Sitting of 27 August 1968

Preamble
The House met at Eleven o'clock
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons (Mr. Fred Peart): For the convenience of hon. Members, I should say that the Government have no firm news as yet from Moscow on the situation in Czechoslovakia, but if firm news arrives the Foreign Secretary will be only too pleased to seek permission from the House to intervene and keep the House informed.
Motion, made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Concannon.]

NIGERIA
11.6 a.m.
Mr. Reginald Maudling: The occasion for the recall of Parliament was, of course, Czechoslovakia, but the Government chose to have a second day to discuss the subject of Nigeria. There are many pressing problems facing this country, but I think the choice of this subject today reflects very truly some issues that arise. It reflects, first, the daily slaughter and death which are continuing in Nigeria, and it reflects also a growing sense of the moral issues involved for this country and for this House. I believe that it is upon these issues that the debate will concentrate, and certainly we hope very much that the Government will be able to help the House with clarification of the situation as it is now in West Africa, because it is exceedingly difficult to be clear as to precisely what is happening.
It is always difficult for us to try to put ourselves in the place of those who live in Nigeria. Their background, tradition, history, values and standards all differ so much from ours that it is particularly important for us to use every effort we can to understand the point of
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view of both sides in a dispute of this character.
It is difficult to understand, too, the immense emotions of tribalism that still persist, not only in Nigeria but throughout Africa, including, as we know so well, some of the East African territories. It is difficult sometimes to understand the tenacity with which the peoples of these countries cling to frontiers imposed upon them by history or by colonial powers but which, nevertheless, are immensely dear to them, and their tenacity must be respected by this House. We must not try to impose upon them our own values or our own political or social conceptions. This is one reason for the difficulty in understanding the issues involved.
The other reason is the immense fog of propaganda that hangs about the whole situation. Both sides deny that they are using propaganda techniques. Both sides, I believe, are using them freely and often expertly, and this makes it most important that the Government should do everything they can to clear up the situation for us. We hear continual arguments about why the whole business started. We know the bloody preliminaries which took place on both sides. The arguments about how or why it started seem sometimes as irrelevant now as they are confusing.
What are the true, genuine aims on either side? Are the aims of the Federal Government those expressed by Chief Enahoro in the statement that we have had in this morning's Press, or are they those expressed by some of the commanders on the spot in Eastern Nigeria? What is the real purpose of the Biafrans? Is it to ensure the safety of their own people within a united Nigeria, or do they wish to see Nigeria broken up? What is the true military situation? Here again, all the accounts that we get are very confusing. I believe that General Gowon said last night on television that they have taken the major fight into the heart of Ibo territory, but that is in conflict with what the Foreign Secretary told the House on 12th June was the stated intention of General Gowon. We want to have the position cleared up as much as possible.
What is the truth about the allegations of atrocities? To what extent, for example, have bombs been used against civilian targets or against airfields

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designated for use by the Red Cross? What truth is there in the stories about massacres and executions? What is the truth about the holding up of Red Cross supplies? In some ways, people in this country have been more deeply disturbed about this than about anything else, because the arguments put forward on both sides seem so totally inadequate.
The arguments used by the Federal Government objecting to airborne supplies seem quite unworthy of the situation. Equally, the arguments used by the Biafrans objecting to the carriage of supplies by land are totally inadequate. There is a general impression that too many statements and attitudes in this matter of relief are based on a desire to wage a propaganda war rather than to see relief carried through effectively. However, we are glad to see that there appears to be some progress and some agreement in principle about the simultaneous movement of relief supplies by air and land. If the details still being argued about can be settled, something of real value will have been achieved.
Throughout this sad and sorry business, the attitude of this country has been one of an agonised search for a way in which to help bring an end to the conflict, and we have all felt frustrated about how little in practice we have been able to do. We cannot impose our will. We cannot impose peace. We cannot impose justice, and we cannot impose mercy. We can persuade and we can suggest. We can bring a certain amount of pressure to bear. I believe that we should try to do all this to our utmost.
Everyone is tempted to take sides in this issue. Everyone is very tempted, visiting one side or the other and listening to the spokesmen of one side or the other, to take sides. This is the most dangerous attitude for hon. Members to adopt. In this conflict there is much of the element of true tragedy. It is not a conflict of right and wrong but one of right and right. There is much right in the claim of the Federal Government about the need to maintain Nigeria as a unitary State. The alternatives to this would be very serious, very bad for the people in Nigeria and possibly very bad for other African countries. On the other hand, the people in Biafra have every right to fear the re-
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prisals which might fall upon them in certain circumstances and on the basis of the statements made by some Nigerian commanders. We have been right to try to mediate, but we must recognise that our influence so far has been relatively little.
One of the arguments for continuing the supply of arms to the Federal Government has been that it enables us to maintain influence with them. I think that that is a persuasive argument, but I hope that the House can be given some evidence of what this influence has been able to achieve in practice and is likely to achieve.
Hon. Members: Hear, hear.
Mr. Maudling: So I turn to the most urgent problem of the supply of arms, and I think that it must be judged against two criteria. The first is the practical one of what would be the consequences of a British refusal to provide further arms. Would it help stop the fighting? Would it help stop the bombs and the suffering? Is it not a fact that the Nigerian Government could get the arms that they require elsewhere? What are the chances of getting an organised agreement to stop the supply of arms to both sides? In previous debates, Government spokesmen have said that this is not a practicable proposition, but there is some evidence in Europe, for example, that the situation may have changed. We would like to know the Government's assessment of the current position.
Practical considerations are not the only ones. Possibly the overriding consideration today is the moral judgment that we should make in the circumstances of the policy pursued by this country. We must start from the point that this country has been the traditional supplier of most of the arms to the Nigerian Government and their forces. They have always been supplied on the basis that they would be used against a threat to the Nigerian State, the threat of invasion, or the threat of rebellion. They were supplied on that basis, and I think that it would be wrong to change the basis.
We understand—and I hope that this will be confirmed today—that the supplies of arms continuing are supplies of types of weapons that we have provided in the past and that there has been no

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change or stepping up of the supplies that we have been making available. However, the position could change if the struggle took on the character of a genuine civil war or if there were the threat of wanton and brutal slaughter. It is to those two points that I want to turn my attention.
First, despite the recognition of Biafra by a number of other territories on the African continent, is it not still a fact that this is a matter of secession rather than a civil war? Could a breakaway by the Ibo areas be reconciled with the continuance of Nigeria in the sense of a unitary powerful State capable of providing security, peace and prosperity for its inhabitants? I do not believe that that could be reconciled. It would be a tragedy if this breakaway brought with it the break-up of the whole of Nigeria. It is probably right still to regard this as a matter of secession rather than one of civil war.
What is far more worrying is the intentions of those who command the Federal forces at present in operation in Iboland. What is the truth about the bombing and about the alleged executions? What, in particular, must we think about the statements attributed to Colonel Adekunle in a recent interview to a European newspaper which, so far as I know, have not been repudiated, which remain on the record and which threaten massacre on a major scale? That attitude is quite different from the responsible one taken by the Government in Lagos and then-spokesmen. But many people must suspect that the voice of the colonel may be the true voice of those who are doing the righting and, consequently, there are many who fear that the commanders on the spot are not adequately under the control of their Government. This lies at the heart of what we are discussing this morning.
The Foreign Secretary will recall that on 12th June he said:
"If we make the supposition that it were the intention of the Federal Government not merely to preserve the unity of Nigeria but to proceed without mercy either with the slaughter or the starvation of the Ibo people … we would have to reconsider, and more than reconsider, the action we have so far taken."
He went on to stress on that occasion that it would not be right to treat that supposition as if it were a fact. He said:
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"… it would not be right now to treat that supposition as a fact. Indeed, as I shall show, there are substantial reasons for not doing so."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 12th June, 1968; Vol. 766, c. 293–4.]
On that basis the House accepted that it would be right to continue the supply of arms, but the House will need reassuring in clear terms that that basis still remains. If it does not, if the conditions that the Foreign Secretary laid down that day and which the Commonwealth Secretary repeated a fortnight later no longer obtain, the continuation of the Government's present policy must, on their own showing, be open to very grave doubt indeed. This, above all, we want to urge on the Government today. They should make clear to the House and to the country how matters stand now. It would be utterly intolerable to provide British arms to anyone who intends to work on the basis of Colonel Adekunle's recent statement. It must be repudiated. It must be made absolutely clear that this is not what the conduct of the Federal armies will be in the campaign that they are at present waging.
As I said, I believe that this is the issue which mainly troubles the minds and the consciences of the country and of the House of Commons at the moment. I hope very much that the Government spokesman will be able to reassure us on this grave matter.
For the rest, I think that the tasks before us are fairly clear. We must continue to do all we can to get the relief supplies moving and to bring all possible pressure to bear on both sides to remove any obstructions. We must try to help to find a solution which can combine a united Nigeria with security and confidence for the Ibo people.
There are, after all, two stages. Chief Enahoro made it clear that the Federal Government accept the idea of an international force very much like the Commonwealth force which has already been suggested in this House, including two great Commonwealth countries. The idea of this force would be to guarantee the security of the Ibo people if they lay down their arms and if the fighting ceases.
But that is not the only point of danger. There is a later point of danger when a constitution has been agreed, if that constitution cannot guarantee the long term future peace and security of

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the Ibo people. All of us with experience of African problems know how great that difficulty is. With our experience of these territories and constitutional problems we should be able to make a valuable contribution to the solution of this problem, which must be solved if Nigeria is to survive and become a happy country.
Finally, we must do all that we can to mount a massive operation of aid to Nigeria as soon as the fighting has ceased. We have long traditional friendships with this country. We recognise its immense importance to the whole of Africa and we recognise the terrific amount of rehabilitation that will be urgently needed. It is not merely the immediate problem of bringing food to the starving and medical supplies to the wounded and the sick. It is also the problem of rebuilding the bridges, communications, railways and roads, and restoring some strength and backing to the Nigerian economy. I am sure that the Government will have the support of the entire House in all they can do to provide British aid to this end on the maximum scale possible.
That is all that I want to say today. This is a matter which troubles our hearts and minds. We are all desperately worried at the position in which this country now is and we are desperately sad at what is happening in Nigeria. I hope that the Government, on the basis of the questions that I have put, will be able to reassure the House. If they cannot, then I think that a change will have to be made.
11.23 a.m.
The Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. George Thomson): It is just over a month since the House last debated the Nigerian situation. In that debate I was able to announce the beginning of a new effort by the Organisation for African Unity to bring about a settlement. The whole House then welcomed the preliminary talks which were about to begin in Niamey in Niger and expressed the hope that they would lead to successful negotiations at Addis Ababa. But, as the right hon. Member for Barnet (Mr. Maudling) has just described, since then there has been a growing anxiety at the lack of progress in these peace talks, at the continuing suffer-
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ing of the civil population, at the increasing reports of difficulties about getting relief through to those who need it, and at the reports about an increase in the fighting on both sides. It was against that background that the Government felt it would be a proper response to the sense of concern in all parts of the House if we took advantage of the recall of Parliament to offer a further opportunity to debate the situation in Nigeria.
I recall that in the July debate the right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) agreed with me that the wise sequence of priorities would be, first the organisation of relief of the starving on both sides of the fighting line; secondly, a ceasefire; and, thirdly, a political settlement. The agenda in fact agreed at the Niamey meeting approached these problems in the reverse order. They began with a search for a political settlement, a ceasefire to follow that agreement, and, finally, agreement on relief.
I think that events have shown that the instincts of the House about the most practical way to make progress were probably right. The Addis Ababa conference has struggled hard but unsuccessfully, despite the distinguished chairmanship and dedicated statesmanship of the Emperor of Ethiopia, to achieve political agreement. It finally gave up and turned to the possibility of an agreed plan for relieving the suffering. There were heartbreaking difficulties and suspicions on both sides, even about the bringing of help to the innocent victims of this tragic war.
Perhaps I might begin a report that will have many grave, sombre and disturbing features, with one encouraging development. The House will have been happy to hear that Emperor Haile Selassie's formula for relief operations was this weekend accepted in principle by both the Nigerian and Biafran delegations. A great deal of credit is due to the persistence and patience shown by the Emperor. The formula is basically about simultaneous use of land and air mercy corridors into Biafra. As the House knows, the Government have always believed that while land corridors were the only way to provide long-term aid in the necessary volume, there was also a short-term need for an emergency airlift to meet immediate requirements

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and to clear the stockpiles which have accumulated at Fernando Po.
Chief Enahoro has been in London for talks during the past few days. I had a long discussion with him yesterday and I was happy to learn that the Nigerian Federal delegation has now returned to Addis Ababa, authorised to accept the Emperor's formula. The House will also be glad to know that International Red Cross flights into Biafra from Fernando Po have already been resumed.
Chief Enahoro told me that he was in Geneva on Saturday and had a useful meeting with Dr. Lindt, who is in charge of the International Red Cross operation in Nigeria. The two have agreed to meet again shortly. Meanwhile, I have just heard that Dr. Lindt has been invited by the Emperor to join the talks in Addis Ababa, and is leaving Geneva today. These, I think, are encouraging developments.
I do not wish to underestimate the difficulties that may still lie ahead before the relief flows on an adequate scale into the Ibo-held territories. We have had too many disappointing examples of agreements in principle proving difficult to implement in practice. But we must all hope that both sides, aware, as the right hon. Member for Barnet has rightly said, of the way the conscience of the world is now aroused by the starvation in Nigeria, will now move with urgency to make the Emperor's formula a living instrument of relief. We must also hope that out of a working agreement on relief will yet come agreements on a cease-fire and on a political settlement. The time may be short if there is yet to be a political settlement without another round of major fighting.
We have pinned great hopes on the talks now taking place at Addis Ababa under the auspices of the O.A.U. It would be by far the best outcome if this tragic African civil war could be brought to an end by Africa's own regional organisation of unity.
Unfortunately, Chief Enahoro was not able to tell me of any progress at Addis Ababa on the central political issues in dispute or of arrangements for a ceasefire. The Federal Government have put forward a set of proposals for ending the war. They emphasise that these are
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negotiable. Taken by and large, and given the very strong military position which the Federal side now hold, these proposals seems to us not unreasonable. On Colonel Ojukwu, however, I am afraid that they have so far made no impact. His demands appear to be as rigid as ever in that they amount to a claim for independence, or at least the attributes of sovereignty. It is not for us to express partisan views in this matter.
Nobody in this House is anti-Ibo or pro-Ibo. Colonel Ojukwu's line would be understandable if he were winning the military conflict, but the reverse is the truth. The right hon. Member for Barnet mentioned the television broadcast given by General Gowon last night and asked for clarification about the military situation. I entirely agree with the right hon. Gentleman that the military situation is both confusing and obscure and I want to try to give the House the clearest account I can of what we know about it.
The Federal forces have now retaken all the non-Ibo areas of the former Eastern region and have thus established their authority in the South-Eastern and the Rivers States, but in addition they now hold those areas of the East Central State—Iboland—which lie to the north of the Onitsha and Enugu road. To get matters into perspective, the House should understand that it is now more accurate to talk of the "Ibo areas" rather than "Biafra", because although Colonel Ojukwu still speaks of Biafra, he is in control of not much more than half of Iboland. The Federal forces are in a strong military position, having cut off the Ibos entirely from the sea. The present military activity by the Federal forces on the southern front followed strong attacks along the whole of this front by the Biafran Army. Indeed, these attacks were initially successful in the Ikot Ekpene area, and were widely acclaimed as such by Radio Biafra. The House must now face the fact that whether the Federal Government will carry out a full-scale invasion of Iboland will depend on the negotiations at Addis Ababa. That is the measure of the importance of them.
It is against this sombre background that a number of my hon. Friends feel that we ought to stop supplying any more arms to the Federal Government. I can

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well understand that the report I have just given the House is bound to add emphasis to that feeling and to the anxiety that hon. Members on both sides of the House have felt for some time. This is a grave and difficult question.
I recognise and share—as everybody in all parts of the House recognises and shares—the deep concern about the civil war in Nigeria. Hon. Members have had many representations from the Churches and from relief organisations in their constituencies. Perhaps, in passing, I might pay the warmest possible tribute to the tremendous work done by both Church organisations and relief organisations in trying to give some practical help to those who are suffering in this tragic war.
Eastern Nigeria was a great centre of Christian missionary work, as I have a special reason for knowing. Mary Slessor of Calabar came from Dundee and was one of the heroic figures of my own childhood, and I have close friends in the mission field amongst the Ibos who are deeply troubled and distressed about British Government policy. I ask those who are worried to recognise that, like so many issues in the political and moral field, and where political and moral issues greatly overlap, this situation is too complex to be solved simply by Britain's turning her back on Federal Nigeria as the traditional supplier of the means of national defence.
The real question—and I ask the House to think about this—the question that becomes more difficult each day as Colonel Ojukwu refuses to recognise the political and military cul-de-sac into which he has led his people—is what policies will minimise and shorten the sufferings of all Nigerians—Ibos and non-Ibos alike? That is the general question. The particular question is: what can Britain do that is most likely to contribute to that outcome?
As I understand it, it has never been the position of the Christian Churches that a civil war against a unilateral act of secession was an unjust war, cruel and tragic although any civil war is bound to be. I might say that I do not follow the distinction that the right hon. Gentleman was seeking to make between the issue of secession and the fact of a civil war. I would describe this as a civil war over
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the issue of secession. Other countries have gone through this agony, as I have mentioned on other occasions.
It is my understanding that concerned Christians did not, in the nineteenth century, denounce Abraham Lincoln and champion Jefferson Davis. More recently, they did not espouse the secessionist cause in Katanga in the Congo. Although there is a great missionary tradition in Eastern Nigeria it is worth remembering that there are more Christians outside Iboland than inside. It is wrong to see this issue in just black and white religious terms. General Gowon is himself of the Christian religion, and has certainly, in my experience, done his utmost to exercise humane restraint in an increasingly difficult situation. Indeed, more than half the members of the present Federal Government of Nigeria are of the Christian faith.
The right hon. Gentleman expressed anxieties which are felt by many people who would recognise General Gowon's restraint about the utterances of Colonel Adekunle, and the right hon. Gentleman asked about these. One must not take too much notice of the flamboyant language of a colonel in the field. We have had recent examples of flamboyant language from some of our own military people. The way to judge a military man is not by the flamboyancy of his language to the Press but by his professional qualities as a soldier and, in this context, by the degree of discipline that he is able to enforce amongst his troops. My information—into which I have looked most anxiously—is that in his professional capacity, as distinct from his public relations capacity, Colonel Adekunle leads troops who have shown self-discipline.
I have seen a report from Mr. David Williams, the editor of West Africa, who will be known to many hon. Members who are interested in Africa as a reliable witness in these matter, and who has been out there on the front south of Aba. He reports that he saw there no signs of any atrocities, and was struck by the fine discipline shown.
The overriding preoccupation of all of us in this House is how to shorten the suffering and, that being so, it seems to me that the immediate effort should be concentrated on urging Colonel Ojukwu

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to recognise the realities—the fact that he has been militarily defeated and that his duty is to save his people from suffering by seeking an honourable settlement that guarantees the safety of his people.
Her Majesty's Government have never made any secret of the fact that they hope that the people of Nigeria will be able to agree on a settlement which allows for the unity of their country. I agree with what the right hon. Member for Barnet said about this. But, equally, our view has always been that within that basic unity there must be room for flexibility. There are many degrees of federation or confederation and it must be possible to find from among them a form of society which would enable all Nigerians to prosper together. But perhaps even more important is that the House should remind itself that it must be for the Nigerians themselves to decide upon what form their State should take. It cannot be said too often that Nigeria ceased to be a colony eight years ago.
The central issue about which the war is being fought is that of unity or separation. In our opinion the Federal Government are prepared to be accommodating about many aspects of a possible settlement, including the constitutional arrangements through which unity is interpreted, but having come this far and being in a winning position they have made up their minds that they are not prepared to give away the basic sense of unity itself.
Whatever the hopes and fears of the Ibos, we cannot believe that they would not now do better to see what conditions they could negotiate for themselves within the framework of a united Nigeria, however this was expressed. We are not trying to pass judgment on the claims that the Ibos have made for a greater say in their affairs and, indeed, everyone is bound to have a profound sympathy for them, but it seems to me—in terms of the situation that I am reporting to the House—that they are risking bringing upon themselves the threatened invasion which is in all our minds and which we are all anxious to see avoided.
Her Majesty's Government have made it clear all along that they wish to see the earliest possible cease-fire, and a solution by negotiation, and that they do not
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believe that a military solution is the answer. I said exactly that to Chief Enahoro yesterday. We shall continue to work towards these ends. Nevertheless, I would not wish to let the House think that the Federal Government are likely to be responsive to appeals merely to stop and give up what they are fighting for, unless there is some sign that Colonel Ojukwu is ready to meet them over the question of unity. It is against this background that the vital importance for the future of Nigeria of the Addis Ababa talks must be seen.
If this is the situation, with a political stalemate threatening a fresh military offensive, then I know how strongly some of my hon. Friends and certain hon. Gentlemen opposite feel about the question of the British supply of arms to the Federal Government. I hope that the House will excuse me if, to give a considered answer to those who feel so anxious on this score, I begin by looking at how Her Majesty's Government came to be supplying arms to Nigeria in the first place.
The Nigerian forces, like the forces of many Commonwealth countries, were trained and equipped on British lines long before independence. Under successive British Governments, they have naturally looked largely to us for re-supply. When the time came that they most needed supplies, they counted on our willingness to allow them to purchase from the United Kingdom.
Neutrality was not a possible option for Her Majesty's Government at that time. We might have been able to declare ourselves neutral if one independent country was fighting another, but this was not a possible attitude when a Commonwealth country, with which we had long and close ties, was faced with an internal revolt. What would other Commonwealth countries have thought? After all, some other Commonwealth countries face dissident minorities who may be tempted to break up their countries to achieve secession. What effect would our action have had on the rest of Africa, struggling to create modern nation states in the face of traditional tribal rivalries and fears?
Our policy since the war began has been to continue authorising the export of carefully controlled quantities of arms

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and ammunitions, and I confirm that there has been no change in that policy. Broadly speaking, they are the same kind of arms as we supplied before the war. We have not supplied any military aircraft or bombs. Our supplies have amounted to about 15 per cent. by value of Nigeria's total arms purchases, and even in the categories of infantry arms and ammunitions, our share has been well under half. They are obtaining the bulk of their arms from elsewhere. In other words, our supplies have been more important in political than in practical terms.
I come to the question of whether, if we were to cut off our supply of defence equipment unilaterally, a peace agreement would be made more likely. We would, I believe, lose our capacity to influence the Federal Government if we were to take such a step. I suggest that the record shows that General Gowon and his colleagues have all along been prepared to listen to our views and meet us when they felt that they could. I do not wish to overestimate the degree of influence we have been able to exercise. However, we have exercised the influence we have, and I believe that we would lose that influence if we were to follow a course of unilateral suspension.
Mr. Frank Allaun: Did not General Gowon say on television last night that the big push had started? How, in the light of that, can my right hon. Friend say that we have had any such influence?
Mr. Thomson: I hope that my hon. Friend will listen to my argument as a whole and will judge it at the end. Apart from the undoubted reduction of influence with the Federal Government that would follow unilateral suspension, I believe that the suspending of arms supplies would make the Ibos less, rather than more, willing to come to a settlement. Far from persuading the Ibos to negotiate meaningfully, I believe that our action would encourage them to fight on. There may be a difference of view about this, but I can only report the fact that the recent, and, I believe, ill-timed French announcement of support for Biafra—just before the Addis Ababa Conference started—has certainly had the
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effect of making Colonel Ojukwu and his colleagues less willing to come to an honourable settlement.
There are other considerations. I have heard it put as an argument for stopping the supply of arms that it is disgraceful that we should be in the company of the Soviet Union in supplying arms when that country has adopted an oppressive attitude towards smaller nations, as illustrated over Czechoslovakia. I am bound to say that this is an odd argument which stands sense on its head. Britain, unlike the Soviet Union, is scrupulous in its respect for the sovereign rights of smaller nations. After all, we have created more independent nations than any other Power. The Russians have already secured a political foothold in Nigeria by supplying military aircraft and bombs, which we refused to supply. If we cut off our arms supplies, Russia would be only too willing to fill the gap and gain the influence which we would lose. Is it seriously argued that this is the best way to help a new Commonwealth nation to stand up to the pressures of Soviet Imperialism?
The other question which many hon. Members have rightly asked is this: if we were to stop the supply of arms, would that be of help to our getting relief into Biafra? The evidence seems to be to the contrary. Nations which do not supply arms have met the same resistance as we have from Biafra to proposals for mercy corridors. Nobody's relief supplies are getting through on the scale that many countries would like to see, and if we were to stop, unilaterally, the supply of arms, the resentment caused on the Federal side would, I believe, affect Federal co-operation and our relief effort as well. But I will come to that.
There is also strong feeling that every effort should be made to bring about some sort of international embargo on arms. Her Majesty's Government have looked into this matter closely in recent months. We came to the conclusion that the only way to get an effective international embargo on arms would be for the contestants to co-operate as part of a ceasefire. Much of the international arms traffic is in the hands of private arms dealers who would certainly find ways of circumventing any inter-Governmental embargo. In particular, the Ibos get their arms through irregular channels which would be impossible to

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control. There would, therefore, have to be agreement between the two sides to the conflict if such a step were to be taken.
It goes without saying that commercial returns from arms sales have not been a factor in our policy in this matter. However, in considering the consequences of a change in our arms policy, we have had to bear in mind the livelihood and safety of many thousands of British nationals working in Federal Nigeria.
Having said that, and having described the consequences that would follow from a unilateral suspension, we are bound to be watching the situation most anxiously, a matter to which the right hon. Member for Barnet referred. Our information on the military side I have given to the House. It is that the only fighting of a substantial character taking place is on the Aba front in the South and that a general offensive has not, in fact, begun.
The conditions attached to our continued supply of arms, as laid down by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary on 12th June, to which the right hon. Gentleman referred, still stand and the Federal Government are well aware of them. The right hon. Gentleman recited them and I will not weary the House by reciting them a second time. Suffice to say that these conditions stand. The conditions envisaged in my right hon. Friend's speech have not yet arisen.
General Gowon has repeatedly said that his quarrel is not with the Ibo people but with the rebel leaders. The Federal Air Force has recently dropped leaflets over Iboland enjoining refugees to return to their homes in Federal-held areas and assuring them that they would not be ill treated. There has been some response to that effort.
Lord Hunt's recent mission to Nigeria found that an attitude of vindictiveness towards the Ibos among the people they met was noticeably absent. I hope that the eye witness accounts of a man of the character of Lord Hunt will be borne in mind when we are distressed by the occasional flamboyant quotations which are made by the sort of people to whom the right hon. Gentleman referred. One must consider this matter as a whole. Lord Hunt and his colleagues found that Federal troops were in many cases helping to feed Ibo refugees.
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It should be remembered that there are at least 100,000 Ibos living peacefully in Lagos and elsewhere in the Federation at the moment and that Ibos continue to hold responsible and senior jobs in the rest of the Federation. These factors clearly show that genocide is by no means the Federal intention, though I am afraid that I gloomily have the feeling that suicide for their people sometimes seems to be the intention of the Ibo leaders. There are no signs that the Federal Government are throwing away with contempt the prospects of reasonable negotiated settlements and there are no signs which should lead one to believe that they are not doing all they can at the Addis Ababa conference to reach a properly negotiated settlement, both on the relief and political issues.
I come to the problem of the relief of the suffering in the territories now in Federal hands, since I began by referring to the problem of getting relief into Ibo-held territory.
Many people feel, understandably, that however intractable the problem of a peace settlement, however stubborn the Biafrans, here at least is a human problem on which immediate action should be possible. The victims are, after all, in a part of Nigeria under Federal control. The right hon. Gentleman properly drew attention to the reports of difficulty about getting relief through. This was the problem that Lord Hunt and his team reported upon so thoroughly and so vividly, and, as I thought it would be helpful to make their report available, a White Paper was published as Command 3727.
Lord Hunt since then has been vigorously following up his own recommendations. He and members of his team have made two visits to Geneva to report their findings to the International Red Cross and to co-ordinate action with the Red Cross. There has been, understandably, a great deal of impatience here over Press reports about hold-ups in the flow of relief and there have been misunderstandings, it is true to say, between the International Red Cross and the Federal authorities. But these have now been cleared up.
The International Red Cross has been subjected to a good deal of uninformed criticism because it has been unable to perform miracles in the middle of a civil

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war situation. In my last speech, I referred to the appointment by the International Red Cross of Dr. Lindt, a distinguished Swiss diplomat and former United Nations Commissioner for Refugees. He has spent over three weeks examining the problems on the ground and is now taking the necessary steps that are necessary to bring the relief operations into full swing. With the cooperation of the Swiss Government, he has appointed a Swiss Air Force officer as his chief of staff and planner and a senior Swiss police officer to head the I.R.C. office in Lagos for the control of operations throughout Nigeria.
The International Red Cross is announcing in Nigeria almost exactly at this time the details of its relief campaign. It is now thoroughly under way in Federal territory and I am sure that the House will be interested to know some of the details. The International Red Cross now has 14 relief teams working in Federal-held areas and hopes to have 18 or more by late September. It already has 50 vehicles at its disposal for the transport of relief supplies and 25 more provided by the British Government will bring this total up to 75 within the next two or three weeks. In addition, the Red Cross is hiring trucks locally for the distribution of locally purchased supplies.
Some 2,000 tons of rice and other local produce have been bought in the northern areas and transported by road to Enugu and Lagos. From Lagos they will be shipped to Calabar. Seven hundred tons of supplies of all kinds were shipped to Calabar earlier this month and a further 1,000 tons are to be shipped very shortly. A further 10,000 tons of food supplies such as maize and corn meal are expected to reach Lagos from abroad within the next week.
The International Red Cross now has two coastal vessels of 500 tons each on charter for the transport of supplies from Lagos to Calabar. It also has its own aircraft for supplies from Lagos to Enugu and Calabar. Two DC 4s have been operating an airlift of 36 tons a day and 2 more DC 4s are being added next month.
There have been reports of relief air traffic being suspended for military reasons during the last day or two. I am
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afraid that these reports are true. The Biafrans have once again acquired a certain aerial bombing capacity. They were, as the House will remember, the first to introduce aerial bombing into this civil war and that has been a factor in the hold-up in the last day or two. Finally, 500 tons of supplies a month are now being sent by rail and road to Enugu.
I think that this recital is sufficient to show that a real momentum is now gathering in relief to Federal-held territories and I shall not go into detailed information about our own part in these operations. However, two medical teams have left London for Nigeria. As was the case with the earlier teams, these have been organised by the Save the Children Fund, which will be contributing something to their cost, although the major part will be borne by the Government.
At this point I should mention the tragic loss which the Save the Children Fund suffered when two young members of the original medical team which went out earlier at the expense of the Fund were killed. Their Land Rover touched off a mine in the road and the vehicle was blown up. The House will want me to express its sympathy to the relatives of these two brave and idealistic young men and to the Fund.
Twenty-five vehicles which have been purchased on behalf of Oxfam should be reaching Lagos in the next few days and they will be put to good use as soon as they arrive. I want to mention with gratitude the tremendous efforts which have been made by the various voluntary agencies in assisting to meet the distress in all parts of Nigeria. They have collected large sums of money and have dispatched considerable tonnages of medical supplies and essential foodstuffs, and in some cases have provided manpower as well.
I know that, whatever anxieties the House has about the course of this conflict in Nigeria, and whatever differences there may be about what the British Government policy should be, there will be universal agreement about the need for us to make a maximum contribution to the international relief effort in Nigeria, and this we are seeking to do. I am sure that the whole House will share my hope that, at Addis Ababa, the parties will be able to give flesh and blood

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literally to the agreement in principle that has been reached about the air and land corridors into Biafra. Equally, we must also profoundly hope that, even at this late stage, there may still be at Addis Ababa, arising out of an agreement on relief, an agreement on a cease-fire and on a political settlement which will allow the Nigerian people to find a way of living together in unity without the shedding of any more of their blood.
Mr. Sandys: There has been talk in the past about the possibility of the creation of some kind of international force which might provide security to the population after hostilities end. Is that idea still being considered?
Mr. Thomson: Yes. It is still under active consideration. Indeed, Her Majesty's Government took a lead in making it an active idea. We said that we were ready to play our part in a Commonwealth force if that was desired. The Organisation of African Unity is also looking at this matter because it is an essential element in giving a sense of security to the Ibos. Associated with it is another point that we have also been discussing with the Federal Government. This is the need to get International Red Cross observers into the fighting line itself to ensure that, in any fighting which may still take place, the relief operation goes in closely and that there is an international team there to deal with any allegations of atrocities.
Mr. Speaker: I remind the House that I was able to call 29 right hon. and hon. Members in yesterday's debate because the speeches were reasonably brief. I hope that the House will co-operate similarly today.
11.58 a.m.
Mr. Hugh Fraser: I am sure that many of the fears felt by hon. Members on all sides of the House have in no way been swept aside by the right hon. Gentleman's speech. It is only fair to recall what General Gowon said on a television programme yesterday—that the war was about to enter a phase which would be completed within four weeks. Whatever the Commonwealth Secretary said, therefore, it seems clear from the words of the Commander-in-Chief and Leader of Nigeria that that phase has begun.
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I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will check with Addis Ababa information which reached me this morning that although there have been talks about the provision of supplies to the people in Biafra as well as to those in the Federation, those arrangements are to last for only fourteen days. That is the latest story from Addis Ababa, confirmed to me by telephone this morning. For the Commonwealth Secretary to speak as though this were a still developing situation is wrong. This is a situation which is approaching crisis point. Unless he can reassure hon. Members on all sides of the House more than he has reassured them so far, I hope that the House will make a protest against the further provision of arms to the Federal Government in Nigeria.
The Commonwealth Secretary rightly said that years have passed since we ceased to be a colonial Power in these parts of Africa. Yet on both Front Benches there seems to be a tendency to talk as though we had some special influence and some special relationship with the emerging people of Africa. In my opinion, that is entirely false. It is an attitude which should be totally disregarded by all sides of the House. Our attitude should be that of friends. It should be an attitude both of realism and of idealism in these matters. I still detect the prevalent influence of an ex-Commonwealth Office compelling Government spokesmen to adopt attitudes which would have been more correct 30 or 40 years ago than they are today. There are indeed much wider issues involved.
I will not speak for too long, but I wish to comment on the so-called influence, which it is said that we maintain by continuing our supply of arms, first on the conduct of the war and, secondly, on the conduct of the relief operations. The line adopted by some Ministers has been that because we continued to supply arms there would be no all-out assault which could lead to the genocide of the Ibo people in Biafra. Yet only last night it was announced that Colonel Gowon is to launch his major offensive. We have also had a statement from the Commander of the Third Division that he will shoot everything that moves. No doubt according to the Commonwealth Office that is a totally irresponsible

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statement. They would claim that it has no validity. But in fact he is the local commander of the troops. I have seen African troops, and I know that they pay attention to the local commander rather than to people sitting back in Lagos.
Secondly, it is claimed that we have had some influence on the relief supplies. I feel profoundly sorry for that noble and distinguished man, Lord Hunt. In fact, his impact and the impact of the British Government on supplies sent to the people of Biafra has been nil. Fewer supplies are being sent to Biafra today by British sources than were being sent a month or two ago. Lord Hunt's mission has been something of a farce. It has had no influence. All that it has done, if anything, is to clog up the Red Cross machinery and to stop flights which were going into Biafra. We have heard from Lord Shepherd and others about air supplies being an impossibility. We know that that is not the case. Ministers and others who have not been reading the European Press closely—because the ghastly Czech situation has driven Biafra off the front pages—may not appreciate the enormous pressure and feeling throughout Europe about the situation in Nigeria. The feeling throughout Europe is so violent because of this continuing situation that there is a move to exercise Article XXIII of the Geneva Convention by which supplies should be provided to a people in a state of civil war.
Lord Hunt's mission has had no effect at all on the supplies for starving people in Biafra, and the claims for British influence in this matter with the Lagos Government cannot be substantiated. We have seen what happened when the Dutch, who were also suppliers of arms and who had large influence and large investments in Nigeria, ceased to supply arms. Were any actions taken against them? There was none. That applies to the Czechs, the Dutch and the Belgians. The only people supplying arms in this civil war today are ourselves and the Soviet Union. I ask the right hon. Gentleman to tell us in his reply how much of the recent interest-free loan to Nigeria is for the purchase of arms from the Soviet Union.
I believe that the conditions previously laid down by the Foreign Secretary are
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about to arise and that there is grave danger of the destruction of the Ibo people. The Ibo people have shown their right to self-determination more clearly, perhaps, than any other people in the world. In spite of deprivation, war and starvation, for 12 months these people have shown that they believe, rightly or wrongly, that they are faced with the destruction of their race, and they are prepared to defend themselves against that.
If there should be a further advance and a defeat of the military forces remaining there, I believe that the civil war would be continued by guerilla action of the most terrifying sort. In a moving phrase yesterday the Prime Minister spoke of tanks not being able to create. I do not know whether any hon. Member present has seen armoured cars in action against a civilian population. I have. I saw that during the resistance in the last war. If this invasion takes place and if resistance continues, there is the gravest possible danger of genocide. That is why I believe that the House should unite today in opposing the Government's proposals, which are born in an atmosphere of hoping that something will turn up or hoping—as certain hon. Members who have visited Nigeria hoped—that there will be a quick kill. That was the language of Attila or Heydrich. I therefore hope that the House, conscious that it is representing the idealism of the people in Britain and representing what people essentially believe to be the right way of government, will insist today that arms supplies should cease.
12.8 p.m.
Mr. James Griffiths: I am sure that hon. Members on all sides of the House are grateful to my right hon. Friend for giving us an opportunity to discuss the tragic Nigerian situation. The House rises at four o'clock today and unless it is again recalled—and we all hope that there will not be another occasion to recall it—we shall not meet again until 14th October, by which time it may be too late for us to exercise our influence upon the Nigerian situation. I must therefore ask what is likely to happen and what we ought to do, as far as we have any influence over events, in the next few weeks.

