Sitting of 26 August 1968

Preamble
The House—after the Adjournment on 26th July, 1968, for the Summer Recess—met at half-past Two o'clock, notice having been given by Mr. SPEAKER,pursuant to Standing Order No. 117 (Earlier meeting of House in certain circumstances).
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

AIRCRAFT COLLISION, HOLT
Mr. Hazell(by Private Notice) asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether he will make a statement about the midair collision over Holt, Norfolk, on 19th August, 1968.
The Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Air Force (Mr. Merlyn Rees): The aircraft involved were a Victor tanker from Royal Air Force Station, Marham, in Norfolk, and a Canberra from Royal Air Force Station, Bruggen, in Germany. They collided in mid-air on the night of 19th August, 1968, at approximately 10.10 p.m., at an estimated height of 15,000 feet. Wreckage was spread over a wide area about three miles south-west of Sheringham.
The Victor was climbing away from its base in the recognised climbing lane to begin a routine crew training flight. Since it was not involved in a refuelling exercise, no additional fuel was carried. It had been airborne for about 10 minutes when the accident occurred.
The Canberra had completed a bombing exercise on the Wainfleet range, off the Lincolnshire coast, and was climbing away to the east. It had already dropped its practice bomb. Heavy cloud and thunderstorms were present in the area at the time. The circumstances in which the accident occurred are now the subject of a Board of Inquiry.
All crew members, four in the Victor and three in the Canberra, were killed. I am sure that the whole House will join me in expressing profound sympathy for all who have been bereaved in this tragic accident.
Mr. Hazell: I thank my hon. Fried for his statement and would associate myself with the message of sympathy to the relatives and dependants of the deceased airmen and also to the sick and elderly people of Holt who suffered a great shock as a result of the explosion.
As it was a miracle that Holt did not suffer loss by death, will the Minister again look at the question of low flying over built-up areas? Finally, can my hon. Friend inform the House when the Board of Inquiry's report likely to be available?
Mr. Rees: The R.A.F. regrets that civilians were involved marginally in the accident. However, this was not low flying, but flying at 15,000 feet. The R.A.F. does low flying to keep operationally efficient, and the fact that areas are designated and low flying connection routes are designated is a flight safety measure. Aircraft should not fly at lower than 2,000 ft. over townships; if my hon. Friend has any evidence to the contrary perhaps he will let me know.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
Mr. Heath: May I ask the Leader of the House whether he will make a statement on the business of the House?
The Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons (Mr. Fred Peart):Yes, Sir. The House has been recalled to discuss Czechoslovakia. This will take place on a Motion for the Adjournment of the House.
It will be proposed that tomorrow the House should meet from 11 a.m. until 4 p.m. There will be a debate on Nigeria, which also will arise on a Motion for the Adjournment of the House.
Mr. Emery: On a point of order. I have given you notice, Mr. Speaker, of this point. As the Motion that we do meet tomorrow has been on the Order Paper only since today, would you accept an Amendment to it, to leave out from "Four o'clock" to the end of the Question and add instead thereof:
"There will be a debate for three hours on the flooding in the West Country"—
and the totally inadequate Government relief, on a Motion to be moved by the

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hon. Member for Honiton, after which Mr. Speaker do—
"adjourn the House without putting any Question".
Mr. Speaker: I will consider any manuscript Amendment. I would not, however, undertake at this moment to accept it.

SITTINGS OF THE HOUSE
House to meet Tomorrow at Eleven o'clock, and at Four o'clock Mr. Speaker to adjourn the House without putting any Question.—[The Prime Minister.]
ADJOURNMENT (AUTUMN)
House at its rising Tomorrow, to adjourn till Monday 14th October.—[The Prime Minister.]
ADJOURNMENT
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Harper.]

CZECHOSLOVAKIA
2.41 p.m.
The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Wilson): At 1.30 last Wednesday morning the Soviet Ambassador communicated to Her Majesty's Government a message stating that the Government of Czechoslovakia had appealed to the Soviet Union and its allies for direct assistance, including the use of armed force; that the Soviet Government and the Governments of certain of their allies had decided to accede to this request; and that Soviet military units had accordingly been instructed to enter Czechoslovak territory. The Ambassador added that these forces would be withdrawn from Czechoslovakia as soon as the "threat to security" was removed and "the legitimate authorities" had decided that their presence was no longer required.
The Soviet message concluded by claiming that their action was not directed against any European State, nor against British interests, but was dictated by a concern to "strengthen peace", as they put it, in the face of a dangerous growth of tension which had left no choice to the Soviet Government. The Ambassador assured us that his Government assumed
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that these developments would not harm Anglo-Soviet relations to which they continued to attach great importance.
One of the first actions taken by the Government after receiving this message and learning that an armed invasion of Czechoslovakia had taken place was to recommend you, Mr. Speaker, to recall this House. I am sure that hon. Members will agree that that was right. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] There were perhaps some who felt that the House would be powerless to do anything beyond recording its profound sense of shock and dismay at this act of blatant aggression, a feeling reflecting a similar doubt as to whether Governments here or in any other part of the world could register more than an impotent protest.
But protest need not be impotent. Moreover, even if we here today could do no more than register the strength and unanimity of feeling throughout the country, that of itself is important and, still more, that is our duty. For just as this people had thrilled at the stirrings of freedom in Czechoslovakia over these past months, just as we had rejoiced in the robust determination with which the Czechoslovak Government made it clear that they would not be deterred in their chosen path, so equally our people, all of us, were chilled by the feeling that we had been here before, that the tragedy of those months of August and September, 1938, just 30 years ago, was being enacted once again before our eyes.
Thirty years ago we saw first the Austrian Anschluss and then the effective take-over of Czechoslovakia as part of Hitler's territorial drive to the East. Last Wednesday'sAnschluss—it seemed to be one in the real sense of the word—was decided not in the spirit of territorial aggrandisement, but in a grim and cynical determination that no Communist country in Eastern Europe should be allowed to decide for itself that it wished to turn away from the deadening uniformity of internal control towards new conceptions of freedom and of freer expression.
That cynicism was made articulate by the Soviet representative in the United Nations Security Council last Thursday, when he declared that the Soviet Government had given repeated warnings that attempts to interfere in what he described as the domestic affairs of the

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Soviet Union and relations between socialist States would not be tolerated and would meet with an immediate rebuff. He called on all States "strictly to adhere to the principle of non-intervention." Events in Czechoslovakia, he said, were the concern of the Czechoslovak people and of the socialist States linked to them by treaty. It was on this basis of the Soviet Union's right to overrun the territory of its allies that the Soviet representative at the United Nations sought to deny the right of that organisation to discuss the invasion of Czechoslovakia.
That claim, if accepted as the basis of policy, meant a deliberate and calculated decision by the Soviet Government, which, in the terms of the statement issued by Her Majesty's Government within a few hours of the invasion, represented
"a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and of all accepted standards of international behaviour".
It raised, too, the question which was pointedly put by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary to the Soviet Ambassador on Wednesday afternoon, when he asked what confidence any State that was not allied to the Soviet Union could be expected to have in the policies of a State which treated its allies in this way.
Those responsible must have counted the cost of the inevitable world reaction and must have considered how the Soviet Union and her unhappy client States would appear to the world—particularly when one remembers the image which the Soviet Government have painfully sought to build up at great cost in so many non-aligned countries of the world. The tragic thing is that they knew that there would be a price and they were prepared to pay that price. But even by last Friday it had become clear that they had woefully underestimated the strength of that reaction, the damage to that image, just as it was by that time clear that they had even more crucially underestimated the vigorous and determined reaction of the Czech leaders and Czech people.
But it was not only to enable Parliament to express with a clear and, I believe, united voice the feeling of the whole British people that the Govern-
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ment recommended its recall. It was equally to enable the Government to report to Parliament and to enable us to take counsel together as to what would be helpful—helpful, above all, to Czechoslovakia—at this very delicate time.
At the same time as we advised the recall of Parliament the Government issued a statement of our attitude to the actions that had been taken. The text of that statement is included in the White Paper which we thought it would be useful for Parliament to have. In addition to categorical condemnation, we referred to the close consultations we had already begun "with our friends". And by that we meant our friends throughout the world.
From the outset it was clear that this was a matter of world concern and that, as such, the proper forum in which to raise it was the United Nations. My noble friend Lord Caradon, with whom we were in contact within minutes of receiving the Soviet message, immediately entered into consultation. The Security Council was called on Wednesday and a resolution was sponsored by eight members of the Security Council. The record of voting and the speeches made on behalf of Britain by Lord Caradon are set out in the White Paper. I know that the whole House will wish to endorse not only the action taken, but the terms in which Lord Caradon spoke.
Hon. Members will have noted that the decision to adopt the Council agenda was carried by 13 votes to two, the minority being limited to the two member States which bore the responsibility of intervention in Czechoslovakia. The resolution itself would have been carried but for the Soviet veto. Ten members voted in favour, two against and there were three abstentions. It is noteworthy that, despite these abstentions, arising chiefly from the inability of the three Governments concerned to approve every word of the resolution, nevertheless 13 members of the Council were unanimous in calling for the withdrawal of Soviet and other foreign troops from Czechoslovakia.
The inevitable Soviet veto could do nothing to diminish the force of this powerful expression of world opinion. In the debate on the resolution. Lord Caradon challenged the Soviet representative about

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the whereabouts and safety of the Czechoslovak leaders. Immediately following the voting on the first resolution, the same eight countries—Canada, supported by Britain, France, Denmark the United States, Paraguay, Brazil and Senegal—tabled a further resolution calling for a representative of the Secretary-General to be sent to Prague to investigate the position of the Czechoslovak leaders.
When the Council met again on Saturday it was addressed by the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Mr. Hayek. He said that while a solution of the crisis lay with the Government which had occupied Czechoslovakia, in negotiation with the Czechoslovak authorities, this act of force could not be justified by anything. He once again confirmed that it had not taken place upon the request of the Czechoslovak Government or of any constitutional organ of the Republic; nor could it be justified by concern for the external security of Czechoslovakia or for the fulfilment of obligations under the Warsaw Treaty.
Mr. Hayek added—these were his words—that
"those who thought they were entitled to interfere by such means as the occupation misunderstood our situation, misunderstood our people and misunderstood the whole of our social development."
The Council is meeting again this afternoon.
I have said how powerless the Soviet veto was to diminish the force of world opinion, but there is a further point. In our sense of disappointment at the casting of the veto for the one hundred and fifth time by the Soviet representative, the House can, nevertheless, mark this great contrast from 30 years ago—not only that this great United Nations organisation now exists and is so widely representative of the whole world, but that the representative of the invaded nation was able to state his country's case in person with the whole world looking on, unlike 30 years ago.
These proceedings in the Security Council reflect the vigorous denunciations of the action taken by the Soviet Governmsnt and the four others—denunciations coming in equal measure and in equal force from all five Continents. They have come from the Commonwealth—and the House will
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know that on Wednesday morning the Minister of State for Commonwealth Affairs convened a meeting of all the Commonwealth High Commissioners in London, to ensure that our friends and partners should be as fully in the picture as we were.
And the House will have noted that the Soviet action has been unequivocally deplored by countries so diverse in their political attitudes, but so representative of our multi-racial Commonwealth as a whole, as Australia, Canada, Cyprus, Ghana, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia—to mention only some of those that have made their voices heard.
Denunciation came, too, from outside the Commonwealth. Hon. Members will have noticed such statements, in addition to those by members of the Security Council to which I have already referred again from the Governments of countries as diverse as those of the Commonwealth which I have just cited. And let there be no doubt that all over the world, as in Britain, these statements are the voice not only of Governments, but of peoples.
The House will have noted, too, the highly critical reactions of the Communist parties outside the Soviet Union and the countries that have acted with it, criticism and condemnation by Communist parties in advanced and developing countries alike.
But if the Government which planned and led that action last week have now been obliged ruefully to recognise how grossly they underestimated the world reaction, still more rueful must be their recognition of how they miscalculated the reaction in Czechoslovakia itself—the reaction of a people who, having once briefly savoured the hopes of freedom, saw these hopes apparently so brutally and irrevocably frustrated.
If we here cannot dismiss from our minds the memories of 30 years ago, how much less can they—and they have not been slow to draw the moral and hurl it at the invaders. It is true that the movements to a greater freedom which we have seen this year were taking place under a Communist régime. But they have, I think, been welcomed too by

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those of us in this House and outside who believe that there cannot be true socialism unless it is democratic.
But in the case of Czechoslovakia they were being asserted for the first time for 20 years—indeed, apart from a brief interval, practically for 30 years—asserted with the easing of the restraints on free comment in Press, television and radio, and freer and freer discussion in factory, farm and market place—with all the hopes these held out of a growing freedom for the individual—the freedom which, through all the centuries, has been the classic test of liberty. Mr. Dubcek was—is—a Communist. But he has been speaking equally with the voice of Czechoslovakia, the voice with which other leaders of that country have spoken, from Hus to Jan Mazaryk.
The events over these past months have struck a chord—not so much of nostalgia, since that it too negative a concept, but a chord of excitement and hope in that country. What is more encouraging than anything else for all who value freedom is the fact that this sense of excitement has captured the young in particular. When the history of these past days comes to be written, a central rôle will be accorded to the courage and enthusiasm of the young people of Czechoslovakia, reaching out and risking their lives for a freedom of which they have no personal experience—a further proof, perhaps, that an undeniable urge to freedom is something bora in man.
We have all been moved not merely by what we have read—and I believe that our Press has excelled itself in dispassionate and factual reporting of these events—but by what we have heard on radio and seen on our television channels—perhaps those films of the entry of the tanks into Prague, smuggled out and shown on our screens last Thursday evening. And, no less moving, the sincere, sometimes desperate but always courageous, messages coming from the clandestine radio stations and rebroadcast in our own news bulletins.
Particularly moving to some of us was the broadcast in English by a woman announcer last Friday, as the net tightened on the free radio stations, appealing to a whole list of named countries—Communist and non-Communist—
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to carry Free Czechoslovakia's message to the world.
It would be right for me here to pay particular tribute to the B.B.C., not only for the service which it has given in bringing home to every one of us in this country the conditions under which life is being lived in Prague and other Czechoslovak cities and towns, but also in the way it has carried in the opposite direction a message of hope, and a clear and honest statement of the facts, and of the world's opinions to the people of Czechoslovakia.
Hon. Members: Hear, hear.
The Prime Minister: Equally clear as early as Friday was the failure of the invading Powers to reckon with what all sections of the Czech population—the man in the street—would do under seige and under occupation.
This is a people of immense bravery and infinite resource. Overrun by foreign troops, they yet convened within a matter of hours an almost complete Party Congress, which showed its courage in its clear declaration against the invasion, its demand for withdrawal and its challenging decision to re-elect its freedom leaders. The National Assembly, too, has continued in persistent and defiant session.
Resource and restraint were shown alike in the organisation of the token strikes last week and again, indeed, this morning. Resource, tempered even with a sense of dry humour, marked the progress and ultimate halting of the armoured train which contained radio identification apparatus. Railwaymen were told that it was desirable that the train should become stationary, and it did.
As we meet this afternoon the talks in Moscow are going on—talks which have lasted now for over three days and which have now been widened by the inclusion of other Warsaw Pact countries. We cannot at this stage know what the outcome is likely to be. We cannot even know what are the conditions under which these talks are taking place. If any authoritative statement emerges during the course of our present debate—and there is a Reuter message that one is about to be issued—later speakers will, no doubt, wish to take it into account. Of course, if that were to happen, my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary would wish to give the House such

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assessment as is possible of what it appears to mean.
It would be right to warn the House against drawing any hasty conclusions even if a statement—as one hopes, a statement recording an acceptable agreement—is issued. I say this not least because it might well be impossible for any of us to form an immediate judgment of the reaction of the Czechoslovak people to what has been decided. Should there be developments either later today or overnight, my right hon. Friend will, of course, be willing to make a further statement when the House meets tomorrow if that appears helpful.
The whole House, I know, hopes that when these protracted discussions in Moscow come to an end, the Soviet Union will have been proved ready to draw the right conclusion from the events of the past five days. If this is so, it will not have been an easy decision. For, as I have said, the Soviet Government must, before their decision to march, have taken into account that a price would have to be paid. Their concern about the security of their buffer States to the West, but still more their fear that liberalisalion once rooted in a single country of Eastern Europe would be impossible to contain—these were the reasons why they were willing to pay that price.
If now, as all the world must hope, a conclusion acceptable to the free leaders of Czechoslovakia and to the Russians and their partners alike can be reached—if this is now to occur—it will have been because of the world reaction—yes—but, above all, because these five days have shown that while a tank can destroy it cannot create, and, above all, it cannot impose a Government acceptable to a people determined on having its own Government. So we can watch with vigilance and also with restrained hope.
But even at this stage we must seek to draw some of the lessons from the events of last Tuesday and Wednesday. The first lesson for us and our friends must be the need to maintain the defensive system provided by the North Atlantic Alliance, and here I mean the alliance as it has been evolving during the past few years, an alliance determined in defence but equally determined on creating the conditions of détente.
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I would remind the House of the immediate response of my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary to the first question put to him in a television broadcast last Wednesday. My right hon. Friend affirmed our resolve to maintain the strength and efficiency of the alliance and reminded us that it was because the alliance existed that many of its members were not subject to the fate of Czechoslovakia.
Last month the House endorsed the policy set out in the Government's Defence White Paper, which included the strengthening of the British contribution to the defence of Europe and this policy has been possible only because of our earlier recognition, which I announced to the House last January, that
"our security lies fundamentally in Europe and must be based on the North Atlantic Alliance."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 16th January, 1968; Vol. 756, c. 1580.]
A vigorous and resilient defence system based upon that alliance is essential, but it is not in itself enough. It must be responsive, also, to political developments throughout Europe.
All of this means change and the willingness to accept change. The Concert of Europe broke down more than a century ago because its inflexible structure made it incapable of adjusting to change, still less of accepting change as its ally. Indeed, it was a holy alliance against change, and it broke down when it sought to stem the tide of European liberalism in its constituent parts. I believe that we have learned this lesson. It is the Soviet Union which has some hard thinking, some fast thinking, to do to shake itself free of the posture in which it appears to have frozen itself.
The lesson for us is that not only must our posture in the North Atlantic Treaty be flexible in its defensive responses; it must be flexible equally in its readiness to respond to the opportunities for détente. And, in the same spirit, we, all of us in Europe, must be ready to move more positively in the direction of European unity. We must show not only that we are united in our defensive purpose. but, even more, our conviction that only on the basis of real political and economic unity in Europe can our Continent heal its divisions and regain, through that ever-widening unity, its rightful influence for peace.

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Because, whatever the tragic disappointments of the last few days, however undoubted and united our response to the brutal act of 21st August, we all know that the only future for the world rests upon continuing to work for détente between East and West, and everything that a lowering of tension can bring. None will question that now, and for an unforeseeable period ahead, this will be much more difficult. For détente means trust, and the events of the past week have undermined the trust and the confidence that can develop only on the basis of that trust.
Time will be needed, but I reject the view that the events of the past week leave us no choice except to relapse into the frozen immobilisme of the cold war. For this same reason I would warn the House against hasty and ill-considered gestures which would be harmful to the longer-term aim of an easement of world tension, and which, at the same time, would be of no help whatsoever at this time to Czechoslovakia.
This would, in our view, apply to economic measures. Obviously, governmental and parliamentary contacts with the countries responsible for the invasion must be at a discount for the immediate future.
But, as far as cultural contacts are concerned, the Government feel that it would be a mistake to impose a ban on visits which have been planned. Individual British citizens, of course, are free to decide how far they want to support these visits, because we believe that the reaction of individuals can be much more eloquent in this context.
Meanwhile, I should inform the House that, as a direct help to Czechoslovaks presently in this country, my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary has agreed that no Czechoslovak national at present visiting this country will be required now to return to Czechoslovakia when his visa expires if he is unwilling to do so. My right hon. Friend is arranging for appropriate advice and assistance to be given to Czechoslovak visitors here.
Finally, I think that there will be two further considerations in the minds of all hon. Members. The first is that we—the world, every nation—must reject the assertion that a State, if it is powerful enough, has the right within its own
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backyard, its own claimed sphere of influence, to extinguish the rights, and particularly the right to choose its Government, of any smaller nation which it thinks is standing in its way. The United Nations exists to protect the integrity and rights of small Powers, and the world reaction last week has shown how widely this view is now accepted. What was rejected last week is that the existence of an alliance, or the claim of a sphere of influence, justifies any nation in employing force to deny the sovereign rights of another nation and use it as a means to the furtherance of its own self-interest.
The second is this. No one in this House is seeking to dictate to the Soviet Union and its allies any change in the relationships which have existed between them. Indeed, the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister has himself emphasised the desire of his Government to settle these matters by negotiations within their Communist partnership. What he rejects, what his country rejects, what all of us in this House reject, is that where these matters cannot be settled by discussion one or more of the partners to that alliance have the right to impose a settlement by force.
This is not a confrontation between the Communist and non-Communist world. This is an argument about the right of one Communist country to decide its own internal system on a basis which reflects the clearly expressed desire before, and still more since, last Wednesday of the Czechoslovak people for a greater freedom; it is about the right of a Communist country to decide how that country shall govern itself under Communism. What we here assert, as the greater part of the world has asserted, is not only that it is wrong to seek to settle these issues at gunpoint, but that, in the long run, it is futile—that, in words we read last week,
"The day will surely come when there are more free thoughts than tanks."
3.10 p.m.
Mr. Edward Heath: The House is indebted to the Prime Minister for the full and detailed account that he has just given us of recent events in Czechoslovakia. We in the Opposition believe that it was absolutely right for the Prime Minister and his colleagues to advise you, Mr. Speaker, to recall Parliament in these circumstances and for the Leader of the House to arrange today's

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debate on the Adjournment in which I believe that the House will be able to display its complete unity.
It is right to recall Parliament, for a number of reasons. The first is for Her Majesty's Government to have the opportunity of stating their position and the action which they consider should be taken in these circumstances, and perhaps I shall have a word or two more to say about that later. It is right as well since it gives the Opposition an opportunity to make their own attitude clear. Above all, it is right for Parliament to be recalled in order that in the debate right hon. and hon. Members can express personally the anguish of this nation at what has happened in recent days in Czechoslovakia, as well as to put on record the House's protest at the Soviet action in suppressing the first glimmerings of freedom in that country for 20 years and, with a slight interruption, 30 years, as the Prime Minister has said.
It is right that Parliament at this time should be the expression of this country's conscience, for Czechoslovakia has deep and poignant memories for most of us in this House. On three occasions, in 1938, 1948 and 1968, Czechoslovakia has been the victim of aggression. In 1938, it was my generation and that of the Prime Minister and many of our colleagues on both sides of the House who felt sick in the pit of the stomach when we heard of what was happening to that small country, and we knew then that war within the immediate future was unavoidable.
On each occasion, the sturdy Czech people have found their land invaded by foreign troops, their individuality affronted, their independence destroyed and their freedom, new-found again in 1948, emerging as it was just beginning to do this year, brutally suppressed. But what none of the tyrants throughout the ages in Central Europe has been able to do on these occasions all through the histories of the peoples who together form Czechoslovakia is to crush the spirit of the men and women and, above all, the young people of that small country. Today, we in this House have the opportunity of expressing our admiration, as the Prime Minister has done, for their courage, their determination and, indeed,
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their skill and ingenuity in the last few days in passively resisting the invader.
In this debate, we can show that we understand their yearning for freedom, their desire for respect for the individual personality, even within the context of a Communist society which, the Prime Minister has reminded us, still is, and within the alliance of the Warsaw Powers in which Mr. Dubcek himself emphasised that he wished to remain. We can demonstrate unequivocally to the Soviet Union and its allies who have taken part in the invasion our utter condemnation of their action, as the Government's spokesman has already done so eloquently in the United Nations.
After the Prime Minister's speech, the House still finds itself asking what more we can do. Here I think that the House also finds itself representing the national mood of the British people today—the mood of frustration that there appears to be so little that Britain can do to help the Czechoslovak people in their struggle. Today, the events are seen on television in almost every home in the country. That is one difference between now and the situation in Hungary in 1956, quite apart from 1938 and 1948. So the individual impact goes far deeper and is more immediate, and the frustration is all the greater.
The situation at this present moment in Czechoslovakia is confused, and the outcome of the talks in Moscow uncertain. I find myself in agreement with the Prime Minister that there is little point in trying to speculate on what is going on and what the outcome may be. But, whatever emerges and whoever survives, it appears to me that three matters are clear.
First, the Soviet Union put massive forces into Czechoslovakia without invitation or authority, without threat from that country, and without the merest thread of an excuse. It was naked aggression of the most blatant kind. It was breaking international law and the Charter of the United Nations, and it is also interesting to note that it was in direct opposition to the agreement in the communiqué by the Prime Minister and Mr. Kosygin after their talks, in which they both declared their conviction that
"…states with different social systems can and must co-operate in peace, observing the principles of independence and national sovereignty, equality, and non-interference in the

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internal affairs of others, and renouncing the use or threat of force in settling disputes between states."
Second, it emerges that any settlement now is negotiated under duress of a foreign occupation. Therefore, we heed the Prime Minister's wise words that any agreement must be considered carefully by the House and by the Government, because there must at least be doubt about whether it is the free and voluntary decision of those taking part in the present talks.
Third, there remains a danger to peace in Europe. As the internal situation in Czechoslovakia deteriorates, that threat becomes all the greater. It may come from elements in East Germany rising in sympathy with the Czechoslovak people. It may come from hard-liners in Rumania seeing the opportunity of reinforcing their view there or of Soviet intervention following them. It is possible to visualise a threat to Yugoslavia or even, as some are saying, to Austria. These are all dangers that we must recognise since the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the doubts that it now throws on Soviet policy.
It is in that context that I would like to consider for a moment the action which Her Majesty's Government should take. First, we support what they did at the United Nations in the Security Council and in voting for the resolution calling for the withdrawal of Soviet forces. I would suggest to the Foreign Secretary that he might consider whether this matter should now be taken to a special meeting of the Assembly under the "uniting for peace" resolution. I know full well from experience at the Foreign Office that there has to be a balance of advantage and disadvantage in taking this action. Therefore, it must be a matter for the Government's judgment with all the information at their command. But I put it to the Foreign Secretary as a suggestion for his consideration.
Second, there is the question of economic sanctions, which the Prime Minister mentioned. I, too, doubt the wisdom of this. It must surely be a matter for extreme doubt whether they can be effective against the Soviet Union, even were it possible to have a complete blockade of that country, which I do not believe would be possible in the circumstances. What is more, any attempt at economic
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sanctions would be bound to drive the Eastern Socialist countries still further under the domination of the Soviet Union, at the very moment when some of them may be having further thoughts about moving into a more individual position.
Third, there is the question of cultural sanctions, which the Prime Minister also mentioned. There is perhaps a natural emotional desire in the House that the Government should impose sanctions of this kind, but, again, I doubt the wisdom of a general imposition by the Government of cultural sanctions. However, I must say to the Prime Minister that many in the House will regard it as intolerable that, in the circumstances, an organisation such as the Red Army Choir should appear in this country in public performances. This is a specific case which I would put to the Foreign Secretary as a matter for action by the Government with the means which are known to be open to them. But for the rest, let it be a matter for individual decision. Personally, I would not wish to go to some of the performances in this country while this situation lasts. However, I agree it must be a matter for individual decision.
We were glad to hear the Prime Minister's announcement about Czech citizens in this country at the moment. I would put one further point. Czech students might perhaps be in need of particular assistance, and perhaps the Chancellor of the Exchequer, with the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary, would consider their positions individually.
Finally, there is the question of diplomatic relations. It is, of course, a historical remedy, where a Government disapproves of a policy of a country in this way, to break off diplomatic relations. Again, I doubt whether this is wise, because it would go far to remove any source of influence, as well as information, which a Government must have. But I suggest to the Foreign Secretary that the Government will have to consider carefully the nature of any Czech régime which emerges from the talks in Moscow. I do not believe that the House would want the Government to recognise what was obviously a puppet régime, particularly if there were to be set up a government in exile outside

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Czechoslovakia with the members of the previous administration forming part of it.
Having discussed these proposals and the various suggestions which might be acted upon in these circumstances, I must express my doubts whether these will change the Soviet position in Czechoslovakia. They may embarrass them internationally, but I, too, have no doubt that this was taken into account in advance by the Soviet Government. It is clear that they will not be put off from their determined purpose by United Nations resolutions, by protests, by demands to withdraw troops, or even by passive resistance, though it is right that all of these things should take place.
Recent events show that in the ultimate the Soviet Union are prepared to use brute force for the maintenance of their Eastern European empire in the interests of what they believe to be their own security. That must be the over-riding lesson to emerge from recent events. Whether their preparedness to take this action comes from fear of the power of ideas, whether from what they conceive to be the dangers of freedom proving infectious, or whether from the realisation of exposed flanks in their military posture, does not alter the fact that the Soviet Union are still prepared to resort to military means to deal with what they consider to be a threat to their own security.
I suspect that the most powerful influence in this situation was the Soviet fear of freedom in Czechoslovakia leading to an uprising in Eastern Germany, with the possibility of a unification between East and West of the Germans, and the Russian obsession with a German threat to the Soviet Union. I suspect that this is the major factor in the situation. If this is the case, they will go to any lengths to reinforce their own position in Czechoslovakia.
The second fact which emerges, which we have to face realistically, is that this domination by force over the Soviet empire can only be challenged by force. That means a preparedness to use not only orthodox weapons, but nuclear weapons, and that means the direct involvement of the United States of America. For those, therefore, who are frustrated, this is the hard fact of life which has to be faced. The West was
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not prepared to face this over Hungary. It was not prepared to use orthodox weapons or the risk of nuclear weapons. Nor is the West, as I see it, prepared to do so today. This, therefore, is the hard fact of life about Czechoslovakia and the other countries of Eastern Europe under Soviet sway.
That is why the Lord President is right, if what I understand he said yesterday is correct, that additional divisions—two divisions, perhaps—would not have changed the position of Czechoslovakia in these circumstances. It is not a question of additional divisions; it is a question of being prepared to go to the ultimate in a challenge to the Soviet Union over what they regard as their own basic security. The real question that we have to face is not divisions for that purpose, but for the security of Western Europe in which we do play a part. We must now look to security outside the Soviet empire, in particular within N.A.T.O.
I, therefore, ask the Secretary of State for Defence to look carefully again at the present assumptions on which the N.A.T.O. alliance is based. I understand they are, first, the political assumption that détente has arrived and is now a continuous process. The Czechoslovak position shows that political intentions can quickly change. This must be taken into account.
Secondly, the N.A.T.O. assumption is that there will always be plenty of warning of action. This was not so in this case. As far as I know, neither Her Majesty's Government nor any of the N.A.T.O. Powers had long warning of Soviet intentions. Thirdly, there is the assumption that there would be plenty of time to deal with operations. But recent events show that surprise is still possible. Surely, therefore, all of these assumptions need to be looked at carefully and urgently considered: the political assumptions, the method of gaining intelligence, and the level of forces and reserves in N.A.T.O. to deal with this situation.
I would, therefore, support the proposals which have already been made by some other countries that there should be a special and urgent meeting of the N.A.T.O. Council, not only at official level, which I know has already taken place, but either at Head of Government

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level or at Foreign Minister level, whichever the Government conceive best, so that they can discuss the matter with our allies.
I also suggest to the Foreign Secretary that there is an opportunity here to bring in the French Government, because the President of France has also condemned the Soviet action. This would be an occasion on which some of the breach in N.A.T.O. might be healed by a meeting of this kind.
I believe that there should also be a review of the contingency procedures for Berlin and the corridor, and that the review should take place by the three responsible Powers.
At home, I suggest to the Secretary of State and the Prime Minister that we should now look to our defence forces and the organisation of our reserves. In addition, I believe that Her Majesty's Government should consider their policy in those areas where it is still possible to help to prevent other small countries from falling under the threat of subversion or of foreign domination. In the case of Czechoslovakia, there is the lack of power to take effective action, because the West is not prepared to go to the ultimate in doing so. But this is not the case elsewhere. It is not the case in the Middle East and the Far East where the situation can be stabilised. I recognise that this is a matter of difference between the Government and the Opposition. We will want to return to the question of forces and reserves and the deployment of forces at a later date. I would merely say that it is frustrating enough to be able only to protest in the case of Czechoslovakia. How much worse it would be if we were to find later, in the case of another small country in the Middle East or the Far East—perhaps in the Commonwealth—that we were able only to protest, because we had withdrawn from the responsibilities which we now have there.
I think that the Prime Minister will agree that the lessons of these events are clear. The responsibility for drawing the lessons and acting upon them lies with Her Majesty's Government. In this House we can reaffirm our unity in condemnation of the Soviet aggressor and in support of the desires of the Czech people, and we can reaffirm our determination to
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defend freedom, to show the will, and to make the effort, wherever it lies in the power of ourselves and of our allies to do so.
3.30 p.m.
Mr. E. Shinwell: I should have thought that this Assembly might have contented itself in this debate with a harsh, even ruthless condemnation of the behaviour of the Soviet Union instead of operating as the Leader of the Opposition has done—despite our unanimity about Soviet aggression in Czechoslovakia—namely, seeking to convert this debate into one on defence. I should have thought that it would be sufficient to condemn and then to wait, as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has indicated, upon events emerging from Moscow and then, having assessed the situation, to decide on what action we regard as necessary and, in particular, what action is within our capabilities.
But the right hon. Gentleman has gone much further. If we were to attempt to carry out even a tithe of what he has proposed this afternoon, far from frightening or weakening the Soviet Union in the sphere of defence and in the possibility of further aggression—more fear would be created in Europe, because it would be natural and inevitable that the Soviet Union, taking account of what was said and the threats that had been suggested, would strengthen her defence—strong as it now is—and, moreover, take precipitate action to frustrate the efforts of the N.A.T.O. countries. That is the danger.
We have heard from the Leader of the Opposition a strategic disposition. What can be done about N.A.T.O.? I cannot imagine anything more fatal than to convene the N.A.T.O. countries at his stage to discuss military strategy. In any event, let us face facts, as the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition asks us to face facts. We shall begin to recognise our strength only when we appreciate our weakness.
In previous defence debates we have had this out. We have faced facts, and one of the inescapable facts about N.A.T.O. and the military situation in Western Europe is our undoubted weakness. The right hon. Gentleman spoke about approaching France to take part in discussion. France has contracted out

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of N.A.T.O., not only in the military sphere but in the Mediterranean and the naval sphere. As for the other N.A.T.O. countries, what is their strength? Belgium? The Netherlands? Greece? Turkey? Italy? Divisions assigned to N.A.T.O.? There is nothing substantial; nothing to measure up to the standard of defence that would be required in accordance with the propositions we have just heard from the right hon. Gentleman. Western Germany? Again, insubstantial in the context of the military strength of East Germany alone.
The right hon. Gentleman spoke about building up our reserves. He feels that the Secretary of State for Defence should have regard to the situation in manpower. What is the proposition that we have heard from the other side in defence debates? It is the revival of the Territorial Army. The conclusion I draw from the right hon. Gentleman's speech in respect of more manpower for military purposes—the logical conclusion—is a return to National Service. Let him say so.
Reserves? What kind of reserves? A few thousand Territorials, untrained and incompetent. Not that they are to blame. Let the right hon. Gentleman and those who agree with him on the benches opposite or anywhere else admit that the logical conclusion of our weakness in manpower—is the revival of National Service. Let them say so; then we shall know where we are.
These suggestions mean little or nothing. They are mere threats. The right hon. Gentleman has just returned from the Antipodes, making speeches of a very foolish character.
Sir Cyril Osborne: He is not the only one.
Mr. Shinwell: I was one of the few hon. Members on this side of the House—and I offer no apologies for it—who expressed doubts about what I regarded as the premature withdrawal of our forces east of Suez. I had regard to Commonwealth implications. But once we are out, to return—[Interruption]—to return with small, weak, futile forces and pretences and promises of coming to the aid of countries in that area would be foolish.
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What about the expenditure involved? Let the right hon. Gentleman and some of his chauvinistic supporters in the House tell the Assembly what would be the estimated cost of any kind of return east of Suez, partially or complete? If they want to ruin the economy of this country—I suspect that that is what they do want—[Interruption.] I will tell hon. Members why I speak in this fashion. I came here today, with other hon. Members, to associate myself with the harshest condemnation of Soviet conduct. In my opinion, that would have been quite sufficient for our purposes. [HON. MEMBERS: "Get on with it."] Hon. Members are telling me to get on with it. There is not enough militancy on the benches opposite to frighten me.
I came here—as I gather other hon. Members on both sides came here—to associate myself with the first words of my right hon. Friend's speech and those of the speech of the Leader of the Opposition. This is not the occasion to indulge in an essay in military strategy, with all its complications and implications. This is the occasion for condemnation.
I regard the conduct of the Soviet Union as uncivilised behaviour, but I am not surprised. Let us look at what has happened in the Middle East, or in respect of Russia's support of the Arab States, or her incursion into the Mediterranean. What do we expect from her? The right hon. Gentleman has said that the only way in which we can challenge Russia is by a display of force. My answer is that that would be futile. That might mean the end of us all—curtains for all of us, Europe and elsewhere. I do not envisage, with any favour, a possibility of that kind.
Be that as it may, it is necessary for us to understand that whether or not we like the Russians—and we obviously dislike their behaviour at this time—we must live with them. We cannot dispose of them by passing resolutions at the United Nations or elsewhere or by the sort of threat of force in which the right hon. Gentleman indulged. We must live with them.
Some of my hon. Friends have said that we should abandon cultural relations with the Soviet Union and even go to the length of dissociating ourselves from a

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Soviet orchestra; abandon musicians who have come to this country, as if these men and women are to blame for what the people in the Kremlin are responsible. We should promote more cultural associations and meet the Russians more often. We should meet people in the East of Europe more often and prove to them—make it manifest to them—that we are civilised people who believe in democracy and in the aspirations of freedom held by many people in some of the satellite countries.
That should be our purpose today and I therefore hope that the House will not spend time discussing military strategy. We can deal with that on another occasion, along with all its implications, the cost and its purpose. For the moment, we condemn the action of the Soviet Union. Let us ensure that the fact goes forth to the country and to the world at large. In this matter we are completely unanimous.
I would have liked to have had a unanimous assembly today, not only on this issue but on every other issue associated with Europe. However, that is impossible now, for obvious reasons. Let us at any rate show to the world that we are unanimous in our condemnation of the Soviet Union's act. That is, in itself, sufficient for our purpose today, and I am sorry that the House has gone further. I hope that there will be no more foolish, futile talk about threats of militarism.
3.43 p.m.
Mr. Jeremy Thorpe: Hon. and right hon. Members have come here today to condemn the behaviour of Soviet Russia and to express our sense of compassion and admiration for the people of Czechoslovakia. I therefore agree with the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) that to discuss wider matters of defence would be disastrous, for which reason I regard his speech as an unmitigated disaster.
The events of the past few days have not only been a tragedy for Czechoslovakia, but a cruel setback to East-West relations. There is not an hon. Member in the House who had not fervently hoped for an improvement in East-West relations. Indeed, there are many who,
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through voluntary organisations and various exchanges, have made valuable attempts to bring that about.
That feeling was, I believe, represented during the visit of Mr. Kosygin to this country and it has been manifested in different ways in the free world. Chancellor Kiesinger was returned to power in Germany, largely committed to improving relations with Eastern Europe. President de Gaulle withdrew from N.A.T.O.—in my view, misguidedly—since he thought that this was a necessary step to bring about a Franco-Russian entente. Russia and America have agreed to sign a Non-Proliferation Treaty towards nuclear disarmament. Cultural exchanges have been on the increase. Suggestions have been made of a dialogue between Parliamentarians in the N.A.T.O. and Warsaw Pact Powers. The youth of the world has shown itself intolerant of the hatred, of the negative attitudes of the cold war.
Despite all these things, by an act of naked aggression which has invoked the horror and disgust of the world, a permanent member of the Security Council, supported by its four hirelings, has invaded a small nation with which it was in treaty relationship. Tragically, this has set back the clock on East-West relations five, 10 or 15 years. It is, therefore, right that Parliament should be recalled so that we can express the horror of this country. It is also right that the T.U.C. should have made the protest which it has. In these ways we can make abundantly plain where we stand. This invasion is not merely about Communism and brands of Communism. This is an exercise in Russian nationalism which would have been just as appropriate if Nicholas I was still in St. Petersburg as with Mr. Kosygin in the Kremlin.
Treachery has been all too apparent. It is clear that during the Cierna and Bratislavia talks, Russian signals units were sending back military information and intelligence reports to supplement the military plans, which were already in complete readiness. Their attempts to justify their act of invasion have been as unconvincing as they have been hypocritically repellant. If anyone is left who doubts the thinness and perfidy of the Russian excuses, he need only consider the fact that in Neues Deutschland, the East German mouthpiece, it was

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originally reported that troops had moved as a result of an invitation received from the Czechoslovak Government on 21st August, which was, of course, the day after the invasion.
This is not the act of a despotic ruler like Stalin or of a drunken peasant like Khrushchev. This is the calculated decision of the cool-headed technocrats who are in collective charge of Russia today, and it is quite plain that the hard-liners, backed by the military, have, at least temporarily, seized the political initiative. The West must analyse the extent to which a military initiative has its own momentum. What will be the dangers if there is an active Czech resistance? Are there possibilities of escalation elsewhere?
Each person has his own interpretation of why these events occurred. There is obviously the precarious position of East Germany, the ruler of which is perhaps the most loathsome of all the dictators in that part of the world. It may be that Ulbricht made it clear that if Czechoslovakia were to go, he would be unable to hold the line. With the recollection of Poznan, Poland and Hungary, it could be that the spirit of freedom would have asserted itself in East Germany so that, whatever had been the policy of the West German Government, it might have been extremely difficult to dissuade the Germans on the western side of the border from interfering and intervening to protect their fellow countrymen on the eastern side. This, in the view of Soviet Russia, is perhaps one of the reasons why it intervened in this brutal way.
It is clear that the geography of Czechoslovakia was as much against her as her policies. Clearly, again, the movement towards freedom spearheaded by the writers, youth and intellectuals in Czechoslovakia could not be allowed to succeed lest it gave encouragement to equivalent movements in the Soviet Union itself. The importance which the Politburo attaches to the necessity for the reimposition of Press censorship in Czechoslovakia is an implication of the fear of the Russians that the people should learn the truth. This whole escapade was militarily superbly executed, but politically it was appallingly bungled.
I do not think that one can guess what is likely to happen; one would have to separate the political from the mili-
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tary demands which Russia is likely to make. I should have thought it very unlikely that Russia would agree to a withdrawal of all her troops without leaving some forces in Bohemia. It is an area where she has always wished to station Russian troops. I think that we shall now move into a situation in which the leaders of Hungary and Poland will feel clearly weakened, because, there again, this action does not command the support of the people in those countries. This is the evidence today.
One must ask, as the Leader of the Opposition did: what is the position with regard to Roumania and Yugoslavia? I should think that their geography was in their favour and, although the Roumanians have been in much opposition to Russia, they do so more from a Stalinist standpoint. They are, therefore, not likely to present the same dangers of subversion as the Russians fear in Czechoslovakia. I should certainly think that an attack on Yugoslavia would do more than anything else to alienate the opinion of the non-aligned world, the Afro-Asian bloc and those with whom Yugoslavia has worked in the past few years.
It is clear that there is a struggle of minds going on in Russia. To the extent to which these pressures build up, the greater we shall see repression within Russia herself. What, therefore, should we in this country do; what, indeed, can we do? I think that these events have proved, first, the superiority in conventional forces of the Soviet Union, at any rate in Europe. This, I think, has always been realised. Secondly, it has proved the total ineffectiveness of the nuclear deterrent, save in those situations where its existence has deterred actions which would lead to global war. This is a conception of double-or-nothing.
I believe that there is some merit in the suggestion of Kiesinger that there should be a summit meeting of N.A.T.O. not filled with the
"offensive spirit of war"
but as he said to give
"new political life to an alliance that is tired and flabby."
The reason I believe this is vital is that I think that one of the dangers, one of the results, will be the reaction in West Germany itself. At the moment, only

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a small minority in West Germany are in favour of the nuclear rearming of Germany.
This is something to which both sides of the Iron Curtain are violently opposed, and rightly so, but I believe the present West German Government need to be able to convince their people that any move towards militarism in the Federal Republic would be politically disastrous for Germany. The main advantage of Germany being within N.A.T.O. is that she is contained in an alliance which can give some political direction to her military and defence policies.
It is now possible that General de Gaulle will realise that his act of withdrawal from N.A.T.O. has not achieved the purposes which he originally desired. We may well see a further build-up in the Mediterranean. We saw it at the time of the Middle East war. These are all matters which should be discussed by the N.A.T.O. Powers. I would not regard that as a provocative act. It may well be in our own self-interest, but it is also our duty to the free world.
So far as concerns the possibility of boycotts, I agree with what has been said. This is a matter for individuals. I very much doubt whether we, as a House of Commons, should continue to accept the Soviet Union in membership of the Inter-Parliamentary Union. This is a matter for some consideration. I hope that all official contact between Her Majesty's Government and the Soviet Union will be kept exclusively to matters referable to diplomatic relations. We must make it abundantly plain that we wish to maintain relations, but that they will be exclusively of a diplomatic and trading nature. We must give the maximum publicity at all times to demanding the whereabouts of the Czech leaders. Nothing but good can come from this. The spectre of Imry Nagy and his subsequent assassination haunts hon. Members in all parts of the House. I welcome the reference by the Prime Minister to the position of refugees. I hope that we shall hear a little more about the sort of assistance and the plans which the Government have in mind in this direction.
I am certain that, while this country and the free world must maintain our defences, it would be disastrous if we
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were to revert to the posture of the cold war. We must show to the progressive forces in Eastern Europe and within the Communist world that we have sympathy for their aspirations and that many of them are those which we ourselves are trying to protect in this country; but, above all, alongside the condemnation of this naked act of aggression we must try to sustain the courage and the determination of the Czech people to prove that, even in the face of Russian steel, the human spirit can ultimately prevail.
3.56 p.m.
Mr. George Brown: I intervene for a very short space of time because I have been disturbed by some of the things which have been said and some of the approaches which are being made. Nobody will accuse me of being, as they used to say, "soft on the Russians", but I am worried if it is to go out from this House that at this moment when, frankly, we do not know the state of the negotiations nor arguments in Czechoslovakia, that our purpose in coming together was to denounce the Russians, the Soviet.
The Soviet leadership, I believe my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary will agree—certainly it was so in the period when I was in that office—seem by no means a wholly unanimous group of people. There may be great arguments going on there. If we believe this meeting of our House—I rather doubted the wisdom of calling it—is to have any effect, it is to try to get through to them. That means trying to get through to those who are open to be got through to.
Denunciation in over-tough terms of the Soviet as such seems likely to be counter-productive rather than helpful. Every one of us, of course, can bring, or seek to bring, comfort and encouragement to the Czechs in no uncertain terms. If I do not spend a great deal of time doing that, it is because I do not want to take up the time of following speakers. Of course we have a sense of guilt going back 30 years. Those of us whose tragedy in political life was to be active then perhaps did less than we should have done. We feel that sense of guilt very deeply. That makes us all the more anxious on the third occasion to let the Czechs know how much we feel for them, how much we believe they are right, and

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how much we seek to encourage them in what they are trying to do by passive—sometimes not quite so passive—demonstration of their contempt for those who want to take away from them their ordinary rights.
I have just come back from Yugoslavia, a Communist country as it would describe itself, yet a country in which I was able to have the freest and frankest arguments and discussions in a sense in which we really did understand each other and tried to find our own ways to the same values, the same attitudes and beliefs. I have seen the change in Yugoslavia, making no threat to the Soviet Union but giving a lot of encouragement to us and doing enormous good for the spirit of its people. Because I have seen it happen there, for the first time since I was last behind what is called the Iron Curtain, in Poland many years ago when things were so very different, I want to give the Czechs all the encouragement I can.
I do not wish to take the other line of denouncing Russia. The pressures of change are on not only in Czechoslovakia. They are on everywhere. They are on in every Eastern European country, and they are on in Russia. Tying these affairs up with N.A.T.O.—I hope that the right hon. Member for Devon, North (Mr. Thorpe) will forgive me here—would be an awful mistake. A little later on, when we see what the solution is, might be the time to consider that. But what we must not do is to give Moscow Radio the opportunity to tell the Czechs who might be wavering, to tell all the Russians who might be wavering or clamouring for change, that these events are being used by the imperialist bloc to build up a stronger N.A.T.O., nuclear rearmament and all the rest, thus giving those interested to say so the one weapon which they can use to damp down the great fight for change, the change of which they themselves are most afraid.
Therefore, on the question of how we speak about the Soviet Union, I would say, "Wait". We have all plenty of feelings inside us if we want to let ourselves go, but there is no harm in waiting a little to see what happens. Having stated our support for the Czechs, it is much more important, surely, to keep telling the Russians what they can do and that, if they would do It, we would
1302
swallow hard and go on with the effort for détente.
Let us tell the Russians what positive moves they can make. They will be hard things to do, as I tried to explain at the Labour Party demonstration yesterday. I gather that those at the back of the audience might have heard me, although we had a little trouble with people in front. They will be hard things to do—they can be nothing less. The Russians must withdraw, if anyone is ever again to have faith in what they say, what they agree, or what they sign. They must withdraw if any administration in Czechoslovakia is to be able to develop its internal affairs in its own way. With respect to the right hon. Member for Devon, North, it is no use saying that the Russians may want to leave some forces behind in one part of Czechoslovakia because they have always felt that they wanted to be there. Once the Russians have the right permanently to station troops in that country, the position of any succeeding civil administration will be hampered.
The Czech leaders, all of them, must be freed. They must be left free to handle their internal affairs, and the Czechs must be free to decide what leaders, of party. State or army, they want. These are hard things to do. There will be the "hardliners" in the Kremlin who will say that it will be humiliation. Our response must be to tell them, "We are sorry, but, unless you do that, you cannot get out with dignity, you cannot get out with any standing in the world outside. How could we persuade anyone to trust you?".
The Russians signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. I can personally testify that we in Britain worked very hard to enlist support in some circles where reserve was felt in order to get that Treaty moving, as it were, when the Russians decided that they wanted to go forward. Inevitably, the Treaty depends in the end upon trust. This is what I had to argue again and again with friends and allies of ours who thought that I was being a bit soft about it. One cannot in the end police it or prove it otherwise. So one has to say to the Russians, "You wanted that Treaty, and there are others you want, as we all know. We are prepared to help you, but how can we do so unless you show that when you say something, when you sign something or you

1303
agree something, you will stand by your word, save for the ordinary processes of giving notice of reservation and so on?".
The Russians must, therefore, take the three steps which I have outlined, however hard they may be. But the implication for us is that, if they take those three steps, they are not beyond the pale and, despite their present affront, we must try again from then on.
What ought to be done in regard to N.A.T.O. should have been done in any case, and the Harmel exercises and so on were already doing it. But do not tangle these affairs up with N.A.T.O. Otherwise, there will be permanent casualties. In my view, what these events call for—here, I think my right hon. Friend may feel not hurt but, perhaps, a little aggrieved at what I say—is a new attempt to make further developments in Western Europe, trying to get out of the situation in which we have been bogged down in the past few months. One of the tragedies of this affair is not that each of us is impotent in the face of a Russian move but that the whole of Western Europe is impotent. We have no European influence to bring to bear because there is not such a place to have its influence. Each of us individually will always be impotent. We need greater developments in Europe. I believe that this is the moment—I say this to my right hon. Friend, knowing that I am pushing at an open door—to go back and try again to set things moving.
We ought to speak frankly to the General, the President of France. Dr. Keisinger has called for a Summit, and the President of France has strongly expressed his view about what the Russians are doing. We ought to say to him, "If anyone bears more responsibility than anyone else for making Europe impotent in such a situation, that person, my dear President, is yourself. In these circumstances, we are entitled to ask you to review your own attitude and actions and to ponder whether these events do not give you occasion to reconsider what your attitude ought to be towards a wider Europe which could bring greater influence, political as well as economic, to bear ".
Moreover—perhaps I can say this as no member of the Government can—I think that we ought to speak clearly to
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the Chancellor of Germany. In passing, I pay my tribute to Herr Willy Brandt for the tremendous job which he has done in edging the Germans out of their traditional thinking on the question of Eastern Europe and into a more defensible policy. The German Chancellor has taken the view that the best chance of achieving the policy which he believes to be right for Germany lay in keeping close to the President of France and relying upon the French President's alleged special relationship with the Kremlin to look after his interests.
In my view, we ought to say to the German Chancellor—as some of us have said in the past privately and diplomatically—"Ought you not to think again? If the President of France will think again, we can go forward on a different basis, but ought you not to stand up for yourself, since it is quite clear from the cynical way in which you were disregarded, with everyone else, including the President of France, in these events, that there is no European influence in your interest, and in present circumstances a European influence will not be brought to bear on events?" Let us suggest to the German Chancellor that he had better think again about some of the assumptions which he has made during the past few months.
That is really what I got up to say. Do not let us exacerbate the situation until we know what is going to emerge. If there is refusal to do the things I have suggested, if there is quite patently a phoney arrangement, then perhaps we should talk in a different way. This is why, on the whole, I would rather have had this debate later. Nevertheless, it is at least good to have it now so that we can show the Czech people where we stand. But do not let us go further than that for the moment. Let us content ourselves with that.
It may be unfashionable to say this in the middle of a crisis in which we all feel so affronted, but I remind all our European colleagues and the House that there are pressures for change in every single nation—including Eastern Europe and Russia, France, Germany, China and the United States and here. We want to keep contact with the forces in these countries which are pressing for change. I shall not myself be caught up in official Russian activity in this country

1305
for quite a while, but I would not have any break in cultural or other activities which will give the slightest chance to us to show what we think. To deny them the opportunity to keep in touch with us would be madness.
I do not believe that the Kremlin leadership as now composed will necessarily be there for a long time to come. But it would be madness to think that we could encourage change in Kremlin leadership by denying students, writers, intellectuals and trade unionists of Russia and Eastern Europe the chance to meet us and discuss this situation. I repeat that this attitude may require re-examination if the ultimate decision about Czechoslovakia is not the one we ask for, but I think that those who are for charge need us. They need those of us in the Western world who are also for change. As they do need us, the best contribution we can make in this situation, without condoning what has been done, is to give all the encouragement that we can to those who will go on with the struggle for change in Russia and Eastern Europe.
4.12 p.m.
Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: I intervene briefly to express my sorrow at what has happened, my sympathy with the Czechoslovak people and my admiration for their courage. It is a sad and perplexing situation. It is sad because it is a reverse to the policies which British Governments of both parties have been pursuing, certainly since Stalin's death, because we in this country have tried harder than most to improve relations with the Soviet Union. I remember, as some of us do, Sir Winston Churchill's great speech in May, 1953, and the visits which took place—the visitors we entertained here, the visits we paid to Russia, the attempts to get the strategic list more sensible, the big efforts to develop trade—
Mr. Speaker: Order. Let us have a little more quietness when an hon. Member is speaking.
Mr. Selwyn Lloyd:—and the increases in cultural contacts.
In 1960, in Paris, after the U.2 incident, there was another reverse. Then there was a feeling of shock and sadness, but also the feeling that it was only a temporary setback for some months and
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that, after that, we could resume these efforts. That in fact was done, leading to the Test Ban Treaty and other contacts and arrangements.
I have always believed that this was the right policy, provided that it was not accompanied by any lowering of the guard. What has happened in the last few days is a sad reverse for this country and its policies and a much greater one than in 1960. It is also a very perplexing situation because the whole affair seems to have been so crudely handled by the Soviet Union. It has done so much damage to its position and credibility in the world.
I think that the Soviet leaders will probably survive being described as "Fascists" by Chinese Communists and that probably even the TASS statement issued on the morning of 21st August—
"TASS is authorised to state that party and government leaders of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic have asked the Soviet Union and other allied states to render the fraternal Czechoslovak people urgent assistance, including assistance with armed forces."
—may also very well be forgotten. But I agree with the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. George Brown) that many people in the West, in the uncommitted nations, in the satellites and even in Russia itself will be most unhappy, and I agree also with what he said about pressures for change.
The situation is also perplexing because we do not know how power is held or exercised in the Soviet Union. I suspect that among the Soviet leaders there have been considerable differences of opinion. The most probable explanation of what has happened is that those won the day who feel pathologically about Germany in the knowledge of the weakness of the Soviet position in Eastern Germany. They fear the threat of reunification with their memory of the suffering caused to Russia by Hitler and his invading armies. I believe that this is still at the back of the minds of many people in authority in the Soviet Union.
What should be our reaction? First, of course, is sympathy with the Czechoslovak people in their long sufferings—March, 1939, again in 1948 and now again in 1968. I agree with all that has been so well said about that country. I also agree with the right hon. Member for Devon, North (Mr. Thorpe) that we

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must keep up this continued questioning of what is going on, of where the leaders of Czechoslovakia are and of what arrangements are being made.
My second conclusion is that we should not accept the advice of those who demand immediate sanctions. I understand the indignation but not the conclusion. On a. previous occasion, in another context, I have said that there should be three tests for sanctions. First, would they weaken or strengthen those at whom they are aimed? Secondly, would they hurt the innocent rather than the guilty? Thirdly, would they be effective? I cannot see that a trade boycott by a few countries would be effective against the Soviet Union. I think that it would rather strengthen the extremists and hardliners. I agree that cultural and other contacts should be a matter of individual choice. It may be right to have a suspension in a particular case but I still say that the more one disagrees with another Government the more necessary it is to have trade and other contacts. It is folly to wall them off because one does not agree with their policies.
We must work away at the basic cause, which is Soviet fear of Germany. At an appropriate time, we should resume our efforts to try and create in Central Europe some kind of system which will promote a reduction of tension. We have been trying this for many years. We must go on with our efforts, anti surprise-attack measures, inspection of armaments and the idea of an area of limited armaments. We must try to get to the bottom of this basic Russian fear and see whether it is not possible to find some scope perhaps for discussion at a suitable time between N.A.T.O. and the Warsaw Pact with this kind of purpose in mind. I do not think that we can merely select a particular weapon and prohibit it. But I think that there is a strong case, within the bounds of possibility, for getting some means of reducing armaments and some kind of arms supervision of the area which would lead to a reduction of tension and which could ultimately remove Russian fear of a renascent Germany.
I come now to what is perhaps more controversial, in view of what the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) has said. I believe that we have to look again at our own collective
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security arrangements. It is really a matter for a separate debate and a separate speech, but for myself, I think that my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition admirably set out the points to be considered and I do not propose to add to what he said.
This has been a very sad day, some very sad days. Our hearts go out to the people of Czechoslovakia. May their agony speedily end.
4.20 p.m.
Mrs. Renée Short: This is an unbelievably painful occasion for many of us on both sides of the House who for many years have tried to make the East-West détente a reality and who know both the countries involved in this conflict. I am Vice-Chairman of the Anglo-Czech Parliamentary Group in the House and Vice-Chairman of the East-West Trade Group, and I love and very much admire the Soviet Union. In these circumstances, I am sure that many hon. Members on both sides of the House who feel as I do will deeply regret what is happening today—this conflict between two Communist countries. It is indeed a bitter blow to all our aspirations and to what we have tried to achieve over very many years, virtually since the end of the war.
Before the news of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, many of us had been saying that the lessons of the past had been learned, because here were two Communist countries, with conflict between them about their future political patterns, who had got around a table and discussed the problems which lay between them. We had been saying that they had discussed these problems, thrashed out the difficulties and signed an agreement. Indeed, this appeared a highly civilised and sensible way of dealing with problems between two countries—a way which we felt other countries with differences between them ought to follow. Alas, the agreement was broken and troops were sent into Czechoslovakia. All of us reacted with horror and intense disappointment at the news.
My second reaction when I heard the news—and here I agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. George Brown)—was that the Soviet leadership were not united. An article which appeared in The Times today confirms that. It shows that the leadership

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in the Government were divided but that they were compelled into this action by the military leadership.
I agree absolutely with hon. and right hon. Gentlemen on both sides of the House who say that it would be disastrous if we were to take some of the advice which has been given to us and to sever our contacts with those people in the Soviet Union and in other Eastern European countries which are involved in the invasion, because that would prevent us from putting forward our point of view to them and expressing to them views which I believe represent the united feeling of most people in this country.
In my heart, I could not believe this of Mr. Kosygin or of President Podgorny—or of Mr. Paletskis and Mr. Spiridonov. The hon. Member for Louth (Sir C. Osborne) will recall that we had discussions with the latter only last May. When I discussed the problems of Czechoslovakia with them, at that time none of them appeared to show any undue concern about the Czecho-slovakian situation. In fact, they said that they were quite convinced that the problems would be resolved in a peaceful way by discussions between the countries.
But we find that the Soviet Union has done precisely that for which they attack the Americans in Vietnam, that for which we have attacked the Americans in Cuba and in the Dominican Republic and that to which we ourselves, unfortunately, were a party when the Conservatives were in power, in 1956, during the Suez affair. That is a bitter thing for us.
But we must face the fact that it is not wholly black on one side and white on the other. Just as the Soviet leadership was divided in this situation, and about the way to deal with it, so we must recognise that there was division, too, in the Czech Communist Party. There were those, the majority, who supported Mr. Dubcek and his proposals for liberalisation. There were the ultra-liberalisers who were always anti-Soviet and who wanted Mr. Dubcek to go much further than he was prepared to go. There were, thirdly, the hard-line Novotny Communists who wanted no liberalisation at all. Mr. Dubcek had to steer a very difficult and delicate course among these groups. As my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said, Mr. Dubcek is a
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Communist leading a Communist Government. Indeed, Mr. Dubcek made it clear that he had no intention of taking his Government out of the Warsaw Pact. There may be elements within Czechoslovakia who wanted that to be done, but that was certainly not his proposal If the Soviet Union were not satisfied with what had been done by Mr. Dubcek and his Government since Bratislava, surely in this day and age the correct step to take was to hold more talks and more discussions not to send in their tanks and their soldiers.
Having said that, we must also repeat what many of us, particularly on this side of the House, but also on the opposite side of the House, have said on many occasions in the House and outside: we understand the valid and reasonable fears of the Soviet Union for their own security, particularly after recent developments in West Germany. We have spoken about that many times. We know the kind of maps which are being produced and have been produced in West Germany since the end of the war showing the 1937 frontiers of Germany. We know that there are large numbers of people in West Germany who continue to claim the return of what they call the lost territories, of which Poland is one and part of the Soviet Union and part of East Germany are the other two. We know of the rise of the N.P.D. in West Germany. We know that the West German army is the most powerful in Western Europe. We know that there are many former Nazi Germans in posts of power and responsibilty in the N.A.T.O. forces.
Mr. Charles Pannell: In East Germany, too?
Mrs. Short: All these are matters of concern not only to the Soviet Union but to all other countries which suffered because of the activities of Germany under Hitler.
Mr. Austen Albu: Does my hon. Friend think that Russia is not to be condemned for bringing a German army again on to the territory of Czechoslovakia?
Mrs. Short: If my hon. Friend will wait I will reach that point, too.
Those of us who follow the West German Press know that, certainly since

