Why not simply make it a request?

    1261
    I should be grateful if the right hon. Gentleman would look at it again. If he cannot answer now why he must have the power to give a direction, I ask him to look at it again in another place to see whether it is really necessary.
    Mr. Stratton Mills: The principle behind the new Clause seems entirely unexceptional, but I think that my hon. Friend the Member for Yeovil (Mr. Peyton) has done us a service by reminding us of what he rightly referred to as this "nauseating piece of drafting". My hon. Friend the Member for Henley (Mr. Hay) also pinpointed another piece of rather bad drafting in the phrase "dispute's arising". I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will note these things and perhaps at some later stage will be able to tidy them up.
    Mr. Peyton: I hope that when my hon. Friend the Member for Belfast, North (Mr. Stratton Mills) repeats what my hon. Friend the Member for Henley (Mr. Hay) said just now about "dispute's raising", he will spell it out so that those who hear it without a copy of the Bill before them will get the full horror of the apostrophe "s". Otherwise it will be interpreted as something quite different. I hope my hon. Friend will take the point.
    Mr. Stratton Mills: I understand my hon. Friend's point, and I remind the House that an apostrophe has been used before the "s" here and in other parts of the Bill. I hope that when the Minister replies to the debate he will be able to give us some encouragement about this.
    Subsection (3) says that the Post Office
    "shall be entitled to receive payments from that council (of an amount to be determined, in the event of a dispute's arising as to the amount thereof, by the Minister)."
    By what yardstick will the council pay the Post Office? Is there to be a return on capital, or is it to be a percentage of turnover? What kinds of overheads, if any, are to be included? We ought to have some details about this, because the Minister may have to adjudicate in the event of a dispute between the local authority and the Post Office.
    My hon. Friend the Member for Henley rightly referred to the extraordinary way in which the requirement of a direction is included. Surely this is taking things too far? Surely a
    1262
    direction would be much more appropriate as a reserve power to be used in the event of a dispute? I think that the Minister ought to tell us why he has seen fit to provide for a direction in all these cases.
    Mr. Stonehouse: My hon. Friend the Member for Bristol, North-East (Mr. Dobson) raised a question about normal business hours. I should like to make it clear to the House that this does not necessarily imply that these transactions will be carried out throughout normal business hours. They will be carried out within the period of the normal business, and the existing agreements with the staff will be continued because these meet the convenience of the Post Office in the organisation of its business.
    The hon. Member for Henley (Mr. Hay) referred to the convenience of the public. The public are also interested in the other services which the Post Office provides, and if they find that they cannot get access to those services because the Post Office is doing this work, they could well raise objections. I believe that the present arrangement is reasonable and fair, and that is why we are proposing that it should continue.
    Mr. Stratton Mills: Is the right hon. Gentleman saying that he will restrict the hours during which people can tax motor vehicles at Post Offices? Surely to do that would be very much against the general convenience of the public?
    Mr. Stonehouse: No. That has always applied, because if a local authority is closed for this purpose on a Saturday, and particularly in the afternoon, it is appropriate that the Post Office should not transact this business at that time, and I am glad to note that he hon. Member for Henley agrees with me about that.
    During our last debate I was very much influenced by the points put forward by the hon. Member for Yeovil (Mr. Peyton) who has an incisive and attractive mind, and brings many useful ideas to the Floor of the House, but on this occasion I entirely disagree with him. If we were to accept his Amendment, which I appreciate is a probing Amendment, we would put the Post Office in a relationship with the Minister which I think the House would agree would be inappropriate. The Post Office would not be

    1263
    under any specific obligation to comply with a direction, and there would be no way of settling that argument, and there would be no obligation on the Minister to take account of the practical capabilities of the Post Office before the direction was made.
    Where subsection (2) refers to:
    "Subsections (4), (5) and (6) of section 12 of this Act",
    anybody with an atom of intelligence can see what that means. By using this shorthand that is the usual form in Parliamentary drafting, a lot of unnecessary words have been avoided; and I should have thought the hon. Member for Yeovil would applaud economy in words, because subsection (4) sets out and makes clear that the Post Office is complying with the directions set out in subsections 1, 2 and 3 of Clause 12. If we did not use the shorthand in subsection (2) of new Clause 3 all that would have to be spelled out again. The hon. Gentleman, who has sufficient intelligence to look up Clause 12 and see what it means, must give other people similar credit for being able to look it up.
    8.45 p.m.
    Mr. Peyton: I have read Clause 12 and I believe that quality and clarity are sometimes to be preferred to economy. When those who never hesitate to use 100 words where one will do plead economy as an excuse for ugliness I am absolutely askance.
    Mr. Stonehouse: I do not think that this is particularly ugly. I think it is poetry. I think it is delightful.
    Mr. Hay: Would the hon. Gentleman care to set it to music?
    Mr. Stonehouse: If we go on long enough tonight I will do my best, but I believe it would be a waste of space to attempt to spell out again all the provisions of subsections (1), (2) and (3) of Clause 12; and the wording is perfectly appropriate. The hon. Member for Belfast, North (Mr. Stratton Mills) raised the question of what is to be the yardstick of the payment made to the Post Office. It will be to ensure not only that overhead
    1264
    expenses are met but that there should be a fair contribution to the financial objective of the postal side of the business which is now expressed as 2 per cent. of expenditure. I hope that with those explanations the House will see fit to accept the Clause.
    Mr. Hay: I raised two points, one about "dispute's" and the other about why direction is necessary.
    Mr. Stonehouse: I did not want to delay the House longer, but this direction is a reserve power. Naturally, the Post Office would be expected to agree with the Minister, after discussion in an amicable way. But if we are to have reserve power we have to spell it out in this way. It is suggested that we should have a series of consultations and that that will be that; but it does not settle the point. In the event of a dispute who makes at decision? If we were to accept the wording suggested by the hon. Member for Henley the matter would be in considerable doubt. No one would know whether the Post Office or the Minister was to make the final decision in the event of dispute. This wording has the virtue of clarity and therefore I should think the hon. Member for Yeovil would give it his 100 per cent. support, the clarity being that the Minister may make a direction. I believe the House would applaud that.
    Mr. Stratton Mills: Of course, subsection (3), regarding the arrangement for payment is activated only in the event of the Minister giving a direction. Surely, it is meant to apply to all circumstances where the Post Office is doing this work on behalf of a local authority.
    Mr. Stonehouse: Of course, there will be an arrangement for payment. This is put in to make it clear that though there is a direction, nevertheless, the Post Office shall be entitled to receive the payment on the lines I have been describing. I take the observation that the drafting point is something we can look at and I see no particular objection to the apostrophe; but I will consider it with my advisers.
    Question put and agreed to.
    Clause read a Second time and added to the Bill.

    New Clause 4

    REMUNERATION OF POST OFFICE FOR ISSUING DOG AND GAME LICENCES IN ENLAND AND WALES

    (1) Any sums falling to be paid by the Minister of Housing and Local Government to the Post Office in pursuance of any agreement to which he, it and a council in England or Wales are parties, being

    5

    (a) an agreement providing for the issue by the Post Office, on behalf of the council, of licences of all or any of the following kinds, namely, licences for dogs, licences for dealing in game and licences for killing game, and the payment by that Minister to the Post Office of sums in consideration of its issuing the licences; or

    10

    (b) an agreement providing for the payment by that Minister to the Post Office of sums in consideration of its issuing, on behalf of the council, licences of all or any of those kinds in compliance with a direction under section 12 of this Act;

    shall be paid out of moneys provided by Parliament.

    15

    (2) Where licences of any such kinds as aforesaid are, in compliance with a direction under section 12 of this Act, issued by the Post Office on behalf of a council in England or Wales during a period during which an agreement is in force between the council and the Minister of Housing and Local Government providing for the payment to the Post Office by that Minister of sums in consideration of its issuing the licences (not being an agreement to which the Post Office is a party), the Post Office shall be entitled, in consideration of its issuing the licences, to receive payment from that Minister (of an amount to be determined, in the event of a dispute's arising as to the amount thereof, by the Minister); and any sums falling to be paid by that Minister in pursuance of this subsection shall be paid out of moneys provided by Parliament.

    20

    25

    (3) Where licences of any such kinds as aforesaid are, in compliance with a direction under section 12 of this Act, issued by the Post Office on behalf of a council in England or Wales during a period during which no agreement is in force between the council and the Minister of Housing and Local Government providing for the payment to the Post Office by that Minister of sums in consideration of its issuing the licences, the Post Office shall be entitled, in consideration of its issuing the licences, to receive payment from the council (of an amount to be determined, in the event of a dispute's arising as to the amount thereof, by the Minister).—[Mr. Stonehouse]

    Brought up, and read the First time.
    Mr. Stonehouse: I beg to move, That the Clause be read a Second time.
    Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Sydney Irving): With this new Clause the House will discuss the three sub-Amendments (a), in line 5, leave out 'licences for dogs'; (b) in line 19, leave out 'Minister' and insert 'Treasury'; and (c) in line 29, leave out 'Minister' and insert 'Treasury', and Amendment No. 59, in page 13, line 17, at end insert 'in Scotland'.
    Mr. Stonehouse: We now arrive at a very interesting and emotional part of the Bill. The main purpose of the Clause is to allow the continuation of the present arrangements under Section 19(5) of the Post Office Act, 1961, by which the Post Office is paid for issuing dog and game licences in England and Wales by the Minister of Housing and Local Government, otherwise the local authorities which receive the revenue and which under Clause 132 will become responsible after vesting day for paying the cost of collection would be out of pocket through the change of status of the Post Office. I am sure that hon. Members will agree
    1266
    that that would be unfair and will generally approve the Clause.
    Mr. Peyton: As the right hon. Gentleman was kind enough in reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Henley (Mr. Hay) just now to say that he would look at the significance of always equipping "dispute" with an apostrophe "s", I will not weary him by repeating the point here. I hope, Mr. Deputy Speaker, that you will allow me to say to you, with profound respect—I of course have great respect for the Chair—that I was particularly gratified that sub-Amendment (a) should have been selected and that I should in no way have been suspected of irony in wishing to talk on this.
    Sub-Amendment (a) seeks to leave out "licences for dogs", a question which concerns the Prime Minister and his followers in at least a metaphorical sense with which we are all familiar. It would be very unkind and unfair if I were to trespass upon the kindness of the Chair in selecting the Amendment. I can only say that I hope that it will be accepted that in tabling the Amendment I had in my mind thoughts of great kindness towards hon. Members opposite

    1267
    some of whose relationships with the authorities of their party have, I understand, been damaged by recent events. I thought that if the dog licensing system were to be abolished it would be greatly to their benefit. Even if it were prejudicial to the interests of the Prime Minister, I thought that this was a misfortune which I personally could stomach.
    Mr. Arthur Lewis rose—
    Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. I think that the hon. Member for Yeovil (Mr. Peyton) has had more latitude than the Chair ordinarily allows on these occasions.
    Mr. Peyton: I am deeply grateful to you, as always, Mr. Deputy Speaker, and I assure you that I shall not press the point further.
    A serious question which I want to ask the right hon. Gentleman is how much it costs to collect a dog licence fee. I strongly suspect that this is a very unprofitable exercise and that a good deal of time, money and labour is spent on collecting the 7s. 6d. per dog per year and that the exercise shows no benefit to anyone.
    In the good old days—they seem awfully long ago now—when there was a Tory Government I once inquired of the Treasury what the cost was. My right hon. Friend the Member for Altrincham and Sale (Mr. Barber), who was then Financial Secretary, was answering a Question about the amount of revenue collected in the form of dog licences.
    Mr. Ridley: It was my Question.
    Mr. Peyton: I believe that it was. I asked a supplementary question the exact form of which I do not remember. My right hon. Friend's answer was interesting. He told us that dog licences had been thrust upon us by the need to finance the French war. I assume that to be the war against Napoleon. It has been a singular misfortune under which we have languished ever since that nobody has seen fit to tell the Treasury that the war against France was over and that Napoleon was dead. It would be useful if the Treasury could be persuaded to digest this information, because it might then be brought to examine the advisability of dog
    1268
    licences. I cannot help but adhere to an old-fashioned prejudice, that if we are to have dog licences it might as well be worth the trouble and expense of collecting the fee, otherwise we should abolish them. But to collect a sum which shows no profit whatever must be foolish even in the ranks of those where foolish propositions grow in fertile ground.
    There are a couple of other points to which I attach no great importance. As it is accustomed to the rôle of referee, it would perhaps be right for the Treasury to be responsible for entering into the matter as referee in the event of disputes arising as opposed to the Minister. I would not wish to press that point very hard, but I should be grateful if the Minister could give us some up-to-date information which I am sure it would be difficult to extract from the Treasury, because it would be profoundly shocked to be asked about the cost of dog licences. It would feel that the next suggestion would be that the licence should be abolished and that the abolition of a licence costing 7s. 6d. per dog per year would imperil our war effort against Napoleon. That fearful news would shake the old-fashioned loyalties and confidence of the Treasury to a great extent I hope that perhaps the Treasury will be persuaded gradually—Ministers must not do this quickly with the Treasury—to let the light dawn on it and be told that the war against France is over, Napoleon is dead and therefore we do not need dog licences which, I strongly suspect, do not justify the trouble involved in collecting the fee.
    9.0 p.m.
    Sir Frank Pearson: My hon. Friend the Member for Yeovil (Mr. Peyton) referred to his Amendment with too much diffidence. He depreciated its importance. After his speech, I felt that the point justified a certain amount of debate, though possibly not a long debate. We are lucky that we have been given the opportunity to talk about a matter which might not arise in the normal course of the business of the House.
    My hon. Friend the Member for Yeovil mentioned that dog licences originated out of the need to raise finance for the Napoleonic wars. Many great anomalies in our tax system have arisen through strange circumstances. Mr. Gladstone

    1269
    had a reason for introducing Income Tax. He introduced it purely as a temporary measure, but it has continued and it plagues us to this day. Who can say that the relatively minor imposition involved in dog licences will not become a social evil? Therefore, I welcome the Amendment. Are dog licences a reasonable method of raising what is a minimal revenue? When I consider all the provisions in the new Clause for avoiding anomalies, I wonder whether this can be a good tax.
    Apart from the administrative anomalies, what are the merits of the tax? There are many breeds and types of dog which should not be subject to it, like dogs for the blind. Are they a proper subject for a tax, however small? It is always said that if a tax is to be fair it must be capable of reasonably efficient collection. Every hon. Member knows that hundreds of dogs are not the subject of licence fees. The hon. Member for Ross and Cromarty (Mr. Alasdair Mackenzie) will know many shepherds with dogs for which they pay no licence fee. A tax like this, which can be evaded, must be thoroughly bad. I hope that the Minister will try to justify the basis of dog licences.
    Whether they should be collected through the Post Office is another matter. The Post Office is to become purely commercial, so many of its old functions should no longer be given to it. Other licences, such as those for dealing in game and killing game, might not be considered the functions of a commercial organisation like the modern Post Office in the modern technological age. Motor licences are issued through local authorities, and perhaps they should issue these licences.
    We know how difficult it is at many sub-post offices to do all the Post Office paper work and to run a small shop as well and issue licences may be a considerable additional burden. Why has the issue of licences been left with a commercially-operated Post Office? Has the Minister considered allowing this function to be performed by local authorities in the same way as they issue motor licences?
    Mr. Arthur Lewis: Is it not a fact that car road fund licences are issued both by local authorities and the Post Office?
    Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Sydney Irving): Order. I do not think that the question of road fund licences comes within the ambit of the Clause. I have been questioning in my mind the inclusion of the whole principle of the issue of licences for dogs. Hon. Members are concerned with the principle of licences being issued by the Post Office rather than with the question of licensing as a whole.
    Sir Frank Pearson: On a point of order. Would it be in order to debate the question of leaving the matter in the hands of the Post Office or having this function performed by local authorities, setting aside the question of licensing as such?
    Mr. Deputy Speaker: That is in order. The question whether dogs should be licensed is a different matter entirely.
    Mr. Arthur Lewis: On a point of order. With respect to the Chair, both the hon. Member for Yeovil (Mr. Peyton) and the hon. Member for Clitheroe (Sir Frank Pearson) have spoken about the substantive issue. Is it not in order—
    Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. I appreciate the point the hon. Gentleman has in mind, but he must not question the ruling of the Chair. It is difficult for the Chair to decide what the issue of principle is here. It is clear to me now, and I have ruled accordingly.
    Mr. Lewis: Further to the point of order—
    Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. I have disposed of the point of order. The hon. Gentleman should not pursue the matter further.
    Mr. Lewis: But you have not yet heard my point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker.
    Mr. Deputy Speaker: The hon. Gentleman began by saying that he wished to speak further to a point on which I had ruled. If he has a new point of order to raise, I will, of course, hear it.
    Mr. Lewis: Two speeches have been made by hon. Gentlemen opposite dealing with an aspect of licensing. Presumably their remarks were in order, or they would have been ruled out of order. Are not hon. Members on this side entitled to debate what they said and what must have been in order because it was not ruled out of order?
    Mr. Deputy Speaker: The hon. Gentleman is seeking to question a Ruling of the Chair. I cannot allow him to do that.
    Mr. Lewis: Are we in the position that certain things can be said by hon. Gentleman opposite and we cannot reply to them?
    Mr. Deputy Speaker: I am sure that the hon. Gentleman appreciates the difficulties that face the Chair. This has been an obscure and difficult matter to decide. Perhaps the Chair was slow in giving its Ruling; but a Ruling has been given and the hon. Gentleman must not question it.
    Sir Frank Pearson: While we are not in order in debating the question of the issue of licences by local authorities, presumably we are in order in debating the relevance of the issue of licences by the Post Office.
    Mr. Deputy Speaker: That is perfectly in order.
    Sir Frank Pearson: I have no doubt that the hon. Member for West Ham, North will be entitled to debate that aspect if he catches your eye, Mr. Deputy Speaker, and I trust that the Minister will reply to the points I have made.
    Mr. Ridley: My hon. Friend the Member for Yeovil (Mr. Peyton) raised an important point which was not adduced in Committee. It is appropriate that the House should spend some time analysing whether or not this is a good provision.
    When my hon. Friend referred to a Question having been put to the then Chancellor of the Exchequer many years ago—at that time my hon. Friend and I were novices in the House—about dog licences, my hon. Friend was mistaken in thinking that the Answer given on that occasion resulted from a supplementary question asked by him. I must remind him that it was I who put a Question all those years ago. The Answer was given to my Question, not to his supplementary question. My Question sought to elicit what was the cost of collecting a dog licence. I speak from memory, but I think the Answer was, considerably more than 7s. 6d. In the preamble to the Answer the Financial Secretary to the Treasury gave the House the information that the dog licence was collected to pay for the Napoleonic wars with France.
    1272
    I think I am right in saying that in those days the licence came in at the rate of 2s. 6d. a dog and it was increased to 7s. 6d. some time during the nineteenth century. I think that students of economics will agree that a charge of 7s. 6d. in the nineteenth century has become worth a lot more now in view of the depreciation of the value of our currency. This would be a very suitable day on which to drop the dog licence altogether. As my hon. Friend pointed out, we are no longer at war with France.
    Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. I am afraid the hon. Member is transgressing on the point which I ruled out of order. He may submit that the Post Office may drop the administrative issue of licences, but he may not discuss the principle of licensing generally.
    Mr. Ridley: I submit that the Post Office should cease to issue dog licences. Rather than anyone else issuing them, they should not be necessary because of the desire of hon. Members in all parts of the House for better Franco-British relations in view of the news this week. This is a most appropriate moment for this Amendment to be moved. It would suggest that the war with our nearest neighbour over the Channel, symbolised by the dog licence, has been brought to an end.
    It seems crazy that this facility should be carried out by the Post Office. There is a real difficulty, because the Clause contains a provision that the Post Office shall be reimbursed by the Minister for the cost of issuing all licences, in particular dog licences, and the administrative cost of collection. We know from previous debates that the administrative cost of collection will include the appropriate share of overheads, interest charges and other expenses, which are properly attributable to the particular function of collecting dog licence fees.
    My hon. Friend made another good point when he said that it should not be left to the Minister to arbitrate on what is the cost of collecting dog licence fees in the case of a dispute between the Minister and the Post Office. He suggested that the Treasury should do this. I have not frequently known my hon. Friend to be an advocate of the Treasury to do anything in any situation. Indeed, he is noted in circles wider than this

    1273
    House for his endemic distrust of the Treasury, which I find admirable. I am sorry therefore to find him slipping on this occasion and trying to insert the Treasury as a referee between the Minister and the Post Office in the event of a dispute.
    It would seem that the Treasury is biased in this matter, as is the Minister, because, if the cost of collection of this tax is more than the yield of the tax, as I believe to be the case, and the Treasury were being obstinate and biased about it and sticking to this ridiculous eighteenth century tax, it would not arbitrate in at all a fair and unbiased manner between the Minister and the Post Office in the event of a dispute as to the cost of collection. Suppose that the tax costs ten bob a dog to collect and that is what the Post Office applies for. Does anyone seriously imagine that the Treasury would agree that it costs ten bob to collect a dog licence when it produced only 7s. 6d. a dog, and therefore there was a clear loss of 2s. 6d. from the start? The Treasury cannot be relied upon to be independent about such a matter.
    9.15 p.m.
    Mr. Peyton: I thank my hon. Friend for having shed light on the errors of my proposal. My only excuse is that I feel that the Treasury would be better doing only a little mischief, as it would here, than those big mischiefs which are its habit.
    Mr. Ridley: My hon. Friend is obviously trying to give the Treasury a sweetener in view of those things of which he has tried to deprive it over his long and distinguished Parliamentary career.
    It is ridiculous that taxes of this sort should still be levied—
    Mr. Speaker: Order. We are discussing not whether certain taxes should be levied but whether the Post Office should claim remuneration for collecting them.
    Mr. Ridley: I was about to press the Postmaster-General to tell us the cost of collecting dog licences. As soon as the Bill comes into force the first thing the new Post Office will do is to ask the Minister for a sum of money to cover the cost of the collection of this
    1274
    tax, so the figure will be known within a year or so, and we might as well know now. This is an excellent opportunity to smoke out the Government as to whether they are really continuing to charge a tax which probably costs more to administer than it brings in.
    The whole provision is very unsatisfactory. Dog licences should be abolished, but if they are to be retained they should not be collected by the Post Office.
    Mr. Speaker: Order. If they are to be abolished, they will not be abolished by this Amendment.
    Mr. John Farr: I cannot agree with my hon. Friends the Members for Yeovil (Mr. Peyton) and Cirencester and Tewkesbury (Mr. Ridley) in this matter. I feel that the collection by the Post Office of the various licences referred to in the new Clause is useful and effective. If dog licences are not to be issued by the Post Office, how are members of the public to obtain them? Post Offices in country areas rely to a certain extent on the little commission they draw from the issue of dog licences, game licences, and even licences to deal in game. It may be a small matter to many hon. Members, but to many village postmasters and postmistresses with very little income it is quite an occasion when somebody comes in to buy a dog licence.
    If the House accepts the Amendment and licences for dogs are omitted, there will be, to put it mildly, a superfluity of dogs around the country. I was impressed by what my hon. Friend the Member for Clitheroe (Sir Frank Pearson) said. He recommended that guide dogs for the blind should not be licensed, and I think that all hon. Members would agree. But if the Amendment is accepted and the machinery for the issue of those licences is destroyed, there will be a tremendous increase in the number of dogs in the country. One example of the tragic consequences of a large number of superfluous dogs is that on occasions when I have driven along the M1 I have seen people who want to dispose of dogs stop by the motorway for a second or two, release a dog from a bag and drive off. No hon. Member would like to see that sort of treatment of animals exaggerated, as I am sure it would be if the Amendment were accepted.

    1275
    Dogs should be licensed, the existing machinery for collection should be continued, and I should also like to see cats licensed.
    Mr. Ian Gilmour: When the Postmaster-General made his rather brief introductory speech, he said we were entering upon an interesting and emotional part of the Bill, but until I heard my hon. Friend speak I did not realise how interesting and emotional this new Clause was.
    Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman must not get too interesting and too emotional or lie will be out of order.
    Mr. Gilmour: I hope I shall become interesting, Mr. Speaker. but certainly not too emotional. My hon. Friend the Member for Yeovil (Mr. Peyton) pointed out that, according to evidence given by the Treasury for the inclusion of the dog licence in this new Clause, the licence was originally due to the disbelief—according to my hon. Friend—that Napoleon had ever died. He thinks that the Treasury still believes that Napoleon is still living, which, in truth, gives an entirely new slant to the Napoleonic legend.
    Mr. Peyton: All my hon. Friend the Member for Cirencester and Tewkesbury (Mr. Ridley) said is that we were jointly informed by a Treasury spokesman—none other than my hon. Friend the Member for Altrincham and Sale (Mr. Barber) when he was Financial Secretary to the Treasury some years ago—that dog licences had been introduced to finance the war against the French. The omission I was commenting on is that no one has told the Treasury that it is not necessary to keep the beastly licences on because the war against the French is over.
    Mr. Speaker: Order. I must rule Napoleon out of order and remind the House that we are discussing not whether there should be dog licences but whether the Post Office should issue them and receive remuneration for doing so.
    Mr. Gilmour: I am sure that it will be in order if I wonder whether there will be any net remuneration from this tax, because if the tax is a loss I imagine that the Treasury will have a strong case for saying that it will not remunerate the
    1276
    Post Office for making a loss on the tax while, equally, the Post Office might say that it is bad luck on the Post Office because it does not want to collect the tax anyway. I do not know how such a conflict would be resolved.
    Mr. Ridley: I can tell my hon. Friend how the conflict would be resolved. Licences would be imposed on cats, budgerigars, hedgehogs, hamsters and all sorts of pets in order to collect more revenue.
    Mr. Gilmour: That would be a very emotional subject, and when my hon. Friend the Member for Yeovil hinted—I thought regretfully—that it might be necessary to raise the dog licence fee, I hoped that he was not speaking seriously because those of us who have had experience of the animal lobby would not relish such a proceeding.
    The main point here is whether or not the Post Office will be spending its time and money usefully in collecting this tax; so I hope the right hon. Gentleman will favour us with a rather longer speech in reply and tell us whether or not the Post Office makes a loss on dog licences.
    Mr. Stonehouse: I hope to remain in order and not incur your displeasure, Mr. Speaker, and so I will be unable to follow up the various points made about the principle of the tax. I want to give some information in response to the other questions raised, however.
    The gross yield of this licence fee is £1 million a year and the cost of issue is just over £260,000 a year, so there is not a loss. There is, indeed, a surplus. The question the House is considering is who shall pay the Post Office for the expenses it incurs in doing this business.
    I was grateful to the hon. Member for Harborough (Mr. Farr) for his useful contribution. As he rightly said, sub-postmasters and sub-postmistresses value this part of their work. It is tremendous convenience to members of the public to be able to go into their post office to pay these rather minor fees. It would be unfortunate if we were to accept the suggestion that the Post Office should not carry out this business. As for the Post Office, this is commercial business, because the Post Office, under recent dispensations is being paid not only the cost, but also a contribution to the financial objective, which is expressed as 2

    1277
    per cent. of expenditure. It is good business for the Post Office and the Post Office Corporation will wish to continue to do this, providing it is reimbursed in the way I have described.
    The hon. Member for Yeovil (Mr. Peyton) suggested that the Treasury should be the Ministry deciding questions of dispute about the amount of payment to be made to the Post Office. I beg to disagree, and I hope that the House will not accept his advice. The Ministry of Posts is the Ministry which is aware of the exacting costing and responsibilities of the Post Office, and it would be most appropriate for the Minister with overall responsibility to have this responsibility. The issue here is clear. If we were to accept the Amendment the effect would be that the local authorities, rather than the Minister of Housing, would have to pay the Post Office for the expenses it incurs, and I believe that the House would not wish that. It would be most unfair to local authorities.
    Mr. A. P. Costain: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that someone from his Department gave evidence to the Estimates Committee that the cost of issuing a wireless licence was ls? Could not some sort of figure feature permanently in the Bill? Why does it cost more to write out a dog licence than a wireless licence?
    Mr. Stonehouse: The information which the hon. Gentleman has quoted, and I am speaking off the cuff, is incorrect. I believe that the cost is not 1s. but 7s. In any case, we should want to look at this a little more closely before we attempt to make these comparisons. The figures that I have given about the cost in this case are quite accurate and they show the proportion of costs as being just over 25 per cent.
    Mr. Tom Boardman: If the cost. of issuing a T.V. licence is 7s. how does the right hon. Gentleman reconcile that with the figures quoted for dog licences, since it surely involves no greater work? He said that only 25 per cent. of the cost is involved in the issue of dog licences. It seems to be a peculiar ratio.
    Question put and agreed to.
    Clause read a Second time and added to the Bill.

  New Clause 6
  Mr. Hugh Jenkins indicated assent.
  Captain Orr: In that case, the proposal is wholly admirable and I shall support it.

  1293
  One can think of many other matters on which one would wish to question the Minister. For example, if the Post Office, by using its licensing powers, began discriminating against private local mobile radio schemes and wished to extend its monopoly into this sphere, would I be entitled to ask the Minister why licences were being refused to a group of doctors?
  Mr. Hugh Jenkins indicated assent.
  Captain Orr: In that case, the new Clause is equally admirable and I will support it.
  In Committee we spoke at length about the monopoly powers of the Corporation and I instanced a variety of cases in which difficulty might occur, including data processing and pipelines. I hope, if the new Clause becomes law, that we shall be able to keep an eye on matters of this kind and question the Minister.
  We should not forget that it would be relatively easy for a Minister who did not want to answer Questions to claim that all of these matters came within the day-to-day administration of the Post Office. I do not know how the sponsors of the new Clause would get round that one.
  Mr. Hugh Jenkins: We are breaking new ground. A body of practice would be established as a result of the activities of the Table Office; but certainly a greater range of possibility would exist if the new Clause were accepted than is the case with existing corporations.
  Captain Orr: I hope that that will be so, although it is a forlorn hope. I put some better propositions in Committee. I regret that the hon. Member for Putney did not support me then. A forlorn hope is better than no hope, and I will, therefore, support his proposal.
  Mr. James Dempsey: Will not the words
  "… other than those of day-to-day administration"
  take the steam out of the new Clause and reduce the ability of the new Minister to answer Parliamentary Questions to the ability which Ministers at present have in respect of other nationalised undertakings?
  1294
  Most other undertakings either produce or manufacture. Different Questions will arise through the operation of this Corporation, because the new Post Office will be providing consumer services, involving the organisation of mail, the telephone service and other essential items in the lives of every citizen. One cannot, therefore, make a strict comparison between those sort of services and the functions performed by other publicly-owned basic industries.
  It would appear that if one were anxious to raise a Question under the present Clause one would ask for a general direction. It could be illogical and in some cases foolish, but it would be done so that the Question could be accepted by the Table and a supplementary question could be asked. I do not think the proposed Clause helps very much. I might wish to raise a Question about mail from a soldier in Cyprus, who asked that it should be delivered intact to a constituent, being interrupted. I would not be able to ask a Question about that under this Clause.
  Once we indulge in the extension of enterprise there is a lack of public accountability whether we like it or not. We are giving the Executive more power and still more power. The danger is the growth of the Executive and the development of remote control.
  Mr. Speaker: Order. We cannot discuss on this Clause the growth of the Executive, except so far as it can be checked by the Clause itself.
  Mr. Dempsey: That is true, Mr. Speaker, but this Clause would mean that I would no longer be able to ask Questions, for example, about the development of delivery of 4d. mail as I can at the moment. We are giving more power to the Executive whether we like it or not. This is disturbing and it makes it more difficult to bring about a democratisation of certain services administered from this House. It is on those lines that the Bill should develop. If I thought this Clause was necessary I would be happy to support it, but, like the hon. and gallant Member for Down, South (Captain Orr), I have doubts about it.
  Mr. Driberg: It is better than nothing.
  Mr. Dempsey: It may be argued that it is better than nothing, but I cannot see

  1295
  any great difference between the Clause and the existing opportunity afforded to hon. Members to put Questions about the nationalised industries.
  If I have to ask for a general direction, whether it be the coal, steel or electricity industry, or to get to know something about the operation of the new Post Office Department, I cannot see that there
  1296
  would be any difference in practice. I am expressing my views which are based on apprehension. The apprehension is lack of democratisation in administering services from this House. This is to be deplored and regretted. I hope my right hon. Friend will try to give us some hope that he intends to introduce a greater degree of public accountability for this service than that which operates for the others at present.
  Dr. Reginald Bennett: This little debate on the new Clause seems to me to be a considerable Parliamentary occasion. I have been much moved by the words of the proposers of the new Clause in looking back through the history of other nationalised corporations, and regretting what has been done in allowing the House to be deprived of its right to inquire into publicly-owned corporations to any degree. The hon. Member for Barking (Mr. Driberg) expounded this with great ability, and I heartily endorse his sentiments.
  The constituents whom I have the honour to represent are quite unable to understand how it is that a Member of Parliament should not be allowed to inquire on their behalf into the maladministration, mistakes or whatever that go on in the corporations already nationalised. Without being patronising, I would say that the hon. Gentlemen who have spoken have seen the light on this matter. I could not sufficiently praise their courage in doing so, especially on a day when the Whips will be replaced by scorpions. I give them my warmest support, and again commend their political courage in putting the new Clause forward.
  But I join other hon. Members in questioning why they did not go the whole distance and include day-to-day business. I suppose that they were got at even by the relatively easy régime that has existed on the other side of the House until now, and therefore flinched from including it.
  I am convinced that the House will come to regret it most bitterly if the Government do not take the opportunity so ably provided for them as a partial get-out from the awful jam Governments, Oppositions and hon. Members always find themselves in when they set up a nationalised corporation. I plead with the Minister to allow the new Clause to be accepted. I know that it goes against the doctrines that have ruled hitherto in the party opposite, but many doctrines that hitherto applied to the Labour Party have been abandoned in the past few years, and this is one which would be unwept if it were abandoned. I plead with the Government to accept the new Clause because I believe that every
  1298
  Member of Parliament and every voter sincerely wants this to happen.
  Mr. Ian Mikardo: I shall not comment on what the hon. Member for Gosport and Fareham (Dr. Bennett) said about Whips and scorpions, except perhaps to remind him that in the original which he had in mind the threat to chastise with scorpions turned out in practice to be an empty one.
  Mr. Speaker: Order. We cannot discuss Rehoboam in this context.
  Mr. Mikardo: I humbly accept your correction, Mr. Speaker.
  The hon. and gallant Member for Down, South (Captain Orr) asked what the purpose of the new Clause is. My answer, in the hallowed phrase, is that its purpose is the avoidance of doubt, because all that it seeks to do is to apply to the new Corporation the answerability to the House which applies to every existing public Corporation.
  Now I have an answer to the hon. Member for Gosport and Fareham and my hon. Friend the Member for Coat-bridge and Airdrie (Mr. Dempsey), with whose speech I largely agree, who wanted to know why we put in the phrase
  "… other than those of day-to-day administration."
  If we had not, we should have been asking for a greater degree of accountability to the House on the part of the new Corporation than is given to it, with the agreement of both sides of the House, by the Railways Board, the Steel Corporation, the Gas Council and all the rest. [An HON. MEMBER: "Why not?"] I agree—why not?
  10.30 p.m.
  I have never believed in autonomous public corporations and I am not being wise after the event. I opposed the thing from the first stage in 1942, when the concept was first delivered, fathered by Herbert Morrison out of the body of the General Council of the T.U.C., or vice versa—it is not for me to say who was the father or the mother. But between the two they hatched it up and sprang it on the Labour movement, and I have opposed it since then.
  Nevertheless, both Labour and Conservative Governments since then—and

  1299
  this House without real demur—have accepted that the nationalised industries should be run by public corporations with a certain degree of autonomy which included relieving them of the obligation of having to account through the Minister to this House for their day-to-day administration.
  I am with my hon. Friend the Member for Coatbridge and Airdrie in that I would be happier if the words he referred to were left out. But if they had been my right hon. Friend could well have said two things. First, he could have asked, "Why are you asking that this Corporation should be more answerable than the House has ever demanded of other corporations?" It would have been a good question and difficult to answer. Secondly, he could have said, "If you include answerability to the House on day-to-day administration you will gravely interfere with the ability of the Corporation to operate on a commercial basis." That I would not have been so quick to accept, but it is precisely what the House has always accepted.
  Therefore, if these words had been omitted, my right hon. Friend could easily have demolished the new Clause and, of course, we do not want him to demolish it, so we included them in order to make crystal clear that we want the Corporation to be responsible to the House, although no more and no less than the British Railways Board, the British Steel Corporation, the National Coal Board and the other corporations.
  Sir Harmar Nicholls: The hon. Gentleman may be making it difficult for the House later on. Does he suggest that, if new Clause 6 is not accepted but voted down, we shall not be able to ask Questions of the same type as in the case of the other corporations? If he is going to accept that in order to get the Clause through, we might be more inhibited later on than we would be otherwise.
  Mr. Mikardo: The hon. Gentleman has, characteristically, anticipated the point. If all we are seeking to do by this new Clause is to lay down for the Corporation what has grown up by custom and practice and the gentle dictates of the Table to be the behaviour of the
  1300
  House towards the other corporations, and if we are doing no more than apply to this new Corporation what applies to the others, hon. Members may well ask, "Why do we have to spell it out in words?" They could also argue that, if the new Clause had never been introduced they could have continued their practice in every way.
  My answer to that is simple. We do not even know yet what Minister is going to be the sponsoring Minister for this Corporation. We do not know whether he is going to be in this House or in another place. We do not know whether, in the default of the thing being spelt out, someone might not try to read something in the Bill which would give ground for a lower accountability of the Corporation to the House than the other corporations have got.
  That was why we spelled it out, for the avoidance of doubt. The original series of nationalisation Acts of which, in respect of relations between the Corporation, the Minister and Parliament, this is a pretty faithful copy, were not clearly written—that is the series from 1940 to 1950. Looking at those Acts we will not find a clear or complete acceptance of the matters hon. Members can press a Minister on. The very term "day-to-day administration" is pretty imprecise.
  What has happened in the last 20 years is that in their wisdom, various Speakers have given advice, and the Table has built up a good body of case law, amended from time to time. Some Questions are now admitted to Ministers about public corporations which would certainly not have got past the Table in 1951 or 1953. Like all good laws, the administrators have sensibly varied and amended it to keep up with the needs of the times. We have now reached the situation when a lot of Questions are asked about what might even be called day-to-day administration in the public corporations, and we get away with it.
  Dr. M. P. Winstanley: Would the hon. Gentleman not agree that Questions may be asked but they do not often get answered?
  Mr. Mikardo: My experience, which is longer than the hon. Gentleman's, is that most Questions are answered if the Member who asks them is persistent and clever

  1301
  enough to ensure that he gets an answer. That applies to some hon. Members; I do not know whether it applies to the hon. Gentleman. We get a lot of these Questions on the Order Paper, and the House gets a lot of information about the administration, including some aspects of day-to-day administration. As is the way here, we have rubbed along and found a good practical modus operandi. We do not entrench too far upon the limits of order and the Ministry does not entrench too far in its claims of invulnerability for a public corporation.
  We are seeking to see that the Post Office shall be no different from the Coal Board or the British Steel Corporation in that regard. If anyone asks, "Why spell it out?" it is for the avoidance of doubt. I hope that this deals with those like my hon. Friend the Member for Coatbridge and Airdrie who think that we have not gone far enough. I rather suspect that my right hon. Friend thinks that we have gone too far—there is a little niggle at the back of my ear lobe which leads me to think that he will not accept the new Clause.
  If he does not it can only be because he thinks it goes too far. It would not surprise me if he said that the Government cannot accept it because they cannot tie the hands of the Corporation, they cannot do anything that will prevent it doing its job as a good commercial organisation. If he says that, my question is: how does the British Steel Corporation carry out its job as a good commercial organisation, because it is subject, no more and no less, to the same Parliamentary accountability as is contained in the new Clause? How does the Coal Board operate as a commercial organisation?
  Any attempt to resist the new Clause would be an attempt to create a greater freedom from public accountability for this Corporation than for any other corporation. That being so, whilst I hope that my prophecy, not for the first time, turns out to be wrong and that the Minister will accept the new Clause, if he does not do so, I hope that my hon. Friends will press it as hard as they can.
  Sir H. d'Avigdor-Goldsmid: The new Clause has furnished the crucial debate of the whole Bill, and has attracted some notable contributions, particularly from
  1302
  my right hon. Friend the Member for Flint, East (Mr. Birch), the hon. Member for Barking (Mr. Driberg), whom we are glad to see back, and not least the hon. Member for Poplar (Mr. Mikardo). The hon. Gentleman, whose expertise on the nationalised industries is unique in this House, told us that he disapproved of autonomous corporations, but in doing so he gave me the feeling one has when reading an article in one of the juicier Sunday papers on the terrible conditions of vice to be found in certain quarters of the world. There seems to be a parallel between the hon. Gentleman's deep and abiding interest in the nationalised industries which cancels his dislike, and the way in which the reporter on the seamy side of Singapore is able to stifle his natural instincts of disgust to bring the good news to those at home.
  I am puzzled by the Clause because, if we accept it, I wonder whether all our labours on the Bill in this House, going back for many months, and for years with the Post Office, have any value. Why bother to change the Post Office into a public corporation? What is the advantage, unless we attract to its service the sort of people whom autonomous corporations are now seeking to employ and to whom they are offering great rewards?
  The Postmaster-General described himself as being the chief executive of the Post Office for the time being. The time will come when he will become Chief Whip and someone else will have to do the job, and a reasonable solution would be to have somebody who did it on a semi-permanent basis.
  I cannot help thinking of the evidence which the hon. Member for Poplar was so active and industrious in getting and which formed the basis of the main report of the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries last year. In Committee I quoted the evidence of Lord Heyworth, an eminent businessman and Chairman of Unilever Ltd., given before an earlier Select Committee but quoted in paragraph 786 of Cmnd. 371:
  "If people came to look at everything I did in a year after the events, the shareholders would be horrified because they would see that sonic of my decisions were quite wrong. The more I felt that someone was looking over my shoulder all the time and was going to examine these things at any time later, the less I would be inclined to take a decision, the less

  1303
  decisive I would become, and pretty well certainly the less good would be the results."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing Committee D, 4th March. 1969; c. 971.]
  10.45 p.m.
  There has been much talk by the sponsors of the new Clause about public accountability. It was in that spirit that my hon. Friends and I moved during the Committee stage an Amendment suggesting that what was desirable was an efficient audit of the Post Office. I believe that if our Amendment had been accepted, a high degree of public accountability would have been attained, and we should not at this late stage be seeking to reintroduce it by a form of words which, whatever else it is, is certainly unacceptable to the Parliamentary draftsman.
  If one wants accountability, I do not think Question and Answer in the House of Commons produces the sort of accountability which is of any real use. It simply discourages from taking executive posts in the organisation the sort of people whom the Postmaster-General is seeking to attract.
  The hon. Member for Poplar made the point that acceptance of this Clause would put the Post Office on an exact par with the other nationalised industries and that they would have to furnish as much as or as little information as the other nationalised industries have to furnish. I feel that we get a reasonable amount of information on the other nationalised industries. It was felt that the desire to make the Post Office, a public service, into an autonomous corporation was partly based on the feelings of Lord Heyworth which I have quoted that Members of Parliament were breathing down the back of his neck.
  I find myself in the difficult position that I have found the hon. Member for Poplar an admirable chairman. I follow his views closely, and on the whole he is probably right. If the effect of the Clause is simply to put the Post Office on a par with the other nationalised industries, it would be right to support the Clause. I know that the right hon. Gentleman is sensitive—whether in the lobes of his ears, I do not know—to the noises which are made behind him, but I would encourage his hon. Friends to press on with their Amendment. It will certainly get substantial support from
  1304
  this side of the House. I feel that it might have the result of putting on the Statute Book something which, however good the Minister's intentions, the Parliamentary draftsman would not wear.
  Mr. Molloy: The new Clause touches upon a fundamental principle of public ownership as we on this side of the House understand it: that an industry which has been taken into public ownership, or created directly by the State, should at all times be accountable to the House.
  My hon. Friends for Barking (Mr. Driberg) and Poplar (Mr. Mikardo) have outlined the discussions which went on for many years in the Labour Party. I have always supported the view which they have advanced, which in those days we used to call the Bevan form of public ownership, as opposed to the Morrison form of public ownership. We should take the view of Aneurin Bevan that any form of public ownership should have the maximum accountability to the House of Commons, to the people whom this House represents. I still think that this is a very valid argument.
  Sir Douglas Glover: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Should the House not have the attention of the Postmaster-General on a particularly interesting speech, rather than that he should be planning when to close the debate?
  Mr. Molloy: I am grateful for the intervention. I hope that my right hon. Friend will take notice of it because I have something to say in a few moments which is particularly relevant to his conscience.
  It is on this issue of public ownership that so many of us feel strongly. We have had divisions of opinion on both sides in Committee. Hon. Members opposite have rushed to our assistance to ensure that there is proper public accountability for the nationalised industries. At the same time, they consider that there should not be too much investigation into the activities of the great monopolies. We on this side of the House have always argued that a great industry in private hands which forms a massive monopoly is anti-democratic. But the same can be said of such a monopoly if it is taken into public ownership and there is no accountability.

  1305
  As I see it, the consultative councils have been pretty hopeless, and if my right hon. Friend proposes to argue later on that something similar is to be established in respect of the Post Office he need not bother, because what has been done along these lines in other industries has been a complete failure—[Interruption.] Before hon. Gentlemen opposite cheer too loudly, let me remind them that, while they approve of public accountability in the House of Commons, they are not too sure about appointing a number of Ministers to effect public accountability. They even oppose the principle of giving the responsibility to my right hon. Friend or his equivalent when the changeover occurs. They fall into the trap of complaining about the powers of those whom they call faceless civil servants but not being prepared to agree to Ministers being appointed to ensure that a public industry is accounted for properly in this House.
  I must support the new Clause unless my right hon. Friend's explanation satisfies me that what is envisaged in it will take place when the Bill is finalised in any event. In reply to a similar debate in Committee, my right hon. Friend said:
  "There will also be ample opportunity for Members to raise Questions on the Floor of the House, and these will be answered in the same way as that in which my right hon. Friend the Minister of Power, for instance, or the Minister of Transport replies on the Floor of the House. I do not think that hon. Members need have any doubt at all that Members of the House of Commons will find some way if they have serious points to raise on behalf of their constituents, of cross-examining the Ministers responsible. That will continue to be the case."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing Committee D, 3rd December, 1968; c. 138.]
  I go along with what my right hon. Friend said in that observation, but I am at variance with him when he speaks of hon. Members finding some way of questioning Ministers, because I do not think that is satisfactory. A straightforward method by which Ministers are answerable to the House should be clearly laid down. I am not sure, for example, that I welcome the idea of a Minister of Power. I would prefer to see a Minister responsible for the gas industry, another responsible for the electricity industry, and so on. I believe that this is the real essence of public accountability.
  In this context I part company with many right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite. While they echo our aspira-
  1306
  tions about the principle of public accountability, many of them in Committee have said that they cannot support the idea of having a number of Ministers to make public accountability effective. Therefore, I hope that my right hon. Friend, when he replies, will be able to go a little further than he did in Committee and say that he will take cognisance of the serious misgivings which have been expressed from this side of the House. I am willing to acknowledge that perhaps some of those misgivings might not have been expressed in such totality if many of my hon. Friends had been aware of the passage to which I have just referred. At the same time, I do not believe that we have ever reached a sensible method of public accountablity in the publicly-owned industries, and we ought not to build into a new industry some of the failings and faults which exist in those industries.
  I believe that new Clause 6 will make a great contribution to ensuring that we do not commit some of the errors which we have made in previous forms of public ownership. Here is a first-class opportunity for my right hon. Friend to remove the doubts which many of us have that the public accountability which now exists is insufficient and that future public accountability will take cognisance of those failings by making them good in this legislation for the creation of a new public corporation.
  Dr. Winstanley: My hon. Friends and I support the hon. Member for Putney (Mr. Hugh Jenkins) on new Clause 6. We are also glad to have the support of the hon. and gallant Member for Knutsford (Sir W. Bromley-Davenport)—
  Sir W. Bromley-Davenport: But not the boredom of the hon. Gentleman's speech.
  Dr. Winstanley: The hon. and gallant Gentleman can go out, if he wishes.
  Sir W. Bromley-Davenport: I will. Thank you very much.
  Dr. Winstanley: Having been able to exercise such a nice discrimination in the selection of my audience, I will proceed.
  Indeed, we also support the observations of the hon. and gallant Member for Down, South (Captain Orr) about the possibility of going further concerning the accountability to this House of the revised Post Office.