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First, may I join in congratulating my right hon. Friend—congratulations which the whole House will wish to extend—on the arrangements which have been made about relief. Both sides in the civil war have been stupid and callous about relief, and I am glad that the way now seems to be open to use every means possible—air as well as land—to bring relief to people who are suffering in Nigeria. We must bear in mind that they are suffering on both sides of the civil war, for it is certain that there are people within the territories occupied by the Federal troops who are suffering from hunger and even starvation.
I want to respond to your appeal, Mr. Speaker, and not to speak for too long. I come now to what I think are the likely events. First, will Ojukwu and the Biafrans surrender? We would be making a great mistake to base policy on that assumption. Whether they are right or not, they believe that they are fighting for survival and that the alternative is to fight to the death or surrender and be killed. Their view is that if they surrender, it will be the end of them.
It would be a great mistake to base any policy on the assumption that Ojukwu and the Biafrans will surrender. We should take note that if this last campaign for a final solution succeeds, the Biafrans will engage in guerilla warfare for which, I understand, some of their best soldiers are being trained now. I should hope that we have all learned that success against guerrillas is not easily won anywhere in the world, especially in Asia or Africa.
The hope has also been expressed that in this tragic situation, perhaps the best thing would be for the Federal Government to launch a final campaign, such as I am told has already been launched, to get a quick victory. We would be misleading our people if we led them to believe that by military operations of this kind there will be a quick end to this war.
When we look at maps in the newspapers and elsewhere and consider the division of Nigeria between the Federal and the Biafran Administrations, we are apt to think that Biafra is a tiny corner of the country which could be quickly overrun. That is not so. The area known as Biafra is the size of Holland
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and has a population of between 8 million and 10 million. This campaign would seek to overrun that territory and to impose a military settlement.
I have sought, as we all have, to find out what is happening, what the war means and what will be the consequences. In the last few days, I have had talks with friends who know the area well. At the moment, Federal troops are approaching Aba. The Under-Secretary will correct me if I am wrong, but I understand that since June Federal troops have advanced nearly 40 miles towards Aba and are about to reach it. What happens when a campaign of this kind is waged? On the way, the army goes through many villages and as it comes to those villages the people flee from it. The Federal armies have guns which can fire shells with a range of six miles. Villages six miles away are shelled and the people flee from them.
I cannot find out how many villages have been left by villagers on the way to Aba. The normal population of Aba is, I understand, about 80,000, but it is certain that the population is now much greater. It has been increased by thousands—maybe tens of thousands, some say hundreds of thousands—of villagers fleeing to take refuge there. Aba is being evacuated and the 80,000, 100,000 or 200,000, whatever it may be, are moving away.
As the Federal troops advance and the Biafran army retreats, people in the villages are caught in the cross-fire from both sides. If they stay in the villages, they risk being killed or wounded in the cross-fire, so they take to the road in an effort to escape. If they escape, they will do so in ever smaller units. That is the picture that has been given to me and I have no doubt that it is true. If it is true, this war is a crime against humanity. The Federal Government have the equipment and the guns, shells and mortars to overrun and to conquer Biafra and impose a settlement, but when they have done so what then?
I hope that there will be a united Nigeria, but this is not the way to unite the country. I have not had the privilege of visiting the country, but I have met people from both sides. I have met missionaries and administrators from Nigeria. They all agree that, if this war is to continue to the bitter, tragic end,

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the victory which the Federal Government will gain will turn to ashes in their hands. That will be the end of any hope for a united Nigeria for a generation or more.
I put this to my right hon. Friend. People in our country should realise that, if the war goes on—and that is taken as the only course—it will reflect the greatest discredit and dishonour on everyone in Nigeria and, since we are involved, on us also. Our influence must be used with the Federal Government to stop this final assault. I hope that we shall throw our whole weight behind the efforts made by the Organisation of African Unity and by Emperor Haile Selassie to stop this war and to bring the two sides together.
Our hopes are now centered on Addis Ababa. There the negotiations proceed with starts and stops. I have sought to find what could help to make a fresh start, with fresh hope, to the negotiations. I want to convey a suggestion which has been made to me. It is that my right hon. Friend should try to persuade General Gowon to go to Addis Ababa himself to meet Colonel Ojukwu. I am told that it is essential to get new personnel there from Nigeria if there is to be any chance of achieving the peaceful settlement which I am sure we all want to see.
I do not know General Gowon. I have never had the privilege of meeting him, but some of my hon. Friends have said that he is not only a very competent and able general but a man of distinction and character. I would make this appeal to him if my voice could reach him: "Go yourself and talk to Ojukwu to see if you can stop this final onslaught which can bring you no credit and no solution. See if you can bring about a settlement."
Mr. John P. Mackintosh: Appeal to Ojukwu, too.
Mr. Griffiths: Ojukwu has been to Addis Ababa, and I appeal to him to go again. I am led to believe that a meeting between the two of them may be the only chance of making the negotiations at Addis Ababa come to life and succeed. That is why I make this appeal.
I have not signed any Motions, I have not written to the Press or been
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on television, but I have written to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs and my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister. If there is now no chance of negotiations and peace, if all that is to take place is the final assault, I implore my right hon. Friends to stop supplying arms now. I believe that I am speaking for very many people in my own party, and I have sought to serve my party and our country all my life. Even if stopping the supply of arms is only a gesture, I want us to have no part in the final assault in Nigeria, if that is what is to take place, and I hope that my right hon. Friends will also take that view.
12.21 p.m.
Mr. Nigel Fisher: I am most grateful for the opportunity of following the right hon. Member for Llanelly (Mr. James Griffiths) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Stafford and Stone (Mr. Hugh Fraser) because I think that it is about time that the Federal side of the case was put in the debate.
With the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull, West (Mr. James Johnson) I visited Nigeria for a fortnight earlier this month at the invitation of the Federal Government. I believe that we were the first Members to see the civil war at first hand intensively and with virtually total coverage of the whole of Nigeria and all its leading personalities. I have been only to the Federal side, and to that extent the House will wish to discount my conclusions, but, although they may not be fashionable, they are at least up to date. We had long interviews with General Gowon, his chief of staff, Brigadier Hassan, the Foreign Minister, Mr. Arikpa, and most of the other Ministers in charge of Departments, and senior civil servants at both Federal and State level. We visited nine of the 12 States, and saw the miltary governors of each of them and many military commanders in the field, including Colonel Adekunle; and we questioned prisoners of war and refugees in the south-east battle area; and saw the leading representatives of the International Red Cross.
We also talked to three German journalists who were interesting because they had just come from Biafra. They confirmed my impression that the Ibos

1461
are to a large extent now the victims of their own propaganda. They are fighting on because they believe that they will be massacred by the Federal troops if they give in. I do not believe that this will happen, but if the people concerned believe that it will, it is not surprising that they are very reluctant to surrender.
The civil war as seen from Lagos or anywhere else in Nigeria is very different from the civil war as seen from London through the columns of the British Press.
Mr. Hugh Delargy: How long was the hon. Gentleman there?
Mr. Fisher: I was there for a fortnight.
The Biafran propaganda has been very effective and very well directed. The emotions of English people are easily stirred by starving children and ill-treated dogs. The pictures of African children, which owing to malnutrition could have been taken almost anywhere at any time in Africa or the Caribbean, touch our hearts, and when a picture appears in the popular Press with a caption saying that this is what great big Nigeria is doing to poor little Biafra, an emotional case is made in a simple form to which anybody naturally responds.
The Federal case, which is political and economic, and much more difficult to make, has to some extent gone by default. That is probably partly the fault of the Federal leaders. They thought that they had a good case and did not need to make it, but one must always make one's case. I should say in fairness to the British Press that I was told by journalists in Lagos that there are no weekly Press conferences; General Gowon seldom, if ever, sees the foreign Press; and the journalists are often only given official hand-outs and must work on them. If that is so, there cannot be anything very interesting coming on to the editors' desks in London from Lagos, and that may explain to a certain extent why the Federal case has not been very effectively put in foreign newspapers.
But the fact remains that Nigerians at every level—the leaders as well as the ordinary people—are deeply hurt by the attitude of the British Press. British opinion is touchingly important to them. They think of themselves as Britain's
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best friends in the Afro-Asian Commonwealth, and that may well be true. Many thousands of their students have been to British universities, all their senior army officers are Sandhurst trained, and as a nation they are immensely pro-British.
In official circles the policy of Her Majesty's Government is greatly appreciated, and although I know that it is unpopular to say this in the House at present, it would be disastrous to future Anglo-Nigerian relations if we stopped selling arms at the present relatively small level, nor would it shorten the war by a single day; rather the reverse.
The Roman Catholic Church has lost a great deal of good will and influence in Nigeria because of the pro-Biafran attitude of the Pope, and there has been tremendous public resentment against France. Nigerians do not understand why General de Gaulle has backed the wrong horse at the wrong time when the war is virtually over. I do not understand it either. French investment in Nigeria as a whole must be much greater than in Biafra. I believe that the repercussions on French commerce in the future may be considerable.
Nor is this a religious war. People talk about the Muslim north versus the Christian south, but that is an absolute travesty of the facts. Of the Federal Army of 60,000 or 70,000 men, I am told that only about 1,000 are Muslim Hausas from the north. The large majority are Christians from the Benue Plateau and the West and, as the Secretary of State pointed out, there are many more Christians in Federal Nigeria than in Biafra.
Dr. Hugh Gray: How does the hon. Gentleman think that tribes differ from nations? Does he consider that the frontiers of African states should be immutable?
Mr. Fisher: I do not want to enter into such philosophical discussions. I conceive my speech as a report to the House on the conclusions I formed in Nigeria, and I do not want to be side-tracked. Perhaps I could talk to the hon. Gentleman on that theme later.
I should now like to say something about the supplies of food. I do not believe that it is always clearly understood even in this House that large areas of that vast country are cultivated and food-producing, including many beef

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cattle, especially in the Benue Plateau State, so that sending food to Nigeria is a little like sending coal to Newcastle. I saw 2,000 market stalls in Jos and elsewhere groaning with food, including meat, which cannot be sold because the traditional markets in Ibo territory to the south are now cut off. The result is that food prices in the north have never been so low, and it would be cheaper and more helpful to the economy of Nigeria to send money to buy cheap Nigerian food than to send in food from abroad.
In any case, there is enough food already stockpiled in Lagos for all immediate requirements, but there are not enough lorries to transport it. Air transport is not very practical, although it is helpful, because the quantities it can carry are too small. Sea and land routes to the battle areas are essential, and food to the Aba/Ikotekpene sector is best sent by sea to Calabar. But there is only an 18 ft. draught at Calabar, and hitherto there has been a shortage of suitable vessels to send food there. This situation was improving when I left, and I was assured by the International Red Cross that 1,850 tons of food would be shipped to Calabar for the south-eastern sector during the second half of this month. But when it gets there, there are still far too few lorries to transport it to the battle areas. The Red Cross had only two large lorries in the whole of the south-eastern sector when I was there. There was also a severe shortage of drugs and trained relief workers—only six nurses and one doctor for the whole sector. I was glad to hear the Secretary of State say this morning that this situation is improving.
We inspected a refugee camp at Ikotekpene. It was one of the most dreadful things that I have ever seen. There were 800 children and 600 adults there, literally starving. I am afraid that most of them, certainly most of the children, must have been dead a few days after we left. They were subsisting on small plates of raw rice and garri once a day, without facilities for cooking except little wood fires made by those strong enough to do so.
Mr. James Griffiths: The hon. Gentleman has mentioned a camp that he saw within the Federal territory. He also said that he saw markets crowded with food
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in the Federal territory. Why has not the food been taken to the starving people?
Mr. Fisher: I explained that by saying that there was a lack of transport by sea to Calabar and by lorries up from Calabar. That is the explanation; one can call it lack of organisation by the Red Cross or by the Nigerian authorities, but I do not want to attribute blame. Only a few miles south of the battle area the villagers appeared to be reasonably well fed. Transport is the main need; and an end to the war.
I must be brutally frank and say that in my view there is very little possibility of a political settlement; but a military settlement could come quite quickly if the Federal army has now, as has been mentioned, resumed a full military offensive. I genuinely believe that in the end this would be the most humane solution. This may sound odd, and I will explain it because my right hon. Friend the Member for Stafford and Stone (Mr. Hugh Fraser) made a rather cutting remark about a "quick kill" and I think he was referring to something that I had said. What I meant by "a quick kill" was a resumption of the military offensive and a quick finish to the war. The example that I gave—it may have been abbreviated in the Press reports—was that it might involve killing in battle another 1,000 Ibo soldiers but I believe it would mean saving the lives of tens of thousands of Ibo civilians who would otherwise die from starvation.
Mr. Hugh Fraser: The point of the "quick kill" is that if it leads to guerrilla action it will lead to reprisals of the most savage sort. I have seen this sort of thing carried out by the Germans against the civilian population. It is the only way that military power can operate. Its forces must shoot civilians in order to destroy the guerrillas.
Mr. Fisher: I am coming to that point. I acknowledge that a quick solution depends upon the assumption that there would be no massacre of Ibo civilians by Federal troops. I believe that my right hon. Friend's talk of genocide is nonsense. There are 30,000 Ibos living peacefully and prosperously in Lagos alone and nearly half a million in the mid-West. In many States that we visited, including the North, we found abandoned property

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committees and reconstruction and rehabilitation committees which are everywhere administering Ibo houses and shops abandoned by their owners when the war started. Detailed records have been kept of the properties in large ledgers, including the names of the Ibo owners, photographs of the properties, their values, damage done to the properties, repairs undertaken, and rents paid if the properties are let. The rents are put in frozen accounts for return with the properties themselves to the Ibo owners after the war. The documentation is very detailed and complete throughout every State. It is not kept to impress chance itinerant politicians like me. It is part of a genuine Federal policy to welcome back the Ibos to Nigeria when the war is over. The Ibos will also get back their Federal Civil Service jobs when they return.
Mr. James Davidson: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. Fisher: I have given way a lot.
I believe that the Ibos will get back their State Civil Service jobs as well everywhere except perhaps in the North. In one place we were given a list of 166 Ibo civil servants who had resumed their former employment. It would be strange indeed to find all this evidence of good will towards the Ibos if the Federal policy was really genocide.
It may be argued that Federal policy in Lagos is one thing but that the conduct of Colonel Adekunle's troops in the field may be quite another. All I can say is that I have not seen better disciplined, better saluting and better drilled troops anywhere outside the Brigade of Guards. I commented on this to Colonel Adekunle, who replied that it was not surprising as they had been trained by a warrant officer in the Scots Guards. His dearest wish is to attend an Imperial Defence College course after the war. He told me, with scorn, that the only senior Nigerian officer who had not managed to get into Sandhurst was Colonel Ojukwu, who had only managed to achieve a fourth-class pass degree at Oxford.
The other important reassurance to the Ibos is General Gowon's statement, already publicly announced, that he would agree to the presence of an international force in Nigeria for six months or a year to ensure fair play and no
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victimisation of the Ibos. He told me that, in his view, this could best be composed of units from India, Ethiopia and Canada. I am convinced that his objective is a united Nigeria and that he genuinely believes that the Ibos have a most important part to play in this. The trouble is that the Ibos do not know this. Just as Ojukwu's external propaganda has been effective, so has his internal propaganda. Ibos feel that if they surrender or desert they will be shot. So they think they have nothing to lose.
The Ibo army is well fed. The Ibo civilian population outside the battle areas, we were told, have barely enough. But it is the refugees on both sides of the front line who are starving.
Mr. Delargy: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. Fisher: I have already given way a lot.
Mr. Delargy: It is a short point. The hon. Gentleman says that the fears that the Ibos have of being massacred are groundless. Will he explain why 30,000 were massacred just before the war began?
Mr. Fisher: I will not go into all that. It would make too long a speech. I have reported in detail on that point to the Secretary of State. There is a perfectly good case, but it would take a long time to make it. The figure has in any case been wildly exaggerated. It is about 5,000, not 30,000. I have checked this with many independent people there, including British people.
Mr. Delargy: The information came from a member of a British mission in Biafra who has been there for the last 32 years.
Mr. Fisher: In Biafra they might have said that, but not in Federal Nigeria. I have not time to go into this. It is irrelevant to my main theme.
One of the ironies of Colonel Ojukwu's policy of secession is that the Ibos were all for a united Nigeria as long as they were running it. General Ironsi, the former Ibo leader, favoured a unitary State, which the present Federal Government have never suggested. But whether the Ibo army fights on or gives in, in my view the war cannot go on much longer.

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There are only two more towns and two more airfields to take, and I believe that as soon as those are captured organised resistance will collapse. Guerrilla warfare might continue for a little time, but I do not think that it will go on for long because there will be no way of getting arms in or distributing arms to the troops once the airfields and main towns are taken. That was also the opinion of the East German journalist whom I have mentioned, who had just left Biafra.
The post-war prospects are important. The new 12-State structure is already operating quite well and has, I believe, come to stay. It will be more expensive to administer than the regional system that we left; but it is politically essential and is, surprisingly, universally accepted in Nigeria, even in the North. It is a Nigerian as opposed to a British creation. They have devised it and they are, therefore, involved in its success. Economically, it is vital for Nigeria and, indeed, for Britain, to get the oil flowing again. I was assured by General Gowon that this should be possible in a very short time, probably within the next month.
Politically, the Federation must have strong powers at the centre and this appeared to be universally accepted. I was encouraged to find that General Gowon and the military State Governors are also keen to get back to Parliamentary rule, which they had planned for March, 1969, but owing to the civil war this will, no doubt, now have to be postponed a little longer.
As hon. Members will have gathered, despite the tragedy of the war, I am extremely optimistic about the future of Nigeria. I believe that this great Commonwealth country will quite soon, and once again, be peaceful and prosperous and a leader of African opinion, as it always has been in the past.
12.42 p.m.
Mr. Frank Allaun: The hon. Member for Surbiton (Mr. Fisher) has asked the Biafrans to surrender. The Biafrans have shown by their suffering, their resistance and their fighting that they will not surrender. Therefore, if the hon. Member wants to avoid bloodshed and suffering, as I believe he does,
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he should not try to stop the victims from resisting. He should try to stop the invaders from invading.
Yesterday, this House rightly discussed the attack on liberty. To-day, we are discussing the attack not only on liberty, but also on life itself. We are told that 22 Czechoslovaks have been killed in their country, but what we are discussing now is the probable death of multitudes, and, moreover, in a sphere for which the British Government have great responsibility.
The relief authorities estimate—it is only an estimate—that 6,000 people are dying each day in Biafra. Yesterday, the International Red Cross estimated that half a million have already died through starvation in the last few months. That is a very high proportion of the population of Biafra. Last night, Dr. Azikwe estimated that in the fighting alone 80,000 Biafrans and 70,000 Nigerians had been killed. British missionaries fear that 3 million might die in the next few months.
It is possible that in the next few days the world may witness the greatest human tragedy since 1945: the slaughter and starvation of millions of men, women and children. We may see an attempt at what Hitler called the final solution of the Jewish question, and this may be the attempted final solution of the Biafran question.
Even if every human being is not shot, as many Biafrans fear, I believe that they are right in thinking that every person capable of giving leadership locally will be killed. In one town in the last few days, every secondary school teacher was killed by invading forces. In two villages near Akwuete, 15 miles south of Aba, 2,500 inhabitants were shot dead, according to the Biafran radio. [Interruption.] That is no more unreliable than the hon. Gentleman's evidence.
I want to quote what the Federal Military Commander himself said. Colonel Adekunle said:
"Shoot everything at sight whether it moves or not."
That is not from Biafran sources.
Millions of British people, shocked by television documentaries and reports and photographs in the British Press, share the impatience of Lord Brockway and

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others with the statesmen of the world that they are doing so little to prevent this tragedy. I am convinced that our Government, the Government most intimately connected with Nigeria, are making a ghastly mistake. Surely the Commonwealth Office and the Cabinet must now realise that they have failed and that by providing arms to the Federal Government they are helping the war and worsening the terrible situation.
I should like to remind the House of what my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary said on 12th June:
"If we make the supposition that it were the intention of the Federal Government not merely to preserve the unity of Nigeria but to proceed without mercy either with the slaughter or the starvation of the Ibo people … then the arguments which justified the policy we have … pursued would fall, and we would have to reconsider, and more than reconsider, the action we have so far taken."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 12th June, 1968; Vol. 766, c. 293.]
The time for reconsideration is overdue. Far from exercising a restraining hand on Nigeria's conduct of operations, British arms and British support have worsened it. As The Guardian said this morning,
"Even at this late stage it would be better to abandon a policy that has been proved morally disgraceful as well as politically bankrupt."
This morning, my right hon. Friend the Commonwealth Secretary said that we do not wish to see the invasion. What does he think he is seeing? How much more can there be invasion than is occurring now? The fact is that the "big push" has begun. Again, this is not Biafran opinion. It was stated by General Gowon on television last night. General Gowon said that he expects that the Federal troops will win in four weeks. They will not. My contacts with Biafrans lead me to believe that they are prepared to die to the last man and woman before this happens. People may say that they are wrong, but that is what will happen. It would take months, but it need not take place at all.
The Commonwealth Secretary said this morning, and it was very much the same as was said by the hon. Member for Surbiton but not in such crude terms, that the attitude of those of us who have spoken this morning—and I must say how much I admired the powerful speech by my right hon. Friend the Member for Llanelly (Mr. James Griffiths) and by
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the right hon. Member for Stafford and Stone (Mr. Hugh Fraser), with whom I seldom agree but with whom I agreed absolutely in what he said this morning—was discouraging the Biafrans from giving in. It is asking them to accept slaughter. It is, again, the argument of the quick victory. These Biafrans are remarkable people, the men and the women, and I am convinced that they will not give in. I do not accept very readily, in view of the statement I have just read by the Federal Government's leading military man, that the Biafrans would be safe from decimation if this takes place.
I find intolerable the complicity of the British Commonwealth Office with the Federal Government it is backing. Commonwealth Ministry officials are misleading the British people. Whether this is deliberate or not, I will not say; they may be misleading themselves. While these officials in Lagos and Whitehall have a lot to answer for, the Commonwealth Secretary, the Foreign Secretary and the whole Cabinet are ultimately responsible for what is happening—and I am very glad to see the Commonwealth Secretary—
Mr. George Thomson: My hon. Friend ought to put the responsibility where it belongs. It is on my shoulders. He should not attack my advisers, who have no opportunity to answer back and whose advice I accept or reject.
Mr. Allaun: I accept that, and my right hon. Friend is quite right: it is a Cabinet responsibility; and I will quote one or two things which the Commonwealth Office has said. Let me give some evidence.
Sunday'sObserver reported that Chief Enahoro and the Commonwealth Office doubted the reports of widespread starvation in Biafra. My goodness, we have seen these things on television, we have seen the reports of scores of British reporters and foreign reporters, and these reporters are not making these things up. I think that that was an astounding and disgraceful statement for the Commonwealth Office to make.
In the last few weeks the Commonwealth Office denied that invasion was taking place. I heard—agreed, from Biafran sources, but it can be proved from the man of Biafra itself snowing

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the change of control—that invasion has been going on for three weeks. It may be that the bigger push is coming now. Nevertheless, it has been taking place, and at this very moment the British Government announce a loan of £10 million to the Federal Government free of interest. I regard this as an affront not only to the Biafrans but to every Member of this House who takes a different point of view from the Government.
This comes from the argument about influencing the Federal Government. This is the third debate we have had on this subject since 12th June, and on each occasion we have been given the stock answer about influencing the Federal Government. It does not seem to have been very successful. It has failed, and, far from discouraging Gowon's invasion, our supply of arms and our political support are encouraging Gowon to invade in the way he has done.
This is one point I ask the Commonwealth Secretary to believe, that so long as we are supplying arms to one side we are in no position to act as mediators, and that is the position which we should be occupying, the position of mediators, but this puts us out of court.
Last night, although there were not so many here late on, 51 hon. Members on this side of the House signed a Motion from the left, right and centre of our party. It is very short, and I ask the House to listen to it. It says:
"That this House asks Her Majesty's Government to stop all arms supplies for Nigeria immediately and to approach the Governments of those countries still permitting the supply of arms to either side for a joint ban."
I must say that the only way some of us have of expressing, other than in words, our opposition to what we believe is a tragically mistaken policy is by voting against the Adjournment, and unless, as we hope there is, of course, some last-minute change, of which there was not a sign in the Commonwealth Secretary's speech this morning—I regret to say that it was merely an attempt to justify a disastrous policy, and the whole bias of his speech was to support the Federal Government and, indeed, Federal action—I feel that the only way of expressing opposition will be by voting against the Adjournment of the House.
Trading interests are involved here, £300 million of British investments, and
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it may be that the Government believe that big orders for British industry will be forthcoming when all this is over. I say it is not intelligent to believe one can do business in a cemetery, and that is largely what is going to result if this war continues.
Just a word on relief. We welcome the Addis Ababa agreement, but there have been agreements before, and they have not resulted in supply of food. The Biafrans have offered an airstrip, and inspection by the Red Cross, for food supplies by air, and I see no valid objection to sending supplies of food. Caritas can get things there. I am not a Catholic, but I say, all credit to Caritas. The World Council of Churches can get things there, and in the last four days the International Red Cross has been able to get things there too. All the British Government have been able to do is to get one Hercules plane in the air. It is not good enough.
Mr. James Johnson: I hope my hon. Friend will be—may I say?—a little more fair and will turn his mind to the possibility of a land corridor which could take ten times as much of supplies, and appeal to the Biafran Government to allow a land corridor. I have been on the spot, and I can assure my hon. Friend that a land corridor could be provided quite easily.
Mr. Allaun: That was proposed at Addis Ababa, and that is what I should like to see, both a land corridor and an air corridor, but I can see no objection to the much quicker means, which is an airstrip, particularly when we have seen food supplies already in Lagos and distributed to hungry people within the Federal Government's area itself.
I make a person point now, and I may not in this necessarily represent the 51 hon. Members who signed the Motion. I believe the Government must have a reappraisal of their attitude towards Nigeria. The idea of federation maybe, was a good one, but I am convinced that bitterness is now so great in Biafra that, whilst union may be possible, it is not reasonable to expect the Biafrans to submit to people who have in many cases massacred them; it is not right, in particular, to expect them to accept security forces of people who come from the North.

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I must quote a letter which was written on Saturday by 21 members of Her Majesty's Overseas Civil Service, either present members or retired members, and 21 very eminent ones. They say, to back up the point which I have just made:
"In any case the war cannot and will not restore 'Nigerian unity'. We regret the failure of a splendid idea for which most of us have actually worked, but we recognise that General Gowon spoke the truth when, after assuming power in Lagos at the end of July, 1966, he announced that the 'basis for unity no longer exists'. The hope of preserving some form of federal structure was, however, not abandoned in Eastern Nigeria until after General Gowon's repudiation of the Aburi Agreement early in 1967. The Biafrans have nevertheless maintained their willingness to negotiate arrangements for common services and future association over a wide field. The pre-requisite for meaningful negotiations is to stop the fighting."
I conclude on this point, that nearly always the sale of arms abroad is a dirty business which worsens the prospects for peace. This is a striking example; it is the classic case against the sale of arms to other countries.
1.0 p.m.
Sir George Sinclair: The House has, today, reflected something of the shock that has been felt throughout the country from the television appearance of one of the Federal Government's divisional commanders, Colonel Adekunle. That appearance, combined with photographs of starving people, has resulted in people everywhere, whether they have interests in Nigeria or not, accepting the impact of this television presentation.
We have not had from General Gowon the assurances that we need if the people of this country are to be reassured about the attitude of the Federal Government towards the Ibos, both in the Federal administrative areas and within the Ibo heartland.
My hon. Friend the Member for Surbiton (Mr. Fisher) gave a vivid account of starvation on the Federal side of the battle lines which, not so long ago was on the other side of the lines. That may properly be taken as some indication of the impact of starvation today within the Ibo areas.
In view of this new information, we are no longer justified in standing aside or in going ahead with the policy announced before the Recess. These re-
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ports cannot just be laughed off. Last night General Gowon announced that he was launching the final phase of the battle which he hoped would be completed in four weeks. That announcement must be combined with the television statements made by Colonel Adekunle which the Secretary of State brushed aside as being a flamboyant public relations exercise of a field commander. If that statement did not represent the view of the Federal Nigerian Government, then the sooner that is made clear to the people of this country and the Secretary of State the better. It was a horrifying presentation in all its callousness.
We know that there are other sides to the picture. An important piece of evidence, which completely destroys the strident statements about genocide, is the reasonable treatment of the Ibos in the areas now administered by the Federal Government. This is incontrovertible. People have access to those Ibos and can ask them about how they are being treated. What is more, this can be seen as evidence of good intentions. We have heard General Gowon speaking on this subject and I believe that he has a realistic and constructive appraisal of the future rôle of the Ibos in a strong and united Nigeria.
I have visited all regions of Nigeria since I was there in earlier days helping to set up their first university. Even then, just at the end of the war, one of the mainsprings of initiative, ideas and drive throughout the whole of Nigeria was from the land-hungry and energetic Ibo people. This still applies today. They have an immense contribution to make to the future of Nigeria. But if they are to realise their potential as a distinct group, with their own language, their own beliefs and their own intense family loyalties, then they must have the whole of Nigeria as the field for their operations. Any Ibo would say this: Nigeria will be greatly the loser if the Ibos do not regain enough confidence to enable them to operate throughout the country.
We have heard from both sides evidence of the Ibo's return, within Federal Nigeria, to routine duties in the midst of tragedy. They are surrounded by the tragedy of their own people who have been misled by Colonel Ojukwu

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into this bloody confrontation for an end that is not worth while. Nevertheless, there is evidence that care is being taken to restore to those Ibos now living in the Federal areas confidence that their future field of operations is in the whole of Nigeria.
For the British Government, this is not just a practical problem of whether or not our continued supply of arms would affect the last phase of the battle. I do not think it will, but I am certain that we ought to make this gesture unless we get from General Gowon quite new assurances, both about the objectives of his Federal Government in the Ibo heartland and the acceptance of those objectives and methods by his field commanders, and evidence that the Federal Government will do far more than they have done up to now to open the land and air routes to the passage of food and medical supplies.
I know that Colonel Ojukwu says that he does not want supplies to be dependent on routes over land administered by the Federal Government. He will need to change on this. But, from what my hon. Friend the Member for Surbiton said today, there has been great laxity in getting supplies even to some of the areas administered by the Federal Government. I do not want to be put off with guff about the difficulty of organising transport. If a sufficiently high priority were given to the task, transport could be found. I am sure that the firms who for many years have represented our great trading connection with Nigeria would be prepared to put transport at the disposal of the Federal Government for this purpose.
I was sorry that the Secretary of State did not refer to the slackness of the Federal Government in getting supplies to areas which have recently come under their administration. It is a manageable task to which a higher priority should be given. Those who know Nigeria know that, in a good harvest year, there is plenty of food. It worries me that greater efforts have not been made; this could represent an attitude too near to that of the divisional commander who appeared on television. There seems to be not nearly enough regard for what is happening to the civilian population in the Ibo areas.
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If the Federal Government really want to regain the confidence of the Ibo people—and rivalries have been building up over many years—the sooner that they start giving more effective help with supplies of food and medicaments to civilians both within the Ibo area under Colonel Ojukwu's control and in areas recently taken over by the Federal Government, the sooner they will make a start on re-establishing that confidence.
The Government should, I believe, give the House an undertaking that, unless they get better assurances from General Gowon about the intentions of the Federal Government towards the Ibo people in their own area and a repudiation of the approach of the divisional commander who appeared on T.V., we shall have no more to do with the supply of arms to Nigeria. Since the Secretary of State last spoke to the House before the Recess there has been a serious deterioration in the situation. There is clear evidence of callousness in relieving starvation.
I know that our stopping our supply of arms may not make any difference to the ability of the Federal forces to wage war to the end, but, if relationships between Federal Nigeria and this country are as close as I believe them to be, such a gesture or the threat of it could, I suggest, have the effect of causing them to give higher priority to saving civilian life in the old Eastern Province both within the Ibo area and that which they administer outside Colonel Ojukwu's area.
I say this with some sadness because, like my hon. Friend the Member for Surbiton, I have a deep faith in the ability of a federated but closely knit Nigeria to provide a reasonably tolerant framework of living for people in the whole of Nigeria, including the three groups in the old Eastern Province. It is a big enough and powerful enough unit economically. And certainly the people, if united, are powerful enough in their determination and brain power and in the rich diversity of their cultures to play a leading part in bringing Africa forward to play an important and constructive rôle in world affairs. However, unless we get from General Gowon the assurances which I have mentioned, we ought to dissociate ourselves from this final phase, on the grounds that the Federal Government are not doing

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all that they could and should to preserve civilian Ibo lives.
Before I stop, I should like to make one additional point. I do not accept this term "Biafra". As I have tried to indicate, I have a great regard for the capacity and tenacity of the Ibo people. However, I do not think that either the new South-East State or the River State, which are included in Colonel Ojukwu's idea of Biafra, will ever again want to be under the administration of an Ibo-dominated administration. The problem remains to find a way of living for the Ibos, they must have both their heartland and freedom to operate within the whole of Nigeria.
Finally, Mr. Deputy Speaker, I would ask the Secretary of State to consider very carefully the new attitudes that have been shown not only on television but in the reports that we have heard today about the callous disregard for civilian life and for starvation. This country should not tolerate it, and we should no longer be associated with it unless we get fresh assurances about the Federal Government's programe of action to relieve these horrors and their intentions towards the Ibo heartland.
1.16 p.m.
Mr. James Johnson: In the speech of the hon. Member for Dorking (Sir G. Sinclair), we have heard the voice of sanity. I enjoyed his speech immensely. However, I want to take up three of his points, the first of them being the callous disregard on both sides for human life.
As the hon. Gentleman knows, within the last week or two I have been to this whole area. I went to within a few miles of the Ibo lines, and at Ikot Ekpene I saw hundreds of boys and girls lying naked on stone floors, living on a pannikin of beans and rice per day. It was the most shocking and saddest spectacle that I have seen in my life.
I accept all that has been said about the inefficiency and lack of organisation in getting food into the Ikot Peninsula on the west side of the Calabar Estuary. However, that state of affairs is changing rapidly. Before I left Lagos, two boats had gone to Calabar, together with vehicles, taking 1,850 tons of food supplies. I hope that matters will continue to improve in this area. It has been ad-
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ministered by the Federal Forces, and there is no excuse now for not getting food to it.
At Ikot Ekpene, the battle has ebbed and flowed, the area spending a few days in Ibo hands and then a period in Federal hands. The civilian population has been between the devil and the deep blue sea. It is hard to understand why civilians have not been taken south to safer areas like Uyo.
I spent two hours in Port Harcourt discussing matters with Colonel Adekunle, and later I had lunch at his house. I did not see the television broadcast to which many hon. Members have referred, but, whatever Adekunle may have said about killing Ibo on sight, that is not the state of affairs on the spot. I interviewed four Ibo officers, one of whom was a deserter, and between 25 and 30 Ibo soldiers, many of them of school age, who had been captured or who had come through the lines. In the Ikot Peninsula there are many thousands of Ibos who are now living with others in this post-war society.
I turn now to the matter of incorporation of the Ibos. I went all over the north—Kano, Jos, Kaduna and elsewhere, and South east to Calabar and Port Harcourt. Everywhere I met the will on the part of non-Ibo people, whatever their ethnic origins, to attempt to forget what had happened in those dreadful days of May and September, 1966, and a desire to build up a new United Nigeria. I accept this. I take this for what it was given to me. I believe there is a genuine will once more to live with the Ibos.
We have heard earlier in the debate that in the cities of the North and West there is an administrator looking after all the old shops and houses of the former Ibo inhabitants. Inventories have been carefully kept, with a caretaker who gets 2s. in the £ for collecting the moneys which are recorded in the files.
Many Ibos are coming back to their old homes. The best place to see this is in the Mid-West, like Benin. If one goes there, there are thousands of Ibos who have never gone over to the east bank of the Niger. In the Cabinet in the Mid-West State there are two Ibos among the nine members. I have been assured by many people that it is not

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impossible to envisage the Ibos once more living amongst their fellow Nigerians. That is my own opinion based on my own experience, having spent a fortnight among these people. I say this sincerely, but must emphasise again the need to get food and medical supplies to Ibo refugees in the places that I have mentioned.
I should like to correct a myth about eastern Nigeria. Speeches have been made by Colonel Ojukwu at Addis Ababa in which mention is made of 14 million Ibos. One does not need to have been a historian at Oxford to know that this is not a fact. When one goes to Calabar, Port Harcourt and elsewhere, one finds there are in the south-east State and the river State at least 4 million—some may say 4½ to 5 million —non-Ibo people who have suffered in the past as a minority in the East under an Ibo administered eastern capital at Enugu, similarly as the Ibos suffered in the North in 1966 under a northern Moslem-dominated capital at Kaduna.
It is a very complex situation, but I hope that we shall all attempt to hit the correct balance. As I put to my right hon. Friend the Member for Sal-ford, East (Mr. Frank Allaun) a few moments ago, there are two sides, both showing an equally callous disregard for human life. I fault the Federal Government, and I have said so while there; because they have been more than evasive in the matter of an airlift over the fighting lines into the airfields of Ibo-land or Biafra, call it what one might in East Nigeria—this heartland of Ibo people. I fault the Federal forces. In the same context, however, I do not hear anyone speaking with emotion or otherwise in this Chamber, who will say to Colonel Ojukwu, as I say to him: Why cannot we have a land corridor which can carry in 10 times the amount of food, 10 times as quickly, for 100 times the number of people? Supplies can be taken so much more quickly and efficiently over land. I am pleading for less inflexibility on both sides of the war. I ask for the sake of 60 million people who live in Nigeria, not 8 million of a particular Ibo ethnic group or, indeed, 40,000 of a smaller ethnic group. I plead for the Nigerian people as a whole, and it is not impossible to visualise this society in future.
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I went out there to do three things: first, to see what was happening to the food and medical supplies; secondly, to ascertain the morale of the people; and, thirdly, to discover what are the hopes for a peaceful solution.
We have heard about the tide of battle ebbing and flowing. I have been in the field, and I want to correct another myth. There is a myth which is fostered over the air and on television, also by journalists who should know better, but not, indeed fostered by missionaries who have come out from either side, that
"there is a seething mass of helpless people about to be overwhelmed."
I found on the Ikot Ekpene Peninsula—and I was also in Port Harcourt, which was devastated by the Ibos when they left—many women carrying their goods in bundles on their heads; many Ibos and other tribes coming back to live in the towns. Behind the Federal lines there is what I call law and order in the usual sense of the term. I found people going about their business and their markets as usual. There were at least 220,000 people, some well fed, some in stages of starvation, between Oron going north to Ikot Ekpene and the Ibo battle lines. They were attending their markets as usual. I am told on the highest authority, a Canadian pastor in the Church of Scotland who has been on the Biafra side, that, in the same way, there is what he called
"a life which goes on with firmness and decision."
I hope, therefore, we will not hear too much about this business of blasting villagers with gunfire on either side of the roads. Genocide is a sinful word, and I hope that no one will use it in this Chamber again. I do not believe there is planned genocide. I think it is disgraceful that we should endeavour to link what is happening in East Nigeria with what happened in that disgusting page in European history in Germany when 6 million Jews were consigned to gas chambers. The word "genocide" has no such connotation in the Nigerian context, and I have no evidence to suggest that this is so or is happening in the occupied areas.
I was told again on the best authority—1 was not behind the Ibo lines, of course—that there are 700 camps with 700,000 refugees on the Ibo side. This

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is one thing I would emphasise before I sit down. It is a ghastly fact that there are at least 5,000—perhaps 6,000—men, women and children dying each day. It may be that 6,000 have died today and that 6,000 will die tomorrow. I hope that we will all remember this terrible fact.
To relieve the hunger we talk about an airlift or a land corridor, but the important thing is for the fighting to cease. It is vital to stop the fighting and then get in masses of food plus an observer corps, formed of the Canadians, Ethiopians and Indians. It is also important to take in thousands of young women as nurses, and men as medical auxiliaries, in the hospitals and camps.
How does one achieve a cease-fire? I pay all homage to the Emperor of Ethiopia for his enormous work and able chairmanship in Addis Ababa. But, despite the enormous losses, the military defeats and the starvation at home, Colonel Ojukwu is still determined to preserve Biafra as a separate state. I plead here, with Colonel Ojukwu and others, including President Azikwe, who is now in London, that they should not be determined to go on with the suffering to their own people. Their answer is "no" to accepting any land corridor, and "no" to anything else as long as peace is linked with the question of giving up their secession. I understand how the Ibo leaders feel about it. I have also listened to my right hon. and hon. Friends speaking this morning, and I respect their utmost sincerity but do not agree.
One of the bad things about the political situation is that Colonel Ojukwu has convinced the Ibo people, within their diminishing heartland, that they will suffer this awful genocide. As I have said before, in my opinion this is a sinful term to use but I understand the motives behind it. I know what happened in September, 1966, in Jos, Kano and other towns. But we must ask ourselves the question: must millions suffer because two élites are fighting it out at the top? Must people suffer because Colonel Ojukwu and his colleagues totally mistrust the intentions of General Gowon and other leaders in Lagos? It seems that millions must, until they can get in observer forces and supplies of food and medicine.
At Addis Ababa it has been said that this is a dialogue of the deaf and the
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dumb. My experience leads me to believe that General Gowon has deliberately chosen not to force home his advantage in the field in the past few weeks. I believe that Her Majesty's Government have had some influence in Lagos in this matter. I believe that General Gowon is sensitive—even hypersensitive—to public opinion, including the opinion of Her Majesty's Government.
I hope that my colleagues will not be too shocked if I say that the logic of the situation will cause me not to pass judgment upon General Gowon if he finally decides that military action is justified after four series of peace talks, with deadlock continuing day after day. When I know that 6.000 lives will be lost a day—which is 200,000 in a month, and 500,000 in a quarter of a year—I must take the view that the imperative thing is to shorten this war, end the fighting and get in relief.
This is the vital thing in the whole situation, and I beg General Gowon and his opposite number, Colonel Ojukwu, to think again about this. This stalemate is upon their shoulders. If Colonel Ojukwu would give up just one thing—secession—and General Gowon, for his part, would meet Colonel Ojukwu, it would mean—to me and to many other people like me—that a load would be taken off our shoulders in terms of our concern for the suffering peoples.
I agree with what was said in The Guardian on 21st August, namely:
"A compromise will be difficult but not impossible. A mid-course must be found between the incompatible extremes of General Gowon's neat twelve-state pattern, and Biafra's claim to complete independence. A sovereign Biafra does not seem within the bounds of practical politics. The disastrously overcrowded Ibo heartland cannot be viable by itself. The rest of Biafra peopled by non-Ibos who are not predominantly in favour of secession, is in Federal hands and will remain so."
I am assured that the Federal Government propose a general amnesty upon the cease-fire, to be followed later by the holding of a constitutional conference which will decide the degree of association between the various peoples of Nigeria. I believe that the vast majority of the people of Nigeria wish to build a united and virile nation, and wish to have the gifted and hardworking Ibos back in their midst. I am sure that all of us in