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1966, Herr Strauss's Germany has somewhat changed its tune and has been demanding the economic penetration of the Eastern European countries. If we look at the Czech trade figures with West Germany we see that in the last year there has been a greatly increased amount of trade with West Germany. I wish that they had done their trading with us and not with them.
But in spite of all these things, for the Russians to act as they did and, as my hon. Friend the Member for Edmonton (Mr. Albu) pointed out, to bring troops from East Germany, from Poland, from Hungary and from Bulgaria to invade Czechoslovakia is something which we cannot accept. It has aroused the feeling of Governments all over the world. It has been notable for the disapproval and concern expressed not only by capitalist governments but Communist parties in almost any country that one can name. There are not many Communist parties in the world which have not expressed their concern and disapproval.
The proposals that we hear from the other side of the House, and outside, that we should now react to this situation by spending more of our economic resources on building up N.A.T.O. is something that I hope my right hon. Friends will resist with all their power. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Easing-ton (Mr. Shinwell) said, this is something that we cannot bear economically. I can well see that if the Government were to accede to this clamour, by the time the next election comes the party opposite will have as one of its main planks in its election programme "Cuts in Armament Expenditure". [Laughter.] Oh, yes. This will be a gift to the party opposite. It will say, "We will reduce armaments expenditure if we are returned and will spend the savings on this, that and the other,"—as we said and as we are now endeavouring to do.
This would be highly dangerous for the Labour movement in this country. To cut cultural ties, as everyone has said, would not help us or the Soviet Union, or the people of Czechoslovakia. Rather than cut these ties we should use those that we have, and where we have towns and cities "twinned" with others in the Soviet Union, those towns and cities, those trade unions and Labour
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parties within them, should express their point of view on the Czechoslovakian situation through their opposite numbers in the Soviet Union and East Germany, as well as in Hungary and Poland where such "twinning" arrangements exist.
This is an opportunity for us to express what we feel. To suggest, as some have, that we should cut our trade relations would not help the Czechs and would harm us, because the Russians would retaliate. Even if we were to lend£30 million to£40 million, let alone£65 million, this would be a very painful thing for us.
We now have an opportunity, through all our contacts with these countries and through this recall of Parliament, to impress not only upon the Soviet Government but other Governments involved what we want. First of all, there must be the return of Mr. Dubcek and President Svoboda to Czechoslovakia, and to the government of that country. Soviet and other East European troops should be withdrawn, and notes on these lines must go to all other countries involved, including East Germany. It is said that we have no diplomatic channels for sending such a note to East Germany because there is no recognition of that country, but my right hon. Friend knows perfectly well that there are ways and means of transmitting our views.
We must impress upon the Soviet Government that threats to Rumania and Yugoslavia must cease. In order to deal with what I firmly believe is partly the root cause of this difficulty, the insecurity felt by the Soviet Union vis-à-vis its common frontier through Czechoslovakia with West Germany, rather than convene N.A.T.O.—which would be disastrous, because it could be used as propaganda against all Western countries—ought we not to reconvene the Potsdam Powers—the countries responsible for the establishment of this set-up after the war?
Should we not think of the conclusion of a peace treaty and discuss with the Soviet Union its fears which stem directly from the situation in West Germany today? This would be very much more to the point than the proposal to reconvene the N.A.T.O. Powers. Then we could see what are the difficulties, what action can be taken, to prevent any further activities of this kind. All efforts

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so far to achieve a reasonable rapprochement between East and West, particularly between ourselves and the Soviet Union, which most of us passionately desire, have been set back for a number of years. We have also to bear in mind the fundamental truth that an East-West détente is the basis of world peace, in spite of what has happened in Czechoslovakia, and we have to go on, however difficult this may be and however long it may take us, working to achieve just that.
4.35 p.m.
Mr. Sandys: I will not comment on the speech of the hon. Lady the Member for Wolverhampton, North-East (Mrs. Renée Short), except to say that I do not believe that it reflects the views of most of the people of Wolverhampton.
Mrs. Renée Short: Has the right hon. Gentleman asked them?
Mr. Sandys: I am very glad that the Government have decided to recall us. It is right that the feelings of the British people over the callous rape of Czechoslovakia should be voiced in Parliament by their elected representatives. I am, however, sorry that we are not to vote a Motion which would declare our collective views to the world.
The Prime Minister spoke of the feeling that we have been here before. That is particularly so for those of us who were in this House before the war. This debate certainly revives cruel and bitter memories. Once again, this small, brave nation has been ruthlessly crushed by naked force, while the rest of the world stood by and watched.
Mr. William Molloy: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. Sandys: I do not think so. There is nothing we can do to reverse what has happened. But I am by no means convinced that this tragic event could not have been prevented. The United Nations should certainly have made some effort to do so last month when the Russians were openly trying to intimidate the Czechs with a show of military force around their borders.
Faced with this direct threat to international peace, the total silence of the United Nations is unforgiveable.
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I wrote to the Foreign Secretary on 24th July, urging him to raise this matter at the Security Council. I felt that a warning shot across their bows would give the Russians a foretaste of the worldwide indignation which an invasion of Czechoslovakia would arouse, and that this might perhaps make them hesitate. In my letter I concluded by saying:
"The time for the Security Council to intervene is now, and not after an irrevocable breach has occurred."
In his reply the Foreign Secretary expressed the view that this was not a matter in which Britain should take the initiative. However, on the radio yesterday, the Lord President of the Council said: "We must rally world opinion on the side of the Czechs." He is quite right. But would it not have been better to do it before and not after the invasion? Today, the Prime Minister said that the Russians grossly underestimated the reaction of world opinion. That only reinforces my view that some prior warning by the United Nations might perhaps have been useful.
However, it is no good now arguing about what might have been done. Our task today is to take stock of the new situation, and to draw the conclusions. History does not repeat itself exactly. But it would be foolish to ignore the lessons of past miscalculations. Up to the time of Munich, there were many who still held the view that, with patience, it would be possible to establish confidence and co-operation between Nazi Germany and the West. At Yalta, despite Churchill's warnings, Roosevelt believed that Communist Russia could safely be entrusted with the task of restoring freedom to the occupied countries of Eastern Europe.
More recently, the Western Governments persuaded themselves that the Soviet Union was becoming more moderate and that this would open the way to a genuine détente. This latest illusion, like the others, has been shattered by events. We are obliged now to recognise—the Prime Minister said it himself this afternoon—that for an indefinite period any hope there was of building up a new East-West relationship resting upon mutual trust has disappeared.
Coming now to action—the Prime Minister rightly said that it is our duty

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to register our protest. Protest is sometimes futile. But in this case it is essential. The Russians, who are highly sensitive to outside opinion, must be made to feel to the full the universal disgust which their brutal, treacherous and cynical behaviour has aroused. In this, the United Nations has a major part to play; and I support my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition in suggesting that the General Assembly should be convened as quickly as possible. It should be asked to pass a resolution condemning Russia in uncompromising terms. I know that the Foreign Office may have doubts about the amount of support which such a resolution would receive. All I can say is that those countries which are not prepared to join in condemning aggression should stand and be counted.
There are many different ways in which we can mark our disapproval. We can withdraw ambassadors, without necessarily breaking off diplomatic relations. We can enlarge the list of goods which are not allowed to be exported to Russia. We can refuse to sit with Russian representatives on international bodies, such as the I.L.O., which have already introduced the principle of political discrimination. We can decline to compete in the Olympic Games unless the Russians are excluded. We can suspend cultural exchanges, trade fairs and visits of various kinds. Those are some of the suggestions which have been put forward.
I do not propose to comment on them individually. All of them, of course, raise difficulties of one kind or another. But I warn the Government that, in their present mood, the British people will not be content to do nothing. If the Government fail to give a lead, others will. If our protest is to be taken seriously, it must be expressed in deeds as well as in words.
Hitherto, the view has been taken that any contacts of any kind between the West and Russia, though their influence may be small, can only do good. But in the present situation, that is no longer entirely true. While the Czech people are bravely resisting the Russian invaders by every means open to them, we have a duty to show them that we are not indifferent to their fate.
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Nothing would be more dispiriting than for them to see photographs of prominent Western personalities shaking hands and exchanging compliments with their hosts in Moscow, or Russian dancers being feted in Western capitals. The Czechs, who are risking their lives in the struggle for freedom, would feel betrayed. They understand quite well that we cannot take military action to help them. But they rightly expect us to give them the fullest moral support. In order to make the maximum impact any protest action must be initiated quickly and must be supported by as many countries as possible. But, if others hesitate, it is no reason for Britain to hang back. Where peace and freedom are at stake, we should not be afraid to take the lead.
Apart from purely moral support, there is one practical way in which we and our N.A.T.O. allies can help the Czech resistance. It is by providing facilities for a free Czech radio station in one of our countries. That we should certainly offer to do.
There remains the task of reviewing and, where necessary, revising, our foreign and defence policies in the light of the new situation. In the West, as the Prime Minister explained, British policy has two main objectives. The first is to assure security against Russian attack by means of the North Atlantic Alliance. The second is to build a United Europe, economically strong and independent and capable of exercising an effective influence in world affairs. The events of last week have emphasised the Tightness of both these aims and make it more than ever necessary to pursue them with vigour.
N.A.T.O. must be strengthened, politically as well as militarily. Too little attention has been paid to its political rôle. The members of the Alliance must make more effort to evolve a common approach. Above all, we must agree upon a joint policy towards Eastern Europe. For, unless we are able to speak with one voice, we can never hope to exercise any influence on the other side of the Iron Curtain.
The rape of Czechoslovakia has put N.A.T.O. on its guard, and will give a timely jolt to those countries which thought that the so-called détente justified the relaxation of defence efforts—and Britain is one of those countries. Having

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seen what Russia does to her Communist friends, we can imagine what she would do to us, if she dared. The only thing which deters her is the military strength of N.A.T.O. We shall be safe so long, but only so long, as this is maintained.
But, outside the N.A.T.O. area, there is no reason to suppose that Russia has abandoned her aims. On the contrary, she will almost certainly try to distract attention from her troubles in Europe by building up her prestige in other parts of the world. Her most obvious target is the Middle East. Apart from maintaining her influence in the Arab countries by supplying them with arms, it is clearly her aim to replace Britain as the dominant Power in the Persian Gulf.
The Government must now surely see what a grievous mistake they made when they decided to withdraw all British forces. But there is still time to reverse that decision, and so prevent this strategically vital area from passing into the control of a Power which is implacably opposed to everything we believe in and stand for. If, despite the lessons of last week, the Government stubbornly persist in their mistaken policy, they will bear a heavy responsibility for the consequences.
The economic and political case for maintaining a British presence in the Far East, though different, is equally strong; and I wish to congratulate my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition on the clear pledge which he gave on behalf of the future Conservative Government to our Commonwealth partners in Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore.
To sum up, we must give the Czechs all possible moral support. By action as well as by words we must make the Russians feel our indignation over their contemptible behaviour. We must recognise that talk of détente was a dangerous illusion. We must back N.A.T.O. up to the hilt and strengthen our own defences. We must reverse the decision to withdraw British forces east of Suez. While remaining on our guard we must continue to seek a basis for peaceful and constructive co-existence. But henceforth our policies must be founded upon experience and reality and not on wishful thinking.
4.50 p.m.
Mr. Maurice Edelman: Russia's crime against Czecho-
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slovakia has had almost universal and merited condemnation, and even if, as seems possible, the negotiations which have been taking place under duress in Moscow finally come to some conclusion nothing will ever be the same again. The invasion has ended the hopes that under the present leadership the Soviet Union has been sincerely interested in peaceful coexistence. By her action Russia has demolished many years of propaganda and protestation that she is sincerely concerned with peace.
Only recently, when I was in Russia as a member of a Parliamentary delegation—this was also the experience of my colleagues—I found that wherever we travelled the slogan set up in banners over entrances to citizens' dwellings was "Peace and friendship". Only recently the Prime Minister, at the Soviet Exhibition, responded to a toast of peace and friendship between the Soviet Union and ourselves. Now we have seen what a mockery the whole thing has been. Mr. Brezhnev has shown the true and brutal face of Communism. The question that the House ought to ask itself is why the Russians have thrown the mask away, and in what wider interest.
Recently, we have been encouraged by optimistic reports—based partly on the heroism and endurance of the Czechs, but also on the reports of the negotiations coming from Moscow—that somehow or other there are grounds for optimism. I must record that for my own part I see no real ground for optimism in the present situation. There may be glimmers of hope—of these I shall speak—but I believe that it would be dangerous to encourage any self-delusions. I was disappointed with my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. George Brown) when he seemed to reprehend the Government for having recalled Parliament today to make this protest. For my part, I believe that it is vitally important that we should register that protest.
More than that, it is particularly important if we look at the scene in Eastern Europe today to recognise that what appears on the surface is not necessarily what lies below. I am convinced that despite the more hopeful reports now coming out of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, beneath it all there is a serious danger that, as in the case of Hungary, ruthless round-ups

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by the Stalinists are in train already or in preparation. I believe that the lorries are already waiting for stage two of the invasion—the mass deportations and imprisonments and perhaps executions.
Today, we are talking not of an academic manœuvre, not of a tactical exercise without troops, but of actual invasion in which lives have been lost and in which perhaps hundreds of people have been wounded. If the deportations and mass imprisonments have not taken place already it is because in the early stages the invasion was taking place under the eyes of television cameras and journalists who were witnesses of the events. I think that the fact that there has been some appearance of restraint in the early stages of the invasion should not deceive us. After all, assassins like to work in secret. We must be alert that the patriots in Czechoslovakia are not removed secretly to some kind of "final solution" which may yet be the object of Soviet policy.
The mystery remains: why have Mr. Brezhnev and his colleagues exposed themselves so crudely that not only their enemies, but even their former friends, can view them only with execration? One simple answer is that Czechoslovakia, from being an Eastern salient into the West, might somehow or other be transformed into a Western salient into the East, and that it was, therefore, necessary for the Russians to take anticipatory action.
Indeed, the trauma of the 1945 war—as my hon. Friends on the parliamentary delegation will recall—is very much present in the minds of the Russians. They recall that one out of every eight Russian citizens died during the course of the Nazi invasion. So it is possible that the Russian leadership may find some kind of persuasive argument to address to the Russian people to justify its incursion. I think that an argument presented in that way, however bogus it may be, would certainly find an echo. There is a primitive response in the Russian mind to the fear of a West German attack, particularly of one which might be sustained by some uprising in Eastern Germany. This may seem to many Russians to be a justification for the pre-emptive strike against Czechoslovakia.
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There is one positive thing that our Government can and should do, and that is to attempt by every means within their power—by the use of radio, by diplomatic means, by every means accessible to them—to disabuse the Russian people themselves of the fear and of the plausible, though false, argument put forward by the leadership that somehow or other the West was on the eve of an attack against the Soviet Union.
I have spoken about the fear of Germany. I must say that I think there is a much deeper reason for the Soviet action, and that is that the Soviet leadership, far more than having a fear of Germany, fears liberty itself. There is a fear of non-conformity, a fear of the heresy of dissent for which Bohemia has been renowned ever since the reforming heresy of John Hus. It is not merely the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact that the Russians fear. They are afraid of the liberal heresy inside Russia spreading and being stimulated had the heresy of the Czechs been allowed to go unpunished.
In Western Europe the concept of the intellectual, and, still more, of the intelligentsia, has little appeal. But in Eastern Europe, where autocracy after autocracy has brooded like a black night over the countries under its sway, the intellectuals have been bringers of light. They have acted as spokesmen and interpreters of the people. They have formulated in poetry, novels, drama and song the deepest aspirations of the ordinary men and women of the countries of Eastern Europe. Their songs have outlasted tyrants. It is the revolt of the intellectuals which the Soviet leadership today fears as much as it fears N.A.T.O.
After all, there have been many signs and portents to which perhaps we did not give enough attention. The trial of the authors Sinyavsky and Daniel, which was notorious, was already a harbinger of that fear. After the death of Stalin, the poet Yevtushenko spoke up able to command vast audiences for his poetry readings, which were denunciations of the evils of Stalinism, the stifling of liberty, anti-Semitism and all the other expressions of bigotry and cruelty which flourished in the time of Stalin. I dissent from the hon. Member who spoke about Mr. Khrushchev as a drunken peasant.

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Let us remember that the thaw in Russia took place precisely when Mr. Khrushchev was in power. We should not ignore that element, which I believe is very relevant to the present day.
Then there is Solzhentsin, who is probably Russia's greatest novelist writing today, a former prisoner of Stalin. He was banned a few years ago for so-called anti-Sovietism, which means that he spoke in the interests of liberty.
These men whose names I have mentioned are notable intellectuals in a great movement of the Soviet intelligentsia, but they do not stand alone. When I was in the Soviet Union—this must have been the experience of many of my colleagues—I observed that there is a sort of second academy, an academy which takes place in private houses among people who have not the opportunity to speak in public and who are thwarted in their discussions by academic intolerance. They are the people who speak for the writers in the Second Literature and the Second Academies and who, in the relative privacy of their home, live among friends and are able to give their views.
The real opposition today in Russia—the people to whom we must address ourselves because they are the hope of the future and of a peaceful co-existence—is precisely the intellectuals who represent an alternative system of thought to the orthodox Stalinists.
Briefly, I should like to refer to the double talk and what George Orwell called the double think of the leadership in the Soviet Union today. Words like "aggression" and "democracy" have lost all rational meaning. During our visit to the Soviet Union we were accompanied for most of the time by the Academician Fedosseyev, who, if I may use the expression, is the high priest of Marxist-Leninism in Russia. He handed us an essay for private circulation on what was called "The Strategy of Peace in Modern Sociology", in which he has endeavoured to give a definition of "aggression".
I should like to quote it because it is directly relevant to the events in Czechoslovakia. He says:
"No country, even the most powerful one, should be permitted to impose its will on other countries. No country or coalition of countries has a right to take it upon itself to resolve questions of internal organisation in other countries, be they big or small."
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I quote that as an example of double talk and double think, because it shows that it is almost impossible to have a rational dialogue with the Russians, whether through diplomacy or at the United Nations, because the basic tone of the discussion means different things to East and West.
The Czechoslovakian invasion has spelt out the double standards which the Communists consistently apply—one for themselves, and another for those who disagree with them. The intellectuals inside Russia whom I have been talking about are the men who reject double think and who affirm the ethic which has been in the mainstream of Western thought for the last 2,000 years. Some of them have been banned and imprisoned and, most sinister of all, some have, in a byzantine way, been shut away in lunatic asylums. It is characteristic of the mind of the rulers of Russia today that, from the seizure and murder of foreign political leaders which took place at the time of the Hungarian uprising to the imprisonment of awkward critics as madmen, they use the same techniques of strangling opposition as were used by the most atrocious despots of Oriental history.
What can we do? Much has already been said today about the possibility of cultural reprisals which, I am glad to say, has been rejected by most hon. Members who have spoken. To some extent, we can talk to the Soviet intelligentsia through our cultural manifestations in Russia. I believe that if we were to cut them off from those cultural manifestations we would deprive them of the opportunity of hearing friendly and civilised voices.
However, I believe that our agencies should be much more selective The British Council should be much more definite in its selection of what goes to the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries. For example, only recently we have had "Don Carlos" playing at Covent Garden. How admirable it would have been had we in the past—perhaps it is no longer possible—been able to send to Russia "Don Carlos", which contains that magnificent conversation between the Marquis Posa and King Philip of Spain. On being asked for a boon, the Marquis Posa replied," Sir, give us freedom of thought". If, by those means, we can

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address ourselves to the people of Russia we shall have established a proper communication.
Sir Harmar Nicholls: I see the point of the hon. Gentleman's argument about getting through to the intellectuals in Russia, but does he not see the danger to our friends in other countries, perhaps bordering on Russia, if we give the impression that this rape has made no difference at all?
Mr. Edelman: No. From my observation—and I believe that this is the observation of hon. Members who have visited Eastern Europe, either officially or otherwise—I believe that the intellectuals of the Eastern European countries are only too eager and willing, and indeed long, to hear British voices and to see manifestations of British culture. Therefore, the maintenance of these links can only do good. To lower the Iron Curtain in such a way that there was no cultural communication would be a grave error and a loss to those in the Soviet Union who long to hear a friendly voice.
Let us remember that the Russian people are not the men in the Kremlin. The Russian people themselves are simple, ingenious, and warm hearted, and are capable of vast suffering and great endurance, as they proved in the last war. I never believed that all the Germans were Nazis, and I do not believe that all the Russians are involved in the horror inflicted by the Kremlin on Czechoslovakia. There is a great, lost generation in Russia which has no place in the hierarchy which is largely occupied by elderly men. There is a student generation, an inarticulate generation, which is longing to speak and which, I am convinced, will regard the invasion of Czechoslovakia with detestation.
When I visited Moscow when Mr. Khrushchev came to power after "the thaw", I asked an old Russian journalist whether it was possible for the young people to go back to the Stalinist days. He replied, "They can never go back. They have had a taste of liberty, and they have been spoilt". Let us use every means of talking to the intelligentsia of Russia. Let us remember what the leading poet of the Soviet Union, the spokes-
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man of Russia's youth, Yevtushenko, said in a poem which he wrote about Bratsk, in Siberia, the country of slave camps under Tsars and Stalin:
"In Bratsk, Mother Russia, your image
Shimmered and revealed itself to me…
And by suffering like love itself you earned the light…
There are still too many slaves in the world.
The slave-drivers haven't gone."
I believe that the youth of Russia will one day expel the slave-drivers themselves.
5.8 p.m.
Mr. John Boyd-Carpenter: Although I do not agree fully with some of the conclusions to which the hon. Member for Coventry, North (Mr. Edelman) came, I am sure that I express the view of hon. Members on both sides of the House when I say that his thoughtful and balanced speech was a joy to listen to. I very much agreed with what he said at the beginning of his remarks, when he made the important point that the events which have occasioned our recall for this debate have the sort of historical significance which results in things never being the same again.
It is right, therefore, that hon. Members should express on behalf of those whom we represent not only our revulsion and horror about these events but our thoughts about what changes in our country's policy will result from the new situation.
As to the events themselves, the vocabularies of adjectives of hon. Members have been so fully exercised that it is difficult to find a new one or one fitting to the occasion. I agree very much, however, with what, I think, the hon. Member for Edmonton (Mr. Albu) had in mind in an intervention when he emphasised what also seemed to me to be the peculiar in-sensitiveness of the Russian leaders in using satellite troops to assist them in the rape of Czechoslovakia. To use, in the first place, the Poles and the Hungarians as Russian satellites in precisely the same rôle that they were used in 30 years ago as Hitler's jackals reveals a quite peculiar insensitiveness. To use East Germans in this operation carries that even further.
When one talks, as most hon. Members have done, to Russians, one of the

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things when they "let their hair down" which most impresses one is the deep fear and hatred of Germany for what the German armies did in Russia during the late war. That is an attitude of mind which one can well understand. It is, however, an attitude of mind that makes it quite extraordinary that they should have loosed German soldiers on a country which was herself one of the earlier victims of German aggression 30 years ago.
In expressing the general view which we all feel about massive military force being used to crush a country which sought to do nothing except to govern itself as it thought fit, one cannot but be impressed and rather alarmed by the extraordinary mental opacity which caused those who planned this aggression to carry it out in this particularly repulsive way. In parenthesis, this way of doing it, as well as the act of doing it, makes the action of the Governments of India and Pakistan in abstaining in the vote in the Security Council peculiarly incomprehensible. Without wishing to intervene in the affairs of other Commonwealth countries, I cannot but think that the Parliaments of those countries will wish very closely to scrutinise the reasons of their Governments for taking that line.
Mr. Gilbert Longden: My right hon. Friend will know that the Indian Opposition walked out of the Chamber in protest.
Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: I am never very keen on walking out. It is better to stay and criticise. But everybody knows what peculiar tactics are suitable in one's own Assembly. I prefer, on the contrary, to walk in.
I should like the Minister of State to ask the Foreign Secretary, when he replies, to deal with the question of where this will stop. We have seen today most menacing accounts of the mobilisation of Russian forces on the borders both of Rumania and of Yugoslavia. Are we certain that the onslaught on Czechoslovakia is the only tragedy of this kind which has to be faced? What steps are the Government taking with world opinion to try to improve the situation and prevent further tragedies? Yugoslavia is a country for which many of us have a deep admiration and affection.
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She was one of the most gallant of our wartime allies, as my hon. Friend the Member for Bute and North Ayrshire (Sir F. Maclean) knows better than any of us. She is not a member of the Warsaw Pact. What steps are the Government taking to make it clear that an onslaught on Yugoslavia—I use my words very carefully—might produce a very dangerous situation? In such situations, ambiguity and obscurity in advance are very dangerous things. I would like to know what are the thinking and the action of the British Government in this respect.
In the case of Czechoslovakia, the question is where do we go from here? I agree with all those who reject economic sanctions because, as a matter of historical fact, they have never been effective in any direction which I can recollect and have generally ended in the humiliation of those who imposed them.
I have a very open mind on the cultural relations side. I agree with the hon. Member for Coventry, North that there may be continuing value in cultural relations, but on the whole—and here I come down against the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. George Brown)—in these matters when something desperately wrong has been done, the less one associates with and the less one shows unnecessary friendliness to the aggressor, the better. That is the fairer for the victim. It marks most clearly the abhorrence of the world against those who have done these things.
It is, of course, the Russian game to suggest that this is simply an incident and that we will go on exactly as before; our contacts, our cultural relations and everything else will continue just as before after we have made our routine protest. Surely, the lesson of the 1930s is all against that. To say, as did the right hon. Member for Belper, that we do not quite know how this will turn out and that we had better not react too sharply, clearly and critically is surely exactly what most of us of our generation attack our predecessors of the 1930s for doing.
Surely, where something has been done which is beyond argument wrong, and is also profoundly dangerous for the future safety of the world, the safest course, while following, no doubt, the niceties of diplomatic protocol and correctitude,

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is to make it clear in personal relations, in cultural and public relations and in everything except diplomatic relations that, for the time being at any rate, the Russians are people who must accept that they are subject to the criticism, the dislike and the contempt of the rest of the world. That, I think, is the right line.
A good deed has been done to us in one way in destroying the illusions which have been built up about Russia.The Times had a powerful leading article on this point under the heading "Dented assumptions" the other day. For years, a lot of us have been trying to kid ourselves that the Russians were now kind and unaggressive, that the brutalities of the Stalin era were peculiar to Stalin's character and were now in the past, and that the vast armies and vast fleets of submarines were maintained rather for decorative purposes. That is the illusion of which we all, to a greater or less extent, tried to convince ourselves, although in fairness to the Russians they have done very little to create those illusions, as those who talked to Mr. Kosygin on his visit here a little while ago will recall.
It is now clear, however, that Russia will use force wherever she thinks that she can use it without being met by comparable force. This is brutally clear and two lessons emerge from it. One is that safety is to be found only in the close-bound N.A.T.O. Alliance where countries bound loyally together make it clear that an attack on one of them is an attack on the lot and will be met by the massed resistance of the lot. The second lesson is for us to stop the procedure of unilateral disarmament which we have been following for the last three or four years.
The Prime Minister was this afternoon more than usually disingenuous when he referred to the redeployment of forces as the result of the July Defence Statement as strengthening our position in Europe. He did not mention that that Defence Statement is only one further instalment of a procedure to reduce the total strength of our forces in the world. With all his experience, he surely did not fall into the error of believing that it is only in Europe that the Russian threat exists.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys) pointed out that
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the Russian Navy is already prominent in the Persian Gulf. If Russia is to be contained, we must not create a power vacuum there by our own withdrawal which Russia will be only too happy to fill. By remaining there we are serving the interests of our friends in Europe, many of whom depend for their oil supplies on the oil of that region.
Therefore, we should not go away for another seven weeks, as the Leader of the Liberal Party saw fit to suggest, without discussing the defence implications of the situation. The suggestion by the Leader of the Liberal Party that to introduce the defence implications into this debate would be very wrong—"tragic", I think he said—was a vivid illustration of the complete uselessness and futility of the Liberal Party. If anybody can really think that aggression in Europe by hundreds of thousands of troops and thousands of tanks is a thing which can be ignored from the point of view of the defence arrangements of this country, then he must have a very odd state of mind indeed.
Mr. Peter Bessell: The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition, my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Liberal Party, and the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister have talked of unity and called for unity and unity has been shown. I hope the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Kingston-upon-Thames (Mr. Boyd-Carpenter) will observe it.
Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: If the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Liberal Party, in appealing for unity, was suggesting that unity is so precarious that it would be imperilled if the most important topic of all in this connection were actually mentioned, and thought there must be a kind of conspiracy not to discuss it because there might be a great division about it, then that is precisely the attitude of the Liberal Party, because, whenever it gets on to realities, it becomes divided.
It was, indeed, the Leader of the Opposition, in his wholly admirable speech, who emphasised the very point which I am trying to support, and that is that retention of British Forces in the Middle and Far East is a step which is made infinitely more urgent by reason of the events which we are now discussing

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I hope that when the Foreign Secretary replies to the debate he will tell us in terms that unilateral disarmament is to be stopped.
I will put to him several specific suggestions. He should announce that the disbandment of the five units specified in the July White Paper has been cancelled. One of them, if not more, is in Germany at the moment confronting the Russians. Must they not think us mad to talk about disbanding such units in such circumstances? The Government should state they will be retained and should be free to recruit to the full. Let is be made clear that the Territorial Army will be retained. Let it be made clear that aircraft carriers will be retained, and that when the "Ark Royal" has completed her£30 million refit in 1970 she will be given a longer life than the two years planned at present. Let it be made clear that the Royal Air Force will be given an efficient bomber even if it is necessary to base it upon the reactivation of the TSR2. Let it be made clear that this country has stopped disarming unilaterally. Let the right hon. Gentleman take the suggestion given to him, by The Times, the other day, that the argument that we spend a higher proportion of our national income on defence than other people is not an argument for cutting down our contribution to defence but one for urging our allies to increase theirs.
If we take advantage of the brutal lesson which the Russian Government have taught us, the tragedy of Czechoslovakia may yet ensure to the future peace of Europe.
5.23 p.m.
Mr. Bernard Conlan: I am quite convinced that the news which came from Czechoslovakia last Wednesday filled each and every one of us with a deep sense of shock and shame—shame, I suppose, because we were unable, as in 1938, to go immediately to that country's assistance. The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact allies are to be condemned for this blatant, brutal piece of aggression.
It may be that the Soviet Union, having given its excuses for that intervention, may find it has made a mistake. I believe that history will show that the
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Soviet Union has made a mistake. In this instance it misread the political signs. It misread, first of all, the reaction not only of the world, but of the Czechoslovak people themselves. I was in Czechoslovakia immediately before the aggression last week, and many of us who have been there must have been impressed with the patience and the dignity and confidence of the Czechoslovak people. Today, under the heel of the jackboot of the Soviet Union, they are still showing those very great attributes. We in this House today speak for the British people, and must wholly condemn the action of the Soviet Union.
There have been comparisons made—not in this House today, but they have been made—between the Soviet Union's action in August, 1968, and its action.in Hungary in 1956. There are many comparisons, of course, but there are many essential differences as well. Whereas in Hungary in 1956 there was a call for a change from the Communist Party system to another system which would divorce itself from the Warsaw Alliance, that did not apply today. Mr. Dubcek and his team of Ministers are confirmed, convinced Communists, and there was no desire to leave the Warsaw Alliance or, indeed, to pursue an independent foreign policy. Assurances had been given all along the line in this respect.
There must have been some other reason, some reason other than the one used in Hungary, and I believe that my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, North (Mr. Edelman) was right when he said that the reason was fear. There is fear that the liberal policies which had been pursued since January this year will spill over into East Germany, into Poland, into Hungary, and into Bulgaria, and it was the fear of these events which persuaded the Soviet Union to invade Czechoslovakia last Wednesday.
What has been the position since January? Let us analyse the situation for just one moment. Until January of this year the Czechoslovak people were ruled with a rod of iron. They were oppressed. The usual paraphernalia of the police State was in existence—die knock at the door in the early hours of the morning, and they were taken away

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from their homes to undisclosed destinations to suffer long periods of imprisonment without fair trial. This was the situation until January this year.
Then, since January, the situation dramatically changed. For the first time in 20 years the Czechs have been able to feel free to discuss the political situation inside Czechoslovakia, inside Eastern Europe, and in the world at large. There was no looking over their shoulders any more. They were not afraid of the secret police. They were able to discuss with everybody around the current situation in their country. This was the new-found freedom, a freedom which the young people, particularly students, had never enjoyed before.
Then there was another change which took place. Czechoslovakia, under the heel of the Soviet Union, has been held back economically. Its industrial and economic efforts have been designed to fit in with the economic planning of the Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia has been compelled to manufacture goods which are world-renowned simply and solely for the benefit of the economic planning of the Comecon, and this restricted the economic activity of the country. The Czechoslovaks have been unable to trade on a worldwide basis. They have been unable to obtain convertible currency to buy the essentials for their everyday lives. There was this further restriction on the Czechoslovak people, and this was another reason why they changed in January this year. Therefore, the Soviet Union was afraid of this new-found freedom overflowing into the other satellite countries, and that is why the Soviet Union took the action it did.
We talk about our possible action. This is a very difficult and a very painful thought that we must have, but, of course, the question we must ask ourselves is, what can we do? A number of possibilities have been put forward. The right hon. Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys) suggested among other things that we might withdraw from the I.L.O., that we might refuse to participate in the Olympic Games if the Soviet Union participated, that we might employ cultural sanctions, and so on. However, we have to ask ourselves what this will achieve ana how it will help the Czech people.
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My view is that it will not assist them one iota.
The right hon. Gentleman referred to a détente in Europe as being a dangerous illusion. My view is that a détente in Europe offers the only possible hope for peace in the world. From now on, having demonstrated our abhorrence and condemnation of the Soviet Union's action, the Government's policy should be to redouble their efforts to achieve a détente in Europe because, as I say, it is the only possibility of lasting peace in this part of the world.
In August, 1938, the Czechs were raped in the way that they are being raped today. The events of that year led to a position which culminated in freedom in the Western world. I believe that the stand of the Czech people in the face of a powerful and overwhelming aggressor will shine as a beacon light for the freedom forces which exist in Eastern Europe and that the events in Czechoslovakia will lead ultimately to greater freedom, and to peace in Europe and throughout the world.
5.31 p.m.
Sir Fitzroy Maclean: I listened with interest to the speech of the hon. Member for Gates-head, East (Mr. Conlan), and I would point out to him that, much as we all agree about a détente in Europe, it takes two to arrive at one, and the Russians have not been making much of a contribution lately.
Apart from that, I have found little to disagree with in his interesting speech. In fact, having listened to the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, North-East (Mrs. Renée Short), I think that we may feel reasonably certain that this House will be more or less unanimous in its condemnation of the Soviet attack on Czechoslovakia. The hon. Lady did her best, but even she could not make out much of a case for what the Russians have done.
To my mind perhaps the most significant feature of the invasion of Czechoslovakia has been the immense harm that the Russians have done to themselves. And, by that, I do not mean to their image, for what it is worth. I mean the incalculable damage that they have done and are doing to practically all of their own most vital interests.

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In the first place, they have demonstrated, for all the world to see, that, in their view, 50 years after the Bolshevik Revolution, Communism is so fragile and unsure of itself that it cannot safely accept the smallest admixture of freedom and equality, and that, 20 years after their enslavement, they cannot afford to allow their unfortunate satellites even the slightest degree of independence.
Because, let us make no mistake about it, what the Czechs have been trying to do is not to walk out of the Warsaw Pact or out of Comecon or, indeed, to abandon Communism. On the contrary, they have repeatedly declared their unswerving loyalty to all three. All that they were trying to do was to temper their Communism with a slight degree of freedom in the hope that it might make it work better. And it was for this and for no other possible reason that, just like Hitler 30 years earlier, the Russians sent their tanks rolling into Prague, taking their Polish, Bulgarian, Hungarian and East German puppets with them.
How ironical it is that, 12 years after the 1956 rising, the Poles and Hungarians should be used to discipline the Czechs. How ironical it is, too, that a member of the alliance which fought against Hitler should send German troops to do once more what Hitler did 30 years ago. Indeed one cannot help wondering if some of the senior officers and N.C.O.s in the German contingent have not made the trip twice. No wonder the Czechs drew swastikas on the tanks of the invaders.
For the world at large, such an act of aggression against what was nominally and what has shown itself in fact to be an independent country is at once a threat and a warning, which I hope will not go entirely unheeded. It seems to me extraordinary that the matter was not brought before U.N.O. a month ago, as some of my hon. Friends and I urged at the time. Certainly it is high time that N.A.T.O. took account of what is going on on its borders, as my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition suggested. It is high time, too, that we in the West realised the danger of doing what we did before the war and gratuitously encouraging aggression by our manifest and self-inflicted weakness and
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inertia. And let us remember that it is by no means certain that the Czechs will be the only victims of Soviet aggression. If the Russians get away with this, they may well seek out other victims.
But I want to address myself first and foremost today to the trouble into which the Russians have got themselves by their action. For one thing, they have enormously increased the disunity of the Communist world. Rumania has now bravely joined Yugoslavia in open defiance of Moscow, while the Albanians, for what they are worth, have joined the Chinese in attacking the Russians and Czechs alike, as revisionists on the one hand and as ultra-revisionists on the other. Even such abject toadies of the Russians as the Communist Parties of France, Italy and Great Britain have thought it advisable to express mild disapproval of Moscow's action, while as for our old friends the fellow travellers, some have travelled off in one direction and some in another. As someone has said, the 1940s saw the communisation of the Balkans. The 1960s are seeing the Balkanisation of Communism.
The disruptive process which we are witnessing began 20 years ago with Tito's successful defiance of Stalin in 1948. We all know the story of the farmer's boy who was asked in a mental arithmetic test, "If you have six sheep in a field and one gets out, how many are left?" I need not remind hon. Members that his answer was, "None", and he was quite right. The process that started in 1948, is still going on. And to my mind, it is bound to go on, in spite of what was done in Hungary in 1956 or in Czechoslovakia last week. Under Stalin, Soviet power rested on the absolute authority and infallibility of the Kremlin. But once that authority has been successfully challenged and the first crack appeared in the Soviet monolith, world Communism could never again be the same well-trained menagerie. That was Tito's achievement. I spent last weekend in Belgrade, at the moment very much an epicentre of the earthquake which is convulsing Eastern Europe, and I found people there very conscious of Yugoslavia's rôle and very proud that their Government at least, from their relatively exposed position, should have supported the Czechs from the outset. This at a time when Western statesmen,

1335
for one reason or another, found it preferable to hang back and not say much. At a time when perhaps a more resolute or, at any rate, a more interested attitude might have given the Russian pause.
I should like to touch briefly on another aspect of the situation which seems relevant. If the Soviet empire is no longer as monolithic as it was in Stalin's day, neither are the thought processes of the Russian people. And that, too, could be a significant factor in the present situation. I feel certain that there are a good many Russians who are just as appalled as we by what their Government are doing. The gradual evolution, the gradual letting-up of pressure which has been taking place in the Soviet Union for the past 15 years, has been partly deliberate, but partly, as human nature began to take charge—and Russian human nature is about twice as human as most—involuntary. Once Khrushchev and his successors had started letting up the pressure, they found themselves on a slippery slope. The more freedom you give people, the more they will take and use it to demand still more. Certainly to anyone who, like myself, knew Russia in Stalin's day and goes back there now, the difference is very noticeable indeed. Of course, the Government can tighten things up for a bit—they are doing it now and they have been doing it for the last year or so—but however much they might want to, they cannot put the clock right back to where it was in Stalin's day when the answer to everything was a bullet in the back of the neck. Things are no longer quite as simple as that. In Russia today there are the beginnings of a public opinion that has, up to a point, to be taken account of. That in itself is a healthy sign.
And that is why I should be sorry to see an end put to all contacts between East and West, contacts that have been built up with difficulty over the last 10 years. I believe that these contacts help to accelerate this gradual process of evolution, to let in a little light and fresh air which would otherwise not penetrate the Iron Curtain. But, quite frankly, so long as the Russians are occupying Czechoslovakia by force and shooting down Czech civilians in the streets, I cannot imagine that there are many people in this country who will feel inclined to
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exchange deputations and delegations with them, or even, for that matter, to attend the otherwise most enjoyable performances of the Moscow State Ballet.
That brings me to how this crisis is likely to end. One thing seems abundantly clear. The Russians, from their own point of view, have made a mess of things. In Czechoslovakia they have so far failed to find any quislings to collaborate with them. They have also failed to find a pretext for all-out military action of the kind they used in Hungary. And finally they have failed to silence or subdue their victim. As a Yugoslav friend said to me the other day, this must be the first time on record that a successful full-scale Communist Party Congress has ever been held illegally in a Communist country.
And so, whatever the outcome of their action may be, it is hard to see how it can fail to be unfavourable to the Russians. If they persist in trying to hold down Czechoslovakia by force, I think that they will find in the long run that, quite apart from the universal odium they will incur, they may have bitten off more than even they can chew. Their rôle as occupiers will, I believe, be full, as it so often is, of unpleasant surprises, some of them perhaps from uncomfortably near home.
On the other hand, there is, I suppose, still a faint possibility that they may be going to think better of it, withdraw their troops, and settle for some kind of compromise solution. This would not be an easy thing for them to do, but it would certainly be infinitely preferable to the other course, both from their own point of view and that of everyone else concerned. From the way in which the whole thing has so far been handled, it has sometimes seemed as though the Russians must have been in two minds about the whole business—as though more than one view was held by more than one faction in the Kremlin. If this is so and there are people who hold a more moderate view, we can only hope that in the end it will prevail. If not—and specially if this aggression is followed by others—the outlook is indeed bleak.
5.45 p.m.
Mr. Robert Maxwell: As is well known, I was born in Czechoslovakia—in fact, in that province of Czechoslovakia that the Czechs were

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made to cede to Russia after the last war, Ruthinia.
I remember well the betrayal that I, though very young, and the whole nation of Czechoslovakia felt at being let down by Great Britain and France at Munich. There followed the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in due course and I found myself being harassed by Hungarian troops. To cut a long story short, the House might like to know that it was not just German officers who probably participated in the same invasion of Czechoslovakia; there were also Hungarians and Poles who participated in it and I will not be surprised if some of their senior officers and N.C.O.s were the very same people who did it then who repeated it this time.
With many thousands of other young people, when war broke out we tried to make our way illegally out of occupied Czechoslovakia to France to join the Czech expeditionary force. I, with many hundreds, was arrested by the Hungarians and imprisoned. Some of us managed to escape. The extraordinary thing is that it was the Yugoslavs then, as it is today, who helped us across Europe with false papers and money. Eventually I, with many thousands of others, ended up in the Czech expeditionary corps in France.
After the defeat of France, and in spite of our disappointment of Britain's attitude, I, with many thousands, came to Britain as a Czech soldier. I did this as did many other soldiers and airmen, because, when the chips were finally down, Britain was willing to stand against Hitler alone.
Like several other hon. Members, I have just come back from Yugoslavia, where I had discussions with ordinary Czechs, some of them in official positions, as well as Yugoslavs. In my opinion, the right hon. Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys) and any right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite who are using this debate as an opportunity to fan the embers of the cold war and as an opportunity to panic this Government into extra defence expenditure are doing a disservice not only to this country, but to the people of Czechoslovakia.
I hope that the Government and our people will not permit themselves to be panicked into that kind of situation. Is it not a fact that whereas we, together with
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most of the world, condemn the Russians for their dastardly act in invading by trickery this defenceless country in the way they did, that invasion has not altered the status quo? The position as between East and West remains the same. It would be utterly wrong to give up the detente for which we have all fought, worked, and made sacrifices, merely because of this ghastly Russian invasion. It would be no service to the Czech people—not to mention us—to do this.
From the discussions that I have had with the people of Yugoslavia I have concluded that the real reason why the Russians have been driven into this mad act is not because of their fear of Germany. In truth, the Russians, with their nuclear arsenal, do not fear a resurgent Germany. That does not mean to say that they are not willing to use the German excuse to bamboozle the world and to say that they should be given a free hand in Eastern Europe and be allowed to do all kinds of things because they are afraid of the Germans. Who is the big bad wolf in Europe today? Who has the bigger and nastier teeth?
The reason for the Russian invasion is that the Czechs, under Mr. Dubcek and President Svoboda, were on the verge of holding their official party conference, and the resolutions from their appropriate constituencies, works and regions made it absolutely clear that there would be a clean sweep—that all the old Stalinists would disappear and that a completely revived, reconstituted and refurbished Communist Party would come into existence, opposed to what the Russians believe is centralised democracy. They believe that it should be a case of, "You do what you are told by the top, or else."
The Czech Communists were willing and able to begin an experiment along the lines of that of Yugoslavia, and the Russians decided, upon the call of those conservative Czech elements who were going to be kicked out, that unless they nipped this development in the bud before the new committee was called into being they would never again be able to stop some of this freedom from seeping into their own party, their own army, and their own satellite forces. They were afraid to let the shaft of light into their own party. After 50 years of Communism they felt unwilling or unable to talk any other language but that of the tommy-gun and

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the tank. They may well have gained for themselves a few years' respite, in which their kind of dictatorship can prevail and their way of democracy can continue. That is for them to judge.
We must condemn the Opposition for misusing the opportunity afforded by this debate to condemn the Russians for their ghastly action in Czechoslovakia, and using it as a drive to get further expenditure on rearmament and thus to bring the cold war back into Europe and across the world. It is not necessary. The Opposition appear to have learnt nothing. They have forgotten nothing, just as the Russians have not. They still talk about the oil in the Middle East and forget what happened at Suez. It is nonsensical to continue talking in this way.
Mr. Victor Goodhew: Does not the hon. Gentleman appreciate that the let-down that he felt in the 1930s, when Britain did not intervene to prevent the rape of Czechoslovakia, was necessary because we were so badly armed at the time? Was it not the Labour Party that had been pursuing the policy of disarmament, and is not his party making the same mistake today?
Mr. Maxwell: I hope that the hon. Member will forgive me if I do not reply to that point.
For 30 years our people have had a special feeling for the people of Czechoslovakia because of the way in which we left them in the lurch at Munich. This makes it very important that everybody in this country should do what he can to support the Czechs today against this brutal Soviet oppression. The Government can and have offered their sympathy. Their early statement that they will not recognise any puppet Czech regime has been of inestimable help to the present negotiators in Moscow, and has stiffened Governments across the world and impelled them to notify the Russians, publicly or privately, that they will take the same line.
I agree with the Government that it would be wrong to enter into formal trade wars or cultural battles. That would do nobody any good. But I hope, as the Leader of the Opposition suggested, that the members of the Red Army Ensemble will have their visas either not granted or withdrawn. It really would
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be a nonsense to have that lot coming here today.
For the rest, what can we do to help the Czech people? In my opinion, it must be as little as possible in the form of Government action. Any attempt to turn the heroism and suffering of the Czech people into a weapon of the cold war for stiffening the posture of N.A.T.O. against the Warsaw Pact would harm the Czech people. One hon. Member asked why Her Majesty's Government did not take the Czech issue to the United Nations. I do not know what my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary will say, but I can tell hon. Members that the Czech Government would have objected most strongly to any member of N.A.T.O. taking this issue to the United Nations, because the Czechs felt certain that they could solve this issue with the Russians. They believed that they had a firm agreement with the Russians.
What is the use of comparing Hungary with Czechoslovakia? Hungary was allied with Germany against Russia, so the Russians took the kind of measures which the Czechs never believed the Russians would adopt against them. What the Czech people really need is action by individuals. In view of the illegal and treacherous invasion by the U.S.S.R. and her four satellites, and in support of the Czech people, any persons who have booked holidays, tours or visits of any kind to the Soviet Union or to the countries which are assisting them should consider cancelling or postponing such visits until we hear what is the outcome of the negotiations in Moscow. Ordinary citizens should avail themselves of every opportunity to protest against this invasion in the strongest possible way.
There is something which everybody can do, to take up a suggestion made by the Sunday Mirror. If people can think of nothing better to do, they should send a postcard to Mr. Brezhnev telling him how they abhor this ghastly act of oppression against this friendly country. Such steps would prove extremely helpful and encouraging to the long-suffering Czechoslovak people.
Ostracism by individuals and organisations in cultural, scientific and sporting exchanges could be very effective. The splendid example of the T.U.C. in cancelling agreed fraternal visits to certain

1341
countries is to be applauded. That action contrasts with that of the London Chamber of Commerce, the attitude of which is "Business as usual". Something which has disheartened the Czechoslovak people more than much else has been the attitude of some British businessmen, as epitomised by the deplorable statement made last Sunday by Mr. James Scott, Chairman of the Russian Section of the London Chamber of Commerce, who is quoted as saying:
"I arranged some time ago to visit Moscow next month in search of orders and I have no intention of cancelling the trip. Business is business."
British businessmen seeking Russian trade, ballet or music lovers seeking Russian culture or even simply tourists seeking Polish or Russian holidays cannot carry on as if this rape of Czechoslovakia had not happened. As individuals, not as action by the Government, we must take a leaf out of the Czech people's book. We should not forget what checkmated the Russians. It was the willingness of the ordinary Czechs and Slovaks to stand up and say, "Certainly, you have occupied us, but you do not own us. You cannot command us and you will not control us. We will take instructions only from our legal Government". This is what we want from the people of Britain and the peoples of the free world. It would be utterly wrong to try to do this through Government channels.
I conclude with a quotation from a Czech student in Prague as published in The Times today. This student ends his message by saying:
"The only way to help us is not to forget Czechoslovakia. Please do help our passive resistance by escalating the pressure of public opinion all over the world. Be still with us when Czechoslovakia will cease to be news."
6.3 p.m.
Mr. Gilbert Longden: The House listened with interest and, in some respects, with sympathy to the personal experiences of the hon. Member for Buckingham (Mr. Maxwell). I agree with him about the cause of. the Russian attitude to and action in Czechoslovakia; especially, indeed, pure eyewash for Russia to pretend that it is still afraid of Germany. But I am not sure that I understood some of his other remarks. For example, does he
1342
wish Her Majesty's Government to pursue the détente, while individual Britons should not?
Mr. Maxwell: Yes.
Mr. Longden: Oh. As for N.A.T.O., it is not simply to help the Czechs that my hon. Friends wish to strengthen our defences and see to our moat. It is to help ourselves. I am afraid that it is the hon. Gentleman who has learned nothing and has forgotten nothing—for his is exactly the attitude taken by his party in the 'thirties, when the Germans were the aggressors.
I express my appreciation to the Government for having recalled both Houses of Parliament. This was absolutely necessary for two reasons. The first—and here I disagree with the remarks of the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. George Brown), who talked such sound common sense about Europe—is to enable us to express horror and detestation at the abominable crime against the Czechoslovak people committed by the Soviet Union what the Prime Minister called "their unhappy client States". The phrase "this abominable crime" was used by Peking, and while it is correct, it might have been more telling had it been used by a country which had not committed exactly the same crime against Tibet.
But, above all, it is right that this great forum of the nation should express its unbounded admiration for the incredible courage—though "incredible" is not the word which those who know the Czech and Slovak peoples would use—the immense courage, fortitude, determination and patience of the Czech and Slovak peoples. I wonder how many other nations would respond to such events in such a way? Not a quisling voice has yet been heard and these gallant people have behaved in the true Masaryk tradition.
Apart from the tragic consequences for the Czech and Slovak people, the most serious results of this crime are the possibilities of further aggression, and even war; its devastatingly destructive effect on East-West relations and on any chance there might have been to reunite Europe; something which has been the declared objective of both Front Benches for many years.

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It is especially grievous to me and to some hon. Members in the House who have been trying, in a small way, to bridge the gap between this country and some of those behind the iron curtain. I have the honour of being the chairman of the governing body of the Great Britain-East Europe Centre, and the hon. Members for Edmonton (Mr. Albu) and Faversham (Mr. Boston) are its vice-chairmen.
The prospectus says that the Centre is an
"…independent organisation, enjoying the full support of Her Majesty's Government and of the two Opposition Parties…which…aims to become a forum where Europeans from the East and West of the Continent will meet in a new. more personal, less official way."
It was only last November, when the Centre was opened by the then Foreign Secretary, the right hon. Member for Belper, that I felt able to say at the opening ceremony, recalling the words of Sir Winston Churchill, 22 years ago:
"From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent."
I felt able then to say:
"Happily, in more recent times that curtain has begun to lift."
I expressed my belief that the Governments and peoples of Europe were becoming ever more conscious of the history and culture which they shared in common and were slowly becoming aware that despite ideological differences it was suicidal to sub-divide this small subcontinent by such a barrier. I went on to describe the object of the Centre as being
"to intensify the efforts, of this country at least to promote a closer understanding between the people of the United Kingdom and the peoples of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Roumania by fostering closer cultural, economic, social and other contacts between ourselves and those peoples."
I said:
"We do not beg anyone's friendship. We simply believe that, in this short life, and in this small world, it will be to the lasting advantage of all our differing peoples to be friends; and that, to be friends, it is necessary to get to know each other much better."
When opening the Centre, the then Foreign Secretary said:
"I see the creation of this Centre as one more practical step to bring our peoples into closer touch with each other…We are all working for a time when the present
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divisions in Europe will have vanished; when, in all our variety, we are united in building a flourishing continent which, prosperous and strong will pull its true weight in the world. That is what this Centre is about."
Never has our Centre attempted in any way, overtly or covertly, to sow dissension between these Governments and then-peoples. We have recognised these Governments for the same reason that Her Majesty's Government recognise them, because they are, in fact, the Governments of those countries. We have been called fools and asked if we really believe that the Communist leopard could ever change its spots, but we thought that was a defeatist and static attitude and that the effort seemed worth making. Well, was it? I still think so.
The vice-chairmen and I, when we had got together as quickly as we could after the invasion, sent the following telegram to the Czech Embassy in London:
"Request your Excellency transmit to your Government an expression of the deepest sympathy of all true friends of the Czech and Slovak peoples in this tragic hour and of the horror and detestation with which we have learned of this invasion of your country in cynical and brutal breach of every pledge made both directly and through the United Nations."
We applaud the courageous stand taken by Rumania, but for the time being how can we continue to hold out the hand of friendship to the official representatives of the Governments of Bulgaria and Hungary? The governing body of the Centre will shortly be meeting to decide upon our future action.
What should we do as a country? There have been many suggestions. I shall not take up the time of the House for very long in making some more. We have, of course, and rightly, referred the whole case to the United Nations; some people think far too late, but at any rate it has been done. The Security Council, by 10 votes in favour, two against and with three abstentions, has passed the resolution condemning the armed intervention and confirming the right of the Czechoslovak Republic to political independence and territorial integrity. Of course, the Soviet veto was certain. Perhaps the abstention of two Commonwealth countries India and Pakistan was not. But we voted for the resolution and its operative paragraph 3
"Calls upon Member States of the United Nations to exercise their diplomatic influence

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upon the U.S.S.R. and other countries concerned with a view to bringing about the prompt implementation of the Resolution."
What influence can we exercise? I do not think that we can possibly be seen to carry on just as if nothing had happened. There seems to be a fatal facility—not, of course, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, but of other apologists—for finding excuses. For example, the Russian action in Czechoslovakia has been compared by more than one in this House and many outside to the American action in Vietnam. No just comparison is possible. Into South Vietnam the Americans went at the express invitation of the legitimate Government there.
Mr. Raphael Tuck: Is it not a fact that the infamous Diem was placed there by the Americans so that he should give the invitation to the Americans to go in?
Mr. Longden: I do not think that that is a fact. In any case, the two actions cannot be compared. If the Americans had behaved like the Russians, and gone into North Vietnam, there would probably be no Vietnam problem now.
Mr. Michael English: Is there not a certain similarity in that both Governments broke their agreements with the countries concerned?
Mr. Longden: I do not think that that is absolutely fair to our American allies.
We have also heard others saying that it is not as if the Czechs had done as Hungary had done—threatened to leave the Warsaw Pact. As if, if they had done that, it would have excused the Russian action. Of course it would not. Nothing can excuse the Russian action.
What influence can we exercise? I certainly would not recommend our withdrawing our mission because that does not imply approval of a Government, but merely the fact of its existence. I am, however, in two minds about cultural exchanges. When I say "in two minds" I mean that. I am not sure on which side I would come down, on that of my right hon. Friend the Member for Kingston-upon-Thames (Mr. Boyd-Carpenter) or on that of the two Front
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Benches. I would certainly cancel the visit of the Red Army Choir. That goes without saying, but I am in two minds about the Olympic Games and the Exhibition at Earl's Court.
Unfortunately, the hon. Lady the Member for Wolverhampton, North-East (Mrs. Renée Short) has left the Chamber. She is a constituent of mine and I know that she has long cherished illusions about the Soviet Union. Those illusions must have been shattered. She made a brave effort to try to pick up some of the pieces, but how can any Western statesman think it worth while to sit down at a table with those people in the Kremlin today? How could they do that with the best will in the world, which I am sure we all have?
Mr. R. T. Paget: That is what the Czechs are doing.
Mr. Longden: Under duress the Czechs are doing it, but can anyone believe that these men who have the honour of a Hitler and the ethics of an Attila would carry out any engagement they might make a second longer than it suited them to do so? This is what makes the situation so very desperate. Let the hon. Lady and others who think like her recall the poignant words of Mr. Dubcek:
"How could they do this to me? I have devoted my whole life to co-operation with the Soviet Union"
What is quite certain is that Communism and individual liberty are incompatible. If we want to protect our way of life and to preserve peace with freedom we must be prepared, if necessary, to fight for it. That means in cooperation with our allies because we could do nothing alone, and that means-strengthening N.A.T.O. I was appalled to hear the defeatist speech of the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) who, apparently, has assumed the rôle of champion of the Left. It may mean conscription, but does the right hon. Gentleman prefer conquest to conscription. Surely this event must have aroused the most apathetic into realisation that N.A.T.O. is still necessary.
I very much hope that Dr. Kiesinger's suggestion will be taken up, because there is a possibility at this moment that we may be able to influence the French. I cannot accept that we ought not to meet

1347
with our N.A.T.O. allies because wavering Russians and others behind the Iron Curtain might object. How much more encouragement would the "hawks" in the Kremlin derive from the fact that we sit here and do nothing.
My last words are to remind every hon. Member of the words spoken by a young Russian in the street to a B.B.C. reporter this week:
"Why didn't we go all the way and occupy West Germany while we were at it?"
6.20 p.m.
Mr. Austen Albu: As the House knows, I am associated with the hon. Gentleman the Member for Hertfordshire, South-West (Mr. Longden) in the organisation which has been set up to try to improve relations on a personal level with a number of the countries which are still behind the Iron Curtain. In the latter part of his speech, with not all of which I agreed, the hon. Gentleman put to the House the extraordinary problems which we have always had, and which have not really changed, when we in Western and democratic countries deal with the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. In my view, the situation has not changed. It has always been so. There has been an appalling illusion about the possibility of a free exchange of views or even of trust with and in the rulers of the Soviet Union as it is at present governed.
We have spent four or five days with a sense of utter outrage and frustration—this has been true especially for those of us who remember all the events leading up to 1938—a sense of outrage and frustration at the appalling action taken by the Soviet Union now, including, perhaps, the most cynical action of all—as I could not help intervening to point out in the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, North-East (Mrs. Renée Short)—the bringing of the East German army into Czechoslovakia again, an army which, as everyone knows, has many officers who are themselves ex-Nazi officers.
Mr. Molloy: Does not my hon. Friend acknowledge that there are quite a few well-known ex-Nazis in the N.A.T.O. set-up as well? That argument gets us nowhere.
Mr. Albu: No, I do not accept that. In any case, the West German army has invaded no one's country and will not do so. The East German army, on the other hand, has raped Czechoslovakia for the second time in 30 years, and that is something which stinks in the nostrils of every decent person
I had some connection with Czechoslovakia fairly recently when I was in office, as I lead a team of economists to discuss economic planning with the Czechs and with other countries in Eastern Europe. I saw what was happening and could see how it would develop. We met Dr. Sik, the economic theoretician behind the changes which have been taking place. There is no doubt that the economic changes and the movement towards a market economy have necessitated a movement towards greater political freedom, and this has met the intellectual developments and the moves among the intelligentsia to which my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, North (Mr. Edelman) referred so movingly and so well.
We met the present Prime Minister, Dr. Cernik, who was at that time chairman of the Planning Commission, and I later had the honour to receive him when he came to this country as the guest of the Government and, in particular, of my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. George Brown). We got on together very well while he was in this country, and I feel very deeply about his present position. The Government must continue to press for the safety and the lives of these courageous men.
Perhaps one of the most extraordinary developments in modern times—one might say that it may well be significant technologically—is the ingenuity and the courage of the radio and television staffs of Czechoslovakia. I do not believe that what they have done was not planned in advance. It must have been brilliantly organised. It shows the possibility that exists nowadays for the dissemination of information and intellectual support, news, and so forth, which it may not be possible any longer to suppress. Whether that is true or not, the radio and television staffs have to some extent been the heroes of the Czech resistance.