  1307
  In giving this support, I remind the Postmaster-General, if he needs reminding—which I doubt—that we have supported him on the Bill in general. We have taken the view that the Civil Service kind of establishment, in the ordinary sense, is not a proper body to administer things like the national giro and the data processing service or to run the kind of enterprise which modern systems of telecommunications require. We have at every stage expressed anxiety on this point. We believe that a major problem facing politics in this country, which has not been solved by this Government, by their predecessors, or, I acknowledge, by the Liberal Party, is: how do we organise and administer large-scale enterprises so as to preserve some sense of public service, introduce an element of competition and at the same time, retain some element of public accountability?
  This is an immense problem. I say, without hesitation, that the nationalised industries have not answered it. Nor, I hasten to add, have the big private undertakings. Therefore, we must think of some new way of constructing and administering these large-scale organisations. I hope that in carrying out what is in a sense an experiment in the reorganisation of the Post Office, we shall think of new ways of doing this, and, in particular, of new ways of introducing this element of accountability.
  11.0 p.m.
  In reply to my intervention the hon. Member for Poplar (Mr. Mikardo) appeared to suggest that the present system was satisfactory. He said that I had not been in the House for very long, but I must tell him that during the time that I have been in the House he has not been here very often. The hon. Gentleman went further and said that one gets good answers to Questions. I remind the hon. Gentleman that I read HANSARD diligently, and I notice that he has asked very few Questions on this or any subject during the last three years. The hon. Gentleman referred to the arrangements made way back in 1942 by Mr. Herbert Morrison, and no doubt they were as he outlined them, but I must tell the hon. Gentleman that his knowledge of what goes on now is not as great as mine.
  Mr. Mikardo: The hon. Gentleman is learning quite fast. He will eventually
  1308
  learn that there are much more sophisticated ways of getting information from Ministers than by putting down Questions.
  Dr. Winstanley: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, because that leads me to my next point. The hon. Member for Walsall, South (Sir H. d'Avigdor-Goldsmid) said that it was not just a question of Parliamentary Questions, that there were other ways of getting information, and indeed that we ought to preserve certain other rights. My experience has been that where it is assumed that Questions on matters of day-to-day management cannot be answered, Ministers will not answer letters on those matters. I have received many letters dealing with matters relating to the British Railways Board in which I have been told that the Minister cannot deal with the issue I have raised because this is a matter of day-to-day management and not a matter of general policy.
  Mr. Mikardo: I have never had such a letter.
  Dr. Winstanley: The hon. Gentleman says that, but there have been complaints about this from hon. Members on both sides of the House. If there is a convention about the admissibility of Questions on the Floor of the House, this seems to govern the willingness or otherwise of Ministers to answer queries raised in correspondence and by other means. I accept what the hon. Member for Poplar says as a result of his great experience, his great age and length of tenure in this House, and I shall follow his advice, for which I am grateful, but it is my experience that the degree of accountability to this House of various boards, and the British Railways Board in particular, is inadequate. It may be adequate for the hon. Gentleman, but I do not believe that it is adequate for the House. I believe that the present degree of accountability will not be adequate in respect of the Post Office. I hope that the new Clause will do something to ensure that it is not less adequate than it is in respect of the organisation to which I have referred.
  I agree that we ought to go even further than it is proposed to go in this Clause. There is a precedent worth following in the arrangements for answering Questions about the National Health

  1309
  Service. This is one sphere in which we are not inhibited in the kind of Questions that we can ask. I have no reason to believe that this arrangement in any way interferes with the working of the hospitals or the administration of the National Health Service, and I should like to see us following that pattern, which goes further than the proposal of the hon. Member for Putney.
  I am surprised to find that my general support for the Clause has been repudiated by some hon. Members on both sides of the House, but it is still there, and I hope that we shall get a favourable reply from the Postmaster-General.
  Mr. Will Griffiths: I agree with a great deal of what was said by the hon. Member for Cheadle (Dr. Winstanley). The hon. Gentleman is clearly interested in the nationalised industries. That being so, I am surprised that he does not know that my hon. Friend the Member for Poplar (Mr. Mikardo) is Chairman of the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries, and that he has put in an enormous amount of work on that Committee and produced with his colleagues some reports which have been invaluable to hon. Members on both sides of the House, even if he has not been in the Chamber to put down Questions as often as the hon. Member for Cheadle would have desired.
  Dr. Winstanley: I acknowledge that. I am aware of the debt that we owe the hon. Member for Poplar in this respect. I have read the Select Committee's Reports and benefited from them. I merely commented on the narrow point of my intervention about the admissibility of Questions and the satisfactoriness or otherwise of getting answers to them. That was all.
  Mr. Griffiths: I regret that I have not had the benefit of hearing the whole of the debate, but I heard the tail end of the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Coatbridge and Airdrie (Mr. Dempsey). I agree very much with what he said. I regret that my hon. Friends who have put down the new Clause have sought to exclude accountability for day-to-day matters.
  The hon. Member for Walsall, South whose speech I heard, said that Lord Heyworth found it a disadvantage to
  1310
  have people looking over his shoulder. When the hon. Member quoted Lord Heyworth, I was reminded at once of the late Herbert Morrison, because when I first entered the House of Commons—with my hon. Friend the Member for Poplar and other colleagues, on both sides—that was precisely the argument that Herbert Morrison used to persuade us to divorce the public corporations from day-to-day accountability to the House of Commons.
  Herbert Morrison said that the managers of the nationalised industries ought not to be looking over their shoulders at Members of Parliament. I remember very well how he said, "We do not want the managers of the nationalised industries to be Civil Service-minded. We want the thrusting, adventurous people who are imaginative." And so we got General Sir Brian Robertson and a whole galaxy of people from the Army, from the Navy or, sometimes, from private industry.
  At that time I was inclined to agree with the advocacy of Herbert Morrison, but after a short experience, after nationalisation of the coal industry—
  Sir Gerald Nabarro: Hear, hear.
  Mr. Griffiths:—I came to the conclusion that we suffered two acute disadvantages from the system that the Labour Government embarked upon in those days. On the one hand, the nationalised industries were exposed to the misrepresentation of the Press, and sometimes of hon. Members opposite—[Interruption.] The hon. Member for Worcestershire, South (Sir G. Nabarro) was not here at that time.
  Sir G. Nabarro: Yes, I was.
  Mr. Griffiths: The hon. Member did not come until later. He has certainly made up for it since, but he was not here at that time. I regret it, because the place would have been livelier had he been here.
  At that time, we realised that the newly-nationalised industries suffered from the disadvantage, on the one hand, of misrepresentation, as I, at least, and some of my hon. Friends saw it, by organs of the Press, and equally, as one learned from one's constituents, by certain bureaucratic practices on the part of a quite low level of manager in the

  1311
  nationalised industries. Therefore, we had twin disadvantages. We could neither expose the lies or misrepresentation about the nationalised industries, nor could we expose the bureaucracy on behalf of our constituents.
  My hon. Friend the Member for Poplar asked why we should treat this piece of public ownership differently from the other public corporations. That is not a very revolutionary sentiment. I should have thought that the experience that my hon. Friend has had, along with me, in the House of Commons would have led him to say that we want to go a little further and that we want, indeed, day-to-day accountability.
  Thinking about this over the years that I have been in the House of Commons, trying to deal with constituency trivialities, as we all have to deal with them from time to time, affecting nationalised industry, I have realised that it has caused the utmost irritation to our constituents. I am embarrassed at mentioning this, because of its triviality, but some years ago in Manchester the railway management insisted that access to a certain station forecourt would be allowed only to a certain number of licensed taxi drivers in the city who were also licensed by the Railways Board. When those taxis were not on the rank, as frequently happened, passengers arriving in inclement weather, which is sometimes associated with Manchester, had to walk down an unprotected access to the station to try to hail a taxi several hundred yards away. A letter to the Minister did no good; I agree with the hon. Member for Cheadle about that. When I tried that, I was told by the then Minister of Transport that it was a matter of day-to-day administration and that he would pass my letter on to the Railways Board. Similar situations existed in Leeds and Liverpool. A deputation of Members attended upon the head of British Railways and asked him to end this absurdity. Even then, our request was not acceded to.
  I was advised that the Minister had taken responsibility in the original Act for a certain old Railway Act. I discovered, because of the Minister's researches and the advice he gave me, that it was possible to table a Question. Though the Table and the Minister had originally said that it was not possible, in the end I tabled a Question. It may
  1312
  have been coincidence and nothing to do with my advocacy or that of hon. Members on both sides who had gone to see General Sir Brian Robertson, but this situation was ended almost immediately. It should have been swept away in a gale of laughter long before that.
  What opportunities do hon. Members have, therefore, to deal with what may appear to be trivia but are, in fact, matters of immense importance to constituents? As a Socialist I say that they are of immense importance when considering the relevance of public ownership. That is the political lesson. It is important that people should be made aware of the shortcomings of the system under which hon. Members can raise these matters.
  In the early days, we had to try to intervene for a few minutes on the one day of the year when the House wanted to deal with the grand sweep of the whole industry. How absurd it was that we had to deal with trivia on the one day which was set aside for an analysis of the coal industry, for example. Yet that used to be the only opportunity hon. Members had to ventilate these grievances in the House. The system which operates has been a great disadvantage. The sooner the House puts an end to it, the better it will be for the management of the existing nationalised industries and the better we shall be able to represent our constituents.
  Mr. Driberg: I am deeply moved by my hon. Friend's speech. I agree with it. As I said earlier, I would rather leave out the last few words of the Clause, but we are dealing with this horrible thing called practical politics. When one is dealing with a Front Bench of good comrades who are also pragmatists, one must try to table something which they are able to accept.
  Mr. Griffiths: I well understand how my hon. Friend feels, because he and I have shared these feelings for many years.
  11.15 p.m.
  Over the years, many people have said, as Herbert Morrison did, that one could not have the nationalised industries exposed to this kind of day-to-day examination. There have been references already to the National Health Service, spending over £1,000 million a year of public money and employing an enormous

  1313
  labour force. Aneurin Bevan insisted—and, presumably, secured Cabinet consent—that it be accountable in every detail to the House of Commons. The National Health Service, what is more, was introduced in an atmosphere of high controversy. The Tories voted against it on Second Reading and Third Reading.
  After the Act became operative in 1948, hon. Members opposite put down an enormous number of Questions dealing with trivial matters in the National Health Service, and people said, "Look what happens when Ministers are exposed to this kind of treatment in the House", but, although the motive may have been political, it could properly be argued that hon. Members opposite were also looking after the interests of their constituents. So they were serving two purposes; they were acting as Members of Parliament in the clash of opinion with the party with which they disagreeed, and, co-incidentally, they were also dealing with their constituents' affairs.
  After a relatively short time, Questions addressed to the Minister of Health became more serious, and today, although one can still put down a Question for Oral Answer about a trivial detail of the National Health Service, hon. Members do not, in the main, abuse the Order Paper.
  I put it to the House, and to my right hon. Friend, who had a radical past, that it would be good for Parliament and good for our democratic processes if the Executive and the people whom the Executive appoints to the management of nationalised industries were exposed to more critical examination on matters of detailed administration which affects the people of this country.
  Sir D. Glover: The Postmaster-General must be feeling very lonely, sitting there under a storm of shot and shell from both sides of the House. In the last hour and a half he has heard from no one who did not ask him to accept the new Clause.
  I speak on this matter as a convert. I admit that at the time when Herbert Morrison was guiding the House—I was not here—while the first batch of nationalisation Measures were going through in the 1945–50 Parliament, I was a great believer in divorcing the nationalised industries from Parlia-
  1314
  mentary control. But gradually—the one sinner who repenteth is worth more than the ninety and nine—I have become more and more convinced that it is essential for the proper running of these national monopolies, if they are to remain in public ownership, to maintain some day-to-day supervision of their activities on the Floor of the House.
  They are by their nature monopolies. The public have no redress elsewhere. People cannot buy electricity or postage stamps somewhere else, so, if there is inefficient service, the only redress open to them is by complaint to their Member of Parliament and through the Member making representations either by Oral Question or by letter to the Minister concerned.
  Mr. Ridley: No one has yet pointed out the futility of asking a Question which receives a stone-walling Answer and takes one's constituent no further. Could we not take it further and try a more effective way than Questions of dealing with our constituents' complaints?
  Sir D. Glover: I agree. I do not suggest that the present system is ideal. We understand that those who want publicity put down a Question; those who want to solve a constituent's problem write to the Minister about it. Once the Minister has said, "No," in public, one has "had it". But we have that right in many cases, although not in others.
  The concept of consultative councils has been a disaster. The sooner they are wound up and the small amount they cost saved, the better. In all the years since nationalisation, I doubt whether they have ever solved one problem. On rail closures, they are only brought in like members of the public at the public inquiries, and not consulted beforehand. So Herbert Morrison's concept that they would protect the public has been proved wrong.
  I should like the new Clause to go much further. I do not withdraw my objections to the system, but we must have real accountability to Parliament from all these nationalised industries. The new Clause is the best thing that we could get—I understand why it has been framed as it has—in this very bad Bill. Some hon. Members have not understood the limitations. Under the new Clause, some of the points of the hon. Member

  1315
  for Manchester, Exchange (Mr. Will Griffiths) will still be outwith the Minister's orbit. The crossed nibs in post offices mentioned by my right hon. Friend the Member for Flint, West (Mr. Birch) will still not be among the subjects about which we may question the Minister. What we shall be able to do is ask him why he is opening a new factory to produce the crossed nibs. It is a strange thing that in all my working life I have never been able to write with a Post Office pen: they all have crossed nibs—
  Mr. Stonehouse: The hon. Member will find that many post offices today have ball point pens, so there are no longer crossed nibs.
  Sir D. Glover: It just shows what happens when one gets conditioned to crossed nibs. I automatically pull out my ball point pen when I go into a post office and do not look for what it supplies.
  Mr. Ridley: If my hon. Friend has so much belief in this remedy of asking Parliamentary Questions and thus putting everything right, why has he not asked Questions, as he has been able to do up to now, about crossed nibs?
  Sir D. Glover: I am a great believer in free enterprise and I thought that there must be a great free enterprise factory churning out these crossed nibs on a Post Office contract, and I did not want to inhibit its work.
  Because of the width of Ministerial responsibility in matters affecting the Post Office, the National Health Service, and so on, one can write to the Minister instead of tabling a Question. I have often been astonished to learn, when I have written to the Postmaster-General about a matter which the hon. Member for Manchester, Exchange would call trivial, the reason why a letter has been delayed. The Post Office must have an enormous and expensive policing mechanism for ascertaining this information. The information one gets is history—why a letter has missed a certain post and so on—and it does not guarantee that a letter posted today will reach its destination tomorrow.
  How much does it cost to run this policing service? Did the Minister take the cost into account in deciding to
  1316
  establish the Corporation, and will this service continue, despite the cost? Even if the cost is high, this type of accountability is necessary in the public interest, particularly if we are to have national monopolies of this kind, private and public, remembering that in the private sector we have the Monopolies Commission.
  Sir Harmar Nicholls: Has not my hon. Friend noticed that the battle has been won? It is obvious, from the goings on opposite, that the Government fear that they may be defeated on this issue. I predict that the Postmaster-General has arranged a form of words which will satisfy his hon. Friends. I look forward to seeing how the Government overcome what until a few moments ago might have been an impossible situation for them.
  Sir D. Glover: I am encouraged by my hon. Friend's intervention. In recent months back benchers have shown the valuable job that they do in that the Executive can no longer feel confident of getting a Measure through without listening to the voice of hon. Members. There has been a collective voice on this issue. [Interruption.] I appreciate that hon Members want to hear the Postmaster-General's answer to our case—[Interruption]—and at present there is so much noise that I almost cannot hear myself speak.
  Sir G. Nabarro: Is my hon. Friend aware that we have been talking about the possible activities of the Government Whip? We were trying to ascertain sotto voce whether he intends to move the Closure on my hon. Friend.
  11.30 p.m.
  Sir D. Glover: As a result of my hon. Friend's intervention, even more noise is going on, and I cannot hear myself think.
  Sir G. Nabarro: More voce than sotto.
  Sir D. Glover: I must reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Peterborough (Sir Harmar Nicholls), who said that as a result of our arguments the Government now perhaps had a form of words which would satisfy their supporters. We should be grateful if we could hear them. We have been debating this matter for about two hours. If the Minister had said an hour ago,

  1317
  "I am entirely convinced by the arguments we have heard and we will accept the new Clause", or even if he had said, "We are convinced that public accountability is essential", we should not be debating this matter at half-past 11. The House would have felt that it had done a good job and we could have gone home full of the virtue of feeling that the great British public had been protected as a result of our efforts. But now we shall go home not knowing what was in the great brain of the Postmaster-
  General and whether we have convinced him that he should give way to the democratic wishes of hon. Members. Now, hag ridden, he has given no indication of what was in his mind.
  Motion made and Question put forth-with, pursuant to the Standing Order (Sittings of the House (Suspended Sittings)), That the Proceedings of this day's sitting be suspended.—[Mr. Fitch.]
  The House divided: Ayes 203, Noes 171.

  Division No. 178.]

  AYES

  [11.30 p.m.

  Albu, Austen

  Fowler, Gerry

  Mapp, Charles

  Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)

  Freeson, Reginald

  Marks, Kenneth

  Alldritt, Walter

  Galpern, Sir Myer

  Marquand, David

  Anderson, Donald

  Gardner, Tony

  Mason, Rt. Hn. Roy

  Ashley, Jack

  Gray, Dr. Hugh (Yarmouth)

  Mayhew, Christopher

  Ashton, Joe (Bassetlaw)

  Greenwood, Rt. Hn. Anthony

  Mellish, Rt. Hn. Robert

  Atkins, Ronald (Preston, N.)

  Gregory, Arnold

  Mendelson, John

  Atkinson, Norman (Tottenham)

  Grey, Charles (Durham)

  Mikardo, Ian

  Bagier, Gordon A. T.

  Griffiths, Eddie (Brightside)

  Millan, Bruce

  Barnett, Joel

  Griffiths, Will (Exchange)

  Miller, Dr. M. S.

  Bence, Cyril

  Hamilton, James (Bothwell)

  Mitchell, R. C. (S'th'pton, Test)

  Bidwell, Sydney

  Hamling, William

  Molloy, William

  Bishop, E. S.

  Harper, Joseph

  Morgan, Elystan (Cardiganshire)

  Blackburn, F.

  Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)

  Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)

  Blenkinsop, Arthur

  Haseldine, Norman

  Moyle, Roland

  Booth, Albert

  Hazell, Bert

  Murray, Albert

  Boston, Terence

  Henig, Stanley

  Newens, Stan

  Bottomley, Rt. Hn. Arthur

  Herbison, Rt. Hn, Margaret

  Oakes, Gordon

  Boyden, James

  Hobden, Dennis

  Ogden, Eric

  Bradley, Tom

  Hooley, Frank

  O'Malley, Brian

  Bray, Dr. Jeremy

  Horner, John

  Oram, Albert E.

  Brooks, Edwin

  Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas

  Orbach, Maurice

  Brown, Hugh D, (G'gow, Provan)

  Howarth, Robert (Bolton, E.)

  Orme, Stanley

  Brown, Bob (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, W.)

  Howell, Denis (Small Heath)

  Owen, Dr. David (Plymouth, S'tn)

  Brown, R. W. (Shoreditch & F'bury)

  Huckfield, Leslie

  Owen, Will (Morpeth)

  Buchan, Norman

  Hughes, Emrys (Ayrshire, S.)

  Page, Derek (King's Lynn)

  Cant, R. B.

  Hughes, Roy (Newport)

  Parker, John (Dagenham)

  Carmichael, Neil

  Hunter, Adam

  Parkyn, Brian (Bedford)

  Carter-Jones, Lewis

  Hynd, John

  Pentland, Norman

  Coe, Denis

  Jackson, Colin (B'h'se & Spenb'gh)

  Perry, Ernest G. (Battersea, S.)

  Coleman, Donald

  Janner, Sir Barnett

  Prentice, Rt. Hn. R. E.

  Crawshaw, Richard

  Jeger, Mrs. Lena (H'b'n & St. P'cras, S.)

  Price, Christopher (Perry Barr)

  Crosland, Rt. Hn. Anthony

  Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)

  Price, William (Rugby)

  Dalyell, Tam

  Jones, Rt. Hn. Sir Elwyn (W. Ham, S.)

  Probert, Arthur

  Davidson, Arthur (Accrington)

  Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)

  Rees, Merlyn

  Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)

  Jones, T. Alec (Rhondda, West)

  Richard, Ivor

  Davies, Dr. Ernest (Stretford)

  Judd, Frank

  Roberts, Albert (Normanton)

  Davies, Rt. Hn. Harold (Leek)

  Kerr, Mrs. Anne (R'ter & Chatham)

  Roberts, Rt. Hn. Goronwy

  Oaves, Ifor (Gower)

  Kerr, Russell (Feltham)

  Roberts, Gwylym (Bedfordshire, S.)

  Delargy, Hugh

  Lawson, George

  Robertson. John (Paisley)

  Dempsey, James

  Leadbitter, Ted

  Rodgers, William (Stockton)

  Dewar, Donald

  Lee, Rt. Hn. Frederick (Newton)

  Rogers, George (Kensington, N.)

  Diamond, Rt. Hn. John

  Lee, John (Reading)

  Rose, Paul

  Dickens, James

  Lestor, Miss Joan

  Rowlands, E.

  Dobson, Ray

  Lever, L. M. (Ardwick)

  Shaw, Arnold (Ilford, S.)

  Doig, Peter

  Lomas, Kenneth

  Sheldon, Robert

  Driberg, Tom

  Luard, Evan

  Short. Rt. Hn. Edward (N'c'tle-u-Tyne)

  Dunn, James A.

  Lyon, Alexander W. (York)

  Silkin, Rt. Hn. John (Deptford)

  Dunnett, Jack

  Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.)

  Silkin, Hn. S. C. (Dulwich)

  Dunwoody, Mrs. Gwyneth (Exeter)

  McCann, John

  Silverman, Julius

  Dun woody, Dr. John (F'th & C'b'e)

  MacColl, James

  Skeffington, Arthur

  Eadle, Alex

  MacDermot, Niall

  Slater, Joseph

  Edwards, William (Merioneth)

  Macdonald, A. H.

  Small, William

  Ellis, John

  McGuire, Michael

  Spriggs, Leslie

  English, Michael

  Mackenzie, Gregor (Rutherglen)

  Stonehouse, Rt. Hn. John

  Ennals, David

  Mackie, John

  Taverne, Dick

  Evans, Fred (Caerphilly)

  Mackintosh, John P.

  Thomas, Rt. Hn. George

  Evans, Ioan L. (Birm'h'm, Yardley)

  Maclennan, Robert

  Thornton, Ernest

  Finch, Harold

  McNamara, J. Kevin

  Tinn, James

  Fletcher, Raymond (Ilkeston)

  MacPherson, Malcolm

  Tomney, Frank

  Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)

  Mahon, Peter (Preston, S.)

  Urwin, T. W.

  Foot, Michael (Ebbw Vale)

  Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)

  Walden, Brian (All Saints)

  Ford, Ben

  Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield, E.)

  Walker, Harold (Doncaster)

  Forrester, John

  Manuel, Archie

  Wallace, George

  Watkins, David (Consett)

  Williams, Alan (Swansea, W.)

  Woof, Robert

  Watkins, Tudor (Brecon & Radnor)

  Williams, Alan Leo (Hornchurch)

  Wellbeloved, James

  Willis, Rt. Hn. George

  TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

  White, Mrs. Eirene

  Wilson, William (Coventry, S.)

  Mr. Neil MacBride and

  Wilkins, W. A.

  Woodburn, Rt. Hn. A.

  Mr. Alan Fitch.

  NOES

  Alison, Michael (Barkston Ash)

  Goodhew, victor

  Onslow, Cranley

  Allason, James (Hemel Hempstead)

  Gower, Raymond

  Orr, Capt. L. P. S.

  Astor, John

  Grant, Anthony

  Page, Graham (Crosby)

  Atkins, Humphrey (M't'n & M'd'n)

  Grant-Ferris, R.

  Pardoe, John

  Baker, Kenneth (Acton)

  Gresham Cooke, R.

  Pearson, Sir Frank (Clitheroe)

  Baker, W. H. K. (Banff)

  Grieve, Percy

  Peel, John

  Balniel, Lord

  Griffiths, Eldon (Bury St. Edmunds)

  Percival, Ian

  Batsford, Brian

  Gurden, Harold

  Peyton, John

  Beamish, Col. Sir Tufton

  Hall, John (Wycombe)

  Pike, Miss Mervyn

  Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torquay)

  Hall-Davis, A. G. F.

  Pink, R. Bonner

  Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gos. & Fhm)

  Hamilton, Lord (Fermanagh)

  Powell, Rt. Hn. J. Enoch

  Biffen, John

  Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)

  Price, David (Eastleigh)

  Biggs-Davison, John

  Harvie Anderson, Miss

  Pym, Francis

  Birch, Rt. Hn. Nigel

  Hawkins, Paul

  Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon

  Black, Sir Cyril

  Hay, John

  Ridley, Hn. Nicholas

  Blaker, Peter

  Heald, Rt. Hn. Sir Lionel

  Rippon, Rt. Hn. Geoffrey

  Boardm-m, Tom (Leicester, S. W.)

  Higgins, Terence L.

  Rodgers, Sir John (Sevenoaks)

  Body, nichard

  Hiley, Joseph

  Rossi, Hugh (Hornsey)

  Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hn. John

  Hill, J. E. B.

  Royle, Anthony

  Boyle, Rt. Hn. Sir Edward

  Hornby, Richard

  Russell, Sir Ronald

  Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. Sir Walter

  Howell, David (Guildford)

  Scott, Nicholas

  Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)

  Iremonger, T. L.

  Scott-Hopkins, James

  Bruce-Gardyne, J.

  Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)

  Sharples, Richard

  Bryan, Paul

  Jenkin, Patrick (Woodford)

  Silvester, Frederick

  Buchanan-Smith, Alick (Angus, N & M)

  Johnston, Russell (Inverness)

  Sinclair, Sir George

  Buck, Antony (Colchester)

  Joseph, Rt. Hn. Sir Keith

  Smith, Dudley (W'wick & L'mington)

  Bullus, Sir Eric

  Kaberry, Sir Donald

  Smith, John (London & W'minster)

  Burden, F. A.

  Kerby, Capt. Henry

  Speed, Keith

  Campbell, B. (Oldham, W.)

  Kershaw, Anthony

  Stodart, Anthony

  Campbell, Gordon (Moray & Nairn)

  Kitson, Timothy

  Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir M.

  Carlisle, Mark

  Lambton, Viscount

  Summers, Sir Spencer

  Chichester-Clark, R.

  Lancaster, Col. C. G.

  Tapsell, Peter

  Clark, Henry

  Lane, David

  Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)

  Clegs, Walter

  Langford-Holt, Sir John

  Temple, John M.

  Costain, A. P.

  Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)

  Tilney, John

  Crouch, David

  Lloyd, Ian (P'tsm'th, Langstone)

  Turton, Rt. Hn. R. H.

  Crowder, F. P.

  Longden, Gilbert

  van Straubenzee, W. R.

  Currie, G. B. H.

  Lubbock, Eric

  Vaughan-Morgan, Rt. Hn. Sir John

  Dance, James

  MacArthur, Ian

  Vickers, Dame Joan

  Davidson, James (Aberdeenshire, W.)

  Mackenzie, Alasdair (Ross & Crom'ty)

  Wainwright Richard (Colne Valley)

  d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry

  McNair-Wilson, M. (Walthamstow, E.)

  Wall, Patrick

  Dean, Paul

  McNair-Wilson, Patrick (NewForest)

  Walters, Dennis

  Deedes, Rt. Hn. W. F. (Ashford)

  Maddan, Martin

  Ward, Dame Irene

  Digby, Simon Wingfield

  Marten, Neil

  Weatherill, Bernard

  Drayson, G. B.

  Maude, Angus

  Whitelaw, Rt. Hn. William

  Eden, Sir John

  Mawby, Ray

  Wiggin, A. W.

  Elliot, Capt, Walter (Carshalton)

  Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J.

  Williams, Donald (Dudley)

  Elliott, R. W. (N'c'le-upon-Tyne, N.)

  Mills, Peter (Torrington)

  Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)

  Emery, Peter

  Mills, Stratton (Belfast, N.)

  Winstanley, Dr. M. P.

  Ewing, Mrs. Winifred

  Miscampbell, Norman

  Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick

  Eyre, Reginald

  Morgan, Geraint (Denbigh)

  Wood, Rt. Hn. Richard

  Farr, John

  Munro-Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh

  Worsley, Marcus

  Fortescue, Tim

  Murton, Oscar

  Wright, Esmond

  Foster, Sir John

  Nabarro, Sir Gerald

  Wylie, N. R.

  Gilmour, Ian (Norfolk, C.)

  Neave, Airey

  Younger, Hn. George

  Gilmour, Sr John (Fife, E.)

  Nicholls, Sir Harmar

  TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

  Glover, Sir Douglas

  Noble, Rt. Hn. Michael

  Mr. Jasper More and

  Goodhart, Phillip

  Nott, John

  Mr. Hector Monro.

  New Clause 6

    QUESTIONS TO THE MINISTER
    Notwithstanding the effect of any provision of this Act giving the Post Office the status of a public corporation, the Minister shall answer questions addressed to him on all matters concerning the Post Office other than those of day to day administration.—[Mr. Hugh Jenkins.]
    Brought up, and read the First time.
    Mr. Hugh Jenkins: I beg to move, That the Clause be read a Second time.
    I believe that this is a Clause which will commend itself to hon. Members on both sides of the House. If I am right in that supposition and there is a body of support which I confidently expect for this, it will be my duty to press the Clause to a Division. I trust that that course will not be necessary, because I rather hope that my right hon. Friend will be able to accept it. There is every reason to suppose that he will look upon it favourably, because it does something which he has, from time to time during the proceedings on the Bill, made fairly clear would be quite close to his heart.
    9.30 p.m.
    The problem about the creation of a Corporation is that it removes to some degree the element of public accountability. I make no bones about saying that I am no great lover of the public corporation. In parenthesis, I welcome the disappearance of London Transport which is shortly to come under the control of the Greater London Council.
    Mr. Speaker: The hon. Gentleman, even in parenthesis, will speak to his Amendment.
    Mr. Jenkins: I was illustrating the point that this is a good Clause because it will retain the element of public control, which the public corporation does not. I was quoting the example of London Transport which will come under the elected body of the G.L.C. just as the new Clause enables my right hon. Friend still to answer Questions in the House.
    On Second reading I said that I was not greatly enamoured of moving the Post Office away from the direct control of the Minister. From time to time in the long drawn out Committee proceedings hon. Members on both sides of

    1279
    the Committee made remarks which suggested clearly that they agreed largely with what I was saying, although those remarks were sometimes incidental. For example, the hon. Member for Howden (Mr. Bryan) said this:
    "Amendment 1 seeks to preserve the office of Postmaster-General, which must be to his advantage."
    I hardly think that the hon. Gentleman would seek to preserve the office unless he were also seeking to preserve the functions of the office, and one function of the office is answering Questions on what the Post Office is doing. He said later:
    "I do not believe that it is acceptable if this is independent of the Minister."
    He was making it fairly clear that he viewed with some anxiety the separation of the Corporation from the effective control of this House.
    The hon. Member for Acton (Mr. Kenneth Baker) said this:
    "We begin on this side of the House by saying that we would like the post, and indeed the title of the Postmaster-General retained. It is a great and a very historic post."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing Committee D, 26th November, 1968; c. 4–44.]
    I can hardly believe that the hon. Member for Acton was saying that he merely wanted the title to be retained, that he wished to strip the Postmaster-General of all his power but to leave him with his title. I therefore take it that the hon. Member for Acton shares my doubts that, in creating a separate Corporation, we are removing it from the effective control of this House, and removing the element of public accountability which has been an essential feature of the operation of the Post Office for so many years and which, compared with post offices which I have seen in other countries, for example, in the United States, has been a beneficent feature. It has been a feature which has enabled us to keep a close check on the efficiency of the Post Office.
    In parenthesis, that efficiency has today broken down. I have not received a parcel which I was expecting to receive, but I hope that this is not indicative of general inefficiency—
    Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman's parenthesis seems to be out
    1280
    of order. He will address himself to his new Clause.
    Mr. Jenkins: I put the other bracket on the parenthesis a moment ago. That has closed it. I should like to pray in aid my right hon. Friend himself who said in Committee:
    "The suggestion in this series of Amendments"—
    he is referring to a series of Amendments which was put forward by hon. Gentlemen opposite—
    "is that postal services should remain a Government Department, because it is said to be such a separate business from the telecommunications, and should be run separately by a Minister."
    What my right hon. Friend said is true. Hon. Gentlemen opposite ran away from the consequences of the whole proposition when they came face to face with it, having themselves advocated the Corporation which the Bill seeks to set up. I understand that when the present Government came into office in 1964, they found the whole idea of the creation of a public corporation to be fairly well advanced and took over proposals which had emanated from the previous Government. I believe that I am correct in that statement.
    Certainly there has been no lack of inducement among hon. Members opposite for the general principle of the Bill. The general principle was supported by them on Second Reading.
    Mr. Speaker: Order. We will debate the general principle of the Bill again when we come to Third Reading. The hon. Gentleman is moving an Amendment. He must keep to it.
    Mr. Jenkins: I hope that I shall not stray again. I shall do my best not to do so. I was about to say that ever since they accepted the broad ideas set out in the Bill in the proceedings in Committee, hon. Gentlemen, realising what the consequences of that would be, have been endeavouring to run away from them in Amendment after Amendment. The general effect has been to try to recreate the missing element of public accountability which has been removed by the creation of the Bill itself.
    The whole history of the Committee month after month, week after week, day after day, has been to try to find some

    1281
    means of recreating the element of public accountability between this House and the Post Office. The new Clause provides that step. It does what hon. Gentlemen opposite have been trying to do throughout the Committee stage. It provides that the Minister shall answer Questions addressed to him on all matters concerning the Post Office other than those of day-to-day administration. It is the half-way house which hon. Gentlemen have been seeking.
    It removes from the Minister the necessity of saying what happened to Mr. So-and-So's past today, although on occasion it has been a good thing that he has been able to do that and some of us will be sorry to see that function go. But we must reconcile ourselves at this stage of the Bill to that loss. I am sure that when hon. Gentlemen opposite consider the consequences of this provision they will want to support it, and I hope that it will have the support of my hon. Friends.
    To illustrate the point—I shall not take a great deal more time since I have established the general necessity for the new Clause—the hon. Member for Norfolk, Central (Mr. Ian Gilmour) said
    "The Postmaster-General has not discharged the burden of proof to show why he wants to set up this Corporation."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing Committee D, 28th November, 1968; c. 63–73.]
    He may have been right if he was referring to the matters which appear in this Amendment.
    It is true that no adequate alternative means of public accountability has been suggested. There have been other suggestions, of course. Instead of what is proposed in the Amendment, such methods of accountability as councils of consultation, other local organisations and means of communication at various levels might be established. But nothing can replace the accountability which is found in this House by putting Questions to the Minister. That is the form of accountability that the Clause seeks to perpetuate. Time and time again it has been proved that there is no alternative for it. We have consumer councils, but I am sure that no one would say that they have replaced the system of putting Questions to the Minister. If one of our constituents finds himself in difficulty with a Government Department, he does not
    1282
    approach the consumer council. He comes to his Member of Parliament, who asks a Question of the Minister concerned.
    Unless the Clause is carried, this procedure will no longer be open to us. Not only will Questions on day-to-day administration be excluded, but all others except those concerned with major financial policy. Anything lower than that level cannot be touched. The Clause seeks to bring into being a half-way house of administration and policy which otherwise is excluded from the examination of this House.
    I will not weary the House with further examples. I could go through the proceedings in Committee and show that on practically every Clause hon. Members attempted to recreate the possibility of interrogating the Minister. This Clause seeks to re-establish it. I hope that my right hon. Friend will not make it necessary for us to go into the Division Lobby but will say that this is a method for which he has been searching and which he has decided to accept.
    Mr. Nigel Birch: I agreed with a great many of the points made by the hon. Member for Putney (Mr. Hugh Jenkins). I am sure that we all agree that the consultative councils set up under previous nationalisation Acts have proved to be nugatory. No one has ever got anything out of them. They are a pure waste of time.
    I do not agree with the hon. Gentleman when he says that he wants to establish a halfway house. I have never been very keen on halfway houses. Surely the point is that it is precisely on matters concerned with details of administration that Members of Parliament can produce their maximum effect.
    Supposing the hon. Gentleman strayed from his constituency, went into a post office in Penge and found that the nibs were crossed. If he wrote a letter to the Postmaster-General or asked a Question about it, he could be fairly certain that next time he went to Penge the nibs in the post office would not be crossed.
    If the Bill is passed as it now stands, in similar circumstances the hon. Gentleman would be told by the Postmaster-General that this was a matter of day-to-day administration. If the hon. Gentleman then wrote to the head boy set

    1283
    up under the Bill, whatever he calls himself, he might get an answer, but he would be more likely to be told that it was a matter for the North, South, East, or West manager's department. Sooner or later a letter will come back from the North, South, East or West manager's Department, very likely in perfectly courteous terms, saying, "I am sorry that the nibs in the post office in Penge were crossed, but they will stay crossed."
    Mr. Driberg: I agree with what the right hon. Gentleman is saying. But if the new Clause is passed and if its operation in the House is the same as in other cases, one can at least put down a question to the Minister asking him to issue a general direction to post offices that nibs should not be crossed.
    9.45 p.m.
    Mr. Birch: That would be a powerful action, but if a general direction were issued that there should not be crossed nibs, I doubt whether it would penetrate as far as Penge. It is precisely in these detailed matters that we can do something. The principle of taking detailed administration away from the Floor of the House was the conception which the late Herbert Morrison had when he set up the nationalised industries. I do not think that it has worked very satisfactorily. The idea was that it would be too terrible if these great men were worried about details.
    The Post Office is not so much a business as a service. I have been a service Minister in a service Ministry where thousands of people come under one's control. There were endless individual cases of letters and questions, but I was not utterly crushed by them.
    We should think about what we are trying to do. I feel that this is a retro grade step. We have made mistakes previously in the nationalised industries. It was a mistake to take any kind of control away from this House. When I first came to the House we could ask why the 3.30 from Manchester was ten hours late, and we got some interesting answers.
    Mr. Hugh Jenkins: Does the right hon. Gentleman realise that unless we carry the Clause not only shall we not be able to ask questions of detail, but we shall be unable to ask questions at all. The
    1284
    right hon. Gentleman is questioning the wisdom of the Bill, and I agree about that.
    Mr. Birch: That is what I am questioning. I have always thought that the Bill was a lot of damn nonsense.
    Mr. Speaker: Order. The right hon. Gentleman must not be tempted to go out of order.
    Mr. Birch: Under your guidance, Mr. Speaker, I trust that I shall be able to resist the temptation. I will not pursue that further.
    We must record the fact that if the House loses all control our constituents will not be pleased. If they get bad service in the post office and their Member cannot ask about it and get a proper letter about it, they will be very cross, and quite right, too. I hope that the House will rise in its wrath and at any rate pass the Amendment, although I do not think that it goes far enough. If the Labour Party forces this Bill through it will be called the "crossed nib party" It means that it will have given way to the will of the Iron Mellish. I hope that hon. Members will not start doing this at this stage. If we pass the new Clause we will have struck some blow for good administration.
    Mr. Driberg: The right hon. Member for Flint, West (Mr. Birch) has raised some interesting historical parallels. I agreed when he mentioned the time when we were able to ask Questions why the 3.30 was ten minutes late arriving at St. Pancras—
    Mr. Arthur Lewis: In the old days when they were ten hours late under private enterprise.
    Mr. Driberg: If hon. Members wish to interrupt I will give way to some of them.
    Mr. Arthur Lewis: I was trying to be helpful to my hon. Friend and to the House by saying that the right hon. Gentleman mentioned ten hours late, referring to the time when transport was in the hands of private enterprise. I think that my hon. Friend misunderstood that.
    Mr. Driberg: I am sorry my hon. Friend has not quite grasped the point I was trying to make, but I am grateful to

    1285
    him for trying to help me. I was referring to wartime when it was called, I think, the Ministry of War Transport, and the right lion. Member for Derby, South (Mr. Philip Noel-Baker) was one of the Ministers concerned, and one could ask him for detailed answers about the arrival of trains and that sort of thing.
    The important point that has to be made here is that when the argument cropped up after the war about whether detailed questioning was inhibiting to the Departments concerned, whether it led to a lot of delay and bureaucratic nonsense, the Minister was always most emphatic that it did not, that on the contrary it kept the Department and the service concerned on their toes. I believe in this very strongly.
    After the war—I hope Mr. Speaker, that you will allow me to indulge in these reminiscences—
    Mr. Speaker: I have not intervened yet.
    Mr. Driberg: No, but I saw you tapping in that ominous way. The experience of this House after the war is strictly relevant to the Clause, because when the post-war Labour Government started to nationalise various industries, as they thought to take them effectively into public ownership, and so on, there was considerable dispute within the governing body about the extent of accountability, and Herbert Morrison, to whom the right hon. Gentleman referred, was on the whole in favour of not too much accountability, because he said that it would lead to those industries which were supposed to be expanding, virile, and dynamic industries—they used the same adjectives then as they do now—being too Civil Service minded, always looking over their shoulders in case a Question was coming up in the House, and so on.
    The opposite view was taken by Aneurin Bevan, the greatest man, in my view, whom this party has produced in the last few decades, if not longer, who was in favour of total accountability, including accountability for details, and when he was appointed Minister of Health and had the fairly complicated job of setting up the National Health Service he insisted in the Cabinet on having total accountability in this House. He could be questioned on why only two bed sheets,
    1286
    or blankets, were provided in a particular hospital on a particular night, and so on. It never inhibited at all his administrative duties and responsibilities.
    I think that the maximum accountability is desirable. In this Amendment, giving way to more moderate opinion, I agreed to the final words,
    "other than those of day to day administration".
    I should have liked day-to-day administration raised at Question Time also, but, even so, I think that some hon. Gentlemen on that side of the House, and some of my hon. Friends on this side, will agree that the Clause represents a considerable improvement on the situation which would exist if it were not carried. I think that it would be a tremendous mistake to remove this whole vast enterprise from Parliamentary scrutiny at Question Time, and that is what the Clause is entirely concerned with.
    The trouble about some of the nationalised industries—not all of them—so far is that they have been run largely by people who do not believe in public ownership, and they have been run without fuller workers' participation—
    Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Member is a little wide at the moment.
    Mr. Driberg: I just managed to get out the word "participation". In this case the Clause does not deal with that matter, as you, Mr. Speaker, have so kindly reminded me, but it deals with the question of accountability to this House. Failing full workers' participation in the running of an industry, which is another democratic safeguard, accountability to the Minister in this House seems to me to be of vital importance when we are considering the public ownership of any industry or service. I very much hope, therefore, that hon. Members on both sides of the House will support this new Clause, although I hope most of all that my right hon. Friend the Postmaster-General will feel able to accept it, because unless he does so there will be a very difficult situation for this House and this party.
    Captain Orr: I have enormous sympathy with the point of view put forward by those who have been advocating this particular new Clause. I have been alarmed once or twice by the number

    1287
    of times I have found myself in agreement with the hon. Member for Putney (Mr. Hugh Jenkins). Like myself, he does not like this Bill. I said on Second Reading that I thought it was a bad Bill, and he clearly agrees with me. I was surprised, however, that during the course of the Committee proceedings he failed to support one or two of the Amendments which I moved which would have restored Parliamentary accountability in many cases; and particularly when I sought to remove the monopoly powers from the new Corporation and keep them in the hands of the Minister as the trustee for Parliament, the hon. Member for Putney, while he spoke sympathetically, did not actually support me when it came to a Division.
    Mr. Hugh Jenkins: I did not speak sympathetically on the occasion when the hon. Gentleman was trying to hive off the profitable section from the Post Office and leave it with the unprofitable section.
    Captain Orr: I think the hon. Gentleman is misunderstanding the point I am making. I remember that when I was talking about monopoly powers he made a very eloquent speech about the film industry, which he knows something about. He then spoke sympathetically on the case I was making but failed to support me in the Lobby. I—[Interruption.]
    Mr. Speaker: Order. Back to the Post Office and accountability of the Minister by Questions.
    Captain Orr: I had got the word "I" and intended to follow it by "am". I am saying that on this particular Clause I am inclined to support the hon. Member and would be inclined to go into a Division with him—not that I think this is much of a Clause but it is a little better
    than nothing. The hon. Gentleman defended it, as did the hon. Member for Barking (Mr. Driberg), on the ground that while it would not allow the Minister to be questioned about day-to-day administration, it would allow the Minister to be questioned about what I believe he called the "grey areas". In other words, instead of the stereotyped Questions that one can put down—and perhaps some of the sponsors of the Amendment might tell me if I am wrong in the interpretation—the kind of Question which is probably the only one one can put down to any Minister, asking him to use his powers of giving a general direction, one could now put down Questions about such things as, for example, the misuse by the Corporation of its licensing powers.
    If, for instance, the Corporation sought, wrongly, to extend its monopoly by refusing, say, the kind of licences that are already given to private mobile radio stations and one thought that the Corporation was misusing its power in order to extend its monopoly into a field in which it should not, under this provision one could presumably ask the Minister of the day a Question about it.
    Mr. Driberg: One cannot at this stage anticipate the advice to be given by the Table Office.
    Captain Orr: The hon. Gentleman must have made some kind of guess on this, otherwise his Amendment is totally meaningless.
    It being Ten o'clock, the debate stood adjourned.
    Motion made, and Question put,
    That the Proceedings on the Post Office Bill may be entered upon and proceeded with at this day's Sitting at any hour, though opposed.—[Mr. Stonehouse.]
    The House divided: Ayes 221, Noes 176.

    Division No. 177.]

    AYES

    [10.0 p.m.

    Albu, Austen

    Blackburn, F.

    Brown, R. W. (Shoreditch & F'bury)

    Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)

    Blenkinsop, Arthur

    Buchan, Norman

    Alldritt, Walter

    Booth, Albert

    Cant, R. B.

    Anderson, Donald

    Boston, Terence

    Carmichael, Neil

    Ashley, Jack

    Bottomley, Rt. Hn. Arthur

    Carter-Jones, Lewis

    Atkins, Ronald (Preston, N.)

    Boyden, James

    Castle, Rt. Hn. Barbara

    Atkinson, Norman (Tottenham)

    Bradley, Tom

    Chapman, Donald

    Bagier, Gordon A. T.

    Bray, Dr. Jeremy

    Coleman, Donald

    Barnett, Joel

    Brooks, Edwin

    Crosland, Rt. Hn. Anthony

    Bence Cyrll

    Brown, Rt. Hn. George (Belper)

    Crossman, Rt. Hn. Richard

    Bidwell, Sydney

    Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, provan)

    Dalyell, Tam

    Bishop, E. S.

    Brown, Bob (N 'c'tle-upon-Tyne, W.)

    Davidson, Arthur (Accrington)

    Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)

    Jeger, Mrs. Lena (H'b'n & St.P'cras, S.)

    Owen, Will (Morpeth)

    Davies, Dr. Ernest (Stretford)

    Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)

    Page, Derek (King's Lynn)

    Davies, Rt. Hn. Harold (Leek)

    Jones, Dan (Burnley)

    Paget, R. T.

    Davies, Ifor (Gower)

    Jones, Rt. Hn. Sir Elwyn (W. Ham, S.)

    Parker, John (Dagenham)

    Delargy, Hugh

    Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)

    Parkyn, Brian (Bedford)

    Dempsey, James

    Jones, T. Alec (Rhondda, West)

    Pearson, Arthur (Pontypridd)

    Dewar, Donald

    Judd, Frank

    Pentland, Norman

    Diamond, Rt. Hn. John

    Kelley, Richard

    Perry, Ernest G. (Battersea, S.)

    Dobson, Ray

    Kerr, Russell (Feltham)

    Perry, George H. (Nottingham, S.)

    Doig, Peter

    Lawson, George

    Prentice, Rt. Hn. R. E.

    Driberg, Tom

    Leadbitter, Ted

    Prico, Christopher (Perry Barr)

    Dunn, James A.

    Lee, Rt. Hn. Frederick (Newton)

    Price, William (Rugby)

    Dunnett, Jack

    Lee, Rt. Hn. Jennie (Cannock)

    Probert, Arthur

    Eadie, Alex

    Lee, John (Reading)

    Rankin, John

    Edwards, William (Merioneth)

    Lestor, Miss Joan

    Rees, Merlyn

    Ellis, John

    Lever, L. M. (Ardwick)

    Richard, Ivor

    English, Michael

    Lewis, Arthur (W. Ham, N.)

    Roberts, Albert (Normanton)

    Ennals, David

    Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)

    Roberts, Rt. Hn. Goronwy

    Ensor, David

    Lomas, Kenneth

    Roberts, Gwilym (Bedfordshire, S.)

    Evans, Fred (Caerphilly)

    Luard, Evan

    Robertson, John (Paisley)

    Evans, Ioan L. (Birm'h'm, Yardley)

    Lyon, Alexander W. (York)

    Rodgers, William (Stockton)

    Finch, Harold

    Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.)

    Rogers, George (Kensington, N.)

    Fitch, Alan (Wigan)

    McBride, Neil

    Rose, Paul

    Fletcher, Raymond (Ilkeston)

    McCann, John

    Rowlands, E.

    Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)

    MacColl, James

    Shaw, Arnold (Ilford, S.)

    Foot, Michael (Ebbw Vale)

    MacDermot, Niall

    Sheldon, Robert

    Ford, Ben

    Macdonald, A. H.

    Shore, Rt. Hn. Peter (Stepney)

    Forrester, John

    McGuire, Michael

    Short, Rt. Hn. Edward (N'c' tle-u-Tyne)

    Fowler, Gerry

    McKay, Mrs. Margaret

    Short, Mrs. Renée (W'hampton, N. E.)

    Freeson, Reginald

    Mackenzie, Gregor (Rutherglen)

    Silkin, Rt. Hn. John (Deptford)

    Galpern, Sir Myer

    Mackintosh, John P.

    Silkin, Hn. S. C. (Dulwich)

    Gardner, Tony

    Maclennan, Robert

    Silverman, Julius

    Ginsburg, David

    McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.)

    Skeffiington, Arthur

    Gray, Dr. Hugh (Yarmouth)

    McNamara, J. Kevin

    Slater, Joseph

    Gregory, Arnold

    MacPharson, Malcolm

    Small, William

    Grey, Charles (Durham)

    Mahon, Peter (Preston, S.)

    Spriggs, Leslie

    Griffiths, Eddie (Brightside)

    Mahon, Simon (Bootle)

    Steele, Thomas (Dunbartonshire, W.)

    Griffiths, Will (Exchange)

    Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)

    Stonehouse, Rt. Hn. John

    Hamitton, James (Bothwell)

    Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield, E.)

    Taverne, Dick

    Hamling, William

    Manuel, Archie

    Thomas, Rt. Hn. George

    Hannan, William

    Mapp, Charles

    Thornton, Ernest

    Harper, Joseph

    Marks, Kenneth

    Tinn, James

    Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)

    Marquand, David

    Tomney, Frank

    Haseldine, Norman

    Mason, Rt. Hn. Roy

    Urwin, T. W.

    Hattersley, Roy

    Mayhew, Christopher

    Walden, Brian (All Saints)

    Hazell, Bert

    Mendelson, John

    Walker, Harold (Doncaster)

    Henig, Stanley

    Mikardo, Ian

    Wallace, George

    Herbison, Rt. Hn. Margaret

    Millan, Bruce

    Watkins, David (Consett)

    Hobden, Dennis

    Molloy, William

    Watkins, Tudor (Brecon & Radnor)

    Hooley, Frank

    Morgan, Elystan (Cardiganshire)

    Wellbeloved, James

    Horner, John

    Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)

    White, Mrs. Eirene

    Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas

    Moyle, Roland

    Wilkins, W. A.