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this Chamber desire that events will allow this to come to pass.
1.34 p.m.
Mr. James Davidson: I am delighted to follow the most thoughtful and well-informed speech of the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull, West (Mr. James Johnson). I want to make a slightly different point. At the end of last month I attended an international conference in Stockholm on aid and development from Europe to the developing countries. Quite incidental to the subject before the conference I was asked to support a resolution offering sympathy to the suffering people of Biafra.
No less than 23 nations were represented at the conference. I rose to explain that people were suffering not only in Biafra but throughout the whole of Nigeria, and proposed that in lieu of the word "Biafra" there should be substituted the word "Nigeria". My suggestion was met with stony silence. This is a measure of the excellence of Biafra's public relations on the one hand and Europe's ignorance of the general situation in Nigeria on the other. People are extremely surprised when they are informed that the casualties in the civil was in Nigeria exceed those in the war in Vietnam. It makes the tragic events in Czechoslovakia look like a bull-fight by comparison.
It may not be superflous to remind the House—and it may put the situation in perspective—that up to the beginning of 1966 the Nigerian Federation had not only miraculously held together but was regarded as the showpiece of the Commonwealth in Africa—a large and potentially wealthy federation with inbuilt safeguards for the rights of minorities. Then, on 15th January, 1966, the Federal Prime Minister, the Northern Prime Minister, the Sardauna of Socoto, and the Western Prime Minister, were murdered, along with several senior Northern army officers, in an Ibo-led coup d'etat. This event probably triggered off the civil war, although other equally unsavoury events intervened.
I am not trying to over-simplify the situation, and it would be completely pointless and unproductive—two years later—to try to apportion blame, or to cast either antagonist in the rôle of hero
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or villain. There has been, and there still is, a ghastly civil war raging, with appalling casualities, many—perhaps the majority—among non-combatants. It is to our shame that Britain has been directly or indirectly militarily involved. The worst sufferers are the minority tribes on the fringe of the Ibo heartland —the Efriks, the Ibibios, the Orvikos and the Calabaris—the small tribes who live in very unsophisticated conditions along the creeks of the Niger delta.
I regret that I have no first-hand expertise to bring to the subject of Nigeria, but I have one or two rather pertinent questions to ask. I have taken a considerable interest in this subject, although my hon. Friend the Member for Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles (Mr. David Steel) has tended to deal rather more with African matters than I have. Nevertheless, I paid a visit to the Secretary of State for Wales, when he was Minister of State for Commonwealth Affairs, in order to raise this subject, and I was also on an all-party group which called upon the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs. I have also attended all the debates on the subject.
The two Ministers concerned are men for whom I have the highest respect, but I have never seen two Ministers look quite so desperately uncomfortable as they did when we have discussed with them Britain's involvement in Nigeria, and when they have attempted to explain, quite inadequately, the reasons for it. In my view, Britain's aim and purpose in Nigeria has never been openly and unequivocally declared. Time and time again the excuse has been offered that by continuing to send arms to the Federal Government we are somehow retaining influence, but this has never been explained or enlarged upon, and I do not accept it.
I cannot believe that Britain has any right—and she certainly has no duty—to become involved in a civil war in the territory of an independent State. Certainly there have been no invitations, and there are no treaty obligations.
Certain nations which originally supplied arms to Nigeria, among them Holland, Czechoslovakia, Belgium and West Germany, have ceased to supply arms.
Hon. Members: And France.
Mr. Davidson: I am not sure that France has suspended the flow of arms. In any event, I understand that the Dutch Foreign Minister has approached other countries asking them to also suspend the flow of arms to the Nigerian Federal Government. Has that Minister approached the United Kingdom and asked us to suspend the flow of arms? If so, what reply have we given?
Mr. John P. Mackintosh: I hope that the hon. Gentleman will enter a qualification about the French suspension of arms because there are reports from people in Nigeria that the French Air Force has flown in a consignment of equipment and that over 20 Panhard armoured cars are now operating in the country. The French may have said that they have suspended the flow of arms, but I am not sure that they have, and I will elaborate on this if I am able to speak in the debate later.
Mr. Davidson: I did not include France in the last I originally gave because I am not as well informed as the hon. Gentleman on this score. I understand that there is some doubt about France in this respect.
Some embarrassing questions must be asked of the Government and straight answers must be given. Have the Government considered replacing the present British Commissioner in Nigeria? I trust that the Minister will forgive me if I do not say much about the gentleman at this stage, but I will give him further information personally later. According to certain unimpeachable sources, the standing of this gentleman is not high. I suggest that a very highly respected British Commissioner of great political ability and integrity will be needed in the coming weeks and months. Great importance is attached to personalities in Africa, since the Africans tend to live much closer to the surface, so to speak, than we in Europe. In this respect I understand that personality is woefully lacking.
Perhaps it is my ignorance which leads me to ask this question, but what steps have been taken to press for the 12-state solution which I understand is widely accepted as the right way forward by many thoughtful Nigerians of
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all types of background, since this would tend to spread power from the three major tribes of the North, East and West? This spreading of power is, of course, an attractive idea to Liberals.
Mr. John TilneyIs not that the Federal Government solution?
Mr. Davidson: If it is, the Federal Government have been remarkably unsuccessful in pushing it forward at a fruitful and productive time.
According to information which I believe to be reliable, a Federal Government soldier captured at Umuede has since stated that five English-speaking officers, four men and one woman, are engaged in the headquarters of C Company, 14th Brigade of the Federal Army in planning operations. Is the Minister aware of this? Are these men and this woman of British nationality? I appreciate that they could, for example, be English-speaking Russians. I gather that they are sometimes seen in uniform and sometimes not.
The same soldier is reported to be convinced that the majority of Ferret armoured vehicles are driven by white soldiers. Are these mercenaries? Has the Minister any information about them? I have with me a list of nine British officers said to have been killed in action in May, 1968, in the Bonny section during an attack on Port Harcourt. I have had names checked against the Army List, but I gather that they are not in the List for this year or last year. Does the Minister know anything about these men? Are they likely to have been mercenaries and are any of them likely to have been in receipt of pensions from Her Majesty's Government? What is the policy of the Government on pay and pensions to former British Army officers now engaged as mercenaries fighting for cash for a foreign power? The same source informs me that a Lieut.-Colonel H. N. Hunter, said to be British, is in command of the Bonny area. If this is true, I would be interested to know his status.
I am told that possibly the main reason for the speed of advance, when they get going, of the Federal Army, is their immense superiority in fire power and in the use of a new type of weapon, the official name of which I do not know but which is said to be a radar-controlled shelling

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machine which completely saturates a given area. Many youngsters in the Federal Army are, I am told, 18 or 19 years of age and have had 10 days' training. However, due to the immense fire power at their command, they have an enormous advantage over their opponents. May we be given an assurance that these radar-controlled saturation shelling machines are not of British origin?
Two assertions have been voiced and I give this opportunity to the Minister to deny them, if they are untrue. One is that Her Majesty's Government will have to pay massive cancellation charges if arms orders by the Federal Government from British firms are not delivered. The second—I have no confirmation of this—is that Airwork Services Ltd., which might be termed a British Government cover organisation, has negotiated a large contract to re-equip the Nigerian Air Force with Jet Provosts.
It is time that the Government came completely clean on the matter of arms supplies. The argument adduced by the Government earlier—that the continuation of arms supplies helps the negotiations—would seem to lead one to believe, if carried to its logical conclusion, that we should increase our supply of arms and so finish the war more quickly. However, that argument is riddled with fallacies. Far from retaining influence, Her Majesty's Government appear to be completely undermining their mediatory rôle by continuing the supply of arms.
It is not too late to stop this flow of arms. We should stop it now and, even at this late date, concentrate on the rôle of mediation. I sincerely believe that Chief Enahoro, the leader of the Nigerian delegation in Addis Ababa, is making a genuine effort to arrive at a peaceful solution, but nobody is certain how firmly he represents the views of his own Government. This is, perhaps, the major obstacle which besets the negotiations in Addis Ababa.
Even at this late date Britain should turn from the rôle of wholesale arms salesman to that of mediator and give full-scale assistance to the International Red Cross and other organisations to relieve the millions of non-combatant sufferers of every creed and tribe.
1.48 p.m.
Mr. Stanley Henig: I would, had my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State been in his place, begun by paying a tribute to his integrity, since that is about the only flattering thing that I can say about him and his policies in this matter.
It has seemed—and the latest evidence overwhelmingly supports this view—that my right hon. Friend and his colleagues at the Commonwealth Office were misled. I understand the constitutional nicety which made my right hon. Friend say that he was responsible. Technically he is, but in a sense I am not certain that this has been his fault, because he was clearly misled at the beginning. He was assured—as a result of which he assured the House—that the war would be short. It has not been short. A few weeks ago, when we last raised the matter in the House, we were assured that there would not be a final push and ultimate military solution. That, too, seems to be wrong. That, too, it seems has become wrong.
The kind of thing which worries me is that last night we saw on television General Gowon saying one thing and today we heard my right hon. Friend say that General Gowon had told him the opposite some weeks ago and that we must trust him. I would prefer to trust my right hon. Friend rather than General Gowon. I know my right hon. Friend, but I do not know General Gowon. But General Gowon said these things only last night. He said that we should take no notice of what Colonel Adekunle said because Lord Hunt had seen for himself and had said that it was not so. But it is not Lord Hunt who is going to lead the armies. It is not he who will give the orders to shoot or not to shoot. This is the kind of thing which worries me. Assurances are all very well, but I no longer believe them.
It is possible to go into two complete histories of what has happened in Nigeria and I shall not start to do so, except to say that they completely disagree with each other. But at this point in time there is no means of finding out any unadulterated facts, and the British Government would do better to accept neither version and not to apportion blame. Why did my right hon. Friend say that Biafra started the air war? Certainly I believe that the first plane to do

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so was Biafran. It was a Douglas aircraft 25 years out of date. This sort of thing does not help to bring about a solution.
The question of the right of secession is something which should worry us greatly. Have a people the right of secession or not? Does the United Nations mean that the countries in the world only recognise each other and that no new country can emerge? Throughout history we have not found a peaceful way in which a country can establish its right of secession. Whenever a country tries to secede there is nearly always war. But who starts the war? We need to look for some better kind of international system than this.
When it was announced that Biafra was to be set up, it was disguised as an artificial State. But it is surely as artificial as Nigeria itself, which we foisted on West Africa. Both are artificial.
The British Government have said that we have relations with the Nigerian Government and must sell them arms. Could we not have granted de facto recognition or the right of insurgency or belligerency in all these things? But we did nothing, for political reasons. We made a political choice when we should have declared our neutrality. My right hon. Friend said twelve months ago that, in effect, we would not take sides but he said today that it was impossible to be neutral. Why is it impossible? Why is it impossible for us, a thousand miles away or more, to be neutral in a conflict which does not concern us save from the humanitarian point of view in that we would like to see as little suffering as possible?
The argument is that we are the traditional suppliers of arms to the Federal Government and we are asked what would be the attitude of other Commonwealth Governments if, at the moment a Commonwealth Government needed arms, we stopped supplying them. Apparently the argument is that, thereafter, other Commonwealth Governments would not buy arms from us but would go elsewhere in future. I say to that that this country should be able to earn itself a more honest living than through the sale of arms. If arms sales lead us to such aimpasse we should stop the business.
There has been discussion of the consequences of our refusal to supply arms.
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But what has been the consequence of our supply of arms? There has been one source available to the Federal Government, but not available to Biafra. The war has gone as it has because the Federal Government have had arms supplied by the Soviet Union and Great Britain—acting together, if you please— while the United States has declared an embargo. On the other hand, Biafra has been able to get arms only from surreptitious sources. Of course the arms supplied to the Federal Government have been better. But have they been paid for, or have they been given on credit?
The Federal Government, therefore, have been able to control the military outcome of the war. That has been the consequence of our supply of arms. What would be the consequence of our refusal? Seven or eight months ago, the consequence of such a refusal would have been that the military situation would not quite have developed as it has. Now, the consequence of our refusal might be that the Federal Government would go elsewhere for the arms if they could.
However, one would like to think that, if we made a diplomatic effort, we might be able to tie this thing up by asking other countries to join us in a refusal to supply arms. Is there evidence that this has been done? Will my right hon. Friend make this clear? Has it been done? If so, with what result? Has the Soviet Union refused? Who has refused to join an international arms embargo? Have we consulted the United States? Does the United States not want some influence in West Africa? Or did the Americans cunningly say at the beginning, "We will not supply arms. We will leave it to Britain to take on the Russians in this Battle for influence." Is influence worth having if all we can do is stand idly by while the final military solution which we have always said we were against is imposed? Where have we had influence? It does not seem to me so far to have amounted to very much.
I want to put three essential questions. They are essential to what is being done in our name, which is something I bitterly regret. The first is the legal question. By what right do we claim to judge what should happen in Nigeria and what is or is not good for the Nigerian people? I do not back one side or the other. I have not been to the area. Most people

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in this country have not been there. One good reason why we should not be interfering is that it is not something that ought to concern this country. I want to know why the Government think we have this right to judge. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary has told us that the aim of all of us is one Nigeria. Why? If the Nigerians want one, two, three or ten Nigerias it may be a matter of regret, but it is their business and not ours.
Secondly, there is the political question. Why have we made the choice that we have made? Why have one Nigeria as against two Nigerias or the right of secession? Would it not have been better for us to have declared neutrality to show that we were not involved?
Finally, there is the moral question. In an immoral world, Governments cannot always direct their behaviour by moral considerations. We know this and argue about it in other contexts. But surely there are occasions when moral arguments should play a major part. I wonder whether we are not reaching the situation here. We have supplied arms in order to get influence. That policy has failed. We have no influence, for the war is spreading. It may be that we could not stop the war now by ceasing to supply arms but is it a moral position for a British Socialist Government, whom I support, to be supplying arms for use in a civil war by men to kill each other and for that Government to say, "When this is over, we have bandages and food for you and we shall give you aid and patch you up again"? This is not an attitude I like, and I echo what has been said by right hon. and hon. Members on both sides—that, if we cannot now do something positive to end the war, we should say that we will no longer supply arms for use in it. That may not be a happy position to be in, but it is clean.
The supply of relief is again an area in which we have shown no great ability to influence events. We have not been able to get through any of the relief which has been needed nor the kind of relief we wish to send. I would like to have seen the Government taking a tougher line with the Federal Government when that Government threatened to shoot British aircraft out of the air if they took supplies to Biafra. We know
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that the Nigerian Government have a few MIGs with Egyptian pilots, but surely we are not all that frightened. This was aid from Britain to Biafra, where the people are starving. Could we not have sent out the British Navy and Air Force? I do not see why not. Other more vigorous things have been done by others in the past.
My hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull, West (Mr. James Johnson) said that he was prepared to urge the Federal Government to be more willing to compromise on the question of relief to the suffering, and he suggested that those of us who have constantly opposed the Government's policy ought to do so, too. I certainly accede to that request. I say clearly that I am against the supply of arms and I am against the British Government's policy, but if I had any voice at all I would add it to those who urge the leaders of both sides in Nigeria to think of the people who are starving and to think, indeed, of bigger things than the war. I say no more than that except to point out that whereas in the long run presumably a land corridor could take most food into Biafra, we should remember that those who have been there say that there are not enough lorries even to organise relief for the starving people in the Federal-held territories. In the short run, therefore, it may be that an air corridor would be the best solution. No doubt what we need, ideally, is to establish both an air and a land corridor, and I hope that the British Government will continue to press for that as far as they can.
I have spoken perhaps in somewhat intemperate tones, but that is for a reason which can be justified. At the beginning of last week I urged my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House that the House of Commons should be recalled in order to discuss this issue, because millions were dying, some with British bullets in them. Another tragedy overtook events, and that is why the House was recalled. Yesterday we discussed the situation in Czechoslovakia. But let us be quite clear that neither at the beginning nor at the end of yesterday's proceedings was anything proposed which we could do to help Czechoslovakia. The salvation of the Czechoslovaks, if it comes, will probably come from themselves. It certainly will not come from us.

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On the other hand, we have been involved very much in Nigeria, and we can still be involved. There are far more things that we can do about Nigeria than we can do about Czechoslovakia. If it were true that Czechoslovakia were in the Russian sphere of influence, then, from what my right hon. Friend said, if the British policies in the past have had any success at all, it may be true that Nigeria is in the British sphere of influence, if there is such a thing. If we have any power to do anything anywhere, we ought to do something to exercise it.
We are in mid-August. I have to rely on what Colonel Gowon said on television last night, when he said that all would be over in four weeks. The Federal authorities have given themselves deadlines in the past and have failed to meet them. But in this House we have another deadline, because at four o'clock today we shall disperse again and, being realistic, I am inclined to doubt whether we shall be summoned back before mid-October, seven weeks from now. What will have happened in those seven weeks? And it will have happened partly in our name, because in Biafra and many other parts of Africa it is regarded as a war of Nigeria and Britain on the one hand against Biafra on the other hand. We ought, therefore, to do everything we can to make our voice felt.
Obviously many of the things that have been done in Biafra may be as wrong as things that have been done in the Federal Government. These are two military dictatorships. At stake there are the Ibo people, who number from 10 million to 14 million, whose leaders—and we have no reason to doubt that the Ibo people support them—have said that they would like some kind of State to rule their own affairs. They consider themselves not just a tribe but a nation. We may think them misguided, but this is the question: do they or do they not have that right?
We are debating what we can do to help. It seems to me to be the greatest hypocrisy of all when we express our opinions about what the Russians may do in Czechoslovakia and about what the Americans may do in Vietnam if that leads us, in any area in the world where we have influence—especially in an area where more people have already been killed than in either Czechoslovakia or
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Vietnam—in effect to say, "Never mind the Ibo people. They are a nuisance. They do not matter, because we are battling with the Soviet Union for influence in Lagos". If that is what is being said in the House of Commons, it is a shame and a disgrace.
This House has always been only too willing to fight, in as far as it can, for the rights of small nations. I hope that when my right hon. Friend concludes the debate, better counsels will prevail and that at least he will tell us that the British will dissociate themselves from this war, will cease to supply arms and will do something positive to bring about a settlement and a relief of starvation.
2.6 p.m.
Sir John Eden: I take very much to heart the wise advice given by my right hon. Friend the Member for Barnet (Mr. Maudling) that we should strive to avoid taking sides. Like him, I find it extremely difficult, in the face of a persistent barrage of propaganda, to make an objective assessment of the situation. But the main questions which I have tried to answer to myself are those which the Commonwealth Secretary posed in his speech: which policies will minimise and shorten the suffering of all the Nigerian people and what can Britain contribute to that outcome?
The British Government find themselves in a dilemma, and to some extent that dilemma arises from their failure it the outset of this unhappy development to envisage the nature and scale of the conflict which would ensue. All the way through they have defended their policy on the ground that the continuance of the supply of arms would best ensure the maintenance of British influence over the Federal authorities. While it is true that over the past eight years we have been consistent in providing military assistance to Nigeria, nonetheless the historical and economic links betwen our two countries go back much further than that and are of much greater significance. It cannot be the case that our influence derives only from the supply of arms. surely, from our knowledge of the country and by virtue of the origins of the existing Federation, we must be able to bring pressures to bear for other reasons than the supply of arms.

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But even if it is true that only if the Government continue to supply arms shall we have any right or opportunity to exert influence, we are nevertheless right to call upon the Government to give evidence of what that influence has so far achieved. It has not ended the fighting. It has not stopped the relief airstrip from being bombed. It has not stopped the preparation for a final settlement—in other words, for a military solution. We may have had some marginal influence, in conjunction with the Emperor of Ethiopia, in persuading the Federal Government to permit some measure of relief to go ahead, and I fully accept that we may have had some influence in slowing the forward movement of the Federal advance. But now this does not seem to be offering us much hope for the future, except through the means of a final military solution.
In looking ahead beyond the military conflict, I am concerned at what may be the outcome of this civil strife. I am much more concerned that we should have influence, not just with the Federal Government but also with Ojukwu and the Biafran forces. We are not likely to have any opportunity to exert any form of pressure there so long as we continue to supply arms to those who are fighting against them. I agree that it would be a tragedy if the breakaway were to lead a complete break-up of Nigeria as we originally conceived it.
I certainly have no wish to advance any cause or to promote any policies which might lead to a dismemberment of the Nigerial grouping of States into a series of rival tribal factions. I cannot believe that any good would come from that, no more than any good can come from a break-up of the South Arabian Federation for example. But we have to face the facts of the present situation that those who have thought to break away from the authority of Lagos, particularly in the Eastern region where its writ has never really run, are now not likely to seek to come to terms unless there is first an established ceasefire.
The Commonwealth Secretary and the Foreign Secretary have both said that the Government's attitude on the supply of arms would change if it appeared to them that the Federal forces were driving into the Ibo heartland and were bent on a
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final massacre. I hope I do not misinterpret at least the implications of what Government Ministers have said in that regard. But from the Commonwealth Secretary's own words Federal forces are already in the Ibo heartland. They have already occupied, or retaken, a very substantial part of Ibo territory. Where does the heartland begin and where does it end? Have they not already, as the right hon. Gentleman indicated, virtually completed the fighting in acceptable terms of a military solution?
One further military step remains open to them. That is the move across the river and into the final assault in what must inevitably be an immensely devastatingly horrible battle to seek to kill and crush for all time the semblance of Biafran independence. I believe from what Ministers have been saying that they would not wish to see this happening, yet there does not seem to be any other next step, in military terms, than that open to the Federal forces. It is not a military solution that is likely to bring durable peace to the peoples that make up the Federation of Nigeria.
The military victory has already been virtually won. Short of exacting total surrender, the military forces of General Gowon have brought Colonel Ojukwu to his final bastion. In these circumstances peace talks must be encouraged. In these circumstances it is right that everyone who has any influence on either side should be exerting whatever pressure he may have to bring about a cease-fire. The quicker that the arms supplies are stopped the quicker will a cease-fire come about. To put it another way, only when a cease-fire has come about at the instance of General Gowon and his forces are we likely to be able to get realistic discussions going about the future of the Ibo people. I believe it would be a very material factor in bringing about a ceasefire if Her Majesty's Government were to stop the supply of arms at this point They said they would show great concern if the Federal forces were to advance any further.
We should not only now in the light of this changed circumstance and the military advance that has been made already stop the further supply of arms, but we should endeavour to bring other countries also concerned in this matter to

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do likewise. It is not a question of turning our backs on General Gowon, as the Commonwealth Secretary put it. It is a question of using that influence which we still possess to bring about a ceasefire so that talks can begin. At this stage in the military developments which have ensued this is the time for negotiation and conciliation. This is not the time for a further military advance.
The hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull, West (Mr. James Johnson) quoted the admirable article in the Guardian of Wednesday, 21st August, in which reasons, which I found most convincing, were advanced for saying that a compromise solution must be found and for stressing that a sovereign Biafra does not now seem to be within the bounds of practical politics. Equally, there is not much realism to be found in General Gowon's neat twelve-state pattern. A compromise must be found between these two. I hope very much that full influence can be brought to bear on Colonel Ojukwu to try to seek an honourable settlement with sufficient and adequate guarantees for the safety of his people. Those again were words used by the Commonwealth Secretary. We must exert that influence upon him. We have no means of contact or communication with him. We are not even able to penetrate to him—until we cease the supply of arms to General Gowon's side.
I desperately hope that Colonel Ojukwu will not persist in a policy which will lead to the complete annihilation of the people with him. I very much agree with the right hon. Gentleman about this but if we are to bring home the realistic alternatives which may be open to him we must first do all we can to bring about the end of the actual fighting and we are likely to precipitate that the quicker if we cease to supply arms to Colonel Gowon's side. Only in these circumstances will Arnold Smith's pleas for a Commonwealth force or anything like that have any chance of being brought to fruition. Only then will the people of Nigeria be able for themselves and in peace to determine the course of their own future and only then will they be able to find a new formula for association between their varied and various peoples. We should not stand pat on the solution we bequeathed to them eight years ago. The war has entirely
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changed the situation. It must be our concern now to bend all our efforts to bring an end to fighting and a restoration of peaceful negotiation and discussion about the future.
2.20 p.m.
Mr. John P. Mackintosh: I respect the motives and sincerity of the hon. Member for Bournemouth, West (Sir J. Eden), but I believe that if we ceased to supply arms now the result might be the opposite to what the hon. Gentleman wants. The effect might be to make Colonel Ojukwu feel that he was getting sufficient international recognition, that sufficient countries were changing over, that he could stick to his hard terms and hope for an economic collapse in the Federation, and that he should fight on to the bitter end. That is at least as conceivable as the hon. Gentleman's argument that a cessation of arms supplies would make General Gowon's terms as set out at Kampala easier or more flexible. The action could lead Colonel Ojukwu to think that because Britain had stopped supplying arms that was a reason for carrying his resistance a bit further.
To turn to the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster (Mr. Henig), he said in a very strong opening passage, "Why should Britain intervene?" He asked why we should not declare our neutrality, what has West Africa to do with us, and made a powerful case for having nothing to do with the whole situation. He then switched his line and contradicted himself completely by saying that we should push in British Air Force planes with supplies and exert the strongest British pressure. He argued that Nigeria is a British sphere of influence and that we are profoundly affected by what happens to the people in the area. In fact, he himself answered in this way the first passages in his own speech.
We have had a long connection with the area. I respect the sovereignty of Nigeria and its right as an independent country to determine its own affairs. We often assume that we have too much power and influence. We have very little. What we can do is purely as a friendly ally. But we have a certain general interest in humanity and the future of the people in the area. We are involved

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by our history and tradition, our connections up to the moment of independence and to the time of the war breaking out. We cannot simply walk out or wash our hands of these connections.
Therefore, we must ask ourselves the very concrete questions of what such little influence as we have can do, and in what way we should exercise it. We must ask ourselves where we should like to see the conflict lead, what ultimate outcome is desirable, and how we should try to effect this.
The question of Britain's influence and what can be done is extremely difficult. I beg hon. Members not to overestimate our influence. There is a great danger of some Government spokesmen doing so, and conversely there is also a great danger of some of the Government's most extreme critics overestimating our influence. While they deny that the Government have influence on General Gowon, they imagine that the cessation of British arms supplies would have an immediate effect and change the situation profoundly. Several Nigerian officials to whom I have talked take the view that if we stopped supplying arms they would simply buy them elsewhere. They would dislike doing this because it would cost a bit more and it is also irritating to find instructions on machines and weapons possibly in German or Russian, which make them more difficult for Nigerians to work. But they would get the weapons elsewhere, and I do not think that the Nigerian Government would fundamentally change their methods or objectives in response to the dramatic cessation of weapons supply, as I gather some hon. Members, such as my hon. Friend the Member for Salford, East (Mr. Frank Allaun), believe would be the case. My hon. Friend said that he thought that if we ceased the supply of weapons we could assume a mediatory rôle, and an hon. Member opposite also felt this was so. But if we ceased supplying weapons now the Federal Government would simply abandon any connection with Britain, and the Biafran Government have detested us so much that they are certain to pay no attention. Any suggestion that we could then mediate more effectively would be ridiculed. That is what would happen if we made a dramatic gesture of that kind.
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Our connection does not give us such a strong position in Nigeria. In fact it irritates some Nigerians. We have a bad Press in Nigeria; we are not universally regarded as the greatest friends of the Federal Government in Lagos. We are often attacked, and we do not get all that much credit. Nevertheless, we have a certain position there, and a certain amount of attention is paid to public opinion in this country. We must choose those issues on which we can, as a friend of the Federal Government, exercise some influence.
Here I endorse the speech of the hon. Member for Dorking (Sir G. Sinclair), who put his finger on the matter precisely. If we tried to insist on an end to the war on terms unacceptable to the Lagos Government, our influence would melt away and would stand for nothing. What we can do is to pick matters on which the Federal Government are half concerned, half interested, and get them to put a little more emphasis on these matters. The primary example picked by the hon. Gentleman, with his long experience of West Africa, is the matter of persuading the Federal Government to take the question of relief to suffering people in Federal-occupied territory more seriously. We are entitled to press them on this, and should do so.
In our last debate I mentioned that in the traditional suppliers of the Ibo areas, Plateau and Benue provinces, one and soon two harvests will be in store. The place is groaning with food. A senior administrator of the Plateau State was visiting me last night, and he pointed out that in Jos a factory making high protein cereal food for babies is now out of production because there is no demand. This food is available, and it could be run into at any rate the northern areas of Iboland without great difficulty.
The reasons why this is not being done are complex, but it is correct to say that shortage of transport is not an adequate reason. Any of us who have been in the streets of Lagos and have tried to fight our way across the street in danger of being run down by lorries and mammy wagons find it hard to listen to talk of shortage of transport in Nigeria. There is plenty of transport if people are prepared to requisition it, but there is lack of concern.

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The concern felt in Britain about women and children dying in refugee camps is not equally shared in Nigeria on either side. I do not wish to sound critical of the Nigerians on this matter, but if one speaks to Nigerians that one knows well on both sides they will tell one that in a subsistence economy in every dry season children die of malnutrition and starvation. This is not new in West Africa. The scale may be new, it may be worse, but it does not concern people there quite as much as it concerns some hon. Members.
The question of getting supplies to starving people in refugee camps in the Federal-held areas is a matter of organisation and willpower. The fact is that at present the prosecution of the war and the terms on which it will end matter far more to the Nigerian officials and officers involved than the question of relief, as people have seen from the statements of Colonel Adekunle. The Nigerians regard British opinion as somewhat quixotic and over-concerned with a particular aspect of the war.
Therefore, while the British Government could not profoundly affect the course of the war it could persuade the Federal Government to step up its level of organisation in this matter. I agree with some Nigerians that international experts living in the Ikoyi Hotel cannot make a great deal of difference from Lagos with the odd aeroplane. What matters is to get the commanders on the fronts to use land transport to distribute the food presently available in the background areas, and to concentrate some energy on this.
My second point is a question that has been somewhat overlooked in our debate—the ultimate outcome of the war. I do not think that the Government should simply press for a cease-fire.
I understand why the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs so emphasised a cease-fire to try to press the Nigerian Government, but a great deal depends upon the terms of the cease-fire. It matters relatively little to many people in this country, but if we were in West Africa or Nigeria it would be like the position in 1940 when certain Americans said, "What is the war between Britain and Germany about? Why not have a ceasefire and stop it?" The war is about something very serious in Nigerian terms.
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It is about the organisation of the communities occupying the entire country. Are they to be federally controlled or to split up into small tribal States? It is perhaps the most important question for the future of West Africa. It is more important in the eyes of the people living there than relief, development or economic progress. It is no good simply calling for a cease-fire. All depends on the terms.
On this question I disagree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Llanelli (Mr. James Griffiths). I do not believe that victory by the Federal Government over the remains of the Ibo secessionist area would destroy the future of Nigeria. On the contrary, I believe that if secession was established by the Ibo area successfully it would encourage others among the 12 States now talking about secession in addition to Colonel Ojukwu and the Ibos, to go ahead. Already one hears some people in the Sokoto State saying "If the Southerners are to spend all this money on having this war which is doing us no good, why do not we break off?" One hears arguments in the West to the same effect. I believe that defeat for the Federal Government would spell disruption and even if the war is won by the Federal Government, the future of the Federation is still tendentious and extremely shaky.
We have to consider what we want to come out of this. I have no brief for either side, but I believe that the terms offered at Kampala by the Federal Government were reasonable. They offered special concessions to the Ibos—the Ibo area was to be secured by an international force and internal order was to be left to an Ibo police force and a Government which would include some of the present leaders of Biafra. There were to be special safeguards for Ibos in the rest of Nigeria all provided they would live within the context of a United Nigeria and accept the other safeguards for Ibo territory. To have offered more would have been to preside over the breakup of Nigeria. I believe it would have been wrong for Nigerians to have done this and for us to have asked them to do so.
Win or lose, what we shall be forced to realise in a few years' time is the extent to which the war has crippled the economy of Nigeria. At the moment it

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is costing £10 million a month to the Federal Government in internal costs apart from overseas purchases. Every one of the existing States is running a deficit. The Federal Government is near the end of its reserves. Colonel Ojukwu may calculate that if he can hold on a little longer the whole thing will fall to pieces. If it does, what will be the future for 55 million people, not merely 7 million or 8 million Ibos, if the whole structure of Nigeria disintegrates? What we shall find, I believe, will be a sort of Latin American pattern in which certain strong expatriate companies—oil, tin and rubber companies—pay to preserve order in the limited area in which they operate, and in other areas small military dictatorships will be set up which will be overthrown with regularity when there is a military mutiny or a bad harvest and the soldiers are not paid.
This is not too great a stretch of the imagination. I repeat what a senior official told me yesterday. When he was responsible for running one of the major Nigerian States and it was in such deficit a few months ago that he telephoned the police and asked them to get out on the roads and try to raise some money in fines for transport offences because if some money did not come in it would be impossible to pay officials salaries in the near future. That is the sort of position with which Nigeria is faced. This Government should say clearly that they believe that in the interests of the long-term future of the area there must be an attempt to hold the Federation together and give safeguards to the Ibos while preserving an element of general order.
I do not wish to enter into detailed arguments about who is right or wrong, but I believe that if we do not exert our influence in this direction we shall be doing the greatest possible damage not merely to the present limited area of conflict but to the 50 million people who live in the entire territory.
I should like the Government to consider a number of small but factual points. First, they should say to the Lagos Government that if we are to continue as the arms supplier for part of the arms needs of Nigeria the Federal Government must do a much better job of organising food distribution and relief
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supplies in the area now under its control as well as help to get relief into areas held by Colonel Ojukwu. It must demonstrate that it shows concern. It has demonstrated politically that it is prepared to put the Ibos in charge for instance at Enugu where the Asika government of Ibos is running successfully. But they must be pushed into providing better supplies for relief in the area.
Secondly, we should offer immediate aid to get the oilwells going. I say this not because I have any brief for the oil companies but because on the production of their oil wells depends the foreign exchange which Nigeria needs in order to avoid economic collapse.
Thirdly, we should continue gently to press the Federal Government to go even further on some of the Kampala terms. I see no reason why the East Central State in the Federation should not be called Biafra; this would make it easier for Colonel Ojukwu.
I see no reason why there should not be a more far-reaching amnesty than has been proposed—and there should be no later series of investigations and trials.
These are the sort of things on which British influence could operate. Any idea of a total cessation of arms supply which should have any dramatic effect on the outcome is a miscalculation and a mistake. I support the Government in going on with what I take to be these pressures, and I hope that we shall have evidence that they will reinforce them on the points I have selected.
2.36 p.m.
Mr. John Tilney: Although I am a member of Lord Brockway's Peace in Nigeria Committee, I find myself in almost complete agreement with the speech by the hon. Member for Berwick and East Lothian (Mr. Mackintosh). It shows how difficult the problem is. We all want peace but are not sure of the methods that ought to be followed to get it.
I also find myself in agreement largely with the speech by the Secretary of State, with two provisos. First, he said that not too much attention should be paid to soldiers' language. But we have coups constantly in certain African States, and we must remember that in Nigeria now we have a military Government.

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As to the other proviso, I do not agree that the British Government could not have taken some action a year or more ago. At that time I said I thought that an embargo should have been put on all arms to both contestants. I am not convinced by the argument of the Secretary of State that that was impossible at that time. I think we should have tried for at least a month or two to get the countries of the world to dampen down a war which it was obvious to so many of us would be a terrible civil war. Had we done so, a number of lives could have been saved, and also much destruction of property and much bitterness.
At that time Biafra, or so-called Biafra, was viable. It had its oil and its routes to the Cameroons. It also had no really embittered minorities. How different it is today! I commend to the House a substantial pamphlet written by Dr. Graham-Douglas, formerly Attorney-General to the Eastern Region of Nigeria. He was actually Colonel Ojukwu's Attorney-General for a long time. He says:
"I resigned because I thought it was dishonest for one man to wish to be king at the expense of the lives of millions of his countrymen. Ojukwu's determination to take Eastern Nigeria out of the Federation was not inspired by any love for the Ibos, less so for the peoples of the minority areas, but by the insatiable thirst for personal political power."
He goes on to say:
"we have all been plagued by the horrors of an avoidable civil war".
That may be propaganda. What Dr. Graham-Douglas says may not be wholly true. But we are all plagued by propaganda from both sides. Every day I get a couple of letters from Geneva, usually duplicates, of Biafran propaganda. One day last week I got no fewer than six envelopes in my post. This shows beyond a peradventure that we must consider the future and the present and not go over the past rights and wrongs.
It shows also that what Ojukwu now claims for his own people he must not deny to the minorities, which up till now he has done. It is a tragedy that the Ibos should have been buoyed up, first by the recognition of Tanzania and Zambia, and then virtually by France, who, by her action, destroyed hope for success in Addis Ababa and has probably prolonged the miseries of the Ibo people.
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The Ibo people have lost two-thirds of what they call Biafra. Can they now ever be independent? I believe that they have lost much sympathy by claiming too much and by putting down their minorities. The story told by the Attorney-General is a terrible one. After what has happened, could the Federals even agree to a form of land-locked Israel? I believe that there would be too many people in a small territory surrounded by tariffs, and the Federals would always fear that they would arm for another rebellion in the future.
I understand to some extent the argument that the most humane way to bring an end to the war is to win it and feed the people, but I very much doubt whether the world would agree. Although a year ago I was in favour of an embargo, I do not believe that such is practical or sensible now. I do not believe that it would have an effect on the ultimate outcome. It would give the Ibos a false hope and even greater misery and we would lose not only what little influence we have in Lagos, but friendship for future years.
There are a number of discrepancies in the information that this country has. Perhaps the Minister will enlighten the House later. Many of us will have had a telegram from an old friend of ours, Raymond Njoku, once Chairman of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association. He sent me this wire yesterday:
"Johnson's suggestion advocating Nigerian Federal troops overrunning Biafra heartland as quick end to the war contrary to British Government's previous undertaking is most unrealistic, mischievous, shocking and wicked. Federal troops are now attempting to do so. If this happened, God forbid, wholesale massacre of all educated Ibos as well as women and children will follow".
He continued:
"Nigerians openly supported Russia's criminal invasion."
I do not believe that that is true. He urges that we should free ourselves from the wicked and ignominious company of Nigeria and Russia in their war of suppression and genocide. And yet a friend of mine only last Friday came back from Port Harcourt to Lagos with 100 prisoners of war, and he saw 50 waiting at the airport for similar transportation. That does not look like genocide.
The other discrepancies concern the ill-discipline of the troops. Perhaps the

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Minister can say something about this. One has heard many stories of the second division around Onitsha, and yet my hon. Friend the Member for Surbiton (Mr. Fisher) said how good he found the discipline of the third division. I am told that that of the first is equally good. No one, I am told, has been punished for the massacres in 1966, and yet other people tell me that those who perpetrated those massacres are in prison. Perhaps the Minister will answer that.
Then we have the great argument about the airstrips. Did the International Committee of the Red Cross really bring back an agreement from Colonel Ojukwu, and should the Federals have agreed? I should like to quote what Mr. David Williams, editor of West Africa, one of the Daily Mirror group of papers, states in the issue of 24th August:
"Almost three months ago the Federal Government had agreed, at a time when the International Red Cross themselves had admitted that a land corridor was the only effective way of bringing help to people in rebel areas, that a temporary daylight airlift with certain safeguards should be permitted to move 700 tons of stockfish from Fernando Po to a rebel airstrip. Only after the Addis Ababa talks had begun did the Red Cross get any response from Colonel Ojukwu who had in the meantime been making international propaganda on the issue. Then, one morning, the Federal Government was told that an elaborate agreement had been signed in Biafra the previous evening for an airstrip to be used by the Red Cross. Federal agreement was requested at once as an announcement was to be made in Geneva that afternoon. The airstrip in question, however, did not yet exist and the Federal Government was expected to agree that equipment for it should be flown in. More important, as it was situated between Afikpo, now in Federal hands, and Okigwi, towards which Federal troops were moving, the demilitarisation of the area would represent a major military obstacle for many weeks."
What truth is there in that? Of course, we must endeavour to get food in by land rather than by air, although preferably by both, but it is interesting to see that Mr. Robert Goldstein, the publicist for Biafra, has resigned because Colonel Ojukwu has consistently refused to accept a land corridor.
Is it true that a considerable percentage of the starving refugees, on both sides, are from the minorities? I know that pamphlets are being dropped, but is it true that safe conduct passes are being dropped, too? Is it true that the body-
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guard of Ojukwu is now composed of Zambians, Chinese and Tanzanians? Does the new supply of arms from Gabon, which comes in regularly every other night, come from the French? Are the Ibo troops well fed? They appear to be in the films which one sees on television. I cannot help but think of what the reaction of my battery would have been had food been dropped to beleaguered Boulogne or Calais at the time their guns were firing at us.
Is it true that General Gowon is prepared to return to parliamentary government as soon as possible? It seems to me that the Ibos cannot win, but they can be a snake in the grass for many years to come, prepared to pounce on Federal leaders or Federal officials of any kind. I know that the argument of General Gowon is that they will have no base, but did the Irish have any base in Ireland? We know what happened to us there.
It seems to me that the Ibos are frightened to surrender because of their own propaganda. They still hope for adeus ex machina to snatch victory out of defeat. Never in history, I believe, has a totally defeated people still argued for a return to the pre-war frontiers. Ojukwu, and his oligarchs about him, seem to be prepared to pull down the pillars of the Ibo's future temple about their own congregation. They are shorn of strength and yet they are prepared to go on regardless of what will happen to their own people.
Our hopes are that although this is an African problem and must be settled by Africans, the Federals in their position of victory will be magnanimous. If not, and if they massacre, they will be ostracised in the comity of nations. I hope that they will bear this in mind.
I hope that it will be made clear that Ibos will be allowed to live anywhere in Nigeria, in all the 12 states of the new Federation. I am glad to read in West Africa this statement by General Gowon:
"I want this to be again a country where Ibos like everybody else can look forward to holding the highest offices. There are a small number of people on the other side who have played with high stakes, the lives of millions, and have lost. They have to face the music. But there are so many others who, I know, once Ojukwu's police state is ended, and they