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After these events, the world political situation must be worse. The movement towards détente is temporarily halted. The "hawks" in all countries will rear their heads—or whatever the appropriate expression be. The electoral fight in the United States will undoubtedly be thrown to Mr. Nixon, whether that be good or bad. The situation in Czechoslovakia and the situation of the other Iron Curtain countries is bound to be rather horrible in the immediate future.
On the other hand, I agree with those who have said that there is no real change in the military situation. Whether or not we should reassess our defence policy is another matter, but what has happened has not changed the military balance of power. Now, we have to wait. We have to wait because we do not quite know how political developments in the Eastern European countries will go.
I agree, also, with those who have said—perhaps the two best speeches on this point came from my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, North and from the hon. Member for Bute and North Ayrshire (Sir F. Maclean)—that this is not really Russian imperialism. It is, on the other hand, an expression of desperate fear within the very divided body of Russian leaders at the opening of a small window of freedom and independence.
It is an illusion, an illusion shared by many people, and, perhaps, by some of my hon. Friends in particular, to believe that there can be a limit to the development of freedom or the development of changes in the economy. Once the process starts, it gathers pace, and it is this fear, I am sure, which has caused the Russians to act. The movement cannot be suppressed and it will not be suppressed. Whatever Government finally come to power in Czechoslovakia as a result of the discussions now going on in Moscow, the movement towards freedom in all these countries, including the Soviet Union, will continue.
However, I agree with the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition and others who have said that our own essential interest lies in the maintenance of the N.A.T.O. Alliance. I am not in a position to judge whether it needs strengthening militarily, but I am con-
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vinced that it must be maintained. It is a tragedy that there is nothing we can do to help Czechoslovakia. Indeed, there is nothing we can do in a military sense to help any of the countries on the other side of the Iron Curtain. But since 1948 there has been no advance of the Iron Curtain and there must be no advance. The reason why this is so is that N.A.T.O. has been in existence, and, if anything, demonstrates that it must remain in existence the events of the past few days have done just that, although, as I say, they have not actually changed the military situation.
I think that I have made up my mind about cultural exchanges. It would be impossible to receive a Red Army ensemble in this country now. The immediate feelings of disgust have made it necessary to cancel some engagements and for people to refuse to attend some cultural activities. However, I agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper in saying that we must not pretend to powers which we do not have. My right hon. Friend was referring, I think, more specifically to the military situation, but it is generally true that we shall not change the situation east of the Iron Curtain, and it is no good pretending that we can by military action. The East European countries will change their situation themselves when the time comes.
All we can do to help that progress is to maintain as much as we can our personal relations, particularly personal cultural relations, the sort of thing which the Great Britain-East European Centre was set up to encourage. It will be more difficult now because, in the next year or two, we may well find that visas are given only to rather more conformist and orthodox persons from the other countries, and we shall find more difficulty in exchanging ideas, particularly political ideas, than we have found in the recent past. But that situation will improve again after a time.
One of the great problems in connection with cultural relations with countries east of the Iron Curtain is that when they are on a large scale or of an official nature—the Red Amy ensemble is a good example—they inevitably tend to be extremely "hard-line" affairs probably bringing their political commissars with them, and so on, and they are used entirely for political propaganda on behalf

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of their home regimes. This does not apply, on the other hand, to the smaller-scale and more personal exchanges. This has been increasingly so in exchanges with other countries behind the Iron Curtain, if not the Soviet Union itself.
Therefore, I come to the conclusion that we should maintain these cultural relations. I believe that we must try to do so because they are the only way in which the very large and increasing number of people in these countries who are undoubtedly trying to embrace the ideas of political and cultural freedom can get anything out of the West. I would not be surprised if, in a year or two, the effect on the Communist world and the Soviet Union of this action in Czechoslovakia is quite startling, not because of what is done from outside but because of what is likely to happen inside these countries themselves.
6.30 p.m.
Mr. Gwynfor Evans: The cruel limitation of the national and personal freedoms of the Czechs and Slovaks and the brutal and contemptible way in which this was done has shocked the world and isolated Soviet Russia and her satellites. I want us to face the fact that there are two forces meeting now in Czechoslovakia. One is Czech and Slovak nationalism and the other is the power of Russian imperialism. Czech and Slovak nationalism has a very attractive face. It stands for personal and national freedom and is life enhancing. But Russian imperialism is ugly and repulsive and stands against freedom. It is a way of death.
But there are other imperialist Powers in the world and they have all without exception condemned this action of Russian imperialism. Some of these other imperialist Powers are themselves not without some blemishes on their record, and one remembers today the action of what I would call American imperialism in Vietnam. I should think that this has gravely compromised the moral position of the United States vis-à-vis Czechoslovakia.
So is the position of our own Government compromised because of the support they have given to American imperialism in Vietnam. Of course, the 1352
Americans were "invited" there to stand for democracy and we are told by Mr. Brezhnev that he, too, was "invited" into Czechoslovakia to stand there for Communism against democracy. It seems to me, therefore, that this is not an ideology that is involved primarily, but rather the fact of imperialism, which is the extension of the power of one State over the territory, people and resources of another. This action in Czechoslovakia is imperialist.
I do not see that this means that Russia now has necessarily any passionate allegiance to Marxist Communism. That is not why it has been driven to trample on Czech freedom. We have heard of Russia's fear, but it is fear for its own power, for its imperialist power, which drives it to do this sort of thing. It is not allegiance to any ideology which drives Russia to do this.
Perhaps one who comes from a small nation can see this a little more clearly. It puts me in mind of the boy in Andersen's fairy tale. He can see that the Russian invader in Czechoslovakia is not attired in any glorious Communism at all, any more than the American invader in Vietnam is attired in the glory of democracy. They are all just naked imperialists—and unlovely sights they make.
But in our anger at this situation we should remember that there are many nations in Russia which have suffered more than an invasion of their territory and have been incorporated in Russia itself. We should never forget that. For example, there are Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and other nations. They all hope one day to recover their freedom. The three Baltic countries placed some gold in safe keeping in London in 1940, looking forward to the day when they would again be free. But our Government made a deal last year about that gold and it is no longer available to those countries.
My own sympathy, naturally, is, quite unforced, with the Czechs and the Slovaks. I have no difficulty in imagining their anguish in their present position. It is true that Welsh freedom has not been limited. That is because we have no national freedom to limit.
Mr. Gordon Campbell: But does not the hon. Gentleman realise that it is because the Slovaks and

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the Czechs are sticking together and resisting any attempt to divide them with nationalist appeals to Slovakia that Czechoslovakia has stood firm as a nation?
Mr. Evans: I am glad of that intervention. I hope that my own people will listen. I am asking the Welsh people to stand together in the same way, but it is a fact that we have no national freedom. Freedom is a positive thing. It is freedom to act in a certain way, and we have no freedom to act in Wales. We are governed entirely from outside.
Mr. J. Idwal Jones: Will the hon. Gentleman explain in what way we are denied freedom in Wales?
Mr. Evans: It is a long story. We have been denied it for centuries. We have political movements in Wales whose policy it is to continue denial of national freedom. I say, shame to them. The fact is that we cannot act for ourselves. [An HON. MEMBER: "Why not?"] I will illustrate. I had not intended to do so, but since I am being interrupted on this point I will recall to hon. Members what happened to me when I first entered this House. I cannot imagine a worse position for the Czechs and Slovaks to find themselves in of being unable to speak their own national languages in their own parliament. Yet here, in the only Parliament Wales has, I am not allowed to speak a word of Welsh.
This position is maintained because we are told that what the world needs is unity and not division. Of course I agree that the world needs unity,, but tell that to the Czechs. Do we not want a border between Czechoslovakia and Soviet Russia and the other satellite countries? Is a border always a bad thing? I would say that it is not.
It is strange that there should be so many who will applaud Czech or Slovak nationalism while denying the same kind of thing in the countries of Britain. It smacks of a little hypocrisy. The Czechs have stood together with the Slovaks, as we have been reminded. But they did so because of their consciousness of their own national heritages. Yesterday, this sentence appeared in the Sunday Times:
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"Awkwardly for the Great Powers, this brave republic remains the home of a superbly durable nationalism."
That is a fact. What do they want? Last week,The Times said, approvingly:
"Czechs were not asking for liberty doled out in driblets from above. They were wanting a new society, with initiative coming from below."
Splendid. That is what every nation wants and this is our aim, too. It is approved by Her Majesty's Government for Czechoslovakia, but not for Wales. It is approved by President de Gaulle for Czechoslovakia, but not for Brittany. It is approved by General Franco for Czechoslovakia, but not for Catalonia or for the Basques. If we are talking about freedom for the Czechs let us be consistent and talk about freedom for small nationalities everywhere. Let them have the right to live their own lives in freedom.
Not only are the aims of Czech and Slovak nationalism good, but their behaviour is splendid. In the face of Russian barbarism they have shown the strength of non-violent resistance.
Mr. G. Campbell: They have stuck together.
Mr. Evans: That is true. They have stuck together. They have shown the world how the highest values in life can be defended, but not by violence. In this crisis, their own armed forces are worse than useless to them. If they employed their armed forces it would be catastrophic for Czechoslovakia and probably for Europe and the world. They are defending their values by moral strength. That is not starry-eyed theory, but hard-headed realism. That is what is happening.
Outside Czechoslovakia—indeed, in this Chamber—we see the reaction of the blind Samsons who rely on their own armed strength and who seek still more strength because of this crisis—the kind of strength which is in danger of bringing the whole world down about our ears and which might mean that this is the last living generation on earth.
The Czechs are showing us a different way. To me, at any rate, that is the great significance of what is happening in Czechoslovakia. They are placing the whole world in their debt. They are showing that they are capable of moral

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resistance—and they are able to show that because of their national solidarity; that is what is making it possible. Resistance of that kind can never be effective in any country unless there is that national solidarity. That is a part of the function of nationalism. When the strength of the human spirit is expressed in that way, it becomes quite unconquerable.
Czechoslovakia has provided a worthy example of this kind of resistance to take its place beside the story of the Norwegians during the war, because the Norwegians employed the same methods against Hitler and his army. It is possible for Czechoslovakia to do this because it seems that they have very few Quislings. It was possible for the Norwegians to do it because they too had very few Quislings who were willing and anxious to be governed as part of the great German Reich. The history of these days in Czechoslovakia can help the whole world by helping to wean it from its blind faith in military power. Nothing is more urgent than that.
Time may prove this example of Czechoslovakia to have been a mortal blow to the Russian dinosaur. As a result, some great good may come to the whole of humanity out of this great evil. Already, the Czechs have demonstrated the superior power of moral strength. I hope with all my heart that they will continue to rely on it, and then their freedom—their full freedom—will be a matter of time.
I salute the Czechs and the Slovaks. Through this House I should like to express the Welsh people's deep sense of gratitude to them for what they have already done for the world.
6.43
Mr. Michael Foot: I agree with the hon. Member for Carmarthen (Mr. Gwynfor Evans) on one matter: it may well be that at the end of these great events the most important discovery will be the power of passive resistance. In that much I agree with him. However, I think that from the point of view of his own argument he used an unfortunate instance because, as the hon. Member for Moray and Nairn (Mr. G. Campbell) pointed out in an interruption, in fact it has been the association of two nations, the Slovaks and
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the Czechs, which has provided this power of resistance. I believe that the Welsh, the Scots and the English together will continue for many years to provide the same power.
I believe that the Government were absolutely right to recall Parliament. It would have been most deplorable if that had not been done. Although, if I may say so, I thought that my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. George Brown) made an excellent speech, I could not agree with him on one point. He seemed to suggest that whereas it was not right for Parliament to meet to condemn the Russian leaders, he would have been satisfied for Parliament to meet for the declared purpose of condemning the President of the French Republic.
However that may be, Parliament has been recalled. It was right that we should meet, if only for reasons which my right hon. Friend stated so eloquently. In such a situation it is right that we should say as clearly as we can in this, the main forum of the nation, how strongly and in what unqualified terms we condemn what the Soviet Government have done. In the same breath we should say how much we admire the heroism, the patience and the determination which have been displayed by the Czechs. For that purpose alone it was right for Parliament to be recalled. So far, we are all agreed.
But it is also right that we should discuss matters on which we disagree because that, too, is one of the purposes of Parliament. I can well understand the reasons why the Prime Minister said that he did not wish to speculate on what might be the outcome of the discussions at this moment taking place in Moscow. But the rest of us, and the country and the world, are bound to speculate about these matters; they are central to the whole argument. All depend on how it turns out. Even if the Russians decide now to withdraw their troops, that will not alter the condemnation of their original action. But it will certainly alter the situation with which we have to deal. I am sure that all of us most earnestly hope that the conditions which my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper expressed so succinctly and intelligently will be accepted by the Soviet Government. If that were to occur, there would be a transformation of the situation. If that

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were to occur, it would indeed be true that the power of passive resistance had secured its most important political victory in the whole history of mankind.
Therefore, we cannot refrain from speculating about these possibilities—and there are at least two. There may be more. If the discussions in Moscow end in deadlock and a fresh resort by the Russians in Prague to all the apparatus of tyranny, then the situation will be even bleaker than it is today, and we shall have to consider the steps which this and other countries will need to take to deal with such a situation. In such circumstances, Parliament should be recalled again. I am strongly in favour of the Government consulting Parliament on all these matters.
But it is also possible—as we all hope—that the second alternative may occur. Nobody knows for certain whether the reports, being received via Bonn, of disputes inside the Soviet Government are correct, but it is very likely that they are correct. We do not know for certain whether Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Kosygin were among those who opposed the military expedition. We do not know, but if that were so it might alter the whole situation and it might be one of the factors which would lead to the possibility of the Russian Government being forced by the weight of public opinion, and even more by the action of the Czechs, to change their mind. I certainly hope that that occurs.
If we wish it to occur, if that is our paramount hope, as an outcome of the whole situation, we must ensure that our actions today are governed, first of "all, by seeing that we do everything possible to assist that outcome. That is why the speeches of the right hon. Members for Streatham (Mr. Sandys) and Kingston-upon-Thames (Mr. Boyd-Carpenter) and, I dare say, the speech which we shall hear later from the right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home), should be so strongly condemned.
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: Leave me out of it.
Mr. Foot: If the right hon. Gentleman wishes in advance to say that he repudiates the speeches of the right hon. Members for Streatham and Kingston-
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upon-Thames, no one will be more gratified than myself. By the simple way in which I have illustrated the difference between them, I hope that it will almost be unnecessary for the right hon. Gentleman to make a speech at all.
But let us suppose that the speeches of the right hon. Members for Streatham and Kingston-upon-Thames were to be flashed across to the Kremlin during the present discussions. Nothing could play into the hands of the "hawks" in the Kremlin more. Those speeches, if reported there, could be used against Mr. Dubcek and his colleagues, who I am sure, are doing everything they can to stand up for the rights of Czechoslovakia. It is, therefore, disgraceful that such speeches should have been made. This is partly because they show such a misreading of the situation. If it were the case that such a second development were to arise, then what will have happened will accord much more closely with the analysis of the situation given by the hon. Member for Bute and North Ayrshire (Sir F. Maclean), who speaks with much more authority on these matters than either the right hon. Member for Streatham or Kingston-upon-Thames—and pretty well the rest of the other side of the House put together.
The hon. Member knows a good deal about it. And what is the central point of his analysis—contradicted, I am sorry to say, by some of his conclusions? In my opinion, it is that the Soviet Government have not merely committed a crime—we all agree about that—but have committed also a gigantic blunder, one which does enormous damage to Soviet power and influence throughout the world. That is the case, and what we are dealing with is not an act of strength by the Soviet Government, but an act of weakness. This weakness could be such that instead of living in the presence of an event which may be compared primarily to what happened in 1948 or 1938, we may instead be living in the presence of something quite different—in the presence of something which might be called a gigantic Bay of Pigs operation, or a gigantic Suez operation, if that is not a reference too indelicate for hon. Members opposite. It may be that a great Power will be compelled to retreat. That is the hope we must all have and work for.

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In my opinion, such a development would accord more with the facts as we see them than the other alternative explanations. If one looks at Soviet policy over the last three or four years it is not one that impresses us as that of a Government with a single-minded, steadfast idea of how to serve its best interests throughout the world. That has not been the aspect presented by the Soviet Government—it has been much more a policy which has turned this way and that, not knowing exactly how a foreign policy should be conducted. The people in the Kremlin have been in a position of weakness partly because of these events in Eastern Europe. They have not known how to deal with them. How to deal with the upsurge of freedom does not appear in the Soviet textbooks, and they have not known how to deal with it.
One of the most intelligent ways to which we might try to deal with this new situation was suggested, strangly enough, by the right hon. and learned Member for Wirral (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd). He was one of the few Members who so far have put their fingers on a very important aspect. He said—and I do not mean that this provides any excuse whatever for Soviet action—that these developments are concerned with security in Central Europe. Of course they are. If we all get what we are hoping for—an agreement whereby Russian troops withdraw from the places that they now occupy—there may be a fresh opportunity for a new security agreement. That was one of the hopes that the Czechs had. If we had had negotiations previously providing for a new security pact in Europe which would help to lift the fears of people in East and West, it might be that this appalling crime and tragedy in Central Europe would not have occurred.
The major conclusion which we should draw from this situation, contrary to what has been said opposite, is not military, but diplomatic. The right hon. and learned Member for Wirral was perfectly correct when he said that we should look afresh at how we should make proposals for providing for the security of Central Europe. There will have to be a new security system, according to which can give legitimate guarantees to the Soviet Union and the other countries in between.
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We will have to do this precisely because of the upsurge of freedom in all these countries. It is not the peoples of the Warsaw Pact countries who have wanted to commit this crime against Czechoslovakia. Many are no doubt aghast at what has been done in their name. All these countries want to follow, in one way or another, the kind of road taken by Yugoslavia or Rumania, or the road which the Czechs were seeking.
How will we encourage them to do it? By saying, "Oh no. We are to encourage you to develop in a much freer way on your side of Europe by consolidating the N.A.T.O.bloc into a much tighter military organisation."? That is the very opposite to what we should do. If that is our reaction and if, Heaven forfend, the policy of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Streatham became the policy of Her Majesty's Government, we would have drawn all the wrong conclusions from these events, and would now be heading back towards the worst days of the cold war.
It has been rightly said on both sides of the House, although not by the right hon. Gentlemen I mentioned, that it would be extreme folly for us to say that the whole idea of the possibility of adétente is gone, particularly, and the whole of my speech is delivered on this basis, as we are still speculating about what may be the outcome of these present critical negotiations in Moscow.
There has been some reference to Vietnam. I will not delay the debate by elaborating on this, but I must say this much: there are tens of millions of people all over the world who think that there is a very close parallel between Vietnam and what has happened in Czechoslovakia. There are 600,000 American troops in Vietnam. In my opinion, they are there in defiance of the Charter of the United Nations. Certainly, the massive and continued bombing of people in North Vietnam is in defiance of any rights accorded to any power under the United Nations. Such action has been condemned time and again by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and it has been condemned, whatever may be the various arguments of hon. Gentlemen, by the vast masses of people all over the world.

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There is an almost unanimous verdict of condemnation of what the Russians have done in Czechoslovakia, but equally there is a very wide measure of condemnation of what the Americans still seek to do in Vietnam. Our Government would be in a much stronger position to put forward their policies for Europe if they were carrying out the same policies, and standing by the same principles in Asia—and, incidentally, thereby executing the official policies of the Labour Party—in opposing what we regard as American aggression in Vietnam.
These; two operations in different continents cannot be separated and it is foolish in a debate of this nature for us to think that we can talk only of Europe and leave aside affairs in Asia, when more have been killed in Vietnam in the last week than in Europe.
One more matter. I do not say this offensively to the right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire, but I do say it directly. I think that it is a pity that the Opposition selected him to speak on this occasion. In dealing with Czechoslovakia it is wrong and unwise, and not in the interests of this country, that one of the main spokesmen in this House should be one of the few surviving "men of Munich ". It would be more graceful if he had forgone this privilege.
I remember very well, I shall never forget, the last broadcast that came out of Czechoslovakia when the right hon. Gentleman and his friends were helping to deal with the affairs of that country. I remember when the German troops marched into Prague the radio stations were closed down. They were not able to conduct the brilliant operations that the Czechs are managing this time. I shall remember to my dying day the last message that came over the radio from Prague:
"We bequeath our sorrows to the French and English people."
That is what happened in March, 1939. For the reasons I have given, I believe that we can have more hopes now, but I think that this depends partly upon the wisdom with which we act. I believe that the way in which the Government have approached the question shows that they have that wisdom in dealing with this situation. I think that they will continue to display that wisdom all the better by rejecting the advice of the right hon.1362
Gentleman the Member for Streatham and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Kingston-upon-Thames all the old cold warriors who have gone into battle again so eagerly in this debate-—and by rejecting, also, the advice that may come from an old "man of Munich", however much he may have suffered a conversion in the interim.
Several Hon. Members rose—
Mr. David Winnick: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I raise it now before you leave the Chair and the Deputy-Speaker takes over. I recognise the tremendous difficulties you must have in selecting speakers, but I wonder whether I can ask your advice. I do not raise the matter facetiously, but I wonder whether, if one had been a sponsor of an Early Day Motion, which had received a substantial number of signatures, and the subject becomes debated, the possibility of being called would have been greater than normal?
Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member is most ingeniously pleading that the Chair will call him in the debate. It is, however, for the Chair to decide who speaks in the debate. Mr. Dodds-Parker.
7.2 p.m.
Mr. Douglas Dodds-Parker: I should not like to embarrass the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Michael Foot) by saying that there are a number of occasions on which I agree with him, particularly when that wagging finger of his is pointed at his own Front Bench, but today is not one of those occasions. It is strange to hear from him the language of appeasement of the 'thirties, suggesting that we would be better off by negotiating from weakness rather than from strength; when he said that we should not try to consolidate Western Europe in dealing with the situation we face immediately ahead.
I agree with the hon. Gentleman in supporting what my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Wirral (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd) said, which is that we should take a new look at the security system in Central Europe, but this is no new idea. It started when my right hon. and learned Friend was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and during the time of my right hon. Friend the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) and it has gone on for
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10 or 12 years. It is a form of the Rapacki and Gromulka plans which said that we should look for a thinning-out of forces, but in looking at the military aspect we should look at the political aspect, too, because that has clearly become more of a factor in what is going on in that part of the world.
To the hon. Member for Carmarthen (Mr. Gwynfor Evans) I would say that one of my earliest memories was of a Welsh Prime Minister leading not only Welsh, but English, Scots and Irish, and people all over the world to victory in the First World War. Possibly Mr. Dubcek is the Lloyd George of Czechoslovakia at this moment.
I am sorry that the hon. Member for Buckingham (Mr. Maxwell) has gone into orbit again. If he had gone the other way in 1939, our paths might have met 29 years earlier, because 29 years ago today, on 26th August, I left Kracow—when I was helping Czechs to get out of Czechoslovakia to France following the Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement on 22nd August. I have always admired very much the hon. Gentleman's gallantry in war and enterprise in peace. The only thing that seems odd to me is that he should find himself landed on the benches opposite.
This is a moment when we need the greatest number of speeches, so I will clip my remarks to the shortest duration.
First, I agree with all that has been said on both sides condemning utterly the action taken in the last week by the Soviet, and also by individual Communist leaderships of four European countries. I do not think that there is any need to underline this point. It has been made all over the world, and not only from our two Front Benches. The tragedy is continuing. At the moment, we still do not know the outcome of what is happening in Czechoslovakia. One thing that is quite clear is that, as happened with the Russian occupation of Hungary, there will be disillusion of the Russian troops, who were told that they were going in to liberate the people from Fascist beasts but, instead of that, found the ordinary people of the country.
There is, incidentally, no report that I have seen of the troops of those other 1364
four countries being committed. Perhaps it is too much of a risk to allow them to meet the Czechoslovaks, with whom they might possibly find themselves fraternising. But even if the Russians were to withdraw now, they will never remove this slain from Soviet repute.
I want to suggest what we in this House might do after seeing the rhetoric that goes on in the United Nations once again proving quite ineffective.
Will the Foreign Secretary tell us whether he is proposing not to look at general sanctions? We on this side have always been agreed that there is no future there, and perhaps he will tell us whether he has now come to the same conclusion. But there might be certain specific actions which, in the circumstances, he might consider taking with some advantage. One is to take another look at the continued giving of credit on quite a large scale to the Soviet. We know that the Russians have plenty of gold, and at this moment, if they were so anxious to buy from the West, they might well use some of their gold instead of coming to our hard-pressed taxpayers seeking credit.
Again, he might look at the import of timber. There was a time, 15 or 20 years ago, when we needed non-dollar timber, but there is plenty of timber now to be got from Canada and other countries such as that. It might make it easier for us to bring home to the Soviet that these agreements are not something we cannot look at if they behave as they have behaved recently.
On the cultural side, I agree with hon. Members on both sides that to bring the Red Army Choir here at this moment would be the utmost hypocrisy. Indeed, I cannot believe that the Russians will now send it here. Further, as I think the Prime Minister suggested, we might leave individuals to decide for themselves in some cases. One decision they might take is to send back their tickets for the two Soviet concerts which are to take place at the Albert Hall on 29th and 30th August. That is an individual gesture that people might make in the circumstances.
I should like to ask the Foreign Secretary whether he will look at what the B.B.C. is up to. I have regretted for the last ten or 15 years the reduction very
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often in what the B.B.C. is sending, particularly into Eastern Europe. I suggest strengthening the power of the broadcasts, if that is technically possible, of the services in English. The growth of English in Russia and all over the world is of great consequence, and when travelling there I have found that they prefer, when they can get it, to listen to the B.B.C. news in English. There is always the slightest but unwarranted suggestion that what they hear in their own language is rather different. If we can get it through the Iron Curtain, now that jamming has started again, I believe that it will be well received beyond the countries of Eastern Europe and in Russia itself. When broadcasting to the Czechoslovaks it might be that they could be told that among those listening to this debate today is the late Mr. Jan Masaryk's secretary during the war years.
We must not penalise those sections of society in Eastern Europe, including Russia, whose ferment is leading to the situation in Eastern Europe and in Russia itself—the young, the opinion-formers, the artists and others who, in the last 10 or 15 years particularly, as my hon. Friend the Member for Bute and North Ayrshire (Sir F. Maclean) has pointed out, have done so much to relieve the tension throughout these countries. To all who have been involved even in the smallest way, it is tremendously encouraging to see these developments which have taken place. Beyond this, I believe that these, as in so many countries, it is inevitable that we will get this striving for intellectual freedom resulting from education and contact with the rest of the world.
Neither must we by our actions damage the efforts towards adétente in the long term. That is of vital importance to all of us. As my hon. Friend the Member for Bute and North Ayrshire, who knows so much about this, said, it takes two to produce adétente. It is very difficult in present circumstances to suggest that we should push on, but I think we have to look beyond the immediate problem, beyond whatever happens in the next few days or weeks, to what is likely to happen in the years ahead.
How can we, therefore, say what we are going to do in that time? First, we must try to differentiate between the 1366
politburos—which are representative of, I believe, ever fewer political opinions—which take these decisions in those countries. They still hold the power of decision, which is the vital thing. We must not be misled about the opinion-formers who are fermenting throughout Eastern Europe and Russia and think that they are affecting the decisions taken by those who are sitting in the seats of power; and cannot be changed in the way that we are used to changing them in this country.
We must differentiate more and more between those smaller, but still immensely powerful groups of decision-takers and the great masses of the people, including many of the thinkers whom I mentioned, in Russia and these great countries of Europe. Let us never forget that. They have as long histories as European countries as we have in this country. They are sick of the conflicts and class warfare of Marxism. When they come to see what goes on in the outside world, they are looking for a way to get out of it.
Thirdly, I ask the Foreign Secretary what he is proposing to do about the future of N.A.T.O. Many of us who were brought up in the 1930s feel that we must negotiate from strength. This point was well put by the Leader of the Opposition in an admirable speech. Many of us feel that there has been a weakening of N.A.T.O. as a whole, and of this country's contribution to the defences not just of N.A.T.O. but of the free world outside the N.A.T.O. area. I ask the Foreign Secretary to follow up the suggestion of my right hon. Friend about a meeting of political heads on N.A.T.O.'s defence in the seven weeks before the House sits again.
Finally, to those of us who were in Czechoslovakia in 1938 and 1939 it seems, as the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale said, that the Russians have made a tremendous blunder in the re-introduction particularly of the German troops. I was in the Sudetenland with Dai Grenfell, who was a friend of a number of hon. Members, in October, 1938, when the Czechs were coming back and German troops were moving in. From what I have seen of them recently, they are the same troops except for the swastika, which has been taken off. They have the same uniforms. It is an immense
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blunder to have brought the German troops in again. It will only reaffirm the determination of the Czech and Slovak peoples to maintain their hard-won, half-independence on their road back to being one of the most effective democracies in Europe, which they were between the wars.
While condemning utterly the Soviet action, let us welcome this latest upsurge of human freedom in the last few months in Czechoslovakia, for 30 years suppressed, which we hope will lead to better things for us all before too long.
7.14 p.m.
Mr. Raphael Tuck: Any statement of the horror and shock that we feel on account of what has happened in Europe during the past week would be an under-statement. Yet I must identify myself with what my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has said about being too precipitate and taking action which might intensify the cold war. I agree with what he said today and would issue that word of caution.
However, I have two suggestions to make. They are sincere. They may seem wild and harebrained to hon. Members, but they are given with sincerity. Therefore, I ask the House not to be too derisive when I make them.
First, I should like to identify myself with the view put forward in The Times this morning by the hon. Member for Louth (Sir C. Osborne), who suggested that the Prime Minister should attempt to go to Moscow. If anybody is persona grata, it is the Prime Minister. He is very well thought of in those quarters, and he may be able to do something if he goes, or attempts to go, to that city. It may be that he will fail, but any attempt is worth the effort. I strongly suggest that he should attempt to go to Moscow to see whether he can succeed in disentangling this terrible situation.
My second suggestion may seem even wilder. America went into Vietnam, and there has been a terrible carnage there since. It is true that she was invited, as the hon. Member for Hertfordshire, South-West (Mr. Longden) said, by Diem, whom she put there, just as Russia was invited into Hungary by Radar, whom she had put there. But very many 1368
people in America and all over the world feel that America has committed a grave blunder there. However, America is so far committed that she cannot pull out without losing face before the world. She is stuck. Similarly, many people in Russia feel that a grave and tragic mistake has been made in sending troops into Czechoslovakia. But the Soviet Union cannot pull out without losing face and possibly without heads rolling in the Kremlin. She, also, is stuck.
Perhaps America could approach the Soviet Union with a view to doing a deal. Perhaps if America were to pull out of Vietnam the U.S.S.R. would pull out of Czechoslovakia and get ahead with her obligations as chairman of the 1954 Geneva Conference with Great Britain and hold free elections in Vietnam. Both countries would be pulled out of the impasse in which they find themselves now, but this time without losing face. Each country could say, "We have pulled out of the country that we have occupied but have obtained a corresponding advantage from the other country." Russia could say, "We have pulled out of Czechoslovakia, but America has pulled out of Vietnam, and so it is to our advantage to do so." America could say, "We have pulled out of Vietnam, but Russia has pulled out of Czechoslovakia and has assumed her obligations as chairman of the Geneva Conference with Great Britain, and so it is to our advantage to do so." Neither country would lose face.
This may be a fantastic idea, but fantastic ideas sometimes become a reality. I urge my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary deeply to consider making representations to the United States and Russia along those lines.
7.19 p.m.
Mr. Gordon Campbell: The hon. Member for Watford has made a very interesting suggestion connecting Vietnam and Czechoslovakia, but I shall be very surprised if it is one that is practicable. I think that these two events in different parts of the world can too easily be related. The difficulties which immediately come to my mind as a result of such a suggestion are immense, and I could not expect this hope, no doubt made with the best possible intentions, to be regarded as one likely to be fulfilled.
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I think that it was right for the House of Commons to be recalled. Although we cannot do much, regrettably, in this situation, we can at least show clearly how deeply we in Britain feel as a country about the situation of the Czechoslovaks, and we can voice disgust for the Soviet action.
In our admiration for the Czechs and Slovaks, we see not only their spirit in the face of overwhelming forces and bullying methods, but their restraint in their conduct, allied to courage of a very high order. As a nation, they are demonstrating unity of purpose but without causing provocation to the Soviet Government. The Soviet Government would welcome riots or incidents which they could use as an excuse for putting down what they could describe as an uprising instigated from abroad. This was what the Soviet Union tried to make out was happening in Hungary, where the Hungarians—again, very courageous but more volatile—gave way to temptation and as "freedom fighters" indulged in throwing Molotov cocktails and resisting with force.
The Russians, it appears, have not been able to find willing Quislings, or Quislings at all, in Czechoslovakia. It seems, also, that they have been unable to reactivate any of the Czech secret police which may have existed in the past. But we must expect elements of the Soviet secret police to be moving into Czechoslovakia at the moment. What we are witnessing is a most remarkable feat—the passive resistance by an entire nation in its daily strikes and the continuation of secret radios. But I fear that there is a limit to the time in which action like this can continue. We know too well that the whole apparatus of a police State can be moved into Czechoslovakia once the troops have occupied it, and it may simply be a matter of time before intimidation, terror, arrests and other pressures make it much more difficult for the Czechoslovaks to continue this passive resistance.
Many have been surprised by the suddenness and brutality of this occupation of Czechoslovakia, particularly after the very recent conferences between the Russians and the Czechoslovaks. The surprise is immense when we see East Germans being used, and we wonder whether the Soviet leaders can have any sense of 1370
shame or of history in promoting an occupation which included soldiers from East Germany. But this event was not surprising to some who have been closely following events in Czechoslovakia over the past year and the dialogue which has been continuing between the Czechoslovak and Soviet leaders.
That is why some of us, including my right hon. Friend the Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys) and my hon. Friend the Member for Bute and North Ayrshire (Sir F. Maclean) tabled a Motion, Early Day Motion No. 412, before the Recess, proposing that the Government should raise, or cause to be raised, the question of Czechoslovakia in the Security Council. We believe that the Soviet invasion would have been made much more difficult for the Russians to undertake if the Security Council had been quietly seized of the situation beforehand. I speak with some experience, having been for three years a member of our permanent delegation on the Security Council, during which time the invasion of South Korea in 1950 took place.
I recognise that the Czechoslovak leaders may have been anxious about the subject being raised, and they may not have requested it, but it is clear that they were completely deceived. Some of us realised that the Soviet leaders were capable of doing this, but the Czechs were, in Mr. Dubcek's own words, entirely deceived and did not think that this was possible. I wish that they had been a bit more cautious and had allowed the matter to be raised quietly at the Security Council a month or so ago.
Another cause for our admiration of the Czechs and Slovaks in what they are doing is the fact that they have held together. They are two quite separate peoples, but they know that their future is bound up together. The attempts which have undoubtedly been made by the Soviet leaders to exploit Slovak nationalism against the Czechs have utterly failed.
One of those who have been named by the Soviet leaders as a possible puppet in a new Czechoslovak Government is the Slovak leader Vasil Bilak. It is not yet clear from the Press reports whether he is prepared to co-operate or collaborate with the Soviet leaders; we simply do not know. But we can applaud the way in which the Slovaks, the minority people,
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have resisted attempts of this kind and are solidly with the Czechs and have not been seduced by false offers of independence for Slovakia.
A point which affects Britain is the question of Mr. Bilak's daughter, who has been in this country. This morning I was in touch with the Foreign Office about this matter, because during the last 36 hours we have had reports about her disappearance in Cumberland last week, with all the signs of a kidnapping by Russians. Unfortunately, there is little which we in Britain can do to help Czechoslovakia in the present crisis. But if Mr. Bilak's daughter has been kidnapped by Russians on British soil, this is something on which we can take action.
I very much hope that the Government have been investigating this matter and that they will be able to give us a report. I am aware that while this debate has been going on there have been reports that a Soviet official in the Russian Embassy has apparently said that she has already arrived in Moscow. But we do not know whether that has happened. Sometimes people are said to have left when they are still in the country.
Surely immigration authorities and others in this country should have co-operated to keep a friendly eye on such a sensitive visitor to this country and to be ready to help. Because this Soviet abduction, if it has happened, could make it more difficult for the Slovak leader to resist the pressures of the Russians. I cannot help suspecting that, whatever explanations may be given by the Russians, the purpose is to kidnap her as a hostage and to add this to the pressure being exerted on someone who has already been named as a possible puppet. I hope that the Foreign Secretary will say something about this matter tonight, because it would be most unfortunate if, by carelessness, we allowed the Soviet leaders to take action in this country which would make it more difficult for any Czechoslovak leader to withstand the pressures to which he is being subjected.
I come to the wider question of what we in Britain can do. I agree that proposals for a trade embargo, although at first attractive, would be useless in the long run, and I do not recommend them. But if we, with other countries which are like-minded, are to mark our dis-1372
approval of what has happened in Czechoslovakia, I suggest that we agree to withdraw for a period our ambassadors in Moscow and in the other States which have been associated with the occupation. This would not be a severance of diplomatic relations and, therefore, all the ordinary contacts would continue. I may say, in passing, that our charges d'affaires in various places, particularly in Peking, have shown that acharge d'affaires can do very well all that is required in many difficult situations. I recognise that some Asian and African countries will not probably even join us in that, but at least it would be a way of making it clear how disgusted we are with the way that the Soviet Union has acted.
I agree, also, that where cultural, educational and similar contacts are concerned, there is again nothing to be gained in the long term by boycotting the Soviet Union. I have for many years been a member and supporter of the Great Britain-U.S.S.R. Association, in which my hon. Friend the Member for Bute and North Ayrshire (Sir F. Maclean) has played a leading part. That organisation, with others, has in recent years been encouraging the exchange of music, drama students, and so on. All this has been valuable on both sides and has helped in the general thawing behind the Iron Curtain.
Many will now feel immediately and personally that they cannot attend some function or other after what has happened, but in the long run it would, I believe, be a mistake to cut off peoples from each other. We must distinguish between the Soviet leaders, who are responsible for this crime, and the Soviet people, with whom we want to continue to have as wide contacts as possible.
It is, of course, disappointing to those of us who, through that organisation, have been sponsoring cultural contacts as much as we can, now to know that in the coming weeks and months these are useless. Those who are invited—eminent musicians, for example—will be cold-shouldered. They are not responsible for what has happened in Czechoslovakia, but they represent a country which is responsible. It is disappointing that in this way we should have a setback and have to start again later.

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The events which are occurring are happening so fast that the position changes from hour to hour. It is, however, clear that the Soviet leaders are putting pressure on President Svoboda and also, no doubt, as prisoners under duress, on Mr. Dubcek and his colleagues. They are doubtless attempting to form a collaborator Government, but so far without success.
Let us in this House remember that grim episode which happened in Budapest in 1956, when the then leaders of the Hungarian people, Imre Nagy and General Pal Maleter, were given safe conducts to leave the Yugoslav Embassy and as soon as they came out, with that guarantee of their lives, they were arrested by agents of the Soviet Government, conjured away and later murdered. It is the Government who were responsible for those events with whom they are having to deal, so let there be no possible doubt about the kind of fate that could be hanging over the Czechoslovak leaders.
I hope that the Russians may be forced to make some concessions to the Czechoslovak leaders before agreeing to remove their troops. It takes time to set up a repressive system of control of a whole nation if that nation is intelligently applying passive resistance, as the Czechoslovaks so clearly are. I believe that the main stumbling block for the Soviet leaders is the question of Press and radio censorship. The abolition of Press censorship in Czechoslovakia seemed to the Russians to be the breach in the dam which could later cause the floods to pour in to Eastern Europe, and particularly East Germany, and later, perhaps, even into the Soviet Union itself. This will be one of the key matters on which the Soviet leaders will be trying to obtain assurances from the Czechoslovaks.
In the wider picture, the free world is faced with a dilemma arising from the fact that the Iron Curtain in Europe and spheres of influence elsewhere between the Soviet Union and the West have been delineated fairly clearly. There is the paradox that the division of a large part of the world in this way has, on the one hand, helped to preserve peace by preventing wars from breaking out by accident. Everyone has known that the
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Iron Curtain was the barrier beyond which a military act which could provoke a world war. An example was Cuba because, although the line there was not so clearly delineated, it was none the less there and the Soviet Union withdrew at the psychological moment. But this also—this is where the paradox comes in—implies control within the area of influence. This the Soviet Union have brutally applied in Hungary and, now, Czechoslovakia.
It may be asked: what about Yugoslavia? The Yugoslavs in 1948 and 1949 survived their defiance without occupation, but they had never been overrun by the Russian Red Army. That was the key. President Tito no doubt recognises now more than ever what peril he was in in 1948 and 1949, when he was also surrounded and was at odds with his Communist neighbours.
The Soviet Union have now shown that they are prepared to resort to force in circumstances of this kind. I believe that we in Western Europe must look to the efficiency of our alliance, not because we can intervene in Czechoslovakia or in Roumania, if the same thing should happen there, but because we must be sure of a deterrent which will make it clear to the Russians that they cannot embark on expeditions elsewhere or into Western Europe.
The Soviet Government have put back the clock. This is a retrograde step in coexistence—a principle which they themselves have supported. To deal with this situation we must pick our way with care, but it must depend upon realistic diplomacy and effective alliances.
7.37 p.m.
Mr. Richard Crawshaw: About 30 years ago at this time, I was helping to organise demonstrations in a futile attempt to get the Government to support Czechoslovakia. I did not realise then that 30 years later I would be speaking here and that this Parliament would have as little power to do anything now as it apparently had at that time.
I listened with interest to the telling speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Michael Foot). He was a little unfair, however, in his remarks about the right hon. Member for
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Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home), who was, apparently, involved in the Munich Agreement. Although that Agreement was shortsighted, we also ought to take a certain amount of blame on this side of the House for the fact that it was necessary, from our military weakness at that time. There was no alternative to do anything different. [HON. MEMBERS: "Quite wrong."] I ask my hon. Friends to remember that continuing that policy so often in the past has meant that we have had to accept these situations.
Mr. Philip Noel-Baker: Does my hon. Friend recall that for 16 years before the Munich conference, the Conservative Party had been in office except for two and three-quarter years, when there was a minority Labour Government, and that they had had six years of complete control before the Munich conference? If there was any shortage of defence, the responsibility was 100 per cent. theirs.
Mr. Crawshaw: Despite that intervention, there is not the slightest doubt that in the 1930s my party were completely opposed to rearmament and this fact had to be considered by the Government of the day.
Mr. Noel-Baker: We were in favour of disarmament all round, and we could have got it. [Interruption.]
Mr. Speaker: Order. We must get back to 1968.
Mr. Crawshaw: Apparently, no one is ever prepared to learn the lessons of the past. During these 30 years, I have wondered why we have so often been confronted with situations similar to that which existed in 1938. Perhaps it was explained this afternoon by my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) who apparently thought that all that was required here today was to say what nasty people the Russians were and to give our condolences to the Czech people, and then to go home. If that is all we have come for, I think we shall be wasting our time. If we cannot come to any conclusions from the events of this past week we should not be here speaking today.
If anything has happened during this past week, it is, I hope, that the events
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of the week have helped to remove a few of the blinkers from the eyes of the people of this country who, over the past years, have assumed that the Russians were having a change of their policy. Of course, when it has been necessary for them to change their policy because of confrontation with Powers which could repeal it, they have done so, but it is quite obvious, as the Foreign Secretary said the other day, that Russia must fear for its safety if any small country within the Russian orbit seeks to do so. I would say that, to my mind, what has happened gives us an undreamed of opportunity in the future that the rest of the world—perhaps five years, perhaps 10 years from now—will some day get freedom to elect its own Governments in the way it wishes and to have the opportunity of free expression, and that is what is required.
Then we come to the problem whether we should involve N.A.T.O. in discussion at this stage. It is said that to mention N.A.T.O. at this stage might be harmful. As I understand it, there was no suggestion at all that N.A.T.O. would intervene in the internal affairs of any Warsaw Pact country. That is implicit in the agreement.
This is what I could not understand about the speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. George Brown). He was suggesting that, had France still been in N.A.T.O., President de Gaulle would have supported us in this situation. However, there was no suggestion that, even so, we could have assisted the Czechoslovaks militarily.
I still think that N.A.T.O. should consider its strategy afresh. Until this last week or so it was held that possibly Russia had no intention of any further expansion, but, as was said in one of the editorials the other day, a country like Russia, which is a dictatorship, can be a danger, but one which is frightened can be an even greater danger, and this, I believe, is the situation today in Russia. I believe that it is a frightened country. We talk about the equilibrium between East and West not having been upset, but I believe that it has been upset, because I cannot believe for one moment that the Russians could ever trust Czech troops to hold the front against Western forces. I think that whatever agreement is reached in Moscow, Czechoslovakian

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forces will not be entrusted with the defence of that frontier, and, therefore, this automatically means a weakening of the Warsaw Pact countries, and, because of that weakening, I believe that there is an even greater danger that, through the fear which is real in Russia today, further steps could be taken.
If, in Moscow, an agreement is reached which satisfies the Czech people, all right; but if Russia has to keep her troops in Czechoslovakia against the wishes of the Czech people, then, of course, she has to consider the attitude of both Rumania and Yugoslavia because, if she has to do that, she knows she has got to do it against whatever the rest of the world thinks, and, having gone that far, she would not hesitate to go further if she thought it necessary for her own defence.
Therefore, I ask the Government, what will happen if threats are made against Yugoslavia? Is N.A.T.O. considering this possibility? We know that there are a large number of Russian naval ships in the Mediterranean. Could we stand idly by if Russian troops were to threaten Yugoslavia? These are questions we ought to be asking ourselves. I suggest we ought to make it quite clear to the Russians that, whatever decisions they take about Czechoslovakia, this country will not move one troop to help; I think that that is a realistic assessment; but I think we ought also to make it quite clear to them that any other adventures in other parts of the Balkans might bring repercussions, and that we could not stand idly by to see them happen.
I know that many people are waiting to speak, and I shall conclude. I believe that the Russian people as a whole are good, decent people. It would be a great fault if we broke off communications or any cultural relations whatsoever with them. Reading about some of the Soviet soldiers in Czechoslovakia this week, we see that they were disillusioned; they did not know that they were going into Czechoslovakia; some of them thought that they were going to Germany. We must maintain these contacts. We must offer the hand of friendship to these people, because they, too, are suffering under a dictatorship which it is
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sought to impose upon Czechoslovakia, but I believe, too, that in the meantime we ought to read the lessons from the events of the last week. If Russia gives to the problem a solution which suits Czechoslovakia, then it will be done because of world influence, which has been brought against Russia, not because the Russian Government would not have done differently had an alternative solution suited them.
7.46 p.m.
Mr. Victor Goodhew: I am delighted to follow the hon. Member for Liverpool, Toxteth (Mr. Crawshaw), who has brought to the benches opposite a breath of fresh air and reality about the situation in the world today. When I heard hon. Members on the other side of the House talking today exactly as their party did in the 'thirties, and suggesting that the mere act of arming ourselves and being strong would be likely to provoke trouble, and saying that what we ought to be is to talk from weakness, I must say that we have been here before, and not only about Czechoslovakia, but about the attitude of so many hon. Members opposite.
It is indeed quite right, as the hon. Member has just said, that we should today not merely express our disgust with what Russia is doing or merely our admiration of the way in which the Czechoslovaks are behaving, but we ought also to draw lessons from what has happened. For my part, I am very glad we have been recalled so that I can add my praise for the courage, cool-headedness and determination of the people of Czechoslovakia. It seems to me that their conduct is as worthy of our praise as Russian's conduct is worthy of our wholehearted condemnation. I hope that our expressions of praise and admiration will help to sustain them in these desperate days.
I wish that I could believe that the Russians will be influenced by our words of disgust and condemnation. One thing seems to me as clear as it has ever been, and that is that the Russians are prepared to use the United Nations when it comes to attacking, to embarrassing or to dividing the countries of the free world, but when it comes to their own interests and their own aims, then they are prepared to use brute force to get their own

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way and to hamper the United Nations in the meantime.
We see today in the United Nations a situation in which there is still no decision whether observers should be sent, or whether a representative should be sent to make contact with the legal Government in Prague. All we have is a veto which prevents any action from being taken, and stalling speeches from Russia and other countries. By now, Mr. Dubcek, along with his colleagues, could have been annihilated, could have been spirited away, as others have been in the past, and removed from the scene literally and actually. It is only the determination and courage of the Czech people that has succeeded so far in preventing this where the United Nations has failed. It is difficult for me to have much confidence in the United Nations' ability to act in any important crisis when I see the events of the last few days.
That being so, it is clear that no country can afford to count on the United Nations preventing acts of aggression or even of using some means of forcing the aggressor to withdraw after he has made his aggression. That must mean that there is a vital need for all countries to learn the lesson that they must maintain their own defence forces and their alliances. It means, above all, that they should maintain their conventional forces, because no one wants to see the N.A.T.O. countries put in the position of going nuclear or giving in, which is the obvious answer to much that has been said in recent debates on defence.
In my view, there are very disturbing elements in the present crisis affecting N.A.T.O. First, there is the question of intelligence. The whole basis of N.A.T.O. military planning is that there is a change in political climate which warns the Governments of N.A.T.O. that perhaps something may be about to happen. Then there is the counting on troop movements which give a warning that, although they may look like manœuvres, they may be aimed at a certain objective, so that one has sufficient time to make the appropriate dispositions of troops.
On this occasion, if what one reads in the newspapers yesterday is to be believed, there were reports from the West German intelligence that plans for such
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an invasion had been in being for some time. These reports were available three months ago and, when the Foreign Secretary replies, I would like to know what happened about them and why they were played down. We are told in the Press that it was because Washington felt it to be necessary in view of her troubles in Vietnam. That may not be true, but, if there were reports of troop movements and intelligence reports to the effect that they had the invasion of Czechoslovakia in view, it is monstrous that N.A.T.O. should not have been able to make some troop movements to show that we were determined to defend the free side of the Iron Curtain should there be any moves against us.
If N.A.T.O. is not to react to a gradual build-up of tension which indicates the possibility of danger, what good is N.A.T.O.? I know that it is suggested that if one reacts to such troop movements one may be thought to be provocative. However, on that basis, N.A.T.O. will never be able to move round troops in times of political tension and when there are warnings of troop movements on the other side, simply for fear of being misrepresented and being thought provocative.
Mr. Frank Hooley: Has it not occurred to the hon. Gentleman that perhaps N.A.T.O. may move without sending him a personal postcard to that effect?
Mr. Goodhew: Yes, I have thought of that possibility. However, the reports that one has heard about the state of alert do not encourage one to believe that as much preparation was made as might have been. I may be wrong in saying that and, if I am, I shall be delighted to be put right. It seems to be vital to make sure that we are prepared to react when we see these warning signs and are not afraid of being accused of provocation.
One of the principal casualities of the last few days has been the Government's new strategic concept for N.A.T.O. In that connection, I draw attention to a speech by the Secretary of State for Defence in March of this year, when he spoke of the change in N.A.T.O.'s strategic thinking and said:
"When the N.A.T.O. Council met for the first time in Brussels last December it endorsed the first major revision in N.A.T.O.'s

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defence strategic thinking since the Alliance was set up 19 years ago. Much of this change in N.A.T.O.'s military thinking will be familiar to the House since Her Majesty's Government have been pressing it continuously over the last three and a half years. First, the Alliance has now agreed to take its opponents' intentions into account as well as their military capabilities, and sees those intentions as broadly peaceful at the moment. In the second place, N.A.T.O. has agreed that since the factors contributing to the present situation are unlikely to change overnight, the Alliance is likely to get a period of political warning should Soviet intentions change, in addition to the expected military warning of troop movements and so on."
I have just dealt with the warning of troop movements, and so on, but what about political intentions? Is this not the most dangerous and irresponsible policy, dictated only by the Government's anxiety to reduce the cost of our defences to a fixed figure? Over and over again at conferences of N.A.T.O. Parliamentarians, I have heard the Commander-in-Chief, Europe, General Lemnitzer, make it clear that the military view is that the threat to the West lies in the number of divisions sitting on the other side of the Iron Curtain.
It is monstrous for politicians to say, "It is all very well for the military to say that, but we know that the intentions of these people are honourable and peaceful at present". Even if they are peaceful at the moment, they can change overnight, as clearly they have done over Czechoslovakia. They could change with Mr. Kosygin and Mr. Brezhnev and, even if hon. Gentlemen opposite believe that they would not with those two gentlemen, they themselves could be changed overnight, with two others coming in with more belligerent intentions towards the West.
So long as N.A.T.O. forces are faced with the Russian military might in East Germany, it must be strong enough and well enough equipped to deter any aggressive adventure, and it must be ready to react to both political and military warnings. The Government constantly talk of adétente of encouraging it by balanced reductions of forces in N.A.T.O. and the Warsaw Pact. I hope that they have learned the lessons of the past week.
I was not impressed when Mr. Kosygin came to Westminster to address both Houses of Parliament. I remember that
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in one sentence he told us that he wished to have a treaty of friendship with Britain. In the next sentence, he started to try to divide us from America by attacking this, our principal ally in N.A.T.O. It was at that point that I walked out of Royal Gallery, because I felt that I could not listen with confidence to what he said. I felt that that should have been a clear enough warning to right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite that this leopard has not changed its spots.
I hope that the Government are now alerted to the danger of hacking away steadily at our defences while we are faced with the might of Russia and other countries, when they could, if they wished, hack away instead at some of their expenditure on which our security does not depend. I believe that they must abandon wishful thinking and at last face reality.
We shall not be relieved of all fear of Communist aggression against the West even if, as we hope, Russia withdraws her troops from Czechoslovakia. There will be a period of upheaval and tension in Europe during which many changes may take place. That will be a sensitive time when no one will know which way the Russian Government will jump when they find themselves in trouble again. Quite often, Governments suffering internal difficulties seek external adventures to try and distract their people from troubles at home. If the United Nations fails entirely to achieve any success as a result of the Soviet veto and filibustering, the risk of limited adventures by Russia in Western Europe becomes greater.
If I were living in any city near the Iron Curtain in West Germany, or even in West Berlin, I should think that I was at greater risk than ever before unless I saw N.A.T.O. today strengthened to make certain that at least one thing is now made clear to the Russians: that though we may not be able or feel able at this moment to intervene, and would not intervene on behalf of Czechoslovakia, because this is not one of the objects of N.A.T.O., when it comes to any adventures to the West we should react at once and prevent this happening. This means that the Government will have to change their whole approach to our defence policy instead of continuing the reductions that they have been making.

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I remember the Secretary of State for Defence scoffing at my right hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Powell). I know that right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite do not like to hear it, but it is important. The right hon. Gentleman said:
"We have always argued, and I shall come to this argument in a moment in relation to the views of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Wolverhampton, South West, that no attempt to provide effective conventional defence against an all-out Soviet attack is neither desirable, possible nor necessary."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 4th March, 1968; Vol. 760, c. 59–60 and 62.]
I wonder whether the right hon. Gentleman has changed his mind about that view today. If not, I think it bodes very ill for this country and for N.A.T.O.
We should be sure that we are strong enough to defend ourselves in conjunction with our allies in N.A.T.O. I hope that one lesson will have been learned from today's debate and from the events of the last week: that the Government realise that they must change their mind about defence and realise that this is one thing we cannot afford to cut, whereas there are plenty of others we could.
8.3 p.m.
Mr. Alan Lee Williams: The hon. Member for St. Albans (Mr. Goodhew) never fails to raise the debate to the most unintelligent level. No matter what we are discussing—and I have heard him speak on many occasions—he never ceases to attempt to make either the most trivial party point or to attack unnecessarily the work of the United Nations.
Whatever view is taken of the Czech crisis, the Soviet invasion of the Czechoslovak people is clearly based on the fear that their Communist system, as understood by Marxism and Leninism, is about to collapse. Soviet troops moved because the men in the Kremlin were afraid that their own gigantic totalitarian edifice was itself in direct danger by those revisionists who had the temerity to talk of a free mass media and individual liberty.
Perhaps the tragedy of the Czech crisis was the recognition that a liberal Communist régime was a contradiction in terms, as well as being a phenomenon that was inconsistent with the security
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of the Soviet Union. Therefore, we have witnessed the collapse of Communism as well as a frightening example of the abuse of military power by a super-Power.
There is one very important and alarming feature, however, out of the events of the last few days. The East-West détente, of course, is both desirable and practical; but the maintenance of the détente—I must be frank about this—is based upon the permanent slavery of Eastern Europe. Nothing short of nuclear war, however, would be involved if we attempted to move militarily in respect of the events in Czechoslovakia in the last few days. Therefore, we have to realise that that is part of the price that we have to pay for détente. We cannot fight the Soviet Union, as some hon. Gentlemen opposite tend to give the impression. Freedom of Eastern Europe cannot be upheld or denied simply by military means. The total subjugation of Czechoslovakia makes it certain that it is dangerous to be at the mercy of the Soviet Union, particularly the small countries. Therefore, we must examine some of the implications of the last few days in some depth.
I do not agree with hon. Gentlemen on both sides of the House who have argued that it is improper to discuss some of the defence implications. It is also proper to discuss some of the political implications, apart from defence. There is no doubt that great damage has been done to the attempt to try to get some regulation in respect of the A.B.M. system which the United States initiated with the Soviet Union in the last few months. It now looks as if a sense of agreement in respect of the A.B.M. system will be very difficult to reach.
It would also have an effect in the United States on the presidential election. I am sure that the Nixon men will benefit at the expense of the Humphrey men. I am also of the opinion that the Vietnam war will, as a result, continue in its intensity and that the "hawks" will prevail over the "doves". These are some of the political implications of the Soviet moves in the last few days.
Everyone knows that in 1969 the future of N.A.T.O. will come under review. In 1969 there will be a period of intense review of the purpose of the

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alliance, including perhaps whether it should survive in its present or an amended form. When N.A.T.O. was created in 1949 it was based on the premise that the Northern half of the globe was divided into two parts: one part Communist and one part not. The Communist part was supposed to have a tightness of organisation and discipline that the free or Western part did not; a drive towards expansion without scruple as to means, a goal of total world conquest, a willingness to risk violence and to engage in it if necessary, and a capacity for never losing what once it gained, so that, even if its foreign adventures alternately succeeded and failed, it would win when it succeeded and would hold its own when it failed.
As so commonly happens, the menace was oversimplified. Unity in the Communist world was taken for granted, while disunity in the West was always a problem. Soviet threats were credited absolutely, while the credibility of the American counter threat was perpetually debated. Nationalism was expected to be smothered by Communist ideology throughout the Soviet bloc, while in the West an appealing successor to European nationalism was an aspiration, never a reality.
We have learned a lot in 20 years, even though we have learned it slowly. First, we have learned that co-existence without major war is possible. Secondly, we have learned that European security cannot be divorced from world security.
The problems of Europe and its future have to be seen in a world context. The crucial question is: if N.A.T.O. and the Warsaw Pact were to be disbanded, what positive alternative could Europe offer to maintain peace on the Continent, taking into account the political implications?
The simplest solution is to maintain the status quo. The events in Czechoslovakia and the general unrest among allies on both sides of the Iron Curtain makes it evident that, in practice, there must be room for greater flexibility among the smaller allies in relation to their giant protectors. Although there are several permutations there are really only two positive alternatives—first, the withdrawal of United States and Soviet troops from European soil, leaving Europe to its own defence devices and,
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secondly, a modification of alliance frameworks, with greater military and political flexibility within them.
In effect, this would mean that European countries would themselves have to seek either bilateral or multilateral agreements to maintain a balance of power and, in particular, the control of Germany, unless it is possible to conceive of a United States of Europe with a strong governing body. Anything short of this must mean that Germany would dominate the European scene, whether for good or for ill. Even if such a European union or federation were probable in the foreseeable future—which in my view it is not—other problems, both intermediate and long term, arise.
Let us assume that there would be no overall control in Europe. In this respect I agree with what was said by the right hon. Member for Barnet (Mr. Maudling)—who is not here for this debate—when he spoke in the defence debate on 25th July last. He said:
"A Europe divided into more and more armed nation States might…produce…serious dangers of a kind which none of us would welcome."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 25th July, 1968; Vol. 769, c. 1029.]
My right hon. Friend the Minister for Defence has reiterated a similar view. It therefore seems to me that such questions are raised as whether a Europe, united or otherwise, should have conventional weapons or should combine the nuclear capabilities of Britain and France, with other nuclear resources, presumably from Germany. That is a solution which I would reject.
Could, therefore, a united Europe, let alone a Europe of divided States, remain neutral as between the Soviet Union and the United States? This is inconceivable today, but if such a powerful bloc were to swing one way of the other this must increase the nervousness of one of the great Powers, upset the wider balance and create the kind of situation for one of them to provoke an opportunity to step in and restore the previous state of affairs.
It is an acknowledged fact that the Soviet Union and the United States do not wish to become involved in a nuclear confrontation unless their vital interests are involved. As Pierre Hasener points out, this has encouraged countries like Israel and the United Arab Republic to

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indulge in war. With a Soviet and United States withdrawal from Europe this situation might be created here, with possibilities of internecine warfare in Europe, but this time with more dire consequences. In the circumstances, a European security pact, divorced from the protecing influence of the United States and the Soviet Union is likely to prove more of a liability than an asset in the future.
The lesson to be learned from the events of the last few days is that it is essential that the future rôle and capacity of N.A.T.O. should be looked at afresh. At the same time, it would be foolish to over-react, because the situation in Czechoslovakia is bound to be part of the general pattern arising from the pressures from underneath in closed societies, and whatever the Soviet Union may attempt to do by the use of force there is no doubt that in the end the people will triumph.
8.14 p.m.
Mrs. Winifred Ewing: As a member of a party of one in this House I am sure that the House will appreciate my desire to say how much my party bitterly regrets the crisis which has led to the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Everyone that I have spoken to in Scotland is shocked and sorrowful. As members of a small country they identify themselves with the situation with no difficulty. Like Czechoslovakia, Scotland has no wish to be dominated by any other nation. I believe that Czechoslovakia wishes to control its own affairs in its own way.
I am very sensitive to the implications of this crime. I believe that in Scotland there is a feeling of great disquiet—a feeling that we all have a responsibility, because this aggression is just a link in a chain of events beginning when the United Kingdom failed to honour our undertaking to Czechoslovakia and then, again, when, at Yalta, we traded her for advantages which now are seen to be meaningless, I do not believe that nationalism in this world is a menace. Once again, it is a large nation which has shown that it is the menace to world peace—a multi-nation State which cannot keep its hands off others or its armed forces in its own boundaries. Until this
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multi-nation State and others like it are reduced to their component parts they will remain a menace to peace.
Much of what I had wanted to say has been said by the hon. Member for Carmarthen (Mr. Gwynfor Evans), but I want to go on to mention something which has not been referred to. The satellites have played only a nominal part in this invasion. I do not believe that any of them is governed by men who have the support of the majority of their people.
Despite the tragic feeling of impotence which we must all have, to some extent, I am encouraged by the degree of Czech determination, which has surpassed our wildest hopes. I believe that the Czechs will solve their own problems in their own country. They do not want help from the West. Perhaps that is not surprising, since the Western nations have let them down twice already. Nevertheless, the degree of concern that all hon. Members feel requires to be registered in some way. I am glad that the House was recalled.
What can we do? I reject the argument that there should be a cessation of cultural activities. I do not believe that the people of Russia know the facts. They do not have a free Press. I cannot claim much expertise in this matter. I am not a well-travelled visitor to Russia, but I have been there as a tourist and it seems to me that there is no free Press there. The invading Russian troops believed that they were going to Czechoslovakia for a different purpose.
I do not believe that a musical occasion should be turned into a political one. It is better to remember that if we want to persuade someone to do something the lines of communication must be kept open.
I want to make a much more drastic proposal. Another hon. Member made a drastic proposal, and, like his, my proposal is not likely to meet with much support in this House. I believe that recent events have exposed the impotence of the United Nations. The power of veto of the Security Council is much to blame, and emphasises its futility. When we talk in the House about strength and weakness it seems as though we are playing with toy soldiers, and moving them here and there. That does not

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help towards a solution of the present situation. We should be aiming at moral strength and moral example. I propose that we should abandon our veto in the Security Council.
This is not a directly related matter, but it would indicate that we are going to pay more than lip service to international co-operation. We should then be the first to take such moral action which somebody must do if there is ever to be any hope of getting a real forum of nations for international co-operation. I suggest that the world would listen a little more strenuously to what we said if, now and again, we were prepared to take a moral stand.
The events in Czechoslovakia have shown the world-wide repugnance that exists to actions of this kind and underlines the universal acceptance of the principle of a nation's right to self-determination, as laid down in the U.N. Charter; that any nation should be entitled to take its own decisions in its own way. The gallant stand which the Czechoslovak people have taken demonstrates the tremendous new emphasis that we can now place on moral resistance. It is clear, in a world in which one test tube can wipe us all out, that moral resistance is our greatest hope. I am not suggesting that we should not have conventional forces. They should exist, but only for specific defensive purposes, or under the direction of an international forum such as the U.N. should be.
I believe that not one iota of the courage being expended by Mr. Dubcek and his fellow Czechoslovaks has been wasted. It has been an example for the world. The better reports which we have been receiving compared with the earlier reports coming out of Czechoslovakia indicate that the Russian authorities are aware that Mr. Dubcek is just the tip of the iceberg or the top of the volcano and that behind him is the massive support of the people of Czechoslovakia and countless thousand, of others in Russia and its satellite nations.
I hope that when Scotland takes its place in the United Nations, as I hope it will, it will be able to welcome Czechoslovakia not as a satellite country but as a self-governing one, choosing its own ideology, its own way and under its own conti Conversely, if Czecho
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slovakia gets there before Scotland, I trust that it will welcome us.
8.22 p.m.
Mr. S. C. Silkin: I hope that the hon. Lady the Member for Hamilton (Mrs. Ewing) will forgive me if I do not follow her into Scotland, attractive though that idea might be.
I do not intend to take up the time of the House by repeating the expressions of condemnation of the outrage which has been inflicted on Czechoslovakia. That has been done far more eloquently and forcefully than I could do it, by authorities as far removed as Peking and King Street.
This debate will have been worth while if it enables us to learn some lessons. I cannot say, however, that I agreed with any of the lessons which the hon. Member for St. Albans (Mr. Goodhew) suggested should be learned. The first lesson which should be learned is one to be learned not by us but by those in Moscow and in the capitals of Russia's allied countries. That lesson is that the rest of the world, including ourselves, is vitally concerned with what happens in any country which is part of the Warsaw Alliance. The authorities in Moscow must not think hereafter that they can do exactly what they wish, so long as they confine their activities to countries in the Communist world, without the rest of the world being concerned.
A number of lessons can and should be learned from the events of the last few days. Although one can see the lessons, it is important that one should not jump to hasty conclusions before the events have come to an end. With some predictable exceptions, the majority of hon. Members have taken a balanced view of the situation and have not jumped to hasty conclusions.
Of vital importance is the question of trust. The vast majority of hon. Members had taken the view that the sequence of events of the last few years had increased the chances of détente between East and West and that that was of the greatest possible value to the security of the world. It would be wrong if, because of the recent series of events—notwithstanding the fact that the trust on which that point of view was based must necessarily to some extent be eroded—we now took the

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view that all possible future progress towards détente was at an end, and adapted our policies accordingly. That would appear to be the view expressed by some hon. Gentlemen opposite.
We must be clear, looking at the matter from the military and political point of view, that it cannot be said that the events of the last few days have altered the balance of power in favour of the Warsaw Pact countries. On the contrary. They have clearly altered the balance of power against them. This is likely to happen even more in future unless some acceptable compromise is produced between Mr. Dubcek and his colleagues and the authorities in Moscow. When I speak of an "acceptable compromise" I do not simply mean the return of Mr. Dubcek to Prague and the withdrawal of Russian forces. I mean that that must be accompanied by a guarantee from the Russians that they will not seek to infringe the freedom for which the Czechs are groping.
It seems to follow from that that although, of course, Her Majesty's Government should look at the situation with fresh eyes—this is an important event and one must reconsider one's policy as a result of it; naturally among the matters that must be considered are the questions of defence, military alliances and so on and the assumptions that have been made about the disposition of our forces—it would be wrong and foolish to go to the extreme to which the hon. Member for St. Albans seemed to be inviting the House to go and now adopt a policy of looking at everything on the most pessimistic possible assumptions. It remains true that détente is the ultimate hope we have and that we must look on that, however realistically we look at the situation in other ways.
The next matter of great importance is the question of free speech generally, an issue which has been raised as a result of these events. There has not been a victory for the forces that are against freedom of speech. On the contrary. I believe that there has been a victory for free speech. I say that because the Russians, by their actions, have shown that the ony way in which freedom of speech can be curtailed or removed is by the use of force, of stratagem and of tanks and soldiers. That is the message we should be sending out
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by every possible means to our friends in Czechoslovakia, indeed, to the Communist world generally, that in order to prevent freedom of speech from spreading throughout the Communist world it was necessary for the Russians and their friends to bring in tanks and soldiers to repress it.
If that is accepted, the next lesson we must learn is that Communism, unlike freedom, is not indivisible. There are different forms of Communism; the Peking Communism, the Moscow Communism as we believed it to be and the Communism as we have now seen it, and the Communism to which Mr. Dubcek and his friends were groping in Prague. It is surely our task not to adopt the sort of monolithic approach towards Communism which has been suggested by some hon. Members opposite as a result of the last few days, but to be selective in our approach, to show that there can be freedom within a Communist society and that freedom is to be encouraged.
That leads one to ask how it came about that this freedom within the Communist society has been growing. I believe the answer is quite inescapable. It has been growing because of the very exchange of cultural activities between East and West, this trade which has grown between Eastern and Western countries, this exchange of tourists between ourselves and countries behind the Iron Curtain, between their citizens and ours. This has led to ideas of freedom being expressed to the ordinary people of the Communist countries. It has led to their receiving them. It has led to the youth of those countries being receptive to these ideas. It has led to them wanting to express these views.
If that is right, can it be a mere coincidence that this idea of freedom has been growing at the same time as these exchanges have been developing? If that is right, the last thing we want to do is to cut off the food of that very freedom, the cultural and trade exchanges and exchanges between citizens which would produce that desire for freedom. These things we should be encouraging rather than discouraging. We ought to be leaving it to the Communist countries, which are afraid of freedom, to pull down the Iron Curtain again, not ourselves to pull it down in their faces.