    Howarth, Robert (Bolton, E.)

    Murray, Albert

    Willey, Rt. Hn. Frederick

    Howell, Denis (Small Heath)

    Neal, Harold

    Williams, Alan (Swansea, W.)

    Huckfield, Leslie

    Newens, Stan

    Williams, Alan Lee (Hornchurch)

    Hughes, Emrys (Ayrshire, S.)

    Noel-Baker, Rt. Hn. Phillip (Derby, S.)

    Willis, Rt. Hn. George

    Hughes, Roy (Newport)

    Oakes, Gordon

    Wilson, William (Coventry, S.)

    Hunter, Adam

    Ogden, Eric

    Woodburn, Rt. Hn. A.

    Hynd, John

    O'Malley, Brian

    Woof, Robert

    Jackson, Colin (B'h'se & Spenb'gh)

    Oram, Albert E.

    Janner, Sir Barnett

    Orbach, Maurice

    TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

    Jay, Rt. Hn. Douglas

    Orme, Stanley

    Mr. Charles Morris and

    Jeger, George (Goole)

    Owen, Dr. David (Plymouth, S'tn)

    Dr. M. S. Miller.

    NOES

    Alison, Michael (Barkston Ash)

    Body, Richard

    Currie, G. B. H.

    Allason, James (Hemel Hempstead)

    Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hn. John

    Dance, James

    Astor, John

    Boyle, Rt. Hn. Sir Edward

    Davidson, James (Aberdeenshire, W.)

    Atkins, Humphrey (M't'n & M'd'n)

    Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)

    d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry

    Awdry, Daniel

    Bruce-Gardyne, J.

    Dean, Paul

    Baker, Kenneth (Acton)

    Bryan, Paul

    Deedes, Rt. Hn. W. F. (Ashford)

    Baker, W. H. K. (Banff)

    Buchanan-Smith, Alick (Angus, N & M)

    Digby, Simon Wingfield

    Balniel, Lord

    Buck, Anthony (Colchester)

    Drayson, G. B.

    Batsford, Brian

    Bullus, Sir Eric

    Eden, Sir John

    Beamish, Col. Sir Tufton

    Burden, F. A.

    Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)

    Bell, Ronald

    Campbell, B. (Oldham, W.)

    Emery, Peter

    Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torquay)

    Campbell, Gordon (Moray & Nairn)

    Erringron, Sir Eric

    Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gos. & Fhm)

    Carlisle, Mark

    Ewing, Mrs. Winifred

    Biffen, John

    Chichester-Clark, R.

    Eyre, Reginald

    Biggs-Davison, John

    Clark, Henry

    Farr, John

    Birch, Rt. Hn. Nigel

    Clegg, Walter

    Fortescue, Tim

    Black, Sir Cyril

    Costain, A. P.

    Foster, sir John

    Blaker, Peter

    Crouch, David

    Gilmour, Ian (Norfolk, C.)

    Boardman, Tom (Leicester, 8. W.)

    Crowder, F. P.

    Glover, Sir Douglas

    1290

    1291

    Goodhart, Philip

    McMaster, Stanley

    Rossi, Hugh (Hornsey)

    Goodhew, Victor

    McNair-Wilson, M. (Walthamstow, E.)

    Royle, Anthony

    Gower, Raymond

    McNair-Wilson, Patrick (New Forest)

    Russell, Sir Ronald

    Grant, Anthony

    Maddan, Martin

    Scott, Nicholas

    Gresham Cooke, R.

    Marten, Neil

    Scott-Hopkins, James

    Griffiths, Eldon (Bury St. Edmunds)

    Maude, Angus

    Sharples, Richard

    Gurden, Harold

    Mawby, Ray

    Silvester, Frederick

    Hall, John (W ycombe)

    Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J.

    Sinclair, Sir George

    Hall-Davis, A. G. F.

    Mills, Peter (Torrington)

    Smith, Dudley (W'wick & L'mington)

    Hamilton, Lord (Fermanagh)

    Mills, Stratton (Belfast, N.)

    Smith, John (London & W'minster)

    Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)

    Miscampbell, Norman

    Speed, Keith

    Harvie Anderson, Miss

    Monro, Hector

    Stainton, Keith

    Hawkins, Paul

    More, Jasper

    Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir M.

    Hay, John

    Morgan, Geraint (Denbigh)

    Summers, Sir Spencer

    Heald, Rt. Hn. Sir Lionel

    Morgan-Giles, Rear-Adm.

    Tapsell, Peter

    Higgins, Terence L.

    Murton, Oscar

    Taylor, Frank (Moss Side)

    Hiley, Joseph

    Nabarro, Sir Gerald

    Temple, John M.

    Hill, J. E. B.

    Neave, Airey

    Tilney, John

    Hornby, Richard

    Nicholls, Sir Harmar

    Turton, Rt. Hn. R. H.

    Howell, David (Guildford)

    Noble, Rt. Hn. Michael

    van Straubenzee, W. R.

    Hutchison, Michael Clark

    Nott, John

    Vaughan-Morgan, Rt. Hn. Sir John

    Iremonger, T. L.

    Onslow, Cranley

    Vickers, Dame Joan

    Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)

    Orr, Capt. L. P. S.

    Wainwright, Richard (Colne Valley)

    Jenkin, Patrick (Woodford)

    Osborne, Sir Cyril (Louth)

    Wall, Patrick

    Jennings, J. C. (Burton)

    Page, Graham (Crosby)

    Walters, Dennis

    Johnston, Russell (Inverness)

    Page, John (Harrow, W.)

    Ward, Dame Irene

    Joseph, Rt. Hn. Sir Keith

    Pardoe, John

    Whitelaw, Rt. Hn. William

    Kaberry, Sir Donald

    Pearson, Sir Frank (Clitheroe)

    Wiggin, A. W.

    Kerby, Capt. Henry

    Peel, John

    Williams, Donald (Dudley)

    Kershaw, Anthony

    Percival, Ian

    Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)

    Kitson, Timothy

    Peyton, John

    Winstanley, Dr. M. P.

    Lambton, Viscount

    Pike, Miss Mervyn

    Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick

    Lancaster, Col. C. G.

    Pink, R. Bonner

    Wood, Rt. Hn. Richard

    Lane, David

    Powell, Rt. Hn. J. Enoch

    Worsley, Marcus

    Langford-Holt, Sir John

    Price, David (Eastleigh)

    Wright, Esmond

    Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)

    Pym, Francis

    Wylie, N. R.

    Lloyd, Ian (P'tsm'th, Langstone)

    Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon

    Younger, Hn. George

    Longden, Gilbert

    Ridley, Hn. Nicholas

    Lubbock, Eric

    Ridsdale, Julian

    TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

    MacArthur, Ian

    Rippon, Rt. Hn. Geoffrey

    Mr. R. W. Elliott and

    Mackenzie, Alasdair (Ross & Crom'ty)

    Rodgers, Sir John (Sevenoaks)

    Mr. Bernard Weatherill.

    Question again proposed, That the Clause be read a Second time.
    Captain Orr: As I was saying when I was interrupted, I want to find out exactly what value the new Clause has. We are forbidden by it to ask Questions of the new Minister about day-to-day administration. What kind of Questions will we be able to put down that would not be possible without it?
    Mr. Hugh Jenkins: I think that I can help. At the moment, one can ask Questions only on general matters about which the Minister can give a directive to the Post Office. For example, one can ask the Minister to give a general directive that the Post Office shall introduce a 4d. or a 6d. post. But the whole range of what someone referred to as the "grey areas", between that general directive, which relates to matters of high policy only, and—
    Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman is intervening; interventions must be brief.
    Mr. Jenkins: The whole area between those two, the very great and the very small, is the area of Questions which the Amendment will allow.
    Captain Orr: I make no comments about the length of the intervention. I am trying to get at what the new Clause will do. I still do not understand what Questions which would not be the subject of general directions would not also be the subject of day-to-day administration. I hope that it would do what the hon. Member says, but I have grave doubts. I want to be able to ask the new Minister a variety of Questions.
    For example, supposing that the Corporation were going to use the powers of manufacture which the Minister said were reserve powers to be used only in certain special circumstances. If, for example, one found that the Post Office was building a new factory in my constituency with the idea of manufacturing relay coils, would I, under the Clause, be entitled to ask the Minister Questions about it?
    10.15 p.m.

LABORATORY TECHNICIANS (HEALTH HAZARDS)
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Ernest G. Perry.]
11.42 p.m.
Mr. Frank Judd: The laboratories with which I am concerned tonight are National Health Service hospital laboratories, Public Health
1320
Laboratory Service laboratories and teaching and university hospital laboratories.
The frequently inadequate conditions under which staff in such laboratories are expected to work were spotlighted by the Sunday Times on 6th April. The article said that in a pathology department of a provincial hospital:
"A patients' six ft. square waiting room doubles as a staff locker room.

1321
Staff rooms for the 28 technicians, five secretaries, two cleaners and a porter are non-existent.
In the bacteriology room, where the danger from the bacteria is acute, food and clothes lockers clutter up the already limited space.
Although it was a cool spring day the poorly ventilated room was uncomfortably close.
Off the corridor is a toilet used by male and female patients and staff."
This debate is particularly concerned with the danger of laboratory staff contracting turberculosis. Statistical proof that such a hazard exists was provided by the Reid Report in 1957. The survey showed that, during the period 1949–53, the incidence of observed frequency of pulmonary tuberculosis among laboratory technicians was higher than the national average, being 3·4 times higher for males, 1.7 times higher for females and 2·7 times higher for both together. The Reid Report did not advance any reason for the apparent discrepancy between male and female incidence, and probably the rate for females was falsely low.
An examination of the figures for the age group 15 to 24 shows that, although a higher incidence is expected among females than among males, in fact the reverse was observed. The observed rates are 4·6 times higher for males and 1·9 times higher for females. The most noticeable drop occurs in the female junior technicians. What the Reid Report seems to have overlooked was the very rapid turnover of females in laboratories at that time, and that by far the greatest turnover occurred in the second, third and fourth years of employment, a fact commented on in the 1954 Annual Report of the Ministry of Health. These are the very years when incidence is highest and young persons are at greatest risk. There is no way of knowing how many females contracted tuberculosis during their stay of two to four years in laboratories which was not diagnosed until after leaving the service. It is, of course, relevant to note that the turnover has declined since 1957.
It was the misgivings about the situation as it now stands that led my right hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland, North (Mr. Willey) to ask the Secretary of State for Social Services on 21st April what was the proportion of cases of tuberculosis diagnosed in the past ten years on staff working in hospital laboratories. The Minister replied that the in-
1322
formation was not available. Even if this information is not available to the Minister, there are a number of pointers which tend to indicate that the incidence has probably increased in recent years and that this increase is not entirely due to the increase in staffing which has taken place.
Evidence for this opinion is varied and includes a survey by the Association of Scientific Workers in 1959, which demonstrated that of over 100 laboratories, 25 per cent. reported having had cases of tuberculosis infection. A report in The Lancet in 1963 said that one hospital in the North of England had had six cases in ten years; there were two cases reported in Blackpool within the space of three years, both since 1960; two were recently reported at Preston; two similar cases at Chesterfield; four in one Glasgow laboratory of which three occurred after 1960; and there were further cases at Wolverhampton, Ormskirk, Belfast, Manchester, all since 1960.
Most laboratory infections are probably not due to accidents such as breakages but are usually caused by inhalation of organisms present in the air. These organisms are present in aerosols, the microscopic particles of fluid liberated into the atmosphere when certain common laboratory experiments are carried out. Because of their minute size, they remain in the atmosphere subjected to air currents, and unless there is adequate ventilation and extraction, they will persist for some time, always being a danger to staff. The accidental breaking of a culture tube can be seen and precautions taken immediately, if necessary evacuating the laboratory. Aerosols cannot be seen, and for this reason are far more dangerous.
Another hazard arises from those specimens received in laboratories for which the diagnosis being considered is in no way tuberculosis. Examples are routine urines subsequently found to be from cases of renal tuberculosis, sputa for malignant cells found to be from cases of pulmonary tuberculosis, faeces for dysentary organisms from cases of tuberculosis, enteritis and so forth.
Following the publication of the Reid survey in 1957, a special working party of the Public Health Laboratory Service was set up. Its terms of reference were:
"To indicate the dangers that accompany tuberculosis work in the laboratory so as to

1323
enable pathologists to take such precautions against them as seem desirable in the circumstances."
In addition to reviewing some of the hazards the report made a number of recommendations designed to minimise or prevent tuberculosis infection among laboratory staff. In the main the suggested measures were directed at bacteriology departments, although some covered all types of staff. The major criticism of the report is that there was no obligation on the part of the employing authority or pathologist to implement any of the recommendations if they were not considered "desirable in the circumstances". In 1961, the Ministry of Health issued a Circular on Prevention of Tuberculosis among Hospital Staff, drawing attention to the recommendations of the working party and asking hospital authorities to act upon them. Among the recommendations made were the following:
The first was that protective hoods—in other words, metal cabinets fitted with a suitable exhaust-fan-system in which dangerous procedures can be performed—should be used in a laboratory whenever more than a few cultures have to be made, particularly when the conditions are cramped. However, the Association of Scientific Workers survey in 1965 showed that 28 per cent. of surveyed laboratories doing culture work were without a protective cabinet.
The second recommendation was the B.C.G. vaccine should be offered to all negative skin-test reactors, and that this should be done on starting work in a laboratory where tuberculous material is handled. The recruit should not be allowed to handle tuberculous material until the reaction has become positive.
This recommendation is particularly important today since it has been found that an increasing number of young people are not naturally immune to the disease owing to better health standards, milk control and a reduction in the disease. For this reason the Ministry of Health offers B.C.G. vaccination to schoolchildren at about the age of 13. However, some parents do not take advantage of this, and their children, if they start work in a laboratory, are at a greater risk than those possessing immunity to the disease.
1324
Until the schools vaccination programmes has been going for about 20 years, there will always be a problem for recruits to laboratories. The Association of Scientific Workers survey in 1965 showed that 25 per cent. of the surveyed laboratories did not provide this facility. It is worth remembering that the age at which the incidence of laboratory tuberculosis infection has been shown to be the greatest is between 15 and 24 and this group is the one that would be best protected.
The third recommendation was that all recruits should be X-rayed before employment, and thereafter at regular intervals, depending on the degree of risk; an annual examination probably represents a fair compromise. Whilst this is not a preventive measure as such, it is nevertheless important to technicians that they should be aware as soon as possible that they may have contracted tuberculosis before it becomes an active open lesion. This gives a far better chance of early cure and less risk to family and working colleagues. Regular X-rays may also provide evidence that a particular laboratory has an unduly high degree of risk to the staff. For these reasons and the fact that the staff feel somewhat more protected and cared-for, regular X-rays are important. The Association of Scientific Workers survey in 1965 showed that 12 per cent. of hospital authorities surveyed still did not provide either regular—that is annual—or irregular examinations.
The fourth and final recommendation to which I wish to refer was that "entirely untrained persons should not handle tuberculosis material. A recruit who has attained some skill in bacteriological techniques may be allowed to handle tuberculous material under supervision". This practice is probably adhered to in most laboratories, but there are exceptions. "Under supervision" can mean only under qualified and experienced supervision, but there are known cases of junior technicians with three years' experience in the laboratory, only part of which may have been in bacteriology, who are responsible for the handling of tuberculous material entirely without supervision. Most hospitals have to rely on the unqualified student and the junior technician for the bulk of the routine work, including the bacteriology, and not all hospitals ensure that they are adequately supervised.

1325
The doubts surrounding the implementation of the working party's recommendations led my right hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland, North on 21st April to ask the Secretary of State for Social Services:
"how many hospital laboratories carrying out cultural tests of tuberculosis material do not have protective cabinets; how many hospitals do not provide annual X-ray tests for staff working in the laboratories; how many hospitals do not carry out tuberculosis skin tests on newly appointed laboratory staff; how many hospitals do not provide B.C.G. vaccine for negative reactors working in their laboratories; what steps he has taken to ensure that the recommendations made by the Working Party in 1958 about precautions in hospital laboratories are carried out."
The Secretary of State replied
"The recommendations of the Working Party on Precautions against Tuberculous Infection in the Diagnostic Laboratory published in 1958 were commended to hospital authorities. A survey of most regional board areas in 1966 showed that the main recommendations were being carried out in the majority of hospital laboratories working with tuberculous material. All children requiring it are now given the opportunity of B.C.G. vaccination before leaving school and subsequent tuberculin testing is no longer necessary."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 21st April, 1969; Vol. 782, c. 19.]
It is my contention that this reply was totally inadequate. It did not answer the Question. What does the phrase "most regional board areas" mean? How many? What does "the majority of hospitals working with tuberculous" material mean? May we he given more specific information on this point as well?
I believe that the Ministry must undertake to make available on a continuing basis the figures of the rate of infection; continually to review the precautionary procedures; to enforce certain basic procedures where they are not being carried out—these include protective cabinets, regular x-rays, skin tests; to provide decent working conditions where these are obviously lacking. It must also ensure that the Industrial Injuries Act governing laboratory infection with tuberculosis is being effectively applied to medical laboratory technicians.
Laboratory technicians are giving a vital service to this country for life, health and medical research. They work away in back rooms, not always seen, not always thanked as they should be for what they are doing on behalf of the community. We must ensure that all
1326
reasonable precautions for their own health and welfare are always taken.
11.58 p.m.
The Minister of State, Department of Health and Social Security (Mr. David Ennals): I should like to thank my hon. Friend for raising tonight the subject of health hazards which exist for laboratory technicians in the National Health Service. His was a well-informed and well-briefed speech, and it raised a number of points which, if I do not deal with them tonight, I shall certainly want to look into. I agree that we owe a great deal to the laboratory technicians in the National Health Service, and, apart from the matter of health hazards, my hon. Friend will know something of the Zuckerman Committee, which has been looking into the career structure of technicians in the Health Service, and our response to it, recognising the significance, as we see it, of the scientists and technologists working in the Health Service.
I want first to say something about laboratory hazards generally and then to comment on tuberculosis and to raise one or two other hazards as well. Hospital staff whose work has the prime objective of improving the health of other people ought to be ahead of other workers, not behind, when it is a question of their own health; although the staff themselves may not speak loudly where facilities for themselves are concerned, hospital management ought to ensure that the best possible arrangements prevail. I am sure my hon. Friend agrees with that point.
We are concerned tonight particularly with the hazards in laboratories, and it is true to say that almost any toxic or explosive substance, almost any pathogenic organism, can potentially constitute a hazard. The first line of defence is the proper training of the staff. Best current advice on techniques of handling material must be given to staff, who must practise them so that correct laboratory procedure becomes second nature to them.
The next line of defence is the provision of the necessary physical facilities by hospital management. This means the construction of modern, well-designed laboratories with sufficient space and special protective measures where these are called for; for example, the provision

1327
of lead screening for protection against ionising radiations. The third line of defence is that management should provide for regular surveillance of workers subject to special hazards, with medical examination and monitoring of the working environment at intervals.
Let me deal first with the risk of tuberculosis infection, which I know is the special concern of my hon. Friend. I cannot deny that it exists, but, although we do not know precisely how many Health Service technicians have contracted the disease, we think that the number must be very small. It is relevant for me to draw attention to the fact that notifications of tuberculosis have continued in recent years to show a welcome decline in the population as a whole, from 20,500 in 1962 to 13,200 in 1967. That is a very substantial reduction. Between 1966 and 1967, there was a marked reduction in notifications of respiratory tuberculosis, the number of deaths from tuberculosis reaching a new now level of 2,043 in 1967.
For hospital staff, the greatest risk occurs in the post-mortem rooms, where technicians do not normally work. Specimens from post-mortem rooms are processed in laboratories but should not transmit infection since the process of fixation, by heat or chemicals, should render them safe. Liquid or semi-liquid specimens and cultures are the real danger, and should always wherever possible be handled under exhaust ventilation. This is usually provided in the form of hooded benches or cubicles, and technicians are trained to use these facilities.
My hon. Friend has referred to the report entitled "Precautions against Tuberculosis Infection in the Diagnostic Laboratory", published in January, 1958. It was prepared by a working party of the Public Health Laboratory Service and the Department's Central Pathology Committee. Its recommendations were brought to the attention of hospital authorities. In 1961 a Circular was issued to hospital authorities, and it reported that the Standing Tuberculosis Advisory Committee and the Central Health Services Council had reiterated the working party's advice, and hospital authorities were asked to ensure that it was being acted upon.
1328
In 1966 the Department followed up the circular and asked hospital authorities to report on the situation in their regions. The survey did not seek to find out how many laboratory staff had contracted tuberculosis, but among the questions asked were the following: how many laboratories handling potentially tuberculous material had protective cabinets, and gave their staff annual X-rays and tuberculin tests on appointment. The replies varied, of course, but most regions reported that the majority of laboratories were implementing the recommendations. My hon. Friend wanted the figures. I will write to him and give him the analysis of the replies, which, on the whole, were encouraging.
However, I must agree that anything less than 100 per cent. compliance where the health of staff is at risk is not satisfactory. We have, therefore, decided to carry out a further survey next year to check that any defaulters in 1966 are now complying with the requirements. As part of that inquiry, we will consider seeking information about the incidence of infection among laboratory staff. As a result of that survey we shall have not only more information on compliance but information which we have not got at present of the incidence of infection among laboratory staff.
Some laboratories are so unsatisfactory that a new laboratory may be the only answer, particularly since the work load has increased greatly in recent years and the number of technicians involved has greatly expanded. The Government also have in hand a major hospital rebuilding programme. New laboratories are getting their share, but there are many other competing demands on the capital available.
I turn now to another infection which my hon. Friend did not raise but which is of similar concern. I refer to infective hepatitis. Anyone handling human blood or serum may contract this infection, and it is a particular risk for staff in haematology departments, blood transfusion centres and renal dialysis units. Infections occur, although they are comparatively rare, but there is no evidence that technicians have a higher infection rate than the general population.
Pathologists were reminded in November, 1966, by the Central Pathology Committee of the main precautions necessary

1329
in handling potentially infected material. The Central Pathology Committee did not think that it was a significant problem but agreed that staff should be warned of the dangers. A Working Party of the Public Health Laboratory Service reported in 1968 on infection risks in haemodialysis units, and, among other things, recommended on precautions to reduce the risk of hepatitis. This report was published in the British Medical Journal and a copy sent by the Department to all dialysis units.
The risk from ionising radiations is seldom substantial in pathology laboratories, but it may exist in other hospital departments where technicians work. Here hospital authorities are expected to comply with the Code of Practice for the Protection of Persons against Ionising Radiations arising from Medical and Dental use. This comprehensive Code, which was revised in 1964, was prepared by a Panel of the Radioactive Substances Advisory Committee. A survey which was carried out last year by the Department to check the extent to which hospital authorities were putting it into effect showed a reasonable degree of compliance. The Code prescribes maximum permissible doses for all staff in accordance with international recommendations, lays down physical measures for protection, and requires monitoring of radiation levels and in certain circumstances medical examination of radiation workers.
A watch is kept on current scientific views on carcinogenic substances. A circular is about to be sent to hospital authorities passing on advice of a subcommittee of the Central Pathology Com-
1330
mittee about the extent to which certain substances—now prohibited or controlled by the Department of Employment and Productivity in their use in factories—can safely be used in hospital laboratories.
It is not only in hospital laboratories where there are hazards of infection or dangerous substances. Workers in Public Health Laboratory Service laboratories which are constantly dealing with infected or contaminated materials are also subject to risks to their health. A constant watch is kept on the situation, and staff are well trained in the necessary precautions. These problems are, of course, a part of the whole wide subject of care for the health of all people who work in hospitals, and I should not like my hon. Friend to think that, because we have concentrated tonight on a particular and special section of the staff, we are not very much concerned with the care of the health of all hospital staff. It is, of course, a much larger subject, with which I have not time to deal tonight.
I thank my hon. Friend for raising this subject in the constructive and well-informed way that he did. One or two points that he raised, with which I have not dealt in detail in my reply, I will look into and write to him about.
The debate having been concluded, the Motion for the Adjournment of the House lapsed without Question put.
Mr. DEPUTY SPEAKER Mr. DEPUTY SPEAKER suspended the sitting at eight minutes past Twelve o'clock till Ten o'clock this day, pursuant to the Standing Order.

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Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock (Prayers having been read earlier at the Judicial Sitting by the Lord Bishop of Coventry):
The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.

MINERAL SUPPLIES AND BETTERMENT LEVY
LORD CLIFFORD OF CHUDLEIGH: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they have considered the effect of the betterment levy on the future supplies of minerals and especially of sand and stone.]
THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF HOUSING AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (LORD KENNET): Yes, my Lords, and under powers provided in the Finance Act 1968 regulations are being drafted in consultation with the interests concerned. These will enable owners of mineral-bearing land, including sand and stone, to choose whether to pay the betterment levy as a lump sum or as a percentage of the royalty which they receive from the working of the minerals. Levy paid in the latter way will be treated as a management expense for purposes of income tax.
LORD CLIFFORD OF CHUDLEIGH: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his Answer. I wonder whether he could answer this question. Can he, first of all, give a firm date when these regulations will come into operation (I think I am right in saying that negotiations took place a year ago) and can he assure the House that the deferred levy payment calculated on royalties will not be proceeded with should the mining operation cease prematurely?
LORD KENNET: My Lords, I regret that I am not in a position to give the precise date for the coming into effect
670
of the regulations. There will be no undue delay. I must confess that the complication of the second part of the noble Lord's supplementary question defeats me without notice. I would ask him to allow me to write to him about it later.
LORD CLIFFORD OF CHUDLEIGH: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord very much and I should like him to write to me on the subject. May I ask a further supplementary question? Would he not agree that on the acquisition of mining rights at the present time owners obviously have in mind, when deciding the royalty rate, the incidence of the betterment levy, and that inevitably the end result must be cost inflation? Would it not be better to abolish the levy altogether?
LORD KENNET: NO, my Lords, I would not go so far as to accept that.

PEERS' CAR MILEAGE ALLOWANCES
2.33 p.m.
LORD INGLEWOOD: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper. In so doing may I say that I have no personal interest in this Question as I live near a convenient main-line railway station.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what proportion of the cost of running a car of average size is intended to be covered by the present allowance of 4½d. per mile which Peers may claim after using their car in order to attend the House.]
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (LORD SHACKLETON): My Lords, we congratulate the noble Lord. The Answer to his Question is, no particular proportion. The allowance is intended to cover the cost of petrol alone, which it still does.
LORD INGLEWOOD: My Lords, would it not be more convenient and appropriate if the House followed the normal practice in business and, I believe, in the Civil Service, where the basis of the recovery of cost of travel bears some relation to the total cost?
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, this matter has been discussed on a number of occasions and if the noble Lord wishes to go further into it I would refer him to the Answer to a Starred Question on May 16, 1961, by the noble Earl, Lord Dundee. Since then, there has been the Report of the Lawrence Committee which put forward proposals which were debated fully in this House, and it was thought that this was the most convenient way to deal with the matter. But, obviously, I am very willing to listen to any views noble Lords have, although perhaps this is not the moment to debate the matter.
LORD BLYTON: My Lords, does not my noble friend think that, as prices have gone up since the 4½ guineas was fixed, and some of us travel 300 miles to come here every week and have to pay for lodgings in a hotel, the allowance ought now to be reconsidered?
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, I understand that my noble friend's supplementary question relates to the expenses allowance, which I regret to say is another matter. I have, however, taken note of what he has said.
BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER: My Lords, does not my noble friend agree that if 4½d. was the correct sum to cover the cost of petrol in 1961 it cannot be so to-day?
LORD SHACKLETON, I am happy to say that every question I have so far been asked I had in fact anticipated. There is, of course, some substance in my noble friend's point, and it may not have escaped the attention of noble Lords that this matter has also been considered in another place. Indeed, I should mention that my noble friend Lord Beswick has been in touch with the Leader of another place where they have the same arrangements in regard to petrol allowances.
BARONESS ELLIOT OF HARWOOD: My Lords, having a considerable interest in this matter, because since my railway was removed I have to motor some 50 to 60 miles to get anywhere near either a railway or an airport, may I ask the noble Lord whether he could speed up these inquiries since I can assure him that 4½d. does not cover anything like the cost of motoring 100 to 120 miles every time one has to catch a train?
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, I must stress to noble Lords that this allowance is intended to cover the cost of petrol alone. This was the decision to which Parliament came. I understand that the noble Baroness is much more concerned with the return journey; that her car has to be driven home so that it may be used when she is not using it herself. Whether her allowance covers the cost of petrol depends on the size of her car. If she travels in a mini, it should more than cover the journey both ways.
LORD NAPIER AND ETTRICK: My Lords, can the noble Lord tell us by how much the purchase tax on petrol has increased since the rate of 4½d. a mile was first fixed?
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, I thought that this question might be asked and I decided that it went too far wide of the original Question to need a reply.

FOREMEN AND STAFF MUTUAL BENEFIT SOCIETY (APPLICA TION OF RULES) ETC. BILL
Read 3a, and passed.
TEESSIDE CORPORATION BILL
Read 3a, with the Amendments, and passed, and returned to the Commons.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper.
Moved, That leave be given to the Lord Stonham to advance the Committee stage of the Immigration Appeals Bill from Tuesday the 13th of May next to Tuesday the 6th of May next.—(Lord Shackleton.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

ARMY RESERVE BILL
2.39 p.m.
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE, ROYAL AIR FORCE (LORD WINTERBOTTOM): My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a second time. I understand that it has been agreed through the usual channels

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that we should give the Bill a formal Second Reading so as to leave as much time as possible to debate the Motion standing in the name of my noble friend the Leader of the House. I would explain, however, that in the course of his speech later this afternoon my noble friend Lord Chalfont will be explaining to noble Lords the purpose of the Bill. Thus they will not be denied an opportunity to discuss it within the wider context of the Motion then before the House. Moreover, the Committee stage on the Bill will, of course, follow at a later date. I beg to move.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Lord Winterbottom.)
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

DEFENCE ESTIMATES
2.41 p.m.
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, I rise to move, on behalf of my noble friend the Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House, the Motion that is before your Lordships: That this House takes note of the Statement on the Defence Estimates 1969 (Cmnd. 3927). I must apologise to your Lordships because my speech may seem to be of inordinate length. I have cut it heavily, and I will keep it as short as I possibly can.
In opening our debate, I think it would be appropriate if I were first to say something about the money figures themselves—the 1969–70 Defence Budget position. Then I would hope to look at the defence policy scene from a geographical point of view—first Europe, as the main theatre of our defence policy, and then a look at the Far East. Finally I would hope to review progress on the re-equipment of our forces. Later in the debate, my noble friend Lord Chalfont will, as I have menioned, be referring to the Army Reserve Bill, but he will also be looking at the wider manpower scene.
I turn first to the current state of the Defence Budget. The publication of the 1969–70 Estimates marks yet a further stage in what history may judge to be one of the great achievements of this Government, their appreciation of the economic difficulties imposed on the country by an excessively large Defence Budget, with its consequential drain on scarce re
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sources, and their achievement of a transformation of defence policy to bring the expenditure down to a level within our economic capacity.
For the first time in over ten years the Defence Budget estimates are, at current prices, below those for the previous year. In real terms they represent a reduction of £111 million on the Estimates for 1968–69. This is part of a pattern now well established by this Government, since in every year since 1965–65 the Defence Budget Estimates have shown, at constant prices, a reduction on those for the preceding year. These reductions, if their significance is to be assessed, must be contrasted with the rising trend planned by the previous Government. My right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Defence has, in answering a Question in another place, shown how this Government's Estimates compare over the years 1965–66 to 1969–70 with the expenditure plans which we inherited. The reductions which we have been able to achieve—while continuing to preserve the nation's essential security—are of major significance. The previous Government were planning to spend, at to-day's prices, almost £3,000 million in 1969–70 on the Defence Budget. Thus, in this year alone we shall be saving about £700 million compared with their plans. This sum is on top of savings of about £1,300 million represented by the Estimates for 1965–66 to 1968–69.
My Lords, we still have some way to go in order to conclude the readjustment of our defence posture to accord with the realities of this country's economic and political situation in the world of the 1970s. Defence Budget expenditure in 1969–70 is estimated to be somewhat below 6 per cent. of the gross national product. By 1972–73, when the withdrawal from East of Suez will be complete, the Defence Budget is planned to fall by a further £150 million, and its share of a growing gross national product will fall to about 5 per cent. These proportions should be set against the 7 per cent. which the previous Government, in their published statements, had said they were prepared to allocate to the Defence Budget.
This summary of the financial position would not be complete without referring, to foreign exchange expenditure. Our policy realignment, besides enabling us

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to make the budgetary economies to which I have referred, will also make a real contribution to the solution of the country's balance-of-payments difficulties. In spite of the effect of devaluation, the foreign exchange costs of our forces stationed outside Europe will, by 1970–71, have dropped to about two-thirds of their 1967 level of £180 million, and in 1972–73 will drop to one-third of that level.
Saving in cash expenditure need not, of course, lead to a proportional drop in combat effectiveness. To state an extreme example, which I hope your Lordships will not take too seriously, we might spend a further 1 per cent. of the gross national product on bands and horse cavalry but our military strength would not be increased thereby. In my view—although I cannot quantify my opinion—the Defence Review, beginning with the imposition of a ceiling of £2,000 million at 1964 prices on the Defence Budget for 1969–70, has imposed a most useful discipline on the planning and execution of all defence expenditure. We are, I believe, getting greater military strength for each 1 per cent. of the gross national product spent now compared with the past, and I suggest that my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Defence deserves the country's thanks for his firmness and tenacity.
I turn now to Europe, the main theatre of our future defence policy. As we have made clear in our Defence White Papers, the foundation of our security lies, as always, in the maintenance of peace in Europe. Peace in Europe has been achieved because the West has been able to present a united front to deter aggression. This united front has been made possible by the creation and continued existence of NATO, which as the House is well aware, celebrated its twentieth anniversary earlier this month. Noble Lords will not have forgotten that twenty years after the First World War we were on the verge of the second; and, while at the moment there is no cause for great optimism, in my view the future is not without hope, because of the policies followed by successive British Governments and their allies. To ensure that peace continues, our first priority must be to give the fullest possible support to NATO. We have clearly shown the paramount importance that we attach to the North Atlantic Alliance by concentrating our
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defence effort in Europe and the waters around it.
My Lords, NATO has from the outset been a defensive alliance, threatening nobody. Consistent with principles laid down in the United Nations Charter, its members are joined together to ensure their collective security. The basic aim of NATO is to prevent war in the Treaty area. This means deterring all forms of aggression, nuclear or conventional, major or minor. This deterrence is achieved by making it clear to the Warsaw Pact Powers that aggression is not worth while. NATO'S strategy of deterrence is a flexible strategy based upon a range of appropriate responses, nuclear and conventional, to various levels of aggression. It still rests ultimately upon the possession by the Alliance of a capability for almost inconceivable nuclear destruction. But the Alliance also has, and must maintain, strong conventional forces. These must be strong enough, in the first place, to deal with limited aggression. It would be irresponsible to rely on nuclear weapons to counter this; and to be seen to be relying on them would not provide a fully convincing deterrent to such an attack. An aggressor might be tempted to gamble that NATO might not be willing to escalate the conflict, with all the risks that that implied for NATO countries, in the event of a minor attack. He must be left with no such illusion.
Strong conventional forces are also necessary as part of the deterrent to a full-scale conventional attack by Warsaw Pact forces. But in this case they are only a part, and nuclear weapons are also necessary for effective deterrence of such an attack. Let me explain this. NATO has never been in a position to handle an all-out attack solely by conventional means for more than a limited period. In the Central Region, NATO forces are outnumbered by well over two to one in infantry and armoured formations—three to one if first-line reserves were mobilised on both sides—and by nearly two to one in combat aircraft. There are, of course, instances where the advantage lies on the other side; for example, in the field of anti-tank weapons, the West has a superiority of three to two, and the earlier figures I quoted certainly do not give a precise measure of relative capabilities, as qualitative factors must also be taken into

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account. But the Warsaw Pact has another advantage as well. As an aggressor it would have the initiative; it would be able to select the points at which to concentrate its forces. The overall superiority of Warsaw Pact conventional forces would thus be greatly magnified at these decisive points.
NATO's conventional forces do not by themselves, therefore, pose an adequate deterrent to an all-out attack. Accordingly, NATO has to present the Soviet Union with unacceptable risks of escalation to full nuclear warfare. Tactical nuclear weapons have an important part to play in making these clear. This has always been the case. This aspect of NATO strategy has been unchanged down the years, and it has been fully supported by British Governments throughout. Neither are nuclear weapons enough by themselves in such a context. NATO'S conventional forces must demonstrate our determination to resist; and they must be able to win enough time to establish beyond a doubt that the attacker's intentions are aggressive, enough time for diplomatic action to bring the conflict to an end and, if all else fails, enough time to enable the fearful decision to use nuclear weapons to be taken in full knowledge of the facts. Neither the nuclear nor the conventional forces constitute a fully credible deterrent without the other; their combination has been effective for twenty years, and I believe it will continue to be effective in the future.
Recent changes in NATO'S strategy, in the context of a major conventional attack, have been in the direction of extending the conventional phase of hostilities: we need to ensure that we shall have the necessary few days during which any decision to use nuclear weapons can be taken. There has been some difference of view until recently between the Government and the Opposition. Sir Alec Douglas-Home spoke approvingly in another place last year of "the trip-wire which trips"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, 24/1/68; col. 420]—the concept of an early and virtually automatic nuclear response. But it is encouraging that the speeches of Mr. Geoffrey Rippon during the Defence debate in another place last month reflected a great deal of agreement between the two sides on this matter, as indeed on other fundamental aspects of
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NATO strategy. Not only did he agree that our major defence contribution must be to NATO and that
"NATO cannot forgo reliance on nuclear escalation in case of large-scale attack without an increase in European military budgets that in present circumstances is beyond the bounds of practical possibility",
but he also agreed that
"it was right for NATO to abandon the former trip-wire doctrine of immediate massive retaliation in favour of the concept of a flexible response based upon a stronger conventional capability in Europe."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, 4/3/69, col. 252.]
This measure of agreement between the Parties must strengthen the world's and particularly our potential enemies'— assessment of the strength of our national will to defend ourselves. And I believe that Mr. Rippon was right when he pointed out by implication that a policy of flexible response is not something that we can get for nothing. There are certain consequential actions that must be taken, and these are quite expensive.
My Lords, actions in alliances, as in most things, speak louder than words. Our actions towards NATO have been to make it our prime defence objective. We have a central role in supporting the solidarity and strength on which the Alliance depends. By concentrating our defence effort in the North Atlantic area we are better able to fulfil this role than in the past. Our contribution to NATO consists of all-Regular volunteer forces maintained and trained to the highest standards. We have committed virtually all the Royal Navy to the Alliance—by far the strongest navy in Western Europe. The British Army is the most professional in Europe and is equipped with the latest weapons. The British Army of the Rhine is over 50,000 men strong and can be reinforced rapidly to more than double its strength in case of need. As I shall be stressing a little later, the Royal Air Force is now well launched on the major re-equipment of its general purpose combat forces.
We have made substantial improvements to our NATO force contribution on three occasions during the last year. Among these improvements have been the earmarking for assignment of a mobile force of over 20,000 men from the Army's Strategic Command. together with air support from the Royal Air Force's No. 38 Group; the commitment of our powerful amphibious forces; and

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the strengthening of our maritime presence in the Mediterranean. Our contribution is one of which we can be proud: and there can be no doubt that we are playing our full part in the most vital of all our possible defence roles, which is ensuring the security of our own people at home.
The improvements to our NATO force contribution in the last year have filled a number of long-recognised gaps in NATO'S capability. Taken as a whole, the present size of NATO'S conventional forces, in terms of numbers of major units, is reasonable in the context of the present strategy. But NATO cannot rest on its laurels after twenty successful years. NATO Ministers affirmed last June that NATO'S overall military capability must not be reduced except as part of a pattern of mutual force reductions by NATO and the Warsaw Pact balanced in scope and timing. We hope earnestly that in due course the Soviet Union will respond to the NATO offer of last summer. for discussions leading to a balance of forces in Europe at a lower level on both sides. But in present circumstances NATO must keep up its guard.
I turn now to our future contribution to the western strategic deterrent. The build-up of the Polaris force is proceeding as planned. H.M.S. "Resolution" has now been operational for some time. H.M.S. "Repulse" and H.M.S. "Renown" were accepted into service by the Royal Navy within the last few months and both submarines are undergoing their final trials and work-up, which include the test firing of Polaris missiles. H.M.S. "Repulse" has recently fired two Polaris missiles off Cape Kennedy. Both shots were successful and proved once again the accuracy and reliability of the system. H.M.S. "Repulse" will be operational this spring and H.M.S. "Renown" by the autumn. H.M.S. "Revenge" will be accepted into service towards the end of the year. Thus during the course of the year the Polaris force will become fully effective and will take over from the Royal Air Force the United Kingdom's contribution to the strategic deterrent which is at present provided by the Vulcans of Strike Command. Meanwhile these Vulcans will continue to fulfil a useful NATO task, operating in the low-level tactical role in support of SACEUR'S forces in Europe.
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In the Far East we are making good progress with the withdrawal of our forces from Singapore and Malaysia announced by the Prime Minister in January last year. This year sees the start of the withdrawal of British units from the Commonwealth Brigade, which will be completed by April, 1970. As the Statement on the Defence Estimates foreshadowed, the first of these units, the 3rd Battalion of the Light Infantry, is now in the process of returning from its base in Terendak. Over the last year more than 5.500 Servicemen have come home from Malaysia and Singapore. Similar progress is being made with support facilities in Singapore. We handed over the Royal Naval Dockyard last December to the Singapore Government for commercial ship repair operations by the Sembawang Shipyard Ltd., with Messrs. Swan Hunter as managing agents. Under the terms of an agreement announced last year we undertook to hand over free of charge to the Singapore and Malaysian Governments those Service lands and fixed assets which they wished to use for defence and economic purposes; in accordance with this agreement we have transferred land, facilities and the associated equipment valued at over £19 million. It is clear that the Governments of both countries are making every effort to use the opportunities provided by this assistance to offset the economic effects of our withdrawal.
But it would be wrong to give the impression that we are pre-occupied only with the problems of the rundown. On the contrary, we are still deeply concerned with the maintenance of security and stability of the area after our forces have been withdrawn from it. We have made it clear that, while after 1971 we shall no longer maintain a special capability for use in the area, we shall still have the ability to deploy substantial forces there if in our judgment the circumstances demand it. We are also doing all we can to encourage our friends in the region to co-operate with each other in developing their own defence arrangements to meet the changed situation after our withdrawal.
A very good start was made at the Five-Power Conference which was held in Kuala Lumpur last June, when Malaysia and Singapore declared that their two countries could be regarded as indivisible

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for defence purposes and agreed to cooperate in the setting up of an integrated air defence system. Agreements were also reached in principle about future naval co-operation in the area and we made clear our intention to continue training there after 1971 and to participate in the multi-national Jungle Warfare School which is to be set up in Malaysia. All five countries agreed to participate in a major exercise in Malaysia in 1970 to which we would contribute a reinforcement exercise from the United Kingdom. We expect that all these matters will be taken a stage further at the next Five-Power Conference which is to be held, at the invitation of Mr. Gorton, in Canberra on June 19 and 20. The impetus towards co-operation among our Commonwealth partners in the area was certainly enhanced by the very welcome decisions announced by the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand in February this year. that they would maintain naval, land and air forces in Singapore and Malaysia after 1971.
My Lords, we welcome these decisions, not only because both countries have decided to maintain a visible military presence in the area after our withdrawal but also because of the attitude of mind underlying them. As Mr. Gorton said in his Statement to the Australian House of Representatives, his starting point was that Australia is:
"a part of and … situated in the region. Hence security, stability and progress for the other nations in the region must also contribute to the security of Australia. We cannot fail to be affected by what happens in our neighbours' countries. What affects their security affects our security."
We welcomed this practical and far-seeing approach when it was manifested at the last Five-Power Conference in Kuala Lumpur; we welcome it now, and we believe that it augurs well for the future of the area as a whole. Against this background we are optimistic about the future of defence co-operation between the countries in the area. It will be our aim to do all we can to further this at the next round of ministerial discussions at Canberra in June.
So much for the world scene of partnerships and alliances. Now I turn to the equipment of the forces on whom our defence policy entirely depends. I make no apology for looking first at tile youngest Service, for whom it is my pride to
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bear special responsibility at the beginning of its second half-century. 'The re-equipment of the Royal Air Force is a subject which the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, gave us an opportunity to discuss a fortnight ago, so I shall not repeat what I told the House on that occasion, particularly as regards the multi-role combat aircraft. Noble Lords will be aware that my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Defence is at this moment in Bonn discussing with the Defence Ministers of the other Consortium countries the future of this project. If these talks can be brought to a successful conclusion, we shall have within our grasp the largest and most significant collaborative military enterprise ever undertaken within Europe. This would be a step on the way to establishing in Europe a defence industry on a scale now possessed only by the super-Powers, America and Russia.
The multi-role combat aircraft project is significant, therefore, not only in relation to our military contribution to the Alliance, but also because it represents a European initiative within NATO and a means for developing closer economic, industrial and technological links with those European countries who, we hope, will eventually be our major partners in a European Common Market. It is perhaps worth re-stating at this point that a United Europe could have a defence potential which would be the equal of that of either of the super-Powers. The United States have a population of about 200 million; the E.E.C. and EFTA members of NATO one of 249 million, with a very strong industrial and scientific base. We are not as strong as we should be because we still have no agreed military production policy. The multi-role combat aircraft points the way to such a common policy; that is why it is so important.
My Lords, it may be helpful if I illustrate the position by reviewing briefly our military aircraft replacement programme according to the various operational roles. In the close-support role, the Hunter is now at the end of its Service life and will be replaced in this year and the next by the Phantom, supplemented by the Harrier. The outstanding performance characteristics of these two aircraft—supersonic speed, on the one hand, and vertical and short take-off and landing performance, on the other—will together provide the Army, and the

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armies of our allies, with first-class battlefield support in ground operations. Noble Lords will be aware that a large number of Phantoms have already been delivered to the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy, and the whole order will be completed by the autumn of this year. Operational training has been under way for several months. The first Royal Navy front-line squadron formed at Yeovilton at the end of last month, and the first in the Royal Air Force should form next month.
The Phantom, equipped with an advanced design of reconnaissance pod produced in the United Kingdom, will also assume the tactical reconnaissance role. As noble Lords will appreciate when I refer to the air defence role later, this aircraft has a remarkable operational versatility which I am sure will serve us well over the next decade. The Harrier was cleared for release to the Service on April 1, and deliveries to the Service begin this month. The dual version of the aircraft achieved a very successful first flight last week. The programme is thus only a matter of weeks behind the schedule planned some years ago, and costs are also well within the original estimates of both development and production. The build-up of operational squadrons will begin at the end of this year and will be completed with the fourth squadron in service by the end of 1971. Noble Lords will recall that we decided to place a further order for Harrier aircraft following the Czech crisis last year to increase the size and effectiveness of our air contribution to NATO.
The vertical and short take-off and landing characteristics of this unique aircraft will allow it to operate from any number of dispersed sites in forward areas. This enables it to make use of natural cover to reduce its vulnerability to attack from the air. It also means that the Army will have its air support closer at hand than ever before, and command and control arrangements are being devised to ensure the quickest possible reaction time for the aircraft and the closest possible co-ordination with the operations of Army formations. There is no question that with the Harrier Britain leads the world in vertical and short takeoff and landing combat aircraft, and further development has already been authorised to increase its range and
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weapon effectiveness. The possible application of such a developed version of the aircraft to use with ships of the Royal Navy is also being considered. Interest in the Harrier is world-wide and export prospects are highly promising.
Looking ahead to 1974–75, the Phantom will start to be replaced in the close support role by the Jaguar, so that it, in turn, will take over air defence in place of the Lightning. The Jaguar, which, as noble Lords will be aware, is an Anglo-French project, successfully made its first flight last September, and the development programme is going well. The United Kingdom aircraft, two versions of which will be produced—one for the advanced training role and one for tactical close support operations—are scheduled to start delivery to the Royal Air Force in 1973. Three prototypes are now flying. British prototypes are due to fly in October, 1969, and January, 1970. The success of this programme to date reflects a great deal of credit on the British and French firms concerned and on those responsible for managing the project.
Turning now to air defence, studies of the future concept of operations and the type of threat to be encountered have confirmed the value of aircraft operating in an integrated air defence system with surface-to-air missiles. The Lightnings, first introduced in 1960, and still ranking among the most formidable interceptor aircraft in the world, will require replacement from 1974–75. When this time comes the Phantoms will transfer to the air defence role. Fitted with air interception radar of high calibre and complementary air-to-air weapon systems, the Phantom will be able to match the likely performance of enemy aircraft or missiles at high or low altitudes. It will of course be complemented by Bloodhound 2 and Rapier missile systems, and in Central Europe by the Hawk and Nike missiles of the NATO air defence system. At sea, the Phantom in the Mark 1 version will have been operating both in the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force since 1969 in the air defence role, supplemented by the shipborne surface-to-air missile systems. In 1972 this commitment will pass wholly to the Royal Air Force, and plans for the long-range protection of the Fleet, involving tanker support, are to be mutually arranged between the two Services concerned.