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no longer fear for their families, will come out on our side to rejoin us in reconstruction."
I trust that what he says will be carried out. I trust, too, that both sides will show greater flexibility, Ojukwu accepting association in whatever way it may be, and the Nigerians, if possible, giving the East Central State some special status, like that of Northern Ireland. We have somehow got to arrange that both sides save face. I hope that both will accept a permanent peace-keeping force, permanent not for six months or so but more like the force sent by Napoleon III to Rome and which was accepted, reluctantly, I agree, by the new great State of Italy at that time.
So finally I would like to urge that action should be taken for mercy routes to be agreed on as soon as possible by air, road and water; for safe conduct passes to be dropped on the whole of the Ibo territory, the literate part of Nigeria, and leaflets are surely better than bombs; that both sides should accept a peace-keeping force, for which there should be immediate contingency planning; that there should be a real co-ordination of relief agencies to get round the stories of incompetence and inter-agency strife of which one has heard; that maximum pressure should be put by us and other Governments on both sides for a cease fire; that aid should be given on a massive scale.
We cannot bring back the dead. One of the most horrible civil wars in history has taken place. Let us see that the survivors recover more quickly and have a better chance than the survivors of past civil wars, and that they are able to build more quickly and better a new association along the great river.
2.52 p.m.
Mr. Philip Noel-Baker: I want to offer a few brief reflections on the debate. The Secretary of State told us that it has now been agreed in the Ethiopia conference that there should be priority for relief, that his Imperial Majesty the Emperor's proposals have been accepted, and that the United Nations delegate is leaving Geneva for Addis Ababa. We all hope that that will succeed, but I venture to add a rider. It is weeks, six or seven, since the Secretary of State told us that it would be dangerous to talk about stopping the supply
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of arms because it might imperil the proposals for relief. I have felt it very unfortunate, to use a mild and academic word, that the talk about relief has cut across, has clouded, has obscured, what really matters, the ending of the war. If we want to save the lives of those starving mothers and children the thing to do is to bring hostilities to an end, and that is the issue on which I wish to speak.
I say, as a preliminary, something which would be quite familiar to the Secretary of State—if he were here: that I have never agreed with the policy which the Government have pursued. I have never understood the reasons with which they have justified their actions. I agree with every word of the powerful speech by my right hon. Friend the Member for Llanelly (Mr. James Griffiths) this morning, and I believe that not a single word has been said in valid answer to it. I have never understood why, in a dozen ways, right down to the Foreign Office comments last week on General de Gaulle's recognition of Biafra, why, in ways military, diplomatic, economic, financial, our Government have favoured, helped and supported the egregious Government of the egregious Colonel Gowon.
I start from the question asked by the right hon. Member for Barnet (Mr. Maudling): is this secession or is it civil war? I agree with the Secretary of State in thinking that that is a distinction without a difference. In 1860 the Southern States of America endeavoured to secede. Ever since, the Americans, and all the world, have called their struggle the American Civil War. I mention it because it has a lesson. What was the vital lesson of the American Civil War? That it ought never to have happened, that if the war had been held off for a few short years slavery would have been abolished by peaceful means, and the nation might have avoided the terrible problems of racial hostility and discrimination, of lynchings and riots and ghettos, with which they have been cursed for the last century. They are problems which are still growing worse from year to year, and which no American Government have yet shown the courage to face.
The supreme problem in Nigeria last summer was to avoid the outbreak of

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war, or, if war started, to bring it to an end. And incomparably the best hope of stopping the war, as the hon. Member for Liverpool, Wavertree (Mr. Tilney) so ably said, was to prevent arms from going to either side. The Government say, how could we deprive an equal Commonwealth Government of a right which they had always exercised to import British arms? I think we could very well have done what the United States Government found it possible to do. The United States Government said, "Sorry, we cannot supply any arms. This is a Nigerian problem. You must settle it among yourselves". I think we might have said, as the ex-Colonial rulers of Nigeria, "We have responsibilities to 14 million Biafrans as well as to the millions of other ex-British citizens in the north and west. We have responsibilities to 14 million Biafrans, and our responsibility to all of them is to try to stop the war from breaking out, to try to use every means of influence we have to ensure that your dispute shall be settled by peaceful means."
At that time the Prime Minister had excellent relations with Chairman Kosygin, and I believe that if the Prime Minister had called on Chairman Kosygin then to stop the supply of arms, with the purpose that, as members of the United Nations, we should join in seeking to prevent the outbreak of an appalling war, then in all human probability Mr. Kosygin would have agreed.
The real argument that has dominated the Government's thinking, and the Secretary of State more or less reproduced it in his speech today—it has already been dealt with in the House but I venture to deal with it again—has been that if we stop giving Colonel Gowon arms we shall lose our influence to persuade him to a policy of peace.
That argument, stated in plain terms, seems to me to be a semantic absurdity. It is a challenge to common sense. Give a man a gun in order to persuade him not to use it! Experience has shown that it has given us absolutely no influence at all.
As the hon. Gentleman the Member for Bournemouth, West (Sir J. Eden) argued, today we have precisely the situation which the Foreign Secretary foresaw in June when he said that, if
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this situation came about, the supply of arms should stop. I believe that even at this late hour it is by far the most hopeful policy for our Government to pursue. Even if this great military drive succeeds, even if there is a massive slaughter and the Biafran forces are defeated, there will be a long guerrilla war. No one who knows the Ibos can doubt that that is true. For that reason alone, it would not be too late to stop supplying arms. The Secretary of State said to us that if we stopped the arms now the Biafrans might be less ready to accept honourable terms. That is an argument for the Biafrans to surrender and for Britain to play a major part in forcing them to surrender; but it is not an argument that the opinion of this country would accept.
Whatever happens, Nigeria and Biafra will have an unhappy future, with many of the problems which have cursed the United States. For us to stop the supply of arms and to do everything in cur power to get Russia and all other Governments to do the same is by far the best hope for stopping the war, preventing the guerrilla sequel and securing a lasting peace. I hope we shall do it, and do it now. Even if it fails, it is the only way in which we can show our deep conviction that further fighting can only do irreparable harm to Nigeria, to Africa and to the world.
3.2 p.m.
Mr. Bernard Braine: Yesterday we met to discuss a sudden act of criminal aggression which none of us in this country could have prevented and where, alas, the only course open to us was to express our moral condemnation. Even so, I think all hon. Members would agree that it was well worth the while.
Today we have debated the long drawn out horror of a civil war in a very different country, a country which we above all others helped to create, whose constitution we helped to fashion, whose leaders were trained in our ways and where hitherto we have enjoyed exceptional friendship, esteem and influence. For that reason it is not surprising that this has been one of the most moving debates that I can remember.
Some speakers have reminded us that Nigeria is now independent and it is not

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our responsibility to take part in an internal domestic quarrel. That is, of course, quite true but then, as the hon. Gentleman the Member for Berwick and East Lothian (Mr. Mackintosh) in a quite remarkable and well-informed speech reminded us, precisely because of our long historical association with Nigeria we were involved in this situation from the start. There is no escape from that.
Speech after speech has made it plain that hon. Members, like the country as a whole, find it repugnant that we should be supplying arms in a war which is causing intense human suffering; all the more so when the leaders on both sides have utterly failed so far to agree on the organisation of relief which the International Red Cross and other voluntary organisations are ready and willing to provide, and have been so for many months past. Whatever the difficulties as a supplier of arms, Her Majesty's Government cannot evade responsibility for what is going on. It is therefore, wholly right that this debate is being held to focus attention on this appalling tragedy. It is right that we should be scrutinising the Government's policy and should be impatient for some proof that that policy has been justified.
As for the arms issue, it must be remembered that we had a hand in Nigeria's defence long before the present troubles. Newly independent Nigeria quickly built up an exemplary international reputation. Her influence was generally cast for moderation in the counsels of the United Nations, in the Commonwealth, and in the Organisation for African Unity. Her troops played a constructive role in the Congo. It was understandable why, at the outset, Her Majesty's Government continued to supply arms to the legal authority in Nigeria and why they believed that such a policy would permit this country to exercise a moderating influence on the situation.
That policy is defensible only as long as it is manifest that British influence has led to restraint in the conduct of military operations, is leading as rapidly as may be to a cease-fire and to speedy relief of famine and, thereafter, to conciliation and reconstruction. It is not defensible if it leads in Nigeria itself to indifference to civilian suffering and eventually to the destruction of a whole people.
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The Government's policy on this has been clear for some time past. It was put by the Foreign Secretary in the debate on 12th June, when he said:
"… it would at any rate have been wrong at the outset of the secession for us to have cut off supplies completely from the Federal Government. That would have been to have said to a Government, in effect, 'We have put you in a position where you are very heavily dependent on us for the instruments of power. Now, when you are faced by a challenge to your authority, we will put you at a very serious disadvantage.'"
He went on:
"I do not think that one can avoid the conclusion that if we had taken that action it would have been, and would have been interpreted as being, giving in practice approval, and substantial practical help to the movement for secession."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 12th June, 1968; Vol. 766, c. 290.]
That made sense. There was a further consideration which the Foreign Secretary laid before us and which perhaps I ought to mention now. If by cutting off supplies we had encouraged the secession of the Eastern Region as a whole on the ground that the Ibos wanted it, that would have meant handing over to Ibo control the numerous non-Ibo peoples living there. That made sense, too.
While the 7 million or more Ibos in the Eastern Region are entitled to self-determination, so are the 5 million Efiks, Ibibios, Ekois, Ijaws, and the rest who were included in the Ibos' dream of a Biafran State. My memory and those of several of my hon. Friends go back some years in this regard. Recalling the demands that some of those minority tribes once made for their own States, the process of secession and disintegration would hardly have stopped with Biafra and would almost certainly have had an adverse effect throughout an already dangerously Balkanised Africa.
Thus the choice presented to us by the Foreign Secretary in June was between supporting the Federal Government and standing by while anarchy prevailed. At the same time, the Foreign Secretary also stressed the difficulty of securing an all-round embargo on arms supplies to both sides, especially as he told us that the arms going to the Biafrans were coming from many different quarters. At that time, and even now, that sounds a reasonable enough argument. However, he made one important reservation of which the House was reminded by my hon.

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Friend this morning. He said that if the Federal Government contemptuously threw aside any chance of a reasonable settlement or proceeded without mercy either with the slaughter or the starvation of the Ibo people, the arguments which had justified the Government's policy would fall.
Now the Commonwealth Secretary told us earlier today that the conditions laid down by the Foreign Secretary in June as justifying a change of policy have not yet arisen. The House must take that as the considered judgment of the Government. To be fair, I do not think that it can be said that the Nigerian Federal Government have thrown aside the chance of a reasonable settlement. The hon. Member for Berwick and East Lothian was right to remind us of the reasonable proposals tabled by the Federal Government at the Kampala talks. It is true that the later talks at Addis Ababa have for the time being broken down. In passing, we on this side of the House would like to pay tribute to the tireless efforts and the painstaking statesmanship of the Emperor Haile Selassie in his efforts to bring the two sides together for a political settlement and to try to get famine relief organised as quickly as possible. If only the Nigerian protagonists had listened to his advice not to hark back over the causes, but to think of the plight of their people now and of the problem for the future. But I am bound to say that any objective reading of the speeches made at Kampala, Niamey, or Addis Ababa by Colonel Ojukwu or General Gowon or their representatives would reveal clearly where the blame for the breakdown of the political talks lies. In my judgment, the blame does not lie at the door of the Federal Government. To that extent, I support the conclusion that the right hon. Gentleman reached this morning.
But now other consequences follow. The fighting has been resumed and with it a dampening of the hopes that swift relief might be brought to the starving. The question raised in speech after speech is: Is this the begining of the end? Is this the military solution? Somebody used the awful phrase, "Is this the final solution?". Many right hon. and hon. Members clearly fear that this is so.
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It is reported in the Press that Aba has fallen. If so, a look at the map will show that there are only two sizeable towns left in Ibo hands. All the indications are that the unhappy Ibos are taking to the bush. Unless some new element is quickly introduced into the situation a long and bloody period of guerilla warfare and intensification of the suffering may ensue. The House listened with great respect to the right hon. Member for Llanelly (Mr. James Griffiths) and the right hon. Member for Stafford and Stone (Mr. Hugh Fraser) when they spoke about what may follow if guerilla fighting ensues. It is in these circumstances that the Government's claim that their policy is justified, because it has succeeded in preserving British influence in Lagos, is put to the acid test.
In the name of humanity we ask two things of the Government. First, that they insist on observers—I do not think that we care very much whether they are from the Commonwealth or from the Organisation for African Unity accompanying the Federal troops in this latest military drive. As long ago as the beginning of the year some of us were arguing for the preparation of a Commonwealth peace-keeping force which, at the appropriate time and with the approval of the Federal Government, could be moved in to give assurance to the Ibos that they were not going to be massacred.
In the debate on 22nd July I said that we supported the Government's readiness to contribute to a joint observer force as part of the pacification programme.
I said that it was not too early to ask what was being done about the preliminary preparation of a British contribution to such a force. I received no answer; yet the question was crucial then, and it is crucial now. This was not a case of outsiders seeking to impose their ideas on an unwilling Federal Nigeria. General Gowon is a sensible man. He has already recognised the need for such a force. In Niamey on 10th July, he said:
"I am fully conscious of the fact that after the bitter experience of a civil war, the Ibos in rebel-held areas may fear for their personal safety when the rebellion is over. To accommodate this fear the Federal Government has agreed to have an outside observer force to give a sense of security to the Ibos … We are thinking of an observer force drawn from friendly Governments to witness the reassertion

1517
of Federal troops will not go into rebel-held areas to 'massacre' Ibos."
At Addis Ababa Chief Enahoro went further and proposed a force drawn from Ethiopia, India and Canada. What contribution is this counry making to the organisation and movement of such a force, and to the setting-up of its communications? What contingency planning have the Government carried out? I got no answer to this question a month ago, and I should like to have one now.
We cannot brush aside the Ibo fears. The right hon. Member for Llanelly, speaking with all the authority of a former Colonial Secretary, said that the Ibos believe that they are fighting for their survival. They believe what they are told by their leaders. They believe that food coming from Lagos will be poisoned, so they will not eat it even if it gets through. They have been told that they will be massacred when the Federal troops arrive. They certainly have bitter memories of what happened in the past. Never mind how many people perished in the North; many thousands did perish, and they have the memory of this engraved on their minds. Who can blame them for thinking in this way when one Federal commander has been talking of shooting every Ibo in sight?
Like my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Wavertree (Mr. Tilney) I too received a telegram from Raymond Njoku, a former Chairman of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, a Federal Minister, and an Ibo. My hon. Friend will forgive me when I say he drew the wrong conclusions from the telegram. I will read it again.
"Suggestion advocating Nigerian Federal troops overunning Biafra heartland as quick end to the war contrary to British Government's previous undertaking is most unrealistic, mischievous, shocking and wicked. Federal troops are now attempting to do so. If this happened, God forbid, wholesale massacre of all educated Ibos as well as women and children will follow and the war will never end. Is that what our British colleagues and friends want to happen to us?"
The point is not whether it will happen; the point is that this is what the Ibos believe will happen, and for that reason will go on fighting as long as there is breath in their bodies.
I hope that an answer has been given to Mr. Njoku by the speeches in this debate. We cannot wash our hands of
1518
this matter, Pilate-fashion. That is why the Government must use every scrap of influence they say their policy has been designed to preserve to give this unfortunate people the assurance that their lives are not in jeopardy and that their suffering can be brought to an end.
The thought dominating everyone's mind in the debate and the thought dominating the minds of millions of people in this country for weeks past is what can be done to ease the plight of the starving civilians?
Here, as many hon. Members have recognised, the problem exists not only in the Ibo heartland but in the Federal-occupied territories around it. We should commend the Government for sending out the Hunt Mission. It is a pity that a mission of this kind was not sent out earlier. It was a tragedy that permission to enter Biafra was withheld. Even so, the Mission did its job with speed and efficiency, and Lord Hunt, Sir Colin Thornley, Mr. Hodgson and Dr. Maelor Evans are deserving of the highest praise for a job well done. If my right hon. Friend the Member for Stafford and Stone is right and little has been achieved since the Mission has reported—and I do not quarrel with that—I say most emphatically that it is not the fault of the Mission. But what precisely has happened since the Mission reported and since the statement of Lord Shepherd of 31st July as to the response the Government made in sending out food, medical supplies, special transport and personnel? We are entitled to know.
There are clearly two separate problems. There is the problem of organising relief in areas where the Federal Government have resumed full control of administration and communications. Then there is the problem of opening new corridors of mercy into the Ibo heartland where, according to Lord Hunt only last month there were at least half a million refugees in about 600 camps. There must be many more now, with larger numbers taking to the bush.
This tragic situation is heightened by other facts, such as those presented by my hon. Friend the Member for Surbiton (Mr. Fisher) and others who have reminded us that there is no shortage of food in Nigeria as a whole. According to Mr. Ian Colvin in last Friday'sDaily Telegraph, there are 5,000 tons of food

1519
waiting in Lagos, 1,700 tons in Enugu, 1,000 tons in Calabar and 3,500 tons in Fernando Po. On 31st July Lord Shepherd said that relief was reaching Federal-occupied areas, but I have seen reports suggesting otherwise. If relief is reaching these areas, we should be given the details.
I ask this question because the voluntary agencies contest Lord Shepherd's assertion. For example, as recently as last Friday I was told that up to then no significant relief supplies were reaching these areas from Lagos. These are areas in which Lord Hunt reported there was severe and pitiable distress, where the number of refugees was increasing daily and there was an acute shortage of relief workers, doctors, transport and properly organised lines of communication. But these are areas which the Federal forces have controlled in some cases for weeks and in many cases for months. What is the truth of the situation there?
Mr. James Johnson rose—
Mr. Braine: I will not give way. I wish to adhere to my promise to sit down at a specific time. I still have a number of matters to raise.
As I was saying, we want to know the truth of the situation. The Commonwealth Secretary gave an impressive list of relief teams being mobilised and of supplies and transport being organised. He said that there was a gathering momentum of effort. Unless I am much mistaken, the implication of all this is that precious little has been done up to now. Indeed, we had to wait until the Hunt Mission left the country and reported before anything was done at all. It reported, but it is only now that matters are starting to move. This may be a reflection of the callous disregard which Nigerian leaders on both sides have been paying to the pleas which the International Red Cross, Oxfam, the World Council of Churches and all the other organisations have been making, not just since the Hunt Mission went out but for many months past. The hon. Member for Berwick and East Lothian used the milder term of there having been a lack of concern. I would say that there has been a callous disregard. This is a commentary on the standards of some of those who exercise control over people
1520
we once governed. Hon. Members can draw their own conclusions from that. Perhaps we did not build as well as we thought we did.
Have we yet any guarantee that relief is now going to be brought to these people on an adequate scale? Has the right hon. Gentleman seen the report in this week'sEconomist, the Lagos correspondent of which stated that at the beginning of last week the International Red Cross was ordered to halt its daily flights to Enugu and Calabar, that the airports there were now being reserved for military purposes? The Commonwealth Secretary told us that the Red Cross's flights to Fernando Po were to be resumed. Does this mean that they have not yet been resumed? If not, what pressure is being brought to bear by the Government?
Mr. George Thomson: There are two separate issues here. I dealt with the closure temporarily of the airports in Federal territory but the flights from Fernando Po into Biafra will not require any Federal airports.
Mr. Braine: I am grateful for that clarification.
I turn now to the question of the situation in the Ibo heartland. Lord Hunt was reported to have told Mr. Colvin of the Daily Telegraph that a new initiative to get relief there might take three weeks to get into operation. Does this mean three weeks after acceptance of the formula proposed at Addis Ababa? If so, this could be a considerable time in the future. In the meantime, the clandestine flights by the French from Gabon are continuing. According to Lord Hunt, they are gallant but ineffective because the aircraft only land five tons at a time. Since Colonel Ojukwu is getting arms from the same source, it is perhaps not surprising that the Federal authorities have threatened to shoot the planes down.
But the end of the military phase of the war cannot be far away. It seems from what the right hon. Gentleman has said that agreement in principle for a landing strip for relief has been or is about to be reached, but I have seen it reported that General Gowon has rejected the last site offered to the Red Cross by Colonel Ojukwu. What steps are being taken to persuade him to accept Red Cross planes?

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There may be simple answers to all these questions but I ask them to highlight the anxieties expressed in every speech in this debate. The message of this debate is that the Government must use every ounce of influence they say their policy has preserved to get the Red Cross supplies moving. The time for equivocation is over. The Government must make the position crystal clear to the Federal authorities. They must state, too—and the House needs to know this because we shall be involved in the expenditure and supply of personnel—what active they are taking to assist in sending an observer force to help both sides in the task of pacification.
Very shortly Parliament will be dispersing. If General Gowon is to be believed, the present military phase will be over in four weeks, that is before we have the opportunity to look at this matter again. But the Government need not think that this gives them a period of respite. We shall watch their actions with the utmost vigilance. We shall expect them to exert every ounce of the influence they say they have, and if events move more hopefully—and I want to end on a positive rather than a negative note—than seems likely at the moment, we shall expect them to offer generous help in the task of rehabilitation and reconciliation in a country which, only a very few years ago, was regarded as one of the most promising in the Commonwealth.
3.28 p.m.
The Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. William Whitlock): The theme of every speech today has been one of great concern with the terrible fratricidal strife in Nigeria. The hon. Member for Essex, South-East (Mr. Braine) said that the speeches have been some of the most moving he has ever heard in this Chamber, and I am sure that the speeches reflect the feelings of the broad mass of our people and, indeed, of the people of the world who have any knowledge of what is going on in Nigeria.
The right hon. Member for Barnet (Mr. Maudling) referred to the great difficulty of understanding what is going on in Nigeria. He said that an immense fog of propaganda surrounds all accounts that we get. Inevitably some of that fog has invaded the Chamber. Perhaps that is
1522
why my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster (Mr. Henig) said that there were no means of finding unadulterated facts about the events in Nigeria and went on to say that, while he could not accept what my right hon. Friend said about events there or what Lord Hunt said about events there, he could nevertheless accept the statements made by people unknown to him about what is going on there.
The right hon. Member for Barnet asked, very understandably, what is the true military situation, bearing in mind that hon. Members had seen on television last night a programme in which General Gowon said that the final offensive had begun. While this debate has been proceeding we have been in touch with Lagos, and General Gowon has told us personally that when he said that the final push is now in progress he was referring to the continuing preparatory operations in both the northern and southern Sectors for a final Federal push. General Gowon explained that the rebels had seized the opportunity while the Addis Ababa talks were going on to harass Federal troops on all fronts and that extreme restraint had been exercised by all Federal commanders. But it is evident that in one area, in particular, the Aba area, there was a very troublesome salient which Federal troops have had to strike out. He points out that that is in response to the attacks made by the rebels while the talks were going on. What is happening in this area, one can see, is not always what is said to be happening and is not always in accordance with the words of the military commanders on the spot.
Mr. James Griffiths: My hon. Friend described Aba as a salient. As I said in my speech, I understand that normally 80,000 people live in Aba. There are an untold number of refugees. If it is being attacked, what is the news about what has happened to the people who live there?
Mr. Whitlock: We have no news about the fate of the people who are there, but obviously when a war is going on there are casualties on either side, and there must always be casualties. In this battle which is going on, there are undoubtedly casualties, but the details of those casualties are not known to us at the moment.

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Our view, therefore, as my right hon. Friend said, is that we should continue to strive for a negotiated political settlement. I remind the House that, however much we should regret any extension of the fighting, an offensive by itself would not necessarily breach the conditions which the Government laid down on 12th June. It is patently untrue that the Federal Government are proceeding without mercy to the starvation of the Ibo people and we believe it to be equally untrue that they have any intention of seeking a merciless slaughter. It is also untrue that the Federal Government are throwing aside with contempt any reasonable terms of a settlement. The true situation is that the Federal Government have offered reasonable terms and that Colonel Ojukwu has rejected them.
As my right hon. Friend warned the House, we have been very much aware that time is short if there is to be a political settlement without more major fighting. I remind the House that while the talks have been going on in Addis Ababa there has never been any ceasefire on either side. Half the Ibo heartland was already in Federal hands when the Foreign Secretary made his statement on 12th June laying down the conditions for the supply of arms—behind which we firmly stand at the moment.
One of the factors which has added to the difficulty of assessing events in Nigeria—of course, I am not referring to the well-authenticated reports of starvation nor denying that there has been appalling suffering and loss of life which we all deplore greatly—has been that at times the Press here has found it by no means easy to obtain objective, first-hand reporting from the fighting areas. In the propaganda field the Ibos have often seemed to be winning the war of words while losing the battle of arms. Behind this success is a highly professional operation conducted by an advertising agency in Geneva. The Ibo official line is regularly telexed to Geneva and distributed wholesale and undiluted by the agency to world-wide outlets.
Much of the material supplied by or on behalf of Ibos has been patently untrue. For example, we have been accused of sending 600 painted British troops to Nigeria, some 260 of whom, it was alleged, had been killed during the
1524
Federal offensive at Port Harcourt. A thousand Royal Marines were alleged to have been dispatched to Nigeria for an amphibious attack on Port Harcourt and subsequently recalled. The Hibernian footballers touring Nigeria were said to be parachute troops. A party of British schoolchildren on a cruise were said to be British soldiers. This is the kind of propaganda which emanates from Biafra. It would be laughable were it not for the fact that this last example, the allegation that British schoolchildren were British soldiers, was responsible for the burning of British property in Port Harcourt by an Ibo crowd.
In fact, of course, no British forces have served in Nigeria during the civil war and we have repeatedly denied Ibo claims to the contrary. The Ibo propaganda machine has also gone on insisting that R.A.F. aircraft and British bombs were being used in the war. Although there has never been the slightest shred of truth in this allegation, it still goes on. It is a completely untrue story; nevertheless it has been repeated in some British newspapers. I noted that in the Daily Telegraph magazine supplement as recently as 23rd August there was the suggestion that conceivably British bombs were being dropped on Ibo-held areas. So still, in spite of contradiction of this allegation, we are seeing it repeated even in British newspapers. Obviously if a lie is repeated often enough there are some people, who should know better, but who believe it.
Mr. James A. Dunn: Would not my hon. Friend agree that during the Middle East conflict in June last year the same sort of situation developed? There were misunderstandings and misstatements but they were not the basis of a case for the Government to take action one way or the other. I am surprised that he should suggest that it is the case on this occasion.
Mr. Whitlock: It has often been said that the first casualty in a war is truth. We see this in every war. Another example of the completely misleading claims made by Markpress, which hon. Members regularly receive from Geneva and a copy of which I have here which was referred to by the hon. Member for

1525
Aberdeenshire, West (Mr. James Davidson), has recently been drawn to my attention. In a Press release headed "Biafran Overseas Press Federation" Markpress claimed:
"Airwork Services Ltd., a semi-official British Government Agency, is currently engaged in extending the Nigerian Air Force."
It added that air crews would be recruited from ex-R.A.F. fighter pilots who would serve as mercenaries, and blamed the British Government for actively promoting and fiancing a new instrument by which to intensify the killing of Biafrans. The hand-out is entitled:
"British Government plans to build Nigerian Air Force."
Airwork Services Ltd. is a completely independent commercial organisation. [Interruption.] It is not a semi-official British Government agency. The activities attributed to it by Markpress could not be a responsibility of the British Government, but I understand that Airwork Services Ltd. has no plans to recruit pilots to serve in Nigeria, and that its activities are confined to the maintenance of trainers and communication aircraft.
In the past we have repeatedly had to deny stories that R.A.F. aircraft and pilots have been made available to Nigeria. Now we have this latest story about the British Government being behind an alleged expansion of the Nigerian Air Force. I should like to take this opportunity not only to deny this allegation but to point once more to the completely misleading nature of the type of hand-outs which the Ibo leaders are using in an effort to influence outside opinion.
I could go on at great length giving examples of Ibo propaganda which are not only untrue but grossly defamatory in their allegations about British policy and intentions. Another example of Biafran claims which has been mentioned in the debate and which paints an illegimately lurid picture of events is their recent allegation that Federal troops massacred all the inhabitants—2,300 people—of two villages.
Mr. Jeremy Thorpe: It might help the House if the Minister were told that it is generally accepted that inadequate and inaccurate propaganda may well have been put out from both sides, harmful to this country.
1526
Would the Minister then think that it was time he moved on to a matter that he has not dealt with and has not denied, namely, that we are continuing to supply arms?
Mr. Whitlock: The Government's policy on arms has been outlined by my right hon. Friends the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs and the Foreign Secretary on previous occasions. It is a policy to which we adhere, and that has been made clear. I am replying to the propaganda speeches which have been made in the House. I was talking about the lurid picture of the alleged massacre of 2,000 people in two villages. This seems an extremely unlikely story since it has been observed that the normal pattern is for civilian village populations to disperse into the bush well in advance of the fighting reaching them. A senior journalist with a wide experience of West Africa has recently returned from a visit to the front in the area mentioned—the Aba area—and stated that he saw no evidence of any atrocities. He told our High Commissioner that he was particularly struck by the excellent discipline of the Federal troops, the troops under the command of Colonel Adekunle.
One can scoff at some of these wilder inventions, but the fact remains that Ibo propaganda, perhaps more credible, but none the less untrue, may well have coloured the judgment of some that it has reached, although the Press here has scrupulously quoted the source of its reports. Particularly tragic is the way in which the Ibos seem to become the victims of their own propaganda. The belief which has been instilled in them that any concessions would lead to a planned genocide by the Federal authorities is certainly a stumbling block to achieving a cease-fire. We do not accept that the Federal Government have any such intention against the Ibos. [Interruption.] They have offered to accept outside observers after a ceasefire for the very purpose of reassuring the Ibos. They have suggested that after the ceasefire the East Central State should be policed mostly by Ibo police and not by the Federal Army.
We have heard from reliable sources of captured Biafran soldiers being well-treated by the Federal forces. Lord Hunt's recent mission to Nigeria found

1527
that an attitude of vindictiveness towards the Ibo people among other people was noticeably absent. It also found that Federal troops in many cases were helping to feed Ibo refugees.
It should also be remembered that there are at least 100,000 Ibos living peacefully in Lagos and elsewhere in the Federation at the moment. Ibos continue to hold responsible and senior jobs in the rest of the Federation. These features clearly show that genocide is not intended by the Federal troops or the Federal Government.
Dame Joan Vickers: In his opening remarks the Secretary of State said that the British Government would be neutral. Does the hon. Gentleman think that his speech is following the lead given by his right hon. Friend?
Mr. Whitlock: What my right hon. Friend said was that the Government in this situation could not be neutral. [An HON. MEMBER: "Shameful."]
I think we might now return to what are the issues that divide the two sides. Much has been made of the view of the present situation taken by Biafrans. But how do the Federal Government see the situation? The Federal Government view the situation just as strongly obviously as the Biafran side. We must bear in mind that the Federal Government believe that Colonel Ojukwu and the Ibo leadership are seeking to create by unconstitutional and undemocratic means a sovereign independent State which they call Biafra, which would embrace the whole of the Eastern Region. But that region is not only the tribal home of the Ibos, who number some 7 million. There are also in the region about 5 million others—Efiks, Itsekiri, Ibibios, Ekois and Ijaws. We believe that most of the 5 million non-Ibos, almost half the population of the region, do not favour secession.
Mr. Frank Allaun: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. In view of the need to take a vote, I beg to move, That the Question be now put, as I am assured that nothing recorded in the Chamber yesterday prohibits a decision before 4 o'clock if it is the will of the House.
Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member is right. There is nothing in yesterday's
1528
Motion which prevents a decision of the House being recorded by a vote but only provided the debate ends before 4 o'clock. I am not prepared to accept the Closure. Mr. Whitlock.
Mr. Whitlock rose—
Mr. Hugh Fraser: Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. Could the Minister give an assurance that he will sit down one minute before 4 o'clock?
Mr. Whitlock: I was saying that we believe that most of the—
Hon. Members: Answer.
Mr. Philip Noel-Baker rose—[Interruption.]
Mr. Speaker: Order. Noise does not help at all. A point of order, Mr. Noel-Baker.
Mr. Noel-Baker: Further to the point of order, Mr. Speaker. I am sure that my hon. Friend would desire to give an assurance to the House that he will sit down before 4 o'clock.
Mr. Speaker: That is a point for the Minister, not a point of order for me. Mr. Whitlock.
Mr. Whitlock: I was saying—[HON. MEMBERS: "Answer."]—that we believe that most of the 5 million non-Ibos—
Mr. James Davidson: On a point of order. It must be obvious to the Government Front Bench, Mr. Speaker, that it is the will of the House to vote. May we, please, have an answer from the Minister that he will sit down before 4 o'clock and give the House an opportunity to vote?
Mr. Whitlock: I am attempting to reply to the debate and I shall be better able to do so if hon. Members allow me to continue. We believe—
Mr. Henig rose—
Mr. Speaker: Does the hon. Member seek to raise a point of order?
Mr. Henig: Yes, Mr. Speaker. May I ask whether you have ruled that it is never in order for the Closure to be moved while an hon. Member is still speaking? I believe that on past occasions hon. Members have been on their feet when other hon. Members have successfully sought to move the Closure.
Mr. Speaker: The hon. Gentleman must no: broaden the Ruling that Mr. Speaker made. It is in order for Mr. Speaker to accept a Closure when he thinks that he will accept a Closure, even if an hon. Member is speaking. Mr. Speaker is not, however, prepared to accept the Closure. He is bound by the Motion of yesterday.
Mr. Thorpe: Further to the point of order. Since the Minister has indicated that he wishes to reply to the debate and, therefore, presumably wishes to assist the House in its deliberations, in case it did not register in his mind on previous occasions, may we repeat the question and ask him to indicate whether the Government are frightened that he should sit down at a minute before 4 o'clock?
Mr. Whitlock: This debate has been arranged by the Government in response to requests by hon. Members—[Interruption.]
Mr. Peter Bessell: On a point of order. May I ask your guidance, Mr. Speaker? Is it the custom in this House for the Government flagrantly to deny the wish of the House in the matter of a vote? In the circumstances, cannot you persuade the Government to act in an honourable and decent manner?
Mr. Speaker: If Mr. Speaker were to attempt to persuade the Government, this would be the first time a Speaker had done so in history and it would also be a failure.
Mr. Whitlock: I will continue with what I was saying. We believe that most of the 5 million non-Ibos, almost half the population of the region, do not favour secession. My hon. Friend the Member for Salford, East (Mr. Frank Allaun) may care to think of the lost liberty of those non-Ibos who have suffered under the Ibos and who have not wanted secession.
It must be remembered that the pipelines, the oil installations and the ports of the Eastern Region are mainly in the non-Ibo tribal areas. Thus Colonel Ojukwu's concept of a separate State of Biafra could be achieved only by subordinating the wishes and interests of 5 million non-Ibos to those of the 7 million Ibos in the region. If Colonel Ojukwu were to succeed—
Mr. Michael Barnes: On a point of order. Is it not the case, Mr. Speaker, that on two earlier occasions this year all hon. Members loyally heeded the advice of both Front Benches that it would be best not to divide the House on the question of Nigeria? Is it not equally the case that today there is overwhelming feeling in this Chamber that the matter should be put to the vote? Can you explain, Mr. Speaker, why it is not possible for you to accept the Closure before 4 o'clock, or would you accept the Closure a little nearer 4 o'clock?
Mr. Speaker: The position is quite simple. The House decided yesterday that today's business should be taken on the Adjournment and that at 4 o'clock Mr. Speaker should adjourn the House without Question put. Those are the instructions of the House to Mr. Speaker. I cannot vary them. I am not without sympathy with the desire of many hon. Members to register their opinion by voting. I am powerless to do so unless the debate ends before 4 o'clock.
Mr. Whitlock: If Colonel Ojukwu were to succeed in his aim, he and the Ibos would acquire for themselves a territory rich in agriculture and containing the great oil installations and reserves, all this at the expense of Nigeria as a whole. The position of the Federal Government, on the other hand, has always been clear. They see Nigeria as one sovereign State. They see the economic wealth of the country as something to be developed for the good of all people in Nigeria. In short, if the Federal Government had condoned secession and armed insurrection it could only have been done at the expense of the future development of Nigeria as a country. It would have increased the danger of further fragmentation and the possibility of future conflict between the main tribes of Nigeria. And so the civil war broke out.
In the early days, Colonel Ojukwu's army proved more ready for war than did that of the Federal Government. It was able to move to the attack and occupy the Mid-West Region and march towards Lagos. The first bombs were dropped by Colonel Ojukwu's air force on the civilian population. The truth is that Colonel Ojukwu had imported a considerable quantiity of arms in the expectation

1531
of war. Can anyone doubt that if his forces had continued to advance successfully they would have approached up to Lagos, too? One cannot help but observe at this stage that many of the more vociferous of the Government's critics failed to condemn the civil war when Colonel Ojukwu was—
Mrs. Winifred Ewing: On a point of order. Could I, as a fairly new Member, ask for your guidance, Mr. Speaker? Is not one of the functions of the House of Commons to arrive at the democratic will of the House at the end of a debate?
Mr. Speaker: That is a delightful philosophic question which I would love to discuss with the hon. Lady.
Sir Knox Cunningham: On a point of order. Could I put this philosophic question to you, Mr. Speaker? If the Minister feels unable to sit down at one minute to four o'clock, would he ask the Prime Minister, who is sitting beside him, and who is in charge, to ask him to sit down so that the will of the House may be shown by a vote?
Mr. Whitlock: Throughout this tragic dispute we have persistently worked for peace, first by trying to help the Nigerians compose their differences without resort to arms, and later by urging both sides to work for a negotiated settlement, and paradoxically—this is not accepted by my hon. Friends, I know—our continuing arms supplies to the Federal Government have lent weight to those methods and have been a real help to us in urging moderation and flexibility upon them.
In January, 1967, Mr. Malcolm Macdonald's largely unknown and unsung work came near to achieving the reconciliation of opposing viewpoints at a conference at Aburi in Ghana. It is a tragedy that this agreement was so shortlived and did not reach fruition. In March, 1967, we urged Colonel Ojukwu not to push Ibo grievances to the point of secession—
Sir Stephen McAdden: On a point of order. As it is manifestly out of order for hon. Members to read their speeches, would it not be just as well if we took a vote now?
Mr. Speaker: It is in order for hon. Members to make use of copious notes.
Mr. Barnes: On a point of order. I beg to move, That the Question be now put.
Mr. Speaker: Order. I have already explained that I am not prepared to accept that Motion.
Mr. Gilbert Longden: On a point of order. It would appear likely that the proceedings of this House this afternoon will bring Parliament into contempt. Naturally, I do not presume to ask you, Mr. Speaker, to bring pressure on the Government, but I ask you to uphold the rights of private Members, most of whom here wish to vote.
Mr. Speaker: Order. I must defend Parliament against the hon. Member. A Motion was carried yesterday, and it defines the proceedings of the day. The hon. Member and his colleagues should have taken exception to that Motion yesterday.
Sir Douglas Glover: On a point of order. When the House reached that decision yesterday it had no idea of the sort of arguments the Government would make. It is quite obvious that nearly every Member in the Chamber wishes to have a Division.
Mr. Speaker: I am not responsible for what was in the minds of hon. Members when they came to their decision yesterday. But they came to that decision.
Mr. Whitlock rose—
Hon. Members: Sit down.
Mr. Philip Noel-Baker: On a point of order. May I suggest to the Leader of the House that, for the good name of the House, he should ask the Undersecretary of State to sit down and allow a vote to be taken?
Mr. Whitlock: May I remind the House that it was the Government who recalled this House in order that Members on either side of the House might have an opportunity to put their points of view on this terrible tragedy of the war in Nigeria.

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My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary has said that we would end the arms supply if the Federal Government were conducting irresponsible military activity which would prevent talks from taking place, if those talks had any chance of success, military activity which would cause wanton and unavoidable
1534
slaughter going on in Nigeria. That is the situation—
It being Four o'clock, Mr. SPEAKER adjourned the House, without Question put, till Monday, 14th October, pursuant to the Resolutions of the House yesterday.