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I agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. George Brown) in his views on the unity of Europe. This has been expressed again and again in debates on that and other subjects and my views are well known. When we debated the British application to join the Common Market and I succeeded on the third day towards the end of the debate in saying a few words on it, I said that the biggest political reason for a united Europe was that it seemed that the greatest danger to Europe is a divided Germany and that we shall never solve the problem of a divided Germany so long as we have a divided Europe.
I was interested to hear the speech of the Leader of the Opposition, who pinpointed the division of Germany as the great danger which exists today. I agree with him entirely there. If we are to try to heal this rift in Europe—which has grown greater, we cannot deny, as a result of the events of the last few days—we must adopt policies which consciously go towards creating a united Europe. I do not mind whether one agrees with the idea of Britain joining the E.E.C. or not. That is not in issue at the moment. What is in issue is the creation of a united Europe.
I happen to believe that Britain joining the E.E.C. is the best and quickest way of achieving it, but there may be other ways. I am not concerned about that, but I urge, whatever else we do, that we should adopt a policy of strengthening the bonds between the countries of Western Europe with a view ultimately to creating—with the help of the countries of the Warsaw Pact, groping as I am sure they will be in future, towards the same freedoms which we enjoy—that united Europe which will be a safeguard against such events as have occurred in the last few days.
8.35 p.m.
Lieutenant-Commander S. L. C. Maydon: I am glad that Parliament was recalled, if for nothing else, to give me an opportunity to express my contempt for the treachery and cowardice of the Russian action towards Czechoslovakia, a. feeling which, I know, is shared not only in every comer of my constituency but is shared throughout the whole of Britain.
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I agree with the hon. and learned Member for Dulwich (Mr. S. C. Silkin) in saying that there will be a change in the military balance of power, though I believe that it will be only marginal. I do not think that the Russians put great dependence on the Czech Army—they were probably wrong in that—and they will now have to garrison Czechoslovakia unless something quite remarkable and drastic comes out of the exchanges now proceeding in Moscow. However, the difference, which will be a difference to the advantage of the West, is only marginal.
The hon. and learned Gentleman spoke of obtaining a guarantee from Russia In all seriousness, I ask him what sort of guarantee from the U.S.S.R. would be of any value whatever now. After this latest example, we cannot believe one word the Russians say.
We know that the Russians were acting from weakness and from fear, but in many ways this circumstance is far more dangerous than the circumstances of 1939 and before that, which I so well remember, when Hitler's Nazi Germany was acting from strength—folie de grandeur, perhaps, but still strength. Fear, as we all know, is a bad counsellor.
The trouble with the Russians is that in recent years they have been looking over their shoulders to the East and trying to keep up with the Chinese Joneses under Mao Tse-tung, and that has created a dangerous situation. But what has happened in recent weeks was predictable. It certainly seemed likely to me in the early stages of the crisis, when manoeuvres were going on so conveniently close to the Czechoslovak border. We were all lulled, perhaps, into a false sense of security when the manoeuvres stopped and there were negotiations which seemed fruitful. Even Mr. Dubcek himself was taken in by them. But all of a sudden the manoeuvres started again, even closer this time, not in Czechoslovakia itself but very near the border.
It is all very reminiscent of events 30 years ago. I am extremely perturbed to read in The Times today that Moscow has issued a statement guaranteeing the integrity of Rumania and saying that it has no evil intentions towards that country. It may well be Rumania's

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turn tomorrow or the next day. Then what chance has Yugoslavia? Then, perhaps, West Berlin's turn will come. We seem to be going down the same painful slope which we all remember so well.
I do not shed many tears for the Czechs. I admire them for their courage—they have exhibited that in full measure in recent days—but for a generation they have been supping with the Soviet devil and they did not even choose to use a long spoon.
It is all very fine to say, as the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shin-well) did, that we just come here is register our protest—that is all there is to do—and then we shall adjourn and go happily home for another few weeks of Recess. There is far more to be done than that. We have to look to our fences. The Mediterranean, in particular, is flanked by the less stable countries in Europe. That aspect has been referred to in the debate, quite rightly. I hope that the Foreign Secretary has taken note of what has been said in that regard. We must look to our defences. We owe it to ourselves and to our allies.
What else should we do? We must miss no opportunity of encouraging the liberal forces behind the Iron Curtain to go on with what they have been doing. We must do this in ways which cannot be concealed from them or disguised to them. This applies not only to the Czechs, but to the Ukrainians, the Baltic peoples, the Poles and others—indeed, to all those who are working for change in the Communist world.
There has been much talk in the debate about boycotts and embargoes or of cutting off the Russians from diplomatic, cultural, trading and even sporting contacts. These are drastic measures and some of the advantages might be completely obliterated by the disadvantages. But the Russians, like many peoples who have emanated from the East of the land mass, are governed very much by the rules of "face"—loss of face and gain of face—and I think that they are very attentive to the sort of ways in which we could bring our disgust and our protest home to them and to the more liberal people among their populations. This is what we have to try to do.
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I do not pretend to know what is the right method of approach. But I was glad to hear my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Mr. Dodds-Parker) suggest one method which seems to me to be sensible. Do not let us stop all trade with the Russians but make them pay cash on the nail without any of those attractive arrangements for long-term or short-term credit which recently they have been obtaining from us. The Russians are always wanting to acquire more gold or foreign currency and this is one way in which I thing we could bring home to them the disgust and distress we feel at their methods.
We do not want to close channels through which messages of encouragement from the West can get to the more liberal and more sensible people behind the Iron Curtain. But, on the other hand, if we do nothing, we shall embark inevitably on the appeasement slope which led to disaster in 1939. I am glad that we have registered our protest in this House but, apart from that, I am convinced that we must take other measures which will not be damaging to our own Interests nor to the propagation and encouragement of liberal ideas behind the Iron Curtain but which will do more to ensure that Russia and the Russian people generally understand the horror and contempt we feel for what they have done to Czechoslovakia.
8.45 p.m.
Mr. David Winnick: As a Socialist I condemn without reservation the Russian invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia. I believe that it was criminal and illegal, and I am glad of world reaction to it. The illegal, criminal invasion of Czechoslovakia last week has shocked world public opinion.
I have been in the Chamber since 2.30 p.m., and a few rumours have been coming into the Chamber that some kind of settlement has been reached in Moscow. If it is true, and if there is an agreement which will allow Mr. Dubcek and his colleagues to return to their country, one reason why the Russians have backed down is world-wide pressure and the angry reaction in working-class, Socialist and progressive movements throughout the European countries.

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There cannot be the slightest possible justification for what Russia has done. The Russians claim that they were invited into Czechoslovakia. The only authority in Czechoslovakia which could have invited them in legally was the Czechoslovak Government, and they have denied inviting the Russians in and, indeed, have described the invasion in the same terms as those in which I have described it.
It is a great pity that Russia has treated Czechoslovakia as if it were a satellite or, rather, as if it were one of the provinces or republics inside the Soviet Union. Last Wednesday not only did Russia commit a grave crime against a friendly independent country. I also believe that Russia committed a grave crime against the cause of Socialism in Eastern Europe.
Many right hon. and hon. Members who have spoken today have condemned Russia, and I am not at all surprised that they have done so. But, if I may say so, I speak on this issue, as do a number of my right hon. and hon. colleagues, without being a hypocrite. I have always opposed aggression from the Western side, too. We know that in the last few years the United States has committed various forms of aggression in Latin America—for example, in Guatemala in 1954, in the disastrous Bay of Pigs attempt to overthrow the Castro Government in Cuba and in the intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, let alone in the colonial war which the United States is waging in South-East Asia.
What has been the reaction of most Socialists to American intervention in Latin America and Vietnam? We have condemned such aggression, and we have done so without any reservation. In the same way, in 1956 we condemned the attempt by the Tory Government at the time to commit aggression against Egypt. I find it very difficult to understand how anyone who in any way justified what Britain did in 1956 can now lecture the Russians.
Today, when we condemn what the Russians are doing, we do so with sincerity and as Socialists who have always condemned aggression on the Western side. We are not hypocrites. We know only too well what has been done by the West in the last few years. But that in no way condones or excuses the Russian
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crime against the Czechoslovak nation or people.
I want to speak briefly about the internal situation in Czechoslovakia in the last six months. I was greatly encouraged by the changes and reforms which have been carried out in Czechoslovakia in the last six months, because it seemed to me that in that country they were making a genuine attempt to marry a Socialist economic system with democratic rights and liberties. Here was an attempt by one Communist country to build a Socialist society without a secret police, without coercion and without brutality. I thought that not only was Czechoslovakia offering a lesson for her Eastern European neighbours but, in my view, under the Dubcek leadership, she was offering important lessons for many of us in Western Europe. People like ourselves, who want to build a Socialist society and to see a change in the social system, want to see it without bloodshed and brutality. An experiment was being tried in Czechoslovakia which I believe to be of the utmost importance.
Let it be stated that the experiment which has been tried in Czechoslovakia has been crushed for the moment, not by superior Russian arguments, not by better debate by the Russian leadership but by Russian tanks and Russian troops, and at present by the terror of the occupation inside Czechoslovakia.
I also believe, together with a number of my hon. and right hon. Friends, that the Soviet leadership, the little people who run the Soviet Union at present, have been frightened by the ideas of freedom, frightened that those ideas put forward in Czechoslovakia could spread even to the Soviet Union itself. I do not want to deviate from the main subject, but it must be said that, as a Socialist, I am very disturbed by many events inside the Soviet Union. I am disturbed by the way in which it has been found necessary to imprison intellectuals and writers, and by the way in which it is virtually impossible for a number of Russian novelists to have their letters of protest published, let alone their works.
It reflects no credit on the Soviet Union that it finds it necessary to do this. I believe that if the people in the Soviet Union could express their views, they would be the same as ours—that there was no justification for the occupation of

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Czechoslovakia last week, and that the Russian leadership was very much in the wrong. I cannot associate the Russian leadership with the Russian people any more than when I look at the crimes which the American Government is committing in Vietnam can I associate the American Government, the Johnson Administration, with the American people. I make a distinction between Government and people.
I am also extremely worried at various arrests which have been taking place in Czechoslovakia in the last few days. A number of writers and critics of Stalinism have been arrested by the secret police. As long as the occupation continues there must be a great fear in our minds that such people could possibly be murdered, or deported at a later stage to the Soviet Union. The more protests there are, the more concern which is expressed by the working class, the Labour Movement, the greater is the safety of those who have been arrested.
It has been asked what sort of support can we give to the Czechoslovakian people? I have sat here throughout the debate and it is interesting to note that not one speaker from the other side of the House has suggested that we should intervene in a military way. It is out of the question. What sort of support can we given to what I believe are the heroic and brave Czechoslovakian people who are at present defying the occupation troops and showing their desire to remain independent? The greatest support that we can give is moral. Here I can only speak as a Socialist.
When I talk about moral support for the Czechoslovakian people I mean it in the same way as we give moral support from the Left-wing in Britain to the Vietnamese people who are fighting the United States; in the same way as we give moral support to the South Africans, millions of them who are denied elementary and basic freedoms; moral support in the same way as we give it to the Greek people who want to remove the dictatorship which came into existence over 12 months ago.
The immediate demand must be for the removal of the Russian occupation troops. I am not now speaking to the Tories, because there is very little in common between Conservative Members
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and myself, and I am not ashamed of that. I speak to the Labour movement inside and outside this House. Our job in the next few days is to make sure that the question of Czechoslovakia is raised at trade union branches and at constituency party meetings, to make sure that as many resolutions as possible come from the British Labour movement, to the Soviet Embassy and to the Russian leadership, expressing our complete disapproval and disgust at what the Russians have done.
At the same time Socialists in Britain should not hesitate to send their complete and unanimous support to the Czechoslovakian Embassy, so that it can be sent on to the Czechs. The Russians will be forced to withdraw their troops because they know only too well the situation now existing in Czechoslovakia. Aggression can never be accepted or condoned in any way, whether aggression from the United States, ourselves or the Soviet Union. Aggression must be condemned and, because I believe that, I have no hesitation in saying that we should today express our strongest disapproval of what the Soviet Union did last week in Czechoslovakia.
8.55 p.m.
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: The hon. Member for Croydon, South (Mr. Winnick) has been the last of the speakers from the back benches and he has echoed the general condemnation of the Russian action in invading Czechoslovakia. The Foreign Secretary and I have heard most of today's speeches, and if one of the reasons for the Government's recalling Parliament was to receive a unanimous protest concerning the Russian action in Czechoslovakia, that result is achieved. I believe that the House has been entirely unanimous on that point.
The feelings which have inspired the speeches have been a mixture of shock, incredulity and anger that 30 years after Hitler attacked Czechoslovakia, and 10 years after Russia's invasion of Hungary, the Soviet Union has now once again demonstrated a crude display of naked power not only at the expense of an independent country, but at the expense of a Communist ally.
There are certain particularly revolting aspects of this action: the claim that the

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invasion was a response to Czech invitation; the lies concerning the Western incitement and re-armament of Czechoslovakia; the deception which used the meeting of conciliation at Bratislava as a means to the end of an occupation by force, and, the greatest hypocrisy of all—and surely hypocrisy can be carried no further—the participation of East Germans and Hungarians in this sordid action.
I take the point made by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Belper (Mr. George Brown) that we should seek to encourage in Eastern Europe, and even in the Soviet Union, and even in the Government of the Soviet Union, those who favour less forceful action than that taken by the Russians this week. But it is, as he will know very well, very difficult for us to know who within the Soviet set-up are the "hawks" and who are the "doves"; who were for the action and who were against it. I myself suspect that a large part was played by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Its members were responsible for getting rid of Mr. Khrushchev when, in their view, his views were too liberal. He had to answer to them. So with the present leaders and Government of the Soviet Union, but Governments must take responsibility for actions and the Soviet Government cannot be excused.
The anger of free people is righteous in that the Soviet Union has so lately been preaching the virtues of co-existence, and by contrast it has this week been guilty of acts which deserve no other description than that they are the acts of barbarians. It is anger compounded with frustration because the world, if the Russians persist on their present course, will have to look forward to and endure another period of tension, instead of deploying the resources of the world for the purposes of peaceful construction. Once more we shall have to think in terms of increasing armaments and defence; in other words, in terms of the context of security rather than that of development which all of us want to see, with the probability that, as China finds her strength, we may be in for another period of tension with the Soviet Union—for many years, perhaps, of cold war.
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There is frustration, too, because there is an almost universal desire in this country, even though the Czechs are Communists, to be able to help the victims, whose only sin has been to discover for themselves that Communism and freedom are incompatible with each other.
The House has today considered various forms of possible action which might induce the Soviet Union to think again. There is action in the United Nations. My right hon. Friend the Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys) made a point which is, I believe, valid: why did not the United Nations debate this question when attention was drawn to it in this House by a resolution as early as July? Still, it is unwise in this case to job backwards. Any action of the Security Council will, clearly, be vetoed by the Russians, and action will, therefore, be paralysed.
I wonder whether the Foreign Secretary can say what has happened to the resolution put forward by the Canadian Government, which proposed that there might be observers in Czechoslovakia. Is that being proceeded with or not? Does the Foreign Secretary, as my right hon. Friend asked, propose to call together the Assembly of the United Nations? I hope that his answer will be "Yes". This could register world opinion; and if there are any who will not condemn the Soviet Union for this action it is better that we should know who they are.
The House is in general agreement that there is no military action that can be taken in this matter other than, of course, a nuclear response, which is out of the question in this case. We have long known that the nuclear arm has a place in peacekeeping. The Leader of the Liberal Party, I was somewhat surprised to see, admitted this. At least, it prevents a challenge from one great Power to another. Yet one has to recognise, too, that in some degree the nuclear umbrella can facilitate the evil plans of an aggressor determined on promoting smaller wars or wars at second hand or takeovers of smaller countries which are not defended by a collective defence alliance. To that, I shall return.
In the general desire to comfort and help the Czechs short of military intervention, hon. Members have canvassed and proposed a number of actions. Very

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few, if any, have supported the idea of trade sanctions. Rather more have supported the idea of a spontaneous boycott by individuals of all things Russian. A case—I think that this is worth saying—can certainly be made for sanctions according to the terms of the United Nations Charter, and the rules could be justly applied because this action of the Soviet Union is not only a threat to the peace but actually a breach of the peace in which people of an independent country have been shot down by the invader. The case is valid, although it could not be pressed home because of the veto.
Nevertheless, on balance, I am certain that the decision of one hon. and right hon. Member after another in this debate that we should not resort to trade sanctions is right. First of all, they would not be effective. It is worth recalling that there is an embargo already on goods which contribute to the military build-up by the Western world. But the Russians possess all the weapons they want, conventional and nuclear. Also, sanctions would be represented to the Russian people as an imperialist plot to destroy socialism. If anything, such action would consolidate the Russian leadership in the eyes of the Russian people and in the eyes of the peoples of the countries of Western Europe, so powerful is the Russian propaganda machine.
There is one final consideration which I think is decisive. It was mentioned by the hon. Member for Coventry, North (Mr. Edelman), and it was implied in the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Bute and North Ayrshire (Sir F. Maclean). It is this: if anything has contributed to the dilution of the closed society of Communism it has been trade and contact with the people of the outside world. It has shown the Russians how other people live and given to the Russian people the only proof which they ever see that the world is not as their Communist propagandists paint it. With trade sanctions and an official boycott by the British Government, all that would end.
When we come to the more positive action which might be taken by the British Government, I take it that the Government will give very careful con-1404
sideration to whether they should recognise the new Czech Government. I am not asking the Foreign Secretary for an answer tonight; clearly, this is a matter of very delicate balance. But if this Government turned out to be a complete stooge Government, I think that the country would expect the British Government not to recognise it, but to leave it there.
I hope—and this has been mentioned by one or two hon. Members—that the Government have decided that they will look after the Czech students who are here and will help them to stay here for as long as is necessary and until they wish to return to their own country. I remember that in the case of Hungary, which earlier suffered an invasion from the Soviet Union, an institution was set up with funds to maintain contact with people in difficulty. I do not suggest that there is an exact parallel here, but the Government might keep that precedent in mind should the situation harden.
I hope, too, that the B.B.C. can be given the necessary funds to re-establish the broadcasting service in Eastern Europe, for which its funds were cut, so that the plain facts, not propaganda, can be broadcast throughout Eastern Europe.
Like many right hon. and hon. Members today, I come to the conclusion that the demonstration which will have most effect on the Soviet Union is that of contempt of individuals for what they have done. Let it be made clear spontaneously by all individuals that they consider the behaviour of the Soviet Government to be the behaviour of uncivilised barbarians. The Russians are attentive in some respects to world opinion, they are sensitive in some respects, and this will hurt.
There are the great difficulties which the Government face, and which indeed we all face, about whether there should be a ban on all activities under the general heading of "culture". I think that there was a large consensus in the House that this would be a mistake, or, at any rate, for the Government to take the lead, although I would make one exception immediately, the one made by my right hon. Friend, namely, that it would be totally intolerable if the Red Army Choir were to come to this country

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at present. I am sure that the Foreign Secretary will agree and that the promoters, even if they wish to go on with it, should not do so.
However, depending on how the situation develops, there is something else which the right hon. Gentleman will have to watch The Russians are masters at using this kind of thing to spread their propaganda and, therefore, I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will watch the activities of any other organisation in this country or which might come to this country which could be said to be part of the State apparatus of the Soviet Union and which would spread propaganda in this country on its behalf.
There is a consideration about the Red Army Choir which weighs with me a lot. It would be incomprehensible in Czechoslovakia and among those in Eastern Europe who look for encouragement to the free if it were allowed to come here. Militarily, the West is not required to intervene in this situation and we have no treaty obligation to oblige us to do so. If, however, Communist can eat Communist in this way, as has been proved in these last few weeks, what are the rest to expect?
It does not follow that because the Russians have acted with particular brutality where they consider that their security is threatened in an area which they look upon as an essential nerve centre, they are thereby serving notice of an offensive against the rest of the world. The real reasons, I think, why they have done this are two. The first is that freedom is infectious and, undoubtedly, if there was freedom of expression in newspapers and radio in Czechoslovakia, this would spread to Poland and East Germany. This they cannot stand. It is a measure of the rottenness of the Communist system that they cannot do so.
The other reason is that since the war they have taken this kind of action in Berlin, in Hungary and, now, in Czechoslovakia, because those countries lie on the security routes to the Soviet Union. This is part of the Soviet defence, part, if one likes, of Soviet colonialism and imperialism. There is, therefore, one aspect of this which has to do with Communism and there is another which has to do purely with the defence of the Soviet Union.
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I have said that there is no reason—or it is not a certainty, at any rate—why this should lead to an offensive by the Soviet Union in a wider field. I say that, too, because that is not the Communist way. What we can anticipate now is a lull, quite likely an offensive on the disarmament front to take the eye off what the Russians have done in Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, countries which are free today may inadvertently cross the path of Soviet ambitions and, perhaps, of Chinese ambitions later. It is for this reason that, not today, but on a future occasion, we must look at our defence policies again.
To review the N.A.T.O. policies is nothing to do with Czechoslovakia or any intention of intervening in Eastern Europe. We have no obligation to do that and no intention of doing it in any circumstances. We must, however, review our defence policy. In response to the hon. Member for Buckingham (Mr. Maxwell), who made a remarkable speech today—I am sorry that he is not now present; his origins are in Czechoslovakia—I would say that we have to look at our defence policies not in panic, but in prudence.
The Prime Minister, I think, and the Foreign Secretary have obviously concluded that N.A.T.O. must look to its force levels, but, above all, to its contingency planning. For that purpose, it is right to call a Council of N.A.T.O. at Ministerial level, either Heads of Governments or Foreign Secretaries.
I agree with my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, who opened the debate from this side, and with other hon. Members who have spoken later, that it is not an occasion to go very much further into the detailed effects of the Russian action on British and allied military planning, but there are certain matters to which the House as a whole will have to give the closest attention in the coming weeks and months, particularly when we reassemble later.
First, there is the state of our own forces. Particularly, I would recommend to the Secretary of State for Defence a look at the size of our Army, at the prospects of recruiting, and the situation of the reserves. Trouble, let me remind the House, could in the next few years arise simultaneously both in Europe and in other places where we

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still, even with the Government's programme, have obligations. There is, too, need to consider with our allies the implications of the Soviet submarine fleet and its rapid annual increase, putting it far ahead at the moment of the Americans'—I would think, ahead of the Americans' plus the other allies of N.A.T.O. The defences of the free world's trade routes must be secured. This is why we have to look at this aspect of defence again.
We shall ask the Government to reconsider their policy in strategic areas where there is now political stability, where there is now British presence, but which could be targets for subversion and takeover, and, in particular, we shall ask them to introduce flexibility in the dates of withdrawal of British presences now scheduled for 1971. These things can be developed another day.
There are reports this evening from Moscow of an agreement between the Soviet Government and the Czechs. I thought that the essential point, if I may say so, was made by the right hon. Member for Belper, and which has since been repeated by a great many other hon. Members, that unless part of this agreement is that Soviet troops shall finally leave Czechoslovakia there can be no trust in future between the Western world or the free world and the Soviet leaders. Withdrawal must, therefore, be part of any agreement. We shall see. But I am bound to say that even if there is an agreement the Soviet Union has seriously damaged itself. With the best will in the world it is difficult to see how the words of Soviet leaders who have indulged in such deception can be taken at their face value or even believed. It may be possible, if withdrawal is a reality, laboriously to build the broken pieces together again. I hope so.
There is work to be done, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Wirral (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd) reminded us, in trying to find a better system of security for Central Europe, including Berlin and relations between N.A.T.O. and the Warsaw Pact, and that we ought to do if we can possible do it. There are plans, I would remind the House, which were first laid, I think, by Sir Anthony Eden, and which are now in the pigeonholes and which could with
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advantage be taken out. If some of those plans could be adopted a great burden would be taken off the shoulders of the people of Europe as a whole.
In such situations as we find ourselves in today, as we have done before in our recent history, we find there is a dictatorial Power practising diplomacy and prepared to back diplomacy with force. There is on the Western side and the side of the free world, let us remember, a well-tried practice of diplomacy in such situations, and that is to pursue a two-handed policy, of conciliation, on the one hand, and strength, on the other. Conciliation is essential because the price of dropping it is too high and the prizes of success are too priceless to miss. Therefore, a part of the British Government's policy must always be one of conciliation, whatever party is in power. How far it should be carried is another matter in any given situation, but conciliation must be one element in our policy.
The other and equally important element is strength. I interpret strength as being the absolute will to perfect the security systems of the free world so that not one yard of free territory and not one human being in the free world can be absorbed into the Russian or Chinese empires. It is not easy to do, but that must be our resolution.
In Europe, we are lucky enough to have the N.A.T.O. Alliance. Those of us who remember the early days after the war would not have laid very long odds against the communists taking over large parts of the continent in Western Europe. The N.A.T.O. Alliance was set up, and, since then, we have not lost a yard of territory and we have not surrendered a free man. That is the value of the Alliance.
I will leave the personalities out of it, but the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Michael Foot) reminded the House of Munich. Some people learned the lesson of Munich, and some did not. I hope that I learned that never again should Britain go into negotiation with a dictatorial power in a state of weakness. Therefore, I hope in this debate that we are resolved not only that it is right to condemn the Soviet Union for a barbaric act, but also that we shall pursue a policy of strength and conciliation. In that way, we pray that even now

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there may be a chance to rebuild and, even now, that we may be able to make agreements with the Communist world that will be of benefit to all mankind.
9.22 p.m.
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Michael Stewart): I have to tell the House that the only reliable information that I have is that the talks in Moscow are still proceeding. There have been various unconfirmed reports as to the nature of an agreement that might emerge. I am not in a position at this time to confirm those reports. I thought that the House would wish me to begin by a statement of the position as we now know it. In Moscow, it is now approaching half-past eleven and, of course, the situation may change even while I am speaking now. However, that is what I now know it to be.
Whatever statement may come out of the talks in Moscow, I think that the whole House will accept what was said by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister when he opened this debate. We shall have to judge by events, by what actually happens, more than by what is said in a statement. We shall have to interpret the words of the statement, whatever they may be, in the light of the events that follow.
We should also remember the circumstances in which the talks in Moscow are being held. Unlike the talks in Cierna or Bratislava, they are being held after the invasion and during the occupation of Czechoslovakia. Unlike the conversations at Cierna and Bratislava, they are not being held in Czechoslovakia.
As I am not in a position to tell the House more than that, it follows that some of the judgments that we can make in this debate and some of the answers I must give to the many questions that have been asked must be of a tentative or provisional nature, because there are several courses of action where a final decision can be reached only in the light of events about which we may know more in a day or two or perhaps even in an hour or two.
But I take it that the purpose of the House in coming together today was, first, to express its admiration to the Czechoslovak people not only for their courage. but for that rare and more precious com-
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bination of courage with self-restraint under enormous provocation. For that, whatever course events may take, all Europe and all the world is in their debt.
The second purpose was to make quite clear that the condemnation of the invasion, which was immediately voiced by the Government, should be endorsed by the House, representing the British people as a whole. That has undoubtedly been done. If I add words now, even if it involves repetition of what everyone knows and feels, it is because I do not think I could speak in this debate without adding my own comment of condemnation on this operation.
What was the nature of the operation? It was asserted, in the message sent to us and to other Governments by the Soviet Government, that their troops were entering at the request of Czechoslovakia. That was not true. No shadow of evidence, even of pretended evidence—this is in a way remarkable, almost unique—has been produced to justify that allegation.
It was said that the occupation had the support of the Czechoslovak people. This is what the citizens of the Soviet Union are being told. There is no evidence for that either. It is a complete falsehood.
It was further said that the troops would be withdrawn when the legal authorities in Czechoslovakia decided that there was no longer any need for them to stay. The legal authorities in Czechoslovakia have been of that opinion throughout the whole process. The world now waits for the Soviet Union to make good the undertaking that they gave as recently as that statement in the small hours of Wednesday morning.
Here is an operation, a defiance of international law, of the Charter of the United Nations, a betrayal of an ally, and surrounded by a tissue of excuses that will not stand examination. What is allegedly the reason given for this operation? We should pause for a moment to examine it. It is that this measure is necessary for the security both of the Soviet Union and of the Warsaw Pact as a whole. I suppose that we ought to give some consideration to this, though I have never held it a right doctrine for any nation to say that it is entitled to send its troops into the territory of another country against that country's

1411
will simply because it serves its own security. That is not how our alliance works. No country in N.A.T.O. has troops other than its own on its territory, except with the approval of the lawful Government of that country.
Even if there is this concern by the Soviet Government and the Warsaw Pact countries for their security we know what that means; it means their oft-expressed dread of what they call German revanchism.
In the light of what I have already said I do not think that the House will charge me with wanting in any way to excuse or palliate what has been done, but if we are to take the measure of the seriousness of this intervention we must accept that of all the torrents of comment that pour out from the Soviet Union about their dread of German revanchism, much is sheer propaganda, and never intended to be anything else. But part of it represents a genuinely felt anxiety, even though that anxiety is not justified by the facts, and we should not be understanding the position in Europe if we did not realise that that was so.
But why, then, did the Soviet Union take this action at a time when, over months, the German Government and the German Foreign Minister, Herr Brandt, had been diligently pursuing a policy aimed at better relations and a better understanding with the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries as a whole? If there is in the Soviet mind a genuine anxiety—and I do not dispute this—they ought all the more to have taken the opportunity which the trend of German Government policy was offering to try to lay once and for all this spectre that frightens them. To attempt to deal with it violently and illegally when the way was open to deal with it patiently and reasonably, by argument, with Germany and with all of us in the West—this is what is inexcusable. If, now—and I do not rule out this possibility—the Soviet Government will do what my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. George Brown) has urged, namely, open the door again to reason, let us by all means see, if they have legitimate fears, how those can be laid.
But I do not believe that the excuse of the security of the Warsaw Pact was
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the only motive for the action that they have taken. The other motive, to which many hon. Members have referred, was the threat of what is called "liberalisation". The fact that they thought it necessary to take action of this sort because of the threat of liberalisation in Czechoslovakia demonstrates something to which the whole world should pay attention. It demonstrates the truth about Communism as the Russians now practise it. I use that phrase because I think that we have all come to accept that the word "Communism" does not mean the same thing in every country of Eastern Europe. If we look over the whole map—Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary—we find that it does not mean the same thing in every case. I speak, therefore, of Communism as the Russians now practise it.
The action that they have taken in the last few days shows that Communism as they now practice it is completely incompatible not with what we could call liberalisation but with what Mr. Dubcek would call liberalisation. It shows, too, that the Russian version of Communism is incompatible with the sovereignty and independence of States which are allied to the Soviet Union. It shows—perhaps most serious of all, in the long run—that Communism as the Russians now practise and understand it is incapable of responding to change and incapable of that flexibility which the present world situation so urgently requires—that flexibility which is particularly required in dealing with the problems of an advanced industrial society like that of Czechoslovakia. This is what the Russian action has revealed about the nature of Communism as they now preach and practice it.
That is what makes the whole matter important, not merely to us in Europe, not merely to N.A.T.O., but to the whole world, because if we look at the world as a whole we see the two great blocs, the Warsaw Pact and N.A.T.O. countries. We also see a large number of uncommitted countries which look at the military power of the two blocs with unease, and which look—we must recognise this—at the protestations and justifications of both blocs with scepticism. We have this large number of uncommitted countries still sitting, sometimes silently and

1413
sometimes vocally, in judgment on our actions and principles.
It is surely important, if they are to reach a right judgment, that they should notice what the Russians themselves have now proved to the world about the nature of Communism as it now emanates from the Kremlin. That was why Her Majesty's Government, immediately after expressing their condemnation of the invasion, pressed in the United Nations for world condemnation. We did that for the reason I have mentioned; that there is here a truth and a lesson which should be brought to the attention of the whole world.
We all know the limitations on the powers of the United Nations. It was deliberately framed in such a manner that it could not operate in the sense of direct action unless there is agreement among the great powers. That we have always known to be part of the nature of the United Nations. But to accept that limitation, whether or not one likes it, is not to say that the United Nations is useless. It is, among many other things, the place where this process of judging by the uncommitted—the formation of the judgment which they will ultimately pass on us and Communism—is made. It is in the United Nations in particular that this process of forming their judgment and decision will be made. That, therefore, was why we pressed for speedy action in the United Nations.
I was asked why we did not go there before. I think the whole House will accept—this has been said by several hon. Members—that when a Government are deciding exactly what United Nations procedures they should operate, there is often a nice balancing of pros and cons. I ask the House to note that in the debate in the Security Council there was a very powerful intervention by a man who was able to speak for Czechoslovakia. An intervention of that kind would not have been available to us if we had raised the matter in July. We formed the view that the kind of debate which we would then have got would not have been helpful as a warning and, indeed, might have been injurious.
It is open to hon. Members to say that perhaps the balance of argument could operate the other way. But I submit that it is not open to hon. Members
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to suggest that Her Majesty's Government or other Governments in the United Nations were averting their eyes from what was happening. I ask hon. Members who have doubts about this to study the speech which I made at about that time in the House, in which, while recognising the delicacy of the situation, I made it very clear what our views about the rights of Czechoslovakia were. The Government have not lost other opportunities of making clear to the Soviet Government in advance what our view was.
I do not think I need go over events in the United Nations because they have been set out for hon. Members in the White Paper, but there are two further questions I have been asked. With regard to the Canadian resolution, at present the Security Council has adjourned because the conversations are going on in Moscow. The Council feels, I think not unreasonably, that it would be better to resume when the results of those conversations are known, when one will be able to make a judgment about the best course to take on the Canadian resolution. Indeed, if all went well, the need for the resolution would have disappeared, but the Security Council is still seized of the whole question.
That is one reason for not immediately taking it to the Assembly. I must ask the House to accept that I cannot at this stage say positively whether we should take this to the Assembly. I have noted very carefully the opinions expressed on this matter and I think the general trend of opinion is in favour of taking it there, but I ask the House to notice, first, the point I have already made, that the Security Council itself is still seized of the matter; second, that we have clearly got to make the judgment on this in the light of the course of events in the very near future; and, thirdly, that in taking a decision about this we must give great weight to the wishes and the interests of Czechoslovakia herself.
I have spoken of our condemnation, of the steps we have taken in the United Nations, and how the matter stands now. Much of the debate has been concerned with the question of what further action it is now appropriate for Britain and her friends and allies to take. It is with that I want now to deal. I think this question of further action fell into three parts,

1415
first, further action in the field of defence; second, further action in the field of all the many contacts, commercial, cultural and the rest, that there are between us and Eastern Europe; and then, on the longer term, further action on the whole matter of policy which has come to be designated by the word détente.
Let me take first the matter of defence. The right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) spoke more gently than some of his hon. Friends on this matter, and spoke I think the better for that. He said we must consider this matter of defence in prudence and not in panic. I would accept that; indeed I would commend it to some other speakers in the debate. There are certain to be opportunities for the House to discuss defence policy. It is a matter that is continually the subject of vigilance by the Government and frequently the subject of inquiry and debate by the House. When we next have such a discussion quite certainly we shall have to make the evaluation, which I do not think we can justly make at the present time, of exactly how far the present situation has shifted the balance of power.
My hon. Friend the Member for Edmonton (Mr. Albu) expressed the view—I think he argued this very forcibly—that it has not shifted the balance of power at all. An hon. Member opposite argued that if there were a shift it was only a marginal one. In the light of that, we must set aside demands, such as that made by the right hon. Member for Kingston-upon-Thames (Mr. Boyd-Carpenter), for the immediate taking of a whole battery of military measures, some of them far from appropriate to the present situation.
Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: I do not think that he was in the House at the time, but is not the right hon. Gentleman aware that the request I made was perfectly simple—to halt the Government's present policy of unilaterally disarming, not at this stage by an increase but by stopping the decrease in our defence structure?
Mr. Stewart: The right hon. Gentleman is right when he says that I had not the good fortune to hear his speech, though I have attended nearly all the debate, but I think I am right in saying
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that he made a number of rather more detailed demands apart from that general request. I must set them aside. I cannot accept the suggestion that the Government have been pursuing a policy of unilateral disarmament. There is no nation of our size and resources which is at present carrying as many responsibilities in the world as we are.
As regards some of the responsibilities furthest from this country, I could not accept the proposition that what has happened in recent events requires a reconsideration of the policies announced for the Middle East and Far East. It was inevitable, in view of the whole march of history, that we could not in this century go on occupying the peculiar position of tutelage which we occupied in the Persian Gulf and the exceptional military responsibilities so far afield. That is a conclusion to which this Government were bound to come and to which right hon. and hon. Members opposite, if they were to succeed us, would have to come as well.
The events happening as they are now in Europe tend to justify the argument that, if we are to use our defence resources to the best advantage, we must not attempt to do too many different things at once. We must, in particular, have a concentration towards Europe. That is exactly what we have done, and that is why we have been able to make an increased pledge of support towards N.A.T.O., a pledge which was welcome to our allies at the recent Reykjavik conference.
That brings me to the question of N.A.T.O. In the context of our defence, this is the heart of the matter, and I understood why the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition asked me several questions about it. The effectiveness of N.A.T.O. depends not only on the amount of military power of which its members dispose but on the certainty that they would act together if attacked. It is that which we have repeatedly made clear. It is that which it may be necessary—indeed, it is necessary—to restate plainly at the present time. The whole House has accepted, whether it liked it or not, that neither our powers nor our responsibilities extended to military action in Eastern Europe. But it must be clear to everyone in the world that the members of N.A.T.O. regard an attack on any one of them as an attack

1417
on all, and they would go—what was the right hon. Gentleman's expression?—to the full length of their mutual defence.
That is why, although the present situation resembles 1938 in some respects, it does not, fortunately, resemble it in one important respect. In 1938 we all knew, I think, that the feet of Europe were set irretraceably on the road to war; the only question was when the disaster would come, and it might be immediately upon us. That is not the situation we face now. We face, as I shall show, in some ways a more complex, more difficult situation but not one with that terrible imminence, and the reason we do not face it is because N.A.T.O. exists.
There are a number of detailed military matters to which N.A.T.O. should pay attention. The right hon. Gentleman mentioned the Berlin contingency plan and several other matters. I assure him that these things are already the subject of close consultation with our allies. Our permanent representative to N.A.T.O., Sir Bernard Burrows, went back from leave to his place at Brussels as soon as the crisis broke. All these matters will be the subject of proper examination and I do not think that it follows—and here again I must ask the House to accept that this is something on which I must reserve judgment in the light of what may occur for good or ill in the near future—that the case is made out for a meeting of a political summit of N.A.T.O. I was impressed, as were many hon. Members, by the speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper, who put the N.A.T.O. aspect of this matter in its proper proportion.
Now I turn to the complex question of the many different kinds of contacts we have with the Soviet Union. There are, as I say, many kinds of contacts and it is not surprising that several hon. Members have been in two minds about this. First, I think that it is generally agreed that attempts to break ordinary trade between us and Eastern Europe are not relevant, would not be useful and are not the proper line of policy at the present time. The right hon. Gentleman argued against a trade ban. His first argument was that trade is one of the ways in which we keep the Russians informed of what life in the West is like,
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and this would apply also against a wholesale ban of cultural activities.
I do not believe that there should be a complete breakdown in these but I am bound to say that it will be extremely difficult to make the impressive steps forward in this field that we had hoped to make before this disaster fell upon Europe. For example we cannot go ahead with the Anglo-Soviet Historical Exhibition in Moscow. That was to depict Anglo-Soviet relations since the Middle Ages. [Laughter.] I am sorry, I should have said, Anglo-Russian relations. But unless we can put into that exhibition a special section dealing with Anglo-Soviet relations in the last five days, I do not think that it would be appropriate to hold it.
I also think that we should avoid contacts which have clear political overtones and are of such a nature that the very fact that one has such a contact could be quoted as evidence that Britain really did not mind what had happened. I have, therefore, cancelled my own projected visits to Hungary and Bulgaria. Nor will for the present other Ministerial visits take place. I think also that for the present it would not be appropriate for hon. Members of this House to visit the countries which have taken part in the invasion. It would be totally wrong for the Red Army Choir to come to this country and this has been made clear to the impresario concerned.
The whole question of contacts will, of course, be a matter not only for Governmental, but for voluntary action. I note that the T.U.C. has withdrawn the invitation it sent to Mr. Shelepin. It is as well that there should be voluntary acts as well, because, in our country, opinion is not something manufactured by the Government alone and presented as a line to follow to the rest of the nation. When the nation feels as one, it should express itself in many voices both public and private.
I do not believe that it would be right to break off diplomatic contacts with countries of Eastern Europe. The Government which we recognise in Czechoslovakia is the present lawful Government of Czechoslovakia, and there we are.
I was asked about information. The B.B.C. has extended the number of its broadcasts, it is employing a much

1419
greater number of transmitters in an effort to defeat jamming and it is making the content of the broadcasts more factual news at the expense of items of a more general or timeless character.
The House has already been told that we are taking all steps necessary for the welfare of Czechoslovak students and others who find themselves in this country and are unable or unwilling to return.
Mr. Maxwell rose—
Mr. Stewart: I am sorry, but I cannot give way. I have only a few minutes more and I must deal with the question of the future of what is called détente.
May I pick up two remarks which were made about that and which set the problem very well? The right hon. Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys) said that détente. is an illusion. He could not be more wrong. The hon. Member for Bute and North Ayrshire (Sir F. Maclean) said that it takes two to make adétente.—and that is true. If we pretended that adétente. could be made by one side alone, it would be an illusion. We have never suffered from that illusion. But let us not write off the attempt to get understanding with Eastern Europe as an illusion.
Mr. Sandys rose—
Mr. Stewart: I must ask the right hon. Gentleman not to intervene.
Mr. Sandys: The right hon. Gentleman is misrepresenting my argument.
Mr. Stewart: I was present when the right hon. Gentleman spoke and I listened carefully to his speech. I thought the right hon. Gentleman more contemptuous of détente. than apparently he is. If that is so, well and good.
We must persist with the policy of seeking understanding if it can be got without surrender of territory, persons or principles. We can make it clear, I think, to the Russians that détente. is the way of safety for them and for all mankind.
The House has, I think, achieved the purposes which it set itself in this debate.
1420
There is no doubt of our condemnation of the invasion by Russia and her allies. We have also urged that if there is yet time for better counsel, they should undo this act and withdraw the troops. The hon. Member for Bute and North Ayrshire said that there are the beginnings of a public opinion in Russia. I believe that he is right. I wish that the beginnings had gone a little further. But, in so far as there is anything that could be called a public opinion, I hope that it will realise that the Russians can still undo the damage that has been done if they will withdraw the troops and if they will make it clear that they accept the principles of international law.
We have condemned the invasion. We have urged a right policy. For the long term, although our policy—and I do not dissent from the right hon. Gentleman's description of it as firmness and conciliation—has to be painted in rather plainer and starker terms than before, and although the prospect of achieving understanding is inevitably pushed further into the future, the main essentials of the policy must remain, because mankind is destroyed if we do not get understanding and liberty would be destroyed if we were the victims of illusion and thought that understanding could be purchased at any price.
Liberty could be thrown away if we neglected our defences. I have dealt with the fact that we are not doing that, and the Government can readily meet any further discussion of that matter which the House may in future require. Liberty could be lost if we neglected our defences. Peace could be wantonly thrown away if we were now swept off by these events into counsels of despair. We shall make neither of these errors. Difficult as it is, we shall persist in the policy, which we believe to be right and which we believe to carry with it the hopes of mankind.
Mr. Harry Gourlay (Lord Commissioner of the Treasury): I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Motion.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

FLOODS, SOUTH-WEST (RELIEF)
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Gourlay.]
10.0 p.m.
Mr. Peter Emery: Turning from international tragedy and pathos to regional exasperation and anger is a short step in this House. I thank you, Mr. Speaker, for allowing me this Adjournment on the question of flood relief for the West Country, at short notice, thus enabling me to raise at least one pleasing aspect in today's proceedings—the landslide of views from the South-West, and bring them to the attention of Ministers. These are views not just from my own constituency, but from Somerset, Wiltshire, Devon, Gloucestershire and Bath and Bristol. I thank the Joint Parliamentary Secretaries for the Ministry of Housing and Local Government and the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food for attending the debate.
My worst fears, when my hon. Friend the Member for Torrington (Mr. Peter Mills) and myself divided the House on the Motion for the Summer Recess, have been realised. We felt then that with Parliament out of the way the need for Government help to the relief funds would somehow be pushed under the carpet, and not dealt with in the way that most people believed essential. It is no understatement to say that the West Country is absolutely shocked at the announcement made by the Government 10 days ago, that the total Government donation to all flood relief funds would only be£1,750.
The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government (Mr. Arthur Skeffington): I think that the hon. Gentleman has made a mistake. He said£1,750. It is£170,000.
Mr. Emery: I am sorry. It is still a niggardly amount.
I have suggested that it was worse than niggardly. Colonel Grey, Chairman of Somerset County Council, called it a deplorably inadequate amount. The Chairman of the East Devon Flood Appeal, Brigadier Acland, suggested that it was only a fraction of what was
1422
needed. When I first saw the figure, I thought that it was the first contribution being made to East Devon. With approximately the same amount raised by voluntary contribution we will have something like£350,000 available for distribution. At a most conservative estimate, this amounts to less than 4s. in the pound of the total claims received by local authorities.
Many figures have been bandied about, and one quotation I made to The Times was multiplied by 100 instead of by 10, so giving a figure entirely out of proportion. In order to let us get as near as possible to the working of the Government's mind, would the Minister give an estimate of the total damage, as he sees it, in East Devon, Somerset, Wiltshire, Gloucester, and in Bath and Bristol? He must have the breakdown figures. Perhaps he will give us his estimate of the amount of claims in those six areas.
It seems to me that in my own constituency in East Devon the figure will run to about£350,000, and in the whole of East Devon to about£400,000. The figures put to the Somerset County Council amount to£576,000 and, according to the Daily Telegraph, the claims in the other areas—Bristol, Bath and Gloucester—will be about£604,000, although I am not certain of the Bristol figures.
Mr. Robert Cooke: My hon. Friend may care to know that in the City of Bristol£310,000 worth of civic property was damaged or destroyed, quite apart from private property.
Mr. Emery: I thank my hon. Friend for that information. The sums I have already given, total in the region of£1¾ million, and the Wiltshire claims are to come in on top of that. Not all the claims are yet in. We are, therefore, faced with an approximation of about£2,000,000, with relief funds of£350,000 to meet it.
Here, I remind the hon. Gentleman of what was said by the Minister of Housing and Local Government on 15th July last. He then said:
"The Government welcome this initiative"—
that is, the initiative to set up relief funds—
"and as on similar previous occasions will be prepared to contribute generously to these…"

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Is a sum representing less than 10 per cent. deemed to be a generous contribution? More importantly, the Minister then went on to say:
"…as soon as the extent of the need has been determined."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 15th July, 1968; Vol. 768, c. 1041–42.]
I suggest to the Parliamentary Secretary that it is obvious that this estimate is not yet known and that the amount to which I have referred is just the first instalment. If that is not the case, I cannot believe that the Government intend to live up to their pledge.
I am sure that both the Ministries represented on the Government Front Bench tonight would wish to be more generous and see more funds made available, but that the nigger in the woodpile is the Treasury. I was afraid, as I have said before, that the moment the House was aware that pressure could not be kept on the Treasury, the concrete hearts of the Treasury Ministers would harden on any relief for flood damage.
Let me bring into proportion just how small this£175,000 is. Does the Minister remember that a little less than two years ago£1½ million was given out of public funds in connection with the "Torrey Canyon" disaster—a disaster which spread nowhere as deeply, or as far, or affected as many households or as many people as did this flood disaster.
I wish to refer quickly to help for the farmers. It has been implied that where there has been damage on the domestic side, claim can be made as with any other section of the community. But still no assistance to meet crop loss so far as feedstock is concerned is apparently to be considered. I should like this cleared up. In Honiton, cut grass was spread by the flood. Sometimes it was 10 or 11 ft. high on trees and banks and in hedgerows. That is an indication of the amount of cut grass and hay swept away. For some smallholdings it has been a complete loss. Often flood water in buildings means that some of the gathered crop will be found to be useless, but one cannot tell this until it comes to be used later in the winter. The actual loss factor cannot then be assessed.
When instances of this kind have occurred nationally instead of regionally the matter has been taken into review in the Annual Price Review. When it happens regionally that cannot be done.
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This is why I believe that further measures ought to be taken than just a grant under the Farm Improvement Scheme. Funds should be made available to meet actual loss in feedingstuffs. This should be done also where top soil has been swept away. How is the farmer to deal with that aspect?
I turn again to the business side. While it is obvious that the domestic situation must come first—indeed, the Government's ruling has always been that limited companies must stand on their own feet—I know a number of instances of small businesses facing ruin unless a greater amount of money than I have mentioned is made available for a percentage repayment. I think of a small engineer in Ottery St. Mary who set up in business 18 months ago. All his electrical machinery has been flooded and ruined. He has lived on the site and every penny he has made has been poured back into the business. He had to be rescued by crane from the top of his home, a caravan on his business site. He faces total ruin if he cannot get more than 4s. in the£towards his damages. The Minister must go to the Treasury and ask for more money with that type of case in mind.
An old couple suddenly found between one and three feet of rubble from a railway embankment swept into their garden and part of their house. Nobody wanted to know about it. It was a disused railway embankment, and nobody acknowledged responsibility. What these people are to do goodness only knows. They feel that they should be able to claim entirely for the removal of the rubble.
There is a problem which arises because of the variation in grant-in-aid or relief payment. Taunton Rural District Council has suggested that the payments would be only for household losses. Other authorities have asked for claims from agricultural interests and small businesses. Are the Government attempting to give any guidance? Sidmouth Council has obtained by means of a small individual fund a larger contribution than has been given in other relief funds. Sidmouth rightly suggests that it should be able to give more to its people than may be given in the neighbouring Borough of Honiton. Are the Government happy about this situation? If that

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is their wish, how can they believe that they arc encouraging voluntary giving in making up the contributions to these funds?
Will the Joint Parliamentary Secretary say, not that there has been a mistake, but that the Minister will have another look at this matter and that an additional figure will be announced in future when a full assessment has been made? Will the Minister repeat the promise given by his right hon. Friend and repeated by the Prime Minister in correspondence with my right hon. Friend the Member for Taunton (Mr. du Cann), whom I am delighted to see present, that generous help will be given? What do the Government mean by "generous help"? Will the Minister—
Mr. Speaker: Order. I understand that the hon. Gentleman is sharing the debate with other hon. Members. If so, he must leave them some time.
Mr. Emery: I am about to conclude, Mr. Speaker.
I wish to make a plea to the Government—and when I get to that stage, I am always at the end of my speech. Will they give a gleam of hope to the many thousands of flood victims in the South-West that they will be considered and will not be lost in a game of political football between the Ministry of Housing and Local Government and the Treasury, because that is the general feeling in the South-West? These are real people, real financial losses and real ruin is involved. Homes, furniture and livings are involved. These people deserve greater consideration than that which has been given so far by the Government.
10.17 p.m.
Mr. Edward do Cann: I shall be extremely brief. I wish to make four points.
First, for the second time today, I wish to express gratitude to you, Mr. Speaker, for the arrangements which you have kindly made for this debate and to the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government for his courtesy in being present. I shall not mind if he does not answer all our detailed points tonight, provided we get a satisfactory answer at some time. I wish also to express gratitude
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to my hon. Friend the Member for Honiton (Mr. Emery) for his typical ingenuity and competence in raising this matter and deploying the case so well.
I turn to my other three points. First, I have had correspondence with the Prime Minister about this matter, going back over a considerable time. I do not know whether the Parliamentary Secretary is aware of it. I wish to make one short quotation from the Prime Minister's letter to me dated 23rd July:
"…the Government know well that there are many cases of personal hardship…"
I am sure that they do. Perhaps they do not know of them as well as my hon. Friends. None the less, we are grateful for the visits which have been made to the area. The Prime Minister continued:
"…and a promise has been given that the Government will be prepared to contribute generously to any bona fide relief funds which may be set up as soon as the extent of the need has been determined."
First,bona fide relief funds have been set up; secondly, the need has been established; thirdly, as my hon. Friend the Member for Honiton said,£175,000 has been offered by the Government. But that sum will not cover even one tithe of the real need. The amount made available is miserably inadequate. It is deplorable that so small an amount has been made available so tardily It will not begin to meet any of the losses and hardships which have been suffered.
Next, my hon. Friend has referred to agriculture. Agriculture is being considered within the general need. I am grateful to the Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture for being here tonight. Representatives of the N.F.U. have been to see the Minister of Agriculture, and they have gone away empty-handed. They are going to see him again. I need not dilate on the needs; they are known by the Minister of Agriculture. Something should be done.
Lastly, there have been flood prevention schemes on which money has been wisely spent. I beg the Government to look with care at the constructive proposals which are being put forward to avoid flooding in future. I hope that the Parliamentary Secretary will give us an assurance on that point.
10.19 p.m.
Mr. John Ellis: I would make only one point. I ask my hon. Friend the Joint Parliamentary Secretary to bear in mind that in this instance what has happened is quite unusual, because in such cases in the past a central fund has been set up for flood relief by the Lord Mayor of the area in question. Bristol failed to do that. I must make it clear that I regard this as an error on the part of Bristol.
We have a plethora of smaller funds with inconsistencies in the amount. I ask my hon. Friend to take this into account and also to consider that we ought now to give serious thought to a national disaster fund, by which these things would be more amicably settled.
10.20 p.m.
The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government (Mr. Arthur Skeffington): I should like to begin by congratulating the hon. Member for Honiton (Mr. Emery) for using the first opportunity—indeed, it is likely to be the only opportunity—in this short recall session of Parliament to focus the attention of the House once again upon the flood disaster in the West Country and the financial arrangements to which the Government have contributed. I am glad that the hon. Member has done so because I hope in the brief time that is available to me—I wanted to allow as many contributions from hon. Members as possible—at least to put some of the facts on record.
I wish perhaps that this debate could have taken place a little later, because we might then have had a still clearer picture than we now have. The hon. Member for Honiton asked for estimates and totals. It is still extremely difficult at this stage to give him the sort of detail that is required. A number of the appeal funds have not yet closed. I think that most of them will be closed by the end of the month, although the East Devon fund may go on longer. We know something of the total amount of some of the claims, but they have not been assessed and I cannot at present give any figure. It might be wildly misleading in either direction, but I would be glad to do so if I could.
A number of hon. Members will be seeing my right hon. Friend the Minister tomorrow about various aspects of the
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problem. The fact is that we are still facing a situation in which a great many of the details are not clear to us and in which a great many communications and information has to be received from both local authorities and others. That is why I cannot at this stage give the kind of estimate for which the hon. Member asked.
Mr. Robert Cooke rose—
Mr. Skeffington: I have such a short period in which to speak and so much to tell the House that I must not give way, because I want to serve the best interests of the House by putting on record as much as I can.
One thing which I should say in self-defence is that these occasions are bound to be extremely difficult for any Minister, as the right hon. Member for Taunton (Mr. du Cann) will realise. No one will accuse either of the Ministries represented here tonight or my right hon. Friend of being unsympathetic. We immediately visited the site. I was there before the floods subsided and I went around with the hon. Member for Somerset, North (Mr. Dean), whom I see present. However sympathetic one is, it is always possible to make a convincing and real case that whatever sum the Government can contribute is not generous enough. I must make this point because it is always a bad wicket for a Minister to have to bat on where central contributions of this kind have to be made.
I would, however, hope that in passing judgment, because the hon. Member for Honiton and others have passed judgment on the amount, hon. Members will look at the total picture of Government help in relation not only to what has been raised, but to other matters, one of which was raised by the hon. Member for Bristol, West (Mr. Robert Cooke) and to which I hope to refer.
About 30 relief funds have been established. Including the contribution of£8,350 which the local authorities have made,£57,000 has been contributed. It may be that more sums will be received. I very much hope that they will, because the distress is there.
It may be that because loss of life was so small, thank goodness, in this case, the nature of the disaster has not struck people so forcibly as when, unfortunately, there is loss of life. It is,

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however, safe to say, even though I hope that there will be further contributions to these funds, that the Government figure of£175,000 is certainly much more generous than the contributions of£for£which were made in the 1953 flood disasters and in the storm damage at Sheffield in 1962.
Mr. Paul Dean rose—
Mr. Skeffington: I have not time to give way. No doubt there will be other opportunities to pursue this matter and I want to put on record the facts as we see them.
I hope it will be realised that this contribution of£175,000 is by no means the total amount of Government money which in one way or another will be going to the area. The hon. Member for Bristol, West raised the question and gave a figure of damage to civic property in the City of Bristol. Again, I would remind the House that on 15th July my right hon. Friend, who has shown deep personal concern and interest in this matter from the beginning, said in regard to local authorities losses, which are quite separate from the losses we are talking about tonight, which are of personal hardship in the main, that
"consideration will be given to assistance in the light of the scale of the damage, the availability of specific grants, and insurance cover and the extent of local resources."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 15th July, 1968; Vol. 768, c. 1042.]
We shall shortly be asking the local authorities to send us their claims for their own costs which will be costs for restoration of public services or of emergency action which they may have had to take. This will be in addition to the sum of£175,000 and I am glad to put that on the record. This is not, of course, the sum total; this is another form of assistance from central funds to the areas concerned. In addition, the Minister of Transport is making contributions in connection with communications. All trunk roads are aided to the extent of 100 per cent. The Newhaven bridge at Marsh on the A.303 has 100 per cent. grant as indeed does the bridge at Fenny Bridges which has been restored. The hon. Member will remember that we went to see the Pensford Bridge on the principal route, and there the grant was 75 per cent.
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These are additional to the sums referred to tonight. The Ministry of Social Security has already contributed£8,000 in emergency grants. More sums will be made for emergencies of one kind or another, and advice and guidance has been set out about this.
The hon. Gentleman raised the question of losses by farmers and he also raised the question of guidance and indeed, asked has any guidance been given. In general, the losses of agriculture will normally be covered by grants—I will say a word or two about it in a moment—by the Ministry of Agriculture. Advice about this was given in very considerable detail by the regional offices on 31st July and followed up on 12th August. This has been gone into in considerable detail—what sorts of claims, how they might be met, the sort of people who can make an assessment, and so on. I will not read out the whole thing, and the House will understand why, for I have not time, but this matter has been looked at, I believe, in considerable detail.
My hon. Friend the Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture also visited the area and discussed with the farmers. He said that this aid would be given as generously as possible and that grants are available under the Farm Improvement Scheme for restoration of damaged farm buildings, roads, fixed equipment, for the removal of rubble from fields, and for field drainage and for damaged ditches. The regional offices have given information as to how claims could be made. I have mentioned all this because I think it is right that the public in delivering a judgment on the Government contribution should realise that the£175,000 is in addition to other relief from central funds.
The question has been raised as to whether local authorities can contribute further. I am glad to have this opportunity of putting it on record that they can make contributions. The City of Bristol contribution was made, I gather, under the Local Government (Financial Provisions) Act, 1963, but it is possible under Section 136 of the Local Government Act, 1948, to make a contribution. It requires Ministerial consent, but this will be freely given. I put this on the record. Perhaps authorities which have used the 1963 Act have not realised that this power exists, and they can still make

1431
a grant under the provisions of the Act to which I have referred. I hope very much that they will use the 1948 Act because this is a possible way of making this sort of contribution.
Finally, the hon. Gentleman quoted relief given in the case of the "Torrey Canyon" oil disaster. I do not myself think that it is a fair comparison. What he ought to have done, it seems to me, was to compare the amount given in connection with the oil disaster to the sums and contributions which will be paid from central Government to the local authorities, because in that case the grants were for the expenses of the local authorities in dealing with that matter, and not personal damage. So, in due course, the hon. Member will be able to make out a comparison, but I do not think that he can make it out now.
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We shall certainly consider most carefully all that has been said in the debate. I am glad that the matter has been raised. I think it right to put the sums in addition to the£175,000 on record, and I hope that when hon. and right hon. Members look at the contributions and the other matters I have referred to they will in their heart of hearts think these contributions not so ungenerous as they have suggested tonight.
Mr. Robert Cooke: If the claims for private damage are not complete, how can the Government—
The Question having been proposed after Ten o'clock and the debate having continued for half an hour, Mr. SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.
Adjourned at half-past Ten o'clock.

SOCIAL SECURITY
  National Insurance Contributions (Retirement Age)
  National Insurance Contributions (Retirement Age)

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock having been called together by the Lord Chairman of Committees pursuant to the Resolution of October 31 last:
The LORD CHANCELLOR On the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Truro
The Earl of Gowrie—Took the Oath.