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Next year the Nimrod will start to take over the maritime reconnaissance role from the Shackleton. Deliveries to the Royal Air Force will start in the latter half of this year and be complete in 1971. Besides its search and anti-submarine capability the Nimrod will also be equipped with AS 12 and Martel stand-off weapons for surface attacks. Thus in these three major areas I think noble Lords will agree that our future aircraft needs are well cared for in the next decade and in some instances well beyond.
I should also touch briefly on the transport force and helicopters. The build-up of the former is about to be completed with final deliveries of the Belfast and the total lift now available is well matched to the mobile concept of our forces. As an illustration of the carrying capacity of Air Support Command to-day, noble Lords may be interested to know that, even under peace-time conditions, it carries nearly 200,000 passengers a year. The Belfast will be particularly useful in European operations with its ability to lift bulky loads such as the Abbott self-propelled gun and the armoured personnel carrier.
The increasing importance of helicopters for operations at sea and to provide mobility in the battlefield has been recognised in recent and future procurement of these aircraft. For the Navy, the Wessex 3 helicopter with advanced British anti-submarine equipment has recently come into service. It will be followed later this year by the Sea King, another Westland helicopter, which will have longer range and endurance. The Anglo-French helicopter package will satisfy the major helicopter requirements of all three Services for some years to come and the collaborative arrangements are proceeding satisfactorily. Initial production orders have been placed for the SA 330 medium-lift support helicopter which should enter Royal Air Force service next year and will have a much improved performance in range and payload over the Wessex which will continue in service. The SA 330 will also have the major advantage of being more readily airportable than any of its predecessors or contemporaries. Deliveries of the SA 340 will follow in the early 1970s primarily to replace the Army Sioux, and in the mid-1970s the WG 13 will start to take over from the Navy Wasp and Army Scout aircraft.
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Finally in the aircraft re-equipment picture I come to the strike/reconnaissance role. The plan now is for the Buccaneer to replace the Canberra as the Royal Air Force strike/reconnaissance aircraft as the latter phases out from 1970 onwards. The Royal Air Force will already be operating Buccaneers in the maritime role as these are taken over from the Royal Navy after the carriers phase out at the end of 1971. The Buccaneer will lake on the more demanding tasks from the V-bomber aircraft now operating in the low level tactical role, and will remain adequate for over-land strike operations in Central Europe at least up to the mid-1970s; such shortcomings as the Buccaneer might possess (as compared for instance with the F.111) are of less significance now that our defence effort is concentrated in the NATO area. For this reason the Government decided la: year to place a further order for Buccaneers for the Royal Air Force to enable us to maintain our contribution to the strike forces of Allied Command Europe as well as to the maritime strike forces of SACLANT. The plan is therefore for the Buccaneer to be the Royal Air Force's strike/reconnaissance aircraft until the mid-1970s, although it will remain viable for considerably longer than that in the maritime role. The aircraft which we have in mind to replace it is the multi-role combat aircraft.
But, my Lords, my enthusiasm for what I already regard as my own Service has run away with me and I must proceed to tell noble Lords something of the similarly encouraging re-equipment picture of the other two Services. In the field of armoured fighting vehicles for the Army, the programme for the new Chieftain tank is now far advanced. It can out-gun any other tank, on either side, in North-West Europe and will be even more effective when, during the next few years, it is equipped with the new laser range-finder which will allow it to use the full range of its 120 mm. gun with greatly enhanced accuracy. The programme for the tracked armoured personnel carrier will be completed during the year, as will that for the tracked fitters' vehicles which will give R.E.M.E. protection whilst carrying out battlefield repairs. These will be followed in a few years by a new family of light armoured vehicles, wheeled and tracked, to re place the Saladin armoured car and the Ferret

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scout car which have given such good service, and have proved to be export best-sellers, over a number of years.
Our anti-tank defence, which is centred on the Chieftain tank supported by the Conbat 120mm gun, the Vigilant antitank guided weapon and the Carl Gustav 84mm gun, will shortly be supplemented by the Swingfire guided weapon which is already in production. This long-range weapon, which will be mounted on highly mobile armoured vehicles, will greatly add to our anti-tank capability. To increase the flexibility of response to an armoured break-through we plan to add to the Royal Air Force capability for air-to-ground attack by equipping Army helicopters with anti-tank guided weapons to knock out such targets from the air. Other anti-tank weapons and devices are being developed. As regards missiles to complement aircraft in providing defence against attack from the air we already have the Thunderbird 2 surface-to-air guided weapon to cope with high-level attack, and for lower levels of attack the L70/40mm gun is replaced by the Rapier guided-weapon system, which is now starting production and will be supplemented by the Blowpipe guided weapon by the mid-1970s. These both promise to be the best weapon of their kind in the world.
The position of our field artillery, consisting, of the American M107 (175mm) and M109 (155mm) and the British Abbott (105mm) self-propelled guns, is satisfactory. But the keynotes of mobility, speed and flexibility of response are exemplified by a field artillery computing equipment, known as FACE, now coming into service, as a means of rendering automatic the previously manual process of gun laying, by a new airportable 105mm towed gun, firing the same ammunition as the Abbott, which will come into service in the early 1970s, and by a new towed airportable 155mm gun (the FH 70) being developed jointly with the Federal Republic of Germany which will come into service in the mid-1970s.
For the senior Service, my Lords, work continues on the development of a broad range of new naval weapons, equipment and ships, and I have already said something about the Navy's Phantoms and the new helicopters which are to enter
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Naval service. For anti-submarine operations the Royal Navy are developing the Mark 24 submarine-launched torpedo and the Mark 31 air-launched torpedo. Work is also continuing on IKARA, the long-range, ship-launched, anti-submarine weapon system, which will be fitted in H.M.S. "Bristol" and also in a number of the Leander frigates. The AS12 air-to-surface missile is now in service, carried by the Royal Navy's helicopters operating in the anti-surface ship role. Studies are also in train for the development of a second generation missile of the same type.
For the defensive role, the Sea Dart medium-range, surface-to-air, guided missile system is being developed. This will be fitted first in H.M.S. "Bristol" and subsequently in the new class of Sea Dart destroyers. Development has also been started on a successor to Sea Cat, called Sea Wolf, a close-range, self-defence, surface-to-air, guided-weapon system. Increasing use is being made of computers; for example in ships' data handling systems, and research continues in a wide variety of fields in aid of future generations of naval weapons and equipment.
My Lords, the new naval construction programme continues on the basis indicated in successive Defence White Papers. Including H.M.S. "Dreadnought", now undergoing her first refit at Rosyth, three nuclear fleet submarines are already in service. The fourth, H.M.S. "Churchill", will join the Fleet next year. Three more submarines of this class are under construction and we hope to order the eighth shortly. By the time the carriers phase out, a substantial force of nuclear fleet submarines will be in service and will provide the Navy's main striking power, in terms of both anti-surface ship and anti-submarine capability. Apart from the American and Russian fleets, the Royal Navy will be alone in operating these powerful warships in significant numbers. During the current year, the surface Fleet will be strengthened by the acceptance into service of eight major units—two guided-missile destroyers and six "Leander" class frigates—in replacement of older vessels which will be phased out of service. They will be followed by H.M.S. "Bristol", the Type 82 destroyer and the last of the "Leander" class frigates.

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Looking further ahead, the surface Fleet of the future will be based on the three new classes of ships already announced. First is the Type 42 destroyer. The order for the first ship was placed in November, 1968. The Type 42 is a smaller version of the original Type 82 design and will have the same surface-to-air missile armament, but will substitute a helicopter for the IKARA anti-submarine system. The principal task of the Type 42 will be to provide air defence for the Fleet. In addition, it will have a useful antisubmarine and surface gunnery capability and will be able to perform a wide range of normal peacetime duties required of naval vessels. Its main armament will be the Sea Dart guided missile, and it will also have a surface-to-surface capability. It will carry a new type of 4·5 inch gun—the Mark 8. For submarine detection the Type 42 will carry the most up-to-date sonar systems. The main anti-submarine weapon will consist of torpedoes carried by the ship's helicopter, which will also carry air-to-surface weapons for use against lightly defended surface ship targets such as fast patrol boats. For main propulsion the Type 42 will be fitted with a flexible gas turbine installation—Rolls Royce Olympus engines being used for cruising. The gas turbine installation is a further development of the system now installed in H.M.S. "Exmouth", which is the first major warship in the West to be propelled entirely by gas turbine engines.
Second among the new classes of surface ships are the frigates to succeed the "Leander", The order for the first of the new frigates was placed with Messrs. Vospers, Limited, in March. She will be a ship of some 2,500 tons built to a commercial design. She will be powered by Olympus/Tyne gas turbine engines, will be armed with surface-to-air guided weapons and the 4·5 inch Mark 8 gun and will also operate a helicopter. Design work is continuing on the third new class of surface ship; namely, the cruiser to succeed the converted "Tigers". This ship is planned to provide command and control of our maritime forces, to deploy surface-to-air guided weapons and to carry the Sea King anti-submarine helicopter.
My Lords, I have finished my catalogue of the weapons of war. These weapons of course must he matched to men, and
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behind both must be the national will to use them wisely to ensure both peace and national survival. I am sure that an expression of that determination will be heard in your Lordships' House to-day. I beg to move.
Moved, That this House takes note of the Statement on the Defence Estimates 1969 (Cmnd. 3927).—(Lord Winterbottom.)
3.20 p.m.
LORD CARRINGTON: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, has made a most comprehensive and interesting speech, and your Lordships will be grateful to him for having introduced the White Paper so clearly. The noble Lord has, naturally, to present and explain the White Paper to your Lordships, and he certainly has done so. I was beginning to be rather mystified what on earth the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, and the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, were going to say for the rest of the debate; but no doubt we shall learn later on.
My Lords, I am under no obligation to follow the noble Lord in everything he has said, for this is the one occasion in the year when your Lordships have a chance of looking at the broader aspects of defence, and I propose for a few minutes this afternoon to discuss some of the broader aspects of policy of Western defence and how it relates to a purely national British policy. Ever since the end of the war, the whole framework of defence has been related to the nuclear bomb. Before the nuclear bomb it was possible for a country with a relatively large population and with a fairly big industrial base to provide for itself against any possible attack, even from countries which were bigger in population and in industrial power. For example, we in Britain owed our dominance in the 19th century in great part to a large Navy. The Germans, though ultimately defeated, managed in two World Wars to fight for four or five years against a combination of countries, far bigger in population and industrial potential than they themselves were. Defence policy in the 19th and early 20th centuries was much more simple. Conventional weapons were uncomplicated and fairly cheap; it was possible for a country to arm itself adequately to protect its vital interests without damaging its

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economy, and controversy in those days centred rather on how much was enough rather than on what sort of defence was needed.
But the bomb and the increasing sophistication of conventional weapons, together with the much greater uncertainty of the type of situation which we are likely to meet, has made the decisions of Secretaries of State for Defence all over the world much more difficult and much more exacting, and I know that my noble friend Lord Thorneycroft and the noble Earl, Lord Alexander, behind him will agree with that. Let no-one imagine that the decisions which are taken are either straightforward or simple black and white decisions, or easy to take. Only the richest countries can afford everything, and even they are beginning to find it difficult, as the debate in the United States on the anti-missile missiles demonstrates. But the fact remains that the appalling destructive capabilities of the nuclear bomb and the prospect that it might bring a near destruction of mankind is precisely the reason that we have not had a world war for the last 25 years. Neither of the two great Powers are prepared to run the risk of complete catastrophe.
After the war, at the time when the United States was the only possessor of atomic weapons, the Russians realised that aggression by them would have meant the destruction of their country. Since then, as the two countries have become more evenly matched, it is mutual destruction of each other's country which has seemed to be equally unacceptable. For this we have much to be thankful. But certain questions arise, and the first one, which to me appears far the most important, is how much of a deterrent to war is a weapon which is so powerful that its use is unacceptable to both those countries which possess it. I have always thought—and this may seem to be a rather unusual theory today when Mr. Foster Dulles and his policy are much reviled—that it was largely due to Mr. Foster Dulles that we did not have much more severe trouble at that difficult time when he was Secretary of State. Everyone knew that Mr. Dulles, who was a determined man, would not have hesitated to advise the President of the United States to use
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nuclear weapons if in his opinion the basic interests of the United States required that decision to be taken. And we must remember that at that time, the time we are talking of, it was the period in which the Russians were not capable of second-strike retaliation. The reality of the deterrent depends upon whether or not those who are being deterred believe that there is any prospect of its being used, and certainly Mr. Dulles left me, at any rate, in no doubt about what he would have done.
But the situation has now changed, and there are those who feel that the destructive capabilities of both the Russians and the Americans in their second-strike capability calls into question the whole theory of deterrence. I do not know. I should very much dislike to take a gamble on whether or not nuclear weapons would be used. It would be an appalling decision to gamble on whether or not an American President were likely in the last resort to be prepared to use his nuclear armoury. And I suppose that that uncertainty in itself is part of the deterrent. It follows that the Americans must appear to be, and must be, absolutely resolute in refusing to give way or to appease either the Russians or the Chinese, who will shortly have a big nuclear capability. Any sign of weakness undermines the reality of the deterrent. I do not mean by that that the Americans should not be prepared to negotiate with the Russians, or join in the discussions with NATO and the Warsaw Pact, or try in any way for détente between East and West, but not to the point where it appears that the United States is acting from a position of weakness rather than from a position of determination and strength.
But the Russian second-strike capability has also one important consequence for us in Europe. If it is arguable whether or not nuclear weapons would be used in the defence of American soil, it must surely be more arguable as to whether or not they would be used in the defence of soil which is not American, when the use of those weapons would lead to the destruction of America itself. We have only to look (and the noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, did) at the relative strengths of the two blocs in conventional forces, both on the ground and in reserve, to realise that Western Europe could not

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fail to lose a purely conventional war; that is to say, if things remain as they are. The deterrent in NATO is partly the conventional forces which are deployed on the ground, and which no doubt would give a very good account of themselves; but the much more powerful deterrent is the nuclear power of the United States which lies at the back of the organisation.
I do not wish in any way to call into question the determination of the Americans to assist their allies in every way. I am sure they have it. They are good allies and honourable men. But we must, I think, look at the matter from a European point of view. We must acknowledge to ourselves the awful decision which would have to be taken by a President of the United States in the circumstance of a Russian conventional invasion of Western Europe, a decision which, to save Europe from being overrun, would lead to the annihilation of the United States itself.
There are really only two things that we can do to make ourselves less vulnerable and less dependent upon the United States. First, we can so increase our conventional forces—I am talking, of course, of NATO, Western Europe as a whole—that we can match the Russian conventional forces. I confess that I do not see the smallest likelihood of this happening. However desirable it might be, I cannot conceive that in the present climate of opinion the countries of Western Europe would be prepared either to spend the money or the manpower in achieving such an object.
The second alternative is to have a nuclear armoury of our own. To me the possession of nuclear weapons of our own is a much more credible deterrent than to rely on a third party, however close a friend; and to that extent I fully understand the French Government's reasons for having developed their own weapon. It is precisely for that reason that I have always been in favour of the independent British nuclear deterrent, capable of being used independently by ourselves in circumstances in which our national position was in extreme danger. When we get into Europe, as we shall, and when there exists in Europe a political organisation capable of dealing with these matters, then it may well be that a European deterrent may emerge,
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though there are, of course, many difficulties in such a concept. There would be no need for such a deterrent to be on anything like the scale of the Russian or the American armoury, and I should have thought that the damage which such a force could inflict would be perfectly adequate if it were something comparable to the size that we have at the present time for the purposes which I have outlined.
One of the paradoxes of the nuclear age is that in certain circumstances the most powerful countries become as weak as the small nations. Nor does the possession of the nuclear deterrent by the super Powers necessarily mean that there will not be outbreaks of smaller and limited wars between other countries. Vietnam and Korea were examples of the former; the Israeli-Arab war is an example of the latter. It is only when the vital interests of the big Powers are involved that nuclear deterrence has any relevance whatever. The United States, with all the destructive capability in her possession, has riot been able to finish the Vietnam war; neither has she or Russia been able greatly to influence events in the Middle East.
Your Lordships may ask, "What has this to do with British defence policy and the defence policy which Mr. Healey has pursued?" I think the first thing is that the Government were absolutely right to reverse their previous policy and to retain the independent British nuclear deterrent and I was glad to hear the noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, taking credit for the Polaris fleet. I would say, in passing, that I wished I had had a record of that speech which I could have played in the Election of 1964: but there we are. The nuclear deterrent is not particularly expensive, as the White Paper makes clear, and yet, for the reasons which I have tried to outline, it seems to me an absolutely vital British interest that we should remain in control of our own destiny, and I greatly welcome the courage which the Government have shown in reversing their previous position.
What of the rest? I have often said to your Lordships before, and at the risk of wearying you I will say it again, that one of the things that most struck me when I was in charge of a Service Department was that the only thing which

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was really certain about defence matters was that the unexpected would, and almost always did, happen: in other words, in so far as possible one had to be ready for all eventualities. There may be some of your Lordships who have thought that what I have said about the possibility of Russian aggression is wholly far-fetched. Well, I hope so; but I would not take a chance on it. We all remember the shock when we learned the news of the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia, and saw the ruthlessness and efficiency with which that operation was conducted. I doubt whether the Communists or Communism has changed as much as some people whose memories are rather short would have us believe. It seems to me prudent, at any rate, not to rely too much on apparent changes of heart.
I confess (and I have tried studiously to be non-Party political in what I have had to say) that I find it a little strange to read in the White Paper on Defence the passage in which Mr. Healey describes how the arms budget of the Communist bloc is rising and how much greater it is than the arms budget of the West. The passage reads:
"The military power of the Soviet Union continues to grow. This year the Russian Defence Estimates went up by some 6 per cent. Soviet Scientific Estimates went up by 14 per cent. In terms of percentage of the gross national product, the defence spending of the Warsaw Pact countries together is nearly twice that of the European members of NATO."
Yet in a passage in his speech he takes great credit, as indeed to a lesser extent did the noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, for the fact that the proportion of the gross national product that we are spending in defence is declining. In another place, the Secretary of State said:
"For the first time for over a decade the Defence Estimates…are actually lower than those of the preceding year".—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, 4/3/69, col. 230.]
He went on to say:
"This year we shall be spending under 6 per cent. of our gross national product on defence compared with the 7 per cent. planned by the Conservative Government … By 1972–73 our defence expenditure will be about 5 per cent. of our gross national product."
These two passages are totally at variance, the one with the other. I understand the reasons for that, but I confess that I do not care for them. If
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we could spend less money on defence, everyone, in the Labour Party and outside it, would be glad, and it would no doubt be politically popular. But it must be the responsibility of the Government of this country to ensure the country's safety, and I find something rather distasteful about the way in which in one breath the Secretary of State takes political credit for having reduced defence expenditure, and in the next breath gives us grave warning about the total defence expenditure of our potential enemies.
There is no doubt that we are indeed running down our forces. To give but one figure (because I do not want to labour the point), in 1964 the operational Fleet, training and trials, consisted of 181 ships; and there were 170 ships in reserve and being re-fitted. To-day, there are only 144 operational ships and 60 in reserve. I am sure that the Government are right to concentrate, as indeed we always have done, the major part of our defences in the NATO area, for ultimately it is in that area on which our national safety depends. And though I do not agree with the Secretary of State that we have in fact done much to reinforce our troops in the area, I do not think that we, as a country, have anything to be ashamed of in our contribution to NATO. I think it could be argued that if some of our Allies in Europe did as much, pro rata, as we did, the conventional strength of NATO would be much greater than it is at the present time.
I also agree with the doctrine, which the noble Lord outlined, of flexible response. There must clearly be enough time for all concerned to think before irrevocable decisions are made, though I must say that I sometimes wonder whether the differences between flexible responses, trip wires, and massive retaliations, and all the other esoteric phrases, are quite as great as their proponents proclaim. I shall not say any more about NATO because my noble friend Lord St. Oswald and my noble friend Lord Thurlow will be saying something later about that.
The area about which I feel the most disquiet is that of reserves and home defence in its widest sense. In my view, the Government have run down our reserves very much too much, and they have done it to a point where they may

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well undermine their own European policy. Your Lordships will know that the Party to which I belong have said that when we are returned to office we shall take steps to remedy that situation. It may well be that there will have to be a change in the old Territorial Army, but we are convinced that there is a role for such a force, whether it be for home defence or for help in emergencies; and we believe that a basis for expansion in war is essential. Yet this will not be available under the Government's proposals.
Noble Lords opposite will also know that we do not agree with them about the abandonment of British positions in the Far East and in the Persian Gulf. I do not intend to say much about that subject this afternoon, for we have argued it out at great length on a number of occasions. I would only say that if it is possible when the Conservatives get back into office, if things have not gone too far and if our friends wish us to do so, we shall consult with them in order to retain a presence in both these areas. I do not believe, certainly in the terms in which I am thinking, that it will be very costly; and it will certainly be greatly welcomed by our friends over there, in particular the Australians and New Zealanders.
To sum up what I have been trying to say my Lords, it is this. I believe that we can provide a proper national defence policy for this country, first by our contribution to NATO, and with it our independent nuclear deterrent; by a proper policy for reserves and for a disciplined force at home in case of emergencies; and that we should, if our friends want us, and it is still possible, keep a modest presence in South East Asia and the Gulf, and that if it is in the interests of our friends we should spend a little more on defence and be prepared to ask our fellow countrymen to do so. These are our aims, and I believe that they will meet with the general approval of the people of this country.
3.44 p.m.
LORD GLADWYN: My Lords, may I make a small apology at the outset. I have an engagement this afternoon which may make it difficult for me to attend the second part of this debate, but I shall
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certainly hope to be present at the summing up of the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton.
We have heard a most interesting exposé of the Defence Statement by the noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, and we have heard a most interesting, and I thought on the whole a convincing exposé of the general thesis of our defence made by the noble Lord, Lord Carrington. I propose to touch on that aspect of defence in the second part of my very brief intervention.
May I say that on the whole we on these Benches welcome the Statement on the Defence Estimates for 1969? This, after all, is not unnatural. Following the advice we gave them in March, 1965, the Government, as we all know, eventually decided to evacuate our bases in the Indian Ocean by a given date. I do not say that this was propter hoc but I can unhesitatingly say that it was post hoc. We are glad to note, therefore, that satisfactory progress is being made in this operation, notably in Malaysia, from which—as we learn from Chapter II, paragraph 14—all our troops are to be withdrawn by the agreed date; that is, the end of 1971. I seem to recall that for our part we, that is the Liberal Party, did not object to some long-term project for having some British, or preferably by that time some European, element in a base which might perhaps be established with the agreement of the Australian Government in the North of Australia, especially if communications were installed West-about rather than East-about. That is, so to speak, another story.
But the process of evacuation does not, on the face of it, seem to be proceeding quite so smoothly as regards the Persian Gulf. Here I stand to be corrected and should like to be corrected. It seems, indeed, from Chapter I, paragraph 24 that:
"An outline plan has been prepared, but the final arrangements for our withdrawal must wait upon political developments in the area."
That is what it says. It seems that these "political developments" concern—in strict accordance, I may say, with the sensible advice given by Mr. Enoch Powell in 1965—the creation of some "Asian balance of power"; namely, the organisation of local defensive arrangements after our departure. I am sure that it is very wise; but I should still

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welcome some assurance from the Government that it is their intention that, here again, the evacuation of our forces should be completed not later than the end of 1971. I ask for that assurance.
After what the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, has said just now, I am not quite sure if it is so, but I had understood that the Tory Party had decided that, should it come into power before the process of evacuation had been completed, it would reverse the Government's intention and re-establish British bases not only in Singapore but also in the Persian Gulf—anyhow, re-establish some bases in those areas, although presumably only if the local authorities should really wants us to do so; and quite likely they will not. I must say that I doubt whether, when and if it comes to the point, the Tory Party will really do anything so ill-advised, as we should think. The "imperial" argument which they use, as it were, to justify such a reactionary gesture always is that unless we have a small—but obviously costly—military presence in the Persian Gulf, our oil supplies and those of our Allies (a great proportion of which will undoubtedly continue to come from the Middle East) will in some way be endangered.
How could these supplies be endangered? Obviously the producing countries might decide not to ship the oil, though why they should cut their own throats has never been very clear to me since they would not have much in the way of alternative markets or facilities for getting the oil transported. But if they ever did organise a boycott, it would not be our small forces in the Gulf—if such continued to exist—which would be able to stop them, any more than these small forces were able to stop such action during the Seven Days War. Or—and this is the great bogey which is always dangled before our eyes—the Russians would come along and somehow collar the oil, either sending it to the Soviet Union in their own tankers or even building a pipe line across Kurdistan. I must say that I find it difficult to envisage the circumstances in which this could happen unless the Russians were in actual physical control of Iraq and Iran, and I should have thought also Turkey. And though this is possible, it is not something which
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could possibly be prevented by a few British platoons and a sloop or two in Bahrain.
The establishment of pro-Soviet Governments in the countries concerned might indeed have unfortunate effects on our oil supplies. Our economic tail and that of our Allies might, for instance, be severely twisted. Admittedly, we might have to pay considerably more for the oil. But short of actual war with the Soviet Union, it is surely unlikely that there would be any embargo, even in the worst situation. And, anyhow, if there is war, many of our tankers will probably be torpedoed or otherwise prevented from supplying us and our friends. In any case, the outcome of the war, even if it were limited to conventional weapons—which seems rather unlikely—would in no way be affected by the presence or absence of a tiny British force in the Persian Gulf.
No, my Lords, the suggestion that we should spend hundreds of millions—which, incidentally, we do not have—in reactivating our bases in the Indian Ocean area is, as we on these Benches firmly believe, irresponsible. If a future Tory Government really had a few hundred million pounds to spare, they would be well advised to reinforce our troops in Germany, as I think was suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, himself. For, as the Statement rightly says, it is now essential—and here I think we all agree—to concentrate our military role in Europe and to have "sufficient" (that, of course, is the magic word) forces there to counter any Soviet military threat, which, incidentally, I note the Statement dismisses as most unlikely. Perhaps. But there may well be a debate about what exactly we mean by the word, "sufficient".
I will not bore your Lordships with figures which have already been given by the noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, but it is a fact that the Warsaw Power preponderance over the NATO forces in Europe is at present immense. I think I heard the noble Lord say that it is not far off three to one, if we take into account all the services and all the factors, and perhaps even as much as seven to one if an offensive were limited initially to certain sectors. I see that the noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, nods his head, so it is possible. Moreover, the Russian forces and

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those of their satellites are all streamlined and standardised; and, as we saw in Czechoslovakia, they are capable of mounting an offensive with lightning rapidity, huge efficiency and without any warning at all. You can bet your bottom dollar, my Lords, that they have similar plans all worked out for a rapid incursion into Western Germany, perhaps with some limited objective, in the event of political circumstances being such as to justify the obviously appalling risk.
It is not being alarmist, therefore, to suggest that we cannot dismiss out of hand some adventurist action on the part of the Russians and/or the Eastern Germans. If the blow were to fall there is no doubt that it would be tremendously powerful, and little doubt that it would bring the adversary to the North Sea or the Rhine in a matter of a day or two, perhaps even less, unless the defence had recourse to tactical nuclear weapons. That is the crux. There are about 7,000 of these weapons, large and small, in the NATO armies in Europe, but all depend for their use on the decision of the President of the United States of America. If any Soviet offensive, even if of a very limited scope, does take place, the question whether or not to employ them will clearly have to be taken in a matter of hours. But the Soviet forces, too, have nuclear weapons, and if such a decision is taken they will, of course, retaliate. The resulting interchange will mean that much of Western Germany, and, presumably, a good deal of the D.D.R., will be reduced to rubble.
The Russians might well be stopped somewhere between the Iron Curtain and the Rhine, but nobody can possibly imagine what would come out of the ensuing chaos. All that can be said is that such a nuclear interchange would not be likely to involve the I.C.B.M.s, or even the Soviet I.R.B.M.s—the medium-range ballistic missiles—trained on Europe. For here the situation is that any "first strike" by the one super-Power or the other is likely, to say the very least, to be counter-productive. The two scorpions in the bottle will not, even if the worst should happen, actually sting themselves to death. I think we can take that as being highly probable, if not certain.
So, my Lords, everything depends on the Russians' assuming that in the event
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of, say, a determined incursion the Allies will have recourse to tactical nuclears. The Russians will also surely reflect that if the conventional forces of the Allies were such as to be able to hold a first rush within a reasonable distance—say 50 miles from the frontier—action would be less profitable than if a dash to the Rhine or the North Sea were likely to be successful in a very few days, and the Soviet Union could then perhaps offer to negotiate a withdrawal on their own conditions; the dreadful alternative, from our point of view, being to initiate a nuclear interchange in the neighbourhood of the Rhine, with towns as far back as Aachen or Metz presumably coming under bombardment by the tactical nuclear missiles.
But if the Allied forces are to perform any such role they simply must be streamlined, standardised, co-ordinated and centrally directed. We must also rely, and rely absolutely, on the co-operation in Germany of the conventional forces of France. I am sorry to say this, but I think I am right in asserting that none of these desiderata exists to-day, and until they do we shall be in a potentially dangerous situation which will, of course, be rendered even more dangerous if there is any further withdrawal of Allied forces, and notably American forces, from Germany.
The absurdity is that all the desiderata could be achieved, and this with practically no additional expense, if we could arrange for a minimum of co-ordination and integration in some kind of European political and defence community, including France, within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty. There is some reason to-day to suppose that with the resignation of President de Gaulle the situation is now such as to permit gradual progress in that direction. Let us hope so. If so, it should be exploited as well and as rapidly as is humanly possible. In such a political and defence community further plans might be elaborated for a new kind of conventional defence, with less reliance, perhaps, on heavy tanks and more on extremely mobile units complete with anti-tank weapons of the first order, rockets for use against other targets, anti aircraft missiles and so on. If the ingenuity of our scientists could eventually provide such units with nuclear-powered vehicles of great velocity, that would be perfect, for then they could operate really

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independently. Such developments would, in any case, be likely to increase the morale of the Allied troops, and notably that of what I am afraid is a rather despondent Bundeswehr.
This is the time for new thoughts and fresh initiatives. Even if we cannot get immediate progress towards our European Political and Defence Community, we might at least be successful in establishing, for instance, some European institute for operational research—a sort of "think tank", as the Americans say—for force integration methods, and make further progress towards the creation of what I think Mr. Healey has himself described as a European element within NATO. To sum up, we on these Benches think that Mr. Healey's heart now—at last—seems to be in the right place. He should be encouraged to keep it there.
4.0 p.m.
LORD BOURNE: My Lords, I am sure it is right that we should debate Defence, even if only once a year, but I believe personally that it is wise on these occasions to discuss not weapons and equipment and details of manning, but the Defence policy itself, and that is what I propose to do. When this Government came into power, the first White Paper, in February, 1965, said that Defence consisted of two purposes: first, to guarantee the nation's security; and second, to contribute towards peace and stability in the world as a whole. We all agreed with that, and there was no difficulty. That White Paper went on to say: "These purposes are inseparable". Of course they were, and of course they still are, but I maintain that the Government have ignored this for at least two years past, as if a line could be drawn round about the Suez area and you could separate Europe from the East.
In February, 1966, after a year's very careful thought and a very detailed Review, that Review said:
"Defence must be the servant of foreign policy, not its master".
Again we agreed, but again it did not happen. It would have been more accurate, in my opinion, to have said that Defence should be the servant of the Treasury, because that is what has happened. Every single Defence policy Statement which has come since then—
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and there have been a good many of them—have been proudly descriptive, as we heard this afternoon, of how we save money. It may be that we have had to do so, but the fact remains that finance has governed Defence policy, and not foreign policy.
May I remind your Lordships that in 1965, when this Government took over, the Armed Forces consisted of 459,000 people. By the middle of the 1970s, when these plans go through, they will be reduced to about 337,000, which is a reduction of 122,000 men, or 26 per cent. That would not be so serious if we had started with I million men, but when the figure is 450,000 in my view it is a very serious reduction. A year ago I pointed to the dangers we were facing, and I thought we might get away with some reduction in numbers, but now we have had the increased reductions, inevitably because of the financial crisis. I have heard it argued that, although we are defended now by the nuclear balance of terror—and I agreed so much with the remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Carrington—we are now in danger of reducing the size of our forces to the level of the 1930s, when we allowed Hitler to pursue his ambitions without being able to prevent him. For myself, I do not think we have reached that stage, but we are getting rather near it.
Again in that Review, with very careful thought, it said:
"In recent years, the threat to peace has been far greater outside Europe than within it".
That was perfectly true when it was written; it is still true to-day; and I think myself it will be true as long as we are here. In my opinion it is quite wrong to look at the defence of Europe in isolation. Of course I agree that NATO should be given top priority, but the day when quarrels among France, Germany, Italy and Britain developed into World Wars I and II is in my opinion past. The two super Powers face each other along the River Elbe—they have done so for 20-odd years—and they know perfectly well the risks, which have been described with such accuracy by the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn. And when there is any doubt about an ally, we have seen what happens. The Russians invaded Czechoslovakia with nearly half a million men, but it was a defensive act, in my opinion, inside the Warsaw Pact area,

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not outside it. That is because they knew perfectly well the risks if they crossed the Iron Curtain.
Even if we accept the system of flexible response, which is now being pushed with considerable strength, the ultimate risks will, I suggest, remain as high as ever in the nuclear region, with the terrible results described. That is the reason why Europe has been quiet for the past twenty years, why it is quiet to-day and why I personally believe it will be quiet tomorrow and in the future. Outside Europe, however, it is very different. Here, the two super Powers are not directly facing each other. They always come into confrontation via smaller, weaker countries. Asia is full of these new States: I think I listed them the last time we spoke on this subject. As yet, they are quite unable to defend themselves, and while they are settling in we have promised again and again to remain with them and to help defend them. There is little prospect, to my mind, of them settling down at the moment. In other words, Asia has been the cockpit of the world since World War II—Korea, Malaya, the Philippines, Laos, Indonesia and now Vietnam, just to mention the big ones. There is only one thing certain when the Vietnam war ends, and that is that the politics in the area and the relative powers will be changed. Asia will continue to be the centre of friction.
From the British angle, what are our obligations? They are legal and they are moral. They are legal under the Malayan Defence Treaty; they are legal towards Hong Kong, which is still a colony; and they are strongly moral to Australia and New Zealand, who have come to our aid in two world wars. Alerting the Australians and New Zealanders (who, incidentally, are already fighting to the best of their ability in Vietnam) to increasing their garrisons in Malaysia and Singapore is not enough. It is unrealistic to say, as the July, 1968, Supplementary Statement said, that the Government
"has consulted the Governments in the areas concerned about means of developing a new basis for peace and stability after British forces have left",
and simultaneously to remove those British forces. It is unrealistic. Our word, as a result, is now doubted in that
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part of the world, and I think that is a very bad thing. Surely the lesson has been learned over and over again that political influence means anything only when it is backed up by power, both military and economic.
In the Middle East, we seem to forget that if we had stayed there—I am not recommending that we should, but if we had by any chance stayed in that area with considerable forces—there would have been no short Arab-Israel wars. Then who would care to bet, if the British garrison were withdrawn, that Hong Kong would remain British? Those are the matters which I personally think we ought to consider. In other words, there is a very strong case for small British garrisons remaining on the spot. I admit, like the noble Lord, Lord, Carrington, that it has been argued again and again, and I hope your Lordships will forgive me for repeating these things, but the argument for small British garrisons remaining on the spot is very strong indeed. I have often argued that a company to-day is worth a brigade next week or a division a fortnight later. The New Zealand Prime Minister, Mr. Holyoake, was absolutely right when he said that there is all the difference between total withdrawal and keeping a small garrison. Berlin is a very good example of this. There we have three extremely weak battalions, the French two weak battalions and the Americans a reasonably strong brigade. They are as nothing to the forces all round them—absolutely nothing. But the Russians know perfectly well that if they start fighting there is a guarantee that there would be a war.
LORD GLADWYN: My Lords, will the noble Lord allow me to interrupt him for one moment? What he says about Berlin is quite true, but it is only the presence of the American forces which deters the Russians; it is not the presence of the small British or French element at all.
LORD BOURNE: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for pointing that out. I do not happen to agree with it. I personally think the British garrison is very well worth while. In short, we ought to keep a small garrison in Singapore; one of, say, two frigates, two squadrons of

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R.A.F. and, perhaps, even one or possibly two battalions—that is, if it is possible to reverse the policy and that we have not actually left. If we have left it is very difficult to reverse it. Incidentally, the White Paper we are debating mentions that, based in Europe, we shall keep a general capability of returning to action in that part of the world to help our friends. If it takes two years to plan an exercise, I should like to know how quickly we should get there—especially with no bases and especially with no aircraft carriers.
Now I come to the Middle East. Here a similar argument applies, and perhaps even more so. If ever there was an unstable area, this is it; and if ever there were people who contributed to its instability by withdrawing in an irresponsible way, we are those people. The Arabs have never combined, I think, for 4,000 years, except against the Jews. I see no reason why they should start to do so now. Creating a power vacuum in the Gulf will simply invite this sort of power politics. The Middle East has always been dominated by a land Power. At the present time it is not; but it may not be very long before it is. Leaving behind diplomatic representation, however strong and adept, is not the answer and will be no safeguard to this position. Let us remember that it is only a year or two since the Trucial States were actually fighting each other; now they are engaged, under British supervision, in the exercise of forming a defensive treaty among themselves. But I should not like to bet too much on its realisation.
The Aden exercise—we evacuated there about a year ago—is, to my mind, small guide. We have created a power vacuum there. As soon as the Suez Canal is opened, I believe that the Russians will establish a small naval base at Aden. Arguments that the Germans, the Japanese, the Italians and the French do very well with their commercial operations without any forces in the East do not appeal to me. Let us not forget that the security in the area is at present being provided by the United States and by the British. If we, the British, leave a gap, especially in the Indian Ocean, there will be trouble. Will the Government please tell me how much more it costs to keep a battalion in Singapore or in the
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Persian Gulf, without families, than it does on Salisbury Plain? Will they also tell me, observing that both these places are in the sterling area, how much the foreign exchange costs compared with a battalion in Germany? I have never been satisfied over this matter and I should like to hear the answer.
My Lords, I come to a mechanical point mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Carrington: recruiting and reserves. I shall deal with the reserves first. This Government, rightly, have modernised TAVR II, and I think TAVR I as well, into a force of 50,000 or 60,000 very well-equipped young men. I agree with that. Of course, it is not a reserve in the sense that it is uncommitted. It is, in fact, merely to plug holes, and is specifically designed to fill special holes in the low establishment of the Regular Army that we have to-day—mostly, incidentally, in B.A.O.R. The TAVR III (which they continue to call the Territorials) was transferred to the Home Office a couple of years ago chiefly to support civil defence. It was to cost only é3 million per annum. Now that civil defence has been knocked on the head, the Territorial Army has been practically destroyed; and I think personally that this is a shabby affair. What is more, I think it is very ill-advised not to have an uncommitted reserve. I maintain that the Territorial Army should be resuscitated and should he of the strength at least of one division, and preferably of two, with a home defence rôle as well as a civil defence rôle.
Please let us remember that when the Territorial Army was destroyed there was destroyed also a two-way link—which is rather vital to the next subject, which is recruiting. The two-way link was to the countryside, on the one hand, and to the Regular Army on the other. It was a very strong link indeed. A good deal of recruiting came via the Territorial Army. That has all been destroyed. It is no surprise to me that recruiting has fallen off. I think that the saddest figures in the whole of this White Paper are those in the appendix on page 81 which point to the fact that the number of young men from civil life joining the Army in 1965 was 12,000 and in 1968 was less than 8,000—actually, 7,577—a drop of 50 per cent. Those are terrible figures to have to compete with.

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The exercises which are vividly described in the White Paper are not sufficient to attract young men into the Services. Germany and B.A.O.R. are no longer attractive and the present defence policy does not answer the standard question asked by young men of their fathers: "Will the Services give me a worthwhile career?" At the present moment, the fathers are answering "No". I am referring not to officers but to the other ranks. I believe that if recruiting continues to fall we shall before long find ourselves faced with the choice either of paying the same rates as in civil life to a small Regular force—which is an extremely expensive business—or of returning to National Service, perhaps in selective form.
Lastly, my Lords, I have a practical suggestion to make. It is to set up an Armed Forces Committee of both Houses of Parliament. I have made this suggestion before; but I make it more seriously to-day. I should like to ask the Government what they feel about it. Surely, we must admit that the annual Defence debates in this House, and perhaps the debates in the other place, once or twice a year are not a satisfactory answer. The Secretary of State, with a certain majority, has only to resist for a matter of hours. He can then go home and put the files away for nearly a year. Defence, in my opinion, ought to he completely bipartisan and should not be decided by the Party which happens to be in power at the moment. It is too important to leave it to one Party. Defence policy, apart from service and technical details, which are the concern of the Chiefs of Staff, ought to be fully presented by the Secretary of State and discussed, if necessary, under the Official Secrets Act. It is a continuing matter and ought not to be debated once or twice a year by Members of Parliament who, necessarily, know very little.
I recommend therefore the setting up of a Joint Committee of both Houses, an Armed Forces Committee on similar lines to the Senate and the House of Representatives Committees on the Armed Services in Washington. Incidentally, the Senate Committee was established in 1816, so it is not a new exercise. These two Committees in Washington can, and do, sit jointly. I recommend only one in this Parliament here. It may be that our
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Armed Forces Committee, if it is established, should not have as wide powers as the United States Committees which have rights
"to investigate, subpoena witnesses, travel and publish reports."
We already have a Public Accounts Committee with very wide powers. I fail to see why we should not have the same thing in an equally important subject. It would certainly keep the Secretary of State for Defence up to the mark.
4.20 p.m.
LORD THORNEYCROFT: My Lords. I hesitate to speak in this debate. For one thing, I speak but seldom in your Lordships' House, and for another I do not any longer rate myself as a particularly good critic. I have at least seen sufficient of the difficulties of Government to make me rather hesitate before starting to attack all those engaged upon it.
There is, moreover, one other problem that confronts us in a debate on the Government's White Paper. It is a rather academic discussion. If one went cutside this Chamber I do not suppose one would find many people who thought that the Labour Party would have any very great role to play, at any rate in the first five years of the '70s. Power and responsibility are already slipping from their hands, and as one goes round the world—as all of us who leave this country occasionally do—one finds that the voices that are increasingly listened to are the voices of some of my noble friends on the Front Opposition Bench in this House or from the Conservative side in the House of Commons. The question one is asked is not, "Why do the Government do this?" but, "What will the next Government do?" That is the question we have to answer. And so in this debate I do not want just to attack the Government. I want, if I may, to follow the able speeches of my noble friend Lord. Carrington and the noble Lord, Lord Bourne, and try to discuss some of the fundamentals of defence policy.
Perhaps I might say one thing which is a little critical. I am getting increasingly worried about the Secretary of State. He keeps on saying the most remarkable things. I notice that in the White Paper he starts off by saying:
"The re-orientation of our defence policy is now completed, and the Armed Forces can

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look forward to a period of stability and progress."
That is either the most arrogant or me most foolish statement that I have read for a very long time. It is not for a Government whose defence policy has lurched between putting our frontiers on the Himalayas and putting them in the Thames Valley to talk about a situation of "stability and progress". The Secretary of State is an able and intelligent man—as are all the Members of Her Majesty's Government. Indeed, I think that when the history of these times is written, men will ponder on how so much wit, ability and honesty of purpose could be squandered on such disastrous policies. I think it is partly—at any rate in defence—because of a tendency to try to exaggerate the differences between Parties, sometimes when no differences exist at all.
During my experience in public life it has often occurred to me that the greatest Ministers talk least in the really Party sense. Take men like Churchill and Ernest Bevin. Sometimes you would hardly know to which Party they belonged except that there might perhaps be a look of anxiety on the faces of Members of their own Back Benches from time to time. But in the main they talked beyond and above Party; and they sought, wherever possible, the maximum accord. I am very worried, therefore, when I hear the Secretary of State larding his speeches with these dubious statistics.
I would warn the noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, about these briefs from the Ministry of Defence. I would say to him, if I may, "Do be careful of their figures; and if you will have a word with me afterwards, I will explain their difficulties". These figures extrapolate somebody's defence expenditure five years ago and stretch it out in some graph to enable the Prime Minister to maintain that he has made a saving of the gap. My Lords, no Chancellor of the Exchequer would take that from anybody, except the Prime Minister. So I warn the noble Lord to be very cautious.
May I say one other thing? I do not know whether the noble Lord has been following the recent articles of that great defence correspondent, Mr. Chapman Pincher, but I commend them to him.
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Mr. Chapman Pincher is one of the best informed defence correspondents that we have in this country and he is a very able, accurate and honourable man. We have all suffered under him from time to time: we have suffered because of his unfortunate habit of getting the facts right, which is so embarrassing to us all. But he called attention to the fact that I the figures of which the noble Lord was boasting allow for the fact that some £500 million worth of foreign aircraft are going to be paid for by a succeeding Conservative Government. I think that when noble Lords opposite talk about these things there ought to be, shall we say, at any rate a note on the account. I do not think that any accountant would allow a business to get away with such claims without drawing attention fairly firmly to this point. No doubt when the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, replies to the debate he will lay some special emphasise on it.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, may I tell the noble Lord that I shall not do so, because I have done it so often already; but the noble Lord was not here to listen.
LORD THORNEYCROFT: My Lords, that is again an indication of agreement, so long as we all recognise that these figures which are normally quoted, these differences between Socialist and Conservative, are, as the noble Lord now says, a little bogus. The noble Lord says that he has said it before, and so I do not mind if he does not say it again. So long as we have reached agreement on these matters it is perfectly satisfactory.
My Lords, the other matter on which I have some doubts regarding the Secretary of State is this maximising of differences. In his speech in another place he covered pages of Hansard trying to find some miraculous difference between the way the Tories would defend Europe and the way the Socialists would defend Europe. But, in fact, it is not true that there is a difference. We are all faced with the same problems and, by and large, we are generally all forced to the same conclusions. I think we ought to address our minds to the general principles of policy which, whether we like it or not, fate really forces us to look at squarely on whichever side of the

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House we may sit. Therefore, my Lords, may I turn for a moment to the nature of the problem as I see it? And may I say that, on the nature of the problem, I agree with what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Bourne, and by my noble friend Lord Carrington. The problem that faces you in defence is not some theory about whether you want to fight in Europe or in the Far East.
It is perhaps often boring to repeat personal experiences, yet sometimes they highlight these things. I remember that when I arrived at the Ministry of Defence, some five or six years ago, I had every hope of slashing defence costs. I genuinely believed that this was something I could do, not because I was a very clever man but because the brilliant generalship of General Templer had so settled the situation in Malaysia that there was every prospect of bringing back large numbers of our forces from the Far East. This was going to be the policy; it would have saved a great deal of money. But what happened? My Lords, what happened was confrontation; was Borneo; was Sarawak. And then came demands in other parts of the world: British Guiana; East Africa, and for the support of NATO in Cyprus. My Lords, these are the realities of defence. It is concerned not with theory but with what is happening in the world.
It is idle to pretend that, somehow, one can pick a figure out of the air and say that that is what goes for defence. It depends on what other people are doing. What you really have to defend yourself against, as was said by the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, is the unexpected; and the best that we can do is to take the best defence and contrive the best defence forces we can, within the limits we think we can afford, and adjust them to what will in any event be almost certainly an unexpected thing. Thanks to General Walker, and the brilliant professional Army with which this country is blessed, all those roles that I have mentioned were sustained. Yet to-day Mr. Healey says that to carry out those roles, to face those situations, is too expensive.
At the time of which I have been speaking the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, was among the bitterest of my critics. He wanted to introduce conscription, which of course would have been even more
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expensive. If I took the sort of figures he was talking about then, and extrapolated them into the future, it would make anything the Tories ever had in mind far more extravagant. In fact, he did not do it. It was before his period in the "Corridors of Power", but he was a responsible man—
LORD WIGG: My Lords, before the noble Lord, Lord Thorneycroft, gets carried away by the exuberance of his own verbosity would he explain how he arrives at that sum?
LORD THORNEYCROFT: What sum?
LORD WIGG: Why, if you have a National Service Army, with the rates of pay that were paid when the noble Lord was himself a Minister, and with e sharp differential between the two, it necessarily follows that a voluntary Army would be more expensive?
LORD THORNEYCROFT: My Lords, I will not elaborate the figures but I will listen with the greatest interest and delight to the noble Lord who is to speak later in the debate who, I know, supported the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, at that time, and who believes—though I must not pre-judge his speech—that conscription ought to be introduced.
LORD WIGG: My Lords, I an most grateful that the noble Lord is going listen to what I will say. He has done so on previous occasions, with advantage to him and perhaps with advantage this afternoon. But if he comes to this House—and like the noble Lord I am new to this place—and informs your Lordships, in his own emphatic and inimitable way, of a fact, I am sure that he owes it not to me but to your Lordships to substantiate what he has said.
LORD THORNEYCROFT: My Lords, I will substantiate what I have said. I do not want to do it at great length. What I was saying briefly is that while there may be many arguments for having a conscripted Army, it is, alas!, the. most expensive way of collecting the Armed Forces we require. We need vast numbers of people and we have to train them effectively. Not only that, but wt have to do so within a relatively short time, and then we have to lose them. If we are faced with troubles overseas, they

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have to spend a considerable part of their time travelling from this country to the theatres of operation. This is the advice that I was provided with at the time by our experts at the Ministry of Defence. I did not believe that they were wrong then and I do not believe that they are wrong to-day. I do not want to pursue this point any further but I will always listen to the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, with interest in these matters.
We could have come to a different decision. We could have decided to abandon that role, but I am bound to say that we would have been wrong to do so. I think that the Government really share this view as well, because after reading the White Paper and listening to the noble Lord, I think that he is still contemplating a capability overseas. He is still looking for some way of carrying out a role in support of the necessities in which outside events involve us. And my judgment is that the Government are perfectly sincere in wanting to do that. The discussion is not really about whether we should do that, but about what are the methods and resources we should make available for this purpose.
I think that the policy of the Government under any Party is going to be a policy of Europe plus beyond. No doubt the main theatre may be Europe, but undoubtedly it will also be beyond Europe. This, I may say, will be a policy not only for the United Kingdom but also for Europe. The idea that there can be a European defence with all the European countries looking narrowly at one another, is a great illusion. The necessity of not stopping short of Suez, of realising that there is a world beyond, of recognising that peace is indivisible, is just as essential to any other European country as it is to us at the present time.
Can we afford all this? We can afford a great deal of it. Of course, we do not want to afford and should not afford the £500 million, or whatever the estimate has been, of the cost of defence beyond Suez. The figure cannot be accurate but it is a very large sum of money. Of course, the Government are right in reducing that figure. Again, this is common ground. But when the noble Lord goes on to say that we cannot match the contribution which Australia would be willing to put in at Singapore,
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is the answer from this great country to be, "No". Is it really possible that we could not say that at least we are prepared to match an Australian contribution in that part of the world? I cannot conceive of any British Government being prepared to give any answer of that character.
Like the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, I have recently been in Australia, and although the Australians might be shocked because we are moving out East of Suez, they are far more shocked at what they firmly believe was said to them before. They are under the firm impression that the policy was not to move out and certainly not in the way and at the pace at which the Government very shortly afterwards decided to do so. There is a lot of bridge building to do there. And I am afraid it is a lot of bridge building for any Party in power in this country, because once a great country like Australia feels that it has been let down, it takes many years to build up confidence again. And in defence confidence is essential.
There are only two things I want to say about this role outside. If we have the role the Government are talking about, in which everybody has to be shoved out at the last moment, it must be based on a maritime policy. We have to have some role for the Royal Navy. I think that this would be common ground. If we are going to have a role for the Royal Navy, particularly if the Suez Canal were closed or unsuited, the Cape route is of the greatest importance. I find it hard to understand how anybody can speak or write about these things without some reference to Simonstown. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, when he replies, will at least re-emphasise that a base at Simonstown and the co-operation of the South African Government (whatever other views we hold about their policies) are absolutely essential if we are to have a proper maritime role.
The other thing I want to say—and I say it more to my noble friends here, upon whose shoulders I think the responsibility will then rest—is that we should think very carefully before we part with the carriers. If we part with the carriers, we reduce the scope of the Royal Navy, apart from a blip on a radar screen, to a few miles of tumbled sea. Wherever