AVIATION
  Flight Data Recorders
  Flight Data Recorders
  Light Aircraft and Helicopters (Noise)
  Light Aircraft and Helicopters (Noise)
PUBLIC BUILDING AND WORKS
  Confidential Information
  Confidential Information
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
  Discharged Servicemen, Woking Area (Rehousing)
  Discharged Servicemen, Woking Area (Rehousing)

Preamble
The House met at eleven of the clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Truro

NIGERIA: REPORTED SUPPLY OF STRIKE AIRCRAFT
11.5 a.m.
THE EARL OF CORK AND ORRERY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether it is true that Airwork Services Ltd. are to supply strike aircraft to the Federal Government of Nigeria, and to recruit ground crews for their maintenance; and if so, by whom these aircraft will be flown.]
The MINISTER OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS (LORD SHEPHERD):My Lords, in a short while I shall be speaking in the debate on Nigeria, and will touch on the role of Biafran propaganda. There is no truth whatsoever in this allegation, and therefore the answer to the noble Lord is,"No".
THE EARL OF CORK AND ORRERY: My Lords, I am much obliged to the noble Lord for this most reassuring Answer. I wonder whether he would feel inclined to think that an inquiry into this matter would be in order, as the information which he so reassuringly contradicts is alleged to have come from British Airwork Services themselves.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I do not think Her Majesty's Government would wish to spend money investigating the activities of the Mark Press and the various Biafran propaganda machines.

BUSINESS
THE PAYMASTER GENERAL (LORD SHACKLETON): My Lords, if there is any fresh news on the situation in Czechoslovakia, with the leave of the
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House we propose to interrupt business and make a Statement, but I cannot foresee whether any hard news will be forthcoming. Perhaps I might also add, on behalf of my noble friend Lord Beswick, the information that there will be a half-hour break for lunch.

NIGERIA
11.7 a.m.
THE EARL OF BESSBOROUGH THE EARL OF BESSBOROUGH rose to move, That this House takes note of the situation in Nigeria. The noble Earl said: My Lords, I am most grateful to the Government, to the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, and the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, for agreeing that I should move this Motion, following on the friendly understanding, which is also accepted in another place, that Government and Opposition Motions should alternate. I hope that it will also enable the noble Lord to deal with some of my questions at the outset, and thus make it unnecessary for him to refer to them again in his final winding-up speech. We welcome him back from, I think, Balmoral. I hasten to add that he has not, I think, been trying to adopt the "grouse moor" image but has, very properly, been attending a Privy Council.
My Lords, like my noble friend Lord Jellicoe yesterday, I think the Government were right to recall Parliament and to take the opportunity, of reporting not only on the situation in Czechoslovakia but also on that in Nigeria, for during the last week the situation in Nigeria has certainly been very confusing and disturbing. We heard early in the week that Federal Nigerian units were poised for a final onslaught on the Ibo heartland; and, on Saturday, that they were approaching Oweri, where Colonel Ojukwu was thought to have his headquarters. Yet another report on the same day stated that General Gowon was holding his troops back—holding them back, my Lords—until the possibility of a peaceful solution had been completely exhausted; and this despite heavy pressure on him to finish the war rapidly with a final military campaign. Then, yesterday, it was reported in the Daily Telegraph that Biafran troops had withdrawn from Aba; and last night, in an interview on "24 Hours", General Gowon openly admitted that the final push was on and that the war would

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probably be over in about four weeks. At the same time, Dr. Azikwe, who is Colonel Ojukwu's political adviser, was reported yesterday to have said that Biafra would fight to the bitter end.
I should be grateful if the noble Lord would comment on these reports (I do not think they can all be very wide of the mark) and tell us whether he thinks this final action by the Federal Government is indeed imminent. We might have hoped otherwise, and that the noble Lord was really satisfied with what I understood to be Chief Enahoro's assurances last week that the attack on Aba was not part of a final push. According to the Sunday Telegraph, fierce fighting on all fronts had been reported by Radio Biafra, indicating that the Federal Government is still intent on pursuing its "final solution" offensive against the breakaway State. At the same time, I understand from the same paper that Federal Nigeria and Biafra delegates to the peace talks at Addis Ababa have now agreed on a formula to send relief supplies to the victims of the war. I hope this really is a breakthrough, but I imagine that there will be many practical problems in the implementation of this agreement and that it will take some time to work out the details, especially in view of the vast size of the problem. I gather that it is estimated that between 2½million and 4 million are in Biafran refugee camps.
We on these Benches welcome the action which the Government took in regard to relief, and in sending the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, on his extremely difficult mission. I read with interest his report, which was published earlier this month. Whether or not the noble Lord feels he was successful in his task, I feel that we should all pay a very warm tribute to the very hard and devoted work which he did in this extremely difficult situation; and we are very glad to see him here this morning, and that he is to address your Lordships. He has the admiration of us all.
I should particularly like to ask the Government, in regard to the Mission's report, whether the recommendations in Part 6 have now been fully implemented by the Government. I know from the noble Lord's reply to the Private Notice Question put by my noble Leader Lord Carrington on July 31 that a large part
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of the sum allocated has been either spent or firmly committed. Altogether, I see that the Mission recommended that some £238,000 should be provided to supply transport, personnel and relief supplies to the starving people of Biafra. In parenthesis, here I think I should say how sure I am that noble Lords on both sides of the House must have been sickened by the films and pictures of starving children which they have seen, and that our hearts, and not only our hearts but our hard cash, must go out.
What I should like to know with regard to this report is whether Lord Hunt's recommendations regarding the provision of trucks and Landrovers, light aid detachments, river craft, ambulances, medico-social teams, civilian drivers, mechanics and food and medical supplies in categories and quantities advised by the International Red Cross have now been fully met. I know that there was some difficulty in determining the types of river craft likely to be most useful and readily obtainable. I wonder whether such river craft are now available. Also, I gather that some of the trucks aresecond-hand and need a good deal of maintenance, and that they will even have to be equipped with certain additional items. I wonder whether the noble Lord can give us further information regarding the detailed fulfilment of Lord Hunt's recommendations.
I read on Saturday that relief flights to Biafra by aircraft chartered by the International Red Cross had been resumed and that during last week there had been two flights nightly from Fernando Po, 8 tons of foodstuff and medicines being carried at a time. Yesterday I heard the B.B.C. report that four other countries, including Denmark, were sending aircraft. Am I right in thinking that all these flights are being continued and that the new Red Cross airfield in Biafra is functioning fully? There was a report, I regret to say, in The Times yesterday that it had again been bombed by Nigerian aircraft.
I am sure we all welcome—indeed I think that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, has done so—the French attempt to fly supplies in by way of the Gabon, even if these supplies do not begin to meet the overall requirements. I gather that the French are landing only 5 tons each time but that the International Red Cross

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has to think in terms of 5,000 tons waiting in Lagos; 1,700 tons in Enugu, 1,000 tons in Calabar and 3,500 tons in Fernando Po. No doubt the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, will confirm these figures today, and I have no doubt that he is right in saying that only that sort of tonnage can make a difference to the suffering in Biafra. I wonder whether the Government can estimate what the total tonnage is which is being flown in by these various aircraft.
I wonder also whether the noble Lord can say whether reports that Britain might withdraw support from the International Red Cross if they started daylight flights to a Biafran airstrip without the consent of the Nigerian Federal Government are correct. As I understand it, this plan was put forward after the airstrip proposed by Colonel Ojukwu was rejected by General Gowon. Is there a possibility that the Federal Government may be reconsidering their position? Then there is the whole question of whether it will be possible to mobilise an observer force to assist in the solution of this dire situation. Can the noble Lord say anything further about the progress which has been made in organising such a force? I gather that recently General Gowon was urged to allow a team of international observers to accompany his troops in the final assault on Biafra, but I also understand that this proposal got little support when it was first mentioned in the peace talks. However, I understand that the Organisation of African Unity is strongly in favour of the idea, which has the support of the Emperor Haile Selassie who presides over the peace talks in Addis Ababa.
Finally, my Lords, on the delicate question of our supplying arms to the Federal Government, I recognise that certain countries have ceased to do so, and there has been considerable pressure from the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, and others to get the Government to reconsider their position. The noble Lord, Lord Brockway, may regret that we on these Benches have not been able to support him on this. I think our view is that while some countries may have stopped supplying arms, other countries have not or will not; and when I speak of other countries I mean in particular, of course, the country whose actions we all so much deplored
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in yesterday's debate. If we ceased to supply arms, what guarantee have we, my Lords, that other countries would do so too? I think that Nigeria would get its arms one way or another, and that there may have been a good case for supplying them legally.
I also appreciate the Government's argument that supplying the Federal Government with arms gives us some restraining influence on them, and I should like to ask this question of the Government. What has our influence been? What, in fact, have we done? We on these Benches accepted the necessity to continue such arms supplies on the basis of the argument that if the war degenerated into genocide, the Government would reconsider their position. Do they consider that the war has degenerated, or is about to degenerate, into genocide, and, if so, have they changed their attitude regarding arms supplies to what I agree is, after all, the legitimate Federal Government? We on these Benches accepted the Government's argument only after a great deal of heart searching. Are the Government changing their view with regard to an arms embargo in the light of the latest military actions by the Federal Government?
My Lords, we were all agreed yesterday in our attitude towards the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. There was no doubt in our minds as to what we thought about this. I think that world opinion in regard to Nigeria is perhaps less crystallised and that it may be more difficult to make up our minds about it. Yet from the Commonwealth point of view it could be said that this situation is even more our concern—it is indeed a family concern—than is the one within the so-called Eastern bloc. On this basis, we have even less reason to stand aside in a seemingly disinterested way in this conflict; and I am certainly not accusing the Government of doing so. Both conflicts involve our vital interests. I only hope that General Gowon's troops will show discipline and restraint, and that the General's expressed sympathy last night on television for the innocent starving children will be matched by appropriate action—relief action and restraint by his troops.
I am indeed most grateful to the noble Lord for having agreed to report the latest situation to us, and I hope that

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he will be able to elucidate it further. All our sympathies go out to the peoples of Nigeria, and I only hope that, in agreement with the International Red Cross, effective relief action may now be taken, even at: this very late hour. I am very glad that the noble Viscount, Lord Head, who has unrivalled knowledge of Nigeria, having been First High Commissioner of the Federation, is with us to speak today. We shall listen to his speech with the greatest interest. Meanwhile, we on these Benches will try to support the Government in every way we can in their attempts, even at this late stage, to help to achieve a ceasefire, and organise relief in a war which appears to be moving inexorably towards an agonising end. My Lords, I beg to move.
Moved, That this House takes note of the situation in Nigeria.—(The Earl of Bessborough.)
11.23 a.m.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, all of us deplore the events that have brought the House together at such short notice. Yesterday, as the noble Earl, Lord Bessborough, said, we could unite in expressing our deep sense of shock and abhorrence at the appalling action of the Soviet Union in invading Czechoslovakia. Television has brought to us in a clear and unmistakable way the anger and bewilderment of the Czech people, on the one hand, and their dignity and restraint on the other. All this we have seen vividly in our homes. Today, we meet to consider another tragedy. It is not in Europe but in Africa, and in a country within the Commonwealth the tragedy of the Nigerian civil war.
In this case, again, television has brought the anguish and the consequences of civil war into our homes. The blank, expressionless faces of starving children clearly not understanding the causes of their misery, and the pathetic and heartbreaking plight of these children, must strike deep in all our consciences. For those of us who know Nigeria, particularly for those of us who are deeply involved in trying to find a solution to this tragic war, those faces will for ever be imprinted in our minds. They will haunt us when the conflict has been forgotten and the war has passed into history.
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There has been in this country, and in Parliament, a growing anxiety at the lack of progress towards peace in the peace talks, at the continued suffering of the civilian population, and at the reports of the renewed fighting. The Government therefore felt it right that it would be a proper response to this sense of concern if we took advantage of the recall of Parliament to offer a further opportunity to debate the situation in Nigeria. I am very grateful that the noble Earl, Lord Bessborough, at very short notice, undertook to initiaLe this debate. I hope he will find that the speech I intend now to deliver will cover most of his points. Those questions which I leave unanswered I will seek to answer, if I have leave of the House, at the end of the debate.
My Lords, I welcome this debate not only to report the events since we last met but also to state once again Her Majesty's Government's policy in the civil war. I think our policy needs to be stated because clearly it has been misunderstood, and, I am sorry to say, deliberately misinterpreted in many quarters. The problem of Nigeria is like a threepenny bit: it has two sides and many edges. The cause of the present conflict, like its solution, lies in Nigeria. It can be resolved only by Nigerians; it cannot be imposed from outside. We, on the outside, can only offer help and assistance in finding a solution, but in offering our help and assistance we must be careful not to make more difficult the task of those immediately involved. Any course of action must be carefully assessed with regard to the consequences, and we must never forget that Nigeria is a sovereign, independent country. It is a country that has evolved through a colonial past and is naturally deeply sensitive on matters relating to its sovereignty.
Before I report on events since we last debated the Nigerian situation, I think it would be helpful if I covered some of the old ground; for such has been the emotion generated by this tragic war that there is a need to set out the whole problem, so that it may be seen properly in perspective. Indeed, Her Majesty's Government's policy can be understood only if we examine the events leading from our granting of independence to Nigeria to the outbreak of the civil war. I think that I ought also to reiterate

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what has been the British Government's efforts to prevent war and, later, to secure peace in Nigeria.
My Lords, Nigeria became independent on October 1, 1960. Her early years of independence showed great promise. It was a great setback and disappointment to all our hopes when the civilian Government was ousted by a military coup on January 15, 1966. Motives were, and still are, unclear. However, the first coup was probably the work of young radicals determined to oust a regime allegedly corrupt; and it is fair, I think, to say that it met with general acclaim. It brought into power the first Military Government led by an Ibo, Major General Ironsi. Ironsi established a Military Administration, and appointed Lt.-Colonel Ojukwu as a Military Governor of the Eastern Region. That is his sole right to command this particular area. At first great things were expected of the new regime. The arrogant behaviour of the Ibos, particularly in the North, quickly brought home to the Northerners that it was Ibo officers who had killed the Federal Prime Minister—a Northerner—and the Premier of the North, as well as the Premier of Western Nigeria.
It did not go unnoticed either, in the country generally, that the coup was not carried out in the Eastern Region. The result was growing suspicion in the minds of many Nigerians, especially in the North, that the Ibos were planning to take over the country as a whole. Ironsi's unification decree of May 24, 1966, was seen in the North as the first step towards Ibo domination of Nigeria, and resulted in the Northerners turning on the Ibos, and riots, and, alas! killings took place. In July, after resentment had grown to boiling point, a second military coup occurred. General Ironsi's military regime was overthrown, and General Gowon assumed power, promising to restore a federal structure, and to seek a new basis of inter-regional harmony and national unity.
A long period of negotiation between the Federal Military Government and Colonel Ojukwu. of the former Eastern Region, then followed. In spite of a meeting at Aburi, in Ghana, and many hopes of reconciliation in Nigeria, the situation continued to worsen, until Colonel Ojukwu declared the former
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Eastern Region to be the independent State of Biafra on May 29, 1967. This was then considered—and I do not believe unreasonably—an act of war, and fighting broke out in July when the Federal Forces sought to re-establish their authority in the Eastern Region. This, as the House knows only too well, has now developed into a full-scale civil war.
What are the issues that divide the two sides? Colonel Ojukwu and the Ibo leadership are seeking to create by unconstitutional and undemocratic means a sovereign independent State, Biafra, which would embrace the whole of the Eastern Region. But that Region is not only the tribal home of the Ibos, who number some 7 million; there are also in that Region some 5 million others, made up of various smaller tribes. We believe most of the 5 million non-Ibos, almost half the population of the Region, did not, and so far as we now know do not, favour secession. And it must be remembered that oil, the pipelines, the oil installations and the ports of the Eastern Region are mainly in the non-Ibo tribal areas. Therefore Colonel Ojukwu's concept of a separate State of Biafra could be achieved only by subordinating the wishes and the interests of the 5 million non-Ibos to those of the 7 million Ibos in the Region. If Colonel Ojukwu were to succeed in his aim he and the Ibos would acquire for themselves a territory rich in agriculture and containing the great oil installations and reserves—all this at the expense of Nigeria as a whole.
The position of the Federal Government, on the other hand, has always been clear. They see Nigeria as one sovereign State. They see the economic wealth of the country as something to be developed for the good of all the people of Nigeria. In short, if the Federal Government had condoned secession it could have been done only at the expense of the future development of Nigeria as a country. It would have increased the danger of further fragmentation and the possibility of future conflict between the main tribes in Nigeria. And so war broke out..
In the early days Colonel Ojukwu's army proved more ready for war than did the Federal Military Government. They were able to move to the attack; they occupied the mid-West Region, and

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marched towards Lagos. The first bombs were dropped by Colonel Ojukwu's air force. The truth is that Colonel Ojukwu had imported considerable quantities of arms in the expectation of war. And can anyone doubt that if his forces had continued to advance successfully they would have pushed on to Lagos, and perhaps beyond? I cannot help but observe at this stage that many of the more vocal of Her Majesty's Government's critics nowadays failed to condemn the civil war when Colonel Ojukwu was achieving military success—though I would acquit Lord Brockway from that particular accusation.
What should have been the policy of Her Majesty's Government in the events leading to the civil war and afterwards? Throughout this tragic dispute we have persistently worked for peace, first by trying to help the Nigerians compose their differences without resort to arms, and later by urging both sides to work for a negotiated settlement. Paradoxically, our continued arms supply to the Federal Government has lent weight to these efforts and has been a real help to us in urging moderation and flexibility upon the Federal Government. In January, 1967, Mr. Malcolm Mac-Donald's largely unknown and unsung work came very near to achieving reconciliation of the opposing viewpoints at the conference at Aburi, in Ghana. It was a tragedy that the agreement was so short-lived.
In March, 1967, we urged Colonel Ojukwu not to push Ibo grievances to the point of secession, because we foresaw the appalling consequences of such an action. We made it clear to him that if the East seceded we should be unable to recognise the secession and expressed the opinion that other countries would also be unable to do so. Even when secession had taken place at the end of May, and hostilities broke out in July, we took the calculated risk of leaving Deputy High Commissioner Mr. Parker in Enugu. He was widely respected and liked in the East, and we hoped that his continued presence there might be helpful in maintaining a contact which would enable the two sides to start talking again. Unfortunately, the secessionists themselves made it impossible for Mr. Parker to remain in Enugu because
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his staff were molested and his radio was forcibly removed.
Then the Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U.) sought to mediate between the two sides. A distinguished delegation of Heads of African States visited Lagos in November, 1967, and as a result of their discussions with General Gowon, General Ankrah, of Ghana, was deputed to make contact with the secessionist leaders. His repeated efforts bore no fruit.
Mr. Arnold Smith, the Commonwealth Secretary-General, then took the initiative in trying to get the two sides to the conference table. It appeared to us that this was the best hope of bringing the parties together and we therefore fully supported his efforts, which were sustained throughout the autumn up until quite recently, when the O.A.U. stepped into the picture. Mr. Arnold Smith's initiative was taken on his own responsibility, and his tireless efforts deserve the greatest praise. We gave Mr. Smith full and unhesitating support throughout, and I believe that much of our contacts and our discussions with the Federal Government led to their flexibility and their understanding in their discussions and their eventual negotiations with Mr. Smith.
What we have done has necessarily been done for the most part behind the scenes. No doubt it would be more gratifying to many people if we tried to launch some more spectacular initiative of our own. But having decided that the best chance of making progress lay with the Commonwealth Secretariat we used all our efforts in trying to make his initiative successful.
Our support for the Federal Government throughout this difficult period gave us the right to express our views freely to them. We have done so continuously throughout the war and have used our influence towards moderation and a solution by negotiation. I can fairly say that our views have always been listened to by General Gowon and his Government with attention and respect, and they have responded, so far as they have felt able to do so. When, in April of this year, Mr. Arnold Smith had still not succeeded in bringing the two sides to the conference table, despite frequent contacts with each side separately, my right honourable friend the Prime

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Minister took the initiative with General Gowon which resulted in an important visit to London by Dr. Arikpo, the Federal Commissioner for External Affairs. Dr. Arikpo's talks with my right honourable friend the Prime Minister and my right honourable friend the Commonwealth Secretary resulted in the Commissioner for External Affairs announcing publicly in London that the Federal Government would not insist on a renunciation of secession as a condition of peace talks but would be prepared to talk unconditionally. This was a significant step forward, and I think we are entitled to claim that we played some part of bringing it about.
Subsequent peace talks in Kampala broke down on May 30. Colonel Ojukwu's delegation, which decided to withdraw, apparently did so on the ground that the Federal Government were unwilling to grant a cease-fire in isolation from some broad understanding about the political basis on which this was to be done. The Federal delegation remained throughout willing to continue the discussions. The leaders of the Federal delegation made it clear that they were prepared to go to the meetings whenever the other side was ready.
It is only natural that Colonel Ojukwu should have sought a cease-fire. Nevertheless, I do not think it unreasonable of the Federal Government to have sought some assurance that a cease-fire would lead to the maintenance of the territorial integrity of Nigeria, which is precisely what they have been fighting for. We, for our part, impressed upon the Federal Government how important it was that they should be prepared to negotiate flexibly, and I believe that, subject to their overriding commitment —the restoration of a united Nigeria—they were, and are, prepared to make concessions.
We regarded the Kampala peace talks as suspended rather than broken off. At this stage I took the opportunity of seeing representatives from both sides in London in an endeavour to get talks started again. I also flew out to Lagos for discussions with General Gowon with the same object in mind. The Federal Military Government said that they were prepared for further negotiation. They were prepared to meet anywhere at any
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time. It was the other side who failed to appear, despite having given me a promise to attend, and despite the fact that I drew the attention of both sides to the fact that while it might not have been possible to proceed with a political solution in these talks, at least we could talk about how we could get relief to both sides in Nigeria. The refusal did not come from the Federal Military Government; it came from the Biafran authorities. The Federal Military Government also declared their willingness to accept an outside observer force to reassure the Ibos about the consequences of a ceasefire. As the House will remember, we announced that we would be ready to contribute to such a force, on certain conditions, if we were asked by both sides.
There followed a further initiative by the O.A.U. Consultative Committee, which managed to get talks going at Niamey in Niger, under the chairmanship of President Diori. Both General Gowon and Colonel Ojukwu attended the meeting, which took place between July 15 and 19, though they did not confront each other at the table. Although final agreement on relief corridors was not possible, a three point agenda was agreed for a further meeting to take place at Addis Ababa, under the chairmanship of Emperor Haile Selassie. This meeting, in spite of its ups and downs, continues. I will revert to this meeting shortly. I have mentioned these points at some length because I am anxious that the House should know the part that Her Majesty's Government have played throughout this tragic civil war, not only to prevent the war itself, but also to bring it to a peaceful solution.
Now, if I may, I will come to our arms policy. Our arms policy has been discussed on frequent occasions in the House. I well appreciate the depth of feeling there is on this subject. But I think that we need to consider once again how Her Majesty's Government came to be supplying arms in the first place. The Nigerian Forces, like the forces of many Commonwealth countries, were trained and equipped on British lines long before independence. They naturally have looked largely to us for resupply. When the time came when they most needed supplies, they counted on our willingness to let them purchase from the United Kingdom. I do not

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believe that, in the circumstances I have set out, neutrality was a possible option for us at that time. We might have been able to declare ourselves neutral if one independent country had been fighting another, but this was not a possible attitude when a Commonwealth country, with whom we had long and close ties, was faced with an internal revolt. Such an act would have been one of condoning secession—in short, an act of support for the rebels.
This is important. What would other Commonwealth countries have thought? Some of them face minorities who seek to secede, who may be tempted to break up their countries in order to achieve secession. What effect would this have had on the rest of Africa, struggling to create modern nation States in the face of traditional tribal fears and rivalries?
How many Commonwealth countries for whom we train and support could have any faith in us if, at this moment of crisis for a Commonwealth country, we refused to continue our support? My belief is that they would have turned to the Soviet Union or one of the countries in the Eastern bloc to supply them, and your Lordships well know the political influence that would follow such a change of policy.
Our policy since the war began has been to continue authorising the exports of carefully controlled quantities of arms and ammunitions, broadly of the same kind as we supplied before the war. But we have not supplied any military aircraft or bombs. These supplies have amounted to about 15 per cent. by value of Nigeria's total arms purchases, and even in the particular categories of infantry arms and ammunition, our share is under half. Nigeria can and is obtaining the bulk of her supplies from elsewhere. Our supplies have been more important in political than practical terms.
It may be asked why, if this is so, we do not cut off supplies now. The answer is that we recognise the Federal Government and our continued, although modest, support gives us a right as a friendly country to use our influence with her towards what all of us want—an end to the fighting and a settlement. Some will argue that we have been unsuccessful in achieving these aims so far. Regretfully, in terms of a ceasefire and
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settlement, this is true. But General Gowon and his colleagues have been prepared to listen to our views And to meet us when they have felt they could. The fact of the matter is that we have been able to use this influence. The House may remember the communiqué that was issued after by own talks in Lagos.
As I said earlier, Nigeria is an independent country and we have no more right than any other nation to intervene in what she sees as an entirely internal affair. We have asked ourselves many times whether cutting off arms supplies would have made agreement more likely. It would certainly have eased our consciences, but would it have improved the prospects of peace or bettered the chance of getting relief supplies flowing? We do not believe so. We would lose our capacity to influence the Federal Government and I believe that it would make the Ibos even more intransigent. Far from persuading the Ibos to negotiate meaningfully, our action would encourage them to fight on. The recent ill-timed French announcement of support for Biafra, at the very moment of going to the Addis Ababa Conference, has certainly had the effect of encouraging the Ibos to fight on and not to negotiate.
There are other matters which we have had to take into consideration. The Russians have already secured a political foothold in Nigeria by supplying military aircraft and bombs which we ourselves refused to supply. If we cut off arms supplies, I am sure that Russia would be only too willing to fill the gap and gain the influence which we would lose. An international embargo on arms would have little chance of success unless the contestants themselves were willing to co-operate. Much of the international arms traffic is in the hands of private arms dealers who would certainly find ways of circumventing any inter-governmental embargo. In particular, the Ibos get their arms through irregular channels which would be impossible to control.
My right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary said in the House on June 12 that if we were to make the supposition that it was the intention of the Federal Government not merely to preserve the unity of Nigeria, but to proceed without mercy either with the slaughter of the

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lbo people, or if we were to make the supposition that it was the intention of the Federal Government to take advantage of a military situation in order to throw aside with contempt any terms of reasonable settlement, we should have to reconsider our policy. This remains our position. But the circumstances envisaged have not arisen. The Federal Government are well aware of these conditions, have accepted them, and have no intention of breaking them.
General Gowon has repeatedly said that his quarrel is not with the Ibo people, but with the rebel leaders. He has made it clear to his troops that if it becomes necessary to carry out a full-scale assault, civilians should not be ill-treated. Many thousands of lbos live and carry on normal life in Federal Nigeria. None of this adds up to the claims of Ibo propaganda that the Federal Government intends to obliterate the Ibo people. Nor are there any signs that the Federal Government are throwing away with contempt the prospects of reasonable negotiated settlement. They continue at Addis Ababa to seek a solution by negotiation. Her Majesty's Government have made it clear all along that we wish to see the earliest possible ceasefire and a solution by negotiation, and that we do not believe a military solution is the answer.
One of the factors which has added to the difficulty of assessing events in Nigeria has been that at times the Press has found it by no means easy to obtain objective first-hand reporting from the fighting areas. I am not, of course, referring to the well-authenticated reports of starvation. In the propaganda field the Ibos have often seemed to be winning the war of words while losing the battle of arms. Behind this success is a highly professional operation conducted by an advertising agency in Geneva. I have heard it said that it is the same agency that looked after the interests of Katanga. The Ibo official line is regularly telexed to Geneva and distributed wholesale and undiluted by the agency to world-wide outlets.
Much of the material distributed by or on behalf of the Ibos is utterly untrue. For example, we have been accused of sending 600 black-painted British troops to Nigeria, some 260 of whom it was
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alleged had been killed during the Federal offensive at Port Harcourt. A thousand Royal Marines were alleged to have been despatched to Nigeria for an amphibious attack on Port Harcourt, but to have been subsequently recalled. The Hibernian footballers who were touring West Africa were said to be parachute troops. A party of British school children on a cruise were said to be British soldiers. This would be laughable were it not for the fact that this particular rumour was responsible for the burning of British property in Port Harcourt by an Ibo crowd. In fact, of course, no British forces have served in Nigeria during the civil war, and we have repeatedly denied Ibo claims to the contrary. The Ibo propaganda machine has also gone on insisting that R.A.F. aircraft and British bombs were being used in the war, although there has never been the slightest shred of truth in this. But there are still some people in this country, even in high places, who believe this propaganda.
Another example of a "Biafran claim which paints an illegitimately lurid picture of events is their recent allegation that Federal troops massacred all the inhabitants, 2,300 people, of two villages. I do not believe these stories to be true; I believe they are a figment of the Biafran propaganda machine, for a reputable journalist, widely experienced in West Africa, who returned from the front last Friday, said that the whole population between the Imo River and Aba, the area where this massacre was supposed to have taken place, within reach of the road, had fled, and there were no signs of atrocities whatever. Is it conceivable, if the slaughter of 2,300 people had taken place, that there would not at least have been some evidence of this? He also said that he was particularly struck by the fine discipline shown by the Federal troops.
There is yet another allegation, about which I wrote to my noble friend Lord Brockway, that the 25 vehicles we sent to Lagos in July for relief purposes have been assigned to the Federal army. The vehicles were in fact handed over to the British Red Cross. But that allegation appeared in the British Press in such a way that I think most people would have believed that the British Government had handed over vehicles to the military

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forces of the Federal Government which had been allocated to the Red Cross. This to me is one of the great tragedies, because in some ways the Ibos are becoming the victims of their propaganda. The belief which it has instilled in them, that any concessions would lead to a planned genocide by the Federal authorities, is certainly a major stumbling block in achieving a cease-fire. As I have said, we do not accept that the Federal Government have any such intention of genocide or the like against the Ibos. They have offered to accept outside observers after a cease-fire for the purpose of reassuring the Ibos.
I would say to the noble Earl that they are also actively considering the possibility of having observers with their forward troops in the present fighting. They have suggested that after a cease fire, the East Central state should be policed by mostly Ibo police, not the Federal Army.
We have heard from reliable sources of captured "Biafran" soldiers being well treated by the Federal forces. Lord Hunt's recent mission to Nigeria found that an attitude of vindictiveness towards the Ibos among the people they met was noticeably absent. That is the impression that I had very much when I visited Nigeria, Calabar and Enugu. There are cases, too, of Federal troops helping to feed Ibo refugees.
It should also be remembered that there are at least 100,000 Ibos living peacefully in Lagos. Ibos continue to hold responsible and senior jobs in the rest of the Federation. These factors clearly show that genocide is by no means the Federal intention, although suicide for their people sometimes seems to be the intention of the Ibo leaders. The current war, together with their own propaganda, has probably convinced the Ibos that they can never live normally with other Nigerians. Those of us who have some ex perience of West Africa would not accept that. As I say, there is evidence in Nigeria to the contrary. The Federal Government have assured them of equal status and rights in a united Nigeria and have made offers to guarantee their word. Given the undoubted abilities of the Nigerians for conciliation and statesmanship, we believe that the Ibos would be able to return to their homes and jobs in Nigeria.
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Turning to the latest attempts to bring about the settlement, I am bound to say that the Addis Ababa conference has struggled hard but unsuccessfully, despite the very distinguished chairmanship and statesmanship of the Emperor of Ethiopia, to get political agreement. Having failed there, the parties turned to the possibility of an agreed plan for relief of suffering. Even here there have been heartbreaking difficulties and suspicions on both sides. The House will, however, be very happy to hear that Emperor Haile Selassie's formula for relief operations was this weekend accepted, in principle, by the Nigerian and Biafran delegations. A great. deal of credit for this is due to the determination of the Emperor. The agreement is for a simultaneous use of land and air mercy routes into Biafra. The House knows that the Government have always believed that, while land corridors were the only way to provide long-term aid in the necessary volume, there was also a short-term need for an emergency airlift to meet the immediate needs and to clear the stockpiles accumulated at Fernando Po.
We are happy to learn that the Nigerian Federal delegation has returned to Addis Ababa authorised to accept the Emperor's formula. The House will also be glad to know that the International Red Cross flights into Biafra from Fernando Po have been resumed, presumably with the concurrence of the Federal Government. Chief Enahoro was in Geneva on Saturday, August 24, and has had a useful meeting with Dr. Lindt, who is in charge of the International Committee of the Red Cross operations in Nigeria. The two have agreed to meet shortly. Meanwhile. I have heard with much delight that Dr. Lindt has been invited by the Emperor to join in the talks at Addis Ababa and is leaving Geneva today.
I do not wish to underestimate the difficulties that may still lie ahead before the relief plans on an adequate scale into the Ibo-held territories are implemented. We have had too many disappointing examples of agreements in principle proving difficult to implement. But we must all hope that, with the conscience of the world so clearly aroused and with the urgency of the Emperor behiid it, we shall be able to find a way of implementing this agreement. We must also hope that a working agreement on relief

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will yet bring about a cease-fire and eventual political settlement. We have pinned great hopes on the talks taking place at Addis Ababa under the auspices of the O.A.U.
My Lords, unfortunately I have very little to report about achieving a ceasefire. The Federal Government have put forward proposals subject, as I say, to the proviso of unity. All the other proposals are negotiable. On Colonel Ojukwu, I am afraid, they have made no impact. His demands appear to be as tough as ever, in that they amount to a claim for independence, or at least the attributes of sovereignty. His line on this would be understandable if he were winning the military conflict; but the reverse is the truth. We have made no secret of the fact that we hope that the people of Nigeria will be able to agree on a settlement which allows for the unity of their country, but we have also stressed from the outset that it was up to them to decide. This is still our view. We have used our influence; we have given all our encouragement to the Federal Government to meet the Ibo leaders, first at Kampala and now at Addis Ababa. We will continue to use whatever support, whatever help, we can should the Addis Ababa talks break down, but they have not yet broken down, and I hope that they will not do so.
I note that the noble Earl, Lord Bess-borough, spoke about the Press speculation regarding the Federal Forces, that they have already launched their all-out offensive. The situation has been fluid for some months. There has been a pattern of attack, counter-attack and infiltration. The noble Earl may have seen the television programme of Major Steiner (I think it is) of the Fourth Commando of the Biafran Army, who was speaking very much of his ability to get behind the Federal lines. So the situation has been extremely fluid.
We have been assured by the Federal Government that they will negotiate to the limit and will not resort to a general advance unless all attempts at negotiation have failed. Indeed, I am convinced from my talks with General Gowon that he has all along desired a negotiated settlement, because he knows the cost of a continued war. Nevertheless, I
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would not wish the House to think that the Federal Government are likely to be responsive to appeals merely to stop and give up what they are fighting for unless there is some sign that Colonel Ojukwu is ready to meet them over the question of unity. It is against this background that the vital importance of the Addis Ababa talks must be seen.
This might be the right moment to give the House the clearest account I can of what is necessarily a confused and obscure military situation. The Federal forces have now retaken all the non-Ibo areas of the former Eastern Region, and have thus established their authority in the South-Eastern and Rivers States. In addition, they now hold the areas of the East Central State —lboland—which lie to the North of the Onitsha and Enugu road. To get matters in perspective, I think the House should understand that it is now more accurate to talk of the "Ibo areas" rather than of "Biafra". Although Colonel Ojukwu still speaks of Biafra, he is in fact in control of not much more than half of Iboland. These are the realities of the situation. The Federal forces are in a strong military position, having cut off the Ibos entirely from outside.
Reference was made by the noble Earl to General Gowon's statement on the "24 Hours" programme last night. I did not see it; but I have a transcript. But I will say this to the House, from information made available to me on leaving the Office to come to this debate. There is no evidence of a major push from the North. The military activity on the Southern front which is now going on has followed strong attacks along the whole area by Biafran forces. Indeed, some of these attacks have been initially successful. I received during the course of the noble Earl's speech a message from Lagos, from which it is perfectly clear to me that the military advance which we certainly have in mind has not taken place, has not started; and it seems to me that the undertaking which General Gowon has given us, that he will continue as long as it is possible before a military solution has to be undertaken, still holds good.
If, however—and one must he frank about this—there seems to be no possibility of a negotiated settlement, and

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with tin continued and increasing supply of weapons to Colonel Ojukwu, and also the fear and the suspicion of the Federa Government following the French action, it may be understandable, though regrettable, that further military action by the Federal forces along the road to the remaining areas of Iboland for the purpose of capturing the airstrips and the seats of government, may now be considered vital by the Federal Government. We have always warned both parties of the desperate shortage of time.
I understand that in the same interview Genera! Gowon also spoke of the humanitarian problem and the need for early relief to follow the fighting. As the House will know, we have continually urged this upon the Federal Military Government. Time is desperately short. I apologise for speaking at length, but this is a situation in regard to which I think the House would wish to have this information. We share the concern that has been expressed on the question of relief, the plight of the refugees affected by the war. I have on an earlier occasion described the position of our own relief programme in which the Government provided some quarter of a million pounds. We had the advice of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, to whom again I pay a most respectful tribute. I think I can also say to the House that although it may be the case that the mission in itself was completed, the noble Lord, Lord Punt, feels so dedicated to his role that he still takes an interest, and was quite recently in Geneva seeing Dr. Lindt.
In thinking of the appalling problem of starvation and malnutrition, it is right to remember that the problem exists not only in the Ibo heartland but also in those areas controlled by the Federal Government. I think the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, will confirm when he speaks later on that we have reacted, within the sums that we had available, to all the requests that he made. I know that there was some criticism of some of the vehicles which were not new. I freely acknowledge this because they were sent on my own responsibility. I thought that the vehicles were so desperately needed in Nigeria that I did not feel able to wait for newvehicles to come off the lines. I obtained vehicles out of Army stock, and I give credit to the Army and
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to the shipping company who diverted a ship to Dover in order that those vehicles could be loaded. I should also like to pay tribute to the seamen who painted these Army vehicles white in the course of the ship's passage. We have always given our support to Dr. Lindt. He has taken over a tremendous task. I would say to the noble Earl, Lord Bessborough, that we have never in any way suggested that we would ever withdraw support from the International Red Cross. We give our full support to the International Red Cross, and to Dr. Lindt in particular.
I conclude by giving this information that was released some 15 minutes ago as to what the International Red Cross has been able to do in co-ordinating efforts in Nigeria. They now have 14 relief teams working in Federal-held territories, and hope to have 18 more by late September. They already have 50 vehicles at the disposal of the International Red Cross for the transport of relief supplies. Twenty-five more provided by the British Government will bring this total up to 75. In addition, the International Red Cross are hiring trucks locally for the distribution of locally purchased supplies. Some 2,000 tons of rice and other local produce have been brought in from the Northern areas and transported by road to Enugu and Lagos. From Lagos they will be shipped to Calabar. Some 700 tons went last week and a further 1,000 tons will be shipped shortly.
A further 10,000 tons of food supplies, such as maize and cornmeal, are expected to reach Lagos from abroad within the next week. The International Red Cross have chartered two coastal vessels of 500 tons each in order that supplies can be moved from Lagos to Calabar. The International Red Cross have their own aircraft for supplies from Lagos to Enugu and Calabar. Two D.C.4's have been operating an airlift of 36 tons a day, and two more D.C.4's are being added in the next month. Two helicopters are being obtained for use in the Calabar area early next month, and we expect some 500 tons of food a month to be brought from the North by road and rail to Enugu and down South.
I should like to pay a most sincere tribute to the many voluntary societies and organisations who have done so