BUSINESS
2.37 p.m.
THE PAYMASTER GENERAL (LORD SHACKLETON): My Lords, With your Lordships' permission, perhaps I may make a short statement regarding business. Were it not for the occasion, I should have liked to say how pleased I am to see so many of your Lordships here looking so healthy. But, on business, the present intention, or the intention which we had agreed as a result of consultations, is that we should if possible complete our debate on the Czechoslovakian situation before we rise this evening. I am still not unhopeful that we may be able to manage this without going to too late an hour, if, as I expect, a number of noble Lords will not necessarily wish to make lengthy speeches.
There is, of course, a case for finishing by about 10 o'clock, if only to make sure that we have a complete Hansard. But if the debate looks like going on until a very late hour—say, much after ten o'clock—we can then consider adjourning and starting again to-morrow before the debate on Nigeria, although I think that most noble Lords, many of whom have come here for only the day hope that we shall be able to finish today. None the less, we should not want anyone to feel constrained, and we shall just have to see how we get on. I hope that the very high attendance will also be reflected for those noble Lords who have to undertake the winding up.
May I also say that I should like to express the appreciation of your Lord
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ships' House to the large number of officials and others who serve us—the Hansard writers and so on—who have answered the call to duty.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Hear, hear!
LORD SHACKLETON: I am sure that they do not grudge their presence here, in the light of the present situation. In a moment my noble friend Lord Beswick would like to say a word on the subject of refreshments.
EARL JELLICOEMy Lords, in the unavoidable absence of my noble friend Lord Carrington, I should like to thank the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, for his statement and to thank him also for his congratulations on our good health. I should also like to say that I share his hope that all 38 wickets will in fact fall before stumps are drawn this evening.
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, there are obviously some difficulties in the logistics of this operation, and I hope that noble Lords generally will be tolerant if there are any shortcomings. I think we ought to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Strang, and the members of the staff of the Refreshment Department, on the excellent lunch which they laid on. I am afraid that it has not been possible to arrange for dinners to be available, but light refreshments will be served in the Guest Room later this evening.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA
2.39 p.m.
LORD SHACKLETON LORD SHACKLETON rose to move, That this House takes note of the Czechoslovakian situation. The noble Lord said: My Lords, in rising to move the Motion standing in my name I should like to say something about why it is worded in this form, since I know that some noble Lords have expressed regret that it appeared to be in such neutral terms. I agree with that. It would be very unfortunate indeed if the impression were given that this Motion implied in any way that we took a neutral attitude. Indeed, I am quite sure that there is unanimity in the House in our condemnation—to use the words of my noble friend Lord Caradon at the Security Council—of this evil invasion of Czechoslovakia.
The purpose of calling Parliament together was not to enable us—or, for that matter, another place, where they are debating this subject on the Adjournment Motion—just to pass a resolution. The time for that has gone by, and the attitude of the Government and the British people has been made crystal clear. The purpose is to enable the Government to describe the situation as it now exists and to enable them, and indeed the country and the world at large, to have the benefit of the opinions and advice of Members of both Houses of Parliament. I am particularly grateful as I am sure are all other noble Lords, that so many noble Lords with experience in foreign affairs are present. We particularly welcome the noble Earl, Lord Avon, to whom this must be a sad occasion, with a historical repetitive quality about it. We shall look forward with great interest to hearing what these noble Lords say, for it is by our voices that we shall be able to make our position clear.
A tragedy has befallen Europe, and indeed the whole world. It is a severe blow to the hope that after so many years of cold war and sterile confrontation between East and West some way was being found to develop a new measure of co-operation and understanding between nations. I do not need to describe in any detail the events of the last few days. I do not believe that ever in human history have events been so fully portrayed, nor has there ever been a time when the people of the free world have been so completely informed as to what was going on. The Press, and especially the radio and television services, have done a fantastic job. I think that in particular we should pay tribute to the courage of the Czech cameramen, who contrived not only to record the actual events but to get their films out of Czechoslovakia—and the pictures of a people facing tanks with nothing but their bare hands have been deeply moving.
It may be helpful if I briefly recapitulate the events that led up to the Russian action. The 50th Anniversary of the foundation of the modern Czechoslovak State is in October. The age-old love of the Czechs and Slovaks for democracy and freedom found sovereign expression in 1918, and they enjoyed this for 20
516
years, until Nazi Germany invaded their land. When, therefore, in January of this year, Alexander Dubcek took over from Novotny as First Secretary of the Party, the world gradually became aware that the Czechoslovak people had at last a leadership which might be working towards fulfilling their desire for a more humane and a more democratic system—a Communist system still, but one from which some of the harsher aspects might be removed.
Dubcek himself had previously been First Secretary of the Slovak Party, and he was as much a Communist Party man as anyone could be. He and his colleagues made it clear from the start that their policy was to be a Marxist-Leninist policy. In foreign affairs they emphasised repeatedly their alliance with the Soviet Union and the other (so-called) Socialist States as the cornerstone of their foreign policy. They emphasised again and again that Czechoslovakia would continue to play a full part in the Warsaw Pact. But it was also clear from the start that Communism in the Czechoslovakia of 1968 was to be Communism with a certain difference. The first thing to strike the attention of the world was the transformation which came over the Press, the radio and television. Freedom of information existed for the first time in twenty years.
But Dubcek and his colleagues insisted that the Communist Party would preserve its leading role and authorities in Czechoslovakia. This remained a vital part of their continued Marxist-Leninist philosophy. They took the view, however, and were prepared to say in public, that the Party could maintain its leading role only if it could show itself capable of a more humane type of leadership than what it called the discredited bureaucratic police methods of the past. They believed that in that event, unless there was a change, Czechoslovakia would only sink deeper and deeper into economic and spiritual decay.
It was clear from the very early days that the Russian leadership and that of some of their allies were outraged by what was happening in Czechoslovakia. I shall not rehearse all the moves in the brutal and cynical game the Russians played in their attempts to push the Czechslovak leaders off the course that they had chosen. Dubcek and his colleagues remained calm and firm. They

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replied to every Soviet demand that they fully recognised the interest of the Soviet Union in what was happening in Czechoslovakia. They recognised that Czechoslovakia was essential to the defence of the Soviet Union. They repeatedly asserted their loyalty to the Warsaw Pact—and this was an essential difference between Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Hungary in 1956.
But although Dubcek had repeatedly reasserted his loyalty to the Warsaw Pact, the Russians saw something more dangerous in the various statements of the Czechs. The Czech Communist Party wished to achieve a policy which enjoyed genuine popular support but did not have to be enforced by coercion. The action programme, which they published, spoke of the history of suppression of popular democratic freedom, violation of law and the misuse of power—all of which, the statement said, undermine the initiative of the people and have severe and undeserved consequenees for many citizens, Communists and non-Communists alike. The Central Committee of the Front, at its meeting on June 15, 1968, stressed that Socialist State power must not be a monopoly of any Party or Parties, but must be accessible to all citizens. Furthermore, a much more important role was foreseen for the National Assembly in the nation's affairs. But at the same time the Party continued to insist that there would be no opposition Parties, that the Parties would all he within the Front, and that any non-Communist participation in political life would be in co-operation with the Party. Then, too, there were judicial reforms. There was the action programme statement, that:
"we must guarantee in precise legal form the constitutional right of movement, particularly travel, of our citizens abroad."
But perhaps the most threatening of all these reforms, from the standpoint of the Russians—although it seems incredible to us—was the abolition of censorship. For the great majority of us, who have always visualised Communism as a monolithic movement subservient to Moscow, this was pretty revolutionary. It was the threat to the whole Communist system in Eastern Europe that the Russians thought they saw. They were confronted with the dilemma that faces all tyrants when once they begin to loosen the chains. More especially, it
518
seems to me, they saw the threat in East Germany, held most tightly, and perhaps only, because of the brutal strength of Ulbricht's dictatorship. They saw again—and perhaps one can understand this—the spectre of a Germany no longer, so far as East Germany was concerned, under complete Russian Communist control. We cannot know what particular considerations decided the Russians to move. But whatever excuses the Kremlin can make, whatever compulsions they may have felt, none can excuse the invasion of an independent and friendly country.
My Lords, the Russians used every device of pressure and persuasion, by propaganda and by the deployment of forces on ostensible manoeuvres in and around Czechoslovakia. But still the Czechoslovak leadership insisted that they must run their own internal affairs. They insisted, too, that Czechoslovakia must be treated as a Sovereign State within the Eastern Alliance. At last, at the Cierna and Bratislava meetings, it seemed that a solution had been reached. The Bratislava communique included explicit reaffirmation of the principles of equal rights, sovereignty, national independence and territorial integrity. My Lords, within days, these principles were torn to shreds.
We all know what happened during the night of August 20/21. Soviet troops, assisted by contingents from four of their allies, invaded Czechoslovakia. Within hours, as was to be expected, the Russians held not only Prague but all other points of strategic importance. It was on the early morning of August 21 that the Russians informed Her Majesty's Government and some other Governments of what they were doing. The explanations they gave then were totally unconvincing, and subsequent events have destroyed their credibility. entirely.
They said, for example, that the Czechoslovak Government had appealed to Russia and her allies for armed assistance. We all know that this is not so. They said that their troops would withdraw from Czechoslovakia as soon as they were called upon to do so by the legitimate Czechoslovak authorities. They have not done so, in spite of appeals repeatedly made by every legitimate voice of Czechoslovak authority:

519
by the Head of State, the Head of Government, the National Assembly, and the Czechoslovak Communist Party. They said that their actions were not directed against any European State and in no way infringed the interests of any State. They have invaded the European State of Czechoslovakia. They said that they were motivated by a concern for peace and by anxiety at the growth of tension in Europe. They have shown their concern and their anxiety in a very strange way. They said that their action should not harm Soviet British relations, to which they continued to attach great importance. In other words they suggested that we should remain indifferent to their aggression. My Lords, the Government and people of this country have, I think, already given their answer to that suggestion.
The immediate reaction of Her Majesty's Government was to condemn the action of the Soviet Government and their allies in invading Czechoslovakia as a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and of all accepted standards of international behaviour. We described it as being in sharp conflict with the often repeated statements by the Soviet Government about non-interference with the sovereign rights of independent States. In this I believe that Her Majesty's Government were rightly interpreting the view of this House, of this Parliament and of this country.
We also made clear our profound sympathy for the peoples of Czechoslovakia. This is not the first time, as your Lordships know only too well, that Czechoslovakia has been attacked and overrun. Czechoslovakia symbolises the small independent nation who has done no harm to anyone, who threatens no-one, and whose rights have repeatedly been violated by her more powerful neighbours. Here again I know that Her Majesty's Government speak for all political Parties and for our people as a whole. The Foreign Secretary has conveyed this sympathy personally to the Czechoslovak Chargé d'Affaires here in London on behalf of Her Majesty's Government and on behalf of the overwhelming majority, indeed, I would say the whole of our people. In fact we know, from the spontaneous reaction of many public and private bodies and individuals,
520
that this did express the feelings of the nation.
There is, incidentally, one immediate practical step which has already been taken by the Home Secretary. He has agreed that no Czechoslovak national at present visiting this country will be required at this critical juncture to return to Czechoslovakia if he is unwilling to do so, and any such visitors as are in doubt about their position should get in touch with the Home Office or their nearest police station, when all the appropriate advice and assistance will be given.
Our feelings in this country were shared not only by our allies in Europe and in North America but by the overwhelming majority of the nations of the world. It has been a very striking experience to see how many uncommitted nations have recognised that here was not an East—West problem, not a cold war situation, not a confrontation between the Warsaw Pact and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, but a question of fundamental principle of interest to all who cherish freedom, sovereignty, self-determination, and everything else for which the United Nations and its Charter stands. Few indeed were the Governments that failed to declare their opposition to what the Soviet Government and four of its allies had done. It is striking to see the opinions stated by many former Commonwealth countries in Africa—Zambia, Kenya, Uganda, and others—in their condemnation of the action taken by the Soviet Union.
I would commend to those of your Lordships who have not yet had a chance to study it the White Paper presented to Parliament to-day on events at the United Nations. It contains among other things the eloquent words of our colleague, Lord Caradon. I do not think I can do better, in expressing the views of the Government and this House, than to quote what he said on the very first occasion when the matter was proposed to be inscribed on the agenda of the United Nations Security Council. He said:
"It is indeed a tragedy that has occurred. A tragedy for Czechoslovakia. A tragedy for Europe and a tragedy for the whole world. The first reaction was clearly one of shock, how shocking was the impact of naked force. And how shocking that a small and brave people should be so bullied and so betrayed. How shocking that so much careful planning to create confidence between East and West

521
should be recklessly disregarded and pushed aside. Indeed I am amazed that so much should be destroyed by a single crude blow. Hopes of greater freedom in Czechoslovakia, hopes of better understanding between Eastern nations and Western nations of Europe. Hopes of closer international co-operation to take the place of the Cold War. Even the unity of Communist countries, all these were jeopardised. All these were threatened by the evil invasion."
My Lords, I shall not give a detailed account of what took place in New York since the facts are contained in the White Paper. Within a few hours of the invasion the United Kingdom, together with five other members of the Security Council, had joined in asking the President, the representative of Brazil, to call an immediate meeting to consider the situation. When the Council met, the Soviet delegate spoke at length in an attempt to prevent the Council from even considering the question. His arguments were totally unconvincing, and when this procedural question was at last put to the vote thirteen of the fifteen members of the Council voted in favour, and only the Soviet Union and Hungary voted against.
The first speaker in the debate which followed was the representative of Czechoslovakia, who had asked to participate in the Council's debate, and to whose dignity and courage my noble friend Lord Cara-don has referred. Acting, he said, on the instructions of his Foreign Minister he quoted a series of Czechoslovak Government statements proving that the Soviet claim to have acted on the invitation of the Czech Government was totally unjustified.
On August 22 the Council met again to consider a draft resolution of which the United Kingdom and six other members of the Council were co-sponsors. The text of the resolution is set out in the White Paper. After an all-night debate, during which much time was wasted by the Soviet representative, the resolution was put to the vote. There were 10 votes in favour and two against; one of which, of course, was the veto of the Soviet Union. The three members who abstained did so in one case for lack of final instructions, and in the other two cases because of reservations about some of the wording of the resolution, while making clear their support of the substance. A second resolution—also in the White Paper—was then tabled calling for
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a representative of the Secretary General to go immediately to Prague to seek the release and ensure the personal safety of the Czech leaders under detention.
At a further meeting of the Security Council on Saturday the Czech Foreign Minister himself, who had been fortunate enough to be outside the country at the time of the invasion, spoke for the first time. My Lords, it would be right to emphasise the conciliatory nature of his remarks. While making it perfectly clear that the invasion could not possibly be justified, and while demolishing one by one the various pretexts put forward in justification by the Soviet Union, he was careful to say nothing which could jeopardise the negotiations going on in Moscow. He spoke of the hopes of the Czech Goverment of successful outcome of the negotiations, and of the spirit of understanding, unify and close co-operation among Socialist countries. He said that it was on this basis that his Government demanded that the foreign troops—foreign even though, as he put it, they come from friendly countries—leave the country without delay so that the sovereignty of the country might be fully restored. He said:
"The solution lies solely with the Governments of the five countries which have occupied our country. I believe that the Security Council having discussed this problem could contribute to such a solution by taking a wise stand and helping to create a favourable atmosphere for an effective and expeditious solution of the situation."
The Security Council will be continuing its debate this afternoon.
There is nothing in anything he said, or in anything the Czech leaders have said, that has suggested for one moment that they were operating in any way in concert or under the influence of Western Powers. Indeed, many of the remarks would be of a kind that we would not normally find particularly congenial from our standpoint. It is important to emphasise this in the light of the accusations that NATO may have played some part in this. I have already spoken of the Soviet allegations that NATO bore some responsibility for what was happening in Czechoslovakia. We read of NATO plots and caches of arms discovered in Czechoslovakia. My Lords, I am surprised that the Russian propaganda machine was not able to do rather better than this. Were they NATO tanks that

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encircled and then invaded Czechoslovakia? NATO did nothing that could provide any pretext whatsoever for Soviet alarm. Her Majesty's Government, like the Governments of their allies, were scrupulously careful to avoid any statement or action that could be interpreted as a provocation by the Soviet Union.
So much for the Soviet allegations about NATO. We must also take account of the effect on the Western Alliance of the Soviet invasion. This has provided a reminder that there has been no decrease in Russian military strength or, indeed, willingness to use it. It follows that the need is as great as ever for the West, within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, to maintain its unity and common purpose in defence. Proposals that Britain should withdraw from NATO are now even more unrealistic than they were before. By undermining the political and military balance now existing in Europe, this would put at risk the security of the whole of Western Europe and lead to a further sharp increase in world tension.
I do not say that the new situation presented by the Soviet intervention increased the direct threat to NATO countries in Central Europe, and I sincerely trust that no such threat will materialise. If it did, we should all at once be involved in a much more serious situation even than that we face to-day. But the invasion of Czechoslovakia raises the level of the state of uncertainty and the consequent need for vigilance by the Alliance. This confirms that NATO Ministers were right to affirm publicly on several occasions that the overall military capability of NATO should not be reduced except as part of a pattern of mutual force reductions balanced in scope and timing. And it is only realistic to judge that the prospects of early mutual reductions are less than they were before the invasion of Czechoslovakia. I hope that this lesson will not be lost on any of our allies.
We shall keep closely in touch with our NATO allies about the defence aspects of the situation. But the member countries of NATO have been extremely careful, and I am sure they will continue to be careful, to do nothing which could exaggerate the tension in Eastern Europe or which could be considered as interference there. It is not the existence of
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NATO which has created the political issues in Europe. On the contrary, the alliance is the result of the unresolved political problems. Indeed, noble Lords will not have forgotten that NATO came into existence following the events in Czechoslovakia twenty years ago.
We shall continue also our political consultations with our NATO allies. In spite of the grave setback to the progress of détente which has occurred, we shall not lose sight of the contribution that NATO may be able to make in this field. A major function of the Alliance will continue to be to provide a forum for the co-ordination of policies directed towards progress in the search for a more stable relationship in Europe and an eventual solution of the underlying political issues between East and West. If we learn correctly the lessons of what has happened to Czechoslovakia, this should provide a valuable impetus in the movement towards unity in Western Europe, not only in the economic but also in the political and defence fields.
My Lords, I spoke at the beginning about the tragedy which has taken place in Czechoslovakia and about the blow that has been delivered to the hope we cherish of the creation of greater understanding between East and West. We have made considerable progress in recent years in overcoming the barriers that existed in Europe. A regular flow of visitors, both official visitors at all levels and private citizens, had begun to learn about the countries beyond what used to be called the Iron Curtain. When my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs spoke in a debate in another place recently about the role of NATO he laid stress on the contribution NATO was making to the work of all members of the alliance towards détente. There has been practical co-operation, too, in such bodies as the Economic Commission for Europe, and the Council of Europe. In disarmament, we have the great achievement of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; and hopes have been aroused of further progress towards other measures of disarmament. We had a long way to go before relations between the different countries of Europe could be considered normal and satisfactory, but there was considerable progress and we were determined to persevere.
As I have already said, when the Russians informed us of their action against Czechoslovakia they said they did not expect that their action would damage their relations with this country. This must be, and clearly is, a vain hope. At the same time, we must not throw away all the progress that has been made in improving relations between East and West. I say this not only because what has been achieved is of real value in itself, both to us and to the peoples of Eastern Europe, but also because the alternative, which is to cut through all the links which have been so laboriously created, would be a sterile policy. The fact is that the world to-day is not big enough to allow us to live in it as though the Russians or any other great nation did not exist. So long as the fundamental demands of the people of Czechoslovakia, which they have shown so bravely and vigorously in recent days, are being refused and stifled, we cannot ignore this and pass by on the other side of the road. At the same time, we must form our policy with an eye on what it may hope to achieve in the future.
The tale is not vet over. One had feared that, just as the Russians were able to over-run Czechoslovakia by military force, so they would be able to bring down a new Iron Curtain, concealing from the world what was happening there. So far, thanks to the courage and resourcefulness of the people, this has not happened. All of us wait with anxiety the latest news of happenings both in Czechoslovakia and Moscow. I fear that I have nothing further to add in the way of information on what has already been reported, nor, I think, would it be useful for me to speculate on the likely outcome. I agree with the Times leader this morning, when it says that the world hardly knows which part of the Soviet action is more appalling, the crime or the blunder.
I have no doubt that your Lordships will to-day reinforce the firm words already spoken by the Government. For, while we keep our heads, we must make clear that we cannot be indifferent to events in Czechoslovakia. There is still an opportunity for the men in the Kremlin to rescue themselves and the world from the appalling consequences of their actions and the dangers that spring from them, and our heartfelt sympathy goes out to those brave and steadfast people of Czechoslovakia. They had embarked on
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an experiment of trying to combine what seemed to us to be two incompatibles—Communism and freedom. It is clear now that the Russian leaders, conscious as they must be of latent urges for freedom among their own people, were not prepared to face up to it, and one of the most striking consequences of the Russian action is the complete fragmentation of world Communism, no longer a monolithic organisation. By their actions the Russians, notwithstanding the dangers they face, including the risks in Asia in the long run, have destroyed their position as the fount and origin of Communist doctrine throughout much of the world. They may not even have preserved their East European system. All this carries danger for the world. The Russians have devoted a great deal of hard work to the preparation and maintenance of understanding with Communist countries and there is to be a Communist conference in Moscow later this year. If that conference is held at all, it is hard to see how it can any longer have any real significance.
There is little more that I can say at this stage. We await the news with anxiety. There are already reports of the possibility that agreement may be made for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. I cannot confirm that, but there is one thing that I think we should all note—that is, that once again there has been reinforced and demonstrated before our eyes the passionate urge in all men for freedom. We talk a great deal about freedom in this country and take it very much for granted. But the determination of the Czechs, the risks ordinary people are taking, the obstinate refusal to return from a path which opened up avenues of liberty, show once again that whatever restraints civilisation may impose on people, there are certain basic freedoms without which man cannot live and without which lie is not prepared to live. I beg to move.
Moved, That this House takes note of the Czechoslovakian situation.—(Lord Shackleton.)
3.14 p.m.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, I have seen it suggested that it was unnecessary for Parliament to be summoned back to debate this convulsion in Central Europe. I should like to make it clear without further ado that I do not agree with this

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opinion and from the attendance in your Lordships' House this afternoon it is clear that your Lordships do not agree with it. I should like to say how very glad I am that my noble friends Lord Avon and Lord Harlech will soon be speaking from this place.
The day after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia the Czechoslovak National Assembly issued a forthright statement. It included the words:
"We categorically demand the immediate withdrawal of the troops of the five countries of the Warsaw Treaty and full respect for the State Sovereignty of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. We appeal to the Parliaments of all countries and to world opinion to support our legal demands."
My Lords, it is sometimes said that our Parliamentary institutions are decaying. I can think of nothing more decadent for us than for us to have blithely continued to pursue our normal August avocations and turn a deaf ear to this cri de cæur issued under the shadow of Soviet bayonets and perhaps within the sound of Soviet guns, from our fellow Parliamentarians in Czechoslovakia.
I have also seen it suggested that we in this country need have little real concern for a quarrel within the Communist camp affecting this faraway country in Central Europe. From this opinion I again categorically dissent. Czechoslovakia was not so far away in 1938 as some supposed, and in this contracting world it is far far closer to-day. Moreover, ever since its inception under Masaryk and Benes, after the First World War, this State, with its peculiarly civilised and democratic values, has had for many of us in this country a particular affinity. True, it was sucked, in 1948, and against its will, into the Soviet embrace. It was not feasible then, it has not been feasible since, and it is not feasible or practicable now, physically, for us to redress this situation; and this I think we all acknowledge. But surely, my Lords, this does not mean that we are precluded from all involvement in the affairs of Central and Eastern Europe.
After all, Czechoslovakia is as much a part of Europe as is Britain, and it seems quite wrong for us, and contrary to all our best traditions, not to feel involved and caught up in the attempt of this small country to chart for itself, albeit
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within the Soviet orbit, a somewhat more relaxed and freer destiny, and one more consonant with its own liberal and civilised traditions than the straitjacket which Moscow seeks to impose upon it. I am glad that, judging by what I have read in the Press and seen on television, this involvement is very much felt in this country. I, for one, would not wish it otherwise. I am glad, therefore, that the Government have given us this opportunity of expressing the sympathy and the admiration which we feel for the Czech people.
I suppose that the first major public event which profoundly touched me was the Munich Agreement in 1938. And when I read last Wednesday morning the appalling news that the Warsaw Pact Powers had invaded their small neighbour, I felt, thirty years later, the same sort of impotent pain and rage that, as a young man, I had felt then. Many of your Lordships, I am sure, must have felt as I did. Many, too, must have felt, as I did, that there was something particularly incongruous, and indeed obscene, about the presence of the East German contingent among the invaders.
I suppose that this is the best reported invasion of all time. We have seen, as the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, suggested, the armoured columns entering Prague and Bratislava. We have seen the cool but contemptuous onlookers. We have seen the students on sit-down strike before the Russian tanks. We have seen the political graffiti enscribed upon them. We have seen that contemptuous kick in the tank and the stolid, bemused faces of the tank crews as they ignored, or strove to answer, those unanswerable questions put to them by those whose land they have invaded. Most of us have witnessed —as has a vast world audience—all this; and, as the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, again said, we have done this largely as a result of the sheer ingenuity and guts of the Czech reporters and camera men. But we have seen and noted more. We have seen the skill by which the Czechs have managed to keep their internal radio transmissions going. Not least, we have witnessed with admiration, whatever our political affiliations may be, the extraordinary steadiness—steadiness virtually under fire—of Czechoslovakia's political leadership.

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My Lords, the picture before the events of this week—the dramatic flight of President Svoboda to Moscow, and the even more dramatic news that Mr, Dubcek had been admitted to the talks—was dark indeed. It is still very cloudy. If it lightens, as we all hope it will, then the credit for this must go to the Czechoslovak people themselves, for their steadiness, courage and ingenuity, and for the way in which their present, more enlightened, leaders, Communist though they be, have reflected their feelings and their desire for greater freedom.
It is easy to express in words one's admiration for the Czechoslovak people in their present ordeal. It is more difficult to find the deeds to match those words. Hence, I believe, the frustration which so many of us have felt these past few days. However, I believe that there are ways in which we can give some practical expression to our feelings. I was very glad to note what the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, said about the Government's decision about permitting those Czechoslovaks who so wish to stay on here. I understand that there are in addition many hundreds of young Czechoslovak students here at present. Can the Government tell us anything about the plans which they may he sponsoring, or the organisation which they may have in mind, for the reception and the further education, if this requirement is needed, of those who in present circumstances will wish to remain here?
Secondly, there is the provision of that important article, truth. I think that these last few days have undermined as never before the importance of the spoken word across radio and of the instant picture across the television screen. We must assume that if the Muscovite gag is to be progressively applied, the peoples of Czechoslovakia will be denied access to the truth on their own radio and television transmissions. I trust, therefore, that the Government will now, and urgently, examine how the External Services of the B.B.C. can fill this gap, if there is a gap—and I believe that there may well be—by stepping up their services to Czechoslovakia and Eastern Europe as a whole, and provide the means for them to do so. The B.B.C. have a deservedly high reputation in Eastern Europe, and this is one real and practical
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service which we may be able to render to the Czechoslovaks.
Thirdly, my Lords, I hope that we shall, if need be, bend all our efforts in the United Nations and elsewhere to ensure the safety and freedom of the Czechoslovak leaders. I say "if need be", though I hope that the need may not arise. However, I understand (and this is confirmed by a glance at Annex D of the Government's White Paper) that there is a motion before the Security Council suggesting the establishment of a United Nations presence in Czechoslovakia with this end in view. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, will be able to inform us what the present state of this motion is.
It is sad that we should be faced with the third Czech tragedy in our lifetime. But, as has already been said, this is more than a Czech tragedy: it is, in a peculiar sense, a Russian and Soviet tragedy as well. It is right, of course, that we should take this opportunity to express our sympathy for the peoples of Czechoslovakia. It is right, by the same token, that we should in our speeches this afternoon, if not in our Motion, condemn this wanton action of the Soviet rulers and their satellite accomplices, and urge upon them, before it is too late, a change of course.
Their action has been a grave setback to all who, like me, had been encouraged to look for a progressive, albeit erratic, evolution in the manners of the Soviet regimé, both internally and externally. Since the death of Stalin we have witnessed a significant liberalisation of the regimé itself, some loosening of the reins in Eastern Europe, and some signs that the Soviet leaders were moving, albeit in fits and starts, towards a more relaxed view of the outside world. Many of us have believed that a repetition in any form of Hungary 1956 was off the cards. Now we have had Czechoslovakia, 1968. True, we have not had—and God forbid that we should have!—the Budapest bloodbath. But in a significant way this crude Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia is even more unjustified. It lacks the justification, for what it was worth, that was trotted out in the case of Nagy, that he had opted for neutrality. Dubcek had made it plain, time and time again, that under his leadership, rightly or wrongly, Czechoslovakia would remain

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a loyal ally to the Soviet Union and its steadfast partner in the Warsaw Pact.
I personally had thought it possible, but improbable, that the Soviet Union would invade Czechoslovakia. I thought it even more improbable, I must confess, after the Cierna and Bratislava conferences By doing so, and by their timing, the Soviet leaders have compounded the odium which their action was bound to attract. By doing so, they have made it plain, unfortunately, that in the last resort they care but little for their reputation at the bar of world opinion. Equally, they have made it clear beyond doubt that in the last analysis it is on force, on brute force, that they rely.
I listened with keen interest to the lucid analysis of the Soviet action by the noble Lord the Leader of the House, and I agree with the view that the action is as much a blunder as it is a crime. But much, of course, is veiled from us My own reading is close to his: that the dominant motive was fear of infection from the liberal Czech experiment—infection, first, in the satellites, and above all in Ulbricht's Germany, spreading back perhaps to the Soviet citadel itself. I should think too, that there is some evidence of divided counsels on the Soviet side—in the contrast between the very ragged political preparation of this operation and the efficiency of Soviet military surgery; in the failure, unusual by Soviet standards, and inefficient even by Nazi ones, to install a ready-made puppet Government; in the botched timing, and in the subsequent shifts and squirms of Soviet policy. We can derive such cold comfort as we may from the fall-out from this botched, blundering and brutal policy. But unless more enlightened views are to prevail within the Soviet hierarchy, it looks to me as if, internally, the Soviet Union may be set for another period of freeze, and as if, externally, we may be confronted with a very blinkered set of Soviet leaders.
My Lords, there is a limit, in my belief, to what we can do here to influence events. But there is something. There is plenty of evidence that large elements of influential opinion, both within the Soviet Union and in the satellites, is unenthusiastic about Moscow's latest ad
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venture. It is too pessimistic to assume that world opinion can make no impression on these people. That is why we have been right, and why the Government have been right, to denounce, and must not tire in denouncing, in the United Nations, in Parliament, wherever we can, this aggression against Czechoslovakia.
What impact such expressions of the world's disgust may make on those who count, no one can of course begin to estimate. If, as I hope, there may have been some slight shift in the Kremlin's policy in the last few days, the main credit for it must go where it particularly belongs—to the courage and steadiness of the Czechoslovaks themselves. But we should not ignore the factor of public support which their cause has attracted. For this reason, I am glad that Her Majesty's Government, through our delegation, took a leading part in bringing the motion of condemnation before the Security Council. I should be glad to know what further action is contemplated in the Security Council, and I should also like to know the views of Her Majesty's Government about laying this matter before the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace resolution.
Are there other ways, other than by words, in which we can make, in the interests of our own self-respect and for the benefit of those Soviet and satellite leaders who may be more sensitive to world opinion, our disgust plain? The withdrawal of our Missions in the capitals of the occupying Powers has been suggested. I personally believe that this would be a great mistake. Diplomats are needed when the going is rough more than when the sea is smooth. Again, the possibility of economic sanctions has been canvassed. Certainly a case for such action can be made under the United Nations' Charter. Not only has there been a clear breach of the provisions of the Charter; palpably a threat to peace exists. But, my Lords, we must weigh our natural instincts to do what we can to demonstrate our valid indignation at the Soviet Government's behaviour against other compelling considerations. We must perforce recognise that the Soviet economy is virtually self-supporting. Sanctions, even if universally applied, could not be effective. Sanctions, moreover, would be unenforceable without

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grave risk of some incident which could well escalate the crisis still further. And sanctions applied against the satellites would merely serve to drive them further into the Soviet embrace. Finally—and I believe that this is the clinching argument against the policy of economic sanctions—it runs counter to our long-term hope that in time, through growing contacts of all sorts and on all planes with the outside world, the individual Soviet citizen, thence Soviet society and ultimately the regime itself, may be transformed and mellowed.
In this context, the curtailment of cultural exchanges and contacts has also been proposed. From the days when I was in the Foreign Office and dealt with Soviet affairs, I have always felt that the policy of free and open contact, of letting as much fresh air as possible into the stuffy atmosphere of the Soviet Union, was the right one. I still believe in principle that this is the case. However, this is an area where I suggest the Government must now watch the position very closely indeed. I personally would favour a restrictive attitude towards these exchanges while the Red Army maintains its grip on Czechoslovakia, and while this abomination goes on there are some exchanges which in my view would be totally inappropriate. For example, if the Red Army remains in occupation of Czechoslovakia we should certainly not dream of welcoming the Red Army choir here next month. It is extraordinarily difficult to draw a line here. The distinction which I would suggest to the Government at present is that between visits of groups or individuals who are obviously closely connected with the Soviet State apparatus and more individual visits of writers and scientists and so on. But in all this there is a strong element of the subjective, an area of personal judgment, and many of us, I suggest, can manifest our private feelings by abstaining to go to those events where we find it an embarrassment to do so in present circumstances.
There is a further tragedy and another casualty arising from this Soviet action, and that is the damage which it has done to the whole structure of international security. That structure depends above all on confidence, on some accuracy in one's readings of the other's intentions,
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and accordingly some predictability in those intentions. That whole fragile structure has been rudely and savagely shaken by this tragic Soviet blunder, for, my Lords, if you bully and deceive and then invade a neighbour and an ally, what can those who are not your allies expect? What conclusions can they draw? We should not at this stage be bleakly pessimistic. The situation is still far too fluid for black and white predictions. However, a reversion to the most sterile period of the cold war is certainly not "off the cards"; and a reversion to such a cold war is in no one's interest.
Let us face this issue quite squarely. We have probably, I fear, a long hot autumn ahead of us and one that will call for calm and patience as well as firmness. The decision, however, whether to arrest this potentially vicious spiral of increasing tension depends, among other things, on three conditions, and all three conditions, I believe, lie within the control of the men in the Kremlin. The first condition is the avoidance of repression in Czechoslovakia. There must be no installation of a Nazi-style protectorate in Czechoslovakia. We do not, of course, know what is now happening in Moscow; what pressure is being put on the Czechoslovak leadership. But there is still time, as the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, has said, for the negotiation of an honourable settlement involving the evacuation of Czechoslovakia by Soviet and satellite forces, the release of the Czechoslovak leaders, and the reinstallation of those leaders, without whom Czechoslovakia may well become virtually ungovernable. If this chance is not seized, and if repression follows it—a repression from which it will be impossible to insulate Czechoslovakia from the outside world —then, my Lords, I believe this can lead only to a return to the cold war.
Secondly, there must be no extension of the area of tension to the South and South-East in Europe. There are already disturbing rumours of troop concentrations on or near the Roumanian and Yugoslav frontiers, and we have seen the action which has recently been taken by the Yugoslav Government. I would hope that the noble Lord may be able to give us some reassurance about these reports when he winds up. Thirdly, there must be no Soviet attempt, through the application of force, to upset the basic East-West

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strategic balance. At present I have no reason to believe that the foolish panic measures which the Soviet leadership have taken in Czechoslovakia are necessarily the prelude to renewed pressures against Western positions in Berlin or elsewhere, but some signs and portents—the naval build-up in the Mediterranean, the probing in the Persian Gulf, and others—are disquieting.
As I have said, whether or not we return to a bleaker period in world history depends in large measure on the wisdom which the Soviet leaders now show. This does not mean that we should sit idly by while they decide their future policies. It may be frustrating for us to recognise that there is so little directly that we can do to assist Czechoslovakia, but in the area where we cannot influence events directly there are morals to be drawn and work to be done in the light of the Soviet actions of the last few weeks. These events have only served once again to throw into relief what we should all know but tend to forget; that NATO is not just a bore or an anachronism, but an absolutely vital element in our security. The German Chancellor has. I understand, called for a meeting of the NATO Council at the Heads of State or Foreign Minister level. I hope that the Government can confirm that they support this initiative.
In any event, my Lords, in the light of recent developments there is urgent need for a calm and objective review of the availability and readiness of the NATO armed forces; above all, their conventional forces. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia has once again demonstrated, if demonstration was needed, the requirement for adequate conventional forces in situ, on the spot. It has also demonstrated, I suggest, that some of our assumptions about Soviet intentions, and about the amount of warning which we may receive about those intentions, require to be questioned. By the same token, I should like to give notice to the Government that there are certain matters in the defence field which naturally weigh on one's mind in the light of these events to which we shall wish to revert when Parliament reconvenes in the autumn. We shall wish to probe whether our armed forces, in view of the possibility of a simultaneous crisis in Europe and outside Europe, have not been run
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down now to dangerously bare margins. We shall also wish to probe the insurance made by the Government against the unexpected. We have just met with the unexpected, and we shall wish to probe their plans for our reserve forces.
Finally—and I put this forward as a personal suggestion—I wonder whether the shock effects of the Soviet action should not now cause us to re-examine, together with our European partners in NATO but within the general orbit of the Atlantic Alliance as a whole, the structure and organisation of our joint defensive effort in Europe. It is my belief that both Rome and Bonn—I cannot speak for Paris—would welcome some such initiative from Her Majesty's Government at the present time.
I only wish to say this in conclusion: there are 36 speakers to follow me. All will speak—and rightly so—with their individual accent and their individual emphasis, and this is not, as I think the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, made clear by the whole tenor of his speech, in any way a Party occasion. Therefore I trust that this debate will reflect a united and a national view. A view expressing condemnation of a bad and foolish Soviet action, of hope that even at this late hour that action will be redressed by the Soviet leaders themselves, and of sympathy and encouragement to the peoples of Czechoslovakia in their present ordeal.
3.42 p.m.
LORD BYERS: My Lords, I should like to endorse the pleas made by the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, and the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, in their speeches this afternoon. Like a number of other noble Lords I have returned from abroad to attend this debate. I have done so to be able publicly to express, on behalf of my colleagues, and indeed of Liberals everywhere, our horror and deep shock at the brutal and cynical violation of Czechoslovakia. No one yet knows what the final outcome will be—and pray God that it will not be as bad as most of us feared at the beginning of last week! But we join with all those who have expressed their sympathy for the Czech people, and especially we want to say how much we admire the courage and integrity of their leaders and, in particular, of Mr. Dubcek and Mr. Svoboda.

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There are so many things in the events of the past week which have angered us all and which justify the universal condemnation with which the Russian actions have been received. Above all there is the nauseating similarity between Russia to-day, Russia in 1956, Russia in 1948, and between the Russian leaders and the Nazis under Hitler in 1939. Nothing seems to have been learned. Even the same hypocritical formulae and phrases are brought out and used time and time again. It is pathetic, yet it is terrifying.
The rape of Czechoslovakia in March, 1939, was described by The Times as, "a crude and brutal act of oppression and suppression." The Times asked then:
"What German outside the Nazi Party believes that Germany has been strengthened by this staggering rejection of the most insistent teachings of history and of the most elementary promptings of political intelligence?"
We can well ask the Russian leaders the same question to-day. Just as the provinces of Czechoslovakia were declared "protectorates" for their own good by Hitler, so we have the Russians claiming, with transparent falsity, that,
"Czech Party and Government leaders have asked the Soviet Union and other allied States to render the fraternal Czechoslovak people urgent assistance, including assistance with armed forces".
Whom did they expect to believe these flagrant lies? Not even the Chinese were taken in. How can anyone believe them when this is the well-known stock-in-trade of totalitarianism?
In 1948 the establishment of the Communist dictatorship in Czechoslovakia, the single-Party rule, the extinction of Parliamentary democracy, were all accompanied by the same trappings and were described at the time by Herbert Morrison as "horribly similar to the Hitler technique". In Hungary, in 1956, the same formulae were used. In announcing the end of liberty in Hungary, the Russian communiqué stated:
"This morning the forces of reactionary conspiracy against the Hungarian people were crushed."
The "reactionary" forces were the ones which wanted the removal of Russian troops from Hungary and the holding of free elections on a multi-Party basis. The similarity is sick-making.
Many of us, as the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, said, have been doing what we
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can to promote an easing of tension between the East and the West, but this shattering of confidence constitutes, to my mind, an absolute setback. It is impossible to build up any enthusiasm for close co-operation when we get this sort of cynical violation of morality. There must, at the very least, be a period of icy coldness in our relations with Russia in the immediate future. We must do all we can to help to keep the world condemnation of Russia mobilised so long as a single Russian soldier remains on Czech soil. We must surely use every device to try to get through to the Russian people themselves the horror we all feel. It is because I believe that it is to the Russian people to whom we wish to bring the message home that I think we must make our decision on boycotts, and on the breaking of cultural and other ties, with some care. We must judge each case on its merits.
I am quite sure, for instance, that the Foreign Secretary's cancellation of his visit to Eastern Europe was absolutely right. I think that a great deal of good has been clone by breaking off relationships in the past week. Cancelling football matches, breaking off trade union visits, and so on, are all absolutely right, and are possibly the best way quickly of bringing our message home to the people of the Warsaw Pact countries. But in the longer run we must look forward to being able to resume cultural, sporting and other ties, because that is the way we shall eventually be able to conquer this situation.
In this connection, I well remember the opening day of the Olympic Games in Melbourne in November, 1956, only a very short time after the Hungarian uprising. The most moving and effective thing about the whole of the opening ceremony was the relative silence with which the Russian team was received and the ecstatic ovation which was accorded to the Hungarian contingent. It was one of the most moving experiences of my life, and I am glad to say it was shared by the noble Lord the Leader of the Conservative Party in this House, Lord Carrington, who was at that time our High Commissioner.
My Lords, all I wish to say, in conclusion, is that we should immediately condemn, and condemn loudly, the action

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that has been taken by Russia in Czechoslovakia. Let us hope that we shall get something like a reasonable result from the talks in Moscow. It may be a slender hope, but let us go on hoping. And in the meantime let us echo, once again, our tremendous admiration for the gallant Czech nation and its courageous leaders in their search for freedom.
3.49 p.m.
LORD ROBERTSON OF OAKRIDGE: My Lords, this is a great occasion. It is a time when the House of Commons, your Lordships and the country want to hear from their political leaders, the Ministers of the Crown, and the heads of the great opposition Parties; and it is right that they should speak for their country and not just for their Parties. Smaller fry like myself may perhaps be tolerated for a few moments if they have something to say which comes from their own knowledge or their own experience, and I venture to address your Lordships in the light of my experience of five years of constant, close negotiation with the Russians in Germany. It was not quite my first contact with them, because as a very junior member of the United Kingdom delegation to the Disarmament Conference of the League of Nations I served under the leadership, among others, of the noble Earl, Lord Avon, and the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury.
When I arrived in Germany in the summer of 1945 the campaign—and that is the right word—of rapine and rape by Soviet troops in the Soviet Zone and in Perlin was in full swing. It was not just the occasional misbehaviour of the victorious and licentious soldiery; it was deliberately encouraged and organised by their masters. We had plenty of evidence of that. Some of those lads who marched into Czechoslovakia from Eastern Germany a week ago have mothers who were brutally raped by the Russian troops in those days. They do not know it, of course. They are too young; maybe they were not born. But it is a fact.
After that followed months and years of wearisome negotiations about the future of Germany, and I had to listen day after day while the Soviet members insisted on conditions and terms which would have reduced Germany to indefinite beggary and serfdom. Incidentally, they helped themselves to large
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reparations in kind out of their own Zone and out of Berlin, a thing which had been expressly forbidden by the Potsdam Treaty which they had signed; and they made further demands of millions of pounds worth of reparations from elsewhere in Germany. That, thank goodness! they did not receive. As to the attitude towards war criminals, our own policy was a stern and a hard one, but theirs was inhuman. If your Lordships do not believe that, just cast your thoughts to the prison at Spandau at this moment, where that poor miserable half wit Rudolf Hess, is still lingering where he has been incarcerated for the last 23 years.
As the years went by, we were eventually compelled to recognise that we could no longer co-operate with the steely brutality of the Soviet representatives, and so we decided to take our own measures. This led to the blockade of Berlin. I shall not forget until I die the look on the face of Marshal Sokolovsky when I said to him: "Is it really your intention to starve 2½ million Germans into submission or death?" The look on his face plainly told me that that was exactly his intention, and that he looked forward to executing it.
I have been back to Germany since those days. I went back there in particular as the guest of my former colleague in Germany, Lucius Clay. That was at the time when they had just been building that hideous wall which is a living monument to Soviet brutality. We should not have allowed that wall to go up. We could and we should have stopped it. However, it went up.
What did my time in Germany teach me? It taught me that the class of men who were ruling Russia then—and it is the same class of men who are ruling Russia to-day—were implacable brutes, that they are completely untrustworthy and abominably cruel. I can say these things. A Minister cannot say them. That is well understood. But I think it is right that someone should say them at this time, because too many people in this country have allowed themselves to build up illusions in their minds about these Russians, just as there were men and women here in England who built up illusions for themselves thirty years ago over Hitler.

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What should we do in the present situation? The first thing we should do is to clear our minds of these illusions, to look in the face the stark facts about the Russians. "Détente" is a nice French word. We have heard it several times this afternoon. But if "détente" means an invitation that we should be a doormat for the Soviet jackboot, I am not in favour of it. Having said that, I should like to make it plain that I have always been strongly averse to making gestures or uttering threats that we have not the resources or the will to fulfil. It is quite foolish and it is extremely dangerous. I include in that not only the making of what I might call military noises, but also noises about economic sanctions which are likely to hurt us far more than they will hurt the Russians. As to a cultural boycott, I think the case has been well put by the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe. Every matter should be looked at on its merits. I, for one, will not take a ticket to see the Red Army dancers. But this is something that wants looking at carefully. In regard to severing diplomatic relations, I have always been taught that a good General maintains contact with the enemy at all times and under any provocation, and I am not in favour of severing diplomatic relations.
Is there, then, nothing that we can do, nothing that we should do? Yes, my Lords, there is. It is the first duty of our Government at this time (I choose my words carefully) to look to our own defences. The Russians have encouraged Herr Ulbricht to march his men into Czechoslovakia. What an obscene thing to do! That was a good adjective. It is something that they can do again. It is the kind of obscenity they can practise again. The day may not be far off when Herr Ulbricht will be encouraged to go into Berlin and into Western Germany. This will be an attack on our own security. It will be a direct threat to this land of ours, from Land's End to John o' Groat's via Salford.
I am not saying these things to reproach the Government for what they have done and what they have not done. I am not interested in doing that. Neither am I interested in encouraging the Opposition to make Party capital out of this situation. But I am imploring the Government to take a look at our
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defences, which means of course the allied defences. I hope that they will consult with our allies and certanly with their own military advisers, and that they will take that advice seriously and act upon it.
There it is. I have said what I had it in mind to say. Is it just the blatherings of an old General? At all events, perhaps your Lordships will believe that this old General has some knowledge of these Russians, and of their dirty games.
4.0 p.m.
THE EARL OF AVON: My Lords, I must first thank the Leader of the House for the masterly account he gave us of recent tragic events. Perhaps I may also thank him for his kind personal remarks in relation to myself, and for rekindling the memories many of us in this House, including the noble Lord who has just spoken, have of the events of thirty years ago. Whatever are our feelings about those days, and these, every noble Lord will, I am sure, wish to join in a tribute to the Czechoslovak people for their endurance of their ordeal and for the courage, the ingenuity and the restraint which they have shown throughout these days. if any one thing in this business is more extraordinary than another it is, to me, that the Kremlin, by what must have been a majority decision (I cannot believe it was unanimous), encouraged thereto, I have no doubt at all, by the dictator of East Germany, should have chosen Czechoslovakia, of all countries, for this action.
We remember, many of us, that throughout the history of Czechoslovakia as a nation it has been the most loyal and, one might call it, determined ally of Soviet Russia from the very beginning. I remember, for instance, that when, at Geneva in the early 'thirties, Monsieur Barthou was canvassing the entry of the Soviet Union into the League of Nations, rightly, as I then thought, his chief supporter and protagonist throughout all that activity was Monsieur Benes and the Little Entente, whose policy together then was to attempt to meet the threat they saw coming from Germany by their alliance with France and the alliance they wished to see with Soviet Russia. Then again, after the war, Benes, who had believed during the war in the treaty he had made with Russia, was soon to be

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sadly undeceived. There were the death —as I shall always believe, the murder—of Masaryk, and the years that followed. But in spite of that; in spite of the maladministration, and in spite of the economic strains and stresses to which Czechoslovakia was put, the loyalty of the country and the loyalty of the new leaders, as of the old ones, was to the Warsaw Pact and to friendship with Russia.
After what has happened what must be the feelings in those countries in the satellite groups, who have not the same friendly traditions going back over the years with Soviet Russia? If this is how an ally can be treated, an ally throughout the war, what, many must be thinking, will be the fate of those who are not? My Lords, it seems to me whatever the outcome of these days—and of course we still hope for better news than reaches us just now—it is surely certain that the stresses and the strains in Europe and beyond will be much graver after this than they have been at any time since the closure of the Second World War. That, I believe, is the reality that we ought to face.
Before I say anything about what I think we should do (I do not want to detain your Lordships long), I should like to make a reference to what may be called the "Russian case" because that case, of course, in so far as it rests on security problems, is not a new case—that is to say, Eastern Europe's fear of the power of Central Europe is nothing new. It is something that has been with us for the best part of a century. It was there before the war, in the time of Czarist Russia and the Central Powers; and it has brought the West and the East often together against the fear of Central Europe's intentions. And so far as that is the problem—and Russia suffered the consequences of it in her own territory throughout the war—it is something that is intelligible to this country. Had that been what was obsessing the Russian mind, there was a method of dealing with it. It would have been perfectly possible for the Russian powers to say, "We do not like such-and-such developments in Western Europe; we see such-and-such movements and concentrations of troops, and we should like to discuss this". Then those matters which were disliked could
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have been discussed between the Warsaw Powers and the NATO Powers direct.
In fact, if I am right (and the Government can correct me if I am wrong), at their very last meetings the NATO Powers suggested joint meetings between the Warsaw Powers and the NATO Powers to discuss how they might reduce their forces and thereby reduce tension either side of the Iron Curtain. That was the course that I think Russia should have taken, if there was a word of sincerity in all the present jargon about security being at stake. So we come back to the fact that that was not the real reason. The real reason was that the East German Government—and it is always East Germany that Russia worries about—believes in the hard line, and that only the hard line will succeed. The Kremlin leaders having been convinced that that was the truth, that those were the horrors they had to contemplate, these actions followed. That, as I believe, was the course of events.
If that is so, I come to the only other question I want to touch on for a few moments this afternoon: what should we do in these conditions? It is obvious that NATO, collectively, must take a long, full, hard look at its defensive arrangements. It cannot rest satisfied, in present conditions, by leaving to chance anything that can be obviated by adequate preparations. To say that is not to be in the least alarmist, but it is to be cautionary; and it is the very least that will have to be done. Some of us—and I admit that I am one—had hoped that it would be possible to reduce forces on either side of the Iron Curtain and make other moves to reduce tension, as in normal circumstances we should like to do. One day, I think Europe will have to come back to projects of that kind; but not, I suggest, unless and until Russian troops are withdrawn from Czechoslovakia and any captives are released and allowed to live their lives again. Until that happens there can be no utility at all, in my view, in any diplomatic discussions about what is to happen on this side or the other side of the Iron Curtain.
But that, my Lords, is not quite all. That is what NATO should do. The question is what we should do. As I understand it from reading the Defence

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White Papers (although I have not done so with the attention that no doubt one should) my recollection is that they are based on certain assumptions as to what the attitude of Soviet Russia might be expected to be in Europe. For the purposes of our discussions this afternoon I make it plain that I am not in the least criticising the Government for the assumptions they have made; but what I would say is that those assumptions should be looked at afresh and in their entirety, because they may be found—I very much fear they will be found—not to apply in present conditions.
For instance, it was an assumption of the Government, and of many of us, that we should see a gradual relaxation of tensions; that the Russians would become more and more willing to have discussions at various levels, so that the Warsaw and NATO Power discussions, which we have wanted since 1955 in one form or another, would probably take place. Now, of course, those assumptions cannot be upheld. On the contrary, I very much fear that it will be necessary for the Government to take defensive measures which were not contemplated a few weeks ago. If they have to do it (of course, I can speak only as a private individual), I would say that they deserve the utmost support in doing so. And I would add that if they do not do so then I think they will be taking a very heavy responsibility on their shoulders. I feel sure the Government will agree with that, because one cannot contemplate whatever the final decisions in these Moscow discussions, that the European situation will return to exactly what it was a week or two ago.
I have just one or two further brief comments to make. There is another aspect of this scene which troubles me. Peace has been kept for the last 30 years, more or less, by the atomic deterrent of the two super-Powers, and I should think there are reasonable grounds for hoping that that can continue to be effective for a while. But of course it is not wholly effective, because other actions, so long as they do not bring about an actual confrontation between the two super-Powers, can take place which are violations of treaties, or even actual war. If the two super-Powers are not engaged, for one reason or another, that can happen. It can also happen if one is
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engaged and the other does not want to be engaged.
That brings me to what I think is a very troubled aspect of this scene. There is bound to be more tension as a result of what is happening between the Communist Powers, which I think is not necessarily a gain for everybody. If there is conflict between them and tension between them, that only leads to more unsettlement, makes trade more difficult, and creates stresses throughout the world. So what should our course be there? What I should like to see happen, apart from the NATO meeting, which I presume will be called, and apart from the review of our own defences which I have no doubt the Government will undertake, is the major Powers in the Free World—not merely in Europe—getting together and trying to work out together the plans, military, diplomatic and economic. which they will try to follow to meet the present and threatening situations.
I should like them to do that (it is difficult to describe in a few sentences) rather in the spirit in which the Labour Government of Mr. Attlee and Mr. Bevin at that time approached the limited European problem of NATO. I should like that spirit adopted towards the world scene. Obviously, we cannot do that alone, but I should like us and the other leading Powers to concert together to see whether we cannot work out such a plan. A very important part of it, of course, will be the economic, and a very important part will be the role of the uncommitted nations. They would not be plans just for ourselves alone, although they would be plans to protect our way of life. They would also be plans to try to arrange that, in trade and commerce and life, some of the uncommitted nations have a bigger share than perhaps they have now.
All these things may be difficult, but they are not impossible. I urge upon the Government that this is the moment for a new approach; that the uncommitted nations and many others will be looking for a haven as a result of what they have seen happen; and that the free nations can, if they will, through their unity and their joint efforts, provide such security and provide such a haven. In short, my Lords, I think the Communist world has made a sad mess of its affairs for the moment. Tragic as that mess is,

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it is also an opportunity for the free nations to show how they can lead and where they would have the world go.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, before the noble Earl sits down, may I just ask him this question? Is he aware that the tape is now recording a message from Moscow that there has been agreement for the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Czechoslovakia within two months on three conditions? The first condition—
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, if I may interrupt the noble Lord, I think a number of noble Lords are, in fact, aware of what is on the tape. It has not been confirmed, and I suggest that we might wait until it is confirmed.
4.14 p.m.
THE LORD BISHOP OF SOUTHWARK: My Lords, it is a curious coincidence that to-day, August 26, is the anniversary of the invasion of this country by the Romans in the year 55 B.C. Since that date there have been other invasions—those by the Danes and the Normans. But that was long ago, and for hundreds of years we have had no enemy armies on our soil. As a country we have been free to run our affairs in our own way. It is because we have been so fortunate that we feel deeply for a nation which has been violated twice within a generation; and these feelings are intensified and aggravated by the realisation that there is so little that we can do to help. At least, so it seems at present. But something more than words of sympathy may be necessary.
In 1945 most of us had lived through two invasions of Europe by the Germans, and at the end of that war we said, "Enough. Never again". But it has happened, and to me the most squalid fact in this episode is the reappearance of the German military uniform and the German jackboot on Czechoslovakian soil. It has been said in the Press and on the radio that Mr. Kosygin and Mr. Brezhnev did not themselves favour armed intervention, but that the dice was cast by Herr Ulbricht. Be that as it may, it is a terrible thing that for the third time in a matter of years a part of the German nation should be allowed to assist in jeopardising the peace of Europe, and all freedom-loving
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countries would be well advised to be on their guard. It is to me astonishing that it is the Soviet Union, of all countries, which says it fears German military resurgence, which is encouraging the Germans to invade a peace-loving country.
There is little point in adding to the denunciations of the Russian leaders. I should have thought that everything that can be said has been said—their wickedness and their folly. If one had to single out one event to illustrate both the wickedness and the folly it would be the nauseating welcome given to the President of Czechoslovakia at Moscow Airport—a Judas kiss and thirty pieces of silver. This sickening incident, witnessed throughout the world by millions of viewers, must have destroyed whatever illusions may have remained of the Kremlin utopia. That is something which we ought to take into consideration for the future, for, strange as it may seem to many of us, owing to propaganda and education and upbringing, to thousands and thousands of young people Moscow nevertheless stood for a way of life which was supposed to be founded on justice and brotherhood. Surely, in view of what the youth of all countries have seen on television during the past days, that illusion has been shattered for ever.
But even that incident, disgraceful though it is, is not without encouragement, because it was meant, I think, primarily for home consumption. It was intended to convince the waverers in Russia itself and in the Communist countries. Here we must make a sharp distinction between the Soviet leaders and the Russian people, or at least some of them. Like many of your Lordships, I have Russian friends—intelligent, kindly and liberal-minded—and my thoughts go out very much at this moment to some of those heroic Christians I know in the Soviet Union and in the other Communist countries who have dared so much, who have suffered so much, and who are still suffering so much. Let us not forget that they are our brothers, and let us make a distinction between them and their leaders. I am not suggesting for one moment that they are anything but patriots, or that they want our system rather than their system. No, they are patriotic enough. It is simply

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that these liberal-minded, cultured, intelligent men question the régime that has imprisoned them for years and they long to be free; free not to get rid of Socialism (we have seen that in Czechoslovakia), free not to plot against their own country, but the very reverse—free to think their own thoughts, free to be themselves. That is what they want.
I am sure that these people must detest as much as we do what is being done in their name. So let us say to them: "We do not condemn you. On the contrary, we realise that you have to live under conditions that are, mercifully, unknown to us here in Great Britain. As good patriots, though, do what you can to restore the reputation of your country and work for the day when Russia and her allies shall be free." If at times we are sceptical and think there is no chance, let us take heart from what we have seen on television of the people of Czechoslovakia, because for years we have thought of Czechoslovakia as a Police State. I remember so well being there in 1953, and I would never have believed that the young people I met on that occasion might he the fathers of those who demonstrated last week and, indeed, probably took part in the demonstrations themselves.
I remember spending five hours with these young people at the airport in the mist and being shown pictures of Mr. Churchill, as he then was, and being assured that this great warmonger had added to his cruelties by murdering the 'Leader of the Opposition, the late Lord Attlee—and nothing I could say would convince them of the untruth of that statement, as I was a Western imperialist warmonger and a bourgeois priest! Those people, brought up tinder that sort of propaganda, really believed the sort of things they were saying to me that day. I am sure your Lordships will be interested to hear that I was told at that time that the then Foreign Secretary, Lord Avon, was living on an income of £100,000 per year in Conway Castle. I pointed out that Conway Castle had been a ruin for 500 years, perhaps more, but even that was dismissed as the mere idle gossip of the Western Press. Yet it is these people, brought up under the regime of that time, who have been so brilliant in their fight for freedom in the past week. That, of course, is a fact of life that the politicians
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in the Kremlin seem incapable of learning. With what can only be described as a jungle mentality they think that provided they can occupy a city with brute force, provided they can empty churches of their worshippers, as they did yesterday, they will compel men's will. That is where they are wrong. They may compel men's bodies, but not their wills.
I remember so well that in 1941—I think it must have been then—the late Sir Stafford Cripps was returning from Moscow, where he was Ambassador, to his constituency in Bristol, and he was asked by somebody in the audience about political prisoners. I remember that he astonished us by saying that the number ran into millions. In a hopeless voice somebody said: "But, Sir Stafford, do you think there is any hope that this regime will ever come to an end?" Sir Stafford said: "Well, it all depends on whether or not in the last resort you believe in the triumph of the human spirit". That, I am sure, is the one thing which must give us heart to-day. A country which can give rise to a Jan Hus and, some hundreds of years later, to an Alexander Dubcek, is a country which shows that it believes in the supremacy of the human spirit, come what may.
4.26 p.m.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, one of the most remarkable things about what has happened in the last few clays is the extraordinary degree of unanimity which has been expressed throughout the world, the horror which has been felt by all sections and types of communities, whether they are prima facie sympathetic to the Communist régime or not—the Communist Parties of France, Italy and so on throughout the world. It is not of course surprising that this same expression of opinion should be stated in this House this afternoon: we all feel horror at what has taken place. But I have been asking myself why this has happened. The noble Earl, Lord Avon has asked the same question.
In The Times of last Thursday, Sir William Havter, the former United Kingdom Ambassador in Moscow, who was Ambassador in 1956 when there was the invasion of Hungary, also asked the same question. He asked:
"Why do the Russians do these terrible things? Do they care nothing for world opinion?"