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there has been an emergency, the question has always been asked: Where is the Royal Navy? I will guarantee that it is still being asked in the Cabinet to-day. The Navy is used by the present Government in all sorts of places. It has about three lines in the White Paper, but it is worth more than three lines; and all of us in this House know it. I hope that, whatever the decision, very deep thought will be given before any final decision is taken to phase out the carriers.
I want to say this about Europe. Defence depends upon more things than weapons: it depends on the will and purpose that lie behind them; it depends on foreign policy. And I am bound to tell the Government that I think the attempt to cancel the Concorde, the slashing aside of ELDO and the handling of what was called "the Affaire Soames", the recent démarche that took place, have done a tremendous amount of damage to our position in Europe. If we are going to talk about mutual defence, and about sharing things, we have to be on completely confident terms with other countries. We have to engage in joint efforts in many fields. France is the heart and centre of Europe. Without the full co-operation of France, European defence is quite meaningless.
I am not going to embark on a discussion of the present scene. But I think it would be unwise to imagine that some dramatic turn will suddenly take place in French policy. It is essential that efforts continue to get full understanding in defence between France and the United Kingdom. When I was at the Ministry of Defence we had regular Staff talks between the French General Staff and the British General Staff, and I attached the highest importance to these. I hope and believe that these talks are still taking place. I should like an assurance that they are. Naturally, I do not ask for information on what happens at these talks, but simply that they still take place and are being used to the full, so that at the moment an accord is possible and so that the underlying technical basis of defence is available for those who wish to bring these countries rather closer together. So, as I say, France is vital.
The main point that I wish to make is simply this. I do not believe that the differences on Defence between the Con
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servative Party and the Socialist Party to-day are really deep. If I may answer the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, I do not believe that when the Conservatives come to power such damage will have been done overseas that it will be impossible to recover the situation. I suppose that most people would say that this Government is going down todefeat oddly enough, defeat in defence—defence that is perhaps a little incompetent but is still defence—of die capitalist system, the Anglo-American Alliance, the Polaris submarine and the nuclear bomb; and are now taking upon themselves the responsibility of cutting the unions down to size. It is an awesome spectacle to see a Labour Government going down to defeat on those grounds, but it is not altogether disgraceful; and they will leave behind them the possibility something that is worthy in the Defence field.
4.41 p.m.
LORD LEATHERLAND: My Lords, one of these days I must borrow Lord Thorneycroft's political crystal ball. However, in the meantime I should like to say how fortunate your Lordships' House is in having so many eminent Defence experts among its Members. I plead to be the exception that proves the rule. But I take some comfort from the fact that experts do not always agree among themselves. Those of us who have read the reminiscences of Generals in the last war are confirmed in that view; and I seem to remember that the noble Lord, Lord Thorneycroft, when he was Minister of Defence was not always in harmony with his own colleagues.
I like the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, when he is a politician; I admire him when he is a statesman, as he so frequently is in this House; and I thought that the first part of his speech here this afternoon would do credit to a professor of strategic studies. But I liked it less when he went on and became a politician. He said in the second part of his speech that we must spend more money on Defence. I would merely ask him how he reconciles that attitude of mind with the attitude of his Leader, Mr. Heath, who says he is going to cut down taxation by £1,000 million. The noble Lord did not give us an explanation of that.
Defence, of course, is vital to us, and I have always been a champion of that

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point of view. But so also is our economy vital to us, and for two reasons: first, because it is vital for its own sake; and secondly, because no Defence policy can be really sound unless it has a sound economic understructure to go with it. The noble Lord, Lord Carrington, said in the first part of his speech (and it gave me very seriously to think) that the United States when the actual moment of the crunch came might not be willing to use the H-bomb in defence of a territory in Europe. He suggested, as an alternative, that there might be a European H-bomb. But could we in that moment of crunch rely on that European H-bomb any more than we could rely on the American H-bomb? Some of the European countries might not want to use it. They might not want to risk the certainty of destruction which would come about through retaliation; they would at once withdraw from that European community, and the back of NATO would be broken straight away.
I often think, my Lords, that I should like to be a pacifist. But there is a dangerous mood of violence in the world to-day. We see it on every university campus from Tokyo to California; we see it in the streets of all our leading capital cities; we see it in Vietnam, Nigeria, in the Middle East; and we see it even in Northern Ireland and in Wales. We see generation set against generation, race set against race, creed set against creed, and tribe set against tribe, as in the tribal war in Nigeria. This is not a time for psychedelic dreams of security and of trusting in the good intentions of everybody else. I wish it were. But, as things are as they are, we have to be prepared to defend ourselves against anybody who hits us, and I hope, as all sensible people hope, that preventive organisations like the United Nations and NATO will be able to keep any necessary hitting down to the very minimum. Nevertheless, we have to do our share in furnishing the forces which may help to prevent war from coming about.
Here I want to congratulate the Government on the realistic and rational Defence policy which they have introduced. It is the most realistic that we have had for many years. For they have had the sense to see that we cannot go on
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policing the whole world. Mr. Enoch Powell told us not long ago that it was ridiculous to maintain a British presence in the Far East and the Middle East. I merely mention him as one of the recognised Conservative Party experts on Defence matters. It is a fact, even though Mr. Enoch Powell says it, that the more you scatter your forces, the less you contribute to your strength and the more you create a state of weakness. The Government have, I believe, really brought our Defence commitments within the economic resources of this country. Inevitably you cannot keep putting guns before butter for ever and ever; there has to be a stop.
I am glad that this new Defence policy will lighten taxation in this country, but, for the sake of safety, this lightening of taxation has to be done within reason. I think that this is what the Government have done. They have cut expenditure and at the same time they have improved efficiency. We have a better command structure; we have better weapons; our forces are more sensibly deployed, and we have a more sensible and realistic overall strategy. It is not a policy which assumes that we are going to engage in things like Suez adventures in the future. It puts the defence of our homeland first and recognises within this interest that we must be able to defend ourselves against any attack that might come through Europe.
My Lords, there is one thing about which I am doubtful. Is Western Europe adequately organised to put up the requisite defence? I do not want to be panicky, and I do not think that any attack is likely. I believe that if Russia seriously thought of attacking, then Russia would also think seriously about Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Poland, Hungary, probably the Ukraine and its independent-mindedness, and, of course, about China. But we cannot overlook the fact that recent events have resulted in a vast Soviet army being aligned along the borders of Western Germany, and just as in the olden days we were told to look to our moat, so I think at the moment we have to look to our NATO stockade. If, as I like to believe, we have adopted this policy of what is called flexible response, and have rejected the

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alternative policy of an immediate massive nuclear retaliation, then I am unhappy about the state of NATO's conventional forces. And the less adequate those conventional forces are, the sooner the West would be driven to make use of nuclear weapons, which of course means European suicide.
I am especially doubtful about France, with her virtual "go it alone" policy, aimed at keeping the United States out of any very important voice in Europe. That is exactly what Russia wants. I hope that when these European security talks take place our representatives will not be seduced by soothing suggestions into splitting the United States off from Europe. I believe that the foundations of NATO were very soundly built, but it is essential that the United States is one of its main buttresses. If we look round just now we see that there arc a few loose tiles on the roof of the edifice. Apart from France, would Portugal be much use? Would Greece he much use? I know that both those countries have valuable harbours, but they also have something else about them which might be more of a liability than an asset. Would Denmark, at the mouth of the Baltic, be able to stand up against Soviet blackmail? At the moment, too, we see that Canada is seriously considering taking home some of her troops from NATO.
Then there is the uncertain political atmosphere over Europe. Is France to be looked upon as stable, either in the short term or in the long term? Will the Bonn Coalition last for ever? And is not Italy walking on a political tightrope? All these factors have to be faced when we are assessing the present solidarity of NATO. We also have to bear in mind that many of these European armies at the moment are manned very largely by short-term conscripts. NATO, in my view, as has been said by other noble Lords here this afternoon, needs to be strengthened and not weakened. So I think that the Government are right not to reduce our forces in Germany, even if for foreign exchange reasons we have to keep one of the brigades on short call here at home.
Incidentally, are the Germans, the prosperous West Germans, meeting enough of the foreign exchange costs of the
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British Army of the Rhine? That Army will cost £98 million this year. Yet all we are told in the White Paper is that the foreign exchange is to he negotiated. I hope that the Government will treat this as an urgent matter and give it some early attention. As it is, this policy of helping to man the German front line is allowing Germany to direct more of her manpower into her factories, as a result of which they are able to undercut us in the export markets of the world. I recognise that there is always a danger in building up the German military machine. Some day there may again be a warmonger in Germany. But I think that that is years ahead. I think that as far as we can see the Germans are likely to be deterred from any aggression by the certain knowledge that they would have to fight on two fronts. In the meantime, NATO has the virtue of enabling us to look at Germany knowing that Germany will not have to develop her own H-bomb.
The essence of this part of what I have been saying is that we should not reduce our forces in Europe, and we should persuade others to strengthen theirs. Incidentally, I think the longer our troops remain in Germany on a friendly basis, the more understanding there is likely to be cultivated between our High Command and the German High Command, and between the British and the German people. I want to repeat, my Lords, that I do not suggest that we are going to see any attack by Russia on the West. All I will say—and I think it is very important indeed—is that the readily available armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries in Europe are vastly greater than those of NATO. Reliable estimates have been given of three to one. We have heard this afternoon that it might be two to one. And it is a fact, of course, that the Soviet Government has 20 Divisions and thousands of fighting aircraft in East Germany alone. If we do not want the burglars to break in, we must keep a dog; and the bigger the dog we keep the less likely it will be that he will ever have to bite.
Just a word or two about the Territorial Army. The absence of a scheme for effective reconstruction of the Territorial Army is one of the incompletenesses (I will use a harmless word) in the White Paper. I have said before that in my

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view it was a mistake to cut the Territorial Army about in the way we did. I know that one effect has been to raise the effectiveness of our main reserves. It has done that very thoroughly, and it is something for which we should be thankful. But those reserves are intended to reinforce our front-line units; they are not intended as the basis upon which we can build new echelons; they are not intended to provide a home defence force. A force of trained men in this country would be a boon if ever war broke out in Europe. I say "if", my Lords; but defence policy has always to be based on balancing the various "ifs".
Bear in mind that the fully trained general combat force of the Army that we have in this country is only 40,000 men. Bear in mind that those men, or most of them, would be required very quickly in Europe. We cannot leave the defence of the homeland to the Army Pay Corps, despite the fact that the pen may still be mightier than the sword. I wonder how many paratroops an evil-minded enemy could drop on this country in one night. And with proper organisation of sabotage they could bring this country almost to a standstill. I feel that the country could get good value from a citizen army for a few million pounds. If this title of Territorial Army is unattractive—and I agree that it has not a very glamorous sound—because successive Governments since the war have carved it about, why not try calling it something like "The Resistance"? I think that adventurous young men would rally round in their thousands.
In the meantime, I should like to make two specific suggestions. Let us look first of all at TAVR II—again, not a particularly glamorous title. It is organised at the moment in sub-units, and these sub-units are widely spread over the country. A colonel I know has two of these sub-units 70 miles from each other, and a third about a hundred miles away. I think that we should try to get those back on a territory basis. It would then be easier to get part-time civilian colonels (as we will call them) who would be able to give their attention to these units. Also, we ought to expand the cadres of TAVR III. At the moment the average cadre consists (and the Government made a much-appreciated concession when they allowed
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the old "Terriers" to continue with these cadres of their old regiments) of a major, two captains and five other ranks. They would be far more useful if they were allowed to grow up to thirty or forty. This could be done gradually, not hurriedly, by allowing the men in TAVR II who have become a little too old, who have family commitments or have opportunities of promotion in civil life which make it rather difficult for them to continue to give commitment to immediate mobilisation in TAVR II, to go into TAVR III and continue their part-time soldiering there. I know that negotiations are going on over these two matters. I should like to see some progress made here.
The only other thing I want to do is to call your Lordships' attention to the book of Estimates which has been issued in connection with the Defence White Paper. It contains some fascinating information. On page 109, which deals with the Women's Royal Army Corps, we find that there are 1.730 officers and N.C.O.s and only 2,070 privates; that is to say, 1,700 of them have stars and stripes on their arms and shoulders, and only 2,000 of them have their arms and shoulders bare. If we deduct the bat-women and ladies' maids (or whatever they are called), who is left to do the "spud-bashing"? On the same page we find that the figures for the Army are even more revealing. Generals, brigadiers, colonels, majors, captains, subalterns, warrant officers—God bless them!—and N.C.O.s number 93,000; privates number 78,000, and those privates include not only the ordinary "squaddie" but the boy soldiers, junior soldiers and apprentices. There are 78,000 of them, and 93,000 to give them orders. I must say that I rather like idea. It is better than it was in my day; it gives opportunities for promotion, and I think some of the highly skilled technical work that has to be carried out by soldiers in these days deserves non-commissioned officer rank.
Last week we talked about pay and we were given an undertaking that improvements would be forthcoming. The sooner the information about an increase is made public the better it will be for recruiting. But the most fascinating of all the disclosures in the Estimates is this: the Army, Navy, Air Force and their respective Ministries and stations are

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to pay £15¼ million this year in selective employment tax. In case noble Lords think I have invented that figure, may I point out that the headquarters of the Defence Ministry itself has to pay £402,000 and its out-stations £195,000. The Navy pays £178,000 for its main establishment and £8½million for its civilian staff. The T.A. itself pays, but it is only a small, unrecorded amount. Army headquarters pays £214,000 and its out stations £253,000. The Ordnance Branch pays £1¾ million, R.A.F. headquarters pays £175,000; and its outstations £3½ million, while R.A.F. stations overseas pay £2,000. This gives a total of £15¼ million.
Here is one trouble: if we increase the number of recruits, as we hope to do, we shall have to pay more in S.E.T. It may he that the Exchequer refunds it, but there is no specific mention of refunds anywhere in the Estimates. It may be that it is included in the total sum of appropriations in aid, but if that be so, why have we quite a number of civil servants collecting the money from the Army, Navy and Air Force and then paying it back to them? Why have we probably hundreds of bonny little Wrens, Wracs and Wrafs sitting on their chairs, adding up columns of figures when they might be making a more useful contribution to the efficiency and morale of the Services?
A more important point about S.E.T. is this: we are paying this year £4 million more from the Services to the Chancellor for S.E.T. than we paid in the year just ended, and if this money is not refunded the £5 million reduction which the Government have made in the total Estimates for the whole Defence Services which Ministers have put before us should really be a £9 million reduction. That, of course, nearly doubles the virtue of the Ministers whom I am so glad to serve. On that note I must end, because there are so many noble Lords who wish to speak; but: once more I should like to congratulate the Government on the energy and enterprise they are showing in reorganising our defences, and on the way they are giving the community better service for less money.
5.4 p.m.
LORD STRATHCLYDE: My Lords, in contrast to the weighty and, in some cases, complicated matters which have
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been discussed during our debate to-day with such knowledge by some of the most eminent Members of this House, the matter which I wish to ventilate is simple indeed. In this country we grow only about half the food we require. With the exception of coal we have no raw materials whatsoever, and it therefore follows that to meet the essential requirements of our people and of our irdustries much of our food and the bulk of our raw materials have to come to us from overseas. These have to be paid for by exports, and I am told that 60 per cent. of the exports from this country are carried in the bottoms of ocean-going ships. Should the trading routes be seriously interrupted, even for a few weeks, our industries would come to a standstill, our exports would stop and our people would face starvation These facts are known to every single one of your Lordships, but they arc so evident that they are sometimes overlooked and forgotten. So far as the great majority of our people are concerned, when they think of these things they take it for granted that our defence arrangements are such as will ensure that at all times there will continue to arrive in this country everything that is essential to our life.
In 1917 submarines operating in the North Atlantic trade routes brought us very close to defeat; in 1943 they again brought us within sight of disaster. In the First World War the submarine was a small vessel which could not stay submerged for more than a few hours; which, when submerged (except for brief periods) could steam at only sortie two or three knots, and their speed on the surface was only very moderate. They were indeed highly vulnerable. In the Second World War we were confronted by vastly superior vessels: larger, faster beyond measure, both on the surface and when submerged. They could stay at sea for considerable periods of time and they were armed much better than their predecessors of the First World War.
In spite of having become so much more formidable, the submarine of the Second World War could still be dealt with and contained by small surface ships with very simple armaments and of only moderate speed, ships such as could be produced in vast numbers and very quickly by our shipyards. In addition, we had at the outbreak of that war many

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old destroyers and other small naval craft, also large numbers of trawlers and other fishing vessels which, armed with a small gun and a few depth charges, were capable of convoy escort duties, of patrolling areas through which submarines were expected to pass, or in which it was anticipated that they might operate. These vessels were all capable of taking on the submarines and generally harassing them and making life most difficult for them.
The situation to-day, my Lords, is very different. The modern submarine is a large vessel—as large, and in some cases even larger, than our latest surface ships. They can stay under water for days at a time without surfacing, while being as fast, or even faster, both above and below water, than any of our other modern ships of war, and faster than the great majority of merchant ships. The type of ship which was so readily available and so suitable for anti-submarine work in the past is of no use against the modern submarine. One wonders how then we are going to protect our shipping.
My information is that we have no new discoveries which make it much easier to detect the submarine when she is submerged. Convoy escorts, I am told, hunt in groups, and patrols still appear to be essential to protect trade. I ask, where are the ships capable of undertaking these duties, or where are they to come from? I remember particularly the greatly increased speed, both of the merchant ships of to-day and of the submarine. I hope that when the Minister replies he will be able to tell us how it is proposed to protect our merchant shipping and that of our NATO allies in the event of war, and how the trade routes vital to us can be kept open at least to such an extent that we in these Islands receive the necessities of life.
When the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, wound up the debate on maritime strategy which had been initiated by my noble and gallant friend Lord Glasgow, on June 12 last year, I asked whether if our lines of communication across the sea were severed and we were faced with starvation—as we assuredly should be—the answer was submission or nuclear war? In reply the noble Lord said—and here I would quote from Hansard those parts of his reply which I believe to be relevant:
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"The point at issue … is not a simple one … if there is a danger of our trade lifeline being cut … that element of our security … in the nuclear age cannot be a simple matter for the nation State on its own. Collective security is the only thing that matters, the only thing that will keep us safe. I am not suggesting that the difference must be between starvation and nuclear war; I am saying that the survival and prosperity of these islands depends in future on collective and not individual action."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 12/6/68; col. 194.]
I am sure that many of us will agree to a very large extent with what the noble Lord then said, but I would submit that that really was not an answer to my question, for I had said nothing whatsoever about "going it alone". What I asked was quite simple: if the lines of communication were severed and we were about to starve, was the answer submission or nuclear war? I had hoped that the noble Lord would be able to say that it was neither of these and that the forces of NATO would be capable of dealing with the situation and of freeing the lines of communication, at least to such an extent as would ensure our survival. I hope that that is indeed the case, and that not only this House but the nation may, before this debate ends, be assured on that very grave issue. My Lords, it is not only a grave issue for this country, it is also a very grave issue for our NATO allies, for should part of Europe be overrun we might well survive and again from these islands, as in the past two wars, play a vital part in recovering what had been lost. But should our communications across the sea be severed, this nation would perish, and that to the very great detriment of the Free World and the future of civilisation.
My Lords, I wish to apologise. I have to be in Scotland to-night and I have to leave now to catch my plane. I hope the noble Lord to whom I have referred and the noble Lord who will wind up the debate and your Lordships generally will excuse me if I leave you now.
5.14 p.m.
LORD WIGG: My Lords, the noble Lord who has just spoken has posed a problem which has faced this country ever since the end of the last war and stares us in the face, stark and stern. Our strategy, our defence policy, may one day face us with the choice of either suicide or surrender. I entirely agree

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with my noble friend who replied to the noble Lord on the occasion to which he referred when he said that the only way out of our dilemma lies in collective action with those who share our purpose. That is why I have always been a steadfast supporter of NATO and a steadfast supporter of the Anglo-American alliance, and it is for that same reason I have always supported the views which have been expressed so eloquently this afternoon by the noble Lord, Lord Bourne.
To my mind it is absolutely vital, with the limited resources available to our country, that those resources must be used to the best possible advantage. This House and another place should be the scenes where debates take place and strategy is hammered out. Here the full play of clash of opinion in a democracy enables the truth in the long run to emerge, or so I believe. But the facts of defence are not matters of opinion. It is no good trying to masquerade, to dress up opinions as if they were facts. We are faced with stark reality.
This is what happens in war—if I may just quote an example which I have constantly used to the point where I apologise for using it again. Before the war the great debate in France was about the Maginot Line—whether more money should be devoted to extending the Maginot Line this way or that, and on the capabilities of the Maginot Line. The French politicians, with the support, presumably, of the French public, took the view that enough money had been spent on La Ligne Maginot and would not give any more money. They were quite satisfied to base strategy on the Maginot Line as it was. The debate went on, articles were written, the equivalent of the Institute of Strategic Studies and its members had their say. And then there came the day when a Panzer division, which previously had not been introduced into the argument, arrived on the scene; and that was the end of La Ligne Maginot.
That is what happens to great nations. Defeat in war does not come like a thief in the night; it comes after a long period of refusing to face the facts, refusing to look the facts straight in the face. Defence policies do not emerge overnight. The seeds are sown, the plant grows, some plants die and some thrive. It is perhaps
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after twenty or more years that we arrive at the situation where we are put to the test, as we were ourselves in 1914–18. I ventured to express the opinion to your Lordships a few nights ago that when that test came the policies which were perhaps born in the mind of Mr. Cardwell and carried through by Lord Haldane were put to the test and we survived. We met the first shock and victory came our way. There have been other occasions when the margin has been much narrower.
The noble Lord who has just spoken from great experience speaks with great authority on what will happen at sea. We are an Island off the North-West corner of Europe, of 50 million people, feeding and living by its trade. We are no longer in a position to defend cur lines of communication: it is idle to pretend that we are. The decisions which landed us in this particular mess, if I may venture my view of history, were taken a long time ago. I do not share the views of the noble Lord, Lord Thorneycroft. He thinks that this country's fortunes are tied up with the French. I hold the opposite view. We instituted talks with the French General Staff. I think the greatest disaster that ever faced this country was when, under the influence of the growing power of Germany, hardly conscious that we had lost our place first to the United States and to Germany, the seeds of the Entente Cordiale were born. A million of our fellow-countrymen died, and for what? And our pre-eminence in the world passed at that time because, in an aimless sort of way, the Monarch of the day went to France and was cheered and the Entente Cordiale became the basis of policy. Cold, hard calculation and establishment of the facts is no substitute at any time for clear thinking, and never is that more true than in the subject of defence.
Perhaps I was a little unkind to the noble Lord, Lord Thorneycroft, because I venture to say that in his inimitable way he is a great debater, and we have often exchanged words in another place. He was in full spate to-day. He fixed his target upon the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, and I rather headed him off from his quarry. I was rather glad he took a shot at me because it was justified by the fact that in the past my views have not been dissimilar from those of the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont.

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I want to come to what I regard as the fundamental of this debate: whether this country is now prepared and this House is now prepared to face the stark reality of our defence position. The noble Lord, Lord Thorneycroft, got one in by suggesting that conscription is the most expensive of all ways of running our armed forces, and I ventured to ask him for proof. I must confess I am still not convinced. He suggested that the onus rested on me to explain why. I have not come prepared to do that, but I have a fair memory and perhaps I may be forgiven if I make any slips. But let us follow the argument through. I have never been in favour of conscription for itself, and indeed in another place in 1952 I was among the first, with my old friend Mr. Shinwell, to call upon the Government to examine the possibility of getting rid of National Service. I reached the conclusion that if this country was to discharge its obligations to NATO, to discharge our obligations on a world scale and develop the manpower pool from which we would be recruiting, particularly in the years up to 1973, then we had to be very careful indeed before we abandoned conscription, for if a mistake was made in this field the consequences might indeed be tragic.
In 1957 we got rid of conscription, and the arguments which were produced this afternoon by the noble Lord, Lord Thorneycroft, were put forward then. A White Paper was introduced which suggested that, above all, this step was going to save us money. Some months previous to Mr. Macmillan becoming Prime Minister he made a speech as Chancellor. It was his famous pipe dream speech, and he dreamed the dream of saving £700 million in defence costs. So it was no surprise that when he became Prime Minister there was some delay in the production of a White Paper, which above all was designed to save money.
Let me say this. To my mind, it is to the undying credit of a Member of this House, Lord Head, that he refused to join the Administration because he knew that this could not be done. He refused to face the consequences that would flow from the decision contained in that White Paper. The noble Lord,
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Lord Thorneycroft, had no such difficulty. He believed that it would reduce costs. If it is true that abolishing conscription can reduce costs, how comes it that we are the only European member of NATO which does not have conscription? Does any noble Lord suggest that the Belgians or the Dutch are any less frugal than ourselves? They are concerned about costs all the time. But every single member of NATO, with the exception of Britain and Canada, has some form of conscription or national service. Then again, are not New Zealand and Australia, which like ourselves are democracies, and have Governments which are supported by popular suffrage, just as conscious of these considerations as we are?
Where do we go from here after what happened in 1957? May I say that in truth I am not seeking to make any Party political point out of this at all. What happened was that it was said, "We are going to have a volunteer Army, and we are going to give civilian rates of pay, generous rates of pay." At that time Mr. Duncan Sandys set up a Committee under the chairmanship of Sir James Grigg to examine the ways in which this should be done. I happened to know Sir James Grigg well. He asked me to go to see him, and on many occasions I did so and had many talks with him. He was a superbly honest and forthright man and he thought and talked in the same adjectival way as I sometimes do myself. I therefore got on well with him, and with Lady Grigg. We had many conversations, and I am quite sure that he never believed it was possible to have a volunteer army. But in written terms of reference he laid down the terms in which it might be done. There were to be biennial increases in pay. But what was to happen on top of that? Any man who cared to join the Army could come in, could get married, have married quarters for his wife and children, and move from here to there. So the point has been reached that in the Rhine Army we have as many wives and children as we have soldiers. When the noble Lord was Minister of Defence, he called this an Army. What I call it is a number on the ration strength. There were units there which were under strength and which were barely capable of moving their own baggage.

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This afternoon the noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, suggested that the Rhine Army was equipped with the most modern weapons. I pay the noble Lord the compliment of saying that he believes it. God help him! because there is not a word of truth in it. The British Army of the Rhine—and I have said this many times before—is armed with "Honest John" and the 8 inch howitzer both of them years out of date. Both the Germans and the Americans have ultramodern weapons. To-day the British Army of the Rhine could not fight for five minutes without the support of Sergeant and Pershing, American weapons under American control, manned by German troops.
These are the facts of life, and they are the facts which this House ought to establish for itself. They can be established under the suggestion made by the noble Lord, Lord Bourne, and repeated by myself time and time again. These are facts, my Lords, not matters of opinion. A Select Committee of both Houses might meet round a table, as happens in the United States. The Committee might have in the Commander-in-Chief, Mr. Healey and the Permanent Secretary, and might put to them the simple point: "Lord Winterbottom came to the House and said that the British Army of the Rhine is equipped with the most modern weapons. Please tell us what they are" I tell your Lordships that B.A.O.R. have not got an Army weapon—not one. These are American weapons, and they are manned by the Germans. Again, the cover at the present moment is not the R.A.F. but the F.104G, flown by Germans with American weapons. I do not dissent from this; but the noble Lord, should not come to this House and tell us stories like this. I go on with the noble Lord, Lord Thorneycroft, because I must not forget his invitation that I should explain the facts. I say again that I did not intend to come down and talk about this, but since he challenged me I am glad to help him.
In August of 1962, when he was Minister of Defence, the Army was hoping to develop a great weapon. It was to be one of the great weapons of all time—Blue Water. It was to be an Army weapon. But we have to depend on the Germans because we are without Blue Water. Of the Belfast, which the noble
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Lord this afternoon spoke of as an important aircraft, we have 10 It is the most expensive aircraft in the world. It provides for one purpose, and one purpose only. It was designed: to carry Blue Water, but when that was cancelled it meant that it was admirably suited only for the purpose of carrying loads of table tennis balls because it has a capacity for great bulk for but a short distance. As a military weapon all we got was the bill.
Where does the noble Lord, Lord Thorneycroft, come in all this? He waited until the House had risen—quite a coincidence, of course, because Conservative Ministers are always prepared to face the public and always prepared to face the truth; there is nothing devious about Conservative Ministers. He wailed until the House had risen in August, 1962, and then, at a Press conference, he announced that Blue Water was cancelled, and he hoped that the row would have blown over in the following few weeks. I should like to congratulate him on his perspicacity. But in regard to strategy in relation to our position in Germany, wholly influenced by the cancellation of Blue Water, wholly influenced by cost, we reached the point when, in order to get the manpower we had to push up the pay, the barracks and the transport, not only for the troops but for the wives and children, to the point where the cost of pay and emoluments is now up by well over 50 per cent. of our arms bill and this country cannot afford the men or to arm them. That is the basic position in which we find ourselves in relation to the balance between manpower and equipment.
But let me pursue this question of conscription. This afternoon, as I understand it (the noble Lord will forgive me; I was a little late, being concerned with other matters of some importance), at the beginning of the debate, the Army Reserve Bill was taken, if I may use a term which I acquired over many years in another place, "on the nod". However, I understand that we can discuss the contents of the Army Reserve Bill. This is indeed an interesting measure. What is intended, if your Lordships agree and this Bill comes on the Stature Book, is that for some years to come 150,000 men are to have hanging over their heads the prospect that one bright morning

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an envelope will come through the door and they will find themselves called up for service in Germany. The Government do not need 150,000, they need 15,000. But so cumbersome is the administrative arrangement, and so reluctant are Governments to face the electors on this issue, and to tell them what it is all about, that both Houses of Parliament are asked to put on the Statute Book a measure to hold the call-up over the heads of 150,000 men. My Lords, that is conscription. These men never volunteered at any time in their lives. This is the residue of National Service.
I thought your Lordships might be interested in the history of this matter. On October 31, 1961 (the noble Lord, Lord Thorneycroft, I think, has some responsibility for this) Mr. Macmillan came down to the House of Commons, and perhaps I may trouble your Lordships by reading what he said. He said:
"Apart from the question of actual numbers"—
they were still worried about recruiting figures—
"there arc of course two further difficulties. In the first place, whatever the size of the army next year"—
and this was at the time of the Berlin crisis—
"it will not, and I admit it, be properly balanced." [OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, 31/10/61, col. 34.]
That was a Conservative Prime Minister, one supported by a Party which has great confidence in its ability to handle defence matters and which, according to Lord Thorneycroft and Lord Carrington, is on the eve of assuming political power, after which, they say, everything will be put right. Yet in 1961, at a moment of great international crisis, the Prime Minister of the day had to admit the Rhine Army could not fight because it was not balanced. He went on to say that it would not be properly balanced,
"and there will be shortages in certain administrative parts."
—not, curiously enough, in the great fighting part of the army, but in the administrative units: because, of course, conscription had worked in that way. It is possible to get chaps for the "teeth" parts, but they will not join the R.A.M.C., or R.E.M.E.; they will not join the administrative arms. As the Americans found in Korea, you cannot run an army unless you have the tech
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nical parts. It is like running a Rolls Royce with the wrong sparking plugs, or finding, when it is raining, that the windscreen-wiper will not work.
So in 1961 what happened? A great measure was brought down to the Houses of Parliament. How I remember the Press conferences, and the great speeches for the 15,000 they were going to have; that young men were going to dash off to all parts of the Commonwealth to defend our interests! How many did they get? Two thousand. And they had to be washed out, in the same way as the Home Guard concept was washed out, because it was a waste of money.
What happened then? The Prime Minister went on to say that they were going to introduce—he emphasised the continuance of the Berlin crisis—the Army Reserve Act of 1962, and explained that they were going to hold the National Service men for an additional six months. That was a breach of faith. These men had been called up for two years; but, whether they liked it or not, they were forced to stay for six months more. It is the same group of men—those who in 1962, because of the incompetence of a Conservative Administration, were held for six months—that this Army Reserve Act we have to-day will catch again, while both Front Benches of the House preen themselves and say, "We have got rid of conscription". My Lords, what humbug! What nonsense! What self-deception ! This House is then forced into the position of holding 150,000 men.
Who are the 15,000? In the debate in another place we had the confession who they were. They were the R.A.M.C. and the Pay Corps: not the fighting elements; not the "teeth" army; they were the administrative units which Mr. Macmillan could not get in 1961. These are the basic facts. If this country believes—as it says it believes through the mouths of its spokesmen on both sides of the House—in a European strategy, then it should set about honouring the undertaking given by a Conservative Administration. I did not give it. No Party that I supported ever gave it. It was a Conservative Administration in 1954 which committed four divisions to the Rhine Army. It is that to-day which makes this country almost wholly dependent upon a nuclear deterrent that we do not possess.

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I was amused this afternoon—amusement, if I may say, qualified with a few tears—when I listened to the noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom. He was doing the best he could, but ill-advisedly I thought, by claiming credit for Polaris. Of course he walked right into the trap which was quickly sprung by the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, who turned round and said, "I wish I had had a record of what he said this afternoon to use in the 1964 Election." It would not have done him much good in the Election in which I took part, since Polaris was kept going because a Conservative Administration—and I can see the laugh on Lord, Carrington's face—pushed along with the four Polaris submarines to the point at which they could not be cancelled. I happened to be a member of the Administration in 1964, so I speak with absolute certainty. If the Labour Government, when they took the decision over Polaris, had taken it in the mood of the noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, my services with them would have ended that day. I took the Polaris submarines only because they could not be got rid of. The idea that they make a contribution (a point which the noble Lord, Lord Carrington was quick to pick up) and would be a substitute for the independent nuclear deterrent carried by the Vulcan—what Mommy rot! The four Polaris submarines that we have are armed with A3. If in actual fact the Polaris submarines we have constitute any formidable deterrent, why do the Government not put Poseidon in them? The Americans have 41 nuclear submarines, and they are mostly armed with Poseidon. Britain is once again left with a "clapped out" version.
My noble friend does not realise how dangerous this is. Let us assume that in a moment of great international tension the chips are down and the Great Powers are looking in the whites of each other's eyes, and the Russians want to demonstrate that they would use the deterrent; they could even simulate that somebody has landed a Polaris, or a Minute Man for that matter—they are very similar—on to Russian soil. They could say that this was a British weapon—and we have the capability, at least on paper. So they take us out, just to demonstrate to the Americans what might happen to them. That is just about the worth of
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four nuclear submarines which do not give all the year round capacity to do what we threaten to do, and which everybody knows we would not do. At the very worst, or if you like, the best. Polaris would only be useful assuming that it could get through. That is the reason why the Americans have Poseidon, because there is no guarantee that A3 would be able to generate the Russian defences. The only reason for Polaris is that if the worst happened to us and our submarines were still at sea, we might be able to execute a posthumous revenge. But I deny completely that it has a part in the defences of this country.
We have the bill, which is one of the legacies of the last Administration, but to use the submarines most effectively we should sell them back to the Americans, and let them arm them with Poseidon, which would give them a full capability. That is what I should like to see happen. I believe in the Anglo-American alliance, and I also believe in the efficacy of the American deterrent; I do not dissent from noble Lords on either side of the House about that. But I have always rejected this phoney concept that we have an independent British nuclear deterrent which is capable of influencing policy in any way whatsoever.
I have tried to make my position crystal clear. I fear that the claim that we have a deterrent can be used to deflect us from the realities of the situation. Here I am in entire agrement with the noble Lord, Lord Thorneycroft, and with many of his friends, and certainly with the noble Lord, Lord Bourne. Britain is a World Power or she is nothing. She has a vital interest in maintaining stability and I certainly believe in the worthwhileness of a manpower presence. I entirely agree with the presence of British forces in Berlin, in Hong Kong and in the Gulf. I would never have taken them out of Suez, but a Conservative Administration did that. I would certainly have kept a brigade at Suez. I am not a supporter of the Zionist movement. I never forget that after Gallipoli there were not. half-a-dozen Jewish settlements in the whole of Palestine, and I never forget that the Ottoman Empire was broken by the valour of British troops under General Maud and General Allenby. What is

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now Israel—with the adventurous General Dayan, who I certainly believe is a warmonger if ever there was one—owes its existence to the valour of British arms, and I certainly would not have given up that legacy. But I am a pretty old out-of-date Blimp.
I want effective British forces and I will not run away from the issue of British conscription—I never have and I will not now. That is what surprises me about the noble Lord, Lord Carrington. I have great respect for him, but I cannot understand why, when he goes to the Despatch Box, when he does not bear any direct responsibility, in the national interest he and his friends do not face up to the question of the imposition of selective service. Why do they not join with the noble Lord, Lord Bourne, and have a committee to share responsibility? Let us assume that they are politically right. Let us assume that they win the next General Election in, let us say, the next couple of years. The noble Lord, Lord Thorneycroft, was absolutely right. The problems have not altered. The worse he thinks about that Front Bench the more aggravated the problems will have become. So if the noble Lord accepts the simple concept that it will take ten years or so to put the problems right, why does he not share the responsibility, not only with the Front Bench but with the House as a whole, and have a select committee or a standing select committee, or various devices on the American pattern, to establish the facts? It seems to me so simple and such common sense that, for the life of me, I cannot understand why it is not accepted.
I will not keep your Lordships for more than a few seconds more, but as I have endeavoured to make clear on the subject of NATO strategy I have entertained some serious doubts—and nothing I have heard to-day abates them—about the arrangements for the defence of Europe. I will not rehearse all the arguments, but it seems to me that this is such an important matter, touching not only military policy but also the foreign policy that lies behind it. that I feel I must ask the Government specific questions. And I want answers to those questions. if I do not get answers to-day, I shall use what Parliamentary skill I have to hold up Government business until I do get answers.
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I am determined to get answers to these questions and not to be put off with bromidic White Papers or interviews of a kind. I want answers and I should like them to-day.
As I understand it, the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, is to speak in the course of the debate. He and I are old friends in more than a Parliamentary sense, and I want to ask him these questions. First, does he consider that the nuclear threshold in Europe is now too low, and that in the event of hostilities breaking out there we would be committed to the use of nuclear weapons at a very early stage? Secondly, do not the Government agree that we must have a fully effective conventional capability in Europe, if the defence of Europe is to make any sense? Finally, do not the Government agree that the present situation, in which the Warsaw Pact forces have a very considerable superiority over NATO forces, falls very far short of fulfilling this requirement?
I agree that with the withdrawal from our other commitments overseas the Government have been able to make considerable improvements in the quality of our forces in the European/Atlantic area, but in my view this is a matter of such crucial importance that your Lordships are entitled to have a clear answer to the questions which I have put. No one would contest the fact that the defence of Europe should be based on what is called a flexible response, rather than on a massive retaliation. I am not convinced, and I hope I have made clear why I am not convinced. that the conventional forces at present in Europe are enough to provide that flexible response, and we may in practice whatever the theories may be, now find ourselves in a situation in which there is no middle course between surrender and nuclear suicide.
5.47 p.m.
THE EARL OF SELKIRK: My Lords, we have listened to a very wide speech by the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, on a subject on which he has great information and which we know is very dear to his heart. I will not attempt to answer the questions which he has put, since I am looking forward to hearing the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, defending the nuclear deterrent and advancing the reasons against conscription. This will be a very interesting discourse to which

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I am sure your Lordships will listen with very real interest.
I should like to go one step further on the point which the noble Lord, Lord Thorneycroft, made. I remember some years back discussing whether or not there should be a White Paper. There are quite strong reasons for not putting out a White Paper if you have nothing to say, but one thing on which we should agree is that a White Paper should be meticulously accurate in every particular, whether big or small. I shall draw attention to only two points on the first page of the Statement. One has already been covered, and that is that the Estimates are £5 million lower. We know that we are buying aeroplanes on the "never-never" system and that is not a very fair presentation; we know that pay costs will go up this year, probably by another £30 million, £40 million or perhaps £50 million, and we know that we are paying what might be called tribute to Singapore and Malaysia for withdrawing our armed forces. This figure is very illusory.
I ask your Lordships to take another point. I see here that in the first year since 1962 troops were not actually fighting. There was plenty of fighting going on in 1962, and there are plenty of officers and men in the Army, Navy and Air Force who can give vivid descriptions of what went on at that time. But that does not matter. All I am saying is that what is here should be meticulously accurate, and it is a great mistake if there is any exaggeration or any attempt to step aside from facts. One advantage of having a White Paper is that it shows in clear relief the variations in Government policy which have taken place from time to time., and no one is left in any doubt. But there is no evidence of a clear demonstration by the Government of the effect of going back on words which they have given.
This is fundamental to all alliances; and if it is thought that we can go back on undertakings we have given, this goes to the root of all collective agreements—and, after all, none of us pretends that we can go alone; we know we act on collective agreements. It affects the attitude of our allies fundamentally, and must inevitably do so. The effect on places like the Persian Gulf and on Malaysia
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was catastrophic; but what I think the noble Lord must realise is that they have pledged not the name of the Labour Government but the British name, and any future Government will almost inevitably find it more difficult to be recognised and accepted.
We in this country sometimes think that all we have to say is "balance of payments" and we are justified in doing anything. There is hardly one country in the world which is not suffering from some measure of balance-of-payments difficulties, and they do not accept this as justification for going back on words which they have uttered. This was very well expressed by Mr. Giles in the Sunday Times. Talking about going back on a decision, he said:
"Whether or not it was a wise decision, the way in which it was taken was a monument of folly and irresponsibility, a lasting blot on the Labour Government's record".
Then the article goes on to explain how poor Mr. Goronwy Roberts had to deal with it. If I may read it, it says:
"In November, 1967, Mr. Goronwy Roberts, the Foreign Office Minister responsible, journeyed round the area, assuring the rulers that Britain was there to stay for an indeterminate time, in the interests of the stability of the Gulf. Two months later this hapless man was hack again, announcing irrevocable withdrawal in 1971".
My Lords, it will take a long time to get back the confidence that the events of that autumn caused us to lose.
I get the impression from Lord Winterbottom that there is a desire to modify some of the rather dogmatic statements which were made in January, 1968. I do not know quite what they are about, but I hope he is not attempting to create any false sense of confidence. He talked about various things like "jungle camps", and I think he used the words "substantial forces". I am a bit sceptical, I must say, about this; but I think he might tell us a little more about the arrangements that he is actually making. I should be grateful if we could know what sort of arrangements he has actually made, either in the Singapore and Malaysia area or, alternatively, in the Gulf. Perhaps I may myself mention one or two things that are happening. I heard one story—I believe it is true—about their asking for the use of a Wing Commander. Her Majesty's Government replied by working out the

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actuarial calculation of how much it would cost to teach a Wing Commander to fly, and so on. All this was put together, and eventually an annual sum of something like £10,000 a year was the sum worked out to be charged for the salary of a Wing Commander. If this is the way this area is to be treated, if this is the sort of assistance which is to be given in the interim period, then all I can say is that Her Majesty's Government are adding great difficulties to the ones they have already created.
May I say one or two words on Malaysia and Singapore? Let us remember that we have already come out of two very difficult periods in that area—first of all the emergency, as it is called, and secondly the confrontation—and the stability and the development of the area have been maintained, to the advantage of all the people there. We can, in contrast, think of Vietnam; or maybe we can think of Israel, where, if we had stayed, perhaps the Israeli-Arab antagonism would never have arisen. In Malaysia and Singapore we have solved those problems on two separate occasions, and these areas are still going through the very difficult period immediately following independence. Where there is a real problem of a conflict between the Singaporeans on the one side and the Malaysians on the other, there is no shadow of doubt that our presence in any form makes that very much less likely to happen. I emphasise this to the noble Lords as important. In passing, I should like to mention, too, that if we are to exercise influence this is not the time to reduce the spending of our representatives from the Foreign Office in that area; that is to say, both in Kuala Lumpur and in Singapore. I am given to understand that very serious consideration is being given to that at the present time.
I would recommend to the Government two lines of policy which they can pursue—I think, frankly, without a great deal of difficulty. The first is to support the firm which has taken over the dockyard—Swan Hunter. It is of the utmost importance that Swan Hunter should be a success there. If it is not a success, let there be no illusion about it, this work will be taken over by the Japanese. The second thing is not so much the
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presence of Army forces but the necessity for established air forces in the area and frequent and ready visits of the Royal Navy. Those things are wanted by the people in the area. I should like to think that the Government can give some assurance that that type of action is being taken. They have already created a division in the area, as the Government are probably aware. On the one side, the Singaporeans are being advised by Israeli instructors as to what they should do, and are creating a system of military organisation which is substantially at variance with that which exists on the other side. This is a situation which may very easily flare up into one of considerable difficulty, in which we should certainly be the losers, as would others in the area.
I would say one word on the Gulf. First of all, our expenditure there is nothing like as big. Secondly, this is a very rich area where still something in the order of two-thirds of the known oil reserves of the world exist. It is therefore almost in the nature of trustees of the district, trustees for the world, that we are trying to maintain stability in the area where the oil is taken. During the last 150 years, when we have been associated with the Trucial States, we could probably at almost any time have withdrawn ourselves without difficulty. We have taken the decision to withdraw at the very time when the major degree of change is taking place in the area. When a community living at subsistence level is suddenly moving to a vast oil revenue, with all the enormous economic and social changes which take place at such a time, we are adding the instability of the withdrawal of British forces.
I understand from the White Paper that we are looking for a political solution, and we seem to think that in two or three years the eight or nine sheiks in the Trucial area will come together because the British Government ask them to. Lord Gladwyn, who spoke so forcefully about European unity, seemed to think there would be no difficulty in about half a dozen or a dozen sheiks coming together. We in Europe, a far more advanced community, have had a lot of difficulty in coming together, and we are still in three separate camps; and yet we expect a far more simple people to come together in a matter of years in

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order to suit our convenience. What are the Government going to do if, as I anticipate, there will not be a federation of sheiks? What is going to happen to the Trucial Scouts? Are they going to be withdrawn? Who is going to command them? You cannot have a body of troops keeping law and order in the place without any commander at all. These are matters we are entitled to know, and if the noble Lords do not know the answer they should not have made the precipitate decision which they made two years ago.
I will add only this: that I do not believe that we are acting in both the areas I have referred to simply in the interests of this country. We are there because no one else can be there at the present time, and we are fulfilling a role which is of value not only to the people of the area but to the many other people who trade in it. If we withdraw from it, no one is going to take our place. I think we owe it not only to the people of the area but to other countries of the world that we should seek to stay there in some force.
6.0 p.m.
THE MINISTER OF STATE, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (LORD CHALFONT): My Lords, may I first express my gratitude to the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, and to other noble Lords who are to follow him, that they have agreed that I should change my place in the order of speakers. May I also say that I am in a way rather sorry that I shall not follow the noble Lord, Lord S. Oswald. I should have enjoyed (if I may use the word in a macabre way) listening to his speech before making mine. But I am assured by my noble friend the Leader of the House that he is prepared to deal adequately with the noble Lord.
My noble friend Lord Winterbottom has explained that in rising to support the Motion which stands in the name of my noble friend the Leader of the House I propose to refer specifically in the course of my remarks to the Army Reserve Bill, to which your Lordships gave a formal Second Reading earlier this afternoon. But before doing so I should like to comment, however briefly, on what I think to be one of the most significant points that has emerged from almost all the speeches that have been
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made in your Lordships' House this afternoon. It is the question of the defence of Europe, the misgivings about the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact, the doubts about the nuclear threshold and about the whole strategic doctrine of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in its defence of Western Europe. This has beet mentioned in various ways by the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, in his typically thoughtful analysis of the present strategic situation; by the noble Lord. Lord Gladwyn, by the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, and by my noble friend Lord Leatherland who, if I may say so, again made a speech of the constrictive and thoughtful nature that we have come to expect from him.
But, before coming to that subject, I should like to seize upon one point which came out of the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Carrington. He seemed to me to be suggesting—I make no attempt to quote him exactly—that there was a strong argument for having a European nuclear deterrent in certain political circumstances in Europe. My noble friend Lord Leatherland, I thought with considerable cogency, took him up on this. But I should like simply to put before your Lordships certain questions that I think we must answer ourselves if we are thinking in terms of the evolution in the near future or the distant future of any kind of European nuclear deterrent, without the emergence of a single centre of political control in Europe.
If the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, was talking of a Europe in which there has been some kind of federal solution, of a Europe in which there is a single centre of political control, of a Europe in which there was one foreign policy, one defence policy and one centre of control served, one would expect, by a single directly-elected European Parliament, then perhaps there is not very melt difference between us on this.
LORD CARRINGTON: My Lords, may I interrupt at this point? I realise that the noble Lord said that he was not quoting me; but perhaps he would be good enough to read in to-morrow's OFICIAL REPORT (if there is one; for understand there may not be) the actual words I used. I certainly was not suggesting that to-morrow there would be a European nuclear deterrent. I hedged it about with some qualifications, one of