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much, perhaps under most difficult and frustrating circumstances, to bring help to the refugees. At the end of the debate I will, with permission, seek to answer any questions that may be raised in the course of the debate. I would only say this. Time is now desparately short if there is to be a negotiated settlement. Both sides are now at Addis Ababa. They have there the Emperor Haile Selassie who will do everything that is humanly possible to bring the two sides together.
It needs two sides to negotiate. One possibly is flexible. For one reason or another, one is not. I know that that side has many friends and sympathisers throughout this country and Europe. I suppose most people in their hearts tend to support what appears to be the underdog. I would beg those people to use whatever influence they have on Colonel Ojukwu and his fellow leaders in Biafra to recognise the military situation that now exists, the inevitable result unless there is a political solution. I would hope that all their efforts would now be directed, as I have said before, to bringing the two sides together. We for our part have not the slightest doubt that, provided there is this one exception of a united Nigeria, the Federal Government would negotiate with the greatest degree of flexibility, because I am convinced that they wish to avoid the necessity of a military solution.
THE EARL OF BESSBOROUGH: My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, and with the permission of the noble Baroness, I wonder whether, in view of the fact that Parliament will not be meeting again until October, it would be possible for the noble Lord to get from General Gowon, perhaps before the end of this debate, a positive statement that he has been completely misinterpreted. I am not the only noble Lord in this House who listened to him last night on "24 Hours," when he definitely said that the final push had started, or was immediately about to start. This seems to me to be in direct conflict with the assurances which he gave the noble Lord.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, the message that I gave was from our High Commissioner in Lagos, in response to an urgent message that we ourselves sent
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early this morning after hearing the reports on General Gowon. I do not know what the circumstances of the interview were. I understand the doubt in the noble Earl's mind, but the information that I have been given is, as one might say, minutes old, and not hours old.
12.20 p.m.
BARONESS ASQUITH OF YARN? BURY: My Lords, in yesterday's debate your Lordships discussed a tragic situation in Europe, the fate of Czechoslovakia, and we unanimously condemned its author. To-day, we are discussing another human tragedy—this time in Africa; and for one of its grimmest features we must indict our own Government. I refer, of course, to the continuous sale of arms to the Federal Government for use against the starving people of Biafra. Every civilised Government has now ceased to practise this hideous trade, with only two exceptions, ourselves and Soviet Russia.
The noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, has reminded us in his speech of special pleading for the Federal Government (for that is what it was) that time is desperately short. What he does not seem to recognise is that it is through our Government's action in supplying arms that our moral authority and the power to mediate has been utterly destroyed. After all, what country in the world would seek mediation, or would accept mediation, from the arsenal of its most deadly enemy? Should we have welcomed Krupp as a mediator during the Battle of Britain? In the eyes of the world our Government represents our country, for better or for worse. Every one of us is thus implicated in a crime—for that is how I see it—which many of us abhor.
As has been often mentioned, both yesterday and to-day, our guilt is brought home to us nightly on our T.V. screens. Thanks to the miracle of television we see history happening before our eyes. We see no Ibo propaganda; we see the facts, and not one of us can say, "I did not know". We have no alibi. We see these things happening. We see the poignant tragedy of Biafra's starving children, 3,000 of whom are said to be dying every day. We see pictures of these children tottering on their spindly

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legs, with wasted bodies and huge tragic eyes charged with experience—experience of the approach of death; some of them held by agonised mothers because they are too weak to stand. I wonder whether the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, and his colleagues sleep well at night. I know that I cannot do so.
We also have seen the stocks of aid, food, powdered milk and medicine rotting in the warehouses of the port of Lagos. These, too, are shown to us. We hear people inquiring, "Can they be sent to the starving people?". Obstacles are mentioned, but our Saracen tanks get through. We are cheered to hear from the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, that at last there is some chance of aid now reaching Fernando Po by air. The arms that we are selling and have been selling for something like two years to the Federal Government for use against these starving people are provided by us, and the Federal Government may soon, as we hear, move in for the kill. It is the most inhuman deed that I can recall in the history of our country.
Now, what is the Government's case? What is their defence? They have two lines of defence, and one is that we must at all costs support the legal Government of Nigeria. There is no sanctity in being a legal Government. The last two legal Governments of Nigeria, I believe, were established by two military coups preceded by two murders. Take a very different instance, the Government of South Africa. Our Government have refused to sell arms to South Africa, I think quite rightly refused, on moral grounds, but, like it or like it not, the Government of South Africa is a legal Government. What is the distinction they draw between the two?
What is Biafra's crime? Biafra has seceded from a federation of incompatible tribal units. It is not the first time that an African federation, clapped together by ourselves with the very best intentions, has come to pieces in our hands. And we have accepted it. Secession is no crime. Take Ireland. Ireland's secession, violently and blindly opposed for years by pig-headed and short-sighted politicians, was not a crime. On the contrary, it was a reasonable demand and should have been far sooner reasonably conceded. As a result of its concession we and Ireland now live together
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in peace and friendship. There is peace and understanding between us. And Ireland in her turn has been forced to accept a secession, the secessi 311 of Ulster. They, too, belonged to diferent tribes, and they are far happier living independently under their separate and self-chosen Governments. Why should not Biafra have the same rights of secession?
The Government's second plea for continuing their supply of arms is that we should lose all influence with the Federal Government if we ceased to send them. I can only say that if the present nightmare in Biafra is the result of British influence she would be better off without its influence or its arms. Our arms have killed far more Biafrans than our influence has saved. Liberals have urged in vain the organisation of a Commonwealth force to police what we hole will be a cease-fire. We are glad to know that there is a chance that some observers may be sent. We have also begged the Government to second to the Red Cross some Hercules aircraft from the R.A.F. to fly supplies into Fernando Po under neutral supervision. Could not the second of these suggestions be accepted —to save what is still left to save while time remains? Above all, I entre it the Government to save what still remains of our good name, and now, at the eleventh hour, to stop the sale of arms. All Governments are fallible they consist of fallible human beings. Many of their failings, their sins of omission or commission, are in time forgiven and forgotten. But by this action our Government have branded our people with a stain which is indelible. They have made our people—our decent, kindly, human people—an accessory to a crime against humanity.
12.29 p.m.
THE LORD BISHOP OF LONDON: My Lords, yesterday we were debating one situation rightly described as "tragic". The situation we are debating this morning is, if possible, more tragic since those who are involved are, in a sense, our friends. Many of them who live In the two areas are personally known to many Members of your Lordships' House, and we suffer too, I think, from something of that sense of impotence. This is a Nigerian business, as the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, has rightly reminded us,

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yet we seem to be able to do so little to help them to solve their own problems.
Ten days ago the Anglican Bishops attending the Lambeth Conference had a special plenary session to receive a statement from the Bishops of the Provinces of West Africa. It was a deeply moving occasion. All 13 of the Bishops of the Provinces come from the area we have known as Nigeria; ten of them are African Bishops, some of them from one side in the conflict and some from the other. The statement which they presented to the Conference was drawn up at the first meeting they had been able to have together since the conflict had begun, and it was a unanimous and moving statement.
It asked first of all that the Conference should call upon all Governments to work effectively towards peace and reconciliation and to refrain from any action which would prolong the conflict in the area; and it asked us to call on the Governments on both sides to look with pity on those who were sick and starving, and to give every facility to the organisations endeavouring to bring them food and medical supplies. The statement concluded with words which perhaps I may be allowed to quote to your Lordships, remembering that these are African leaders from both sides in the conflict:
"We state our belief that the conflict can be resolved positively in a creative way only when each side is prepared to abandon its exclusive position and to seek to reach agreement on how to secure the vital interests of the peoples on both sides."
The Lambeth Conference, of course, endorsed the appeal made to them to call on the Governments to do these two things. But what does that imply? To refrain from doing anything which would prolong the conflict. The noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, has given us a full and balanced account of the events and the reasons why Her Majesty's Government have felt it right to continue the supply of arms, but I wonder (and here I speak only for myself) whether it has not perhaps reached the point when we might hope that our Government would call on other Governments, even though the chances of success may not be great, to abandon the supply of arms and to give an earnest of it by refusing to sell any more arms ourselves.
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In the meantime, there is the other side, the call for pity for the sick and the starving. The report made by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, showed how difficult his task had been and, if I may add to what has already been said, increased our admiration for him by the way in which he had battled with those difficulties. And he will know far more than I do about what can be done and how it should be done. This we do know: that there is no lack of concern among the peoples of the world. Apart from the Governmental aid, such as the £250,000 set aside by Her Majesty's Government, there has been a magnificent response in personal giving to the various agencies—to the Red Cross, to the various Church relief services, including in our own country Christian Aid and OXFAM, and I think there is not the slightest doubt that money and volunteers will be forthcoming in fully adequate supply to meet the need, if only they can get through to those who are in such desperate straits.
Perhaps what this debate in your Lordships' House can do, along with what is being said in another place, will be to bring to those who have almost abandoned hope—the refugees and the starving, and the children—at least the assurance that the people of this country still care for what was once a colonial possession; indeed, they care for it perhaps more now than they have ever done in the past. It can also show those people that the people of this country will support their Government in everything that can be done to carry on the work of reconciliation; to support what is being done in Addis Ababa; to exploit, so far as may be without an easing of the situation, the bringing in of relief, and to work for a just and lasting settlement. Difficult though it may be, and difficult though we know it will be, if the message that goes out from us after this debate is that we believe that a solution can be found, and that we believe and are determined that relief shall get through in the quantities required, this debate, apart from all else, will have served a valuable purpose.
12.36 p.m.
LORD HUNT: My Lords, I do not proposed to speak in emotive terms about the suffering and starvation of innocent civilians in the Nigerian civil war, even

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though I propose to make it my sole concern to debate this aspect of the situation in Nigeria. I hope your Lordships will accept that this is not because I have not been, as the noble Baroness and no doubt every other one of your Lordships have been, deeply moved, but precisely because I have been. Your Lordships will have seen those terrible scenes on television.
Some of your Lordships will have read and heard much else from first-hand witnesses of the horrible things that are happening to civilians in that country. You will also have heard and read a good deal else that is not fact—that is fiction—but all I would say about that is that nothing that your Lordships have seen, have read or have heard can make the impact that is made when you actually meet these children and their mothers face to face; when you speak to them and you are empty-handed, and when you are powerless to help there and then on the spot. I have had this experience. It is something I shall never forget and never fully get over. But it is my view that many words that we have heard and read, stemming from emotional reactions, have hindered rather than helped a solution to this intractable problem. Therefore I propose to speak from a basis of hard facts about what is practicable. This means taking account of political situations and military facts. It is one thing to take account of them, it is another thing to form judgments about them, and I have no intention of forming judgments about those situations —the political situation in particular—any more than I had when I first went to Nigeria on July 5.
What are the facts which have continued for months to block the way to relief operations in Nigeria? There are a number of them. The noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, has mentioned several, and I hope that your Lordships will forgive me if I go over some of this ground again, simply to provide a background for my own convictions. I will mention only three of these immediately, and I apologise for the fact that your Lordships know them all already.
The first is the fact of a state of siege in a civil war in an independent sovereign State—a siege which was the result of an act of deliberate forbearance by General Gowon, in the hope that he could persuade
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his adversary, Colonel Ojukwu, to come to terms without further bloodshed. General Gowon failed, and one evil has been replaced by another; and there will be no doubt in the minds of many of your Lordships that tin; evil which has followed is greater than the one that he tried to avoid. The siege has continued for several months, with the Ibos completely surrounded and cut off by land and by water; their physical communication with the outside world restricted to two or three night lights under hazardous conditions on to one improvised airstrip, when flying conditions make this possible, and landing within range of the Federal anti-aircraft guns. Brutal and inhuman though it is, the very essence of siege tactics is to reduce the defenders to physical conditions which they can no longer Idure. Colonel Ojukwu has chosen (and I do not for one minute criticise this) to endure.
Secondly, there is the fact that, despite three international conferences and numerous diplomatic efforts by Governments and individuals the opposing political objectives, both based on plausible ideals—many would, say tenable ideals —and both sincerely held, have proved incapable of compromise.
Thirdly, there is the fact that world opinion has been brought to bear on the political and human aspects of this war to an extent never before experienced in Africa. Of course there is the example in Asia of Vietnam, and yesterday the noble Viscount, Lord Eccles, made a most important point when he spoke of the power of public opinion over riding Governments and crossing frontiers. He was talking, as we all know, in the context of the situation in Czechoslcvakia. How true this is of Nigeria! But I hope that the noble Viscount, if he reads Hansard and what I am now about to say, will not disagree if I remind I him of the power of propaganda over public opinion, when I venture to suggest that sometimes public opinion, swayed and shaped by propaganda, can in the short term be unhelpful. In fact, it car even be a harmful factor when it fails to take full account of all the facts and the whole truth. I have a fourth fact to bring to the notice of your Lordships, but I shall reserve that until a little later in what little more I have to say. However, I

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select these facts simply to give a background to what I propose to tell your Lordships about my own personal convictions.
It is against the background of ideals of both leaders, of the forbearance of the one and of the fortitude of the other, that we must view the sufferings inflicted by both contenders, mainly on Ibos. But let us not forget that the suffering is not inflicted only on Ibos: it is inflicted also on Ibibios, Efeks, Ijaws and Calabaris; and not all the children your Lordships have seen on your television screens are in fact Ibos. It is against this background, too, that we should see the readiness of the Federal Military Government to facilitate relief operations by third parties, not only within the territory which they have regained and now control, but into the Ibo fortress itself. I question whether there is any precedent in history for relief operations by third parties in a situation comparable with this. Your Lordships may refer me to the Berlin airlift, but I should quickly say that that is a highly fallacious comparison. However, I do not propose to debate the point now.
Before I state my personal convictions, I should just say this. My colleagues and I went to Nigeria on July 5 on the understanding that we would be independent, that we took a neutral attitude, that our advice to the Government would not be political, and that we would act independently. I hope your Lordships will accept that even with the passage of time, or perhaps because of it, my attitude has remained independent and neutral ever since, and it is against the facts that I have chosen and give your Lordships that I wish to state my personal convictions.
The first is this. I am convinced from my personal meetings with him that General Gowon is a man of high ideals, of deep sincerity and real humanity. He is not bent on genocide of the Ibos. His dilemma is that of reconciling his ideals for a united country with his concern for the people who are suffering by his pursuit of it. If he were to remove all the obstacles and drop all safeguards in the way of relief aid, he would not only be delaying the attainment of his objective—he has been delaying that for months but would risk losing it altogether,
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for time is not on the side of General Gowon.
I could say the same about Colonel Ojukwu. I regret very much that Colonel Ojukwu did not think that any useful purpose would be served by myself or members of my mission going to meet him, because it is quite possible that had I done so I should now be able to say the sane nice things about Colonel Ojukwu as I have said, in all sincerity, about General Gowon. I am convinced that Colonel Ojukwu is in the same dilemma, but I am also persuaded that, unlike General Gowon, time is on Colonel Ojukwu's side.
My second point is one which the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, has already mentioned to your Lordships. I was impressed by the lack of vindictiveness in any of the high officials whom we met in Lagos and in the States, and in any of the senior commanders or battalion commanders whom we met, in the sense of a desire to punish, let alone to exterminate, the Ibo people. I refuse to believe, from my own convictions and observations and experience, that that is the intention. It makes very effective propaganda, but it just is not true.
I include in my belief Colonel Benjamin Adekunle, that very daring commander of the Third Division in the South-East. A great deal has been made, to his detriment, of his colourful personality and his outrageous remarks. Colonel Benji has enjoyed and encouraged this. It has been fairly lapped up by the B.B.C. and certain Press organs. Colonel Adekunle enjoys shocking journalists, but there is nothing particularly reprehensible about that. In the world of competitive sport there is at least one sport which both parties actively enjoy, and if circumstances were different I myself should enjoy that sport. He likes striking bellicose poses. He gave my Mission a tremendous dressing down for coming as a "do-gooding" Mission into the middle of his battle. But Colonel Adekunle is no sadist bent on genocide: he is a good soldier who is single-minded in doing his professional job. Many of your Lordships who have taken high command in war—I did myself—will agree that this is not incompatible with humanity.
Quite by chance, I received two days ago a letter from Colonel Adekunle. It

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was written some time ago, before this debate was arranged, and I hope he will forgive me—he certainly did not intend this—if I read out one passage from his letter. He said:
"The end is in view and the next problem is the resettlement and integrating of the misguided lot. It will be an uphill task, but we will try."
I think we must forgive Colonel Adekunle for referring to the Ibo people as a "misguided lot", but that is his point of view. But you cannot resettle and integrate dead people.
While on the subject of genocide, I can deny from personal observations the allegations of ill-treatment or genocidal intentions and concentration camp conditions in the refugee camps in the Federal areas. We visited four of them. The refugees are there because they are homeless, and because they wanted to go there. They are free to leave if they so desire, and they are well looked after within the fairly limited resources that the Federal forces can provide. That is my second point.
Thirdly, I am convinced that relief operations from all expatriate sources must take account of the hard facts, political as well as military, on which I have touched. It is sheer nonsense to talk, and to attempt to act, as though a legal Government, wielding its legal powers and conducting a military campaign, can be treated as though it were some dependency or some local authority of ours, as some people seem to think and write; its communications used and its battle lines cut through as though they were some form of red tape. Indeed, it is worse than nonsense, because such attempts have the opposite effect to what is intended: they are counterproductive. This may be very deplorable, but I suggest that it is an understandable reaction by the Federal Government, and the war has unfortunately produced a number of instances of that.
My fourth conviction, my Lords—and it is consequent upon the previous one—is that it is essential that all relief operations should be co-ordinated and controlled by a single authority acceptable to both sides. The only international body which by its traditional role is appropriate for this job is the International Committee of the Red Cross,
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the I.C.R.C. I was convinced about this, and so were my colleagues, from the evening of the first day of our stay in Lagos; and I have become more persuaded of it ever since.
My fifth conviction is this. Late in the day, but better late than never, the I.C.R.C. have grasped the full immensity of the task confronting them. For too long they had remained under-staffed, "under-gunned", without a man of the correct qualifications and calibre. For too long the voluntary bodies, with great devotion, have been operating, or trying to operate, independent ventures. To some extent there has been some consultation between some of them in regard to the help in the Federal-controlled areas, but there has been no consultation, no co-ordination, in regard to the help intended for Biafra. And for too long, too, the Nigerians themselves have done too little by way of relief operations, and have seemed to resent the help which was offered from outside.
I am convinced that this is all in the past. We now see in Dr. August Lindt a man really up to the job. Hen is a man of the required stature an I the appropriate experience—a strong, determined and energetic man. He is deeply imbued with the urgency of his job and the size of his tasks. I went to Geneva ten days ago to meet Dr. Lindt and to attend his conferences immediately on his return from a very exhausting and ex acting three-weeks tour in Nigeria and Biafra. I spent most of the whole 24 hours closely at his side, and I have remained it close touch with him, almost daily, ever since. I experienced the terrific pressures to which he was (and still is) subjected by Governments, by voluntary bodies and by individuals clamouring for Action, rightly clamouring for action—some of them already "going it alone"; others threatening to do so; many of them dubious about the man and his oil anisation; some, I regret to say, thinking at least as much in terms of the political cause of Biafra (and I say why should they not? 'The mistake is in combining these two thoughts at the same time) as of suffering human beings inside, let alone outside, the Biafran territory. I sensed the delicacy of his relation; with the conflicting parties concerned, circumscribed as they are by the political impasse and the military situation.

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My Lords, I was deeply impressed by what Dr. Lindt has already put in hand to meet the immediate needs, and your Lordships have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, something of what Dr. Lindt has achieved in a very stiort time. I was impressed by his staff structure build-up, by the contingent plans to meet different eventual situations, and the resources he can now call on to meet each eventuality. I came back quite determined to do everything in my power to obtain for Dr. Lindt the support he needs and deserves in order to create order out of chaos and to get a concerted relief operation into full swing, if possible in agreement with both the parties concerned.
I said that I would reserve and bring to your Lordships' notice one other fact. This is a logistical fact. So long as the siege continues, the two alternatives which have so far been used, attempted or discussed, one by air into Biafra, the "air bridge", the other by road through the fighting lines, the Awgu corridor, must be viewed logistically and not emotionally. It is very gallant, it may give some satisfaction to those who do it, and provide some outlet to pent-up emotional feelings about the humanitarian issue of many people outside Nigeria (I do not decry either of those points) to fly in one or two plane-loads of food by night when flying conditions make this possible. Two, five, ten or even twenty tons may be flown in by these means. If a day airlift were negotiated, the present limited landing conditions in Biafra might make possible something of the order of 16 or 20 flights, and therefore between 80 and 100 tons of food.
But how does this match up to the actual need? We heard something about this in an earlier speech. The need is to feed not 2 million (as I think the noble Earl, Lord Bessborough, suggested) in camps, but perhaps 600,000 in camps; although certainly a total adding up to something of the order of 2 million or so if we include all those who are loose in the bush. The need is for at least 300 tons supplied into Biafra every day, and such a tonnage, it is quite obvious when you look at it logistically, can be met with far greater certainty, far greater regularity, at far less cost and
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for far longer, by land corridor. With even 30 5-ton trucks a daily convoy over a comparatively short distance—and that convoy exists—could run two ferries and meet this requirement. This is why the land corridor has always been far to be preferred if a choice has to be made. But of course the ideal would be to have both. In any case, a land corridor will be necessary to bring in the heavy equipment to make an airstrip in Biafra capable of taking the bigger and heavier aircraft, like the "Hercules", and thus giving a really significant airlift.
My Lords, I have touched on the background against which the whole problem must be viewed. I have stated my personal convictions on certain relevant factors and on certain personalities involved. I should like now to finish by voicing one or two personal doubts. I doubt the value to starving people—I repeat, to starving people—in any part of the whole war zone, whether it is in F.M.G.-held territory or in Biafran territory, of plugging Biafra incessantly and ad nauseam land I use those words advisedly) on B.B.C. "24 Hours" or through any other publicity medium, with the strong inference that it is all due to the callous wickedness of the Federal Military Government.
The noble Baroness said that we were seeing history on the screen. My understanding of the writing of history is that it must be seen in the round and in perspective. We are not seeing history written on the screen: we are getting a wholly fallacious impression of the facts, implying that the International Red Cross is ineffective. Such impressions, which promote a political cause and undermine confidence, and which play on the emotions in doing so, can do little, and certainly do little, to open land corridors or to widen air bridges.
Secondly, my Lords, I question the fairness of showing film of food supplies stacked in stockpiles in Lagos, and the inference that the food is being diverted to military purposes. And I question the interview with Dr. Lindt at the very outset of his mission, when he had not had time to look round—a film shown about a fortnight after the events in question, and giving the impression that it was a current state of affairs. The inference was unsupported by any evidence, and the facts no longer obtained at the time the film

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was shown. What is more, there is nothing intrinsically unsound or reprehensible about maintaining a substantial stockpile at the main base at Lagos. This is in fact precisely what Dr. Lindt is doing and intends to continue to do. He wants 5.000 tons at Lagos.
What was not shown was the state of the forward depots at the time the film was shown. At or about that time there were 1,000 tons of food stockpiled at Enugu, partly collected from ample local resources, actually being used for the relief of people on the Federal side and being stockpiled for eventual use through the land corridor. Only the difficulty at that time of negotiating a charter vessel to ply between Lagos and Calabar and to negotiate an air charter to fly both to Calabar and to Enugu, the two forward bases, to the level that Dr. Lindt required —1,700 tons at Enugu and 1,000 tons at Calabar—was delaying further stockpiling at these forward depots. Both these charters have now been obtained as we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd. and the stockpiles will be ready and filled by the end of this month.
The noble Baroness referred to the use of R.A.F. aircraft. It is not in my province to comment on the political complications of that or the objections to it. I should, however, like her to know that Dr. Lindt telephoned me two nights ago to say that he now has five large aircraft, D.C.6s, four from the Nordic countries in addition to the one he has already, with which he is going to supplement the limited flights at night—and soon we hope there will be flights by day—into Biafra. This is quite an appreciable amount.
In conclusion, my Lords, I hope that I have said enough to reveal my belief that there is idealism, fortitude and forbearance on both sides of this political struggle; that there is humanity among the Federal leaders who hold the military initiative and that help from every quarter whether direct, through the Press, or in any form whatever to wretched people who suffer and starve (and perhaps particularly the children who cannot possibly have any views whatever on the political ambitions of either Government) can best be administered by a strictly neutral posture; by a strictly realistic recognition of the legal and military facts; by the maximum possible co-operation between all humanitarian
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agencies and individuals; by backing the man in charge of operation: and, of course, by the deep caring of as all which, subject to these considerations, can provide the motive force for the whole enterprise.
1.3 p.m.
VISCOUNT HEAD: My Lords, I have listened, as I am sure all your Lordships will have done, to the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, about his mission to Nigeria, with great interest and with a sense of knowing how hard he has tried to achieve the task was given in his very difficult mission. I can remember that the noble Lord came to me when I was at the War Office to borrow equipment to go up Everest. I think I am right in saying that be got it for nothing—though that is not an easy task with the Treasury around. I said to him, I remember, "Will you get up Everest?". He said, "Oh, yes, we shall get up all right. It is purely an administrative problem." I hope hat I have not misquoted the noble Lord. This, too, is an administrative problem, but I think the noble Lord will agree that it is a very much more serious and difficult one than climbing Everest.
As some of your Lordships may snow, I spent the first three years of Nigerian independence in Nigeria. I grew very fond of its people and very hopeful of its prospects. It is therefore with some despondency, and almost with despair, that I address your Lordships to-day. If any of my remarks reach Nigeria I hope that the people there will believe that I address your Lordships entirely impartially politically, and entirely impartially so far as Nigeria and the, two sides are concerned. I think, and I hope, that I had a reputation for impartiality when I was there, and in my remarks I shall in every way be as impartia as I can.
In that respect I must say that I much regret the inability of the Government to act in any way as an impartial influence for settling this crisis. I do not wish to drag up old things and to talk about arms. It is indeed sad that the Government have forfeited this role in a situation which, after all—let us face it—is for the British unfinished business. We created Nigeria. We knew the difficulties; we knew about the North, and it is indeed sad that we cannot play a greater part in solving this present difficulty.

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The noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, gave us an historical survey of what has happened. I should like to stress two points which the noble Lord did not mention, but which I think are of importance. In the cloud of propaganda that has gone out, and especially from Biafra in this respect (and I wish to try to stay impartial), one would perhaps think that it is impossible ever for Biafra or the Ibos to live with the North or the Yoruba. In fact the noble Baroness, Lady Asquith of Yarnbury, in her moving speech, was saying very much that thing. I would remind your Lordships that when I was there, for all of the three years that I was there, the North and the East were in close alliance and the Yorubas were in the doghouse". Enahoro was in prison; so was Awolow. Whom did you see when you went to the Saudauna's big receptions in Kaduna? Ibos, as honoured guests. There was a very close alliance between the North and the East. In considering the present situation I do not think it right to take the view that the two are irreconcilable, that they can never live together, that they are cat and dog. They are not like Ireland; and, anyway, when Ireland was a problem we were the Government.
The second thing I should like to stress to your Lordships about the past and the present is this. When I was in Nigeria, the North was a monolithic organisation under the influence of one man, the Sardauna. Two things have happened since then. The Sardauna was murdered, and, secondly, the North genuinely has been broken up and is no longer a monolithic organisation. The previous problem in Nigeria was that one big lump, the North, although not an overall majority in itself, could nick the East or the West as a partner and form a coalition and then they had the third part in the "ha'penny place". They chose the East when I was there so that the West went into "the doghouse". Now you may say they have the West and the East is "in the doghouse". But it is not quite that—and I have had a certain amount of information from Nigeria, from people who are both knowledgeable and living there, and I have seen quite a few. I am convinced that the North will never be the same unified force as the old North, under the Sardauna. It is in bits Maiduguri, Katsina,
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the Tivs, and so on. It is broken up and there is a genuine feeling in Nigeria that it must remain a loose federation of many small States.
I make this point about the alliance between the North and the Ibos because I think that the propaganda and the hatred and the ferocity of the present situation tend to make people feel that any long-term unity is impossible; that the Ibos cannot live within the Federation. I am not convinced of that, but I do see that for his own political reasons (again I do not wish to take sides) Ojukwu says it, and his propaganda in this respect is very strong.
My Lords, I am well aware that I am the last speaker before lunch. What I should like to do now, if I may, is to try to see this thing from the point of view of the Nigerians—because, after all, only the Nigerians can settle it. People may talk about the United Nations, or this and that, but it is the Nigerians who have to settle it and the people who have to settle it are the present leaders in Nigeria. Trying to see this matter impartially, and from a long way off, think that what they are doing now does not make sense. I am trying to be impartial but this is particularly true of Biafra. I do not address my remarks entirely to Colonel Ojukwu. He became the Military Governor and the whole thing built up around him. Events bore him along and produced a kind of political log-jam. But if anybody in Nigeria reads my remarks. I am addressing them to people like Sir Louie Mbanefo, an extremely able and intelligent man; Dr. Azikwe; Mr. Nokwe—all Ibos.
I wish to say this to them. "Do you really believe in your heart of hearts that with the present military situation, with the military strength of the Federal Government, you are going to get independence? If so, how? Are the French going to come and do it for you? Is the Federal Government going to say, 'Call it a day, we will give them independence'? "How is it coming? I cannot see it, I may be stupid. Looking at it a long way away they are going for something they cannot get. That is what I say to Louis Mbanefo.
If they say, "Well, maybe not; but if we do not have it, if we go back in and negotiate and reach agreement, we shall all be killed", again I say that I do not

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believe it. I saw an Ibo the other day who lives in Lagos. There are many, many Ibos in Lagos, and in the Western Region, and in the North, still, to-day. I do not believe they will all be killed—I cannot believe it. Of course (and here your Lordships may think I am being partial) it is a very good political stiffener to say, "You will all be killed". But I do not believe it. Nor do I understand how men of the intelligence of the ones I have talked about can believe it.
Then I would ask him a third question: "Have you thought out the full consequences of a 'backs to the wall, independence or death' policy? That may be all right as a slogan for you, but have you really thought it out in terms of human misery? "What we know about now is nothing compared to what will happen if that is the attitude under Ojukwu's leadership that the Ibos take. If the Federal Government take over all the centres and when I say "centres" I mean the big areas of settlement, the big towns and so on—and the Ibos have been told they are all going to be killed, anyway, then they will go into the bush, and the remains of Ojukwu's army will go into the bush.
If I may say so, people are much too complacent about such a situation; the horrors of it are almost beyond belief. I do not know where Ojukwu will be. What I do know is that his army will go into the bush; his people will go into the bush, and what is left of the harvest will be lost because people will desert their homes. They say that they will keep things in order, and people will not do this or that. But what happens? "Bang, bang, bang!" Somebody has shot at you out in the bush. You run out to find the chap who has shot at you; you find somebody, but whoever it was probably would have thrown his gun away so you do not know. It will he a shambles. It will not only be through fighting, but through starvation. Suppose you get the Red Cross, and all the aeroplanes over. If you go into the area where these people have taken to the bush, how do you find them? It is just as though you had a lot of beads and threw them in a hayfield and said, That will make it easier to look after the beads". I personally think that to bring this to a military conclusion and occupation would be fearful, and again I
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say to those in charge of the Ibos, and to Ojukwu, "Have you thought out the full horrors of what is going to happen?" Anyway, where will Ojukw I be?
Lastly, I would say, "Do you really believe that no negotiated settlement is any good? Do you believe that with a force sent in to see fair play—a Commonwealth force, a United Nations forcewith the world desire for peace, with terms that you would get (maybe getter than the Addis Ababa ones) you could not get assurances which would make for the Ibo people a negotiated peace such a terrible and lethal thing?" Here we come to the crux of the matter. I see that for Ojukwu there is no future in that negotiation, and that is one of the jams we are in. If a negotiated peace is made there is one thing I would guess that the Federal Government would say—"No, Ojukwu." In fact they have said it already. Whether they could swallow that, and whether they would agree to his playing a part. I doubt. What I say to Ojukwu personally is that it is an enormous responsibility to take on your shoulders, because your own political position is tied to insistence on no negotiation, to bring a whole people down to the misery which I forthe Ibos.
I would say one thing to General Gowon. He was on television last night. and I do not wish to be rude, but I must say that I was not terribly impressed by the C.R.O.'s answer to what he Kid on the television. But I do not want to be controversial and political. He said that he was going to complete and finish the war. I would say to him, "Have you thought out what you are going to do to the Nigerian people? Please do not forget, General Gowon, that you were all sitting down happily together only a few years ago. They are your people, they are your country." What is going to happen to them will never be forgotten in Nigeria, in Africa or even, to some extent, the world. I think this complete military victory will be a fearful disaster. I genuinely think that.
There are people who say: "Well, get the soldiers going; finish it: peace will then he declared and we can get down to it." I do not agree; that is not it at all. This would lead to a starving, minor Vietnam. That is what it is going to be. Gowon said that it would be over is four

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weeks, but it will be going on in four years. That is my view. I am not trying to scare anybody. I would say to Gowon: "You said in your television interview, 'I have got my soldiers so well disciplined that there will be no atrocities ' ". With the best disciplined soldiers in the world, and with respect to the noble Lord who has just spoken, if you are in the bush and you get shot at you get dispersed. The Nigerian army has expanded very quickly, the officers are not very experienced and, in many cases you may not have control of the men. In a lot of cases you are not going to avoid pretty awful things happening. I know you will not.
The second thing General Gowon said on television was, "I have told my soldiers that when the war is over—this is in four weeks' time—the battle is not really won, because we have to feed everybody". He cannot do so; most of the harvest has gone; the food is not in Nigeria; it has to come from outside. How are you going to get the food to them? By his acts Gowon will be creating a disaster. This is where I come to task with the Government. The noble Lord, Lord Shepherd—if I do not misinterpret him said, "You have to understand they may have to take over the airfields, et cetera." I thought—and I may be wrong; I hope I am—he was more or less giving the go-ahead for the completion of military conquest. I hope he is not, and that he will say so when he winds up, because in my view if the complete military occupation of Iboland, with the terrible consequences it would bring, is brought about—the moment that decision is made, which it appeared to be on the television—there is absolutely no case whatever for one single bit of ammunition or arms going from this country to the Federation. It should be cut off at once.
My Lords, I have tried to put the thing as I see it from outside, and I know how inflammable the situation is and how people in Nigeria can be carried away by partisan feelings. I would say to them that if ever they thought I could be of any assistance. I would get on an aeroplane to-morrow. But I do not expect they think I could help. But anything I can do I will do. I have a nasty fear that Ojukwu is going to go on, and that
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in time—maybe to-day—Gowon will go on with full military conquest. I hope I am wrong, but it is a dreadful prospect. What I would say to your Lordships, particularly the noble Lord who has just spoken, is if that is going to happen then we should prepare and bring all the influence possible, all nations, to get some Commonwealth force in being, something to hold the ring somewhere. Secondly, I believe that all that Dr. Lindt is doing now—if this takes place—would need to be multiplied by five or possibly ten. Unless that happens there is going to be a disaster of almost unique size so far as starvation and hardship is concerned.
My Lords, this is a gloomy situation and a gloomy speech. There is the Addis Ababa meeting still going on, and there is another meeting of O.A.U. next month. I only hope that even at this moment the leaders of Nigeria will think of their people, who I believe could live together. I hope that they will think again and talk, that they will negotiate and end the war.
LORD HUNT: Before the noble Lord sits down, may I, I hope, reassure him on the point he made latterly? Doctor Lindt is fully alive to the immensely greater problem that is going to arise in one of several contingent situations, and when I touched on his immediate plans which he is now developing and will realise in the next day or week or so, these are not the bigger plans on which he is working for this enormously bigger job.
[The Sitting was suspended at 1.22 p.m. and resumed at 2 p.m.]
LORD SEGAL: My Lords, I listened carefully to the remarks of my noble friend Lord Shepherd, speaking for the Government in this debate. There is no one, I think, who is held in greater esteem in this House, and no one, I think, has laboured more arduously than he to bring about peace in Nigeria. But as the debate proceeded, I think that many of us must have been left with many doubts as to the wisdom of the British Government's policy and as to the effects that it is achieving.
Those of us who recall the days of British rule in Nigeria will remember how the country was largely at peace, how all tribes learnt to live with each

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other and how steady progress was made under British guidance and the British traditions of political maturity. After independence was granted, an attempt was made to continue the British liberal tradition in a united Nigeria under Balewa. That attempt, unfortunately, failed. Since then Nigeria has been plunged into internal strife and tribal rivalry, and no one can look at the dreadful picture to-day without feeling how much better the country was even under colonialist rule.
What gave rise to the greatest doubts in my mind, after hearing especially the speeches of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and the noble Viscount, Lord Head, was the feeling that now Nigeria is going to be plunged into the final ordeal. The Federal forces are poised for the ultimate strike. But let none of us imagine that war will solve any of the present-day problems of Ibo independence. On the contrary, I think that a military victory now would only create vaster, new problems than existed before the civil war broke out. And I think that these facts ought to be brought home as emphatically as we can to the present leaders of Nigeria. No solution can be effected by military victory The concern of many of us is, after a military victory has been achieved—and, unfortunately, it now seems very imminent—how will the Federal Government be able to face up to the vast problem once the military resistance of the Ibos has been finally crushed?
One of the tantalising problems of Africa is that every new advance in any direction creates in its trail a vast set of new problems. As medical progress advances, we find that the population increases and problems of unemployment are created. As education increases, we find new problems created by individuals seeking to gain by their own education for their own ends, but not with a sense of strong social conscience of their duty to the community. These are still early days for African civilisation. Nigeria, which in itself is almost a subcontinent, comparable perhaps to India, will find these problems intensified immeasurably after military victory has been achieved.
Unfortunately, there is every possibility now that the odium will recoil on us in this country. Britain has borne the brunt
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of trying to render assistance to Nigeria to help it to solve its problems. I do not believe for a moment that this is. primarily a British problem. I feel that the only way to approach it is on a Commonwealth basis. It was not sufficient to my mind simply to send out the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth Secretariat as an individual to solve these problems. I should like to ask the Government seriously to reconsider the whole situation in the light of an impending Federal victory. Surely even now we can call a Commonwealth Conference specifically to deal with the problem of Nigeria. The military situation the famine and the suffering have already got out of bounds and it should not fall upon this country to be the only one to attempt to solve this problem.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords,I hope my noble friend will agree that the Emperor Haile Selassie and the O.A.U. are to-day actively working in this field; that this is very much an African problem and if an African organisat on is able to solve it, there is much to be said for that, particularly in terms of frican statesmanship and development. I hope my noble friend also agrees that if they are now working in this field and have these discussions going, it would be wrong to suggest that another outside initiative should now be taken. Of course, if there was a failure, clearly we should have to look at the whole matter again.
LORD SEGAL: My Lords, I fully agree with my noble friend, and I Can only say that I fervently hope that his optimism will prove justified. But I have a great many reservations. I feel that because we ourselves were formely the governing power in Nigeria, this is specifically a problem that we should not have left to the initiative of Haile Selassie or the African Powers. It is something much vaster than a purely African problem. Now it is a tremendous humanitarian problem, which has shocked the whole civilised work. If I may be forgiven for saying so, we ought not to be completely content to leave it as an African problem, much less as a purely Nigerian problem. I repeat that I only hope that my noble friend's optimism about the successful outcome of the deliberations at Addis Ababa will prove justified.

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But surely we ourselves ought to hold rather more than a watching brief and as a Commonwealth should extend our help to Nigeria, not only in the material sense and certainly not only in the provision of arms. I am one of those who feel that it would be wrong to cut off our supply of arms to Nigeria, because this at best would be only a gesture, and I do not believe in gestures. These steps may have an immediate effect but ultimately they fail in their objective. So I fervently hope that our Government may seek to have in reserve the calling of a Commonwealth Conference in an attempt finally to solve this problem.
Just as I do not believe that military victory will solve this problem, so equally I do not believe that the problem of Nigeria can be solved by federation. Federation is a Westminster solution, which has grown out of the centuries of our own political maturity in this country. But the whole concept of federation is simply alien to many parts of the world. We tried it in the Caribbean, and there it failed. We tried it in Central Africa, and again it failed. We tried it in Aden, and now the last thing one talks about in the South Yemen Territory is the idea of federation.
My noble friend Lord Shepherd said, if I interpret him aright, that the declaration of independence by Biafra was tantamount to an act of war. Would he also agree that the declaration of independence by Singapore was an act of war against Malaysia? The parallel holds good, with this difference: that the political wisdom of the Tungku, the head of Malaysia, prevailed over counsels of war, and we accepted the independence of Singapore as a reality.
My Lords, can we not make it clear now to the rulers of Federal Nigeria that they have far more to lose than to gain by persisting in this war? On the contrary, they have far more to gain by allowing Biafra some measure of independence, some means of self-expression, within a part of the vast territory of Nigeria. I would most fervenftly ask the Government to think once again and to try to find a basic reorientation of their policy. We have achieved a Federation in Nigeria only as a result of a union of four separate entities. Can we not put it now to the
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Federal rulers in Nigeria that their only hope of a united Nigeria, of a truly federated Nigeria, is by allowing some measure of independence, of freedom and self-expression to the Ibo element in their territory, which has been driven away from the Northern provinces by massacre and slaughter, and has now decentralised itself in part of the Eastern territory of Nigeria, and which I think has a claim now for recognition not only by Federal Nigeria, but also by our own Government here at home?
Unless we can give them some measure of guidance, some assistance out of our fund of political experience here in this country, I think that many of us might have grounds for questioning the political maturity of many of the African States to-day, and of the possibility of their being able to govern themselves and to help their peoples forward to a more enlightened future without vast help from the outside world, and particularly from the Commonwealth, not only help in an economic sense, but also active help in a political sense. I can only hope and pray that it may yet not be too late to avert further famine and slaughter in Nigeria.
2.14 p.m.
LORD GOODMAN: My Lords, it is perhaps the illest of ill winds that does not bring some slight comfort. The disaster in Czechoslovakia has given us the opportunity of discussing the position in Nigeria. There is, I think, a relevant difference between the two situations, in that in relation to Nigeria, even at this eleventh hour, I believe there is something to be done, and something that we can do. I heard with great interest and, if I may say so, great admiration the immensely constructive speech of the noble Viscount. Lord Head. I thought that what he had to say was precisely to the point.
My Lords, I believe that we have pursued a mistaken policy; I believe that we have pursued a disastrously mistaken policy. But I believe also that there is still an opportunity to rectify it. I do not believe that the people who have carried out that policy are criminals, with bloodstained hands. I believe that they are honourable, well-meaning people, who are as humane as anyone in this House, and certainly as humane as I am.