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Of course they do—they care very much. And he says so. He refers to all the trouble they take to ingratiate themselves with world opinion, and he goes on:
"…and then they commit a crime which makes it impossible for even their most servile foreign sympathisers to defend them.
"Yet they are not lunatics.… There must be some very powerfully compelling motive that forces these heavy bureaucrats to behave in a way which seems at first sight to be as senseless as it is criminal."
The rest of the article is not very clear about the conclusions that Sir William Hayter has reached.
The noble Earl, Lord Avon, also tried to give an answer to these questions. He referred, I thought rather lightly, to the fear that the Russians have about Central Europe. I thought he was not attaching sufficient importance to it. After all, the Russians have been invaded twice by Germans in the last half-century, and during these invasions they have suffered as almost no other country has suffered throughout history. Incidentally, they have been rescued by the "Imperialist, capitalist lackeys"—by Great Britain and America, and, in the first world war, by France. But for them they might still have been under German domination. But have they no right to give a thought to these two great events in their history, the two invasions that have taken place by Germany? In my view this is the dominating factor in the action of the Soviet Union.
I am trying to look at the matter objectively, and certainly I hope no one will think that I am condoning what has taken place. Even if the Russian fears are justified, as I think they may be, that is no excuse for the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and I would not wish it to be suggested for a moment that it is. But let us look at the position as it might appear to them. Here is Czechoslovakia, which is gradually loosening its ties with the Soviet Union. Whatever may be said, the fact that they still stand by the Warsaw Pact and are still allies of the Soviet Union, the action they are taking—this loosening of the dictatorship and of permitting freedom to travel, the removal of censorship and so on—must all have some effect in loosening their ties with the Soviet Union.
Then we hear of discussions that have been taking place for financial assistance
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to the Czechoslovaks by the Western Powers, including Germany. How sore the Soviet Union must feel at the possibility of the Western Powers, and particularly Germany, coming to the help of Czechoslovakia… After all, at the moment the Czechoslovakian economy is very closely tied to that of the Soviet Union, and anything which would release them from that tie, or which could ease it, must be something that the Soviet Union would strongly resent.
We also hear of the proposed talks between East and West Germany. I do not know what that can mean, but the very fact that they are beginning to talk must mean some relief of tension between these two countries and, as the Soviet Union might see it, the possibility in the not too far distant future of reunification. After all, there are divisions of opinion in East Germany. I am quite convinced that the East Germans themselves are not happy in their relationship with the Soviet Union. I believe that the majority of them would far rather be reunified with Western Germany than be associated with the Soviet Union; and if that became at all a possibility, we should once more see a reunified Germany: strong, powerful—the most powerful nation in Europe, better armed than any other—and that, as the Soviet Union see it, with United States support. The United States have been giving Germany considerable encouragement in their rearmament.
So I think we shall be foolish to close our eyes to the fact that the Soviet Union are in fear, in great fear, of the same thing happening again, and of their suffering a third invasion on a big scale. It will not happen to-morrow; it will not happen next year, and probably I shall not see it in my lifetime. But it is something which a nation must look ahead to and take steps to prevent. I think that in their folly—and this was a piece of folly—they decided that one way of calling a possible halt to this was by the invasion of Czechoslovakia. They must have misjudged what would happen; they did not expect to find the whole world against them. They must have calculated that at least those countries which were sympathetic to Communism, and those big movements in countries like Italy and France which were communistic, would support their

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action. I think that was a great miscalculation. I think it is important, therefore, that we should have diagnosed the situation and tried to fathom what is in the minds of the Soviet Union. I hope your Lordships will not think it impertinent of me to disagree with the noble Earl in this diagnosis—or, rather, perhaps, to put more emphasis than he did on this particular aspect.
What ought we to do? One thing I am quite sure about is that we should not take any of the actions which have been urged upon us, such as diplomatic or economic action, or even action affecting cultural activities. In my view, it is essential that we should remain as close together as possible. By all means let us make it clear beyond all doubt that we deplore their action, and certainly do not condone it. Nevertheless, I beg that we shall not lake any action which will dissociate us or make us more remote from the Soviet Union. Certainly I agree, as the noble Earl and the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, said, that we should look at our defences again and make quite sure that we can stand up to any possible attack upon us or upon any of our allies. By all means do this.
But I believe that in the last resort the greatest hope will come from letting the Soviet Union realise that there is this danger, even if it is ill-founded; and if in fact Germany has no designs against the Soviet Union, there should be no difficulty in making that abundantly clear to the Soviet Union through discussion. But so long as Poland, for instance, is in possession of large areas of former German territory, and so long as others are in possession of debatable territory, like the Sudetenland, it will be difficult to convince the Soviet Union that these intentions, given the opportunity, will not be fought for once more. I think that if only we could get together and discuss with the Soviet Union, with Germany, some kind of pact, some kind of reassurance which it might be possible to give them, there might be some hope for the future. If it is not possible to do this, then I am afraid that sooner or later the world is in for a very bad time. I cannot believe that the Soviet Union (who, after all, are sensible people: they are not stupid; they are not fools; they do understand what lies before them) would be unresponsive to an attempt to make
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the world safe again and unwilling to accept reassurance so far as it is reasonably possible.
I am afraid that beyond that kind of suggestion there is nothing that we as a nation can do. Obviously, we will work with the United Nations and give them every possible support—and I am very glad indeed that we took one of the initiatives in bringing this matter before the Security Council. I hope that the news on the tape, which has been foreshadowed, is right; but we must wait and see.
4.39 p.m.
LORD HARLECH: My Lords, it is no doubt right that Parliament should meet and place on record its condemnation of and contempt for the actions of the Soviet Union and its allies last week. From virtually every other country and from every segment of the political spectrum in those countries there has flowed a torrent of invective against the military occupation and the attempted coercion of Czechoslovakia. Treachery, barbarity, perfidy, trickery, rape and countless other epithets have been hurled against the Soviet Union, its leaders and its miserable henchmen. All are applicable and all are justified. This universal abhorrence has been expressed already with great eloquence by the leaders of all Parties in this House this afternoon, and I do not intend to try to find new words with which to describe this criminal act. Our attitude, together with that of all civilised men and women, is abundantly clear, and the guilty Governments, together with their peoples, can be in no doubt whatever about it.
The question we have to ask ourselves is what, in the circumstances, should our reactions be? Is there anything we could or should do? Are we really as helpless in this crisis as has been generally assumed? Personally, I do not believe that we are so helpless, for this is a struggle being fought out not so ninth in military terms or in tangible physical terms as in intellectual terms. It is a struggle concerning the mind and the spirit of man, and it may well be that the attempt by the Russians to inject the element of military force into such a struggle will prove to be one of the most monumental blunders of the century. I am therefore convinced that the reaction of this country, and that of the numerous

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other countries who are appalled by the events of the last week, can have some effect on the course of this crisis.
However, my Lords, before deciding what we should do, it is obviously necessary to come to a correct assessment of what has been happening, not just in Czechoslovakia in recent months, but throughout Eastern Europe, and indeed in the Soviet Union. This is an immense subject and it is difficult to be brief without being superficial, but I shall make the attempt. Put in its simplest terms, there has been a growing conflict between the unquenchable human desire for a measure of personal freedom or individuality and the kind of society which has been developed in the Soviet Union, and after the war riveted upon the peoples of Eastern Europe. It is not so much a question of Communism as of totalitarianism. Some may argue that Communism always will lead to totalitarianism; others that it is possible to devise a form of Communist society which is democratic and allows the individual a sufficient measure of freedom. The latter is evidently the view of Mr. Dubcek and his colleagues; and although one may have doubts about whether such a system will be successful, that is not the point presently at issue. For what there can be no doubt about is that the Czech leaders, with the support of the great mass of their people, have an absolute and undeniable right to make this experiment if they so wish.
It has become abundantly clear that after twenty years of Russian-type Communist society, most intelligent people in Czechoslovakia, including many influential members of the Communist Party, had become convinced that such a system not only was inefficient and uneconomic, but was failing to satisfy the profoundest aspirations of ordinary men and women. It is impossible to read the moving accounts of the new spirit abroad in Czechoslovakia since the upheavals of January without being conscious of the feeling of rebirth, of new joy in living, of the ecstasy that comes from a renewal of freedom of expression after decades of censorship and repression. We know that similar feelings were welling up in Hungary before 1956, and there were parallel manifestations in Poland at the time of Gomulka's return. It is quite
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inconceivable that this intellectual and political ferment which has made itself visible in a number of East European countries, and now in a most stark and courageous manner in Czechoslovakia, can be confined within any national boundaries.
Human desires, human instincts and the human spirit are not different in Poland or Hungary from what they are in Czechoslovakia. We may be certain that they are not different in the Soviet Union itself. There must be countless Soviet citizens, and if Czechoslovakia is a guide there must also be many influential figures in the Communist Party itself, who have sensed the need for a drastic overhaul of the whole of their system of society as they move into an era of more affluence and better education. I believe that Mr. Khrushchev sensed it to some extent when he broke away so sharply and dramatically from the Stalinist past. That was the first and imperative step away from extreme totalitarianism, but it has not and will not prove enough in the face of the pressures welling up from below.
The ever more defiant attitude of writers, artists, poets and intellectuals in the Soviet Union is no more than a reflection of the general dissatisfaction with what they regard as an old-fashioned and out-dated system. There will have to be changes, and the contemplation of these changes deeply disturb the old Party hacks in each one of the five countries which have perpetrated this outrage on their erstwhile friends, the Czechs, just in the same way as Khrushchev's reforms outraged Molotov and the old guard a decade and a half ago. This, surely, is the fundamental reason for the wild, rash actions of last week. They are the actions of men who felt weak and insecure and not those of men playing from strength, confident of their cause and of popular support for it. No doubt the despised and universally hated Ulbricht was the weakest link in the chain, although the previously demonstrated attitude of the Polish and Hungarian peoples to their Governments must also have been of grave concern to the Soviet leaders.
At all events, the moment came when this bunch of frightened men, having lost the intellectual argument, reached for their guns and tried to reverse an inevitable historic trend by the use of

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military power. It is like the boorish behaviour of a man who is losing a game of cards and kicks over the table in a rage. I do not agree with the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, that the major fear here was a fear of Germany—not on this occasion. The major fear was a fear of increased liberalism.
If this is what in broad outline has been happening, what attitude should we adopt and what should we do? I am sure that we must bear in mind that it is likely that there are highly placed men in the Soviet upper echelons who were opposed to the action taken and were extremely apprehensive about the outcome. How do we strengthen their hand and the hands of like-minded people in the other four countries? How do we at the same time give, in some tangible form, an indication of our admiration and support for the Czech people in their hour of trial? They deserve this at least. We cannot just sit around like desiccated calculating machines, estimating the practical advantages and disadvantages involved. Strong human emotions have been unleashed by this barbarous act, and I cannot think that it would be right to carry on as usual with the nations that have perpetrated this hideous crime.
I would certainly not sever diplomatic relations, because this country has maintained a sensible and invaluable tradition that representatives are exchanged not as a mark of approval of one country for another but because such action leads to the more efficient despatch of business between the countries concerned. I agree with my noble friend that sanctions would be both inappropriate and ineffective on this occasion; but as for cultural exchanges I really think that they must cease for the time being. No one has been a more fervent supporter than I in recent years of increased contacts of every kind between East and West, but I think that the brutal and uncivilised actions of Russia and her allies have made the situation quite impossible. I do not think it seemly to fete visiting artists from these countries, and receive their performances with rapturous applause, when the Russian Government is ordering its troops to threaten, and in some cases to shoot, unarmed Czech women and children.
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Quite simply, I think we owe it to the Czechs to make this minimal gesture. But, apart from that, I think that by it we shall be strengthening the hands of those in the five countries concerned who were opposed to the invasion, and feared the consequences that would follow throughout the world. It may be a comparatively small matter, but if the British Government, and all like-minded Governments, pursued a policy of ostracism with regard to the five aggressors I believe that this could have some impact upon the internal struggle going on between the more liberal and the more totalitarian leaders within the Soviet bloc.
A simple test is surely this: do we want reports to go home from visiting Soviet groups that the activities of the Soviet Government had had virtually no effect upon the success of their tour, or that the people and the Government here were so incensed by the Russian actions that they had been asked to leave? I think that the ostracism should extend to all diplomatic representatives of these five Powers. They need not be invited, and ought not to be welcomed at any social event under the present conditions.
It may be argued—indeed, it is argued —that it will be difficult to restart these exchanges, which in themselves are to be welcomed, but it is my contention that what we are witnessing in Eastern Europe is not the end of a brave but futile experiment in liberalism, and the opening of another dreary chapter in the story of the cold war, but the beginning of a new era in which the trend pioneered in Czechoslovakia will spread, perhaps haltingly and with set backs at first, but inevitably and inexorably in the end. All we can do is to show our encouragement and support for these tendencies and our detestation and contempt for the reactionary forces of totalitarianism.
Of course we must not cease to search for a détente. No other policy makes sense in this shrinking world, overflowing with nuclear weapons and overburdened with armaments. But we shall not help the cause of détente if we give the impression that we are as happy to treat with gangsters as with civilised men. We are not. I do not believe we shall for much longer have to deal with gangsters. Ulbricht's days are surely rum-bored, and it is inconceivable that so

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gross and massive a blunder will leave the Soviet leadership unchanged. Khrushchev could not survive his massive miscalculations over Cuba, and it is certain that the more enlightened members of the Communist Party in Russia will have learnt many lessons from this disastrous crisis of their own making.
I recognise that the forces of reaction may yet triumph for the moment. We may be in for a grim autumn. Harsh terms may be imposed upon the Czechs which they feel bound to accept. If so, we are in for a very unpleasant period, with frightened, beleaguered, and therefore dangerous, men at the helm in the Kremlin. In such circumstances, it will be necessary to revitalise the military side of NATO and look to our defences. since the threat to Berlin will most certainly increase. It is, I think, gloomily significant that President Tito, a fellow Communist, is already taking steps to strengthen his military forces.
For myself, I doubt whether the outcome of this crisis is sufficiently clear for us to take any major decisions yet, although it would be prudent to prepare for them. However, as your Lordships will have gathered, I remain basically optimistic, and if the unofficial reports which have been coming over on the tape were to be confirmed, perhaps I should have more justification for my optimism than I had earlier in the day. Whatever temporary horrors and setbacks we may now have to witness, and whatever sacrifices may be demanded of the brave Czechs, I am sure that there is a historic tide running within Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union which cannot be held hack with tanks and the apparatus of the Police State. It is not, of course, a struggle between capitalism and Communism—whatever those terms are now supposed to mean—and we must be careful never to give the impression that it is anything so simple and so naive as this. It is a struggle between totalitarianism coupled with a desire for foreign domination, on the one hand, and, on the other, the desire of millions of people for a greater degree of personal freedom and national independence.
The heroic actions of the Czech people have illuminated the real issues with a blinding clarity. They are not threatening
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to transfer their allegiance to the West; they are not even demanding neutrality. They are simply proclaiming their absolute right to conduct their affairs in their own way. Their calm courage has commanded the admiration of the entire civilised world. It must also have had a most profound effect upon the peoples still harnessed to the reactionary policies of Moscow—and not least upon the hapless young Soviet soldiers daily treated with contempt and derision by the men and women who had allegedy invited them into Czechoslovakia.
Nothing in Eastern Europe can ever be the same again. The Czech struggle will not have been in vain. They have lighted a beacon which will kindle the hopes of millions. Whatever the outcome of the Moscow negotiations, their passionate desire for a freer, more humane more compassionate society cannot be denied much longer.
4.57 p.m.
THE EARL OF PERTH: My Lords, you will have come here to-day for two reasons: first, to show your respect and sympathy for the gallant Czechs and their resistance to Russian action. The remarkably large attendance of your Lordships' House to-day shows proof of this. The second reason is to debate what we can do. Many of your Lordships have discussed what the Government can do. Those who know far better than I do on such matters have urged the need to look at our defences, to look at NATO defences, on which we all know the ultimate freedom, not only of ourselves but of the whole world, depends. I do not intend to touch more on Government, but I do think we should consider further what the individual can do.
I believe this is one of the rare cases where the heart should overrule reason in any actions that we may take. I understand how the Lord Provost of Glasgow offended against what may be diplomatic proceedings when he called the Polish Consul before him and said, "Would you warn your Government we very much doubt that we will continue to have the exhibition planned for Glasgow."
LORD BOOTHBY: My Lords, they have cancelled it.
THE EARL OF PERTH: My Lords, I am told by Lord Boothby that they have cancelled it. That is splendid. At the same time, I regret that the City Fathers of Edinburgh decided that they should continue with the civic reception, and a supper, for the Russian State Orchestra which is performing at the Edinburgh Festival. They argued that the Government had advised caution on such matters, and that it was hardly for them to take action of this kind. "After all", they said, "The orchestra is really not to blame for what has happened in Russia. Art and music-lovers are things without international barriers."
As the noble Lord. Lord Harlech, has just said, what would be the report that these people give when they go back to Russia from the enthusiastic applause that they got from the vast audiences who listen to them? It would be: "Oh well, they cannot be serious; the people of Britain cannot really care if this is the sort of reaction—the applause they give at such a moment." Perhaps I should add, as a footnote, that out of 69 City councillors only four attended the civic reception.
Your Lordships may have read the report in the papers to-day of how some Czechs managed to prevent the setting up of some jamming machinery by getting the Russian train into a siding, so that the Russians had to come with their helicopters to rescue it. That was an act of great bravery on the part of the people responsible. This may well be the reason why at this moment jamming is not taking place in Czechoslovakia. But at the moment of the actual invasion, the B.B.C. chose to broadcast the first concert of the Russian State Orchestra in this country. I wonder what must have been the feelings of those Czechs who could still listen to the B.B.C., for which they have such enormous respect, when they heard this orchestra and the applause which it aroused. Although I know that the B.B.C. is independent. I beg the Government to use their influence to stop such happenings, and in that way, as the noble Lord, Lord Harlech, said, to show our feelings.
One more example of heart ruling reason. The Celtic football team have sent a message to the European Football Federation saying that they do not want
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to play against the Hungarian team. Even more remarkable, for those who follow football, is that the Rangers have fully supported them. Governments have to act cautiously, but I beg the Government to listen to the suggestions made by the noble Lord, Lord Harlech, and to give to those who are involved guidance in calling off exhibitions, trade fairs, concerts and the like. Above all, I beg that the B.B.C. should be careful.
All I have said so far is on the negative side. What can we do positively to help the Czechs? It is very little. We have heard what is to be done for the students and refugees. But even while Russian troops are still in Czechoslovakia, we should consciously plan for the future development of our trade with that country, to try to show that when the time comes we shall be prepared to help them, and that our tourists will be able to spend their £50 in Czechoslovakia again when the occasion allows. Let us try by all the means in our power to show our respect and sympathy for those whose only crime is that they want intellectual freedom.
5.5 p.m.
LORD RITCHIE-CALDER: My Lords, this is a momentous occasion and I am pleased that both Houses of Parliament have shown that they are capable of standing up to be counted it such numbers on an issue of this magnitude. While we must denounce the military intervention in Czechoslovakia and support the brave Czech people in what they are doing, we must be aware that the situation through which we are now passing calls for the utmost possible tact and understanding. What is happening has been called brutal, outrageous and obscene by speakers this afternoon, and I too would apply every one of these adjectives to this action. The Soviet Union have made one of the three great blunders of our time. But it must be a traumatic experience for the Soviet Government to find themselves in a situation in which they have been shockingly misinformed about world reaction, about the situation they were going to encounter in Czechoslovakia and about the response of the Communist Parties throughout the world. At this moment, I counsel caution. I feel that we shall have to get them off the hook in some way, and what we do is a matter for

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serious consideration. With all respect to the noble Lord, Lord Harlech, and the noble Earl, Lord Perth, I would ask your Lordships not to start slamming doors; this would be a ridiculous, a stupid, a fatal, thing to do.
What in fact has caused the present situation in Eastern Europe? Is it a spontaneous and indigenous growth of thinking? No. It has happened because over the last ten years, by the warming up of the cold war, we have been able to re-establish mutual communications. It is this communication with others that is producing the urge and determination of people to assert their rights and demand their liberty. Those of us who have had dealings with people in the scientific and cultural circles of Eastern Europe know that there is no question about this. At the Pugwash Conference, a meeting I have called the "ecumenical conference of science" one meets Russian scientists and knows their response, not in a conflict of ideologies but in the exchange of simple common sense. If we are going to slam the door against this kind of communication we shall make the biggest mistake in our generation.
I do not care what individuals do. I do not care what the Lord Provost of Glasgow or Celtic does or what people do about going to the Russian State Orchestra; but I do beg anyone who is in an official or para-official position most sincerely not to resign at this moment from any organisations that may be involved, because this is the moment when the people in such capacities can do their best work. I suggest sincerely that, when we have tried the due processes of the United Nations, my right honourable friend the Prime Minister should try again to exercise what I know is his personal influence within the U.S.S.R. This is a case in which individuals can do much to influence events. One more point on the United Nations: I hope that we shall not take recourse to the device of involving the General Assembly in a "Uniting for Peace" resolution in order to get round the Veto in the Security Council. That would be an artifice too plain to have any influence at all.
My Lords, events in Czechoslovakia over the past few weeks have shown us what happens when a new generation of
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thinking comes through. I say this because, as a Director of Plans of Political Warfare during the war, I had a good deal to do with Czech resistance, and at one stage of the war Czech resistance was emphatically the most effective resistance movement in Europe, until the Heydrich assassination. Then the Germans peeled off the resistance as if they were peeling off the layers of an onion, and that was the end of effective resistance. Indeed, one felt afterwards that it was the end of a resistance movement which had existed since the days of Jan Hus. Some of us felt after the war, when there was this acquiescence to conformity in Czechoslovakia, that the elements of resistance had been destroyed. But we see what it means, and why it was effective during the war, when we see what they are doing to-day, in a new generation, in the way of resistance. In fact, I used to say during the war that I could get a reply from the resistance movement in Czechoslovakia, even under German occupation, more quickly than I could get a reply from our Embassy in Washington. Here we see again the ingenuity which the Czechs can exercise in effective resistance; and that is most encouraging in this situation, even with the risks and hazards, with a new young generation of Czechs.
I would reinforce what I have said about not slamming doors. I would ask your Lordships to remember that in the last ten years the Czech movement, which was definitely repressed in an ideological and political sense, has been coming through loud and clear in everything except—until now—just outright resistance. Their cultural movement and their cinema leads the world in imagination. Their art and literature, everything in the cultural world, has been over the last ten years growing vigorously. Some of your Lordships who were at Expo '67 will know this. There, even with a privilege ticket and a four hour wait, I could not get into the Czech building. There is this tremendous resurgence, this ebullience, if you like, of the human spirit in Czechoslovakia. In fact, an old Czech friend of mine from the resistance days. who had been put away for a long time. degraded and so on, met me at an international conference a few weeks ago and said: "We Czechs have proved aim laughter

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can burst even leather breeches". This is what was done.
The most important thing that has happened, and, indeed, in an elemental way the basis of what we see happening to-day, is the re-thinking which has come through in Czechoslovakia, mainly from the scientists. The leaders of this movement in Czechoslovakia have been largely the National Academy of Science—thinking through, even under Novotny, the reconstruction of the economy and, above all, doing something which we are not doing in this country, and which is not being done in America or anywhere else: that is, to learn how to come to terms with the technological revolution; how they can bring automation and so on under control; how they can democratise technocracy. They have done it. The thinking, which has been done by Ota Sik, is not only an example of Czechoslovakia or Eastern Europe coming to terms with Communism or the democratisation of Communism, but a lesson to all of us who have to deal with the forces of change in the technological world. Here we see, in that sense, one of the most powerful elements in the changes which have taken place in Czechoslovakia. I repeat most sincerely the request that those of your Lordships who may be contemplating slamming the door which the Czechs by their own efforts are trying desperately hard to keep open should not do so.
5.14 p.m.
VISCOUNT ECCLES: My Lords, much of what I had intended to say has already been said by my noble friends Lord Avon and Lord Harlech, and I can be quite brief. I entirely support my noble friend Lord Avon in saying that we should look at our defences with our allies. This is because we still have to deal with the Government that is in power in Russia. We do not know for how long these men will be there, or whether the action which they have just taken might lead them to still further panic measures. I should have thought that we should all be agreed that prudence demands that we should look to our defences.
Then there is the other side of the question, which was so well put by my noble friend Lord Harlech, which is: What do we do about the change in
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opinion inside the Communist bloc? This makes an enormous difference between the situation as it is to-day and, say, the situation in 1956 when the Hungarians were so brutally put down. Many of them died then, but I think not in vain. They started something, and the Czechs to-day remember this. In the last ten years we have seen throughout the world an enormous increase in the power of public opinion over Governments.
Let us not look at Russia for a moment, but consider how even the heaviest armaments are now not much good in the hands of the most powerful Governments if public opinion does not support the use of those armaments. We had a lesson at Suez (we need not go back over that) when France and Britain were unable to carry on their war with Egypt because public opinion was not with them. Some years later a suffient amount of public opinion was with a much smaller country, Israel, and they quickly wiped out Nasser's army. Look at the war in Vietnam. There you have a country which spends by far the largest sum in the Western world on armaments, but is unable to finish the war. Why is this? It is because in the South the people are too lukewarm, and in the North they are too hot. The Americans have not enough public opinion behind them; it is against them. Why should it he different with the tanks that have gone into Prague? I do not think it is different. The pictures that we have seen and the reports that have been coming out from that country show that armaments are out of date unle is you have a great crusade behind you, with the whole of your nation united; and that, I believe, will be less and less likely.
Why has this change in public opinion taken place? Well, my Lords, I think we all know that it is because of rising standards of life, which have given power to far more people to live their own lives. They want to move about; they go to see cultural exhibitions; they read more books, and so on. And the mass communication system of wireless and television is so powerful now that frontiers are no good. The censor is taking a back seat. On top of this, the number of personal contacts between the people of the Communist bloc and those outside has steadily increased.

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I remember about ten years ago, when Her Majesty's Government were negotiating a treaty of commerce with Mr. Khrushchev's Government, how one evening during the negotiations Mr. Khrushchev was in good humour. He had that day made a speech in which he had said to the Russian people: "We have now sufficient armaments to defend ourselves against anybody. I can assure you that our country can never be overrun by anybody". I congratulated him. I thought he would be very pleased with what he had said. But not at all. He said: "Now they will want consumer goods, because once I tell them that their defences are adequate they are bound to want other things, and when that happens I cannot tell what the future will be in this country". He was an expansive man and very agreeable, and I am sure he foresaw what he was doing. That is one of the reasons why in the end he had to go. Are we to have sanctions—I mean private sanctions or public sanctions? I am sure that that would be a mistake, because the landslide in opinion is beginning inside the Communist world, and we could do nothing more helpful to the Communist Government than to give them the excuse of saying, "The whole world is against us. Now you must rally! Now you must put away your liberal ideas. We are once again under a state of siege, or semi-siege". This is exactly what they would like to happen. Sanctions would help them much more than they could conceivably hurt them.
Then what about private contacts and cultural exchanges? I know only about two spheres of contacts with the Communists. One is the textile trade and the other is the museum world. Things are quite different from what they were ten years ago. We all have friends both in the textile trade and in the museum world—real friends among the textile manufacturers behind the Iron Curtain, especially I must say in Czechoslovakia, and of course in the museum world throughout the whole of the Communist countries. Are we to throw all those over? I hope not. But I do not think we can go on as we have been going on. What should be the difference in our attitude when we are selling fibres to Russia by the million pound weight or
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when we are organising an exhibition for which we are borrowing something from one of the Soviet museums, and so on? What should be our attitude?
I think personally that the private individual must now take his politics seriously; that is to say, when we have these contacts we must not go neutral, not rule out all conversation to do with Czechoslovakia, anything to do with the way things have been mishandled by the Russian Government. But in sorrow, not in anger, we have to become missionaries. I am quite confident that the Russians, in particular those whom I know, are ready for this. Therefore, I hope, my Lords, that we strengthen our defences. We can give much more encouragement to the Czech people than perhaps we know, because public opinion is so much more powerful than it used to be. And as private persons we must behave like missionaries and not just make a profit out of the Russian trade, but make propaganda as well.
5.23 p.m.
LORD MACLEOD OF FUINARY: My Lords, I feel it my duty to speak from the point of view of religion. When a financier addresses this House we expect enlightenment on fiscal policy. When a scientist speaks, we eagerly await new insights in his especial subject. But, a little oddly, when a parson rises, am I right in thinking that a majority indulge the secret hope that he will steer clear of strong religion? Yet we are still a religious country. This House is daily opened with Christian prayer, and I believe that only in terms of Christian faith revived can we really get deep about the issue before us.
Two short alleviations. First, I am not going to be sectarian. I speak about the ultimates. Your Lordships will remember St. Augustine's great words:
"That which is called the Christian Religion existed among the ancients and never did not exist: from the beginning of the human race. until Christ came in the flesh: at which time the true religion (which already existed) began to be called Christianity".
I speak in the widest and the deepest sense. The second alleviation is this. I may speak strongly about the United States of America. We often write it down in our notes as "U.S."—meaning "United States"; but U.S. also spells "us". Well, I think of us as well when

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I say "United States"; I think of the West together. I believe that if we can see it we are living at a great moment of truth. I believe,
"There is a tide in the affairs of men, which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune".
And we are at such a tide. The nature of that fortune, and the cost of that fortune, I reserve for my conclusion.
I am less likely to be misunderstood, and more likely to be brief, if I can make two comments on the present scene as I see it. Point one. There have been some odd uses, especially in the Press, of the word "morality" in this tragedy that brings us together. Folk are horrified at the "morality" of Russia in forcibly entering a Communist State, or the Warsaw Pact countries. But their horror is always in terms of what Communists would call "bourgeois morality", such as sovereign rights of nations and human rights of persons. But this is not classic Communism. Marx, interpreted by Lenin, rewrote completely the concept of morality. For classical Communism, that alone is moral which furthers the workers' revolution. This is the essence of morality. Immorality, for them, is any act that impedes the progress of dialectic materialism towards that great day when law will wither away and there will be no further need for anyone to dictate. For instance, in Russia a man may make a mess of personal morality. He may perhaps hold up a bank. This is serious and he deserves a prison sentence. But let a man deviate from the State's interpretation of progress of the next stage towards the great day—such is a crime worthy of death. Now this, I submit, is no debating point.
What we see happening in Europe at this hour is bound to happen in classic Communism. In the minds of the Russian hierarchy, at this hour their invasion is highly moral. The complexity obviously deepens when we remember that Czechoslovakia is also a Communist country. They have not deviated, so they claim; it is the rigidity of Russia that has deviated. Thus, the problem, internal to all Communist States, is the correct interpretation of their "Bible", of where they stand. Here is the chaos. And, from our point of view, from the point of view of truth as we see it, here is the hope. Karl Marx did not foresee this. He is positively revolving in his
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grave as he looks at Russia/China, Czechoslovakia/Hungary, Yugoslavia/Poland. The intended Communist monolith increasingly looks much more like a Tower of Babel. Here is at least, as has already been pointed out, the longterm hope.
But my second point is that we cannot afford to crow. Indeed, if we claim that our morality concerning the sovereign right of nations and the human rights of persons stems from a Christian thesis, we stand more deeply condemned. Would anyone seriously argue that our economic imperialisms do not invade the sovereign rights of nations? Look back, say, sixty years at Congo, remembering Belgium; at Algeria, remembering France; at China, remembering Britain and others. Or, more contemporaneously, we can think of Formosa. A few years back we were horrified at the possibility of Russia taking over Cuba—Cuba, lying 150 miles from the States, with its puppet Government. Why, then, our equanimity when United States of America took over Formosa?—Formosa lying 150 miles from China; or at the build-up in South Vietnam, with its puppet Government, to prevent Communism from seeping clown into South-East Asia? One wonders what the temperature among us would be if, escalating gradually, 500,000 Chinese were now, say, in Mexico, and were holding South Mexico against North Mexico to prevent capitalism from seeping down into South America. Or, what do your Lordships suppose they are saying in the Dominican Republic, as they read of the moral indignation of the United States of America as allied tanks roll through the streets of brave Prague? I merely say that we cannot afford to crow.
It goes so much deeper than that. What about our economic control of South-East Asia countries? I mean the control by the United States—us. In 1954 America passed a commendable Act to get their surplus agriculture to the underdeveloped countries. But were we just benevolent? This is how one of the drafters of that Bill described it at the, time:
"In its simplest form this is how I see these food ships would work. A country with riots coming up could be controlled by letting our wheat ships sit outside the port like a carrot on a stick. A leader whom we considered dangerous would lose support of the masses because everyone would know we were not

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going to unload the wheat if he became top man."
A United States magazine at the time carried a revealing though rather naïve headline—"Feeding the world's hungry millions…How it will mean billions for U.S. business".
Or, again, U.N.C.T.A.D. at its first conference—that is the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, with underdeveloped countries as voting members. Would you not count this a hopeful resolution for the peace of the world?
"Economic relations between countries (including trade relations) shall be based on the principle of sovereign equality of states, self-determination of peoples and non-interference in the internal affairs of countries".
Hopeful? Yes—but the United States voted against that resolution. Or, again:
"Every country has the sovereign right freely to trade with other countries and freely to dispose of its natural resources in the interests of the economic development and wellbeing of its own people'.
Hopeful? Only fair—yes. But the United States voted against that resolution.
Enough: I am not trying to be gratuitously nasty. I am merely giving chapter and verse as to why we cannot afford to crow. On the "Christian morality" side of the fence—if we are to have world peace (and peace is indivisible), we must confess as well as accuse. We must say "guilty" as well as "fie, fie!" The Communist monolith has become a Tower of Babel. There lies hope. But our Christian morality has equally become a tumult of contending humanist noises. We must get back to a principle: some, seriously accepted North Star. This is what we are failing to pass on to our youth; and hence their extravagances.
Another has said, "If a man does not stand for something, he will fall for anything". We must stand for, and really believe in, a new source of power. Here we come to the moment of truth to which I referred at the start. For the crashing problem of our age is, "Where does power now lie?" Where does power now lie at all? It was Gandhi who said, "If there is injustice about, it is better to fight than to do nothing". Well, there is injustice about,
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but how do we fight? In 1914, a big nation walked into a little nation, so we fought the big nation. In 1939 the same nation walked into little Poland, so we fought again. Now, in 1968, a big nation walks into Czechoslovakia, and no one suggests fighting. Why? We all know why: because if we did, it might escalate in a week. Within a fortnight there would be 10 million dead, and there would be no Czechoslovakia. As Martin Luther King said,
"The nature of the modern problem is simple; it is either non-violence or nonexistence".
Or as Einstein said, way back in 1945,
"None of the politicians understands the ultimate effect on politics of nuclear power. Roosevelt doesn't understand; Stalin doesn't; Winston Churchill doesn't. Only one politician begins to understand, and that is Gandhi".
This is the challenge of our time. "The world has become a unity", cried Romain Rolland "and for this high destiny mankind is not yet fit". To get a clue we have to go back to Darwin. Bernard Shaw once said:
"The greatest delusion of the Englishman is that he has read The Origin of Species".
If more had done so we should not hear such poppycock being talked as we do about "the survival of the fittest". Far too many people think that the survival of the fittest is the survival of the beefiest. But Darwin's teaching was the opposite of that. It was in fact a paradox. In plant life and in animal life that form alone survives that is capable of coming level with its environment. Down goes the dinosaur; up come ever more sensitive forms. In brief, what is true in the animal and vegetable kingdom must now begin to be applied in our sociological situation. The only nations which will survive in the new environment will be the nations which seriously come level with a co-operative world.
A small ship called the "Pueblo" sailed into the territorial waters of the smallest nation in the world—North Korea—and was captured, and the mightiest nation the world has ever known did nothing. The insect nation said "Boo!" to the dinosaur, and the dinosaur said nought. North Korea still holds craft and crew. This is the terrifying novelty of our time. Yet there are still people who say "We have lost Aden and Singapore and Malay—Ichabod,

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Ichabod, our glory is departed". Ichabod my foot! Our glory is at hand if only we rightly read the signs of the times. The fittest to survive are no longer the mighty, but are those who will co-operate with the new environment. If we do not, we have "had it".
You remember Toynbee's insight. Four thousand years ago China was the economic centre of the world. Then came the inexorable ground swell towards the West, and Assyria took over; then Greece; then the glory that was Greece became the grandeur that was Rome. After the dark ages, the star of the Holy Roman Empire was in the ascendant. Came the Portuguese Empire, the Spanish, the French, the Dutch that flowered in the 18th century. Then Britain became the economic centre of the world power in the 19th century. The inexorable ground swell went on. This century belong to the United States, but already the writing is on the wall. They are losing their nerve. They doubt their destiny. Their morality, private and public, withers. Twenty-eight per cent. of the American soldiers in Vietnam have venereal disease.
So what looms up for the 21st century? China, of course. The ground swell has moved full circle. Yes; in twenty years the population of China is estimated to be double what Russia and America will be together. I say that if we do not grasp the nature of the new environment we have "had it", anyway —unless we embrace (not investigate) the new power, the power of non-violence, and embrace true world co-operation at last. We had better be quick. Already even nuclear power (for those few who still put their trust in it) is slipping from our hands. Read the last number of the medical journal, the Lancet; note the speed with which biological power is taking over. In two decades the threat of chemical warfare will demolish nuclear power—cheap stuff for universal procurement. Universally acknowledged as obscene. In two decades, shall we say, Roumania and Yugoslavia will be able to decimate the population of Moscow without benefit of tanks—and do it on the cheap at that—unless we all at once banish chemical and biological warfare. At the moment we are engaged in furthering the obscenity.
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The old power structures—even the latest—have turned in on themselves. In the ultimate, said Martin Luther King, it is non-violence or non-existence: there will be no existence unless there is nonviolence, yet still it is true that it is better to fight injustice than to do nothing. What then of the new fight? The power of non-violence has nothing to do with passivity; it is not withdrawal; it is not pusillanimity. What are the great names of contemporary Christian history? Kagawa in Japan, Luthuli in Africa, Danilo Dolci in Italy, Niemoller in Germany, Martin Luther King in America—every one of them totally committed to non-violence, yet every one of them up to the neck in politics, every one of them in prison at one time or another for being involved. Not one of them passive or pietistic.
This is something for which civilisation must now begin to stand, if we are not to fall for everything. The foolishness of God that is wiser than men, the weakness of God that is stronger than men, must now be applied at the periphery and not just at the personal. Pacifism, eccentric in the Church's witness since the first centuries, has become centric again. What is now eccentric is the supposition that the Church can have anything to do with modern war from now on.
But what (some noble Lords are asking) has this to do with the present crisis? For the State in the short run it has little to do with it; in the short run in this situation we can but patch without losing our heads and seek true moral relations with our neighbours until the world has a faith again. In the long run, this has to do with unimaginable riches at the disposal of the world. For the Church there is never any long run. There is no way to peace. Peace is the way. For the Church, obedience must be immediate or she is not the Church. It may well be that we are entering one of those times when the Church must pull out from the State. It may well be that the Church must suffer persecution, as she did at the last Reformation, so that in the end she may serve the larger good of the State again. What she must not tolerate is the obscenity, the gross impropriety of the now.
Let me close with a true story of what happened in India in living memory.

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A missionary served in a primitive tribal area. Each year on the first day of March the tribe marched through the forest to a certain point and there lingered until midnight struck. Then they went down into the groves to practise their obscenities. One year, with great courage, a missionary accompanied them through the forest till the lull before midnight, and during the lull he got on a log and preached the love of God. For a moment there was a deadly silence. Would the youth of the tribe lynch him then and there for getting in the way of their ceremonies while they allowed him to have his Easter? But no; Grace intervened. When they went down into the grove for the obscenities he returned alone to the Mission House.
The next year he did it again, with lessened tension. He did it for ten years, and then he died a natural death. When the first of March came round on the year after he died the head of the tribe came to the Mission Station and asked that another missionary be appointed to do this preaching because it had become part of the show. At the moment the Church is a part of the show, part of the obscene world. But only the Church has the answer now—the way of the Cross. The power of non-violence to be practised again at the periphery and not just among persons. If we are to rise to it, ecclesiastically and nationally, we have a baptism to be baptised with. And how shall we be straightened till it be accomplished?
5.43 p.m.
VISCOUNT WATKINSON: My Lords, like many other noble Lords I dropped everything to come to support the Government to-day. I think one should perhaps say that at this time, because we in this House are in some difficulty. We read the tape but we do not know really whether or not what it says is right. I should like to say that I think the Government's action is absolutely right. I think the condemnation of the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, who opened our debate, is absolutely relevant, even if the courage and bravery of the Czechs has brought something out of disaster. So I think we are right to be here, and I think are absolutely right to say what has been said by many noble Lords. What kind of a watershed
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policy this may be I think it is perhaps difficult to say with exactitude at this moment, but one thing is absolutely plain; namely, that the Russian leaders certainly have not lost their belief in force as the ultimate instrument of policy. Of this we have had as clear a demonstration as anyone could seek.
I think I can understand how difficult and disappointing it must have been for the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, and his colleagues in the Government to be told by the Soviet Ambassador, in terms which after all no intelligent man would be expected to believe, that this action had been decided upon. If, as my noble friend Lord Harlech and others have indicated, this use of force springs from fear, I think it is even more menacing a proposition for all of us. If the Russians felt that they had no option but to invade Czechoslovakia because they could not stand the possible risks and results of the Czechoslovak version of Communism spreading into other countries, then they are indeed at the moment men who might be driven into dangerous courses. So I do not myself regard the situation as one that is other than extremely menacing to all that we hold dear. I think it has many ominous implications, and I still hold that view even if, after all, the bravery and courage of the Czechs has rescued something from disaster.
Sadly one has to say that in the ten years when I was a Minister, and in the years since, I do not think the character of the Russian leadership has changed much. The processes of moderation work extremely slowly. One hopes they are working. One must do all that is possible to seek to speed them up. But I think we should be wise to assume, in the light of current events, that the progress made has been disappointingly slow to those of us who had hoped to see a break in the cold war and a real warming up in the relationships between the Communists and ourselves.
I would hope that the Government—no doubt they have already done this—have already had the normal informal NATO consultations that obviously can be arranged at short notice. I think the Government should be quite clear where the alliance stands and, what is perhaps more important, I think the alliance should be quite clear in its external statements as to where it stands, and what

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particular position it holds to-day. Despite the French semi-defection, I believe that the alliance is as strong as it has ever been; and perhaps it would not be a bad thing to say that at this time.
Turning to the Czechs, they deserve all the backing that we can give them. We should be foolish to imply that this could be other than a moral backing; but even this may do some good. What support we can give, and however we can give it, we should give it. I do not want to pursue this issue; noble Lords have explored it fully already. What I want to do for just a few moments is to follow the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, to some extent, and take a look at the longer term, having had our warning that there is no easy course in regard to a genuine rapprochement, anyway with present Russian leaders, and the clearest possible demonstration that, driven either by fear or by determination to impose their will on others, they will resort to force.
Perhaps as an ex-Minister of Defence, one should add a footnote. I do not think one can make much criticism of the military occupation of Czechoslovakia. One can make a great deal of criticism of the utter folly of the political way in which it was managed, but I am afraid there is little criticism to be made of the speed, the skill and the deployment of the forces which resulted in the occupation of that country in a very short time indeed. Let us hope that we do not return to the full vigour of the cold war. But from now—and I am not seeking to make a Party point of this—we must be a little more prepared for drastic action of a military nature that is carefully calculated to be of a kind likely to be tolerated without recourse to all-out nuclear war.
This is not something that the Government have to make great statements about, but it is certainly something that we hope the Government will be earnestly considering, and one must say again that if such action were to be mounted it would hardly be likely to be in areas where the NATO Alliance is at its strongest. It would be much more likely to be in areas of doubt, in areas where perhaps British retrenchment may be opening new opportunities for intervention in the Eastern Mediterranean, if you like, or in the Persian Gulf. So we
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must hope that the Government and their advisers will now consider this whole complex of defence policy in the light of present circumstances, and that they will examine it both inside and outside NATO because, as I have said in this House before and no doubt will say again, the NATO Alliance is most vulnerable on its flanks. It is unlikely to be pierced in its centre; to pierce it in its centre is all out nuclear war, and to envelop it on its flank may be a much easier operation to the eyes of the Russians bent on some action to defend their way of life, as they see it.
This does not mean we should sever all connections with the Russians, and I strongly support those noble Lords who say that we should keep open all the doors we can. I think the Government might seek to draw some difference between relations with the Government and relations with the Russian people. I hope that exchanges with the Russian people and other than direct Government agencies will continue to be fostered as perhaps our best way of helping the Czechs in their way of life, but certainly the Russian Army Choir, for example, could hardly be welcomed in this country so long as their forces are occupying Czechoslovakia.
To come back to the sphere of defence for a moment, I think that to be prudent we should say to the Government to-day—not, as my noble friend Lord Jellicoe said, that we wish to pursue it to-day; this can be looked at in the normal course of debate when we come back—that surely they now have time to look again at our alliances in NATO, to look at the dangerous areas where British retrenchment (I am not going into whether it is necessary or not) may leave areas of a power vacuum. One hopes that this review will go on in the next few weeks so that the Government an; ready for any new situation that may come upon us. I think the more ready we are seen to be to face such a situation, the less likely it is to happen. I have a fear myself that the present leadership of the old Communist bloc, who probably know now they are outmoded, that they are men who are surrounded by younger intellectuals and scientists who are looking at them as people who are no longer with the true stream of Communist advance, might be driven to a point where

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they would meditate almost any madness before falling to their own people. This is something we should bear in mind, and something that perhaps Czechoslovakia has given us a warning about.
As to our own position, I do not fear competition of our way of life with the Russians. In the long term it is they who have to bend to the wind of change and not us; but in the meantime we must do our duty and see that our country plays its full part in its alliances, plays its proper part in the world. I do not think this affects our creditor position; I think our creditors are much more likely to back us if they think we are doing our full job in the world than if they think we are always on the retreat or trying to save a penny here and a penny there. All I would ask at this time is that, first, we should support the Government, as I certainly do, in their condemnation of the present situation; secondly, that we should ask the Government not to make great statements but, with their advisers, to reexamine the whole sphere of defence within and without the NATO Alliance to make sure that those who take a slightly gloomy view of this situation will not be caught unawares if the present Russian leadership, having perhaps suffered a humiliating reverse in Czechoslovakia, looks around for somewhere else in which once more to glorify themselves.
5.56 p.m.
LORD GLADWYN: My Lords, if the latest news is to be believed there is now a chance, I suppose, that some kind of agreement may be arrived at between the Russians and the Czechs whereby the Soviet Army evacuates Czechoslovakia after a certain time, subject to certain conditions. Whether we shall eventually welcome such an agreement will depend on the conditions; and they will be obviously tough, so we must keep our fingers crossed. In the meantime there is no reason why we should not have a sort of inquest on what is really an international crime.
I will not say much about that because it has been so eloquently denounced by so many of my colleagues here. What I can say is that, in my view, it is even worse than Munich. It is certainly worse than the coup de Prague in 1948, which, after all, did not involve the introduction
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of foreign troops and depended largely on local Stalinists, of whom there were many more in Czechoslovakia then than there are now. It is worse even than Korea where, after all, the aggression was by a little State which was not a member of the United Nations. I think, indeed, that it is obviously worse than any of those instances because this time the aggression, that is to say the application of brute force has been perpetrated in direct violation of the Charter by a Permanent Member of the Security Council of the United Nations against a small ally which was actually professing her loyalty to her own Treaty obligations. You cannot have a more scandalous international action than that.
However, my Lords, there is not much use in our simply holding up our hands in horror at the Russian action, however indefensible. Here I must say that I agree with something that the noble Lord, Lord Macleod of Fuinary, said. None of us is completely without blame. Nations are rightly called "Cold monsters", and they can only be controlled gradually by the acceptance of some form of law. I believe there is still such a thing as an international conscience, and our hope must be that it will gradually prevail.
I think, therefore, that in our inquest on this terrible blunder, this sort of aberration, we should do well this afternoon to concentrate principally on three aspects. First of all, clearly, there is the question of what we should do. The second broad aspect is what will be the likely results of the aggression if it should continue. The third aspect is why did it happen at all. The first point has already been very adequately dealt with by many noble Lords, including my own noble Leader, and I do not propose to go into that. However, I propose to make a few remarks on the likely results, as I see them.
Even if their blunder is somehow patched up, the first result surely is that the Russians have finally lost the leadership of international Communism. Apart from their four partners in crime, and I believe also Cuba, there is hardly any national Communist Party which has done anything but condemn the aggression. Some nations may not do so. For instance, India and Pakistan have not outrightly done so. They have

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abstained. But these abstentions are by nations for national interests which you can understand, even if you do not approve. What is certain is that every nation in the third world, in the whole undeveloped world, and no more so than in the Middle East, Egypt and Iraq—all these nations will be wondering if it really is now desirable to come into any very close contact with the powerful bear.
If it were not that China now seems to be sinking into a sort of anarchy and mass hysteria, I suppose the Chinese might take up the torch of the old international world Communist movement. But, happily for us, the mere fact that there are millions of screaming Red Guards, beside whom the old Hitler Jugend seems comparatively sane and virtuous, is not likely to promote the Chinese cause and Chinese leadership of international Communism throughout the world. The fact is that international Communism is now dead, and international capitalism is now dead also, as I think the noble Lord, Lord Harlech, said.
The fact is that we are all living in an age dominated by two industrialised super-Powers, each with associated smaller industrialised States. One of these groups, as we all know, is more advanced industrially than the other, if only because it is based on the principle of individual freedom. Here again I agree very much with what the noble Lord, Lord Harlech, said: that in the long run such principles will prevail. At the moment, however, confronting these two industrialised blocs, which between them comprise rather over a third of the population of the world, is the so-called third world of underdeveloped countries. While the one is getting richer, the other is getting poorer. That is the grim fact behind the present situation which has, unhappily, been reinforced by the aggression against Czechoslovakia.
So it follows that the prospects of a so-called détente, about which so much has been talked lately—and here I mean the prospects of a détente in the narrower sense that is to say, arriving gradually at some sort of European agreement on Germany—have disappeared, I am sorry to say, for a considerable time. I say that because it is now quite clear that Bonn cannot continue its policy of raprochement with the Soviet satellites,
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notably with the D.D.R. Efforts to do so are for the moment out. No doubt the Germans will try to continue their policy of trading, but in present circumstances they cannot hope to develop it to more than a certain point.
In the second place, it is quite clear that in the face of this shock to security in Europe, and indeed to the world, the Western nations, and notably the Western European nations, must take certain elementary additional precautions. Here I entirely agree with what the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, and the noble Viscount, Lord Watkinson, have said. It is no good saying that we can just carry on as we are. The enormous efficiency of the military overrunning of Czechoslovakia, with the transport of two 30-ton tanks in each Antonov converted bomber arid the dumping of Soviet detachments all over the country within about twelve hours, is absolutely staggering when one thinks of the organisation needed. It is, after all, conceivable that if we let down our defences the same sort of thing might happen to Hamburg, Frankfurt or Munich, which are almost equally close to the frontier. It might conceivably be that they would take such a chance in Denmark or Northern Norway. We must, therefore, take some precautions against the possibility of their being able to do elsewhere as they did in Czechoslovakia.
In this sense the détente has always been somewhat of an illusion. Why do I think so? It is because I believe the Russians are not yet really ready for it. It was an illusion to think that they were. I am sure it will happen eventually, but only when the Soviet regime has evolved and, more especially, when it is prepared to contemplate a united Western Europe, of which the West Germans will be part. I do not want to develop that now, but that has been my consistent theory.
The prospects of a détente in a wider sense are, of course, a different thing. A détente in a wider sense means Soviet-American co-operation, of which a notable example recently has been the nonproliferation treaty. All that has obviously been adversely affected; but the prospects of a détente here are not necessarily out. The Americans are desperately keen on maintaining this kind

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of contact if they possibly can, and I think they probably will. From this point of view, it is obvious that the balance of terror, to which so many noble Lords have referred, without specifically using that term, will continue until such time as a very effective anti-ballistic missile is evolved, or, as the noble Lord, Lord Macleod of Fuinary, suggested, small States are able to send rockets with microbiological weapons over Moscow or any other capital, which is certainly a long time ahead. So I think the balance of terror will prevail for a very considerable period of time. Of course, from the point of view of prevention of war, the balance of terror in the mad world in which we live is more significant than any legal or contractual obligation.
In the light of all this, I think one can reach one conclusion, and that is that a major casualty, if not the major casualty, apart from the unfortunate Czechs, has been the policy of the present ruler of France, General de Gaulle, and, to a lesser extent, I am afraid, the policy of Chancellor Keisinger. I say this because, in the first place, it must be evident where the pursuit of a completely nationalist policy may lead. In the second place, France cannot possibly by herself act as a sort of "middleman". In fact, it has been shown that the whole idea of fixing up some deal between the French and the Russians, as predicted in General de Gaulle's memoirs, and very often in his subsequent speeches, is quite illusory. If anything is fixed up between the two blocs about Germany it must be as the result of negotiations in which the British and Americans also take part. De Gaulle may be the man of the day before yesterday; he may be the man of the day after tomorrow; but he is certainly not the man of to-day.
Here I should like to make one point about what has been made recently about the conference at Yalta. It has been suggested in France ever since the aggression took place, and French television has been constantly repeating it ever since, that the reason for this outrage is that Europe was divided into two parts at the conference at Yalta. I must say that that is an extraordinary view to hold. Nobody knows better than the noble Earl, Lord Avon (he can confirm
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this), that there was no question of handing over half of Europe to the Russians at Yalta. The Russians were just about to invade Europe in enormous force. They could not have been prevented from going into Europe. They were chasing the Nazis and they could not have been stopped until the war ended. That was a fact of life. Nor did anybody ever say, "Half of Europe is yours".
All that happened at Yalta in that sense was that the noble Earl negotiated a document called the Declaration on Liberated Europe, which I had the honour of helping him to draft to some extent. In that document—which I quite agree was not nearly so strong as it should have been, for the Russians would not agree to our original draft—they agreed that when they liberated territories they would hold free elections. What happened when they got into Roumania and Poland, and particularly Poland? They imprisoned all the leaders who were not their own stooges, and there was no question of free elections or anything like that. But at Yalta we did our best, and we got them to sign a document. Afterwards, when they had torn up the Declaration on Liberated Europe by their action in Poland and Roumania, we could have said, when the armies had met, "We are not going back to our zones. You have torn up one document and we are going to tear up the other". My impression was that Winston Churchill wanted that, but it was President Roosevelt who would not have it. It was nothing whatever to do with Yalta. Yalta did not hand over anything to anybody except in the Far East. and we took no part in that at all.
A minor casualty has been the Ostpolitik of the German Government, and that is a pity. ChancellorKiesinger was right in trying to pursue this new policy of getting in touch with the Central European States—and notably with the D.D.R. From this point of view the aggression was a tragedy. Rut there it is. All you can say is that the Chancellor was rather ingenuous in thinking that he could pursue this policy with the sole aid of France and the dubious and anti-American support of General de Gaulle.
So the result of all this, so far as we are concerned, ought to be, first, a closing of the Western ranks, and, secondly, progress, if possible, towards the formation

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of a genuine Western Europe, which I believe is the only hope for an eventual détente. As regards Western Europe and the closing of Western ranks, within the NATO Treaty, of course, here again I entirely agree with the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, who said that we ought to accept, and I am sure the Government will, the proposal of Chancellor Kiesinger that there should now be a high-level meeting of the NATO Council to consider generally what should be done. Whether that is a success or not depends on whether France will agree. Surely they will now—we can only hope so—even if it means changing their posture slightly. As regards the gradual formation of Western Europe, there again we can only hope the French will change their view. They may possibly do so now. Goodness knows! we should welcome it if the French did change their policy, even to some extent. No-one would welcome it more than this nation. Of that I am sure.
That is really all I want to say, my Lords. I do not want to detain your Lordships on why all this happened, except to say that the effect on East Germany of the proposed new Czech reforms was a very considerable, if not the main, reason for the hawks, the hardliners, getting the upper hand at the last minute in Moscow. What would have happened, and what might still happen, if there were some successful anti-Ulbricht movement near the frontier, shall we say, in Western Germany, and the East German frontier guards opened the frontier and invited their West Germany brothers to come in—what would happen do you think? It is rather a disquieting question, and not a disquieting question for the East Germans only.
The second reason, as I am sure has been said, was because of the effect of the Czechoslovak reforms in the Soviet Union itself, where the fundamentals of Stalinism are now being challenged. Here I should like to quote from a passage in Le Monde, which did not appear in the British Press, dated August 24—it was this translation of an article which appeared in Pravda. It is of very great interest because it shows that these great debates have been going on in the Soviet Union in the last year or two between the forward-looking people who are thinking in terms of a new development
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of Communism and those who go on with the hard line. There was a young academic, I believe, who said that what he thought was going to happen was a gradual convergence of the Soviet philosophy and the American philosophy: that the Americans were becoming more State-minded and the Russians were becoming more liberal, and eventually they would arrive at some kind of synthesis. Then he was denounced by a lot of people and eventually this article which officially ended this dispute appeared in Pravda:
"In the field of ideology no pacific coexistence between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat is possible, just as there can be no question of a 'class peace' between the two. Fanatics of bourgeois order' assume a pseudo-socialist guise and have recourse to all sorts of propaganda manoeuvres in order to break up the socialist community. But the peoples of the brother countries have not finally disposed of the capitalist régime in order to stand by with folded arms in the face of the oppression and exploitation of the masses. On the contrary, they have irrevocably bound their future to socialism and will not tolerate any derogation from this accomplished fact."
If that means anything it means that we are right hack to the cold war and Stalinism. It is very regrettable, but I am afraid that is where we are at the moment.
I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Harlech: I am not quite so optimistic as he was about the progress being made in the next few years. But I thick that Lord Harlech's thesis is good, and that eventually the Soviet Union will be penetrated by some Western philosophy. However, I do not want to end this much too long speech on a note of despair. On the contrary, the mere fact that the Russians have had to have recourse to force in Czechoslovakia means that there is a very formidable element in the Soviet Union itself which could still at some time pursue policies not unlike those initiated by the Government of Mr. Dubcek. They used to say that you could do anything with bayonets except sit on them, and I think the same applies to tanks. Eventually, what are known as liberal ideas—in other words the essential idea of freedom—will still spread Eastwards from the West, with unpredictable but still good results. When it really spreads in the Soviet Union, then the so-called détente will come about.

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It will take longer than any of us thought before—perhaps ten or twenty years. Who knows? But one day it will come about. If, in the meantime, as seems probable, the balance of terror prevents any major war, eventually we shall arrive at the long-desired goal; namely, the co-ordination of world policies on some agreed basis between Russia, America and a United Europe. The present agony of the Czechs—the probable return to rationing, to queues, to restricted production, general miseries and so on—may well last for a shorter period than we now think. Certainly it will if we, together with the French and the Germans, can now get together—and why should we not?—with the other democratic European States in a big way and construct a genuine, that is to say a supra-national, United Europe. Once this is done, the basis for a new deal with the East will have been laid, but not before.
6.19 p.m.
LORD BOOTHBY: My Lords, I hesitate to disagree, and I am pained to disagree in any way with my noble friend Lord Gladwyn, but in order to get this crisis in proper perspective we must take a cool look at the past as well as the future. I cannot agree with him that this is not, in part at least, an inheritance of Yalta. It was, of course, against the wishes of His Majesty's Government at the time. But that is how it turned out, because the establishment of so-called spheres of influence led in the end to a far bigger sell-out than Munich ever did.
LORD GLADWYN: Regarding the spheres of influence, so far as they occurred at all, the noble Lord may be right, but this was not done at Yalta.
LORD BOOTHBY: It started with Yalta. I am afraid I cannot withdraw that at all. It began at Yalta undoubtedly, where I am sure our negotiators, with the best will in the world, believed that Stalin was going to hold free elections in all these countries. But if they believed that they could believe almost anything. At Yalta we abandoned in fact if not in intention—and I entirely agree there was no intention there—the main political objectives for which we had gone to war. And this after the partition of Poland
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and the attack upon Finland in 1939, and the annexation of the Baltic States in 1940. Surely these events should have been a warning and a lesson.
My Lords, the method has not changed, and it is the method that matters, much more than any so-called settlement which may or may not have been imposed to-day in Moscow. It goes back to Czarist days, to the invasion of Hungary in 1849 and the bloody supression of the Polish revolutions of 1830 and 1863. It is the method of absolute despotism, sustained by ruthless oppression, cruelty and the intoxication of power. At Yalta, it looked—it was not intended, but it looked—as if sovereign nations were handed round like plums: as if, over the caviar, vodka and cigars they said, "All right, old boy, you can have Bulgaria and Roumania so long as you give us Greece".
THE EARL OF AVON: My Lords, I do not want to interrupt the noble Lord, but there really is not a word of truth in that statement.
LORD BOOTHBY: My Lords, I said it looked liked that: I did not say it happened. But the fact remains that Stalin agreed with alacrity to the Yalta agreement, without the slightest intention, as I am sure the noble Earl would agree, of ever allowing free elections anywhere, if he could possibly avoid it, in the countries within his zone of influence. Indeed, he proceeded to collect ten countries in Europe (which was not bad going) in about ten months, and we never heard of a free election in any one of them.
The process was of course facilitated —and, indeed, looking back in the past, I think this may have been a much graver event than Yalta—by the disastrous decision of the Supreme Command to halt the Western advance into Europe in 1945 and actually to withdraw forces from Czechoslovakia. We could have taken Prague, Berlin and Vienna. Montgomery could have taken Berlin, and the Americans could have taken Vienna and Prague; but we let the Russians take them all deliberately. This was an American decision, not ours—and we have reaped the consequences ever since. I go thus far with the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, when I say that it was the Americans who were the prime

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influences at the Yalta Conference. It was Roosevelt who was the prime influence there. He had to come up against constant resistance on the part of Churchill and of the noble Earl, Lord Avon, but by that time we no longer had the power. They had the power, and that is the real answer.
My Lords, it went on at San Francisco. I attended that Conference as a journalist and I remember when the order came to Jan Masaryk that he was to propose the inclusion of the puppet Lublin Government of Poland in the conference. I remember dining with him in San Francisco that night. We dined off aspirin and champagne. I besought him not to go back to Czechoslovakia, not to move this resolution, and he said: "I cannot abandon my country, whatever else I do. I would rather go back to my death"—and to his death he went back. I wrote at the time—your Lordships will forgive me quoting myself, but I am often fond of doing it:
"While we chatted, Molotov shored up the Eastern bloc ! He found the Western Democracies impotent and divided. In these circumstances, it was easy for him to run through their broken ranks and kick goal after goal. The method may have been a bit rough. But no small part of our subsequent and increasing irritation with the Soviet Union has been due to the instinctive resentment of a man who suffers from a paralysis of indecision watching someone else, who knows exactly what he wants, getting it.
"One final comment. The United States have completed the regional unity and organisation of the American Continent, and Stalin is bringing a similar process, on different and harsher lines, in Central and Eastern Europe to a rapid conclusion. If the Western Democracies in Europe do not get together fairly soon, the entire Continent may well be brought decisively within the Russian orbit!So far as Western Europe is concerned, the lead must—and should—be given by Great Britain without further delay."
All this was written in May, 1945—over 23 years ago—and the pattern has persisted.
Since San Francisco we have had the blockade of Berlin, the bloody suppression of the revolts in East Germany and Hungary, and the Wall. In short, the rule of the tank and the jackboot—and we had better face up to that fact because this is only yet one more lesson, and this time there is not even the shadow of an excuse. The Czechs have given no provocation of any kind. On the contrary, they have scrupulously observed
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every demand of Communist and international legality.
Churchill was the first to see the light. He cannot escape some responsibility for Yalta, but with the noble Earl, Lord Avon, he strove most manfully, if in vain, to mitigate the consequences. I do not believe that Churchill and the noble Earl, Lord Avon, would ever have signed the Potsdam Agreement as it stood, which set the seal upon the Russian fait accompli. Churchill once said to me, rather sadly, after all this was over: "Statesmen are apt to be judged by historians not so much for the military victories achieved under their direction as for the political results which flowed from them. Judged by that standard, I am not sure that I shall be held to have done very well".
What, my Lords, should we do now? That question has re-echoed through the House this afternoon. We are all agreed that war is out of the question. If there ever was a time when we could have imposed our values and standards upon the Eastern European satellites, it has long since passed. What we would not do or could not do for Poland, Hungary or East Germany we cannot now do for Prague. The noble Lord who is to succeed me in speaking resigned most courageously over Poland, and my sympathies were all with him at the time. But even he would agree that there could be no case for a comparable resignation this time. Moreover, my Lords, in this thermo-nuclear age the only alternative in the long run to a détente between East and West is a holocaust in which the whole world will be destroyed. In my submission, therefore, although it may take decades to achieve such a détente, we should never for an instant stop trying. That is why I cannot agree with those noble Lords who have urged that we should cut off all trade and cultural relations. They are the only means of getting our ideas across the Iron Curtain, and they have been getting across quite reasonably in recent years. I think it was inevitable—and I am glad about it, as I had intended to go there—that the Polish Trade Exhibition in Glasgow should have been cancelled in deference to Scottish public opinion. That was quite right. But at the same time we should go carefully, I think very carefully, in these cultural and trade matters, and slam no

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doors; because this at the moment is the best way through, and it may be the only way through for quite a long time to come.
Nevertheless, my Lords—and I am nearing my end—there remains a vague impression of almost paralysed impotence on many occasions on the part of the Western Democracies, which takes one back to those awful 'thirties, of which the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, reminded us. I had the same feeling listening in Austria every hour on the wireless, at the hour, to what had happened. My mind went back to the days before Munich, to the days after Munich and to the days leading up to the war. I thought to myself: "This is where I came in. Here we are going through it all over again". You get this feeling of impotence and frustration, not only in Europe but in Biafra, which we are going to discuss to-morrow; and it may well induce the Kremlin—and this is what I am a little frightened of—to say, as Hitler said to his protesting Generals when he seized first the Sudetenland and then Czechoslovakia:
"You haven't seen the leaders of the Western Democracies. I have. We can get away with anything".
If you ever get that into the minds of what have been described as "the gangsters of the Kremlin"—I prefer to describe them as the "hard-liners"—then the danger would be very great indeed. They must not think that we are as weak as Hitler thought Chamberlain and Daladin were. Otherwise, the danger of a third world war would be very real indeed.
This brings me to my last point, that of defence. Here I have some right to speak, because from 1933 until the outbreak of war I stood behind Churchill in the House of Commons on this issue—and I am on the record—during Motion after Motion begging the Government to increase the defences of this country, particularly our air defences, and all were turned down flat. There were only about a dozen of us.
My Lords, I remain convinced now, as I was then, that it was the continued military weakness of the Western democracies that was the primary cause of the actual outbreak of the Second World War. It was not in fact Munich. It was the fact that before Munich, long before
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Munich, we did not make a vehement effort to put the defences of this country in order and to show that we meant business, and to make ourselves strong enough, with the French, for Hitler to realise that if he attacked us he would be defeated: as he could have been, right up to 1939, if we had had adequate forces. Nobody should know this better than de Gaulle, and I hope that he will revise some of the opinions to which the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, drew attention. It seems to me that West Berlin is a touchstone. In August, 1948, when the tension over West Berlin was very great, Churchill said to me:
"I would have it out with them now. If we do not, war might come. I would say to them quite politely: 'The day we quit Berlin you will have to quit Moscow'".
A simple statement, but there is a lot to be said for it to-day.
My Lords, I am not advocating provocative action, I am not advocating an arms race; still less massive additional expenditure on armaments. But at present we are, in my judgment, dangerously weak. NATO, which has recently been falling into great disarray, must be reactivated and made again into an efficient shield against any possible major attack on the West. And de Gaulle's nonsense about a united Continent extending to the Urals, under the leadership and influence of France, has fallen irretrievably about his ears.
Secondly, I think that the defence ceiling of £2,000 million can no longer be regarded as sacrosanct. Thirdly, I think that we should at once commence the construction of a fifth nuclear missile Polaris submarine. What is £50 million in comparison to the amount we spend annually in this country, and the danger which now confronts us? This would give our Polaris submarine fleet a real validity which, with only four, it does not have. Fourthly, we must take account of the Russian naval presence, which is increasing with every month that passes, in the Eastern Mediterranean, and down into the Red Sea and which to-morrow, possibly, will be in the Indian Ocean.
I wrote a letter to The Times. which was published last week, about the Persian Gulf, and I stand by every word of it. The Soviet probings, as they have been described in this debate by the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, are going on