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which was that there had to be some control at the centre. Even then, I said, there would be a great deal of difficulties to be overcome before that could happen.
LORD CHALFONT: My Lords, I should scarcely expect the noble Lord to advance a theory like this without hedging it around with a number of qualifications. if I have the opportunity to do so in the circumstances, I shall read the OFFICIAL REPORT to-morrow with great interest. I am not suggesting for one moment that this is the theory that the noble Lord is advancing. I think that he and I are not far apart on this issue. But it is a matter of such complexity and importance that I think I must put to your Lordships some of the difficulties that the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, did not advance in the course of his interesting speech.
As I was saying, if we can have a single centre of political control in Europe, there then may be something to be said for that single central control having at its disposal military forces and establishments of all kinds. Perhaps my misgivings about such a European nuclear deterrent as he has put forward would be less in those circumstances. But I think we must be clear—even those who like myself are convinced and passionate Europeans—that we are not going to have such a single central control for many years to come. However fast and smoothly the process of European integration goes, the idea that we shall have a single Parliament, a single foreign policy and a single defence policy for the whole of Europe is one that, as I say, even the most starry-eyed European must accept as being something for the very distant future.
Where my misgivings lie is in the area in which it might be suggested there should be a European nuclear deterrent short of that. Even if the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, did not himself put that forward to-day, it has been put forward many times as a possible solution to some of the problems of the defence of Europe. I should like to say simply that those who put it forward must ask themselves some very simple questions. They must ask themselves about what is called the demography of Europe; that is to say, the intensity of population con
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centration in Europe; the intensity of concentration of industries. And they must think of that in terms of the sort of target that Western and Central Europe would make for strategic missiles aimed from the Soviet Union or for tactical intermediate-range missiles aimed from the Warsaw Pact countries. They must ask themselves about the degree of warning time that a European country would be likely to get of any such nuclear attack. They must ask themselves about the difficulties of control.
I recall the great arguments that went on about the multilateral force, that ill-starred venture in which someone attempted the idea of getting together a fleet of submarines or of merchant shipping, armed with nuclear missiles manned by mixed crews of mixed nationalities and controlled by some sort of committee that was apparently going to decide when these weapons would be used. If it was impossible to evolve a system of control for something like that, how much more difficult is it going to be to evolve a system of control for nuclear weapons that would be wielded in one way or another by the whole of the NATO alliance or by the European Members of it?
I make these points simply to say that in Lord Carrington's interesting adumbrations about the possible future emergence of a European nuclear deterrent, I hope that nobody will think of this as being really strategically and politically possible until the path of European integration has gone much farther than it has gone to-day.
LORD THORNEYCROET: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord a question? I agree completely with what he has said: but he is answering the easy questions. There is another form of nuclear co-operation in Europe which could be much closer, much more possible; namely, the sharing of nuclear knowledge between us and the French, and even the possibility of sharing the manufacture of some nuclear material. It is a difficult question. It involves the Americans and their acquiescence; but I conceive that at this moment of time it may be a very much more relevant one.
LORD CHALFONT: My Lords, this is an extremely important point. The

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question of sharing nuclear knowledge, or even certain areas of nuclear planning, not only with France but with other European countries as well, is a vital factor in the whole question of the defence of Western Europe. It is possible to say—and this is my own view—that it is not a particularly good time at this moment to consider any real close discussions of this kind with the French Government. Indeed, the French Government have shown in the past that they are not particularly interested in this kind of cooperation with us, either on a bilateral footing or on a multilateral European footing. In the course of my (I hope) brief speech I shall come later to the question of European co-operation as a whole. I think that perhaps the point that the noble Lord, Lord Thorneycroft, has made will be dealt with then.
There is one point about Lord Carrington's speech on which I cannot forbear to comment. He made one more of those Delphic pronouncements about what the Conservative Party will do in the hypothetical event of its return to power. In these moods the Conservative Party—and indeed the noble Lord himself—sometimes reminds me irresistibly of that apocalyptic Shakespearean figure, King Lear:
"I will do such things—
What they are, yet I know not; but they shall be
The terrors of the earth."
I need no convincing that a Conservative Government would he one of the "terrors of the earth"; hut, my Lords, we should be in no doubt of something else as well. It is this: you cannot do all these things for nothing.
If the Conservative Party really believes, if noble Lords opposite really believe, that they can restore our military presence East of Suez; improve our conventional strength on the Rhine; strengthen our reserves; contribute to a European nuclear deterrent; retain our aircraft carriers—all these things have been suggested by one or other of them at some time—and at the same time reduce our taxes, which they also say they are going to do; if they believe that, my Lords, they will believe anything. And it sometimes seems to me that in the field of defence they almost are prepared to believe anything. This, my Lords, is simply not a practical proposition.
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May I now deal briefly with the European theatre and the arguments that have been advanced about the nuclear threshold and the strength of conventional forces. My noble friend Lord Winter-bottom said in his speech that peace in Europe has been achieved because the West has been able to present a united front to deter any political aggressor. He went on to say that to ensure that peace continues, our first priority must be to give the fullest support to NATO. There must be few, if any, in your Lordships' House who would contest such a proposition in the present political climate in Europe. Europe remains divided: two conflicting political, economic and ideological systems prowl warily round, suspicious, fearful of each other's motives.
To most enlightened people, I think, there is no good reason why these systems should not live together in peaceful competition, each conducting its own affairs, with no fear of armed aggression from the other. But, of course, that is not how things are; and to those, if there are still any left, in your Lordships' Home who think that this is any fault of ours, let me quote one short passage from a statement issued by the Government of the Soviet Union on April 10, two weeks after the much-quoted Budapest Declaration calling for a conference on European security. This is what, among other things, the statement said:
"NATO has become an instrument of 'cold war', an organiser of subversion, espionage and ideological subversion and an inspirer of attempts to counter-revolutionary coups in Socialist countries. These actions, which have recently been intensified,—"
this, my Lords, is only a few months after the invasion of Czechoslovakia—
"set back the process of détente in Europe and thereby disprove the hypocritical statements of North Atlantic bloc leaders that they are allegedly working for a détente and seeking to make NATO a body that promotes peaceful co-operation."
My Lords, that kind of language used about the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is the kind of language that only very stupid men really believe, and the leaders of the Soviet Union are not stupid men.
LORD CHORLEY: My Lords, would the noble Lord agree that the word "hypocritical" has never been user more hypocritically than in that statement?
LORD CHALFONT: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for that suggestion, and I shall bear it in mind in my future analysis of this document. As I say, anybody who has negotiated with the leaders of the Soviet Union is very soon convinced that there is nothing stupid about them. It is impossible, therefore, to escape the conclusion that, for the present at any rate, the Soviet Union perceives it to be in its interests to perpetuate the suspicion and hostility that exists in Europe.
Whatever the reason may be for this—and I do not seek to analyse that today—there are a number of inferences which we in the West are entitled to draw; and in the context of this debate by far the most important of those (this point has already been made by several of your Lordships) is that it would be criminally foolish to neglect our defences or to drop our guard while this hostility persists. I do not suggest that this state of affairs should, or need, last for ever. Military policy—it has been said before but it will bear saying again—is, and must be, the servant of foreign policy; and the foreign policy of this country, if it is to be credible and intelligible, must be based upon a recognition that armed force, organised violence, is a barbarous and self-defeating instrument in the conduct of international affairs.
My Lords, there can be no lasting security in a world that is divided into armed camps, and here perhaps I might take up a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Bourne. I hope he will forgive me if I take it up with some force because he made a statement which I believe to be out of tune with the realities of the time. He said—I think I quote him accurately because I took down what he said—"Influence is only effective when it is backed up by military and economic power". Now, my Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Bourne, may believe that; I do not. I believe that those are the ideas of Hobbes, of Clausewitz and of the philosophers and strategists of the pre-nuclear age. Those sentiments, indeed, are perilously close to that other famous dictum:
"Power grows out of the barrel of a gun."
a dictum that will be familiar to your Lordships; though I must say that I find the noble Lord, Lord Bourne, and
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Mao Tse-tung as unlikely an unholy alliance as Michael Foot and Mr. Enoch Powell. Those who lay claim to any kind of weight—
LORD BOURNE: My Lords, the Minister is quite entitled to make comments, but he is not entitled to align me with Mao Tse-tung because I never said anything of the sort. I was very careful not to say, "Power grows out of the barrel of a gun" because I do not happen to believe it. But I do believe the first sentiment.
LORD CHALFONT: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord. I was, of course, making no attempt to link him in any significant way with Mao Tse-tung, I was simply pointing out that a statement that says that the only real influence is that which is backed up by military power is very much like the more colourful expression that power grows out of the barrel of a gun. But I do not wish to press that any further. I would simply say that anyone who lays claim to any kind of weight in a strategic debate in the nuclear age must realise that the nature of military power has totally changed.
The power to inflict almost total destruction on civilisation now lies in the hands of the leaders of the nuclear Powers. It seems to me, my Lords, that the categorical imperative from this is that we must find a more intelligent way of conducting international affairs; more intelligent than the obsolete instrument of nation States in a constant state of conflict, prepared to use organised violence in the pursuit of their national aims. Unless we do that, we shall eventually end up with disaster. The nuclear stalemate, even if it were indestructible—and it is not—can never be a substitute for what in the end we must all strive for, whatever political colour we may be, which is universal disarmament. Unless we realise that now, when the major armed confrontation is still the comparatively simple one between Capitalism and Communism, it may be too late to realise it when China is a nuclear super Power; when the great confrontations are racial, as they will be, and the great issues concern how the natural and industrial resources of the world are to be shared fairly among a population growing daily at an alarming rate. And let us be quick

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to admit, all of us, that there is nothing fair about the way those resources are shared at the moment.
As I say, my Lords, unless we are prepared to search for some new way of conducting international affairs we shall in the end be heading for disaster. But, of course, I understand as well as any of your Lordships that disarmament cannot be approached in isolation from the political problems that divide the world, and especially those that divide Europe. While we go on seeking, as we must, with the Soviet Union and the Communist countries of Eastern Europe, some common ground from which to attack the problems of the third world; while we search for these policies of détente and for better relations across these artificially sustained ideological frontiers, we all have a clear duty—Governments particularly—to play our full part in the defence of our values and our freedom. It is incumbent upon us (and here I think I speak to the converted) to arrange things so that at least we need have no fear that the elementary freedoms of speech, thought and political action can be snuffed out virtually overnight because they threaten the power and supremacy of some neurotically insecure oligarchy.
In other words, my Lords, we must live in the world as it is, not as we would like it to be. That means that in Europe to-day we must still be ready to defend Western Europe to ensure the safety of these Islands. I make these points simply because there seems to be a feeling abroad, especially perhaps among young people, that all defence expenditure is bad and that all military organisation is bad. I believe that, whatever one may think about the ideal world of the future, we must still be ready to defend the values that we hold closely to us.
To come back to the views on how Western Europe should be defended, I think that so far, perhaps with one or two isolated exceptions, we have been on common ground about the need to defend ourselves. Where we may differ is how we should go about this task. Some noble Lords, especially the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, suggested that the nuclear threshold is too low. In parenthesis, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, will feel that in the course of my
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remarks this afternoon I shall answer his questions, if not directly then indirectly, because I should be horrified if he were to put into effect his threat to use all his Parliamentary skills to bring the machinery of your Lordships' House to a grinding halt, because I think that if he did deploy his Parliamentary skills that is what might well happen.
LORD WIGG: My Lords, the noble Lord can save himself any apprehension if he will be good enough to answer my questions directly. It may well he that I shall find a certain amount of enjoyment in unravelling the form in which the noble Lord may seek to rut his answers, but I put these questions after careful consideration and I think that not I alone but also your Lordships' House and the country ought to hate the answers. I think the answers are somewhat belated, and I therefore hope that my noble friend will remove any temptation for me to spend more time than I should in interfering in your Lordships' affairs by giving me a direct answer to what I should have thought were sensibly direct questions.
LORD CHALFONT: My Lords, of course, they are direct questions, arid the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, knows me well enough to know that he will get the answers. But I really must plead to be allowed to develop the argument that leads up to the answers in my own way. This idea that the nuclear threshold is too low, or, to put it more simply, that we are subscribing to a strategic doctrine in NATO which depends on the immediate or early use of nuclear weapons any conflict in Europe, would, if it were so, be a grave indictment indeed. Bat as my noble friend Lord Winterbottom has said, we recognise that it would be irresponsible to rely upon nuclear weapons for the defence of Europe against any possible form of attack. If we did that—I give the noble Lord this argument—a potential attacker might then assume that we would be unwilling to use these weapons except in extremis. Then we must have strong conventional forces. They must be strong enough—this is the point—to contain a substantial military aggression until it can be identified as limited or unlimited. They must provide the breathing space for diplomacy

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to make its final attempts to ward off the certain devastation that would follow an exchange of nuclear weapons.
I have spent, in one incarnation or another, the last twenty years in constant company with this problem. I could, if we all had a limited time, spend a few infinitely depressing hours analysing the concepts of "flexible response" and "graduated deterrents"—incidentally, two terms that are very often used as if they were interchangeable, and they are not. I could examine the credibility of tactical nuclear weapons and the threat of escalation as elements of deterrence and if, by the time I had finished all that, your Lordships' House was not empty, or everybody in it fast asleep, I could then go on to examine the perennial argument among strategic analysts about whether the possession of the capacity to fight a war increases or diminishes the capacity to deter other people from actually starting a war. These are all extremely interesting problems to the strategic analyst. But this is the House of Lords and not the Hudson Institute, I am happy to say, and I will therefore content myself with two very practical observations. I hope that if they do not answer the noble Lord's questions directly in the form he would like to have them answered, and in the form he would get them answered by the Hudson Institute, at least they will convey the drift of the Government's view on the questions he has asked.
Whatever may be the arguments about the relative importance of nuclear and non-nuclear forces, one thing is beyond any doubt. Here I should like to refer back to something which the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, said. It is that the defence of Western Europe can never really be sound while the countries of Western Europe are unwilling to subordinate their purely national concerns to the interests of Europe as a whole. Just as it is true to say that only a truly united Europe will ever be economically self-sufficient in a world of industrial super-Powers, and that only a Europe speaking with one voice politically will ever be heard in the councils of the world, so it is true to say—and the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, said it—that only a Europe united in its determination to preserve peace will have any real chance
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of survival if that peace should ever be broken.
My second point is a simple one, and comes back to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Wigg. What I must do is to ask those in this country who demand greatly increased conventional forces in Europe or elsewhere whether they are prepared to face the inevitable consequences. These are, so far as Britain is concerned, a substantially increased defence budget and the possibility of a return to some form of compulsory military service. If they are prepared to face these implications, then their case is intellectually respectable. But they must be prepared to say this out loud, if they do not want to be suspected of merely destructive criticism. If they are not prepared to face these consequences, then they must say, leaving no room for doubt or equivocation, where and how they would raise the manpower and the money to implement a strategy which has much to commend it, if only—and it is a big "if"—the political and economic realities can be overcome. This is a point I make in answer to the questions put by the noble Lord, Lord Wigg.
LORD CARRINGTON: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord a question? He has told us what the great British public ought to think about this. What do the Government think about it?
LORD WIGG: My Lords, before the noble Lord answers that, may we also have an answer to what the Conservatives think about it? I asked the question of the Government, but I want to get an answer from the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, too. The Conservatives are constantly complaining that there is too low a force in Europe.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, I really must interrupt at this point. I think the noble Lord must realise that he cannot continue an interruption by another noble Lord—perhaps after my noble friend has replied.
LORD CHALFONT: My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend. The thinking of the Government behind this is implicit in what I say: that it if is thought that the strength of conventional forces on the Rhine now is not enough, then the consequences must be faced. I have not said that in the view of the Government

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those conventional forces are not strong enough. It is not so much the size of these forces that is important; it is the quality. So it is no good the noble Lord asking me what we would do. I am saying that those who say there must be more conventional forces—and I am not one of them—must face the consequences. Such forces cannot be got for nothing. This, as I was saying, leads me logically to the second and final part of my remarks. As I have just suggested, the obstacles on the road to the ideal world of peace and order are the realities of the world to-day; and if we take this at a lower level, ideal military policies which we should all like to implement depend upon the severely practical problems of providing men and money to carry them out.
This leads me to the question of reserves, and I think this might be the appropriate stage at which to take up a few minutes of your Lordships' time, as my noble friend said that I would, on the subject of the Army Reserve Bill to which we gave a Second Reading this afternoon. Noble Lords will remember that in the Supplementary Statement on Defence Policy last July we explained that we were carrying out a general review of the Army's reserves. We also explained that one of the purposes of the Review was to find a means of providing from alternative sources the reinforcements currently found from the Army General Reserve. The noble Lord, Lord Wigg, also criticised successive Governments for their attitude towards the Army General Reserve and Reservists as a whole. As I said, we hoped at that time that we should be able to tap the alternative sources of manpower quickly enough to enable us to avoid any further extension of that legislation which is causing the noble Lord so much pain. We were disappointed to find that this was not possible, although it may not come as any surprise to the noble Lord. It is therefore necessary to keep the Army General Reserve in being for five more years.
My Lords, the function of reserves generally is to bring the Regular Army, when necessary, on to a war footing. The principal reserves that we have are first, the Regular Reserve which consists of former Regular soldiers; and secondly, the Territorial Army Volunteer Reserve, which consists of volunteers, and mainly
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organised into units. Unfortunately, at present the TAVR is not as well recruited as we should like, and the Regular Reserves are deficient in some ranks and trades. So we have to rely on this other source, the Army General Reserve, for about 15,000 Reservists all as individual reinforcements. I will not go through the detailed requirement of those Reservists, but we do need 15,000.
The Army General Reserve from which we would draw these men is composed mainly of former National Servicemen, as the noble Lord knows, and was brought into being by the Navy, Army and Air Force Reserve Act 1954. This Act, with some amendments, was extended for five year periods, first in 1959 and then again in 1964. So the present extension comes to an end on June 30 of this year. On the occasion of the last extension in 1964 the application of the Act was limited to those who completed their whole and part-time Notional Service after December 31, 1962.
These Reservists are well capable of doing a useful military job. They were all trained in their specific jobs during their period of National Service, and although it is now six years since many of them served with the Colours, I am sure that they will not entirely have forgotten what they then learnt. In any case, a large number, estimated at about half of them, are working in civilian occupations which are similar or revelant to their military trades. These Reservists would be called up only in circumstances of the gravest war emergency. The noble Lord talked about them being "called out", but they would be called out, in fact, when general war was considered to be imminent The whole of our Defence and foreign policy, as I have tried to show, is designed to ensure, so far as possible, that general war will not happen. We cannot guarantee it, but that is the general drive and impetus of our Defence and foreign policy. The liability, therefore, is not a very onerous one. It is, in fact, extremely unlikely that any Army General Reservists will ever be called out; and if they were, it would be at a time when we should all be facing a very grave situation indeed, and the circumstances would be very much different from what they are to-day.
These Reservists, who number 168,000, do no training; they get no pay, and the

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only cost of keeping them is that of keeping their records, which is essential, and that is something of the order of £9,000 a year. I do not think even the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, would begrudge £9,000 a year for keeping the records of these admirable men. Noble Lords may ask—indeed I think one noble Lord has already asked—why keep 168,000 members of the Army General Reserve when we need only 15,000? Well, we have tried to find a way of restricting the liability to those actually needed, but unfortunately this does not seem to be possible. It would be impracticable to define for the purposes of a selective process of this kind the very great number of categories that we require; and furthermore, the requirements change from time to time. The only real way of reducing the field of selection—and the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, knows this—would be to fix a cut-off date later than the present one of December 31, 1962. But if we did that, we should immediately deprive ourselves of some of the esssential ranks and trades that we need. This is a very blunt instrument, but unfortunately there does not seem to be any more refined instrument to hand. We have no alternative, therefore, but formally to retain the reserve as a whole, even though we shall on present plans need to call out only 15,000, in the very unlikely event of any being called out at all.
I should like to say a few words finally, my Lords, on the subject of recruiting for the Regular forces. This, as noble Lords know, and as the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, has reminded us again, is not good enough. The Government realise that it will be difficult to keep up the level of recruiting which will keep our forces at the number required by our Defence policy. There is nothing new in this. Previous Governments, as the noble Lord, Lord Thorneycroft, will know, have met with similar difficulties even at the period when the postwar upsurge of births—the birthrate bulge, as it was called—was producing the number of men of recruiting ages. So, as I say, there is nothing new in this problem.
Last week, the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, in a debate in your Lordships' House, told us how long before the arrival of the modern term "demography" he had thought of this problem as being the problem of there being too few fish in the
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pool. If I may borrow his metaphor for a moment, I would say that the problem for the next few years is that the number of fish is getting fewer, and that we have to catch a higher proportion of them. That is the measure of the problem. This is a very serious factor in our plans until the mid-seventies. In 1964 the existing plans supposed that we should need 44,000 Servicemen each year to maintain the future level of Defence forces. In 1965 we came very near to this target by recruiting something like 43,500. The difficulty that we are going to face now is that the three Services recruit from the 15 to 20 year age group. In 1965, when, as I have just said, we got over 43,000 men, there were nearly 1½ million young men of that age group who had completed their education. This is the catchment area from which the forces were drawn.
By 1974 the number will have dropped from 1½ million to under one million, a reduction of nearly 35 per cent. Thus, while our long-term target is now rather more than 35,000 recruits a year, we shall have to produce this figure from a very much reduced field. So even if we get only the same proportion of Lord Wigg's fish in the pond in 1974 as we did in 1965, we should be recruiting only about 29,000 a year, or just over, against the long-term target that I have mentioned. So it is obvious that we have to aim at a higher proportion of young men as time goes on. It is only in the midseventies—perhaps 1974 and thereafter—that the trend will begin to favour us again.
There are, of course, other substantial difficulties. As the number of school leavers with higher educational qualifications increases, greater opportunities are open to them in civilian life. Young men are hesitant in the uncertain climate that has followed successive Defence Reviews to make the Army their career. Headmasters and parents are hesitant to advise them to do so. There are all these difficulties. But I hope and believe that the clear statement of policy in the Statement on the Defence Esimates (and I am referring now especially to paragraphs 45 and 46 of chapter 1) will help to restore confidence in the worthwhile character of the Service career.
We now have a Defence policy that recognises the basic reality of our economic and political interests in the world,

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and because these are, if not stable, at least vital and crucial to defending the quality of life in Britain, I hope that young men will continue to believe that the Armed Forces present a worthwhile career for them.
My Lords, I shall not go into any more details about recruiting or about manpower. I have used up far too much of your Lordships' time already.
LORD BOOTHBY: My Lords, before the noble Lord leaves that subject, may I say that I was on a Parliamentary delegation to Cyprus last year, and the gravamen of the complaint of all the Servicemen, both in the Army and even more in the Royal Air Force, was uncertainty about their own future in the Service. I believe that that is a tremendous deterrent to recruiting. Could the noble Lord say a word or two about that?
LORD CHALFONT: My Lords, I can only say that we hope that this Defence Review and the Defence White Paper that has sprung from it have created a situation of stability in the Armed Forces. I very much hope, and I know the Government hope, that there will be no more of these changes in the strength and the organisation of the Armed Forces. We have had a lot of them and there can be no denying the fact that they have created this erosion in the morale of the young men in the Forces. No one would attempt to deny that. The noble Lord, Lord Thorneycroft, accused the Defence Secretary of being arrogant in saying that we have reached a situation of stability. Of course, as the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, pointed out, nobody can say what will happen in the future. The only thing we can be certain of is that the unpredictable will happen. We should be very foolish indeed if we were to stand up as a Government, or as Defence spokesmen, and say. "This is the end of the reorganisation of the Armed Forces. There will never be another reorganisation". That would be foolish. But we believe now that, within the limits of what is possible to a Government in a rapidly changing world, we have created a Defence establishment which will make further reorganisations of this kind unnecessary. We hope that these young men can now look forward to a stable and worthwhile career.
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My Lords, I hope that I have not detained your Lordships for too long. I have tried to cover a very broad canvas in a comparatively short time. There are those of your Lordships, I know, who will find my view of the world from which men have abolished armed force as an instrument of policy, academic and indeed idealistic. I make no apology whatsoever for that. I am not one of those who regard the term "idealist" as one of contempt. I believe it right that even those of us who are engaged in the grim business of politics—or, perhaps I should say, especially those of us who are so engaged—should have some concept, some vision, of the kind of world we are trying to shape. Certainly if we do not keep such a vision, and keep it safe from the daily pressures and compromises of political life, we shall I think deserve the accusations of "bloody irrelevance" that were reflected in the words of a passionate young gentleman at one of our more modern universities last week.
Some of your Lordships may be familiar with the writings of Walter Lippmann. If anybody is he may be able to place for me the passage in one of his essays in which he says in effect (my recollection may not be exactly accurate):
"One of the qualities that distinguish the civilised man is his desire and his ability sometimes to see beyond the ephemeral and the pragmatic, and beyond the uncertain groping of daily affairs to the vision that lies beyond; and, by the light of that vision, at best to become the master of his condition, or at worst to learn how to endure it".
This, my Lords, may seem light years away from the Army Reserve Bill and the difficulty of getting enough recruits for the infantry. But what we are debating to-day, of course, is not only the ephemeral and the pragmatic; it is the totality of a Defence policy which has to make sense in the context of the foreign and economic and general policies of this country, without losing what I hope is the real vision of any civilised Government in the world to-day—that is, an international organisation from which the rule of force has been abolished for ever. I believe that the Defence policy of this country gives us some hope of that; and I am confident that, whatever may be the criticisms of your Lordships' House in detail and emphasis, in

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principle that is the belief that will be generally shared.
6.45 p.m.
VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN: My Lords, I am very glad to have given way to the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, because I feel that he has made an important speech that will bear very careful reading to-morrow. I have no intention of ranging so wide as he did, but I shall hope to take up one or two points that he has made with some points that I should like to make myself. I would take the time of the House for a few moments in talking mainly about two things: Army manpower, which several noble Lords have spoken about already, and home defence, which very few noble Lords have spoken about at all.
Before I do that, however, I wonder whether I may mention two small points in the Defence Statement which I think ought to be mentioned with approval. One is the evident quickening of the pace of streamlining the staff in the Ministry of Defence itself, which I think it was high time to do; and the other is an evident change in the official attitude to defence studies outside the Ministry. We see that in paragraphs 42 and 43 of Chapter 1 of the Defence Statement. This is a very good thing and points to a more liberal attitude in associating universities and the Royal United Service Institution with defence studies which have to be undertaken from day to day; and of course, if it is developed, it will pave the way to a wider circle of defence studies which was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn.
For a long time it seemed to me that universities and the R.U.S.I. were kept out in the cold or, if you like, starved of vital information because of what I thought were very bogus considerations of security. That would lead to a state of affairs where, certainly among the professional Service people, there is very little continuity; because if there are changes of appointment every three years among the people who are supposed to have studied these matters, there is no continuity at all among Service people but only among civil servants, and that is not good.
Having mentioned those two matters, I hope with approval, I should like to
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go on, perhaps not quite in the same vein, and I shall be dealing with the Army and not with any of the other Services. The Vote A in the estimates is £210,000 for all ranks. On page 66 of the Defence Statement the strength of all ranks is put down at 115,400. That is 11,000 down on last year. I am not going to give a great many figures (the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, is much better at that than I am), but nothing I have read in the Defence Statement itself, or in the debates in another place, or in the Green Paper, The Task Ahead, to which I shall refer in a moment, makes me think that any of the attempts which I have no doubt are being made to stop the drift in recruiting are proving in the least successful.
Meantime, our concentration to-day on the Defence Statement by Mr. Healey should not cause us to overlook completely the passages dealing with defence in the other Green Paper, The Task Ahead, which comes with the blessing. not of Mr. Healey but of Mr. Shore. I know that this latter Paper is called a planning document and not a plan, and that the Paper we are discussing to-day is called a Statement. I myself do not know—I do not understand these things—the difference in the credibility of these two documents. Let us pay our money and take our choice; they are both priced at half a guinea.
But, my Lords, this defence passage in The Task Ahead is concerned entirely with reduction in defence expenditure. It says:
"Defence could defeat its own purpose of securing vital national interests if it were to place too great a burden on the economy."
That ties up quite a bit with paragraph 4 on page 2 of the Defence Statement, except that the paragraph in The Way Ahead is in rather larger print. Those words about defeating our "own purpose of securing vital national interests" if too great a burden is placed on the economy seem to me to give a key to the thinking of noble Lords opposite. Incidentally it is a curious use of the word "vital". I looked up "vital" in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary and found its meaning given as:
"essential to the existence of something absolutely indispensable, necessary or requisite".
Looked at in that light I am bound to think that to use the word "vital" here

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is rather a slipshod use of the English language, because it means that indispensable needs of defence are to be second to the need of saving money. If it does not mean that, what does it mean?
So much, then, for what the Secretary of State for Economic Affairs has to say. May I now go back to the Secretary of State for Defence and ask noble Lords to turn to Chapter 1, at page 35. There it says that the forces are manned by volunteers. Taking these two passages together, it seems to me that we can piece together the policy somewhat like this. Whatever the vital national interests are, the defence vote is to be progressively reduced; and certainly whatever the shortfall in regular recruiting or lack of reserves, the maintenance of voluntary service is paramount. I should be glad to be contradicted about this—I hope that I may be. But I rather fancy that this statement, "the forces are manned by volunteers" is the first unequivocal statement by the present Government to indicate that on no account and in no circumstances will they revert to national service of any form. I cannot remember having seen such a statement before, and I should be interested to know if there has been one.
To return to what the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, said about the need for those who wanted a strong conventional force to be ready to face the consequences, I wrote down his words at the time, and the consequences were said to be a substantial increase in the defence budget and a return to compulsory military service. I hope the noble Lord will not mind my saying that I thought those remarks were slightly over-simplified. Of course an increase in the defence budget would be necessary, but it does not follow that the taxpayer would be asked to face an increase in the Budget. Secondly, the word "compulsory" covers a multitude of sins, or otherwise, because there are at least three main possibilities. One is compulsory military service, as it was known when it was in operation. Another is selective military service, which everybody has said is quite impracticable; but impracticable is not impossible, and we have yet to learn what happens when the experts are told to get on with it. The impossible, of course, is apt to take a little longer. The third possibility is compulsory training and then transfer to
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General Reserve, which was what happended under the Belisha system.
LORD CHALFONT: My Lords, before the noble Viscount moves away from that point, may I ask him to give way for one moment in order that I may mention three small matters? The first is that he quoted a statement of fact—the forces are manned by volunteers—as being a statement of intent or non-intent. He has been so careful about the us of the word "vital" that I must ask him to be equally careful in analysing this particular sentence. It is a statement of fact, not an indication of what the Government may or may not do in some hypothetical situation in the future. Secondly, he talked about there being no need for a total increase in the Budget. I never said that would be necessary; I merely said that there would be an increase in defence spending. If you have increased defence spending and you do not increase the total Budget you must take it from somewhere else. That was the dilemma with which I was facing him. Finally, of course, I realise that compulsory service does not only mean universal conscription. That was why I was careful to say that there would be a need to return to compulsory military service in some form, and he will see this in the OFFICIAL REPORT. I am grateful to the noble Viscount for giving way.
VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for what he has said. If the White Paper had said that the forces are at present manned by volunteers there would be no doubt in my mini as to what was meant. As to the other points, I take them, but now having gone back to 1937 there would be no harm, surely, in saying that one ought to go back not quite so far and to look at the 1957 White Paper and its consequences. That White Paper was the work of my own political friends. I spoke on it at the time and. I looked with some trepidation to see what I had said when I wound up on the first day—May 8—and found I had made three points. One was that a nuclear deterrent might fail in its object unless there was a certain amount of conventional deterrence. Another point was that I doubted very much whether the calculations which led to the announcement that National Service

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should be done away with would really stand up to events. I find I am very glad that I said those things, because although I thought the decision to drop National Service at that time was a right one I felt that some of my friends in the Regular Army had been so anxious to get rid of it that they had produced a far too optimistic estimate of the recruiting potential and therefore one ought to have serious plans for reintroducing it in some form if the alternative was to fall short on our commitments, whatever they might be. But the recruiting figures have been going down ever since.
My own feeling is that the noble Lord, Lord Bourne, was right when he said we are getting near the end of the road. We may not be quite at the end of the road, but the Army Reserve Bill, to which the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, referred just now, looks to me very much like scraping the bottom of the barrel. So we are coming to the end of the road, by which I mean Mr. Healey's road and not Mr. Shore's road. I think every opportunity has been given to young men to join the Regular Army. Every single suggested requirement has been met and we have done everything now, short of inviting them to join a brown collar union. The attempts to increase our recruiting have had to be made in the face of several adverse factors, not all of which will persist indefinitely, but two are there now. One is the disruption of the regimental connections and the other is the loss of the attractive overseas stations which young men have been able to serve in until now. In the process of dealing with this manpower shortage we have thrown overboard almost everything except our commitments to NATO.
Altering course on matters of this sort is a long process. Just as the gradual deterioration in Regular recruiting has been a long process, so altering course in our manpower policy will be the same. Even supposing noble Lords opposite were minded to listen to any suggestions that we might make from this side of the House this afternoon, none the less they would not have time for it. Therefore this problem will fall on the Government who succeed them, in exactly the same way that the problems created by
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the 1957 White Paper fell upon the present Government.
Then we come again to this question of reserves, and I do not want to spend much time on it, because we have been going on for a long time. One thing that does concern me is that, although I have searched high and low in the figures connected with the Defence Statement and the Estimates, there is nothing to tell one what is the capacity of the present Reserve to bring the existing units to war establishment and provide them with the necessary first reinforcements—three months wastage or whatever it is—to make good what is wanted until a National Service scheme came in in an emergency. I know this is old-fashioned language, but none the less the real value of our NATO commitment must depend not only on the excellence of equipment, which the noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, talked about, but also on the need to have the right number of men and the right number of reinforcements. I am afraid that I have no reason to believe that that situation is in the least sound, and that is one of the reasons why I have said so much about National Service in one or other of its forms.
Now we come to the TAVR II. I think that both Lord Bourne and Lord Leatherland said the TAVR II in its present form is a great improvement. So it is; I entirely agree with them. But I also think that the numbers who will be persuaded to recruit to the obligation of TAVR II are very restricted indeed. The present figure, I think, is about 34,000 or 35,000. The establishment is 56,000, and from all I know—and I have seen a good deal of this problem—56,000 is the very utmost that it will be possible to get at any time, even assuming that a number of people come in technical units, such as those of the Post Office. That will not be a very large number to plug the holes of mobilisation, and if it is not enough and this 34,000 of Lord Chalfont's reserve are not enough, what then?
Now we come for one moment to the TAVR III and the Home Defence. The noble Lord, Lord Leather-land, made some sound remarks on that point, and we have had this in almost every defence debate from almost every

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angle. I should like this evening to approach it from the angle that because of the emphasis in the Defence Statement on our commitments to NATO, and therefore to Europe, this country is bound to be a base for operations of some sort or other for ourselves and for fellow members of NATO from the other side of the Atlantic. Home defence in the last war was something rather different. It was first thought to be for invasion; then it centred on the disruption caused by air attack. But nowadays I fancy that the real risk will be not of parachute landings, or any such thing; nor the nuclear threat, but of sabotage.
I beg noble Lords opposite, and I would beg the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, if he were here, most earnestly not to sweep this danger under the carpet. I beg them to think what would happen if the expertise and the staff work used for things like the Great Train Robbery or student unrest were turned towards the disruption of the Queen's Peace. I would ask the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, to speak to his noble friend Lord Stonham and ask him for the figures of the strain on the police caused recently when the Birmingham aqueduct was blown up by people who apparently had the mistaken idea that their action would favour the cause of Wales. Those figures and the situation there, if they are appreciated, will give the key to what I am saying.
There was at that time nothing behind the police except a few odd lots of soldiers in depots who knew nothing about the problem, had not been trained for it and had no local knowledge; nothing in uniform except the ambulance corps, and, bless their hearts! the W.R.V.S. It was against this background that the Civil Defence Corps and TAVR III were thrown away. If anybody thought that the disbandment of TAVR III was going to produce any appreciable number of recruits for TAVR II, I feel that I must tell him that he was widely mistaken. There are something like 50,000 people in this country at any time—I am saying this from some experience—who will assume TAVR II obligations. There are something like 100,000 people at any given time who will assume TAVR III obligations—that is the fortnight's camp, and certain specified training periods. These numbers are very resistant; the
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TAVR III 100,000 will not take on anything more, except in rational emergency, when they will. Figures will show that these numbers have been constant over the ages, and no amount of propaganda or wishful thinking will alter them more than marginally.
Under these conditions it is the greatest mercy that the T. and A.V.R.III cadres were, as one might say, saved for seed. But to anybody who has the slightest knowledge of the problem it is really fantastic when you think that the noble Duke the Duke of Norfolk and his T.A. Council had to throw in everything they had to reach that common-sense solution. I do not think we shall ever get any clear thinking on this point until you remove the division of responsibility between the Defence Department and the Home Office, or, to be more accurate, you alter the place where it is now; or, indeed, unless you adopt the other solution, which is to go back to the home defence executive in the war, a little known but very successful body under Sir Findlater Stewart, which in fact bore the greatest responsibility for the smoothness with which the Departments worked together. Far too much of this question of home defence has been bedevilled by the division of responsibility between the Defence Department and the Home Office.
My Lords, I have spoken too long, and I am quite conscious that I have not only been speaking to noble Lords opposite but have been making a plea, in faith and hope, to my noble friends about how they will approach some of these problems when they return to power; or, to put it more crudely, I have been behaving like a bad gunner, aiming my shots at the people opposite but sending some of them into tie rear of my own troops.
7.8 p.m.
LORD ST. OSWALD: My Lords, we are still within the season of celebrations to mark the founding of the NATO Alliance twenty years ago. It is natural and appropriate that this debate should echo those celebrations, and my remarks will be entirely confined within that context. It would not be appropriate, or even permissible, if those echoes merely lulled us into a false sense of security, based either on a belief in the perfect readiness or adequacy of the Alliance to-day, or in a belief that a true détente

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with Soviet Russia was just around the diplomatic corner. I believe that NATO is at least as vital to-day as on January 22, 1948, when Mr. Ernest Bevin, speaking in the House of Commons, proposed a form of Western defensive union, which led to the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty somewhat less than 15 months later. There is a certain telling, though largely ignored, coincidence in the fact that precisely a month after Mr. Bevin's speech, on February 27 a Communist coup d'état struck down and liquidated the democratic Government of Czechoslovakia.
That warning in 1948 was enough to draw together the free Governments on either side of the North Atlantic. The same kind of warning was repeated eight months ago, again on the soil of Czechoslovakia, and has been drummed home upon our political awareness ever since, with particular emphasis last week. The anxiety which I feel, and shall express this afternoon, is born of the doubt that this second, louder and more prolonged warning has been sufficiently heeded by the same nations which responded to the first. That doubt does not exist in my mind alone; nor does it depend on guesswork or any inborn pessimism. Optimism, to which I am far more naturally prone, is more likely to be the danger to-day. There is a kind of euphoria which envelopes the mind of the Free World when the possibility of a new treaty or détente is mentioned, so anxious are men and women to trust in its authenticity and certainty. I have even heard it said that the invasion of Czechoslovakia, because it created moral fissures in the Communist bloc, has debilitated and restricted the threat from Soviet Russia. I am afraid that I see it quite differently.
To an extent, the Communist world has been sundered from within. So far from decreasing the danger to Europe this could sharpen it. The philosophical command of Communism within its own territories has, at least for a time, been undermined. Military control takes over what part of the field it can. A weakening of this kind breeds fear, and fear which can lean on force breeds danger. Since the rulers in Moscow can no longer trust in the ineluctible passage, by evolution, of world society towards Commun
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ism, they must think afresh. Thinking afresh could too easily mean switching back to the old, simply comprehended methods of naked strength. They cannot coast to victory as they once expected; so coasting is out. Power politics is the game that they have always understood.
NATO remains to guard us, and we may long have to depend upon it. I know that many thoughtful men, deeply engaged in the protection of peace and of freedom are far from sanguine as to the true strength and adequacy of the Alliance to-day, in material and psychological terms. They see a weakening, a fading of the sense of need of this Alliance to be maintained—maintained not simply as to surface appearance, but throughout its structure. I know it because I have read and listened to their words. There is some evidence visible to any who have eyes to see, and other evidence which has to be sought to reveal the inner picture.
Later in what I have to say I shall put forward some suggestions as to the way in which this country could itself more formidably contribute. At this moment, perhaps I might say that noble Lords opposite will not hear from me this evening any attempt to score off them, to lay blame or to imply that we differ in the sincerity of our motives—this despite the characteristically provocative remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, a few moments ago. We are speaking of matters affecting the survival of Britain and the survival of civilisation; and which of us has not a vested interest in both of those?
The argument that I am presenting is that the success so far of the NATO Alliance could be its undoing, unless all of us are alert to that possibility. It has kept Western Europe intact for twenty years. The Iron Curtain and the Berlin Wall are physical proofs of the quality of life that is protected, which is the envy and yearning of those held back from it in the satellite countries. To those who believe that Communism and the Kremlin no longer represent a danger, I say, "Look hard and long, and even selfishly, at Czechoslovakia". If that is how the Soviet rulers interpret "peaceful co-existence" with their own allies, how would we in the bourgois democracies fare at their hands if we lay unprotected as well as uncompliant?

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For twenty years we have been protected by NATO, and during the early years the chief instrument of our safety was the possession of the hydrogen bomb, mainly in American hands, with a destructive capability infinitely greater than that of our potential attacker. As we know, that ceased to be an effective or credible instrument when the Russians came closer to parity. Therefore the concept of massive retaliation gave place to the new concept of flexible response. More fully this is described, as it was described by the noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, to-day, as "a flexible and balanced range of appropriate responses, conventional and nuclear, to all levels of aggression or threats of aggression". In colloquial parlance, no longer the big bang as the answer to anything and everything.
Philosophically and practically, that had to be right, but the philosophy and the practice can be only as valid as the military backing we afford them. That is where the philosophy seems likely to collapse, in practice, at an early stage. I am not intending to exaggerate or dramatise if I paint the picture in this way. In the event of a conventional attack upon NATO territory, of uncertain size and purpose and ultimate direction, the NATO commanders on the spot would have to hold that attack with conventional weapons and without giving ground. Those are their orders. According to the seriousness of the attack and its development, they would have to decide whether and when to ask leave for the use of tactical nuclear weapons. This request would have to be submitted, first to SACEUR, then by him to the Council in Brussels, and by them, after processing, to each of the member Governments, in capitals perhaps nearly 3,000 miles from the action itself—in the case of Washington over 8,000 miles —each of them having to approve the use of even the smallest nuclear weapon. I have heard it reckoned that this approval might take 48 hours or even longer to obtain, during which time troops in the battlefield itself would almost certainly have to hold superior forces having the advantage of initial surprise.
As we were told by the noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, to-day, Mr. Denis Healey has no illusions regarding this.
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In his speech at Munich on February 1, he emphasised that as the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia showed,
"no matter how long the political warning, Soviet Russia would probably"—
I am quoting directly from Mr. Healey—
"be able to gain military surprise—the 'operational initiative', certainly as to time and possibly as to place, by skilful concentration of troops under cover of exercises. Her overall superiority in armour would therefore be greatly multiplied at the decisive point."
In the same speech he had already pointed out most realistically that:
"The Warsaw Pact outnumbers NATO in tanks by more than two to one in peacetime, and by two and a half to one after mobilisation".
Furthermore,
"NATO is outnumbered by the Warsaw Pact on the central front by more than two to one in infantry formations and nearly three to one in armoured formations; after mobilisation of first line reserves, this disparity is increased. The Warsaw Pact superiority in aircraft is nearly two to one."
That is the end of my direct quotation from Mr. Denis Healey, who did not flinch from painting the picture in stark terms.
One other factor is pertinent. To-day a NATO brigade is given a front something like two and a half times broader than that of an infantry brigade in World War II. What stares a man in the face is that these facts of present co-existence and legitimate, convincing defence, require more conventional troops in the right place than could have been required by the discarded concept of massive and immediate nuclear retaliation. Yet the paradox (and I submit an absurd and perilous paradox) is that the very Council of Ministers which gave approval to the strategic concept of flexible response also accepted, tacitly and mutually, a scaling down of existing forces. That was in Brussels in December, 1967. Yet twenty months earlier, in March, 1966, France had ended the assignment of all French forces to NATO, drastically reducing the trained manpower and weapons available.
It is because it seems to me politically and militarily incomprehensible that the concept of flexible response should not be accompanied by adequate and faithfully guaranteed force levels, that I must labour this central argument further. I have heard it most eminently suggested that it is deceptive and even dishonest—a self-confidence trick—to refer to

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flexible response as being a reality, until and unless we can provide the conditions that make it real. The current conditions fall short of that reality. The picture on the ground is fairly discouraging. If I refer to the British contribution, it is not to imply that ours is uniquely or exceptionally unsatisfactory; in certain ways the reverse is true. Only if one is to be critical of certain aspects of an Alliance, then I think it is right to spare one's own country least.
British divisions used to contain three brigades. The standard NATO division has three brigades. Ours, almost alone among member-forces, have two. In B.A.O.R. there are three divisions, with, theoretically, two brigades each. But one of those divisions has effectively only one brigade, because 6 Brigade has been withdrawn to the United Kingdom. Even to state that there are five brigades is a delusion, because it suggests that these are fully manned. The fact is otherwise. The average actual strength of British units in Germany is 80 per cent., and some. I have been told, are as low as 60 per cent. That is not a sensible, tangible, viable implementing of the new concept. It means that commanders on the ground have to fight without giving ground, without nuclear weapons, with fewer troops than are provided on paper, and on a wider front than under previous conditions of land warfare. The inevitable result of all these handicaps together would be the early requirement of nuclear weapons, the precipitate breaking of the "pause" and the defeat of the whole concept. That is more properly described as "inflexible" response.
By way of counter-balancing part of what I have said, it is right and satisfying proudly to state that the weapons and equipment of the British forces are better than almost any others, and their training is almost certainly better than that of any others. None the less, I submit that it is not fair or effective to expect commanders or their troops to operate the new concept with this reduced ability.
I would ask the Government to do three things, and I give my priorities for what they are worth. Send back 6 Brigade to Germany; complete the manning-up of the units in Germany so that they are the units as described, not
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statistical shadows; and halt forthwith the whittling down of the Volunteer Reserves. I am convinced that all these measures are necessary. The return of 6 Brigade would be a heartening example to all other nations within the Alliance. The manning-up would mean that commanders could perform the task set to them with units as described, not partly consisting of ghost squadrons, ghost companies, and ghost platoons. A stop on the planned run-down of TAVR II would mean the availability of trained officers and men, quickly available in an emergency.
My noble friend before me has spoken of this but I would point out, as has been pointed out to me, that the portion of reinforcements which has to come from the General Reserve, ex-Regulars and ex-National Servicemen still liable for call-up, will be men who in many cases have not worn uniform or touched a weapon, or intended to, for many years. In distinction many of us know the quality of the T. and A.V.R.: the energy and the application which the members give to their own voluntary training throughout the year, and at least in one annual camp. I believe that, should there ever be an emergency, the present-day Ministers concerned—Mr. Healey as much as any—would find it impossible to forgive themselves, in the hour of sudden need, if they had forfeited a part of that fund of voluntary service and the pool of good, keen, up-to-date soldiers, as they intend under current proposals. Every Government makes mistakes. I appeal to Ministers to redeem this mistake in time; to cancel these proposals. To enable the T. and A.V.R. to retain and restore its strength will be an important means of giving reality to the new strategic concept being provided. In an emergency it will be able to reinforce the troops on the ground.
Again, I urge the Government to do these things as an example to other nations. Positive action is infectious, just as negative action is infectious. We serve under the cloud of the dismal example of France; and now, added to that, the announcement that Canada intends to reduce her commitment. It is the sort of occasion when our partners, including the Americans, look to us for reviving action, and we, the British nation, are bound to look to Her Majesty's Government.