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But I believe that they were totally mistaken, and that their mistake arises from error, and also perhaps from the least forgivable attribute, that of obstinacy. I believe that they have declined to look at the facts that are staring them in the face.
The noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, shakes his head in disagreement, but I think that anyone who heard his "Child's History of Nigeria" this morning—appropriate, if I may say so, to be published as a "Child's History of the Federal Government "—would realise how very much he has omitted in relation to this matter, and how much he appears not to know. Ignorance is an entirely excusable situation; but an ignorance that refuses to admit that knowledge exists is a less excusable situation where it contributes to a catastrophe of the magnitude that has now developed throughout Nigeria. This is not a Biafran matter alone, and those of us who speak here are not concerned alone with Biafra, but are concerned with the welfare of the whole of Nigeria, which is totally affected by this disastrous situation. And we must be immensely concerned if we believe, as we sincerely do, that Her Majesty's Government have got hold of the wrong end of the stick and have been clinging to it with an almost unexampled tenacity.
There were three demonstrations, relatively simple ones, of how Her Majesty's Government and their spokesman here to-day have swallowed, totally uncritically and without question, everything that comes out of Federal Nigeria. First of all, there was the unedifying situation with regard to the construction of the speech made by General Gowon on television yesterday. That speech was open to only one interpretation. There was no possible element of doubt about what he meant; no gloss can be put upon it; nobody can refine it or adjust it or adapt it so that it fits into our comfortable preconceptions of what the policy is. The man has said in the clearest possible terms that he is going to force the fight to an issue. He has said that in my hearing. If there is one thing that I have come to trust over the years, my Lords, it is the reliability of my own hearing. When I cease to trust that, I shall cease to function in any capacity. I heard him say it on television, and other Members of your Lordships' House
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heard General Gowon say it. It cannot be explained away.
Then there were the reassuring utterances about what General Gowon was going to do when he got into the hot land of the Ibo. Not a word was said about the bloodcurdling utterances of his leader, the gentleman who has been announcing that he is going to shoot at anything that moves. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, to whom the whole of this House and the whole of the country is deeply indebted for having under aken that thankless mission, said (if I may paraphrase him) that the Colonel was nothing more than a public school type. Those of us here may well think that that is what the Colonel is, and we might come to regard him as a very agreeable and pleasant fellow to have a drink with in a club. But when you think of the cowering, terrified masses in Biafra, I am afraid that they will not construe these statements in that way. They will construe them quite literally. They will say: "This man intends to murder us". Not a word has been said on that subject by Her Majesty's Government.
And, if I may say so, most facile of all were the explanations of the various negotiations for peace treaties. These negotiations, in my opinion, have been totally and utterly valueless, because; they have been directed towards an impossibility. They have throughout been restricted to formal and procedural considerations. In London they argued about where the peace discussions were to take place, about what the agenda was to be, and about whether they were to have a chairman—and in fact they departed without a chairman. A greater absurdity it is impossible to imagine, than these two adversaries confronting each other across the peace table without an independent chairman. But that is not what the London discussions were about.
Then they went to Kampala, and many of your Lordships may have read the record of the proceedings in Kampala, as written about by Sir Louis Mbanafo. I should like to say a word about Sir Louis Mbanafo because the noble Viscount, Lord Head, said a word about him. I have known him foe most of my life; we were undergraduates together. If there is one man I would trust, it is that man. If there is one man

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whose opinion I would take, it is that man's. My concern and interest in the Biafran situation arises simply from my friendship with him. I have met over the years many other of the Biafran leaders. But I believe what he says, and he gave me an account of the Kampala negotiations that made it quite clear that the Federal Government were treading a stately minuet; that there was no genuine or sincere desire on anyone's part to achieve a settlement that involved a cease-fire. And, if I may say so, one cannot blame them, because each side wanted something quite different.
The Biafrans wanted a cease-fire because they were losing the war; a ceasefire would be a military advantage to them; it would relieve the military pressure. The Federal Government did not want a cease-fire: they wanted a capitulation. And the two people were negotiating for objectives to which they gave the same term, the same description, but which were totally different things. All the negotiations had been concerned with these preliminaries, preliminaries which could never achieve a result because the vital and essential matter with which we should have concerned ourselves—which was first to arrive at a constitutional settlement that would be acceptable to both sides—has, deplorably enough, never been discussed under our aegis or under our auspices with both sides present, or even without that intermediary.
Why is this so? I am afraid that I must detain your Lordships for a little time in trying to explain what I regard as a very important matter indeed. The explanation is that we have for some reason adopted the view that the Federal Government of Nigeria is a legal Government and the Biafran Government is an illegal Government, a rebel Government. May I review the situation as it was reviewed (though I will endeavour to do it more briefly) by the Minister this morning, when he was describing the situation to us. Nigeria was granted its independence in 1960. It was granted a Federal Constitution. It was granted a Federal Constitution after the most careful and anxious thought by this country. No one can be blamed. There were Commissions, minority Commissions, that went out to consider whether there should be
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three or four areas. There were discussions about whether there should be a Middle West tribe. The Willinck Commission considered the whole matter and decided in favour of three territories, and a Federal Government was granted.
I think that that form of Government was in itself incapable of achieving a successful result, for the simple reason that it created a division of the territory which ensured that in each of the three territories there was one dominant tribe, and no possibility at all that any one of the tribes could achieve a majority throughout the integrated territory. That was the built-in situation created by the Constitution which we granted. It was adjusted subsequently when a fourth territory was created, contrary to the recommendations of the Willinck Commission, by the creation of a Mid-West territory following the grant of independence.
Then in 1963 (I do not think this matter was mentioned by the Minister) there was of course the creation of a Republic, and the creation of a further Constitution, and Nigeria became fully independent as a Republican Constitution. At that stage legal government existed in Nigeria. One knew where it was; one knew where to find it. Then came the coups. In January, 1966, there came the first of the coups. What I believe were called the "Ibo majors" massacred the Prime Minister and a number of other people. It was, I have no doubt, a highly reprehensible matter. It was not a purely tribal matter, and it was significant that the massacred was put down by an army leader who was himself an Ibo. It was significant that the Quartermaster General at that time, himself an Ibo, was shot dead because he refused to hand over arms and ammunitions to the rebels.
Thus it was quite clear that this was not a division along purely tribal lines. But the fact remains that there was an insurrection largely inspired by the Ibos. That came in January, 1966, and at that stage the Cabinet, as I understand it, apprehensive of the continuation of democratic or legal government in civil form, asked General Ironsi if he would take over the Government and conduct it in a state of emergency.
At that stage, I should have thought, there ceased to be a constitutional legal government as we understand it. At that

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stage there was an ad hoc government operating because it exercised control in a certain territory. But, further, there came the second coup in June or July, 1966, when Ironsi was murdered and when, following a period of very considerable confusion, as I understand it, Colonel Go won emerged as the leader. Colonel Gowon was not even, in terms of seniority, the lineal successor to Ironsi. He was several stages removed in seniority, but he was the person who assumed power. How can it remotely be suggested by any legal authority that his Government has the status of a legal government? Yet we have stated this blandly and blindly; iterated it and reiterated it to a point where it has dominated all our thinking in this matter, and where, if I may say so, it has directed the whole of our policy, to the extent where we have imposed upon ourselves a total paralysis in any useful action. Because by saying that we are dealing with a legal government that was not a legal government, we have of course said that we cannot deal with anyone else.
The situation arises—and I do not profess to be art international lawyer; it may be that the Government will produce arguments to dispute this—that there are two ad hoc legal governments in existence in the Nigerian territory at the moment. There is the Gowon Government—or was—which ad hoc and de facto controlled an area of territory, because it was operating it and controlling it effectively; and there was the Biafran area—whatever portion of that was in fact controlled by Colonel Ojukwu. That appears to me to be the legal situation. But not only is that the legal situation, but that is the situation to which we should have cleaved with enthusiasm, because that gave us an opportunity of doing something effective. I agree, if I may say so, with the noble Viscount, Lord Head. I am by no means sure that the aspirations of the Biafrans towards total independence can ever be achieved. I am by no means sure that they take sufficiently into account the economic considerations and considerations of the minority. But what I am absolutely convinced of is that if we had effectively negotiated between these people on the basis that they both had ad hoc governments, we could have arrived at some compromise for a loose
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confederation that would have been acceptable to them both.
I have had long, almost endless, discussions with Biafran leaders. I have, put innumerable permutations and alternatives to them about what sort of Government might be a possibility within a confederation. I have had, personally, a most encouraging response. They have frequently said to me, "Yes, this might be a possibility. But how do we ensure, pray, that if we are attacked, we can defend ourselves?", because, if I may say so, Her Majesty's Minister this morning did less than justice to the real apprehensions of the Ibos and of the Easterners, because not only Ibos are concerned. He said very little about the fact that they fled back to their territory after a massacre. One does not want to make too much of it, but they have it fully in mind, constantly in mind. Their solitary recollection is that 20,000, 30,000 or 40,000 of them—I do not know how many, but nobody has ever put the figure at less than 20,000—were in fact massacred in the North. It was, I think a little unworthy that the Government should have suggested that there was a justification for this because there was a general apprehension that the Ibos were about to seize power. Supposing there was such an apprehension. Could that remotely have justified such a course? There is always an apprehension—
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, will the noble Lord permit me to intervene, because I am sure he would always wish to be accurate? I would not wish myself to set a figure as to the number of Ibos who were killed in the early massacre. Certainly the evidence that we have does not come anywhere near the 20,000 figure that the noble Lord has himself quoted. But I think he would also wish to be accurate when he speaks about the Ibos fleeing to Biafra. Some did. But at least I million have remained in the Federal areas. I think we need to get some degree of accuracy in the noble Lord's speech.
LORD GOODMAN: Well, my Lords, I hope the Minister is not suggesting; that everything I have said up to the moment is lacking in accuracy. I entirely accept from him that some Ibos have remained in the Western territories. Some in the

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mid-West, as he will know, and if I may say so failed to refer to, are still in insurrection. There are still elements of Ibos in the mid-West who are fighting for their independence, despite the fact that they are divorced from their colleagues in Biafra. I do not know whether it is as many as a million, but certainly there are members of the Ibo tribe who are in other parts of Nigeria. Equally, I do not know the number of Ibos who were massacred. It was a formidable number, and this is the first time that I have ever heard any Governmental denial that the figure was less than 20,000. This is the very first time that anyone has asserted that. Whether it was 10,000, 20,000 or 15.000, this is the factor foremost in the minds of the Biafrans.
Just think what we could have done to reassure them had we remained in dialogue with them. But we cut ourselves totally off from dialogue. We offered them no reassurance; we never said to them that these people were not going to murder them. We never said: "We will see to it that you are not murdered; international forces will see that you are not murdered". General Gowon is a nice civilised man, as has been said, and I do not deny it for a moment. The fact remains that this is not believed in Biafra, and if people tell me that the Biafrans are fighting because of notions of aggrandisement or because they want oil, or for any other reason, I tell them simply that that is not the case. Whatever the ambitions of Colonel Ojukwu may have been, the simple fact is that at this moment of time the Biafransthe simple people in Biafra—are fighting because they believe that if they give up the fight they will be massacred. That is their belief; it may be a mistaken belief, but it is a belief and an anxiety that we had it within out power to allay.
When I started to speak I said that I thought there was something constructive still to be done. This remains my belief. I believe that we should put ourselves into touch with the Biafran chiefs. I believe that we should allay the anxiety and suspicion about us that exists in Biafra—and that principally because of the dispatch of arms. It is not that we were under any obligation to dispatch arms. A more extraordinary proposition I do not think has ever been enunciated
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in international law. Allowing even that this was a legal State could we then in any circumstances be under an immutable and absolute obligation to supplyarms for whatever use they wanted to put them to?
LORD BOOTHBY: Hear, hear!
LORD GOODMAN: How does such an obligation ever arise, and when has it arisen before? I say, and I assert most positively, that this is not a legal State. This is a State that had no claim on any footing; and if it was a legal State this is an untenable claim for a legal State to make. But the damage of the supply of arms was not whether or not they would have got them from somewhere else, but that it shattered the confidence of the Biafrans in the British, because there is no territory in the whole of Africa where British authority sounded deeper and sounded richer than it did in Biafra before this war started.
Men like Mbanafo and his colleagues were Anglophiles to the last of their breath. They were educated in England. Here was a man created a Knight by Her Majesty and made the Chief Justice of Eastern Nigeria. He was an Englishman in everything but colour. His colleagues were wholly dedicated to the British cause. We forfeited the whole of that because of this imbecile persistence in supplying arms, and if the Nigerians could have got the arms from somewhere else, good luck to them. If we believed that the Nigerians ought to win the war, and knew also that they could win the war by getting the arms from somewhere else, well let them get them from somewhere else. But why should we have forfeited confidence, why should we have alienated the good will, why should we have created and maintained disaffection when it was going to do this irreparable damage?
I believe, as I started by saying, that this is not a case where recriminations serve any purpose. I believe that everything that has been done has been done with the best of intentions and in the belief that it is right, but alas! hell and Biafra are paved with good intentions. Even at this late hour I urge the Goverment to reconsider. I think the Government still can do something effective, but they must reconsider their policy, and reconsider it in the light

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of reality and not concern themselves with the question of what propaganda is coming out of Biafra.
How pitiful, if I may say so, that a Minister of the Crown should concern himself with the question of what stories were being put about and believed by poor, cowed, terrified creatures in Biafra, whether they believed that a football team was an army or not. If I were a native in Biafra whose child was starving, who was being subjected to bombardment, whose relatives were being murdered all around, I would believe absolutely any rumour and report that I was told. If I may say so, having at times found myself in England during the war, I well remember the rumours and reports that were believed by quite sensible people in this country at that time. There was no story too extravagent for some people to believe. But what a thing to reproach them with! If I may venture to say so, if they are defending themselves by propaganda, then it is the clament cries of a man sinking for the third time. Those cries may be very offensive indeed to civilised ears, but it is the only form of hope that is still open to the poor wretched creatures.
I venture to ask the Government to think very long before they pursue a policy that I am convinced can end only in disaster. I am absolutely convinced of the complete authenticity of everything the noble Viscount said—that there is no military solution to this problem at all. If the Ibo are defeated if the Easterners are defeated, because I do not accept the story that the whole of the rest of the Eastern tribes are not fighting with them; it is completely inconsistent with the fact that the war has been maintained for this length of time, and people who come out of Biafra do not support it—and these people take to the bush, heaven knows what disaster will descend upon the whole of Africa.
I would echo what the noble Viscount said to Colonel Ojukwu. If his position stands in the way of a settlement, then it is an enormous responsibility for one man to assume that he should allow his personal ambitions and hopes and notions to imperil the lives of the whole of his people. I have not met Colonel Ojukwu. I earnestly hope that he will give heed to these words, and that if
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there is a possibility of a settlement that involves compromising the maximum hopes and aspirations of the Biafrans, that the Biafrans, like everyone else, will listen to sense. But I am sure that even to-day we have a mediating role, and this is the role we should immediately undertake.
2.36 p.m.
LORD MILVERTON: My Lords, I have listened with deep appreciation of the technical skill with which the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, has destroyed practically everything within sight, and I have been wondering how best I could indicate that there were so many of his points with which I disagreed that I could hardly take them one by one and make a coherent speech. Therefore if I proceed to say what I had intended to say to your Lordships it will be evident how wholly I disagree with the approach and the conclusions of the noble lord, Lord Goodman.
It was with a heavy heart that I decided to take part in this debate, and with considerable reluctance. Nigeria has meant so much to me, in affection and in hope that the Federation would grow into a great nation, prosperous, happy and an example to all Africa of what Africans can do, and an inspiration to other nascent nations to exemplify the truth that unity is strength.
I begin in this way because I want to paint the picture as I see it. I yield to no one in my horror over the starving thousands of men, women and children and the terrible suffering which disfigures this civil war, on both sides. I am as anxious as anyone to terminate the terrible sufferings of innocent women and children. Equally I hope I may say, without being accused of inhumanity, that external intervention in this tragedy should beware of allowing our deep sympathy with the victims of the present situation to cloud our judgment to the extent of building up a future situation, the horror of which would dwarf even that which exists today.
Perhaps I may be allowed to go back twenty years and recall what Lord Lugard said to me in 1943, when I was about to go out and take over the Governorship of Nigeria. In several long talks which I was privileged to have with

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the greatest of all Colonial Governors he said:
"The future of Africa is pregnant with possibilities and the lot has fallen upon you. What you do in Nigeria over the coming few years may well affect not only the future of Nigeria but the future of the Continent of which she forms so important a part."
With humility, I should like to repeat this friendly advice to Her Majesty's present Government. We are not concerned only with an overwhelming desire to help the victims of a terrible rebellion. We must consider and take a decision on the setting and the real cause or causes of this fratricidal strife. So may I submit to your Lordships a brief summary of the position as I see it?
If I may travel for a moment over one or two of the features which have already been mentioned, the foundation on which the Federation of Nigeria was built was laid in 1946–47 and was originally based on the three Regions: the Northern Protectorate, the East and West, which constituted the Southern Protectorate (those were the three sections), and also, of course, Lagos, which was a small Colony where the person in charge of this conglomeration lived and worked. It was obvious that the Northern Protectorate (which, incidentally, at that time was not at all represented in the Southern Legislative Council and did not wish to be represented) was going to be, in any joint Government, in a dominant position, and that later that position would have to be corrected to ensure equality of influence in the constituent States as the union developed. Overall Government control was centred in the small Colony of Lagos and its immediate hinterland.
Development over the years 1947 to 1960 has been rapid, accelerated as ever by the approach of independence, which came about in 1960. I think we should never forget the great success with which Nigeria was adapting itself to this Federation, which received the rather contemptuous attention of the noble Lord, Lord Goodman. By 1960, the Regions had developed their own separate Governments with wide powers under a supreme Federal body still centred in Lagos.
In 1964, a new, separate region was excised from the Western Region, making four members of the Federation. Apparently Nigeria was an immense and
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successful Federation, and had an immense future before it. Then in January, 1966, occurred the Army coup, organised by a group of young Ibo officers who planned, inter alia, to kill all non-Ibo officers over the rank of major. The Federal Prime Minister, the Premiers of the North and West, and many others, were murdered. In addition to the ruling motive of lbo aggression (aggressive ambition was one of their characteristics) to control the country, there was a basis of popular dissatisfaction at the corrupt practices of certain members of the Federal regime, which did not of course include the Federal Prime Minister, who was a man of unimpeachable integrity and moderation.
In the subsequent confusion Major-General Ironsi, himself an Ibo, took charge as officer commanding the Army and formed a Military Government. He proceeded to pack the senior positions, civil and military, with Ibo nominees, and he promulgated the Unification Decree No. 34 of May, 1966, which abolished the Federal system and aimed at altering the very basis of the Nigerian political system, without consultation with anyone. Added to renewed popular dissatisfaction was the provocative arrogance of Ibo officers who flaunted their claim to having achieved control of the Federation.
The result, as we have been told this afternoon, was another military coup on July 29, 1966, culminating in the assumption of office by Major-General Gowon as Head of the Federal Military Government and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. An immediate return to the Federal system was ordered and certain eminent political prisoners were released. Conferences were held concerning a review of the Federal system in the direction of curing its constituent imbalance by the creation of 12 States of equal status. which in effect meant splitting the huge North into six States and the East into three. The West, of course, had already three.
These proposals were greeted with enthusiastic consent except by the Military Governor of the East, Colonel Ojukwu, who was determined to retain control of the minority tribes in the East because he wanted to control the rich oil supplies in their territories. Incidentally, for many long years the

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minorities, who were 5 million strong in the Eastern province, had been demanding the creation of separate States to free them from the domination of the 7 million Ibo majority whose land adjoined their territories. All sections of Nigeria agreed on this political reconstruction except the East, re-named Biafra by Colonel Ojukwu. This decision to insist on retaining control over the proposed South Eastern and Rivers States was, of course, that of Colonel Ojukwu and his group of intensely ambitious men. The oil-bearing areas of the Eastern Region are located in these non-Ibo territories. Under the Federal Constitution all minerals belong to the Federal Government, and all agreements in respect of exploitation of these minerals are made with the Federal Government.
Protracted negotiations and communications followed. In short, from August, 1966, until May, 1967, the Federal Government made every possible effort of compromise and conciliation to avoid the use of force against Ojukwu, who consistently refused to attend any meetings and continued a steady and highly organised illegal importation of arms and ammunition. Finally, he organised a systematic campaign for the return of Eastern Nigerians resident in other parts of Nigeria, in the expectation that existing public services in other parts of the Federation would thus collapse. He then hoped to be able to dictate his own terms.
On March 31, 1967, he promulgated an edict which seized all Federal assets and stopped all Federal operations in the Eastern Region. On May 30, 1967, he illegally declared the former Eastern Region of Nigeria as a sovereign State under the name of the Republic of Biafra. My Lords, there was surely no alternative in this situation; the Federal Government must employ economic sanctions and force, and it is amply justified, in justice and in mercy, in trying to effect the earliest possible end to a situation which casts such an ominous shadow over so much of Africa.
My Lords, as has been said this afternoon, thousands of lbos have continued to work despite the crisis in the Nigerian armed forces, the police, the Federal Public Service, in the services of some of the States, and the private sector outside the Central Eastern State, their own
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land. General Gowon offers the recalcitrant leaders of the rebellion the opportunity to resume their place as welcome and equal partners in the national progress of Nigeria. He says, and has repeatedly said, that Nigeria needs the Ibos and the Ibos need Nigeria. He further has again and again asked hem to assist in conferences of represents fives of the 12 equal States to settle the details of the new Federation and to facilitate as early as possible a hand-over of Government to civil authorities.
I have tried to sketch the background which, from past experience, makes it clear that any cease-fire before the, renunciation of secession by the rebels will be abused by their leaders to rearm and resume fighting on a larger scale. It is not fair, in considering this situation to overlook the fact that the rebel leader is prepared to use the starving bodies of innocent women and children to achieve his ends by evoking foreign public sympathy for a disaster which he could have terminated by one word of his own at any time in the last six months. The Federal Military Government al ways keeps before it the major policy goal of the current military operations; that is, to create and safeguard the conditions of lasting peace, and not only la sting peace but stability and communal harmony, so that the nation can continue its economic and social development at an acceptable pace under a civilian Government.
One of the most significant developments from the capture of Enugu has been the discovery by the Federal forces of documents which throw greater light on the expansionist ambitions of Colonel Ojukwu and his rebel clique over the Federal Republic of Nigeria. While Colonel Ojukwu has been telling the world that the fight for his fatherland was for the survival of the allegedly oppressed Ibos, it is now clear that his plans were in fact to conquer the greater part of the Federation of Nigeria and subjugate her peoples to his own douination. Ojukwu's planned empire, as these captured documents show, was to extend from the Cameroon border in the North-East to the Dahomey border in the West. It would include the whole of Iorin, Kabba and Benue Provinces, and parts of Adamawa and Sardauna Provinces of the Benue River and Southwards including

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all the territories stretching to the coastline.
My Lords, whatever foreigners may think, the people of Nigeria have known all along that Ojukwu's claims are unfounded. They know that his real ambition and that of his advisers was not only to carve an empire for themselves but to overrun the rest of Nigeria. He has sedulously spread among his own people the utterly false story that the Federal Government aims at genocide, the extermination of the Ibo people. The Nigerian people were satisfied that the Mid-West misadventure, which your Lordships may remember, when Ibo forces captured Benin, which so narrowly missed success was only part of the unfolding of the great rebel plans. The captured documents illustrate, as never before, the major cause of the Nigerian crisis, namely, the mad ambition of Ojukwu to conquer and subdue the Federation of Nigeria and instal himself over it.
If I have not exhausted your Lordships' patience I would make a brief reference to the visit to Lagos of the Organisation of African Unity Consultative Mission of September last year, headed by the Emperor of Ethiopia. General Gowon, in a welcome address, analysed the position, with admirable brevity and clarity, as a choice between agreement to the disintegration of Nigeria and the use of force to preserve its territorial integrity. My Lords, the Emperor of Ethiopia in his reply stated, inter alia:
"Ethiopia, as a founding member of the Organisation of African Unity, fully subscribes to all the principles enshrined in the Charter. The national unity and territorial integrity of Member States is not negotiable. It must be fully respected and preserved. It is our firm belief that the national unity of individual African States is an essential ingredient for the realisation of the larger and greater objective of African Unity. It is precisely because of this that we oppose any attempt at national fragmentation on religious or ethnic or other grounds. That is why Ethiopia unreservedly supports Nigerian national unity and territorial integrity."
Perhaps I ought to add a postscript of my own to these comments. It concerns the allegation which has been made by the Biafran propaganda people that religious differences have influenced Nigerian politics. There is no justification whatever for this statement. From
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colonial days until now religion has never become mixed with politics in Nigeria. A glance at the religious adherence of members of the Cabinets of the various States or of the courts would indicate that religion had no influence whatever in such appointments.
In their communiqué the Mission of the African Heads of State reaffirmed their views in these words:
"It recognised that the crisis is purely an internal affair of Nigeria and that no solution is possible except within the context of the national unity and territorial integrity of the Federation. Further the Mission is in complete agreement with the Federal Government's insistence that, as a prior condition for an end of the war, the rebel regime must accept the administrative structure of twelve States as a basis for permanent peace and stability in the Federation."
My Lords, I have tried to give a clear picture of the background of this complicated situation as I see it, and I think it is most important to realise what the background is. I feel considerable sympathy with the difficulties of Her Majesty's Government in having at one and the same time to deal with a misguided public opinion in this country, which has been inflamed by the emotional falsification of the issues under the influence of clever and unscrupulously perverse propaganda, and with their own delicate position of long traditional friendship with an independent country in whose internal affairs they have neither the right nor the desire to intervene.
It is my view, in support of which I have tried to indicate the facts, that any attempt to cut off, or to lead a movement to cut off, supplies of arms to the Federal Government would in effect amount to support of a sordid rebellion and, whether effective or not, would give moral support where I presume Her Majesty's Government would least wish to give it. The responsibility for the terrible suffering in Nigeria lies firmly on the shoulders of Colonel Ojukwu and his group of colleagues, and, in my view, the quickest and most humane way of ending this suffering, and, incidentally, to prevent even worse calamities, would be the early and complete victory of the Federal forces, or a last-minute return to reason by the rebel leaders.
I am glad to see in the Press that at long last an agreement has been reached to enable food and medical supplies to

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reach the stricken areas, both by road and by air. But the fighting continues, and I can only express a hope in the name of humanity that an early and complete victory of the Federal forces will terminate one of the saddest periods in Nigerian history. There is still hope that Nigeria will recover and, in spite of the views of the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, will yet become that shining example to the rest of Africa that a wise combination of the diverse qualities of her citizens can evolve from the increasing development of her natural wealth.
I end, my Lords, where I began, by emphasising that action dictated and guided by emotion is a dangerous substitute for statesmanship. I have avoided direct reference to the sordid negotiations of Ojukwu with a foreign Power eager to gain promise of future oil and mineral concessions as the price of heavy finance of the rebel supplies of guns, ammunition, planes and war material. I have also refrained from emphasising—and I merely mention it in passing—that an initial support by Her Majesty's Government, had they been able to see their way to do it, in allowing to the Federal Government an increased purchase of war materials from British sources to meet the emergency might well have ended the rebellion in a few weeks and have saved thousands of innocent lives. Her Majesty's Government were then perhaps in a very difficult position to make such a decision, or honestly thought they were. No such doubt can surely exist to-day.
May I repeat that, in my view, Her Majesty's Government should give every possible support to the Federal Government in the name of humanity and the future stability of Africa? I felt that it was my humble duty to hand on the torch. The Federation has grown to manhood, and I implore Her Majesty's Government not to listen to those whose short-sighted emotional pleas would help to put out that torch, whose light would gladden and encourage the whole of Africa. If Her Majesty's Government will refuse to hinder by any withholding of their support, I am confident that not only the people of Nigeria but future generations of Africans all over the Continent will bless the British Government as its truest friend. I therefore plead with Her Majesty's Government to take a firm unequivocal stand in favour of the Federal Government, lest any faltering
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now may cause the situation to deteriorate beyond the reach of regret.
3.6 p.m.
LORD SORENSEN: My Lords, it is with considerable temerity and indeed diffidence that I venture to intervene in the presence of so many who have obviously had rich experience of Nigeria, who are very greatly informed about recent developments there, and who are possibly much greater authorities on these matters than I would ever dare pretend to be. But I must comment on the fact that the last two noble Lords who have spoken gave us an excellent example of the difference between the subjective and objective view. The same faces are there, but their interpretation by the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, and the noble Lord, Lord Milverton, are quite different. Of course, that is very characteristic of much else in human history. Again, the noble Lord, Lord Milverton, said that in his view religion and politics have never been mixed in Nigeria. I should have thought that remark needed qualification, particularly in regard to the Northern Region, where the Hausas are almost exclusively Moslem, and where the religious tenets of their faith are intertwined in the social structure and determine in some measure the outlook of the Hausas and their Emirs to the rest of Nigeria.
Here I pay tribute to the splendid services that the B.B.C. and the L.T.V. are both providing, although I quite agree with the implications of certain words by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, that at times there has been—undoubtedly unconsciously—a certain distortion of facts or omission of other facts. Be that as it may, on the whole I am sure that the people of this country have been considerably enlightened by both of those channels providing us with some knowledge of current events.
When I went home last night I sat down, turned on the television, and on to the screen there came the features of Dr. Azikwe. In a moment or two I realised that I was sitting in precisely the same seat in my room in which he had sat over twenty years ago, and it seemed very odd that he should be looking at me as if to remind me of that fact. I mention that, because I knew Dr. Azikwe many years ago, and many other leaders of Nigerian political

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ferment and aspiration at that time. Since then many of them have been murdered or have disappeared, so I am not so familiar with the present leaders of Nigeria.
I remember being present, with other Members of this House and the other House, at the celebration of Nigerian independence in Lagos, and sharing with others the high hopes and expectations when Chief Awolowo and Dr. Azikwe —the one a Yoruba and the other an Ibo—went together with the Hausa Prime Minister to the flagmast on which the Nigerian flag was raised for the first time in a shaft of light amid the enveloping gloom. I thought that was symbolic; and undoubtedly all of us there looked forward with great hopes to this Federation.
Unfortunately, everyone will agree now, those hopes have been dashed to the ground. There are cynics, of course, who utilise this to fortify their claim that Nigeria should never have been given its independence. I disagree. I disagree on grounds of expediency, on the one hand, and of moral consistency, on the other. We in this country cannot claim to believe in freedom and democracy and withhold it from any portion of an Empire, which by its very entymology and significance means domination. This does not mean that in some measure we were not apprehensive about the future, mixed up with our high hopes and expectations. It does mean, however, first of all expediency on the ground that if we had withheld that independence, then certainly Hausas, Yorubas, Ibos, Ibobios, Efeks and Falaras would all have found a temporary unity against the resistance of this country to what they claimed to be their legitimate plea.
So one has to admit at the present time to dismay, sorrow and grief, but I am not inclined at all to engage in recrimination or to try to apportion blame to either the Biafrans or the Federal authorities. Rather, I feel an overwhelming compassion for the human beings on both sides, and for the well-meaning people on both sides of the present conflict; I suggest that that, perhaps, is the mood which is best calculated to help the Nigerians of all tribes or ethnic types, rather than to accuse them of sinister and even malicious motives.
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Of course, it is true that if we are to understand the present situation we have to go back much further than the advent of independence. The noble Lord, Lord Milverton, quite rightly reminded us of the great work of Lord Lugard, who founded Nigeria; or, to put it another way, who laid the foundations of Nigeria upon which we hoped Nigerians themselves would build. For he it was who drew a pencil round a portion of the map and said, "All those diverse ethnic groups within that area, whether they be nomadic or settled, whether this tribe or that tribe, shall be in what we shall now call Nigeria." Whatever criticism we may make of British imperialist colonisation—and I have many criticisms—that is nevertheless one of the good elements that I think were contributed by British imperialism.
I draw a distinction between the two kinds of colonisation, for colonisation is perfectly natural. We have a million different peoples from various parts of our Commonwealth to-day who are colonising this country. Be that as it may, imperialist colonisation is of a different type. Rightly or wrongly, whether used benevolently or malignantly, it is the imposition by an outside Power on other peoples of their concept of how the people should behave. That I reject. At the same time, I think we must recognise that some contributions of value have been made even by British imperialism.
That being so, I think we should appreciate that we are responsible for forming the foundation of Nigeria which the Nigerians themselves then accepted, and I think it is a little unfair for Nigerians, or others in this country who are as hostile to imperialist colonisation or colonialism as I am, to complain that Britain did not do all that it is now believed it should have done. As in India, so here: there were many problems left unsolved. But if we are going to transfer power to other countries, we must also transfer responsibility. They must find out how to solve their problems, and not constantly turn back to us and say, "You should have solved these for us". We cannot have it both ways. Certainly there were great perils and dangers when the foundation of Nigeria was laid. The Nigerians knew this, too, but they accepted it. They would have accepted nothing less. If we had withheld from them at the time not merely independence but our

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groundplan of the future, they would have accused us of leaving them in the lurch and of not giving a proper start to their new venture. It was for them, afterwards, of course, to alter and change, to adapt, amend and expand as they chose.
That being so, I think we must recognise that not only did we make a great contribution in forming this nation, but also that the Nigerians themselves have accepted the fact and have tried to build on it ever since. So I reject the suggestion that we should have withheld independence. We could not have done it if we wished: we had enough on our plate as it was. But in addition to the fact of expediency, there was also the moral obligation to be consistent. I myself at the time when I was in Nigeria—I have been in Nigeria two or three times —was perfectly aware of these disparant elements inside Nigeria. I knew, for instance, that Dr. Azikwe, for whom I had a high regard—and I am glad to find he is now in this country; I wish I could see him personally once more—was an Ibo. Although he was one of the outstanding, perhaps the outstanding, political leader at that time and for years, I was conscious of a certain resentment against him because he was an Ibo.
In addition to that, I have had experience in other ways. For some years I was chairman of a body known as the West African Students Union Limited. There was also another body known as the West African Students Union, consisting only of students. I was chairman of a body holding property which was able to give hospitality to students, and I am very glad that the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of London, who is not here now but who spoke this morning, was one of my Committee, together with the late Canon Campbell, Chaplain of the House of Commons. There were others, European and Africans as well. Sometimes it was a somewhat turbulent assembly. I do not mean that the Bishop of London was turbulent at that time —heaven forbid!—but there was a certain turbulence from time to time. There were many reasons for this but one reason was because of the tension between the different ethnic groups. There were cross-currents of politics as well. I remember one occasion when our admirable warder discovered that the telephone
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bill had leapt up alarmingly, and on investigation we found that, surreptitiously, some of the students, not by any means all, had broken into the office and had made clandestine telephone calls to places like Moscow and Prague. They were passing the bill on to us, and they Complained when we protested at this outrage.
On the other hand, there were people of different types altogether. Dr. Arikpo, who is now one of the Ministers it the Nigerian Government, was a member at one time. I knew him very well. Mr. Akintole was another member of that body. I think he was secretary. He was murdered at the time of the great putsch. I mention this because, as I say again, I was sensitive then to the fact that not only were there tensions and conflicts as between Ghanaians and Nigerians and Sierre Leonnians and Gambians, but also among Nigerians which now, unhappily, have come to be expressed even more virulently and tragically. I think that is the real cause of the present trouble. Not that we should not have made the attempt to bring them together. We did it with some measure of success. At the same time, we have seen an erruption, and erruption is not peculiar to that country, for it has obtained elsewhere as well.
Here I would say, in regard to the supply of arms, that while I personally regret that arms have been supplied, and while I personally would have said, if I were a dictator, "Sooner than have the bloodshed and the misery which have been imposed on the people of Nigeria, I will let them go their own way", that is my own inclination shared by very few people. I mention that purely as a personal attitude. To come back to the main theme, we have to realise that if, for instance, Canada, which is pact of the Commonwealth, had been receiving certain arms from us, suddenly found (shall we say), which I hope will never happen, that some of the people of Quebec had rebelled against Canada, would we then have refused to supply arms to Canada on the ground that some of the people in her own territory had suddenly rebelled? I think not. We should have said that, lamentable as it is, it was for Canada to deal with its own secessionists and rebels. All we could do

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would be to continue to supply arms as we did before.
Equally, I would ask: if the Biafrans had penetrated with some temporary success, and finally got to Lagos and disrupted that Government and become the dominant power in the place, what would have happened then? They would have been the first to say, "We want arms supplied to us in exactly the same way as they were supplied to our predecessors". Indeed, if they had had a military success we should not have had so many complaints from Biafra that arms were being supplied to Nigeria while they had to obtain arms from other Powers. I hope that all Governments will agree not to supply arms, though if some do and some do not it is a different picture altogether. But even if they did that, it would not cure the situation. The tribal hostilities would still be there. They would fight with bows and arrows, spears and cudgels, and would be just as ferocious, as the stories in the Old Testament very well remind us. We have to get underneath all this and find out what it is that makes people with tribal gregariousness so conscious of their entity, their autonomy, their distinctiveness, that they are prepared not only to defy one another but also to go to war.
I hope most earnestly that Her Majesty's Government will continue to exercise that influence which they have exercised. I pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Shepherd and others who I know have spent themselves without limit to try to get some good influence to bear on all the participants. I hope that this process will go on, but we have to realise that in the long run what happens to the future of Nigeria depends not on us but on the Nigerians. Bitter as is the hatred between the Biafrans, on the one hand, and the Nigerians, on the other, it is possible of dissolution. They are fellow human beings with the same common needs, and if they can somehow transcend their hatred and bitterness and start afresh there would be great hope. Otherwise Nigeria may be not the example which the noble Lord. Lord Milverton, hoped, but quite the reverse—a morass, added to the many other morasses that obtain in that great Continent of Africa at the present time.
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Though it may be a non-political plea, I would add my voice particularly to reach the authorities in Lagos, who obviously are now capable militarily of completing their campaign, and ask them to be magnanimous, in the hope that, somehow, that will penetrate beyond the fears and the dreads of the people of Biafra. It can be done only by this sort of appeal which might at last bring them back to a sense of their common Nigerian humanity. I hope earnestly that the Nigerian Federal Government, with its much superior strength and military capacity to complete the campaign, will do its utmost to recognise instead the right of Biafra to some measure of independence within a larger corporate Nigeria; and will in any case guarantee to the world that there shall be no genocide but the utmost humane treatment of all those who have been the rebels of the last few months.
My Lords, much else could be said but time does not allow. My mind went back this morning to the words of Abraham Lincoln in the famous Gettysburg Address, which I am sure your Lordships remember:
"We are here highly resolved that the dead shall not have died in vain; that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom."
I would join in that prayer and trust that this will mean not only a new birth of freedom but a return to fraternity, sanity and humanity, so that the high hopes of Nigeria will yet be fulfilled. If the Nigerians can look to us to give them such assistance as we are able, I trust that they will forget any hostility they may have had towards us in the past and will recognise our genuine desire to extend to them not only material help but every other means by which they can yet be a great nation, with the bitterness of the past at last dissolved in a new spirit and a new hope.
3.25 p.m.
THE EARL OF LYTTON: My Lords, the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, who is sitting next to me on the Cross-Benches, enables me to reduce the length of my speech from about ten minutes to two minutes. I call the noble Lord a "colleague", but we have not exchanged a single idea—Cross-Benchers never do. But what I feel about this was expressed by him so much better