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in the Persian Gulf. It seems to me that to announce now that we intend to remove the British military and naval presence altogether from the Persian Gulf in three years' time is an act bordering on insanity. It should be taken back at once. There we have our vital oil supplies. We can get to it easily by sea. The Arab States want us, Iran wants us. The Arab States have even gone so far as to say that they would make a contribution to their own defence and to keep free navigation in the Gulf. Nobody wants political trouble or war there, and the British presence could put a stop to it. I implore the Government to reconsider this decision on the Persian Gulf because I think it is potentially calamitous.
Lastly, I would say just this. I think that the whole business of our defences in the Far East requires re-examination. We cannot forget Australia and New Zealand entirely. I am not in favour of re-activatirng Singapore, but I think there is a great deal to be said for establishing a base in Western Australia to which we might make a contribution.
LORD GLADWYN: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord one question? Does he really think that the rape of Czechoslovakia will induce the Arab States to make special agreements with the Soviet Union?
LORD BOOTHBY: No, my Lords, I do not think that at all. I am not talking about the Arabs. I am talking about the Russians. I am talking about the Russian presence in the Persian Gulf of which the noble Lord may not yet have heard, but about which he will hear quite soon if we are not careful. It is the Russians I am talking about, not the Arabs.
I think that these are basic and minimum requirements. It may be said—perhaps it will be said—that our balance of payments does not permit of it. My Lords, that is nonsense. We could put the balance of payments right, and should put it right, by putting a ceiling on imports; and why a Socialist Government, with its inevitable emphasis on economic dirigism, should flinch from this is a mystery to me. I do not understand it. When he speaks on this issue, the voice of the President of the Board of Trade is the voice of Richard Cobden—and he
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was out of date before he died nearly a hundred years ago. So there is modern Socialism for you!
The invasion of Czechoslovakia may have been a tactical victory for the hardliners in Moscow who still believe that nothing concrete can be achieved except by brute force, and who fear one thing more than anything else in the world—freedom. It is certainly a strategic defeat of the first magnitude, not only for the Soviet Union, but for international Communism under Russian control and direction. You only had to be on the Continent of Europe, in Paris and Austria, as I was last week while these events were going on, and see the reaction of the Communist Parties in these countries and in others to what happened in Prague, to realise the truth of that fact. This, I think, should bring us some comfort in the stern and testing days that lie ahead.
6.36 p.m.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, Her Majesty's Government, I am convinced, were quite right to summon Parliament to debate this great matter, and the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, the Leader of the House opened the debate in a very clear and admirable speech with which I shall certainly not quarrel. There may have been a passage or two with which I did not completely agree but on the whole it was the speech with which I most agree, with the possible exception of the speech of the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Robertson of Oakridge.
My Lords, I propose to say something about Communism which I still believe to be extremely important. A great deal of my life, and the most important part of my political activities in both Houses, has been concerned with Communist aggression. Over 23 years ago I resigned from Mr. Churchill's war-time Government because I thought that the Yalta Agreement was intolerable. I still believe it to be one of the great blunders of history. I thought then that it was unprincipled and wrong, and I think so still.
I subsequently spoke about Communism in March, 1949, in the House of Commons, and on December 11, 1956, and March 13, 1958, in this House. I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, has left the Chamber, because, needless to say, I find it necessary to say

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a word about his speech. I had no idea that the noble Lord was going to speak about Yalta, but I did take the precaution of bringing the Yalta Agreement with me. I read the letter of the noble Lord which appeared in The Times last Saturday. He said then, as he has spoken in the House to-day, a great deal about the part of the Yalta Agreement (it is Section V) dealing with the Declaration on liberated Europe. Of course, that was not the important section of the Yalta Agreement. The important section was the next part of the document, Section VI, labelled "Poland". It was the treatment of Poland that caused this Agreement to be one of the most disastrous in history.
My Lords, I speak with reluctance about this, and would not do so but for the mention of the Yalta Agreement by the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn. Perhaps I may just say this. I made no resignation speech in the House of Commons because I thought it would not be in the public interest. We were still at war, and if I had said then what I thought could be the consequences of this Agreement I might have been accused of putting ideas into the Russians' heads. But I did speak in my own constituency, a month later, on April 6, 1945. The record of what I then said was published in the Press, and is available. Perhaps I may just quote one short passage. I quoted what Mr. Churchill had said in another place, in the debate on the Yalta Agreement, on how we should judge it, and the criteria of freedom by which we should judge what had been done, and I then continued in these words:
"I find nothing in the Yalta Agreement, or in the facts, which provides any guarantee or likelihood of the Poles being allowed to enjoy such freedom. For the first time in history, as one member said, a country has had both its regime and its boundaries altered in the course of a war by three other nations, all in alliance with it, without that country being present. If that was necessary, surely the greatest care should have been taken to safeguard the interests of the absent ally."
Then I went on to examine the wording of that part of the Agreement. Those interested in this matter may remember that an entirely bogus set of men were brought forward by the Russians who were first referred to as the Lublin Committee, in whom nobody in this country had the slightest belief. They were an
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alien importation—a creation of the Russian State. The Russians proceeded to recognise them as the provisional Government of Poland, and the Yalta Agreement on this subject proposed to recognise them as the basis, but hoped to add a few other Poles as well. Wording was used that gave some currency to the view, for which there was no foundation, that this Lublin Committee were democratic leaders of Poland.
With so many speakers yet to speak, I do not propose to speak on those subjects on which I find myself in complete agreement with Her Majesty's Government. As I have said, I find myself in substantial agreement with what was said by the Leader of the House in his opening speech, and I very much hope I shall have the same experience in listening to the concluding speech of Lord Chalfont, to which I look forward. The noble Lord the Leader of the House has invited us to give our honest views, and I shall mention some of those points on which I find myself in some difference with many of the speakers on both sides of the House. First of all, while I agree with everybody that what is being done is a great crime, it is not in the least clear that from the Russians' point of view it is a great blunder. That remains to be tested. The mere fact that it is a great crime does not make it from their point of view a great blunder. It is said that they have lost the support of Communist Parties all over the world. I expect that leaves them fairly cold. They treated those Parties with the well-deserved contempt with which most people treated them. They were— characteristically—supported by two Communist Parties, those of Cuba and those of North Vietnam. India, of course, could not find it possible to vote for the resolution that actually condemned Russia.
My Lords, what about surprise? Many noble Lords, and many commentators on the B.B.C. and I.T.V., and in the Press, have expressed great surprise that this is what the Russians did. I can only say I felt no surprise whatever. It is what I expected them to do. My noble Leader, Lord Jellicoe, said he thought it might happen, but thought on the whole that it would not. I confess I thought it would happen. The reason is that I have, over the years, made a fairly serious

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study of Communism. I say "Communism". Some people say that it is nothing to do with Communism; it is Russian imperialism. Well, Russian imperialism and Communism are inextricably intermingled. I quite agree that Russian imperialism existed before Communism. A great deal of what they are now doing is part of the traditions of their imperialism. But it is also part of the teaching of their Communist doctrine. I see no point to-day in trying to separate what is due to imperialism and what is due to Communism.
Of course there were probably divisions among the supreme leaders of Russia—there frequently have been. That does not mean that, once they have come to a decision, decisive action will not immediately be taken and carried through. There was a time indeed when the minority of the leaders in any such decision were probably executed after one of their celebrated mock trials in Moscow. More recently that has not been the custom. They do not execute the minority; the minority agrees to collaborate with the majority in whatever the atrocity may be on which a majority has agreed.
May I say how much I disagree with one of the noble Lords—or possibly more than one who attributed responsibility for what has happened to Ulbricht? I have no doubt that this villainous leader, imposed on East Germany by the Russians, advocated what has been done. But to suggest that he was in a position to coerce the Russians, unless they wanted to do what they have in fact done, is complete nonsense. Nobody who has had any experience of dealing with the Russians, or has followed these matters in any detail through the years, will have any doubt whatsoever that this was a deliberate act by the Russian rulers carrying out their deliberate and well thought out policy.
Surprise is not a virtue. We do not strengthen our claim to be considered seriously by the Russians when at each new atrocity we express complete surprise. It was some time between 1946 and 1950 when I remember asking the Minister who answered foreign affairs questions in another place a supplementary question: Why were His Majesty's then Government invariably surprised, and if they were, was it a good thing to say so? I remain of that opinion. It does
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not strengthen our standing in the world always to express surprise, whether we feel it or not.
There are two methods—as I have so frequently pointed out—of finding out what the Russians are after. It is no good pretending that we do not know. We can find out what they are after by reading the sacred books of their dogmatic religion. The most easy work of reference is the English edition, published in Moscow, of Stalin's Problems of Leninism, which I think, after all that has happened, still remains their bible. The second method, which leads to exactly the same conclusion, is to apply the simple rule of English Common Law: that men are presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of their actions. And when we have seen that those consequences are the subjugation of one country after another, we can take it that that was also their aim.
My Lords, that brings me to my main point of difference from Her Majesty's Government—again not from the noble Lord the Leader of the House but from what was said by a Minister in Hyde Park yesterday. Dealing with something that had been suggested, Mr. Crossman said:
"That would be tantamount to a resumption—
mark that word, my Lords—
"of the cold war."
Later he said:
"We say to the Russians, 'We do not want to go back to the cold war and we believe that you do not want to either'."
The cold war has never been abandoned by the Russians. They have pursued it relentlessly, without any let up, without any change of any kind. What is clear from what the Minister said in Hyde Park is that what had ceased was our contesting the cold war.
Why is it suggested that all the things they have written no longer have any importance? The reason is that Stalin is dead and that Khrushchev, who had been his greatest toady when he was alive, thought fit to denounce him after he was safely dead. On the strength of that the English public were encouraged to believe that some tremendous change had taken place in Russian aims. I pointed out, in the speech in another place to which I have referred, that there

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were three important facts about the cold war. The first was that it was war. The second was that it was by no means cold in the experience of its victims. The Greek parents whose children were carried into captivity in Communist countries did not find it very cold; nor did our planters who were slain in Malaya. But there was a third fact. Not only was it war and not cold, but on the whole we were then losing it.
Then, I am glad to say, NATO was created, and since then we have been losing it less rapidly. But I have still no confidence that we are winning. People are so confused about what they want of the cold war that they have not even decided whether it should be made colder or hotter. In the days when the expression "cold war" first came into use, though it was deplored, it was universally recognised as a better thing than a hot war. It was thought that a hot war was what we wanted to avoid at all costs, and a cold war, however undesirable, was better than that. But now people say that what we want to do is to thaw the cold war—in other words, to get nearer to a hot war. I think that a genuine peace is better than any kind of war, but in my view a cold war is better than either a hot war or surrender to Communism.
Let me give a concrete example of something we have done recently which I think accounts for the fact that we are not taken seriously by Soviet Russia. On May 26, 1942, this country entered into an Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance which was to last for 20 years. Under Article 5 of that Treaty, the high contracting parties undertook that they,
"will act in accordance with the two principles of not seeking territorial aggrandisement for themselves and of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States."
I listened in another place to Mr. Ernest Bevin giving example after example of interferences by the Russians in other countries, direct breaches of an express term of their treaty of alliance and friendship with this country. On September 15, 1948, Mr. Bevin said that this habit was as old as Marxist-Leninist theory itself, and he was quite right. The Russians broke this treaty from the beginning, and finally, while it was still in force, on May, 7, 1955, they repudiated and annulled it.
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Would not your Lordships think it would be impossible for them to lead us up that garden path again? Not at all. When their hands were reeking with Hungarian blood, with every resolution of the United Nations on the subject of the Hungarian suppression not acted on but disregarded by the Russians, when their leaders visited this country and asked for another treaty of friendship and alliance, Her Majesty's Government started discussing it as though nothing had happened. Fortunately, that has, so far, come to nothing. And I doubt whether even Her Majesty's Government will start that bit of nonsense again.
There is one other point which I think is worth making. This is a crime because it is an invasion of another country nominally self-governing. It is a fact that the Government of the country attacked are all Communists, determined to maintain Communism as the only legal political creed. But that did not make the attack any worse. It is a very dangerous argument to suggest that it did—for this reason; that it implies that Soviet aggression might have some justification if non-Communists were to have any power. lf, however, the maintenance of Communism is a sacred cause in the Communist world, which must prevail over everything, then arguably the Russians are quite right. If the maintenance of Communism is a cause over-riding all others, then the Russians might well be justified in saying that they know that to admit any freedom will bring the unpopular Communist regime crashing to the ground. The Czechs may take a different view, but who is to say which is right? The only logical basis for objection to aggression is to object to aggression as such. The Government of Czechoslovakia would not be in a worse but in a better position if they had said that what they were after was real liberty. In these circumstances, your Lordships may have seen without any surprise—the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, will be able to confirm this—that the English newspaper used by Mr. Malik at the United Nations to support his argument was the Observer which had taken this line that I am criticising.
What next, my Lords? Of course, no intervention is proposed (I am not disputing this) to help Czechoslovakia. But have the Government made up their

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mind what action they are going to take, or propose, against what may be the immediate sequels—an attack on Berlin, an attack on Roumania or an attack on Yugoslavia? These are possibilities, and I hope that the Government are considering them. I am not going to say anything on cultural exchanges: there is an argument each way. As regards hospitality, also, I do not think that this is so much a matter for Government intervention as for individual people to decide what they shall do. I hope that Ministers will find it possible occasionally to say "No" to an invitation to a cocktail party by either the Russians or one of their satellites who have engaged in this horrible aggression.
May I refer to the extraordinary terminology that we still tolerate—and these things are often not even put in inverted commas. On the B.B.C. and in the Press, when the Communists invade a country they are still often described as "liberating" it. They are labelled "democratic" when they insist on a state of affairs where nobody may even stand for election unless he has been approved by the Communists in advance. And, oddly enough, they describe the worst of the Communist leaders, who have been got rid of, but who it is reported by the terms now enforced by Moscow are going to return, not as Communists, but as conservatives.
Finally, there is the most ridiculous of all the words of description—and I am not sure that the Leader of the House did not himself slip into this at one point. I will not make too much of it, for the reasons I have given, that I agree so much with what he said; but I think the noble Lord referred to what was taking place in Moscow to-day as "negotiations". Has that word ever before been used to describe such an actuality: kidnapped men taken away from their own country, which is occupied by the tanks of those to whom they are talking, not knowing whether they will ever escape from Moscow unless they agree with the Russians? After all, there are precedents for leaders who have been kidnapped not being returned. Yet this is described as "negotiation". Talking under duress is not generally called "negotiation" by English lawyers.
I should like to end, my Lords, with one quotation, which should be followed,
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I think, by what is sometimes described by humorous writers in the Press, "interval for nausea", and I quote the reaction of another distinguished man, U Thant. When this horrible and brutal invasion took place, U Thant did not suggest to the Russians that they should get out—oh, no!—but he did express the hope that they would use the utmost restraint in their relations with the Government and people of Czechoslovakia. An admirably chosen word— "restraint".
7.4 p.m.
BARONESS GAITSKELL: My Lords, I hope that the news from Czechoslovakia will be good and, if it is good, that it will endure. In any case, I am goirag to stick to what I had intended to say. After three years' experience at the United Nations, perhaps I should not have been surprised by the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia. But I was surprised, as well as shocked. Here I should like to make one comment on the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, and his great play on the word "surprise". He said that surprise was no virtue when one country made an act of aggression against another. Of course it is not a virtue when it is based on lack of information about the other country; but we are often surprised because we hope for better actions from a particular country. Even if that is not a virtue, at least I think it helps us along.
I am quite familiar with Russian cynicism on human rights. This has been very familiar to me in the last Session, as is their blatant exploitation of the Human Rights Committee as a propaganda machine, in which the Afro-Asian grievances just help to oil the works. Too often I have heard the Soviet delegate's voice swell with self-righteous indignation about British colonialism and American imperialism. The Soviet satellite countries repeat the arguments and echo their master's voice. The Western delegations have become rather immune to this long-playing record, but it never fails to touch a chord in the hearts of the Afro-Asian countries.
At the United Nations one has to study and judge colonialism, and I sometimes wished that I was an historian, because it seems to my untutored mind that there is more than one brand of colonialism, and that while the United Kingdom have been steadily de-colonising

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during the last twenty years, the Russians have been holding on to an empire. On one occasion I asked the Polish Minister to the U.N. what he considered had been the most significant achievement of that Organisation up to date. He said that it had been the speeding up of de-colonisation. This seems to be me to be true. But I became aware that there was one kind of colonialism about which there was a conspiracy of silence at the United Nations—the distinctive Soviet brand. After the invasion of Czechoslovakia, it is good-bye to this double standard, and I hope that the Afro-Asian countries will heed the red light. The Russian veto in the Security Council is understandable, but there are no orchids for the abstensions of Algeria, India and Pakistan. They are so obsessed with past colonialism that they might miss the bus on future colonialism.
Personally, I have never had any illusions about Communism. Here I should like to comment on the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, for whom I have a great respect. The noble Lord attacked the Russians with very strong words, speaking of the time when he was in Germany—with words that I should like to borrow to use against the Nazis. After all, the Russians were our Allies. It is true that a feeling of revenge is a very ugly emotion, and I often argue with the Russians in the Human Rights Committee when we discuss war crimes and plead that they might forgive and forget. But, all the same, I think that we should understand a little of their feelings, when we know that they lost 20 million dead in the last war. So I am sorry that the noble Lord was quite so partisan against them.
It is true, as I said, that I have never had illusions about Communism, but I have always believed that the system could change and that it was capable of change, as indeed it has changed in the last ten years in Russia itself. But, in the United Nations, once the Soviet delegate had spoken, every other Communist country would echo his words, and Czechoslovakia has been no exception. That is why Czechoslovakia's courageous stand to-day for independence and freedom is so heartening and so remarkable, and is the most exciting
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event in the world to-day, more significant than the fact that the Russians have taken a step backwards. Czechoslovakia is a Communist country whose present Government wishes to lead its people in freedom and independence. This universal political expression would have been absolutely unthinkable three years ago when I was first at the United Nations.
I should like to illustrate this by a very small personal incident at that time. I had been asked to meet a leading Czech politician at a lunch party. During the conversation he said to me, "Ah! You are a Member of the House of Lords. I know one of your colleagues, Fenner Brockway. He is a great anti-colonialist". "Anti-colonialist?", I replied. "Aren't we all to-day, Labour, Conservative, Liberal? "But this distinguished Czech politician insisted that there was something especially anti-colonialist about my noble friend. I rather resented the fact that my noble friend had cornered the market, so to speak, in anti-colonialism, especially as that morning the United Kingdom had been pelted with more than the usual number of Communist clichés and slogans. So I suggested to this distinguished Czech politician that I was not aware that Czechoslovakia had been within the Soviet sphere of influence before the war. I was made bitterly to regret this incautious remark. For the next few weeks our delegation was battered by the words "British colonialism" from every delegate of the Eastern European countries and from Russia.
People say that ideas can sometimes move mountains. What we must hope for is that ideas will now move the tanks in Prague and Bratislava. We must only react to these disturbing world events with as little fear and as little hysteria as the Czechoslovak people themselves have done. We should not get hysterical about our military defences. I really deplore the way we keep on saying how miserably weak we are, both in military defences and even in economic defences. The piling up of more and more armaments is the sure way to world destruction. In fact, by increasing the armaments race we should be delaying the spread of democracy, as we know it, in these countries; we should not be advancing it for one moment.

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My Lords, the words "peaceful coexistence" are not very fashionable today, but it seems to me that they are as relevant and crucial as they have ever been. This applies in every part of the world where there is tension or conflict: in Vietnam, in the Middle East, and in Czechoslovakia. The progress in human rights goes forwards and backwards, but, like the noble Lord, Lord Harlech, I am optimistic, and I feel that without being optimistic, really there is no hope anywhere.
7.15 p.m.
LORD CACCIA: My Lords, at a time like this I, like many others in your Lordships' House, came here to-day with the object of demonstrating solidarity behind the Government of the day. With respect, may I say how glad I was that they have made this so easy for us all by what they have said and by what they have done so far. It was right, if I may say so, to have Parliament recalled. Right that Russian action should be condemned and in the terms used by the Leader of the House. Right that the Foreign Secretary should have cancelled his visits to Eastern Europe. Right to refrain from economic sanctions, if for one occasion I may use these words without being contentious. Right not to withdraw our Ambassadors, and over cultural contacts, and I should also have thought again right to suggest that these should be regarded each on its own merits. Perhaps one other test might be applied, and that both in public and in private matters: to ask ourselves how would this be regarded by the Czechs? I think for the Russian Army troupes at this moment to receive great applause and a great welcome would be singularly inappropriate. And equally I take the point made by the noble Viscount. Lord Eccles, when he said that in our private communications with the Russians it would be monstrous if we did not make it quite clear to them exactly what we thought of the actions of their Government.
Perhaps it would be prudent to leave things there for the moment. The Government, after all, have far wider sources of information, and they have responsibilities, and anyone who has been a Permanent Secretary at the Foreign Office realises what that must mean. At the same time, without wishing in any way to embarrass them, it is perhaps proper also
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to respond to the encouragement given by the Leader of the House, who said that the House had been recalled not only for the Government to inform Parliament, but also to give an opportunity for each to contribute according to his experience, and her experience, and to put a number of points for consideration and answer, if appropriate.
In a sentence, then, out of these ills, can we draw any profit? First, of course, comes intelligence before action. On that no doubt we should reassess Russian intentions and, with respect, I should have thought that the Government need not be at all ashamed of doing this and saying so. A détente is of course the ultimate aim of this Government, and, as I understood it, of all Parties. If the present régime in Russia seemed to show some sign of taking some steps on this path, both Parties since Stalin have been right, I submit, to probe for what was possible. But now we should reassess their intentions and motives and draw any necessary consequences.
Like others, I start with NATO; that is of the essence. But should our concern be restricted to Western Europe alone? So long as we continue to show firmness over Berlin, and the United States and the deterrent are known to be engaged, I should, like the noble Viscount, Lord Watkinson, doubt myself whether the Russians will wish to crack their heads against the toughest obstacle that we have so far built. But what about the Russian Mediterranean Fleet? And that barely masked threat in the Middle East? Should we not reconsider this before it is too late, and make it clear that our policy is not to move out of the Middle East just in order to let the Russians in? Is this not an area where we should consult with our allies again rather than being forced to tell them out of our economic requirements what we are going to do, when and where? These would he positive acts, and I realise that much would depend on the attitude of our allies. But that does not excuse us from all initiative, nor, of course, do I expect that the Government should think so.
In the same vein, now that General De Gaulle's European policy has been shaken to its foundations, is it not time to see whether we can yet make something more out of free Europe than the E.E.C. and associates on the one side and EFTA and

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company on the other? If full membership is still not "on" must we be absolutists and stick to the line "all or nothing"? All I would ask here is for readiness to reconsider.
On an even broader front should we not see, as the noble Earl, Lord Avon, has suggested, whether the Western World as a whole cannot review its aims, political and military, trade and aid? This is not raising EFTA versus E.E.C. or anything of that character. It is a recognition of the many dangers and needs in front of us. Dangers, that is, of protectionist tendencies arising in France, perhaps here as a result of considerations of our balance of payments, and perhaps in the United States; needs of the underdeveloped countries, and the compulsive importance of maximising the strength and prosperity of the West in the face of the latest exhibition of power.
There is one last point I should like to make. We should not forget Austria, where for months and years I negotiated with the Russians in circumstances not dissimilar from those described so eloquently by the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Oakridge, in connection with Germany. In that case we said effectively, with the Americans, "No summit until there has been specific performance by the Russians on some head—not just promises". We insisted on many occasions, and instanced an Austrian treaty. We got it. So now in dealing with the Russians and their troops in Czechoslovakia could we not take something of the same line?
Of course if the tape is right, the Russians may be on the way out; but the tape also says that they will be going when "constitutional Government is consolidated" and that is followed by an exclamation mark. Whether or not that exclamation mark appeared on the tape by mistake, it was singularly appropriate. Therefore, I would suggest that we should look very carefully, as I am sure the Government will, at the small print and keep our powder dry. We got freedom for Austria, let us try to do it once more, and persevere.
7.24 p.m.
LORD HASTINGS: My Lords, I need make only a brief speech because most of what I wished to say has been said
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much better by my noble friend Lord Harlech. Nevertheless, I feel I cannot remain silent but must add my voice to the general protest and condemnation of this vile and cowardly action. This is an assault on human freedom. I am not interested in whether it is one Communist State against another; it is an assault on the whole basis of the freedom of one sovereign people to live their own life without interference from another. It is an assault on the human spirit. This is something which affects us all and which we cannot ignore.
I seized upon a phrase used by my noble friend Lord Jellicoe, who said that he suffered from a feeling of impotent pain and rage. Indeed this is a day for anger, as was pointed out by a leading Sunday newspaper yesterday, yet the protests being made in your Lordships' House have been in measured and statesmanlike terms. The only angry speech we have had was in fact from the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, and, although I cannot agree with all his remarks, I am glad he made that speech because we should be angry and we should make our anger plain and known to the Soviet leaders in a tangible fashion.
This brings me to my feet to support my noble colleagues on the Front Bench who have asked for deeds to back up our words. Words in this present situation are relevant, and I hope they will be made very relevant in the United Nations, not only in the Security Council but also in the General Assembly, about which we should like to hear more; but I am sure we can add deeds to those words. This debate has divided itself into two fairly clear sections. One has dealt with the Communist dogma and policy, and its effect on our defences, and I hope that this aspect will be treated with great seriousness by the Government, and that at the end of this debate they will be able to tell us that they are prepared at least to consider and review very carefully our defence policy, because it is something which, despite the economic condition of our country, cannot possibly be ignored.
However, I am on my feet this evening to back up that second part of the debate, which has dealt with the way in which we can make our protest crystal clear and even more effective to the Soviet leaders. I am convinced that the noble

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Lord, Lord Byers, was right when he said that there must be a period of icy coldness. We can, and must, make it perfectly clear to the Russians, to the Russian leaders and to the Russian people, that we cannot tolerate any dealings with them until they have fulfilled whatever agreement they may reach with the Czechoslovak leaders. I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Caccia, pointed out that ambiguous phrase on the tape about withdrawing after the restoration of constitutional government—whatever that may mean. I am sure that we should not have any formal contacts with the Russians, apart from the necessary and limited diplomatic ones, until they fulfil that agreement, withdraw their troops and leave the Czechoslovakian people with their own Government in peace.
I disagree with those noble Lords who believe that cultural relations should be left to the conscience of the private individual. At this moment there is a State Orchestra playing in this country, and I believe that it is due to play again next week. In my view, that tour should be cancelled forthwith. In the field of artistic and cultural life I am no Phillistine. I happen to take a particular interest in one of those aspects of art which appeal particularly to the Russians—I refer to ballet, of which I have some knowledge and, indeed, with which I have some connection going back over 35 years. Yet in no circumstances would I condone the arrival in this country of those marvellous ballet companies from Moscow and Leningrad, much as I admire them. It would be an obscenity. This was said in one of the Sunday papers yesterday. I feel that the Government should make it possible for people who have entered into contracts of this nature to cancel them forthwith, and I hope that this will be done. Of course in the long term we must continue our cultural contacts, but we cannot go on now as though nothing had happened.
In that connection I wish to make an emphatic protest, because my own feeling is that this evening, although the condemnation is clear, it has not been made in such forceful terms as I should like to have it made. That is why I appeal to the Government. I believe that the people of this nation really want the Soviet leaders, and the Soviet people, to realise that this is something quite beyond
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the pale in human practice and that we cannot have any dealings with them until they do as the Czechoslovaks wish them to do.
7.30 p.m.
LORD WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, the events leading up to the present situation, the crisis which we are discussing to-day and what we ourselves should do in the future have been more than adequately dealt with by your Lordships who have already spoken, and therefore I do not want to dwell on those three aspects that have engaged our attention this afternoon and this evening. I want to content myself with making two points. First, I want to express and register my horror and disgust at the action of the Soviet Union, and to say that in my view it deserves the strongest possible condemnation. I believe that it has come as more than a shock to many people in this country, because I firmly believe that no country has done more than our own to try to understand the Soviet Union.
Like several other Members of your Lordships' House I have spent some time in the Soviet Union. We have all been conscious of her struggles, the oppression of her people under a succession of Czars, the events leading up to what I would say was a necessary revolution in 1917 and her suffering and devastation at the hands of the Nazis. We in this country have applauded her progress; we have tried to recognise her wants and needs, to appreciate her fears and anxieties and to understand her thoughts and feelings. Yet her unprovoked invasion of Czechoslovakia is deeply disturbing, particularly to all those who have thought that we were able to detect, as I thought I was able to detect when I was in the Soviet Union, some signs of liberalisation in her political way of life.
The second point I want to make has been made for me by the noble Lord, Lord Hastings, whose speech I would underline, and cross every "t" and dot every "i". Having said that, I, too, should like to subscribe to a number of points made by the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, and the noble Lord, Lord Harlech. My noble Leader in his speech said that when discussing our dealing with the situation we cannot behave as though Russia did not exist in the world. I think that is roughly what he said, and

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I would agree. But I would also say that we must not behave in such a way as to give to the Soviet Union the impression that she can do as she pleases.
Much has been said, quite rightly, by way of condemnation of her action. But let us be quite frank about it: strong and brave words are easily uttered, as they have been in your Lordships' House to-day and in Trafalgar Square yesterday. Brave words can be both cheap and empty of meaning if they are not backed with a determination to do something tangible forthwith to show that we mean precisely what we say. We cannot in our private lives, nor can we in our national life, be all things to all men all the time. There comes a time when we must have the courage to do what we consider to be right in a particular set of circumstances.
With the noble Lord, Lord Hastings, I deplore the fact that we have not shown more anger over the action of the Soviet Union. It may well be that most noble Lords in your Lordships' House are more mature than I am, but I think the emotion of anger at the right time is the right thing. Last Saturday The Times, in an article, said:
"The Government have decided that for the present no action should be taken to curtail cultural contacts or to impose any form of sanctions against the Warsaw Pact countries involved in the invasion of Czechoslovakia."
I do not know what authority The Times had for saying that, but I hope that my noble friend the Minister, when he comes to reply, will perhaps be able to indicate what we are prepared to do along the lines suggested by certain noble Lords, in particular the noble Lord, Lord Hastings.
Emil Zatopek, a Czech, and one of the greatest athletes of all time, speaking from Prague only a few days ago, called on other nations to get the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries responsible for the invasion banned from the Olympic Games. Is this unrealistic? I should have thought it was a perfectly proper thing to do. The Lord Provost of Glasgow has made it abundantly clear to the Polish Consul that the exhibition the Poles are proposing to have in the Kelvin Hall, Glasgow, will not be welcome.
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It is also reported that that small country, Belgium, which has herself experienced a number of invasions, has indicated that until further notice she will not participate in economic, cultural or technical contacts with the five Warsaw Pact countries which invaded Czechoslovakia. Surely to goodness, if a country as small as Belgium can take such a courageous line, we too ought to examine whether we can allow those cultural activities which are going on in this country at the present time, comprising concerts by the U.S.S.R. State Orchestra and television concerts, and so on. which will stem from them. I think we have to ask ourselves whether this is the time to permit performances like this to continue. I realise that music and politics may not be related. But in a matter of this kind when as I believe we are so frustrated and so impotent because we can do nothing more than show our concern in words, we ought to seize on anything that we can to protest in a tangible way. If it means putting an end to certain aspects of relationships on a cultural level with the countries concerned, I think it is our duty to do so.
7.39 p.m.
VISCOUNT MONCKTON OF BRENCHLEY: My Lords, I rise tonight for the first time with a speech written out—something I have never been able to do before. But I think that when the emotions are strong one has to be careful about what one says too openly. I agree so much with the noble Lord, Lord Wells-Pestell, who has just spoken that I will not cover the same ground as he has done. But like the noble Lord. Lord Robertson, I have had contacts with the Russians on a military level, some of them only the year before last, when General of the Army Koshavoy came to West Germany to be entertained by the British Forces in Germany; and it was apparent then, as soon as one got to know the Russian military, how ruthless and how powerful they are.
Going back a little further, I had the privilege of being the military adviser to the noble Earl, Lord Avon, at the Conference on Indo-China and the Conference on Korea in 1954. On arrival there in civilian clothes I was not known as a Foreign Office person, and I was asked out to dinner by one of the Russians who I discovered was a major in

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the Security N.K.V.D. I asked whether I should go, and was told that I should. The first thing he said to me was: "Why are the British interested in what happens in Vietnam?" I said: "We are interested in justice" and the old adage "Fiat justitia",—"Let justice be done though the heavens fall"—still applies. He said, "This I cannot understand. We, the Russians, have no interest in the future or the fate of Indo-China. All we are worried about is the future rearming of Western Germany." This was their line then, and I believe that to a degree it is still their line to-day; and this is perhaps their one and only excuse for what they have done—and not a very good one.
Like the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, I have been surprised on two points in your Lordships' debate. First, there has been immense surprise and shock at what the Russians have done, and secondly there has been a gross overestimate of the power and potential of the Russian Nazi empire. I personally had little doubt that when the first Russian colonial manoeuvres around Czechoslovakia took place some weeks ago, the invasion was on. To have thought otherwise would have been to misread the whole philosophy of the old guard in Moscow and, above all, not to recognise the strength in Moscow circles of that Nazi carrion crow, Ulbricht of Soviet East Germany.
Last October, in a talk to the R.U.S.I., I said, "I think there are far too many people in this country who think that things are very much easier with the Soviets". I am afraid that this feeling still exists now throughout the West, and it was as grave a misappreciation as the Russians have made when they backed the Arabs in the attempted destruction of Israel. The invasion of Czechoslovakia is the second error the Russians have made. Miscalculations of this magnitude are not made with any degree of safety in a world of arms and nuclear weapons. It is almost inconceivable that a great Power should make these two enormous miscalculations, but that it has done is not surprising if one looks at the power of the military in the Kremlin. It is not the same as the relationship between the political control in the West over its military forces. It is a totally different relationship, of fear and trust counteracting with the political and
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military hierarchy in Moscow. If Russia can misjudge events so grossly in Europe and the Middle East, it is not hard to envisage that even more dangerous mistakes could be made. It is for this reason that we in the West should look to our own defences, and I will deal with this matter a little later.
We now face a period where a complete lack of trust must exist between Russia and the West. We can no longer believe a word that she or her colonial States say. We must make it clear that in coming to this conclusion we do so only on the basis of the policies of the ruling classes in Russia and her colonies. We have no quarrel with the Russian people, still less with those of Poland and Hungary, but that until either their policies are changed or the Governments are overthrown we cannot deal with them on any basis of trust.
This time we must think and act for the long term. We must not let time dull our memories. We know that in the next few days things will get worse for the Czechs. Free radio stations will be found and destroyed. Underground leaders writers and artists and youth leaders will be arrested, tortured and imprisoned. More churches will be closed, more factories taken over, until life for the ordinary man becomes impossible. Agreements may be reached to-night, and I would suggest to your Lordships that they have been reached by the old classical Russian method. The President, an ageing man, a famous soldier, General Svoboda, has been kept in one room; the Leader and First Secretary of the Communist Party, Dubcek, has been kept in another, and never the two have met. Neither knows what the other has been forced to agree. Both are tiring; one has been a prisoner, the other given the kiss of Judas by the Russian leaders as he arrived. It is not inconceivable that they will be forced to sign some agreement which they would not have done if they had been whole and mentally sane.
THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (LORD CHALFONT): My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Lord? As what he has just said about the treatment of Czech leaders in Moscow is clearly going to have a great impact, especially in Prague, I wonder whether he would say he is quite sure that his information about, for example,

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the separation and isolation of these two men is based on absolute fact; whether it is in fact confirmable intelligence.
VISCOUNT MONCKTON OF BRENCHLEY: My Lords, I said I suggested this. There is certainly no fact whatever; but it is in the classical Russian Nazi tradition. We cannot forget the pictures of Russian soldiers pulling down pictures of General Svoboda when at that same time that same man was being received in Moscow. We cannot forget the moving plea from the young Czech student. We must not forget that youth inside and outside the Communist world are against the Russian actions.
My Lords, The Times to-day said:
"A stupid and rather frightened bully can be really dangerous."
The activities of the Russian defence forces have been both stupid and dangerous. What dangers lie ahead for Roumania and Yugoslavia, and after that who knows whether Austria, and even West Germany, will not come next on the list? It is time now that we took some action. Russia respects force and power. She always probes weakness and fishes in troubled waters. She did this in the Middle East, and she will do it also in the Far East. We can easily overestimate the strength and power of the Soviet bloc. Her troops are not all that well trained. They have been a long time since their wonderful defence of their own country. Their administration is appalling, and I think one has seen some examples of that from the Czech reports from Prague itself.
To say, as Mr. Crossman did on the radio two days ago, that he could see no connection between this crisis and our own defence policies would be laughable if it were not so serious. The Foreign Secretary has rightly said that we have strengthened our commitment to NATO, but what really matters, in my opinion, is that the men on the ground have in fact been reduced by the withdrawal of one Brigade Group. I have said before in your Lordships' House that the withdrawal of this Brigade Group was understandable and was probably right, so long as it remained under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, Northern Army Group, and so long as it could be returned at any time, crisis or not, without
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fear of acccusations of escalation or excuses of that sort. I wonder now whether this Brigade has been returned or whether there are plans so to do. We had the best tanks in Europe in Rhine Army, but there is a need for replacement of our ground nuclear capability, and above all for tactical reconnaissance aircraft in Germany.
I do not think we can wait until the Session starts before some of these suggestions are adopted and actions are taken. The Government have recently rightly increased the capability of the air force in the Mediterranean, and particularly in Malta, but the Royal Navy must also be increased out there; and, above all, the two Army battalions must be retained to maintain a firm base for them.
As the Russian interference will not be confined to Europe, so must our defences deal with other parts beyond Europe. We must surely help our Commonwealth friends in Malaysia and Singapore. I do not think large forces are needed, even a Brigade Group, would do. The same principle applies: the man on the ground prevents the war; the promise of one does nothing whatever to help. Instead of giving £3 million for the new Russian base in South Yemen, surely we could spend that money better on some of our defence forces, or at least on the Reserve Army. Surely now we cannot consider making cuts in the Services. Already the Army has been cut so severely that it is almost beyond self-regeneration, and if your Lordships look in the Printed Paper Office at this moment you will see that the last recruiting figures all too amply illustrate General Sir John Hackett's warning to us last year about how much we ought to be looking to our defence and backing NATO. It is still not too late if we and the NATO countries, together with France, strengthen our determination and forces.
Short of military action, what can be done now? Mr. Brown's speech, which included the words, "We are with you in the fight", means less than nothing if trade talks and sweet reasonableness continue with Russia and her colonies. In the diplomatic field we should at least reduce the size of the Russian Embassy and those of the other four countries to the size that we have in their countries. Are they not in some cases grossly over strength? I think this point wants looking at. Certainly, we should close their

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trade missions. All of us know from reading the papers that these missions have been often in the past, and are probably now, centres of espionage activities. Surely this is a field which we could look at. We should also refuse invitations to social functions both in this country and in the Russian empire. In all these actions we should, of course, make it clear that they will stop when the Soviet Nazi forces have been removed from Czechoslovakia or when the youth of Russia overthrows the present Government.
We should take note of what the last speaker said. Colonel Zatopek appealed for Russia to be excluded from the Olympic Games. Surely we should listen to that voice of freedom, who is now on the run for his own safety. If South Africa has been excluded, how much more should these countries be excluded? I think we should congratulate Gordon Pirie for saying this clearly in the debate with Mr. Duncan of the British Olympic Committee. The latter said that the Russian Olympic Committee had done nothing wrong, and that is quite true. We know that in this case nobody in this field has done anything wrong. But at the moment it is the only way by which we can show what we really feel about what has been going on. Congratulations are also due to the Celtic Football Club who have done what they think right. If the Government feel unable to follow this line, perhaps those individuals and individual clubs should act on their own. They will know that they have the support of the vast majority of British people.
There is one last thing that we should consider doing if things get more serious; that is, to recognise those committees which the Russians look on with great disfavour and fear and which represent the various freedom groups; that is to say, those committees representing the old Baltic States about which most of us have entirely forgotten, which have freedom groups both in this country and all over the West, as well as those groups representing the Ukraine and many other groups representing Russia itself. I hope very much that demonstrations will go on. I have one piece of advice for potential demonstrators: I think they must be peaceful to be successful; I think they must be quiet to be successful. I suggest an organised relay of demonstrators, few
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in number, around every Mission, every Consulate, every Embassy of the Soviet empire over here. There should be no words, no shouts, no banners, but when any of those people appear from inside those buildings there should be given the salute which at present they deserve; that is, the Nazi salute. Let us always call them what we think they are at the moment, until the day when we can once more be friends. I am afraid that that day is some way off, but we should always prepare for the worst and hope for the best.
7.54 p.m.
LORD PARGITER: My Lords, when I heard the news of the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Russians, my mind went hack to a period which I thought had been a closed book for thirty years. At that time I happened to be the mayor of the Borough of Southall. There is nothing very particular about that, but I remember the anger and dismay and frustration that we felt then. There was the same sort of feeling that we have now, except that on that occasion it was accompanied by a feeling of betrayal; that we had bought our precarious peace at the expense of the Czechoslovak people.
The reaction of people was very interesting, in my own borough, at any rate. People came to me and asked, "What can we do?" All we could think of doing was to provide money to help the displaced Czechs who had been turned out of the Sudetenland in a distressed condition. The response in the form of conscience money was quite amazing. I had written to mayors and chairmen of local authorities in the country, asking them to do something of the same kind, and within twenty-four hours the response was so great that I was asking the Lord Mayor of London to make it a national appeal which, after a couple of days' hesitation on the part of the Prime Minister, was approved.
We know 'what happened at that time. We felt that to some extent we had salved our conscience. But this time, of course, our conscience is not involved. It is not even involved as much as it might have been involved with regard to Hungary. It was, of course, propaganda from the West, particularly the Voice of America, which encouraged

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revolution against the existing Government, legal or whatever it was, yet when they looked for help from the West it was not forthcoming. The Czechs are realists. They know that they can expect no help from the West in their present struggle. But they have, nevertheless, undertaken the struggle of their own volition, and that is to some extent understandable.
Many of us thought that the clock was being turned back by the events of 1948, but if we look at them in perspective it can be seen that they might well have been expected. They had not forgotten what the West had done in 1938. Russia was their liberator, and it was natural that they should turn to Russia. It was also fairly natural that they should turn to a Russian system of government, particularly as they had to discredit the existing Government. Therefore, they had that unenlightened period. I do not think that period was altogether unenlightened. I went to Czechoslovakia during the 'fifties. I found a good deal of private discussion going on among the people. I met a number of the former resistance people and there was no question about their bravery or their desire to express themselves. Equally, I was acquainted, as some of your Lordships were probably acquainted and as were many Members of another place, with the present Czech Foreign Minister, Dr. Hajek. For many years he was the Ambassador here and did much to restore relations between this country and Czechoslovakia, and to get a proper understanding between us. I was particularly pleased, therefore, to see that he had become the Foreign Minister in the liberalised Government, and that he spoke out so well on behalf of his people at the United Nations, well knowing the possible personal risk that he was running in so doing.
Perhaps, also, I learned from him something of Czech culture. He is a Professor of History and he taught me much of how the Czech culture had existed under various occupations for hundreds of years—under the Hapsburgs and so on—how they have maintained their national outlook, and how, sooner or later, it was inevitable that it would appear again. That has happened now and even if it is submerged again as a result of the present state of affairs I
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feel quite certain that the spirit will reestablish itself. I believe that it will re-establish itself more firmly, because perhaps at the present time rather more than previously there has been one other significant change in Czechoslovakia itself. The Slovak people were to some extent regarded as the poor relations of the Czechs—not quite on the same scale. This period has brought the Czechs and the Slovaks much more into brotherhood and consultation, and made them much more one nation than I believe they have been before. So good may even come out of the present unfortunate circumstances.
But behind all this is the feeling of disappointment which one has with regard to Russia itself. Many of us accepted at the time of the Russian revolution, as in all periods of great change, that it would be followed by ruthlessness and bloodshed. This happens with great changes in civilisations. But what has usually happened in the past is that when the period of change is over one gets a liberalisation, a little easing off of the power of the revolutionaries. That is what all of us have been hoping was going to happen in Russia, but, of course, there are factors in Russia which make us somewhat pessimistic about the position.
When one considers where Russia started from after the revolution, and considers that she has become one of the two major Powers of the world, one realises what a great accomplishment there has been. But one must remember what it has cost Russia, and the extent to which her resources have been poured into a military machine and into prestige struggles which have a military basis, and that this continues at the present time. It must also be realised that liberal thought goes with liberal policies, and also with public wellbeing. The Russians are in the position at the moment that they cannot afford liberalism because they cannot afford the standard of living to which their people are really entitled. Therefore, we still have repression, and one can only hope that we may look to that country to devote a far greater proportion of their resources to the wellbeing of their people and less to military commitments. We recognise that this depends not only on Russia but on other factors as well. But it is rather important that we should

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recognise this and accept that for quite a considerable time—though many of us would hope that the process of liberalism would be taking effect—it is unlikely to happen for some time to come.
There is also another factor to be borne in mind. There is no doubt about the feeling that there still remains in Russia the dread of a revised military Germany; and perhaps affairs in Czechoslovakia are not so much connected with Czechoslovakia itself as with the possibility of the spread of infection from Czechoslovakia to East Germany. After all, East Germany and East Berlin represent the pawn which Russia holds in European affairs, and a pawn that they have no intention of letting go in present conditions or, so far as we can see, in the foreseeable future.
These are the factors that we have to bear in mind and understand—that while nothing can excuse what the Russians have done one likes to try to understand why they have done it. However wrong it may be, I feel that they may possibly come to some conclusions which may give the Czechoslovaks the opportunity of proceeding with a more liberal policy, but I am quite certain that the Russians will take care that it is not exportable to East Germany. These are the facts we have to live with. I would say that I hope the Czechs will continue their fight for freedom. I would hope that we would give them all the moral support we can. We can give them no practical support. They know it: they are well aware that we can do nothing practical. We could not do it in 1938 when we betrayed them, so we certainly cannot do it now. But at any rate let us hope that the torch of freedom which the Czechs have carried throughout the centuries of oppression—it is still there, though it may be dimmed—will burn brightly again in the future.
8.5 p.m.
LORD GRANTCHESTER: My Lords, I wish that the resolution submitted to this House had been differently worded. Even the Communist Party contrived to express itself with greater sympathy, deploring what had happened. But the very pointlessness of the resolution provides an object lesson to us. Whilst so many go about the world in fear and frustration, surely the most distasteful statement heard both here and in the
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United Stales has been that in this tragedy that has overtaken Czechoslovakia we are quite helpless.
My Lords, the Government may be helpless. Anyway, when Governments take up a quarrel the result is likely to be devastating, for Governments have been allowed to accumulate the massive instruments of modern power. The United States also are helpless in this case. They carry the real responsibility, jointly with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, from the time of the Yalta Agreements, by which the world was divided into two spheres of influence, separated by a line through the middle of Europe. Both the United States aid the U.S.S.R. are still seeking agreements which are likely to prolong, and even extend, this division. I hope the President of the United Slates will think again before he enters into any further discussions on these proposed agreements. In passing, think there is no doubt that the distinguished historian, Arthur Conte, endorses the view which the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, took in the matter of the Yalta Agreements. The United Nations is helpless, for action by this organisation is dependent, and was intended from its origin to be dependent, upon agreement between the Great Powers.
I suggest that what we have to do is to work out a new pattern of resistance. While Governments stand by, helpless. individuals can act; for we are not all helpless. We must not let ourselves be confused, at this time, by too wide or too many objectives. Although there are some subtle kinds of pressure more difficult to detect, let us concentrate on two of the worst manifestations of power—the use of military forces and the use of secret police above the public law to bully, so that men and women are afraid to talk freely together.
This is no new idea; it has inspired man throughout the centuries. But new methods of presentation and approach are needed in a super-materialistic world which takes little or no account of the individual anywhere or of any freedom which he may have to express himself, in a society which to-day sacrifices the identity of a person to a technology which has been concentrated primarily on his destruction. These societies now stand helpless when one of their number sets its machinery in motion. The urgent

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need in all the world is surely a determination to restore the balance in favour of the dignity of the individual against coercion, against being overwhelmed rather than convinced.
My Lords, I think that in these matters we must speak to ourselves as well as to others. We must not regard any country as immune against the loss of freedom. One step must be to realise that it is dangerous to entrust all the modern instruments of power to any Government, and most of all to the Governments of large countries. Smaller units are usually less dangerous to others than large units. If necessary, we should choose and urge secession out of big units until this basic need of the human mind is protected by rigid safeguards. It this involves slower economic growth or progress, let us remember that to be able to breathe more happily comes first, and we must resolve not to surrender this ideal to any Government or institution for material gain.
The most important step, I think, is to learn the lessons the Danes taught the world when Hitler invaded their country. The Czechs seem to have done so, and we admire their determination and courage. It was the helpless Danes who scored a great moral victory over their invaders which not only discomforted and demoralised Hitler's troops but saved the Jews in Denmark from the horrors they suffered elsewhere. No doubt they faced the possibility of extermination, and so may the Czechs. While our Government stand helpless, is it too much to expect all the people in this country to show by their attitude their detestation of what is happening until it is stopped?
May I also express the hope that Her Majesty's Government will take more notice than they have been doing of the views of our friends in the Far East, remembering that influence depends in the long run on wisdom rather than upon military commitment; remembering also that too great a deference to American policies has undermined our influence in the West, and could destroy what influence we still retain in the Far East? So is it too much to expect the United States in future to discuss their policies more widely and frankly before they pursue them, particularly in the Far East?
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Part of the evident helplessness of our Government in recent years has been due to our loss of independent thinking—and I emphasise "thinking", for to think aright is the foundation for right action and respected influence.
So, my Lords, can we at least agree to show in every possible way on every possible occasion the disgust we feel at what has happened in Czechoslovakia, and also that we disapprove of those who collaborate with the supporters of such action? The important thing about contacts, official or private, it seems to me, is that they should know what we feel and that our action should be designed to have the maximum effect.
8.13 p.m.
LORD HANKEY: My Lords, I warmly agree with a very great deal of what has been said to-day in condemnation of the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia. I shall try not to repeat what has been said, but I should like to say a few words in this debate, because for years I dealt with the problems of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service, and in several of the Eastern European countries; and rather particularly because I was a member of the Parliamentary delegation which visited the Soviet Union in May. My remarks to-day are of course made entirely on my own responsibility, and do not involve that of our able leader, Mr. F. T. Willey, or that of any other member of the delegation.
We were received with the utmost kindness and hospitality in the U.S.S.R. We were encouraged to ask as many questions as we liked, wherever we went, and so far as I could judge we received pretty frank answers. In twelve days we saw Moscow, Irkutsk and Bratsk, in Central Siberia, Baku in Azerbaijan and Leningrad on the Baltic, with a final most interesting visit to the Kremlin. I think we were all greatly impressed with the immense economic development and with the scientific and material progress of the areas we visited. I have written my impressions in detail in the New Scientist of June 13, and will not repeat them here because they would not be germane to this debate. But I should like to add this. Compared with Stalin's time 19 years ago, when I last visited Moscow, there seems to be a far greater willingness among the population to talk

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to visiting foreigners; and it seems evident that there is now room for reasonable differences of opinion among members of the Government, local authorities and Party, because one often heard both sides of a question discussed and explained in a way which used not to happen before.
On the other hand our hosts, who impressed me by their toughness and determination—in some cases I might perhaps have said ruthless determination—made it plain that the fundamental doctrines of Marxism-Leninism are still the basis of their thought. They are still afraid of an attempt by so-called aggressive imperialist circles abroad, more particularly in West Germany and the United States, to cause trouble in the Communist world, and even to carry such a policy to the point where it might cause a serious risk of another war. To those of us who know the present Western Germany and the United States, such fears appear so fantastic as to merit little importance. They could in no circumstances justify the disgraceful rape of Czechoslovakia.
But, my Lords, we have in this country learnt, to our cost, in the last half century how vital it is to study the beliefs of others, and how dangerous it is to underestimate them. I feel justified in mentioning this fear, expressed in high quarters in the U.S.S.R. to our Parliamentary delegation, because it might seem to have transpired as the result of events in Czechoslovakia that the resistance to the Soviet occupation there may have been led by some sort of underground movement prepared and started by the Russians themselves, in case there should one day be a German occupation. Could there be a more extraordinary development, if that is true?
Reverting to the U.S.S.R. and its allies, many of us have hoped that as time passed their secret police systems would get less oppressive and their Governments milder. We have hoped that increasingly this would make possible a dialogue with the Soviet Government and with the peoples of the Soviet Union, and with the Governments arid peoples of Eastern Europe, in which common sense might be heard and, in the end, prevail. After all, the more powerful and successful these States become, the more they have to lose from a war, and the more they
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have to gain by arranging sensible diplomatic solutions of current problems. We have already seen the beginnings of this encouraging trend.
But, my Lords, I am bound to say that the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the U.S.S.R. and her Communist allies, coming after the agreement of Cierna and Tisou, has been a tremendous shock to those who harboured even that degree of tempered optimism. How often are the precedents set in Hungary in 1956, and now in Czechoslovakia in 1968, to be repeated? What importance, if any, does the Soviet Union attach to its United Nations obligations? And if it treats its friends and allies thus, what may it not do to other nations? Let us not forget that under current Marxist-Leninist doctrines a war of liberation is not to be considered a war of aggression. This was actually said to us in the Soviet Union. But how far is this doctrine to be carried? Could it run outside the Communist world also? One is entitled to wonder. I warmly agree with what has been said to-clay about the need to look to the state of our own defences, both in Western Europe, including Berlin, and on the more distant wings of NATO.
But coming back to the purely practical side of the Czechoslovak affair, what sure hope is there that common sense will prevail if the Soviet and East German and other leaders make such incredible blunders? Fancy the Russians, who have complained of the Munich Agreement just as much as the Czechs, associating the East German and Polish troops with their invasion, as well as troops from Hungary, a country which has for centuries been at enmity with the surrounding Slavonic populations! And yet the Russians seem to have had no prepared political plan, or certainly no practically effective political plan, even if they had a military one.
My Lords, did the Soviet leaders, perhaps, act on an impulse, all of a sudden, knowing that the military plan existed? Did they, in the distant isolation of Moscow, underestimate, or decide to disregard, the reactions of the Czechoslovak people? My Lords, what a commentary on "democratic centralism" and how much this reinforces our own need to be well prepared! The timing of the Russian move seems clear. The Russians apparently felt that they must act before

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the Czechs and Slovaks elected new central committees and eliminated some of the old Stalinist hard liners. But why did they not think of this before making the agreement at Cierna and Tisou, where they were anyhow trying to influence the course of Czechoslovak internal policy?
This brings me to the purely internal side. I remember being asked by the noble Earl, Lord Avon, who was then Foreign Secretary, when I was British Minister in Hungary in 1952, what life was really like in Budapest. It was at a time of extensive deportations; of innumerable arrests and of great repression by the A.V.O. or Secret Police. Truth, mercy and justice were literally abolished—a truly terrible state of affairs. I replied, "Either there will have to be years of much better government or one day the streets will run with blood." He was greatly shocked, but I assured him that I meant literally what I said. It came true in 1956, three and a half years after Stalin's death, and long after I had left Hungary.
The Soviet peoples, including the Russians, detested Stalin's secret-police methods as much as everyone else did. In particular, the growing mass of intellectuals and scientists demand and absolutely require freedom of thought. One of the problems of the Communist world to-day is how the Communist Governments can be sure of remaining in power unless they are triumphantly and obviously successful, politically, economically and socially, which many of them are not; or else unless they retain a secret-police machine which can maintain internal order in all circumstances. The less success they have, it seems, the more repression there must be. The Soviet Union has in fact been remarkably successful, and the security machine is much less evident there than it used to be. Even so, my Lords, it is only too apparent, when one is in the Soviet Union, that the authorities are much more interested in telling people what they are to think, than what they can buy. Mr. Dubcek, for his part, was about to reform the internal security authorities, but the Russians clearly thought this was an unreasonable risk to take. But what a disappointing and shocking commentary their drastic action
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is on the machinery and policies of the Soviet bloc!
My Lords, it is not clear where all this is leading. Stalin once said that revolutions happen only when the people are unwilling to go on being ruled in the old way and when their rulers are unable to govern in the old way. Are they perhaps getting to that position in parts of the Communist world? And, if so, is there any risk that Moscow may one day say that their troubles are being fomented from the West? That would be a very easy and convenient excuse, and they have in fact used that argument on this occasion.
We cannot be sure of the answers to these fundamental questions to-day; nor can we crystal-gaze with any safety. Recent events should be deeply worrying to those who think that we can always rely on good will or common sense in the world we live in, or that we can relax our defences. For in the Czechoslovak affair the Soviet leaders have shown themselves capable of incredible blunders; of a brutal disregard for the rights and feelings of other people, even of their allies; and of doing all this in order to stem the course of progress towards greater freedom and probably towards greater prosperity.
Let us not forget that Europe is, by comparison with the Soviet Union, weak and divided, and is by itself very inadequately supplied for defence either nuclear or conventional. Remember that the NATO Treaty is to be reviewed next year. I do not know whether General de Gaulle, who has also committed some quite remarkable mistakes in his time, still thinks that Europe is secure—for instance, because the new China has created a new situation. If he does, I hope that he will have an agonising reappraisal of his policy at once. In no circumstances should we do anything to give colour to the idea that NATO is aggressive. but it does seem obvious that a divided Europe and a divided Atlantic 'Community may mean less security for us all and perhaps invite mistakes which endanger world peace.
8.26 p.m.
LORD AILWYN: My Lords, I shall be very short. I wish to express, as so many other noble Lords have from all quarters of the House, my strongest condemnation of Russia's perfidy, and to

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register my abhorrence of what has taken place and my misery at the fate which has overcome that gallant little country of Czechoslovakia. Just thirty years ago my wife and I found ourselves, for a few hours, in that lovely capital city of Prague where we mingled with the people. At that time Lord Runcirnan had his Mission there and was striving with all his might to find some solution to the menacing situation existing at that time between the Sudeten Germans and the Czechoslovakians. We spent over an hour in the ante-room or hall of the hotel where, behind the communicating door, sat Lord Runciman and his Mission. We spoke with several of the Czechs sitting there with us and later with people in the street. They all recognised an English couple in their midst and repeatedly appealed to us, saying, "You will not forsake us; you will stand by us; you will not allow Hitler to march in".
I remember vividly our taxi driver and the intensity of his feelings. I remember the grip of his hand when I got out of the vehicle, and his parting words, "We know that Britain will never desert us". Three weeks later, my Lords, I was attending a three-day debate in your Lordships' House on the Munich Agreement and the subsequent invasion and dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. I will not dwell on the devastating anguish and feeling of shame I experienced at the betrayal, as I saw it, of our friends in Prague. But because I am, alas! the sole survivor of the five noble Lords who spoke in your Lordships' House against that Agreement and its miserable, shameful sequel, I have felt impelled to say these few words to your Lordships this evening.
The detestable crime and Soviet treachery we are discussing to-day brings us back once more into that horrible atmosphere of Quislings, collaborators (hateful and vile words) which we had hoped had gone for ever. Once more we watch the agony of this small nation. Lord Stanhope, who was Leader of your Lordships' House in 1938, when winding up that three-day debate, in paying tribute to the Czechoslovakians, used these words:
"The dignity, courage and self-control shown by the people and leaders of that little country."
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My Lords, we can at least re-echo those sentiments to-day. Thirty years ago it was Benes. To-day it is Svoboda and Dubcek. Then there was a League of Nations—which failed. To-day there is a United Nations. Is it going to fail, too? Then it was the Germans; to-day it is the Russians. I pray that those stout-hearted people of Czechoslovakia may be given strength and endurance in this further martyrdom they have been called upon to face. The rape of Czechoslovakia in 1968 will surely be remembered for all time as one of the blackest crimes in history.
8.32 p.m.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I am quite sure Members of this House, in all quarters, will welcome the contribution which has just been made by the noble Lord, Lord Ailwyn. He was one of the five Members of this House who protested against the Munich agreement. I was not even then a Member of another place, but how well I remember that occasion! I was concerned in bringing refugees from Czechoslovakia to this country. They arrived just on Christmas Eve. We placed them in a hotel in Kensington. That night the hotel caught fire, and three of those who escaped from Czechoslovakia from under the Nazi heel died in that accident. Although the noble Lord was much more concerned than I was then, I want to assure him that many of us also felt very deeply the tragedy of the Munich agreement.
There has been one missing voice in this debate. It is a voice which, over the years, was raised in another place and, since his membership of the House, in this place. He always spoke for the authority of the United Nations; he was always looking forward to the ultimate solution of world government; always expressing the eternal deeps of the human spirit. I am referring to Lord Rowley. He is seriously ill only a few hundred yards from where we are speaking to-night, and I am sure all your Lordships would like to express gratitude for what he has contributed to life, and would like to express our good wishes to him, in his present serious illness, for the return of his health. He had the great father who contributed much to the Party to which those of us on these Benches belong, who contributed as a pioneer

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to the conception of collective responsibility in foreign affairs, and his son has carried on those traditions. I hope that these words, which I am sure express the feelings of the whole House, may reach him in his bed in Westminster Hospital.
Turning to the subject of our debate, there has been absolute unanimity in this House. We have the distinction from another place of having the one Communist Member of the two Chambers that make up Parliament. I expect him, as a member of the Communist Party of Great Britain, to endorse the denunciations which his Party has made of Russia's action in this crisis. I think most of us look on what has happened with both sorrow and anger. We look at it with sorrow because of our sense of feelings towards the peoples of Soviet Russia. We look at it with sorrow because, since the death of Stalin, Soviet Russia has contributed to the peace of the world. We have had the change of policy which has led to a détente in the conflicts of the cold war.
I can speak from personal knowledge when I say that Soviet Russia has sought to contribute towards peace in Vietnam, as well as its contribution to disarmament in the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Those of us who have met Soviet leaders, who are aware of the contribution which they have made in these recent years to peace in the world, find it very difficulty to believe to-night that there is unanimity in the Kremlin regarding the policy which has been pursued in Czechoslovakia. I should think it very likely indeed that there are leading members of the Kremlin who may have differed. Because of our association with the Russian people, because of our recognition of the contribution which Soviet Russia has made in these past three or four years to the cause of peace, our first reaction is one of sorrow. But it is also one of anger. None of us who believe in the right of peoples—and particularly small peoples—to work out their own destiny can feel other than anger when a great military Power invades their country and by that power seeks to destroy what they themselves are aiming to create. In that denunciation of what Soviet Russia has done, not only all Members of this House—and I am sure of another place—but the vast
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majority of the people are united and emphatic.
Nevertheless, in the contribution which I am making to-night, I shall take a different line from most noble Lords who have spoken. I regard the reforms which have happened in Czechoslovakia as of historic significance. I believe that they mark the coming to a peak of the conflict between totalitarian Communism and the possibility of advancing to a Socialist society where there are personal freedoms—the freedoms of thought and expression—and democratic liberties. Most of us on these Benches are democratic Socialists—that is to say, we believe in a society which has a Socialist economic structure but which also recognises liberties of thought and expression and which in democracy reflects the desires of the people. Many of us who are democratic Socialists in that sense have seen that there are two channels of advance to the kind of society that we want.
On the one side, there is the capitalist politically democratic countries of the West. While I say "democratic"—because all of us tremendously appreciate the freedoms of thought and expression which allow us to speak with freedom and to elect our Governments—nevertheless even in the countries of the West there are limitations on those liberties, particularly because of the control by a few magnates of the Press by which the majority of people not only receive information but are influenced in their opinions. Yet, much freedom. I visited America. When I applied for my visa, I said I wanted to go out there to oppose the war in Vietnam. They not only provided me with a visa but also, as a Member of this House, they provided it free. This is magnificent, this liberty. Those of us who are democratic Socialists believe in this kind of liberty to the depths of our being. Yet, on the other hand, one has to recognise that if we are thinking of an advance to a democratic Socialist society, neither the Labour Government nor the Governments in which there have been strong social democratic representations have advanced far towards the economic structure of our beliefs or to a Socialist society.
The alternative has been that Communist countries, which have economic Socialist structures but have repudiated the ideas of liberty in which we believe,