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My Lords, I have spoken already at some length without my feet leaving the ground. This House is rich in noble and articulate Admirals and former First Lords, and it would therefore hardly become me to embark in a separate vessel, or leave them sitting ashore. I would mention only the acute and deeply felt lack of a surface-to-surface guided missile, not possessed by any NATO Navy, and without which ships of those Navies, saving one factor, may find themselves sitting ducks in any exchange with Soviet ships which do possess them. I am thinking, naturally enough, of the Styx missile, with a range of 20 miles, which sank the Israeli destroyer "Eilat" in seconds on October 21, 1967, and of the Shaddock intermediate guidance weapon, with a range of 300 miles. The sinking of the "Eilat" was a turning point in the history of naval warfare, which seems to have been largely ignored. The saving factor is, of course, air strike provided from the aircraft carriers, now under sentence of scrap so far as our own Royal Navy is concerned.
I will speak in a little more detail of the R.A.F., in the NATO context, even if it may take the form of continuing the small and very friendly debate we had on aircraft procurement the week before last, wound up by the noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom. Nothing I say will be intended to contradict what he has said, nor to undermine his basic assessments or his statement that the R.A.F. were satisfied with the aircraft position. I would merely qualify his words by saying that they were correct, so far as they went, and would try to carry the inquiry a little further, and widen it beyond the purely British role. The gravest considered opinion I have heard is that in the whole European theatre there is a shortage of between 400 and 500 aircraft. This shortage is shared between many countries and owed to factors additional to financial stringency. Be that as it may, it represents a serious weakness, and one which I should think Britain could help to rectify in part by positive example.
The British contribution to the Allied Tactical Air Forces is numerically unimpressive. Some would say—some do say—distressingly so. We have almost the smallest Air Force assigned to NATO and, at this day and hour, quite the most
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outmoded. There is a total of eight squadrons, only two out of these being describable as relatively modern planes: they are the Lightnings. The Canberra, whatever well deserved compliments we pay it, dates, in prototype, from May, 1949—twenty years ago. Deliveries began to the R.A.F. in January, 1951. Yet the noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, told us the other day:
"The Canberra, oddly enough, is carrying on for a long time in certain specialised roles." —[OFFICIAL REPORT, 17/4/69, col. 289.]
I think "oddly enough" must be the operative phrase. I do not know what period the noble Lord had in mild, but if the Canberra should go into action the year after next it would be equivalent to using a First World War plane in the Battle of Britain—that is in terms purely of age.
However, he also told us that the present Canberras would have their role taken over, transitionally, by the Buccaneer. The first 20 Buccaneers were ordered for the Navy in mid-1955, and first flew in 1958. More cheeringly, the noble Lord confirmed that the R.A.F. would soon be receiving the Phantoms and Harriers, the former to last into the second half of the 1970s, while the Harrier, of course, will be the most up-to-date aircraft in service with any air force in the world. I wonder if the noble Lord the Leader of the House, in winding up, would say when the first Harrier Squadron, and the following two, will be assigned to NATO, and whether they will be stationed in Germany when that happens. The second factor is the greatest obvious importance, since if they were stationed in Britain that would eat into their useful range.
As the noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, pointed out, the R.A.F. contribution to NATO will soon, or fairly soon, be qualitatively strengthened. But there are four less encouraging characteristics which I feel bound to mention. First, the contribution will still be only eight squadrons, including only three Harrier squadrons, which hardly measures up to Britain's potential, responsibilities, or traditions. Secondly, the Harrier is, as we know, just subsonic, whereas the P.1154, had it not been killed, would have been supersonic. Thirdly, even this mix of Harriers, Phantoms and Buccaneers does not fill the need for a

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deep penetration, all-weather, ground attack, strike and reconnaissance aircraft, with an "edge" over the enemy's probable capabilities in the mid-'seventies.
Despite this, we still do not know what we shall have in that capacity in the mid-'seventies, and we cannot—I do not think the noble Lord will disagree—depend entirely by that time on the superb Phantom. I am not attempting to press him on this matter. I know that the Government are working hard on the M.R.C.A. and I do not expect an answer from him to-day. The noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, was as explicit and forthcoming earlier as he possibly could be. I simply want to emphasise and re-emphasise our anxiety about this matter. Fourthly, the dispersal and protection of combat aircraft in the NATO area is in a far from satisfactory state. I shall also refer to a fifth anxiety more parenthetically.
I will not expatiate on the first anxiety, that of the low numerical effort, though the noble Lord may wish to comment on it in his winding up. However, there was a certain semantic misunderstanding between the noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, and myself the other night, when we were discussing the importance of degrees of sophistication, speed being only one of the factors involved; payload, range, contour-following and type of takeoff all being important capabilities, one of course reducing some others in certain instances. The noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, took me a trifle too literally when I spoke of the lack of speed meaning that they could overtake us but we could not catch them. I did not have a picture, as he understandably construed it, of aircraft "chasing each other about in splendid dog-fights". I was thinking of overtaking in performance, and specifically in terms of "target acquisition". Here speed does matter, perhaps critically. Target acquisition, if you are the target, can be the difference between life and death for you and your aircraft. Put in primitive terms, the faster and closer to the ground you are flying, the fewer will be the enemy's weapons with which he can hope to touch you, and the less likely will he be to bring you down even with his more sophisticated weapons.
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Of course, this quality of "target acquisition" by flying lower and faster has another side to it. It renders the pilot's own target much more difficult to strike. It thus requires more sophisticated. more delicate and more expensive instrumentation. That expense has to be balanced against the pilot's life or death, the aircraft's survival or destruction, the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of its role. That is no simple equation and I would not pretend that it is.
Passing from the highly sophisticated to the basic, I have a question for the noble Lord who will wind up and I trust that he will be able to answer it reassuringly. Are the stocks of bombs, rockets and other stores kept in Germany entirely and immediately adequate, or are they below par as I have heard from some quarters? The agreed scales must exist. If he can say that they are adhered to in practice, or that where otherwise they will be promptly replenished, it will set my mind and some others at rest.
More difficult, because less susceptible to rapid correction, are the problems of aircraft dispersal, protection and concealment. The required dispersal pattern within NATO is one squadron per aerodrome. In no case, I am told, does this exist. The average is 2·6. The noble Lord will not claim that this is satisfactory and it must cause some concern. I understand that there are contradictory schools of thought within the R.A.F. on this subject. It is administratively more convenient in peace-time to have repair and maintenance carried out on a wing basis, rather than on a squadron basis, and the use of more aerodromes adds, of course, to the expense of installations. These are also factors which are hard to balance against the survivability of the squadrons themselves.
What cannot be questioned rationally is the need, on the aerodromes, for proper protection and concealment. The critical importance of this was revealed, if it needed revealing, by the fate of the Egyptian Air Force, destroyed almost in its entirety by a pre-emptive ground attack before a single plane took off. I hope that there is no complacency over this, because we are unlikely to have more political warning than the Egyptians had in the summer of 1967.

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My information is that at present the R.A.F. planes in Germany are standing about on aerodromes as nakedly as were the Egyptians' in their hour of destruction.
To attempt to shelter every individual aircraft against a heavy direct hit would be not only costly, but ruinous. Simpler, cheaper shelters against rocket attack and blast, for instance, revetting and camouflage, are measures of an economical order which I should think are fundamental to the readiness and security of the squadrons on which one day so much could depend. I am told that here, as so often, the best has been the enemy of the good. In expectation of future expenditure on more impregnable shelters, member nations have tended to leave things as they are in a perilously vulnerable state. This strikes me as glaringly false economy.
Before closing, and in fairly natural sequence to what I have just been saying, I should like to refer to the truly remarkable way in which the Alliance survived the major blow of France's withdrawal Apart from the factor of large, brave and highly-skilled forces at one moment assigned to NATO and the next withdrawn, apart from the problem of moving several important headquarters established on the soil of France, including NATO and SHAPE themselves, there has been the exclusion of sheer space for deployment of 211,000 square miles, together with many well-equipped aerodromes, from the Alliance's already restricted zone.
On Sunday night and well into yesterday morning I was in Paris, watching on television a memorable and significant event. After the results of the Referendum were known, I could not find anyone among the acute observers with whom I spoke who would forecast what might be the effect, if any, on France's relationships with NATO. Certainly, this Referendum and its outcome could not have been foreseen when France withdrew upon the General's decision. Yet the basic integrity of purpose in the Alliance suffered little more than a shudder. That is not to say that it could stand another such blow. Moreover, the continuing reaffirmations of purpose among those who remain must be physical as well as moral.
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America provides by far the largest element of manpower within NATO, 320,000 men at the moment; and of the total expenditure of 99 million dollars in 1967 the United States contributed 76 million. President Nixon, within weeks of taking up his new office, chose to come first to Europe; and the first of his calls was to NATO. In various European capitals during his visit he stated, clearly and firmly, that his Administration would stand by NATO and maintain force levels. It should be noted that the United States' divisions are the only ones maintained at 100 per cent. strength, despite the fact that on the other side of the world they are fighting a war in which they are losing 200 men a day. Mr. Nixon's assurance is heartening to a European o in itself; but no American President is going to find it easy to be so staunch to NATO if the American people consider that the Europeans are doing less than they should in their own immediate defence. That is the understandable suspicion never far below the surface in America to-day. The Mansfield amendment failed in the United States Senate, but it had powerful support, and that resolution would have reduced the American participation from its present 320,000 to 50,000 men. Under such opposite pressures, a President prepared to give such categorical undertakings as did Mr. Nixon needs and merits a realistic response from us, the peoples of Western Europe.
NATO is far from being sick or sorry. NATO is fundamentally healthy in mind, heart and body. In some respects, important respects, it is not as well-found as it deserves to be. It is under-nourished in certain essential vitamins. This means that full advantage is not being made of that robust condition of basic health. Governments of all democratic countries—we have to appreciate—are under pressure to retrench financially, crimped all too often by considerations of foreign exchange. This has led, largely unseen (though not by the enemy), to something resembling a conspiracy of self-deception. Governments have agreed, without difficulty or demur, on the total minimum needs of the Alliance in the rolling programme of force levels. They have then quietly, almost smugly, diluted or pared away at their own agreed quotas.
The problems of NATO are the directly interwoven problems of will and performance. Lip service is paid to both in a

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new Esperanto. It covers a kind of protocol of pretence perilous pretence, in my submission. No Government in the past many years is blameless. Every Government can find and present excuses. Excuses cannot replace fighting men, or build up force levels which Governments have agreed upon but provided on a diminished scale. This is not the time for negative excuses: it is a time for positive, productive resolve—to keep the peace and to protect the human race. This must be a living, lasting part of the whole vocation of the Britain we know.
7.41 p.m.
THE EARL OF GLASGOW: My Lords, I shall be speaking this evening mostly, as is my wont, about the Navy, but I have already received a large torpedo from my noble friend Lord Thorneycroft because I intended to take as my text the first sentence of the Statement on the Defence Estimates. If I may re-read that sentence, it
"The re-orientation of our defence policy is now completed, and the Armed Forces can look forward to a period of stability and progress".
My Lords, this is not an inspired document, but it probably could not be expected to be. It has consolidated the controversial decisions of the last four years, but in my innocence I still take a crumb of comfort from the words of my text. It is my pious hope that, for the moment, the days of order, counter-order and disorder are over, and that so far as the Armed Forces are concerned we have reached rock bottom. As Arthur Bryant used to say to us at the staff college, "The British Army never fights better than when in that position of supreme advantage, the last ditch". From that position, perhaps, we can consolidate and then move forward.
In taking stock of the Royal Navy at this time I will start with the surface Fleet, which in my opinion has much to commend it. For its restricted and more humble task of defending Europe in conjunction with our Allies within the NATO Alliance, its shape and size are adequate. It has a small but efficient amphibious element, and a reasonable fleet of minesweepers, although we could always do with more of these. The County class destroyers and the new Leander type
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frigates are very fine ships—probably as good as those in any Navy in the world. I was also interested in what I read and in what the noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, told us to-day, that the successors to these ships are to be smaller. I thoroughly approve of this policy so long as we do not try to put too much equipment into a smaller hull and, more important still, so long as they are cheaper so that we can have more of them.
As regards numbers, the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, gave your Lordships some of the details of ships in commission. If your Lordships will forgive me, I will give the figures again because I want to talk a little about them. The number of ships in commission in the Royal Navy in 1964 was 181. To-day, it is 144. Now this is perhaps understandable taking into account our economic situation and our reduced rôle in world affairs, but it makes a fairly complete nonsense of Mr. Healey's claim to be substantially improving our contribution to NATO. What I find not so reassuring is the state of the Reserve Fleet. Whereas in 1964 we had 170 ships in reserve or undergoing long refits, to-day we have 60. To take one example, H.M.S. "Maidstone", an old ship of mine, was converted between 1958 and 1962 at a cost of over £2 million to be a depot ship for nuclear submarines. She is now to be scrapped. A number of other ships, on many of which much money has been spent on refits and conversions, are going with her long before what would appear to be the end of their useful lives. Now there may be some very good reason for this, but I should be grateful if the noble Lord the Leader of the House would explain to me what it is.
Turning to submarines, again the noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, gave us an extremely able and full explanation of the position there. Three of the four Polaris submarines will be in service before the end of this year. I still wish that Her Majesty's Government could be persuaded to order a fifth. From the operational point of view, there is a subtle difference between four and five, more so than between three and four or five and six, and I do not doubt that that was the reason why five was the number originally chosen. I would ask the Minister of Defence to take a look

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at this again. Of the nuclear hunterkiller submarines, Mr. Mason declared in another place in December, 1967:
"We will continue to build up the growing force of Fleet submarines which will provide the main striking power of the Navy …" —[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, 14/12/67, col. 231.]
At that time there were in service some three submarines, three were building and a seventh had been ordered. In January, 1968, only a month later, the Prime Minister announced a slowing down in the rate of naval construction. In the present White Paper, which is dated February, 1969, we still have only three in service. The other three are still building, one becomes operational in January, 1970, and the eighth has not yet been ordered. I submit, my Lords, that when the carriers phase out in 1971 it does not seem as if the "main striking power of the Navy" is going to be very strong. May I ask the noble Lord the Leader of the House whether any consideration has been given to speeding up the building programme in view of the fact that when the slowdown was ordered the carriers were planned to continue well into the 1970s?
I now turn to maritime strategy. I looked for a very long time at the White Paper to see whether Her Majesty's Government were considering any responsibilities at all outside Europe and NATO in the 1970s. In paragraph 26 of Chapter I I found the words:
"… we must ensure that we still have forces which can operate effectively outside Europe as required".
My Lords, if "effectively" is the operative word, the Navy is desperately handicapped by the phasing out of the aircraft carriers, or, to put it another way, the failure to provide ships at sea with their own reconnaissance and strike capability. This is a very serious weakness which must one day be overcome if ships are ever to conduct even minor operations beyond the close range of an R.A.F. umbrella. I am most anxious that in their enthusiasm to disengage from everything outside Europe Her Majesty's Government should not be hoisted by their own petard. There is now a large Russian fleet in the Mediterranean, and there is increasing Russian naval activity in the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. This has caused much alarm and despondency. I think it was
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unfortunate that the Minister of Defence should have announced of the Mediterranean that
"in the event of war we could sink all Soviet ships within minutes".
He might have some trouble with the submarines. But even if it were true, it was a silly thing to say, because it was not the point. Russian naval activity is, of course, political. The Russians are ostensibly doing no more than exercising their right to the freedom of the seas—a principle for which the Royal Navy stood for 300 years.
The Russians are in fact showing the flag—a form of sport which I have commended to your Lordships on many previous occasions in this House. The only answer to this is for us and our allies to do the same, but to do it better. We should match them, ship for ship, with perhaps a slight edge in areas of the world which are especially important to us—the Persian Gulf, for example. This problem is taken care of in the North Sea and the North Atlantic, where we and our allies have sufficient ships and the Russians are of little more than nuisance value: also in the Mediterranean, thanks to the American Sixth Fleet. In the South Atlantic, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, where we, the British, have special responsibilities, we should be playing a major part, instead of which it is the policy of Her Majesty's Government to withdraw altogether. The Minister of Defence said the other day of the Mediterranean:
"We have provided a Naval presernce of our own as a counter to the political role of the Soviet Units."
All he was, in fact, doing was replacing something in the Mediterranean which should never have been taken away. Why do the same arguments not apply to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf?
I must emphasise again that the first preoccupation of sea power is to prevent war. We can play our proper part in this only if we have a Naval presence ready and available to act when the first spark is lit. Unlike the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, I believe this to be more and not less important when a subsequent conflagration could end up with a nuclear exchange. The Prime Minister seemed to be more aware than some of his colleagues and supporters of the importance of a Naval presence when he ordered

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"Fearless" to Lagos to back un his talks with the Federal Government of Nigeria. In doing so, he was removing half Mr. Healey's Naval presence in the Mediterranean; but who is to say that he was wrong?
My Lords, I now want to turn to what I consider to be much the most disquieting thing in the White Paper, and it was referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Bourne; that is, the shortfall in the recruiting. This is true of all three Services. The reasons given in paragraph 38—the fall in the birthrate in the middle-50s, the effects of the Industrial Training Act, and early marriage—may play a small part but are not convincing, although much play was made of them in the Defence debate in another place. The Minister of Defence was far more honest when he said in a speech on July 25:
"There is no doubt that the main reason for the fall-off in recruiting is the general image of the Services among the civilian population."
In the same speech, he said:
"I think there is no doubt that one major reason for the worrying fall in recruiting over the last twelve months or so is the impression, current among a large section of the civilian population, that there is no future in the Services."
The Government, and perhaps a hard core of their supporters in another place, must accept the responsibility for this impression and for the effect it has had on the image of the Services among the civilian population. We have now had seven Defence White Papers in under five years, each one informing us of abandoned commitments and reductions in the Services, with a smug pat on the back for the amount of money that has been saved. It is also a fact that the way in which pronouncements are phrased can affect the view taken by parents, school authorities and the young people themselves of the prospect of a career in the Forces. Too often the announcement of a cut in the Services has been made to coincide with some unpalatable piece of legislation on the home front. The modern Serviceman is no fool, and he dislikes the feeling that he and his Service are being used as a political pawn. It should be said more often that even after the declared reductions have taken place Britain will retain powerful, effective and indispensable
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Armed Forces for as far ahead as anyone can foresee.
The Armed Forces are too readily associated with the "dirty" words of the 1960s—imperialism, colonialism, gunboat tactics and the rest. So much so that in every military operation, from Aden and Anguilla to Northern Ireland, Pressmen and politicians are constantly breathing down the necks of the soldiers in case one thug, be he Arab, West Indian or a member of the I.R.A., should get a British rifle butt on his chin. Soldiers, sailors and airmen are highly professional men and can well be left to get on with the job. The sort of attitude which I have described hampers commanders and is thoroughly bad for morale. But, worst of all, it lowers the standing of the Armed Forces in the eyes of the civilian population. Instead of constantly asking damn-fool questions about the alleged brutality of our Servicemen, Parliament should give our Armed Forces their confidence and support and make it clear to the country that they are doing so.
Finally, my Lords, there is one priceless asset which does not appear in this very cost-conscious document. It is not clear what proportion of the Defence Votes can be identified as devoted directly to the training of individuals in technical and administrative schools which in due course will add to the total skilled and trained manpower of the country. Training in the Armed Forces in technical and other skills is second to none. In the Navy we get their services for anything from five to fifteen years but even the oldest of them have a good twenty years left to devote to a civilian job. In addition to this, the voluntary nature of our Armed Forces means that in a permissive and turbulent world these young men have voluntarily placed themselves under discipline. I do not think it is an exaggeration to say that the social behaviour of young Servicemen, which formerly was apt to be a bit rough, now stands out as a model for their civilian contemporaries. Thank God! we still have them—and let us do all we can to persuade more to come forward.
As a third generation of sailors, I have always regarded the Royal Navy as the finest Service in the world. Perhaps the

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other two are not too far behind. The time to buy shares in a good company is when they are at the bottom of the market. If I were a young man with a spirit of adventure and a desire to serve my country, I would join now
7.57 p.m.
LORD CLIFFORD OF CHUDLEIGH: My Lords, since 1965 those of us intimately connected with the Territorial Army have in your Lordships' House fought, first against the rumours of mutilation and later against the successive mutilations of what was once the cheapest voluntary part-time military service in the world. I can only suggest that those who would argue that the TAVR II is an adequate successor to what was there before or an adequate reserve for our Regular Army need their heads reading. I am the Honorary Colonel of the Devon Territorials—all eight men of them. What a Gilbertian situation! But they represent what used to be a dozen major and minor units, each with its history and traditions. As I noted in a letter to our local General recently, I reaccepted the position only in the hope and belief that our next set of rulers would do something to repair the well-nigh irreparable damage done to our Volunteer Reserve Forces. I also noted that the Ministry of Defence must still have a sense of humour, in that the date of reappointment was to be April 1. Colin Mitchell says in his recent book, after referring to two Territorial Army officers:
"At that time any citizen in the Territorials was living proof that the British race was still capable of giving voluntary service to the State despite the inherent apathy of socialism to national pride."
The whole defence concept seems to be now to show our enemies that we are not too strong and our friends and relations how little help we can be in an emergency. Certainly Australia and New Zealand consider our proposal to withdraw from Singapore as the greatest niece of ingratitude ever. I may mention that for four years I happened to be a GM Intelligence in Australian Army headquarters and I think I know a little of the feeling. It may interest your Lordships to know that quite apart from the assistance they had given this country in the previous three wars, they had still, up to Korea, a corns commitment to come to our assistance in need. That is
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a commitment on which we based our Intelligence at the time. One is tempted to say about the position in which the Government have put us to-day what Nelson said of the Neapolitans:
"God knows, they had little enough honour to lose; but what little they had, they lost."
The decision to abolish the Fleet Air Arm just as the development of the V.T.O.L. aircraft was becoming a feasibility and therefore with small, cheap aircraft carriers just around the corner was short-sighted in the extreme. I should not like to be a soldier doing any of the normal peace-time operations—I was a Regular soldier for 15 years—with the nearest airfield 500 miles away. The Air Force has had some of its more promising aircraft cancelled; their nuclear capability is to go. But then, in abolishing the Civil Defence, the Government abolished the credibility of our nuclear deterrent. Was it not ironical that the Government got rid of the Civil Defence in the year when its members, in conjunction with the old Territorial Army, could have been most useful in coping with the floods that we had in the South-East and South-West of England? In Dc von we used to have a Sapper unit which every year built a Bailey bridge for our county show. They were mutilated, and when the bridge on our boundary with England was washed away they had to send to Essex for one.
One of the main reasons, to my mind, why recruiting is so bad—and we had all this last week—is that the Governments of this country (I use the word, in the plural) it seems have decided over the years to do away with the regimental system. To talk about the big regiment is, to my mind, so much intellectual poppycock. I think the position was summed up best in an article in the Evening News during the time of the Korean war. Talking about the posthumous award of the Victoria Cross to Major Muir the article stated:
"The theorists and those with a passion for administrative tidiness held that the infantry battalion, with its great simple prick of regimental tradition, was hoplessly out of date. Officers and men must be interchangeable like cogs. The social theorists with their fingers in the pie too; they particularly resented the idea of family connection with a regiment—it smelt of 'privilege' and 'reaction', of social snobbery. It is to be noted that Major Muir rallied and inspired his men, not with the code number of an anonymous group and not

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with some such cry as, 'Citizen soldiers of the Social Democracies of the West' but with the name of their regiment, the Argylls."
After pointing out that Major Muir was killed leading the counter attack on Hill 282 and was the son of a previous C.O. of the Regiment, the article went on:
"He represented and embodied the faith—so sneered at in progressive circles—that inheritance of this kind is a great privilege, linked inescapably with an austere duty."
My Lords, with completely inadequate reserves, as I see it, with the abolition of most of the Territorial Army, I see no alternative to the reintroduction of National Service. In fact, I am one of those who believe it should never have been abolished. If, for those two years, developing young lives could have their energies directed once again to doing something for their country, I think that the hoodlums, vandalism and protesters for the sake of protesting would be largely banished and other forms of national indiscipline halved.
For hundreds of years, my Lords, it has been the strategic policy of this country to keep the Russians out of the Gulf and the Mediterranean. Now it seems we are practically inviting them in; and this at a time when we make a virtue of pretending to have an Army based on Europe. How can we make believe that we could protect the Falkland Islands against the Argentine; Guyana against Venezuela; British Honduras against Guatemala; Gibraltar against Spain; have a NATO commitment or anything else you like, with the reserveless, under-recruited forces which seem to have been dumped on us by our administrators to-day?
8.5 p.m.
VISCOUNT YOUNGER OF LECKIE: My Lords, at this time of night I shall try to cut my remarks to the minimum. In the Supplementary Statement on Defence Policy for 1968—that is, last year—Cmnd. 3701, the following was said in paragraph 20:
"NATO defence planning must pay special attention to possible situations below the level which would provoke a strategic nuclear response."
My Lords, if they have paid this special attention I do not think that the knowledge of it has yet reached the public. Last year, in our debate here, I tried to
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extract some information on the subject of NATO'S conventional commitments. To-day's debate has produced a certain amount of light on the subject, but I still feel that it is not nearly as clear as it should be for the benefit of those people in the country who take an interest in defence and who are genuinely worried, I am sure, at the present very complicated situation in NATO; and who have grave difficulty in understanding what it is that is being done.
I do not think that they have much difficulty in understanding the main problem of the nuclear deterrent; that is to say, a deterrent in response to a major deliberate attack. People can understand that and realise that the horrible consequences might, in certain circumstances, have to he tolerated. On the other hand, I think that people, especially those who read Lord Wigg's article in The Times on February 20, would agree with much of what he said, in that they feel that the credibility of the nuclear deterrent is not nearly as absolute as some people make it out to be and that there must be a threshold below which no one would contemplate invoking the nuclear deterrent and no one would contemplate providing it.
In anything that I have seen it has never been made very clear what NATO's capability is to cope with emergencies which might arise and which were clearly below the level of nuclear response. We are told of NATO'S conventional commitment to hold the fort for a few days while people think whether to invoke the nuclear deterrent or not, but that is quite a different problem. What I think is worrying people is that, it is evident, on studying the attitude of Communist countries since the War, that obviously their most successful type of operation has always been based on subversion It would start with some unstable political situation, as indeed in Vietnam in the early days. There is a cry for help, probably wrapped up in camouflage to make it look like self-determination. You get a Communist country coming in to help, either with armed forces or volunteers, and there is your Vietnam situation.
Many people that I have spoken to cannot see why such a situation should not arise in Europe. The noble Lord, Lord Leatherland, referred to the unstable

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situation which we all know exists in Greece. One does not want to mention other countries, but I think that Greece is perhaps an exception. It has had a Communist resolution before and it could have a Communist revolution again. Suppose it issues a cry for help; suppose the Bugarians come in to help; what is NATO's attitude going to be to that, bearing in mind that if Greece goes Communist and becomes part of what has now become known as the Communist Empire, Russia gets the use of Piraeus and the Mediterranean and our friends in Turkey are virtually cut off, landwise anyway, from the rest of NATO? I do not expect detailed answers on that kind of point, but it is an aspect which does not seem to me to have had any public discussion. I think it ought to have, because I believe that people who are interested in defence must know something of that commitment before they can judge whether the conventional resources of NATO and our own conventional contribution to NATO are sufficient.
As regards the efficiency of NATO'S resources, one hears a great many different opinions. Those noble Lords who read The Times Supplement on NATO, issued on April 10, will remember that it contained an article from a member of the Institute of Strategic Studies, in which he wrote:
"If countries only maintain small regular forces they must have a proper reserve strength to back them and to provide for the unforeseen. Britain has here been one of the weaker elements of the alliance."
On the deployment of NATO, he said this:
"The deployment of NATO's forces is far from ideal. This deployment is a legacy of the last war. Peace-time barracks are there and changing would be costly. Movement across the front at a time of fighting would be hindered by congestion and lack of depth."
I have no idea what weight should be placed on that particular gentleman's opinion but it is certainly very different from what Mr. Healey told us, for instance, in the debate in another place on March 4, when, dealing with NATO'S conventional forces, he said:
"I believe that the current level is entirely adequate to deter—or suppress—without the use of nuclear weapons anything short of a deliberate major attack."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, 4/3/69, col. 242.]
My Lords, one could not say fairer than that. It is a very big claim to make, but
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one cannot of course say how big, because one does not know what level of danger he is contemplating. That, in turn, depends on this nuclear threshold about which we have heard so much.
I feel that the public are entitled to more information on this aspect of NATO'S policy. I think they are horrified at the idea suggested in the article by the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, that there is a really low nuclear threshold. People to whom I have spoken, apart from being horrified, cannot believe that it is credible. In other words, they cannot believe that in anything short of a major all-out deliberate attack, where NATO would call for the nuclear deterrent, any American President would be foolish enough to use it. But there is, of course, the no-man's-land occupied by tactical nuclear weapons. All I can say on this is that no one I have heard seems to understand anything of it at all. It would be as well if at some time we were given at least some indication of the role they are sup-posed to play—whether these weapons are simply an automatic prelude to a nuclear exchange, or whether they have some viability in their own right.
To conclude, I want to give another reason why I think some of this information should be given, so far a8t it is consistent with security. We have heard a great deal about its being of no use having military strength if it is not backed up by economic strength. That is true, but it is not the whole truth. It is probably equally true to say that it is no good building up a high standard of living and a high standard of freedom if we do not have the military strength to defend not only our own standards but also those of our allies.
There is a third factor which is not always remembered but which I believe is of overriding importance—that is, moral strength, or as you may like to call it, morale. There is a danger, which I think perhaps Her Majesty's Government have not appreciated, that if they devote almost their entire public statements to proving how clever they are to have cut down the cost of defence, and if they spend all their time talking to the wishful thinkers, defeatists and pacifists, though in this House we understand why that is done, it makes a bad impression in public and has a cumulative effect which it is difficult perhaps for

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its authors to appreciate. Therefore, it is vital that the public should be given an idea of what they would be in for in all the horrible alternatives that are open to us in NATO, so that, if the worst does happen, we can be sure of the support from public opinion which we have always had before. I would ask Her Majesty's Government to give this House all the information they can on this question of the conventional role of NATO and also to try to switch the emphasis in their public statements from pacifying the pacifists to encouraging those people who are interested in defence and who will undoubtedly rally round the country in any time of crisis
8.17 p.m.
VISCOUNT MONCKTON OF BRENCHLEY: My Lords, following the last speaker I would say: "Let justice be done though the heavens fall". Surely that is a foretaste of what nuclear warfare may be? Perhaps noble Lords remember the young pilot who was killed in the last war, who wrote to his girl friend:
"There is a fate, Elizabeth, For which we all must wait,
And man and war can do no more Than try and change the date."
We have to face it, otherwise it does not deter. There are armies from all the countries in NATO committed to realising that their duty is to be killed first, in order, one hopes, to prevent the Armageddon starting.
The NATO forces in Europe have to obtain options, to obtain time for sanity. They have to use their mobility and expertise to make sure of what is coming. What they have to do is to stop nonsense occurring, because nonsense in this case could be disastrous. The death of Ulbricht would cause an increase of tension and cause on both sides an awkward situation. If China came farther into the Soviet Union, the tension all along would be increased. It is this retention of control in an unstable political situation which is the duty of NATO forces in Europe, and that is why it is a pity at this present time that NATO itself is in danger. Where we have a vacuum—and there are so many around the world at present—there is always danger. The removal of forces and the threat of force reduces that time lag when the forces must ask for nuclear response. Every
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time a brigade comes back to England or goes back to Canada, or a battalion goes back to Belgium proper, so much more dangerous is nuclear war. Of course, the forces there hope to use the tactical nuclear weapon first. That will depend largely on when we are going to get the new tactical nuclear weapon launcher, because unless we are mobile it is much more difficult to do and this itself reduces the time lag and therefore is much more dangerous. The tactical weapons are also used only to ensure that madness does not occur, and to leave open further options to canalise what is coming, and not to destroy everything that is coming and all the area round about it. It is to find out even more surely and certainly that it is a major planned aggression.
That is why it is a pity that the Sixth Brigade has come back as it has done. It is an even greater pity that it does not practise returning to B.A.O.R. in its operational role at operational speed. It goes down almost by civil line four or five days, gathering up as it goes, and goes back to Germany. Would it ever really go back when the crisis was on? Would not everybody say: "Look; if England sends that brigade back to Germany it is escalating the situation and making it even worse"? In the invasion of Czechoslovakia there was plenty of military and political warning. To hide it is to take the coward's way out. The fact was that nothing could be done because NATO is a purely defensive military alliance, and nothing more. All the trappings of music and of culture are irrelevant. It is a defensive military alliance for those who are in it, and Czechoslovakia was not in it. Of course the tension increased, and of course dangers could have come. Where was the Sixth Brigade? It did not budge from where it was in Yorkshire. Obviously, people thought then: "Do not send it. There is a danger of escalation". This is what one fears: that the more forces that are taken back and promised to go will never go when the real danger comes.
If you want the forces in Germany to hold up possible attacks conventionally for longer you have to be impossibly rich to provide the weapons and the men that they need. They must be at full strength. Because of recruiting difficulties, very few British Army units in

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B.A.O.R. are up to full strength. The numbers, I am sure, are as the noble Lord opposite said this afternoon, something over 50,000; but the fighting units are not up to strength. Above all, I think more Chieftain tanks about which the noble Lord also spoke, would be needed; and it is important that when regiments come away from the tour of duty there they are not switched to other forms of tanks where they have no necessity for the expertise they have picked up on the Chieftains. So if you want a longer conventional pause you must have more conventional tanks and soldiers.
To get down to more pleasant matters, sport is a necessity in the Rhine Army. Only in that way can people be prevented from going stark, staring mad when they are thinking of the alternatives of atoms, tactical nuclear weapons, microbiological warfare, and, indeed, espionage, which is at present practised, particularly from the Soviet bloc countries, in all the towns where British soldiers live. Every form of pressure is put upon them—alcoholic, sexual and otherwise—to break them in this thing. It is only by sport, getting into the mountain air and away from the soldiering life, that this tension can be relaxed. I hope that the Government may consider the help that they would give by making some of the ski-ing events military training and adventure training, for which money is granted. Already, I believe, cross country ski-ing is considered necessary, and therefore adventure training, for which grants are made. But downhill ski-ing is not so considered. I suggest that this idea might be worth looking at, and one would hope later for a helpful answer.
Now that we are no longer fighting wars around the world, risks have to be found elsewhere, because soldiers must have risks. Here is a golden opportunity for risk-taking adventure. The Army championship in downhill ski-ing was won last year by three soldiers—by which I mean what we used to call "other ranks", but what we now call "soldiers". This shows what can be done. But they had to spend from their own pocket about £100 each. I should hope that this could become official adventure training. They would still have to spend something, because it is right that they should pay for what they
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enjoy; but the Government could help them over some of the rest.
We have heard a lot to-day about whether trade follows the gun-barrel or the flag. What it does follow is stability. What it avoids is vacuum and danger. It has avoided where we have pulled out. The idea that it would cost more money to stay in some of the places where we are now is negligible compared with the money which could be invested there and lost. Nobody on this side thinks of enormous forces remaining in the Far East or the Persian Gulf. But one of the things that most of us on this side regret is the ending of the Commonwealth Brigade, that happy band of brothers. Those of us who have served in Commonwealth forces, as in Korea, know so well what good it does, apart from the purely military good. It was a real factor of stability and happiness, and a real Commonwealth feeling. It could have been so easily Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom at very little cost.
Coming back closer to home, to the place that I always mention, Malta, the Government have increased the Air Force to be stationed in Malta, and have reduced the Naval force, I think, to nil. Will they, therefore, not consider keeping a British battalion of soldiers in that country, if Malta so desires it, so as to ensure the security of the base fir the R.A.F. there? Could not a battalion be taken from the Third Division? Nothing would be more pleasing to the soldiers. The buildings and the barracks are there, and it is reasonably cheap and extremely pleasant.
Coming right back home, I would make a personal plea as regards Mill-bank Hospital. There has been much correspondence as to whether it should go to the Arts side or remain far the good of human beings recovering their physical health. If that hospital is moved outside the centre of London, the advantages that it has for soldiers now will go. Those advantages are that all the honorary specialists, the physicians and surgeons, the cancer experts, and every other expert, are here on the spot and are honoured and pleased to go to Mill-bank. They know that they are going to attend to soldiers who are, after all, subject to all the human diseases, except age, that we all are. One hopes

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very much that an early answer can be given that the Royal Military Hospital will remain at Millbank.
I will not say more about recruiting, except that the Territorial Army cuts themselves affect recruiting, because so many people do not see soldiers any more. A young man walking in the Highlands would not know what a soldier looked like, except from a story book, and that would probably be a hundred years out of date. This is one real effect. Coming back to Germany, in relation to home defence, there is another odd effect. A soldier overseas, if he honestly believes that he may have to fight for his country, for his regiment—which is probably more true—likes to know that his family at home is properly looked after; that his mother and father and his own country are safe. He cannot feel that now. The idea, as some people have said, that the United Kingdom will be attacked only after the British troops in Germany have been defeated does not bear looking at. The enemy could so easily come straight here. By-passing the main defence is a classic tactic ever since history began.
We have cut military forces in all sorts of odd places. We have cut considerably the number of officers in the Ministry of Defence, yet at the same time (I say this without meaning any disrespect to the Civil Service) the number of civil servants has gone up. At some time it would be interesting to see the figures of the drop in serving officers and the increase in civil servants.
With this kind of thing one has to think years ahead, and not days. One must have the desire to serve and to do one's duty. These are terribly old-fashioned words, but they still mean much to the forces. Of precepts there have been many. I can remember three, of which one is relevant but I hope your Lordships will excuse the other two. Without a family you cannot have true love. Without property you cannot have true freedom. Without leadership you cannot have true authority. My Lords, there is plenty of leadership in the Services; there is plenty of authority in the Government. One only hopes that a little of the first can go to the last
8.30 p.m.
LORD SOPER: My Lords, I should like first of all to apologise because I have not been able to attend the entire debate. That is all the more regrettable because I shall make one or two assumptions about the debate as a whole, and if they are invalid then of course somebody will tell me. I think it would be agreeable to your Lordships' House if I said that what is contained in this White Paper from page 9 onwards is consequential on what is set forward in the first nine pages of this document. The assumption that I will briefly record, if I may—and it is made, if I may say so, with all the authority of a ticket collector on an excursion train—is that the basic aim of our defence policy is to
"ensure the security of Britain by concentrating our major effort on the Western Alliance"—
because that has a unique value as a deterrent to war.
"This aim is sensible, stable and vital. It is sensible because it recognises the basic realities of our economic and political interests in the world to-day. It is stable because the task is irreducible."
That, of course, semantically is nonsense. Because something cannot go lower, it does not necessarily mean that it cannot go up. But we will leave that.
"We can withdraw from East of Suez but not from our situation in Europe.…It is vital because, without the security which comes from the strength to deter aggression, we put at risk the achievement of all our other national purposes."
My Lords, supposing this is agreed. Then it is, I think, consequential that most of the arguments to which your Lordships have listened, and which your Lordships have deployed, have only marginal differentiation. And as the noble Lord, Lord Thorneycroft, and others reminded us, there is considerable consensus. If these propositions are agreed, then we have to work within a certain framework, and within that framework there are broad agreements to which your Lordships have already given notice in the debate hitherto. The extraordinary thing to me is that, so far as I know, the assumption has been made by every speaker that the fundamental nature of this White Paper is not in dispute; that in fact, whatever our differences may be in detail, there is no substantial difference that we are confronted

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with an issue or a number of issues which require the deterrent, which can be provided only by the kind of proposals contained in the 109 pages of this document which follow the first nine.
This I am to contest because I believe it is fundamentally unsound. I do not say this with any relish, and I hope that no one will accuse me of being a defeatist just because I am a pacifist, as the noble Viscount assumed. What I have to say is that I should have thought it existential to begin with. I do not believe that all the people who might read this debate would assume that this is already a cut-and-dried case. I am persuaded that there are a great many young people who repudiate the whole thing. They may have reasons which are not particularly cogent; they may have arguments which are not finished or final. But they have deep instincts that this is a kind of moonbeam from a larger lunacy; and if we are to think in terms of recruiting it may be that the blandishments offered to those who would be invited to join the Forces may be insufficient. It may be that particular demographical conditions have reduced the number of intake. I would respectfully suggest that another reason is that there are a great many young people who will still have the vote who are utterly and completely antipathetic to the whole idea that the deterrent is the way to peace and that the programme in this White Paper is anything more than Bunker ideology.
I am surprised, if I may say so, that none of my ecclesiastical friends have felt that they ought to put in their oar on this particular issue, because I am persuaded from my knowledge of them that they hold views tantamount to those which I am now expressing. When I think of C.N.D., and Members on this side of the House and members of the Government who have stood up and walked round and sat down for C.N.D., I wonder: where are these flowers gone? Is it to be assumed that there is unanimity in your Lordships' House, and therefore the suggestion of unanimity in the country as a whole, that deterrents by the processes laid clown in this White Paper are not only valid, not only sensible, not only stable, but also justifiable in every other respect? I doubt it. In fact, I take the entirely opposite view.
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I should have said that there are an increasing number of people, not unintelligent, who have come to the conclusion that we are living in the kind of world of this White Paper, which is basically unreal, increasingly irrelevant, and therefore in the strictest sense lunatic. It may well be that there is an internal consistency about the arguments. But then this is a purely imaginary analogy. A number of mental patients might congregate together and conduct a Cabinet meeting, and they might conduct their affairs with flawless logic, but that would not make them Cabinet Ministers and it would not validate any of the conclusions at which they might arrive. If you do not accept, as I do not, the basic assumption on pages 7 and 9 of this document, then you are bound to say that, in taking note of it, what you are taking note of is something that is internally relevant only provided that its positive and objective intentions are themselves valid.
For a number of reasons I believe that they are not. I do not subscribe to the idea that the deterrent is effective, and I repeat what I was venturesome enough to say to your Lordships on another occasion: that the Cuban crisis, which gave comfort to so many people as evidence of the deterrent's effect, was in my judgment no such thing. It is true that Mr. Khrushchev was deterred after due opportunities had been given to him in the 13 days we remember for "getting him off the hook". But Mr. Kennedy was not deterred. I do not know within how many hours or minutes Mr. Kennedy was, of a declaration of some kind of war which could quickly have escalated. When I am invited to believe in the deterrent, and at the same time invited to believe that in Europe our conventional weapons will be so inadequate to resist a conventional attack from Russia, shall we say—it is always Russia that is the enemy—I ask: what does that mean? Does it mean that we would in fact initiate the use of tactical nuclear weapons; we would use them first and feel the response necessary to the action of the enemy to use those weapons retaliatorily?
I do not believe in the deterrent, and for another reason. What bothers me about the whole of this debate, if I may say so, my Lords, is the conduct of our affairs as if we are pursuing some kind of logical process by the clear light of reason. If there be truth in Clausewitz's oft

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repeated and much mutilated statement, that war is a continuation of policy or politics by other means, it is certainly true that those other means do not contain the elements of rationality that were present, or should be present, in the first processes. People do not go to war because they have carefully calculated the results of an action that they might be persuaded to take or not to take. People go to war from Jenkins's ear onwards, or backwards, because of human instincts and human emotions which at a certain stage are so inflamed that the logical consequences of their actions are no longer valid. I would suppose that those who have read, for instance, The Sword Bearers, and other documents relative to the two World Wars through which we have already passed, would not be unheedful of the argument that it is only within an irrational and therefore an unreal context that the deterrent could be guaranteed to work at all.
I am persuaded that we are in fact bemused by this internal consistency and therefore there is clouded from our eyes the sort of external idiocy of which I rather think some of our younger friends are already aware. I did not take part in your Lordships' debate last week on the students. If I had done I should have tried to say, with due modesty—because I do not reckon that I am au courant with students: I do not know enough about them and I think it is all too easy to sling a guitar around your neck and think you are "with it"—that if there is any truth in the general acerbations of students which they make in their more sober moments of revolutionary fervour, it is surely this: that we have become so conditioned to the mad world of violence that we do not see it with the immediacy and the sense of nausea which to them is catastrophic; and, without impudence, as I have listened to-day I have wondered what would be the impact of such a debate upon your Lordships if you were hearing it for the first time and had not been, if I may say so, conditioned over a period of years to regard this as a pis aller. But it would be futile just to make a number of comments and criticisms without endeavouring to say something positive. Again, if this is not impudence, I have sympathy with a Government which has to deal with a corn
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munity which largely does not accept the propositions which I have laid down. I would only say that in this debate it is important that it should be recorded that there is an increasing number of people who are now looking at the world of violence so distastefully as to believe, as I do, that even Communist aggression would be preferable to the horrors of a third world war.
But what are the propositions? I believe in the unilateral action which was first sponsored by the C.N.D. movement. It is a half loaf that is better than no bread, as far as I am concerned. I look with horror at the proliferation of nuclear weapons; I wonder how long it will be before Israel gets them and the Arab States get them. I do not know how near China is to having them. Evidence can be drawn from the history book that this competition, the race in nuclear armaments, can do nothing more than finally to produce the inevitable cataclysm. I have been overwhelmingly impressed by my noble friend Lord Snow in his prediction that if sooner or later these things do not go off by intent they will go off by accident.
What is needed, as I see it, is to break into this vicious circle: not to ask America or Russia to do it, because as things are it seems unreasonable, but to ask ourselves to do it. We can contribute what small percentage to the total strike power we can. Our credibility in the world is heavily over-taxed by our dilatoriness and, what is more, our profession on the one hand to regard defence as a matter of life and death and then to equate it with our financial stability. What could make all the difference is to provide a non-aggressive and non-associated chairman for a kind of conference that has yet to be seen because no one as yet can be guaranteed to sit impartially in the chair. This, to me, is not some vague and unsubstantial project. It is surely of the very essence of the case. But what happens now is that you are on one side or the other, and whichever side you are on pollutes the evidence which however free and honest you seek to make it, is nevertheless evidence which is polluted as it reaches the other side.
I want to finish by saying that I believe in total and complete disarmament, phased, of course, which would require another economic system than the one

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under which we now suffer if we were not to produce complete economic chaos in the process. I know this sounds almost like pacifying the pacifist, and I make no apology for claiming a pacifist faith. I do not make it in order to ease my soul only; I make it because, looking at it, if I may try to do, sub specie aeternitatis (and that is required of a parson) I am not at all sure that we are not embarking upon a more risky and perilous path by the processes advocated in this White Paper than would be ours if we were to take the role of complete and absolute disarmament. I know there are incalculable risks but I know also there are calculable risks; and just as the noble Viscount, Lord Younger of Leckie, completed his speech by an appeal for a moral condition, I would ask Her Majesty's Government whether a great opportunity does not confront us now of looking out at this world, which is in the grip of nuclear power, and of saying to ourselves, "We, who have tasted power and still enjoy some of it—if we were to make this gesture, we might ourselves have to suffer many things, but might it not be the creative action by which a new kind of peaceful opportunity were made available to all men?"
That I believe, and that I would add to this debate, not as some kind of contentious objection to what has already been said but as part of the contribution to the full examination of this much perplexed, difficult and lethal issue. I believe that this is part of our responsibility, my Lords, in taking note of this White Paper; and I pray that it may ultimately be our policy
8.46 p.m.
LORD TEYNHAM: My Lords, I fully appreciate the views which have been put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Soper, but I do not propose to follow his arguments, except to say that I am convinced that the nuclear deterrent has kept the world at peace for the last twenty years or so.
One of the most important matters which has been debated to-night, and I propose to add a little to it, is manpower. Of course it is a platitude to say that without men we should have no Air Force, no Navy and no Army; but it is perfectly true. I understand that last year Her Majesty's Government spent some £3 million in propaganda and advertising
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for recruits, and all we got out of the expenditure of this large sum of money was a diminishing return. Why are we not getting the numbers we require? I believe that there are many reasons for this. First and foremost I believe that it is largely due to the second of the White Papers, indicating that our Forces are to be reduced, together with constant changes in policy, which we all know have occurred from time to time. Men already in the Forces have become dispirited by the constant changes, and I think they wonder what their future is going to be.
I would say that the old slogan, "Join the Navy and see the world", will shortly be a dead letter. I suspect that very soon we shall be faced with a shortage of suitable candidates for Commissions. This can be a very serious matter indeed, as once it has developed it takes a very much longer time to correct than in the case of the ratings in the Navy, and other ranks. I hope that Her Majesty's Govern-will tell your Lordships to-night what plans they have in mind to remedy this disturbing situation.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, if everybody is so dissatisfied—and the noble Lord particularly referred to the Navy—how does he explain the fact that the re-engagement rate has steadily improved? I do not know whether he has read the White Paper.
LORD TEYNHAM: My Lords, I fully appreciate that the re-engagements are very good—in fact better than they have been for some time. But it does not necessarily follow that there will be a great many new recruits; indeed, I fear that there will not be recruits unless we get a constant policy and do not keep making changes.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, I am sorry to press this point. I fully concede the point on recruits, but the noble Lord did not only say that: he said that people were dissatisfied in the Services. Really, he ought not to make remarks of that kind without justification, in face of the re-engagement rates.
LORD TEYNHAM: My Lords, I would say that is true among the younger men in the Services, but not among the older ones, who of course come on for re-engagement.

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I should now like to turn for a few minutes to reserves for the Navy. It is obvious that as the size of the active Fleet is being reduced the need is for a greater and not a smaller number of reservists to deal with any unforeseen emergency that may arise. Where are the reservists who in time of emergency would be available to man the Reserve Fleet? I believe that the Fleet, Reserve numbers only about 8,000, apart from the volunteers. It is a very small number, and it would be difficult not only to man the Reserve Fleet but to bring the ships of the Active Fleet up to war-time complement. I regard this inadequacy of our reserves as a very serious matter, because properly trained men for the Navy cannot be produced in a hurry. I hope that Her Majesty's Government will indicate what plans they have in mind for remedying this disturbing situation.
To touch on another matter, in the past we used to debate the Services' Estimates on different days, and I suggest that it would perhaps he more useful if we were to return to this procedure. I suggest it is not very suitable to debate "nuts and bolts" lumped together in a Motion on defence as a whole. However, I feel that I must turn for a few minutes to Fleet armaments to-day. I would say that the greatest danger to the Fleet at the present time is from Soviet destroyers armed with surface-to-surface missiles having a range of some 30 to 40 miles. Indeed, it has been said, I believe, that the range is very much higher. Another danger is from mass attack by missile patrol boats controlled by long-range aircraft at ranges of up to 20 miles.
What do we have to protect the Fleet against these attacks? Are the Minister of Defence and the Admiralty Board relying on the vulnerable helicopter, fitted with missiles to provide this protection? Surely what we require is some form of fixed-wing aircraft carrier which can be produced at a reasonable price. I suggest that we could have a number of merchant ship hulls converted to a flat top for this purpose; and a considerable number could be provided for less than the cost of one sophisticated aircraft carrier. I hope that Her
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Majesty's Minister who is to reply will deal with these matters this evening.
I should like to refer for a few minutes to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. I suggest that with maritime forces the distinction drawn between the NATO area and the rest of the world is a false one. It is not possible to draw a line across the ocean to limit the area of maritime operations. In the early part of the last war, your Lordships will remember, the German Admiral Raeder caused us a great deal of trouble by attacking our merchant ships at widely dispersed points in the ocean. To-day, the threat posed by Russia is certainly not confined to North Atlantic and European waters. I suggest that it is high time NATO was reorganised and took account of these facts. Why not change the name of NATO to the Western Alliance Treaty Organisation, WATO? I maintain that it is vital to broaden the responsibilities of the Western Alliance in the maritime field to meet Soviet naval expansion.
May I just refer for a few minutes to the maritime position in the Mediterranean? The idea of creating a force specially for operation in the Mediterranean is not a very practicable one. No doubt it is a nice gesture put forward by the Minister of Defence to cover his doubtful idea of being able to sink the Russian Mediterranean fleet in a few hours, a pronouncement which I think would have been much better left unsaid. This NATO force would not be practicable, I would say, without prior political agreement of the countries concerned, and we all know what that would mean, in time alone. Some organised force is obviously better than no force at all, but I suggest that an "on call" naval force in the Mediterranean is not such an impressive gesture as it sounds, for the reasons I have given.
My Lords, I find the Statement on Defence document to be a very drab one indeed, and full of contradictions. Why not a few pictures in the book to brighten it up, as we used to have in the old days? In section II we are told that our naval forces are now deployed throughout the world, and at the same time we are pressing to withdraw from the Far East. I hope that we may have a full statement concerning the points I have raised which may help to relieve the gloom that I feel about the adequacy of our naval forces.
8.55 p.m.
LORD BALERNO: My Lords, no one who heard the noble Lord, Lord Soper, can fail to have been moved by his utter sincerity knowing the basic convictions upon which his speech was based, but I think that we have to bear in mind what arises from his logic. The noble Lord, Lord Soper, said that Communist aggression was preferable to the horrors of the Third World War. He is entitled to feel that, but I think that we are entitled, on this side of the House at any rate, to remember the effects in Czechoslovakia quite recently. The passive resistance which the Czechoslovakians put up so nobly, so vigorously, so independently, has unfortunately not been sustained, and Russia is drawing the noose tighter round that country than ever it was before, and another generation of Czechoslovakians is doomed to continue to live under the thraldom of Russia.
My Lords, I was much impressed by and much in sympathy with the speech of my noble friend Lord Bridgeman and his plea for the maintenance of the local defence of this country. I am not quite sure that I entirely agreed with him on one point, and on that I would rather incline to follow what the noble Lord, Lord Leatherland, said. I think that there is the possibility—and one which we should not exclude—of an invasion by enemy paratroops over this country as the first move in a non-nuclear war. The last man to realise that if you want to control Europe you must occupy the British Isles was Julius Caesar. He was the last man to put it into action and the Romans did it very successfully for 400 years or thereabouts.
It was not my intention to enter into the wider aspects of the Defence debate but to confine myself to quite a small section of the White Paper, that relating to the universities and defence. I should like to draw your Lordships' attention to the fact that this White Paper reports a very important development in the outlook of our theories in defence in this country. That is to be found in Chapter 1, paragraph 42, where it announces the establishment of lectureships by the Ministry of Defence at five of the British universities. These have now got going, and undoubtedly they have been accepted and welcomed by the universities and are already attracting students.
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This development was a logical development of what had happened in the United States, for which we owe much to Mr. Paul Nitze, both before he became Secretary of the United States Navy and afterwards. This has been further developed in Canada, where certain professors of defence have been established. I heard on Thursday last a lecture by Professor Ayres of the University of Toronto on the defence of North America, and coming as it did from a pure civilian looking at the problem from that side it was most illuminating. The benefits to the Ministry of Defence of being able to get observation—shall we put it no higher than that?—on defence problems from other than the professional Service chiefs must be immense, and indeed that has been found to be the case by the United States Government. But I would also adil that the benefits to the universities themselves of having these defence lecturers and departments of defence within the universities is considerable.
From that one can go to the subject of the education of the officers of the Services. I want to submit to your Lordships the advantages of having graduates as officers in the Services, and especially that they should go to the universities before they take up their Service duties, because then they emerge more in line with and more understanding of the civil and national problems of the country. They are in contact with their contemporaries, and as they become more senior officers later on they are less likely either to be arrogant or to suffer from an inferiority complex.
In regard to I.Q. and intelligence, the universities are taking a much bigger slice of the population than they have been taking in the past. In consequence, a smaller proportion is left to draw upon from the schools for direct entry into officer training for the Services. There is also, of course, the advantage to the officer himself, that if he is a graduate of a university, when he ceases to be employed by the Service he is far more qualified to get a job. Perhaps the last and most important of these factors, at any rate to the Government, is that it reduces the budget for defence in that the greater part of the cost of the education of such officers will come from

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Ministry of Education and Science funds and not out of the Defence budget.
We in the universities welcome wholeheartedly the decision that has been taken that the normal entry for officers for the Royal Air Force should in future be through the universities; that they should graduate at the university and then go for their Service training. This is not, as yet, to be universal, but I understand that it is hoped that this will be the normal mode of entry to the Service. I believe this is going to help the R.A.F. considerably, and I would draw your Lordships' attention to Chapter IX, paragraph 9, of the White Paper, dealing with the Army. That says:
"It is becoming more difficult to obtain the necessary numbers of young officers of the right quality for the various categories"
of the specialist corps. One might perhaps draw the attention of the Army to the action that the R.A.F. is taking.
I was impressed by what my noble friend Lord Teynham said about the shortage of officers. Here I would welcome what the Services are doing in the way of officer cadetships at the universities. We in the universities who have been taking an interest in this matter have for many years past been pressing for something of this sort. I remember in the early 'fifties drawing the attention of the Services to the fact that there would be an acute shortage of medical officers for the Services on the termination of National Service. Indeed, that was the case, and had medical cadetships not been instituted fairly quickly after the termination of National Service was announced there would have been a most lamentable shortage of doctors in the three Services.
The other types of commission have now all got cadetships at the universities. Again, it is interesting to notice that it is the R.A.F. that is going fastest and further in the award of these cadetships. I think that as regards the Army, and perhaps also the Navy, the examination of the boards is perhaps too severe and that they ought to be able to award more of these cadetships at the universities. They are well worth while for the impecunious student, because if one adds everything together I believe the figure amounts to something like £700 a year while the man is at the university.
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Of course it carries the obligation for service in commissioned rank for a certain number of years after being commissioned.
In regard to these university cadetships there should be closer co-ordination with the universities, particularly by the military education committees, to make certain that the individuals who are awarded the cadetships are known by and identified to the universities even before they arrive, in order that they can be directed to appropriate courses of study. When we were listening to the debate on student participation a good deal was said about ineffectual lecturers at the universities. All of us who are connected with the universities know that there are some ineffectual lecturers, and we should like to manage to steer those who hold university cadetships away from these ineffectual lecturers. Therefore we want to know and to identify such students before they get pledged to any particular department in the university.
The Service units in the universities are an important part of the system. Quite rightly, economies have had to be effected in these Service units at the same time as economies have had to be effected in other branches in other parts of the Defence Budget; and in this connection it was quite reasonable to put several universities together in running one enlarged university squadron. That obviously cuts down the overheads. Certain of the economies that have been effected in the Officers' Training Corps and the numbers of the permanent staff can also be justified, but I believe that a mistake is being made in having further economies at the cost of the officer cadets themselves, at the cost of the students, either in cutting their remuneration and pay or in reducing their bounty. Unfortunately, students must earn money in the vacation, or at other times, in order that they can enjoy the full delights of the university during term time; and the present generation of students expect payment—and indeed need payment; and if they cannot get a reasonable amount of payment from the Service units in which they serve in the university they cannot be blamed if they go off and do bus conducting, which is a much more remunerative, though less useful, vacation service.

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My Lords, I should like to make just one point about graduates who do become commissioned. Every endeavour should be made to see that they are given as purposive training as possible after they enter the Services. I think that, so far as the Royal Air Force is concerned, this is quite all right, and I would have no criticism to make of it. This probably goes also for the Royal Navy. But in the Army this is not always the case, and we sometimes hear instances of the energy, skill, and knowledge of a first-class honours graduate being quite unused in an infantry battalion, with the result that the man himself, having gone in full of enthusiasm, becomes frustrated. Intelligent young officers must be extended mentally as well as physically.
The future for officers who join the Services to-day is sometimes thought to be poor. For myself I would say that this is the very time that a young man of intelligence should seek a commission in the Services. I cannot see that our Forces can be further cut down than they are just now, and I would say that within the next ten years, possibly much less, expansion of the Forces is absolutely inevitable. I would agree with my noble friend Lord Carrington, and with other noble Lords who have spoken, that it is quite certain that the unexpected will happen—and when you have to cope suddenly with the unexpected, you must be very quick with it.
9.12 p.m.
LORD ASHBOURNE: My Lords, in our discussions on Defence I have always confined my remarks to maritime affairs. The main theme of my speeches has generally been concerned with the protection of our merchant fleet in times of war, in dealing with all those many incidents that can and do occur at any time and with little warning—such, for instance as the Beira Patrol, Kuwait, fishery disputes off Iceland, and so on. Though these matters were once more or less second nature to me, I realise that times have changed and are still changing fast. Ships, aircraft, and weapons have become vastly more complicated and expensive, and their destructive power has been multiplied many times. Nevertheless I, rightly or wrongly, believe that up to the point where nuclear exchange takes place the main purpose of the
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Royal Navy, in conjunction, of course, with the Royal Air Force, has been the protection of our merchant fleet. That, I have always thought, is what the Navy is for; and yet, strangely, I can find only one rather oblique reference to this all-important matter in the White Paper. The Navy has, of course, many other duties, such as putting the Army ashore wherever and whenever this is required, but its main duty has always been, and still I believe is, the protection of our merchant ships at sea.
Two speeches were made some months ago by noble Lords on the Front Bench opposite which make me wonder whether I am so out of date that my views and arguments are no longer valid. One of those speeches was made on April 3 last year by the noble Lord, Lord Brown, in a debate on the shipping industry In the course of his winding-up speech for the Government the noble Lord said:
"I do not think the Norwegians and Greeks have been specially bothered by the fact that they have not got a Navy safeguarding their growing shipping in many areas of the world."
He continued a little later:
"It is appealing to feel the Royal Navy is there to help the Red Ensign whenever the need arises, but I fear very much that this is an image that will fade."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 3/4/68, col. 1314.]
Surely, the primary duty of the Royal Navy is to be there, or, at any rate, just around the corner, to help the Red Ensign whenever the need arises. It certainly was so in the past, and, if the Royal Navy is not now required, or is not going to be able to carry out its primary duty, then I think it should be explained very clearly, so that not only our great shipping interests but our people as a whole will understand what our Navy has been reduced to and in what peril our foreign interests and our merchant fleet will be in times of emergency.
There will be no policeman on the beat to come to their aid, especially in the Indian Ocean, for once we have withdrawn from there it will take weeks, rather than hours or days, for our warships to get there from home or Mediterranean waters, especially with the Canal closed; and when they get them there will be no base for them apart from Simonstown. It seems clear enough, if

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I have interpreted the position correctly that the time is not far off when our merchant ships East of Suez will have to fend for themselves, unless it so happens that there is an allied friendly warship in the vicinity; and to me this does not seem a very sound proposition for the United Kingdom.
On this matter of the Greeks and the Norwegians, I should have thought that they were very bothered. They were certainly very bothered in the last war. It is true that both those countries have large merchant fleets for their size, but we have to remember that, so far as paying for a Navy is concerned, Greece has a population only one-seventh the size of ours, and Norway has one only one-fourteenth the size of ours. This is surely very relevant when the relative sizes of our navies is being discussed. But even supposing that the Norwegians and the Greeks are not specially bothered about the protection of their merchant fleets, that does not seem to me a very good or sensible line for us to follow.
We have enormous worldwide interests, and these are clearly reflected in the number and distribution of our merchant ships. A very few figures will illustrate this. Of all the world's ships at sea—that is, ships of over 100 tons—19 per cent. are British, and of all the world's ships in harbour 17 per cent. are British. To make the picture more convincing, we now have about 650 merchant ships East of Suez at any one time, and this number includes about 53 ships passing the Cape daily, another 36 in South African ports and another 13 in the Malacca Straits. If this is not convincing enough, British seaborne imports have roughly doubled in the last twenty years and they continue to rise at about this rate.
Surely these figures indicate the necessity for maintaining strong maritime forces, a proportion of them East of Suez. And yet we are told, rather glibly I think, on page 9 of the Defence White Paper, that
"… we can withdraw from East of Suez"—
just like that. No reason is given. It goes on:
"but not from our situation in Europe, on which our national security depends."
I think that is a pretty dangerous statement. I should have thought that our
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national security depended substantially, though not of course solely, on our trade and therefore on our shipping East of Suez.
The other speech from the Front Bench opposite to which I referred, was made by the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, on May 22 last in reply to a Question by the noble Lord, Lord Boothby. He said:
"I submit that in this kind of world it makes no sort of sense at all to suppose that the future of this or that part of the world, the Persian Gulf or anywhere else, can be prescribed and determined by the presence of men in tanks or aeroplanes, or even in ships."
A sentence later he continued:
"… let us at least realise that military power in the nuclear age is a very different thing from the military power of the days of the Charge of the Light Brigade."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 22/5/65, col. 799.]
Here, again, I get the strong impression that the Royal Navy is not in future necessarily to be employed as it always has been in the past, in guarding our interests abroad and in protecting our merchant ships wherever they may be. As I pointed out, there are plenty of them there to be protected, in the Indian Ocean from the Cape to the Persian Gulf and to Singapore. It would be so easy for an incident to arise in this vast area, particularly in times of strained relations, and I do not understand how it can be imagined that those incidents will not occur again and again. Nor do I understand why it should be supposed that naval action at sea should necessarily escalate rapidly into a nuclear exchange. For that is how, rightly or wrongly, I interpret the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont.
I ask once again: what can Russia have in view for her great submarine fleet, now rapidly being brought up to date by the addition of a substantial number of nuclear-powered submarines? Surely they are a force which could and would threaten our very existence, and in a war at sea squeeze the life out of us in the old, conventional way. If I were at the Russian Admiralty I do not think I should have much difficulty in working out where I should send some of those 400 submarines. Based perhaps on Aden, together of course with the necessary air reconnaissance, they could play havoc with our vital oil supplies from the Persian Gulf and our shipping in the Malacca Straits and round the Cape.

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My Lords, if I may digress for a moment, I should like to ask the noble Lord who is to reply to the debate if he can tell us what the future holds for the Joint Anti-Submarine School at Londonderry. This important and advanced anti-submarine training school did vital work during the war and, as I understand it, has continued to do so ever since. A year or so ago we were told it had been decided to move it to Devonport—a step backwards, I thought, as Devonport is a good deal further from deep water than Londonderry. However, much better to have it there than to have it abolished, which I felt might have been the alternative. In the event, of course, the school, as I gather, is still at Londonderry, and I hope that perhaps it may be left there. I believe this school is of high importance to the Navy and the Royal Air Force in helping to ensure the efficient protection of our merchant fleet in war, and I hope the Minister will be able to assure us that, in spite of drastic cuts in defence spending, the Joint Anti-Submarine School will continue its vital work, preferably at Londonderry.
To continue my main argument, we all understand perfectly well that our financial resources are strictly limited, and that our Armed Forces must consequently have a strict limit also. But I, for one, simply do not understand this virtual complete withdrawal from East of Suez, certainly so far as the Navy and the Royal Air Force are concerned. I believe indeed that we have got our balances wrong. I agree, of course, that the Navy's most vital area of responsibility lies in the Atlantic; and I agree also that the Mediterranean is of great importance. With the closing of the Suez Canal, however, the importance of the Mediterranean has been diminished, since the through-traffic to and from the Indian Ocean no longer goes that way. We must remember, too, that at present the powerful American Sixth Fleet is stationed in the Mediterranean, not to speak of the Navies of Italy, Greece and Turkey; and from the point of view of time and distance it would not be too difficult for us to reinforce the NATO navies in the Mediterranean with some ships from our Western Fleet.
None of this, however, applies to the Indian Ocean, where I believe our respon
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sibilities are as great as ever. Our trading interests there, in particular our supplies of oil from the Gulf, are of primary importance. There is very little there in the way of Allied naval strength; there will shortly be no naval base apart from Simonstown; and, with the Canal closed, naval reinforcements are a very long way off. It may be, my Lords, that I am wrong in the inferences I have drawn from the speeches of the two noble Lords and from the Defence White Paper, and if I am I shall be very glad if I can be told so. If, however, I am not wrong, then I say that already the Royal Navy has contracted to such an extent that it cannot properly carry out its traditional role in peace or in war, more particularly in the Indian Ocean; and that already we fall so far short of requirements, in ships, in aircraft and in trained crews, that it will take many years to build up to a safe level again, even if we start tomorrow.
My Lords, with our seaborne imports doubling themselves every twenty years, I do not believe this is the time to be reducing our maritime defences; and with 650 of our merchant ships East of Suez at any one time, I do not believe it is right for us to be planning a complete withdrawal from the area. On the contrary, I believe that it is highly dangerous.
9.25 p.m.
LORD AMPTHILL: My Lords, in common with many of your Lordships I have taken part in a number of Defence debates over the past ten years or so. For this reason and others, including my own defects as a speaker, it is becoming increasingly difficult for someone like me. basically a "spun yarn" major—a retired lieutenant commander, equivalent in rank to an Army major, to those who do not know the "lingo"—to make a worthwhile speech in a debate such as this without becoming repetitive to the point of boredom. The older we get the more inevitably we lose touch with our naval contacts, who retire and pass on, and the more it becomes less and less easy for us to keep au courant with naval affairs and to keep ourselves up to date.
However, I took some encouragement from this White Paper. because like my noble friends Lord Bridgeman and Lord Balerno I came upon paragraphs 41, 42 and 43 of Command Paper 3927 which

819
is before us. I read these with particular pleasure from a rather selfish angle for I thought that perhaps, if the measures described therein took effect, it might be of some help to us who have to debate these matters in Parliament. I refer to paragraph 42 of Chapter I which says:
"The increasing study of defence problems outside the Government is helping to create an awareness in the country as a whole of the value of the Armed Forces and a comprehension of the problems of defence and foreign policy."
A wider comprehension is very necessary for the public who, after all, have to support the Government of the day with money and men for Defence policies. I personally can only hope that the awareness and comprehension referred to will sooner rather than later percolate through to the members of this Government and their followers; because there is as yet no sign—and certainly not in this White Paper—that they really understand the problems which face them in this field of defence.
The establishment of defence lectureships with Ministry of Defence support at five universities is in my view a step of the greatest value. My noble friend Lord Balerno referred to that in some detail. I shall not waste your Lordships' time with further comment. But because it was not mentioned either by my noble friend Lord Bridgeman or by Lord Balerno, I should like to refer to the Royal United Service Institution, which is referred to in paragraph 43. I have been a member of that Institution for many years. I have contributed my mite towards the fund which the Institution is now raising to help in its reorganisation to make it a public instead of a private body. I believe that an independent national institute of defence such as is envisaged, so far as I understand it, with the reorganised R.U.S.I., will prove of immense value to all those responsible for or interested in our defence and security. Therefore, I hope very much that not only will the necessary funds soon be available from industry and commerce, who are being approached, but also from the Government who have been given a special place on the Council. If there is time when the noble Lord comes to wind up perhaps he could give us some idea of how
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matters are proceeding. These public lectures, discussions and seminars could in my opinion have a very beneficial effect and be of great assistance to those of us whose duty it is to debate Defence problems from time to time in Parliament.
I also feel that all these measures, described in the three paragraphs which I have mentioned, must, sooner or later, bring us back to the real fundamental truth which is, in my opinion, that our defence must be based on a maritime strategy to which more than one of my noble friends have referred to-night. I too have referred to it frequently in speeches on defence, and I do not propose to go over the details again to-night. But in my opinion this maritime strategy is essential to us and it is inevitable that the Royal Navy must play a leading part in it. There is a question whether the Royal Navy is adequate in strength, manpower, et cetera, to do just that.
My noble friend Lord Ashbourne has just told your Lordships of the problems involved in the protection of our trade. My Lords, our trade has always been a great problem to us throughout the ages. This is not the first time that Members of your Lordships' House have spoken with anxiety about the provision we are making to protect it. As a matter of fact, 250 years ago, on April 26, 1708, this House was concerned about just that matter, and your Lordships' predecessors took a very dim view of the lack of provision made in those far-off days by the then Government.
After a debate, which is on your Lordships' Records, they ordered that the whole House should attend on the Monarch. The Lords with White Staves were instructed to wait on Her Majesty herself to know when the Lords could be received—as in due course they were, or at any rate, their Address was. This Address, my Lords, opened with words, variations of which have been frequently used in this House and have sometimes appeared in the more enlightened White Papers which we have had before us from time to time. The words are:
"It is a most undoubted maxim that the honour, security and wealth of this Kingdom does depend upon the protection and encouragement of trade and of the improving and right managing of the Naval strength."
Your Lordships' predecessors went on to discuss the dangers to be apprehended

821
from negligence and mismanagement resulting in loss of trade and our maritime strength entirely ruined, and then they beseeched Her Majesty in the most earnest manner:
"that the sea affairs may always be your first and most peculiar care."
My Lords, it is the fear of my noble friends on this side of the House, and of many outside Parliament. that this Government are not giving "sea affairs" their "first and most peculiar care".
In 1969, with all the sophisticated hardware now available for warlike purposes, on the sea as well as on land or in the air, "sea affairs" cover a great deal more than purely Naval matters and notably in the air. Noble Lords who have spoken from these Benches have given plenty of examples to show that the Government are not giving peculiar care to the sea affairs. In the 1709 Address your Lordships' House ended with these words, addressed to Her Majesty's Counsellors, which I take to have been the Cabinet or the equivalent of that day:
"Every one of these should be made to know that it is a particular charge to take care that the seaman be encouraged, the trade protected, discipline restored and a new spirit and vigour put into the whole administration of the Navy."
To-day, in 1969, there is no question about our having to restore discipline, either in the Navy or in the other Fighting Services. Our concern to-day is to restore a new spirit and vigour into the whole of our defence policy.
My noble friends and I are unhappy about the complacency shown in paragraph 45 of the White Paper, which claims that the basic aim of our defence policy, is now fully established; that it is sensible, stable and vital, and that it recognised the basic realities of our situation in the world to-day. I cannot accept that, as other noble Lords on this side have already said they cannot accept it. Nevertheless, I hope that the measures described in the earlier paragraphs, 41 to 43, which I have already mentioned, will rapidly cause a wider comprehension of the problems of defence and foreign policy. And the sooner the better. Then the public will realise the dangerous and perilous position into which the Government have got us and will decide to have no more of them. Let us hope that it will not be too late.
9.37 p.m.
LORD NAPIER AND ETTRICK: My Lords, I feel that it is incumbent on me to intervene briefly in to-day's debate even at this late hour, since I was the only Member of your Lordships' House to accompany the inter-Party delegation that visited the Gulf Command last September. I shall confine my remarks in the main to this area and to the problem the Government to-day are facing caused by the serious shortfall in recruiting. I should also stress that my contacts are not so much with high commands but rather with my own contemporaries in the Army, who are now at the level of commanding officers or brigade majors.
When I made my maiden speech in your Lordships' House some 5½ years ago, I said that I believed we ware at that time faced with two fundamental problems. One was a shortage of manpower and the other was the delays in the delivery of military weapons and equipment. I believe that to-day the second point has been nearly overcome, due, I may say, in no small measure to the far-sightedness of previous Conservative Administrations; but at the same time the Government are to be congratulated, in my view, on—shall we say?—having maintained the momentum in this direction. I regret to say, however, that the first point is far more serious to-day than it was in 1963—but I will return to this in a minute.
First, may I say a few words about the Gulf Command: and here I agree with all that my noble friend Lord Selkirk has already said. There is not the slightest doubt in my mind that the manner in which Her Majesty's Government announced to the Arab rulers that Britain would pull out completely from the Gulf by 1971 has done great damage to our name in that area. As I ant sure many noble Lords on all sides of the House are aware, the Gulf is the exception to the rule in the Arab world. Our presence is most genuinely desired. When I was out there, it was put to me forcibly by one Ruler that all that they were asking for was time: and 1971 gives them too little time.
It is no secret that Russia is for the first time short of oil, and she has of late been showing more than a certain interest in that area. I cannot myself believe that

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it will begin to be possible by 1971 for the local defence forces to be capable of meeting any external threat whatsoever, and it must, therefore, be possible that new protectors will move in to take our place. Do Her Majesty's Ministers really believe that when we are gone our oil concessions will remain undisturbed? When I asked the Secretary of State for Defence this question, he replied:
"I should not like to claim that I or anyone else can predict with assurance about events in this part of the world, but our military withdrawal does not mean an end of our interest or concern in this area."
I would ask: What do these words actually mean? Is it eyewash, or do they mean something concrete? I should be grateful if the noble Lord the Leader of the House would give some clarification on this point, of which I have given him notice.
The next question that I should like to ask is this: Is it not both military and economic nonsense to pull out from our bases in the Gulf before we have completed our final withdrawal from the Far East? Is it not elementary that the Gulf bases should be retained, to be available as a staging post from the Far East? Can the Minister give the House an undertaking that this will be done? For, again, all the Secretary of State would tell me—admittedly, it was six months ago—was:
"It is too early to make final decisions on this yet."
Surely, Socialist planning being what it is, it is not too early now. Many of us would have liked to see the United Kingdom maintaining a presence in the area at least until 1975. I firmly believe that the mere fact of our showing the flag is worth a very great deal indeed; and this is the more so when we are welcome. This, I fear, is where I strongly disagree with what the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, said earlier on in this debate.
The policy on this subject of the Party I support was most clearly stated by the Opposition Leader, Mr. Heath, in an article in the Sunday Times the day before yesterday. And, as was pointed out in Peterborough's column in the Daily Telegraph only yesterday, Mr. Wilson's own words to Congress in 1963 were:
"It is 100 times easier for Britain to remain there,"—
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he was referring to the Far East and the Gulf—
"even with a token force, than for us to seek to enter if trouble breaks out."
Should unification—"federation" now being a dirty word—fail to work among the Gulf States, would this Government be prepared to maintain a naval force?
Turning southwards for one moment, I shall always believe that one of the greatest disservices that our present Government have done this country during their term of office is failing to reach a sensible agreement over the provision of external arms for the Republic of South Africa. It is the greatest tragedy that, because of what I consider to be this Administration's ineptitude, South Africa is now ordering submarines from France, her sea defences are being strengthened with fast patrol boats and spotter aircraft, and an enlarged helicopter force, equipped with guided missiles, is also being considered. What have we provided?
I was going to say a little about strategy in Europe and the nuclear threshold, but I feel that this matter has already been so well covered to-day, particularly by my noble friend and Leader Lord Carrington, and, if I may say so, in a highly sophisticated manner by the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, that I will skin it.
That brings me, my Lords, to my last point and the most important of all; namely, manpower. The current figures for recruiting are so bad that I have grave doubts as to whether even the greatly reduced ceilings will be attained. I have heard that the Secretary of State himself is worried as to whether he will be able to implement and carry through phase two of his proposed rundown. Can the Government deny this? Why are we experiencing this difficulty? Let us have no illusions about it, my Lords. It is because, and directly because, of the Defence policies of this Administration. It is a clear reflection of an incredible Defence policy and of what the Army, rightly or wrongly, believes to be a deliberate destruction of all the romantic and traditional incentives to military service.
Coming down to unit level, I am told that there is a very real sense of insecurity. I hear that many units have

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recently been faced with an alarming number of resignations of junior majors and senior captains—the very officers whom we are going to need for command in about eight years' time. When asked why this is, the answer comes straight away: "There is a lack of faith in the future and the opportunity to travel is fast vanishing". The vast majority of soldiers do not want to be brought back to the United Kingdom where, apart from anything else, the training areas are so limited. One commanding officer recently told me that, because of restrictions placed upon him in this country when training, he could do little better with his battalion than give them gas rattles, since if he let off a thunderflash he was liable to receive a barrage of complaints. All right—this may be an exaggeration; but it is indicative of current feelings.
I understand that establishments are being made just to fit in with manpower ceilings. No one who understands these things expects a battalion with only three rifle companies to fight for any length of time successfully without a fourth company. Yet I am told that the infantry is now fixed to this reduced figure. Accordingly, any recruiting reduction below a full three company establishment—and this applies virtually to any kind of unit—quickly makes the Army a poor war-time organisation. I fear that in the past year in the Sixth Brigade alone over 200 men have purchased their discharge. I have also been told of units where up to 50 per cent. of soldiers completing their third year of service have bought themselves out. I should like to make a strong plea that if the Government must go on cutting down they should stop reducing units, but reduce still further some of the larger headquarters and the Ministry of Defence.
Here we are then, my Lords. faced with this plight and yet the new Forces' pay scales are held up by reference to the Prices and Incomes Board. As a leader in the Daily Telegraph so aptly said two months ago, "Can nonsense go further?" But, when the new scales are eventually announced, will the Government make sure that the revised rates compare favourably with the equivalent civilian rates, allowing for the incidence of overtime? For this is what the present-day soldier is interested in and it is where he makes comparisons. Can they also say when
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the Prices and Incomes Board is likely to report? In conclusion, may I remind your Lordships of some words once spoken by Abraham Lincoln? They go like this
"You cannot escape the responsibility of to-morrow by evading it to-day".
9.50 p.m.
LORD THURLOW: My Lords, the debate this evening has so far lasted exactly seven hours, and I think I can say that all our apprehensions have been expressed and all our recommendations advanced. I intend to confine myself for a very short time to tabulating some of the main differences of opinion between our two sides and the various matters that give us serious worries. I think all of these have been expressed by my noble friends and by noble Lords on the Cross-Benches, and indeed by the noble Lord, Lord Leatherland, on the Government side of the House. So it is quite unnecessary to do more than just mention them—to indicate from this Dispatch Box that we consider these are the important factors.
We accept the Europe and NATO strategy. We agree with the Government's nuclear policy but we are doubtful of our ability to respond to conventional aggression unless we have forces capable of expansion—and that we have not got. However, NATO should not be our sole interest. My noble Leader mentioned—and the point has been made by several other noble Lords—that we are seriously concerned about the future of the Gulf and East of Suez. This has been mentioned so many times this evening that I do not think I need say anything more about it. We feel there is a need for a continuing presence and we should consult with our allies how, perhaps by mainly maritime and air forces, we can come to their aid; and we must be able to safeguard our ability to reinforce if need be. That is my first point on our main differences.
My second point is this. We think that the Government show a lack of appreciation of what we can still do to engender confidence and stability throughout the world. This was well expressed by my noble friend. Lord Bourne and by other noble Lords, and I do not intend to say more than that.

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My third point of difference is the lack of provision for home defence, civil defence and defence of strategic and vulnerable points, about which I shall have a little more to say later. These are large points and have been covered this evening, but there are a number of matters with which we are seriously concerned, and I intend merely to tabulate them. In the first place, as put forward by my noble friend Lord Glasgow and others, all the Services are in a bad way, owing to poor recruiting. In all Services there is general apprehension about the future, and fear of more cuts for political expediency. My noble friend Lord Napier and Ettrick has already mentioned that a number of officers who ought to be full of enthusiasm, getting to the Staff College and with command of their units in sight, are looking over their shoulders to find jobs because they fear the future. Those two points, recruiting and apprehension about the future, cover all the Services.
Then, taking the Navy, we have heard from my noble friends who have served with distinction in the Navy—three of them here to-day—of the tremendous importance, as always, of safeguarding our trade routes. We feel that the Government show lack of appreciation of the vital importance of the Simonstown Agreement. We have heard stress put on the future of the hunter-killer submarine. We have heard mention of the lack of surface-to-surface capability. We know that the Russians have a very great lead on this and we hope that there will be a reappraisal of the Government's policy towards aircraft carriers.
So far as the Army is concerned, we have heard about the serious shortages in the British Army of the Rhine. Our allies rightly consider that our forces should be as near establishment as possible. As regards reserves, we know that the whole of the Territorial Army, the A.V.R., is required to bring the Rhine Army up to strength, and in addition we heard to-day from the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, that 15,000 reservists who left six years ago and have done no training since would also be required. This is a worry. I should like these reservists to be able to do some kind of training, though of course I appreciate that they have been out a long time.
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Many of them, I am sure, are capable of doing a good military job, but I am always rather doubtful of reservists who have been out a long time really coming back willingly to do a useful job without a certain amount of re-training.
As regards the Royal Air Force, we have heard to-day of the shortage of combat aircraft for conventional operations, and I should like to stress the worry that has been expressed at the lack of dispersion of airfields and the lack of protection of airfields both here and in Europe.
Now a word on home defence. We are convinced that there is a requirement for a Territorial Army, and many of us have expressed that in the last two years. The existing Army Volunteer Reserve is working well, and we hope that they will recruit former members of TAVR III. Only yesterday I was delighted to hear that in my own part of the world, the North-East of the Highlands of Scotland, that is happening. There the men of the TAVR III are rushing to join the Highland Battalion, which in no time at all will be up to strength; and I hope that this will happen in the South. But all our reserves are earmarked for reinforcement of the Rhine Army. There are no Territorial Army units for home defence. The only basis for expansion in time of crisis is the cadres, up to 100 of which will be attached to the TAVR units. The formation of these cadres is undoubtedly a step in the right direction. It was a wise decision of the Government who, I think rightly, appreciated the serious fears in the country at the complete lack of any form of home defence.
But these cadres consist only of two officers and five N.C.Os. I understood originally that, as well as taking some of the load of peace-time administration off the officers and N.C.Os of the TAVR II units, and acting as rear parties, if those units go away, they would form the nuclei of new units, which could be raised if necessary, and for any sudden expansion of the reserves, and also to provide an organisation, after mobilisation, throughout the country to which Regular reserves not required to fill particular posts in the Regular Army can be posted and which can be used for any military purposes for which they might be required. That is what we hoped to see, but it has not yet been agreed by the Government.

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We want to see more flesh on these bare bones of these men in the cadres. I understand that the original idea was to hold a ledger of names of willing volunteers who could be called out whenever necessary and who had already had a certain amount of military training, so that small units could quickly be found for the purposes that I have mentioned. But I understand that that has not yet been agreed, and I should like to ask the noble Lord the Leader of the House (I think I have given him notice of this) whether he can tell me what is planned in this connection. It is no good Ministers' reiterating, as they have done, that when all reservists and Territorials have been despatched to B.A.O.R. there will be plenty of trained men left. There will be plenty of trained men in the country, but they will have jobs to do, and at a time of crisis they will have twice as much work to do as they have at ordinary times. And who is to accept the hundreds of volunteers who will pour in at any time of crisis? Who is to train them? Much can be done at small cost by a little planning, earmarking, skeleton exercises and making use of the vast volunteer potential in the nation.
Our plans for the future of the home forces will cost a little more, and probably our plans in other directions will cost more; but it will be nothing like the large sum which was quoted ironically by Mr. Healey. Naturally, we cannot forecast the costs of what will be necessary when the Conservatives come into power, within, I hope, the next year. But that will soon be done, and I am sure that the cost will be repaid one hundred times by the return of confidence in us by our allies and our friends and in the security afforded to our vital interests abroad.
10.3 p.m.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, I should first like to congratulate those of your Lordships who have remained with us. I am glad to see the Army and the Navy in strength, and the Air Force represented by the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, and of course my noble friends on these Benches. I am sorry that a number of noble Lords, most of whom have apologised, but not all, have had to go to the superior attractions provided by the President of Italy. I may say that that is no reflection on him; it is a great lure.
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I think we have not had a very satisfactory debate. I believe most noble Lords would agree that once again we must try to think out how we should plan these debates. I know that certain noble Lords have suggested that we might well have taken NATO out of the debate and had a separate debate on that matter. I was against that because it seemed to me to be impossible to debate defence without talking about NATO. But before next year, having regard to certain issues raised by a number of noble Lords with deep interest and experience in the Royal Navy and upon which they would have liked to concentrate more fully, we might consider this matter again. I may say also that I have been rather depressed by the debate. When we were in Opposition, if ever we suggested that things were not always well with the Armed Forces we were repeatedly accused of a lack of patriotism. I remember how much my noble friend Lord Alexander resented this. I shall not accuse noble Lords opposite of lack of patriotism, but I must say that I thought that the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Thurlow, was a characteristic dirge, un-costed quite markedly; we still do not know what the bill will be in this respect.
It is now obviously impossible for me to answer all the interesting points, but I think it also shows (and I say this to the noble Lord, Lord Bourne) the; difficulty, however interested we may be, of establishing in debates a pure bipartisan approach. There is no doubt that for most of us the objectives are the same, but there are important differences. Of course, this is the stuff of politics, and although I think all of us would like defence to be outside Party politics, it is quite vain at this stage of our development to believe that it is possible, and I think we should blind ourselves to realities if we pretended very easily that it could be.
That does not mean that there may not, none the less, be an underlying objective and unity between us in regard to many of the main objectives. Indeed, the one note of total disagreement was from my noble friend Lord Soper, and the noble Lord, Lord Balerno, sought to answer him. I would myself hesitate to engage in a debate with so experienced, silver-tongued, sincere and knowledgeable an orator—indeed, almost the outstanding orator either at Hyde Park Corner or in

831
your Lordships' House. We acknowledge his sincerity. But he did refer almost to a "Cabinet of lunatics"—he was not referring to the present Cabinet, I know—and I wonder who is most closely in touch with reality. I believe that we are more closely in touch with reality. I believe that the course that successive Governments in broad outline have followed, without any feeling of desire to inflict aggression on others, has helped to achieve—not by particularly moral or noble means—peace; and I think it is particularly true of NATO.
I very much appreciate the fact that the noble Lord, Lord St. Oswald, in the tributes he paid to NATO, very properly delivered the mildest speech I have ever heard him deliver in my life. Perhaps NATO has had a calming effect even on him. But I believe that most of your Lordships feel that at the present stage in the development of mankind the sort of policies that we are following are essential and contribute to the peace of the world.
I was disappointed that nobody paid a tribute—and I think a little more generosity from the other side might occasionally be fitting—to the comprehensiveness of the Statement on Defence Estimates. The noble Lord, Lord Teynham, lamented that there were no photographs; but if your Lordships compare that document with the sort of papers that were produced in the days of the noble Lord, Lord Thorneycroft—and I have a tribute to pay to him in a moment before I stir him into opposition—this represents an enormous improvement One may argue about what is in it, but it is a much more coherent and informative presentation. That comes about as a direct consequence of the reforms that the noble Lord—I was going to say "the right honourable Gentleman", because I still remember him much more in that capacity—introduced in the Ministry of Defence.
I am glad, if I have not been able to do so previously as a former Defence Minister, to pay tribute to what has been achieved. I believe that the grouping of the Services together in that one headquarters, the development, the introduction of programmed budgeting, which has certainly, perhaps unfortunately, made successive Defence reviews much
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more possible than otherwise they would have been, owes a great deal to his work. Therefore, I am all the more regretful that he is really a bit out of date. He said that he has not been around lately and had not taken part in debates. Indeed, this has been characteristic of a number of speeches, in the extent to which they have harked back over old controversies. The noble Lord, Lord Thorneycroft, made much play with Mr. Chapman Pincher's blinding glimpse of the obvious: that the object of a loan is to defer expenditure to a later date.
LORD ST. OSWALD: To a later Government.
LORD SHACKLETON: If the noble Lord will let me develop the sort of mess we inherited from noble Lords opposite, there were the aircraft that were not going to arrive—and this has been said time and again—and the vital necessity of filling the gap which is now being filled. The noble Lord, Lord Thorneycroft, was, I think, a little confused about what I said I had already made clear. Neither my right honourable friend, nor I, nor anyone else has ever made the slightest attempt to conceal the fact that the deferment of expenditure is the whole purpose of the American aircraft loan. Far from there being any concealment, Parliament in fact passed a special Act to authorise it—the Military Aircraft Loan Act 1966. It really is very difficult to conceal an Act of Parliament, and the whole matter was thoroughly discussed.
I should just like to explain this for the benefit of the noble Lord, and—who knows?—even Mr. Chapman Pincher, who I acknowledge is very well informed, may increase his fund of knowledge in this respect. Perhaps he will read the Record of your Lordships' debate to-day. We borrow to make progress payments on the aircraft, and we then pay interest on the loan and repay the capital by instalments. Even at this late hour. I think that this is a fairly simple mathematical proposition. The latter figures arc what we actually spend, and these are included in the Defence budget as they are incurred. The progress payments are equivalent to the sums we borrow. I really see nothing wrong with financing these purchases by a loan. I said that the R.A.F. was in sore need of aircraft—
LORD ST. OSWALD: My Lords, I wonder whether it is not the noble Lord the Leader of the House who is himself a trifle out of date. In my recollection, the Act to which he is addressing himself was chiefly concerned with the F 111.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, the noble Lord is quite wrong. It was concerned with a large number of aircraft, including Phantoms, some of which had been ordered by the previous Government, and of course the amount has been reduced by not ordering the F111. The fact is that when the Government took office we were in need of new aircraft, and, in particular, the P 1154 which was a very fine aircraft. The only trouble was that it did not exist, and we did not know when it: was going to come into existence. I think the noble Lord, Lord Thorneycroft, will confirm that this is an area where certainty is not easily attainable.
Every Government has been bitterly disappointed. Now and again, on the other hand, they have been encouraged by some rather striking results, and the most striking of the success stories is the Harrier; that very remarkable aircraft which was dismissed as a toy by certain people and which, so far from going up in cost, has actually declined in cost. I should like to claim that this was entirely due to the wisdom of the present Government, but we know perfectly well that there is a degree of uncertainty in this whole area of procurement of advanced equipment on which certainty is not possible. But it is a very remarkable aircraft and yesterday it flew the Atlantic for the first time. I think we can all be very proud of it.
I will try briefly to answer a very few points. If there are particular issues that have been raised which it has not been possible to answer, I or my noble friend Lord Winterbottom will, as always, try to supply answers, but I will give as much quick information as I can. The noble Lord, Lord Thorneycroft, asked for an assurance that the Anglo-French military staff talks were still in existence. I can assure the noble Lord that they are, and that there was a meeting last December. And, of course, similar talks take place with other Allies. There were talks with the Italians only last month.
I think perhaps that I will not take the time of your Lordships'
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House to talk about NATO beyond saying this. I hope that noble Lords will not underestimate the size of the contribution. It is not only the forces, and particularly the air forces, that we actually have in Germany. It is the squadrons of our most modern aircraft that are based in this country, too, which are available in support of NATO. As I have said already, there are the Harriers. The first operational squadron will be formed this year and will be based in this country but will be assigned to NATO as part of the Ace Mobile Force—a role which will enable it to be deployed quickly to any part of the NATO front in an emergency—and all four squadrons will be operational and assigned to NATO by the end of 1971. Before leaving the subject of aircraft, I would say to the noble Lord. Lord St. Oswald, that we are not complacent on the subject of dispersal and protection of aircraft. It is a major problem, and the points to which he and other noble Lords have drawn attention have not escaped the notice, surprisingly enough, of the Chiefs of Staff.
My Lords, I should have liked to say something about the extent of operations and activities which have been going on even in this last year when, as we know, no British soldier lost his life in the course of military operations. There is a great deal of activity, and there has been a great deal of training abroad. Noble Lords who have had an opportunity to see something of training will, I think, if they have looked fairly at it, have found that morale and efficiency was very high indeed. There is one field of activity which is worth noting and that is the military aid to the civil community. If any noble Lord would like to know more about this, there is a pamphlet which is available (and if it is not already available in the Printed Paper Office I will certainly arrange for it to be put there) describing the extent to which military aid is going on. This is not a new thing, but it is being more clearly recognised, and it is worth noting the rather striking forms that it takes.
The noble Viscount, Lord Monckton, who pleaded that downhill ski-ing should be counted as an adventure training, may be interested (and I am sure the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, is already aware) that in fact the Royal Engineers built a road into one part of the Cairngorms, and

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thereby opened up a very promising skiing area. I was up there only three weeks ago, but there was a blizzard blowing and I did not attempt to go down that particular corrie. But this was built by the Army as a direct contribution.
To the noble Viscount, Lord Monckton, perhaps I may say that I should have thought that cross-country ski-ing, or Langlauf, or whatever it may be, would have been more relevant; but we should like to look again at this question of recognition for adventure training. It is sometimes rather difficult to say that such delightful sports, the most supreme sports of all, should be regarded as a form of adventure training, but I accept that this ought perhaps to qualify, and I think I shall have to leave this to be further considered. May I quickly say to the noble Viscount, on the question of the Royal Military Hospital, Millbank, that I have nothing more to say this evening. The matter is being very carefully considered. I am bound to say, out of Service loyalty, that I think the R.A.F. Hospital at Halton, outside London, does equally well for members and ex-members of the Royal Air Force.
My Lords, I do not think I have time to go into questions of military salaries, beyond recognising the importance that noble Lords attach to this subject, and to the studies by the National Board of Prices and Incomes, the N.B.P.I. Extensive inquiries are being made. We attach the greatest importance to this. I am particularly concerned, as I am sure are all noble Lords, that the Services should not drop behind in this particular matter. But we shall have to wait to see the outcome of this particular exercise.
Again, I think noble Lords were not really fair on the subject of the reserves. It is not unknown for reserves to be used for precisely the purposes for which we intend the reserves that we have. I was interested to hear the noble Lord, Lord Thurlow, speaking of the position in Scotland and of the enthusiasm which is being shown in recruiting; for this is reflected also in other parts of the country. I have no figures to give but I am very hopeful about this. Everybody regrets the disappearance of particular units and the curtailment of institutions which we regard as intrinsically good
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in themselves, regardless of the purpose for what they are intended. But I would ask noble Lords, whatever their feelings, to recognise that when it comes to weighing the cost and deciding how to allocate resources sometimes good things have to go. It is very sad to see a number of regiments disappear but from what I have seen of those who serve in it I believe that the British Army has resilience.
My Lords, one of the messages that I should like to see go out from this debate is that the standing of our Armed Forces is as high to-day as it has ever been. I believe this to be so not only in the estimation of those who know something about them but also in the estimation of the general public. I think we take it for granted that our Armed Services, the British Army, whenever it is called in to any situation—whether it be Anguilla or something more threatening—will do extremely well. I do not believe that people thought this of the Army 30 or 40 years ago. I believe there really is a change in our national outlook on this. I hope that we shall not damage this by being too depressed at particular shortages and particular cuts that may have to be made.
I believe that the capacities of our reserves—although one would like many more—are well adjusted to the particular purposes they are intended to fulfil. I do not see the inconsistency that some noble Lords have seen in the statement that our own defence expenditure, expressed as a proportion of the gross national product, has been reduced while at the same time attention is drawn to the size of the Communist countries' expenditure. This is, after all, a statement of the facts. We are still spending a greater proportion of our gross national product on defence than most other countries in the world. I think that these things should be properly exposed.
The noble Lord, Lord Ampthill, and the noble Viscount Lord Bridgeman, both referred to the Royal United Service Institution. Knowing the interest that Lord Bridgeman has taken in this, I am delighted that the change in the attitude to defence studies on the part of the Ministry of Defence is so widely welcomed. There is a long-standing need for a forum such as the Royal United Service Institution. I think it is disappointing that

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the appeal has not been more successful. It was hoped to raise a minimum of £50,000, but so far, in round figures, only something like £25,000 has been raised, and the Government have agreed to contribute two-fifths of the sum received. My Lords, I should like to take this opportunity earnestly to entreat anyone who has not yet responded to the appeal, and who is interested, to help the Royal United Service Institution in this matter. This is something to which the Government would like to give their fullest moral support along with the financial support that they have given.
I am glad that noble Lords have welcomed the defence studies. We heard some interesting remarks on this matter from the noble Lord, Lord Balerno. I very much appreciated his welcome to the new graduate entry policy adopted by the Royal Air Force. This is a revolutionary step forward, but it is one which the Royal Air Force—as the noble Lord himself recognised—regards as inevitable. I should like to make one point clear. The requirement for Royal Air Force officers in the future to have a degree applies only to officers taking up direct permanent commissions. We shall of course need a number of others. The noble Lord and I have co-operated, not to say "plotted", on the subject of the university air squadrons. Although we regret the abolition of pay for members of the squadrons, we have had to look at this matter very carefully. I have discussed this myself and have had contrary views from members of the squadrons.
To certain noble Lords who have raised important questions on the Navy, I would say that the Government believe that it is very important to maintain a strong Navy. I should like to suggest that although the Fleet may be smaller the re-equipment will give us a very high quality Navy. Nor will the activities of the Navy be confined purely to NATO waters. It will be possible, with the mobile fleet trains and all the other developments to-day, for the Navy to operate very widely throughout the world. It has already made important contributions in minor operations. The Government and the Chiefs of Staff (if I may mention them; perhaps I should not) attach continued importance to the protection by the Royal Navy of mer-
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chant shipping wherever it may be threatened. This was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, the noble Lord, Lord Ashbourne, and other noble Lords, including Lord Teynham. This is not the occasion to go into detail, but I can tell noble Lords that there are the most thorough plans in existence, including diversions from threatened areas. All the techniques necessary are being actively considered and instructions exist for the necessary action.
I was asked by the noble Lord, Lord Ashbourne, about the Joint Anti-Sub-marine School at Londonderry. I must stress that this is a personal expression, but I was very sorry that the old A.U. school which I knew during the war at Maydown, and which went to Derry should be leaving there; but this was a decision taken only after the most thorough consideration. I assure the noble Lord that the school will be moved to Southwark Park near Portsmouth, where it can share facilities with other naval training establishments, and work is in progress on constructing the necessary integrated establishment.
I am conscious that points were raised by the noble Earl, Lord Glasgow, who referred to the Reserve Fleet. To maintain a large number of ships in a state of preservation is expensive both in skilled manpower and in money The policy, therefore, is to keep in reserve on short notice only enough vessels to replace active Fleet ships which may break down. The strength of the Reserve Fleet is affected by reductions in the strength of the active Fleet. But, broadly, our policy remains the same as was stated in the Explanatory Review on the Navy Estimates of 1961–62.
The hour is late—and I have even lost that one piece which was fully prepared by way of a peroration, which is no doubt an advantage. It has been found—but I will spare your Lordships. I would end by saying only this. I think that the policy the Government are following and the Defence Services that are being created, maintained and re-equipped will give us first-class Defence Services and will do so at a price—and this, as we all know, is the real issue—that will not impose such a heavy burden on the economy. This is not just a question of choosing to trade and make money at the

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expense of defence. We know that a strong economy is something just as essential to the survival and defence of this country. I believe that even in these difficult times the Services offer a first-class career to any young man who thinks of joining. I was pleased to hear the remarks of the noble Earl, Lord Glasgow, on this subject. I believe this to be true. And I hope that noble Lords, whatever they may choose to say about the Government—and all Governments are entitled to be criticised—will recognise that we shall still have Services which will be second to none.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

TANZANIA BILL [H.L.]
BARONESS LLEWELYN-DAVIES OF HASTOE: My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lord Shepherd, I beg leave
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to introduce a Bill to make provision for modifying the law in consequence of the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar; to form the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar as a Republic within the Commonwealth and the subsequent adoption by that republic of the name of Tanzania: to make provision as to the operation of the Colonial and Other Territories (Divorce Jurisdiction) Acts 1926 to 1950 in relation to the courts of Tanganyika and of the United Republic; and for purposes connected therewith. I beg to move that this Bill be now read a first time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 1a.—(Baroness Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe.)
On Question, Bill read 1a, and to be printed.
House adjourned at twenty-seven minutes before eleven o'clock.