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than I could do it, and so I am able to be brief.
Yesterday the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, exhorted us to support the principle of self-determination and apply this to a State which is impotent militarily in the face of an overwhelming Power. To-day the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, invites us to subscribe to a different principle which he has described as non-fragmentation and which others have described as territorial integrity. This principle if it is an adjunct to self-determination is valid, viable and effectual. If it is a substitute for self-determination it is diabolical. All of us should know that the colonial boundaries in Africa, as we handed them over, were riddled with absurdities which are screaming out to be put right.
To-day we have had the case put for one side only. The noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, spoke as the mouthpiece of Colonel Gowon. The Emperor Haile Selassie is on the same side with territorial integrity as the supreme political principle. We heard him quoted in that sense by the noble Lord, Lord Milverton. Were the Emperor not to hold this principle, his own Empire would long ago have disintegrated. Therefore we have had this side only put to us by the Government. I do not know either of the Colonels I have not been in Nigeria. But I am interested in Africa as a whole, and in all parts. I am horrified at the cost in lives which the application of this false principle of territorial integrity is inflicting on unfortunate people in the Southern Sudan. in Ethiopia, in the Congo, in Northern Kenya, and elsewhere. I estimate that some 2 million people have paid the tribute of death to the principle of territorial integrity, and it is wrong that it should be placed above the principle of self-determination.
I also think that Colonel Ojukwu has been misquoted. It is true that I have received documents from both sides, but I have not read either side because the documents are too voluminous and I have not had the time. But I read the B.B.C. monitored reports from that part of the world every day, and my belief is that the Colonel has asked for the principle, not demarding independence as such, for a particular area as such, but the application of the principle of self-determination to the area of Biafra, and
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a decision by a neutral Commission as to whether they want it, what they want and what the boundaries shall I cannot see why we should resist that sort of thing as a solution to this, and to many other problems of this kind in Africa. I may be asked whether any Africa has ever expressed the opinions which I express. I remember at the beginning of 1967 the Secretary General of the Organisation of African Unity said that in his view the main task of the last year for the O.A.U. was to correct the irregular boundaries, or words to that effect.
As regards the application of this solution, I feel sure that the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, has made a recommendation which should be given the most consideration. I feel that those who resist the principle of self-determination in Africa should have from us—as we gave yesterday—an expression of our disgust, and from us no arms and no aid, because the principle of self-determination is the principle by which we live. We intend to preserve it even with that abominable thing, the nuclear deterrent. If we can do that, surely we can understand what others feel about it? If there is doubt as to whether 7 million, 5 million or 14 million want this or that, it should not be beyond the wit of man and a nentral, impartial, commission to find out what they do want, very much as the Regional Boundaries Commission we sent to Kenya before independence made an admirable report of the wishes of the people.
3.32 p.m.
VISCOUNT MONCKTON OF BRENCHLEY: My Lords, one of the difficulties of being a Member of your Lordships' House is to try to listen to speeches and then to take a view on self, if one has not already come with preconceived ones. This afternoon it is apparent that views differ quite regardless of Party, and thank God for that! Equally, I realise that I would never make a lawyer. I found myself agreeing with every word of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and I then found myself agreeing with every word that my noble friend Lord Head said. I was pretty near agreement with everything the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, said. So your Lordships will appreciate the extreme difficulty I am in.
As an ordinary British soldier, one can say that those who served in Nigeria

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liked that country and liked the Nigerian people. We realised the differences existing there, and we realised, I think, that it was kept together by an outside Power who was strong, and was not of either religion, or any religion. I think most of us genuinely loved the Ibo people. I have many friends still, both of the Moslem North and Ibo Eastern Region. The Ibos were the advanced people who provided the lawyers, doctors, priests and, of course, the traders throughout Nigeria, and not only in the Regions.
This is where I find some difficulty, because after 1966 nearly 1½ million had to come back into their own part of the Eastern Region. This made the difficulties of refugees difficult and, therefore, what ghastly position they must be in now is inconceivable for an ordinary Westerner to conceive. I can understand the difficulty of Her Majesty's Government in the decision on arms. I can see that they were probably right to continue to do so, but I wonder now, if the final attack is on, if the Government know it is on—and only they can probably know—is it then right to continue? Can we ever hope to influence the other side, or both sides, if we are seen to be supporting only one? That is the plea I am making at this time, to reconsider this matter in the light of the knowledge of a final attack.
One last thing, and I shall be very short. The International Red Cross Committee in Geneva estimate that about 5,000 people a day are dying in this Region. That excludes the Federal area, where people are also dying from starvation and from wounds. But 5,000 a day in this small area is a greater total loss than has taken place in the whole of the Vietnam war. I wonder whether people in this country realise that it is not only the soldiers who are dying—there are very few—but also women and children; and the children who do not die will be affected right up to the next generation, and probably the generation after that. If the Government will realise that it is better than nothing. There is one more thing the Government should do, that is, to give a promise that whatever happens they will give a further grant to the International Red Cross to help those left in Biafra. I can
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do no more than end with the Salvation Army cry, "For God's sake, help".
LORD RITCHIE-CALDER: My Lords, I apologise to the noble Earl, Lord Cork and Orrery, for intervening when I had withdrawn my name. I withdrew my name because I so much agreed with what Lord Goodman has said, and I felt that anything I had to say was unnecessary. All I want to say is that I believe it so much that I must stand up and say so.
3.35 p.m.
THE EARL OF CORK AND ORRERY:My Lords, there was a moment when, with a mixture of disappointment and relief, I thought that my noble friend Lord Monckton of Brenchley had shot my speech entirely from under me. I do not think he has quite done so, and therefore I will venture to say what I was going to say. I should also like to make another venture, which is perhaps a rather unusual one, that is, to allow the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, to begin my speech for me. I take the words he uttered about a month ago in answer to a Question. They were these:
"The approach of Her Majesty's Government can, I think, be summed up like this."
This is the approach of the Government to the supply of arms to the Federal Government of Rhodesia.
"If we were at this moment to change our policy and stop the supply of arms to the Federal Government, that would in no way affect the power of the Federal Government to do evil: it might, however, affect our influence upon them to do good."—[OFFICIAL. REPORT, 18/7/68; col. 442.]
I think, having listened to the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, this morning, those remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, are probably still considered by him to be valid and in force.
Of course, taken in vacuo the argument seems unexceptionable. Indeed, it was received with something like sympathetic approval by noble Lords in all parts of the House when it was stated, including myself. But in overseas affairs, Governments do not operate in vacuo. They operate very much in publico. The public in this country—and any other country—are likely to bend a rather more searching gaze upon the argument. The sympathy with which your Lordships

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received it was due very largely, I am certain, to an understanding of the enormous difficulties that confront the Government in this situation. Heaven knows! the situation in Nigeria presents plenty of difficulties to the Government.
But I believe there is an extra difficulty, one that does not originate in Nigeria, but here in Whitehall, and one that is really the responsibility of the Government themselves. That is the difficulty of having no proper book of rules to go by. I mean by that that they do not seem entirely to have evolved a completely fixed set of standards or principles: moral, ethical, political, logical—or you can use any adjective you choose. In any case, standards or principles, that will provide a consistent system of guidance in dealings with other Governments. Of course, I do not mean by that that they have no such standards or principles. That would be as offensive as it would be untrue. What I mean is that these are not fixed, so they are inclined to use now one set, now another set, and now yet another set. There is the result that it is sometimes not only inconsistent, but actually contradictory. This is not the way to win respect or enhance one's chances of influencing other people for good.
We have here in this case an almost perfect example of such contradiction. My Lords, I wonder whether you would agree with me if I said this. If in the argument put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, he had simply changed the name of the Government, it could have been stated in those identical words with greater force in relation to the supply of arms for the external defence of South Africa. Yet we know in fact that the line the Government took in that case was the exact opposite.
I submit that these two policies, or principles upon which they are based, are frankly contradicting one another, and it follows that they cannot both be right and they cannot both be true. Nor does it follow that because one is wrong the other is right. I think they may both be wrong; I think they both are wrong. I will explain why I think they are wrong in connection with Rhodesia. With South Africa, of course, we are not concerned in this debate. Before doing so, I want very briefly to make this point.
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Thanks to this contradiction we have an ad hoc morality. Ad hoc policies and procedures are, of course, very often necessary and right. But ad hoc morality is something I do not greatly care a bout, and I do not believe your Lordships do either. And I do not think either that it is at all likely to command the respect of a Gowon or an Ojukwu or anyone else. I think that in this respect the Government exaggerate their chances of being listened to when they try to exert an influence for good.
Now I turn, very briefly, to the argument that if we were to stop supplying arms to the Federal Government that would in no way lessen the power of that Government to do evil but might —not would, only might—affect our influfence upon it to do good. Even a month ago the aspiration was not put forward with very much confidence, and with some reason, and with even more reason now, could it be repeated. For I suspect it seems fairly clear that our influence upon the Federal Government to do good is precisely nil.
What then is the first part of the argument that slopping the supply of arms would not in any way lessen the Federal Government's power to do evil? Taken strictly at its face value, this argument is untrue. If the Federal Government has the power to do evil, and means to do it by force of arms, and if some of those arms are supplied by us, then by ceasing to supply those arms—and particularly ammunition, I suppose—we should automatically lessen its power to do evil. There cannot be any argument about that; it is a simple arithmetical fact. In order to make the argument true—which the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, cert Ainly intended it to be—something has to be added to it, some implied additional argument that has not yet been stated in so many words and probably never will be. I do not see how this additive can be anything but this: that if we did not supply the arms to the Federal Government they would be supplied by somebody else. We very nearly had that said, but not quite. It is the same as saying that if somebody is going to supply the arms in any case, why not we? But unless you are going to insist that the purpose for which they are going to be used contains no evil—and I do not see how you can say that—then this is an

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argument that no honourable Government can use, for it is the classic self-justification of the black marketeer, the looter, the drug pedlar.
I am quite aware of the dilemma confronting General Gowon, and I am not at all sure from the news that has come in in the last 24 hours that he has not decided how to resolve it, in face of Biafra's intransigence, and probably in any case he would not be able to stop without conceding the right to secede. But that is his dilemma, not ours and in any case its existence makes no difference to the fact that what is going on in Nigeria is evil—and this is where I converge very closely upon the speech of my noble kinsman, Lord Head, in his most graphic description of what is likely.
I think "likely" is the word, but one might even say probable—I am not sure —to happen in Biafra, if things go from bad to worse, as they appear likely to do. But if you suppose—and I do suppose—that we have no chance of stopping this evil, there are still two reasons why we should send no more arms to the Federal Government. Firstly, a burst of 9 mm. bullets in an African stomach is an evil thing anyway you reckon it, and if we send those bullets from England knowing that they may be so used, then that particular share in the general evil is ours, and that share is neither diminished nor magnified by a hair's breadth by the likelihood that if we did not send those bullets they would be sent by somebody else.
The second reason I will put in the form of a question. How much evil of this kind are we justified in doing, never mind anyone else? How many corpses, of men, women or children, from British bullets— how many of such things as these are justified by a vague hope that somewhere, some time, we may be able to exert some influence for good? Is there any way of showing that the good we can do will balance all or any of the evil that is being done with our assistance? If there is, then I beg the Government to set it forth. If not, then let us, I beg, withdraw immediately from this beastly trade.
Lastly, in case there may be any (though I doubt it) who are not moved by moral arguments of this kind, let me add this. Affairs in Nigeria seem to be
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moving on into a phase in which the Government are standing in a certain danger of appearing to be, if they are not actually doing so, playing both ends against the middle, and that is a process which inevitably ends by incurring the contempt of both.
3.47 p.m.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I regret very much the fact that time has gone and that I am intervening at such a late hour. It has been recognised, I think, in this debate that I have been among the Members who have been the pioneers in raising this issue, and because of that, and because I am so deeply concerned, I feel that I must, even at this late hour, put the case which I hope your Lordships will find constructive, which I have in mind.
First, I want to express my appreciation to the Government that they have arranged this debate. Nine months ago, when I raised this issue, I said there was a danger of the war in Nigeria becoming a forgotten war. That is not the case now, and I think this is largely due to the same influence which aroused all the indignation about Czechoslovakia yesterday. We have yet to estimate the effect of television in keeping us aware of events in the world and the impression which it makes on the public mind. We saw the tanks in Prague and we have seen the starvation in Biafra. Nine months ago, when a few of us first called on our Government to stop their supply of arms to Lagos, we were isolated voices. Now, as this debate has shown, this view is expressed from all sides of the House. And it is quite remarkable how the daily Press—The Times, the Daily Telegraph, the Guardian—the voices of responsible published papers, are now coming to the same view.
May I just say this to the noble Earl, Lord Bessborough, whose speech I very much appreciated? He argued that there was a case for this country to continue to supply arms to the Federal Government because if we did not do so others would. I think he will be awar—certainly he will be if he refers to Hansard—that whenever we have raised this issue we have also put as a priority an appeal to all Governments to stop supplying arms to both sides.

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My noble friend Lord Shepherd has pointed out that there is a black market which might not be controlled by Governmental decisions. I put two points. First, I have consulted with representatives in London, with Ambassadors of other Governments, before some of the Governments ceased their supplies, and I have also consulted with Ambassadors representing Governments who are continuing supplies. I will not put it higher than this: that I have had a completely different impression from that which has been given by the Front Bench, that other Governments who are supplying arms would not be prepared to enter into consultation and agreement with the British Government if our Government would stop their supply of arms to the Federal Government. So far as the black market is concerned, Governments are not only involved in giving authority for arms to be supplied; they also have authority at the points of embarkation. If an agreement could be reached to stop supplies, there is no Government which could not say that there must be no further export of arms to either side in this terrible war.
I understand the British case. It is the legalistic view. It is the classical routine view. Because the Federal Government is the recognised Government, and particularly because in this case it is a Commonwealth Government, to whom we have supplied arms in the past, we must continue to supply them. I think in the modern world that legalistic view does not represent the dynamic forces of the situation. I have been involved from the very beginning in the struggle for independence in Nigeria. I remember that even before independence was secured, ironically, it was the representatives of the East who were the greatest advocates of the unity of Nigeria. Both Dr. Azikwe and Chief Awolowo actually postponed the independence of the South because they wanted to bring in the North and have a united Nigeria as a whole. They made that daring experiment, and the British Government endorsed it. I am one of those who do not wish to see the Balkanisation of Africa. Therefore, I have stressed the unity of Nigeria. But, however deeply one wants certain prospects of this kind, one must recognise human facts, and the human facts in Nigeria are that tribal
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loyalties and tribal traditions were not ready for the unified Nigeria which the pioneers sought and which our Government endorsed.
If I may, I would congratulate my noble friend Lord Shepherd on his survey of the history of what has occurred. With very minor adjustments, I accept that broad statement. But look at that history. The Constitution of a Federal Nigeria was so unreal that the democratic Government could not stand. One military coup; the assassination of a Prime Minister; the assassination c f the leader in Northern Nigeria; another military coup. It is said that 30,000—and undoubtedly 20,000—not only Ibo: but others from Eastern Nigeria, were massacred in Northern Nigeria. There are nearly 2 million refugees from Northern Nigeria in the Eastern Region. How can we begin to underestimate the psychological effect of this? And with that kind of psychology in Nigeria, can we really expect a centralised regime to continue to operate? We are paying attention to a legalistic constitution and absolutely neglecting to recognise the psychological facts among the people. There can be unity only if there is a spirit of unity among the peoples who would compose a united Nigeria.
Let me say this on the subject of secession. I regret it when it takes plane in Africa, because I want the unity of Africa, but do not let any of us think that the right of secession is something that is contrary to historic progress. My noble friend Lady Asquith of Yarnbury (if I may call her such, because I feel like that towards the liberal thing; for which she stands) indicated the case of Ireland. Would the history of Roland have been any better if Southern Inland had not gained the right of secession? Would the centre of Europe have been better if Hungary had not obtaindependence from the Austro-Hungarian empire? And what about the Sudan, under a condominium of British and Egyptian control? The Sudanese people decided in favour of secession from Egypt. Can anyone look at the map of Africa and say that there could lave been more progress if secession had not taken place? Secession is not of itself a retrogressive fact. We have to learn that unity can operate only if among

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the peoples concerned there is a spontaneous acceptance of the co-operation which that unity demands.
In that situation the British Government should not have followed the classical routine, the cold legalistic, constitutional role. They should have tried to understand the psychological facts, the social forces and the tribal forces which made up Nigeria. In that situation we should not have offered arms to either side, and the whole of our contribution should have been towards conciliation between the two sides.
My Lords, perhaps I may mention something which I think strengthens this argument, and that is the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. I would join with others in this House (I think the noble Lord knows this) in offering my very sincere appreciation of all he did in Nigeria to relieve the suffering. But he was hampered. It was necessary for him to see the Biafran authorities, as well as the authorities at Lagos, if he was to fulfil his humane task. The Biafran authorities declined to see him. Why did they decline to see him? It was because he had the misfortune of going to Nigeria from Britain with the endorsement of the British Government, and the Biafran authorities felt that the arms that we were sending to Lagos made any representative from this country someone with whom they were not able to communicate. If the British Government had been neutral in this matter, my noble friend Lord Hunt, with his great abilities, might now have come back to this country, not only with the proposals which he was able to make after going to Lagos, but with proposals which had the co-operation and endorsement of Biafra, as well, and hundreds of thousands of starving children could have been saved from their deaths.
My Lords, the Government have said that they have only been continuing the arms supplies which they previously sent to Nigeria. I recognise that they have not sent heavy armaments, but I do not think the Front Bench will deny that the extent of the arms supply has been tremendously escalated. Unfortunately, we have not been able to get the figures, but I have been able in this House to indicate the enormous escalation in the
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supply of arms from this country to Lagos through the Crown Agents.
I want to say how much I welcome the fact that the Government are now reconsidering their policy. I wrote a letter to the Prime Minister on this subject, and I had a reply from 10 Downing Street on August 21, from which I propose to quote. It mentions a statement by the Foreign Secretary in another place on June 12, and then the letter continues:
"He"—
that is, the Foreign Secretary—
"said in effect that we would have to reconsider our policy if it became the intention of the Federal Government to proceed without mercy to slaughter or starve the Ibo people or to reject any reasonable settlement. That remains our position."
And in fact from the Front Bench the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, has to-day made a similar statement. I want to submit to the noble Lord, as I would submit to the Prime Minister, that this is exactly what is happening. He will forgive me for saying that I was completely unconvinced by his argument that the final intended military thrust upon Biafra had not begun.
I was taking part in the debate last night, and therefore did not hear the speech on television of General Gowon. But not merely did the representative of the Front Bench on the opposite side indicate that General Gowon said in that speech that this thrust had begun, but everyone with whom I have spoken who saw and heard that television presentation takes the view that General Gowon intimated that the thrust had opened. I am told, indeed, that he said it was likely to be so effective that the complete military defeat of the Biafrans in the area which they still occupied would be completed within one month. I gather that the noble Earl, Lord Bessborough, agrees with that statement.
THE EARL OF BESSBOROUGH: So do other noble Lords.
LORD BROCKWAY: With all the desire in the world to believe what the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, said, I would ask this. Does he really think that military action from the South on the Iboland that remains, with armies attacking three towns—indeed two prongs of assault were actually described—does he believe that this can begin and then be

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held up without the complete thrust, intended to be final? Does not this assault in its terms defeat the conditions which the Home Secretary and the Prime Minister and he himself have laid down for the continuation of arms to the Federal Government? Does he really believe that, if the rest of Iboland is to become a battlefield this way, the relief of hunger can go on?
I do not believe that the noble Lord, if he will be honest in his own mind, can stand by the view he has expressed in this House: that this final military effort is not being made, and that if it is being made it does not merely mean the loss of thousands of lives on the battlefield, but means no hope at all for the relief of those starving children to whom aid is now being given.
I want to be absolutely fair. I did not hear this broadcast of General Gowon's, but I was not surprised to hear that his attitude was a humanitarian one. I have had the same impression. Indeed, years ago, in the struggle for Nigerian independence, I met him. But I have also had the same impression with every public statement he has made. The real difficulty is that General Gowon cannot control his own commanders in the field, and he cannot control his own troops. I wonder whether my noble friend Lord Shepherd has seen the interview which has appeared with Lieutenant-Colonel Benjamin Adekunle, who is the Commander-in-Chief of the Federal troops in the southern front who are now undertaking the advance in Biafra. These interviews have appeared in two papers. They first appeared in De Telegraaf published in Holland and they were reproduced in the Sun in this country; and second, they appeared in the Stern, the German magazine, and were reproduced in the Evening Standard last night.
I draw attention to these words by the Commander-in-Chief of the Federal forces which are now advancing into Biafra:
I do not want to see the Red Cross. no Caritas"—
that is the Roman Catholic organisation of relief—
"no World Church Committee, no Pope, no missionary, and no United Nations' delegation".
Asked whether this means that the thousands of tons of food stored in Lagos
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would never get to the refugee camps, he replied:
"That is exactly what I have said. I want to avoid feeding even one Ibo until these people capitulate".
That cannot be suggested as the propaganda of a Biafran agency. It is a direct interview with the commander of the Federal troops who are making the advance into Biafra. May I say that the impression I gained, when I watched I the television interview with this commanding officer a few days ago, confirme I the attitude which was expressed in those words?
I want to conclude by being constructive. What are the possibilities of peace? As my noble friend knows, I an the chairman of the Committee for Pease in Nigeria. It is the most represeni alive and influential committee over which I have ever presided. It has two ex-Governors General of Nigeria, it has an ex-Colonial Secretary, it has representatives of all the missionary societies, it has leading members of the three political Parties in this country, both from the House of Commons and from your Lordships' House. It has ex-colonial servants; extraordinarily enough it also has representatives of businessmen in Nigeria and Biafra; and perhaps most extraordinary of all we have Africans from both sides, the Federal side and the Biafran side.
I admit that as chairman I sometimes have difficulty. My noble friend knows what we have done and how we have gone to both sides; he knows how we have gone to the big industrialis s of the West African Committee; he knows how we have gone to the Common-wealth Secretariat and to the Secretary of State in this country, because he was present at that interview. We have gone to the Archbishops and the Bishops at Lambeth, and as a result of all that work I would only say that I begin to sympathise with the Minister when he says that despite the present situation we have contributed something. That is my feeling. I wish that the representatives of the two sides whom we received would say publicly what they have said to us privately. If they did that there would be a possibility of a solution. These possibilities now lie mostly in the conference which is being held at Addis Ababa.

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I want to make five constructive suggestions, which I will put in a sentence each for reasons of time. First, there should be an immediate truce. Biafra took the initiative for that. It is all very well for my noble friend to say that it is natural that Biafra should do that because the Federal side are winning—
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I did not say that.
LORD BROCKWAY: I beg my noble friend's pardon and I withdraw my observation at once, because I never want to misrepresent anything that is said. That was my understanding, but I will now only say that the chairman, Emperor Haile Selassie, has supported this proposal for an immediate truce. My second suggestion is for a peace-keeping force, on which it has been suggested that Canada, India and Ethiopia should have representatives. Both sides have agreed to a peace-keeping force, and I hope they will agree to the representatives of those three countries.
Thirdly, there is the reported agreement on air and road relief. Perhaps my noble friend in his reply could tell us the facts about this, because I am puzzled. This was reported about four days ago, and since that time it has been reported that International Red Cross aeroplanes have been fired upon by Federal forces as they have been going to the Biafran territory. The noble Lord used the phrase that the International Red Cross had resumed flights, presumably with Nigerian concurrence. My own general practitioner has volunteered for service for six months without payment. That is typical of the heroism of doctors and nurses and others who have volunteered for this purpose. He went in the last week. He left Fernando Po in a Swedish 'plane. That Swedish'plane was fired upon by Federal forces before it reached Biafra.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I am glad the noble Lord has at least identified the aircraft. I think, after examination, he will find that that aircraft was fired on before the agreement was reached at Addis Ababa.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I should be glad if that is the case; but there have been so many inconsistencies
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of statement in all these proceedings that my noble friend will forgive me if I am just a little sceptical.
My fourth point is that all arms supplies should be stopped and that the British Government should give the lead. My fifth point is with regard to the political settlement, and to this I want to add a little because it is important to be precise. I find, as I meet representatives of Biafra, that the thing that concerns them most is their further security. Massacred in the North, overwhelmed with refugees, defeated with thousands killed in military warfare, the hunger of thousands of their children—quite naturally, above everything else they demand security. I strongly hope that we shall support the proposal for an international peace-keeping force which will enable such security to be maintained.
In conclusion, I want to refer to the basis of settlement. I believe that both sides have to give up the rigid terms which they have so far employed and which have kept them apart. May I say to my noble friend (I think he may know this) that Mr. James Griffiths, M.P., the ex-Colonial Secretary, and I have appealed to both sides to give up the rigidity of terms and to show some flexibility in their negotiations. I want to acknowledge this, which goes a little further than what my noble friend said. He said that the Federal Government had been prepared no longer to demand the renunciation of secession as a condition of negotiations. Actually they appear to have gone further than that. In the Guardian of August 17 there was a letter by His Excellency Ogundipe, the High Commissioner, who used these words:
"The Federal Government do not even insist on the public renunciation by the rebel regime of secession; but instead suggest a Joint Declaration in which both sides agree to maintain the unity and territorial integrity of Nigeria and to ensure for all time the security of all its inhabitants."
That is not merely a condition of negotiation; that is a suggestion of the terms of a Joint Declaration.
My Lords, I welcome that. It might be argued that the use of the terms "unity and territorial integrity" mean renunciation of secession. I am inclined to agree with that. But our appeal to both sides at this moment should be to be flexible. It should be the duty of both sides to find a basis of a free association,

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with common services for both Biafra and the Federal area, and a plebiscite in disputed areas. I can assure my noble friend that some of us who have been critical of the Government have been urging that kind of formula upon our Biafran friends.
There are two alternatives to fulfill those conditions. The first is confederation. The Biafrans themselves proposed that. They have rather gone back on it because of what has occurred, but I do not believe that that reversal of view need be permanent, and it may easily prove to be an acceptable pattern for the future constitution of Nigeria. It may easily be that the Hausas and the Yorubas may desire a confederation on the basis of a grouping of the smaller States which are proposed. We must not close our eyes to that possibility.
The second alternative is that Biafra should be limited to the Ibo heartland. It still contains a population of 7 million, which is much greater than some sovereign countries. It would be landlocked and it would need access to Port Harcourt and representation on the administrative authority in that city, which historically has been associated with the Eastern region and the Ibos, and it would necessitate a plebiscite of the Eastern States. I do not ask my noble friend to make a comment on those two alternatives now. I ask him whether he will consider them, and perhaps when he reads them in Hansard to-morrow ask whether there is not a possible solution in one of those two alternative lines. My Lords, I apologise for having spoken at this length, but I think your Lordships will know not only my deep concern but my endeavour to find the truth of this matter and to try to contribute towards a solution.
4.24 p.m.
LORD WEDGWOOD: My Lords, I intervene, as briefly as I can, to make one or two points and to seek a little further information. In doing so I would add my voice to those of noble Lords who have spoken eloquently and with close personal knowledge of the circumstances of this tragic civil war in Nigeria, and in particular the noble Viscount, Lord Head, with whose assessment and fears I found myself so very largely in agreement.
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I should like to emphasise just this: that Nigeria is undoubtedly within the British sphere of influence and responsibility, not only as a part of than old British Empire but now as a member of the Commonwealth of Nations in which Britain is at least a senior member. Consequently we have the proud responsibility of determining our attitude and the attitude of other interested nations towards a solution of this ghastly war. We cannot, I am sure, just say that Nigeria is an independent emergent nation and that we have no rig it to exercise to the full any power or influence that we may have in preventing what may become an old-fashioned nineteenth century war of tribal extermination but backed by 20th century weapons—not the bows and arrows which the noble Lord, Lord Sorensen, said were used before and will be used again. I hold no brief for the rulers of either Federal Nigeria or breakaway Biafra. In my view, they are exercising powers which are at present of very doubtful use for the future benefit of those whom they rule. Like every one of your Lordships, my only concern is for those he pless victims of this gigantic gang warfarin, the 99·9 per cent. who make up the rest of the population.
The noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, made a vigorous defence of Government policy and demonstrated what I thought was almost full support for the Federal Government and their actions towards the secession of Biafra. What worried me very much was his strong contention that what we hear of massacres and possible genocide appears to him as only Biafran propaganda. But is it? I wish I could be sure that he is right, that his information is authentic and his assessment correct. There are those on the spot who would disagree, and the noble Viscount, Lord Monckton of Brenehley, gave us just now some very disturbing figures of 5,000 a day. We shall not know accurately what the picture is.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, did the figure of 5,000 relate to battle casualties?
LORD WEDGWOOD: My Lords, the noble Viscount gave that figure as the total deaths per day.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, are they battle casualties or deaths by starvation? I really want to know.
LORD WEDGWOOD: My Lords, I believe those figures came from the International Red Cross. Am I not correct?
VISCOUNT MONCKTON OF BRENCHLEY: Yes, my Lords.
LORD WEDGWOOD: My Lords, I remember some varying reports of those who were liquidated in the Northern Provinces in July, 1966. They varied from some 10,000 to some 100,000. I also remember the figures given by a previous British Government after the Zanzibar uprisings of January, 1964, when some 23 were given as dead, but when those of us who were a little nearer to the fighting knew that the figure was in the thousands. It was eventually assessed by, I believe, thoroughly reliable individuals at about 10,000 people. That is why I wonder whether the noble Lord. Lord Shepherd, can be quite sure that his estimate is more exact than others we receive. I pay little attention to the Mark Press publications: they are obviously slanted. But there are other sources of information. If the noble Lord's figures are correct, then of course the Federal Government is shown in a much better light and Her Majesty's Government's policy in continuing arms supplies appears less odious. I hope he is right, but I fear that he is over-optimistic. I feel that he rather overpainted the picture of the rightness of all the Federal Government's actions and our own.
Rightly or wrongly (I am not going to argue that now) we have sent arms to Federal Nigeria, and those are being used at this moment in this bloody strife. I also see in the Press that we have recently agreed to supply a sum of £10 million to Nigeria for various purposes. It is my view that at this point both arms and money should be withheld until there is a general cease-fire, and that we should, moreover, openly condemn any further military action by either side and say that no further assistance will be forthcoming until there are firm prospects of a more peaceful solution. What we feel about Russian tanks in Prague should, I believe, not be so very different from what we feel about Federal troops going into Biafra. I do not believe that
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this will immediately end the fighting, or help the destitution and starvation of millions; but it will show the same sort of disapproval that we directed at the Russians. I also do not believe that such a policy as I urge would mean that Nigeria will get all she wants from other great Powers. Soviet aid in nearby Ghana was an expensive failure.
What worried me even more, was the apparent implicit acceptance by the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, that General Gowon had no alternative but to continue to destroy Biafran resistance. The noble Viscount, Lord Head, drew our attention in most convincing terms to the implications of a further reduction of Biafran resistance and of the Biafrans' continuing to fight to the end. He said what needed to be said. I say, my Lords, that a firm call should now go out to General Gowon to hold his hand. He should be told now, in unmistakable terms, that if he continues the bloodshed it will mean the loss of British good will and of all material and financial support. Tell him clearly, and tell Colonel Ojukwu, that only a peaceful solution will find us in any way willing to help to repair the economy and further the development of Nigeria. There has been a terrible toll of human lives in tropical Africa to which the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, has drawn our attention. I think it is high time that we should exert all our power and influence to halt that toll.
Finally, my Lords, I think that the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, should give us, if he can, some more up-to-date information about the intentions of General Gowon. As perhaps the noble Lord realises, there is some conflict of information, and time is not on the side of the Nigerian people. I cannot close without referring to the brave efforts of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, to bring succour to the needy and distressed under the most difficult conditions. His effort has been so very deserving of our praise, and I found his speech most moving. But I would say this. It is no use organising food for the starving if the mouths that are to be fed may soon no longer exist, as will be the case if General Gowon persists with his final attack.
4.33 p.m.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, we have had a long debate. I think it was

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generally understood that if possible we would conclude the debate at 4 o'clock, and we have slipped one half-hour. Therefore, and particularly as I made a very long speech at the beginning of the debate, I do not intend to go again over much of the ground that I covered at the beginning. I apologise for the length of the speech I made, but I must say on reflection, and having listened to some of the speeches made during the debate, that I am glad I made it. My only regret is that some noble Lords came to this debate with their speeches prepared and took very little notice of what I said, as a Minister, in reply to the speech made by the noble Earl, Lord Bessborough. I would say to my noble friend Lord Goodman that I made a very special effort to be accurate in what I said, and I hope that noble Lords will find it worth while to read my speech before perhaps they change their minds one way or another on this very difficult and very unhappy affair.
My Lords, we had from the noble Baroness, Lady Asquith, a very emotional speech. I do not remember ever hearing her make a speech which was not in some respects emotional. Then we had the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, who I thought, if I may say so, made a very partial speech. I do not know what the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, knows personally about Nigeria, but I thought, particularly as I know Sir Louis Mbanafo, that his speech very much reflected the views of Sir Louis Mbanafo. The noble Lord has given him service. I thought the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, produced a paradox. He complained that because the British Government had supplied arms to the Federal Government we had lost all possibility of influencing the Biafrans; that it was no longer possible for us to negotiate with the Biafrans. I would not accept that. But the noble Lord does not seem to recognise that if we had not carried out our traditional policy, which I went to great lengths to explain at the beginning, or if we were now to change our policy, we should immediately have lost that influence which I believe we do have with the Federal Government.
The noble Lord, Lord Goodman, asked whether we could not make contact with the Biafran leaders. I did that as soon as I became responsible, at Whitsun, for the Nigerian desk. I took the opportunity,
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because Sir Louis Mbanafo was in London, as were the Federal Government leaders at the Kampala talks, to meet both, not on one occasion but on many occasions; and it was because of those meetings that I went to Lagos in order that I should be in a position to satisfy Sir Louis Mbanafo that there could be meaningful talks so far as the Lagos Government was concerned. My Lords, the gravest tragedy is that when I came pack, having been satisfied, Sir Louis Mbanafo was no longer present in London, and a message was received that he would not be returning, despite the fact that we made it clear to him that not only did we want to discuss the political questions, to see whether we could find a political solution, but we wanted also to deal with perhaps the most fundamental point, the question of relief. So, my Lords, we have done, certainly within our limits, what could be done towards finding a peaceful solution.
My noble friend Lord Segal asked for a new, special effort. I honestly believe in one saying at least, and that is that too many cooks spoil the broth. Already the O.A.U. and Emperor Haile Selassie are working very hard, and with great determination and skill, and I would think it would be wrong at this stage to consider some new British or Commonwealth effort. My noble friend made the point, if my memory is right, that if, perhaps, there was a recognition of unity by the Biafrans—not necessarily a united Nigeria, but a form of unity—and if we could take time to find out what is to be the relationship between the State and the Central Government, and between one State and another, then this might hold out hope. That is what the Federal Government offered at Niamey and at Kampala, and again at Addis Ababa. But, my Lords, the response of the Biafran authorities, when the Emperor asked them to put the minimum demands for a settlement, was that when the demands were presented, I gather, one skilled diplomat said he would like to know what the Biafrans' major demands would have been. They were well beyond any possible consideration or negotiation. But the point which my noble friend Lord Segal made would, I believe, be possible if only it were acceptable to the Biafrans; and I will certainly look at the points that were made by my noble friend Lord Brockway.

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I should like not only to thank the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, but to express very great appreciation for the way in which he described his visit to Nigeria. I thought it was very fair; and I think perhaps the House will have seen, since his speech came from the Cross-Benches, that this is not in itself an easy problem: we have to deal with the political problems in order that relief can flow. I will say to my noble friend Lord Hunt that Her Majesty's Government will give all possible support to Dr. Lindt, and we will see that a message is conveyed to him as soon as possible.
My Lords, if I may, I will turn now to a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Wedgwood, and the noble Viscount, Lord Head. I may say that I agree very much with nearly everything the noble Viscount said about the present situation in Nigeria. I entirely agree with him that a military solution in what is now Iboland would not be a military solution, as generally understood. It would be a long, drawn-out guerrilla war of terrible ferocity, and I would say this to the noble Viscount: General Gowon also understands this; and this was one of the reasons why he had refrained from seeking a military solution.
I should like to deal with this aspect because I gather that my speech may have been taken as implying that the British Government were giving passive agreement to a military solution by the Federal Government. When I spoke I think I had the point in mind, and what I was trying to do was to point out the dilemma of the Federal Government. I need hardly say that all our influence has been towards a settlement by negotiation, because we believe that only such a settlement has any hope of bringing long-term stability to Nigeria, since the Ibos and non-Ibos in Nigeria will have to live together, once a settlement has been reached, whether it is military or political. I agree with the noble Lord when he said that, despite all that has happened, he believes that the factors for cohesion are greater than those of diversification in Nigeria, and that, given time, the people can in fact live together, as in tact many Ibos are now living together, with others of different tribes.
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The noble Earl, Lord Bessborough, asked me to make a very special effort in regard to the television programme of last night. I have been, through the Office, in communication by telephone with General Gowon. I am bound to say that the line was not very good, so perhaps the noble Viscount. Lord Head, will guess that it may be raining in Lagos —the weather seems to have affected telephone lines. The information that we have I think I had better put in this way. We have just been informed personally by General Gowon himself that when he said that the final push was now in progress he was referring to the continuing preparatory operations in both the Northern and Southern sectors for the final Federal push. General Gowon explained that the rebels had seized advantage of the Addis Ababa peace talks to harass Federal troops on all fronts. Extreme restraint has been exercised by all Federal commands. He says that, owing to the relentless attacks of the rebels, authority was given by him—General Gowon at the weekend to check the rebel activity in all sectors.
What he has said is in line with my understanding of the fluid military situation, particularly in the South. I should like to end that particular point by saying that General Gowon and the Federal Government are under no illusion as to what our view is. There must he every conceivable effort to find a peaceful, negotiated settlement, if possible, at Addis Ababa, and there is no question at all that our view is anything other than that.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, may I interrupt my noble friend? Does not the message which my noble friend has read from General Gowon absolutely confirm the impression that was given by the noble Earl, Lord Bessborough, and others who heard that broadcast that the Federal Government has now begun preparations to begin its final push in Ibo land?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, there is often a good deal of difference between the prepartory operations and the military solution.
LORD GOODMAN: One hesitates to interrupt, but may I suggest that it is not necessary to communicate with General

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Gowon; that it is necessary only to communicate with Portland Place? The Minister should take an opportunity of asking to see the television programme, because what has been stated by General Gowon is a misinterpretation of what he said yesterday.
TILE EARL OF BESSBOROUGH: Hear, hear!
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I have seen the transcript. I was in an aeroplane last night, so I did not see the programme. The noble Earl, Lord Bessborough, asked me to get in touch with Lagos, and if possible with General Gowon. That is what I have done, and the message I received I have conveyed to the House.
I want now just to deal with my noble friend Lord Brockway and others who have mentioned this rather famous, perhaps even notorious commander of the Third Division in Nigeria. I am bound to say that I disapprove of much that the commander has said. I am bound to say, too, that I have on many occasions disapproved of what other military commanders have said from time to time. But I think that in fairness, particularly in view of what the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, said, I should say this. Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, would prefer to take what the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, said to what I may say in this matter, but my knowledge from my visit to this area was that the discipline of this particular Division, having regard certainly to African military standards, was of a considerably high order.
I should like to conclude by referring to what I think has been the kernel of the debate. There has been very little new that has been put before us as to possible solutions. Most of it has been criticism one way or another, but the kernel of the debate has been whether, if we were to give up the supply of arms to Nigeria unilaterally. we should bring peace quicker to Nigeria. I want to say this to the noble Lord, Lord Goodman. I am relatively new to the Nigerian problem in terms of office. I was therefore
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not committed to the policy other than as a Minister, and I had the opportunity of examining the despatches over o long period of time. I have been able to look at all the papers that are available to me, and I have been able to question officials. Those who know me know that I do not take things for granted or that because I like a man's face I necessarily accept what he says. I have questioned and I have challenged, and I believe that the policies that we have adopter and that we now carry on subject to the qualifications of the Foreign Secretary are the only policies that are available to us. I do not believe in neutrality. But I will say to the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, and to the House, that knowing what is going on in Nigeria and being very conscious of it, if I believed that giving up the supply of arms altogether would bring peace one hour nearer I would personally resign from office if my colleagues took a contrary view and continued to supply arms, because this is in itself a matter of conscience. I personally am satisfied that in the circumstances now existing there is no alrernative policy open to Her Majesty's Government, distasteful though it is to all of us, because none of us likes to see the use of arms in war, and particularly in a civil war.
THE EARL OF BESSBOROUGHMy Lords, I think that I should spend one minute in thanking the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, for having replied twice i t this debate, and also in thanking all the other noble Lords who have taken part. I am sure that it has been a very useful debate, though it has shown a very considerable divergence of view. None of your Lordships who heard General Gowon's broadcast last night was satisfied with the earlier reply of the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, but I am most grateful to him for his second reply, although it may not be wholly re assuring. In view of the terms of the Motion, I do not think that I should withdraw it.
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House adjourned at eight minutes before five o'clock until the 7th October.