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will be modified towards liberalisation. I welcomed the fact that in the last few years there were signs of that in Soviet Russia. I welcomed the fact four or five years ago when I visited Poland and saw the liberalisation which was taking place among its people. We have now to recognise that there has been some reversal of that tendency, and we all regret it,
Then suddenly there comes the change in Czechoslovakia, retaining its Socialist economic structure but introducing freedom of thought and speech, introducing elements of democracy. I regard this as an historic event, because it means that there has been a break-through in Czechoslovakia towards the democratic Socialism in which we believe. I believe that in history the name of Dubcek, who has been the leader in this change, will stand in the whole field of Socialist development alongside those of Marx, Lenin, Rosa Luxembourg, Karl Kautsky and of our own Harold Laski and R. H. Tawney, not so much as a theorist, but as the man who has made the great advance from a Communist society which was totalitarian and suppressed liberty towards a democratic Socialism which reflected liberty.
BARONESS GAITSKELL: My Lords, may I interrupt my noble friend? Is he really seeking to associate the particular kind of democratic Socialism in which the Labour Party believes with the economic Socialism of Czechoslovakia or of any other Eastern European country?
LORD BROCKWAY: Yes, very largely.
BARONESS GAITSKELL: Well, I should like to repudiate that.
LORD BROCKWAY: Very largely indeed. Those of us who are democratic Socialists and were brought up in this Socialist movement for seventy years stand for a Socialist structure in which the whole economy shall pass to the people and shall he used for the benefit of the people. Basically that is the Socialist structure which there is in Communist countries. There is a great deal to be criticised in their structures—for instance, the absence of industrial democracy—but this is also a feature of public ownership under democratic Socialisms. I am arguing to-night that what is happening in Czechoslovakia is a synthesis of the idea of economic Social-
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ism and of the personal liberties for which we stand.
If that is a correct analysis of the present position, what is to be our approach to it? I believe we have to be very careful. If I may say so, l think the spokesmen of the Opposition and the spokesmen of those who are against Socialism should be particularly careful.
The Soviet Russian justification for their intervention has been that within the new liberties in Czechoslovakia capitalist forces were operating for the overthrow of its Socialist system. They also argued that there was a great danger of military attack, particularly through Western Germany. I want to say to the representatives of the Opposition that they should be very careful how they speak in the present situation. If they speak in terms of overthrowing Communism and Socialism, they will only add force to the case that Soviet Russia has made for her intervention. The one ground on which we have to criticise what she has done—and no-one can emphasise this more than those who believe in democratic Socialism—is on the ground that Soviet Russia has callously crushed the right of a people themselves to decide their own form of society
LORD SHACKLETON: If I may interrupt the noble Lord, his remarks imply that there was some sort of threat from the West against Czechoslovakia. I certainly have not heard any Member of this House suggest that the West played any part whatsoever in regard to the Communist process in Czechoslovakia.
LORD BROCKWAY: May I ask my noble friend to read carefully in Hansard to-morrow what I have said. What I said was that the Soviet Russian alleged justification for their intervention in Czechoslovakia was that capitalist forces were using the new liberties to try to overthrow the Socialism and Communism, and that they have also argued that through Western Germany there was the likelihood of military intervention. I do not believe either. I do not think, when my noble friend reads what I have said in Hansard, he will find any indication that I have said I do.
LORD SHACKLETON: If I may interrupt my noble friend again, he did not say whether he believed it or not. He just threw it into the debate. I am

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glad that he has now clarified the position.
LORD BROCKWAY: That is very kind of my noble friend. I should have thought from the whole tone of my remarks and my denunciation of Soviet Russia that this would have been implicit. If it was not, I am grateful to my noble friend for giving me this opportunity to make it clear. What I was trying to say—and I put this point very sincerely to the Opposition—is that we have to be very careful in this situation that we are not denouncing Soviet Russia on the ground that there is Communism in Czechoslovakia or on the ground that there is Socialism in Czechoslovakia. Our denunciation must be on the ground that it is the intervention of a great military Power against a smaller people who wish to work out their own salvation.
I proceed from that to another reason why we must be particularly cautious. We cannot be self-righteous. It is only twelve years ago since the Suez adventure. Since then the United States has been responsible for the Bay of Pigs attack on Cuba, for the intervention in the Dominican Republic, and now for the appalling war in Vietnam. While none of those events has quite the same calculated attributes which the Russian attack on Czechoslovakia has, they are the same in principle. What was done at the Bay of Pigs intervention, at the intervention in St. Dominica, and now the American aggression in Vietnam, and what was clone by this country in Suez, is exactly the same in principle as the attack by the Russians in Czechoslovakia. Because of that we must be very careful indeed that we are not too self-righteous in our attitude towards what Russia has done.
I had intended to say other things, but I will omit them because of the time. However, I want to conclude by paying my tribute to the Czechoslovakian people. I think there are two facts which have arisen out of this crisis which should be welcome and should give us cause for hope for the future of humanity. The first is the effect of world opinion. It is quite clear that it has had its effect on Soviet Russia. One does not yet know whether the terms of the agreement announced in Moscow are to be confirmed, but they do include the withdrawal of forces from Czechoslovakia. I have no
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doubt at all that it was the effect of world opinion which contributed to that change, because Soviet Russia cannot live outside the community of nations.
The other fact is the wonderful nonviolent resistance which has been given by the Czechoslovakian people to the occupation by Soviet arms. We must all have been absolutely thrilled at the sight on our television screens of those young Czech students sitting under the very muzzles of the guns of the tanks, waiting for those tanks to crush them. We must all have been thrilled by the reports which we have received, despite the decision of the Russians to shoot upon those who broke the curfew, of the youth who sat round the Wenceslas statue for 24 hours and defied them. We must all have been deeply impressed by that story of the paralysed man who lost his legs in the war against Germany, who propelled his wheel-chair in front of the Russian tanks, and when saved by his Czech compatriots, said: "I lost my legs against the Nazis. Why should I not lose my life against the new Nazis?"
This makes what has happened historic: the power of world opinion above the power of military might, the power of an unarmed people to resist even one of the greatest military Powers on earth. That is a lasting contribution which will go beyond the present time.
9.1 p.m.
THE EARL OF ARRAN: My Lords, some years ago I had a conversation with the former Russian Ambassador to London. Mrs. Soldatov. As was to be expected, we disagreed about almost everything until we came to Germany, and there at last we found something in common. I said that I was alarmed at the thought of a strong and united Germany. "That, Lord Arran," said the Ambassador vehemently, "is something we shall never allow." I believe, as I think Lord Silkin did, that it is this obsessional fear which is the fundamental cause of the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia—the cause, but not of course an excuse, for there can be no excuse for this horrible thing.
It is a curious fact, one that I think has not been mentioned so far in this debate, that both the countries invaded by the Russians since the war have had frontiers with Germany or Austria. It is another curious fact that those countries which

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have no frontiers with Germany and fall within, as it were, the Soviet sphere of influence, and yet have not conformed to Soviet ideology, have so far been left severely alone. I speak, of course, of Finland, of Roumania, and of Yugoslavia, though Yugoslavia does in fact have a common frontier with Austria. The Yugoslays' defection must have been a bitter thing coming as it did at the height of the cold war. Yet the Russians did nothing about it.
My Lords, I believe that so long as this fear of Germany persists in the Soviet mind, and they have cause to fear, so long there will be no peace in Europe. And let us not forget—though I think it has been forgotten in this debate—that this fear has been intensified by the recent successes of the neo-Nazis in the German elections. I share these fears, and I have said so in this House more than once. It is to me (though this may sound heresy) the most comforting feature of the whole of the post-war situation, and largely due to the Russians, that Germany remains divided and, as it were, emasculated. You will not get any British Government of any colour officially to admit this. After all, we are pledged to free elections throughout Germany. But I believe that if you were privately to ask most serious British statesmen, with their knowledge of Europe, for their views, they would agree that the longer Germany is in two parts the safer will be the peace of the world.
I think we must be realistic about this matter, as well as horrified. Any attempt to deliberalise Czechoslovakia must arouse our indignation, and a reign of terror of course our abomination. But if, for example, the Russians were to insist on putting troops on Czechoslovakia's frontier with Germany, then I think, while abhorring such a measure, such a gesture, we should regard it as a defence measure based on genuine anxiety and not aimed at future aggression. This of course does not mean that we should not strengthen our NATO forces and our own forces in particular. Of course we must. You cannot have a mass of potentially hostile troops facing a relatively undefended frontier.
But, my Lords, all in all, though I may still be proved wrong, I do not regard this as the acute crisis that it has been made
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out to be. I cannot and will not feel as I felt about Munich, in 1938, and in August, 1939. I believe that this time we are dealing, not with cold-blooded aggressors but with frightened folk—frightened, if you like, as my noble cousin, Lord Harlech, said, for fear of liberalisation, but far more frightened by practical physical risks. To me, my Lords, the real danger to world peace lies in the future, as in the past, in the hands of another Power and not with Soviet Russia.
9.6 p.m.
LORD AUCKLAND: My Lords, thirty years ago when Germany raided and invaded Czechoslovakia, I, like a number of noble Lords, was still at school. But I have at least faint memories of those days, and when I watched on the television screen the pictures of the Soviet tanks rolling into Prague it was in some ways rather like a bad dream. But of course this was a reality. I should like to join with those who have paid tribute to the television cameramen, particularly from Austria, who obtained such magnificent and impressive pictures so that viewers in this country of all ages, and particularly the young, could see just what aggression really was. If one looks at the history of Czechoslovakia, particularly in the past fifty years, one sees the awful tragedies in 1942 of the rape of Lidice under the German occupation; prior to that, in the months immediately before the last war that country was under German occupation, and now it is under Russian domination.
I have never been to Czechoslovakia, but I spent three years in the Army in Austria immediately after the last war. It was not very far from the Czechoslovakian border, and I came into contact—and other noble Lords who have had more service than I have had will similarly have come into contact—with Russian troops. I remember that the barracks we took over had previously been occupied by Russian troops, and the state of those barracks and what we heard from the civilians in the village where we were stationed bore out the fact that the Russian soldiers were a bestial lot. I do not say that every Russian soldier is, or was, bestial, but there was certainly that almost universal cry from the Austrian civilian population at that time. Some even went so far as to say that they

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would rather be under Nazi domination than under Russian domination, but this must obviously be regarded as a matter of degree.
If one looks at a map one sees the obvious danger which Austria must be in at the present time—and I am allowing for the somewhat confusing reports on the tape which we are receiving as to the present situation there. As yet we obviously cannot assess what it all means, but possibly in a short time we shall get a clearer picture; and of course we all hope that it will be a brighter picture than we have had in the past few days. I should also like to pay a tribute to the officials of the Czech Embassy in London, who have given interviews on television and elsewhere, for the dignified way in which they have answered questions under what must have been an awful strain. I think it is only right that this tribute should be paid.
It has been stated that there is nothing really positive that we, as a nation or a Parliament, can do for the Czech people. In regard to those—particularly the young students and others—who are showing such magnificent defiance in the streets of Prague, this may be so, but I believe there is quite a lot that we can do in the short and medium term. I am thinking particularly in terms of trade because I, like many other noble Lords, do not think that trade sanctions—or indeed any sanctions—against any country really work against those who are the guilty parties, and I believe that by and large that must include Russia. At the same time, I believe that there is a good deal we can do in the medium term, at any rate regarding trade with Czechoslovakia. Next month there is scheduled to be a trade fair in Brno, and presumably if the situation is as it is now this will have to be cancelled. I hope that in future trade fairs in countries such as Czechoslovakia we can show an increased interest, if necessary at the expense of the Russians and their more militaristic satellites.
Similarly in the field of culture. I well remember the last visit to this country of the Czech Philharmonic Orchestra. I went to one of their concerts, and a finer body of musicians it would be difficult to imagine. I hope that perhaps we may see these fine people in this
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country again before too long a time has elapsed. I believe it is in this field that we can do a great deal to help this gallant country. I would hope, too, that perhaps the Government might consider what the British National Export Council can do, because as a businessman I think that in trade we can do a great deal to uplift the morale of this country which has been so cruelly struck down. I was talking yesterday to a business acquaintance who had returned from Prague only a month ago having been to a congress there. He told me that even then there were signs of trouble brewing up, but that the people were all most confused and did not know what to do about it.
I think the feeling of this House, and I am sure of another place, is clear; that is, that the message has gone out to these great people, these gallant people, these most colourful people, as is instanced by their music and all their culture, that we certainly offer them our prayers. I hope that at least in some of the ways that I and other noble Lords have instanced, as soon as we possibly can we shall offer them positive help in the way of trade and of importing some of their fine cultural activities.
9.15 p.m.
THE EARL OF LYTTON: My Lords, like the rest of your Lordships, I have come at some little inconvenience to support Her Majesty's Government in their decision to condemn the crime which we have been considering. Before I had arrived I wondered whether I should have any qualifications in connection with that condemnation; but having heard the noble Lord the Leader of the House, I should like to record my support without the least qualification of any kind. It seemed to me that his opening speech was akin to the early part of a judicial judgment from a judge, assessing the evidence which he knew had been before us and assuming that we were in agreement with him in his conclusion, yet expounding it all and then leaving us free to consider to what extent this was not only a crime but a blunder.
I endorse the condemnation of a violation of Charter after Charter enshrining the principle of self-determination which is the prime political right of us all, large and small. I do not know whether it

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happens to be also a violation of international criminal law. It is sufficient that it violates the United Nations Charter; it is contrary to the Charter of Addis Ababa; it is far removed from the Atlantic Charter; it is contrary to every sort of resolution passed again and again by the Conference of the Nonaligned Nations, who, one notes, have never intimated that violations were perpetrated by the Soviet Union.
Therefore we come to the second point, in which the noble Lord the Leader of the House pointed to the possibility and the degree of blunder which, so far as I am concerned, seems to be a prime factor in the whole issue: that this is indeed more of a blunder even than a crime; and with the Russians so adept at spotting mistakes when they play the game of chess I cannot believe that they never discovered at once all the implications. Therefore, I should like to enumerate five. First of all, it has exposed the revolt against imperialism which is world-wide, and which has been concealed and smothered in the Soviet empire, although we knew about it.
I was interested in, and thoroughly in support of, the remarks made by the noble Baroness, Lady Gaitskell, in that connection, which brought to the notice of everybody, including those who had turned a blind eye to it, that there are captive nations, not only Czechoslovakia, the Baltic States and others, who live debarred of their freedom under the Soviet régime. The murmurings of freedom are spreading among all these, and the action of the Soviet Union has, owing to the valour of the Czechs, been displayed to the whole world, and that is most advantageous. This impulse of anti-imperialism, I am sure, as I think I understood the noble Lord, Lord Harlech, to say, is very strong. I am not quite sure whether it cannot be repressed. After all, we have Bohemia addicted to freedom, and yet, from the Thirty years War to the First World War, 300 years in the catacombs of political subjugation. I do not know. I do not think prophets can ever name a date when things will happen.
Secondly, it exposes the fragmentation of world Communism. I am not sure whether I understood the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, correctly in enumerating this as one of the evils of the
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situation. I think I must have misunderstood. I welcome this fragmentation of world Communism. While Communism is in essence an economic theory I think it is handicapped enormously by being politically controlled from one capital alone. I do not know if I am right, but I feel disposed to congratulate the British Communist Party on the line they have taken in this case. Twenty years ago I cannot think that that line would have been taken. I think it is a matter for congratulation.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, if I may interrupt, I merely noted the fact as a matter of enormous historic significance. I did not say that I regretted it.
THE EARL OF LYTTON: My Lords, I was absolutely certain that the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, was not wedded to the non-fragmentation of world Communism, but I did mention the point, and I thank him very much for having corrected me.
The third point where the Soviet Union will soon realise its error, its blunder, is that it exposes its image to what I call "occupation troops phobia", of which I have had quite a lot of experience in a lesser capacity than the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, in Austria. At the end of the war the victorious Russians, the Red Army, had an unparalleled position of honour and glory in everyone's esteem. When they sent over the Dynamo football team to this country to play (I think it was at Wembley or some other centre like that), the reception accorded to the Soviet Ambassador when he arrived was corn-parable to that traditionally accorded to our own Sovereign, such was the great esteem with which those who had liberated Europe from Nazi domination were greeted at that time.
They came into Austria. On the political level they were reasonably prudent; they selected a Government which was quite reasonable, and after a quite unnecessary delay we recognised the same Government, and ultimately, when there were free elections, the same sort of Government was elected in free elections—elections which were admitted by everybody to be free, whether in the Soviet Zone, in the British Zone, the French Zone, or the American Zone.

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However, the Russian troops had by that time made themselves unpopular. Of course, after battle they raped and they looted. I am sure that all armies, including our own, on the morning after battle are liable to rape and loot, and I do not think it is fair to condemn them on what happens after battle. And if cases are produced of the Soviet Army I can produce (although I should not like to do so) evidence of the British Army. I do not think that counts for very much, but they were not liked. By degrees, anybody near the Red Army became less and less Communist. When the elections were held the maximum vote was 10 per cent. in the British area, and it was negligible in the area next door to the Red Army.
I do not wish to suggest that the Red Army is alone in this. My father lived in Paris for many years, and I do not think anybody disliked the Germans more violently than he did. Yet, after the American liberation forces had been in Paris for some time, he said, "The Parisians detest the Americans far more than they ever loathed the Germans." It is one of the fates of occupation forces that they generate these feelings, and if the Russians have any sense they will know that the Red Army coming in not as conquerors but as subjugators are bound to be detested. Such action is loathed by the Red Army themselves. I do not speak Russian and I have never been able to get on terms with people. But I try to get in touch with people who do these things, and I understand that the average Red Army man is a nice sociable, chatty fellow who likes to talk about his home. Such Russians as I have talked to talk about their homes and their longing to get back, and they dislike being hated. They cannot bear it. So this is the situation to which the Soviet Union is exposing itself. Had the coup come off quickly they would have got away with it, but as it has been resisted this is the third penalty to which they will expose themselves.
Fourthly, their action unsettles the whole of Europe, because we all live in the orbit of the Super-Power, the Soviet Union, with a capacity to destroy this country if it so wishes, whether the United States is on our side or not, in the course of half-an-hour or perhaps a
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few hours. Whether we like it or not, we must recognise that as one of the facts of life, and it is our inescapable desire that this great power should be exercised humanely and not with arrogance. Therefore, they must be aware that the disgust with which we regard them is something which impairs the tolerance with which we accept residence within the orbit of the Soviet power.
Fifthly, it puts temptation in the way of what I might call Nebuchadnezzar, who in history is some kind of symbol of the enemy of us all who, so far as I am able to judge of these matters, has moved his tent from Moscow to Peking. There, within five to ten years, is a potential enemy much more dangerous than the Soviet Union, capable of accepting as casualties the entire population of the Soviet Union and emerging stronger than any other nation left in the world. It is a very considerable danger of which the Soviet Union must be painfully aware, and its action has not produced any greater fraternisation with Peking but further denunciations. Therefore, I am certain that the Soviet Union to-day is aware of this factor, along with the others, which indicates that a great blunder has been made.
In view of the possibility, which I see as a very strong one, that a blunder has been made from which the Soviet Union would like presently to withdraw (and I say this quite independent of anything that comes on the tape, and also quite independent of whether it happens now, next month, in two months, six months or a year) I think that the task before us as diplomats is to refrain for the moment from the least rattling of the sabre.
I was again impressed by the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Gaitskell. I think again of the vortex of rearmament and the end of the hopes of mankind, because that sort of thing can not only end the world we know but result in its awful destruction by nuclear war. I think we should be patient and wait to see what happens. There should not be the smallest tinkle or rattle of the sabre or the scabbard at the present stage. There will be time enough if we have to do it, but at the moment if there is a 40 per cent. chance that they may withdraw and go, let us not threaten it. Let us not say anything about gunboats to

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the Gulf or hawks to Hanoi, or whatever it may be. This may be irrelevant, and particularly so if the Russians do withdraw, because, as I see it, we are not divided in this world between political saints and political sinners. We are all sinners: and those who have transgressed and withdrawn and reformed are often more reliable than they were before. I do not see that we should do anything now which makes the smallest provocation. I think we should take it calmly and stand fast.
There is a final thing which the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, and others, invited us to
do, and that is to express our sympathy with Czechoslovakia. Of course they have had a chequered career, not only from the First World War and from 1918 onwards, but long before that. If we take Bohemia as a major partner in that particular association, a thousand years ago, their leader was a man dedicated to freedom. He was assassinated by his brother—a crime instigated by his mother—and was later canonised as a saint and martyr. I wonder, if any of us think of having recourse to prayer in this country, whether his feast, which falls on September 28, might not be regarded as a day of national prayer for the whole nation which is enduring this trial so nobly. The person I am speaking of is, of course, somebody well known to our children but more at Christmas time than in September: Good King Wenceslas.
9.33 p.m.
LORD BETHELL: My Lords, I should not like my guns to be spiked by the reports coming through that the Czechoslovakians and the Russians have reached agreement in Moscow. News has been coming through on the tape and has been watched by us with great interest. It seems to indicate that if Soviet troops withdraw there will be a reimposition of censorship in Czechoslovakia. It may be that the Czechoslovak Government will have to agree to this as a necessary alternative to a new colonialist regime lest their fight under near-Stalinist tyranny were construed as an act of resistance, the result of which would inevitably be that their country would be in ruins. This is why, even if the Soviet troops withdraw from Czechoslovakia in the next few days. I shall remain a pessimist for some little time.
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In my recent two visits to Czechoslovakia, I was told by everyone I spoke to that the one issue on which no Czechoslovak would compromise was that of censorship. They see the removal of censorship—at least the Czechoslovaks that I spoke to—as the key not only to freedom of speech and expression, but also as the key to increased prosperity for themselves and for greater equality and for an end to the tyranny of the bureaucrats. The point is, will the censorship continue, and how will the Czechoslovak Government be able to enforce it? They have promised their people that there will be no censorship. If they now promise the Soviet Union that there will be censorship I can see there will be a crunch somewhere.
An agreement in Moscow will probably leave open for the time being the question of to what extent the new Czechoslovakia is going to be oppressed by the secret police, by the S.T.B., which only recently was rumoured to be 200,000 strong. They are powerful men who will dislike losing their privileged position, and I wonder whether we can be complacent about an agreement in Czechoslovakia when presumably these men will not be disposed of but will remain active, and perhaps even in their jobs. This is why I suggest to the Government that they consider certain contingency planning in case, even if the Soviet troops withdraw, there should be a return to aggression against Czechoslovakia. In this I am strengthened by the memory of 1956, when, your Lordships will remember, Soviet troops withdrew late in October from Hungary and only a few days later, when the world and the Hungarian people were lulled into a sense of false security, returned and crushed Hungary.
Many of your Lordships have said that they knew that this invasion would take place; that they knew the Soviet mind, the Communist mind, and that this was bound to happen. Others have said that they were surprised and would never have believed that the Soviet Union a country which seemed to be improving its image in recent years—would take such an immoral action. But I think your Lordships must take into consideration the fact that the evidence goes to show that until last Monday not even the Soviet leaders themselves knew what they were

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going to do about Czechoslovakia. Before the recent meeting of the five Warsaw Pact Powers in Warsaw there was, we are told, a decision not to invade Czechoslovakia. After Warsaw the decision was reversed, and we are told that when the Russian leaders came to Cierna, they were in the position of having changed their minds and having resolved to use force. They changed their minds again at Cierna; and then, as we have seen to our cost, they changed their minds again after that and decided to invade. Now, to-day, it seems that perhaps they are changing their minds again.
They told their troops to go in; they did not tell them to mow down the population. They made a half-hearted decision, and it may be that they are vacillating so much that they will reach some compromise decision that no one in the leadership really wants. But I think this puts a special chance in the way of us in this country. The phrase we have heard too often, I think, in recent days is the moan that there is nothing we can do. We have been throwing up our hands in horror complaining about this dreadful thing we have seen on our television screens, and moaning that there is nothing we can do. But I think there may be some things we can do, and I am going to suggest one or two of them that the Government may consider and, if necessary, put into operation.
Those of your Lordships who have spoken this afternoon in favour of some sort of sanctions against the Soviet Union have tended rather to reject trade sanctions and to be in favour of cultural sanctions. I would go exactly the other way about. I can see no point at all in boycotting groups of scientists, architects, writers or musicians who come to this country, the majority of whom are men of good will and our friends. I do not mean that they are our political friends, whether they are Socialists or Communists or anti-Socialist or anti-Communist. But the people who are in the cultural world in the Soviet Union and in the Warsaw Pact countries, as is well known, are men who believe in roughly the same liberties that we believe in. To boycott them is to boycott our friends. If doors have to be slammed, surely they should not be slammed on those people.
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When we come to trade, I think that there are opportunities. The Soviet leaders are not so invulnerable as they once were. Under Stalin the Soviet people were crushed as they had been under Czarism. It was unthinkable that Soviet public opinion should influence their leadership in any particular way. But now the situation has changed. Even though Soviet public opinion does not influence their leaders as public opinion does in this country, it influences them to some extent, and the Soviet leaders find themselves forced to satisfy demands for increases in the standard of living. I have found the Russians more interested in the question of the standard of living than any other issue, whether it be freedom for writers or freedom of speech any of these more ethereal ideological matters.
The average Russian wants to live better. I remember driving my car round Moscow, and wherever I parked it—it was only a small Morris Mini Minor—great crowds would gather to look at the engine and stare at it in wonder. They would tell me at the same time how a factory had been set up by the Italians to build them cars, and how in two or three years' time they hoped that they would be able to have cars, as they knew that people in the West had them. I wonder, my Lords, what would happen if the Soviet leaders thought there was a danger of the Italians putting a stop to the factory at Togliatti; or the French putting a stop to the Renault/Moskvich factory; or of the British refusing to give the Soviet Union machine tools and spare parts for cars; or refusing to give them chemical goods; or refusing to complete the factory at Mogilyov being equipped by Polyspinners. I feel sure that this would have a great effect on the Soviet leaders. It is true that the Russian economy is self-supporting. They can support themselves without our help, but I do not think that they can give themselves the sort of luxuries for which the Russian people are now clamouring. To provide this sort of thing they need Western equipment and know-how and we are in a stronger position, perhaps, than we realise.
Last Friday night I heard an appeal on Radio Free Prague asking trade unionists to boycott all Soviet means of

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transport. I know that British trade union leaders have done quite a lot already in this crisis. They have spared no pains to tell the Soviet leaders what they feel about the action of those leaders. They have stopped a Soviet delegation from coming to the Centenary Congress in Blackpool. But I wonder whether British trade unionists might think twice before continuing to service the means of transport of the country which has invaded Czechoslovakia. I am thinking particularly of such ships as are designed entirely to provide the Soviet Union with foreign currency by taking passengers on cruises round the South Seas and which really do no good to any one except to the Soviet Union.
Another contingency plan that I would suggest would involve the B.B.C. I was surprised to learn to-day that the B.B.C. has done very little in the way of stepping up its broadcasts to Eastern Europe. We broadcast four hours a day to the Soviet Union, and in the past week we have not increased this time. Our broadcasts to Czechoslovakia have been increased by three-quarters of an hour per day. Some of your Lordships may feel that this is not enough, and some of you may also feel that the B.B.C. should be better equipped to deal with this sort of emergency. In recent years there has been a run-down on the B.B.C.'s external services; the money that is given to the external services is begrudged because there is no palpable financial return on the money provided. We cannot, of course, estimate what good the B.B.C. external service broadcasts do to our reputation, but I would suggest that it is considerably larger than some of us may imagine.
These measures, which I know are more extreme than other noble Lords have suggested this evening, are not merely biting off one's nose to spite one's face. They are not shutting the stable door after the horse has bolted. There are other stables and there are other horses which may bolt. Czechoslovakia may seem a long way away. Neville Chamberlain said thirty years ago that it was a far-off country of which we knew little. In fact the Czechoslovak border is only 500 miles from where we are sitting now —about the same distance as the northern tip of Scotland. I personally am worried that the invasion which we have
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just witnessed may not stop there, especially if, in the next few years, the United States of America become disillusioned with the role they have assumed since the last war of a world peacekeeping Power. They may withdraw and leave us to the tender mercies of the largest European Power. An example of this is a small incident in which this country has been directly involved in the Czechoslovak crisis, in which a Czechoslovak girl was seemingly spirited out of this country, with the implication that she did not leave this country legally, and no one, least of all our police, seems to know where she is. The only people who seem to know where she is is the Soviet Embassy, who have announced that she is in Moscow. I find the sort of situation in which something like this can happen very disturbing, and I look forward to the Home Office inquiry, which I know is going on, providing us with an explanation as to what in fact happened.
This crisis has shocked almost every man, woman and child in this country. I think there is still a hope that it may be turned, and a threat to us may become a threat to those who threaten us. The leadership in Moscow is very divided on this issue and I have hopes that, given support, those elements which desire peace and some form of liberty may triumph. It could be that the Czechoslovak adventure may be the last desperate throw of dogmatic neo-Stalinist Communism.
9.49 p.m.
LORD ST. JUST: My Lords, we are drawing near the end of the battle, and I shall not be long. I have no intention of saying anything of importance concerning Czechoslovakia itself, but over the years that I have sat in this House—and they are a good many years now—I have learnt one golden rule, and that is never to speak on anything on which you do not know your ground securely before your start. I am going to speak not about Czechoslovakia but about the Russians. I may say that I am far from being a Communist—I should not be sitting in these Benches if I were. The reason why I am going to speak on this subject is that through my parents, who were great friends of the Russian ballet master, Diaghilev, I was brought up from an early age knowing

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Russians, and this developed into knowing more and more Russians, both White and Communist. I should like to make it perfectly plain that what I am about to say does not excuse the ghastly crime of what the Russians have done to Czechoslovakia now.
In a foreign affairs debate in your Lordships' House some years ago, when Sir Alec Douglas-Home (as he is now known) was still with us, I made a speech about what I know of the Russian character and about how we could start to approach the people of Russia as a whole. I think that we shall agree that one of the ways would be through the arts. Earlier in the debate to-day my noble friend Lord Harlech brought up an important point when he said that one of the shattering ways in which we could boycott the Russians was through the arts. This is something that is very dear to the Russian soul. After all, they were the founders of the ballet. They are keen on music. I believe that what the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, said later in the debate was right that it would be far better for the public to be allowed to make up their own minds about attending Russian performances, and one hopes that most people will stay away. But I am certain that this line of action, rather than sanctions or anything else, would have a deep effect in showing the Russians that what they have done in the present circumstances is not approved by the British people.
I think it makes little difference to the mentality of the Russians whether they are White or Red. The main characteristics of their make-up are very much the same. I think that one would put down, first, the deep intensity of their emotional attitude towards any subject. Secondly, I would put very high their suspicion of all things and of all people. This is deep in the Russian character. Thirdly, their natural sense of intrigue is something common to every Russian and this is why in politics they have such incredible success. Fourthly, there is no doubt that the Russians have a sense of humour, if it is on their own plane. Fifthly (though this I suppose is a debatable point), I still believe that the Russians have a deep religious conviction.
Let us never forget that the Russians are Asiatics in personality and temperament,
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and no European mind will ever completely understand the Russian process of thought. I spent six months at the end of my Army career in Berlin working between the Military Government and the Press. I attended commandatura meetings of all four Powers every single week, and I had the shattering experience at the end of every commandatura meeting of trying to get out a communiqué that could be issued to the world Press. Believe me, my Lords, if we changed one word, the Russians were on the telephone and would not be seen for the next hour, because they had to get in touch with somebody in the hierarchy to see that it was all right.
The other thing I remember very clearly was that on one occasion the Russian representative was a General Korsikov, a man of immense charm. He arrived with a very impish look on his face and I said to my American opposite number. "We are in for something to-day". And this had been at the top of the agenda for months. We had been asking to send a military mission to Potsdam, which was the Russian supreme military Power. This had been turned down time and time again. At this meeting, at the end of the conference, suddenly General Korsikov turned round and said: By the way, the military mission can go to Potsdam, but it must go in 48 hours." This caused a certain amount of consternation, because all the colonels concerned had been sent down to the British Zone.
My Lords, I wish to end by saying that I think that, so far as we have seen in the present situation, the Russians are probably having second thoughts. I personally feel that the satellite Communist countries, such as Eastern Germany, have had a very strong sway on the Russians. As I said in the foreign affairs debate when speaking on this matter, I believe that Communism in these satellite countries is in a far stronger and more virulent form than it is in Russia itself. I am convinced that great pressure has been put on the Russian Government by the satellites concerning the present situation in Czechoslovakia. All we can hope for is that the Russians. with their more liberal thought, when it comes through—and we hope that it may—will now overcome their fear and suspicion and allow some form of free Czechoslovakia to exist.
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, in this long emergency debate we have heard many powerful, authoritative and sometimes moving speeches. If I may, I should also like to congratulate the noble Lord who has just sat down on the unruffled way in which he continued his speech during the unexpected interruption. All that is needed from me at this late hour, before we hear the Government's reply, is a brief summary of some of the main themes as they have developed in the course of the debate. It seems to me that there are four main headings. First of all, there was the imperative need, immediately stated by the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, when he opened for the Government, and by my noble friend Lord Jellicoe from this side of the House, to record formally and in the setting of Parliament, our absolute and unqualified condemnation of the Russian action in invading Czechoslovakia. No words of condemnation in this debate have been too strong to deplore what by any standards must rank as a calculated international crime of historic proportions.
In the United Nations, as the Leader of the House reminded us, 10 countries approved a Security Council resolution demanding that the Council should condemn outright the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and that the occupying troops should withdraw at once without reprisals. In the course of the debate the official representative of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic said that the occupation of his country by foreign armed forces was completely illegal, and that all the acts of the foreign occupation forces were illegal. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union used its veto in the Security Council to stop any action by the United Nations. It was the 105th time that the Russian veto had been used over the past 23 years. In her speech this afternoon, the noble Baroness, Lady Gaitskell, drawing on her experience as a United Nations delegate, told us that she believes the Russian action will have done them no good at the United Nations, and that the uncommitted countries may (in her words) "say good-bye to the double standards of the past".
BARONESS GAITSKELL: My Lords, may I just clarify that? It was that I
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personally think it will be "Goodbye" to the double standards. I am not so sure about the uncommitted nations.
LORD WINDLESHAM: We would all want to join the noble Baroness in that hope. It is particularly sad and unfortunate that the timing of the veto comes when many people, well disposed towards the United Nations in different parts of the world, are reappraisiig the role of the U.N. as an institution on which so much hope and effort has been centred. And yet here we are once again: the Security Council being prevented from making any positive response to a tragic and dangerous event that has shaken world confidence. In his speech earlier in the debate the noble Lord, Lord Ritchie-Calder, alvised against attempting to secure action through the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace procedure. On this point, and also on the draft resolution contained in Annex D of the White Paper, which was referred to by my noble friend Lord Jellicoe, I should like to ask the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, to tell us, when he comes to reply, whether he has any further information on developments at the U.N. since the publication of the White Paper.
The third theme of the debate has been the effect of the invasion of Czechoslovakia on Russia and her allies, if "allies" is any longer the appropriate word. The noble Earl, Lord Avon, remarked today, "If this is how a loyal and determined ally is treated by the Kremlin, what about those of us who are not?" My Lords, after this how can the smaller nations of Eastern Europe join forces with a super-Power like Russia and yet hope at the same time to retain their autonomy and their independence? They depend on the Soviets for much of their raw materials. They depend on Russia for many manufactured goods. Russia is the main market for their own industrial output. Moreover, Russia is, and will remain, the cornerstone of the international Communist system, of which Czechoslovakia was a loyal member.
The crucial factor, it seems to me, was that in Czechoslovakia the demands for greater economic freedom were matched by a responsive and bold political leadership which was ready to experiment. This experimentation took

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place within the framework of a Communist society, although in many ways a new model of Communist society which seemed to be evolving. There was consideration of material incentives. There was an increasing emphasis on the quality of manufactured goods, in contrast with the old rigid adherence to quantitative targets for production. New attitudes towards investment, towards pricing even, were beginning to appear. To talk of a market, although a strictly controlled market, was not too unrealistic.
What has the Russian response been to all this? Even though increasing liberalisation in Czechoslovakia had been looked on with hope in many parts of Eastern Europe, and, as we have heard in the debate to-day, also in Russia itself, the reaction of the Russian political leaders was sudden, inflexible, fearful, and now it seems totally misjudged. By occupying Czechoslovakia with nearly half-a-million men they revealed the weakness of the entire Soviet system. The noble Lord, Lord Harlech, in, if I may say so without presumption, a brilliant and moving speech this afternoon, spoke eloquently on this point. The Russians have shown that their system is so vulnerable that it cannot, and will not, allow free speech. It cannot and will not allow the discussion of alternative forms of Socialist enterprise; and it is so brittle and inflexible that it dare not permit any experiment at all. Like any other intensely autocratic and totalitarian regime which is faced with demands for a change, it has interpreted such demands as a challenge to its own authority. As a result the Russian leaders have resorted to military power to enforce their will. These are the actions of men who are weak and insecure, not men who are confident in themselves. As Lord Harlech remarked, it is the reaction of a man who sees he is losing a game of cards and kicks over the table.
The fourth and final theme running through the debate has been the response of Britain, Western Europe, and the Western Alliance as a whole. Militarily, British reactions must be very carefully judged. It is easy to over-react, and it would be fatal to do nothing. The noble
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Earl, Lord Jellicoe, followed by the noble Earl, Lord Avon, and the noble Lords, Lord Robertson of Oakridge, Lord Watkinson, Lord Boothby, Lord Caccia and others, all stressed the need to re-examine, urgently and privately, NATO force levels and the present and future state of the British armed forces. The poor recruiting results recently have put the achievement of an Army of 152,000 men in the early 1970's in some doubt. The question of reserve forces must also surely come up again for reconsideration. In the course of the debate we have heard several speakers on British defence commitments overseas, particularly in the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf, and we look forward to Lord Chalfont's reply on those points.
The possibility of sanctions has been mentioned by many noble Lords in the course of the debate. I share the view that trade sanctions would be ineffective and would do nothing to mitigate the closed aspect of Communist economies in Eastern Europe, which Czechoslovakia has demonstrated can be opened up. To show that there is a better life, and higher living standards, and more efficient ways of managing an economy, remains a worthwhile objective.
I want to end, as I think we must on the occasion of this emergency debate, with the tragic plight of Czechoslovakia itself. Let us not forget that Czechoslovakia is the Westernmost of the Communist States of East Europe, and one that has close historical and cultural ties with the West. It is not so many years since it was possible to take a tram from Bratislava into Vienna to go to the Opera and return again the same evening. The tramlines are still there, running between the two cities.
Before and immediately after the last War Czechoslovakia was an industrially advanced nation. The fact that it has not developed at the same rate as, for example, Austria, was one of the underlying causes of the dissatisfaction that built up to the demand for a changed economic system. These economic pressures, coinciding with the aspirations of young people who are now twenty years of age—themselves children of the revolution which brought the Communists to power in 1948—and the forces of Slovak

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nationalism symbolised in the person of Mr. Dubcek, the first Slovak to hold supreme office in Prague—coalesced with political policies which led to the Russian invasion. It is a chain of events with a coherent historical and rational order about it. Until, that is, all reasonable and normal developments were suddenly shattered by the Russian aggression.
With the noble Lord, Lord Harlech, I do not believe that this process of national development in Czechoslovakia or Eastern Europe is at an end. I do not believe that it will be extinguished by a single military operation launched and directed from Moscow. Even though the legal Government of Czechoslovakia has been intimidated by the Russians and the country occupied by half a million troops, when the history of these troubled times comes to be written it will not be the Russian invasion but the reforms of Dubcek, and the economic forces which lay behind them, which will he regarded as of wider significance and more enduring consequence. Let us at the end of the debate keep in mind the courageous words of Mr. Dubcek as he was driven away from his office in Prague last week. As he got into a Soviet armoured car he passed out a note on which were written the words:
"Keep firm: the sun will rise again."
10.11 p.m.
LORD CHALFONT: My Lords, this debate has taken place in the shadow of an act of such cynical and brutal violence that it is hard to find its like in the whole turbulent history of Europe. Those of us whose lives have twice in this century been ravaged by great wars, and many times more shaken by assaults on freedom and democracy, are no strangers to these shocks, the shocks of barbarism.
Here, of course, I must reflect and echo the tributes that have been paid in your Lordships' House today to the restraint and the steadfastness of the Czechs and the Slovaks. As many noble Lords have said, we have seen the newsreel pictures; we have read the Press reports; we have seen examples of great courage—unbelievable courage; we have seen examples of the humour of an occupied people. We have seen signposts put up in the streets of Prague soon after the occupation giving the Soviet troops precise instructions about the
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route to Moscow. Seven hundred years of history have given these people, the people of Czechoslovakia, a great courage, a great dignity and the bearing of men and women who are not easily to be terrorised into slavery.
There is nothing new about what has happened in Czechoslovakia. This kind of aggression has been going on since the Conquistadores of Pizarro raped the civilisation of the Incas in Peru; and long before that, too. But there is something about this latest exercise in naked power politics that has the unique combination of brutality and cynicism and contempt for the most rudimentary principles of civilised behavour.
My Lords, let us be absolutely clear exactly what has happened. It is as simple as this. On August 20 the Soviet Union, one of the most powerful nations on earth, used its vast and irresistible military strength in an attempt to snuff out the political life of Czechoslovakia. For reasons of convenience, it included in its invading forces a few token units from those of its so-called allies who were prepared to lend their names to this sordid act of betrayal. But it is the Government of the Soviet Union that must bear the principal responsibility for what has happened. I must say here that if my noble friend Lord Brockway thinks that the United States or this country have done anything that can be compared with this shocking act of international banditry, then I can only beg profoundly to disagree with him.
In the course of this debate, which has been notable for a number of things, but especially, I think, for the sense of contempt and outrage that has vibrated through every speech that has been made, the condemnation of this country for this naked aggression has been clear and unequivocable: and it only remains for me, replying for the Government to the debate, to endorse without reservation these feelings of revulsion. As the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, has asked us to do, we shall denounce this, and we shall continue to denounce it until this crime is expiated.
My Lords, may I say here that I think we should indeed be unwise to take too much note of the unconfirmed reports that are coming over the tapes this evening. There are reports that Russian

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troops are to leave on certain conditions; there are reports that the conditions may include closer control of the press in Czechoslovakia; there are rumours that the Czechoslovak leaders are to resume their posts; there are reports that the roads around and into Czechoslovakia have been closed. But I must tell your Lordships that the latest report we have from Radio Free Prague describes the Czechoslovak Government as saying that any reports that an end to the Moscow talks are imminent are premature. I beg your Lordships not to look upon these reports as confirmed, because they are not. Even when we have the communiqué from these talks I suggest that we shall need to study it with very great care. If it is true to say that one should fear the Greeks when they are bearing gifts, it is even more true to say that one should fear the Russians when they are drafting communiqués.
When the Soviet Ambassador called on me at 1.30 in the morning last Wednesday and asked me to convey a personal message from his Government to the Prime Minister, I felt a sense of shock and disbelief at what he told me. I must confess that, whatever may be the feelings of other noble Lords, I was shocked and unbelieving; I could not believe, in spite of all the warnings we had had, that the Soviet Union could bring itself to carry out this immoral act. I was shocked; and that shock was deepened by the cynicism with which this straightforward act of aggression was being rationalised. We were being asked to believe that the act was in some way a necessary one. This is not, of course, an unfamiliar gambit in the language of oppression. William Pitt said in another place a long time ago that,
"Necessity is the plea for every infringement of human freedom; it is the argument of tyrants and the creed of slaves,"
and his words are as true today as they were 200 years ago.
The Soviet Government claim that they intervened at the request of the Government of Czechoslovakia has already been comprehensively demolished. My noble friend the Leader of the House referred to it tonight, and it was indeed demolished, if it needed any further demolition, in the brave speech of the Czechoslovak delegate at the United Nations.
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The fabrication of the outside threat has been exposed for the hypocrisy that it always was, and it is difficult to imagine a greater intellectual perversion than the final suggestion that the internal changes in Czechoslovakia were in fact a danger to that country itself. The truth of this matter is that the invasion of Czechoslovakia was not a matter of necessity; it was an act of fear. Here I agree, as I agreed with most of what he said, with the remarks on this subject made by the noble Lord, Lord Harlech. Fear is the corrosive poison of a closed society. Totalitarian régimes, like those of the Soviet Union, depend for their power upon fear and not upon consent; and they, in turn, fear the growth of liberal ideas in the minds of men.
Of course there were other factors to take into account here. I have no doubt that the Soviet Union was bearing in its mind the effect of the Czechoslovak liberalisation movement in East Germany, in Poland, and possibly even in metropolitan Russia. I think, too, we must admit that there were military factors at work here. The fear that any alleged weakness in Czechoslovakia might lay open a sector of the Soviet frontier to military attack from some quarter or another. We must also admit that there is something in the argument that the Soviet Union has an obsessive and corroding fear of the Federal Republic of Germany. Whether we believe that fear to be justified or not—and I must say quite plainly that I do not believe it to be justified—we must admit that it exists. But I believe that in the end it was not fear of West Germany, or fear of military attack, that motivated the Soviet Union eventually to take this extraordinary decision. It was the simple fear of the growth of ideas in the minds of men, because it is this that is the greatest danger to the Communist mind, the greatest danger to a régime like that of the Soviet Union; not the arms or the threats of other countries.
It is not that the Czechoslovak leaders had threatened to desert the Communist camp. They had not threatened to do that. They had not threatened to abandon the Warsaw Pact or to become a neutral country. They did nothing so dramatic as that. All they did was to try to apply to the existing Marxist-Leninist system what many of us would

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regard as a modest enough experiment in humanity and democracy. Yet even this modest attempt at liberalisation was apparently enough to convince the Soviet Union that its control of Eastern Europe. and even its security, was at risk.
My Lords, what are we to think of a political system so frightened of change and ideas that it wields its vast military strength to snuff out the first faint spark of democracy that appears near its frontiers, and is so deficient in self-confidence that it attacks friendly people who have committed no greater crime than that they have dared to think for themselves? The people of Czechoslovakia sought to have a more liberal society. A liberal society, as President Kennedy once said, is a free society and it is at the same time, and for that reason, a strong society. Its strength is drawn from the will of free people committed to great ends. It is moral strength that the Soviet Union fears, and surely there can be no greater sign of its own moral bankruptcy than that.
We must now accept that for the Russians the way of Communism is as inflexible, as reactionary and as doomed as was the way of the Pharaohs. We must accept, however sadly, that their standards of international morality have not apparently changed materially since the death of Stalin. Their standards are different from ours and it has become hard, for me at any rate, to see how they can ever be reconciled. We believe in human dignity as the source of national purpose. They are prepared to deny that dignity to frustrate that purpose. We believe in human liberty as the source of national action. They are quick to crush any national action that leads to liberty. We believe in the human heart as the source of national compassion. They leave us uncertain that they have any national compassion. or that they care much for the human heart. No such system as that can prosper for long; nor can we willingly lend it our comfort or support.
What can we do to express our loathing for this act and this attitude? The United Nations, I believe, as my noble friend the Leader of the House has said, is the right place to carry out whatever action is needed in the political sphere. I regret that I have no further information
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that I can give about proceedings in the United Nations other than that contained in the White Paper which is available for your Lordships to read. There have been no further developments here. But in reply to the specific questions that have been put to me, about whether the issue should eventually be taken to the General Assembly in an emergency session, I think that is a question which will obviously have to be considered very carefully. I should not want at this stage to pre-empt any decisions. We must first see whether there is strong support for such a move in New York at the United Nations. But I believe that both sides of your Lordships' House would agree with me that unless the General Assembly can achieve something effective, and not just embark on another long and sterile debate, an emergency session could be bad for the Czechoslovakians themselves and bad for the United Nations. I shall of course very carefully bear in mind, and I know that my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary will bear in mind, what has been said here and in another place on this point. But I think it would be wrong to take any firm position upon it now.
Perhaps I might at this stage mention very briefly the various remarks that have been made about NATO and its possible reactions; and perhaps I might comment specifically on the suggestion made by the German Chancellor, Chancellor Kiesinger, that a NATO Summit Meeting might be held to consider the effect on the Alliance of events in Czechoslovakia. I was asked to make some comment about this in my winding-up speech. At this stage I can only say that my understanding is that this was not intended by Chancellor Kiesinger to be a formal proposal. He was speaking in reply to a question in a radio interview. We of course share his view that the Atlantic Alliance, which is the bedrock of our security, remains essential. We share his view that recent developments underline the need for European unity. This was mentioned during the course of the debate in this House this afternoon.
We are already in close consultation with our Allies about all these matters; and one of our first actions on Wednesday, when we received the communication from the Soviet Government, was to

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arrange for the United Kingdom's permanent representative in NATO, who was away at the time, to return to his post in Brussels. We have been in contact with NATO constantly ever since, and we shall of course consider very carefully any proposals that might be made in the course of these consultations. But at this moment I must say that for my part I would not see any great value in trying to arrange a NATO Summit Meeting at this stage.
This leads me to the general question of the defence policy of this country, and how it might be affected by these events. I am not, I fear, going to spend much time on this particular aspect of the problem, but we have been asked to give assurances that the assumptions upon which our defence policy is based will be reviewed. Of course they will be reviewed. The assumptions upon which our defence policy is based are constantly reviewed and reassessed. I do not think that the danger of Soviet aggression has in fact increased since the Czechoslovak crisis. This is an immediate assessment. Indeed, it is arguable that in the immediate future the capacity of the Soviet Union to carry out any act of aggression in Europe has decreased. They are going to have enough on their plate for some time, to keep their own empire together, without engaging in any overt acts in Europe. But I say this only as an immediate comment on the events of the past few days.
Of course, there may be changes in Moscow. No one knows yet whether the result of this adventure will be a shift of power inside the Kremlin; and, if so, no one knows yet which way that shift will go. It may be that any change of power that takes place in Moscow will indeed cause us to look again, and look very hard, at the assumption that the threat from the Soviet Union to the continent of Europe has diminished. But I should really like to beg again for a sense of purpose without panic in looking at this matter of defence policy. We are, as I say, in constant consultation with NATO. One of the things we are continually reviewing is the nature of the Russian threat; and I should like to repeat here this evening what the noble Lord, Lord Harlech, said earlier on in
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the debate. It is too early yet, in the face of the events of the last few days, to take decisions about our defence policy, about NATO strategy or about force levels; and it is certainly, I should have thought, not only too early, but inadvisable to take any kind of action in the military field which might create the sort of provocation which would do exactly that harm to the people of Czechoslovakia which we and they are so earnestly seeking to avoid.
My Lords, the only other small defence matter that I want to touch on is again in answer to a question which I was asked in the debate, and that is about the troop movements on the Yugoslav and Roumanian borders. We are of course aware of these reports. It is not clear whether they are related solely to the situation in Czechoslovakia, but I am aware, of course, as I think most of your Lordships are, that the Roumanian and Yugoslav authorities have announced certain measures indicating that they themselves are alert to these movements. The Soviet Government have, in fact, denied troop movements in relation to Roumania, but I am sure that they are in no doubt of the very serious consequences that would spring from any widening of the area of dispute.
May I spend just a few seconds on the question of the safety and freedom of the Czechoslovak leaders. I think it very important at this stage that we do not create any alarm or despondency or crisis about the Czechoslovak leaders who are alleged to be in Moscow at this moment. When the Government learned that certain of the Czechoslovak leaders were not in a position to exercise their free functions, and when it became evident that they had been detained, we made our concern very clear indeed in the United Nations. Lord Caradon expressed publicly in the Security Council the importance that we attached to their safety. We have since co-sponsored, with seven other members of the Council, a resolution calling for a representative of the Secretary-General to go to Prague to seek the release and ensure the personal safety of the leaders under detention. In view of the participation of some of the Czech leaders in the Moscow talks since then, no vote on that resolution has yet been

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taken in the Security Council, and I suggest to your Lordships that it would seem desirable to await information on the result of these talks before deciding whether any further action in this respect is or is not going to be necessary.
My Lords, I have much sympathy, I must confess, with those who suggest that more positive action might be taken to right the grievous wrong that has been done to Czechoslovakia. I believe I speak for everyone in this House when I say that our compassion for the people of that small country is matched only by our contempt for those who are trampling on their very modest dreams of freedom. It is difficult to counsel realism in the heat of this kind of passion. As Edmund Burke once said, the only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing. But if we are honest, we must admit that any kind of military response now would do little to heal the wounds of Czechoslovakia, and would carry with it the gravest risks to the world. I think that there is no one in your Lordships' House who would disagree with that.
If we are ever to expect the Soviet Union to listen to the voice of reason and to conduct its international affairs in the light of justice and according to the rule of law, we must resist the temptation to descend to the level at which violence and threats of violence are answered in kind. Armed force has never yet solved a problem in the history of the world and it will not solve this one. Is there anything that we can do? I believe that there is. Essentially, as most speakers in this debate have said, it is to mobilise the opinion of the world in a sustained and overwhelming cry of condemnation. The Soviet Union cannot be allowed to get away with the breathtaking claim that this is an internal matter to be settled within the Communist empire. A crime is no less a crime because it is committed in what some great Power may choose to regard as its sphere of influence.
We have to ensure, my Lords, that the eyes of the whole world see plainly the crime that is being committed against the people of Czechoslovakia, and that until it is expiated it is not forgotten wherever men and women care about freedom. The only freedom which deserves
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the name, as John Stuart Mill said, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs or impede their efforts to obtain it. This, my Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Hastings, has said, is what has been attacked the freedom of a sovereign people to conduct its own affairs. It is no less than an assault upon the human spirit. It is, as my noble friend Lord Shackleton has said and as I have repeated once this evening—through the United Nations that we must make our principal effort to channel the anger of free nations and free peoples against the Soviet Union. Because this, whatever else it may be, is a crisis of the United Nations. A small country has been attacked without warning by a military giant, and it is in the United Nations that the small nations can speak and make their voices heard.
The steps we are taking have been outlined by my noble friend and in the White Paper, and I will not take up time by going over them again. I should only like to underline one point. I have said that the Czechoslovak crisis is a matter for the United Nations and that it cannot be regarded as a brawl in the Communist backyard. I should also like to say that in my view it is equally important that we should not regard it as a conflict between alliances. This is not a quarrel between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet Union have already made a contemptible effort to suggest that it is, with their ludicrous fantasies of Western plots and caches of NATO arms in Czechoslovakia. If it were not so tragic, it would be ridiculous to contemplate the spectacle of a super-Power deploying the ponderous apparatus of its military strength because a few machine guns have been conveniently discovered under a country bridge in Czechoslovakia.
There is not, and there never has been, an outside threat to Czechoslovakia. When the Russian troops and tanks began to show their strength in May, when they refused to leave after the so-called Warsaw Pact exercises ended, and when they finally left, sullenly and with menace, and then returned, less than three weeks later, to defile the streets of Prague—while all this happened, not one single soldier of NATO has moved. The only threat to Czechoslovakia has been,

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and still is, from those who call themselves, with a brand of "double talk" that even George Orwell must have envied, their allies.
It was fear that led the Soviet Union into this latest exercise in power politics, and we must not follow them into that fear. We need not, because fear of change and progress is alien to the peoples of free societies. Of course we must not drop our guard, but, equally, we must not be led by a sense of outrage and frustration into the barren wasteland of the cold war. Here I must take issue with the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, who, it seemed to me, got rather mixed up in his thermo-dynamics in his analysis of hot and cold war. I think this may illustrate some of the danger of the semantic approach to international politics. The issue is not whether there is a hot war or a cold war but of our relations with the Soviet Union. It is my view, and I think it is widely shared, that those relations have improved over the past few years. This, I think, is what is at stake and not a simple matter of the temperature of the cold war at any given time.
Perhaps I may now come to the matter which I think has occupied most of the attention of noble Lords in this debate—that is, the influence of cultural contacts and diplomatic contacts, and the possibility of sanctions against the Soviet Union. As the noble Lord, Lord Harlech, has said, we cannot contemplate that our day-to-day relationship with the invading countries should continue as if nothing had happened. It is inconceivable that while the troops of the Soviet Union and her Allies hold the Czechoslovak people in their grip we should continue to treat these invading countries as people deserving of our trust, our confidence and our friendship. But here again I think that we must be calm and we must be constructive.
I believe that it would be quite wrong at this time to suggest that things can go on unchanged. I believe that it would be quite wrong to encourage, for example, British performers and artistes, who, as the House knows, usually visit Communist countries under the auspices of the British Council. to perform in these countries at the present time. I think
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that that should be stopped. Fortunately, there are very few outstanding visits. Visits by Soviet and other East European performers to this country are, however, a very different matter, because. as noble Lords will know, these are usually organised privately by impresarios with the State organisations concerned, and normally the British Government have no connection with them at all. But we are examining closely at the moment what visits are impending. We shall take what action is right and proper.
I would ask the House not to press me to go further on individual cases at this stage, although I think I might go so far as to say that I, too, believe that it would show a very curious sense of propriety if at this moment we were to encourage the choir of the Red Army to come and perform in the Albert Hall, or anywhere else in this country. Your Lordships will be interested to know that my right honourable friend the Secretary of State has already told the Soviet Ambassador that the Anglo-Soviet Historical Exhibition, which was due to be opened in Moscow on September 19 by a British Minister, is being cancelled. As the House may know, the Exhibition was to be the return for a similar Exhibition opened in London by Mr. Kosygin in January of last year. We take the view. as do many of the contributors to this Exhibition, that it would be entirely inappropriate in the present circumstances.
The question of diplomatic functions has been brought up, and the question of invitations to diplomats of the invading countries. Here I can only say (and I thought the remark of a certain noble Lord on this contained a slight element of sarcasm) that Ministers will not be attending social functions of the invading countries for the present. So far as other Members of your Lordships' House are concerned, this is entirely a matter for each individual. I think this is true of a great number of these activities, and I can only say that, even if I were not a Minister, I should not be attending any social functions in the Embassies of these countries for some time to come.
I think I should deal briefly with the question of the B.B.C. On the question of the concert of music that was performed by the Soviet Orchestra on August 21, I think here one must first of

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all make the obvious plea that the content of the B.B.C.'s programmes is not under any Government control. This was a concert put on immediately after the invasion. To those who were worried that this concert might have been heard in Czechoslovakia I would point out that only one item in the concert was transmitted on the World Service, and that was a work by Dvorak. The rest of the concert was broadcast only on the domestic services of the B.B.C. and could be heard only in this country.
I think that perhaps a more important issue here is the question of the B.B.C.'s programmes to Eastern Europe. Since the crisis the B.B.C.'s programmes addressed to Eastern Europe have been carefully recast. I think there were suggestions that not much has been done about this. The B.B.C. have had to take account of a number of factors, and not least the fact that many people now listening to the B.B.C. in some of these countries find themselves in great danger. The B.B.C. have increased their news bulletins, commentaries and Press reviews at the expense of more general items. The daily transmissions in Czech and Slovak have been increased by 30 minutes a day, and we are looking a great deal at the possibility of further increases in these and other broadcasts to Eastern European countries. I can assure your Lordships' House that this is very much in our minds, and it is a matter that we shall keep under urgent review.
I should like to make one further comment, and that is a comment on the question of economic sanctions. When we are asked to contemplate economic sanctions, as at least one noble Lord has asked us to do tonight, we must ask ourselves the one crucial question: Will this course of action help the Czechoslovak people and the liberal cause in Eastern Europe generally, or will it provide that element of direct provocation which the liberals of the Communist world are so anxious to avoid? I do not believe, my Lords, that we should interfere with the normal commercial relations of these countries. In the case of the Soviet Union, in any case, economic sanctions would have a very limited effect indeed because the Soviet Union does not rely much upon economic relations outside Eastern Europe. Sanctions against the other countries, the Soviet allies,
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would of course force them back still further into dependence on the Soviet Union.
We must, I suggest, in all this balance the legitimate expression of our rage and contempt for the Russian action against the appalling dangers of a total failure of contact and communication with the Communist world. It may be true, it is true, that progress towards detente has been halted. The clock has been suddenly and brutally turned back. But this question of détente has been referred to I think in rather disparaging terms on one or two occasions today. I should like to say to the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Oakridge, that I certainly do not regard détente as he described it, as a doormat for the Soviet jackboot. I regard détente as the need for two systems, two ideological, economic and political systems, to live in peace together. I believe this is still the only hope for us all if we and our children are not to live our lives out in suspicion, mistrust and the cancerous fear of nuclear war.
It seems to me then, my Lords, that we might express the sense of what your Lordships have said today by sending out two clear messages at the end of this debate, one to the Soviet Union and one to the people of Czechoslovakia. To the Soviet Union we must say bluntly that the people of this great country, not long ago their ally in a great war against tyranny, are saddened, repelled and outraged by what has happened in Czechoslovakia. The trust and the confidence with which we were beginning to build a new understanding in international affairs has been broken and it will not easily be repaired. But it may not be too late. We must ask the leaders of the Soviet Union to believe it possible that they have made a mistake of tragic proportions, not only the obvious and fundamental mistake of believing that they can obliterate the soul of the people under the tracks of their tanks, but the more immediate political mistake of miscalculating the unity and determination of 14 million Czechs and Slovaks, and of underestimating the rage and hostility of world opinion, even of Communist opinion outside their own frontiers, and those of their more servile friends. It is possible that they will not be safe from reaction even within their own frontiers,

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because there is a limit to the treachery the human mind will contemplate and accept. And, above all, I think it right to say this. Let there be no doubt in Moscow that if the Czech leaders there come to any harm at Russian hands the anger of the world outside may be very difficult to contain.
It may not, then, be too late to hope that the Soviet Union will find some way out of the pit that they have dug for themselves. If any of these reports that we have been hearing to-night are true, this may already have begun. It cannot be in their interest to attract the lasting contempt of civilised men and to shatter permanently the design in which the industrially rich countries in the world will get together in attacking the great problems of the 20th century. There is no reason why East and West should live for ever in a paralysis of hostility and suspicion. But the Soviet Union must now be in no doubt that while their troops keep a stranglehold on the Czechoslovak people, while the nation's leaders remain in scarcely concealed chains, and while the aspirations of Czechoslovakia towards a liberal regime are brutally denied, there will be in the Free World no trust, no confidence and no accommodation. Even those of us whose whole political philosophy is based on the need for understanding across frontiers cannot do business in an atmosphere of violence and of treachery. Perhaps our voices will not be heard by the men in Moscow. It seems that fear has robbed them of their reason.
What then, finally, my Lords, can we say to the people of Czechoslovakia? First, we must say, however sadly, that there is no material comfort that we can bring to them to-night. I do not know how many of your Lordships heard the moving words of the young student on a tape recording that was smuggled out of Prague this week, when he apologised that his English was not very good, and apologised that the quality of the recording was not very good because of the Soviet tanks moving up and down the street outside. He said that he knew there was not very much we could do, but he said: "Please do not forget Czechoslovakia". My Lords, I think the simple and plain answer that we can give to him from your Lordships' House,
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and from the whole of this country, tonight is that we shall not forget Czechoslovakia.
At the moment we can only stand by with pity and admiration as these people demonstrate once more with such restraint and such conviction the strange and moving indestructibility of the human spirit. But they must still face the guns and the tanks alone. All we can do is to remind them that in ancient Greece, 500 years before the birth of Christ, there began to flow an irresistible tide—the tide of liberty, the tide against tyranny. It is the wave of the future—no dictator or oppressor can hold it in check or turn it back. As Macaulay once said,
"A single breaker may recede, but the tide is coming in".
A single breaker now recedes in Prague, and in Pilsen and in Bratislava, and it leaves the Czechs and the Slovaks unhappy and confused. But they should know that when the tide comes in again —as it certainly will—it will sweep away all those who, through ignorance or fear or evil intent, try to deny the freedom and dignity of mankind.
BARONESS GAITSKELL: My Lords, before the Minister sits down may I ask him one short question? He said that this incident in regard to Czechoslovakia had destroyed Anglo-Soviet relations, and permanently. Did he really mean this?—because it is a very serious statement indeed.
LORD CHALFONT: My Lords, I did not mean that, and I did not say that. I am sorry to have to ask my noble friend Lady Gaitskell to look at the OFFICIAL REPORT to-morrow, but what I said was that great damage had been done to Anglo-Soviet relations. I do not think anyone would deny that. I did not say they had been destroyed, but that great damage had been done and that damage would take a long time to repair. I should be the last person to say that Anglo-Soviet relations had been destroyed, or that they had been finally destroyed, and in case she remains in any doubt I can assure her that Her Majesty's Government will go more than halfway to repair them, but only when the crime against Czechoslovakia has been expiated.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

  DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEES
  DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEES