Sitting of 8 April 1968

Preamble
The House met at half-past Two o'clock
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
  SOCIAL SECURITY

    British War Pensioners Resident Overseas
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenterasked the Minister of Social Security what is now the value in terms of Canadian and Australian currencies, respectively, of the war pensions paid to a British war pensioner resident in Canada and Australia on the assumption that he is married with two children and 100 per cent. disabled; and what is the pension paid in these countries to their own war pensioners in similar circumstances.
    The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Social Security (Mr. Charles Loughlin): On the assumptions made in the Question, a private who did rot qualify for any supplementary allowances would get just over 23 dollars a week in Canada and 18 dollars 96 cents a week in Australia. I understand that in similar circumstances these countries would pay their own pensioners about 92 dollars and 18 dollars 80 cents respectively. There has always been a wide disparity between pensions paid to Canadian war pensioners and British war pensioners resident in Canada.
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: In view of the long-standing disparity to which the hon. Member has referred and the special problems of war pensioners, arising from the high cost of living, particularly in Canada, will not he at least restore to British war pensioners in these countries the 14 per cent. cut that they suffered as a result of devaluation last November?
    Mr. Loughlin: I appreciate the right hon. Gentleman's point of view, but the
    858
    real value of British war pensions have increased somewhat since 1963, even taking into account devaluation. As I told the right hon. Gentleman in a recent Adjournment debate, as far as it is humanly possible where any of our war pensioners are suffering hardship we are introducing procedures to meet it.
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenterasked the Minister of Social Security whether, in view of the fact that war disability pensions payable to disabled former members of the Brigade of Gurkhas resident in Nepal have had their pensions maintained at an increased cost in sterling, she will reconsider her decision not to take parallel action in respect of those British war pensioners resident overseas for whom she is responsible.
    Mr. Loughlin: No, Sir. Neither British nor Gurkha disability pensions have been changed in terms of the currencies in which they are expressed. In fact, the sterling cost of Gurkhas disability pensions is now less than before our devaluation.
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: Is it not a fact that the Ministry of Defence have increased the sterling provision in respect of each Gurkha war disability pension in order to retain its rupee value? Does not the hon. Member think it a little shocking that a social service Department should take less care of people for whom they are responsible than does the Secretary of State for Defence?
    Mr. Loughlin: I do not think that we take less care of pensioners than does anyone else. I answered the Question on the Order Paper.

    Ministry Offices (Rural Areas)
    Mr. Wingfield Digbyasked the Minister of Social Security what plans she has for closing local offices of her Department in small country towns; and whether she will take into account the importance of a local office to those living in rural areas.
    The Minister of Social Security (Mrs. Judith Hart): I would refer the hon. Member to the Answer I gave on 7th March to a similar Question by the hon. Member for Cornwall, North (Mr. Pardoe). I can assure him that account will be taken of the needs of those living in rural areas.—[Vol. 760, c. 158–9.]
    Mr. Wingfield Digby: Is the right hon. Lady aware of the great concern that exists in the South-West because the Government appear to give so little attention to the interests of country people? The British Legion in particular is very disturbed at these rumours.
    Mrs. Hart: There are no absolute proposals at the moment for anything in the region of the hon. Member's constituency. I can give him an assurance that we take the utmost account of two factors—first, that the great mass of our arrangements are now done by post and, secondly, that there is frequently a need for a caller office whatever kind of reorganisation we make, and this need is given a very high priority.
    Mr. William Price: Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind the importance of the larger towns also being allowed to keep their offices, especially in view of the fact that the amalgamation of the Rugby office with the Coventry office has been a total disaster?
    Mrs. Hart: I am sorry to hear that. My hon. Friend must tell me more about it. I emphasise that two factors are involved—first, reorganisation of what might be called the backroom work and, secondly, the need to ensure that we supply whatever is needed by way of caller facilities for the public. When we reorganise the backroom work it does not necessarily follow that there is any deprivation whatever to the public in terms of caller facilities.

    Low Income Families (Assistance)
    Mr. Barnesasked the Minister of Social Security if she will make a statement on her plans for a general entitlement campaign to ensure that low-income families are aware of the various forms of help available to them.
    Mrs. Hart: A number of forms of publicity are being prepared. In particular, we are hoping to send these families a leaflet listing all the benefits which are available and telling them where to go for help.
    Mr. Barnes: Does not my right hon. Friend agree that mounting pressures on low income families and also the low uptake of benefits in some areas make this campaign very urgent? Can she give the
    860
    House an assurance that this leaflet will be backed up by adequate Press and television publicity to urge people to take advantage of it?
    Mrs. Hart: Yes, I have that very much in mind. I envisage that the leaflet will be backed up by Press, television and radio. I am anxious to get the leaflet absolutely right. It is important that it should be completely understandable by people and be very clear in the advice it gives them. I envisage that in the early summer—in early June—we should be able to get this going.

    Retirement Pension (Purchasing Power)
    Mr. Ridsdaleasked the Minister of Social Security by how much the purchasing power of the retirement pension has decreased to date since it was last raised.
    The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Social Security (Mr. Norman Pentland): Just over 2 per cent., as measured by the rise in the Index of Retail Prices; it is now worth about 18 per cent. more in real terms than in October, 1964.
    Mr. Ridsdale: Does the Minister realise that the standard of living of pensioners is being affected by devaluation probably more than that of anyone else in the community? Cannot he ensure that the Government save a little of the hundreds of millions of pounds needed to pay for the increase in the number of civil servants since 1964?
    Mr. Pentland: The hon. Gentleman should realise that we are now keeping the number of civil servants down in proportion. What he never seems to realise, and what keeps coming up again and again, is that, when we last increased the pension six months ago, we made it 20 per cent. higher than it was when we took office in 1964.

    Devaluation (Retirement Pensioners)
    Mr. Ridsdaleasked the Minister of Social Security if she will take steps to help those retirement pensioners above the supplementary benefit level against the effects of devaluation.
    Mr. Pentland: We have clearly indicated how we propose to protect the most vulnerable against the effects of devaluation, and in relation to old people in our society, we shall be increasing supplementary benefits in the autumn.
    Mr. Ridsdale: But despite what he says, does the hon. Gentleman realise that many elderly people, especially those over 70, have to go without their daily help because of the increase in the price of this service?
    Mr. Pentland: The daily help is another matter, but we have made it perfectly clear, as has the Prime Minister, that the most vulnerable in our society—those on supplementary benefits—will be protected by an increase in the autumn.

    Retirement Pensioners (Fuel Costs)
    Mr. Eadieasked the Minister of Social Security what her inquiry into fuel costs relating to retirement pensioners has shown.
    Mr. Victor Yatesasked the Minister of Social Security if she will make a statement on the results of her inquiry into the effect of fuel costs on the standard o living of pensioners.
    Mrs. Hart: By arrangement with my right hon. Friend the Minister of Power, an inquiry is being made into the comparative costs of different methods of space heating for elderly people. I shall study the results when I have them.
    Mr. Eadie: Has my right hon. Friend's Department given any consideration to the question of surplus coal stocks? Should not some consideration be given, as a matter of social policy, to reducing those stocks to benefit some old-age pensioners?
    Mrs. Hart: I answered a Question about this some weeks ago. This problem is really a matter for the Minister of Power but, in relation to Scotland, the problem often is that the surplus fuels are not those which are suitable for domestic use.
    Mr. Yates: In view of the fact that a number of old-age pensioners in Birmingham have been under the mistaken impression that they could send their fuel bills to the Ministry for payment, when
    862
    my right hon. Friend completes her inquiry will she see that they are in no doubt about their rights, since this burdensome misconception is unfortunate?
    Mrs. Hart: A number of cases in various parts of the country have been reported to my Ministry and appropriate action has been taken. As a result of discussions within my Ministry, I am concerned to ask this open-ended question and to see what the inquiry shows. This is a matter of asking the right questions and not prejudging what the answers will be. I know that my hon. Friend will be the first to agree with that approach.
    Mr. Worsley: Will the right hon. Lady ensure that, among the right questions, the whole matter of regional differentiation will be kept in mind, particularly the difference in costs of fuel in different areas and the different need for fuel according to climate?
    Mrs. Hart: Some of these are particularly matters for the Minister of Power. I am concerned to discover and establish scientifically the effect of living in different environments and of the different kinds of freedom or restriction of choice of fuel upon the costs faced by old people.
    Mr. Dempsey: Is my right hon. Friend aware that one of the main reasons for this problem is that the general element of 5s. allowed in supplementary benefits is far too low? Would she consider stepping this up to a more realistic level, which would help the old folks considerably in winter?
    Mrs. Hart: The whole question of what is a realistic level is bound to depend on the kind of choice available to old people and particularly to the kind of limitation of choice which they face when they are, perhaps, rehoused by a local authority, and the kind of house which uses a particular kind of fuel. These are the sorts of questions which led me to initiate the inquiry.

    Prescription Charges
    Mr. Eadieasked the Minister of Social Security what administrative machinery will be set up in her Department to deal with matters arising from prescription charges.
    Mr. Hefferasked the Minister of Social Security what arrangements will

    863
    be made, when prescription charges are introduced, to help people on supplementary benefit and low incomes to meet the charges.
    Mr. Archerasked the Minister of Social Security whether all those in receipt of supplementary benefit will have to pay the prescription charges and then obtain a refund.
    Mr. Winnickasked the Minister of Social Security whether people receiving supplementary benefit will have to call at her Department's local offices to obtain help with the cost of prescriptions.
    Mr. Will Griffithsasked the Minister of Social Security by what means people under 65 years of age in receipt of supplementary pension or allowance will be able to obtain from her Department help with the payment of prescription charges.
    Mrs. Hart: I am glad to say that it is proposed that the Regulations which my right hon. Friend the Minister of Health will be laying before the House after completion of discussions with the professions concerned should provide that most persons receiving supplementary benefits, and those who are living below supplementary benefit level or at about that level who are in work, can be issued with certificates by my Department authorising them and their dependants to claim exemption from the charge, instead of claiming refunds for each prescription. Similar arrangements will apply to war pensioners in respect of charges incurred for treatment of their accepted war disablement.
    Mr. Eadie: Is my right hon. Friend aware that one of the criticisms of prescription charges is administrative costs? Would she comment on the administrative costs of this scheme?
    Mrs. Hart: The fact that we have now been able to provide for exemptions rather than refunds for broadly the hardship categories will, of course, mean that the administrative costs for my Department are much smaller. This, however—I must tell the House this frankly—has not been my prime consideration: my main object has been to ensure that people on extremely low incomes do not have to apply continually for refunds but can get an exemption from the charges.
    Lord Balniel: First, will the scheme for exemptions from prescription charges come in simultaneously with the introduction of the charges? Second, will women retirement pensioners between 60 and 65 be exempt from the charges?
    Mrs. Hart: The answer to the first part of that supplementary is that, in a number of cases among the categories which I have mentioned today, the exemptions will come into operation as soon as the prescription charges do. There will inevitably be some cases—for example, the family in work—where we shall have to wait for the first application for a refund in order to provide the exemption. Secondly, in relation to supplementary benefits, there will inevitably be a little time—a month or two—during which we will work through all the cases on supplementary benefit. But the main answer is yes, subject to these qualifications. The answer to the second part of the question is that it will depend, of course, on whether or not the woman comes within the categories which I have already mentioned—whether she is on supplementary benefit or not.
    Mr. Arthur Lewis: In her original reply, my right hon. Friend talked about "most of those" on supplementary benefits. Could she give us the percentage and say why all on supplementary benefits cannot be treated in this way?
    Mrs. Hart: The only exception—I cannot give a percentage, because it fluctuates—will be, clearly, someone who is on supplementary benefit for a very short period. A transient case, perhaps, who receives benefit this week but not next week or the week after is out of that range, and it would be impracticable to give him an exemption. It is only the short-term and transient cases which will not be included.

    Retirement Pensions
    Mr. Worsleyasked the Minister of Social Security whether she will seek to introduce arrangements whereby a man on reaching retirement can opt to forego his state retirement pension payable under the National Insurance scheme on the understanding that this pension can be paid with any necessary adjustments to his wife, in addition to her normal widow's pension, if she becomes widowed.
    Mr. Pentland: Such a personal option would involve additional administrative costs and complexities which could not be justified for individuals already more favourably placed than the general body of retirement pensioners.
    Mr. Worsley: But would not the hon. Gentleman be a little more constructive about this proposition? Would he not see that this is considered in the general review which is supposed to be taking place, since it would bring into the scheme a desirable element of flexibility?
    Mr. Pentland: No, I cannot agree, because the only people who could take advantage of such a scheme are those with considerable resources in addition to the National Insurance retirement pension, and perhaps not all of them would want to allocate their pension in this way.

    Part-time Workers (Employers' Insurance (Contributions)
    Mr. Goodhewasked the Minister of Social Security whether she will consider taking steps to remedy the anomaly whereby employers pay full insurance contributions for part-time workers.
    Mr. Pentland: I would refer the hon. Member to the reply I gave to the hon. Member for Chelsea (Mr. Worsley) on 4th March.—[Vol. 760, c. 23.]
    Mr. Goodhew: But is the hon. Gentleman not aware that this is a great disincentive, as is the Selective Employment Tax, to those who might otherwise employ part-time workers? This particularly applies to the elderly. Will he not consider this matter again?
    Mr. Pentland: No, Sir. We do not think that it would be a disincentive. In fact, if we shifted the contribution to the employer, it could discourage him from employing part-time workers.
    Mr. Blenkinsop: Will my hon. Friend consider a review of the part-time workers in newsagents, for example, in which trade the hours fall just above the 21 hours a week, which very much affects the payment for S.E.T. purposes in particular? Could he reconsider the period fixed for employment?
    Mr. Pentland: If my hon. Friend wishes to put a Question about particular types of employment, I will do my best to answer it.

    Persons of Pensionable Age (Register)
    Mr. Higginsasked the Minister of Social Security what studies have been made as to the desirability of compiling a comprehensive register of all those of pensionable age and over.
    Mr. Loughlin: This has been considered, but is not thought to be a viable way of ensuring that entitlement to benefits is fully known, since it could not be based on any compulsory requirements to register.
    Mr. Higgins: Does not the Minister agree that a register of this kind would make it easier to analyse the problems suffered by these people, and particularly those above supplementary benefit level? How many old-age non-pensioners in receipt of supplementary benefits have had their books stamped "over pensionable age"?
    Mr. Loughlin: I cannot give, off-hand, the figures which the hon. Member requested in his second supplementary question. The problem about a register which would give us the information which we require is that it would have to be a compulsory register, and keeping it up to date would be a continuous process. I am not unsympathetic to the hon. Member's suggestion, but he will appreciate that we do not want a compulsory register.

    Retirement Non-Pensioners
    Mr. Higginsasked the Minister of Social Security what estimates she has made of the effect of the Government's measures during the last year on the standard of living of retirement non-pensioners.
    Mr. Loughlin: The effect has been to safeguard the position of those whose resources are insufficient for their requirements. In 1967 the Index of Retail Prices rose by 2½ per cent. Supplementary pensions were increased by about 6 per cent. last autumn.
    Mr. Higgins: Does the Minister accept that "retirement" is a relative term? Is it not a fact that these old-age non-pensioners above supplementary benefit level have had their standard of living severely

    867
    curtailed in the last year and are likely to suffer a further 5 per cent. reduction in their standard of living next year?
    Mr. Loughlin: I appreciate that the hon. Member is concerned about non-pensioners, a subject which we debated recently. I am as concerned about them as he is. He will appreciate that about 70,000 of them are in receipt of supplementary pensions. We should be delighted to receive applications from all those likely to benefit.

    National Insurance Contributions (Increase)
    Mr. Fisherasked the Minister of Social Security when the last increase in the National Insurance contribution was made without an increase in benefit.
    Mrs. Hart: This has not happened previously under the present National Insurance scheme, but since enactment of the National Insurance Act, 1959 there has been provision for increasing contributions at five-yearly intervals with no accompanying benefit increases.
    Mr. Fisher: On a slightly different but related point, does the right hon. Lady agree that it is perhaps rather harsh to cut the first three days' unemployment sickness benefit at a time when increased contributions will be made? Am I right in assuming that she will alter this proposal in Committee on the Bill?
    Mrs. Hart: I believe that the hon. Member was not present in the House last week when I said something on this subject. I advise him, as I advised those in the House, to await the Committee stage of the Bill.

    Means Tests
    Mr. Fisherasked the Minister of Social Security whether she will list the number of means tests at present operating in the social security field.
    Mrs. Hart: Tests of means for social security benefits are operated by my Department for supplementary benefits—including repayments of National Health Service charges—under the Ministry of Social Security Act, 1966, and for accommodation and pocket money provided under the Polish Resettlement Act, 1947. In addition, resources are
    868
    taken into account in considering claims for certain war pensions dependants' benefits.
    Mr. Fisher: Will the right hon. Lady consider consulting her colleagues, some of whom operate a large number of means tests of various kinds, to see whether some simplification could be achieved by greater co-ordination between Departments?
    Mrs. Hart: I am tremendously aware of the need for some simplification, but the hon. Member realises that one of the problems is that a number of different means tests are operated by local authorities in relation to their own functions. It is a very wide problem, but I am much concerned with the need, if we can, to achieve some simplification.

    Department Pamphlet "Administration of the Wage Stop"
    Mr. Worsleyasked the Minister of Social Security whether the recommendations of her Department's pamphlet, "Administration of the Wage Stop", have now been fully implemented.
    Mrs. Hart: Last month the recommendations relating to the use of standard local authority wage rates, and more favourable treatment of expenses, were brought into effect. This change benefited about 14,000 claimants. The other recommendations, which demand examination of the individual circumstances of those who are wage stopped are now being introduced as rapidly as each separate case can be reviewed.
    Mr. Worsley: Would the right hon. Lady indicate whether the whole of this provision will be carried out administratively or whether a regulation on the matter will be laid which we can debate?
    Mrs. Hart: This is purely an administrative matter for the Supplementary Benefits Commission, just as the report was from the Supplementary Benefits Commission. If the hon. Member has any particular points in mind, he is free to write to me or to the Chairman of the Supplementary Benefits Commission about them.
    Mr. William Hamilton: My right hon. Friend says that 14,000 will benefit. How many are in Scotland?
    Mrs. Hart: A fair proportion. I do not have the figure, but the correct proportion are from Scotland. A number of people in Scotland have benefited particularly from the new assessment in relation to the rates of manual labourers, and the other recommendations, which depend upon the individual assessment of each case, will equally benefit a number in Scotland, particularly among the disabled, because in Scotland we tend to have quite a proportion of disabled persons.

    Widows
    Mr. Fletcher-Cookeasked the Minister of Social Security whether she will now end the present ruling which prevents a widow with children whose husband died without paying at least 156 insurance contributions from getting any widow's benefit.
    Mr. Pentland: Contribution conditions are necessary in an insurance scheme and the rule that 156 contributions shall have been paid has been a common condition for prolonged sickness benefit, retirement pension and widow's benefit since 1948. This rule, is of course, being looked at in relation to our proposals for a wage-related scheme.
    Mr. Fletcher-Cooke: If what I am asking cannot be given in full, will the Minister seriously consider allowing these unfortunate widows to aggregate, with their late husband's contributions, any contribution which they themselves made before they were married, thus preserving the insurance principle but at least giving some of the widows some relief?
    Mr. Pentland: I take the point, but, as I said, the provision to be made for women is being studied in the context of work on our wage-related pension scheme.
    Lord Balniel: Will the Minister take very seriously the specific point made by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Darwen (Mr. Fletcher-Cooke)? Does he not agree that it is a very hard anomaly that, irrespective of the date of marriage or of age, some widows receive no pension whereas other widows receive a pension? May we have an assurance that that will be dealt with in the White Paper in the autumn?
    Mr. Pentland: I said that I took particular notice of the point made by the hon. and learned Member for Darwen (Mr. Fletcher-Cooke). Everything which was said by the noble Lord is being considered as part of our review at the moment.

    Devaluation (Poorer Persons)
    Mr. William Hamiltonasked the Minister of Social Security if she will make a statement on the progress made to protect the poorer sections of the community from the worst effects of devaluation; and what further steps she proposes to take.
    Mrs. Hart: A Bill now before the House proposes a further increase of 3s. a week in family allowances from October, in addition to the increase this month. Supplementary benefit will also be increased in the autumn and, as my hon. Friend will know, it is proposed that the income limits for full rate rebates are to be raised with effect from the autumn.
    Mr. Hamilton: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the whole country will be grateful for that attempt to protect the poorer sections of the community? Is it true, as the Press reported this morning, that the Government are refusing to help to finance the project survey into national poverty? If that is the case, it is an absolutely outrageous decision.
    Mrs. Hart: My hon. Friend should not judge from the rather one-sided reports in The Guardian this morning of what our intentions are. This matter is under consideration. My concern—and this will arise on a later Question—is to analyse in some depth and detail the particular circumstances which we need to take into account if we are to end poverty. I am much more concerned about knowing which line of action would be best to meet—for example, the problems of fatherless families or separated wives or partly disabled—than about any generalities, which could not assist us directly in policy-making.
    Mr. Winnick: While appreciating the increase in family allowances, may I ask whether there is any chance at all that the supplementary allowances will be increased before the autumn, in view of our great anxiety about the way in which

    871
    so many poor people are having a very hard time?
    Mrs. Hart: We have to make a balanced judgment on this matter. We have to take into account the fact that the increase last autumn left people in a much better position than they had ever been in before and that it was able to take into account a price rise which was expected. Next autumn will probably be about the right time to take account of those price rises which the last increase was not able to meet.
    Mr. Edward M. Taylor: Does that mean that older people living on small fixed incomes who do not receive social security benefits or rebates will not be sheltered from the effects of devaluation?
    Mrs. Hart: The circumstances affecting those who are entitled to supplementary benefits are continually changing. It may be that people living on small fixed incomes will find, when we increase the supplementary benefit rates in the autumn, that some of them will then become entitled to them. They should not hesitate in the autumn, when the increases are made, to apply if they have any reason to suppose that they may be entitled to them.

    Old Age Pensioners Resident Overseas
    Mr. Moyleasked the Minister of Social Security if, in view of the reduced value of the £ sterling overseas and the consequent effect on the standard of living of State old-age pensioners living overseas, she will introduce legislation which will assist them by starting the practice of granting to them increases awarded to old-age pensioners resident in this country.
    Mr. Loughlin: No, Sir. Retirement pensions are payable in sterling, even where the pensioners are living abroad. We see no reason to change this long established practice or the terms under which pensions are paid to persons living abroad.
    Mr. Moyle: Would my hon. Friend ask his right hon. Friend to look at this matter again? Is it not true that by living abroad these old-age pensioners are considerably lightening the burden on our social services? Should not we return to them a small part of the saving that they
    872
    are making to us, and would not the adoption of the suggestion in my Question do this?
    Mr. Loughlin: The present rule has applied since the inception of the present scheme. The British social security system is based on, and is related to, the conditions which apply in this country; and we feel that we must continue with the present practice.
    Mr. Paget: In exceptional cases where pensioners must live abroad, perhaps for health reasons—for example, if they cannot stand our climate—would my hon. Friend reconsider the position?
    Mr. Loughlin: That would be a difficult thing to do.
    Mr. Paget: Why?
    Mr. Loughlin: One would become involved in the problem of establishing the facts. If public money is being spent we must ensure that it is spent in accordance with the wishes of Parliament. If a person claimed that, for health reasons, he had to live abroad, we would need to set up machinery to confirm his claim.

    Supplementary Benefits
    Mr. Arthur Lewisasked the Minister of Social Security in view of the Government's policy of allowing increases in rents, rates, fares and prices, which fall heavily upon those in receipt of social security benefits and supplementary allowances, whether she will now review these payments and issue further advice and publicity to explain to recipients how they can claim supplementary benefits to offset any reduction of their living standards.
    Mrs. Hart: The rates of supplementary benefit are to be increased in the autumn. Supplementary benefit assessments take account of increases in rent and rates. We shall continue to explain as widely as we can, the conditions for supplementary benefits and how people can claim them. National Insurance benefits in general continue to be worth considerably more than under any previous Administration.
    Mr. Lewis: Is my right hon. Friend aware that poorer families are often not seen because they cannot afford to go out, that they often cannot afford to buy

    873
    blankets for their beds or eggs for their children? As people living on £10 to £12 a week are finding it difficult to keep their heads above water—and I have used some admirable words which were uttered by my right hon. Friend in her speech last Friday—will she now agree to do something to see that these people are looked after?
    Mrs. Hart: My hon. Friend is correct to quote what I said on Friday. I also said it in the House on Tuesday, although am not sure that my hon. Friend was in his place to hear me on that occasion. He will, I am sure, agree that it is absolutely essential that the public in general should understand, as I believe the House does, that family allowances, and the increases in them which will take place this month and again in October, are the means directly of assisting the very families I was mentioning. For example, a man with three children living on £12 a week will be 8½ per cent. better off as a result of these increases in family allowances.
    Sir G. Nabarro: Eight-and-a-half per cent.?
    Mrs. Hart: If the hon. Member for Kidderminster wishes to challenge my figures, he should get to his feet and do so.
    Sir G. Nabarro: I am not the hon. Member for Kidderminster. I am the hon. Member for Worcestershire, South. Does not the right hon. Lady realise that she has stated four times this afternoon that the increases announced last autumn will more than compensate these unfortunate old people? Is she aware that that is an absolute myth in view of the tremendous increases which are following devaluation, the further increases that are taking place in the cost of living following the Budget, and the many more increases which are to come? Is it not about time that she brought her ideas up to date?
    Mrs. Hart: I apologise to the hon. Gentleman for misrepresenting his constituency. I would be more impressed with his argument if he had ever at any time during the period when the Conservative Party was in power urged an increase in family allowances. The increases which started in October were
    874
    the first for about 10 years. A further increase will follow closely on its heels and, whether or not the hon. Gentleman agrees, it will mean a substantial improvement in the standard of living of the very poor family in this country.

    Disabled Persons
    Mr. Astorasked the Minister of Social Security if she will seek to make available allowances for constant attendance and other benefits, as large as those payable under the Industrial Injuries Scheme, to all disabled people who are not at present eligible to receive benefit under existing schemes.
    Mr. Montgomeryasked the Minister of Social Security when she expects to receive a report on the Government survey on the number of disabled people; and what action she intends to take to help the disabled in the near future.
    Mrs. Hart: I am anxious to find some way of helping people who are very severely disabled, irrespective of the cause of disablement, and I understand from my right hon. Friend the Minister of Health that some results from the Government's survey of use to my Department can be expected in probably about 18 months. The provisions of the Industrial Injuries Scheme, however, serve special purposes and could not be extended to all disablement irrespective of its cause.
    Mr. Astor: Would it be possible to extend some benefit—for example, to disabled housewives, who at present receive none—ahead of the results of the review, which may not be known for another 18 months?
    Mrs. Hart: Our planning in this matter will go concurrently with the research that is being carried out. We will need the results of the research, in that they will establish the incidence of disability among groups of people like housewives, before we can completely finalise our plans.
    Lord Balniel: Does the right hon. Lady appreciate that we have waited a very long time indeed for this social security review? Can she say at this stage whether she accepts as a principle that all forms of disability should be treated alike, whether caused through

    875
    industrial injury, long-term chronic sickness or resulting from any other natural cause?
    Mrs. Hart: It depends entirely on what the noble Lord means by "treated alike". There are very good reasons why the industrial injury which is encountered during work should receive a special kind of approach. At the same time, I believe that the real gap at the moment is in provision to meet chronic sickness or chronic handicap arising not through work, and particularly among housewives or congenitally handicapped children who grow up to be adults. Thus, in saying that I do not necessarily agree with the noble Lord that they should be treated alike, I wholly agree that we need provision to meet the other contingencies which we are so far not meeting.
    Mr. Montgomery: Since the Minister accepts that we may have to wait another 18 months for this report, cannot something be done for these disabled people in the meantime, remembering that many of them have been badly hit by price increases and that the Prime Minister promised that the weakest members of the community would be helped following increases in the cost of living through devaluation and other measures?
    Mrs. Hart: I wish to make it clear, since this may be a difficult point to understand, that the real gap in our knowledge—having accepted and agreed that there was a legitimate cause for concern here and since we did not have any facts—concerns the incidence of disability of differing degrees in the community outside the industrially and war injured. Before we can, for example, cost a scheme in accurate terms, we must know the incidence. However, that does not mean that nothing will be said on this issue in the White Paper which will be forthcoming before the end of the year.
    Mr. Edwin Wainwright: Is my right hon. Friend aware that it is of the utmost importance and urgency that she accepts the principle of the Question, which itself would go a long way towards doing something for the group of people involved? Would she agree that if former Tory Administrations had accepted this principle, the problem would now be easier to solve?
    Mrs. Hart: I entirely agree with my hon. Friend about the urgency of this matter. I would only disagree with him to the extent of saying that the general public expect much more of us than they do of Tory Administrations.

    Low Income Families (Devaluation)
    Mr. Fortescueasked the Minister of Social Security what steps she intends to take to protect families with one child living at or below supplementary benefit level from the increases in prices following devaluation.
    Mr. Loughlin: Where the family is receiving or entitled to receive supplementary benefit, it will, in general, be helped by the increases we propose to make in the autumn. Some of the others will stand to benefit from the changes in the rate rebate scheme which are also proposed for the autumn.
    Mr. Fortescue: Will not the hon. Gentleman agree that one-child families living at or below the supplementary benefit level have at least as much right to assistance as have Income Tax payers with one child, and will he not move as fast as possible towards a negative income tax scheme?
    Mr. Loughlin: In our recent debate my right hon. Friend expressed great sympathy for these one-child families who are living in poverty. The hon. Gentleman knows my attitude to the scheme to which he refers, as I have expressed it clearly on about three occasions.
    Mr. McNamara: Will my hon. Friend look carefully at the position of the one-child family? There is quite a degree of poverty amongst such families with low incomes. In many cases, one child is far more expensive to bring into the world than a second or third child, or subsequent children.
    Mr. Loughlin: We appreciate that it is a problem, but the family allowance scheme has always excluded the first child. Where there is more than one child, we can assist the family by increasing family allowances. About 3 million children would be brought into the family allowance scheme if we included the one-child family, which makes it pretty difficult.

    Departmental Research
    Mr. Fortescueasked the Minister of Social Security what research is being carried out at present within her Department; and what plans she has for more research in the future.
    Mrs. Hart: My Department is continuously engaged in the examination and interpretation of statistical material available to the Ministry, and the development of techniques for obtaining analysing other relevant information.
    The Department is also closely involved in the planning of the major survey of the permanently and substantially handicapped initiated by my right hon. Friend he Minister of Health.
    I am at present considering what the priorities should be in relation to other specific research projects I have in mind.
    Mr. Fortescue: As a result of the news last Friday, can we now be sure that all research being done in the right hon. Lady's Ministry will be very closely coordinated with that being done in the Ministry of Health?
    Mrs. Hart: Indeed, this will be so. The hon. Gentleman will be aware of the degree of co-ordination there is already in planning the survey of the disabled. I am quite convinced that we can all gain from even further co-ordination.
    Lord Balniel: As the Government have now accepted the suggestion they have repeatedly rejected in the past of amalgamating the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Social Security, will they now accept this recommendation, which also we have repeatedly made, of greatly strengthening the research department of her Ministry?
    Mrs. Hart: I have anticipated the noble Lord's pressure for increased research facilities, because I have been strengthening the research facilities of my Department. If the noble Lord looks at the proposals now made by the Government for the amalgamation of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Social Security, he will find that these proposals are rather different from those put forward by the Conservative Party, which spread a great deal wider, and more unfortunately.

    Additional Pensions
    Mr. Montgomeryasked the Minister of Social Security whether she will consider taking steps to increase the additional pension earned by staying on at work after pensionable age.
    Mr. Pentland: Increments to the flat rate retirement pension were improved as recently as last October, when the maximum addition which can be earned was increased from 21s. to 29s. a week.
    Mr. Montgomery: Is the Minister aware that this is not actuarially fair, and that, as the trend seems to be for people to retire earlier, if he wants to encourage people to stay on after retirement age more incentives must be provided?
    Mr. Pentland: No, Sir. The opportunity to earn increments has never been one of the major factors in influencing people to defer retirement until after retiring age, and the financial attractions of earnings and the ability to continue to work are, in our view, much more important.

  HOUSE OF COMMONS

    Catering
    Mr. Burdenasked the Lord President of the Council if, when powdered milk is used in tea and coffee in the Refreshment Rooms of the House of Commons, he will display warning notices to that effect.
    Mr. Kitsonasked the Lord President of the Council if he will cease serving powdered milk in the refreshment rooms of the House.
    Mr. Maxwell: I have been asked to reply.
    Fresh milk was reintroduced for beverages from Monday, 25th March, 1968.
    Mr. Burden: I am sure that all hon. Members will appreciate that statement. Does the hon. Gentleman realise that his reply also means that a slur that was being cast on many of the cows in this country will now be removed?
    Mr. Maxwell: I cannot accept that remark. No slur has been cast. Powdered

    879
    milk was introduced as an economy, but it did not appear to be popular and it has been rescinded.
    Mr. Kitson: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that no Parliamentary Questions have ever been followed by such speedy action in this House?
    Mr. Shinwell: May I ask whether powdered milk will be provided in tea and coffee in Annie's Bar?
    Mr. Maxwell: I require notice of that question.

    Morning Sittings
    Mr. William Hamiltonasked the Lord President of the Council whether, for an experimental period until the end of the current Session, he will move to amend Standing Orders to enable certain morning Sittings of the House to be devoted exclusivly to Questions on matters relating to Foreign Affairs, Labour, Board of Trade, and Scotland.
    The Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons (Mr. Fred Peart): I have been asked to reply.
    No, Sir.
    Mr. Hamilton: In view of that reply, I almost forbear congratulating my right hon. Friend. Does he recognise that there is a good deal of dissatisfaction about the lack of opportunity hon. Members have of getting Answers from particular Departments? Would he consider setting up a small sub-committee of back bench Members, who are most interested in these matters, so that we might get some better distribution of Ministerial opportunities for answering Parliamentary Questions?
    Mr. Peart: I hope that my hon. Friend will appreciate that in his supplementary question he has gone wider than the original Question. I will take note of what he has said; perhaps he and I can have a word together.
    Sir G. Nabarro: I should like to be the first on this side to congratulate the right hon. Gentleman on becoming the Leader of the House. Will he realise that after many months of painful experimentation, every quarter of the House realises that morning Sittings were a total and complete flop—[Interruption.] Oh, yes; and does he realise that the principal absentees were the members of his
    880
    own party? Will he therefore set his heart against any resumption of this totally inadequate device?
    Mr. Peart: I thank the hon. Gentleman for the first part of his supplementary question. I must be the servant of the House. I will take note of what the hon. Member says. I recognise that the Select Committee on Procedure, in its Report on times of Sittings of the House, did not suggest that Questions should be dealt with in morning Sittings. I must take note of that, but I must also, as is right, assess the feeling of the House.

  PUBLIC BUILDING AND WORKS

    Knightsbridge Barracks (New Stables)
    Sir G. Nabarroasked the Minister of Public Building and Works for what reason inquiries are being made in Finland by his Department with regard to obtaining suitable timber for the construction of accommodation for horses at the new Knightsbridge Barracks; what circumstances have arisen to make it impossible to accommodate British Army horses by using indigenous materials; and whether the matter will now be reviewed.
    The Minister of Public Building and Works (Mr. Robert Mellish): No such inquiries are being made. When the contract was let, timber from Baltic resources, among others, was specified because no suitable home grown timber was available. I am aware that home grown soft wood is now becoming available in small quantities, and I am asking my professional officers to consider in what circumstances its quantity, quality and price would make it suitable for future projects.
    Sir G. Nabarro: Does the right hon. Gentleman's Answer mean that all specifications put out to tender by his Ministry will in future require, as a priority, the employment of home-produced materials, especially timber, having regard to the fact that timber is the largest single commodity import of the United Kingdom, costing us more than £200 million per annum?
    Mr. Mellish: The hon. Gentleman has been very good in pursuing this question, which I fully support in principle. He

    881
    will know of the various professions involved. Our architects already know, through Parliamentary Answers to Questions, that, as Minister, I believe that the intention should be to prescribe that only British materials are used where possible.
    Mr. Wingfield Digby: Will the Minister say who advised him that home-grown timber was not suitable for horse boxes?
    Mr. Mellish: I can only say that I have professional advisers. I understand that these horses are very fond of British wood, and chew it up.

    Palace of Westminster (New Bar)
    Sir J. Langford-Holtasked the Minister of Public Building and Works what has been the capital cost of the new bar provided in the Palace of Westminster; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Mellish: Only just over £3,000, which I regard as excellent value for a splendid job, done by my Department.
    Sir J. Langford-Holt: At a time when the whole Government's efforts are devoted towards reducing consumer expenditure, is the right hon. Gentleman satisfied that this is the right time for this provision? Could not the same very laudable end be achieved—namely, easier access by hon. Members to Press men and vice versa—by opening the present Strangers' Bar to the Press?
    Mr. Mellish: I have great regard for the hon. Member and I did not know that he was quite so reactionary. This was requested by the Lobby correspondents and agreed to by the Catering Committee, and it is only replacing that which used to be in the Palace of Westminster. I think a very good job has been done.
    Mr. Shinwell: It may be that the construction of the new bar does credit to my right hon. Friend's Department, but was it really necessary to spend this money at a time like this in order to provide another drinking establishment for Lobby correspondents? Is it not true that the Press has a bar and, indeed, members of the press have several facilities which enable them to consume alcoholic liquor if they wish? Why provide the Lobby correspondents and the Press with an additional bar? Is this what the Government mean by "Parliamentary reform"?
    Mr. Mellish: I do not want to get involved with my right hon. Friend on the virtues or non-virtues of alcohol. We have replaced that which used to be provided many years ago. I do not know whether my right hon. Friend complained about the bar when it was here before. We have now brought back that which used to be here, and I think it is a very useful change.
    Mr. Russell Kerr: Is my right hon. Friend aware that Lobby correspondents have been doing their work under almost impossible conditions for many months and that this addition to the present facilities is the least we should do for them?
    Sir Knox Cunningham: When the country is being asked to save and expenditure is being discouraged, is it wise to make this capital expenditure?
    Mr. Mellish: The actual total amount involved was £3,000. This Bar was furnished by my Department. I do not know whether the hon. Member has seen it, but I believe we have value for money and I think it is a service to the House.
    Mr. Heffer: While accepting that this is value for money, will my right hon. Friend convey to the Catering Committee that for a long time many hon. Members have been trying to get teapots provided in the Strangers' Cafeteria not only for the use of strangers but for hon. Members?
    Mr. Speaker: Order. This is a long way from Annie's Bar. We must get on.

  TECHNOLOGY

    General Electric Company-Associated Electrical Industries (Merger)
    Mr. Leadbitterasked the Minister of Technology what discussions he has had in connection with the General Electric Company-Associated Electrical Industries merger on the effects of the reorganisation of the industry on the development areas; and what are the employment prospects for men and women in Hartlepool at the present Associated Electrical Industries factory.
    The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Technology (Dr. Jeremy Bray): A number of discussions with the

    883
    General Electric Company about the effects of reorganisation following the merger have taken place. G.E.C. is well aware of the advantages, both to the company and to the nation, of maintaining and expanding their establishments in the development areas. As part of the rationalisation of its telecommunications activities I understand that it is intended to increase the work load at A.E.I. Hartlepool. This should ensure a continuing and substantial level of employment at this factory.
    Mr. Leadbitter: Is my hon. Friend aware that his Answer will be particularly welcomed in the North-East but, arising from the information he has now given to the House, is he further aware that this is the first indication for many workers in Hartlepools that there will definitely be an increased work load, and there is considerable anxiety about present promises of reducing work loads? Will he therefore encourage the organisation of G.E.C. and A.E.I. to consult more with the unions so that confidence can be restored?
    Dr. Bray: I am grateful for my hon. Friend's encouragement. We always encourage firms to consult with the unions in these matters.

    Furness Shipyard (Closure)
    Mr. Leadbitterasked the Minister of Technology what discussions he has had on the proposed closure of the Furness shipyard; and if he will make a statement.
    Dr. Bray: My right hon. Friend had discussions with the yard's owners, the national and local leaders of the unions, the Shipbuilding Industry Board and other shipbuilding organisations. As a result, he decided to arrange for a rapid economic appraisal to be made to see whether any way could be found to put the yard on a long-term viable basis.
    Mr. Leadbitter: Is my hon. Friend aware that I, as a Member in that area, am particularly grateful for his personal assistance in this matter, but nevertheless there is a shortage of time? Is he aware that in this yard, which is the most modern in Europe, the rundown in manpower is at such a rate that if the decision is not made to keep it open, time will run out for us?
    Dr. Bray: The working party which has been set up to examine this question has been working urgently and we look forward to receiving its report soon.

    Atomic Energy Authority and Science Research Council (Pension Schemes)
    Mr. Dalyellasked the Minister of Technology what he is doing to synchronise the pension schemes of those in his establishments employed by the Atomic Energy Authority and the Science Research Council, respectively.
    Dr. Bray: If my hon. Friend has in mind the terms of the proposed transfer of astrophysics staff at Culham from the Atomic Energy Authority to the Science Research Council in April, 1969, I can say that it is the intention that these staff should remain on A.E.A. conditions of service and be retained in the A.E.A. superannuation scheme. Legislation will be needed for this purpose, but I cannot say at this time what form it will take.
    Mr. Dalyell: Does my hon. Friend agree that in view of the circumstances, there is a certain urgency about this matter?
    Dr. Bray: The urgency is to ensure that proper pensions provisions are made. I assure my hon. Friend that there will be no lack of care taken to ensure that there is no injustice to individuals.

  MINISTRY OF LABOUR

    Low-Paid Workers
    Mr. Brooksasked the Minister of Labour what estimate he has made of the number of those workers, who, apart from their extra earnings from working overtime in their regular jobs, would be classified by his Department as low-paid.
    The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Labour (Mr. E. Fernyhough): No estimate can be given. One reason for this is that, as the National Board for Prices and Incomes have pointed out, it is not possible to lay down a figure in cash terms to distinguish low-paid workers from their fellows. The other is that the necessary statistical information is not at present available.
    Mr. Brooks: Does not my hon. Friend think it about time that it was available? Does he not agree that the implication of the Ministry's approach to municipal busmen is that the men, by having to work a 56-hour week, disqualify themselves from generous treatment by the Prices and Incomes Board?
    Mr. Fernyhough: For the information to become available it would be necessary to add considerably to staff. Hon. Members who ask for detailed information of this kind ought to be aware of that. As to the busmen, since this is now a matter of negotiation, I think I had better make no further comment.
    Mr. Brooksasked the Minister of Labour if he will undertake an inquiry to establish what proportion of those workers who are classified by his Department as low-paid have supplementary sources of income from part-time jobs undertaken outside their normal working hours.
    Mr. Fernyhough: No, Sir.
    Mr. Brooks: Would not my hon. Friend agree that this is a very relevant point in relation to that made in the earlier Question? If the busmen made up their 56 hours by window cleaning they would qualify for generous treatment by the P.I.B.
    Mr. Fernyhough: My hon. Friend may not be aware, but the family expenses survey will this year for the first time make it possible to provide estimates of the earnings of individuals in different income groups from subsidiary occupations.

  HOUSING

    Houses (Prices)
    The following Question stood upon the Order Paper:
    Mr. BIFFEN: To ask the Minister of Housing and Local Government, by what percentage the price of houses is estimated to have increased between the second half of 1966 and the corresponding period for 1967; and what is the expected rise during the current year.
    Mr. Biffen: No. 63 to the Minister of Housing and Local Government.
    Mr. Whitelaw: Where is he?
    Sir Knox-Cunningham: On a point of order. In view of the unsatisfactory situation—
    Mr. Speaker: Order. A point of order—Mr. Biffen.
    Mr. Biffen: On a point of order. May I ask your guidance, Mr. Speaker? What now happens to my Question No. 63? Is the whole business of the House to be held in suspense until such time as a Minister arrives?
    Sir G. Nabarro: Or until the Leader of the House answers it.
    Mr. Ioan L. Evans (Comptroller of Her Majesty's Household): The Minister is not present as we did not anticipate that this Question would be reached. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh"] We are sending for him.
    Mr. Maudling: Further to that point of order. Is it not a fact that Ministers should not anticipate; they should be here?
    Mr. Edwin M. Taylor: As my Question No. 64 deals with mortgage interest, to be discussed tomorrow, which will affect millions of householders in this country, have I protection against a delay which will stop my Question being answered as otherwise it would be?
    Mr. Speaker: I cannot move from Question No. 63 to Question No. 64 which is in exactly the same position.
    Mr. English: Further to that point of order. In these circumstances, is it not the custom to proceed through the other Minister's Questions and to revert to this at a later stage? [HON. MEMBERS: "No."]
    Sir A. V. Harvey: As the country is now being administered by the Mark II Government, would the new Leader of the House like to make a statement about how this matter can be rectified?
    Mr. Peart: I will certainly see that this never happens again. I have already sent for the Ministers concerned. If it is half-past three by the time they arrive, I will see them privately.
    Sir Knox Cunningham: Would it not be possible for the Patronage Secretary

    887
    tional Commission cannot be much longer to read the Answer, in place of the Minister concerned?
    Mr. Speaker: The point of order is an important one. For the information of the House, I have been reminded that, per Standing Order No. 8(3):
    "No questions shall be taken after half-past three of the clock, except questions which have not been answered in consequence of the absence of the Minister to whom they are addressed…"
    I shall, therefore, see that hon. Members are protected.
    Mr. English: Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. Would you now like to get an apology from the hon. Member for Worcestershire, South (Sir G. Nabarro) who, when I suggested this, said that it was not the case?

UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT
The following Question stood upon the Order Paper:
Mr. HOOLEY: To ask the President of the Board of Trade, if he will make a statement on the progress of discussions at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development II.
The President of the Board of Trade (Mr. Anthony Crosland): With permission, Mr. Speaker, I will now answer Question No. 72.
The Second United Nations Conference on Trade and Development began in New Delhi on 1st February and ended on 29th March. The Conference covered virtually all subjects in the field of trade, aid and development which affect the economic interests of the developing countries. It is too early to make a final judgment on the achievements of the Conference. But I believe that it did produce a number of positive results and in certain sectors laid the foundations for further advance.
First, the Conference unanimously agreed on the early establishment of a system of general preferences on exports of manufactures and semi-manufactures from developing countries. This involves a major change in commercial policies as between developed and developing countries. Although this will require further intensive work, the aim is to settle the
888
details of a mutually acceptable system in the course of 1969.
Secondly, the Conference made significant progress in respect of the aid target. The developed countries accepted a higher target than hitherto, namely, to try to transfer annually to developing countries resources of a minimum net amount of one per cent. of their gross national product at market prices. Previously donors had interpreted the target as 1 per cent. of net national income at factor cost. This new target offers the prospect of a substantial increase in the flow of resources to developing countries in the years to come.
Thirdly, the Conference agreed that work should be put in hand to resolve the problems which still remain in devising a scheme for supplementary finance, and that measures should be worked out and presented to the Trade and Development Board next year.
Fourthly, there was agreement on an international action programme on commodities.
The Conference also adopted resolutions on a wide range of other topics including the terms and conditions of aid, various shipping questions, economic cooperation and regional integration among developing countries, and special measures on behalf of the least developed among the developing countries.
The Conference did not, any more than did its predecessor, produce all the results for which the developing countries hoped. But it did produce certain positive achievements, whose importance in practice will now depend on the follow-up action to be taken. The British delegation played an active and indeed often a leading rôle in the Conference itself. Her Majesty's Government will be equally active in seeking to ensure that the detailed subsequent negotiations make a genuine contribution to the welfare of developing countries.
Mr. Hooley: I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for that very exhaustive and interesting reply. In view of the immense importance of this Conference to the whole of world trade, and especially to under-developed countries, would my right hon. Friend be prepared to publish a general appraisal, including the information he has now given and the significant resolutions of the Conference,

889
so that we can study them more carefully at a later date?
Mr. Crosland: I will certainly consider that suggestion, although, if a document were published, it would have to be a very long one. There were 34 resolutions covering a very large number of subjects, and the House will have access to the normal United Nations documentation which will be available to us.
Mr. Higgins: First, will the President of the Board of Trade confirm that the increase in the financial resources transfer target from I per cent. of national income to 1 per cent. of gross national product is very substantial indeed? How many developed countries are now achieving this? What does it imply for the level of United Kingdom aid? Secondly, as our achieving the target will depend very much on private investment, which the right hon. Gentleman did not mention, what is he now doing to encourage it? Thirdly, has there been any change in the French position on generalised preferences?
Mr. Crosland: The hon. Gentleman is quite right in saying that the newly defined target will mean a very large increase in aid; indeed, there will be a difference of about 25 per cent. between the old target and the new one. I cannot say offhand how many countries are already achieving the higher target, but I would think virtually none is. The United Kingdom is exceeding the present target, but has not achieved the new and higher target. I have said more than once in answering Questions in the House that private investment did not figure in any significant way in the U.N.C.T.A.D. discussions, and there is no change in Her Majesty's Government's policy. The policy of the developed nations as a whole on preferences was laid down in the O.E.C.D. document produced at the end of last year and, although there were certainly modifications on the part of individual countries, that still generally represents, as it were, the negotiating position of the developed countries as a whole.
Sir R. Russell: What effect will this have, broadly speaking, on the Commonwealth preference system as it exists at the moment?
Mr. Crosland: This will prove to be an extremely complex question. The problem will be to dovetail the existing Commonwealth preference system into the new generalised system of preferences. In practice this will be one of the most complex, detailed and difficult parts of the negotiations which will be taking place.
Mr. Philip Noel-Baker: In view of the great importance of the decisions taken at the Conference, and in view of the lack of information facing the Press, the public and hon. Members, may I urge my right hon. Friend to agree to the proposal to publish a White Paper made by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Heeley (Mr. Hooley)?
Mr. Crosland: I will certainly bear that suggestion in mind.
Mr. Wingfield Digby: Can the President of the Board of Trade give an assurance that no encouragement was given to discrimination in the use of merchant shipping?
Mr. Crosland: There were very long and, again, very difficult negotiations on merchant shipping. I will not go into detail now, unless the hon. Gentleman asks me to, but there was no resolution in favour of flag discrimination, which is what the hon. Gentleman is concerned about; and, had there been one, we would have voted strongly against it.
Mr. Sheldon: As the real hopes for success here very much depend on the improvement of the situation concerning preferences for manufactured and semi-manufactured goods, and as Britain has a very good record in this matter, will my right hon. Friend say what attempts are being made to translate this into positive action when the details are being discussed? It is on these details that success will depend. The general agreement, standing alone, will be of no use. It is the details, which will come next year, which will determine any chances of success.
Mr. Crosland: My hon. Friend is quite right, although I think that we should not underestimate the importance of the agreement in principle which was reached at the U.N.C.T.A.D. Conference. This is something which has not happened before. But my hon. Friend is

891
right in saying that it will be the detailed negotiations that matter, and then I hope that we shall play as constructive a role in them as we can. The Special Committee on Preferences to discuss the details will hold its first meeting in November of this year.
Mr. Maudling: As our balance of payments is much affected by the extent to which aid is tied or untied, to what extent was this discussed or commented on at the Conference?
Mr. Crosland: There was much discussion of the question of untying aid. There is no hope of moving towards more untied aid, in view of the position of the United States Government, who are totally adamant and, therefore, prevent any move towards more general untying. All we were able to do in practice on the question of tying and untying was to discuss the disadvantages which now arise from tied aid, which are quite considerable in practice, and to try to alleviate these.
Mr. Gardner: As to Commonwealth preference, what would be the likely effects on United Kingdom trade if there were these generalised preferences in favour of developing countries?
Mr. Crosland: The object of the exercise is to give an advantage to all developing countries, both Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth countries. To the extent that we give them an advantage, this affects United Kindom trade. This is the whole object of the operation, after all.
Mr. Biggs-Davison: Whether or not there are serious objections to the generalisation of preferences in the Commonwealth, will the President of the Board of Trade state what is the present position of India and Nigeria on this matter?
Mr. Crosland: The hon. Gentleman is quite right in saying that there are different opinions within the Commonwealth on general preferences, as there are on Commonwealth preferences, due to the fact that some countries gain more from the existing Commonwealth preferences than others do. When we come to the detailed discussions in November, we shall, as we did in New Delhi, keep in
892
the closest touch with all Commonwealth countries.
Mr. James Johnson: Is it not a fact that only the French have hit the target of 1 per cent. so far? It is a modest target. When does my right hon. Friend think that we are likely to achieve it, in view of the anxieties in the developing countries, particularly those in Africa?
Mr. Crosland: As my hon. Friend knows, there are special factors which lead to the total French aid being exceptionally large. As for when we shall reach the new target, it would be wrong to give a date, and we did not give a date in New Delhi. We must make sure that our own balance of payments position is brought under control before we can set a definite date to the achievement of the new target.

GROSVENOR SQUARE (DEMONSTRATION)
The following Question stood upon the Order Paper:
Sir D. WALKER-SMITH: To ask the Attorney-General whether he has received the report of the Director of Public Prosecutions regarding the possibility of proceedings under Section 2 of the Public Order Act, 1936 in relation to the display of physical force in Grosvenor Square on Sunday, 17th March and whether he will make a statement as to what proceedings have been initiated or are in contemplation under this Section or otherwise arising out of this occurrence.
The Attorney-General (Sir Elwyn Jones): With permission, I should like to answer Question No. 75. By virtue of Section 2 of the Public Order Act, 1936, those who take part in the control, management or training of the members of an association of persons organised and trained for the use or display of physical force in promoting a political object are guilty of an offence. After study of the police report on the Grosvenor Square demonstration, I have decided, in consultation with the Director of Public Prosecutions, that the evidence available does not justify proceedings under that Section.
However 246 persons have been charged with other offences arising out

893
of this demonstration. These include charges for assaults on the police, possessing offensive weapons, insulting and threatening behaviour, obstructing the police, obstructing the footway and highway, and miscellaneous charges. Seven persons have been imprisoned, 174 fined, eight conditionally discharged, two bound over to keep the peace, and 18 had their charges dismissed. Thirty-seven cases remain to be heard.
Sir D. Walker-Smith: While everyone will, naturally be pleased that the objective diligence of the Director of Public Prosecutions has not found it necessary to bring any proceedings under Section 2 of the 1936 Act, will the right hon. and learned Gentleman agree that these powers are available in the future if, unhappily, any organisation were minded to organise and train for violent display with political objectives?
The Attorney-General: These powers are available to deal with any association equipped to use physical force to promote any political object. Unlawful violence or incitement to violence will not be tolerated, from whatever source or however motivated.
Mr. Orbach: Has any disciplinary action be taken against the minority of police from whom, it is evident—[HON. MEMBERS: "No."] It is evident both from the pictures in the Press and from television that there was a very small number of policemen who kicked demonstrators and who had to be restrained by other policemen from attacking certain members of the demonstration. Has any disciplinary action been taken against those few policemen?
The Attorney-General: My hon. Friend will recall that as a result of incidents in this demonstration 171 police officers were injured and 42 civilians received hospital treatment. The violence which took place was deplorable. One or two incidents were mentioned to my hon. and learned Friend, then the Under-Secretary of State, in the debate last week, and those incidents are being investigated.
Sir P. Rawlinson: The right hon. and learned Gentleman will appreciate that the majority of people believe that the police behaved with the greatest of restraint,
894
in view of the circumstances which they met. Was there evidence of foreigners and foreign students taking part in this raid, and, if there were any such, what processes of deportation are contemplated?
The Attorney-General: There was a disturbing feature in the demonstration in the conduct of what appeared to be an organised group of German students. As my hon. and learned Friend said in the Adjournment debate on 4th April, there might be cases in future in which individuals would not be allowed entry into this country if it were thought likely that they would abuse the occasion to foment disorder and cause injury and damage.
Mr. Conlan: Can my right hon. and learned Friend say whether any of the persons involved were members of the Monday Club?
The Attorney-General: I have no information to that effect.
Mr. Hastings: Can the Attorney-General tell us what organisation, if any, sponsored the arrival and activities of the German contingent in question?
The Attorney-General: I should like notice of that. Again, it was not the Monday Club.

GIBRALTAR (DISTURBANCES)
Mr. Maudlingasked the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement about the recent disturbances in Gibraltar.
The Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. William Whitlock): On 4th April, a group of Gibraltarians signing themselves as "The Doves" published an open letter in the Gibraltar Chronicle suggesting a
"positive solution to the Gibraltar question"
to be embodied
"in a contemporary Anglo-Spanish Treaty in substitution for the outmoded Treaty of Utrecht".
There followed a number of detailed proposals, which included one for the symbolical flying of the Spanish flag in Gibraltar along with the Union Jack; and they stated specifically that their proposals would not involve a transfer of

895
sovereignty to Spain. The letter also said that its authors had been in direct touch with the Spanish Foreign Ministry. "The Doves" are a small group of professional and business men.
At about 11 o'clock on Saturday, 5th April, a small crowd came to the Governor's residence and asked to see him. He saw three spokesmen who told him that "The Doves" did not represent the people of Gibraltar, had no right to negotiate with Spain, and should be cautioned about their activities. The Governor said that he would take note of their representations but stressed that Gibraltar was a democracy and that freedom of thought and expression must be upheld.
However, irresponsible elements in the crowd continued to incite public feeling against "The Doves" and their property. Before long, the crowd had grown and were doing considerable damage, including the overturning of a motor car and a bus. Two policemen were injured. At this point, a small quantity of tear gas was used. The crowd then went to the main square where the Chief Minister, assisted by other elected Members of the Legislative Council, attempted to speak to them. He talked to some of their representatives and pointed out the folly and danger of the crowd's action. With their help and that of his colleagues he persuaded the crowd to disperse.
Unfortunately, sections of the crowd led by a small group of hooligans began to ransack premises belonging to members of "The Doves" and to overturn cars. They also burnt a boat belonging to one of "The Doves", and innocent bystanders were assaulted. At this point, the Governor decided, after informing the Chief Minister, to call out sufficient troops to assist in the protection of lives and property. The troops have not carried fire arms but only pick handles and have been used mainly to guard points likely to attract demonstrators.
On Saturday evening, the Governor spoke to the Gibraltarians on radio and television about these events. He reported yesterday, 7th April, that all was then quiet in Gibraltar. Sixteen arrests were made on Saturday evening, and those accused were to appear before the magistrates' court this morning.
896
The Governor is setting up a Commission of Inquiry under the appropriate local ordinance.
I am sure the House will join with me in deploring these disturbances, which are so uncharacteristic of Gibraltar.
Mr. Maudling: The House will regret these disturbances and wish to congratulate the authorities on handling them in the way they did.
Does the Minister realise that tension is bound to grow in Gibraltar so long as the constitutional talks are delayed? It has been a very long time, many months, since the referendum. When do the Government intend to take some action in this matter?
Mr. Whitlock: I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that tension is bound to mount in Gibraltar in these circumstances. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs reported on the situation of our negotiations with Spain on this matter on 1st April, when he said that because of the attitude adopted by Spain in the negotiations it was impossible to create the better atmosphere in which progress might have been made towards a settlement.
Mr. Maudling: I think that the hon. Gentleman misunderstood my question. I was not referring to talks with Spain but to consitutional talks with the Gibraltarians. Could the hon. Gentleman say when the Government intend to do something about that?
Mr. Whitlock: That is a matter of discussion with the Gibraltarian authorities. But it is obvious that this situation has arisen from the resentment caused by the publication of the letter by "The Doves."
Mr. George Jeger: Does my hon. Friend realise that the statement issued by "The Doves" was made on 1st April and was by a limited number, a mere handful, of people in Gibraltar? Do the Government realise that the tension that exists there and the anxiety among the Gibraltarians is contributed to by the delay in having the constitutional talks, and that so long as the delay continues so will the tension get worse, and a few hooligans can spark off an explosion such as the regrettable one that happened last week?
Mr. Whitlock: So far as I am aware, the article which has caused this trouble was published in the Gibraltar Chronicle on 4th April.
Mr. Jeger: It was 1st April, I have it here.
Mr. Whitlock: I agree that tension exists and it has been exploited by a few hooligans. The Governor has reported that the number of looters and rioters was very small, and that they were definitely drawn from a criminal element in Gibraltar.
Mr. Wall: I deplore the hooliganism, but it is now seven months since the referendum and there is a deep feeling of frustration among the people of Gibraltar that Her Majesty's Government have done nothing to guarantee their constitutional future.
Mr. Whitlock: The talks with Spain have only just come to an end, as my right hon. Friend recently reported, and therefore the future situation will be dealt with as quickly as possible with the Gibraltarians.
Mr. Paget: If talks by "The Doves" with the Spanish authorities cause this sort of alarm in Gibraltar, how much more alarm would be caused by talks by Her Majesty's Government? Is it not reasonably clear that talks with Spain on this subject are neither practical nor desirable, and that we should get on with our own talks with our own people?
Mr. Whitlock: The reasons for our talks with Spain on this matter are perfectly well understood in Gibraltar, as they should be in the House. Now that these talks have definitely come to an end, as my right hon. Friend said on 1st April, because of the attitude of Spain, we can consider the future.

HOUSING

  Houses (Prices)
  Mr. Biffenasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government by what percentage the price of houses is estimated to have increased between the second half of 1966 and the corresponding period for 1967; and what is the expected rise during the current year.
  Mr. Speaker: The Minister of Housing and Local Government to answer Question 63.
  Viscount Lambton: On a point of order. Is it in order to take an Oral Question after a Private Notice Question, which in the order of business in the House can come only after Oral Questions?
  Mr. Speaker: If the noble Lord had been here earlier he would have heard me quote the rule. [Interruption.] I apologise if he was here, but I have already quoted the rule which says that Questions which are not asked because of the absence of the Minister may be taken after half-past three.
  Viscount Lambton: Can they be taken after Private Notice Questions, which surely naturally conclude the Oral Question period?
  Mr. Speaker: They can be taken after half-past three. To fulfil the circumstances which the hon. Gentleman is suggesting, the Minister would have had to be present just after half-past three, before the Private Notice Question was taken.
  Mr. Edward M. Taylor: Will the Questions to be answered now include Question 64, which would inevitably have been reached if the Minister had been present?
  Mr. Speaker: The hon. Gentleman must be patient and trust the Chair.
  The Minister of Housing and Local Government (Mr. Anthony Greenwood): I hope that the House will accept my most humble and sincere apology for the inconvenience that has been caused.
  The average selling price of all new dwellings, for which Building Societies granted mortgages in the second half of 1967, was approximately 6 per cent. above that in the second half of 1966. No confident forecast can be made about the extent to which prices will change in the current year, but I hope that rising productivity will mitigate the effect of higher costs. It is important that prices should be kept down as far as possible.
  Mr. Biffen: Is not the right hon. Gentleman's inability to make any kind of forecast, as requested in the second

  899
  part of the Question, rather disturbing? Would not he agree that many building societies have already indicated their expectation that prices will rise by well over 6 per cent., and are not these circumstances which make it totally impossible for the Government to persist with the statutory fixing of incomes?
  Mr. Greenwood: Forecasts of that kind are not always substantiated in practice. I think it much better at this stage not to cause unnecessary alarm and perhaps defeatism in the building industry by indulging in an attempt to forecast something which nobody at the moment can forecast.
  Mr. Speaker:Mr. Edward M. Taylor.

  Mortgage Interest Rates
  Mr. Edward M. Taylorasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government (I) if he will seek a meeting with the Building Societies Association to discuss the possibility of stabilising mortgage interest rates;
  (2) what effect he estimates that the present shortage of funds of the building societies for financing new mortgages will have on the housing programme.
  Mr. Greenwood: I apologise again.
  I maintain continuing contact with the Building Societies Association about the availability of finance for house purchase. The Societies' forward commitments to new mortgages continue at a high level. The main issue under consideration at present is not an immediate shortage of funds for lending but the steps which may be necessary If secure the requisite finance over the months ahead.
  Mr. Taylor: Does the Minister agree that an increase in house mortgage interest rates appears to be inevitable tomorrow and that that would affect millions of people? As the troubles stem directly from the Government's financial policies, will the Minister take the initiative in holding an urgent meeting to see how this can be avoided?
  Mr. Greenwood: I do not accept the hon. Member's assumption that a rise in rates is inevitable in the very near future. I maintain constant contact with the Building Societies Association, and
  900
  officials of the Ministry had discussions with it last week. The Association is having discussions this week, and I think it much wiser for us to wait until we know the results of those discussions before commenting on what is likely to happen.
  Mr. William Hamilton: Since the Government's prices and incomes policy provides for basic increases in wages and incomes of not more than 3½ per cent. a year, will my right hon. Friend insist that the same applies to the rates the building societies charge mortgagees?
  Mr. Greenwood: We shall certainly insist on the desirability of keeping down any increase of this kind. At the same time we must appreciate the need for building societies to be able to attract the money from the public.
  Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: In view of the particularly severe effect of high mortgage rates and the prospective shortage of funds on home buyers in the London area, will the Minister give relief to them by raising his ban on lending for house purchase by the G.L.C?
  Mr. Greenwood: The general level of local government lending in the immediate future will remain the same. I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman will have very much welcomed the option mortgage scheme which came into operation on 1st April
  Viscount Lambton: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Am I to understand that it is in order for a Minister to answer Questions at any time after half-past three on a day on which he is absent from the Government Front Bench?
  Mr. Speaker: It is most unusual. It has happened before, for otherwise there would be no Standing Order about it The Standing Order says:
  "No questions shall be taken after half-past three of the clock, except questions which have not been answered in consequence of the absence of the Minister to whom they are addressed…".
  When the Minister came in I had to choose between interfering with the Private Notice Question and the Questions which were being asked by permission at the end of the Order Paper and intervening. I waited until those were over before I put the Standing

  901
  Order into operation. It is most unusual, I must admit.
  Mr. Onslow: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. May I draw your attention to the fact that my hon. Friend the Member for South Angus (Mr. Bruce-Gardyne) is in his seat, and may I invite you to call his Question?
  Mr. Speaker: I assure the hon. Gentleman that that point had not escaped my notice. But I understand that he was not in his position at the moment when the Questions were being answered.
  Mr. Bruce-Gardyne: Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. I entirely accept that I was not here when earlier Questions were asked, but I understand that my Question was not taken with earlier Questions.
  Mr. Speaker: The answer is a simple one. The hon. Gentleman was not here when we reached the Minister and would not, therefore, have been able to put his Question.
  Viscount Lambton: Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. With respect, you have not answered my question. Is it possible for a Minister to answer a Question for which he was not present at any time after half-past three,
  902
  or is there any time after which he cannot answer the Question?
  Mr. Speaker: I would hope that there is a limited time, but I do not think that it is in the Standing Orders. I am sure that the House would be unwilling for a Minister who had not answered a Question at the proper time to answer it six or seven hours later. The contingency seems not to have been envisaged, even by our all-embracing Standing Orders.

BILL PRESENTED
  RACE RELATIONS
  Bill to make fresh provision with respect to discrimination on racial grounds, and to make provision with respect to relations between people of different racial origins, presented by Mr. Callaghan; supported by Mr. Crossman, Mrs. Castle, Mr. Crosland, Mr. Ross, Mr. Greenwood, the Attorney-General, and Mr. Ennals; read the First time; to be read a Second time Tomorrow and to be printed. [Bill 128.]
  SITTINGS OF THE HOUSE
  House to meet on Thursday at Eleven o'clock; no Questions to be taken after Twelve o'clock; and at Five o'clock Mr. Speaker to adjourn the House without putting any Question.—[Mr. Peart.]

  ADJOURNMENT (EASTER)
  Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House, at its rising on Thursday, do adjourn till Tuesday, 23rd April.—[Mr. Peart.]
  4.2 p.m.
  Mr. John Biffen: I rise to oppose the Motion. I do so for a number of reasons, but the one which primarily concerns me is the Government's prices and incomes policy, which is clearly going through yet a further interesting phase of development. The House should be fully informed of that development and not have to wait until Tuesday, 23rd April. Not only should the House not have to wait because of its own concern that it should come first in the interest and affection of the Executive, but it should be told of this further development before 23rd April so that the Government can also make available to those engaged in industry, either as employers or trade unionists, certain information so that they may conduct their affairs to some extent consistently with what the Government hope to be their policy.
  I have a special reason for opposing the Motion in that I sought to indicate that I would raise on the Adjournment an unsatisfactory Answer which was given to me by the Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. I then realised, of course, that there would be no opportunity whatsoever to raise it on the Adjournment if the House were to rise on Thursday until 23rd April. For that reason alone, therefore, in the light of my professed desire to raise the question of the prices and incomes policy on the adjournment—a desire which I expressed last Thursday—I would only be consistent if I invited the Government not to proceed with the Motion and thus enable me to raise that matter.
  There are two or three points of recent concern which require a statement from the Government of far greater detail and commitment than we are likely to get between now and Thursday and which I do not believe can wait until 23rd April. The first, of course, concerns the announcement of the Cabinet changes and the creation apparently of a new office—that of First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Employment and Productivity. This is a major announcement,
  904
  the full implications of which should be made available to the House this week. We should not have to wait upon the pleasure of the Government until the end of the month before we know more about it.
  This is particularly so because we are told, not in this House, but from what we read in the newspapers, that the prices and incomes legislation and the prices and incomes policy will presumably be increasingly under the authority of the new Ministry. But this is a Ministry concerned with wages. It is a Ministry concerned with incomes. It is not a Ministry concerned with prices.
  Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman cannot discuss the merits or demerits of the Cabinet changes but must link them with his desire to come back earlier after Easter.
  Mr. Biffen: Certainly, Mr. Speaker. My desire is two-ended—that we should not rise on Thursday and that we should come back before 23rd April. In either way the House could be apprised of the significance of the switch. I believe that the timing is all-important. It is all-important that we should be assured as speedily as possible what is the meaning of the transfer of the responsibility for operating the legislation and of the overall responsibility for the policy from one Ministry to another. We have to be assured in particular about the administrative arrangements now made for prices and incomes policy and to whom we should be addressing our questions on that account.
  We cannot go away and spend the Easter Recess thinking up various questions we would like to put to various Ministers when the House reassembles if we are not certain which Ministers will be responsible for answering them. Nothing is more frustrating for an hon. Member than to be told that Questions which he has carefully allocated to a Minister on a certain day have been transferred because responsibility has been transferred. We must know, and know soon, what are the new divisions of responsibility.
  Secondly, a statement should be made to the House about the new Department of Employment and Productivity because

  905
  of the emphasis on the word "productivity". It needs a fairly speedy and much more detailed definition from the Government than we have so far had, because negotiations are proceeding in industry leading to income settlements which, presumably, will attract either the satisfaction or the displeasure of the Government. We must know much more about the creation of this new Ministry and the new emphasis on productivity.
  Perhaps I can give a demonstration of the significance of timing. This issue concerns things happening day by day and one cannot suspend the operation of industry for a couple of weeks just because this House does not happen to be sitting. The case I have in mind is the recent settlement of the claim of Merseyside tugmen.
  Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman is drifting into the merits of the subject. He is extremely competent to deal with the prices and incomes policy but not in this debate. He must now keep to the question of whether we should adjourn on Thursday until 23rd April.
  Mr. Biffen: Certainly, Mr. Speaker. I would like your guidance at least on the point of whether, if a decision has been announced to the House by way of Parliamentary Question, and if there is no opportunity to get amplication of that decision before rising on Thursday. I would be in order in saying that we ought not to rise on Thursday until there has been amplification of the Answer. It is along these lines that I would like to proceed, because this particular dispute on Merseyside was of great significance. It was bound to be watched by many others hoping to determine incomes over the next two or three weeks, during which time the House is to be in Recess. Hon. Members will not be able to call upon Ministers to answer for policies to which they are committed.
  The answer to my question on 28th March concerning the tugmen's dispute was: given by the Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Labour, who said:
  "I have been notified of a pay settlement for Liverpool tugmen effective from 1st March. This was not a straight percentage increase in rates, since payment for overtime continues to be based on the previous rates
  906
  subject to special additions for Saturdays and Sundays."
  I come now to the significant part of the Answer:
  "The increase in earnings is estimated to average 13½ per cent. The employers were informed that the Government noted the increases but did not propose to prevent payment".—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 28th March, 1968; Vol. 761. c. 324–5.]
  That is an interesting answer which needs amplification instantly in the light of all the other settlements which may be taking place over the next few weeks. What is the significance of 13½ per cent.? Is it a significance which is noted, but not endorsed?
  These questions cannot be left until the end of the month. They deserve immediate answers, because the Government do not, alas, proceed in this policy by legislation alone. We know only too well that it is a policy which proceeds on the indicated wishes of the Government, and the House is entitled to know what are likely to be the indicated wishes of the Government over the next three weeks or so when the House is not sitting and able to ask Ministers questions.
  I turn now to the dividend aspect of the policy. At the moment, there is no legislation requiring dividend limitation, but, clearly, influence is being brought to bear on companies in this respect. As dividends are declared day by day over the next two or three weeks, the Stock Exchange will not go into a state of suspended animation, but will continue without the sniping, or assistance, as one will, from this place, but two instances have come up recently and require authoritative statements from Ministers, statements which we cannot reasonably expect to be postponed until after 23rd April.
  The first was the grotesque announcement that Grattan Warehouses had cut its proposed dividend from 32 per cent. to 31·99 per cent. It would be extremely interesting to know, as there was no legal requirement on Grattan Warehouses to do this, whether this is the kind of way in which the Government want their policy to be voluntarily observed. It would be a nice calculation which we should like to have with some certainty before Thursday as to the amount of time and work and trouble—
  Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman is again drifting into discussing the merits. He must argue that he wants time before 23rd April to discuss the ·01 per cent.
  Mr. Biffen: It would take time immemorial to calculate the transfer from 32 per cent. to 31·99 per cent., and I shall not pursue that, for I reckon that the merits are self-evident.
  The second example concerns fringe benefits supposedly paid with dividends, as undertaken by Berni Inns. The House should have time to debate this case. What happened was that Berni Inns, when paying its dividend, gave a luncheon voucher, or meal voucher, or meal ticket, worth 15s. with each individual payment and said that it had been told that it had Treasury permission to do this, because it did not infringe the Government's prices and incomes policy.
  This opens up fascinating avenues of the ways in which fringe benefits might be paid, and we must have tune to discuss it fully and to reflect upon the absurdities to which this policy is leading us. By asking that we do not rise on Thursday, we give the Government one last chance to draw back from the futilities of a statutory prices and incomes policy.
  4.15 p.m.
  Mr. Marcus Lipton: My reasons for being reluctant to agree to the Motion will not take long to explain. I regret that the Home Secretary is not here to listen to my representations, because he is in the best position to deal with them.
  On 4th January, the residence of one of my constituents, Mrs. Callis, was searched by the police. Some time after that, a well-known figure featured in the Press when her premises were searched by the police with a search warrant. An apology was forthcoming to that well-known society figure within 48 hours. As a consequence, my constituent approached me to find why it was that although that lady had had an apology within 48 hours, no apology had been made to her.
  Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman cannot discuss the merits of the case which he wishes to discuss if the House returns earlier than 23rd April.
  Mr. Lipton: I am raising this matter because, although I wrote to the Home Office on 11th March about the police search of these premises, I have not yet had a reply, except to be informed in an Adjournment debate on 19th March that it is expected that inquiries will be completed very shortly. I hope that "shortly" means that I shall have a reply to my representations before the House rises on Thursday. I have been very patient and I have not made any undue demands on the Home Secretary. Without going into the merits of this case, to which I have already tried briefly to refer, I think that I am entitled to an answer before the House rises on Thursday.
  A second reason why I suggest that we should not adjourn on Thursday depends to some extent upon the Ruling which I am about to ask you to give, Mr. Speaker. After we dispose of this Motion, we are to discuss the Eleventh Report of the Estimates Committee dealing with prisons, borstals and detention centres. This Report was ordered by the House of Commons to be printed on 27th July, 1967. It has a full index of 15 pages, but that index contains no reference to Durham Prison. All the recent events in Durham Prison which have caused disquiet occurred after the Report was made.
  I have had a number of communications from Durham Prison, two smuggled out and three sent to me through official channels. I should like to know whether we shall have a statement from the Home Secretary about Durham Prison during the course of the debate on the Estimates Committee's Report, or on some other occasion before the House rises. A difficult and serious position exists in Durham Prison. Although it would be out of order to quote from the lengthy communications which I have received, I suggest that if discussion today of recent events in Durham Prison is out of order, we should have a statement from the Home Secretary before the House rises on Thursday.
  4.19 p.m.
  Sir Arthur Vere Harvey: I wish the Leader of the House every success in his new position. I am glad to see him sitting on the Government Front Bench, because I want to raise the question of foot-and-mouth disease and the importation of Argentine beef.

  909
  I hope that I shall not hear trotted out the old arguments which we have heard in recent weeks.
  I find it difficult to agree to the Motion to go off on Thursday when the farmers in my part of the country, in Cheshire, are angry and disturbed about the whole situation concerning the import of Argentine beef. I am glad to see the hon. Member for Erith and Crayford (Mr. Wellbeloved) in his place, because I assure him that if he went up to Macclesfield he would gain a very warm reception for what he had to say about the import of beef.
  Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Member is drifting into a debate which cannot take place today. We are debating whether we adjourn until 23rd April.
  Sir A. V. Harvey: I quite understand, Mr. Speaker, and I follow your instructions, but I will have to expand a little to cover my argument.
  The Minister is to allow Argentine beef to be imported into Britain. We have read in the Press various reports, in which the Argentinians said that they would send some beef, but the latest news is that they are not sending any. It seems to me that the former Minister of Agriculture, as I said at Question time one day last week, has got the worst of all worlds. He has aleniated British farmers, and he has pleased one or two of his hon. Friends who want cheap votes and cheap meat.
  I want to know where we stand, because before the House goes into recess on Thursday there are thousands of farmers in the West Midlands and the North-West of England whose whole livelihood depends on these decisions. We have had seven or eight more outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease in the last week or so, some of them being primary cases. Not only the farmers are affected. There are cartage men, hauliers and many others who are employed at cattle markets. Having suffered what they have suffered in recent months, I can only suggest to hon. Members that if they were to visit those areas and talk to farmers, they would understand the problem which I am trying to put to the Leader of the House.
  I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will reconsider the matter, because he will
  910
  not get anywhere; he is not getting the beef. Therefore, why not wait until he has got all the reports and then make up his mind about the importation of Argentine beef? He has a fine opportunity this afternoon as Leader of the House to clear up this matter. I hope that he will put the anxiety of my constitutents at rest concerning this problem.
  4.22 p.m.
  Mr. Victor Goodhew: I had hoped that we would have a statement or a chance to debate the question of Service pay and allowances before we rose for the Easter Recess. The Minister will know that we have been waiting for a statement on this subject for some time. It is, I think, the first time in nine years that the Services have passed 1st April without knowing the future of their pay and allowances.
  You will remember, Mr. Speaker, that this matter used to be decided by the Grigg Committee, and it was to have been reviewed regularly. You would rule me out of order if I gave you reasons why I consider it unfortunate that this matter is now sent to the Prices and Incomes Board instead, so I will not pursue that one. The fact remains, however, that the result of passing it to the Prices and Incomes Board is that we have passed 1st April, and the people in the Services do not know what their future pay and allowances will be.
  This is a matter which the Leader of the House should have considered important enough to be decided at the earliest possible opportunity. It does not need me to remind him that even the Minister of Defence recognises that morale in the Services is low after his efforts to knock them about in recent years with his continuing defence review. That being so, and bearing in mind that our ability to man the Services properly in future depends upon recruitment today and the number of certain categories we can recruit even in the next fortnight, this is a vital matter for the Services. I hope, therefore, that we shall have an opportunity to have a statement on which we can question the Minister, or even a debate. Failing that, I wish to oppose the Motion.
  There are, of course, other matters about which the Minister of Defence needs to tell us before we can rise for

  911
  Easter. There is the question of the advanced combat aircraft. The TSR2 was cancelled three years ago. Since then, the Anglo-French variable-geometry aircraft has been cancelled, as well as the F111K which we were to have. We therefore find ourselves, three years after the cancellation of an aircraft which was to replace the Canberras, with nothing on the stocks. [An HON. MEMBER: "Except the Minister of Defence."] He should be in the stocks and not on them.
  The Canberras are increasing in age and there is an urgent need for a replacement. I am sure that I am in order in saying this because, as you will appreciate, Mr. Speaker, these projects take five or ten years to develop. Thus, every week counts. If we get up now for two weeks knowing that nothing further is done, we shall be neglecting our duty.
  We have been told in recent defence debates that the Navy is to depend upon land-based aircraft of the Royal Air Force for its future reconnaissance and strike rôles, as well as for its defence. Since the carriers are to go out of existence in 1971, it is vital that a decision should be taken on this matter immediately, because, as I have said, it takes five or ten years to develop these aircraft.
  Likewise, the Royal Air Force has no long-range strike or reconnaissance capability of this kind. That Service, too, will find that in the early 1970s, the Canberras will certainly no longer be able to carry on.
  Mr. Speaker: I am not unsympathetic to all the subjects that hon. Members wish to raise in the week in which it is proposed that we should not be here. The hon. Member must, however, keep to the terms of the Motion.
  Mr. Goodhew: I apologise, Mr. Speaker, and I will not pursue that further. I add that the question of equipment of the Forces affects recruitment also. Therefore, it is vital that we should hear about these things and be able to debate them at an early date.
  There is also the question of export possibilities. The Government are constantly telling everybody else that they should be exporting the country's goods and products, yet they are preventing the
  912
  aircraft industry from producing an advanced combat aircraft which could well be exported. They should make up their mind instead of constantly changing it.
  In that way, the Government are preventing a valuable product from being got under way which could be exported in large numbers to foreign air forces. The aircraft industry is being delayed by the Government when a little encouragement and a decision or two, instead of constant changing of mind, would enable the industry to produce prototypes and start selling the aircraft.
  On the same point, I should like to be able to raise the question of the Harrier, the Nimrod and the Jaguar. I would like to know why the Government have not yet placed production orders for these aircraft. We are told constantly that they are on their way, and we know that they are being built. The fact again remains, however, that foreign customers who would like to buy these aircraft cannot obtain quotations for them until a production order is placed at a fixed price by the Government. Bearing in mind the unceasing need for exports, this is another matter which I should like to have debated. If we are not to have an opportunity to debate before Thursday, I shall certainly vote against the Motion.
  4.28 p.m.
  Dr. David Kerr: The House is, curiously, thinly attended for what should be something of a rumbustious debate, ranging widely. I ponder on the curious paradox, when the world is so full of a number of crises, that more of my hon. Friends and more hon. Members opposite—[HON. MEMBERS "Oh."]—even more hon. Members opposite, are not seeking this opportunity to raise a number of different crises in the world at large.
  As to prices and incomes, there are, perhaps, arguments for opposing the Motion as not giving us long enough to reflect about the matter. It might help some of my worthy colleagues and hon. Friends below the Gangway if we had a little longer to put our minds in order on this matter and to come back to the House determined that a prices and incomes policy is necessary and is capable of operating only with a big strong dose of Socialism. We cannot hope to operate

  913
  a prices and incomes policy success-fully—
  Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Member is beginning to argue in detail a matter which he will be able to debate if he defeats the Motion which is before the House and brings us back early.
  Dr. Kerr: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I will leave the point and merely dwell upon the necessity, somewhat heterodoxly, of the need for a longer Recess than we are promised. It is not only that we need a little time to reflect on prices and incomes. There might even be some hope that during a more extended Parliamentary Recess the ferment in the world outside will subside a little.
  I have in mind that the Government might wish for a little longer time, in the light of the obscene and tragic news from America, to reconsider our policy towards that nation. It may be that, in the light of the appearance yesterday in the Sunday Times of an account of the roverty-striken areas in the Appalachian Mountains of the United States, the Minister for Overseas Development might wish for a little more time to consider sending a team to that area to assist them in more community development.
  If we are to accept that the House needs to come back a little earlier, there are also very cogent arguments for that, and I would refer to three areas which ought to demand our immediate attention within the next few weeks.
  If I may come back, a little more seriously, to the situation in the United States, it seems to me that this is a little remote from us, and there is an unhappy tendency to regard the events in American cities today as being outside our interest, beyond our control. Yet the fact remains that they are influencing this country already. Today's evening papers carry news of the effect on our stock market of the riots in United States towns. I am not suggesting that we are in any way to be involved in the internal situation of the United States, but it may very well be that, in the course of the next week or so, the Government might face the further necessity to make announcements of the gravest importance to the House which would require debate. It is by no means beyond the bounds of possibility that a further deterioration in
  914
  the domestic scene of the United States could lead to a further weakening of the dollar, with all the implications for this country and for international finance which we have witnessed all too recently and all too unhappily.
  Secondly, I would refer to the rapidly changing scene of the Vietnam war. It may very well be that the Government would wish to have the House in session much sooner than 23rd April, and I would venture to predict that many back benchers would wish to be in session much sooner than 23rd April, in order to discuss the Government's responsibility both in relation to the announcement by the President of the United States that he will open talks with North Vietnam, and to discuss the Government's responsibility to U Thant's proposals that discussions would depend upon the unconditional cessation of the fighting in North Vietnam. These are matters which we would all hope to have an opportunity to discuss and to assist the Government on.
  Lastly, from my own point of view, I would once again draw the attention of the House to the situation in Africa. It is true that we debated this only a few days ago, yet already in those few days there have been two very striking developments. One has been the announcement by Ian Smith of the call-up of a small number of his home defence units. The implications of this in terms of the breakdown of law and order must clearly be a matter to which the members of my Government would, I hope, give the most urgent attention. At the same time, it speaks very loudly of a deterioration of the situation in Rhodesia between Rhodesia and her neighbours.
  This brings me to the second point which I consider might require the urgent attention of the House long before 23rd April, and that is the news that Zambia is now proposing to embark upon a programme of arming herself, a programme which I can only regard as an inevitability in the light of the pressures to which she is subjected, but which would certainly involve this country, both in terms of Zambia's defence policy and the kind of economic aid and defence advice we might offer to that country.
  In all these circumstances, there are very cogent and very powerful arguments indeed for bringing the House back into

  915
  session well before 23rd April. The rate at which changes in the international scene have occurred in the last week ought to be proof enough to any Member of this House that a fortnight's absence from the scene will bring us back to a vastly altered situation. I ask the Government to think again and to shorten the Easter Recess.
  4.35 p.m.
  Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles: I believe the House should not adjourn for the Easter Recess until the Government have dealt with two aspects of Service pay and allowances, one of which has been mentioned briefly by my hon. Friend the Member for St. Albans (Mr. Goodhew). First, there is the question of the overdue announcement of revised rate of pay and pensions for serving and retired Service personnel. There is clear evidence of great uncertainty in the Forces of the effect of this on morale, recruiting and re-engagement which was mentioned by my hon. Friend. There is no doubt that the House understands that the Grigg formula, as it is called, has been accepted by the Government and has been honoured ever since. There is a precedent. In previous years, in 1960, 1962, 1964 and 1966, where the adjustments in the Forces' pay were implemented by 1st April. This has conspicuously not happened this year. We have already passed 1st April, and the Forces remain in their state of uncertainty, not to say dismay.
  The reference to the Prices and Incomes Board involves a completely new principle which the House has not debated adequately. The whole concept of the Grigg formula was that Forces' pay should be brought up to date retrospectively to match past adjustments of Civil Service pay and average industrial wages.
  The Under-Secretary for the Army on 12th March at column 1297 seems to call in question the whole matter of the Grigg formula, and this leads to uncertainty in the Forces. I hope the Leader of the House will be able to answer these specific questions at the end of the debate. Firstly, when is the Prices and Incomes Board's report to be expected? Secondly, can he assure the House that priority
  916
  will be given to the urgent question of the Prices and Incomes Board? Thirdly, and very important—
  Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Eric Fletcher): We cannot go into these questions. We can only give reasons why the House should not adjourn until 23rd April.
  Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles: Yes, Mr. Deputy Speaker, I am putting exactly the point that the House should not adjourn because of these urgent matters affecting the Forces. I believe the question I am now asking the Leader of the House should be answered before we feel ourselves free to go on the Easter Recess. The most important one of all is that when these delayed pay increases are announced they will in all cases be fully retrospective to 1st April, the day on which they were due. Fourthly, that the increases will apply to retired officers and Service widows, as is the case under the Grigg formula.
  The second subject, an urgent one, which should be settled before we leave for the Recess, is the question of overseas pay and allowances which are payable to the Forces as a result of devaluation. The House should not adjourn, Mr. Deputy Speaker, leaving the situation as it is. To take a typical case of an Army sergeant serving in B.A.O.R., his basic pay has to be—
  Mr. Deputy Speaker: The hon. and gallant Member must not go into specific cases of individual complaints on this Motion.
  Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles: Mr. Deputy Speaker, I do not intend to go into individual facts and figures. I want to put before the House what is the situation in the mind of an Army sergeant serving in B.A.O.R. who reads that his elected representatives have trooped off on their holidays.
  Mr. Deputy Speaker: The hon. and gallant Member must relate that to the question we are considering, which is whether we should come back before 23rd April.
  Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles: I am putting to the House that we should not leave for our Recess on the date suggested, nor remain absent until 23rd April, unless this business which was raised by the Minister of Defence for

  917
  Administration has been cleared up. He said that he had received complaints about this matter because it had not been adequately dealt with, and men serving overseas would not feel that they were adequately compensated because of devaluation. I believe that before the Minister goes on leave, and before the House permits itself to go on leave, the right hon. Gentleman should explain what steps he is taking to deal with this outstanding matter.
  4.40 p.m.
  Mr. Roy Roebuck: There are three reasons why I think the House ought not to adjourn. First, I think that we should not go away for our Easter Recess until we have had an opportunity of discussing the Common Market. The House will recall that last May, when my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister was commending the course of action which the Government have pursued about the Common Market, he said that our application should be pressed home with pace and momentum; yet at Business question time a week or two ago, when I asked my right hon. Friend the then Leader of the House whether we could have an opportunity to debate the Common Market, he said that he did not think there would be time for it before the Recess.
  If there is not time for it before the Recess, we should not have the Recess. We should discuss this important matter because of the situation which has developed in the Common Market countries, and also because there is evidence that many hon. Members have changed their minds since the subject was last debated in May. There is a clear indication of this among those who recently visited the United States to discuss the free trade area. They returned and indicated quite clearly that they had changed their minds. I therefore think that the House should have an opportunity to debate this matter before we adjourn.
  My second reason for opposing the Motion is that we should have an opportunity to discuss the situation in South-East Asia before we rise. My right hon. Friend the Commonwealth Secretary has recently been in South-East Asia. In fact, I am not sure whether he is back, but I think he ought to be, and we
  918
  should have an opportunity to discuss what he has found out there in connection with the decisions which were announced in the Defence White Paper, and by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister on 19th January. The House will recall that during the debate on the Defence Review some views were put forward about what could happen, particularly in Singapore and Malaysia, as a result of our withdrawing troops earlier than expected. There was a report in the newspapers, either this morning or yesterday, that the Prime Minister of Singapore had produced some new plan for training his Air Force. The House ought to have an opportunity to discuss what assistance we can give to Singapore and Malaysia, and indeed to our other Commonwealth friends in South-East Asia.
  My third reason for opposing the Motion is that the House ought to haw an opportunity to discuss this new post of Deputy Leader of the House, which seems an extraordinary appointment. I understand that my right hon. Friend the Patronage Secretary is to combine this office with his existing one. This puts many of us on this side of the House in a dilemma, because, in his capacity as the Patronage Secretary, he is such a stern disciplinarian that many of us quake when we come face to face with him. It would appear that he now has another rôle, that of defender of the back benchers. I think that we ought to have an opportunity to discuss how one can identify which rôle my right hon. Friend is appearing in when one approaches him. Will one approach him as the Chief Whip, and will he wear a different hat, or carry some weapon in that rôle? And when he assumes the mantle, if he does, of Deputy Leader of the House, will he carry a feather and go into battle against his right hon. Friends on behalf of the back benchers? I think that to ensure that hon. Members on this side of the House can sleep o' nights over the Easter Recess we should not adjourn until my right hon. Friend has had an opportunity to explain his new rôle.
  4.45 p.m.
  Mr. Stephen Hastings: I rise to oppose the Motion on rather more general terms than it has been opposed by some of my hon. Friends. I do so, first, because

  919
  of the unprecedented uncertainty in the country, and in the House, about the intentions of the Government on a wide range of subjects. I think that this is matched by the recent evidence of the unprecedented unpopularity of the Government in the country. Those two propositions linked together give us a strong argument for opposing the Motion, and for demanding that we should be allowed to stay here a little longer in an attempt to learn the Government's intentions.
  For instance what do the Government intend overseas on the broad issue of foreign policy? Who in the House, certainly on this side, and who in the country, can give a sensible, comprehensive explanation of the Government's foreign policy? We know that almost every initiative which they have undertaken during the last two years has failed. Should we at this stage in the game, when, as the hon. Member for Wandsworth, Central (Dr. David Kerr) said, there is great danger in the world generally, adjourn for the Easter Recess? We have no idea what they intend in the Far East, the Middle East, or anywhere else.
  A number of my hon. Friends, and particularly my hon. Friend the Member for St. Albans (Mr. Goodhew), have asked what defence policy the Government have. We just do not know. We have a long catalogue of catastrophe and muddle which we have been debating for the last year or so. Will the right hon. Gentleman explain the Government's policy when he replies to the debate? I doubt it, and this is another reason why we should stay here until we find out.
  Mr. Roebuck: Perhaps I can assist the hon. Gentleman. If he can tell the House that the shadow Defence Secretary is prepared to say what the Conservative Party's defence policy is, I shall be prepared to assist the hon. Gentleman.
  Mr. Hastings: I think that that is about the feeblest defence of the Government that I have ever heard. If the hon. Gentleman wants me to launch into a speech on our view of foreign policy, and defence policy, which is dependent on foreign policy, I could do so, but I am sure that I shall not be within the rules of order. The hon. Gentleman knows that I would not be allowed to discuss
  920
  that topic. What we are demanding is that we should stay here until the Government make it clear what they intend to do. We have not the faintest idea of their intentions.
  My hon. Friend the Member for Oswestry (Mr. Biffen), with his usual succinct accuracy and clarity, raised the whole question of the incomes policy which has been launched in various forms, including last week's incomprehensible White Paper. We ought to know much more about this before we rise for the Recess.
  We have the right hon. Lady the ex-Minister of Transport suddenly promoted, now rising from a bed of nails to a springboard, and we should like to know what she intends to do. We have heard a lot about prices and incomes, but we are told that the right hon. Lady is the Secretary of State, not for prices and incomes, but for Employment and Productivity. What does this mean? Before we go away, we should have some idea of what this title means, for many of us are convinced it is just another Prime Ministerial gimmick.
  The right hon. Lady is the Secretary of State for Employment. Does this mean that application must be made to her before people are employed in firms all over the country, or before somebody is made redundant?
  Mr. Michael English: Hear, hear.
  Mr. Hastings: The hon. Gentleman says "Hear, hear". We shall wait for an explanation of what he and the Government mean by that.
  The right hon. Lady is also Secretary of State for Productivity. If we were to fill this Chamber with economists, and ask them for a definition of productivity, no two answers would be the same, and certainly we should not get a simple definition. During the debate on the Queen's Speech the then Chancellor of the Exchequer gave us a totally untrue definition of productivity. It is time that we had a definition of what the Prime Minister means, and we ought to get it before we go away.
  Now we have the Mark II, stretched Cabinet. What does this mean for us all?
  An Hon. Member: A souped-up Cabinet.
  Mr. Hastings: A souped-un Cabinet. What does this mean for us? We should be told about it before we go away. We want to know the intentions of this Cabinet. We want to know the intentions and views of individual Members of the Cabinet, if possible, as well. I want to quote from a recent article by the hon. Member for Pembroke (Mr. Donnelly) which relevant to the reasons that I am putting forward for our staying here for the time being. In the article, published 10 days ago, he said:
  "An important Cabinet Minister and a member of the inner Downing Street clique disclosed most indiscreetly his personal thinking a few days ago to a friend of mine who is a reliable witness.
  The Minister said, 'We are not going to be talked cut of office like little Attlee. We don't give a damn what the country says. We're just going to sit it out. If necessary, we'll pull the whole temple around us.'"
  That is what was said by the hon. Member for Pembroke, who has as much right to his opinion as any other hon. or right hon. Member. I should like to know whether the Cabinet Minister to whom he was referring is a Mark I or a Mark II, Cabinet Minister. Is he still there? Did he really say this? Shall we have a statement about it? Will there be a denial? If we are going to get a denial let us have it before we are required to rise or the Recess.
  If there is no denial we have a right to stay here and find out. I see that the Leader of the House, so recently promoted to his exalted office, sees fit to smile. There is not much smiling going on in the country or on this side of the House. Let him be clear about the fact that although these debates are traditionally treated with a certain levity he point that I am making has a serious purpose. We want to know about this matter before we are called upon to rise for the Recess.
  I want to raise one other point concerning Central Africa and Rhodesia, which has already been referred to. I do not know why the hon. Member opposite should have raised the subject at this stage in the game. Those of us on this side of the House, who have done our best in recent months and year to comprehend both sides of this complicated question and who have sought—where we have thought it right—to defend the Rhodesian cause, will be very much gratified at the
  922
  news, this weekend, that the Rhodesian Government have now lifted censorship of all kinds. This announcement will be welcomed by hon. Members on both sides of the House. It is surely a mark of considerable confidence in the sort of things which the hon. Member opposite and his colleagues are normally supposed to support.
  But at this moment we know that the Prime Minister is doing his best to reject and—if I may use the word—dodge the initiative and the most magnanimous offer of my right hon. Friend the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) who only recently came back from Rhodesia and has offered to do everything that he can, regardless of Party consideration to assist in reaching a settlement and to get negotiations going again. What answer were we given to our Questions, and in the debate two weeks ago? None. The danger of violence mounts. In the view of my right hon. and hon Friends there is only one way to avert this danger, and that is to work, through negotiations, towards a settlement in Rhodesia.
  Are we to go away now and leave a situation in which my hon. Friends and I are convinced that the Prime Minister is refusing to negotiate because he is frightened of his hon. Friend on the Left? That is the position, and that is another reason why we should remain until we receive some sensible answers to our questions about the main problems which face this miserable Government.
  In my seven years of Parliamentary experience, if ever there was a moment when a Government had reason to want to get rid of Parliament that is it—and if ever there was a moment when Parliament should do its best to resist it is now.
  4.55 p.m.
  Mr. Ted Leadbitter: The course of the debate has been somewhat spoiled by the speech of the hon. Member for Mid-Bedfordshire (Mr. Hastings). He spent his time interesting himself in the business of the Inner Cabinet and in wondering about the doings of that nice young lady, my right hon. Friend the ex-Minister of Transport. Finally, he gave a lecture to a legally constituted Parliament, speaking from his bench opposite as a supporter—a militant supporter—of

  923
  an illegal and unconstitutional Government in Rhodesia. It is an affront that the hon. Member, in a British Parliament, should want to talk about the need to stay here next week when his real allegiance is not towards democracy but towards totalitarianism.
  Mr. Hastings: On a point of order. I am willing to accept anything from the other side, normally, but I ask for your protection now, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Like many others in the House, I spent a number of years doing my best to do away with totalitarianism. I do not see why I should accept that accusation from the hon. Member.
  Mr. Deputy Speaker: No point of order arises. The hon. Member for Mid-Bedfordshire (Mr. Hastings) was giving his reasons why we should not adjourn until 23rd April, and the hon. Member for the Hartlepools (Mr. Lead-bitter) was endeavouring to reply. We must confine the debate strictly to the question whether or not we should adjourn until 23rd April. It is not right to go further into the details of the Rhodesian problem.
  Mr. Goodhew: On a point of order. Is it in order for an hon. Member opposite to accuse my hon. Friend of supporting totalitarianism?
  Mr. Charles Pannell: Of course it is.
  Mr. Roebuck: On a point of order. Is it in order for Members of the Opposition to support an illegal régime?
  Mr. Deputy Speaker: In answer to this series of points of order, I must say that I have heard accusations and complaints of this kind in previous debates.
  Mr. Cranley Onslow: This was rather different from previous accusations that we have heard from across the Floor of the House, Mr. Deputy Speaker. This was a positive accusation that my hon. Friend owed an allegiance to totalitarianism. I would have thought that most hon. Members heard those words quite clearly. Most of us would ask you whether you do not think that that remark should be withdrawn.
  Mr. English: Surely to say that one owes an allegiance to an ideology can hardly be an accusation of high treason.
  Mr. Leadbitter: I was going to point out, in effect, that this was an argument why we should not support the hon. Member in his opposition to the Motion.
  It is a nauseating experience to sit in a British Parliament and hear an hon. Member make out a case for staying here over the Easter Recess when it is common knowledge that his criticism of a British elected Government is that it is not acceptable to him—he used those words—yet an illegal régime in Rhodesia is. I leave that point there. I have made it, and it is understood. In course of time the hon. Member will realise that the long-lasting influences of British Government—of whatever nature—will endure when the unhappy story of Rhodesia has long been forgotten.
  I want to come to the reasons why we should be here during the Recess—[Interruption.] I have learned that interventions like that are characteristic of the party to which the hon. Gentleman belongs. The subject I wish to raise is of immediate importance. With the exception of that of the hon. Member for Mid-Bedfordshire, I have respected every case put forward so far. Many of them are of great interest, but nothing is of greater interest to 3,000 men than the subject which I wish to raise.
  At the moment, in the most modern shipyard in the whole of Europe, 3,000 men have been told that they will lose their jobs. Although discussions, which the Minister described to me this afternoon, are going on, until last Saturday neither the men nor the management nor hon. Members had had any indication of any firm Government statement of intention about what can be done in the circumstances in which the yard is to be closed. In a few days, one of the ships which has been completed will be launched and already the design staff in this important yard—the Furness shipbuilding yard on Tees-side—are serving a month's notice.
  It follows that, after the launching, there will be a firm time scale of redundancies. I do not want this Government—
  Mr. Onslow: Hear, hear.
  Mr. Leadbitter: That kind of comment also is very childish. As long as I have the floor, I will say what I have

  925
  to say on behalf of 3,000 men who expect me to do my duty. If hon. Members want to snigger at that, they will answer for it.
  I do not want this Government to hold these discussions in a Recess during which the one of the last ships will be launched, when there is no clear intention of keeping the yard open. Therefore, I ask the Leader of the House to remember that there are positive reasons here why these matters should be discussed next week.
  Also, the Government have a large financial stake in the yard. Some 40 per cent. of the costs of re-equipping and modernising it are provided through investment incentives. The yard is also probably the most modern in the western hemisphere and the amount of work there, capable of producing ships of 240,000 or 250,000 tons is remarkable. If nothing is done by the Government, this will be the first time in the annals of shipbuilding that such a modern yard, with such new equipment, ahead of every other ward in the country with productivity agreements and so, on, has been dosed. In terms of finance, labour relations and recent re-equipment, the yard should not be closed.
  If we do not discuss the matter in a few days, it could be too late. There is nothing worse for a development area than the closure of a shipyard, because, alone among industrial activities, it is the heart of an area, with a remarkable psychological effect. I hope that the Government will understand that, if they are thinking of not keeping the yard open, they should declare it now, and that, if they intend to keep it open, we are entitled to a statement this week or during the Recess.
  The final and most important consideration is that we cannot afford, in Hartlepools, Sunderland and Middlesbrough, an area with a high industrial potential, where unemployment is running at six, seven and eight per cent., a further 3,000 men unemployed, because the skills involved cannot wait for promised industrial development, but will migrate, leaving too many unskilled men. That is just the North-East's problem—too many unskilled men with a shortage of skilled people, who are the first to migrate from depressed areas.
  926
  I therefore ask my right hon. Friend not to underestimate the problem or the fact that there are 3,000 very angry men in this yard who cannot see the sense of its closure. It is no good saying that this is just private enterprise—
  Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. The hon. Member must relate his remarks to the simple question of whether we should adjourn until 23rd April.
  Mr. Leadbitter: The case for a debate cannot be opposed simply on the grounds that this is confined to private enterprise. It involves tremendous national assets of equipment and manpower and these men would far rather have their Members debating it next week. Where is the sense of a British Government giving about £36½ million to British shipowners in the next few years to build ships abroad, so as to close our own yards? That is the final question which Northern Members would be expected by these men to ask should the Government agree to postpone the recess.
  I said that this matter was immediately important. The Government have done a remarkable job in the North-East Region, but the improvement is not keeping pace with the decline in the basic and traditional industries. I ask the Leader of the House to complement what has been done by conducting an emergency operation to save a valuable industry.
  5.10 p.m.
  Mr. Peter Mills: I remind the Leader of the House of a very serious problem, particularly in the South-West, which needs an immediate answer—that of rising unemployment, especially in North Devon, where, in spite of the holiday trade, which is under way, the unemployment figure is rising rapidly. We ought to be discussing it in the House and we ought to have a statement from the Minister of Labour on how he will deal with it. Unemployed people, not only in the South-West but throughout the country, will look with disfavour upon the House going into Recess without dealing with the problem and without a statement from the Minister of Labour and the Government on how they will overcome it. That is my first—and valid—reason why we should not go into Recess at the moment.
  My second reason is concerned with agriculture, in which I am particularly

  927
  interested. Before the Recess we ought to have a debate or at least a statement from the new Minister of Agriculture on how he will deal with some of the urgent problems which affect not only agriculture but also the consumer, as I shall seek to show. Before we rise for the Recess, the Minister of Agriculture ought to make a statement on what he intends to do about foot-and-mouth disease. That situation has altered radically in the last week or two and we cannot leave it without a statement before the Recess. There have been further outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease, all adding to the risk to farmers of a further primary outbreak somewhere else, and we ought to know exactly what the Minister proposes to do about it.
  The consumer, too, is affected. As we have said many times in past debates, if we have a further outbreak the consumer will suffer not only in the increased price of meat but also in the dislocation of communications which arises through a very serious outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease. The House ought to know what the Minister of Agriculture feels about it and he ought to make a statement. I should like to see the new Minister of Agriculture at the Dispatch Box so that we may find out whether he can cope with this problem before the Recess. When such serious problems abound in agriculture, it seems an odd time for us to have a new Minister of Agriculture. We ought to know from him exactly how he will deal with these problems.
  Agriculture is suffering from a variety of difficulties which ought to be debated—or, at least, we ought to have a statement from the new Minister. The flood of subsidised imports, particularly of cheese and dried milk, is causing grave problems to agriculture. I may be asked why these problems should be raised before the Recess. The answer is that they are having a serious effect on farmers' incomes. Already we see the effect of these imports as they dilute the milk pool price. What does the new Minister propose to do about that situation? Will he simply leave it and allow it to drift? We want to see him at the Dispatch Box so that we may question him.
  It is all very well for the new Leader of the House to smile. He has left these
  928
  difficulties. It would be unfair for me to say that he has ratted, but he has certainly left the new Minister of Agriculture with very serious problems, including those created by foot-and-mouth disease and the import of cheese and dried milk.
  The Report of the little Neddy on the bacon-curing industry raises important issues. I want to know what the new Minister of Agriculture feels about them and how he will deal with them. The problems are serious and not easy to resolve, and I want to know, before the Recess, how the Minister will tackle them.
  I could draw attention to many other agricultural problems which ought to be considered, but I come back to foot-and-mouth disease. The previous Minister allowed imports of beef again in spite of all our warnings and in spite of fresh outbreaks. I hope that before the Recess we shall have a clear-cut statement from the new Minister of Agriculture reversing the decision of the previous Minister so that farmers and, more important, consumers, may be protected. I hope that the Leader of the House will take note of what I have said and pass my views to the new Minister of Agriculture, and I hope that we shall have a debate or, at least, a statement before the Recess. If not, we must oppose this Motion.
  5.16 p.m.
  Mr. R. T. Paget: We ought not to adjourn while Motion 191 remains on the Order Paper—
  [That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying Her Majesty to remove the name of Sir Thomas Hugh William Beadle from the list of Her Majesty's Honourable Privy Council.]
  That Motion consists of an attack upon one of Her Majesty's judges and demands that his name be removed from the list of the Privy Council. The Government have a special duty towards Her Majesty's judges. The judges cannot protect themselves, and it is therefore the Government's duty to take steps to protect them—and immediate steps—when they are attacked in this manner. No Motion such as this should be tolerated in our Journals, and I know of no instance in our political history in which an attack on one of Her Majesty's judges has been allowed to rest on the Order Paper with

  929
  nothing done about it. I recall an occasion when we took grave exception to a Government in Africa taking action against a judge because that judge had reached a decision which they did not like. A suggestion that we ought to do that sort of thing ought not to rest on our Order Paper.
  This is no new kind of case. Where there are rebel régimes and occupations by an enemy, judges who are loyal to the Queen find themselves in a difficult position. They can retire, they can refuse to go on, or they can continue to work, as did a number of judges during the American Revolution and as did the judges of the High Court of the Channel Islands during the German occupation. That choice, certainly in the case of Sir Hugh Beadle, is not one of which we can complain, because we asked him to carry on.
  Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Order. The hon. and learned Gentleman cannot argue the merits of the Motion 191. He can only draw attention to the reasons why we should discuss it before we adjourn. He cannot go into the details of the matter.
  Mr. Paget: I respectfully agree, Mr. Deputy Speaker, but in order to indicate the nature of the Motion and why it is such a grave debasement of our Order Paper and such a derogation of the duty owed by the Government to the judiciary that it be allowed to stay there for a single week, I must point out the circumstances. Therefore, it is necessary simply to indicate what the position of Sir Hugh Beadle in this matter is. He is a man who served in the difficult position of a judge loyally to Her Majesty, carrying on under a rebel Government; and he did so because Her Majesty's Government asked him to. In doing so, he had certain duties. Those duties are fairly well settled in international law. First, he must apply international law to the authority of the Government as he sees it and finds it in practice.
  Mr. Deputy Speaker: The hon. and learned Gentleman cannot argue the merits of the matter as distinct from arguing the necessity for debating it be-lore we adjourn.
  Mr. Paget: It is very difficult to draw a fine line here between saying that something should be debated and saying what
  930
  should be debated. I believe that, where there is a Motion on the Order Paper calling for the removal of one of Her Majesty's judges from the list of Her Majesty's Privy Councillors, it is necessary to indicate what the complaints against that judge are and to say that those are complaints with regard to which this judge is not only entitled to be defended but is entitled to be defended immediately by Her Majesty's Government, because this is the essence of the matter. There is authority after authority for the proposition that, where a judge is attacked in Parliament and upon our Journal, it is the Government's duty to take immediate action.
  I therefore believe that it is necessary here to indicate certainly what my view is—that in a number of very erudite and, I believe, deeply impartial judgments this Chief Justice, one of the Queen's most distinguished judges, did no more than his duty and did no more than the law required of him.
  Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. I know that the hon. and learned Gentleman feels very strongly about this, and I have no doubt that it is a matter which should be debated, but the rules of the House make it clear that these matters of a personal nature can be properly debated only on a specific Motion and it is not appropriate to debate the merits of the Motion concerning Sir Hugh Beadle on the Question now before the House as to whether we should adjourn. I must ask the hon. and learned Gentleman to realise that he has drawn attention to the urgency of the matter and to the need, because this Motion is on the Order Paper, for not agreeing to the Adjournment Motion, but it would be quite out of order to pursue the merits of the matter now, because there would be no opportunity of reply.
  Mr. Hastings: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I respectfully submit that the Motion on the Order Paper concerning Sir Hugh Beadle has caused many hon. Members, probably on both sides, a great deal of concern. Moreover, the majority of us are not learned in the law. To enable us to make a judgment as to whether we should adjourn before the matter is satisfactorily explained by the Government, it is of great benefit to hon. Members on both sides to hear something of the legal case propounded by

  931
  the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget).
  Mr. Deputy Speaker: The difficulty is this. It is perfectly open to the House to negative the Motion tabled by the Government to the effect that the House should adjourn. If the Government's Motion is negatived, no doubt there would be an opportunity of discussing the Motion relating to Sir Hugh Beadle. However, it would be quite irregular, because of the Motion now on the Order Paper, to embark upon a debate on a matter which is no doubt very serious and very important but to which there would be no opportunity for a reply.
  Sir A. V. Harvey: Further to the point of order. I support what my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Bedfordshire (Mr. Hastings) has said. As I am not a lawyer, I find it very difficult to come to a conclusion on this. The hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) is certainly informing back benchers. I recall the Prime Minister's saying not long ago that Sir Hugh Beadle had the courage of a lion. This Motion on the Order Paper should be cleared up before we go on holiday.
  Mr. Deputy Speaker: It is perfectly In order to put forward that argument that in view of the Motion about Sir Hugh Beadle the House should not adjourn. But obviously the House cannot in this debate form a judgment about the merits of the Motion relating to Sir Hugh Beadle. Therefore, it would be quite irregular to embark upon such a debate, however desirable it might be at some other time.
  Mr. Paget: I do not intend to go into this at any length. I have not even brought into the Chamber the judgments of Sir Hugh Beadle, which I have read. It is something on which I could make a very long speech, but I have not the slightest intention or wish of doing anything of the sort. You said in your Ruling, Mr. Deputy Speaker, to which I pay the utmost respect, that this matter could be discussed only on a Motion—that this judge can be defended only on a Motion. This is precisely my point. There is this Motion on the Order Paper. It is the duty of the Government to take immediate steps to deal with the Motion.
  Mr. David Weitzman: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Many of us entirely disagree with the views now being advanced by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget). We cannot debate the question. If my hon. and learned Friend is proceeding to put arguments in favour of it, it would be only right that we put arguments against it. I therefore put it to you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, that it is quite out of order for this matter to be proceeded with in the way that my hon. and learned Friend is doing.
  Mr. Deputy Speaker: I have already indicated my view that it was open to the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) to draw attention to the Motion on the Order Paper as a reason why we should not adjourn. As the hon. and learned Member for Stoke Newington and Hackney, North (Mr. Weitzman) has indicated, it would be quite improper if we were to embark upon a general debate upon the merit. I repeat that I think that the hon. and learned Member for Northampton has already adequately given the reasons why he thinks it is a reason for not adjourning. It would be wrong to pursue the matter further in any detail.
  Mr. Paget: Further to that point of order. I must protest a little. It is impossible to rule in advance that what I was going to say is out of order when you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, first ruled that to raise the question that the House should not adjourn until the Motion has been discussed, and discussed as a matter of immediacy, is in order. In view of that Ruling, all that I propose to say—I do not propose to take this in any detail—is that Sir Hugh has given certain judgments, that those judgments, in the view of many lawyers, are not only erudite and able, but clearly right upon the law as it stands—
  Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. I must adhere to the Ruling I have given. It would be wrong for the hon. and learned Gentleman to pursue this matter in the way that he is proposing to do so.
  Mr. Paget: In that case, I will not go further. I will simply say that I hope very much indeed that the Government will take a very serious view of this

  933
  matter and of their duty to do it judicially. They are wrong to allow a judge to be abused in this matter. The fact that his judgment may be something they do not like and something that some of their wilder supporters do not like does not change their duty in the least. Their duty is to deal with this matter. Their duty is to the judge, whether or not they or their supporters like his judgment. We should not adjourn, and leave this matter as something that can be ignored. It disgraces and debases our proceedings.
  Rhodesia is, quite clearly, a deteriorating situation. From every point of view things are getting worse. We have an opportunity, and it may be the very last opportunity, to negotiate. The matter has been so much a conflict of personality and a lack of trust, but we have a man whose integrity is completely respected, a rid not only on both sides of the House, and who is trusted not only here but in Rhodesia. We should get some assurance that these valuable services, which could a: long last bring this folly to an end, are not being neglected. This is something we should reasonably ask of the Government
  5 32 p.m.
  Mr. John Biggs-Davison: I am very glad to follow the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget), and to support him on both his counts. The Motion standing on the Order Paper to which the hon. and learned Gentleman referred, and which you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, said needed debate, is a very grave Motion. It is, indeed, an injustice if we are to go away without this learned and honourable judge, whom the Prime Minister praised so highly, and requested to remain at his post and continue with the administration of justice in Rhodesia, being given an opportunity of clearing his name.
  A debate would be a necessary debate, and it would bring to light some anomalies, because if it is suggested by hon. Members opposite that Sir Hugh Beadle should be removed from the Privy Council—
  Mr. Weitzman: Hear, hear.
  Mr. Biggs-Davison: The hon. and learned Gentleman says "Hear, hear"—it would be brought before the House and made known to the public that the
  934
  list of members of Her Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council included the name of the Honourable Dr. Kwame Nkrumah.
  I support the hon. and learned Member for Northampton who, as time has shown, is so much better informed about Rhodesia than are his right hon. Friends and most of his hon. Friends. I ask the Leader of the House, whom I welcome to the Treasury Bench in this capacity, to assure us that we shall have from the appropriate Minister a clear statement that Her Majesty's Government will urgently follow up the offer made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) to place himself at the disposal of the Government in a search for an honourable settlement with Rhodesia.
  The hon. and learned Gentleman said that the situation there is deteriorating. If it is deteriorating in Rhodesia, it is certainly deteriorating in the United Kingdom. The report of the Constitutional Commission cannot be much longer delayed. Indeed, if we go away on Thursday we may find before we come back on 23rd April that the report of the Constitutional Commission—which, I understand, is now before Ministers in Salisbury—has been made public. Once that is published—we do not know what it will contain—positions may be taken that will make it well nigh impossible for an honourable, peaceful and early solution to be reached.
  Good things have happened in Rhodesia, and I am a little surprised that hon. Members opposite who raised the subject of Rhodesia did not see fit to mention them. Hon. Members opposite are always eager to mention the things that are bad in Rhodesia, and that reinforces the argument for the urgent need of a statement, if not a debate, on Rhodesia. Mr. Ian Smith has announced the raising of the censorship—
  Dr. David Kerr: Has the hon. Member noticed that there is no official Press censorship in South Africa, either, but that does not stop the South African Government pursuing their policy just the same?
  Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. I must ask hon. Members not to take notice of irrelevant interruptions.
  Mr. Biggs-Davison: I shall not be tempted to discuss South Africa. When I was interrupted I was mentioning new factors which emphasise the urgency of the Rhodesian situation. On the one hand, we have the danger of the report of the constitutional commission and, on the other hand, we have certain constructive features which suggest that there may now be another opportunity of negotiating for a settlement. The first factor is the lifting of the censorship. The second is the speech made by Mr. Ian Smith against racialism. The third is the speech made by a cabinet colleague of Mr. Ian Smith against republicanism. Those are three new factors that have emerged since the debate we had not so long ago. There is now what may be a last chance for the Government to seize the opportunity of negotiation.
  I shall not rehearse any of the arguments on Rhodesia that we have had a number of times in the House. I shall not repeat anything that was said in our recent debate—but it was a most unsatisfactory debate. At the end of it, we were left with an impression almost of hopelessness. Nothing was offered by the Government in the way of a constructive approach to the problem. The Prime Minister's speech was sterile, negative, destructive, and emotive to the point of hysteria. We now ask the Leader of the House in this Mark II Government to try to do better, and to put before the House a clear statement that an effort will be made while there is yet time to reach a settlement with Rhodesia so that we may retain or regain something at least of our trade and influence.
  5.38 p.m.
  Mr. Marcus Worsley: Like some of my hon. Friends who have opposed the Motion, my complaints about adjourning on Thursday go back to the reshuffle at the weekend. I take it that what we had then was what the Lord President rather humorously, as I thought, called "Wilson Mark II". If that is so, I must tell the House that it is the Lord President's position that I put forward as the reason for this House not rising on Thursday.
  The announcement stated that the Lord President was to preside over a merged Ministry of Social Security and Health. We have today not had any statement
  936
  from the Government about the details of this proposal. It is a proposal of the very greatest importance—and, incidentally, it is one that we ourselves have been pressing for months, indeed for years. Only last Tuesday I had an opportunity to put it forward, and at that time the Government seemed wholly uninterested. Naturally, we are delighted to find that the Government have now adopted it, but the trouble is that when the Government steal our clothes they tend to put them on the wrong way round. We should therefore like to have a statement from the Government as to what is intended. That statement should be made before we rise.
  It could be that decisions will be taken during the Recess about the shape of the new Ministry. They might be wholly against the ideas which we have put forward. Our suspicions in this respect were increased this afternoon by a remark by the right hon. Lady the Minister of Social Security. She said that the merger was not to be of the sort we had asked for. It was to be less in extent. We should like to hear more about this before a final decision is taken. Many of us believe that there is nothing in the whole field of Government administration more important than getting this matter right. Therefore we think it quite wrong that the House should rise before the matter is settled and we are satisfied. I ask the Leader of the House, when he addresses the House, to give a firm indication that there will be a statement on this merger before we rise for Easter.
  One thing makes me extremely suspicious. The right hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) remains Lord President of the Council. A new Ministry is not being set up; he apparently is to preside over a merger. What is to be the time-scale? Is this another kind of whitewashing or a gimmick operation similar to those to which we have become used, or is it a real proposal for a merger? These questions should be answered from the Government Front Bench before we rise. What will be the relationship between this new Ministry and local authorities? To this we should have an answer. Merely to merge two Ministries and to produce a mammoth Department would be to go against the proposal for devolution of power to local

  937
  authorities. We should like to know whether the concept of devolution is part of the idea of the merger.
  Only a week or two ago the Prime Minister announced, in similarly vague and inconclusive terms, a merger between the Commonwealth Office and the Foreign Office. In that case also existing Ministers were to continue and the change was to be made some time in the future. Only with the greatest difficulty were try hon. and right hon. Friends able to extract a direct statement from the Prime Minister. Only after pressure was a statement made. This increases my suspicion. I think it a right and proper request to make to the Government that before we rise for Easter we shall be provided with a full statement with opportunities for questioning on this proposed merger.
  5.44 p.m.
  Mr. Thomas Swain: I think it hypothetical of hon. Members in many cases to argue against this Motion. When I looked into the cloakroom today I counted 14 bags with airline tickets on them. They were for various countries—Rhodesia, South Africa, Greece, and mine is packed to go to East Germany. The Governments of the four countries I have mentioned are not recognised by this House. I repeat that it is hypothetical of hon. Members to argue against the Motion.
  Unfortunately, my hon. Friend the Member for The Hartlepools (Mr. Leadbitter) is not now present. He referred to 3,000 men in the North-East. I want to raise a similarly important question which should come before the House before we rise for the Easter Recess. I wish that that Recess could be five weeks instead of one week because, apparently, all the business of the House is taken over by the Executive. We are just called to go through the Lobbies in support of the Executive. This happens no matter which party forms the Government. Perhaps the longer we are away the more business will be done by the Government.
  I raise the question of the mining industry. My hon. Friend said that 3,000 jobs were in jeopardy in the shipbuilding industry, but in my county—not merely is my constituency—during the past two months we have lost 3,250 jobs in the mining industry and 22 per cent. of those
  938
  declared redundant are men over 55. I have consistently asked since November last year when the Regulations pertaining to Sections 4(3) and 5 of the 1967 Coal Industry Act would be laid before the House, debated and ratified. In the debate in November the then Minister of Power begged on his hands and knees of the miners' group and of this House in Committee to give him the Bill with the utmost urgency so that the benefits could be paid during the Christmas holidays.
  We are now to adjourn for Easter and those Regulations, although they have been completed and I have had a sight of a copy of them, have not been ratified. It is of the utmost urgency that they should be ratified by this House at the earliest possible moment. The benefits given by the Act will be retrospective to 18th July last year. Men who were declared redundant on 21st July have not received a penny benefit under the Act. This is a grave matter of urgency. Although many consider that 2,000 or 3,000 men in the whole complex of industry do not amount to much, to one man who is denied benefit because of the lackadaisical attitude of the Minister it is most important. This is of urgency for the man concerned.
  I congratulate my right hon. Friend the new Leader of the House on his appointment. No doubt he has had a real feeding up in the Ministry of Agriculture. I am surprised at the carping criticisms of his activities which have been made by our opponents. He has had a very difficult job. In my constituency he has done magnificently. I must insist to him that the matter I have raised is one of urgency. I do not suggest that we should oppose this Motion. If anyone wants to oppose it I am prepared to go into the Lobby in support of it. This is one of the things on which I am always willing to support the Government, allowing for seasonal adjustments and my Division records.
  I ask my right hon. Friend to bring to the notice of the new Minister of Power the urgency of the matter I have raised. I am speaking, not as chairman of the miners' group but as the Member for Derbyshire, North-East. There are at least 2,000 men in my constituency who should be beneficiaries under the Act. The Regulations are quite satisfactory

  939
  and there is nothing to stop them coming before the House earlier than Wednesday evening at half-past ten. I ask my right hon. Friend to draw my remarks to the attention of the new Minister and that if possible he will bring the Regulations forward for ratification so that the money can go to the men who have been suffering hardship since last July.
  5.50 p.m.
  Mr. Cranley Onslow: I assume that the Minister is unlikely to accept the objections which have been raised against the Motion. I regret this because the arguments for debating certain vital matters before we adjourn should be accepted, even by the new Leader of the House. If he does reject them, I must argue against the Motion on the ground that the proposed Recess is insufficiently long.
  I advance this view not as an hon. Member of the Opposition but because of the insufficiency and incapacity of the Ministers who are at present in office to adjust themselves to the realities of their Departments and because they need at least another week in Recess to acquaint themselves with what is going on. The new Leader of the House needs far more than another week.
  These new Ministers have not had time in which to recognise their limitations. They should be allowed time in which to commune with themselves so that these limitations become obvious even to them. For example, the new Minister of Transport must be limited when faced with the task of taking over a Bill which is enmeshed in Committee and gripped with the Closure Motion. He is even deprived of the assistance of a junior Minister who knows his way about the Bill. Indeed, the House should be invited to reconsider the Sittings Motion because even if the new Minister knows what is in the Bill, which I very much doubt, he cannot be aware of whether the timetable is appropriate.
  The Minister of Defence could use another week in which to think about Service pay. Threatened with a Recess, the Services do not know what is to happen to their pay. This should be most worrying for the Minister, particularly in view of the low morale of the Services and the low recruitment
  940
  figures. While I do not condone the incident of last Friday, when apparently a flight lieutenant in the R.A.F. elected to take a dangerous course to demonstrate his private resentment against the Government's refusal to allow a ceremonial fly-past in commemoration of the R.A.F.'s fiftieth anniversary, it is obvious that the morale of the Service is much lower than the Government should have allowed it to become.
  Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman must show what this has to do with the Motion.
  Mr. Onslow: The Motion requires us to adjourn until 23rd April. I am arguing that we should adjourn for at least another week so that certain Ministers have an opportunity to improve their performance and revise their ideas.
  Many other examples could be cited; for example, the incomes policy, which was mentioned so effectively by my hon. Friend the Member for Oswestry (Mr. Biffen). More time is needed for this to be given some serious rethinking. The Government need time to rethink their policies over Rhodesia. The responsible Minister needs time in which to prepare a proper attitude for the conduct of these affairs.
  Perhaps the most tired and broken man in the Government is the Prime Minister. He certainly needs more leisure time in view of the way in which he has utterly misconducted the nation's affairs. An extra week in the Scilly Isles would allow him to do a little quiet reflecting and perhaps he could reassess the whole position of his Administration. It might make him recognise that the reputation of Parliament, at his hands, has sunk so low that only a General Election can save it.
  5.55 p.m.
  Mr. Brian Harrison: I am glad of this opportunity to give a few reasons why we should receive statements on various matters either before we adjourn or immediately we return. I am pleased to see the Patronage Secretary in his place, because in his combined rôle of Deputy Leader of the House and Patronage Secretary he may recognise his responsibilities to the House and accept the request of most hon. Members, including a number of those behind

  941
  him, to reject the Motion. Alternatively, he may agree to a free vote taking place, if the matter is forced to a vote.
  We must insist on receiving a statement, either before we adjourn or immediately we return, from the new Minister of Agriculture. One can understand why the new Leader of the House left the Ministry of Agriculture. The Minister who has replaced him will no doubt hasten to undo some of the damage his predecessor did by allowing Argentine meat to be imported before a full report of foot-and-mouth disease was received. We should receive a statement from the mw Minister explaining that he appreciates the errors of his predecessor's ways an that he intends to stop this importation. Now that the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. George Brown) is no longer in the Cabinet to support the former Minister of Agriculture, we can appreciate why the right hon. Gentleman had to retire from the Ministry of Agriculture. I say that because I understand that the only time that he got anything through the Cabinet was when he had the support of the right hon. Member for Belper.
  A number of other matters need clarifying; for example, what is happening with the prices and incomes policy? Although the Secretary of State for Economic Affairs made a speech in the House the other day, he has now been deprived of half his Department. One might almost say that the poodle has had its bark taken from it. We need statements from other new Ministers. We should know precisely what is happening in their Departments and how the Mark II Government are likely to operate.
  Rural transport is another matter which needs clarifying. Unless there is proper co-ordination between the railways and bus transport, parts of the country will be denuded of population. Statements on these subjects must be made before the Recess, or, alternatively, we should have a shorter Recess.
  Mr. James Dempsey: The hon. Gentleman has just said that we should have a shorter Recess. As the Recess at present is only one week, will he tell us to what extent would shorten that week?
  Mr. Harrison: I thought that a week was seven days, and it seems to me that
  942
  the Recess will be a little longer than that.
  Before we went away would be a suitable time to have a statement on rural transport, which is very necessary if we are to remain healthy as a country.
  For those reasons, and because of the complete disarray in which we find the organisation of Government, which must be clarified very rapidly, we are entitled to oppose the Motion.
  6.0 p.m.
  Captain Walter Elliot: I suppose that on both sides of the House there would be agreement with me when I say that no Government within living memory has needed a rest more than the present one. Nevertheless, it should resist the tendency to lay down the load and go away, and I oppose the Motion. There has been a good deal of criticism rising in recent months about this House in general and about particular features of it. Some of it is misdirected and should fall on the Government, and some of it is unfair, but there would certainly be much warranted criticism if we all go away now while 500,000 or 600,000 men and women of the Armed Services are waiting to hear when the decision is to be made on their pay and pensions, a decision which is now overdue.
  The Grigg Commission considers the pay of the Armed Forces biennially. That is the normal procedure, and its considerations cover to what extent the Services' pay has fallen behind that in civilian life, and recommends accordingly. It does not necessarily recommend an increase. It merely makes a recommendation to maintain the Services' pay, the rate of advance of the Services' pay the same as rates in civilian life. The procedure means that over a period of two years the Services gradually fall behind in their rates of pay.
  Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. We cannot discuss the particular recommendations of the Grigg Commission. We can only discuss the date of the Easter adjournment.
  Captain Elliot: I appreciate that, Mr. Deputy Speaker, and I apologise if I am straying out of order. I wanted to make these points to lead up to a criticism of the Government's referring the matter to the Prices and Incomes Board

  943
  and so delaying the decision and arousing anxiety in the Services, which should be allayed before we adjourn. As a result, if the recommendation is accepted the Services' rates of pay become level with those in civilian life, and so they are not the pace-setter in this matter. Therefore, it seems to me absolutely unnecessary that the Government should have referred the matter—
  Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. I am sorry. The hon. and gallant Gentleman is now dealing with the merits of a particular issue, and that cannot be discussed on the Motion for the Easter adjournment.
  Captain Elliot: I am sorry, Mr. Deputy Speaker, if I strayed out of order, but I have come to the end of that part of my speech.
  The Government could only have done what they did in order to delay the recommendations being put into operation and it is too cynical and would be bad for the reputation of the House if, having done that, we now go away for our Recess, leaving the hundreds of thousands of men and women in the Services in suspense and doubt as to their future conditions of service. For that reason, I strongly oppose the adjournment of the House until a statement has been made on the subject.
  6.5 p.m.
  Mr. Edward M. Taylor: The most interesting comment in the whole debate was the intervention of the hon. Member for Coatbridge and Airdrie (Mr. Dempsey), whose opinions are always listened to with great respect in the House. He asked if a day would make any difference to the Recess, which he said was to last for a week.
  Mr. Dempsey: When the hon. Member for Maldon (Mr. Brian Harrison) talked about reducing the length of the Recess, I said that it lasts for exactly one week, or seven Parliamentary days, and asked to what extent the hon. Gentleman would reduce it.
  Mr. Taylor: I listened to the hon. Gentleman with great interest, and I remind him of the remark attributed to the Prime Minister, that a week is a long time in politics, as we all know. Although the
  944
  Recess is just seven Parliamentary days, seven days matter a great deal under the present Government because on the average day of Labour Government we have had £1½ million of extra taxation, 50 extra civil servants have been employed, and 800 people have left the country to look for an opportunity overseas which they cannot have in this country. Although I respect the hon. Gentleman's opinions, I think that in view of those figures of £1½ million extra taxation, 800 emigrants from these shores and 50 additional civil servants then an extra day or one less day on the Recess matters a great deal.
  I can well appreciate the feelings of the new Leader of the House, for whom we all have great admiration, because he hears conflicting arguments. One of which we are all well aware is that it might be a good thing to have a slightly longer Recess to enable the new Minister of Transport to look closely at the dreadful Transport Bill. I have had the pleasure of sitting on the Committee considering that Bill. It is absolutely shocking that we have been prevented from discussing important and significant Clauses, which could have a major effect on the people of this country, because of the imposition of the guillotine. We have tried to make very great progress, and have done our best to get through the arguments as quickly as possible, but despite that we have not had time.
  There has been a dramatic change. We have had the appointment of the new Minister of Transport, and we have had the Joint Parliamentary Secretary promoted to another post. In these circumstances, it will be absolutely intolerable if we do not give the new Minister time to think about the problem, time to look at this dreadful Bill, with 169 Clauses and over 260 pages. It is absolutely intolerable to expect him to take over and know exactly what is going on. The new Minister has had experience of this. He was responsible for piloting through the nationalisation of iron and steel. I was a member of the Committee that considered the Iron and Steel Act, and I told him then that it was a mistake to nationalise iron and steel. I said that it would cause a great deal of harm to the country. I think that he would now admit that I was right, because a highly profitable industry had been brought into a serious state in the interim. We must give the

  945
  Minister time to think about the implications of the Transport Bill, particularly as it affects Scotland. I and other Scottish Members will be absolutely furious if we do not have time to discuss those matters adequately.
  That is one argument for extending the Recess. There are many arguments for shortening it, one of the most important of which is to enable Scottish Members to have an opportunity of a proper one day's debate on the dramatic rise in violent crime in Scotland. We had a short discussion on the subject at three o'clock in the morning some time ago. I know that the new Leader of the House takes a very real interest in these matters.
  Crimes of violence have doubled in 10 years in Scotland, and the murder rite has doubled in six years. There is the outstanding question of a request from the magistrates and the police in Glasgow for additional powers of search. The Under-Secretary of State for Scotland is sincerely and carefully looking at the problem, which involves many difficulties, but I am sure that he would agree that it is a matter of urgency. In these circumstances, we want a full-scale debate on the Floor of the House to give Scottish hon. Members an opportunity to look at the problem in all its aspects. This difficult problem must be carefully examined and debated urgently. We are asking for a return on 22nd April so that we can hold such a debate. This is not just the Conservative Party's point of view. The important series of articles in the Scottish Daily Express in the last week have shown that this is a matter of universal concern.
  The third reason for shortening the Recess concerns our financial affairs. It is difficult to understand from Ministers whether the country is in a serious economic plight or not. However, we are told that, even after six Budgets in three and a half years, the country is still in a serious position. We should have more time for the Government to explain their policies. I was surprised to read in HANSARD the reply to a Question from my hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice (Mr. Wall), who asked if we are going into the money-lending business. It was revealed that the Government were to lend the U.A.R. money to enable it to pay off a loan from the I.M.F.
  946
  It is staggering that this country, which has recently borrowed so much money from the I.M.F., should lend some of it to the Egyptians to enable them to pay back money to the I.M.F., particularly when we bear in mind that our financial troubles partly stem from the activities of Nasser over the Suez Canal. The Government are giving him money to keep the Suez Canal closed.
  No doubt President Kaunda of Zambia is looking for more help from the Government. Last year, we agreed to give Zambia £13·85 million for approved projects. Unfortunately we had no opportunity to debate this then because of a Recess. I hope that we shall have an opportunity this time. On 26th March, in HANSARD it was shown that not all the money had been spent because not all the approved projects have materialised. However, the Government are still to give the whole sum to Zambia, so £5 million not required is to be given to Zambia just the same.
  Is this the action of a Government facing an economic crisis? I remind the House that President Kaunda is enabling facilities to be provided for armed terrorist attacks on Rhodesia. Is it also the action of a Government facing economic crisis to give a loan to President Nasser, who has closed the Suez Canal to us? The actions of the Government do not make it clear whether or not we are facing an economic crisis. It is high time they told us.
  We must also have an extra day to discuss the prices and incomes legislation. Whether such legislation is right or wrong, we should be told what is to happen when the compulsory powers are removed. The moment they are removed—and we know this from three temporary doses already—there will be a flood of wage claims which will knock the economy scatty. I do not want to face the prospect of this happening without having one extra day in which to discuss this vital matter. It is important that the Government should tell us what their policy is to be after the compulsory powers disappear.
  We need a Recess so that Members of the Government and of the House can have a reasonable rest but we need an extra day of Parliamentary time to enable the Government to tell us how they are

  947
  to run the affairs of the country once these compulsory powers are removed. A day is an important matter. A day under Socialism means 50 extra civil servants, £1·5 million of extra taxation and 800 people emigrating from our shores. When we face these stark facts, it is all the more important to have adequate Parliamentary discussion and I am hopeful and confident that the right hon. Gentleman will accede to this reasonable request.
  6.16 p.m.
  Mr. Stanley R. McMaster: We cannot possibly adjourn for Easter while British citizens are still being held in prison by the Chinese [Laughter.] A constituent of mine, Mr. Watt, has been locked up for six months in China and not one British consular official has been able to see him. I resent the jeers on the benches opposite. The freedom of British subjects should mean more to this House than the jeers of the Socialists on the benches opposite.
  Mr. George Watt is an engineer employed by Vickers Zimmer in Lanchow on a synthetic fibre plant. He has been held since September. Mr. Grey and Mr. Barrymaine and others—no one knows how many—
  Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman cannot go into the merits of the case, in which he commands the sympathy of the whole House.
  Mr. McMaster: I shall not do so, Mr. Speaker. The Foreign Office has recently reported that, as a result of probing and questioning, not one but three British citizens are held in prison in China—Mr. Watt, Mr. Grey and Mr. Barrymaine. We do not know how many British citizens are being held in China and before we go into Recess we should know what the Government intend to do about these citizens. What representations are being made to the Chinese so that our consular officers can see them? They have not just been kept under house arrest. I was recently told, indirectly through the New China News Agency, that one has been accused and sentenced to three years' imprisonment—and still no consular official has been to see them—and he has been unable to communicate with his wife and family.
  Mr. Speaker: Order. We are debating whether the House should adjourn for Easter until 23rd April and the hon. Gentleman must keep himself to that. I have assured him that on the case itself he has the complete sympathy of the whole House, including Mr. Speaker.
  Mr. McMaster: Then I will conclude this part of my speech by saying that, before we adjourn for Easter, I would like a statement made not only about these men but about our relations with China, a country with over 700 million people and with which we should have good political, economic and trade relations. This matter has been ignored completely by the Government.
  Mr. Speaker: Order. We cannot debate that now.
  Mr. McMaster: I will not seek to debate it, Mr. Speaker, but will simply call for a statement before we adjourn about what the Government are doing to improve trade and political relations with China. The peace of the world may depend on good relations with China, whose population is growing each year at a rate equivalent to the population of the British Isles. This is a serious matter and we on this side are particularly concerned for those British citizens who are under arrest there.
  Other important matters have been raised in the debate on this Motion, notably the Transport Bill. This Measure will have a considerable effect upon Northern Ireland, adding to the cost of our trade with Great Britain. This is another matter which should be dealt with urgently. Two new Ministers have been appointed, and there should be a new Motion in the Standing Committee on the Transport Bill to give these Ministers time—
  Mr. Speaker: Order. We cannot traverse in debate all the business in which the hon. Gentleman is interested. He must argue why we should not come back until 23rd April or should come back before that date.
  Mr. McMaster: My argument is that, while the Government are chopping and changing, while new Ministers are being appointed as Bills are in progress which affect the prosperity of the nation, we should not adjourn. All these matters

  949
  should be fully debated. Many parts of the Transport Bill have not been properly considered. One example is the question of aircraft policy, which has a particular effect on my constituency. Some of my hon. Friends have spoken already of matters relating to the design of our military and civil aircraft. All these questions should be fully considered by the House before arrangements are made to go into Recess.
  There is uncertainty in the shipbuilding industry. Orders are going abroad and unemployment is threatened. These are serious matters, and it is quite wrong for the House to go off for two weeks—not seven days; it is almost two calendar weeks—without being able to discuss them. Two weeks of Socialism can do a great deal of harm to this country.
  6.21 p.m.
  Mr. Reginald Maudling: I add my voice to those who have congratulated the new Leader of the House on his appointment, and express the hope that he will start well by answering many of the points which have been raised in the debate. The debate has ranged over a wide area, which is only proof of the wide area of dissatisfaction with this Government throughout the country.
  The arguments for amending or opposing the Motion have been of two kinds. Some hon. Members have argued that we should have a longer Recess and some that we should have a shorter Recess. It was argued by the hon. Member for Wandsworth, Central (Dr. David Kerr) that the Government needed more time to sort out their ideas. He even seemed to paraphrase a famous phrase, suggesting that they needed months, not weeks, to do it. Then, it was argued by my hon. Fr end the Member for Woking (Mr. Or, slow) that more time was needed to show how the Transport Bill could be handled with a change of Minister in the middle of the passage of a most complicated piece of legislation. That is a thoroughly valid point.
  Incidentally, on the question of Ministerial changes, the House should be told more about the position of the new Deputy Leader of the House, who is both Patronage Secretary and Deputy Leader of the House. This is the only example I can recall of someone who has simultaneously to be both a hawk
  950
  and a dove. We want to know what the right hon. Gentleman's plumage will be like and what sounds, if any, he will emit in the House. We hope that, before the House rises for the Recess, we shall have some information about that.
  I suspect that those who argued for a longer Recess argued with less vigour and, perhaps, less conviction than those who argued for a shorter Recess on the ground that there are many important matters which ought to be dealt with before the House adjourns. I shall not catalogue them all. They were raised on both sides. The hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) raised the important matter of the Motion on the Order Paper about Sir Hugh Beadle. The hon. Member for The Hartlepools (Mr. Leadbitter) is concerned about the closing of a shipyard in his area. The hon. Member for Derbyshire, North-East (Mr. Swain) is concerned about miners in his constituency who are awaiting their redundancy payments. All these are genuine examples of urgent matters which hon. Members are entitled to have dealt with in some way or other before the House can feel entitled to take a substantial, though not a long, Recess.
  From our side, many matters have been raised, and I shall take up three specifically, all examples of questions calling for urgent action. First, the question of foot-and-mouth disease, raised by my hon. Friends the Members for Macclesfield (Sir A. V. Harvey), for Torrington (Mr. Peter Mills) and for Malden (Mr. Brian Harrison), all of whom stressed the urgency of the problem. In his new capacity, the Leader of the House can call on the resources of his own experience in dealing with it. There is genuine concern about the recrudescence of foot-and-mouth disease and the effect of the Government's decision about the importation of beef from Argentina. This matter should be cleared up before the House can reasonably rise for the Recess.
  The second matter of urgency I take up is the question of Forces' pay, raised by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Winchester (Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles), my hon. Friend the Member for St. Albans (Mr. Goodhew) and my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Carshalton (Captain Elliot). They

  951
  all stressed the exceptional situation this year, the first time for nine years at least, I think, when the Forces have not known so late in the year what the position regarding their pay will be. We warned the Government when they referred this matter to the Prices and Incomes Board that there would be this delay. There is clear evidence that it is an urgent matter, and it is one which ought to be dealt with by the Government before they allow the House to go into Recess.
  The third urgent matter is the prices and incomes policy and the need for further clarification about it. It is urgent because decisions are being taken day by day throughout the country, and the form of these decisions is influenced by Government policy although that policy has not been adequately clarified. What is their exact policy regarding rents, regarding dividends or regarding rate fixing in industry? All these are matters on which daily decisions have to be taken by Her Majesty's subjects although they are still in ignorance of the Government's real purpose and intention. The Government seem determined to act retrospectively, to legislate to validate acts of influence, as they call it. They cannot properly ask the House to go into recess without vouchsafing more information about their policy.
  I have confined myself to matters requiring urgent consideration which are, therefore, proper for this debate. A good many other points were raised, but I need not rehearse those. To recapitulate, the three main matters raised from this side on which urgent action is required are the danger of foot-and-mouth disease, the urgent need for an announcement on Forces' pay, and the urgent need for clarification of the Government's policy on prices and incomes. I ask the Leader of the House to make a good start in his new capacity by dealing with them, in so far as his colleagues' inadequacies allow.
  6.27 p.m.
  The Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons (Mr. Fred Peart): I thank right hon. and hon. Members on both sides for their kind remarks about me. I confess that I shall miss my Department. It is a very fine Ministry, even though it has been mentioned again today in a critical tone. It is not unusual
  952
  for a Minister making a change to miss his Ministry, and I shall miss mine. However, I shall do my best in the position which I now have the honour to hold.
  I have been in the House now for 23 years, 19 years as a back-bencher. I can remember many occasions when I, as a back-bencher, pressed Ministers, as hon. Members have pressed them so effectively today, conveying to the House their interest and concern on specific matters and calling for a change in Government policy. I understand that. I believe that a Leader of the House should not only see that Government policy goes through smoothly but should also represent the rights and interests of individuals and of both sides of the House, in the best sense. I trust that I shall do that in my period of office. I believe it to be the right approach.
  I listened carefully to the many points raised today. In his concise speech, the right hon. Member for Barnet (Mr. Maudling) highlighted some of the main problems which are worrying hon. Members on both sides, although, naturally, the emphasis was on the views of the Opposition, as is only right. First, the question of foot-and-mouth disease. Here, I am not briefed. I must speak from my own experience. Only a few days ago, I answered questions on this subject, not only Questions in the House but questions in the Welsh Grand Committee as well, as Flintshire, a small Welsh county, has been considerably affected. I am aware of the anxieties of many hon. Members in this connection. The hon. Member for Torrington (Mr. Peter Mills) chided me, as he has done on many occasions in agriculture debates. The hon. Member for Macclesfield (Sir A. V. Harvey), because of the nature of his constituency, quite rightly expressed his concern. He has always taken a considerable interest not only in foot and mouth, but in brucellosis.
  I have never denied the existence of anxieties. I was the guest of the National Farmers' Union at an annual dinner in Flintshire only a week ago when many farmers whose farms had been affected by the disease spoke to me. I think that there was an appreciation of what the Ministry of Agriculture had done to meet this terrific disaster for many farmers in the belt of the country that runs through Shropshire and Cheshire,

  953
  how the Ministry had coped with it and how, even though the slaughter policy had been attacked in many quarters, we had succeeded in containing the outbreak.
  I know that there is now concern about recrudescence of the disease and reinfection. It is quite right that hon. Members should express their concern and I will convey it to my right hon. Friend who only today has taken over as Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. If it is necessary for a specific statement to be made, it will be for him to make it. I have been frequently pressed to give information to the House, but I hope that hon. Members will not now panic.
  I was asked about food imports. It cannot be said that the present supply of imports from the Argentine has affected recrudescence and reinfection. A decision was taken and the House debated and approved it. But that is no reason for opposing the Motion. We have spent a considerable time discussing this subject, although I appreciate that hon. Members may want to return to it. There is the Northumberland Report, and my right hon. Friend will get the report of the veterinary mission which is in the Argentine. I will convey to him the anxieties which hon. Members have expressed today.
  Sir A. V. Harvey: I appreciate the reasonable way in which the right hon. Gentleman is referring to this problem, but in view of the statements being made by the Argentine Government, is it likely that we shall be able to import beef from the Argentine?
  Mr. Peart: I answered a Question on this subject only last week, when I said that the trade was now making arrangements. As far as I know, there has been no definite promise of any meat coming from the Argentine. I understand that there are certain difficulties, but these are matters for the trade and for private enterprise. I do not suggest that the Sate should interfere with normal trading.
  Mr. Speaker: Order. We cannot debate each of these issues in full.
  Mr. Peart: I recognise that, Mr. Speaker. I was trying to be helpful to the hon. Gentleman.
  954
  I accept what the right hon. Member for Barnet said about Forces' pay, a subject to which a number of hon. Members have referred, including the hon. and gallant Member for Winchester (Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles) and the hon. Member for Chelsea (Mr. Worsley). I understand the worry. Other hon. Members have tried to develop the defence aspects of the matter in greater detail. I shall convey to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence what has been said about Forces' pay, the production of aircraft and the needs of the Forces in different parts of the country and in the world. But none of these things is a cause for opposing the Motion.
  I was asked specifically by the hon. and gallant Member for Winchester when we would have the N.B.P.I. Report, but I can add nothing to the answer given last Thursday. The Board is well aware of the importance of the subject. I cannot discuss its merits, but I will note what has been said. I know that hon. Members are anxious to have a quick report and for the Secretary of State to make his attitudes known. I shall certainly convey those sentiments to him.
  The hon. Member for Oswestry (Mr. Biffen) began the debate by stressing the importance of the prices and incomes policy and the need for a clear statement about the new position of the new Ministries. Several other hon. Members pursued the subject. I will convey to my right hon. Friends what has been said. There ought to be more information about the responsibilities of my senior colleagues in their new Departments. The hon. Member for Chelsea asked me particularly about social security and the social services.
  My hon. Friend the Member for Derbyshire, North-East (Mr. Swain) spoke about the state of the mining industry and asked me to convey to my right hon. Friend the importance of speeding up the issue of regulations which will very much affect the mining community generally. My hon. Friend the Member for The Hartle-pools (Mr. Leadbitter) spoke about the Furness Yard. As he knows, I have a constituency which is similar to his. I assure my hon. Friend that I shall convey to my colleagues responsible his anxieties about 3,000 shipbuilding workers who may be made redundant.

  955
  A number of other matters were mentioned. One subject was the Common Market and the need to clarify the position in view of a change in situation. I note what has been said, but I see no reason for altering the Recess. During the few days before we adjourn, hon. Members will have the opportunity to cross-examine Ministers and to consult them about matters of detail.
  The hon. Member for Belfast, East (Mr. McMaster) spoke about the detention of British citizens in China. He must be aware that the matter was raised in debate on 28th March when we discussed the Consular Relations Bill. He will find a report of that debate in columns 1843 to 1864 of HANSARD for that date, and I hope that he will read it. We must continue to press the Chinese Government so that we can have good diplomatic relations and make certain that the rights of British citizens are safeguarded.
  Mr. Roebuck: My right hon. Friend very briefly passed over one of my reasons for opposing the Motion. Can he make some statement about the duties of the Deputy Leader of the House in view of the matters which I raised? I do not know how to approach my right hon. Friend. Can the Leader of the House give us some assistance?
  Mr. Speaker: Order. We are discussing whether the House should adjourn until 23rd April.
  Mr. Peart: Any need to make a statement on that matter is no reason for altering the date of the Recess. I shall be only too pleased after this debate to explain the new arrangements to my hon. Friend. I think that they will improve the efficiency of the House and considerably help me in my duties as Leader of the House.
  Mr. Roebuck: Is my right hon. Friend aware that I shall be unable to sleep at night until I know precisely in what way to regard my right hon. Friend the Patronage Secretary—as the friend of all back-benchers or as a stern disciplinarian.
  Mr. Peart: I hope that my hon. Friend will sleep longer when he has the Recess so that he can come back refreshed. I hope that, after his talk with me after this debate, he will appreciate how much this procedure will help to improve efficiency.
  For all those reasons, I hope that the House will now agree to the Motion.
  Mr. Biggs-Davison: Before the right hon. Gentleman sits down—
  Mr. Peart: If the hon. Member will give way, I know what he is going to say. It is about Rhodesia and the judges.
  Mr. Biggs-Davison: It is a different matter. The right hon. Gentleman has not addressed himself to the points which have been raised, from both sides, regarding the Report of the Constitutional Commission, which makes this a matter of grave urgency. The whole Rhodesian affairs may move to a decision during the proposed Recess—
  Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Member cannot make a second speech as an intervention.
  Mr. Peart: As I said before the hon. Member came back, I will take note of what has been said and I will convey to my colleagues who are responsible the views of all hon. Members. I give that assurance.
  Question put and agreed to.
  Resolved,
  That this House, at its rising on Thursday, do adjourn till Tuesday, 23rd April.

  BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE (SUPPLY)
  Ordered,
  That this day Business other than the Business of Supply may be taken before Ten o'clock.—[Mr. John Silkin.]

  CIVIL EVIDENCE BILL [Lords]
  Referred to a Second Reading Cornmittee.—[Mr. Peart.]
ORDERS OF THE DAY
  SUPPLY
  [18TH ALLOTTED DAY],—considered.
  SUPPLY

    ESTIMATES
    The following Motion stood upon the Order Paper:
    That this House takes note of the Eleventh Report from the Estimates Committee in the last Session of Parliament and of the Fifth Special Report from the Estimates Committee elating to Prisons, Borstals and Detention Centres.
    Mr. Speaker: Before I call the first speaker in the debate, may I remind the House that the forthcoming debate has been truncated. Reasonably brief speeches will help in what is a very important debate.
    6.42 p.m.
    Mrs. Renée Short: In view of what you have aid, Mr. Speaker—that debate has been truncated—as Chairman of the Sub-Committee which prepared the Report I am not prepared on this occasion to move the Motion for the House to take note of it.
    I do this because it is clearly not fair to the members of my Sub-Committee, who spent a great deal of time on the preparation of the Report, and on the witnesses who came before us, to attempt to despatch the Report in just over three hours. When the business of the House was announced last week by the then Leader of the House, no mention was made of the fact that we would today be taking the Motion for the Easter Adjournment—
    Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Lady must be careful or she will find herself peaking to the Motion.
    Mrs. Short: I hope that I have made the point, Mr. Speaker.
    Sir David Renton: On a point of order. As I understand it, Mr. Speaker, today was an Opposition Supply Day and it was decided by common consent, on both sides, that the important subject of prisons, borstals and detention centres should be put down for
    958
    debate. It cannot be debated—I understand that the reason is purely technical—unless a member of the Estimates Committee moves that it be debated. The hon. Lady the Member for Wolverhampton, North-East (Mrs. Renée Short), who was Chairman of the Sub-Committee of the Estimates Committee, has declined to move it.
    Is there no other way, Mr. Speaker, in which the rights of the Opposition can be protected so that they do not appear to lose their Supply Day? If there is no other way, perhaps the new Leader of the House—whose appointment I greatly welcome—can indicate when the Government will allow this matter to be debated in Government time, because it is of the greatest importance and of great interest on both sides of the House.
    Mr. R. Gresham Cooke: Further to the point of order. May I, Mr. Speaker, as an hon. Member who is also a member of the Sub-Committee, say that the hon. Lady is perfectly right in not moving the Motion. This is the third time in three weeks that the business of the House has been changed from what was announced on the previous Thursday. First, we were to have a Vote on Account. Then, my right hon. Friend the Member for Kingston-upon-Thames (Mr. Boyd-Carpenter) objected about the business being changed. Today, I came here at half-past three to debate the important Motion from the Estimates Committee and, once again, the business has been changed, without any notice of the change being given by the Leader of the House.
    Last week, as the then Leader of the House on Thursday was inviting so many hon. Members to raise points in the debate on the Motion for the Easter Adjournment, I asked him when he proposed to move his Motion for the Recess. He replied that he did not know. I suggested to him that Tuesday or Wednesday would obviously be the proper day to do so. He gave no indication when he would move his Motion.
    It is quite wrong, and against the Estimates Committee and the rights of back-benchers, that the business of the House should be interfered with for the third time in three weeks.
    Mr. E. Rowlands: Further to the point of order. I wish, Mr. Speaker, to endorse what has just been said and also, as a member of the Sub-Committee under the chairmanship of my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, North-East (Mrs. Renée Short), to support the view which she has expressed concerning the way that the debate has been truncated. We spent 12 months preparing our Report, we waited six months for the debate and we now find that it has turned out to be no more than half a day. I therefore support what has been said from both sides in opposing any debate on the subject today.
    Mr. Reginald Maudling: Further to the point of order. I wonder, Mr. Speaker, whether we may have assistance from the new Leader of the House on this matter. The House seems to have been put in a very difficult position. If hon. Members who expected to debate this important matter are, apparently, to be disappointed, what happens to our Supply Day as such I do not know. We need an explanation immediately from the Leader of the House. Can he think of a way to extricate the House from the unfortunate situation in which it has been placed by the Government putting down the Easter Adjournment Motion for today?
    The Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons (Mr. Fred Peart): I understand that hon. Members are in difficulties in this matter. This arrangement had been made. Many hon. Members have spoken earlier today on the Motion for the Easter Adjournment, as is the traditional way for hon. Members rightly to raise their different points of view. It would have been for any hon. Member who was a member of the Estimates Committee to have moved the Motion. However, that has not been done and the next Order has been called.
    I will look at the possibility of having Government time. I cannot promise a whole day, but I will do my best to get some time so that we can have the debate. We cannot, however, do it now. It is too late.
    Mr. Charles Pannell: One can understand the indignation of
    960
    members of the Estimates Committee, but, on the other hand, we have had the earlier debate on the Easter Adjournment. I remember few occasions on which that debate has been so drearily and almost procrastinatingly, if that is the right word, dragged on. It must have been within the knowledge of the House that that important debate was coming up. All sorts of hon. Members have raised ad nauseam matters concerning Rhodesia and all sorts of things.
    It is not an occasion even for the right hon. and learned Member for Huntingdonshire (Sir D. Renton) to complain about the rights of the Opposition. If the House—not merely the Opposition—cares to inflate all sorts of speeches in debate without any consideration for the Estimates Committee, the only result is that the House gets into this position. The House can carry on only by the good will and common sense generally of hon. Members. The Estimates Committee has called attention to an abuse.
    Mr. William Hamilton: On a point of order. May I make clear for the record, Mr. Speaker, that as Chairman of the full Estimates Committee I have contacted as many members both of the Sub-Committee and of the full Committee as I could in the time at my disposal, and they unanimously agreed that we should take this course of action as a protest against the Government action in putting down the debate on the Easter Recess on the same day as the important debate on prisons, borstals and detention centres.
    The Government must have known full well that the debate for the Easter Adjournment would take two or three hours, as it normally does, and that it would automatically cut into the time at the disposal of the Estimates Committee. This is a scandalous way of treating an important Sub-Committee of the Estimates Committee.
    Mr. John Wells: Further to the point of order. If the right hon. Member for Leeds, West (Mr. C. Pannell) will take the trouble to consult the list at the entrance to the Chamber he will see that his hon. Friends spoke for far longer than hon. Members on this

    961
    side of the House. Furthermore, he was not sitting all through the debate, as I was, hoping to be called.
    Mr. Speaker: How long hon. Members on each side have spoken for is not a point of order.
    Mr. Leo Abse: Further to the points of order that have been raised. Natural disappointment has been occasioned by the collapse of this debate and very few hon. Members will have been mollified by what the Leader of the House has said. When hon. Members have been told that this question has to be discussed in conjunction with another report that has since come out, it seems, to say the least, churlish that the Leader of the House could so parsimoniously suggest that the House can be satisfied by having at a future date something less than a day. I think that my right hon. Friend could give more careful consideration to this demand than has been given to it.
    Mr. W. F. Deedes: Further to the point of order. Before the Leader of the House responds, may I ask whether he can give a firm assurance about what will happen next. I endorse what the hon. Lady the Member for Wolverhampton, North-East (Mrs. Renée Short) has decided to do. It would do her report on the subject less than justice to cram a debate on it into three or four hours. I hope that it is appreciated in the prison service. A second report has now been added. It is a report which justifies a full day's work in the Chamber. I hope that we will be assured of that.
    Mr. Peart: I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Pontypool (Mr. Abse) will not accuse me of being churlish. I was not responsible for the long debate on the Adjournment Motion. On my first appearance as Leader of the House I had to accept the arrangements that had been made. I am merely trying to help my hon. Friends, my present responsibility having started today. I have had a word with my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary and, if it is possible, he could make a statement, if he wishes to do so, which affects the point raised on Durham Prison by my hon. Friend and others. He could make it at ten o'clock, or after. [HON. MEMBERS: "No".] Or
    962
    before that. If we do not spend a great deal of time on the Education Bill, my right hon. Friend can make his statement almost immediately.
    Mr. Maudling: Further to that point of order. I do not think that is a satisfactory suggestion, although I am sure the Leader of the House is trying to be helpful. The House had been expecting a full day's debate on this subject before the Adjournment Motion was put down. The House, I am sure, still expects a full day's debate for which the Government must find time.
    The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. James Callaghan): I have followed, with respect, what the right hon. Gentleman was saying but, if the Leader of the House will permit me to say so, I had in mind that we might have two half-days. We may need a full day.
    Mrs. Renée Short: My right hon. Friend does not do that to other Committees.
    Mr. Callaghan: Perhaps my hon. Friend will allow me to put my point. I did not know until 30 seconds ago that the Motion was not going to be moved, and I have taken time to prepare a statement. What I suggest to the Committee, who are now filled with outraged dignity, is that perhaps it could meet their convenience if we had two half-days, from now until 10 o'clock, and then resuming with the Question put back again on a second day. That might mean that some speeches would not be made until the second half-day, but it would meet the possibility of having a full day's debate. I do not know whether that would meet my hon. Friends. I must say to the House, with respect, Mr. Speaker, that there is a statement I wish to make. If I cannot make it, I cannot make it, because the House is master of us all. It would meet the convenience of a great many if we divided the debate into two in this way and had two half-days on it.
    Mr. Speaker: We have been a long time on points of order. May I rule on the points of order as far as Mr. Speaker is concerned. We are on a Supply Day. The Supply Day has been given

    963
    by the Opposition to the Estimates Committee. If no member of the Estimates Committee whose name appears on the Order Paper moves it, then there can be no debate. It is as simple as that.

  EDUCATION BILL
  Lords Amendment considered and agreed to.

  MATRIMONIAL CAUSES RULES
  6.58 p.m.
  Sir Peter Rawlinson: I beg to move,
  That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that the Matrimonial Causes Rules 1968 (S.I., 1968, No. 219), dated 21st February, 1968, a copy of which was laid before this House on 29th February, be annulled.
  Mr. Speaker: If it is convenient we can consider at the same time the next Motion—
  That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that the Matrimonial Causes (Costs) Rules 1968 (S.I., 1968, No. 281), dated 21st February, 1968, a copy of which was laid before this House on 8th March, be annulled.
  Sir P. Rawlinson: The two Motions concern the legal machinery which affects the changes in the mode of trial of some-think like 40,000 undefended divorce cases every year.
  Mr. Speaker: Order. It is very difficult for anyone to address the House against a background of conversation.
  Sir P. Rawlinson: The fact that the Motions concern something like 40,000 undefended, as they are known, divorce cases a year gives to the House some indication of the number of people who will be affected by this change in legal machinery. I suppose that, with the children of the families concerned, it comes to well over 100,000 people each year. Although the title of these Motions is the rather dry title of "Matrimonial Causes Rules", in fact this is a subject which is of considerable importance which affects the lives of very many of our fellow citizens.
  964
  The Matrimonial Causes Act, 1967, in respect of which these rules were made, mandatorily transferred to the county courts suits where there is an allegation of adultery, cruelty and desertion. Power was vested in the county court to grant a degree in such circumstances.
  While some persons objected, for the various reasons which the House will recollect we debated in 1967, apparently that matter of principle has been generally accepted, certainly by the House. I remind the House that it was in the summer of 1967, in the last Session of this Parliament, that this decision was taken by the House. An entirely new situation arises now, because in this Session of Parliament already, the House has given a Second Reading to a new Divorce Bill, and within six months at the latest we shall know whether that Bill will be enacted into law. The Bill has within its provisions, if enacted as they now stand, certain radical changes in the substance of the divorce law.
  By these rules Parliament is being asked to alter the law without changing the substantial law. The whole concept of divorce may be changed if the Bill to which I have referred receives the approval first of the Committee upstairs, then of the House, and finally of another place. The whole principle of a guilty party in a divorce suit will disappear. There will be a wholly new justiciable issue. There may be many who wish to see that happen and the House should take that into account, but is it right to change merely the machinery of a system—which, I agree, has lasted for a considerable time—when we are considering a substantial change in the law itself?
  Apart from the Bill, the Law Commission is studying this matter. Great minds are considering the whole corpus of family law. The members of the Commission and their staff have been given the task of considering all aspects of the law affecting marriage, divorce, the custody of children, access to children, maintenance of the spouse, and so on. In fact, they are going beyond that and considering the position in law of a woman and her property. They are considering the guardianship of infants, and also whether we should establish family courts. This is a new concept, a new jurisdiction, and a new procedure.

  965
  I very much welcome that. It is right that the Law Commission should review this aspect of the law, and its report will no doubt be extremely useful. Therefore to alter the law by these rules, is, to my mind, a cockeyed way of undertaking reform. It seems pointless to start changing the machinery of the law if we are to change the law itself by July, or if not then by October, and then perhaps later again be asked to make another change when the Law Commission has reported. This is putting Parliament through the hoops.
  What is the point of proceeding with these rules? Surely it would be more sensible, more practical, more reasonable, and more cognisant of the proper position of Parliament to wait for a few months to see what happens to the Bill which is now being considered, and then to come to the House with these rules?
  My first practical suggestion to the Attorney-General is to hold up the operations of the Matrimonial Causes Act,1967, to see what Parliament finally decides in 1968 about the Divorce Bill. I hope that the Attorney-General will wait until the Law Commission has reported. If he does not agree to do that, I hope that he will agree to wait at least until the Divorce Bill has become law.
  We now have an enormous amount of time at our disposal, and I hope that when the Attorney-General replies to the debate he will deal with all the points that I have raised.
  Apart from my comments about this extraordinary mode of carrying out law reform, I am concerned about the merits of the rules, and the manner in which they came into existence. It might be acceptable to some of us that the county courts should deal with undefended cases which lead to the termination of a marriage, but it must be remembered that Parliament has always intended that a High Court judge should deal with divorce cases. Parliament has always taken the view that, even though a case is undefended, it should be decided by a High Court judge.
  The system of appointing Commissioners, or of appointing persons under the Commission to sit as Commissioners—and county court judges sit as commissioners—was adopted only because
  966
  of the pressure of business. It was not the way in which, Parliament wanted the question of divorce to be dealt with by the courts. Now, however, as a deliberate expression of Parliamentary policy, questions such as the custody of children, access to children, the maintenance of a wife, and so on, will be decided by the county courts whose jurisdiction we have limited to disputes involving no more than £500.
  Parliament has kept a close control over the tiers of judges, in the sense that the county court is a second-tier court. Its jurisdiction is extremely limited and restrained. This is deliberate Parliamentary policy, and, accordingly, and I say this with no disrespect to the county court judges—county courts are manned by second-tier judges.
  We should not require parties to have their lives, their residences, and the conditions under which they live with their children decided by second-tier courts, and second-tier judges. It may have happened in the past in certain parts of the country, but it has never before been done as an act of deliberate Parliamentary policy. It has never been deliberate policy for these judges to deal with ante-and post-nuptial settlements, to award maintenance over many years, and to deal with the lump sum payments which may amount to thousands of £s. Is it sensible that as an act of deliberate Parliamentary policy we should give this power to judges who, in other respects, are limited to a jurisdiction of £500?
  I have always thought that the system of Commissioners was unsatisfactory, but I know that the practice has been adopted for many years because of the pressure of business in the courts. Even though they deal with simple divorce, or simple pleas, I do not believe that the system is wholly satisfactory, yet now by these rules, we are to force the parties concerned to have important issues decided by county court judges.
  Where a marriage has come to an end, the wisdom of Solomon is needed to make a just and sensible decision about the custody of the children. For this task we need the best judges. We need men of proven ability. One of the most difficult decisions which a judge has to make is that of deciding with which parent the child of the marriage should spend

  967
  his life, how often he should see each parent, how much access should be allowed by each parent, and so on. This judicial task has been performed by county court judges, but not as a deliberate act of policy by Parliament.
  A county court judge sitting in the provinces exercises that function, but he does so as part of the High Court. The suit is in the High Court, and the parties can apply to have matters such as access to the children and custody of the children, transferred to the principal probate registry. The Attorney-General may be interested to know that in today's lists, out of about six summonses, three have come from a district registry. This has happened because power was given to either party to go to the district registrar and say, "I want this case transferred to the principal probate registry and have it heard in London." It would seem that it was left to the Rules Committee to decide, what, under the Act, could be sent to be tried by the High Court and not retained by the county court.
  At that time many people believed that issues of custody, maintenance and access had been left for decision by the Rules Committee—and many people still believe that to be the case. As I understand it, however, when the matter came before the Rule Committee that intention of Parliament was thwarted, and it was not left to the Committee so to decide. It was said that Parliament had already decided this issue. If that is so it is a serious matter, because it means that although Parliament decided that something should be given to a committee of experts—a committee presided over by the Lard Chancellor and consisting of other judges, and the President, as well as practising solicitors and practising barristers—
  Mr. Speaker: Order. It seems to me that the right hon. and learned Gentleman is criticising the 1967 Act. He cannot do that in this debate.
  Sir P. Rawlinson: What I am objecting to is that there is provision that all these ancillary matters should have gone to the county court. I am saying that under the Act the Rule Committee has the right to decide whether or not that should happen. I am asking the learned Attorney-General
  968
  whether the Rule Committee considered this question before producing these rules. Before that Committee produced the rules under the Act was it allowed to discuss and decide whether these ancillary matters should go to the High Court or be retained in the county court? The answer to the question will very much affect our judgment about the rules which are now under discussion.
  I would remind the right hon. and learned Gentleman that Section 1(5) of the Act reads:
  "Rules of court shall define the circumstances in which any matrimonial cause is to be treated for the purposes of this Act as undefended and may make different provision with respect to matrimonial causes of different descriptions."
  Section 2(2), again dealing with powers given to the Rule Committee says that:
  "rules of court shall provide for the transfer to the High Court of any proceedings pending in a county court by virtue of this section in any case where the transfer appears to the county court to be desirable, and may so provide in such other cases as may be specified in the rules."
  I understand that that was the position with regard to the Rule Committee when, in Standing Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Colchester (Mr. Buck) moved an Amendment to set out this requirement instead of leaving it to the Rule Committee. In replying, the learned Attorney-General said that:
  "The Bill requires rules to provide for the transfer to the High Court of proceedings relating to the children where the transfer appears to the county court to be desirable. It also enables rules to be made so to provide in such other cases as may be specified in the rules. With this safeguard, I can see no reason why the county court judges should not have full jurisdiction to deal with issues of custody."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing Committee F, 15th June, 1967, c. 35.]
  So the right hon. and learned Gentleman was telling the Committee that there would be other cases which would be dealt with by the rules. To corroborate that impression, I remind him what the late Sir John Hobson said on the Report stage of the Measure, on 15th July, 1967, when he moved an Amendment fixing the level beyond which a case should go to the High Court. He said:
  "I also appreciate that the Rule Committee could deal with this under its general power to make rules on these matters in such cases as it may specify."

  969
  He appreciated that it was a general power of the Rule Committee to make rules on these matters, but by making his Amendment he showed that he preferred Parliament to make the decision.
  In his reply, the right hon. and learned Gentleman said:
  "The Government take the view that it would be undesirable to fetter a county court by requiring it to transfer proceedings where the amount of any order is likely to exceed a particular sum and the parties have not consented to the jurisdiction of the county court." [OFFICIAL REPORT, 5th July, 1967; Vol. 749, c. 1758–63.]
  He did not deal with the view expressed by his predecessor about the general power of the Rule Committee to make rules on these matters.
  I should like to hear from the right hon. and learned Gentleman what powers the Rule Committee was told it had which made it produce the rules that we are now debating. It is not only the view of some hon. Members; it is also the view of the Bar Council that Section 2(2) of the Act provides specifically for the Committee to be able to make rules in such cases.
  I ask again: was the Rule Committee permitted to discuss this question or was it prevented from doing so? The memorandum which the Law Society issued referred to the objections raised by the solicitor members of the Rule Committee Put said that they were eventually satisfied by the Lord Chancellor, who said that such rules were necessary to give effect to the intention of Parliament. Did Parliament have that intention? Is that the correct interpretation of Section 2(2)?
  In another place the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, said that others on the Committee signed with reservations. Were there reservations? If so, by whom? Were such reservations minuted? Was discussion and decision prevented? If so, although Parliament allowed the Bill to go through in the belief that the Rule Committee had power to make the relevant rules—and the Act provides that the Rule Committee had such power—the Minister refused to permit the Committee o discuss it and to make such rules.
  This is a serious matter. It may be that I am wrong, and I shall listen to the right hon. and learned Gentleman, who will no doubt tell us about it. This
  970
  matter could be challenged elsewhere. But if the House has given a Committee of experts a certain power and that power has not been exercised because the Committee was told that it could not exercise it, a very serious situation arises.
  I have only one comment to make on the merits of the rules themselves. They will be a sharp weapon in the hands of a wealthy party in divorce proceedings. A husband might be well off and his wife legally-aided, so that, in a custody case, she would be restricted to the county court scale while the husband's resources would be unlimited. Apart from the advice and representation which he could call upon, what will be the position of experts like doctors and psychiatrists who are often needed in these cases, when limited to the county court scale? What about the accountants who are often called in? All these matters are acceptable on a High Court scale, but will they be so on the county court scale? Is the balance not being shifted? The court can deal with such questions as whether George A has committed adultery with Mary Y, but we should ensure that the children are dealt with by the best possible judges.
  This will mean reduced remuneration for solicitors. The Prices and Incomes Board recommended an increase in their county court income. The Attorney-General said in Standing Committee:
  "The rules committee which will have responsibility for these sums will undoubtedly pay regard to the principle of fair remuneration."—OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing Committee F; 15th June, 1967, c. 50.]
  Have they been permitted to do so? I suspect that Parliament has been fobbed off with a Rule Committee which has been met with the Minister's diktat, and that remuneration is not fair but has been reduced, although the Prices and Incomes Board said that it should be increased.
  Hon. Members are quick to criticise lawyers, although it is said that there are more lawyers than representatives of any other profession in the House. The distinction should be made, perhaps, between lawyers and practising lawyers, but if there were such a great lobby, they should be turning out in their hordes this evening. We were quick to ensure fair remuneration for ourselves—
  Mr. Speaker: Order. With respect, there is no mention of remuneration in the Order which we are discussing.
  Sir P. Rawlinson: I think that there is in the costs rules, Mr. Speaker, which we are discussing at the same time—
  Mr. Speaker: Order. I am sorry. The hon. and learned Gentleman is right. We should, however, leave out the subject of the salaries of Members of Parliament.
  Sir P. Rawlinson: If any hon. Member wanted to criticise, it should be remembered that the majority of this work is done by the country solicitor who will suffer unfairly and service will deteriorate. Anyone who practices law does so to give a service and should be entitled to fair remuneration. I suspect that this has been settled by the Rule Committee because the solicitors signed under protest and I ask the right hon. Gentleman to give us the details of what other members signed under protest—
  Mr. Leo Abse: With great respect, I understand that the solicitors concerned have not signed this at all.
  Sir P. Rawlinson: I am obliged. I am completely wrong. The solicitors, of course, did not sign, and I should like to know whether any other members signed either of these sets of rules subject to any minute or reservation.
  What is the Law Commission's view of these rules? Has this Rule Committee, which makes these rules which play an important part in the machinery of the law, the opportunity to make such rules as it thinks right under the Act? Power was not given to the Lord Chancellor, as a Minister, to decide as he liked. He must not arrogate to himself powers which Parliament did not give him. The Act speaks for itself, as do the right hon. and learned Gentleman's words in Committee and the views of his predecessor and the Bar Council.
  I often detect criticism of Parliament's lack of control over Ministers, and it would be reinforced if these rules had been produced under a Minister's diktat. I have detected also a certain reluctance in matters of law to pay heed to what are described as time-consuming and sometimes as time-wasting arguments about law reform. But Parliament is a sensible body in which to debate law reform. Just as war is too important to be left to generals, so is law reform too important to be left to lawyers. The more it is discussed by hon. Members who are
  972
  not lawyers, the better for the law, because they bring the commonsense attitude of men who may serve on a jury or a bench. I hope that law reform will never be pushed through without listening to arguments in Parliament.
  My principal objections to the rules are that it is wrong that they do not provide that the parties at their own risk can go to the High Court for a decision in matters of access and maintenance and that it is wrong that a rate of remuneration for solicitors should be settled unfairly. I hope that the right hon. and learned Gentleman will tell us that the Rules and this legislation will be postponed until a proper and sensible Measure is brought forward.
  7.29 p.m.
  Mr. Gordon Oakes: I listened with great interest to the right hon. and learned Member for Epsom (Sir P. Rawlinson). I agree almost entirely with what he said, particularly in the second half of his speech. In the first half of it, I thought, there was a certain tendency to attack the Act itself.
  In addressing the House, I want to deal, in particular, with the second Motion relating to costs. I am a practising solicitor with a small divorce practice. In the Memorandum of the Law Society, which solicitor Members of the House received, these words occur:
  "The Council"
  —that is, the Council of the Law Society—
  "are not aware of any other section of the community, professional or otherwise, who are being asked in the present stringent economic situation to do the same or more work at a substantially reduced rate of remuneration and at a consequent personal loss."
  Mr. Mark Carlisle: The hon. Member states that that is the view of the Council of the Law Society. Does he agree that the same argument, under the same set of costs, applies equally to the Bar and to solicitors?
  Mr. Oakes: I entirely agree. I was quoting the Memorandum of the Law Society, but all my remarks have equal force for the members of the Bar. This is not a demarcation dispute between the two branches of the profession. We are all in this together, and we are all in the position that under the rule the same

  973
  amount of work, or possibly more work, 'A/ill bring substantially less money.
  I was a member of the Standing Committee on the Matrimonial Causes Bill. The right hon. and learned Member for Epsom quoted what my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General said about costs. I want to read a further quotation from my right hon. and learned Friend from the OFFICIAL REPORT of 22nd June, c. 70:
  "The Rule Committee is not specifically required to have regard to the principle of allowing fair remuneration in prescribing the scale and, in my submission, it is unnecessary to require it to have regard to that principle in prescribing the fixed costs to be allowed in undefended matrimonial causes. As the fixed costs will be related to the amounts which might be expected to be allowed if the costs were taxed, regard will in effect be paid to the principle of fair remuneration, but I do submit that it would not be appropriate that e Rule Committee should be told to have regard to this principle. I am quite confident that in practice it will have due regard to it."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing Committee F, 22nd June, 1967; c. 70–1.]
  They have not had due regard to it. That is what the Motion and the debate is about. Instead of having regard to the principle of fair remuneration on a 1968 basis, they have applied a scale of costs which was drawn up over 13 years ago for an entirely different class of work from divorce work—and that is tie scale of costs which will apply to both barristers and solicitors in this very important branch of the law.
  The Rule Committee, which is composed of my noble Friend the Lord Chancellor, two county court judges, two practising barristers and two solicitors, considered these rules, and, as my hon. Friend the Member for Pontypool (Mr. Abse) pointed out, the solicitor members of that Committee did not sign the rules. They did not sign the rules because the principle of fair remuneration had not been adopted. What is astonishing is that the Committe had before them, when they were considering these rules, the Report of the National Board for Prices and Incomes on the Remuneration of Solicitors, which had been published the week before that Committee meeting. Paragraph 65 of that Report states that solicitors are grossly underpaid—no matter what may be the view of the public or of hon. Members.
  Mr. Percy Grieve: May I reinforce the point which the hon. Mem-
  974
  ber makes? I hope that this will assist him. It is stated in the Matrimonial Causes Costs Rules that there should be allowable in respect of solicitors' charges, if counsel is briefed at the hearing, £40, or in a higher rate case, £43. That is in paragraph 7. I am given to understand that it is no more than a solicitor would have expected to earn in an undefended case in 1939, let alone 1955.
  Mr. Oakes: I am obliged to the hon. and learned Member. As far as I know, that is correct. I was at that point discussing what the Rule Committee had before them. They had before them the Report of the Prices and Incomes Board on the remuneration of solicitors, paragraph 65 of which said that solicitors are clearly grossly underpaid in present county court business, to such an extent that very many firms will not undertake it at all. They recommended that there ought to be an increase of no less than 55 per cent. in the costs of county court business. The Prices and Incomes Board had in mind this Bill, because in paragraph 66 they specifically stated that the principle of fair remuneration and their consideration of a general increase of costs ought to be regarded as essential by the Rule Committee.
  What the Law Society and the Bar Council, most Members of the House and certainly members of the Committee expected was that there would be a separate scale in divorce business just as there is a separate scale for bankruptcy business in the county courts. It must be remembered that all divorces will commence in the county courts. We cannot put a petitioner for divorce, whether undefended or defended, on the same basis as a plaintiff in an action for the recovery of debt. I think that hon. Members who are members of the Bar appreciate that before the matter ever goes before the courts, solicitors have a whole host of considerations to bear in mind. We are dealing with a family and with the children. We are dealing with the future lives of the parties, and with maintenance, which may amount to tens of thousands of £s over the years. We are dealing with the matrimonial home. All these matters must be considered before the petition is ever put down, and advice must be given upon them.
  This is a very human problem, and it should be related to a very different scale

  975
  from that of a man who is suing for the hire purchase payment of a motor car, for example. As a rule, a solicitor has to deal with distraught persons on either side of the divorce, not with a coherent business man who will explain the case quickly but with people often at their wits' end. He must have great patience and understanding, and it takes a great deal of time to sort matters out from the rather incoherent statements of the intended plaintiff or intended defendant. A different scale altogether is required in divorce business from that of any other business in the county court.
  It is often thought by members of the public and it is thought by hon. Members who are not lawyers—it is certainly exaggerated by the Press—that solicitors make a vast fortune. The Report of the Prices and Incomes Board should have dispelled that view. In this country solicitors are very much in the position of the Red Queen in Alice—they have been running for years to stand still. My senior partner in the firm in which I work outside the House is a man of nearly 60 who should be on the point of retiring. He has suffered a very severe illness, and a lesser man would have given up work altogether. He cannot sit at a desk to work. In fact, he works not eight hours a day, not 10 hours a day, but 12 or 14 hours a day—after 20 or 30 years in practice—because solicitors find themselves in the position of having to run fast in order to stand still.
  Mr. Anthony Grant: Would the hon. Gentleman agree that, unlike a number of other occupations, a solicitor—particularly the senior partner to whom he referred—is unable, because of economic events and the tax structure, to build up a capital asset and so prepare for his retirement? Is it not all the more reasonable, therefore, to ask that he be allowed to earn a reasonable livelihood?
  Mr. Oakes: That is indeed the position in which all solicitors find themselves. When the public generally consider the activities of large firms in London and the provinces, they may think that tremendous incomes are made, but these firms probably do expensive conveyancing work in the main and are not interested in divorce work. Many solicitors operate
  976
  on the theory that the money made on conveyancing subsidises the money lost on litigation. That is all very well if every firm of solicitors is doing its fair share of litigation, but that is not the position. Some firms do almost exclusively conveyancing while others must carry the burden of dealing with litigation on an unprofitable basis.
  Since the Rule Committee considered this matter, another question has entered into the issue—Selective Employment Tax. It has been increased in the Budget and while I am not attacking the tax, because I support it—I supported the Chancellor in imposing it—it is a tax on services and should not be a tax on the provider of services in the sense that the solicitor provides them in the county court. Under the Act a solicitor cannot agree to a figure of charges other than that laid down. This means that he must pay the S.E.T. at an increased rate without being able to recover it from his clients. He must, therefore, pay it out of his own pocket. S.E.T. was never designed as an additional tax on the individual but as a tax to enable services to contribute to the Exchequer. This is relevant to this matter, because the scales under the rules are too low and do not provide for this extra burden which solicitors must carry.
  The solicitor finds himself squeezed between the two and I therefore urge my right hon. and learned Friend to look at the rules again. It is rare for rules to be brought before Parliament and for a whole section of the legal profession—the entire solicitors' branch—to refuse to sign them. This is a danger signal which my right hon. and learned Friend must consider. We should have separate rules for divorce matters. New rules should, therefore, be introduced and they should be based on the fair and reasonable remuneration which my right hon. and learned Friend promised the Committee. Although I have the highest personal regard for my right hon. and learned Friend and admire him enormously as a lawyer and Minister, unless this is done I will not be able to support the Government if a Division is called.
  7.44 p.m.
  Sir David Renton: Speaking from the breadth of his great

  977
  practical experience, the hon. Member for Bolton, West (Mr. Oakes) properly described this as a human problem. Almost every hon. Member in the Chamber, and probably every hon. Member who will speak in this debate, is either a barrister or solicitor. When we are talking of what to many laymen will be considered to be as dry as dust, the rules of court, we should never forget that we are dealing all the time with matters which affect the married state, the happiness of children and the wellbeing of people whose lives have temporarily been badly upset over divorce. It is important, therefore, that the House and the public should be satisfied that the Government are acting in accordance with the wishes of Parliament and that nothing is being done hastily, badly or in a way likely to lead to unexpected and undesirable results. The hon. Member or Bolton, West, therefore, made a valuable contribution and I trust that the Attorney-General will heed his remarks.
  I feel rather sorry for the Attorney-General in this matter because although le must answer us, I very much doubt whether he has had to take a direct responsibility behind the scenes. As a Member of the Government, he must share the collective responsibility, of which we hope there will be very much more in the future.
  My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Epsom (Sir P. Rawlinson) reminded us in a convincing speech that under the 1967 Act various ancillary matters were to be not only discussed but decided by the Rule Committee. In a sense, Parliament therefore delegated to that Committee the decision on those matters. No doubt because he did not wish to make too long a speech, my right hon. and learned Friend did not go in great detail into those matters, but we should remember what is stated in rule 68 onwards. Those rules cover a large number of matters; for example, an order for alimony pending suit, a child maintenance order, a maintenance order, a secured provision order, a permanent alimony order, a lump sum order and various other matters.
  Mr. Grieve: Is my right hon. and learned Friend aware of matters like a variation of settlements order or a wife's property settlement order, matters which may involve considerable sums of money
  978
  far outside the normal county court's jurisdiction?
  Sir D. Renton: I am grateful to my hon. and learned Friend, although I said that there were various other matters dealt with. I mentioned only those which would most frequently arise.
  We must bear in mind not only those matters under the broad heading of "ancillary relief" but the fact that difficult decisions which have far-reaching effects and which involve considerable sums of money must be reached. Hon. Members with less legal experience may be tempted to say, "That is a matter for the rich. Parliament is concerned with the masses." If Parliament is incapable, by rules of court, to ensure that justice is done to the rich, then the outlook for the poor is not very good. The rich can always employ expensive lawyers—I shall return to the question of costs—and while we have legal aid, there is a shortage of lawyers generally and especially of lawyers applying the legal aid system. It is important, therefore, that the rules of court should ensure that the public have complete confidence in those rules as well as complete confidence in the way in which they are administered by judges and court officers.
  As my right hon. and learned Friend said, we are making a very big change in giving this jurisdiction to the county courts, and as Parliament in making the change specifically said that the ancillary matters were to be decided upon by the Rule Committee, we should be told exactly what consideration the Rule Committee gave to them. It would be very bad if there were the slightest doubt whether there was anything in my right hon. and learned Friend's suggestion that the Committee itself was not so fully seized of the matter but that a Minister invited it just to approve what was put forward. I hope that that did not happen, but I understand that in the profession there has been some doubt about it. I look forward to the Attorney-General's being able to reassure us on that point.
  It would be helpful to be enlightened on a point in the Explanatory Note to the Matrimonial Causes Rules, 1968. Paragraph (3) on page 71, states:
  "A woman with whom a husband is alleged to have committed adultery must be made a respondent, whether or not costs are

  979
  claimed against her (rule 13) and she will no longer be treated as a person entitled to intervene."
  One view of that statement is that it means a mere change of procedure, but I would suggest that it is such an important change of procedure that it amounts, in effect, to a change in the substantive law.
  Rule 13 states:
  "Unless otherwise directed … where a wife's petition alleges adultery with a woman named, the alleged adultress shall be made a respondent in the cause …"
  There may be good reasons for that rule, but the system whereby the woman named has had the right to intervene but not the obligation to become a party to the suit is one that has worked for a great number of years, and worked with reasonable satisfaction. If this change is being made merely by rules of court, we should be told exactly why it is being changed.
  I hope that the right hon. and learned Attorney-General will heed the advice of his hon. Friend and arrange for the Matrimonial Causes (Costs) Rules to be withdrawn, and to be reinstated when the matter, which is of very great importance, has been given further consideration.
  The background to the complaint of the hon. Gentleman and of my right hon. and learned Friend is that in England and Wales today there are more law students than ever before and their numbers increase as law schools are enlarged and new ones are created, but the number of lawyers relative to the amount of work that has to be done is nothing like enough. We all know it. We know it at the Bar. In the solicitor branch of the profession it has caused acute trouble in the administration of the legal aid scheme. With that as a background, and bearing in mind what the Prices and Incomes Board has said, it seems most extraordinary that in order to achieve a relatively minor economy the Government should have possibly made the situation even worse by reducing the remuneration payable.
  I am all against any branch of our profession being thought by the public to be overpaid, but the scales laid down here amount to about the same as was being paid 30 years ago, and before.
  980
  In those circumstances, if we want to see the legal aid scheme as applied to the new county court jurisdiction in divorce to go successfully, we should make sure that the remuneration offered to solicitors will be sufficient to attract enough solicitors to do the work. If that is not done, the intentions of the Government and of Parliament will be frustrated.
  I endorse what was said by my right hon. and learned Friend about what I can best describe as chickens and eggs and carts and horses, although he did not use those words. We all want to see law reform—goodness knows, we have had law reform in pretty well every year since the war, and it will go on, I think, for many more years—but this is a branch of the law in which we have to be fairly sure-footed when we step forward.
  It seems very strange, when we have the substantive law being dealt with in a divorce Bill going through the House, when we have the Beeching Committee sitting—and, we hope, not taking too long over its deliberations; it has had a fair amount of time already and is likely to report before very much more time has elapsed—and when we have the Law Commission nearly ready, presumably, to put forward proposals covering the whole range of family law, to introduce these rules, some of which are controversial, and to invoke the jurisdiction of the county court in divorce matters in the particular way in which it is proposed to be done. My right hon. and learned Friend was right to challenge the Government. We should be making sure of every step forward in a delicate matter like this which, as the hon. Gentleman said, affects mankind at large. These are human problems wrapped up in legal clothing, but we want to make sure that the legal clothing fits properly and is suited to every occasion.
  I hope that hon. Members who are not members of our profession will forgive us for taking up fortuitously available time—out of evil cometh good—to discuss this important matter; and that the right hon. and learned Attorney-General will be able to help us to some extent.
  8.0 p.m.
  Mr. Leo Abse: My hon. Friend the Member for Bolton, West (Mr. Oakes) said that he had his interest to

  981
  declare since, as he said with characteristic modesty, he had a practice which included a small divorce practice. Let me say with customary immodesty that I equally declare my interest, because I have a very large divorce practice. This does not mean that anything I can say would add to the weight of the argument of my hon. Friend except so far perhaps as precisely because of that it is open for me to speak on this subject with a little more detachment.
  I suppose that it would weary the House if I followed the course which has been already so well trodden by the right hon. and learned Member for Epsom (Sir P. Rawlinson). In much of what he said I am sure he spoke for all of us, or almost all of those present. It is curious with what unanimity the House is speaking tonight. Once again the Attorney-General is the stag at bay, as he has been ever since he started on this ill-favoured matrimonial causes legislation. I do not share the implied condemnation of the purposes of the Act itself which perhaps may have been seen within the right hon. and learned Gentleman's contributions, because I have long yearned for a Measure—and long urged a Measure—which would enable solicitors to deal with divorce in the county court for which they are well equipped.
  Equally, I do not raise any objections on these rules, because they will mean that much more will be done by county court judges and county court registrars for they are men who have had greater experience, certainly in the provinces, in dealing with divorce cases than many High Court judges. It seems sad that the Attorney-General once again has to come here on the defence, having successfully aroused, as I prophesied he would, the ire of the whole of the legal professions. I recall the rough words he used against me, doubtless imagining that I was exaggerating the position, when I warned him that he was moving forward to a complete confrontation with the solicitors' profession.
  The situation now is that when we come to these rules we find the solicitors, who are honourable men, found it quite impossible through their representatives, or at least those who spoke for them on the Rule Committee, to put their signatures to the basic rules we are discussing
  982
  tonight. How could they? Of course, they knew quite well the history of this matter. They know quite well that the real reason behind the Bill was not, I regret to say, a new zeal and passion for reform which inspires much of this Government's legislation. It was only because the Government had come to the conclusion that the burden of divorce on the Legal Aid Fund was unfortunately very high.
  I appreciate their concern; it is concern over a social question, but of course the increased burden was certainly not due to the fact that the Legal Aid Scheme was uneconomically administered. It was not due to the fact that it was ill-administered. Nor could it have been said in any way that there was a waste of public money. It could not be said that it was due to a mercenary attitude, or cupidity on the part of the legal profession. It never has been said that this is due to any of these matters. It could not have been said that here was another of those scandals which should have been referred to the Public Accounts Committee. There was no suggestion of that kind.
  There is a simple reason why there is this burden on the Legal Aid Fund. The burden is there, of course, because we have given, and we must take pride in giving, the same facilities to those who are without much means as to those who are wealthy to be able, if they wish, to go into the courts. So it is that in 1956 there were some 27,000 petitions for divorce and in respect of those 13,000 were legally aided, 10 years later, in 1966, the total number of petitions filed had risen to about 45,000 of which some 31,000 had legal aid certificates granted.
  The fact is that the reason for this burden which this Government have decided they want to deal with is that many more people are in a position to take advantage of the Legal Aid Scheme and wish to take advantage of it. If that is the position and if the Government find it intolerable, they could at least say to the House, "We find it intolerable and we have decided, because we are really prompted only by financial matters, that we are not going to permit people with incomes as high as at present to take advantage of the Legal Aid Scheme". They could have said that,

  983
  but of course it would have been highly inequitable. It would have meant that they would be savaging all their Socialist principles, but at least they could have said that.
  They could have taken up another attitude and decided that so pressing, apparently, was the need to save what they claim can be saved, £300,000 or £400,000, that they were so desperate, that they would insist on having a new permissive divorce law. They could have said, "We will permit divorce by consent. We regard these questions as so important, to save £300,000 or £400,000, that we shall radically alter the substantive law and take the initiative to allow people to divorce more easily." If that is to inform and inspire divorce Bills in future, if that were the attitude of mind of the Government because they wish understandably to reduce costs, they could have done so. On the other hand, if they wanted to make divorce more difficult they could have done that and it would deter people and reduce the number of petitions. But they did not do any of these things.
  They say they are determined to reduce costs. They say to solicitors, particularly those who, unfortunately, have comparatively small practices and do a limited amount of divorce work in the provinces, "In a period of rising costs we shall reduce these fees, even though the matter has been referred to the Prices and Incomes Board and the Prices and Incomes Board who with complete detachment, having made a complete assessment of the position has come to the conclusion that the existing scales which we are imposing on you are something like 55 per cent. less than they should be." Is it surprising that solicitors, who certainly are not the most radical of people as a profession, who certainly are not the sort of people who lightly invite confrontation with any Government, had reached their limits and found it necessary to protest, as they are protesting, against the imposition of rules which in any event are so totally premature?
  Mr. James Dempsey: Would my hon. Friend like to comment on the opinion that the rates of remuneration paid to solicitors and other legal personnel in legal aid cases
  984
  are rather generous? Would he like to express a point of view on that?
  Mr. Abse: It is not for those of us involved in the matter to make an assessment. It is fortunate for the legal profession that the Prices and Incomes Board has on the matter we are discussing made its assessment and come to the conclusion that in this particular respect they are receiving 55 per cent. less than they should be having if they are to get a fair remuneration held out by the Attorney-General in Committee.
  It is extraordinary that these Rules are introduced by a Government who could normally have pointed to their reforming zeal and who could have got all the kudos, as they are entitled to get, from the establishment of the Law Commissions and for their elasticity. After three years in power, with this great record behind them, the Government choose to opt for the miserable picture of a direct confrontation with the whole legal profession. It is sad. It is impolitic. The implications of it have not been considered by the Government. Solicitors are part of the opinion forming process. Their views are still respected. They are very articulate, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General knows to his sorrow.
  The Attorney-General (Sir Elwyn Jones): Not too much sorrow.
  Mr. Abse: I am glad that my right hon. and learned Friend so praises my own articulate plea for the profession. He should not under-estimate, as I fear the Lord Chancellor did in another place, the amount of work which has to go into the preparation of a divorce case. I understand, though, how easily my right hon. and learned Friend could have been misled. There were other days when he was gracious enough to accept briefs from me. On those occasions the most succinct of briefs were presented to him. He will agree that they were short and pert, but that they always masked the great deal of work which had to be done so that the matter could be presented with great clarity to my right hon. and learned Friend, who, taking full advantage of such briefs, with his inimitable charm and profound knowledge of the law invariably made all our clients extraordinary happy.

  985
  However, my right hon. and learned Friend should not be misled by such experiences. The fact that he was presented with such briefs, not only by myself but also by many other solicitors, does not mean that a solicitor's work can be assessed by the amount of time that a case takes in court. It is unfortunate that the practice followed by so many of us of subsidising litigation—by in some respects playing Robin Hoods—should be perpetuated by these rules. A considerable number of smaller firms—and, indeed, larger firms—will undoubtedly be driven into the position of refusing, because it will not pay them—in fact, because they will lose money—to take on work which they should take on. It is natural that they will be attracted to the work which will give them a fair living. It is equally natural that when they find they are making a loss upon such work they will turn from it.
  I understand that in a similar debate in another place the Lord Chancellor pointed out that solicitors have been told in the Report from the National Board for Prices and Incomes that conveyancing charges need readjusting. That is relevant to this matter, because it is logical to argue that in answer to one's plea that one is hard done by in county court costs one is told to make adjustments in conveyancing costs, as the National Board said in a very careful and fair Report.
  In another place the Lord Chancellor advanced an argument which I hope that my right hon. and learned Friend will not adopt. The Lord Chancellor said that he is now waiting for the Law Society to make its comments upon the Report of the National Board and that, on receipt of the Law Society's comments, the Government will consider them. That is not the way to proceed. As the National Board has made this Report, the bodies concerned should be given fair opportunity and fair time to collect the opinions of the profession and to present their report. In the light of that, the Government should concern themselves with these rules.
  Many weighty arguments have been presented for the postponement of these rules. There is now an additional argument, in the light of the Report of the National Board. Solicitors should be
  986
  given full opportunity to decide what they wish to do or what they suggest should be done so that they can readjust their conveyancing fees, as a consequence of the Report of the National Board. To put the cart before the horse in this way is an additional reason for solicitors to think that an affront is being committed by the passing of these rules.
  I very much regret that the Government have, from the beginning, taken such a short-sighted attitude. They will not save the amount of money they have in mind. That saving is illusory. The Government have over-stated the amount which can be saved. At the end of the day they will find that they have gone through unnecessary opprobrium, all to no purpose. This is becoming a habit of theirs. This, presumably, is a precursor of the general prices and incomes policy and the legislation that is to come. Although I recognise that Governments have to take unpopular decisions and have to be bold, I do not understand why the Government so gratuitously must invite so much bad feeling from the whole legal profession. I join other hon. Members in expressing the hope that these unfortunate rules will be postponed.
  8.17 p.m.
  Mr. Ian Percival: I support my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Epsom (Sir P. Rawlinson) on both Prayers. I propose to confine myself mainly to the question of solicitors' remuneration, but I support my right hon. and learned Friend's plea on the main rules to this extent. There may be substantial arguments both ways as to what matters and ancillary matters should be left entirely to the county court judge and in respect of which ones the parties should have a discretion. If the Rule Committee had discussed this question and had reached a corporate decision on the matters which the House clearly left to that Committee, the House could not complain.
  The aspect upon which the whole House—there is nothing party about this—looks to the Attorney-General and, in his absence, to the Solicitor-General to help it is the question which was raised by my right hon. and learned Friend. Can it be right for the Government to say to the House, "We will leave those matters for a Rule Committee, consisting of a

  987
  panel of experts, to discuss and decide" and for there then to be a situation, that discretion and those functions having been given to that Committee, in which the Committee did not discuss those matters as matters at large and as matters on which its views were welcome?
  I repeat my right hon. and learned Friend's request. I hope that we shall hear a little more from the Attorney-General about what happened in the deliberations of the Rule Committee. Were the members of that Committee invited to express their opinions as to whether there should be a right in any particular case for the parties to choose the High Court; or was the whole matter pre-empted, as the talk which is going round leaves one to believe? Was it not made clear that the Committee's views on this question were not really wanted, that the matter had been decided and included in the draft rules?
  No doubt, the draft rules were laid before the Committee. I make no complaint about that, provided that they were laid before the Committee as a subject for discussion, if, on the other hand—as there seems some reason to believe—they were laid before the Committee not as a subject for discussion, not as containing matter upon which the views of the Committee were desired but as something which had already been pre-empted, a serious question of principle is raised. It is not right for this House to be persuaded to leave a discretion to a Committee of this kind if thereafter the Committee will not be invited or allowed to exercise that discretion.
  There are only two people who can help the House in this matter, the Law Officers. I am sure that both of them take the view that, as Law Officers, they are the servants of the House. Here is an opportunity for them to render a service to the House, irrespective of party. Let them tell us what happened. If what we believe may have happened has happened in fact, let us have it out in the open so that we may make sure—I am certain that they personally would wish it—that such a situation does not arise again. If the Government intend that they should have the power to say what the rules are, let them take responsibility in this House and write the provisions
  988
  they want into the Act itself so that we may discuss them here.
  I come now to the question of solicitors' remuneration. It is always difficult for anyone to get excited about someone else's pay. I think it unlikely that I shall hold any briefs in undefended divorce cases in the county court, so I can fairly say that the provisions of these rules are of no financial interest to me as an individual. If this were a matter simply of solicitors' income or profits, I might be less interested and say that it was no affair of mine. But there is far more in this matter than the mere question of how much solicitors should earn. It involves matters of wide public importance.
  The question of solicitors' remuneration affects our whole system for the administration of justice. It is not possible to exaggerate the importance for every man, woman and child in the country of having an efficient system for the administration of justice. The administration of justice touches all of us in almost every aspect of our lives, not least those aspects in which we British claim to have a great interest, namely, our individual liberties, the liberties of our fellow subjects, and the preservation of those liberties against the depredations of the State. There is nothing which can assist the subject in these matters save the law.
  Because we pay lip-service to the idea that the administration of justice is important, we have one Committee after another sitting on the matter. We had the Streatfeild Committee a few years ago, and now we have the Beeching Commission, which we hope will report soon. It ought never to be forgotten that it does not matter how well we organise our system unless we have the right people, and the right number of people, to work it. Furthermore, in view of what has been said and done about these costs, it is necessary to add the reminder in certain quarters that the solicitor's profession is a vital link in the administration of justice. That is where it all starts. Some of it is dealt with entirely by solicitors. Under this Act, more will be dealt with by solicitors. But, even if solicitors do not do it all themselves and they go to counsel, it all starts with them.
  I do not doubt the Government's desire to reform the law, by which I mean not just change it but improve it—the two are sometimes a little confused—but they

  989
  are in danger of producing a result very different from what they desire by putting too heavy a burden upon practitioners and causing a breakdown in the very system which they desire to improve. In the past three years, we have had a large burden of complicated legislation, legislation which taxes the skill and experience of any practitioner on either side of the House. It is very time-consuming. It means that the citizen has to seek advice more often because he cannot understand the law. The solicitor, even if he is lucky enough to understand some of it, has to spend much longer in explaining it. In many more cases, he has to admit that he cannot understand it, he goes to counsel, who in turn says that he does not understand it, and then the wretched lay client says, "What an ass the law is". The whole system is in danger.
  A great many more people are needed to work these changes in the law if they are to be worked at all. Are we getting them?
  In his speech in another place last Thursday the Lord Chancellor said that it is estimated that the solicitors' profession is already 5,000 under strength. I think that that means that a 25 per cent. increase is needed to get it up to the number which can provide the service the citizen needs. The shortage is not only in private practice. Hon. Members who are in the profession will no doubt correct me if I am wrong, but I understand that that reference was to a shortage of 5,000 in the practising profession of solicitors, and does not allow for the shortage of lawyers in other fields, not least in Government Departments.
  All of this is of direct relevance now. I am not thinking only of the question of an individual solicitor's pocket but of whether we shall have enough solicitors to provide the service that people reed. Hon. Members opposite with great experience of this matter have given instances of why the remuneration is too low and why it cannot cover increased costs and so on. The strength of their case is that this does not need any proof from their side. Everybody from the Lord Chancellor down agrees that the scale of remuneration now proposed is wholly inadequate. The noble and learned Lord said on Thursday:
  990
  "One thing that is quite plain is that county court fees—and this applies to both barristers and solicitors—could not possibly be right, …"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, House of Lords, 4th April, 1968; Vol. 290, c. 1451.]
  And yet that is the scale which the Government propose, and indeed up to now are providing, for the remuneration of a body which has a public service to perform. The Government are providing for a scale which, in the Lord Chancellor's own words, could not possibly be right.
  In addition to those already raised by other hon. Members, there are three serious objections to it. First, there is a question of principle. No matter whose remuneration it is talking about, it is quite wrong for the House when it has the duty of prescribing remuneration, to lay down a scale which, on its own admission, could not possibly be right. How can that make sense? How can it be sensible as a question of principle?
  Mr. Ted Leadbitter: I have followed the debate with interest and agree with everything that has been said about solicitors' status, their work and the Report of the Prices and Incomes Board, which recommended a 55 per cent. increase in county court costs. But is the hon. and learned Gentleman really saying that the very year in which every other worker in the country must accept a certain level of remuneration across the board is the right one in which to apply what he suggests?
  Mr. Percival: I am glad that some non-lawyers are intervening, because it gives the opportunity of clearing up questions which might otherwise go by default. If the matter were approached as the hon. Gentleman suggests, he might have a point. But this question is based on a misconception of what is happening. This is not a matter of limiting solicitors to what they are already earning. The Prices and Incomes Board, curiously enough, says that that is not enough and that it must be increased—and soon—even having regard to all the economic circumstances. It is not a question even of keeping remuneration where it is. These rules provide for a lower rate of remuneration for what is, broadly speaking, the same work done in a different place. I do not know of any other profession or occupation in which anybody has yet been asked to

  991
  do more than to hold his horses, or to keep his increases to what is called the norm. I do not know of any case in which people have been asked to take a cut in the pounds, shillings and pence in addition to the cut which results from the steadily rising costs they must suffer.
  Mr. Leadbitter: There is no difference between us here. It is a question of clearing up a small point. I think that the hon. and learned Gentleman has adequately answered my question except in this: does not he agree that the Budget proposals require a 1 per cent. reduction in the standard of living of all our people, and will he accept, therefore, that this is the wrong time of the year in which to put the proposal he makes?
  Mr. Percival: Again I am glad if there is one point outstanding and the hon. Gentleman gives me a chance to deal with it. I think that he is a little optimistic about the figure of 1 per cent. I would think that the Budget proposals will result in considerably more than a 1 per cent. reduction in the standard of living, but I suggest to him that there is no connection between that and the point about which we are arguing.
  All of us, whatever our remuneration, will have to suffer the consequences of the Budget—namely, that our remuneration will be worth 1 per cent. or 5 per cent. less. But what is asked of the solicitors' profession is that, on top of this, they should suffer an additional cut which no one else has yet been asked to suffer, as far as I know, by having not only to put up with the fact that the value of what they are getting will become less but with taking less in terms of £s, shillings and pence than they are already receiving, which of itself is based on a scale fixed many years ago and already patently out of date.
  Mr. Hugh Rossi: Pursuing that point, would not my hon. and learned Friend agree that the new cost rules proposed mean that the fixed remuneration for a solicitor could be between £40 and £43 for undefended divorces, which is what a solicitor was earning in 1939 for an undefended divorce? Could he state what other section of the community would be prepared, in the interests of the national economy, to go back
  992
  to what they were earning £ for £ in 1939 in their job, forgetting entirely the devaluation in the purchasing power of the £ since 1939?
  Mr. Percival: I do not want to get involved in too much detail here. I am a member of the other profession. I prefer to express what I think to be a disinterested view of these scales, which I hold as someone who is concerned about the efficient administration of justice. I suppose that, if everyone's situation got to the stage—as perhaps it may before long—when they were asked to take a cut in net earnings, so be it, but that is not being asked here. It is not a question of being asked to do anything. The solicitors are having forced down their throats a scale which, by common consent, cannot be right and which has the consequence of paying them less than they have been paid for doing similar work until recently, which scale itself is perhaps 20 or more years out of date.
  I return to my point of principle. I urge upon the House that it cannot be right, it is a misuse of the trust and power reposed in this House, for this House, when it has the power to prescribe what someone shall be paid, to prescribe that remuneration at rates which everyone from the Lord Chancellor down, agrees cannot possibly be right. We ought not to do it in any circumstances.
  It is even more serious—and this raises another question of principle on which I hope we shall have the assistance of the Law Officers—and is even worse when it follows an assurance given by the right hon. and learned Attorney-General in these terms when the question of fair and reasonable remuneration was discussed:
  "The Rule Committee is not specifically required to have regard to the principle of allowing fair remuneration … it is unnecessary to require it to have regard to that principle…As the fixed costs will be related to the amounts which might be expected to be allowed if the costs were taxed, regard will in effect be paid to the principle of fair remuneration …"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing Committee F, 22nd June, 1967; c. 70.]
  There is nothing critical of the right hon. and learned Gentleman in what I am saying. I have no doubt that, when he gave that assurance, he did so in the belief that it would be honoured, as any hon. Member with any experience of the law would fully have expected, because I

  993
  do not think that any hon. Member, even without the assurance of the Attorney-General, could posibly have foreseen that the Government would fix remuneration at anything less than was fair and reasonable. Here we have a case where we have that specific assurance from the right hon. and learned Attorney-General which I have no doubt he gave only because he genuinely believed that it would be adhered to but which has been set at naught by the manner in which this has been dealt with. These rates are by common consent not fair or reasonable and have been forced upon the Rules Committee by the Government after that assurance given in the House by the Government. I hope that the Attorney-General will feel the same about that as the rest of the House feels—that it is singularly unfortunate that such an assurance cannot be honoured.
  In a speech which I have read with the greatest care, the Lord Chancellor appeared to lay all the blame at the door of the Prices and Incomes Board. I was somewhat surprised, as hon. Members opposite may have been, by the sort of criteria which the Board thought suitable `or determining what was reasonable remuneration. However, be that as it may, the Board cannot be blamed for this, because, as was pointed out by the hon. Member for Bolton, West (Mr. Oakes), the Board itself says that the determination of the charges for divorce work in the county courts, which have et to be fixed, should be consistent with its recommendation for an increase in the level of county court income. It could not be more specific. It expected the Rules Committee to fix the new costs in accordance with the views expressed by the Board, and that is just what the Mules Committee, or the Government, has not done.
  I read the Lord Chancellor's speech with great care several times. The Prices and Incomes Board has expressed the view that county court costs are too low and ought to be increased by an average of 55 per cent., but that some other costs are too high. The Lord Chancellor has apparently accepted that view and said, "We must now negotiate the new scales of costs". What he has done is to fix the fees for this very important work at levels which he himself has said are not enough to cover even the cost,
  994
  while at the same time saying, "Now we will negotiate about an increase, but at the same time you will have to accept some decreases in your other fees".
  I hope that we shall hear from the Law Officers about this. No doubt taking this course will strengthen the hand of the Lord Chancellor in those negotiations. He dealt himself a few more trumps by including in the costs which have to go up these new divorce costs. His position will now be very strong in the negotiations in which, as he made it clear, he considers that the solicitors will have to give ground on their other fees. I question as a method of fixing remuneration for an entirely new branch of work such as this, in which the principle should be that those who do it should have fair and reasonable remuneration from the start.
  I hope that the Government will think again. It could just be that a course of action which has attracted such universal criticism from within the profession is wrong. I hope that we shall not hear, "We must look at this in the broad context", and, "All the speeches have been in support of a narrow self-interest". I do not believe that. There is at stake a matter of wide and great importance, because unless we establish, accept and abide by the principle that all those who are expected to play a part in that most important of services, the administration of justice, should receive fair and reasonable remuneration for doing so, the system of justice which we profess to love and admire, and which is certainly the envy of the rest of the world, will no longer retain that position. If it is allowed to slip back from that position, we shall be doing this country just about the greatest disservice we can do it.
  8.45 p.m.
  Sir Barnett Janner: We have all listened with considerable interest to the speeches which have been made, and I hope that my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General will have listened with equal interest to the points which have been raised during the debate. I make an appeal to my right hon. and learned Friend because, as my hon. Friend the Member for Pontypool (Mr. Abse) has said, he knows what is at stake.
  I should; of course, declare my interest. I am a solicitor. From a varied and

  995
  interesting practice, my right hon. and learned Friend could, I am sure, make a speech emphasising the points which have been made even much better than those who have, nevertheless, done so well during their speeches. My right hon. and learned Friend knows that this is a matter which affects a large section of the community who will now seek remedies in the people's court—the county court—which has been accustomed, year in and year out, to deal with problems and cases relating to the so called man in the street.
  We are discussing an extension of the activities of a court which, throughout the whole of one's experience, has never paid solicitors adequately, unless they have been so engaged with county court work that they had nothing else to think about—in other words, coming into court with case after case and devoting practically the whole of their time to that kind of practice.
  That situation cannot prevail for cases which are as widespread as the kind which we are now discussing. The county courts are to deal with matters which have exercised the minds of High Court judges and frequently of eminent counsel, as well as eminent solicitors. I do not think that the nation as a whole understands what is involved. Those who come with their cases to a solicitor's office begin to realise what it is about because the time that is taken to get at the salient facts in a case certainly, as my hon. Friend the Member for Pontypool has said, cannot possibly be measured by the words of the brief which hitherto has been produced for counsel.
  Apart from professional people, how many—including, I venture to suggest, counsel, who have never had experience of being in a solicitor's office—know what is involved? It is not what is ultimately produced in the way of the brief, as I have said, that is the test of the work involved It consists partly in eliminating material which is irrelevant, but to the person who is involved in the case very relevant until and unless he realises what is legally at issue.
  A person goes into a solicitor's office and gives his version of the matter. It takes a very long time for an experienced person to investigate which part of that
  996
  material is of importance to the case. This procedure applies in divorce cases to no less an extent than it applies in other very involved cases. This means that an experienced man or woman in the office, perhaps a principal, perhaps a managing clerk, has to spend hours sorting out what is important. The client often returns time after time until ultimately the material has been so sifted out that it is ready to present to a court. The witnesses concerned think that everything they have to say is relevant, and they have to be extremely carefully handled so that they do not feel that an injustice is being done to them if material they produce is not used.
  It may sound very mundane to put the matter in this way in the House, but the individuals who prepare the case have to be paid, the rent of the office has to be paid and the secretaries have to be paid. The payment for these services is not the same as it was in 1955, yet as the House realises, solicitors have received no increase in the place of fees since that time.
  I am sorry that my hon. Friend, who asked why solicitors should not take lower fees as do others, has left the Chamber. He asked why solicitors should not reduce their present fees. Solicitors have rendered a very big service to the country in legally aided cases. Instead of taking the full fee, they have taken a cut fee on taxed costs, a fee which has been at the same rate for some 13 years.
  These are matters that should be known to the public. Many silly remarks are made about the solicitors' profession, which would not be made if people understood the work they do. If they understood, instead of denigrating the work they would realise it is extremely important in the administration of justice. The Prices and Incomes Board, which has investigated every detail of solicitors' activities, is made up of independent persons who are not solicitors. They investigated whether the income or the price charged is a reasonable one. They came to the conclusion that a solicitor doing only county court work would not be able to exist because his fees are 55 per cent. less than he ought to be charging to enable him to live.
  Over the years thousands of cases have been taken on by solicitors without any

  997
  remuneration at all, in the same way as medical practitioners treat some patients for no fee. Do hon. Members think that every case which comes into a solicitor's office is regarded as one in which payment is expected? I am sure that no one can name any other profession or trade which would be prepared to be paid 55 per cent. less than what is reasonable. I appeal to the Attorney-General to take that into account and deal with the matter on that basis.
  As it is entitled to do, the Law Society watches the interests of its members, but it also watches the interests of the community as a whole, as shown by its disciplinary rules, and so on.
  Mr. Grieve: It is not only in consequence of its disciplinary rules, but by reason of the fact that the country has entrusted the Law Society with the administration of the Legal Aid Scheme that it looks after the interests of the community.
  Sir B. Janner: I am obliged to the hon. and learned Gentleman. It is not often that that kind of compliment is paid here to the profession, but when it is, we are grateful to those who appreciate what is being done.
  The Law Society has inquired into the matter. It has not done so lightly, and the results of its inquiry have been submitted to the Lord Chancellor and to the Law Officers. Why have they not accepted what is an eminently reasonable case? The Law Society points out that the fixed costs, and the scale of tax costs, passed by the Rule Committee were based on Section 4 of the County. Court scales of costs which were formulated in 1955 and came into force o a 1st January, 1956. This means that the position has remained unaltered for more than twelve years. Can any hon. Member tell me of any other example of remuneration remaining the same for the last twelve years?
  County courts are now being asked to do the work which used to be done in the High Court, and solicitors are being called upon to do what counsel used to do. It might interest the House to know that a solicitor will receive about 15 per cent. to 18 per cent. less than he would have done had he prepared the same case before, when he did not have the responsibility of presenting it to the court.
  998
  Hitherto, a solicitor prepared a case, and counsel took the responsibility for any slip that was made in its presentation.
  We must get the new situation into its proper perspective. Previously a solicitor was able to rely on counsel to a certain extent. Now he will have to depend upon himself, unless he is able to get counsel to take a case in a county court, and I am not sure that many counsel will be prepared to take such cases, bearing in mind the scales of remuneration that are being suggested. I do not know whether any of the hon. and learned Gentlemen opposite will see fit to go into a county court, in view of some of the scales that are being allowed.
  This is an extremely important matter from the point of view of the community. I do not wish to reiterate what has already been said, but we must get the question of this payment into its proper perspective. We want the work done properly, and we must remember that a solicitor cannot afford to lose money, any more than anybody else can. He cannot carry on a practice if his overheads are not covered. He certainly cannot live unless an additional payment is made to him. He has to study for a long time before qualifying and he has large responsibilities when in practice. In those circumstances I appeal to my right hon. and learned Friend to do something about the situation and not to allow an unfortunate position to arise, which will make it impossible for a solicitor to carry on his work.
  The idea that, because some other kind of work done by a solicitor is more remunerative than some people think it should be, the litigation department of a solicitor's office should be run at a loss is ludicrous. How can a solicitor employ a managing clerk and a staff—especially if his firm is a small one—and be expected to run a litigation department if it is not paying albeit in some small measure? That is what will happen in the present contemplated situation.
  In the circumstances it is likely that in future those interested in advocacy and others who would like litigation work will not be persuaded to enter the profession. We shall not obtain the necessary executive and all other kinds of staff who are required in this kind of work. In the long run this will deal a severe blow to

  999
  people who are seeking redress of their grievances in the courts.
  That situation is not to be desired. It has already been stated that the profession is 5,000 short of its required numbers. We certainly do not want to take a step which will make it even less desirable to enter the profession simply because people will not be able to make a likelihood at it. It is an honourable, important and responsible profession. It is necessary for the country and for the people, and it is in that sense that I appeal to my right hon. and learned Friend to revise his ideas on this matter.
  9.9 p.m.
  Mr. Mark Carlisle rose—
  Mr. J. T. Price: On a point of order. The Chair has already called seven or eight hon. and right hon. Gentlemen. It is obvious that at the moment the House is almost completely occupied by professionally qualified lawyers, who have a personal interest in this matter. I submit that it is about time that we had a speech from a lay Member who was representative of the public interest and who could put the opposite point of view, regardless of which side of the House he came from. The lawyers are all ganged up together.
  Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Sydney Irving): The Chair is conscious of the difficulties of a situation like this, but it would be proper if hon. Members were to leave the selection of speakers to the Chair.
  Mr. Carlisle: I am sure that, if the hon. Gentleman tries to catch your eye later, Mr. Deputy Speaker, he will probably be successful, but if he had been in the House earlier, he would have heard one non-lawyer, his hon. Friend the Member for The Hartlepools (Mr. Leadbitter) say that as a layman he sympathised with the arguments advanced from both sides.
  This is an extraordinary place. I came here intending to speak on crime and would probably have made that speech at this very moment. At least it is an ill wind that blows no one any good, because, as the previous business fell, we have had a good deal of time to consider these important rules.
  Many hon. Gentlemen have mentioned solicitors' costs, but, although I sympa-
  1000
  thise, I want to come back to the question of how the rules were passed. Some people, including, we understand, the Rule Committee, feel that it could not consider the type of rules which some of its members considered within its jurisdiction. Section 1(3) of the Act says:
  "Every matrimonial cause shall be commenced in a divorce county court, but rules of court … may provide for the transfer to that court of matrimonial causes which remain undefended."
  Subsection (5) says:
  "Rules of court shall define the circumstances in which any matrimonial cause is to be treated for the purposes of this Act as undefended …"
  A reasonable interpretation was that the Rule Committee could lay down rules stating in what circumstances a case was deemed to be defended or undefended.
  This was to some extent substantiated by the Attorney-General when he said in Committee:
  "The Bill requires rules to provide for the transfer to the High Court of proceedings relating to the children where the transfer appears to the county court to be desirable. It also enables rules to be made so to provide in such other cases as may be specified in the rules."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing Committee F, 15th June, 1967; c. 35.]
  One understands from memoranda received from hon. Members that it was clearly indicated to the Rule Committee that it had no right to consider this matter and that a decision on whether a case should be treated as undefended had been decided by Parliament without reference to the Committee.
  I hope that we may hear whether this matter was raised and some members of the Committee signed the rules with a protest, and why the right hon. and learned Gentleman does not consider that it was within the Committee's competence to decide this question. There is no doubt that to a large extent these rules produce a complete absurdity in the present jurisdiction of the county court. In normal matters the county court judges have jurisdiction to decide actions relating to sums of up to £500. Yet, taken at its very lowest, their jurisdiction in the county courts on divorce would enable them to decide ancillary matters amounting not to £500 overall but to £500 a year in maintenance, perhaps continuing for 20, 30 or even 40 years. It cannot be outside the knowledge

  1001
  of the Attorney-General and the Solicitor-General that many cases are settled in the courts in which maintenance of £1,000 is commonplace. Whereas we limit the jurisdiction of a county court judge to £500 in a straightforward action, by these rules we are giving him jurisdiction to decide cases which may run into tens of thousands of pounds, without Parliament having expressed a view whether such jurisdiction is suitable in the county court.
  As most of my practising time as a barrister is spent on the northern circuit, I am mindful of the argument which says that divorce cases in the High Court have normally been carried out by county court judges and that, unlike in London, they have jurisdiction in matters over children and in substantial matters of maintenance. But the Government's argument justifying the introduction of the Act was to do away with what they called the absurdity of High Court jurisdiction when the work was being carried out by county court judges. As a result of these rules, they have made the service very much the worse, because by giving the county courts jurisdiction in divorce they have at the same time given them jurisdiction in ancillary maters far outside their normal limit.
  Previously it could be argued that those who served the High Court as commissioners were often county court judges, but at least their jurisdiction arose from the fact that they were sitting in the High Court. Now they are taking back into the county court jurisdiction which previously existed only in the High Court. The anomaly therefore continues. Indeed, it continues still further, because it follows from the logic of these rules that an undefended case should be tried by a county court judge but that if defended, whether short or long defended, it is a matter for the High Court. Will the Attorney-General deal with that point? If that is so, are we to understand that under these rules High Court judges will in future try defended actions? That is an obvious corollary of the provision that undefended cases are to be tried by county court judges.
  I understand that the Government propose to continue the practice of inviting county court judges to sit as commissioners to try the defended lists on circuit. If that is so, they are not only perpetuat-
  1002
  ing the anomaly but are extending it, since presumably county court judges will be trying long defended cases as well. I should have thought that this proved the nonsense of introducing these rules at this time; that is, at this time when it is clear that the courts are not prepared for it, when the whole of the divorce law is under change as a result of the Private Member's Bill introduced by hon. Gentlemen opposite and when the Law Commission is considering the whole question of family law.
  There is no doubt that solicitors have a justifiable grievance. On 31st January the Prices and Incomes Board, on which the present Government rely so heavily, recommended that solicitors' costs for county court work should be increased by 55 per cent. because, the Board said, the work was hopelessly unremunerative. After that, these rules were laid down, with costs for divorce work in the county court based on the same scale of costs as that which the Board had said was 55 per cent. under value.
  Members of both sides of the legal profession are often under attack in this House. Would any hon. Member seriously believe that chaos would not be caused if a recommendation of the Prices and Incomes Board for an increase in costs of 55 per cent. was ignored by the Government, the matter having been referred by the Government to the Board? Alternatively, would any hon. Member suggest that if the Board had recommended that no increase should take place, the Government would not accept that recommendation? Equally, if a substantial increase has been recommended, it should not be ignored.
  We see that there is a considerable hardship to the solicitors' part of the profession. This must mean a loss of £30 or £40 per undefended case, although the work that solicitors are doing is exactly the same as that performed before this Act. Such a loss cannot be justified, despite the Lord Chancellor pointing out in another place that the reason for the reduction in costs was the fact that much of this work was now being done in the county courts rather than in the High Court; so that, by moving the work from one to the other, costs should come down. However, although divorce work may have been removed to the county court, it has meant only the removal of what

  1003
  would otherwise have come within the High Court jurisdiction from the point of view of money and ancillary matters.
  Perhaps I have spoken for too long on this issue, but had I been called to speak on the subject of crime I could have spoken for longer, although I appreciate that to do so now would put me out of order.
  Mr. Speaker: Order. It would indeed.
  Mr. Carlisle: I said earlier, Mr. Speaker, that I would try not to be tempted.
  I ask the Attorney-General to consider again the timing of these rules, the constitutional basis on which the Rule Committee acted, and the considerable unfairness, of which one could give individual examples, that the Government are perpetrating on part of our profession by asking solicitors to accept remuneration so much below that which they were already receiving for other work.
  9.20 p.m.
  Mr. J. T. Price: If it is not indecent for a lay Member of the House to intervene in a debate that has so far been completely dominated by our legal friends on both sides, I propose to speak briefly and without entering into the technical arguments that have been so eloquently put forward.
  I have listened to some, but not to all, of the speeches. A good many hon. Members have already said, speaking from various angles as professional operators in the law courts, that we are here dealing with a matter of principle. I deny that to be the case. It is fundamentally a debate about money—filthy lucre—
  Mr. Speaker: Order. It is a debate about two Statutory Instruments which have to do with matrimonial causes: money enters into it a little bit.
  Mr. Price: I would not for one moment get at cross purposes with the Chair on such a matter. I need not use too much illustration of what I mean. I mean that Statutory Instruments 281 and 219—both of which, incidentally, I have read—concern the procedure by which matrimonial causes are to be conducted and the conditions under which the solicitors are to be paid. My justification for using the words "filthy lucre" is that I believe in calling
  1004
  a thing by its proper name. It sometimes irritates me when lawyers who are so skilled in advocacy speak in the House—without always declaring an interest in a matter—and succeed in injecting an atmosphere favourable to their profession, something that I regard as an abuse of their position here.
  This is an occasion when, if I had been professionally interested, I would never have crossed the Bar of the House—I should have been too shy to say anything. I am not professionally interested, but I do not speak entirely as one who does not know anything about what happens in the legal profession. As my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, North-West (Sir B. Janner) knows, in a previous incarnation I had a good deal to do with his profession and its affairs—
  Sir B. Janner: I have no knowledge of any previous incarnation of my hon. Friend the hon. Member for Westhoughton (Mr. J. T. Price). I am sure that it must have been a very pleasant one, whatever it was.
  Mr. Price: My hon. Friend would be kicking into his own goal if he agreed with me there, but I am grateful for what he has said.
  The real gravamen of the complaint of those hon. Members who are barristers or solicitors is that a great deal of the business that used to be conducted in the High Court and was paid for on High Court scales has been transferred to the county court where it is remunerated on a much lower scale. The scale at one time used to be called the Liverpool Court of Passage fees. The name was altered later, but that was the sort of rate fixing trade union basis. Just as the engineers have a basic rate fixed by a 1939 agreement which is always quoted, so the lawyers always quoted the Liverpool Court of Passage fees as the basis of their remuneration.
  This has all been altered by two factors. The Government, rightly or wrongly, have decided—I believe rightly—that there are so many petitions filed for divorce in these days that a great deal of the business has been blocking the High Courts to the exclusion of more important common law and criminal actions which could occupy the time of learned judges and it is common sense to channel some of the divorce work into

  1005
  the county courts where it can be done much more cheaply.
  You Mr. Speaker, have been in this House, as I have, for a good many years. You know that on all sorts of occasions hon. Members on the back benches, and sometimes those on the Front Benches, complain about the inordinate amount of influence which professional lawyers have on the affairs of this House. They not only operate the laws we make, but they take part in making them. In many Erections they make them more complicated than they need be, because it needs professional assistance—
  Mr. Speaker: Order. Whether they do or not, we are discussing two Orders, one the Matrimonial Causes Rules Order and one the Matrimonial Causes (Costs) Rules Order.
  Mr. Price: I am sorry if I have got out of order. I have made the point and will not press it.
  The second thing which has caused a change of front on the part of the Government is that some years ago this House, with my support, placed on the Statute Book the Legal Aid and Assistance Act. That was a humane piece of legislation which was designed to enable people of poor means to obtain qualified professional assistance if they needed to go to law. I happen to believe that the law is better left alone; it is better not to go into court, particularly if some kind of civil dispute is concerned. Be that as it may, since we placed the reforming Legal Aid and Assistance Act, with subsequent Amendments, on the Statute Book, there has been an enormous increase in the number of persons seeking legal aid certificates. Strangely enough, the vast majority of the applications made for legal aid have been in respect of divorce.
  I should be entirely out of order if I tried to make any kind of moral or ethical speech concerning divorce. That is not within our terms of reference. We are concerned with money which the lawyers get for operating or performing as advocates in the law courts for clients who have obtained legal aid certificates or otherwise. My hon. Friend the Member for Pontypool (Mr. Abse), who at the moment is not in the Chamber, has great experience of these matters as a practising solicitor with a large practice in
  1006
  South Wales. No doubt he is a very good lawyer. In his speech he strongly criticised the Attorney-General. I am not reporting what he said, because he will be able to read it in HANSARD.
  He took the line that the Government were wrong. He said that on the latest available figures the number of divorce petitions in this country had risen from the relatively low figure which existed as a norm before legal aid, to 47,000 last year and of those petitions 31,000 were supported financially by Her Majesty's Exchequer, by Government grant of an unlimited amount in some cases. This is serious, because we are entitled to ask whether the vast increase in divorce productivity arises from a vastly increased level of infidelity between married couples or whether it arises because those who were previously prepared to live in sin, once the Government could give them a clean bill of health, were able to obtain divorces with the Government paying the costs of both sides, party and party.
  Mr. Speaker: This is an interesting question, but it cannot be answered in this debate.
  Mr. Price: I will have to leave it as a matter of reflection for hon. Members who are better qualified to answer it than I am to ask it. I have often been critical of things the Government have done. Tonight I am critical of the lawyers. The hon. Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle) said that solicitors have a justifiable grievance because of the new scale of fees prescribed in Statutory Instrument No. 281. I would not deny any professional body or any other group of workers proper remuneration for work done, but I am not convinced from the speeches which have been made that a case has been made against these rules. I am not convinced, because solicitors' practices in the main are not confined to divorce work. They are concerned with trust, wills, and all the other things.
  Mr. Speaker: All the other activities do not come under these two sets of rules.
  Mr. Price: With great respect, Sir, they do. If I were convinced that there was any danger of practising solicitors going to the workhouse or becoming applicants for public assistance as a result of some

  1007
  wicked action taken by the Attorney-General, I should become the most humane advocate solicitors ever had in the House. I am not so convinced, because solicitors' practices are geared to property, and the inflating values of property have made millionaires of many solicitors. [Laughter.] Those who disagree with me should fight this out with the editor of the Observer who recently published an article showing that 17 of the last 21 millionaires in Britain were solicitors whose activities are geared to the inflated value of property.
  Mr. Oakes: My hon. Friend's assertion is based on the theory that all solicitors' practices are concerned with all kinds of legal work. This is not so. The solicitors he is talking about—those who make the fortunes—would not take on a divorce case or a legal aid case. They deal exclusively with very expensive property transactions. This is why my hon. Friend's reasoning is so unfair.
  Mr. Price: My hon. Friend is always fair and is a good friend of mine. If I were not getting sufficient business to warrant my continuing in my profession, I should seek to diversify my activities.
  Sir B. Janner: Will my hon. Friend give way?
  Mr. Price: I shall give way in a moment. I do not want to speak too long, but I shall not sit down yet. [Interruption.] So long as I am in order, I am prepared to speak for a long time, and so I shall if I have many more interruptions. I do not want to bore anybody, but I shall have no difficulty in carrying on with my speech.
  I do not want to listen to professional "blah". I am looking at the realities of the situation. When I am told that these rules will inflict hardship on solicitors. I want that allegation proved. There is a learned society, the Haldane Society, of which I am not a member but of which my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General will know. The Haldane Society has many solicitors and barristers in its membership, and it has said that the Legal Aid and Advice Act has not been what this House intended it to be but has become, in practice, the lawyers' aid and assistance Act.
  Mr. Speaker: Order. We are not discussing the Haldane Society or the legal profession in general. We are discussing two Instruments, which the hon. Gentleman has read. He knows the position perfectly well.
  Mr. Price: I am sorry if I have transgressed in mentioning the Haldane Society, Mr. Speaker, but, if hon. Members who have been speaking from a purely professional and vested point of view tell us that the Law Society, the Bar Council or some other professional body supports what they say, I feel that I am entitled to give the view of a society which has many lawyers in its membership and has expressed a contrary opinion.
  I do not want to bore the House by continuing the debate longer than necessary, but I must say a word now to my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, North-West. He said that solicitors would have not only to prepare the briefs but would have to go into court and deal with them in the county court because solicitors are not allowed to appear as advocates in the High Court. I am old enough to remember the days when W. H. Thompson, one of the most famous solicitors in the country, had his practice in Chancery Lane, an enormous practice. The family still have that practice, I understand. He used to go into the county court every week of his life, and he was rebuked by learned judges for going into court wearing a blue collar when he should have worn a white one. I am a little sceptical about what is said today. If solicitors are men of parts, competent men, and they do not want to go into court, they will hand the briefs, when prepared, to a suitable barrister. There are many briefless barristers looking for work from such genial, friendly and humane people as my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, North-West. So that argument is a non-runner, a complete non sequitur.
  In many ways, this debate is a non-runner. On the surface, it may appear that solicitors will be required to take lower fees for divorce work, but there is far more divorce now than ever before in our history. Divorce cases have blocked all the channels in the High Court and they are now to go to the county court, to the second division, as

  1009
  it were. I am all in favour of that. We are not a corporate State yet. We are a democracy. If there is a far greater amount of work being channelled into solicitors' offices, any solicitor who does not want it because it is unremunerative will find that there are plenty of solicitors prepared to take it on. They will not be black-legging on their trade union if they do, a very powerful trade union, as we all know.
  I have taken longer than I intended, but I have spoken at some length because there are occasions when this House seems to be a monopoly assembly for members of the legal profession. On other occasions hon. Members on both sides of the House who are not present tonight do not tire of saying, "Lawyers again!". You know what I mean, Mr. Speaker—that everything is set up for the advantage of lawyers, like the last two years' income which was allowed to go tax-free—
  Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman must not pray Mr. Speaker in aid, and he must keep to the two Instruments we are discussing.
  Mr. Price: With great respect, Mr. Speaker, I am trying under great difficulties to do just that. I am trying to keep in order. I am behind the red line, and I want to stay behind it. But I pray in aid of perhaps a few transgressions that, in view of the totality of the income and remuneration a solicitor of reasonable competence can earn in the present sort of set-up existing in the courts and elsewhere, we have no need to apologise to anybody, including my right hon. and learned Friends the Attorney-General or the Solicitor-General, who deal with these matters on our behalf. They will find me 100 per cent. behind them, for the first time since I have been here on a matter like this. I think that they are right, and I shall give them my vote if there is a Division.
  9.41 p.m.
  Mr. Daniel Awdry: We enjoyed the speech of the hon. Member for Westhoughton (Mr. J. T. Price), but I shall not take up his points in detail. I do not think that he had really done his homework. I do not think that he really knew the details of what he was discussing, and I am sorry that he missed the earlier part of the debate.
  1010
  It is a pity that so many lawyers are having to take part in the debate. I start by declaring my interest. I am a solicitor, though I do not practise very much in court, nor do I do a great deal of divorce work. I do not, however, approach the debate on the narrow basis of arguing the case on behalf of solicitors. I believe that the public interest is involved, for I am convinced that if proper remuneration is not paid to solicitors the public will certainly suffer in the end. It is purely in that spirit that I speak.
  What are the short and simple facts behind the debate? I was a member of the Standing Committee on the Act. On 22nd June we had a debate on solicitors' remuneration and when I asked the Attorney-General certain questions and he replied:
  "The Rule Committee is not specifically required to have regard to the principle of allowing fair remuneration in prescribing a scale and, in my submission, it is unnecessary to require it to have regard to that principle in prescribing the fixed costs to be allowed in undefended matrimonial causes. As the fixed costs will be related to the amounts which might be expected to be allowed if the costs were taxed,"—
  then there are these important words—
  "regard will in effect be paid to the principle of fair remuneration, but I do submit that it would not be appropriate that a Rule Committee should be told to have regard to this principle. I am quite confident that in practice it will have due regard to it. Accordingly, I hope that the hon. Gentleman opposite will not be disposed to press his Amendment."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing Committee F, 22nd June, 1967; c. 70–1.]
  We have the position clearly stated there by the Attorney-General, that the Rule Committee would pay proper regard to the principle of fair remuneration. We now see that the Rule Committee has had no such regard to that principle. At present the average amount of profit costs paid to a solicitor for handling a simple divorce case from beginning to end is £70. I do not regard that as a high figure, and I very much doubt if any other hon. Member does either, bearing in mind the amount of work involved. The hon. Member for Westhoughton talked about advocacy, but he forgot that the solicitor's task is not advocacy but rather the handling of the whole case from the moment the client first walks into his office to the end of the case and the decree absolute.

  1011
  My experience is that solicitors do not handle divorce business to make money. The hon. Gentleman referred to some solicitors who had vast practices in commercial work. That may well be so, but the hon. Gentleman was well answered by his hon. Friend the Member for Bolton, West (Mr. Oakes) who pointed out that the solicitors about whom we are mainly talking tonight are those in small provincial towns who feel that in handling a divorce case they are also rendering a service. I do not think that anyone here really disputes that contention. If solicitors simply wanted to make money, they would go into another profession.
  The point has been well made in another place. Lord Granville West said:
  "I think it can be said that in the Provinces much work is done by solicitors without thought of remuneration. But, of course, conditions in these days are different from what they were in the early days. As has been stated, rents and rates have increased, salaries have gone up, and it is indeed a very difficult time for provincial solicitors."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, House of Lords, 4th April, 1968; Vol. 290, c. 1439.]
  I remind the right hon. and learned Attorney-General also of what the Lord Chancellor said and I hope that he himself will deal with the point in replying to the debate. The Lord Chancellor said:
  "… I agree—and I have said this publicly for the last two years—that solicitors are having a difficult time. They are overworked. There is a great shortage of solicitors. The Law Society themselves reckon that they are short of 5,000 solicitors—about 25 per cent. There are 30 jobs for every newly qualified solicitor now. They cannot get staff. Their overheads go up all the time, and they are subject to S.E.T.
  One thing that is quite plain is that county court fees—and this applies to both barristers and solicitors—could not possibly be right, because they have not been increased for 12 years."
  The Lord Chancellor himself said that, and all of us practising as solicitors know that it is true. Solicitors are having a difficult time and to be fair I accept that some members of the Bar are having a difficult time as well.
  As I have said, the present profit costs amount in a simple case to about £70. Under the rules we are discussing, a solicitor will now receive £45 for doing precisely the same amount of work. This is a reduction of 35 per cent. It is totally unacceptable and unfair. Of course I realise that, in future, these cases will be
  1012
  dealt with in the county courts instead of in the High Court, and I will deal with that point.
  The hon. Member for Westhoughton has already left the Chamber, having arrived late. He seemed to suggest that, because cases are to be dealt with in future in the county courts, there should be lower remuneration. I hope that the Attorney-General will deal with this specific point. I imagine that he will argue that solicitors are expected to show exactly the same high standard of work and care in the future as in the past. Surely no one suggests that because we are transferring jurisdiction to the county courts, any less standard will be expected from solicitors in the work they do. On this point the Lord Chancellor raised another argument. He said:
  "There are two other points that I should like to mention. It is not accurate to say that solicitors who work in the High Court and who used to have an average of £65 a case are now getting less for doing exactly the same work. It will not be exactly the same work for this reason: that in some dozen different ways we have simplified the new Rules. We have taken out steps which used to have to be taken, like an affadavit to support a petition, like the solicitors having to find the petitioner and serve him. The court is now going to do the serving, so it will not be exactly the same. Solicitors will not have as much work as before."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, House of Lords, 4th April, 1968, Vol. 290, c. 1450 and 1453.]
  That really is not a very good point because the new rules being prepared will make only a marginal difference to the work solicitors have to do. I hope that the right hon. and learned Gentleman will also deal with this in his reply because, basically, the true fact is that solicitors will be expected to do almost exactly the same amount of work as they are doing today for a very much smaller remuneration.
  I think I know why the Government have gone wrong in their approach to this matter. The Lord Chancellor emphasised the rising cost of legal aid and we are conscious of the fact. He said that the total has risen to about £6 million a year. The reason for the rise in the cost of legal aid is not the rise in solicitors' remuneration. It has already been said that in 1956 27,753 petitions were filed, of which 12,981 were legal aid cases. In 1966, the figure rose to 45,610 petitions, and 31,188 legal aid certificates were granted. The cost of legal aid has

  1013
  risen because of the tremendous rise in the number of cases which are heard. The Government have created the difficulty for themselves by starting off by saying that it is their intention to cut the cost by a given figure, of £400,000. They are now trying to implement their intention at the expense of the solicitors, and it is this fact which solicitors resent so deeply.
  This is entirely unfair and utterly wrong. If the Government accept the principle of fair remuneration, they should keep to that principle. What they are doing is trying to make a savage cut at the expense of solicitors on whose shoulders so much depends for ensuring that we have a just society and also for ensuring that difficult and important cases are handled with that high standard of care and attention which solicitors throughout the years have always been prepared to give.
  9.51 p.m.
  Mr. W. O. J. Robinson: It is fortunate that my hon. Friend the Member for Westhoughton (Mr. J. T. Price) has left the Chamber and saved me the task of apologising to him for another solicitor entering the debate. I ought to make that confession—apparently it is a matter of confession—but also to say that I have never undertaken county court work, and I hope that I shall never appear in the county court in future as an advocate and certainly not as a respondent.
  Many criticisms were made by my hon. Friend the Member for Westhoughton about the failings and not the virtues of members of the legal profession, but I have always thought that one of their virtues was the ability to see both sides of a question. It may be a disappointment to my colleagues in the legal profession, but I shall approach this matter from a somewhat different angle.
  Hitherto I have very properly followed the Government's attitude towards the prices and incomes policy. I have read all of the Reports of the Prices and Incomes Board and have thought it right to accept them. For that reason I approach these two orders in the light of the Board's comment on the remuneration of solicitors in the Board's Report, Command 3529, of February this year. There are two ways in which that Report can b; applies to these rules. I find the two
  1014
  conflicting to some extent, but I should like to quote those parts of the Report which have a direct bearing on the rules and my approach to them.
  Paragraph 63 says:
  "We have shown that in general county court business is unremunerative"
  That will not be denied by anybody and it obviously goes a long way to fortify the arguments against the rules. Paragraph 65 says:
  "… we conclude that an increase in charges for county court work would be justified. The question is how large the increase should be."
  That too strongly fortifies the arguments against the rules.
  On that same page, the Report gives the Board's conclusion about increases in remuneration for county court work as a whole. This means that an increase of some 55 per cent. would be appropriate and hon. Members have argued that that should be the yardstick to be used in applying these rules. The Report refers specifically to the possibility of these rules coming before the House. It refers to the fact that divorce court work is to be transferred from the High Court to the county court and goes on to refer to the fees which should be fixed for this purpose, saying:
  "The determination of the charges for divorce work in the county courts, which have yet to be fixed"—
  and which are fixed by the rules—
  "should be consistent with our recommendation for an increase in the level of county court income."
  This is a very strong argument and has been used as such by hon. Members who have said that the rules set fees at far too low a level. But we ought not to stop there. We ought to pursue the other points which the Board makes. This is the point which we should have in mind when discussing the rules.
  The Prices and Incomes Board states quite clearly in paragraph 68:
  "We have made it clear that no increase in the total income of solicitors is at present called for".
  Mr. Reginald Eyre: In reading that extract and making that observation, has the hon. Member borne in mind that Selective Employment Tax deprived solicitors of £3 million in the previous year and will

  1015
  deprive them of half as much again in the next year?
  Mr. Robinson: I accept that. I do not think that it invalidates the spirit of the argument which I am endeavouring to put. The Prices and Incomes Board states clearly—and the question of S.E.T. would have been present in any case—
  "but certain forms of income should be reduced while others are increased".
  It cannot be denied that the Board is saying that if there is to be an. increase in fees in one direction, there must correspondingly be a reduction in other directions. That is a material point in considering our approach to the rules.
  If, as hon. Members would require, the fees should be increased by 55 per cent., they must surely be ready to concede that in another direction there should be a corresponding reduction.
  Mr. Speaker: Order. The argument is sound but it cannot be advanced on this occasion. No hon. Member would be in order if he suggested where fees should be reduced elsewhere.
  Mr. Robinson: I am sorry, Mr. Speaker, for transgressing.
  If I may continue with the report of the Prices and Incomes Board, which is material to the question, it states:
  "It is a matter for the County Court Rule Committee to consider how to adjust individual fees so that in total an increase of about 55 per cent. in income results for the present level of work."
  Again, there are two cogent arguments. On the one side there is the argument that if there is to be an increase in fees, it must be offset.
  I was very much impressed, against my will—because I have been strongly impressed by the arguments advanced by the Law Society against the rules—by the argument advanced by the Lord Chancellor in another place when he described this as a package deal. I hate to hear that expression used again so quickly. The Lord Chancellor said, however, that it was a package deal. It could well be argued that in those circumstances, the orders should not be interfered with unless and until the profession, in consultation with the Government, is able to present a picture which will entail the overall balance of fees that the Prices and Incomes Board suggested.
  1016
  There is, therefore, a strong argument, reluctant though I am to say so, for the Government to say that the Statutory Instruments should either stand as they are or that, alternatively, as I should prefer, their application should be deferred until the negotiations inherent in the Report of the Prices and Incomes Board have been completed. I say reluctantly, but because I think it is right, that we should apply the same standards to the legal profession as have been applied to every other trade union and every sector of industry. We should not defeat the rules.
  I appeal to my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General to undertake, if he is able to do so, that the rules will be withdrawn and others substituted immediately the desirable results suggested by the Prices and Incomes Board can be achieved.
  9.58 p.m.
  Mr. Percy Grieve: All too often when one rises to speak in debates in the House of Commons, one does so very much in the spirit of the long-distance runner who has to cover a great deal of ground in a very short time. When today's debate on the rules began at an altogether unwontedly early hour, I wondered whether, on this occasion, one might not approach them in a rather fuller spirit and develop one's arguments at greater length.
  Indeed, it seemed to me when we set out on this debate some time before 7 o'clock this evening that far from being a running course that we had to traverse, there was a desert of time before us in which we should need a good deal of the water of good argument. So it has been. We have been fortified in crossing the desert by pellucid and clear water, water of good argument, on both sides of the House, and I hope that when we listen to the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney-General winding up we shall find he has drunk of that water.
  Mr. Speaker: May I take the hon. and learned Gentleman back to the oasis of order.
  Mr. Grieve: I am delighted to return to that oasis and to set forth the few observations which remain for me to make at this stage of the debate this evening.

  1017
  I shall not go over all the arguments which have been advanced against the Instrument dealing with costs. I shall refer to them in a few minutes very briefly. It would give altogether the wrong impression to the outside world were it thought that we in this House were principally concerned with that matter, important though it is, and important though it is that the solicitors who will be called upon to do the work of divorce now in the county courts shall be properly remunerated for the work they do. Rather, I want to concentrate on the Matrimonial Causes Rules dealing with those matters which now shall be dealt with in the county court.
  I share the view, so well expressed by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Epsom (Sir P. Rawlinson) and my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Sir D. Renton) among others, that that is the matter we should concentrate on in this House, and that, for reasons of public policy, for reasons of humanity and for reasons of the great importance of the issues involved, certain matters should not be forced into the county court straitjacket.
  In my submission to the House it is, for instance, wholly wrong for the question of maintenance, which may involve thousands of pounds, to be brought within the purview of a jurisdiction, which on grounds of public policy and others, however strong the judges who may sit there, is limited to £500.
  I have here a letter which I have re-received from a country solicitor, which says:
  "Maintenance awards following decrees absolute have in my own experience varied from £200 a year to £3,000 a year."
  This is in the country. It would be within the experience of many people in this House that maintenance awards may e 'weed that figure. I ask the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney-General, is it right that matters of that magnitude should be left by this House in the hands of a court the upper limit of whose juridiction is £500?
  I turn, now to other ancillary matters, the question of the custody of children and the maintenance of children. If there is any matter in this country which
  1018
  should be within the High Court's jurisdiction if the parties so desire, it is surely matters affecting the welfare of children following upon a decree of divorce. It simply is not good enough to say that we are making a blanket arrangement whereby not only divorce but all the vitally important matters that follow it should be put within the jurisdiction of the county court judge. For that reason, I urge upon the Attorney-General that these rules should be reconsidered.
  When my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Huntingdon was addressing you, Sir, earlier this evening, I intervened to draw his attention to the fact that the various settlements and wives' property settlement orders are all among and ancillary matters coming within the scope of these rules. These rules are effecting a revolution in our law, and we should approach this revolution with great care, with great circumspection, and with great hesitation. For those, among many other reasons which have been urged by my right hon. and hon. Friends, I support my right hon. Friend the Member for Epsom in praying against the Matrimonial Causes Rules.
  With regard to the rules about costs, the hon. Member for Westhoughton (Mr. J. T. Price) suggested that this was a gathering of lawyers all bent on defending their own interests. I draw the attention of the House to the fact that very little has been said during the debate about the Bar. Members of the Bar in this House have spoken almost with one voice against the imposition of this straitjacket of costs on the other branch of the legal profession. This does not always happen. Perhaps the severest critics of the barristers are those of the other branch of the profession, and perhaps the severest critics of solicitors are members of the Bar, but on this occasion members of the legal profession have spoken with one voice, because they realise what is involved.
  Hon. Members on both sides have referred to the recommendation of the Prices and Incomes Board. It is extraordinary that in the light of this recommendation the House is considering proposals which are designed to cut down the remuneration of solicitors in a very important branch of their work. One cannot

  1019
  shut one's eyes to the fact that, particularly in the country, on circuit, a large part of the bread and butter of a solicitor's profession is the preparation of divorce work. These rules will make a substantial difference to their real income at a time when, as has been said, they have been adversely affected by the S.E.T. I intervened in the speech of the hon. Member for Bolton, West (Mr. Oakes), to point out that under these rules the payment to a solicitor for doing the necessary preparatory work when counsel is retained is unlikely to be more than £40 or £43. I am told by some solicitors who have written to me that that is below the figure which prevailed in 1939, let alone
  1020
  1955. The remuneration for similar work then was about £46.
  It is no use the hon. Member for Westhoughton saying that solicitors are getting too much anyway, that their remuneration must be cut down. We cannot expect an honourable profession to do work—which I concede has increased to a large measure because of the passing of the Legal Aid Act—for a remuneration which is being diminished to a degree which would be regarded as intolerable by any other profession or occupation in the country.
  The ground has been gone over thoroughly by my right hon. and hon. Friends, and I trust that I have not taken too long. I ask the House to join me in refusing to allow these rules to proceed any further.
  10.10 p.m.
  The Attorney-General (Sir Elwyn Jones): When he spoke in this debate my hon. Friend the Member for Pontypool (Mr. Abse) described me as a stag at bay. I notice that he has not remained to the end of the chase. I remain free and uncaptured by the blandishments of hon. and right hon. Gentlemen who have opposed the proposals of the Government. The only refreshment offered to this stag at bay being some pellucid water, you will not be surprised, Mr. Speaker, if I find it necessary to reject that invitation.
  At the beginning of the debate the right hon. and learned Member for Epsom (Sir P. Rawlinson) and other hon. Members invited the Government to suspend the operation of the Matrimonial Causes Act and of these rules because of the existence in the proceedings of the House at the moment of the Divorce Reform Bill and because of the possibility that family courts may be introduced in the future.
  When I presented the Matrimonial Causes Bill to the House I ventured to submit that it was not merely introduced in the expectation of reducing the heavy cost of legal aid which, in divorce matters, amounted last year to over £2½ million—which is no insubstantial sum. I also submitted that the Bill, which is now an Act of Parliament, was a valuable Measure for tidying up the administration of justice in this field and for introducing useful procedural changes.
  I adhere to that view about the virtues of the Act and think that it would be quite wrong to hold up its implementation pending a major Bill rationalising the substantive divorce law. The Divorce Reform Bill is a Private Member's Bill and it is not certain that it will pass in its present form. Even if it does, it is unlikely that it will come into force before next year. The Matrimonial Causes Act, on the basis of which the rules that we are now debating have been formulated, was passed as long ago as 21st July of last year, and I submit there is no justification for postponing its operation for a further year or so.
  The necessary rules have been made and great care has been given to their preparation. I submit that it is desirable that the courts and the legal profession should become accustomed to the transfer
  1022
  of jurisdiction in undefended cases to the county courts before having to assimilate more changes.
  As to family courts, I fear that the coming into being of those courts is very much a matter for the future. The jurisdiction of the courts in family matters was in the first programme of the Law Commission. The Commission has been in touch with the Royal Commission on Assizes and Quarter Sessions that has otherwise been unable to give time to this matter, and I fear that there is no immediate prospect of legislation in respect of family courts of that kind being a ground for postponing the operation of an Act of Parliament passed nearly eight months ago.
  The second main matter mentioned by the right hon. and learned Member for Epsom involved his anxiety as to the ability of county court judges to deal with ancillary matters, such as custody and maintenance disputes where large sums of money are involved. Last year, 38,500 undefended cases were heard in the courts, of which 34,000 were tried by county court judges. It is true that they were dressed as High Court judges, but they were county court judges and I have had no evidence that they failed to try issues of custody and maintenance reasonably competently.
  For years, county court judges have been dealing with adoption, which entails particularly difficult matters, and for 20 years they have, in practice, as High Court judges, been dealing with custody and maintenance. Of course, they have, as judges, to deal with far more difficult issues than a mere undefended divorce case, which lasts about ten or 12 minutes and the remuneration is not inadequate. The solicitor conducting the case himself will get about £60 a case and he can do about half-a-dozen in a morning, which is not bad going. Of course, I do not want to mislead the House into thinking that that 12 minutes' work is the main part of the time taken by the solicitor or the effort given to the case—
  Mr. Graham Page: Would the right hon. and learned Gentleman withdraw that comment, which would lead the public to think that solicitors can earn six times £60 in one day, which is ridiculous nonsense?
  The Attorney-General: I did not say anything of the kind. I said that a solicitor could, if he had the good fortune to have so many undefended cases, which he will, hereafter, be entitled to do himself, each of them taking about 12 minutes, be able to complete half-a-dozen in a morning—
  Mr. Abse: This is a ridiculous statement, which could mislead the public, in view of the fact that the fee which the solicitor would get represents months of work, dozens of interviews and the collection of all the evidence. It is a gross distortion of the facts to present them in that way.
  The Attorney-General: I have said twice and I will say a third time, if it gives any comfort to those hon. Members who are solicitors, that the actual time taken in court and the skill and effort involved in the presentation of the case is not the solicitor's major contribution when he does the case himself. Obviously, it is the climax of a substantial volume of work. I was trying to say that undefended cases in a county court generally do not involve profound problems either of intellect or of law. This is, therefore, well within the competence of county court judges and they have been coping with these matters for 20 years with a good deal of skill to the satisfaction of the parties.
  A good deal of the debate has turned on the complaint that the rules which we are debating have not provided for the transfer of ancillary proceedings to the High Court, and it has been suggested that there has been some "rough roading" of the Rule Committee. Section 2(2) of the Act of 1967 requires rules to provide for the transfer to the High Court of any ancillary proceedings pending in a county court where the transfer appears to the county court to be desirable, and may so provide in such other cases as may be specified in the rules. Rule 80(1) provides that where an application for ancillary relief is pending in a divorce county court, a judge may, if it appears to him to be desirable, order that the application be transferred to the High Court. In difficult or exceptional cases dealing with ancillary matters, the county court judge may order the transfer of the application to the High Court. I hope that that
  1024
  reassures the right hon. and learned Gentleman about the difficulties which may arise in the exceptional case. The rules fulfil the requirements in the first part of Section 2(2) which I have mentioned.
  It has been contended that it should have been free to the Rule Committee to exercise the power conferred by the second part of the subsection by providing for the transfer to the High Court of contested ancillary proceedings. But to do so would be contrary to the intention expressed in the debates on the Bill—and there were substantial debates on the Bill—that where a case is undefended any issue arising in it should normally be dealt with by the county court.
  I pointed out in Committee that the Committee presided over by Lord Denning and other Committees have said that the judge who deals with the substantive issues should as far as is practicable also deal with ancillary matters. An Amendment requiring any issues in respect of the custody of a child to be determined by the High Court was rejected in Committe as, too, was a proposed new Clause giving a right of appeal to the High Court where a maintenance order was made in the payment of more than £500 a year. On Report, an Amendment to require rules to provide for the transfer to the High Court of an application for maintenance where more than £500 a year, or a lump sum of £2,000, was likely to be awarded, was negatived. It was negatived after I had pointed out that for many years an unlimited jurisdiction had been exercised by county court judges and registrars in their respective capacities of commissioners of the High Court and as district registrars.
  Sir P. Rawlinson: Section 2(2) provided that there should be transfer when the county court thought it desirable and "in such other cases". The Attorney-General told the Committee that there would be other cases as might be specified in the rules. Will he tell us what are the other cases, since it was the impression that other cases would be those such as the custody of children and such like matters?
  The Attorney-General: The rules were required to provide for the transfer of

  1025
  ancillary proceedings to the High Court where the transfer appeared to the High Court to be desirable. In my submission that has been provided for in the rules and it would not, in my view, be right to fetter the county court judges' discretion by requiring the transfer of proceedings where the amount of any order was liable to exceed a particular sum.
  Reference has been made to Section 2(2) of the Act and, in fact, the Rule Committee has exercised that power. The object of conferring the power in the second part of Section 2(2) was to enable the rules to provide, as has been done, for the transfer to the High Court of an application under Section 22 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965, for maintenance on the ground of wilful neglect to maintain where the respondent denies liability on a ground which implies misconduct by his wife or a denial of the jurisdiction of the court. Rule 99(1) requires the judge in such a case to order an application to be transferred to the High Court, and that is the exercise of the power given to the Rule Committee by the second part of Section 2(2). The decision of the Rule Committee was in furtherance of the power given to it by virtue of that Section.
  The main debate, however, has turned on the question of the fees and the proposed level of remuneration set out in the rules. When the Measure was introduced, one of the objects was to seek to relieve the burden on the Legal Aid Fund. As I have said, in 1966–67 the total of legal aid for civil cases was nearly £6 million, and of that nearly £2½ million was attributable to matrimonial causes. Over and above that, the taxpayer had to face a considerable bill for legal aid in criminal cases.
  When the Measure was conceived it was estimated that the transfer of undefendeds to the county court would save about £400,000 a year. When this aspect of the Measure was debated it was made perfectly clear—I certainly sought to make it clear—that although the solicitor must be adequately remunerated for his work, the costs he will hereafter get must be costs on the county court level. The scale costs would be on the county court scale, amended in appropriate cases, and the proposed fixed costs which the solicitor would be free to accept or reject—if he did not like them he could go by
  1026
  way of taxation for his costs—were based on the amount which would be allowed on the county court scale in a straightforward undefended case, taking into account the saving in the costs of taxation and the likelihood of procedural simplification under the new rules.
  The average figure for solicitors' costs in the High Court was £65. The proposed fixed costs would give the solicitor, on average, £59 if he conducted the case without counsel, and £49 if counsel was briefed. There would be special allowances for discretion cases, for consent orders and for maintenance and legally-aided petitions. Those figures were put forward by the Lord Chancellor as affording reasonable remuneration; and it would be for the solicitor to say whether he elected to accept them or chose to go by way of taxation.
  I ventured also to point out in respect of counsels' fees that in the case of petition founded on adultery or desertion the total would be £16 10s. compared with the average £18 12s. 4d. allowed in the High Court after making the statutory 10 per cent, deduction in legal aid cases. Later there was consideration by the Rule Committee of the fees payable to counsel for settling petitions and for advice on evidence which increased the fees payable to counsel for their work in the county court to a figure almost the same as they now get in the High Court.
  Mr. Eyre: In referring to the debate in Standing Committee on the Matrimonial Causes Bill, is the right hon. and learned Gentleman aware that since that date there has been the Report of the Prices and Incomes Board on the Remuneration of Solicitors? In his argument so far he has been flying in the face of paragraph 55 of that Report and also ignoring the increasing burden of Selective Employment Tax. Will he deal with this in detail, because it causes resentment?
  The Attorney-General: Yes, I will, in much detail because obviously this is quite crucial. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"] I am sorry that that has been greeted by groans, but, owing to the unexpected course of events, some of us have been waiting here for four hours to have the privilege of addressing the House on this matter. This is an important matter both for the taxpayer and the solicitor. I will

  1027
  endeavour to deal with it, I hope at not excessive length.
  I was dealing with the scale that is provided for in the rules. Rule 5 provides that the costs of matrimonial proceedings in a divorce county court shall be on scale 4. Scale 4 is the highest of the county court scales. The modifications which are proposed take account of the special features of divorce proceedings and in particular of the fact that an application for ancillary relief may frequently involve more work and responsibility than the substantive proceedings. Scale 4 divorce enables an ancillary application to be treated as a separate proceeding for attendance for a trial, for attendance at an adjourned hearing, taxation brief on hearing and refreshers. So there is room in respect of those items for special fees to be paid.
  Rule 7 of the costs rules prescribes the amount which may be allowed where the solicitor elects to have his costs fixed instead of taxed. In addition to the fees that are proposed, I have already said that additional allowances were provided as a result of the deliberation of the Rule Committee for discretion cases and for additions to counsel's fees for settling petition and for advice on evidence.
  It is not accurate to say that the Rule Committee was asked to pass a costs rule without discussion. Although the Lord Chancellor indicated that he could not agree to treating undefended divorce as other than county court work, or to anticipate the recommendations of the Prices and Incomes Board, a number of points of detail were discussed and a number of alterations made in the approved provisions submitted to the Rule Committee. I have illustrated these in the alterations in the fixed costs I have referred to. It is quite right, however, that I should tell the House that the solicitor members of the Rule Committee were not prepared to agree to the provisions in regard to costs. It is no secret that the view expressed by the right hon. and learned Member for Epsom reflects the point of view that was argued by the barrister members of the Rule Committee.
  It was contended, as it has been contended during the debate, that in accordance with the recommendation of the National Board for Prices and Incomes
  1028
  there should be an immediate increase of 55 per cent. in the figures proposed by my noble Friend the Lord Chancellor. The relevant recommendation appears in paragraph 66 of the Board's Report:
  "It is a matter for the County Court Rule Committee to consider how to adjust individual fees so that in total an increase of about 55 per cent. in income results for the present level of work. Major changes in the work of the county courts—e.g., an extension of county court jurisdiction—will increase the amount of income accruing from any given change in charges though it may adversely affect solicitors' income from High Court work. We have noted the intention, as from this year, to start all matrimonial causes in the county courts, and to transfer to the High Court those which are defended. Formerly all divorce work was within the jurisdiction of the High Court. The determination of the charges for divorce work in the county courts, which have yet to be fixed, should be consistent with our recommendation for an increase in the level of county court income."
  The information that appeared in that last sentence did not seem to be entirely clear and further information was sought from the Secretary to the Board, who wrote as follows to the Lord Chancellor's office:
  "The Board's intention was that this recommendation for an increase of £2·4 million …"
  I remind the House that the National Board's recommendation in regard to solicitors was that, broadly speaking, the remuneration of solicitors was satisfactory, that it had kept pace with the increase in the remuneration of those receiving wages and salaries, that solicitors had bettered the history of dentists' salaries and had not done quite as well as the doctors; but that as to part of solicitors' work, and in particular that in the county court, remuneration was inadequate and that an additional sum of £2·4 million should be made available to solicitors for that work. Two other elements were added providing for an increase in solicitors' remuneration, but, to counter the increase in those partials of solicitors' work, there was the recommendation that there should be a reduction in the fees paid to solicitors for the work of conveyancing; so it was indeed a package deal.
  Mr. Graham Page: The Attorney-General seems to be referring to some letter which contradicts the Report of the National Board for Prices and Incomes to the Government. If the right hon. and learned Gentleman is referring

  1029
  to a letter, ought he not to produce it to the House and lay it on the Table?
  The Attorney-General: I shall be very happy to do so.
  Mr. Graham Page: Why not before the debate and not now at the end of the debate?
  The Attorney-General: If it is desired to know the full history of the prices end incomes matter, as I am asked to inform the House about it and think it proper to do so by referring to this letter, I will certainly see that the letter is put in the Library.
  Mr. Eyre: Will the Attorney-General now go on and deal with the question of Selective Employment Tax, which over-cancels the item he has mentioned?
  The Attorney-General: All in the Lord's and Mr. Deputy Speaker's good t me. I was dealing with the explanation by the Board of its proposals. It said:
  "To make charges for divorce work consistent with the rest … will mean the application, with such variations as may be necessary, of the appropriate scale, either in its present form so long as that remains in use, or in its revised form when that is settled by the Rule Committee."
  Having regard to the views of the Prices and Incomes Board, my noble Friend was of opinion that, until the Board's Report has been accepted and the County Court Rule Committee had amended the ordinary scales of costs to give effect to the Board's recommendations, the costs of divorce proceedings must necessarily be based on the existing county court scale. The Law Society asked for an opportunity to consider and make representations on the Board's Report. That opportunity has been granted, and my noble Friend is awaiting receipt of the Law Society's representations. When these have been received, it will be for the Government to decide whether to accept them and to accept the Prices and Incomes Board's recommendation, and in due course for the County Court Rule Committee to consider how to adjust individual fees so as to produce a total increase of 55 per cent.
  It may well be that the Rule Committee will prescribe a larger increase than 55 per cent. for debt collecting work and for mechanical items such as attendances at the court office and a smaller per-
  1030
  centage for discretionary items such as preparing for trial. If this principle were applied to the costs in matrimonial cases, the increases in solicitors' remuneration for that class of work might prove to be nearer 30 per cent. than 55 per cent. As consideration of the Board's Report inevitably has taken and is taking some time, and it is undesirable to hold up the transfer of divorce jurisdiction for so long, the only course consistent with the assurances given in Parliament was to proceed on the basis of the costs as at present allowed. In my submission, it would have been quite wrong to make an immediate increase of 55 per cent. in the proposed costs, as the solicitor members of the Rule Committee suggested.
  The existence of the Government's prices and incomes policy prevents any increase in the remuneration of a profession which is governed by statutory scales of costs unless and until the Prices and Incomes Board approves in principle an overall increase, and, second, its recommendations are accepted by the Government. Until that time, the costs for any new block of work like undefended divorce business which is given to the county court must be regulated by the appropriate scale, and under this scale they will be regulated by the highest scale available. That is embodied in the rules which I now ask the House to approve
  May I make a final reference to what the Board has in mind in the matter? This is a letter published in the Law Journal of 21st March, 1968, of which, I know, the hon. Member for Crosby (Mr. Graham Page) is an avid and regular reader, so that it will not take him by surprise. The letter from the Board said:
  "What the Board intended was that charges for divorce work in the county courts based on whichever of the existing county court scales of costs was thought appropriate, should be increased if and when the scales are revised in order to secure the total increase of about 55 per cent. in the profession's income from county court work which the Board have recommended. The Board did not expect that the Rule Committee could take account of the Board's recommendation in relation to divorce work alone before any of the other recommendations had been accepted."
  That is the state of the matter, and we are now awaiting the recommendations and suggestions of the Law Society.
  Mr. Tom Boardman: Would the Attorney-General agree that under these rules solicitors will be required to do more work for less money?
  The Attorney-General: I am glad to assure the House that the exact opposite is the case, and that solicitors will be required to do less work by reason of a large number of simplifications in that procedure embodied in the rules. The House has been so patient with me that to read out all 12 or 13 would exceed that patience, but I will merely refer to them by number, since a prescribed form of petition is provided instead of setting out in the rules the main matters to be dealt with. They are Rules 12 and 14, Rule 13, Rule 33, Rules 33 and 34, Rules 39 and 40, Rule 65, Rule 59, Rules 58, 59 and 65, Rule 68, Rule 73, Rule 82 and 86. An examination of these rules will show that there will be great simplification and a lesser burden on solicitors. I have an excellent brief here in which I have even more confidence than some of those which I receive from my hon. Friends, if that were possible.
  I was asked about the impact of S.E.T. The Prices and Incomes Board said in Paragraph 76 of its Report:
  "We referred in the previous chapter to certain factors which might diminish the profession's income over the next year or two. One of the most important is the Selective Employment Tax. Though our statistics largely relate to that period before this tax was in full operation, we estimate that in a full year it might amount to more than £3 million over and above what we have included in our figures. There may be offsetting factors, partly operating from outside the profession—e.g the possibility of rising prices of houses and hence of conveyancing charges—and partly operating within the profession—e.g. the scope for increasing charges to clients in certain fields. The net effect of these movements cannot be forecast, and this has prevented us from taking them into account in the changes we have recommended in the previous chapter."
  In the next paragraph, the Board said:
  "… we feel that the position of the profession may have to be reassessed in the fairly near future, in the light of up-to-date statistical information … We consider this to be an additional reason for the Government's making a standing reference"—
  of solicitors' incomes—
  "which would enable us to exercise a continuous check and to judge the moment when a review was likely to yield useful results."
  1032
  The Government will no doubt consider that recommendation in due time.
  I was also asked whether the county court judges will continue to act as special commissioners. They will, for the time being, to try short undefended cases in the provinces until there are enough High Court judges for the purpose, but they will not try long defended cases.
  I was asked about a change in the rules which provide for a woman with whom adultery is alleged to have been committed to be made a respondent instead of being entitled to intervene. This has been done to simplify the procedure. It was the unanimous recommendation of the Rule Committee, and it is thought that it will simplify the proceedings in the divorce court by doing away with the separate class of "woman named".
  Complaint was made about the letter I read. It was before the Rule Committee and considered by it. [HON. MEMBERS: It was not before the House."] That point has been raised and I dealt with it. For the reasons I have given, I ask the House to reject both these Motions.
  10.50 p.m.
  Sir P. Rawlinson: This has been a longer debate than was expected and I do not think that anyone who has sat throughout it can be very impressed by the reply of the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney-General. He has answered a lot of questions which were quite irrelevant and to which no one attached importance. He has failed to answer the major questions put to him. He has made it clear that he supports what will be an unfair remuneration.
  The Prices and Incomes Board has said that there should be a better remuneration for solicitors in this court. The right hon. and learned Gentleman has not answered the question of whether the Measure left the House with power for the Rule Committee to decide whether the children of divorced people should be dealt with by the High Court judges or by the county court judges. He referred to Section 22, which is not relevant. It has nothing to do with Section 2 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1967, which refers to ancillary matters.
  The Bar Council and other have interpreted the 1967 Act as giving to the Rule

  1033
  Committee power to deal with these vital matters and we have not been told whether a Ministerial veto was imposed. If such a veto was imposed, it is a serious matter that, when this House gives to a representative committee power to deal with a matter, a Minister should take it upon himself to say that that Committe may not deal with it. We have not heard the answer to that question, and so we must draw our own conclusions.
  Finally, I repeat what I said four hours ago. This really is a cockeyed way of doing law reform. Here we are dealing with the problem of the present law when upstairs at present there is a Committee of the House changing the whole substance of the law. For this and many other reasons, I ask my right hon. and hon. Friends to vote for the Motion.
  Question put:—
  The House divided: Ayes 124, Noes 177.

  Division No. 113.]

  AYES

  [10.55 p.m.

  Allason, James (Hemel Hempstead)

  Grant, Anthony

  Onslow, Cranley

  Awdry, Daniel

  Grant-Ferris, R.

  Page, Graham (Crosby)

  Baker, Kenneth (Acton)

  Gresham Cooke, R.

  Peel, John

  Baker, W. H. K. (Banff)

  Grieve, Percy

  Percival, Ian

  Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gos. & Fhm)

  Grimond, Rt. Hn. J.

  Pink, R. Bonner

  Berry, Hn. Anthony

  Gurden, Harold

  Powell, Rt. Hn. J. Enoch

  Biffen, John

  Hall, John (Wycombe)

  Prior, J. M. L.

  Biggs-Davison, John

  Hawkins, Paul

  Pym, Francis

  Birch, Rt. Hn. Nigel

  Hay, John

  Ramsden, Rt. Hn. James

  Boardman, Tom

  Heald, Rt. Hn. Sir Lionel

  Rawlinson, Rt. Hn. Sir Peter

  Boyle, Rt. Hn. Sir Edward

  Hiley, Joseph

  Renton, Rt. Hn. Sir David

  Brewis, John

  Hill, J. E. B.

  Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon

  Clinton, Sir Tatton

  Holland, Philip

  Ridley, Hn. Nicholas

  Bruce-Gardyne, J.

  Hordern, Peter

  Rossi, Hugh (Hornsey)

  Buck, Antony (Colchester)

  Hornby, Richard

  Royle, Anthony

  Carlisle, Mark

  Hunt, John

  Russell, Sir Ronald

  Cary, Sir Robert

  Iremonger, T. L.

  Scott, Nicholas

  Clark, Henry

  Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)

  Sharples, Richard

  Clegg, Walter

  Johnson Smith, G. (E. Grinstead)

  Silvester, Frederick

  Cooke, Robert

  Jopling, Michael

  Smith Dudley (W'wick & L'mington)

  Cooper-Key, Sir Neill

  Kaberry, Sir Donald

  Steel, David (Roxburgh)

  Corfield, F. V.

  King, Evelyn (Dorset, S.)

  Stodart, Anthony

  Crosthwaite-Eyre, Sir Oliver

  Knight, Mrs. Jill

  Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir M. (Ripon)

  Crouch, David

  Lamboton, Viscount

  Taylor, Frank (Moss Side)

  Dalkeith, Earl of

  Langford-Holt, Sir John

  Thatcher, Mrs. Margaret

  Dance, James

  Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)

  van Straubenzee, W. R.

  Dean, Paul (Somerset, N.)

  Longden, Gilbert

  Wainwright, Richard (Colne Valley)

  Deedes, Rt. Hn. W. F. (Ashford)

  Loveys, W. H.

  Walker, Peter (Worcester)

  Dodds-Parker, Douglas

  Lubbock, Eric

  Walters, Dennis

  Doughty, Charles

  McAdden, Sir Stephen

  Ward, Dame Irene

  du Cann, Rt. Hn. Edward

  MacArthur, Ian

  Weatherill, Bernard

  Eden, Sir John

  McMaster, Stanley

  Whitelaw, Rt. Hn. William

  Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)

  Marten, Neil

  Williams, Donald (Dudley)

  Eyre, Reginald

  Mawby, Ray

  Wills, Sir Gerald (Bridgwater)

  Fletcher-Cooke, Charles

  Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J.

  Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)

  Fortescue, Tim

  Maydon, Lt.-Cmdr. S. L. C.

  Winstanley, Dr. M. P.

  Foster, Sir John

  Mills, Peter (Torrington)

  Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick

  Gibson-Watt, David

  More, Jasper

  Worsley, Marcus

  Gilmour, Ian (Norfolk, C.)

  Morrison, Charles (Devizes)

  Gilmour, Sir John (Fife, E.)

  Mott-Radclyffe, Sir Charles

  TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

  Godber, Rt. Hn. J. B.

  Munro-Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh

  Mr. Hector Munro and

  Goodhew, Victor

  Murton, Oscar

  Mr. Humphrey Atkins.

  Gower, Raymond

  Noble, Rt. Hn. Michael

  NOES

  Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)

  Boyden, James

  Davies, Dr. Ernest (Stretford)

  Alldritt, Walter

  Braddock, Mrs. E. M.

  Davies, Harold (Leek)

  Anderson, Donald

  Bradley, Tom

  de Freitas, Rt. Hn. Sir Geoffrey

  Archer, Peter

  Bray, Dr. Jeremy

  Delargy, Hugh

  Armstrong, Ernest

  Brooks, Edwin

  Dell, Edmund

  Atkins, Ronald (Preston, N.)

  Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.

  Dempsey, James

  Atkinson, Norman (Tottenham)

  Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, Provan)

  Dewar, Donald

  Bacon, Rt. Hn. Alice

  Brown, Bob (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, W.)

  Dickens, James

  Bagier, Gordon A. T.

  Buchan, Norman

  Dobson, Ray

  Barnes, Michael

  Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)

  Doig, Peter

  Baxter, William

  Carter-Jones, Lewis

  Dunwoody, Mrs. Gwyneth (Exeter)

  Beaney, Alan

  Coe, Denis

  Dunwoody, Dr. John (F'th&C'b'e)

  Bennett, James (G'gow, Bridgeton)

  Coleman, Donald

  Eadie, Alex

  Bidwell, Sydney

  Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)

  Edelman, Maurice

  Binns, John

  Crawshaw, Richard

  Ellis, John

  Bishop, E. S.

  Cullen, Mrs. Alice

  English, Michael

  Blackburn, F.

  Davidson, Arthur (Accrington)

  Ennals, David

  Ensor, David

  Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)

  Pentland, Norman

  Fernyhough, E.

  Lomas, Kenneth

  Perry, Ernest G. (Battersea, S.)

  Finch, Harold

  Loughlin, Charles

  Perry, George H. (Nottingham, S.)

  Fitch, Alan (Wigan)

  Lyon, Alexander W. (York)

  Price, Christopher (Perry Barr)

  Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)

  Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.)

  Price, Thomas (Westhoughton)

  Foot, Rt. Hn. Sir Dingle (Ipswich)

  McBride, Neil

  Price, William (Rugby)

  Fraser, John (Norwood)

  McCann, John

  Rhodes, Geoffrey

  Galpern, Sir Myer

  MacColl, James

  Richard, Ivor

  Garrett, W. E.

  McGuire, Michael

  Roberts, Albert (Normanton)

  Ginsburg, David

  Mackenzie, Gregor (Rutherglen)

  Roberts, Gwilym (Bedfordshire, S.)

  Gourlay, Harry

  Mackie, John

  Robertson, John (Paisley)

  Cray, Dr. Hugh (Yarmouth)

  Maclennan, Robert

  Robinson, W. O. J. (Walth'stow, E.)

  Grey, Charles (Durham)

  McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.)

  Rodgers, William (Stockton)

  Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)

  McNamara, J. Kevin

  Rose, Paul

  Hamilton, James (Bothwell)

  MacPherson, Malcolm

  Rowlands, E. (Cardiff, N.)

  Hamling, William

  Mahon, Peter (Preston, S.)

  Shaw, Arnold (Ilford, S.)

  Hannan, William

  Mahon, Simon (Bootle)

  Short, Rt.Hn.Edward (N'c'tle-u-Tyne)

  Harper, Joseph

  Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)

  Silkin, Rt. Hn. John (Deptford)

  Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)

  Mallalieu.J.P.W.(Huddersfield, E.)

  Silverman, Julius (Aston)

  Hart, Rt. Hn. Judith

  Manuel, Archie

  Small, William

  Haseldine, Norman

  Mapp, Charles

  Snow, Julian

  Hazell, Bert

  Marks, Kenneth

  Spriggs, Leslie

  Heffer, Eric S.

  Mendelson, J. J.

  Summerskill, Hn. Dr. Shirley

  Herbison, Rt. Hn. Margaret

  Millan, Bruce

  Swain, Thomas

  Hooley, Frank

  Miller, Dr. M. S.

  Swingler, Stephen

  Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas

  Milne, Edward (Blyth)

  Thomas, George (Cardiff, W.)

  Howarth, Robert (Bolton, E.)

  Mitchell, R. C. (S'th'pton, Test)

  Tinn, James

  Howell, Denis (Small Heath)

  Moonman, Eric

  Urwin, T. W.

  Howie, W.

  Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)

  Wainwright, Edwin (Dearne Valley)

  Hoy, James

  Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)

  Walker, Harold (Doncaster)

  Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)

  Moyle, Roland

  Wallace, George

  Hynd, John

  Mulley, Rt. Hn. Frederick

  Watkins, David (Consett)

  Irvine, Sir Arthur

  Murray, Albert

  Wellbeloved, James

  Jackson, Colin (B'h'se & Spenb'gh)

  Newens, Stan

  Whitlock, William

  Johnson, James (K'ston-on-Hull, W.)

  Noel-Baker, Francis (Swindon)

  Wilkins, W. A.

  Jones, Dan (Burnley)

  Noel-Baker, Rt.Hn. Philip (Derby, S.)

  Williams, Alan Lee (Hornchurch)

  Jones, Rt.Hn.Sir Elwyn (W.Ham, S.)

  Norwood, Christopher

  Willis, Rt. Hn. George

  Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)

  O'Malley, Brian

  Wilson, William (Coventry, S.)

  Jones, T. Alec (Rhondda, West)

  Orbach, Maurice

  Woof, Robert

  Judd, Frank

  Orme, Stanley

  Yates, Victor

  Lawson, George

  Pannell, Rt. Hn. Charles

  Leadbitter, Ted

  Pavitt, Laurence

  TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

  Lector, Miss Joan

  Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred

  Mr. Ioan L. Evans and

  Mr. Eric G. Varley.

  HOUSE OF COMMONS (SERVICES)
  Order read for resuming adjourned debate on Question [27th March],
  That Mr. Frank Hooley be added to the Select Committee on House of Commons (Services).—[Mr. Fitch.]
  Question again proposed.
  Question put and agreed to.

  NURSES (TRAINING)
  Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Harper.]
  11.3 p.m.
  Mr. Kenneth Lewis: Obviously depending on which way one looks at it, we are either a little earlier with this Adjournment debate or a little late. At one stage of the evening, I began to think that we would reach the Adjournment at about 7 or 8 o'clock.
  This debate which I am initiating on the modernisation of the training of nurses was put down before the Prices
  1036
  and Incomes Board reported on the pay and conditions of nurses. Therefore, I suppose, I may congratulate myself on foresight in putting it down. It is interesting to notice that some of the suggestions made by the Prices and Incomes Board have been made many times by hon. Members, both to the previous Government and, from time to time, to the present Government. Those suggestions have been by-passed by successive Ministers of Health.
  I remember that during the 12 years when I served on a hospital management committee, when I was chairman of an establishment committee and, therefore, concerned with nurses, there were a number of improvements for which we were pressing there which, we thought, would improve the recruitment of nurses. Recruitment, and to a certain extent the rate of wastage, have improved during the last few years. Nevertheless, we are still deficient in recruitment and far too many nurses who join the hospital service leave to go into other jobs either during their training or just after it. I

  1037
  therefore want to suggest one or two improvements to this situation.
  The late starting age of nurses has always been a problem and should have been dealt with many years ago; a somewhat high starting qualification is demanded from girls, particularly by the teaching hospitals. There is the difficulty of early marriage, which creates loss of trained staff; this applies not only to nurses but to many other professions, particularly to the teaching profession. In addition, too many out-dated rules and regulations still exist in discipline. There is also the problem of recruitment of qualified nurses away from the hospital service into industry and into the local authority services.
  I will not take too much time on Fay, the principal question raised by the Prices and Incomes Board Report, save t a make two comments. First, no one would dissent from the suggestions made for increasing pay, and even for increasing pay beyond the norm of 3½ per cent., since it is justified in this case. Apart from straight increases, however, pay can be dealt with by looking at the starting point on a grade. I am not sure that the hospital service, in recruiting staff nurses and sisters, takes advantage of the possibility of putting more highly qualified people, or those who are specially required to fill certain posts, on a higher grading than may be justified by their actual years of service.
  Secondly, a differential between rates paid to nurses by some local authorities as against rates paid by the hospital service should not be encouraged, and the Minister should look at this. It seems wrong that local authorities should be able to recruit from the hospital service nurses trained by the service at a rate of pay higher than is paid by the hospitals.
  Finally, on pay, the Minister should take very seriously the use of nursing employment agencies. The Prices and Incomes Board suggests the creation of a new set-up called the Supply Nurse Service. This is a reasonable suggestion, but, of course, it would be of no avail if employment agencies for nurses were allowed to recruit and supply nurses to the hospital service on a rate of pay very much higher than that paid by the hospital management committees.
  1038
  Most people with any knowledge of this subject would accept that the attraction of the nursing profession to young people is not dependent upon a marginal financial return. Many other things act as deterrents against recruitment into the profession. First, the qualifications demanded by some teaching hospitals are way above the qualifications demanded by many other nurse training hospitals. Teaching hospitals which have a social cachet to them could take on a great many more nurses for training if they were to reduce the high standard of, in some cases, two A-levels at present demanded.
  The proposal by the Prices and Incomes Board Report that the starting age should come down from 18 to 17 is long overdue. It has been resisted at the top level in General Nursing Council circles, despite the pressure which has been brought to bear in this House. It should be brought down to 17, and I hope that the Minister will say whether he intends to act on this proposal.
  The hierarchy of nursing organisations have also resisted the introduction of cadet schemes. I know that cadet schemes exist in many of our training hospitals, but they are not given great encouragement. They are somewhat frowned upon. At the same time as the age of entry for training as a nurse is lowered, there should be introduced cadet schemes throughout the service. Recruits should be able to come in at the age of 16, straight from school. If a girl, who wishes eventually to become a nurse, gets a stop gap job until she reaches the necessary age of entry she often settles into this job and does not want to make the change later.
  The Report also suggests that the training of nurses should be concentrated in a limited number of large training hospitals. I think that this would prove impractical. Many of our training hospitals need trainee nurses for the care of patients. Part of a girl's training consists in taking care of patients, and if they had to leave their present hospitals and these hospitals were deprived of recruits, this would make a difficult situation much worse.
  We should actively encourage the recruitment of enrolled nurses. There has been a lukewarm reaction by the

  1039
  nursing authorities to the wider use of enrolled nurses. There is danger of an apartheid situation developing within the profession on this. This is stupid, and does not help in the staffing of our hospitals. The Minister ought to make it clear that he intends to encourage an increased recruitment of enrolled nurses.
  It is time that we ended the restrictive regulations which insist that a S.R.N. who goes on to take a maternity or other training course must suffer a drop in salary. This is undignified, apart from being financially damaging. A nurse who takes a course which will be not only to her advantage, but to the advantage of the service as a whole, should not have to suffer a loss of either status or salary.
  Next, this is mentioned in the Prices and Incomes Board Report, and it has been dealt with by some of our hospitals, split duty shifts are a barrier to social life among the nurses. Young nurses are entitled to a social life, in the same way as is any one else. It is interesting to note that matrons and senior sisters do not work split duty shifts. The work of nurses should be organised on a rota system, so that those who have time off do not have to take it in the middle of the day. It is very difficult for a young nurse to go out with her boy friend if she is off during the middle of the day and he is working. This problem ought to be appreciated by those who organise shift working.
  The Report has a good deal to say about the lack of staff at night and at weekends in hospitals. I think we should appreciate, however, that we cannot have it both ways. We cannot expect nurses to be given time off at hours that are socially advantageous if at the same time we call for full staffing in the hospitals during the night and at hours when perhaps there is not quite so much to do.
  The sixth point I want to make concerns the living in of nurses, and this again is mentioned in the Report. I would think it reasonable that nurses in their first year should live in. It should be within the competence of the matron of a hospital to decide whether second year nurses should live in, but I am quite certain that third year nurses should be allowed—and indeed encouraged—to live out. Obviously apart from every-
  1040
  thing else this cuts down the cost to the service of having to provide the accommodation.
  The Report suggests that nurses in order that they may have more money for themselves they should pay for meals as they go, rather than pay a board fee which is taken from them. I have some doubt about this. I think it is important that the first year nurse who is working very hard—she is young and has just come out of school—should have her meals. She should not be encouraged to do what some university students do, to save money and not buy proper meals. Therefore, so far as the first year nurse is concerned, it seems to me that meals should either be provided free, or at least it should remain that limited board be taken off so as to ensure that the girl does get sufficient food to enable her to do her job.
  Finally, there is the general attitude of the nursing hierarchy to the whole question of the treatment of nurses who are under training. This is still old-fashioned in certain places. We have got rid of the barrack square technique in the services, but nursing is still overlaid with a stiff-cuffed approach to training.
  This is an irritant. The decision of a nurse as to whether she carries on her profession after she is qualified, I would say, takes place in the first year. If, therefore, the nurse becomes disenchanted in the first year she may well decide that she is going to grin and bear it. She is going to carry on with her course; come what may, she is going to complete it. Then she is going to get out.
  The hospital service has got to recognise that in the training of a nurse it is important that there should be a modern outlook in both the spirit and the techniques of training. The modernisation of this system, which is pin-pointed in the Prices and Incomes Report, is something that has been pressed, as I said at the beginning, over many years, and the hospital service will get great advantage from any improvements the Minister can either impose or persuade.
  If he takes the view that he ought to try to persuade, I would remind him that various Ministers have been trying to persuade the Royal College, the Nursing Council and others to improve their general attitudes towards training. It

  1041
  may be, therefore, that we have now reached the position where action is needed by the Ministry direct. I hope that the Minister will not hesitate to take any such action in order to improve the situation for those who are already in the service, retain more of those who are going out of it, and recruit more of those who are looking forward to joining it.
  11.20 p.m.
  The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Health (Mr. Julian Snow): I am not quite certain what the hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford (Mr. Kenneth Lewis) meant when he talked about direct action, because the statutory authority for nurse training rests on the General Nursing Council, which lays down the syllabus of training for each part of the register and the roll of nurses. My Department pays £4¼ million a year direct to the Council to help it to carry Out its responsibilities.
  Training must be related to the patients' needs and must then reflect the changes in the organisation of care and the methods of treatment. I agree, therefore, that nurse training needs to be kept constantly under review. At no time since the National Health Service started has nurse training been so constantly to the fore. The syllabus which is the responsibility of the General Nursing Council was revised by what is known as the 1962 syllabus, based on greater integration between theoretical teaching and practical experience.
  It might be thought that by 1968 the results of a syllabus introduced in 1962 should be settled, but training takes three years and involves the running of two systems for a time together and causes some dislocation of the organisation for allocating staff to wards. Therefore, constant review is desirable, but constant change is highly undesirable. Many of the suggestions put forward for improving nurse training involve the separation of schools of nursing from the hospital service, either to form independent entities or to be linked with the general educational system. I think that the implications of such proposals are not always realised.
  Much is often made of the conflict between service and teaching requirements. However, much can be done within the existing framework to mini-
  1042
  mise the effect of the conflict between service requirements and training needs, and many of the hospitals with the best training records have achieved a great deal in this respect. Guidance based on their experience was given in the memorandum on improving nurse education which was issued by my Department some six months ago. The measures suggested, which included a review of off-duty restrictions imposed on nurses, were endorsed by the National Board for Prices and Incomes, which thought that they should be followed up vigorously. I very much hope that hospital authorities will take these suggestions most seriously.
  The reason I queried the hon. Gentleman's talk of direct action was that he will know that we must act through that statutory authority, the General Nursing Council. If we were to seek to follow the lines suggested by the Platt Committee, for example, as a means of completely eliminating all risk of conflict between training needs and service requirements it would involve making student nurses supernumerary to a very large extent in their first year and to some extent in their second year. Not only would this be very costly—and money spent on this would be at the expense of other developments in the hospital service—but it would also be expensive in manpower. Even accepting that replacement by equivalent numbers would not be required, it is likely that between 15,000 and 20,000 additional nursing staff would be required over and above those already needed to make good existing shortages and for the general expansion of hospital and community nursing services. I think it most unlikely that additional staff could be found to the extent required over the next few years.
  It is quite possible to secure much revision and modernisation of nurse training within the existing framework of the syllabus; the key to this continuing revision and adaptation lies, I think, in close co-operation between teaching staff and those providing the service to the patient. We hope that the introduction of the Salmon proposals will clarify nursing management and, by fostering more efficient administration, will release ward sisters and nurses of assistant matron level particularly from non-nursing duties. It is important to remember that we have a great shortage of qualified nursing

  1043
  tutors. We shall closely examine the proposals in the Report with a view to alleviating this discrepancy.
  The hon. Gentleman referred to State enrolled nurses. It is, of course, essential that we have an adequate and settled qualified staff, including this category of nurses. Publicity has been aimed at recruiting more enrolled nurses, and the Report to which I referred drew attention to the fact that their contribution, relative to that of other qualified nurses, is increasing. A sub-committee of the Minister's Standing Nursing Advisory Committee is now considering the function in the National Health Service of State enrolled nurses.
  We fully accept that it is necessary to watch continually to see if there is a need for changes in methods of teaching and for major changes in the content of the courses which would require changes in the syllabus. Section 12 of the Nurses Act, 1957, gives the General Nursing Council power to approve, with the Minister's agreement, experimental courses of training. Indeed, my Department recognises the need to encourage the trial of new types of training.
  My Department gave information to hospital authorities and in September of last year my right hon. Friend announced that he would be prepared to give limited financial help to foster some experiments which the General Nursing Council thought worthy of trial. Some of these are already under way and they include some combining university degrees with training for registration and others using facilities at colleges of further education. Some are aimed at widening the nurses' background or to help them to obtain, in addition to their registrable qualification, a Diploma in Nursing or additional experience in management. The hon. Gentleman referred to the status of educational qualifications. I do not see much harm in what he suggested, as long as we get the nurses who are wanted; in any event, we should achieve as high a degree of educational level as possible.
  In this connection, experiments in psychiatry will give students registration as nurses for the mentally subnormal and a qualification in the teaching of the mentally handicapped, or the qualification of Registered Mental Nurse with a
  1044
  diploma in community nursing in the psychiatric sphere. This is an important matter because in the view of most people there should be a lead in pay for nurses specialising in this type of nursing.
  There is a danger in too much experimenting without having a sense of direction and purpose. We must guard against this. My right hon. Friend offered the General Nursing Council finance to establish a small research section at the Council's office, where, in the course of the day-to-day administration of nurse training, the Council have material which would provide a sound basis for research. This offer was accepted by the Council. A research officer has been appointed and work has been progressing well. A joint steering committee, including members and officers of the Council and officers of my Department, has been set up to advise on the programme of work of the Council's new research unit. The General Nursing Council is not limiting itself to immediate needs. It has established a special sub-committee to consider long-term policy on nurse training.
  The Report of the National Board for Prices and Incomes also drew attention to the desirability of making some changes in nurse training and of speeding up other changes, such as the grouping of schools. One specific proposal it made was the reduction of the age of entry to 17 and a complementary reduction in the training of cadet nurses, who are paid and employed under conditions laid down by the Ministry. In our view, the reduction of age to 17 is, and has been in the past, fully supported by my right hon. Friend. Unfortunately we have not yet convinced the Council, although we intend to try to do so again.
  Mr. Lewis: That is the nub of the whole question. The hon. Member said that I should realise that he and his right hon. Friend did not have power over many of these matters. He has repeated that he has to convince the General Nursing Council. That is the difficulty, and he must do something about it.
  Mr. Snow: The hon. Member is suggesting carrying out a fundamental change in the responsibility of the G.N.C.

  1045
  from a professional point of view. That is a fundamental question which cannot be discussed in such a short debate as this. We will examine any proposals that the hon. Gentleman puts forward, but there is a professional reticence and a professional attitude in this matter which it would take a great deal to change.
  1046
  I do not say that reform is not necessary, but we should have to establish a much deeper investigation of the relationship of the profession with the political direction of nursing.
  Question put and agreed to.
  Adjourned accordingly at twenty-nine minutes to Twelve o'clock.

SOCIAL SECURITY
  Earnings Limit
  Earnings Limit
  Commonwealth Immigrants (Repatriation)
  Commonwealth Immigrants (Repatriation)
  Supplementary Benefit
  Supplementary Benefit
  Occupational Pensioners (Unemployment Benefit and Contribution Credits)
  Occupational Pensioners (Unemployment Benefit and Contribution Credits)
  Local Authority Houses
  Local Authority Houses
  Retirement Pensions (Contributions)
  Retirement Pensions (Contributions)
  Wage Related Benefits Scheme
  Wage Related Benefits Scheme
  War Pensioners Overseas
  War Pensioners Overseas
  Unemployment Benefit Appeal Cases, Kingston-upon-Hull
  Unemployment Benefit Appeal Cases, Kingston-upon-Hull
  Migrant Workers
  Migrant Workers
  Research and Statistics Department
  Research and Statistics Department
HOUSE OF COMMONS
  Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs (Oral Answers to Questions)
  Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs (Oral Answers to Questions)
  Women's Suffrage
  Women's Suffrage
  Catering
  Catering
  Falkland Islands
  Falkland Islands
PUBLIC BUILDING AND WORKS
  Government Whips (Official Transport)
  Government Whips (Official Transport)
  Cement (Special Surcharge)
  Cement (Special Surcharge)
  Construction Industry (Bankruptcies)
  Construction Industry (Bankruptcies)
  Construction Contracts (Fittings and Components)
  Construction Contracts (Fittings and Components)
MINISTRY OF LABOUR
  Pensioners' Cost of Living Index
  Pensioners' Cost of Living Index
  Occupational Pension Schemes (Transferability)
  Occupational Pension Schemes (Transferability)
  Low Paid Workers
  Low Paid Workers
  Industrial Hygiene
  Industrial Hygiene
  Agricultural Workers (Redundancy Payments)
  Agricultural Workers (Redundancy Payments)
  Unemployment, Northern Region
  Unemployment, Northern Region
  Disabled Persons (Register)
  Disabled Persons (Register)
  Overtime Work
  Overtime Work
  Employment, Teesside and Hartlepool
  Employment, Teesside and Hartlepool
  Manufacturing and Service Industries
  Manufacturing and Service Industries
  Queenslie Training Centre
  Queenslie Training Centre
  Unemployment, Newham
  Unemployment, Newham
  HUMAN RIGHTS
  HUMAN RIGHTS
  UNITED NATIONS TRUST FUND FOR SOUTH AFRICA
  UNITED NATIONS TRUST FUND FOR SOUTH AFRICA
MINISTRY OF HEALTH
  Prescription Charges
  Prescription Charges
  Spina Bifida
  Spina Bifida
  Congenital Deformity (Statistics)
  Congenital Deformity (Statistics)
  Disabled People (Identification)
  Disabled People (Identification)
HOSPITALS
  New Hospital, Banbury
  New Hospital, Banbury
  Geriatric Services, Banbury
  Geriatric Services, Banbury
  Banbury Hospital (Nurses)
  Banbury Hospital (Nurses)
MINISTRY OF POWER
  National Coal Board (Trade Undertakings)
  National Coal Board (Trade Undertakings)
  Electricity (Overhead Lines)
  Electricity (Overhead Lines)
HOUSING
  Council Houses (Rents and Rates Increases)
  Council Houses (Rents and Rates Increases)
  Mortgage Option Scheme
  Mortgage Option Scheme
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
  Refuse Tips
  Refuse Tips
  Town Centre Shops (Turnover)
  Town Centre Shops (Turnover)
COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS
  Gibraltarians (Passports)
  Gibraltarians (Passports)
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
  B.A.O.R. (Local Overseas Allowances)
  B.A.O.R. (Local Overseas Allowances)
  Member's Question
  Member's Question
  Orfordness Radar Station (Radio Equipment)
  Orfordness Radar Station (Radio Equipment)
  North Sea (Russian Reconnaissance Aircraft)
  North Sea (Russian Reconnaissance Aircraft)
  Land, Leicestershire
  Land, Leicestershire
HOME DEPARTMENT
  Metropolitan Police (Clothing)
  Metropolitan Police (Clothing)
  Hiroshima Survivor (Stay)
  Hiroshima Survivor (Stay)
  Embassies (Police Protection)
  Embassies (Police Protection)
  Medical Practitioners (Abortions)
  Medical Practitioners (Abortions)
  Grosvenor Square (Demonstration)
  Grosvenor Square (Demonstration)
  Drugs (Police Raids)
  Drugs (Police Raids)
  Departmental Staff
  Departmental Staff
  Proposed Prison, Wartling (Inquiry)
  Proposed Prison, Wartling (Inquiry)
BOARD OF TRADE
  National Film Finance Corporation
  National Film Finance Corporation
  Employment (North-East Warwickshire)
  Employment (North-East Warwickshire)
NATIONAL FINANCE
  Selective Employment Tax
  Selective Employment Tax
  Fulton Committee (Report)
  Fulton Committee (Report)
  Special Charge (Close Company Shareholders)
  Special Charge (Close Company Shareholders)
  Family Allowances (Surtax Payers)
  Family Allowances (Surtax Payers)
  PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE (STAFF)
  PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE (STAFF)
AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD
  Foot-and-Mouth Disease
  Foot-and-Mouth Disease
  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT (STAFF)
  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT (STAFF)
ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
  Departmental Staff
  Departmental Staff
  Grey Areas (Definition)
  Grey Areas (Definition)
EDUCATION AND SCIENCE
  Antique Furniture (Export)
  Antique Furniture (Export)
  Immigrant Pupils (Leicester)
  Immigrant Pupils (Leicester)
  Royal Air Force, Brize Norton (Educational Facilities)
  Royal Air Force, Brize Norton (Educational Facilities)
  Spina Bifida
  Spina Bifida
  Russell Papers
  Russell Papers
  Part-Time Teachers (Hertfordshire)
  Part-Time Teachers (Hertfordshire)
  Public Schools Commission (Membership)
  Public Schools Commission (Membership)
OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT
  Aid
  Aid
TECHNOLOGY
  Hearing Aid Batteries (Report)
  Hearing Aid Batteries (Report)
ROADS
  A62 Road
  A62 Road
  Grasscroft-Saddleworth Road Junction (Accidents)
  Grasscroft-Saddleworth Road Junction (Accidents)
  Old Woking Road, West Byfleet (Pedestrian Crossing)
  Old Woking Road, West Byfleet (Pedestrian Crossing)
  A66 Road, Crackenthorpe (Double White Lines)
  A66 Road, Crackenthorpe (Double White Lines)
  D Ring Road
  D Ring Road
TRANSPORT
  Royal Aircraft Establishment (Inland Transport Problems)
  Royal Aircraft Establishment (Inland Transport Problems)
RAILWAYS
  Locomotives (Rental Charges)
  Locomotives (Rental Charges)

Preamble
The House met at three of the clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR On the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Truro.

SOUTH WEST AFRICA AND THE UNITED NATIONS
3.5 p.m.
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will instruct their representatives at the United Nations to throw the whole weight of United Kingdom influence against any threat of using force against the South African administration in South West Africa.]
THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (LORD CHALFONT): My Lords, Her Majesty's Government do not consider that the use of force is a satisfactory solution to the situation in South West Africa, and they will continue to exert their influence at the United Nations to obtain a peaceful solution to its problem.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, in view of the fact that a mission from the United Nations is now seeking to enter South West Africa, may I ask my noble friend what alternative method Her
2
Majesty's Government are suggesting to enable them to carry out the decision of the United Nations that the administration of South West Africa should pass to the United Nations?
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord who it is understood is paying for the exercise proposed by the United Nations?
LORD CHALFONT: My Lords, I fear that I know of no exercise or operation proposed by the United Nations The Security Council Resolution No. 246 has been passed, the South African Government has reacted to it, and it is now for the Security Council to determine what further action, if any, is necessary. I know of none.
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, in view of the recent statement by the noble Lord that the United Nations is £60 million in deficit, with over forty countries late in their payments, it would seem that the question I asked was justified. Would the noble Lord say whether he has had brought to his notice the deposition of Dr. Muller, the Foreign Minister of South Africa, dealing with the hostile actions of the United Nations towards South Africa, running into some 30 pages, a copy of which I have in my hand, because it would seem—
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Question!
LORD BARNBY: I ask the noble whether he has had brought to his notice the deposition of the Foreign Minister of South Africa to the United Nations dealing with the matters which stimulate

3
the proposal reported in the Press of a threat to South Africa? May I also—
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Order!
THE PAYMASTER GENERAL (LORD SHACKLETON): My Lords, I realise that the noble Lord is dealing with a serious point, but the House would like him to ask a question for information. Perhaps he would do that. He is not twisting anybody's tail except that of the House by going on as he is.
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord the Leader of the House whether I may repeat the question—
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: No.
LORD BARNBY: It is of a sufficiently important character. I would then ask: is it not considered unwise at this stage for the United Kingdom's representative to appear insufficiently opposed to the risk of a conflagration in South West Africa, particularly when the South African Government has made clear that it would oppose it with all the force at its disposal?
LORD CHALFONT: My Lords, I think I can perhaps help the House by saying that my attention and the attention of Her Majesty's Government have been drawn to the deposition which the noble Lord has mentioned, but that there is no possible justification for the noble Lord's suggestion that Her Majesty's Government have not opposed, and do not oppose, the idea of the use of force as a satisfactory solution to the situation in South West Africa.
LORD OGMORE: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord whether his attention has been drawn to the new Constitution which the South African Government has proposed for South West Africa, and to what extent this new Constitution affects the feeling of the United Nations with reference to the territory?
LORD CHALFONT: Yes, my Lords. My attention and that of Her Majesty's Government has been drawn to all these facts, but I repeat that it is now for the
4
Security Council to determine what further action is necessary in this case in the light of South Africa's response to Resolution No. 246, if indeed any is required at all. I think it would be wrong of me to bind Her Majesty's Government to any course of action in a hypothetical situation.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend (and I am asking for information) in view of the immediately critical situation where a United Nations mission is on the way to South Africa, without advocating the use of force, what proposals have Her Majesty's Government to make in order that that mission may be successful?
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, before the noble Lord answers that question, may I ask whether it has any retation to the Question on the Order Paper with regard to the threat of using force?
LORD CHALFONT: My Lords, I must on this occasion express a certain amount of sympathy with the view of the noble Viscount. I believe that my noble friend's question does go very wide of the original Question on the Order Paper. I can only say that, in the view of Her Majesty's Government, the action that is now needed in this case is action that I hope will be taken by the Security Council, and Her Majesty's Government are prepared for the moment to leave it to them.

U.N.C.T.A.D.: NEW DELHI CONFERENCE
3.13 p.m.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the first Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what conclusions were reached by the UNCTAD conference at New Delhi.]
THE MINISTER OF STATE, BOARD OF TRADE (LORD BROWN): My Lords, with permission I will answer this Question at a convenient moment after 3.30 p.m. by repeating a Statement which my right honourable friend is giving this afternoon in another place.

VIETNAM: PROPOSED PEACE TALKS
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the second Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what action is being taken to encourage talks between North Vietnam, the N.L.F., and the U.S.A. to bring about a cease-fire in Vietnam.]
LORD CHALFONT: My Lords, noble Lords will be aware that the United States and North Vietnam are engaged in arranging direct contacts between themselves. It is our hope that these will lead to a complete cessation of hostilities and a negotiated settlement of the conflict. Her Majesty's Government have welcomed the moves by both sides and have reaffirmed their readiness to co-operate in any measures which would advance the prospect of a settlement.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, while thanking the noble Lord very deeply for that Answer, may I ask him whether the present negotiations might not be helped if, accompanying any decision by America to stop bombing the North unconditionally, there were a cease-fire which would have the effect of no more infiltration from the North; whether, following this, there might not be suggestions of a settlement on the basis of the Geneva Agreement which would give self-determination; and, further, whether Her Majesty's Government will act in these interests with the Russians for a solution upon these lines?
LORD CHALFONT: My Lords, I do not want to prejudge in any way the form or content of any negotiations that might take place. It is our hope that the first contacts between the United States and the North Vietnamese will lead to negotiations in which the legitimate aspirations of all the people in Vietnam will be realised. I would say to my noble friend that we stand ready to help in any way that seems practical, whether through the Geneva co-chairmanship or through the United Nations, or by any other means.

VARIABLE GEOMETRY AIRCRAFT
3.15 p.m.
THE EARL OF KINNOULL: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on Vic Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government how soon now they expect to make a further statement on the future of the British variable geometry aircraft project.]
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, it is too early to say.
THE EARL OF KINNOULL: My Lords, while thanking the noble Lord for his very full reply, may I take this opportunity of congratulating him on his promotion? While not seeking particular information, may I say that I hope his promotion will not take him too much away from the House in the future. May I ask him, in regard to the Question, whether the revised operation of the variable geometry aircraft project has yet been settled; whether it is still intended that this plane shall replace the V-bombers, and whether the time of phasing-out of the V-bombers has now been extended due to the delay in ordering a replacement?
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, these questions are rather wider than the original one. Of course, the whole of our operational environment has yet to be studied, and it really is too early to answer any of these questions. I am not saying that they are not important, but I am afraid that I cannot answer them at this stage.
LORD ST. OSWALD: My Lords, may I ask whether Her Majesty's Government have made any contact with the Governments of Holland, Belgium and Germany, and I believe Italy as well, who have lately, I understand, formed a committee to study the possibility of evolving the successor to the F.104? I believe that the project comes under the name of "Hornet". Since I feel that the British Government's interest would be welcomed among those countries, may I ask NO ether any contact has so far been made?
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, first of all may I thank the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, for his remarks about myself. I am not sure whether it is a promotion or a sideways move, but I hope to be as attendant as ever. I fear that I cannot give very detailed answers to questions which are not on the Order Paper, but certainly the points which the noble Lord, Lord St. Oswald, has made are under active consideration, and contact is being held particularly at the moment with the German authorities at several levels.
LORD TREFGARNE: My Lords can the noble Lord tell us how far the British project has gone in its technical development? For example, is there yet any prospect of a prototype instruction?
LORD SHACKLETON: No, my Lords, there is no settlement yet, and that is why I am afraid it is too early for me to make any statement.

GIBRALTAR DISTURBANCES
3.18 p.m.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question of which I have given Private Notice; namely—
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they have any Statement to make about the recent disturbances in Gibraltar.
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, my noble friend Lord Shepherd will be answering this Question in the form of a Statement at a convenient moment after 3.30 p.m.

RENT BILL [H.L.]
Report of the Amendments received.

THEFT BILL [H.L.]
3.19 p.m.
THE MINISTER OF STATE, HOME OFFICE (LORD STONHAM): My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now further considered on Report.
Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
Clause 2:
"Dishonestly"
2.—(l) A person's appropriation of property belonging to another is not to be regarded as dishonest—

(a) if he appropriates the property in the belief that he has in law the right to deprive the other of it, or that he would have the other's consent if the other knew of the appropriation and the circumstances of it; or

(b) (except where the property came to him as trustee or personal representative) if he appropriates the property.

(2) A person's appropriation of property belonging to another may be dishonest notwithstanding that he pays for the property.
LORD AIREDALE LORD AIREDALE moved, to leave out subsection (1), and insert:
"(1).A person's appropriation of property belonging to another is not to be regarded as dishonest if he appropriates the property in the belief that

(a) he has in law the right to deprive the other of it on behalf of himself or of a third person; or

(b) he would have the other's consent if the other knew of the appropriation and the circumstances of it; or

(c) (except where the property came to him as trustee or personal representative) the person to whom the property belongs cannot be discovered by taking reasonable steps."

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is an Amendment to redraft subsection (1) of Clause 2. I put it down after the Minister had kindly written to me to say that he was proposing to put down the Amendment which is No. 6. It occurred to me that if that were done the subsection would have the disadvantage that it would consist of three paragraphs, (a), (b) and (c), all of which would contain the long phrase:
"if he appropriates the property in the belief that".
It seemed to me to be preferable from a drafting point of view to put those words in before branching off into paragraphs (a), (b), and (c), and that in that

9
way the subsection would be much clearer. I have taken the liberty of including in the redrafted subsection the words of Amendment No. 6, standing in the Minister's name. I trust that from a drafting point of view the subsection is more satisfactory in the form in which it now appears as Amendment No. 5. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 16, leave out subsection (1) and insert the said new subsection.—(Lord Airedale.)
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, for attempting in a helpful way to redraft this Clause. There is certainly no liberty, as he put it, to include in his redrafted version the two Amendments which I hope subsequently to move and which embody suggestions that he, and also the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, made.
There is, of course, something to be said for avoiding the repetition three times of the words "if he appropriates the property in the belief". I think it is arguable whether there is not something to be said—and I think there is —for repeating those words in each of the paragraphs, but unfortunately in his redraft the noble Lord has failed to preserve the meaning and intentions of the clause because of the position' in which he has placed the words in brackets in paragraph (c). If your Lordships will bear with me I will repeat the relevant part of the subsection as it would read
"A person's appropriation of property belonging to another is not to be regarded as dishonest if he appropriates the property in the belief that
(c) (except where the property came to him as trustee or personal representative) the person to whom the property belongs cannot be discovered by taking reasonable steps."
In the clause as drafted the words in brackets are intended to provide, in effect, that it is immaterial that the person appropriating the property had the belief referred to in paragraph (c): that is, except where the property came to him as a trustee or personal representative. Those words ought to precede and not follow the word "that". Therefore the effect of placing the words in the way the noble Lord has placed them (inadvertently, I am sure) really would create a nonsense, because it would have
10
to be part of the person's belief that except where the property came to him as a trustee or personal representative, the person to whom the property belonged could not be discovered by taking reasonable steps. That is certainly not what he intended.
I hope the noble Lord and your Lordships will appreciate that this Amendment is not viable. It does not carry out what the clause intends, nor, I think, what the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, intends. Therefore it is not acceptable, and as a corollary to that I trust your Lordships will agree to keep the subsection as drafted, subject to the improvements which I hope your Lordships will agree I should make when I move Amendment No. 6.
LORD AIREDALE: My Lords, I should never wish to continue a lengthy argument, and certainly not to divide the House, on a matter of drafting. No doubt there is substance in what the Minister has just said. I think it is a great pity that one cannot draft a subsection without having three paragraphs, each of which contains quite a long expression. I have done my best to avoid that situation. I have clearly failed, and therefore I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD STONHAM: My Lord, as I have already foreshadowed, this Amendment has a twofold purpose. First, it meets a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, in Committee, that paragraph (a) of the subsection was confusing because it contained two separate propositions. This Amendment meets that difficulty. Secondly, the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, suggested that the Bill should make it clear that, as established in the case of R. v. Williams in 1962, a belief in a right in law to deprive another of property can be a belief in such a right to deprive him of the property on behalf of another. While, in the view of the Government there is nothing on the face of the Bill to negative the decision in R. v. Williams, we have come to the conclusion that there would be merit in an Amendment to make the position clear, and that is achieved by the reference to "a third person". I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 19, leave out ("or") and insert—
("on behalf of himself or of a third person; or
() if he appropriates the property in the belief").—(Lord Stonham.)
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, I should like to thank the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, for meeting the point I made, and I hope the House will approve this Amendment.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD STONHAM LORD STONHAM moved, in subsection (2), to leave out "pays" and insert "is willing to pay". The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment meets objections raised by the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wilberforce, on the ground that "pays" was a misleading expression as "payment" implied acceptance by a willing vendor, whereas the subsection is intended to meet cases where the thief takes property which he covets from a person who is unwilling to sell, but nevertheless the thief seeks to pay for it. The subsection assumes an "appropriation of property belonging to another", and for this reason I doubt whether the word "pays" would be misleading in its context, but the Government agree that it is right to put the question completely beyond doubt, and I believe the Amendment does put the intentions of the provision beyond doubt by directing the mind to the intention of the taker. If the subsection is amended in the manner proposed it will meet the case where the offender actually pays—that is, where he leaves or sends the money—because he will clearly have been "willing" to pay, and it is his intention that matters. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 5, leave out ("pays") and insert ("is willing to pay").—(Lord Stonham.)
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I rise to thank the noble Lord for moving this Amendment.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause3:
"Appropriates"
3.—(1) Any assumption by a person of the rights of an owner amounts to an appropriation, and this includes, where he has come by the property (innocently or not) without stealing it, any later assumption of a right to it by keeping or dealing with it as owner.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE VISCOUNT DILHORNE moved, in subsection (1), to leave out "come by" and insert "obtained possession of". The noble and learned Viscount said: My Lords, in Committee my noble and learned friend Lord Wilberforce drew attention to the use of the words "come by". He said then that he did not know where they had been brought from, and he found a considerable cause for stumbling in the phrase "come by". He did not know what it was intended to mean, other than to give a popular look to the clause. It seems to refer to having possession, or something of that sort, and he said that to him it was unattractive and not clear. I spoke in support of my noble and learned friend and said that in all the Bills I had had to read over the years I did not remember coming across that expression. I understand that it has been used in a number of Statutes, some of considerable antiquity, but the last Statute in which it was used was in 1875; so my statement that it was well before my time that the expression appeared in any Bill was correct. It seems to me a rather slangy expression, the meaning of which is rather uncertain. I am not very interested in the number of Statutes in which it has been used in bygone days, but if "come by" is meant to mean "obtained possession of" it seems to me that it would be much better to use those words. Therefore I have put down this Amendment. I do not think there is much in it, and I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, will accept it. I do not think myself that "come by" is a very happy use of words. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 8, leave out ("come by") and insert ("obtained possession of").—(Viscount Dilhorne.)

GIBRALTAR DISTURBANCES
3.32 p.m.
THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS (LORD SHEPHERD): My Lords, with permission, I would now wish to reply to the Private Notice Question asked earlier by the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, in regard to recent disturbances in Gibraltar.
On April 4 a group of Gibraltarians signing themselves as "The Doves" published an open letter in the Gibraltar Chronicle suggesting a "positive solution to the Gibraltar question" to be embodied "in a contemporary AngloSpanish Treaty in substitution for the outmoded Treaty of Utrecht". There followed a number of detailed proposals which included one for the symbolical flying of the Spanish flag in Gibraltar along with the Union Jack, and they stated specifically that their proposals would not involve a transfer of sovereignty to Spain. The letter also said that its authors had been in direct touch with the Spanish Foreign Ministry. The Doves are a small group of professional and business men.
At about 11 o'clock on Saturday, April 5, a small crowd came to the Governor's residence and asked to see him. He saw three spokesmen who told him that the Doves did not represent the people of Gibraltar, had no right to negotiate with Spain and should he cautioned about their activities. The Governor said that he would take note of their representations but stressed that Gibraltar was a democracy and that freedom of thought and expression must be upheld. However, irresponsible elements in the crowd continued to incite public feeling against the Doves and their property. Before long the crowd had grown and were doing considerable damage including the overturning of a motor car and a bus. Two policemen were injured. At this point a small quantity of tear gas was used. The crowd then went to the Main Square where the Chief Minister, assisted by other elected members of the Legislative Council, attempted to speak to them. The Chief Minister talked with some of their representatives and pointed out the folly and danger of the crowd's action. With their help and that of his own colleagues he persuaded the crowd to disperse. Unfortunately, sections of the crowd led by
14
a small group of hooligans began to ransack premises belonging to members of the Doves, and to overturn cars; and they also burnt a boat belonging to one of the Doves and innocent bystanders were assaulted. At this point the Governor decided, after informing the Chief Minister, to call out sufficient troops to assist in the protection of lives and property. The troops have not carried firearms but only pick handles and have been used mainly to guard points likely to attract demonstrators.
On Saturday evening the Governor spoke to the Gibraltarians on radio and television about these events. He reported yesterday, April 7, that all was then quiet in Gibraltar. Sixteen arrests were made on Saturday evening; and those accused were to appear before the magistrates' court this morning. The Governor is setting up a Commission of Inquiry under the appropriate local Ordinance. I am sure the House will join with me in deploring these disturbances, which are so uncharacteristic of Gibraltar.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord for repeating the Statement being made in another place, and clearly we should await the report of the Commission of Inquiry before going into the details of this regettable incident. If I may express a personal opinion, I should like to say that in my view at least it is clear that the Gibraltar authorities, the Governor and Chief Minister, have acted with wisdom and with restrained firmness in their handling of what could have be en, or could still be, a difficult situation. Meanwhile, while having every sympathy for the people of Gibraltar in their present difficulties, and while believing in their right to determine their own destinies, I should like to echo what is said in the Statement about deploring this particular disturbance.
LORD GLADWYN: My Lords, will the Government see to it that all Gibraltarians have the right to express in a constitutional way their views, however unpopular, on the future of their country?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I am very grateful for what the noble Earl has said, and I will see that his views, which I share, are conveyed to the

15
Governor and Chief Minister, who have acted with very great statesmanship in a very difficult situation. In reply to the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, I have not the slightest shadow of doubt what is the general view in Gibraltar, that democracy is there and that this means that people should be allowed to express their views no matter how unpopular they may be, and it is now up to all in Gibraltar to see that this can be maintained.
LORD MERRIVALE: My Lords, would not the noble Lord agree that these incidents took place in some measure through the sense of frustration and insecurity at present felt by the people of Gibraltar, due to the dilatory attitude of Her Majesty's Government, especially regarding their desire for a final Constitution since the outcome of the referendum many months ago, when they voted overwhelmingly to retain their link with this country?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I would not myself accept that as the reason behind this disturbance. I recognise the uncertainties that exist in the minds of many in Gibraltar, and we have done our best, and I thought we had succeeded, in putting at rest many of those fears. I think it would be wrong to presume what the Commission of Inquiry will find, but I would suspect that this is the activity, not of a political organisation but of hooligans.
LORD MERRIVALE: My Lords, may I ask one more question? The noble Lord referred to the proposals of these five Doves. Can the noble Lord confirm that there has been no change whatsoever in the Spanish attitude regarding sovereignty, and that therefore these proposals of the Doves are totally unacceptable to Her Majesty's Government?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I think the noble Lord's question goes a good deal wider than the Statement. There has been no departure whatsoever in the view of Her Majesty's Government in regard to Gibraltar and our own relations with Spain.
LORD MOYNIHAN: My Lords, would the noble Lord agree—he has often said in the past that one of the main reasons
16
against a negotiated settlement with Spain was the lack of democracy in that country—that if one is now not able to express one's opinion in Gibraltar without threat of physical violence to oneself or one's property, Gibraltar is in danger of becoming no more democratic than Spain itself, and that they are doing a very great disservice to themselves and their case?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I would suggest to the noble Lord that he will have very great difficulty to find on record any statement by me that democracy does not exist in Gibraltar.
LORD MOYNIHAN: In Spain.
LORD SHEPHERD: I thought the noble Lord referred to Gibraltar. I think the noble Lord is going very wide of the Question. This is a Statement on disturbances in Gibraltar, and I think it would be wrong to go wider than the Private Notice Question asked by the noble Earl.

U.N.C.T.A.D.: NEW DELHI CONFERENCE
3.40 p.m.
LORD BROWN: My Lords, with the permission of the House, I should like to repeat a Statement made by my right honourable friend in another place.
"The Second United Nations Conference on Trade and Development began in New Delhi on February 1 and ended on March 29. The Conference covered virtually all subjects in the fields of trade, aid and development which affect the economic interests of the developing countries. It is too early to make a final judgment on the achievements of the Conference. But I believe that it did produce a number of positive results and in certain sectors laid the foundations for further advance.
"First, the Conference unanimously agreed on the early establishment of a system of general preferences on exports of manufactures and semi-manufactures from developing countries. This involves a major change in commercial policies as between developed and developing countries. Although this will require further intensive work, the aim is to settle the details of a mutually acceptable system in the course of 1969.

17
"Secondly, the Conference made significant progress in respect of the aid target. The developed countries accepted a higher target than hitherto, namely, to try to transfer annually to developing countries resources of a minimum net amount of one per cent. of their gross national product at market prices. Previously donors had interpreted the target as one per cent. of net national income at factor cost. This new target offers the prospect of a substantial increase in the flow of resources to developing countries in the years to come.
"Thirdly, the Conference agreed that work should be put in hand to resolve the problems which still remain in devising a scheme for supplementary finance, and that measures should be worked out and presented to the Trade and Development Board next year.
"Fourthly, there was agreement on an international action programme on commodities.
"The Conference also adopted resolutions on a wide range of other topics including the terms and conditions of aid, various shipping questions, economic co-operation and regional integration among developing countries, and special measures on behalf of the least developed among the developing countries. The Conference did not, any more than did its predecessor, produce all the results for which the developing countries hoped. But it did produce certain positive achievements, whose importance in practice will now depend on the follow-up action to be taken. The British delegation played an active and indeed often a leading role in the Conference itself. Her Majesty's Government will be equally active in seeking to ensure that the detailed subsequent negotiations make a genuine contribution to the welfare of developing countries."
3.43 p.m.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, while thanking my noble friend for that Statement, may I ask him whether, despite what he has said, the total effect of the Conference was not a disappointment, and did that not lead to a widening of the gulf in regard to good will between the "have" and the "have not" nations? Was not the only concrete decision that of increasing aid to one per cent. of the
18
gross national product, which I recognise that this Government and this nation have already fulfilled? And did not the General Secretary say that that aid would be of little value unless the prices of commodity products were increased and preferences for manufactured goods achieved? Is this not left to the future? And will Her Majesty's Government seek to establish a ministerial conference next year which will enable these most urgent questions, which may lead to world hunger and great disruption in the world, to be settled before it is too late?
LORD BROWN: My Lords, the noble Lord is considerably too pessimistic. It has to be understood that the First UNCTAD Conference was at that time presumed as a once-for-all Conference. This second Conference is part of an ongoing series, and what that Conference has in effect done is to establish in prospect machinery that will deal with a number of the problems which over the years have been facing the developing countries. It is quite true that the high aspirations of the developing countries formed at the Algiers Conference have, to a large extent, not been met by specific decisions at this Conference, but the machinery which is going to be set up by resolution, will deal with a number of these measures this year and in the years to come; and a process has been started by this UNCTAD Conference which will lead to benefit to the developing countries in the future.
LORD DERWENT: My Lords, may I thank the Minister on behalf of noble Lords on this side of the House for repeating this Statement? I, too, am a little disappointed by the results of the Conference, but, unlike the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, I should have thought that this was a matter to be taken in stages. I personally am glad that Her Majesty's Government have taken a leading part in this effort, and perhaps they will be able to keep the continuing Conferences on the right lines.
LORD GLADWYN: My Lords, would the noble Lord say whether he thinks that there is any reasonable prospect of this country during this year, and perhaps next year, transferring, in the words of the Statement,
"annually to developing countries resources of a minimum net amount of one per cent. of their gross national product at market prices'"?
LORD BROWN: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord opposite for his remarks, with which I concur. In reply to the noble Lord on the Liberal Benches, may I say that we have accepted the one per cent. of the gross national product, which differs from the previous target, as a target, by about 25 per cent. All the developing nations have explained in conference that they cannot commit themselves to undertake this new target without drawing attention to the possible economic difficulties for them which arise from time to time. But it has been accepted as a target, and I think there is little doubt that, as a result of the acceptance of this target, many thousands of millions of additional pounds over the next few years will go in aid to the developing countries.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend whether, in further consideration, he will take into account the constructive proposals which were made in the Algiers Statement by 77 developing countries; and also the constructive proposals which have been made by the British Council of Churches in this country?
LORD BROWN: Yes, my Lords; we have taken that into account, and we shall continue to do so.

THEFT BILL [H.L.]
3.47 p.m.
Report stage resumed.
LORD AIREDALE: My Lords, if we are now returning to Amendment No. 8 to the Theft Bill, I should like to support this Amendment, which seeks to leave out the woolly phrase "come by" and to insert the much more precise expression "obtained possession of".
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD GARDINER): My Lords, in the view of the Government this is an unnecessary and inappropriate drafting Amendment.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: Order, order! With the greatest respect, surely, if the noble and learned Lord is speaking in reply to the debate, he should not do it from the Woolsack.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I am much obliged to the noble and learned Viscount. I will move a few
20
feet. Clause 3(1) defines the word "appropriates" in the basic definition of theft in Clause 1 as covering
"any assumption by a person of the rights of an owner",
and goes on to provide that
"this"—
that is to say, any such assumption—
"includes, where he"—
that is to say the thief—
"has come by the property (innocently or not) without stealing it, any later assumpion of a right to it by keeping or dealing with it as owner."
The object of these words is to make it theft when a person, having originally obtained property without stealing it, later does something which amounts to stealing. An example is where a finder of lost property intends at the time to return it to the owner, but later changes his mind and dishonestly keeps or sells it.
The words "come by" were chosen as a simple expression to convey the simple idea of a person's getting property by any means, other than stealing—for example, when it is given or handed to him, when he finds it, when he takes it to borrow it without intending to steal it, or however else it happens. The words "come by", your Lordships may think, seem just right to convey this idea. The noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, said on Second Reading that this was a novelty. I know his, and Lord Airedale's, interest in words; and I think that the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, and I also have an interest in words. We do not so much like some of these modern American expressions, such as, "I guess", or "flapjack" or "to loan to" someone. But then one has to be a little careful, because if one looks into them one finds that "I guess" is straight from Chaucer; "flapjack" comes from Piers Plowman, and "to loan to" is a well-recognised Elizabethan expression. These are words and phrases which went to America with the Pilgrim Fathers, subsequently fell into some disuse here; and now from America they have come home.
The first instance of the use in a Statute of the expression "come by"—though its use in the English language may be much older—is in the Game Act 1692, which I hope is sufficiently old. It says:
"and if such person do not give a good account how he came by such hare, partridge,

21
pheasant, pigeon, fish, fowl or other game such as shall satisfy the said justice…"
and so on. This is exactly the sort of context in which the expression "come by" is used in the Bill that we are now discussing, and since the Game Act it has been used in at least a dozen other Statutes, the most material of which, perhaps, is the Larceny Act 1861. It is contained in Sections 14, 35 and 65, each of which deals with cases where property is found in a person's possession or on his premises; and the person concerned is liable to forfeit the property and be punished unless he satisfies the magistrate that he came lawfully by the same. This is just the sense in which the expression "come by" is used in Clause 3 of the Bill. Therefore I submit that it is a proper use of a well-known English phrase.
On the other hand, "obtained possession of" seems a less suitable expression. In the first place, why employ a longer and legalistic expression when a short and simple one will do? The Bill tries to use simple language, and has been praised for this, particularly by the noble Lord. Lord Foot, in the debate on the Second Reading; and there are objections to both "obtained" and "possession". "Obtained" suggests getting by doing something positive to get the property, as in obtaining by false pretences. It is hardly appropriate for where a person is mistakenly given something (as in the case of somebody being paid too much by mistake in a pay packet), and it is doubtfully appropriate to a case of finding, as it suggests obtaining from somebody. "Possession" is another legal concept, which it is unnecessary to bring in in this connection and which might give rise to argument, especially in the case of intangible property such as shares. In any event, in order that the provision should work, it will have to he understood as including "constructive" possession of the property in question—for example where a person gets the key of the place where that property is kept; and although the clause, if so amended, might well be construed in this way, there might be argument about it. Again it is legalistic: I do not suppose that anybody except a lawyer understands what is meant by "constructive" possession. On the whole, therefore, I would submit to the House that the phrase "come by" is a very
22
much more expressive and appropriate form of words.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, as one who has from time to time intervened on questions of language—and probably will do so again—may I declare that on this occasion I am emphatically of the same opinion as the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I do not think that the moving of this Amendment has been a waste of time. I thank the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor for dealing with it so fully. He has made it quite clear that one cannot "come by" something without being in possession of it—which to some extent elucidates the meaning of the phrase. I do not attach al1 that much importance to it. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 4:
"Property"
4.—
(4) Wild creatures, tamed or untamed shall be regarded as property; but a person cannot steal a wild creature not tamed nor ordinarily kept in captivity, or the carcase of any such creature, unless either—
(b) he does it for reward or for sale or other commercial purpose.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, your Lordships will recall that on the Committee stage the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wilberforce, suggested that the phrase "breach of trust" would lead to difficulties because in law it had a technical meaning and was distinguished from a breach of authority. In his view, it was the more general meaning which was required in this subsection. I agree that the word "trust" in the context of this subsection was meant to mean "confidence", and the Amendment removes any possible difficulty by substituting that word for "trust". I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 27, leave out ("trust") and insert ("confidence").—(Lord Stonham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
3.57 p.m.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE VISCOUNT DILHORNE moved to leave out from the beginning of subsection (3)

23
to "other commercial purpose", and insert:
"Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding subsections a person who picks wild flowers, mushrooms or other fungi growing wild and not cultivated or the fruits of plants growing wild shall not be guilty of stealing."
The noble and learned Viscount said: My Lords, we come now to the interesting topic of wild flowers, wild fruits and so on. Your Lordships will remember that under the clause as it now stands, subsection (3) lays down:
"A person who picks mushrooms growing wild on any land or who (without injury to the growth of the plant) picks flowers, fruit and foliage from a plant growing wild, does not…steal what he picks, unless he does it for reward or for sale or for other commercial purpose."
Last Thursday we were discussing whether dishonest appropriation should be treated as theft without proof of an intention permanently to deprive. The main argument advanced against that Amendment was that theft would then cover cases of a very trivial nature. The noble Lord, Lord Stonham, said that if he borrowed his neighbour's step-ladder when he knew that his neighbour would not like it, it would be theft, or that if he "sneaked" a book out of the public library without permission it would be theft. But nobody would accuse the noble Lord of conduct of that character in any circumstances.
He went on to give two other instances: the borrowing of a dinner jacket without permission, or the borrowing by a girl of her sister's dance frock, knowing that her sister would not like it. Then he posed a question which is pertinent to this subsection. He said:
"Do we really want these things to be theft, punishable with a penalty of up to a maximum of ten years' imprisonment?"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 4/4/68, col. 1393.]
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Parker, took the same line. He instanced the borrowing by an au pair girl of her mistress's coat and asked whether it was proper to treat it as theft with a ten-year penalty.
I pose the same question now. Is it proper to treat the picking of a wild flower, or the picking of blackberries growing wild, as theft punishable with a maximum of ten years' imprisonment in any circumstances? The Lord Chancellor last Thursday pointed out how
24
very serious was a conviction for larceny, or theft as it now is to be called. Is it really right to expose anyone in any circumstances to the risk of prosecution and conviction for theft for picking a wild flower or blackberries, even if they are picked for reward, for sale or for commercial purposes? The police are occupied, as they should be occupied, in dealing with the really serious crimes, as was said by the Lord Chief Justice last Thursday, and I agree with him. He said that they should not have to deal with an au pair girl borrowing her mistress's coat. I ask, should the police have to deal with the picking of wild flowers?
The Criminal Law Revision Committee made the same point as the Lord Chief Justice in relation to dishonest borrowing. They said that it would be difficult for the police to avoid being involved in wasteful and undesirable investigations into alleged offences which had no social importance. Yet that Committee recommended that the picking of wild flowers should in certain circumstances be stealing. If they thought that occupying the time of the police in investigating the picking of wild flowers was not wasteful and undesirable, I beg leave to disagree with them; but I cannot see how they can contend that the picking of wild flowers has any serious social importance.
I should like to make one more quotation from the speeches last Thursday. The noble Lord, Lord Stonham, said—and I quote his words:
"we devise, or revise, our criminal law, in order to protect society against types of conduct which are so offensive or serious that those who so conduct themselves should be liable to be punished or controlled by the State."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 4/4/68, col. 1391.]
I shall look forward with some anticipation and keenness to hearing him argue that picking wild flowers, blackberries, and the like, is so offensive and so serious that, in order to protect society, those who do it must be made liable to conviction for theft and to a maximum of ten years' imprisonment.
I make no apology for relying on the arguments advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, and others last Thursday. Then we were discussing the dishonest appropriation of other people's property. Now we are considering a different question. We are considering whether wild flowers and blackberries, or wild plants and things of

25
that sort, should be treated as property at all, as property which can be stolen if, and only if, they are picked "for reward or for sale or other commercial purpose".
This is surely an extension, and an undesirable extension, of the criminal law, for I think I am right in saying that as the law stands at present a man cannot be convicted if he picks wild flowers, whether or not he does it for reward or for sale or other commercial purpose; that he cannot be convicted even of simple larceny, which carries a maximum of five and not ten years' imprisonment. Stealing means the dishonest appropriation of someone else's property. It seems to me illogical and wrong that wild flowers, mushrooms growing wild or blackberries, should be treated as someone else's property if, and only if, taken for sale, for reward or for a commercial purpose.
I have therefore tabled this Amendment to make it clear beyond doubt (this is the intention of the Amendment; I may be told that I have used the wrong languages; that I ought to have inserted something about how you "come by" blackberries or something of that sort) that the picking of wild flowers, mushrooms or other fungi growing wild and not cultivated, or the fruits of plants growing wild, cannot be stealing in the future, just as now it cannot be simple larceny. We do not frame our criminal law to deal with theoretical mischiefs, said the noble Lord, Lord Stonham. Is not this just what this Bill is doing here? Is the picking of a bunch of white heather by a gipsy on a moor, and picking it for sale to earn a few pennies, so offensive or serious that she must be liable to be convicted of theft under this Bill?
I would just remind the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, of one further thing he said last Thursday. He said (col. 1392):
"it is for those who desire a fundamental extension in the law to prove the need for such extension, not in terms of theoretical concepts, but in terms of hard realities."
The Bill here proposes an extension of the law. It is for the Government to prove that it is necessary in terms of hard realities. That was not, in my opinion, done during the Committee stage; nor was it done by the Criminal Law Revision Committee. They recommended the inclusion of this subsection (3), but it is, I
26
think, clear from their Report that it was a compromise and, as I fear is so often the case, a compromise that was not wholly satisfactory.
May I say what I envisage the position will be if this Amendment is carried, because it is somewhat important? So far as the picking of wild flowers, mushrooms or other fungi growing wild and not cultivated, and blackberries or the fruits of wild plants is concerned, that will not constitute theft. But of course the ordinary law of trespass will apply; that is to say, the occupier of the land can turn trespassers off it if he wishes. But if he does not do that, and people come on to his ground and pick blackberries off the hedges, it does not matter whether they do it to sell them and get a few pennies, or for any other purpose: They will not be liable to be prosecuted and convicted of theft, of stealing. It is the same in regard to picking mushrooms where they are not cultivated. If, in addition to this present law of trespass, some special provision is needed in relation to wild flowers, et cetera, then I feel it would be much better dealt with in a special Bill, and not in a Theft Bill such as we are now considering.
Your Lordships will note d at the words which I suggest should be inserted in place of the present subsection do not include the word "foliage", which appears in subsection (3) as it now stands. The omission is deliberate. As I understand it, the effect of Clause 4(2)(b), if it stands alone, is that if anyone comes on to land and dishonestly grubs up a Christmas tree, or cuts off the top of a tree to serve as a Christmas tree, he will be liable, if subsection (3) is omitted, to be convicted of stealing if he does it dishonestly. Similarly with holly and the cutting of boughs off trees. I know that few Christmas trees grow wild, but holly may do so. Would not that be the right solution? Would not that be the right answer? Is it not right that somebody who goes in for such conduct, cutting boughs off trees or cutting the tops off trees, whether they are growing wild or are cultivated, should be liable to he prosecuted for theft?
It is the same with holly. If someone comes and cuts holly off a holly bush or tree and takes it away, perhaps damaging the holly bush or tree a great deal, would it not be right to treat that as possibly

27
leading to a charge of theft? Is it necessary to distinguish, as the Bill does in its present form, between holly growing wild and other holly? Is there really any need to provide a special defence by subsection (3) of Clause 4—for that is what it amounts to—for the person who has taken holly which does not belong to him? It is a special defence if it can be shown that the holly bush is wild, and then it is necessary for the prosecution to show that the holly was taken "for reward or for sale or other commercial purpose".
Let me consider for a moment what will happen if a man is found taking holly out of a wood, and that is followed by a prosecution. As the Bill stands at present the prosecution, if they had no reason to suppose that the holly was not growing wild, would have to prosecute just for theft, and seek to rely on Clause 4(2)(b). But unless they could show that it was planted they would have to rely, in the alternative, upon subsection (3), in which case they would have to show the motive for which the holly was taken. In Committee we had considerable discussion about the provision that a taking should be stealing only if done for reward or for sale or other commercial purpose. The Lord Chief Justice was critical of that. He suggested that, instead of putting the burden of proof upon the prosecution, the Bill puts it on the defence. The fact that a person was found in possession of bundles of holly should be some evidence that it was for sale or reward. The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said that he thought that that was a very sensible halfway house and that he had some sympathy with the view—I quote his words:
"that in this particular kind of case it is difficult for the prosecution to be expected to discharge the onus themselves"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 11/3/68, col. 36]
He added that he would like to consider the suggestion.
My Lords, I do not know what has happened about that suggestion. There is no Government Amendment down to deal with it. The only Government Amendment set down is one to take out the words "without injury to the growth of the plant"—words which were much criticised in Committee—with the result that, no matter how damaged the plant,
28
shrub or tree may be, it will not be theft unless it is done for reward, et cetera. While I would agree that liability to conviction for theft should not depend on whether injury is or is not done to growth, I also feel that it should not depend on the motive for the conduct. Motive is immaterial in the ordinary case of theft. That is made absolutely clear by subsection (2) of Clause 1. It seems to me, I must confess, illogical that it should be introduced in this special case.
So, my Lords, to sum up, I propose that the picking of wild flowers, mushrooms, blackberries, et cetera, shall not constitute theft in any circumstances, but that the ordinary law shall apply in relation to the taking of branches off shrubs or trees, and that, in that regard, while dishonesty and an intention permanently to deprive would have to be proved, it would not be necessary to prove that the taking was for reward, for sale or for a commercial purpose. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, leave out lines 42 to 47 and insert the said new words.—(Viscount Dilhorne.)
4.13 p.m.
LORD LEATHERLAND: My Lords, I am quite sure that the health of the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhome, will be drunk in elderberry wine in every women's institute in the land, after the erudite speech which we have just heard. As my noble friend Lord Stonham knows, I am generally a supporter of the Bill, and I do not wish to intervene this afternoon between any views he may have on this particular clause and those which have been put forward by the noble and learned Viscount. I have troubles of my own, by way of something of a side issue to the main problem that we have been discussing. I am not concerned with the question of whether these flowers are picked for sale or reward, but I feel that some difficulty is likely to arise in the interpretation of either the clause as it now stands or the Amendment that has been moved by the noble and learned Viscount; that is to say, interpretation when this Statute-to-be is considered side by side with regulations which exist in various parts of the country.
I preside regularly in a magistrates' court which has to deal with malefactors who frequent Epping Forest. Those malefactors are necessarily of many kinds,

29
but those with whom I wish to deal this afternoon are those who pick flowers in the forest's sylvan glades. This Bill and the Amendment which the noble and learned Viscount has moved run contrary to the Epping Forest Regulations which are issued under seal by the City Corporation of London. I remember, some months ago, taking my little granddaughter for a walk in the forest, when on a sunny bank she saw some violets. She said, "I'm going to pick some violets and take them home to mother". I had to be very stern; and, with all the authority that I could command—and, my Lords, you cannot command much authority with an eight-year-old grand-daughter—I said, "I must read to you Bylaw No. 5 of the Epping Forest Regulations, which reads as follows:
'A person shall not cut, lop, dig up, fell, burn, break or otherwise do damage to trees, underwood, shrubs, brushwood, grass, gorse, fern or other plant'."
That includes holly, it includes dog roses, it includes buttercups and daisies and it includes dandelions and violets.
After I had finished reading it, she said to me, "Grandpa, what does that mean?"—and that, more or less, is the question I am putting to your Lordships' House; because this By-law is contrary to the Bill. Which of them is to prevail? Am I, when I am sitting on the Bench, to apply the regulations, or am I to apply this Bill? And when I walk into the forest, am I to obey the regulations, or am I to obey the Bill? I hope we can have that point cleared up at some stage in our discussion.
LORD HURCOMB: My Lords, before the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, replies, may I put one point to him? Legal considerations (with which I am not competent to deal) entirely apart, there is a real point about wild flowers; and although I think I agree with everything that the noble and learned Viscount has said, we are already at a point where the wholesale picking of wild flowers has a social bearing. As we all probably know from our own experience, there are areas which at this time of the year are covered with a beautiful crop of wild flowers—daffodils, or whatever they may be. If, in two or three days' time, you go to the same place, you will find that every one of those flowers has dis-
30
appeared, and all the people who were looking forward to an opportunity to see them during the Easter holiday will be disappointed.
If I may say so, I agree entirely with the argument that the proper way to cope with this problem is not by trying to define what is or is not theft, or whether the picking is done for sale or reward or otherwise, because the people who go to pick these flowers may all put them in vases on their own chimney-pieces, and may not necessarily sell thorn in the neighbouring market. But the effect is just the same. It seems to me that, as has been said, the right way to deal with the problem is by a Wild Flowers (Protection) Bill, in which appropriate penalties and appropriate machinery could be laid down, and not by trying to deal with it by some definition of theft. I do not know whether Her Majesty's Government have consulted their proper advisers on this question, the Nature Conservancy, but if not possibly they could bear in mind the advisability of doing so before the Bill gets very much further in another place.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, I want to say only one or two things in support of my noble and learned friend Lord Dilhorne. One of them is that I have so far been wholly unconvinced by anything that the Government have said that the test, the criterion which has been introduced in this subsection—that of picking for sale, for reward or for any other commercial purpose—is the proper way by which to make action of this type criminal. I have been wholly unconvinced that it is likely to be a practical test. It was said by one noble Lord that the value of the clause as it stands might be not so much to get the people who actually steal flowers, holly or whatever it may be, but to deal with those who receive it or, in the terms of the Bill, handle it, in that they buy it and then sell it to the public. In most cases those people would be dealt with by my noble and learned friend's Amendment, because they would be receiving or handling those stolen goods, mainly under Clause 4(2)(b). So there is no great difficulty there.
But what seems to me to be the convincing argument is when one looks at what the Criminal Law Revision Committee themselves said. They said in

31
paragraph 46, when dealing with this problem, that it could not quite be dealt with in the same way as land, because there were practical considerations which were different. They said:
"They appear to be these: on the one hand a person should not ordinarily be guilty of theft by taking wild flowers and the like."
That is what my noble and learned friend is saying. They go on to say:
"On the other hand it may be right that this should be theft in some cases."
Then they give three examples. The examples are:
"cutting holly at Christmas to sell…"
There they are in agreement with my noble and learned friend; that is what he, too, says. The second example is:
"and perhaps nicking flowers which the owner of the land wants to keep in order to make sloe gin…"
That is just as laudable as Lord Leatherland's elderberry wine. But that is not caught by the clause as it stands, because unless the gin or the sloes are going to be sold commercially, it is not theft. So there is one example not covered by the drafting. It may or may not be right; but it is not covered by the Bill as it stands.
The third example is:
"…picking wild flowers which he"—
the person who owns the land—
"is anxious to preserve for their beauty or rarity."
That, too, is not covered by the Bill as drafted—not unless they are picked to be sold. As I understand it, the real trouble about having a particularly rare or beautiful wild flower is not that it is usually picked or dug up to be sold, but that it is often taken by some collector of wild flowers, some amateur botanist, who finds out where it is growing and who takes it to try to grow it himself. That is the danger with the beautiful and rare flower; it is not a question of its being sold at all.
Therefore, out of three examples given in the Report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee, the majority, two of the examples, are not covered by the Bill, while the third is covered by the Amendment of my noble and learned friend. It seems to me, therefore, that this way of dealing with it—in conjunction with the advice (with which I agree) from the noble
32
Lord, Lord Hurcomb, that wild flowers should be dealt with by special legislation—is the right way in which the matter should be handled.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I agree with a great deal that has been said in this debate and with nothing more than than what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Hurcomb, that there is a very real point about real flowers. On this subject in general—using the term generically; speaking not only of flowers but of all wild fruits of the countryside—I think there is a virtual unanimity of feeling about the need to protect the countryside against vandalism, be it commercial vandalism or simply thoughtless vandalism, and against the destruction of beauty. But we are not dealing to-day with a wild flowers Bill; we are dealing with Amendment No. 10 to the Theft Bill, and I must concentrate my thoughts on that. I do not know whether the health of the noble and learned Viscount will be drunk in elderberry wine by every women's institute in the country; but I know they will not drink his health under any misapprehension that it lies in my power to remove. I am going to devote my remarks to the removal of misapprehensions which have been aroused in this debate.
First, I will remove one doubt from the mind of my noble friend Lord Leatherland; because the Bill, however it goes on this point, will not override by-laws provided they are lawful under the power under which they are made. I am afraid that that means that my noble friend's granddaughter will still have to leave the violets alone; but she is only eight and therefore is under the age of criminal responsibility.
LORD LEATHERLAND: But I should have been aiding and abetting!
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, that, too, would depend on the by-laws. The noble and learned Viscount asked the question—these may not be his exact words: Is it right to expose anyone to the possibility of conviction for theft for picking wild flowers even when it is done for a commercial purpose? He put a very powerful case to convince your Lordships that it is not right. As I listened to his very eloquent speech I was astounded, indeed exhilarated, because at no time in my ten years in your Lordships' House have I been so overwhelmed

33
by the effect of my own words, of my own arguments, made on a previous occasion. Because on the last occasion on which we debated this subject the noble and learned Viscount's arguments were quite otherwise. They were then in the opposite direction. The view that he put forward during the Committee stage was that it would not matter particularly if under the Bill the dishonest taking of wild flowers was in all cases theft; as it was—
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, the noble Lord will forgive me, but I never said that. We were talking last time about the dishonest appropriation of other people's property. Wild flowers are not, so far as I know, anybody's property at this moment.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I will give the noble and learned Viscount his actual words: It he refers to Hansard of March 11, 1968, column 18, he will see that he said this:
"…I doubt whether it is really necessary to make any special provision in the Bill for wild flowers, et cetera. Those who go on another person's land to pick wild flowers or blackberries may be trespassers, but it is highly unlikely that there will be any prosecution."
He was then arguing not that the taking or picking of wild flowers in this way should never be theft, as is his present argument—
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord again. If he will look at the speech, he will see that I was dealing with the position under Clause 4(2)(b) on the assumption that subsection (3) of Clause 4 was left out. If that happens, then anyone who severs anything from the land when he is not in possession of it will be liable to be prosecuted for stealing. I said that such prosecutions were unlikely. I think it better to make the position clear.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I have actually quoted the noble and learned Viscount's words. May I remind your Lordships that wild flowers, growing on a person's land, are his property. In this discussion we are merely talking about a kind of property the picking of which may or may not be theft. It must be within your Lordships' recollections that the arguments that we have heard to-day—and this is why they have astonished me—are directed to the opposite effect. The previous arguments
34
would have meant—and I pointed out this position to your Lordships myself—that the picking, the dishonest picking, would have been in all cases theft; and that this would have led to the possibility of many trivial prosecutions. The noble and learned Viscount argued that that was unlikely.
Now we are asked to consider the directly opposite proposition that in no case will such picking be theft. I am commenting—and I think fairly—that we have had in the short space of a week or so two directly-opposed arguments; and it is reasonable to suppose that the compromise in the Bill, which is that this dishonest picking shall not be theft unless it is done for a commercial purpose,is the right compromise. It gives this added protection. It can be argued that there may be times when it is difficult to establish commercial purposes; but there will be many times when it wilt not be difficult to establish commercial purposes; when, for example, somebody comes along with a lorry-load of Christmas trees or holly; or when, as the noble Lord, Lord Hurcomb, said, you see a beautiful countryside denuded of flowers and go to a local shop and there see all those flowers in the shop. There is the question of whether the charge of handling might not lie with the shopkeeper.
Basically what we are considering now, therefore, is the choice between two arguments. Shall this picking in no case or circumstance be theft—which would be the dishonest picking and which would be the effect of the noble and learned Viscount's Amendment, with which I have great sympathy—or should we have the safeguard (which is in the Bill) that it can be theft if it should be done for commercial purposes? I think this safeguard in the Bill protects the countryside and protects the owner of the land against the more extreme cases, the cases of commercial exploitation.
My Lords, I come to one or two other points which were raised. I understood the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne (he will correct me if I misunderstood him) to say, in a reference to Clause 4(2)(b), that in his view it would not be theft to lop the top of a tree.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I said that it would be: I said exactly the opposite.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I thought I must have misunderstood the noble and learned Viscount, because, of course, it certainly would be an offence, whether subsection (3) was in the Bill or not—
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: That is what I said.
LORD STONHAM: —because such would not be "picking", it would be "severing", which is provided for in the clause.
With regard to the number of trivial offences, we are not here making such a major change in the law as has been suggested. Commercial picking can be a serious mischief, and I think that it should be dealt with. But there are offences of malicious damage where the amounts are quite small and they will be continuing. For example, it could already be theft to pick a single cultivated flower, which does cover trivial cases; and there have been prosecutions. Even now the picking of a piece of plant to the value of a shilling, wherever it is growing, in an offence under the Malicious Damage Act. This would cover, and has covered, the case of the picking of white heather, if it is sold for a shilling. My Lords, it is not outwith the bounds of possibility that there would be prosecution.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord, but the Malicious Damage Act has not been repealed and no difference is being made there. This has nothing to do with this Bill.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I know; but if the noble Viscount listened to the argument of the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, he will recall that the noble and learned Viscount made great play with the question of small prosecutions. I am saying that small prosecutions do take place, in analogous cases under existing legislation, which is a fair point to make in answer to the noble and learned Viscount. Therefore this is what we have to decide about this Amendment. If you are happy that in no circumstances will the offence, according to the words of this Amendment, be theft, all right. But would it not be better to have a condition which is analogous, and which is what is in the Bill now, plus the possibility of prosecution
36
where it is done for commercial purposes? This seems to be right and common sense. Why remove this additional protection as the Amendment would do?
Although I do not attach the greatest importance to this point the noble and learned Viscount's Amendment, as drafted, would lead to serious doubts and create quite remarkable anomalies. It would exclude from theft the picking of:
"…wild flowers, mushrooms or other fungi growing wild and not cultivated or the fruits of plants growing wild…"
It omits plants or shrubs, except for their fruits and flowers. "Plant" is defined in subsection (3) by the words, "includes any shrub or tree" which would be left in the Bill even though the Amendment was carried. But since the Amendment applies only to fruits or plants, and to blossom if that would constitute wild flowers, it would still be possible for the picking of a branch or twig, or of foliage from a tree to be theft.
It is difficult for me to see the object of such a distinction, if indeed the noble and learned Viscount intends it. It could be a deliberate attempt to exclude from exemption the picking, for example, of wild holly, which would be profitable, but it would not have this effect because the taking of the berries—,that is, the fruit of the holly—would not be theft; and on the whole, therefore, the distinction seems to be a quite impossible one to make. In my view, there is no difference in principle between, for example, taking fruit such as blackberries against the wishes of a farmer and taking foliage.
My Lords, it comes to this. The noble and learned Viscount is proposing that these acts should not be theft, and that would be the position if his Amendment were carried. The Government suggest, for the reasons which I have given, including the last one, that it is not viable; that it would be better to leave the subsection as it is, which does not ordinarily make these acts theft but does so when they can be proved to have been done for a commercial purpose. This was the middle view taken by the Criminal Law Revision Committee, after very carefully considering the matter, and I hope your Lordships will agree that it was the right view.
4.36 p.m.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, I am in the unfortunate position of not

37
being happy either with what is in the Bill or with the Amendment of my noble and learned friend Lord Dilhorne. I find myself in complete agreement with what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Hurcomb. What we are trying to do, I should have thought, is to deal with the evil of the despoliation of the land by the picking of wild flowers where the pleasure or the profit of the taking does not justify the injury done to the landowner or to the public through the deprivation of beauty. It has nothing whatever to do with whether there is a commercial purpose or not. If every bluebell in a wood is taken, a commercial purpose is very unlikely. People who took bluebells in this fashion used to take them away on the back of their bicycles. I do not know whether that particular form of taking is as common as it was. Bluebells taken in those circumstances have a very short life in the home of the picker. But the injury done, the mischief done, against which the criminal law is supposed to protect the public interest, has nothing whatever to do with whether there is a commercial purpose or not.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, perhaps the noble Lord would allow me to say that the position he describes would be exactly the same under the clause as it is in the Bill now or if the Amendment of the noble and learned Viscount were carried.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, that is precisely the reason why I said I was profoundly unhappy with both. That was indeed the very first sentence of my speech. I do not like what is in the Bill, and I do not like my noble and learned friend's Amendment. What I support is the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Hurcomb, who said that what we really wanted was specific legislation dealing with a particular mischief; and I should have thought that that was right.
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Colville of Culross quoted from paragraph 46 of the Report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee. The Committee went on, in paragraph 47, to say something which is also relevant. But they never, it seems to me, give any justification for making commercial purpose the distinction. It may be that noble Lords opposite think that there is always something very terrible about having a com-
38
mercial purpose in any circumstances, but I do not find anything much worse in having a commercial purpose than in having a merely selfish purpose for injuring the public interest. If the public interest is injured by taking these flowers, I cannot see that is much worse if it is done for profit in the form of money than for profit in the sense of acquiring something temporarily beautiful for your own home. The point is that one is doing something which is injurious to the public, and it is with this that the criminal law ought to be concerned.
For these reasons, I am against what is in the Bill and I am against what is in my noble and learned friend's Amendment. Both of them, if read by pickers, would prompt them to go on with this unnecessary picking of wild flowers. I entirely support the noble Lord, Lord Hurcomb.
LORD ROYLE: My Lords, I am sure the whole House will agree that the most valuable contribution on this issue this afternoon has come from the noble Lord, Lord Hurcomb, and that ultimately his suggestion must be the solution to our problem. But we have before as two choices—the terms of the clause, as it is written in the Bill and the Amendment. In spite of all the things that have been said about other legislation, which makes complications for a layman like me, I find one issue before me—that is, whether or not the commercial aspect is a greater danger to the countryside than picking wild flowers by individuals. I would say that it is a much greater menace.
I was in one of our pleasant southern seaside resorts on Saturday afternoon, and in front of one of the shops was a group of gipsies with half-a-dozen, large baskets full of small bunches of primroses. Some wood in Sussex had been badly denuded to provide that commercial enterprise. I believe it is one thing for my wife, or anybody else, to go into a Sussex wood and pick a few primroses for a small vase in her own home, and quite another for people to despoil the countryside in this way. I am sure that a wood that looked beautiful with small yellow flowers at 10 o'clock on Saturday morning had lost a lot of its beauty by noon of that same day. Many people who had looked forward to going into the woods and enjoying their beauty had that beauty taken

39
away from them for commercial purposes. That is the issue. On this matter I take the opposite side to that taken by the noble Lord, Lord Conesford. I think that there is a big difference, and I am satisfied that on this issue the Government are perfectly right. Whether subsequently we shall find the solution of the problem in the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Hurcomb, I do not know. I hope so.
4.44 p.m.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Boyle, about the desirability of preserving the beauties of our countryside. I have lived in the countryside as much as I can, and I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hurcomb, about that, and with all that my noble friend Lord Conesford has said. We are all united about that. But that is not the question now. We are not dealing with a Bill to preserve wild flowers growing in the woods. We are dealing with the provision of penalties for the criminal offence of theft. The only question for us to consider here is not whether it is desirable to preserve wild flowers but whether the picking of wild flowers should in any circumstance constitute the serious criminal offence of theft.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, not in any circumstances—it is picking them for a commercial purpose.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I have used "in any circumstances" only to avoid repeating the phrase I have used so often, "for reward or for sale or other commercial purpose." I am sure that the House understands why I am saying it, because at the moment such acts are not theft. If the noble Lord doubts that, I would refer him to paragraph 45 of the Committee's Report, in which they say, dealing with the stealing of "trees or plants, or their flowers, fruit or foliage, and mushrooms and other fungi":
"These are not the subject of simple larceny under 1916 s.2, because they are `attached to the realty' within the meaning of s.1(3)".
We are here proposing an extension of the meaning of one of the most serious criminal offences—theft.
The noble Lord, Lord Leatherland, referred to regulations made for the pro-
40
tection of Epping Forest. There may be regulations and bylaws all through the country for dealing with this problem in particular places, but that is beside the question, which is: what is covered by theft? For theft, someone's property has to be stolen. As regards wild flowers and plants, I am not at all sure that they are necessarily anyone's property. That is the point I am making. It may be wrong that gipsies should pick primroses and try to earn a little money by selling them. But that may be dealt with as a minor offence. The noble Lord, Lord Stonham, said that there were already small prosecutions. I pray in aid what he said in the last debate about bringing within the scope of the crime of theft what he described as "trivial misconduct". That is what the question is here.
The noble Lord said that, whether intentionally or not, my Amendment left gaps in that it did not deal with foliage and the picking of branches. I had said, but he could not have heard it, that intentionally my Amendment did not cover that, because picking foliage or breaking off a branch seems to me a very different thing from picking a wild primrose. I said that that would be dealt with under Clause 4(2)(b), and he confirmed that. But the argument which the noble Lord put forward really astonished me. He said that if anyone cuts off the top of a trree that would be severing it, not picking it, and therefore it came under Clause 4(2)(b), but that when anyone picked a primrose or daffodil he would not be severing it, only picking it. I do not think that that will do.
The noble Lord endeavoured to make some play with what I said on the previous occasion, but if your Lordships look at my speech on that occasion you will see that I was saying throughout that we should leave out subsection (3) entirely and was considering what the position would be if that were done. From what the noble Lord said, he agrees that if we left that out and said no more, we should remove the possibility of a prosecution under this Bill for picking primroses. That is why I have put down these words, to make it clear that in no circumstances can that be theft, whatever else it may be.
We had a long discussion last time about the impracticability of proving,

41
when someone is seen coming out of a wood with a bunch of flowers, that he has picked them "for reward or for sale or other commercial purpose". It is a most unsatisfactory compromise. I agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Hurcomb, said about regard for the beauties of the countryside, but I certainly do not think that we ought to expose to the risk of prosecution for theft people who go out picking blackberries from the hedges in the countryside with a view to selling them. The issues are clear. I do not know if any further debate will add to them, and I shall ask the House to express its opinion upon this matter.
LORD REA: My Lords, may I ask one point, purely for information? It is not a debating point. In the case of grass which is growing on a wild place—that is, not in a cultivated garden—would anybody be entitled to gather it in large quanties for the purpose of making hay? Secondly, in the case of branches which have not yet sprung into foliage, some of us like the chestnut branches, which have no berries on them at all, but which when put into water branch out very pleasantly. That is not fruit, flower or foliage. Can the noble Lord explain how he views this?
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I do not think there is any difficulty about the last example. If you lop off a branch of a tree, or sever a branch, you are
certainly severing something from the property, and it does not matter whether or not it has leaves on it. You are severing it, and that is covered by Clause 4(2)(b). I was making the point that the proposal of the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, would still leave it an offence just to take the leaves off, which seemed to me to be absurd. With regard to the first point, grass is a plant, and again I suppose it would depend upon the question of commercial purpose. If somebody was going to make hay, no doubt it would be for a commercial purpose.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lord, with the leave of the House, as the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, has made a second speech on my Amendment, perhaps I may add one word. Of course, if you pick leaves by themselves it would not be protected by the Amendment; but people who usually pick leaves pick the boughs. There is no one I know—perhaps the noble Lord may know differently—who picks the berries off holly without picking the boughs, as the noble Lord suggested.
4.53 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 10) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 46: Not Contents, 55.

CONTENTS

Ailwyn, L.

Craigavon, V.

Jellicoe, E.

Airedale, L.

Daventry, V.

Lucan, E.

Albemarle, E.

Denham, L.

Merrivale, L.

Alport, L.

Derwent, L.

Milverton, L.

Asquith of Yarnbury, Bs.

Dilhorne, V. [Teller.]

Nugent of Guildford, L.

Auckland, L.

Dudley, L.

Redmayne, L.

Bannerman of Kildonan, L.

Effingham, E.

St. Helens, L.

Barrington, V.

Emmet of Amberley, Bs.

Sempill, Ly.

Bessborough, E.

Falkland, V.

Simonds, V.

Birdwood, L.

Ferrier, L.

Strange of Knokin, Bs.

Blackford, L.

Fleck, L.

Swinton, E.

Brock, L.

Greenway, L.

Thurlow, L.

Brooke of Cumnor, L.

Grimston of Westbury, L.

Tweedsmuir, L.

Buckton, L.

Howard of Glossop, L.

Wilberforce, L.

Carrington, L.

Ilford, L. [Teller.]

Windlesham, L.

Colville of Culross, V.

NOT-CONTENTS

Addison, V.

Collison, L.

Grenfell, L.

Beaumont of Whitley, L.

Douglass of Cleveland, L.

Hall, V.

Beswick, L.

Faringdon, L.

Henderson, L.

Blyton, L.

Fiske, L.

Hilton of Upton, L. [Teller.]

Bowles, L.

Gaitskell, Bs.

Jessel, L.

Brockway, L.

Gardiner, L. (L. Chancellor)

Kilbracken, L.

Buckinghamshire, E.

Garnsworthy, L.

Kirkwood, L.

Champion, L.

Granville-West, L.

Latham, L.

Leatherland, L.

Plummer, Bs.

Sorensen, L. [Teller.]

Lindgren, L.

Ritchie-Calder, L.

Stonham, L.

Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, Bs.

Robertson of Oakridge, L.

Strabolgi, L.

McLeavy, L.

Rowley, L.

Summerskill, Bs.

Mais, L.

Royle, L.

Taylor of Mansfield, L.

Mar, E.

Sainsbury, L.

Teynham, L.

Massereene and Ferrard, V.

St. Davids, V.

Vivian, L.

Mitchison, L.

Shackleton, L.

Walston, L.

Morrison, L.

Shepherd, L.

Wells-Pestell, L.

Moyle, L.

Silkin, L.

Winterbottom, L.

Phillips, Bs.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

5.0 p.m.
LORD STONHAM LORD STONHAM moved, in subsection (3), to leave out "(without injury to the growth of the plant)". The noble Lord said: My Lords, as drafted, subsection (3) prevents a person from being guilty of theft by dishonestly picking flowers, fruit or foliage from a plant growing wild on land, without injury to the growth of the plant, unless he does so for reward or for sale or another commercial purpose. Thus, the picker may be guilty of theft if he injures the growth of the plant, but not otherwise, unless he has a commercial purpose. That is the clause as it stands at present.
During the Committee stage there were criticisms from the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, and others, of the whole approach in Clause 4 to the taking of wild flowers, and it was suggested that in any event criminality ought not to depend on whether or not the picking of flowers, fruit and foliage resulted in injury to the plant. The noble and learned Viscount suggested that there could be room for differences of opinion as to whether picking involved injury to a plant's growth. Having considered these criticisms, the Government have come to the conclusion that it would be reasonable to simplify subsection (3) to the extent of leaving out the words in the Amendment, and its effect, if accepted, will be that the picking of a plant cannot amount to theft, even if the growth of the plant is injured, unless of course the picking is for a commercial purpose. This Amendment slightly widens the exception to subsection (2) of the clause made by subsection (3), but the change is not thought likely to make a great deal of practical difference, and we think it worth making in order to simplify the requirements of the clause. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 43, leave out from ("who") to ("picks").—(Lord Stonham.)
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, I would simply say that I think the removal of these words is among other things going to avoid a great deal of botanical evidence at quarter sessions. I do not like the subsection as it is, but it is an improvement to take out at any rate this part of it.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE VISCOUNT DILHORNE moved, in subsection (4), to leave out,
"Wild creatures, tamed or untamed, shall be regarded as property; but".
The noble and learned Viscount said: My Lords, I think it would be for the convenience of the House to take Amendments Nos. 12, 13 and 14, together. They all relate to the same subject matter. We had considerable discussion on this subsection during the Committee stage, and the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, said that he would consider all the points raised. I thought that formidable criticisms were advanced, but he has not tabled any Amendments to meet the points raised, and so we are left with the subsection as it was in Committee.
The Criminal Law Revision Committee say this in paragraph 48 of their Report:
"Whether wild creatures should be the subject of theft is a difficult question of policy. When at liberty they are not the subject of larceny, because they have no owner."
That, of course, is to say that they do not belong to anyone; they are no one's property. Now the Bill proposes to change that. It provides that:
"Wild creatures, tamed or untamed, shall be regarded as property".
Of course it is necessary to say that to make a prosecution for theft ever get on its feet at all, because you cannot be convicted of stealing unless you steal

45
someone else's property. So one understands why for the first time it is enacted that wild creatures are to be regarded as property. But of course it is not enough just to say that they are regarded as property. Under Clause 1, which defines "stealing", you have to be guilty of taking property belonging to another, and the first question I put to the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, here is this: To whom under this Bill are wild birds to belong? That question does not appear to me to be answered in the Bill at all. Clause 5 deals with belonging to another, and Clause 5(1) says:
"Property shall be regarded as belonging to a person having possession or control of it".
No one has possession or control over a bird flying through the air; nor does anyone have "any proprietary right or interest" in it, which is dealt with in the other part of Clause 5(1).
Here, again, we have proposed an extension of the existing law, and much of what I said on the last Amendment is equally applicable to this. I shall not repeat what I said, except to say again, with the authority of the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, that it is for those who seek to change the law to show that the change proposed is necessary. We have our laws for the preservation of wild birds; we have our poaching laws. Are they so inadequate that it is now necessary to extend the law of theft to cover wild creatures at liberty? I have no doubt that any changes proposed in our game laws would be most closely examined, and not least by the Party opposite, but here we have the Government proposing, in all seriousness, that a poacher should be liable to conviction as a thief, and to a maximum sentence of 10 years, if it can he proved that he has poached for reward, for sale, or for some other commercial purpose. We had a lot of discussion in Committee about the proof of motive. It will be just as difficult to prove in relation to wild animals as it would be in relation to wild flowers, and the Lord Chancellor recognised the difficulty in that connection.
I really do not think that this subsection will do in its present form. It is quite illogical, surely, that the man who poaches 50 pheasants and stores them in a deep freeze should not be liable to be convicted of theft if he uses them for
46
his own consumption or to give them to his friends, but that the man who poaches two pheasants and sells one to his neighbour shall be liable to have a conviction for theft recorded against him and be branded as a thief.
The effect of my first Amendment is to take out the words:
"Wild creatures, tamed or untamed, shall be regarded as property".
Those words are necessary only if you are going on to define whose property they are; and that is not defined. My third Amendment takes out the Words:
"or … he does it for reward or for sale or other commercial purpose".
So, if the three Amendments are carried or accepted, we are left with the clause reading as follows:
"a person cannot steal a wild creature not tamed nor ordinarily kept in captivity, or the carcase of any such creature, unless it has been reduced into possession by or on behalf of another person and possession of it has not since been lost or abandoned, or another person is in course of reducing it into possession".
I suggest that the words in paragraph (a) really mean, and are intended to mean, that one cannot be convicted of stealing unless the wild animal has been reduced into possession, or is about to be reduced into possession and so belongs to someone, or is about to belong to someone. That is the right test. It does not seem to be right to extend the whole scope of the criminal law in relation to theft by saying that wild creatures, tamed or untamed, shall be regarded as property. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 3, line 3, leave out from beginning to first (a) in line 4.—(Viscount Dilhorne.)
5.11 p.m.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, the noble and learned Viscount put a direct question to me when he asked to whom, under the Bill, do wild birds belong? For the purposes of the Bill, they belong to the person or persons who have the legal right to kill them, that is, the landowner or the person with the sporting rights. This is because that person has a proprietary right or interest in the birds within the meaning of Clause 1(5).
I am grateful to the noble and learned Viscount for reading to your Lordships how the clause would read with the three

47
Amendments. I hope your Lordships will not mind if I commence my speech by again reading how the clause would read if these three Amendments were accepted. It would read:
"A person cannot steal a wild creature not tamed nor ordinarily kept in captivity, or the carcase of any such creature, unless it has been reduced into possession by or on behalf of another person and possession of it has not since been lost or abandoned, or another person is in course of reducing it into possession."
The effect of these three Amendments is that it would be possible to steal a wild creature only in the limited circumstances at present described in subsection (4)(a), that is to say, if it had been
"reduced into possession by or on behalf of another person and possession of it had not since been lost or abandoned."
In effect, this would reproduce the existing law relating to the theft of wild creatures which have been reduced into possession. But the Bill would not extend the law, as proposed by the Criminal Law Revision Committee (I know the noble and learned Viscount objects to this) to make it theft to take a wild creature, even if it is at liberty, for reward or for sale or other commercial purpose.
In his speech to-day, as he did in Committee, the noble and learned Viscount cited the theoretical case that it would be possible for someone to take a quite large number of pheasants, but that if he put them in the deep freeze and kept them for his own consumption and did not sell them, he would not be committing a theft under the Bill, whereas a person—a poacher, if you like—who took a single pheasant and sold it would be committing theft as defined in the Bill. If may say so, I think that is an extreme example, but nevertheless I confirm that that would be the effect, and unquestionably anomalies of this kind might occur. But I do not think there is any doubt that in practice most cases of dishonest taking of wild animals on a large scale will be done for reward, sale or other commercial purpose. It seems better that a person who takes a single pheasant, or one or two pheasants, for a commercial purpose should be guilty of theft (even though another person could steal them for his own eating and get away without liability for theft), than that the Bill should not attempt to deal with large scale poaching
48
operations at all, except where they come within the limited circumstances covered by paragraph (a) of subsection (4)—circumstances which the noble and learned Viscount would preserve in his Amendment—or where they are within the scope of the special provisions relating to deer in enclosed land and fish in private waters, which are separately dealt with in Schedule 1 of this Bill, which, with minor modifications, reproduces the existing provisions of the Larceny Act 1861 relating to the poaching of deer or fish.
An indirect advantage, but I think no small one, of retaining paragraph (b) of the subsection, which the noble and learned Viscount would delete, is that where poaching is done to supply a shopkeeper, the shopkeeper will, if he knows that the animal has been stolen, be liable for handling stolen goods. This may have the valuable effect of deterring some poaching by blocking the market for the goods. The noble and learned Viscount also has the same objection to the commercial test, which we discussed on a previous Amendment. Again, while it may be difficult to prove that some borderline cases were for a commercial purpose, I believe that with animals or birds it would be far easier to prove than with flowers or foliage.
The noble and learned Viscount has argued that this matter should virtually not be in the Bill—at least, not in its present form—but should be left to the game laws. Certainly the Government will keep in mind the question of Amendments to other legislation, but they can give no kind of assurance at present on this matter. Meanwhile, just as in the previous case—but I think here even more strongly—it would be right to keep the commercial purpose; it would be right to keep paragraph (b), which the Amendment proposes to delete, so that we may have a chance of getting at the shopkeeper as well, and so stopping up the market for these goods. Therefore, I hope the noble and learned Viscount will feel able to withdraw this Amendment.
BARONESS EMMET OF AMBERLEY: My Lords, before the Minister sits down, may I ask him a question? I am rather confused about the position. If I were to run over a pheasant on the Queen's highway and I picked it up and took it home, should I be committing an offence if I

49
sold it to the local butcher but not if I ate it myself?
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, the noble Baroness is quite right.
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: My Lords, I am afraid I cannot agree with the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, in regard to this Amendment. Admittedly, rare birds are covered by the Protection of Wild Birds Act. I have come across instances in Scotland where people have stolen eaglets and falcons out of their nests. Although such action is covered by the Wild Birds Act, anything that can be done to strengthen the law in regard to the protection of wild birds ought to be encouraged.
Leaving the question of rare birds, there are quite a few people who trap common birds for commercial purposes. They trap game birds, also. Some unscrupulous people will trap hen pheasants and partridges, and they will trap common song birds and sell them. That is extremely cruel, of course. The noble and learned Viscount said we cannot control the birds that fly in the sky over our land. Of course we cannot: but we can control them if they are nesting on the land. As I have said, any law that can be enacted to protect wild life I most heartily endorse, and that is why I cannot agree with the noble and learned Viscount in this Amendment.
LORD HURCOMB: My Lords, I am not sure that I followed what the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, said about the position of wild birds: that they are the property of people who have a right to shoot them. It seems to me that here again one wants to distinguish between the protection of wild birds as such and the birds which are covered by the game laws. I am not at all clear that anyone has a proprietary right to shoot any bird except a game bird. But the opening words of this paragraph seem to me to give rise to wider difficulties, because it talks about "wild creatures". Zoologically, "wild creatures" certainly covers the whole animal creation, vertebrate and invertebrate, and I assume that that is what they must also mean in law, but on that point I may be quite wrong.
50
At first sight, I feel there is force in what the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, has argued, that one is giving greater protection to wild life by declaring it to be someone's property. In the past that may have been so, when the land generally was owned by the great landowners. They regarded themselves, I think, not as owners of the wild life on their land but as custodians of it, and indeed as trustees for the country as a whole. Circumstances have changed and the ownership of properties has changed, and I am rather apprehensive that a certain number of people, If they are told that the wild creatures on that land are their property, will say, "They are mine and I shall do with them whatever I please, and if I like to catch every butterfly and exterminate it or sell it, that is my affair and no one else's". Though we have wild birds protection Acts and game Acts and fisheries Acts, and though I hope we may have a wildflowers Act, it will be a long time before we get general protection for all the rest of wild creation.
My mind is torn between two arguments. Is there not a risk that we may encourage unreasonable treatment of wild life by people who say, "It is my land and they are mine, and I shall do what I like"; and, on the other hand, there is the argument—rather a different point— that one strengthens the law by making it a grave offence to steal certain parts of it? Perhaps the noble Lord will explain what the first line in this paragraph is really intended to mean and what its effect is. And may I again suggest that while this no doubt has been very carefully considered from a purely legal point of view by lawyers, some of these classes, and this one in particular, has some wider reactions; and before the Government finally decide on how the Bill should be left or put through another place they should consult their advisers on scientific subjects?
5.24 p.m.
LORD WILBERFORCE: My Lords, I was going to make very much the same sort of points as the noble Lord, Lord Hurcomb, has made. I was glad, and interested, to hear him say that no doubt this has been very well thought out from the legal point of view, though perhaps not from the wider angles. But it still

51
puzzles me from its legal aspects, because I do not really understand what the first part of this subsection (4) is trying to do. Most of the discussion has concerned pheasants but, as has been pointed out, this clause is not about pheasants; it is about, "Wild creatures, tamed or untamed", and it starts by saying they "shall be regarded as property". Very well, I take that to mean larcenable; but it does not say so. It does not say whose property; it just says property.
However, you cannot steal something unless it is property belonging to another—that is Clause 1(1). Therefore, you have to find out, in the case of these wild creatures, whether they are property belonging to another. I understand the contention to be that in relation to game animals they are regarded by virtue of Clause 5(1), as property belonging to another. That may or may not be so: I am not concerned with that point at the moment. But of course there are a great many other wild creatures—some of those mentioned by the noble Lord—which are not game animals, and which, so far as I know, are not at Common Law, or by anything in this Bill, made anybody's property. Take butterflies. I know no theory which says that a wild butterfly is the property of the owner of the land, and Clause 5(1) does not seem to say so. Yet this subsection (4) seems to say that if you capture a butterfly and do it "for reward or for sale or other commercial purpose" you are committing an offence—in other words are guilty of theft. And that applies to any other animal throughout the whole range of creation. Of course, in the case where it is "reduced into possession" or is going to be "reduced into possession" that is not difficult: it is covered by paragraph (a) and would be left by the Amendment of my noble and learned friend Lord Dilhorne. But there remain the cases where it has not been reduced into possession, where it is simply a wild creature and where it is taken "for reward or for sale or other commercial purpose"; and I, like the noble Lord, quite fail to see the implications of this.
Another consequence which I think has not been discussed, though it may have been mentioned on the Committee stage, is in regard to fish, which are the subject
52
of a separate provision—I cannot think why—in Schedule 1. They are put in Schedule 1, whereas the rest of the wild creatures are left in this Clause 4. What about the case of fish which are taken "for reward or for sale or other commercial purpose"? That does not seem to be met in Schedule 1. Even if you do it in daytime it seems you are liable not merely to the modest penalty there for angling in the day time; if the fish taken is regarded as something in which someone has a proprietory right or interest, which would be so in the case of a private fishery, it comes within subsection (2) and you are liable to the full ten years' imprisonment. I find it very puzzling to relate this clause to the other matters discussed; on the one hand, the game law, about which there is a good deal of anxiety, and, on the other, the position of fish and every kind of creatures and animals which may be on the land. I do not understand it, and I am glad to note that I am in distinguished company in not understanding it.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I think we have had a most interesting discussion on this Amendment. I wish that the Government had explained more fully what they wanted to do by this particular clause. As I understood the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, he was really saying: "We want this clause to make large-scale poaching theft." The whole emphasis of his speech was on poaching, and he added as an argument that then it would he possible, if you could prove it, to "run in" the shopkeeper who had received the poached game.
In my opening I suggested that this was a curious way to strengthen the poaching laws, by branding the poacher as a thief, but it may well be that that was the prime motive of the Committee behind this clause, because I see that they said that they were themselves in favour of making all wild creatures in respect of which sporting rights exist the subject of theft like other property; that is to say, if you like, game birds. The clause goes much further than that. That was the point to which I was directing my attention when I asked: To whom do they belong to, the wild birds that fly? Take the example of the noble Viscount, Lord Massereene and Ferrard. There may be a golden eagle or two in Mull—I do not know. But if a golden eagle

53
nests on property on Mull, does the landowner claim that the golden eagle belongs to him? I should not have thought that he would have the proprietary rights in a golden eagle under this or any other Bill. Therefore you have that defect in the first part of this clause to which the noble Lord, Lord Hurcomb, and my noble and learned friend drew attention. All wild creatures are made property, and the property of someone. When I asked the question "Whose property?" the answer I received from the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, was "The property of those who have proprietary rights to shoot them". I think I have quoted him correctly, but if I have not I am sure he will forgive me.
So we are not really covering the wide field; there has been no justification for the wide scope of this clause. I personally think that it will have little practical effect, if it is passed in its present form, because I cannot believe that in the vast majority of cases where you catch poachers you will ever be in the position of being able to establish that what they did was for reward or for sale or for any commercial purpose. I do not believe that at all. The burden will be on the prosecution to prove it. The noble Lord can bring up all sorts of theories about how they can be pursued back to the shopkeeper and caught in the act of handing over. But it is not very likely.
The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, when we were discussing this same point in relation to wild flowers, said that he appreciated the point made by the Lord Chief Justice on this and would like to consider it. The noble Lord will remember that a question was raised whether the onus of proving that it was not for reward, or not for sale, or not for a commercial purpose, should be placed on the defence. The Lord Chief Justice produced what I think the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor described as "a very sensible half-way house"; namely, the fact that they were in possession—he was talking of holly or whatever it may be—"and the fact that they are found, should be evidence, by which I mean some evidence, that it was for sale or reward." If the noble Lord would take that evidential burden here and put that on the defence this extraordinary subsection would have a little
54
more practical value. Although I did not raise that question on the earlier discussion, we have not as yet had any observations from the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor about why he was unable to accept, or the Government were unable to accept, the suggestion made by the Lord Chief Justice about that which he thought was "very sensible". I really cannot say any more upon this particular provision. I think the answer we have had, with the greatest respect to the noble Lord, is most unsatisfactory. I do not myself propose, however, to divide the House en this Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 5:
"Belonging to another"
5.—
(2) Where property is subject to a trust, the persons to whom it belongs shall be regarded as including any person having a right to enforce the trust, and an intention to defeat the trust shall be regarded accordingly as an intention to deprive of the property any person having that right.
5.35 p.m.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE VISCOUNT DILHORNE moved, in subsection (2), to leave out all words after "to enforce the trust". The noble and learned Viscount said: My Lords, this is a short point, and it would be convenient to take Amendments Nos. 15 and 16 together. There are three points I want to make, and I can take them quite shortly. The first is that this clause deals with what is meant by the expression "belonging to another". To my mind, it is quite inappropriate that it should contain in it anything that interprets the meaning of the words "intention to deprive". We shall shortly be coming to Clause 6. If we must have the special interpretation of "an intention to deprive", it ought to be included in that clause and not in the clause dealing with the meaning of "belonging to another". So my first point is that that part of subsection (2) which deals with what is an intention to deprive and that part of subsection (4) which also deals with an intention to deprive, are both in the wrong place. It is a mere drafting arrangement, but the interpretation could be redrafted and put in the next clause or in a separate clause.
The second point I put to the noble Lord, quite shortly, is: what is the significance of the omission from subsections (2) and (4), of the word "permanently"? Is it the case that "an intention to defeat the trust is to be regarded as an intention "permanently" to deprive? Again, I ask in this, my third point, what exactly is meant by the words "intention to defeat the trust"? My noble and learned friend Lord Wilberforce commented on those words last time, but I do not think we have any clear explanation of what they are intended to cover.
If I may come back to the second point that I made, under subsection (4) an intention not to restore property to its owners amounts, it would seem, to an intention permanently to deprive him of his property. But it seems to me that the omission of the word "permanently" from both these subsections may be given added weight and significance because of the emphasis of the word "permanently" in the following clause, if it remains in the Bill. I find myself in some difficulty in understanding what is the need for defining so closely an "intention to deprive" when the real object is to interpret the phrase "an intention permanently to deprive". I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 3, line 19, leave out from first ("trust") to end of line 21.—(Viscount Dilhorne.)
LORD WILBERFORCE: My Lords, I should like to say a few words on the first Amendment about subsection (2) with reference to "the trust". I still remain in the dark as to exactly what these two and a half lines are meant to do. We start with subsection (1), which talks about property as belonging to someone if he has possession or control or proprietary right or interest; and it is to be assumed (though I am not sure the assumption is right) that that does not in itself deal with equitable interest under a trust. We then come to subsection (2), which apparently is meant to bring within the definition of "property" and the words "as belonging to any person" property subject to a trust, and no doubt also to bring within it property held on a charitable trust where there are no ascertained beneficiaries.
56
I understand the first two and a half lines as bringing within the definition of "property" and of the persons who own the property, either the beneficiaries under the trust or, in the case of charitable property, someone who can enforce it. So far so good. But then what about the two and a half lines? From the fact that subsection (2) uses the word "accordingly", one gets the idea that it is merely carrying out the first two and a half lines of the subsection and not adding anything new. If so, then I think they can be dispensed with. But if it is intended to introduce something new, to add something to the first part of the subsection, I wonder what it is that these words are trying to add. One is then thrown on to the words "an intention to defeat the trust", and one asks what they mean.
There are many cases where there may be an intention to defeat a trust which relate simply to breaches of trust. For instance, there is the case where a tenant for life has some oak trees on the settled property and he cuts them down—that is an intention to defeat the trust so as to prevent the remainderman from getting the trees—or any case where specific property is held for life and then for somebody else, and where somebody may decide to sell the property to prevent the remainderman from getting the property, contrary to what the trust says. That is a breach of trust which has its appropriate remedy. But is that brought within the words,
"an intention to defeat the trust shall be regarded as an intention to deprive"?
I find those words singularly opaque in their meaning, and I thought there was merit in the noble and learned Viscount's suggestion to remove them as merely a gloss on the first part of the paragraph or, if they are not a gloss, as adding an element of which one does not appreciate the scope. As at present advised, I would support the Amendment.
5.42 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, subsection (2) is needed to deal with cases, admittedly comparatively rare, which sometimes arise under foreign trusts or under charitable trusts where the beneficiaries have not yet been ascertained and in which the beneficiary has in law no interest in the trust property.

57
When this was referred to on the Committee stage the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, said that he had no objection to the first part of the subsection, but he saw no need for the second part—that is to say, that covered by the proposed Amendment. I submit to the House that the words which it is sought to omit are needed.
The opening words of the subsection secure that a person having a right to enforce a trust is a person to whom property which is the subject of the trust "belongs" for the purpose of the definition of theft in Clause 1(1). For theft to be committed under that subsection there has to be an intention to deprive the owner of the property, and it is desirable to make clear in the Bill that an intention to defeat the trust in the circumstances covered by subsection (2) of Clause 5 amounts to an intention to deprive. This is achieved by the second limb of that subsection, and is a necessary or at least highly desirable consequence of the first part of the provision. It is true that this part of the subsection goes beyond what strictly amounts to a definition of "belonging to another", but it hinges entirely on the first part of the subsection and it would do nothing to make the Bill clearer to shift it elsewhere, solely on the ground that the clause can be argued to go rather wider than its side note. Precisely the same arguments apply to the concluding words of subsection (4) of Clause 5, which make it clear that when someone gets, by another's mistake, property which is to be regarded, for the purposes of the Bill, as belonging to the person entitled to restoration, an intention not to make restoration should be regarded as an intention to deprive that person of the property.
The noble Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, questioned the omission of "permanently" from the relevant words of subsection (2); and the same point arises on subsection (4). The word "permanently" is unnecessary in these provisions which operate, in effect, on the meaning of "depriving" in Clause 1(1). Assuming that "permanently" is in that subsection, it is still necessary to show an intention permanently to deprive for a theft to be committed in the circumstances envisaged by subsections (2) and (4) of Clause 5.
58
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Wilberforce, asked what the phrase "defeat the trust" means. It means to frustrate a trust in the sense of causing it to fail to achieve its object; or, one might say, to cheat the trust by putting the property out of reach of the trust. The noble and learned Lord may feel that the fact that the expression Tray not be known to equity lawyers is not necessarily a disadvantage in this Bill where people are trying to use ordinary words.
This is not a matter of enormous import. It would be applicable only to a relatively small number of cases. It is not any brilliant idea brought forward by the Government. The clause is exactly as it was drafted by the Criminal Law Revision Committee. The Government would ask the House to reject the Amendment on the ground that, although it is not of enormous importance, it is better to have the words in the Bill than to leave them out. I am quite prepared to consider again whether it would be more appropriate to have them in some other place. There is something to be said for the view that the wording of the clause goes goes rather wider than the side note, but I respectfully ask the House not to accept the Amendment.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: I am grateful to the Lord Chancellor for what he has said. I have never questioned the first part of subsection (2) but, despite the explanation which we have had, I still feel some qualms about the later words. I feel that, bearing in mind the wide compass of these words, any breach of trust might lead to a prosecution for theft. I do not see any limitation. If the words "intention to defeat the trust" have the wide scope mentioned by the Lord Chancellor, it would seem to me to follow that any breach of trust might fall within the purview of theft. I cannot think that that is intended. I may be wrong but I feel that this matter ought to be given a little more thought. I would make clear to the noble and learned Lord that in criticising the Bill I am not concerned to find out who is responsible for drafting a particular provision. I am merely putting forward criticisms where I think they are justified, or where the matter calls for explanation. Such an approach may be significant, since one sees that the next clause which we are coming to was not one which was recommended by the

59
Criminal Law Revision Committee. In view of the fact that the Lord Chancellor has said he will give further consideration to this matter, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 6 ["With the intention of permanently depriving the other of it"]:
LORD AIREDALE LORD AIREDALE moved, in subsection (1), to leave out "amounts (or substantially amounts)" and insert "substantially amounts". The noble Lord said: This is an Amendment to Clause 6, which explains the meaning of "permanent deprivation". It mentions any dealing with property
"that amounts (or substantially amounts) to a complete usurpation …"
If we leave the subsection as it is, it will be apparent that Parliament has not made up its mind what it means. Does it mean "amounts" or does it mean "substantially amounts" to a complete usurpation? The word "amounts" is surely a more all-embracing word; and once you have said "amounts" you have included the idea of "substantially amounts". When the courts have to decide upon and interpret the meaning of this subsection, surely they will say: "It is sometimes hard enough for us to interpret a meaning which Parliament has done its best to make crystal clear, but here Parliament simply has not made up its mind what it means. What is the purpose of us, the courts, going into refinements of the distinction between what 'amounts' and what 'substantially amounts', when this is going to be of no practical importance because Parliament has used both expressions in the same subsection?"
I should have thought it imperative that before this subsection reached the Statute Book Parliament must have made up its mind what it means and intends. I imagine that the Government mean and intend the expression "substantially amounts". Therefore I am moving to leave out the words "amounts or", but I should be just as happy to have it the other way round. If for the Government's purpose the word "amounts" is enough, then clearly there cannot be any useful purpose in going on to say "or substantially amounts". All it will do
60
is confuse the courts, and we must not set out to do that. I do not mind which way round we amend this subsection, but we must make our intention clear. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 3, line 40, leave out ("amounts (or substantially amounts)") and insert ("substantially amounts").—(Lord Airedale.)
VISCOUNT BARRINGTON: My Lords, I had not intended to speak but I should like, as a layman, to support very warmly my noble friend's Amendment. If we are talking about financial matters, there is a difference between an "amount" and a "substantial amount". If we are talking in legal jargon, I do not know what is the difference between "amounts" and "substantially amounts", and I should very much like to hear what is the difference, if there is one. If there is no difference, then I should like to support what my noble friend has said; that the Government mean "substantially amounts", and wish to emphasise the fact that it is something important. But if the word "amounts" itself means something important, then that will be enough. As a layman, I cannot see the object of these two meanings being put in one clause.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, suggested that without his Amendment Parliament would not have made up its mind. In my view, he is quite wrong in thinking that Parliament will not have made up its mind if the clause stays as it is, because the clause literally says that if it either "amounts" or "subtantially amounts" then the clause applies. There is no question of us not making up our minds as to the circumstances in which the clause applies. The noble Lord also argued, I think quite reasonably, that "amounts" would, as it were, include "substantially amounts", the greater including the not quite so great. While not dissenting from that argument, to put it the noble Lord's way would lose the flavour, as it were, of the subsection and give it a wrong emphasis. Its primary purpose is to deal with conduct which amounts to a complete usurpation, and the parenthesis after "amounts" conveys that there may in addition be circumstances falling short of a complete usurpation in an absolute sense, which nevertheless the clause is intended to cover.

61
The point is a nice one, as are most of the points which the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, raises. But the intentions of the clause are better effected, in the Government's view, by the form of words which are now adopted in the subsection. The noble Lord is making a verbal point and is seeking the highly commendable course of reducing the number of words used. But, in my view, clarity is even better than brevity. Language, after all, consists not just of words but of phrases and sentences, and the phrase "amounts or substantially amounts" is perfectly simple. It is the kind of phrase one would use to convey the idea in ordinary writing or conversation, and in our view it conveys precisely to the courts what the Government's intention is in this clause.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I listened with great interest to that reply, but I do not think it is in the least degree satisfactory. This is not just a verbal point. The noble Lord talks about clarity, but seldom have I seen in a criminal Statute such vague and imprecise language. The noble Lord must bear in mind that this is not just a question of the Bill implementing, in language the Government like to use and choose for themselves, their intention. This particular clause will have to be considered in probably nearly every case where there is a charge of theft, and it will be for the jury to consider whether what has happened substantially amounts to complete usurpation. Complete usurpation is one thing. I suppose that is clear language which the noble Lord thinks is precise. But when you say that it "substantially amounts" to complete usurpation, you mean that it
is something less than complete usurpation. So you are faced with the choice. Either it amounts to complete usurpation, or it is something less than complete usurpation. Then the question immediately arises: how much less will suffice? But on that no guidance whatsoever is given in the Bill.
Because of the reply which fin noble Lord, Lord Stonham, gave I was tempted to rise to my feet to speak in support of the noble Lord, Lord Airedale. My next Amendment seeks to remove the whole clause, and I hope that noble Lords who have heard the reply to this Amendment, and who have heard the debate will bear them in mind when considering whether Clause 6 should remain in the Bill.
LORD AIREDALE: My Lords, I have received very powerful support indeed from that last speech. This is an important subsection, because it is a definition subsection. It is a subsection which defines theft, and it must be clear and plain. This is a criminal Statute, and words in a criminal Statute which define a crime must be absolutely plain. To use words which are alternative to each other—"amounts (or substantially amounts)"—in such a subsection will merely create confusion for the courts. I am sorry to say that, having heard the Minister's reply, I could not possibly withdraw this Amendment.
6.3 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 17) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 46; Not-Contents, 44.

CONTENTS

Airedale, L. [Teller.]

Denham, L.

Milverton, L.

Albemarle, E.

Dilhorne, V.

Mountevans, L.

Asquith of Yarnbury, Bs.

Effingham, E.

Napier and Ettrick, L.

Auckland, L.

Emmet of Amberley, Bs.

Norwich, V.

Audley, Bs.

Falkland, V.

Oakshott, L.

Bannerman of Kildonan, L.

Ferrier, L.

Redmayne, L.

Barrington, V. [Teller.]

Greenway, L.

St. Helens, L.

Beaumont of Whitley, L.

Grenfell, L.

Strange of Knokin, Bs.

Bourne, L.

Grimston of Westbury, L.

Strathclyde, L.

Brooke of Cumnor, L.

Ilford, L.

Teynham, L.

Carrington, L.

Jellicoe E.

Thorneycroft, L.

Colville of Culross, V.

Jessel, L.

Thurlow, L.

Conesford, L.

Lambert, V.

Tweedsmuir, L.

Cork and Orrery, E.

Lucan, E.

Vivian, L.

Craigavon, V.

Massereene and Ferrard, V.

Wilberforce, L.

Daventry, V.

NOT-CONTENTS

Addison, V.

Granville of Eye, L.

Phillips, Bs.

Beswick, L.

Granville-West, L.

Plummer, Bs.

Birk, Bs.

Henderson, L.

Ritchie-Calder, L.

Bowles, L. [Teller.]

Hill of Wivenhoe, L.

Rowley, L.

Brockway, L.

Hilton of Upton, L.

Royle, L.

Burden, L.

Kilbracken, L.

St. Davids, V.

Champion, L.

Latham, L.

Shackleton, L.

Collison, L.

Leatherland, L.

Shepherd, L.

Delacourt-Smith, L.

Lindgren, L.

Sorensen, L. [Teller.]

Douglass of Cleveland, L.

Llewelyn-Davics of Hastoe, Bs.

Stonham, L.

Faringdon, L.

Lloyd of Hampstead, L.

Strabolgi, L.

Fiske, L.

McLeavy, L.

Summerskill, Bs.

Gaitskell, Bs.

Milner of Leeds, L.

Taylor of Mansfield, L.

Gardiner, L. (L. Chancellor.)

Mitchison, L.

Wells-Pestell, L.

Garnsworthy, L.

Moyle, L.

Resolved in the affirmative, and Amendment agreed to accordingly.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, before I move the next Amendment, which I shall do as shortly as I can, I think the noble Lord, Lord Beswick, wishes to say something.
LORD BESWICK: I am much obliged to the noble Viscount. For various reasons, for the convenience of the House it is proposed that at around 6.30 we should have a short adjournment for three-quarters of an hour. I would propose, therefore, that at about that hour we should adjourn during pleasure, and then see if we cannot, after that time, get through this Bill this evening.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE VISCOUNT DILHORNE moved to leave out Clause 6. The noble and learned Viscount said: My Lords, as to the last part of the noble Lord's remarks, may I say that I do not think we are delaying matters at all, but there is a lot more to discuss. However, I shall move this Amendment as shortly as I can, because the substance of it has already been discussed a good deal. Of course, if I were naughty and wished to misbehave a little I would not move this Amendment at all, because this clause as it stands entirely destroys the effect of the reinsertion of the word "permanently" in Clause 1. The object of the clause is to define the meaning of the words,
"With the intention of permanently depriving the other of it".
Clause 1, subsection (3), makes it clear that it would be nonsense for anyone to contend that Clause 6 must be read and interpreted in any way as subject to Clause 1. If that argument is put forward, it will be the weakest argument that has been put forward at any time in
64
our debates on this matter. If one looks at subsection (1), one sees that it provides:
"A person is to he regarded as permanently deprived of property … by any dealing with it that amounts (or substantially amounts) to a complete usurpation as against him of the property, …"
One question which I asked in Committee and which has not yet been answered is: what precisely is meant by the words "complete usurpation" in this subsection? Do they mean any more than depriving the owner of his rights in the property? I do not think they do. The phrase, "substantially amounts to a complete usurpation", as I said just now, must mean that something less than complete usurpation will suffice.
Subsection (2) provides:
" … a person … intending such a usurpation is to be regarded as having the intention of permanently depriving the other of it,"—
and I ask your Lordships to note these words at the top of page 4—
"whether or not he intends the other ultimately to have the property".
If those words mean anything, they mean that a person can be found to have an intention permanently to deprive when in fact he has not got that intention at all.
Now, subsection (2) uses the words, "intending such a usurpation". Unlike subsection (1), it does not refer to "any dealing"; nor does it contain the words, "amounts (or substantially amounts)". On any view, I cannot myself see the need for subsection (1). It appears to me to be likely to give rise only to confusion. If, in subsection (2), instead of saying, "such a usurpation", one had the words, "a complete usurpation as against that

65
other of the property", the clause would operate without subsection (1). Assuming that "complete usurpation" means depriving an owner of his rights in the property, does not subsection (2) provide that anyone who takes and drives away another's car without his consent can be convicted of stealing without its being proved that he intended to deprive the owner of his car permanently? It would appear to me to be clear beyond all shadow of doubt that that is the effect of subsection (2). Would there not then be a "complete usurpation" of the rights of the owner? In the Goya matter, was it not a complete usurpation of the rights of the National Gallery? If so, and if this clause remains in the Bill, there is no need for Clauses 11 and 12, and the effect of this clause would be much better comprehended and achieved by once again deleting the word "permanently".
My Lords, the whole of this clause is a departure from the principle that there must be an intention permanently to deprive. This clause, I ask your Lordships to remember—those of you who were here; for many come in when a Division is called—was criticised by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chief Justice, who said that he could understand many people reading "amounts (or substantially amounts) to a complete usurpation" as covering the borrowing of a bicycle or the taking of a picture or the taking of a motor car. It was criticised also by my noble and learned friend Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, who thought that its wording might lead to a great deal of confusion. He, too, asked what the words "amounts (or substantially amounts) to complete usurpation" meant. My noble and learned friend Lord Wilberforce also criticised the clause. Last, but not least, the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said last Thursday that he personally regarded the clause as unnecessary. So for once all the lawyers who spoke about this clause, both those in favour of the word "permanently" and those who were against it, agree that this clause is not one which is loved by anyone. If you are going to have the word "permanently" in the Bill, then I think it can make sense only if this clause goes out. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Leave out Clause 6.—(Viscount Dilhorne.)
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, I want to say just a few words in support of my noble friend. When I was doing some research for the purpose of seeing whether "permanently" should or should not be in the law, it seemed to me that it was extremely difficult to see where the line was drawn. It is drawn, as I understand it, according to the facts of the case. This is usually the only criterion one can get. On the Committee stage the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor—and I think the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chief Justice agreed with him—said that it was a question of drawing a line. That may be so; but no line is drawn by Clause 6. It seems to me to go completely as far as my noble and learned friend has said it goes; it seems to undo all the point of putting "permanently" in Clause 1. As for getting rid of reliance on old Case Law, it appears to me to be likely to lead to just as much new Case Law. I can see no object at all in having it in the Bill.
6.14 p.m.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, both the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, and the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, have expressed a view, although not in the same words, that Clause 6, if it remains in the Bill, virtually removes the whole value of "permanent deprivation" in Clause 1. If they are right about that, I find it remarkable that they should be so anxious to get the clause out of the Bill, because we had a great fight to get the word "permanently" put back. Both noble Lords voted against putting the word "permanently" back in the Bill. Now their prime argument is that this clause, in effect, is useless—
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I could save the noble Lord time—
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I can scarcely say two words without the noble and learned Viscount interrupting I should like to try to finish a sentence.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I am sorry if the noble Lord takes that line. At the beginning of my speech I said that if I had wanted to be naughty, I would not have moved this Amendment. But having got the word "permanently" back, I accept that for the time being. Therefore I argued, and still

67
argue, that this clause has to go out in consequence.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I still feel it is remarkable—
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: It is consistent.
LORD STONHAM: I still feel it is remarkable that we should have this debate after the debate on Thursday.
I think it desirable to deal with this subject at some length and to explain as well as I can the Government reasons, first, for drafting the clause and, secondly, for saying precisely why we want it in the Bill and why it should stay in the Bill. In considering it, I think it is necessary to consider two issues: whether the intentions underlying the clause are right and whether it fulfils its intentions—because I think the intentions have been very widely misunderstood. The noble and learned Viscount said that there was complete unanimity among the lawyers who spoke in this House on the Bill. That is something I have never known achieved before. Therefore it is remarkable, if for no other reason than that it has achieved this unanimity among the lawyers.
The clause has its origin in certain special cases in which, under the existing law of larceny, there has been held to be theft because the offender has intended to do something with the property he has taken which, for practical purposes, amounts to "permanent deprivation" although it does not literally amount to permanent deprivation. That is the first reason. The Criminal Law Revision Committee were aware of those cases, wished them to be covered, and thought of including a provision of this kind in their draft Bill. But, in paragraph 58 of their Report, they said:
"We thought of including a provision in the Bill to bring in cases of these kinds expressly; but the view of the Committee generally was that this would be unnecessary. It would also be difficult to frame a provision which would certainly cover all the cases without being elaborate".
They put the case perfectly fairly. They thought there would be merit in framing a clause of that kind. The difficulty which Clause 6 has caused suggests that the Committee's fears about the difficulty of framing a provision were only too well justified. But when it came to preparing
68
the Bill for presentation, the Government decided, for reasons which were explained during the Committee stage by my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor, that after consulting the Chairman and several members of the Criminal Law Revision Committee an attempt to draft the provision should be made.
Briefly, my Lords, the two reasons were, first, to make the Bill as complete a statement of the law as is practicable, bearing in mind the decision, reached since the Criminal Law Revision Committee reported, to have a comprehensive criminal code; and, second, to meet doubts expressed whether the Committee were right in their view that the previous Case Law would be applied to the Bill so as to give the reference in Clause 1 to permanent deprivation the same interpretation as the corresponding reference in the Larceny Act 1916. It is quite right that if the Committee had thought their intention would have been entirely covered by the fact that Clause 1 excluded "permanently" this Clause 6 might well not have been necessary. But in the Government's view it is not by any means absolutely certain that the courts would so interpret it.
In the same paragraph of their Report, paragraph 58, the Committee gave examples of the type of case which Clause 6 is intended to cover. Typical cases are where the taker intends to abandon the property in such circumstances that the possibility of its return to the owner is, to his knowledge, extremely remote. This is the kind of case which would substantially amount to complete usurpation where he intends to return it only after using it in such a way that it becomes useless to the owner—for example returning a railway ticket after travelling on it, or where he intends to sell the article back to the owner as being the taker's own property. The noble and learned Viscount will recall the case of the smelter who was employed to smelt ore. He took a furnace and an axle belonging to his employer, smelted it down and sold it back as ore. This is a case in Case Law, and I could read out a good many other such cases, on precisely the kind of subject which Clause 6 would cover, so obviating the reference to Case Law, but which without Clause 6 might well not have been regarded as theft.

69
It has been said that in seeking to keep this clause in the Bill we have been inconsistent with our insistence on retaining the word "permanently". It hope I have made clear from the class of cases I have mentioned that we have not been inconsistent in our intention. Clause 6 is in no way intended to remove, but only to qualify, the need for an intention permanently to deprive. All it does is to preserve in substance the principles of the present law, that there may be an intention permanently to deprive notwithstanding that the offender may not positively intend the owner to lose the actual physical thing.
It will substantially amount to complete usurpation, and therefore there will be permanent deprivation, even though the actual deprivation may not be permanent. Such an act will still be theft, and that is what Clause 6 says and makes clear. An example is where the intention is to abandon a thing somewhere where the owner is only remotely likely to get it back, or even may be intended to get it back, perhaps by buying it back from the offender. Provided that Clause 6 fulfills this intention, it will be only in exceptional cases that the requirement of permanent deprivation, in the literal sense, will be taken away. But the need to qualify that principle to meet the particular and exceptional cases is, of course, no argument for abandoning it, any more than the covering of specific types of dishonest borrowing by Clauses 11 and 12, to which the noble and learned Viscount referred, is an argument for making all dishonest borrowing an offence.
If your Lordships accept that it is right to try specifically to cover in the Bill particular types of cases that I have mentioned—and I think it is right—I have to satisfy you that the clause fulfills this intention. It has been argued that it will be difficult for a court to know what the clause was meant to cover. The noble and learned Viscount referred to the remarks of the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chief Justice, who said during the Committee stage:
"I can understand many people reading the words 'amounts … to a complete usurpation' as covering the borrowing of the bicycle or the taking of the picture or the taking of the motor car."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 11/3/68, col. 71.]
I agree that these points were raised. The noble Lord, Lord Goodman, argued, in
70
a debate on Clause 1 on the first day of our Report stage:
"If I see someone at Ascot wearing my grey silk hat at the moment when I precisely need it, that is a classic example of a complete usurpation of my silk hat"— [OFFICIAL REPORT, 4/4/68, col. 1413.]
My Lords, it would clearly be disastrous if Clause 6, as draftee, went so far beyond its intention as the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, and the noble and learned Lord, the Lore Chief Justice, have suggested. The Government have anxiously considered the danger of its being given such a wide interpretation, and whether there is a better concept of the expressed intention of the clause than the concept of complete usurpation. It would be possible to elaborate Clause 6 and to give signposts to its intention. This was something we considered not only yesterday or last week, but a long time ago. But it would be subject then to the difficulty which is always there when a large number of examples are given: that they can never be wholly inclusive and cover the whole field. This possibility could be reexamined if the House found it attractive, but the Government have certainly not been able to find any more apt concept to express the general intentions of the clause than complete usurpation.
As my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor explained in Committee, there are many nineteenth century cases in which an accused has been held to be guilty of larceny because he usurped the entire property in the goods. The concept, of course, is not novel. As to the meaning which might be given to the words, the Government do not think that they should be interpreted as covering all temporary acts of deprivation. An expression so strong as "completely usurp" must, we think, mean something a good deal worse than borrowing. Clearly, in considering particular cases the courts would have to draw a line between what did or did not substantially amount to complete usurpation. And it is impossible to say on which side of it a particular hypothetical case might come. But there seems no reason to fear that the line would be drawn much, if at all, differently from the way it has been drawn under existing Case Law, and we feel that we have gone on for a long time without any grave difficulties there. We

71
do not accept the view of the noble and learned Viscount that it is illogical to say that the courts, in interpreting Clause 6, would have to have regard to the word "permanently" in Clause 1 and the inclusion of Clauses 11 and 12 in the Bill. The courts, in construing Clause 6, would be bound to look at it in the context of the Bill as a whole.
My Lords, we do not think that Clause 6 would create for the courts or for juries the kind of difficulties which it has been suggested it would create. We believe that this clause, as it were, adds to, supplements and explains Clause 1, and is of definite assistance. In the generality of cases it will not be necessary, but in exceptional cases it will help the courts to decide whether the position substantially amounts to complete usurpation and therefore can be regarded as permanent deprivation—theft. The Government think that it will be extremely useful, and I would ask
Resolved in the affirmative, and Amendment agreed to accordingly.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, in relation to the announcement of my noble friend the Chief Whip, I now propose
72
your Lordships to ensure that it is written into the Bill.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I just want to say two words. This matter has been debated in great detail in Committee and shortly to-day. Whatever the Government's contentions may be, the Home Office here want to retain this clause. All the legal opinion expressed in the course of the debates, including that of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, is that the clause is unnecessary. I ask the House to take the noble and learned Lord's personal view that the clause is unnecessary, and cut it out. Then it can be for the Government, if they have second thoughts, to reintroduce an amended clause.
6.30 p.m.
On Question: Whether the said Amendment (No. 18) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 46; Not-Contents, 42.

CONTENTS

Airedale, L.

Emmet of Amberley, Bs.

Morris of Borth-y-Gest, L.

Albemarle, E.

Falkland, V.

Mountevans, L.

Auckland, L.

Ferrier, L.

Napier and Ettrick, L.

Audley, Bs.

Gray, L.

Oakshott, L.

Bannerman of Kildonan, L.

Greenway, L.

Redmayne, L.

Barrington, V.

Grenfell, L.

St. Helens, L.

Bourne, L.

Grimston of Westbury, L.

Strange of Knokin, Bs.

Brooke of Cumnor, L.

Ilford, L.

Strathclyde, L.

Carrington, L.

Jellicoe, E.

Teynham, L.

Colville of Culross, L.

Jessel, L.

Thorneycroft, L.

Conesford, L. [Teller.]

Kinnoull, E.

Thurlow, L.

Cork and Orrery, E.

Lambert, V.

Tweedsmuir, L.

Craigavon, L.

Lucan, E.

Vivian, L.

Daventry, V.

Massereene and Ferrard, V.

Wade, L.

Denham, L.

Milverton, L.

Wilberforce, L.

Dilhorne, V. [Teller.]

NOT-CONTENTS

Addison, V.

Gardiner, L. (L. Chancellor.)

Norwich, V.

Beaumont of Whitley, L.

Garnsworthy, L.

Phillips, Bs.

Beswick, L.

Granville-West, L.

Plummer, Bs.

Birk, Bs.

Henderson, L.

Ritchie-Calder, L.

Blyton, L.

Hill of Wivenhoe, L.

Rowley, L.

Bowles, L.

Hilton of Upton, L. [Teller.]

Royle, L.

Burden, L.

Kilbracken, L.

St. Davids, V.

Champion, L.

Leatherland, L.

Shackleton, L.

Collison, L.

Lindgren, L.

Shepherd, L.

Delacourt-Smith, L.

Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, Bs.

Sorensen, L, [Teller.]

Douglass of Cleveland, L.

Lloyd of Hampstead, L.

Stonham, L.

Faringdon, L.

McLeavy, L.

Strabolgi, L.

Fiske, L.

Milner of Leeds, L.

Summerskill, Bs.

Gaitskell, Bs.

Mitchison, L.

Taylor of Mansfield, L.

that we should adjourn during pleasure until twenty minutes past seven o'clock.
Moved, That the House do adjourn during pleasure until twenty minutes past seven o'clock.—(Lord Stonham.)
LORD LEATHERLAND: My Lords, is it possible for anyone to oppose the Motion? If so, I should like to do so. We are confronted with a Marshalled List containing 68 Amendments. We have so far dealt with 18 of them. We were deliberately brought here to-day half an hour later than usual. We are told, also, that we have to see the whole Bill completed to-night. I think it is rather a pity that we should waste three-quarters of an hour when we have this task in front of us. It may well be that certain noble Lords—probably the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, and others—have other engagements, but can we not take in the meantime what I would, not disrespectfully, call some of the "non-Dilhorne" Amendments? I am opposing this Motion rather sorrowfully, but we have come here to do a job, and we want to do it, and we do not want to be here after the last trains have gone.
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, I perfectly understand my noble friend's attitude on this matter. I think we should all like to press on and get this Report stage completed as quickly as possible, but there are other considerations. I assure my noble friend that, although I happen to know that the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, has another engagement, it is not an engagement that has been arranged for his personal convenience: he is seeking to do a job that the Government have asked him to do. For that one reason it would be courtesy to enable him both to fulfil that engagement on behalf of the Government and to look after the Amendments that he has down on the Marshalled List.
Moreover, my noble friend Lord Stonham, who most people would recognise has taken the burden of this Bill most manfully, has been operating since a little after three o'clock; he has been in the Chamber the whole of the time, and it would be a great convenience for him at any rate to be allowed to go out of the Chamber for 40 minutes. I think, for that reason, too, the suggestion that we should adjourn until 7.20 would not be unreasonable. If my noble friend would like to have a word with me afterwards, I hope I may convince him that this arrangement is, probably for the good of
74
the House as a whole, and I hope he will agree to the Motion.
On Question, Motion agreed to.
[The Sitting was suspended at 6.43 p.m. and resumed at 7.20 p.m.]
Clause 9:
Burglary
9.—(1) A person is guilty of burglary if—
(b) having entered any building or part of a building as a trespasser he commits or attempts to commit any such offence.
(2) The offences referred to in subsection (1) above are offences of stealing anything in the building or part of a building in question, of inflicting on any person therein any grievous bodily harm or raping any woman therein, and of doing unlawful damage to the building or anything therein by fire or explosion.
LORD STONHAM LORD STONHAM moved, in subsection (1)(b), to leave out from "he" to the end of the subsection, and insert:
"steals or attempts to steal anything in the building or that part of it or inflicts or attempts to inflict on any person therein any grievous bodily harm".
The noble Lord said: My Lards, I hope that it will suit your Lordships' convenience if with this Amend rent I also deal with Amendment No. An Amendment, Amendment No. 20, is tabled to my Amendment No. 19, in the name of the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne. I wonder how I should proceed—whether we should deal first with the Amendment to my Amendment.
THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (LORD ST. HELENS): My Lords, I would ask the noble Lard to move his Amendment and speak to it, and immediately afterwards I would ask the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, to move the Amendment to the Amendment.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, Amendment No. 19 would delete the words "commits or attempts to commit any such offence" and substitute the words on the Order Paper in paragraph (b) of Clause 9(1). The relevant part of the subsection would then read:
"A person is guilty of burglary if …
(b) having entered any building or part of a building as a trespasser he steals or attempts to steal anything in the building or part of it or inflicts or attempts to inflict on any person therein any grievous bodily harm".

75
The effect of paragraph (b) in the subsection as at present drafted is that a person is guilty of burglary if, having entered any building or part of a building as a trespasser, he commits or attempts to commit any of the offences specified in subsection (2) of the clause, that is to say, theft, inflicting grievous bodily harm, raping a woman, or doing any unlawful damage to the building or anything in it by fire or explosion. At the Committee stage some doubt was expressed by Lord Colville and Lord Dilhorne whether paragraph (b) was needed at all, and it was suggested that it would be sufficient if the offence of burglary depended on paragraph (a) in the subsection, that is to say, upon an entry as a trespasser with intent to commit one of the offences mentioned in subsection (2). It was suggested, in particular, that there was no need to provide that a person who entered a building as a trespasser and committed rape should be guilty of burglary since the offence of rape would, in any event carry a penalty—life imprisonment—greater than the penalty for burglary, which is 14 years.
The Government have carefully considered these criticisms, but are satisfied, for reasons which I gave in Committee, that paragraph (b) cannot be dispensed with altogether. Without the paragraph, it would not, for example, be possible to convict a person of burglary who had broken into a building and stolen unless he could be proved to have broken into the building with intent to steal; and it seems wrong that such a person should not be liable to the higher, 14-year, penalty for burglary rather than the 10-year penalty for theft under Clause 1. The preservation of paragraph (b) for stealing was advocated by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chief Justice in the Committee debate.
The Government's conclusion on this paragraph is that it should be preserved not only for stealing but also for the offence of causing grievous bodily harm, which carries a maximum penalty of only five years' imprisonment compared with the maximum of 14 years' for burglary, that is, for the offence under Section 20 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861, as distinct from the offence under Section 18 of that Act of wounding et cetera with intent to do grievous
76
bodily harm, which carries life imprisonment. The Amendment provides accordingly.
Amendment 21 is a consequential Amendment to subsection (2) of Clause 9. As a result of the proposed Amendment to paragraph (b) in subsection (1), subsection (2) will be relevant only to paragraph (a) in subsection (1). The Amendment provides accordingly.
Amendment moved—
Page 4, line 26, leave out from ("he") to end of line 27 and insert the said words.—(Lord Stonham.)
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS moved to add to the Amendment, "or does unlawful damage to the building or anything therein". The noble Viscount said: My Lords, my noble and learned friend Lord Dilhorne has asked me to move the Amendment on his behalf, and I hope that I can do justice to it. As I understand the clause when it has added to it the two Amendments the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, has just spoken to, subsection (2) will in future relate only to subsection (1)(a). We then have a position whereby, if we leave out the part dealing with intent, which is dealt with in subsection (1)(a), there is a series of offences which come under the general category of burglary and what a person does having entered a building or part of a building as a trespasser. I know that this was discussed in Committee, but it seems to me that there is a loophole, with the drafting of Amendment No. 19, as it stands, in that if somebody, although he did not have any intent to do any damage in the building, entered it and then did some damage I understand that he would not be a burglar. If he committed no other offence than entering a building, he could then be charged only with the damage on its own and not as a burglar.
My noble and learned friend thought that somebody who went into a building without the requisite intent to come under subsection (1)(a), but when in there committed unlawful damage to the building or anything inside it, should be treated as a burglar, and that this was not dealt with in Amendment No. 19. Accordingly, although I now see that my noble and learned friend is in his place and can supplement or correct anything I

77
have said, I beg to move the Amendment to the noble Lord's Amendment.
Amendment to Amendment moved—
Line 3, at end insert the said words.— (Viscount Colville of Culross.)
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I have not heard all that my noble friend said in moving the Amendment, but I am sure that he would have said all that I would have said. I should like, if I may, not to address the House now but to wait and hear the reply and then, with the leave of the House, which I should have to have, having risen to my feet, to say a few words.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I only waited to meet the noble and learned Viscount's convenience. I have moved and spoken to Amendment No. 19, but it has not yet been debated, although the noble and learned Viscount's noble friend has moved the Amendment on his behalf. As I explained, the effect of Amendment No. 19 is to change Clause 9(1)(b) so that it would be burglary, having entered a building as a trespasser, and irrespective of the intent in entering, to commit or attempt to commit certain serious offences. The effect of the noble and learned Viscount's Amendment would be to extend the offences to include unlawful damage to the building or anything in it after having entered as a trespasser. Your Lordships will be aware from the Order Paper that it is the hope of the noble and learned Viscount, the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, and myself, to persuade your Lordships, by Amendment No. 22, to delete the words "by fire or explosion". The subsection then would conclude with the words:
"and of doing unlawful damage to the building or anything therein",
which are almost precisely the words which the noble and learned Viscount wishes to add to my Amendment No. 19 now.
There is the question whether these words should also be added in this subsection so that it would also be burglary for a person, having entered a building as a trespasser, to do unlawful damage in it, even if entry with an intent to do such damage could not be proved. That is the whole point now between us. It is, of course, a clear point but a debatable point, and the Government's view is that
78
on balance such an extension of paragraph (b) would widen the offence of burglary too much, and it is unnecessary. Burglary is, and ought to remain, a very serious offence, and, as I have mentioned, we already propose to widen it substantially by providing, through Amendment No. 22, that it is burglary to enter a building as a trespasser with intent to do malicious damage by any means. If the offence were further widened as Lord Dilhorne proposes, a person who trespassed in a building for some innocent purpose and then committed malicious damage there, however trivial (perhaps on impulse or because of some unexpected provocation), would be a "burgler". We think that is carrying "burglary" too far, and it seems sufficient that a person such as I have described should be liable to prosecution only for the offence of malicious damage.
Your Lordships may suggest that this leaves a gap where the intent on entering as a trespasser was to do malicious damage but the intent cannot be proved. The typical case, however, in our view, where malicious damage is done by a burglar is one where he has broken in to steal and does the damage vindictively but incidentally, perhaps because he is disappointed in his finds. It seems unlikely that a jury in such a case would have difficulty in inferring an intent to steal, and perhaps also an intent to do malicious damage, from the accused's behaviour. And if there was, in fact, no intent to do the malicious damage, the case seems to be distinguishable from the one in paragraph (b), where the trespasser inflicts grievous bodily harm, even if he did not enter with that intent. That is the explanation for which the noble and learned Viscount asked, and I hope he finds it sufficient.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for what he has said. The intention behind this Amendment was not to widen the clause beyond all reasonable bounds but really to close a gap. The Amendment to which the noble Lord referred, Amendment No. 22, which is supported by such a remarkable conjunction of names, is obviously a very desirable Amendment. We need hardly say anything more about it But the effect of that is to make trespass with intent to do unlawful damage "burglary". That we are all agreed

79
upon. It appeared to me that that in fact left a bit of a gap, because a man could be trespassing with intent to steal, and that clearly be his intention—let us assume that that is the case. He gets inside; he cannot find anything to steal but he finds a noble Lord's whisky—if any noble Lord has that at the present time. He consumes it, with sad effects, and does a tremendous amount of damage. It is the case, I fear, in these days that breaking and entering, as it now is, is often accompanied by an extraordinary amount of damage.
What I wanted to make sure was covered was not only the case where the man trespassed with intent to do unlawful damage, but where he trespassed with intent, if you like, to steal, and then did unlawful damage. I thought that if trespass with intent to do damage was burglary, so ought trespass followed by the actual doing of damage to be burglary. In many cases it may be difficult to prove that trespass was done with the intent to do damage. It may be that in some cases you can infer that intent from proof of the conduct of the trespasser, but you will not be able to do it in all cases; whereas you would catch all the kinds of cases I should like to see caught if we passed this Amendment, No. 20.
I am impressed by the noble Lord's point about a man being a trespasser in a building and doing a trivial amount of damage, and then being prosecuted and convicted of burglary. That is not my desire, nor is it my intention. I should hope, if this Amendment were made, that those who settle charges would not dream of preferring a charge of burglary in such circumstances. But I feel that, as the Bill stands, if Amendments Nos. 19 and 22 are made, we are left with that gap, and I should like the noble Lord, if I withdrew my Amendment, to say that he will give further consideration to it. I do not think there is anything between us on policy. I think that to limit it to Amendment No. 22 alone is really not quite sufficient to do the whole of the job.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I will certainly look at the point the noble and learned Viscount has suggested. As to the two examples he gave, as I see it, on the first one the man had an intent
80
to steal and so would be caught by paragraph (a); and on the second one he stole the whisky and he would be caught by paragraph (b). But obviously there may be other examples, and I will certainly look at it as the noble and learned Viscount has suggested.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, in that case I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment to the Amendment.
Amendment to Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 21.
Amendment moved—
Page 4, line 28, after ("(1)") insert ("(a)"). —(Lord Stonham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
7.38 p.m.
LORD STONHAM LORD STONHAM moved, in subsection (2), to leave out "by fire or explosion". The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 22. The noble and learned Viscount suggested that this Amendment was supported by such an array of talent that it did not need discussion but I can hardly expect your Lordships to accept that, since my name appears among the three. I would therefore briefly say that the effect of the Amendment is to widen the clause so that it would, among other things, be burglary to enter any building or part of a building as a trespasser with intent to do unlawful damage to the building or its contents by any means. At present the subsection is limited to damage by fire or explosion.
It was suggested by the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, and particularly by the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, during the Committee stage that people sometimes break in to do damage otherwise than by fire or explosion and there seems no reason for restricting the provision to damage of this kind. It seemed to me that the arguments were unanswerable and that this Amendment was badly needed, and I hope that your Lordships will accept it.
Amendment moved—
Page 4, line 32, leave out ("by fire or explosion").—(Lord Stonham.)
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, may I just say that I entirely agree with the noble Lord, and I, for one, shall be very glad to accept it.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 23. This would make subsection (3) of Clause 9 read thus:
"References in subsections (1) and (2) above to a building shall apply also to an inhabited vehicle or vessel, and shall apply to any such vehicle or vessel at times when the person having a habitation in it is not there as well as at times when he is".
Those of the faithful few who were here at the time will remember the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, raising the point that a vessel or vehicle can be inhabited, even if nobody is in it when it is burgled, and the words of the Amendment have been chosen to meet that valid point. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 4, line 34, at end insert (",and shall apply to any such vehicle or vessel at times when the person having a habitation in it is not there as well as at times when he is.")—(Lord Stonham.)
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, I should like to thank the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, once again for meeting this point. It only shows how much better it is done when the draftsman does it than when I try to do it myself.
LORD AIREDALE: My Lords, I had intended to put down an Amendment to this Amendment and I am sorry to say I forgot to do so. Perhaps I may briefly mention the point in case the House may decide that an Amendment at the next stage would be useful. My suggestion in this Amendment would have been, instead of referring to "the person having a habitation" in the vehicle, that the wording should be
"any person having a habitation in the vehicle".
It occurred to me that it might be difficult in some cases to define the particular person who might have habitation. For instance, one might have a company of hauliers who had a large number of long distance lorries which were lived in by the drivers, but no particular driver would be allocated to one particular vehicle. There would be a pool of
82
vehicles and a pool of drivers, and any driver might, on any night, be inhabiting any of the company's vehicles. That would create a difficulty if it was necessary for the purpose of this clause to have to identify a particular person and say, "This particular person has a habitation in this particular vehicle". Therefore I think it might be useful, instead of saying "the person", to say "any person". It would make the task of prosecutors much easier in cases of that kind. That may be worth looking at with a view to a possible further Amendment to this Amendment at the next stage.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, in the example quoted by the noble Lord I think the words "the person" would have covered the long-distance lorry drivers or any one of them who was entitled to have a habitation there at the particular time. But certainly I will look at that point between now and the next stage.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 11 [Removal of articles on show in buildings open to public]:
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I move this Amendment with the greatest confidence because I see the first part—I will not say the better part—of the next Amendment in the name of the: noble Lord, Lord Stonham, is to the same effect. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Leave out Clause 11.—(Viscount Dilhorne.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
7.46 p.m.
LORD STONHAM LORD STONHAM had given notice of an Amendment to omit Clause 11 and to insert instead:
Removal of articles from places open to the public
11.—(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (4) below, where the public have access to a building in order to view the building or part of it, or a collection or part of a collection housed in it, any person who without lawful authority removes from the building or its grounds the whole or part of any article displayed or kept for display to the public in the building or that part of it or in its grounds shall be guilty of an offence.
For this purpose 'collection' includes a collection got together for a temporary purpose, but references in this section to a collection do not apply to a collection made or exhibited for the purpose of effecting sales or other commercial dealings.
(2) It is immaterial for purposes of sub-section (1) above, whether a thing removed from a building or its grounds is removed at a time when the public have access to the building as mentioned in that subsection; but a person removing anything from a building or its grounds shall not thereby commit an offence under that subsection unless either—

(a) he does so by the use of some opportunity or information obtained by visiting the building as a member of the public admitted for the purpose so mentioned; or

(b) the thing removed forms part of a collection intended for permanent exhibition to the public.

(3) A person does not commit an offence under this section if he believes that he has lawful authority for the removal of the thing in question or that he would have it if the person entitled to give it knew of the removal and the circumstances of it.
(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall, on conviction on indictment, be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years."
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this new clause is intended to replace the existing Clause 11. Incidentally, the existing clause was substantially amended in Committee, and the intention of those Amendments was the removal from the clause of the "commercial test" to which substantial, and I think valid, objections were taken. As originally introduced, the clause applied only where the object of admitting the public to the building was not a commercial object, and "commercial object" was defined in subsection (2) of the clause, which was one of the provisions deleted during the Committee stage. The noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, argued that criminality should not depend on whether or not a building was open for a commercial purpose, and suggested that the courts would have great difficulty in deciding whether a building was or was not open for a commercial purpose. It was also argued during the debate, by the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, that the principle should be to protect objects of artistic merit wherever they might be, and by the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, that protection should be given to objects in the gardens of a building or in the open air generally. The "commercial test" in the clause as introduced was intended to put a limit on the scope of the clause by confining it to places not opened for the purpose of making money. There was no evidence that a provision of this kind was needed for wider purposes, and in the Govern-
84
ment's view it was not desirable that the clause should go farther than was strictly necessary to make the temporary taking of articles stealing. In the light of the debate in Committee, the Government have decided that it would be reasonable for the clause to go rather wider than they originally proposed, but they cannot accept the clause as amended in Committee because, as it now appears in the Bill, it is far too wide. It would apply to any building to which the public had access in order to view the building or part of it or any of its contents, and would extend not only to art galleries (public and private), museums and similar places where objects of art or of special interest to the public are displayed, but also to places such as shops, auction rooms and exhibitions of manufactured products where the public go to view the "contents" of the building and where articles are "displayed".
Thus, someone going into a shop to look around, or perhaps to make some trivial purchase, would be within the scope of the clause if he took away an article displayed or kept for display, even if he did not intend to keep it. This would, in effect, enable people taking things from shops to be prosecuted and convicted, under the clause, without the need, as in the case of theft, to show an intention permanently to deprive the owner of his property. It would be giving the clause a scope far outside its intention of dealing with the mischief discussed by the Criminal Law Revision Committee in paragraph 57(ii) of their Report, and would be inconsistent with the Committee's view, with which the Government agree, that there should be only limited exceptions to the general principle reflected in the Bill, as in the present law, that temporary deprivation of property should not be stealing or any other offence.
The new clause therefore offers a compromise between the clause as originally drafted and the clause as it now stands. Subsection (1) states the general proposition that where the public have access to a building in order to view the building or part of it, or a collection or part of a collection housed in it, any person who, without lawful authority, removes from the building or its grounds the whole or any part of any article displayed or kept for display to the public in the building

85
or its grounds shall be guilty of an offence. "Collection" is defined to exclude collections made for the purposes of effecting sales or other commercial dealings, the object being to exclude, for example, collections of articles in shops and for sale in commercial galleries, and collections in exhibitions for advertising purposes where the articles displayed are specimens of articles for sale. Subsection (1) thus makes the exclusion, which the Government think essential, of shops, auction rooms, and so on, while at the same time meeting critics of the original clause by dispensing with the test that, whatever the nature of the building, the object of admitting the public to it must not be commercial. One effect of the change is that, subject to subsection (2), the clause will now protect articles in private collections even if they are opened to the public for the purpose of making money in excess of the cost of upkeep.
Your Lordships may wonder why we have used the term "collection" and not "contents". The virtues of using "collection" in the subsection are, first, that it helps Ito indicate the intended purpose of the clause—that is, to protect articles which have been got together as objects of artistic or other merit or of public interest—and, secondly, that it facilitates the exclusions made by the definition of "collection" in the latter part of the subsection. If "contents" were substituted, it would be necessary to change the second part of the subsection for the purpose of excluding the contents of shops; and it would be difficult to do this satisfactorily on the scheme of the clause.
It may be objected that sometimes the things which the public are admitted to view do not amount to a "collection or part of a collection", or that the public are sometimes admitted to view a single object, such as a painting. For example, works of art or beautiful furniture may have been assembled in a stately home over many generations for ornament or utility and not as a "collection"; but if the contents are preserved together, to be viewed as the contents of the house, so to speak, it is thought that they would undoubtedly be regarded as a "collection" for the purpose of the clause.
Moreover, this objection overlooks the fact that the clause applies in any event
86
where the public have access to view the building or pant of it. This will cover buildings such as "stately homes" and churches which are open to view by the public as buildings, although they may also contain articles on display.
The clause as introduced does not require the taking to be dishonest because it was thought to be implicit in the form of the clause that the taking would be done without lawful authority. The new clause makes it clear that the taking must have been done "without lawful authority", and subsection (1) provides accordingly. The notion of "without lawful authority" seems preferable in this context to the notion of "dishonesty", and it keeps the clause so far as possible, in line, on this point, with Clause 12, the other provision in the Bill dealing with temporary deprivation, which uses the formula "without having the consent of the owner or other lawful authority". The notion of "consent of the owner" would be inappropriate in Clause 11 in relation to some of the buildings or types of buildings covered.
It will be noted that the subsection extends to articles in the grounds as well as in the building. This provision meets the criticism made at the Committee stage by Lord Airedale, that the gardens of buildings on show to the public are equally on show with the buildings, and that objects are also at risk there.
Subsection (1) is subject to subsection (2), which seeks to deal with the difficulty that, while some places within subsection (1) will be open to the public regularly throughout the year, others will be open only occasionally or irregularly, or at particular seasons. In the Committee stage the consensus of opinion appeared to be that where there was a permanent exhibition to the public, such as in the National Gallery, the protection of the clause should be available irrespective of whether the person taking away the article did so by the use of some opportunity or information obtained when visiting the building as a member of the public. The Government are content that the clause should be widened accordingly. But if the same approach were adopted to, for example, a stately home which was open for only a few days a year, the clause would create an indefensible anomaly. A place which happened to be open to the public on a day or two a year (as

87
it might be in aid of charity) would then be protected against the taking away at any time, 365 days a year and in circumstances which might have no connection with access by the public, of any article displayed in it when it was open, although a home which was never open to the public would have no protection under the clause. The difference between complete protection and none would depend on the almost fortuitous circumstance whether the place was opened to the public for one day in the year.
Those who want Clause 11 to be very wide, or all dishonest borrowing to be an offence, may say that they agree that this would be indefensible but that the remedy is to give the protection of the clause to works of art and the like whether or not they are kept in buildings open to the public at some or all times. The Government do not think that this would be right. The essence of the clause is to protect things which are put at hazard by being displayed to the public, and it would be going too far in the direction of making temporary deprivation an offence to apply the clause to articles to which the public had no access.
Moreover, it would be very difficult to draft a provision which caught precisely the type of articles forming part of the national heritage which proponents of a wide clause would wish to see covered. How, for example, would it be possible to distinguish from paintings, books, vases, and the like, of little value, the rare and precious objects which it was desired to cover? If, on the other hand, the clause were extended to every painting, book or ornament in private possession, there would be no logical reason why it should not extend to every article in private possession, making the clause, in effect, co-extensive with theft. The Government are therefore convinced that, for places not permanently open to the public, the clause must contain some limiting principle. Subsection (2) has been drafted accordingly. It provides that it is immaterial whether a thing removed from a building to which the clause applies, or from its grounds, is removed at a time when the public have access to the building, but that, except where the thing removed forms part of a collection intended for permanent exhibition to the public, there is no offence
88
under the clause unless the article is removed by the use of some opportunity or information obtained by visiting the building as a member of the public. Thus, if the thing removed forms part of a collection intended for permanent exhibition to the public—as, for instance, the collections in the great national museums and art galleries—there will be full protection under the clause at all times. But if the collection does not come in that category there will be protection only if, in effect, there has been abuse of the privilege of entry given to the public.
I am aware that there are many who think this clause is entirely unnecessary, but in my own view it provides a useful addition to the law. It can, of course, be argued that the jury in the Goya case were wrong and that they should have convicted. It may well be so; but juries give verdicts: they are there to give verdicts, and the Goya case verdict had the effect that the man accused was not convicted of the theft of the Goya. With this clause he would undoubtedly have been convicted of an offence punishable with imprisonment up to five years. It is not only the National Gallery; it is not only the Goya, that would be covered. I believe that this clause will give to houses which are part of our national heritage, and their contents, a very wide range of protection which they never had before. I think it is a worthwhile clause, and I hope your Lordships will agree to its inclusion in the Bill. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 11, insert the said new clause. —(Lord Stonham.)
7.57 p.m.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE VISCOUNT DILHORNE, as an Amendment to the Amendment, in the proposed new subsection (2), to leave out from "unless" to the end of paragraph (a). The noble and learned Viscount said: My Lords, I am sure the whole House is grateful to the noble Lord for so clearly explaining what this new clause is meant to do. If ever there was a case where a hard case made bad law the noble Lord is trying to achieve it by introducing this clause into the Bill. For the purpose of making my argument I must deal a little with what the noble Lord said about the

89
clause in general. Of course, we recognise that this is a clause introduced to secure the conviction of anyone else who wants to follow the example of the man who took the Goya. Whether or not the jury were perverse in acquitting that man is a subject on which I should not like to express an opinion. But bearing in mind that they had to be satisfied that he intended permanently to deprive, if they were not satisfied then I think their verdict was right. So we have this clause which takes out that element entirely and which proposes to put certain buildings and their contents in a special category so far as the law is concerned.
The noble Lord spent a lot of time in dealing with subsection (1). I was glad to hear him deal with the use of the word "collection" and not with the word "contents". I will not comment on that at the moment, because, as I understand him, he is satisfied that if you are going in to view a building or part of it you cannot view the contents without seeing part of the building, and that will accordingly be covered.
But when he comes to subsection (2) and says, "We must limit this, because otherwise someone who has his house open to the public will get the protection of this clause for 365 days in the year"., there I am afraid I disagree entirely with his reasoning. Subsection (2) provides:
"It is immaterial for the purposes of subsection (1)…whether a thing removed from a building or its grounds is removed at a time when the public have access to the building as mentioned in that subsection."
That is made perfectly clear. But what practical value is this clause going to be to a house owner who throws open his house for admission to the public if, under this clause, he can get a conviction only if he proves that the removal by the accused of some object of value from his house was
"by the use of some opportunity or information obtained by visiting the building as a member of the public admitted for the purpose so mentioned."?
The inclusion of those words destroys almost entirely, if not entirely, the good effect, if there he a good effect, created by the earlier part of the clause. The inclusion of those words destroys the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Stonham.
And—mark the difference—that particular condition in paragraph (a) is not to apply where the thing removed
"forms part of a collection intended for permanent exhibition to the public".
So the National Gallery, the Tate Gallery and other galleries like that have only to prove that the article has been removed. But when it comes to the owner of one of our stately homes—I do not have one —who throws it open to the public so that they may come and see the lovely things which have been accumulated there throughout the ages, he, for some quite illogical reason, is not given the same protection for things which may be just as valuable, if not more valuable, as a part of our national heritage. It really is an astonishing proposition to me.
Why is it put forward? Because, said the noble Lord, in a voice full of horror, "If you do not have this provision in the Bill you would be giving protection to the stately homes for 365 days of the year." I should have thought that that was what you wanted. If you come down to it, how are you going to prove this? A man or woman comes round the house which is open to the public, sees where the things of value are, goes away, maybe miles away. Six months later, a man who has obtained from that person the information about the house, the layout and everything else, goes back to it and removes this article. If he is unwise enough to remove it from a place where it is on permanent exhibition he will be convicted. But under this clause you will not get a conviction by showing that he removed the article from a stately home unless you can show that he did it
"by the use of some opportunity or information obtained by visiting the building as a member of the public…".
Unless he makes a frank and fell confession as to his sources of information, I do not believe you will ever get a conviction under that part of the clause. So far from this clause providing a real and exceptional protection for the contents of stately homes, it is, to my mind, nothing less than a piece of thoroughly bad law prompted by a hard case. I beg to move.
Amendment to Amendment moved—
Subsection (2), line 6, leave out from ("unless") to end of line 9.—(Viscount Dilhorne.)
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, may I say that I hope that my noble and learned friend will not

91
press this Amendment. If he does, and we take out paragraph (a) from the new subsection (2), it seems to me that only the permanent exhibitions will have any protection under this clause; and that is something that, I think, he does not wish, and certainly I do not wish.
What I should like to ask the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, is whether he is quite certain that this paragraph (a) provides the right test. He said just now that he thought it was wrong that the home or other building which was open only on a few days of the year should have protection throughout the year. But of course, under the clause as it is drafted, they have protection throughout the year. It does not matter whether the house is open or whether it is shut to the public at the time the article is taken. Only one thing matters in this clause, and that is that the information must have been obtained from the visit as a member of the public. But on any other day of the year, whether the house is open or not, if the object is taken away then the offence is still committed.
So I do not think that the noble Lord has succeeded in achieving what he wants if he wishes to limit the protection to some smaller number of occasions than every day in the year. I do not think that one ought to limit the clause to a certain small number of occasions in the year, and I think that the noble Lord is perfectly right when he drafts this clause in such a way that under this subsection a person can be convicted even although he comes back on a day when the house is not open and takes the thing.
I am quite certain that that is what the noble Lord wishes, because that is what the clause does. If that is what he wants, why is it necessary to have this test, which I suggest will be exceedingly difficult to prove? I agree with my noble and learned friend that it is only an obstacle to the success of the prosecution. You have year-round protection; you have the rare case, I think it may well be, which is not theft but merely a temporary removal of the object. Why is it necessary to show, in order to establish the guilt of the person who has taken away this object, dishonestly, or at any rate without lawful authority, and not with an intention permanently
92
to deprive the owner of it, that he got it "by the use of some opportunity or information" which perhaps he himself has had to acquire by going to the house? It seems to me that if the information has been derived, either directly or indirectly, from an open day at the house, that is one thing: that may be the source of the crime; that may have been how it came into somebody's head. But why should it be necessary to prove that, when the noble Lord has already drafted a clause which gives year-round protection?
I think that the noble Lord may have some comments to make on that point, because I do not quite understand what are his aims in limiting the clause in the way he has suggested. I do not think that it works in the least in the way that he thinks. But at any rate one thing is, I feel, quite certain: even it paragraph (a) is taken out something else ought to be put in instead.
8.10 p.m.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, on the Amendment I agree with nearly everything said by my noble and learned friend Lord Dilhorne, and, having listened to my noble friend Lord Colville of Culross, I am convinced that the fault of the Amendment moved by my noble and learned friend is that it does not strike out enough. I think that he ought to strike out everything in subsection (2) after the word "subsection" in line 4. Whether he proposes to strike the words out in bits or altogether I do not know, but it seems to me that that is what is needed. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, that this clause is a great deal better than nothing. But why go out of your way to protect those who remove works of art? The unlawful taking of works of art has become a great public nuisance in many countries and it is in the public interest to stop it, not to try to protect, by all sorts of artificial means, those who indulge in it. I can see no reason whatever for the words attacked by my noble friend in paragraph (a) of the proposed new subsection (2).
The only other matter I wish to raise on the noble Lord's Amendment is that I think he has been unfair to his own subsection (1). His subsection (1) is a little better than he thought. He said—and it may be that he was speaking in general

93
terms and did not wish to be taken too literally—that it did not protect auctioneers. It would, I think, have protected Christie's in the example which I ventured to give at an earlier stage when we were considering the Bill in Committee (although no doubt it would not protect Christie's as regards articles for sale at their auctions) that is to say, in a case where they gave an exhibition, as they did about a year ago, of objects which had been originally purchased from them and were lent by public galleries all over the world and which were not for sale in their showrooms. If Christie's had collected them for exhibition to the public, I think they would fall within subsection (1), and it is right that they should do so. In that respect, subsection (1) is better than the noble Lord implied. But as to the objections to the limitation in subsection (2), I am sure that we ought to strike out not only the words which my noble friend seeks to strike out but a good many others as well.
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: My Lords, in regard to subsection (1), does the phrase "any person" cover only a person visiting a collection and viewing the building, or does it apply to anybody? Does it apply, for instance, to a window cleaner in the museum, or to a member of the staff, or to some other person in the museum, or does it apply only to somebody who is visiting the collection? It seems extraordinary that a man should be guilty of this offence only if he is, according to paragraph (a) of subsection (2), visiting the building and the collection. After all, a friend could go round the museum and tell the man everything about it and where everything is situated, and that would be just as effective as the person himself going round the collection. Therefore, I find it difficult to understand paragraph (a). That appears to leave a large loophole in regard to the commission of a theft.
As for private collections in the stately homes, as they are called, it seems rather illogical that the owner of a private collection does not receive the same treatment as a public museum. It would appear to me, as a layman, that in relation to the man who commits a theft, the crime is judged from the point of view of the source from which he steals rather than in regard to the crime which he
94
commits. That seems to be illegical, but perhaps I have it wrong. It would appear that if one steals from the National Gallery after one has visited the National Gallery it is a serious crime, but if one steals from a private collection it is not such a serious crime. That seems to me to be rather odd. But I am not a lawyer.
LORD AIREDALE: My Lords, I should like to support this Amendment to leave out paragraph (a) of subsection (2). I feel that it is impracticable to expect anybody to prove the matters in paragraph (a). Somebody who is going round a building on an open day to spy out the land for a subsequent raid obviously will not make himself conspicuous. He will not go round dressed in a bright red shirt and a top hat so as to be easily recognised afterwards. Presumably he will go during the busiest time and will be one of hundreds of visitors to the building. What hope is there that subsequently, when the person has been found to have taken property out of the building, somebody will be able to say, "We saw him in the crowd on the open day three weeks ago"? He would be a fool if he found himself in that position. He will make himself as inconspicuous as he can on the open day, and there will not be the remotest hope of establishing the facts in paragraph (a) of subsection (2).
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I am bound to say that I am disappointed at the reception which all noble Lords, save the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, have given to my efforts on this clause.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, we are only discussing the Amendment to the Amendment. Nobody yet has said anything nice about the main clause, since it would have been out of order.
LORD STONHAM: Then that is a battle yet to come. I will deal with some of the points raised on the Amendment. The noble Viscount, Lord Massereene and Ferrard, seemed to find difficulty about the window cleaner or somebody who worked in the building in question. But subsection (1) refers to "any person who without lawful authority removes" and so on, and "any person" means precisely what it says, subject, of course, to paragraph (a) of subsection (2) which deals

95
with a case where it is not a permanent exhibition. We are talking about the case of temporary deprivation, and many of those offences are just plain stealing. Most of them would be plain stealing and there would never be any doubt about it. But we are talking about what I think are a minority of exceptional cases.
The noble Lord, Lord Conesford, raised a point about an exhibition, and certainly the clause would protect an exhibition at Christie's if it were not for sale or commercial purpose. There is no question about that, and the clause was indeed so framed. So it would protect that. The one major point was the one raised by the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, that it might be difficult to prove that a person committing an offence under the clause was making use of some opportunity or information obtained by visiting the building as a member of the public. He spoke about a man in a red shirt and top hat. Judging by some of the ties I have seen worn by noble Lords on the Liberal Benches, I think he had better not be a Liberal. But that is by the way.
It must be remembered that cases of temporary taking from private collections are extremely rare. In fact, there is no evidence of their happening at all. To a great extent, therefore, the extension of the clause to private collections is a bonus beyond what was contemplated by the Criminal Law Revision Committee. We do not think there would be great difficulty in proving. It is quite true that if a man was one of hundreds or thousands who might visit a house on a certain day, he is unlikely to have been spotted by someone who could say that he was there. But if there were such a temporary taking there could be an admission of having made a previous visit, or a clear inference from the evidence that such a visit must have been made. I will come back in a moment to the question of proof, which remains the one point of substance, and the point raised by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross.
In dealing solely with the Amendment, however, I put it to the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, that the effect of his Amendment—and I cannot believe that this is what he intends—would be that it would never be an offence under the clause to take an article unless, under
96
paragraph (b), it formed part of a collection intended for permanent exhibition to the public. I do not know whether he read his Amendment in that light, but that is the effect of it. That means that if the Amendment were accepted the clause would no longer apply to a temporary exhibition whenever held, or a collection shown in a private house occasionally or periodically but not intended for permanent exhibition to the public. It is possible that the clause should be so restricted. That was never my intention, and I do not think it was the intention of your Lordships when we discussed it in Committee, and if that is the noble and learned Viscount's intention then I, for my part and certainly for the Government's part, would reject it. We should think it undesirable, and certainly not what I set out to do after the Committee stage in trying to meet, if possible, the points raised by noble Lords. Therefore, on that point I would urge that the Amendment be rejected.
I come back to the point raised by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross. He was quite right. The wording of the clause on this matter is deliberate. The object—and I tried to make this clear when I introduced the clause—is to make the essence of the offence the abuse of the privilege of entry, whether on the day of entry or afterwards. At the close of the discussion all we are left with is that. Certainly, any temporary taking from a place where there was an occasional or periodic exhibition, and not an exhibition open to the public all the year round, would be covered at any time of the year, whether the exhibition was open or not. So all we are left with is the question of proof and the words which the noble and learned Viscount wanted to delete. I believe I understand what he was wanting to achieve, but if it is achieved by this Amendment it achieves much more which is unacceptable. I can only suggest that if he agrees to withdraw his Amendment I will look again at the point raised by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, to see whether we can do away with the restriction on the question of proof. But to limit the protection in the way suggested in the Amendment would not carry out the intention which I think most of us have.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I think I raised the point about what

97
would have to be proved. I made that the basis of my speech and I said that it was an unreasonable requirement. I put down this Amendment with a view to drawing attention to this unreasonable requirement. I was hoping that for once I might be able to convince the Government that it really was an unreasonable requirement, and that they would say, "Well, we will meet this with the appropriate wording in an Amendment of our own." I do not gather that the noble Lord has gone quite so far as that. Whatever view one takes about the earlier part of the clause, whether or not one thinks the revised version is an improvement on the original edition, is to me immaterial in considering this Amendment, because I stressed, and I stress again, that in relation to the stately home this requirement of proof robs the clause of all practical effect. I said that before, but as the noble Lord seemed to think I had not and attributed it to the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, and my noble friend Lord Colville of Culross, who made the same point, I thought I should remind him that it is my Amendment and that I had said that.
But I certainly do not want to have these serious consequences of leaving only paragraph (b), and, bearing in mind that the noble Lord has placed so much emphasis on that—although I was tempted to think that we might proceed piecemeal and excise paragraph (a) at this stage and paragraph (b) at a later stage—I am perfectly content to withdraw this Amendment now, so long as the noble Lord, clearly understands that I shall take the advice of my noble friend Lord Conesford and move to leave out all the words from subsection (2) after the word "subsection" at our next stage, unless the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, likes to put that Amendment down in his name.
Amendment to the Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, I think it would be less than just if somebody did not say "Thank you" to the noble Lord, Lord Stonham—I think the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, may do so as well—for the new Clause 11. It does away with all the objectionable emphasis on commerce which I found so very unacceptable in the earlier draft. Its great advantage has been the leaving out of that test, and the noble
98
Lord has now come forward with a completely new method of tackling the matter which I find a great deal more acceptable. Therefore I should like to allay his disappointment at the reception which he thought this clause was getting.
I just want to add a footnote to what he has said he will take away to consider. Suppose you have what I agree with him, is likely to be the comparatively rare case of a temporary taking of a work of art or some other thing on exhibition in a house which is open for a few periods of the year—and I think I must confine it to a house which is open on a few occasions in the year. In such a case the prosecution have a choice. Are they going to try to get the jury to convict for theft, with the extension of what "permanently" in fact means in the very large cases? Will they take that risk; or will they take the risk of trying to prove the matters in the paragraph which we have just been discussing on the previous Amendment? I think there might be cases where they would say, "Subsection (2)(a) is so difficult that we will prosecute for theft". If they do that, then there is really no reason for having this clause at all. That is the point I should like the noble Lord to look at, and it is the only spot on an otherwise greatly improved clause.
LORD AIREDALE: My Lords, I, too, am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, for the new Clause 11, and I am particularly grateful for his extension of it to cover the grounds and gardens of buildings so as to protect statues and other attractive objects which people might remove. But I am extremely sorry to have to go on to level a further criticism— and it is very disappointing for me to have to say this. Consider, for instance, the many gardens which at certain times are open to the public without the houses to which those gardens belong being open to the public at all. This is quite common all over the country throughout the summer. Then, of course, we have Kew Gardens and Wisley, and all sorts of horticultural gardens belonging to horticultural societies, which are open to the public and ought to be protected under a clause of this kind, if anything is going to be protected, but which have no houses attached to them to which the public have access. As the new subsection (1) is drafted, none of these gardens is going

99
to be covered unless there is also a house beside the garden to which the public have access, because the clause begins:
"…where the public have access to a building in order to view the building or part of it, or a collection or part of a collection",
and so on. Then, further on, when it comes to the removal of objects from a building, it includes, of course, the grounds. It says, "or its grounds". But this is not adequate to cover all those cases where there are gardens that are open to the public but no houses attached to them which are also open to the public. That is my first point.
My second point is that I am very disappointed that a point taken in Committee by the noble Viscount, Lord St. Davids, was not taken note of when this new Clause 11 was drafted. The noble Viscount pointed out that art galleries and museums are not used by members of the public only for viewing their contents. People go there for concerts, for lectures, for meetings of philanthropic societies, and for a number of other purposes which do not depend upon a desire to view the objects of art displayed. It would obviously be quite absurd if some dishonest person who attended a meeting or a concert in an art gallery, took a fancy to some object and then went later and removed the object from the building, was able to escape by saying. "I am not covered by this clause because I did not go there to view the collection; I went there to a concert". It would be quite absurd that, in a case of that kind, no offence would have been committed.
I have only one other point, and it is quite a small point. What is the purpose of the difference between the words "without lawful authority", which are used in subsection (1), and the words "without due authority", which are used in the next clause but one, Clause 13, which deals with extracting electricity? This may be a small point, but if Parliament means the same thing in two clauses, as I imagine it does in these two clauses, Parliament had better say so. If not, this opens the way for lawyers to argue to their hearts' content that these two expressions, although very similar, must have different meanings because otherwise Parliament, in its wisdom, would not have used one expression in one clause and another in another. So perhaps that
100
matter, too, could be looked at when this Clause 11 is being looked at again, as I very much hope it will be.
LORD LEATHERLAND: My Lords, I apologise for trespassing on my noble friend's patience at this hour, but I will be brief, and I do not expect a reply tonight. Perhaps he will look again at subsection (3), which says:
"A person does not commit an offence under this section if he believes that he has lawful authority…"
and so on. The word"believes"has a subjective connotation. If I believe something I do believe it, whatever my state of mind may be. Imagine, for instance, that I am a person with a slightly unbalanced state of mind—that is pure imagination—and that I have, say, an obsessive conscientious objection to nudes. Let us say that I visited a stately home or a museum where the picture of a nude was on exhibition, and that I took my conscientious objection to nudes to the extent of believing that I had lawful authority, in the interests of public decency, to remove this picture. I believed that. Whether you believed it, my Lords, is quite another matter. Whether I was mistaken in believing it is quite another matter. But I believed it. Therefore, according to this clause, I am innocent. I wonder whether the clause requires tightening up a little so that we might say "reasonably believes", or something like that. For the moment the nude remains on exhibition.
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: My Lords, if the noble Lord believed he had lawful authority and he had not he would presumably end up in a mental home.
LORD LEATHERLAND: No; we all make mistakes.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, to satisfy my own curiosity, I wonder whether any noble Lord who has spoken can tell me whether in the last hundred years, except for the Goya case, any picture or other object has been taken from a museum, gallery, a country house or a garden, and the prosecution has ever failed because of the difficulty of proving that he intended to deprive the owner permanently of it. Are any of the other cases which have been referred to real cases, or are they all mythical?
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, since the noble and learned Lord extends the invitation, perhaps I may say that I am only quoting from memory but I think the Committee themselves mention one other case in the paragraph dealing with the Goya.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: The case of the statue by Rodin.
LORD CONESFORD: Yes, the statue by Rodin. They say:
"In another case an art student took a statuette by Rodin from an exhibition, intending, as he said, to live with it for a while, and returned it over four months later. (Meanwhile the exhibitors, who had insured the statuette, had paid the insurance money to the owners, with the result that the statuette, when returned, became the property of the exhibitors.)"
Then the same paragraph goes on to deal with the difficulty about the Coronation Stone. Those three examples are mentioned by the Committee themselves.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I am getting a great deal of help from all sides for which I am most grateful, particularly to the noble Viscount, Lord Massereene and Ferrard. But on the point raised by my noble friend Lord Leatherland, I know the answer. I am grateful to him for not demanding an answer to-night but I feel that I must give it. The belief would have to be a belief that what was done was lawful. In the example given by my noble friend the taker is unlikely to believe that he is lawfully as distinct from morally justified, and I do not think there is any problem there.
The noble Lord, Lord Airedale, raised several points. One of them was a revival of the point made by my noble friend Lord St. Davids about attending a concert. If the building is open for people to view the contents, it does not matter that the person went there to hear the concert; he is "any person" and would be covered by the clause. Then the noble Lord said that gardens would not be covered if there was not a building there. He gave as an example Kew Gardens. Quite obviously, Kew Gardens would be covered; there are many buildings there. I have been trying to think of any garden open to the public where there is no building. There may be some; but I do not know of them.
LORD AIREDALE: My Lords, am I right in thinking that the District Nursing Association or some such society is almost entirely dependent on the charitable proceedings from people opening their gardens to members of the public? This is one of the cases I was thinking about.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, quite obviously those societies are covered. Apparently the noble Lord does not patronise these occasions as often as I do. I have never once gone in and paid my half-crown to see the garden without not only seeing the building but very often going through it to another part of the garden.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, surely the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, is quite right in what he said. The words here are:
"Where the public have access to a building in order to view the building or part of it…"
There are many cases where the garden is open and where those words do not apply.
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: My Lords, on my estate the public do not have access to the building; they have access only to the garden.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, one must take the clause as a whole. It goes on
"…removes from the building or its grounds the whole or part of any articles displayed or kept for display to the public in the building or that part of it or in its grounds…"
These things can only be interpreted by the courts. But in my view the case raised by the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, would be covered. I say again that I do not know of any of these gardens where there is no building or part of a building. I have not seen any.
I do not think there is any desire generally to prolong this discussion. I think it has been extremely useful, and one point which impressed me—indeed it may have been originally raised by the noble and learned Viscount Lord Dilhorne; but certainly it was a point that impressed me—was the second of the two points made by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, which was that it

103
is so difficult to prosecute under paragraph (a). I think that is a very important point, and it is one that I shall look at. I do not think it would be helpful if the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, introduced a very truncating Amendment. Certainly I will look carefully into it.
I have just had a note handed to me with regard to what I have said about gardens. I understand that gardens on their own are not covered and, of course, the gardens attached to buildings open to the public are. But, of course, we think that gardens which are not attached to buildings are unlikely to contain things that would be taken temporarily. I will look into that particular point, and I hope to come up with a satisfactory answer.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, before calling Amendment No. 27 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, I should say that I think, in view of what has happened, the correct form of the noble Lord's Amendment should be:
"To leave out the words last inserted and insert the new Clause as printed."
LORD AIREDALE LORD AIREDALE moved to leave out the words last inserted and to insert instead the following new clause:
Removal of articles from places open to public
"11. Any person who removes without due authority the whole or part of any article from a place where it is put for public display shall, on conviction on indictment, be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years."
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I will not make another long speech on this Amendment because we have covered the ground extremely fully in the last few minutes. But I should have thought that our discussion on the new Clause 11. which has just been agreed to, has shown that it contains some quite serious defects. I believe that something very much simpler is required, and I do not suppose that my proposed Clause 11 is perfect. I should be very surprised if it were, but it is certainly shorter and very much wider in its scope, and I should have thought answered what was required much better than the new Clause 11 that has just been agreed to.
This Amendment is almost identical with an Amendment I moved in Com-
104
mittee, which I have amended in two respects. In the earlier Amendment I used the word "dishonestly" which came in for some criticism. I have therefore changed that word to, "without undue authority". In the earlier Amendment I referred to an article being taken from a place where it is "kept" for public display, and it was suggested that this gave an impression of its being kept there permanently. I have therefore left out the word "kept" and inserted the word "put". It now reads, "where it is put for public display".
I think the Minister will criticise this Amendment by saying that it still covers takings from shops. That criticism may be well founded, and it may be that subsequently an Amendment to this Amendment ought to be moved which would read:
"…from a place where it is put for public display otherwise than for sale"
That presumably would exclude takings from shops which fell short of theft. But subject to those self-criticisms, if I may so call them, I should have thought that these four lines went very much nearer to meeting what was demanded than the rather involved Clause 11 which we have now in the Bill and which has been subject in the last few minutes to very serious criticism. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Leave out the words last inserted and insert the said new clause.—(Lord Airedale.)
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, will not press this new clause. I agree with him that it seems that shops are covered, and since I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, that they ought not to be covered under this clause, I think it is a defect. But I hope I may also say, without being garrotted by some noble Lords behind who have a garden, that I hope the House will not make too heavy weather about Clause 11. It seems to me that it is going to fill a small niche indeed in criminal law. There may be some garden which contains, perhaps, a beautiful statue—but only one statue—and which is open to the public; and it may be that the statue is taken. But, if so, it must be a remarkable concatenation of circumstances that will result in that taking not being theft under this Bill. It must be the rarest

105
possible occasion, and I think that if we complicate Clause 11 so as to take account of all these non-permanent takings in every conceivable situation, we shall end up by doing more harm than good: we shall make the clause too complicated to work at all.
I hope, therefore, that the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, will stick to his guns over the breadth of this clause. The House has decided that theft is going to include depriving "permanently", whatever that may mean, and I think that we ought to confine ourselves to something which is fairly obviously likely to happen and not go so broad as all that.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, for his suggestion, which I very much hope the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, will accept. As he has said, the Amendment which he is now moving is very similar to the one that was put forward in Committee, although the noble Lord has made the adjustments to it which he mentioned. As he will recall, I made clear during the Committee stage, when dealing with his Amendment, that his clause, in seeking simplicity, went far too wide. It would apply to the taking of an article kept for display in an ordinary shop. I know that the noble Lord has substituted the word "put" for "kept", and no doubt this is intended to meet the point raised by the noble and learned Viscount Lord Dilhorne, who suggested that it was difficult to say that, because an owner had a valuable picture in a private house, even if people were admitted on certain occasions to see the pictures, the picture was kept there for public display. It is by no means clear whether or not the change made by the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, in his present Amendment meets that criticism. But, whatever may be the answer to that, it is clear that something displayed in a shop is put there for display, and the new version of the Amendment is, therefore, just as wide as the old one. Obviously, in this context of temporary taking we cannot possibly include any form of words which would include shops. I hope, therefore, that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his Amendment.
LORD AIREDALE: My Lords, I should not burst into tears if someone
106
were convicted of temporarily taking something from a shop which he was not entitled even temporarily to take. But in view of all that has been said, and as we have given this matter a good airing, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 12 [Taking motor vehicle or other conveyance without authority]:
LORD STONHAM LORD STONHAM moved, in subsection (1), to leave out "and drives away any conveyance" and insert, "any conveyance for his own or another's use". The noble Lord said: My Lords, I hope that it will meet your Lordships' convenience if, in dealing with this Amendment, I deal also with No. 29. These Amendments slightly widen the offence in the clause as originally drafted to meet doubts about what would constitute taking and driving or riding away. During the Committee stage the noble Baroness, Lady Emmet of Amberley, questioned whether a boat which was towed away to be used later would be "taken and driven away" for the purposes of subsection (1) as interpreted by sutsection (7)(a). It seemed to the Government that such conduct ought to amount to an offence under the subsection and that any doubt on the point should be re-moved by adopting the wording in Amendment No. 28 which I am now proposing.
Amendment No. 29 makes a similar change in subsection (5) to meet the analogous case of a person wheeling away a bicycle, perhaps with the intent to use it later. That Amendment also fills another gap in the subsection by providing for an offence to be committed by a third party who rides the bicycle knowing it to have been taken without authority. This puts subsection (5) on all fours with subsection (1) which already makes it an offence for any person, knowing the conveyance to have been taken without authority, to drive it or allow himself to be carried in or on it. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 5, line 22, leave out ("and drives away any conveyance") and insert ("any conveyance for his own or another's use").—(Lord Stonham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 29.
Amendment moved—
Page 5, line 40, leave out ("and rides away a pedal cycle") and insert ("a pedal cycle for his own or another's use, or rides a pedal cycle knowing it to have been taken without such authority,").—(Lord Stonham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 14 [Extension to thefts from mails outside England and Wales and robbery etc. on such a theft]:
8.56 p.m.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS moved to leave out Clause 14. The noble Viscount said: My Lords, I hope your Lordships will agree that I can deal with this Amendment and with Amendments Nos. 58, 59 and 60 at the same time.
LORD STONHAM: And Amendment No. 61?
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, it is open for suggestion that the noble Lord, Lord Airedale—the noble Lord nods his head—would like to join in with Amendment No. 61 as well. The noble Lord, Lord Stonham, will remember very well the discussion we had on paragraph 10 of the Schedule 2 on Committee stage, and at that time both the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, and I suggested to him that the proper place for the contents of Clause 14 of this Bill was in the Post Office Act 1953. The noble Lord made a long and extremely useful speech explaining the difficulties of this matter, and I will not go in detail into any of those points. But the more I looked at Clause 14 afterwards, the more it seemed to me that the criticism which had been made was right, because Clause 14 does not in fact create any offence at all. It is simply a matter of jurisdiction and it provides that an offence under either Clause 1 or Clause 8 can be dealt with in any of the jurisdictions to which the Post Office Act 1953 applies.
The noble Lord, Lord Airedale, has solved this problem in one way and I have solved it in another. I do not mind very much which of the two is chosen, so long as one or other is accepted as correct. It seems to me that three fairly simple Amendments to the existing paragraph 10 of Schedule 2 may be enough, although I am sure that I shall be told
108
that it is effective as it is drafted. Alternatively, it may be that there should be a new subsection added to the Post Office Act, as the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, suggests. I do not suppose that he minds very much, either, which way it is done. What seems to be quite unnecessary is that a Bill which succeeds in getting rid of all the special kinds of thefts —theft of animals and apples, and anything else that you can find in the old Larceny Act 1861—should contain one special clause for mail bags and the contents of mail bags; and that dealing only with jurisdiction and not with a special offence at all.
I have noted the point that this Bill does not apply to Scotland, so that one has to be careful when amending the Post Office Act 1953, which does. Nevertheless, there is a provision in one of the later clauses which makes all the Amendments to the Post Office Act 1953 apply to Scotland, so I think that one is safe in that respect. Therefore there does not seem to be any good reason why we cannot attempt what I think is desirable, to put all these matters about jurisdiction for Post Office offences back where they belong; cure the defect which has been found in the existing Section 70 of the 1953 Act and replace it with something comprehensive which deals with offences under that Act in the jurisdictions where they still apply, and in England and Wales for offences under Clauses 1 and 8 of the Theft Bill itself. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Leave out Clause 14.—(Viscount Colville of Culross.)
LORD AIREDALE: My Lords, I wholeheartedly support everything that the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, has said; and I have nothing more to add.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, what we are dealing with, as your Lordships know, is the theft of mail bags and postal packets or robbery in committing that offence when the bag or packet is in the course of transmission by post between different jurisdictions of the British postal area; that is to say, England and Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands. I should have thought that the scheme of the Bill as to these postal

109
offences is simple. If the offence is prosecuted in England or Wales, the offender will be dealt with as for the ordinary offence of theft or robbery under the Bill. If the offence is proved to have been committed in England or Wales, the ordinary rule as to jurisdiction will apply. If it was committed in transit, Clause 14 will secure that it is triable in England or Wales as if committed there. Schedule 2, paragraph 10, substitutes a new Section 70 of the Post Office Act 1953 so as to make exactly similar provision in respect of the other jurisdictions in the British postal area, so that thefts and robberies from mails in the course of transmission by post between any of the different jurisdictions can be dealt with in any of those other jurisdictions.
The noble Viscount, Lord Colville, and the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, both seek by Amendment 31 to leave out Clause 14. Lord Colville proposes instead, by Amendments 58 to 60 to amend Schedule 2, paragraph 10, so as to make the substituted Section 70 of the Post Office Act apply to proceedings in England and Wales as well as to proceedings in the other jurisdictions. The result would be that, so far as proceedings in England and Wales are concerned, a person who stole a mail bag or postal packet in the course of transmission by post between two different jurisdictions would be guilty of the offence under the Bill by virtue of Section 70 of the Post Office Act as substituted by Schedule 2, paragraph 10, and not by virtue of Clause 14. But it is far more convenient to separate the provisions necessary to give jurisdiction in England and Wales from those necessary to give jurisdiction in the other countries and to deal with the situation in England and Wales in the main body of the Bill without the need to refer to the Schedule and to the Post Office Act. The Theft Bill is one for the law of England and Wales, and the necessary provisions for the trial in England and Wales of an offence of theft or robbery in respect of mails in transmission by post should be found in the main body of the Bill. It is, I suggest, only confusing to have to look for them in provisions in a Schedule and in another Act mixed up with provisions for Scotland and the other countries.
The noble Lord, Lord Airedale, on the other hand, has, by Amendment 61,
110
simply lifted Clause 14 and inserted it, by a new paragraph in Schedule 2 after paragraph 10, as a new Section 70A in the Post Office Act. He has copied it word for word, but of course "the offence against this Act" will mean the Post Office Act instead of the Theft Act. It is difficult to see any possible reason for making people look at the Schedule and the Post Office Act instead of what will be Section 14. It is on those grounds that I hope the noble Viscount and the noble Lord will not press this Amendment.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, could he tell me whether there are technical criticisms of my three Amendments? I gather there are not. In that event, I should dearly like to press this matter, but in view of the time of evening I think that it would he a mistake to do so now. I should like to study what the noble and learned Lord has said. On first hearing, I could net disagree more with practically every word of it. It seems to me that if we want to deal with a matter which is one of jurisdiction under the Post Office Act the place to look for it is in the Post Office Act, not in the Theft Act. If it was a substantive offence, then I agree that one would look for it in the Theft Act, because one would know that it was going to be dealt with under the Theft Act in England and Wales, but here one is interested only in looking for jurisdiction, and the proper place to find it is, with every other country in the British postal area, in the Post Office Act. There is no reason whatever why this should not go back to the Post Office Act, where it belongs. I beg leave to withdraw this Amendment, but if I am not satisfied by what I read in the OFFICIAL REPORT to-morrow, I will raise the matter later.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 15 [Criminal deception]:
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I beg to move the next Amendment.
Amendment moved—
Page 7, line 6, leave out ("For purposes of this subsection") and insert ("(2) For purposes of this section").—(Lord Stonham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I beg to move the next Amendment.
Amendment moved—
Page 7, line 12, leave out subsection (2).—(Lord Stonham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
9.8 p.m.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS moved to add to the clause:
" () For the purposes of this and the next following section a person's obtaining any property or pecuniary advantage is not to be regarded as dishonest if he obtains it in the circumstances mentioned in section 2(1) of this Act."
The noble Viscount said: I move this Amendment to seek a progress report from Her Majesty's Government. It is a matter which was raised in Committee and was not originally understood by the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, for which my drafting was no doubt responsible, but in the end I managed to explain to him what it was I had in mind and he said that he would be so good as to look at it. I need not go through the arguments, but if noble Lords look at paragraph 88 of the Committee's Report they will see that the Committee think that in cases of criminal deception or (as I think it might now be called) cheating, and also of the new offence under Clause 15, the defences which are provided in Clause 2(1) of this Bill should apply. I suggested to the Committee on the previous stage that if the Bill did not say so specifically there was liable to be some doubt whether this was so or not. Equally, the existing law appears to be somewhat doubtful on the matter. Therefore there seems to be double merit in putting this in express terms in the Bill. I really had no answer because the noble Lord had no opportunity to find out what it was about. I should be glad, therefore, if he could now tell me whether this is the correct way of dealing with it. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 7, line 24, at end insert the said subsection.—(Viscount Colville of Culross.)
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Viscount for his brief explanation. I did undertake to consider the point. In accordance with the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, which was supported by the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, the proposed Amendment should
112
be to Clause 15 instead of Clause 2, for the convenience of the reader of Clause 15. If the Amendment were to be made, Clause 15 would be a more appropriate place than Clause 2, because, as the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, said, the reader would naturally expect to find any provision as to the interpretation of Clause 15 in that clause.
As I understand it, the point of the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, is that unless the partial definition of "dishonesty" in Clause 2(1) is expressly applied to Clause 15 it might not be certain that it would apply to Clause 15. In particular, he suggested that the defence under Clause 2(1)(a) corresponding to that of a "claim of right" under the present law in the case of a charge of theft might not apply to a charge of obtaining by deception contrary to Clause 15(1). He quoted the last sentence of paragraph 88 in the Criminal Law Revision Committee's Report in support of his argument that clarification was necessary. But the Government do not think there can be any doubt that the requirements in Clause 15 and the new clause that the conduct in question should have been committed "dishonestly" will exclude a case where the person concerned has, or believes that he has, in law the right to get the property or the pecuniary advantage. The Government agree with the statement higher up in paragraph 88 of the Committee's Report that:
"Owing to the words 'dishonestly obtains' a person who uses deception in order to obtain property to which he believes himself entitled will not be guilty; for though the deception may he dishonest, the obtaining is not".
The sentence quoted by the noble Viscount does not mean that the Committee thought that the effect of the new clause would be only "probably" as mentioned; it means that the effect of the present law is "probably" as stated.
There are also two particular objections to the Amendment. First, it would be misleading and otherwise undesirable to apply the partial definition of "dishonestly" in Clause 2(1) to two only of the other clauses in the Bill which refer to something being done "dishonestly" (these include Clauses 13, 16, 19 and 21), and it would be difficult, and unnecessary, to frame a general definition of "dishonestly" which would apply throughout

113
the Bill. Dishonesty is, as the Committee said in paragraph 39, easily understood, and the partial definition in Clause 2(1) was, again as mentioned in paragraph 39, included only to preserve specifically two rules of the present law—the defence of a "claim of right", and the rule that a finder of property cannot be guilty of stealing it unless he believes
"that the owner can be discovered by taking reasonable steps".
Those defences are expressly provided for in the definition of stealing in Section 1 of the Larceny Act, 1916, and to have omitted any reference to them might have caused people to wonder whether the defences were intended still to apply. There is no similar specific defence included in the existing provision as to obtaining by false pretences in Section 32(1) of the 1916 Act, to which Clause 15 corresponds.
Secondly, neither the substance nor the wording of the partial definition of "dishonestly" in Clause 2(1) is really appropriate to Clause 15 or the new Clause 1, as Clause 2 relates to appropriation and the other two clauses to obtaining. The defence of a "claim of right" is applicable to Clause 15, but that of belief in the owner's consent, and that in respect of an innocent finder, have nothing to do with obtaining by deception. We have considered this matter and, as I have explained, we feel the Amendment is unnecessary, and is therefore unacceptable.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, the noble Lord does not surprise me when he thinks that my drafting is imperfect, but, more important, I think, he points out that there are other clauses in the Bill where "dishonestly" is used and where one would tend to wish to find a similar partial definition if one were going to put it in Clauses 15 and 15A. I think this is a convincing argument, and I only hope that we do not find it necessary to have too much Case Law to establish it in practice. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I wonder whether your Lordships will allow me, before we leave Clause 15, to mention that, owing to the deletion of Clause 6, there are two consequential Amendments which should be made to Clause
114
15. And I wonder whether I may be allowed to make them by Manuscript Amendments. The Amendments are as follows:
Page 7, line 8, after ("it") insert ("and");
Page 7, line 9, leave out from ("retain") to end of line 11.
Both those Amendments are consequential on the deletion of Clause 6 from the Bill. I beg to move.
Amendments moved—
Page 7, line 8, after ("it") insert ("and");
Page 7, line 9, leave out from ("retain") to end of line 11.—(Lord Stonham.)
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, these Amendments are clearly consequential on the decision which the House reached this afternoon on the wording of Clause 6 as it stood then. I understand this means that the noble Lord will not seek at a later stage to reintroduce Clause 6 in the form which has now been excised. Does that also mean—I hope it does not—that he is not giving consideration to an entirely different wording to carry out the intentions which he said lay behind Clause 6?
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, the only purpose of the Amendments I have now moved, which are two consequential Amendments, is to clean up the Bill in that respect. No other undertaking I have given will he forgone, but it may well be that the undertaking would have to be implemented in another place.
On Question, Amendments agreed to.
9.20 p.m.
LORD STONHAM LORD STONHAM had given Notice of his intention to move to insert the following new clause after Clause 15:
Obtaining pecuniary advantage by deception
".—(1) A person who by any deception dishonestly obtains for himself or another any pecuniary advantage shall on conviction on indictment be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.
(2) Without prejudice to the operation of subsection (1) above in cases not mentioned in this subsection, a pecuniary advantage within the meaning of this section is to be regarded as obtained for a person in any case where—

(a) any debt or charge for which he makes himself liable or is or may become liable (including one not legally enforceable) is in whole or in part evaded or deferred; or

(b) he is allowed to borrow by way of overdraft, or to take out any policy of insurance or annuity contract, or obtains an

115
improvement of the terms on which he is allowed to do so; or

(c) he is given the opportunity to earn remuneration or greater remuneration in an office or employment, or to win money by betting.

(3) For purposes of this section 'deception' has the same meaning as in section 15 of this Act."
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 36: Clause 15, page 7, line 6, leave out, "For purposes of this subsection", and insert; "(2) For purposes of this section".
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: No.
LORD STONHAM: I beg your Lordships' pardon. This explains a little contretemps that occurred earlier, because I had Amendment No. 36 with two earlier ones which were paving Amendments for it. Amendment No. 36 was not then moved, and I had intended to move it. The first two, Amendments 33 and 34, were drafting or consequential. The new clause, which I now move, is designed to fill the gap caused by the deletion of what was then subsection (3) of Clause 15—obtaining credit by fraud —which was deleted by Amendment No. 34, to which your Lordships have already agreed.
Subsection (3) of the Bill as introduced created a general offence of dishonestly, with a view to gain, inducing a person by any deception to do or refrain from doing any act, and provided for a maximum punishment of two years' imprisonment. The main criticism of the subsection at the Committee stage was that it was too general and ought more specifically to deal with particular types of criminal deception. There appeared, however, to be general agreement in the Committee that there would be a serious gap in the Bill if the subsection were simply deleted, and that the Bill ought specifically to make criminal certain types of conduct such as the fraudulent obtaining of services.
In the light of the discussion in Committee, the Government have considered afresh what form the criminal deception provisions of the Bill should take. They are satisfied that subsection (1) of Clause 15 should remain in its present form (to deal with the obtaining of property by deception) but have come to the conclusion that the best course would be to
116
replace the original subsections (2) and (3) of Clause 15 by a new provision which makes it an offence, punishable by a maximum penalty of five years' imprisonment, by any deception dishonestly to obtain for oneself or another any pecuniary advantage. Subsection (1) of the new clause provides accordingly, and "pecuniary advantage" is partially defined in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of subsection (2).
Under paragraph (a) of subsection (2) a person commits an offence under the clause if by deception he dishonestly evades or defers (or enables another to evade or defer) in whole or in part any debt or charge for which he makes himself liable or may become liable. This paragraph incorporates the offence of obtaining credit by fraud, previously in subsection (2) of Clause 15. It also covers the obtaining of services by deception (because liability for any debt or charge for the service will be evaded) and such conduct as obtaining an income tax allowance by deception (because a liability will have been evaded in part) or using deception to evade meeting some financial obligation. Paragraph (a) is not concerned with such conduct as fraudulently obtaining a family allowance or a subsidy because this will be an obtaining of property and will be covered by Clause 15(1). Nor does it cover (because it seems unnecessary to do so) fraudulently obtaining services for which no financial liability arises.
Paragraphs (b) and (c) of subsection (2) deal with a number of specific types of conduct which fell within the former subsection (3) of Clause 15. They are thought to cover all the principal types of things done by deception which do not or may not result in an obtaining of property (so as not to be covered by subsection (1) of Clause 15) or involve an attempt to obtain it (which would of course itself be an offence). This paragraph (b) covers obtaining by deception overdrafts, insurance policies and annuity contracts (including obtaining them on more favourable terms than would have been the case without the deception) and paragraph (c) covers obtaining by deception an opportunity to earn remuneration or greater remuneration in an office or employment, and obtaining by deception an opportunity to win money by betting.

117
In the case of obtaining employment or opportunities to win money by betting, there might be an offence of obtaining property under Clause 15(1), but there have been cases under the existing law of false pretences where there has been difficulty on this point. For example in R. v. Clucas in 1949 it was held that betting winnings paid over by a bookmaker had been paid, not because of certain false pretences used by the punter to get him to take tits: bets, but because the horse had won; and similarly, money paid to an employee who has got his job by false pretences was held in R. v. Lewis (1922), to have been paid because of the work done by the employee and not because of the false pretences. Including these cases in the new clause makes it clear that the obtaining of the opportunity to get the property is an offence in itself. Owing to the possibility that some cases of obtaining a pecuniary advantage which ought to he punishable are not provided for by paragraphs (a), (b) or (c) subsection (1) is framed so as not to confine the meaning of "pecuniary advantage" to those cases.
Subsection (3) provides that for the purposes of the clause "deception" has the same meaning as in Clause 15; that is, it means any deception (whether deliberate or reckless) by word or conduct as to fact or as to law, including deception as to the present intentions of the person using the deception or any other person. As a result of the amendment of Clause 15 and of the new clause it will be necessary for all the relevant repeals in Schedule 3 to be closely examined to ensure that they are covered by these clauses. This task is being undertaken, but it is unlikely to be possible to complete it before the completion of the Report stage. We will do what we can, but some tidying up of the repeal Schedule may have to he left to be dealt with in another place. I thought it better to explain this new clause at some length. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 15, insert the said new clause.—(Lord Stonham.)
9.25 p.m.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, this is a very important new clause; I think the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, will recognise that. I am grateful to him for his long and, I am sure, lucid explanation
118
of what the clause does. It is a little hard, I find, to take in at this hour of the night the full details of what the noble Lord said. I shall read it most carefully. But I must say I think it is difficult for the noble Lord and difficult for some of the rest of us, to carry on with this intricate measure at this late hour when we have been sitting since 3 o'clock or shortly afterwards with only a slight intermission. We have now come to Amendment No. 36 and there are 68 Amendments. I do not think anyone can suggest that anybody has tried to delay business. But when we have dealt with this important clause we have still to come to what is perhaps one of the most important clauses in the Bill, Clause 20, and that ought to have a considerable time for consideration.
I think we ought to take a little time over this clause. We certainly ought to consider it most carefully. I would say, from having heard the noble Lord, that it is a considerable improvement on Clause 15 as it stood originally. The old subsection (3) of Clause 15 had few friends, and it conflicted in principle, I thought, with subsection (1) of Clause 15 as it was. We moved it out in Committee, and the result has been, I think, that although there may be some defects which I have not as yet perceived, the noble Lord has come back with a far better proposal. There may be some things which I should like to criticise, but I have not perceived them yet, and that may give him some hope for the future. It is far better than Clause 15 was. Despite the fact that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor thought it right to reprove me on more than one occasion for my temerity in moving Amendments to this Bill, I think the fact that the Amendment we moved and carried, which has led to this great improvement in the particular clause which is being tabled by the Government, shows that our conduct in that respect was justified. I propose, if I may, to reserve any detailed comment upon the new clause, except to say that, reading it as I have, and listening as I have to the noble Lord's explanation, I think it constitutes a very remarkable improvement.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, I very much agree with my noble and learned friend about this. I think it is a most important new clause

119
and one which will have to be studied, as this Bill has been studied, deeply by others, not only in this House but also outside, to see whether there are further criticisms to be made. One point strikes me immediately very much in favour of this clause, which is that it faces the business of obtaining services by deception or fraud. There has been over a long time a suggestion that the method of approaching this matter through the offence of obtaining credit by false pretences was not only laborious but quite unreal. What was wanted was to get somewhere approximating to the idea of the theft of services. That is the course they follow in America in some cases, and for all I know in other parts of the world also. This new clause does that, and it makes it perfectly simple under the three paragraphs of subsection (2). It is an improvement not only from the point of view of presentation but from the jurisprudential point of view as well, and it will therefore be very much welcomed.
The other point that seems to me to be an improvement in this clause is that whereas I criticised the old subsection (3) as not being wide enough to cover some of the things I think the Criminal Law Revision Committee themselves wished to have covered by it, we now have these signposts in three paragraphs, but a wider definition in subsection (1) itself. So that although there are these specific instances, which are set out, and some of the old difficulties are cleared up, as the noble Lord explained, there is still a breadth in the new clause which will enable other things also to be covered, if it is found necessary; and the combination of this, with the remains of the existing Clause 15, seems to me to be an enormous advance upon what was in the Bill before. I share the slight tone of self-congratulation which was adopted by my noble and learned friend in having required Her Majesty's Government to have this re-think, and I should like to congratulate them upon the outcome of it.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 17 [Liability of company officers for certain offences by company]:
LORD STONHAM: This Amendment is consequential upon Amendment No. 36, the new clause which your Lordships
120
have just accepted. It inserts a reference to the new clause in subsection (1) of Clause 17, which relates to the liability of company officers for certain offences by the company—that is, at present, offences under Clauses 15 and 16. The Amendment would add offences under the new clause. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 8, line 2, leave out ("or section") and insert (" (obtaining pecuniary advantage by deception) or").—(Lord Stonham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 20:
Blackmail
20.—(l) A person is guilty of blackmail if, with a view to gain for himself or another or with intent to cause loss to another, he makes any unwarranted demand with menaces; and for this purpose a demand with menaces is unwarranted unless the person making it does so in the belief—

(a) that he has reasonable grounds for making the demand; and

(b) that the use of the menaces is a proper means of reinforcing the demand.

9.33 p.m.
LORD STOW HILL LORD STOW HILL moved, in subsection (1), to leave out from "unless" to the end of the subsection, and insert:

"(a) the person making it does so in the belief that he has reasonable grounds for making the demand, and

(b) it is in all the circumstances not unreasonable to seek to reinforce the demand by the use of the menaces in question."

The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 38 which stands in my name and those of the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, and the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross. This is a variant on an Amendment which I put down on the Committee stage to Clause 20 of the Bill, dealing with the definition of blackmail. It would not assist your Lordships if I repeated at any length the objections which I respectfully urged to the definition of blackmail which at present appears in Clause 20.
The basis of my objection, if I may repeat it in a few words, was that the definition contains the requirement that there should be compliance with two qualifications, depending on the belief of the person charged. The definition is one which makes the offence of blackmail consist in this: the making of a demand backed up by an unwarranted menace.

121
The definition goes on to provide that a demand with menaces is unwarranted unless the person making it does so in the belief (a) that he has reasonable grounds for making the demand, and (b) that the use of the menaces is a proper means of reinforcing the demand. In other words, it depends on the belief of the person charged with blackmail whether in fact he has committed the offence at all. If, having heard all the evidence, the jury come to the conclusion that the person charged believed, in the first place, that he had reasonable grounds for making a demand, and in the second place, that the use of the menaces was a proper means of reinforcing the demand, then the person charged must he acquitted; the offence of blackmail has not been made out.
I ventured to submit examples which, I argued, demonstrated that that definition might result in the most unfortunate consequences. I instanced the imaginary case of a lady who was pregnant as a result of her association with a married man. I tried to delineate an accused woman in those circumstances appearing before the jury, obviously wracked with fury against the father of her unborn child, extremely indignant at the man because he had refused to make any provision for the child which was to come into the world.
I pictured her as a person who felt, with deep intensity, that his conduct was utterly villainous, wholly unjustifiable, and as a person who felt she was morally justified, not merely in demanding from the putative father proper maintenance for the child, but also in thinking to herself, with considerable sincerity, that she was not only justified but in duty bound to the unborn child to bring home to the father, by any threat which she chose to use, that he must comply with his duty to the unborn child. This might mean the woman making a demand for maintenance for the child in excess of what ordinarily would be considered adequate, on the ground that it was to be born with the stigma of illegitimacy and that the unfortunate child was to go through the world with that disadvantage. She might demand that the putative father should settle half his fortune on the child.
If the jury, having heard the woman charged with this matter, having heard her cross-examined and having taken into
122
consideration all the circumstances, came to the conclusion that she thought her demand was reasonable, and also came to the conclusion that she genuinely thought she was justified in so threatening, and was indeed bound to use the threats in relation to which she was charged, they would be bound to acquit her. Those threats might include threats to burn down the man's house, or perhaps even to throw acid in the face of his wife—in fact, any threat that she might think she was perfectly justified in making. If the jury came to the conclusion that she really thought she had a reasonable demand and was justified in using the threat, whatever it may be, they would be bound to acquit her.
I submit to your Lordships' House that if that were to be the result of the law of England, we should be back in the jungle. That is not law; it is the obverse of law. That would be a state of legislation which permitted a person using threats to bend the law to his or her own will, to threaten to do anything which he or she thought it was reasonable to threaten. Speaking for myself, and I believe for both noble Lords who are named as supporting this Amendment, I should be sorry to think that we were leaving our law in that state. If citizens, whether their own conduct is reprehensible or not, are to be exposed to what may well be the venom of a jaundiced mind and the criminal law is to be powerless to intervene, I should have thought that we should have gone badly wrong. It was to try to offer some alternative that I put down my Amendment on Committee stage.
That Amendment would have required that, in order to secure an acquittal, the accused person would not merely have to show that he or she believed genuinely that he or she had a reasonable demand to make and was justified in backing up that demand with the threat in question, but would have to go on to prove to the satisfaction of a reasonable jury that it was reasonable to back up the demand with the threat; that it was proper, to use the words of the definition, to use that threat in support of the justifiable demand.
The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, in answering the debate on that Amendment, argued that if one pictured a jury confronted with a lady wracked with hatred of the type that I

123
have described, it would be unlikely that they would record it as their verdict that she genuinely believed that she was entitled and justified in threatening to burn down the house of the putative father of her unborn child. Sometimes they might refuse so to find. On other occasions I should have thought, with very great respect to the noble and learned Lord, they might come to the completely opposite conclusion. My own conjecture would be that in a very large number of cases the more vicious and spiteful, and torn and twisted by fury a defendant was, the more likely would it be that the jury would feel impelled to come to the conclusion, perhaps reluctantly, that the defendant thought that he or she had the reasonable claim necessary, and that the defendant thought that he or she could properly reinforce that claim with the threats which had been used in the case.
The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said that that would be a rare occurrence. With very great deference, I would seek to join issue with him on that and say that it might be far too frequent an occurrence, and that people who richly deserved punishment for blackmail would too often secure acquittal from reluctant juries in our criminal courts. Even if the noble and learned Lord is right and I am wrong, and if it is the likelihood that most juries would convict in that sort of case, surely it is enough to support the case which I put before your Lordships, that at least sometimes they would not, and that sometimes one would get people who on an ordinary moral assessment were as guilty as they possibly could be of this most detestable crime and who would in fact be acquitted. One would really be making the criminal law a laughing stock if one could present oneself in the character of an accused before a jury, and the more utterly repugnant one's attitude to the ordinary decent-minded man or woman in the street the more likely it was that one would be acquitted by being able to show to the satisfaction of the jury that one genuinely believed that it was proper to reinforce the claim in question by the most vile and contemptible threats.
But in coming again to your Lordships' House on the Report stage of this
124
Bill I have sought—and I believe the noble and learned Lords who have put their names to the Amendment also seek to achieve this result—to come halfway to meet, if I may put it respectfully in that way, the argument put before your Lordships by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor. The Amendment which is now on the Marshalled List is a changed Amendment. It differs from the Amendment which we earlier put down. It retains the requirement, in order to establish innocence on the part of the accused, that he or she should be able to prove a belief that he or she had a reasonable ground for making the demand. That, in other words, is the subjective test. It retains that subjective test, which is the first of the two tests contained in the clause which we are discussing. But it imports an objective test in place of the second of the tests which the definition embodies. Under the existing definition, the second of the tests is that the accused should believe that it was proper to reinforce the demand with the menaces in question.
The Amendment which I place before your Lordships substitutes for that subjective test an objective test. In other words, it requires that the accused should genuinely believe in the fairness of his or her claim, but that it should be shown by him to the satisfaction of a jury that:
"it is in all the circumstances not unreasonable to seek to reinforce the demand by the use of the menaces in question".
There is an objective test which does not depend on the belief of the accused person.
My Lords, I would very respectfully commend that wording to your Lordships. Is the language which I have chosen in the second of those tests, paragraph (b), language which would permit of its being possible for a judge to sum up to a jury? I respectfully submit: Yes, it would. A learned judge could deploy the circumstances in his summing up to the jury which would enable them to come to a conclusion as to whether, in all the circumstances, it was not unreasonable to use the menaces.
I would add this further consideration in support of the change which I press upon your Lordships' House. I suppose that in the actual hearing of a charge of blackmail before a jury there might be a slight parallel between a case of blackmail

125
as defined in my Amendment and a case in which it is sought to reduce the crime of murder to manslaughter by showing irresistible provocation. At the conclusion of the evidence, if an accused is charged with murder and seeks to put before the jury evidence of irresistible provocation which induced him to kill, it is for the judge at the conclusion of the evidence to decide whether the evidence of provocation offered on behalf of the accused is such as could in law constitute provocation; and if a learned judge comes to the conclusion that it is inadequate in law to constitute provocation, he can decline to allow the issue of provocation to go to the jury.
So, here, if the evidence put before a jury on behalf of the accused could not reasonably in law lead to the conclusion that it was not in all the circumstances unreasonable to use the menaces, I would respectfully submit that the judge could decline to leave that issue to the jury. One would, in effect, have a double check. First of all, the court would have to say whether in law it was open to a reasonable jury to come to the conclusion that it was not unreasonable to use the menaces; and, secondly, if the learned judge decided to leave that issue to the jury, it would then be for the jury to decide whether in fact it was not unreasonable.
I should like, if I may, to reinforce my argument by one other type of example. In answer, again, to what the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said about its being unlikely that a jury would acquit in the sort of circumstances which I envisaged earlier, I should like to put this case before your Lordships' House. Suppose that A—say an unscrupulous trader—ruins B and brings him to bankruptcy by unscrupulous dealing with B, and that C is a perfectly right-minded man who is cognisant of the circumstances; and suppose that C, in a genuine state of indignation, goes to A and says: "You have behaved like a scoundrel to B. Unless, by paying B money, you put him back on his feet, I shall denounce you to the Inland Revenue for the frauds which you have carried out on the Inland Revenue over a period of years". If the definition stands as it is now in Clause 20, it would be highly probable that a jury would say, "C was perfectly genuine in his belief that it was proper to bring that degree of pressure on A".
My Lords, that sort of case can be multiplied over and over again. A father is indignant that a man has seduced his daughter. He goes to the man and says, "Unless you see my daughter right by making a settlement upon her for her unborn child I will denounce you to your wife". I would respectfully put this question to the House. In those two cases, should the person who uses the threats be guilty under the law of England of a crime, or should he not? The answer I would offer to your Lordships is, quite obviously, that he should. One must not take the law into one's own hands. One must not, to secure an objective, even a rightful objective, use threats at one's own discretion to compel somebody else to embark on a particular course of action. As the definition stands, that would not be an offence: but it should be an offence.
The Amendment which I would seek to make would constitute it an offence, and I respectfully submit that it is not open to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor to say that in most cases of that sort a jury would be likely to convict. On the contrary, I would respectfully submit that in 99 cases out of 100 of that sort juries would be likely to acquit—and they ought not to. It is for those reasons that I respectfully submit to your Lordships that the change which I, and those noble Lords who signed their names under mine, would make is one that would greatly improve Clause 20. I commend it to your Lordships and hope that you will accept it.
Amendment moved—
Page 9, line 13, leave out from ("unless") to end of line 17 and insert the said new words. —(Lord Stow Hill.)
9.52 p.m.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, I suspect that this is a subject upon which it is very difficult to produce a wholly convincing argument one way or the other. It is really a matter of judgment as to which of the two, the subjective or the objective test, ought to be used for the second of the two elements in the offence of blackmail. But when you consider which of those two is right, it is most important to have in mind—and I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Leatherland, is in his place—exactly the

127
sort of thing Lord Leatherland was speaking about when he addressed your Lordships earlier in the matter of what people did in houses and gardens which were open to the public. As the noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill, has made so clear, it is just those people with a slightly marginal approach to some of the problems, who have perhaps a slanted view, an extreme view, who may really have the belief which they are entitled to use as a defence. I think this is the precise point that Lord Leatherland was making about the nudes hung up on exhibition.
Of course, the noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill, has exemplified this on other occasions in the case of blackmail. The answer to it seems to be one of two choices. Either you say, as the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said last time, "Oh well, the jury will not, in fact, believe that that was his belief—and so they will convict." Or, alternatively, you may say that it is not going to be a matter for the jury to look at his belief on that occasion. Blackmail is so abhorrent and so sinister a crime that it is for the jury to decide for themselves, on their own judgment, whether the means employed were reasonable or not. Of those two, on the Lord Chancellor's argument, the result in nine cases out of ten will be the same; because if it is left for the jury to decide what they thought was the genuine belief of the person accused, if he has or claims some extreme belief in the propriety of the means he used they just will not believe him.
That particular stage will be reached by one of two means, I think—although it is not really legitimate to go into what is in a jury's mind, I think that perhaps one can rationalise a little. They could say, "We do not believe that that was his belief because he has been telling a lie". That would be, no doubt, a perfectly reasonable thing to do. They could also say. "We do not believe that that was his belief because it would be completely unreasonable for anybody to believe that sort of thing at all." If they say the latter—and I suspect that they would be strongly inclined to come to this sort of conclusion, by one route or the other, if the menaces were severe in type —they have really been using the objective test. They have been substituting what they themselves thought reasonable
128
for what they were meant to be doing, seeing whether the person definitely believed what he said he believed.
If, in fact, we are all seeking to get the same point whereby the extreme type of menace used in one of these dreadful cases is not enabled to be used as a defence because a person claims he really believed it was proper; if we are trying to catch cases of this sort, I think the safest way to do it is to put the second paragraph of this offence on to the objective basis. Because, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stow Hill, said, even if most juries do what the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said they would, and come to the conclusion that they must convict on one of the two methods I have suggested, there may be cases where there will be a genuinely conscientious jury who say to themselves, "No; we believe that this man did hold this belief, and held it genuinely, and we have been directed that if that be so we must find him not guilty". They will let him off, and it may be those very cases which are the most abhorrent of all, where the most extreme types of menace have been used.
That would be the effect in the occasional case where you have a truly conscientious approach to the way in which the law has been set out in this Bill. My Lords, I find that to be a risk which I do not think we ought to take, and I therefore support the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stow Hill, in leaving it to to the judgment of the jury as to what is reasonable, and I very much hope that your Lordships will do the same.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I want to say a word or two, even at this hour, in support of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stow Hill. It is, I think, a great pity that we should be discussing a clause of this importance so late and in a House which one cannot expect to be otherwise than "thin" at the present time. I say that, my Lords, because I hope that the Government will give, and say that they will give, further consideration to the questions raised by the noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill. I think the fact that there is nothing Party about this is shown by the fact that our names appear on the same Amendment. So far as I can recollect that has not occurred before. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Stow Hill, speaks with considerable

129
authority. Not only did he practise for a long time on the Midlands Circuit, and do criminal work, but he has been a Law Officer and, last but not least, Home Secretary. His words on a subject like this ought to carry very great weight in all parts of your Lordships' House.
I may be revealing a secret when I say that I had no hand at all in the drafting of this Amendment. It was his solution of a difficult problem, and I believe (and I have given such consideration as I could to it between the Committee stage and now) that he has found a right solution to a problem of very considerable difficulty. It is clearly right that there should be a subjective test on the question whether a person accused of demanding something with menaces believes that he had reasonable grounds for making the demand. That is clearly right. That is the first step in justifying his course of conduct. That is left untouched by the Amendment of the noble and learned Lord.
My Lords, the only issue, then, is with regard to the second step. Is it to be a defence to a charge of demanding money with menaces that the accused believed also that the menaces used were a proper means of reinforcing that demand? Surely when you come to consider what happened, that is what the jury should pronounce upon: whether the conduct was proper or improper. Assuming the belief that the demand was reasonable, surely a jury in the natural order of events would say, "Let us see what was done to seek to enforce compliance with this demand. Was that reasonable? Was that proper?" Once that test is applied, the test to the second limb is entirely objective, as the noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill, says. I do not believe that the courts should concern themselves with the question of whether the accused believed that the menaces used were a proper means of enforcing the demand. If the conduct was grossly wrong, the jury can reach a conclusion. I suggest the fact that the accused believed that the means, though grossly improper, were proper in the circumstances would not be a matter of defence but a matter of mitigation.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, is here. He has summed up to juries often, and he will correct me if I say anything that is
130
wrong. As the clause now stands, will not the jury have to be told that here is a charge of blackmail and that they will have to be satisfied that with a view to gain for himself, or for another or with intent to cause loss to another, the accused made an unwarranted demand with menaces? Whoever is summing up will have to explain what that means: that a demand with menaces is unwarranted unless the person making it believed he had reasonable grounds, and they will have to be satisfied of that before saying that the demand with menaces was unwarranted. But they would also have to be satisfied—and this is where the rub comes in—that the accused did not believe that the use of the menaces he used was a proper means for enforcing that demand. So, if that direction is given—and I think it is that direction that has to be given—the jury's attention is turned to the man's belief as to the propriety of the means used, and not to a consideration of those means themselves. If that direction is a right direction to give to a jury, it seems to me that a jury could not possibly be regarded as perverse if they found a person not guilty, despire the fact that most violent, most objectionable means were used, on the ground that they were not satisfied that the accused did not believe, because of his particular mentality, that they were proper means to be used. It may be argued that this is too refined. If a jury thought that the means were improper, they would not go on to worry about what the belief was. That is really saying that, despite the language of the Bill as it stands at present, in practice the jury will apply the objective test. If that be the argument, and I have heard it advanced, I say with all the conviction I can that it would be much better to accept the Amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill.
I have kept my remarks as short as I can. I feel that this is extremely important. On Second Reading, on Committee and again to-night the noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill, has made most powerful, sincere and compelling speeches. I hope that the Government will say that they will give further consideration to his proposal; but if they turn it down flat, I shall feel bound to support any course that the noble Lord may feel inclined to take.
LORD MORRIS OF BORTH-Y-GEST: My Lords, your Lordships have heard three powerful speeches, and the point of view that they represent has been most eloquently put before your Lordships. But I am bound to confess that I have some uneasiness in regard to the proposal that meets with the favour of the three noble Lords. I do not like the idea of mingling the subjective and the objective test, and that is what this Amendment would involve. Indeed, it is made quite plain by noble Lords that it would involve, first, a subjective test, and secondly, an objective test. I thought that in our criminal law we had set the course firmly in favour of the subjective test. After a decision in this House in a murder case, it was made quite plain last year in the Criminal Justice Act that the test for the future was to be a subjective test.
In the clause as it stands, I assume that the onus is always on the prosecution, and most respectfully I agree with the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, that the summing up to the jury would be on the lines that he has outlined. But if the jury considering the matter came to the conclusion that the person accused did have the belief that he or she had reasonable grounds for making the demand, and did have the belief that the use of the menaces was a proper means of reinforcing the demand, then there could not be a conviction.
Are we not right to consider the individual in the dock as an individual, and to consider whether that individual has been wicked or not? Is not that our approach in criminal matters? If this Amendment meets with favour—and I am indicating the doubt I have in regard to it —it would be possible for somebody to be convicted even though the jury thought that the person in the dock was quite genuine and honest in the belief that he or she had reasonable grounds for making the demand, and that he or she honestly believed that the use of the menaces was a proper means of reinforcing the demand. If this Amendment were carried, a judge would have to tell the jury: "Even though you think that the accused person really believed that he had reasonable grounds for making the demand; even though you believe, also, that the person in the dock had the belief that what he did was all right, in the sense that the use of the menaces was a proper means
132
of reinforcing the demand; even if you think that individual as an individual has been quite honest and has not been wicked, if you think that in all the circumstances what the accused did was unreasonable, then, in spite of your view that as an individual he was innocent, you must convict him." That is the anxiety I feel in regard to this matter, and that I thought I ought to express.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I entirely agree with the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, that it is of great importance that we should get our law of blackmail right, and I can assure the House that there is no clause to which the Government have devoted more care and attention than this clause. At the Committee stage my noble friend Lord Stow Hill and the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, moved an Amendment which sought to add to the clause an objective test of the reasonableness of the ground for making the demand and the propriety of using menaces to reinforce it. The Amendment would have had the effect that the clause contained both a subjective and an objective test, and I ventured to state fully the objections and complications which it seemed to me such an Amendment would cause. My noble friend withdrew the Amendment on an undertaking to give further consideration to the points raised in the debate.
My noble friend has now changed his mind. The present Amendment adopts a different approach. It preserves the subjective test in paragraph (a), but applies an objective test in paragraph (b). Thus, if the Amendment were accepted, a demand with menaces would be unwarranted for the purpose of the clause unless the person making it believed he had reasonable grounds for making the demand and the use of menaces to reinforce it was (objectively) "in all the circumstances not unreasonable". It is quite clear from the Committee's Report that there is no part of their Report to which they themselves devoted more attention than this, which is fully discussed in paragraphs 116 to 122 of the Report. The Committee were satisfied that the test of the legality of both making the demand and using the menaces should be subjective. As to the

133
illegality of making the demand, the Committee said, in paragraph 118:
"We are decidedly of the opinion that the test should be subjective, namely, whether the person in question honestly believes that he has the right to make the demand … Since blackmail is in its nature an offence of dishonesty, it seems wrong that a person should be guilty of the offence by making a demand which he honestly believes to be justified. Moreover to adopt the objective test seems to involve almost insuperable difficulty. It would he necessary either to set out the various kinds of demands which it was considered should be justified or to find an expression which would describe exactly these kinds but not others. The former course might in theory he possible; but the provision would have to be very elaborate, and it would involve the risk which attends any attempt to list different kinds of conduct for the purpose of a criminal offence—that of including too much or too little".
Turning to the legality of using threats, the Committee said, in paragraph 120:
"for reasons similar to those given in paragraph 118 concerning the demand we think that the only satisfactory course would be to adopt a subjective test and to make criminal liability depend on whether the person who utters the threat believes in the propriety of doing so".
After the most careful consideration, the Government share the Committee's view. If the Amendment were adopted, a person could honestly believe that he was entitled to the thing demanded and entitled to use threats to get it, but he could still be convicted of blackmail unless he satisfied the jury that his use of threats was "not unreasonable". The Amendment does nothing, beyond directing their attention to "all the circumstances", to give juries guidance about what are and are not reasonable threats, and there would be risk that juries, in attempting to apply the objective test (which they could do only by using their own subjective judgments), would arrive at disparate results.
Your Lordships will remember that one of the difficulties of the existing law was the difficulty juries had concerning reasonable or probable cause. As I understand it, under the Amendment it would be open to the defence to submit to the judge that there was no case to answer, on the ground that there was no evidence on which a jury could find that what he had threatened was not unreasonable. If the judge did not accede to that view he would have to direct the jury as to what "not unreasonable" really meant. I myself have not followed
134
whether there is some subtle distinction to be drawn between "reasonable" and "not unreasonable", but the test, the thing which the jury has to decide, is whether in all the circumstances it is "not unreasonable".
The form which the law should take is not, I suggest, to be decided solely by what will enable most people to be convicted. The case, I know, which my noble friend has mostly in his mind, in the, if I may say so, very clear and cogent argument he put before the House, is that of the woman who is going to have some man's illegitimate child, and then she makes demands on him. But he will bear in mind that under the present law an oral demand by a woman to a man to pay maintenance for her child of which he is the father is not blackmail, whatever the nature of the threat, because Section 30 of the 1916 Act requires an intent to steal, and therefore a claim of right is a defence. Similarly, of course, although under this Bill we do not call it a "claim of right" the intention is that the state of mind of the accused is relevant, because under Clause 2(1)(a) he is not dishonest.
"If he appropriates the property in the belief that he has in law the right to deprive the other of it,"
and again, if I may remind my noble friend, under the existing law in Skivington's case, which was decided only last year, a defence of claim of right applies to any aggravated form of larceny, such as robbery, robbery with aggravation, or assault with intent to rob. It is not necessary to establish a claim of right in such offences that the defendant should further have had the honest belief that he had the right to take the property in the way in which it was taken.
I pay the greatest tribute to the high offices which my noble friend has held and the very great experience which he has had, but one of the things which I think the Government must take into account at the end of the day is that we are dealing with a practical thing, not something on paper, in which I should have thought great experience must count; and I am sure my noble friend would agree that the seven criminal law Judges on the Committee, and also, of course, the Director, have no less experience of blackmail cases than he has had. I am sorry that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chief Justice has

135
not been here to-night, but perhaps it is significant that the Member of your Lordships' House who, of those present, has undoubtedly had most experience of trying criminal cases, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, takes the view which the Government have been compelled to take: that really the test ought to be subjective. This is where this House went wrong a little time ago and we have had to alter the law by Statute since. I refer to the case of Smith v. The Director of Public Prosecutions, another case where an objective test had been laid down instead of a subjective test. At the end of the day blackmail, like all the matters dealt with under this Bill, is a crime of dishonesty, and it does not seem right that a man who has not a guilty mind may be convicted.
However, in view of the cogent argument which has been put forward by my noble friend Lord Stow Hill I will see that exactly what he has said is considered, not only by the Government but, if I may do so, by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chief Justice, and perhaps other members of the Committee. On that undertaking, I hope that my noble friend will agree not to press his Amendment to a Division.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, before the noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill, intervenes, I wonder whether I may put to the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack one point which puzzled me. I saw the force of the conclusion of paragraph 120 of the Commission's Report, which he quoted in the speech which he has just made. What I find so difficult to reconcile with that is what the Committee themselves say in paragraph 119. May I read the passage, which seems to indicate a point of view more nearly that of the noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill. It reads as follows:
"On this view no demand with menaces would amount to blackmail, however harsh
136
the action threatened, unless there was dishonesty. This is a tenable view, though an extreme one. In our opinion it goes too far and there are some threats which should make the demand amount to blackmail even if there is a valid claim to the thing demanded. For example, we believe that most people would say that it should be blackmail to threaten to denounce a person, however truly, as a homosexual unless he paid a debt. It does not seem to follow from the existence of a debt that the creditor should be entitled to resort to any method, otherwise non-criminal, to obtain payment."
But, my Lords, unless we adopt some such Amendment as is now proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill, it seems to me we shall be rendering possible the very thing that the Committee themselves said should not be possible. It may be that I have overlooked some point, but it seems to me that what they say in paragraph 119 cannot be very easily reconciled with what they say in paragraph 120.
LORD STOW HILL: My Lords, this is the second time that I rise to speak, and I think on Report stage I should ask your Lordships' permission to do so. May I have your Lordships' permission to do so? What I would like to say is this. We are all anxious to get this right. The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said very kindly at the conclusion of his speech that while he rejected entirely the arguments which I had ventured to put before your Lordships' House, he nevertheless would give them careful thought again and see that those arguments received further consideration. I always live in hope. In the most dire moments I think there is hope always which lingers in the human heart, and it does in mine. In those circumstances, in view of what the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has said, I would ask permission to be allowed to withdraw this Amendment in order that it may receive further consideration in due course before it goes to another place.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 21:
Handling stolen goods
21.—(1) A person handles stolen goods if (otherwise than in the course of the stealing) knowing or believing them to be stolen goods he dishonestly receives the goods, or dishonestly undertakes or assists in their retention, removal, disposal or realisation by or for the benefit of another person, or if he arranges to do so.
10.23 p.m.
LORD AIREDALE LORD AIREDALE moved, in subsection (1), to leave out "handles stolen goods" and insert "shall be guilty of an offence". The noble Lord said: My Lords, I think it may be convenient to discuss Amendments Nos. 39, 40 and 42 together. Inevitably those three Amendments must stand or fall together. These are Amendments to Clause 21 which is described as "Handling stolen goods", not only so described in the side-note but also in line 1 of the clause itself—"A person handles stolen goods if …", and so on. I think it was the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, who pointed out in Committee that of the list of offences comprised in this clause only the first, receiving the goods, would almost inevitably amount to handling the goods. The remainder of the offences listed there—undertaking or assisting in their retention, removal, disposal or realisation by or for the benefit of another person or arranging to do so—all those things could be done without handling the goods at all. It therefore seems rather misleading to describe specifically as handling stolen goods the whole list of offences which might quite easily not involve handling the goods at all.
I can quite see the purpose of having an expression of this kind in the side-note. No doubt the offence in lawyers' parlance can loosely be described as handling stolen goods, but I do not see that any useful purpose is served by using these words in the body of the clause. I should have thought it was much less misleading to say that a person "shall be guilty of an offence" if he does these things. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 9, line 25, leave out ("handles stolen goods") and insert ("shall be guilty of an offence").—(Lord Airedale.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, this was a question which was raised on the Committee stage of the Bill, and the Government have already given it careful consideration. They are satisfied that it would be wrong to alter the clause as proposed. In the first place, it is desirable, for the convenience of the courts, the police and others wishing to refer to an offence to have a name for it. We really require that of all offences—taking and driving away, or grievous bodily harm—and it would be rather unusual to have an anonymous offence, one having no name. To facilitate references elsewhere in the Bill to the offence, we think that it should have a name, and nothing more suitable than "handling" has been suggested.
The existing word "receiving" would not be apt in view of the extension of the offence by the clause to cover people who do not "receive" the goods, and are not "receivers" as that word is generally understood. In Committee, the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, suggested the term "deals with"; but the Government would regard it as a pity to use such everyday expressions as "deals with" and "deals in" as names for a criminal offence, and so make the expressions difficult to use in ordinary speech in an innocent sense.
Apart from the fact that no preferable alternative to "handles" has been suggested, the Government do not accept that the word is used in the clause with an unnatural meaning. I am not much given to looking at dictionaries to see what words mean, because I tend to flatter myself that I know what the English language means. But in point of fact, the New Oxford English Dictionary has nearly two full columns of definitions of the word "handle", and one of the main usages recognised is with the meaning: "To have in hand or pass through one's hands in the way of business; to trade or deal in; to buy and sell." In short, the word is used to describe business dealings of the kind which are done in

139
stolen goods. In any event, it is not necessarily wrong, since English is a living language, to give a word an extended meaning in a Statute provided that, as here, the meaning is clear in its context. Whatever "handles" has or has not meant in the past, it is used in the Bill as a term to describe a defined course of conduct, and is likely to become rapidly recognised as having that meaning.
Apart from the Amendments being unnecessary, I do not think the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, appreciates that there would have to be consequential Amendments made, for example, in Clause 23(2), Clause 25(2) and (5), Clause 26(1), (2), (3) and (4), Clause 28(2) and Clause 31(2), and also in a number of places in the Schedules. If the offence under Clause 21 was nameless these clauses and Schedules would require some cumbrous drafting. When all that is taken into account, I suggest that "handles" is with respect a convenient expression—better than having no "handle" at all to the crime, if I may use that term; and no one has suggested a better one. I would hope that on consideration of these matters the noble Lord would withdraw his Amendment.
LORD AIREDALE: My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor. I confess at once that I had not spotted all the consequential Amendments. But when I am told that it is so important that an offence must have a name in the clause which creates it, I simply observe in passing, as the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor himself will, that when we get to Clause 24, which is called in the side-note "Going equipped for stealing", it does not begin, as one would suppose, with the words, "A person goes equipped for stealing if"; it begins, "A person shall be guilty of an offence if". That was what I was trying to do in Clause 21, because I thought that "Handling stolen goods" was not really accurate to describe most of the offences in this clause. However, it is not a matter that I want to press to a Division, and I am quite willing to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
10.30 p.m.
LORD AIREDALE LORD AIREDALE moved, in subsection (1), after the second "of" to insert "himself or". The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment is one which I moved in Committee. I did not think that its purpose was then fully understood, and I have put it down again. The offence of handling stolen goods is, as the clause stands, committed only if it is done for the benefit of another person. I should have thought that it was necessary to say that it was to be for the benefit of the handler himself or of another person. I gave an example of a case where it would not be for the benefit of another person but for the handler himself, a case in which I should have thought the handler was meant to be caught under this subsection.
The case was as follows. A thief steals a lawn mower and goes to a receiver and says, "Can you dispose of this for me? "The receiver replies, "I cannot sell it, but I would not mind having it for myself." The thief says, "You are a good friend of mine, and if it is for yourself you can have it for nothing." The receiver then makes arrangements to have it collected. In the meantime, the police catch up with what is going on, and the lawn mower never arrives at the receiver's premises. In that case it will not have been for the benefit of anybody else. It will not have been for the benefit of the thief, because the thief was not going to get anything for it. It will have been for the benefit of the receiver or handler. I do not see why the handler who was plotting to get for himself a stolen lawn mower should not come within the offence of handling stolen goods. For this reason I have put down this Amendment. I hope that I have here spotted a lacuna and that the Amendment will be accepted. My Lords, I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 9, line 29, after ("of") insert ("himself or").—(Lord Airedale.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, this is really a question of the correct interpretation of subsection (1). Under subsection (1) of Clause 21:
"a person handles stolen goods if (otherwise than in the course of the stealing) knowing or

141
believing them to be stolen goods he dishonestly receives the goods, or dishonestly undertakes or assists in their retention, removal, disposal or realisation by or for the benefit of another person or if he arranges to do so."
The Amendment would alter the words, "by or for the benefit of another person," to read, "by or for the benefit of himself or another person". I thought that we had fully discussed this matter in Committee when the noble Lord explained that his Amendment was to cover the hypothetical case which he has repeated tonight. I thought that my noble friend Lord Stonham dealt with this in column 564, when he said that the hypothetical case put by the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, was clearly caught by the clause because of the words, "or if he arranges to do so" at the end of subsection (1). The receiver, in the hypothetical case, would have arranged dishonestly to receive the goods. The noble Lord, Lord Airedale, rejected this explanation and said he did not accept that the words, "for the benefit of another person" do not also apply to the words, "if he arranges to do so".
This is wholly a matter of the correct construction of subsection (1), and the Government, having taken further advice on the point, are satisfied that the assurances given by my noble friend Lord Stonham in Committee was correct. It may be that Lord Airedale overlooked the significance of the word "if" in line 29 of the subsection. The words following the word "if" in line 25 set out a number of things which constitute "handling", and it is clear from the repetition of "if" in line 29 that arranging to do any of these things also constitutes handling. In any case, the noble Lord has done nothing to alter it to meet the objection put to it by my noble friend in Committee in columns 563 and 564 that the Amendment could have the undesirable effect of making a thief a handler (thus exposing himself to the higher penalty for handling) for no other reason than that he undertook the "retention, removal, disposal or realisation" of goods which he had previously stolen. I thought from reading column 564 that the noble Lord had accepted that that might well be a criticism of his Amendment, and had said that he had not intended that. But he has not, I think, altered it from what we discussed on the Committee stage. I hope that the noble Lord
142
may be good enough to consider what has been said, and will not press his Amendment to a Division tonight.
LORD AIREDALE: Yes, my Lords. I certainly accept that invitation. I feel sure that if it were not so late I could find the passage where the Committee expressed the view that they would not be very concerned if a thief, who subsequently took part in a separate incident of handling the goods, was liable to be convicted separately of the handling offence. But I will, of course, read carefully in Hansard what the noble and learned Lord has said, and will consider this matter further. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 24 [Going equipped for stealing, etc.]:
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I hope that it will meet your Lordships' convenience if I deal at the same time with Amendments Nos, 45, 48 and 50. These Amendments are consequential on the changes which have been made since the Bill was introduced in the provisions of the Bill dealing with criminal deception. Clause 24 as drafted referred to offences of "criminal deception", meaning offences under Clause 15. But we have now deleted subsection (2) of Clause 15 and it has been replaced by the, new clause on "pecuniary advantage", and there are now two criminal deception clauses in the Bill—the new clause and Clause 15 as amended. It is therefore necessary to adjust Clause 24 to take account of this position, since it is considered unnecessary for that clause to apply to the offences under the new "pecuniary advantage" clause. The Amendments therefore make Clause 24 apply only to the offence under Clause 15 as it now stands—the offence which is given (by Amendments Nos. 48 and 50) the new name of "cheat". I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 10, line 38, leave out ("criminal deception") and insert ("cheat").—(Lord Stonham.)
LORD AIREDALE: My Lords, as I have alternative Amendments to each of these, perhaps I may say something now upon this Amendment. The most

143
glaring inappropriateness of the word "cheat" in these Amendments is in Amendment No. 45, which relates to subsection (3). If the Minister's Amendment is accepted that will then read
" … for use in committing burglary, theft or cheat".
So we have the expression "committing cheat". I cannot feel that that is an appropriate expression in the English language. My alternative to all these instances of inserting the word "cheat" is "cheating", which would give us the expression "committing cheating". I cannot say that I am greatly enamoured of it, but I venture to suggest that it is a great improvement on the extraordinary expression "committing cheat".
LORD STONHAM: I am grateful to the noble Lord for raising this point now as it will save time. I am sorry that he finds the use of the word "cheat" extraordinary, particularly in the context of Amendment No. 45 to which he referred. Cheating is a word which has a very general meaning, whereas cheat is a term of art which can appropriately be applied to the offences under Clause 15. It may well be that the use of the word "cheat" as a noun to describe an act of cheating is unusual, but I assure the noble Lord that there is well-established legal usage of the word "cheat" in this sense. It is nothing new. Its use in this sense is nothing novel, and it is not unusual to use it in an ordinary literary sense. The New Oxford English Dictionary (everybody else seems to have quoted it during the Report stage, so I may as well do so, too) gives examples of its use to mean:
"the action of cheating or defrauding".
These examples come from Milton and Locke, both of whom are generally thought to have written tolerably good English. It is good English. It is an appropriate term—a term of art, if you like. It is what we mean in this Bill, more than "cheating", which might mean a small child doing something wrong when playing "Beggar your neighbour". This is what we really mean, and this, we consider, is the best word. I hope that the noble Lord will accept that.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD AIREDALE: My Lords, I cannot think that any great writer has ever used the expression "committing cheat". However that may be, I will not move my Amendment, No. 44.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I beg to move No. 45.
Amendment moved—
Page 11, line 1, leave out ("criminal deception") and insert ("cheat").—(Lord Stonham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 47. This Amendment deletes the words "and driving away" in subsection (5) of Clause 24, which relates to going equipped for stealing, et cetera. The Amendment is consequential on Amendment No. 28. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 11, line 7, leave out ("and driving away").—(Lord Stonham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I beg to move the next Amendment.
Amendment moved—
Page 11, line 8, leave out ("criminal deception") and insert ("cheat").—(Lord Stonham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 50.
Amendment moved—
Page 11, line 9, leave out ("(1) or (2)").(Lord Stonham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 27 [Orders for restitution]:
10.43 p.m.
LORD STONHAM LORD STONHAM moved, in subsection (1)(c), to leave out "taken from the person convicted" and insert: "of the person convicted which was taken out of his possession". The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 51. The noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, will recall that he was prominent in the discussion on this

145
particular subject. Each of the provisions which this and the next Amendment would alter contains a power to order restitution "out of any money taken from the person convicted on his apprehension".
Subsection (1)(c) provides for compensation, out of such money, of the person entitled to recover the original, stolen, goods; and subsection (3) for the compensation, out of such money, of a person acting in good faith to whom the convicted person sold the stolen goods or from whom the convicted person borrowed money on them. The Amendments would widen both provisions so that an applicant could be compensated not out of "money taken from the person convicted on his apprehension" but out of any:
"money of the person convicted which was taken out of his possession on his apprehension".
These Amendments meet, and I think meet effectively, the criticisms that were made during Committee. They are intended to meet the difficulties then raised without departing from the principle, which the Government are certain is right, that the subsections should apply only to money which was, broadly speaking, in the personal possession of the offender when he was arrested. I beg to move the first Amendment.
Amendment moved—
Page 13, line 27, leave out ("taken from the person convicted") and insert ("of the person convicted which was taken out of his possession").—(Lord Stonham.)
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, I think the true credit for these Amendments is due to the vivid and, as it turned out, accurate imagination of the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, and also to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wilberforce. Nevertheless, it is to be welcomed that the Amendments broaden the general conception of what we are trying to deal with here, and do so in a very satisfactory way.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, this Amendment deals with the same point. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 13, line 41, leave out ("taken from the person convicted") and insert ("of the
146
person convicted which was taken out of his possession").—(Lord Stonham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD STONHAM LORD STONHAM moved, after subsection (3), to insert the following new subsection:
"(3A) The court shall not exercise the powers conferred by this section unless in the opinion of the court the relevant facts sufficiently appear from evidence given at the trial or the available documents, together with admissions made by or on behalf of any person in connection with any proposed exercise of the powers; and for this purpose `the available documents' means any written statements or admissions which were made for use, and would have been admissible, as evidence at the trial, the depositions taken at any committal proceedings and any written statements or admissions used as evidence in those proceedings."
The noble Lord said: The object of this Amendment is to make it clear that the procedure for making restitution orders under the clause should be used only where the title to the property is clear from facts emerging in the criminal proceedings, as the clause provides only a summary method of compensation. The Amendment should meet the point raised by the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, in Committee who, in making a number of criticisms of the clause, suggested that there should be some words to act as a "guide post" that the intention is to provide for a procedure to be used only in the clearest cases. The Amendment is intended to indicate that if the title to goods was not clear, or if it would be necessary to hear evidence beyond that which was available in the course of the trial, the court should not exercise its powers under the clause. The Amendment thus makes it clear on the face of the clause that the criminal court is not expected, in exercising the powers under the clause, to get itself involved in issues that are best left to a civil court. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 13, line 44, at end insert the said subsection.—(Lord Stonham.)
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I rise to thank the noble Lord. I think that this proposed subsection satisfactorily meets the suggestions I put forward. I am grateful to him and to those who work for him for the trouble they have taken.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, I think it also deals, at any rate, indirectly, with certain points I made on this clause. I am bound to say that I regard this new subsection as a holding operation, because we have not yet finished with the whole problem of restitution: there will be the Report from the Criminal Law Revision Committee in due course. I am sure it is right for the moment to hold it in this way so that it is made clear that it will be only in the most obvious and summary cases that the power is to be used by the courts. I reserve the right later, when we have some Report from the other Committee to go back to the other points I raised. I am content to leave it like this at the moment.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 28:
Jurisdiction of quarter sessions, and summary trial
28.—(1) A court of quarter sessions shall not have jurisdiction to try indictments for blackmail; but in Schedule 1 to the Criminal Law Act 1967 there shall cease to have effect paragraph 13(a) and (b) of List B (which exclude from the jurisdiction of quarter sessions the theft etc. of court records and documents of title to land).
VISCOUNT DILHORNE VISCOUNT DILHORNE moved, in subsection (1), to leave out, "A court of quarter sessions shall not have jurisdiction to try indictments for blackmail; but". The noble and learned Viscount said: My Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lork Parker of Waddington, who, unfortunately, is unable to be present this evening and whose absence we all regret, has asked me to move this Amendment which he has tabled to this part of the Bill. The offence of blackmail created by Clause 20 is really an amalgamation of the offences under Sections 28, 29, 30 and 31 of the Larcency Act 1916. Section 29 creates the most serious offence, carrying a sentence of life imprisonment which is triable only at assizes. Sections 30 and 31 create lesser offences carrying sentences of five years and two years respectively, and these are in fact triable at quarter sessions. However, when Lord Goddard was Lord Chief Justice, he said that certain Section 30 cases should be triable at assizes unless there was some compelling reason to take another course. Subsequently a Practice Note to this effect was issued.
My Lords, experience has shown that some such cases are comparatively trivial, and could well be tried at quarter sessions. It may be right that the Practice Note which is now in existence should be varied to enable that to happen, and it would not be unreasonable that it should, having regard to the pressure of work on assizes and to the fact that chairmen of quarter sessions are legally qualified, as are recorders.
If Clause 28 stands as it is at present, the Lord Chief Justice will not be able to make arrangements for the trial of any cases under Clause 20 at quarter sessions. I think it very desirable that he should have the power to do so in appropriate cases. Of course, it goes without saying that the serious offences now covered by Section 29 of the Larceny Act, and in future to be covered by Clause 20 of this Bill, will always be, and should be, tried at assizes, and no legislation about that is required. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 14, line 6, leave out from beginning to ("in") in line 7.—(Viscount Dilhorne.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I expect the noble and learned Viscount would agree that Amendments Nos. 64 and 68 are purely consequential on this Amendment, and that it would be convenient to discuss them together. For the reasons which the noble and learned Viscount has given, and which it seems to me quite unnecessary to repeat, I would advise the House to accept the Amendment.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 33:
Interpretation
33.—
(2) For purposes of this Act—
(a) "gain" and "loss" are to be construed as extending only to gain or loss in money or money's worth, but as extending to any such gain or loss whether temporary or permanent;
10.52 p.m.
LORD STONHAM LORD STONHAM moved, in subsection (2)(a), to leave out "money's worth" and insert "other property". The noble Lord said: My Lords, I hope it will meet the convenience of your Lordships

149
if we deal also with Amendment No. 56 which embodies, as it were, amplifications of the meanings of both "gain" and "loss". During the Committee stage, the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, suggested that "money's worth" had a more limited meaning than the word "property" and that the two expressions were not interchangeable. The Government do not think that in the context of this Bill "money's worth" has quite the limited meaning attributed to it by the noble and learned Viscount—for example, such things as cheques, bills of exchange and promissory notes—but we are anxious that there should be no doubt on this point, and accordingly Amendment No. 55 meets the criticism of the noble and learned Viscount by substituting the words "other property".
Amendment No. 56 clarifies the meaning of "gain" and "loss" in the Bill. Again, doubts were expressed by the noble and learned Viscount during the Committee stage about whether the words "with a view to gain" cover action taken with a view to avoiding loss. Paragraph (i) in Amendment No. 56 meets this point and paragraph (ii) simply provides that "loss" includes loss of expected gain. My Lords, I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 17, line 33, leave out ("money's worth") and insert ("other property").—(Lord Stonham.)
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, I do not think that one would realise from what the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, has said what an important Amendment No. 56 is. Having moved this, and having given me an opportunity to see on the Order Paper beforehand that this was being done, the noble Lord has avoided a discussion over again of Clauses 16, 18 and 19, and that is no mean achievement. In the process of expanding the definition of "gain" and "loss" he has met the point that was made so many times: that the Bill, as it was previously drawn, did not deal with those people who falsified accounts or suppressed documents or did other things of that nature to cover up past defalcations.
There were a great number of arguments in the Committee stage about what was the extent of the existing criminal law about some of those rather com-
150
plicated matters, but I do not think that the Government ever went so for as to say that the existing criminal law when it said "to defraud" did not mean "to cover up past defalcations". Certainly this seems to be what has been tried in criminal courts and upon which accused people have been found guilty. I do not think that the definition in the Bill as it stands, without these Amendments, was apt to cover these matters. I consider it to be a major Amendment, which has brought a great deal of relief to me, because I believe now that there is a fair chance that the scope of the existing criminal law is being preserved by this Bill. It may he that there are one or two small matters that fall outside—blackmail, offices that carry profit and one or two other things—but, broadly speaking, the Bill covers the vast substance of existing criminal law, and I want to thank the noble Lord sincerely for these Amendments, which I believe cut out a great deal of further argument at this stage of the Bill.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I should like to endorse what my noble friend has said. I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, thought fit to introduce the question of whether I was right or the Home Office was right as to the interpretation of the missing word. At least it was vague, but by this Amendment it has been made clear. I think it is one of the most important Amendments made to the Bill and effects a considerable improvement. Indeed, if only Clause 33 with these Amendments had been in the Bill when it was considered in Committee, it would have saved a lot of time and discussion. The fact that we have persuaded the Government to make these Amendments justifies the trouble we on this side of the House have taken and I thank the noble Lord for meeting us in the way he has.
LORD AIREDALE: My Lords, I am bound to say that I feel that what has been done has been done in the wrong way. I deplore this straining of the meaning of words so that in an interpretation section we can have solemnly enacted that "'gain' includes 'avoidance of loss'." In plain English, gain and the avoidance of loss are not the same thing; they are quite distinct and separate. There would not be the slightest difficulty, so far as I can see, in making the Statute much

151
more intelligible by saying in all places where we intend to say it "for the purpose of gain or for the avoidance of loss."
If we put in "for the purpose of gain" and leave it at that, and take the chance that the reader will eventually arrive at the end of the Statute at the Interpretation Clause and then discover that gain does not mean just gain, its ordinary meaning, but also the avoidance of loss, when he would never otherwise have suspected, we are not doing what I think in these days we are striving to do: make the Statutes, particularly the criminal Statutes, as intelligible as possible to ordinary people. It is straining the English language to say that "gain" also means "the avoidance of loss". I am not quarrelling with what is being done, but the way and place in the Statute in which it is done.
LORD STONHAM: I am grateful to the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, and to the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, and I agree with them that these are important Amendments. I have always thought that Clause 33 was of great importance. I do not wish to enter into an argument with the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, but, speaking as a layman, I do not think that the avoidance of loss necessarily means the same things as the definition.
"(ii) 'loss' includes a loss by not getting what one might get, as well as a loss by parting with what one has"
I think that is much greater and covers a wider field than the words "avoidance of loss".
LORD AIREDALE: "Keeping what one has" is not, in ordinary English, "avoidance of loss".
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 17, line 35, at end insert—
("and—

(i) 'gain' includes a gain by keeping what one has, as well as a gain by getting what one has not got; and

(ii) 'loss' includes a loss by not getting what one might get, as well as a loss by parting with what one has").—(Lord Stonham.)

LORD AIREDALE: My Lords, this is a very simple matter. If the expression "what one has" is satisfactory in line 2, is it really necessary to have the expression, "what one has not got" in line 3? I should have thought that the hideous little word "got" could have been eliminated from line 3. I beg to move.
Amendment to Amendment moved—
Line 3, leave out ("got").—(Lord Airedale.)
LORD STONHAM: I agree that the expression "what one has not got" is really shocking. It does not really matter whether "got" is in the sentence or not, although the repetition of the verb is not without its value for clarity. "What one has not" has the same meaning, and it sounds so much better that I think we should accept this Amendment.
On Question, Amendment to Amendment, agreed to.
Amendment, as amended, agreed to.
Schedule 2 [Miscellaneous and Consequential Amendments]:
LORD STONHAM LORD STONHAM moved to insert, after the amendment to The Pawnbrokers Act 1872:

"The Bankruptcy Act 1914 (4 & 5 Geo. 6. c. 59).

In section 166 (admissions on compulsory examination etc. not to be admissible as evidence in proceedings for certain offences) for the words from any of the misdemeanours' onwards there shall be substituted the words 'an offence under [section 1, 16, 17 or 19 of] The Theft Act 1968'."

The noble Lord said: My Lords, with this Amendment I should like to deal with Amendment No. 67. The Bill in its present form follows the draft Bill annexed to the Criminal Law Revision Committee's Report. Paragraph 205 of the Report gave as the reason for the proposal the fact that, according to the Committee's information (obtained from the Board of Trade, whose solicitor was a member of the sub-committee of the Committee), the existing provisions did not in fact produce disclosures.
At the Committee stage the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, criticised the Bill on the ground that the proposal to abolish the restrictions on giving

153
evidence of an admission made in bankruptcy proceedings was inconsistent with the provision in Clause 30(1) imposing a similar restriction (in place of the wider immunity from liability under the present law) in the case of admissions made in certain kinds of ordinary civil proceedings.
I have considered this question, as I promised. In the Government's view, it would still be justifiable to make a difference between disclosure in bankruptcy proceedings and disclosure in ordinary civil proceedings, because the two kinds of proceedings differ considerably in character. In particular, in bankruptcy proceedings much of the information required is got in the so-called "preliminary examination" under Section 22 of the Bankruptcy Act 1914, to which the restrictions in the present law do not apply, and there is nothing corresponding to this in ordinary civil proceedings. It seems to the Government a mistake to assume that, because experience shows that something does not happen in one kind of proceedings, it will not happen in quite different kinds of proceedings.
Since the question has been raised, and since the Criminal Law Revision Committee in their review of the law of evidence in criminal proceedings are considering, among other topics, the rules as to the privilege of self-incrimination, which Clause 30 restricts, the Government see no objection to preserving the present limited privilege in bankruptcy proceedings, leaving the question of privilege generally to be considered by the Committee in relation to both kinds of proceedings. They are quite satisfied, however, that subsection (1) rightly reduces the present immunity from liability to criminal proceedings in the cases to which it refers to inadmissibility of evidence of the admission. This result is secured by the Amendment 62, which amends Section 166 of the Bankruptcy Act 1914 so that, instead of applying only to the offences under the Larceny

(" 34 & 35 Vict. C.41.

The Gas Works clauses Act 1871.

In section 38, as incorporated in the Electric Lighting Act 1882, the words 'or fraudulently abstracts, consumes or uses gas of the undertakers', the words 'or for abstracting, consuming or using gas of undertakers' and the words `abstraction or consumption'.")—(Lord Stonham.)

Act 1861 to which it applies at present, it will apply to any offence under the Bill. Amendment 67 is consequential. My Lords, I beg to move.
Amendement moved—
Page 24, line 11, at end insert the said words, —(Lord stonham.)
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, I should like to thank the noble Lord for what is again, I think, a holding operation which will be examined at the proper time and in the proper place. Meanwhile, I welcome this Amendment.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, Clause 15(3) was deleted in Committee and is to be replaced by a new clause, "Obtaining pecuniary advantage by deception". The repeal of Section 4 of the 1900 Act is no longer desirable as it is uncertain whether the new clause would cover it as Clause 15(3) of the Bill as introduced did. This Amendment would accordingly delete the consequential change to the 1927 Act which was to have been made by Schedule 2. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 24, leave out lines 12 to 17.—(Lord Stonham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, on behalf of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chief Justice, I beg to move Amendment 64. This is consequential.
Amendment moved—
Page 25, leave out lines t4 to 18.—(Viscount Colville of Culross.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Schedule 3 [Repeals]:
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 65. This is a purely drafting Amendment.
Amendment moved—
Page 26, line 31, at end insert—
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, the remarkable thing is that when it says "gas", I believe it means "electricity".
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, this Amendment is consequential. Before I move it, I should like to thank all those noble Lords who have taken part in this long and hard-working but, I think, very fruitful session. Thank you all for your courtesy and help. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 27, leave out lines 31 and 32.—(Lord Stonham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 67.
Amendment moved—
Page 31, leave out lines 46 to 49.—(Lord Stonham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, in moving this Amendment, which is consequential, I should like to reciprocate what the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, said. There are still one or two things he has promised to look at, and I think, therefore, that there will have to be a few discussions on the Third Reading. I agree that considerable and substantial progress has been made tonight, and for that I thank him and the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack.
Amendment moved—
Page 32, line 42, column 3, at end insert ("and, in List B, item 13.").—(Viscount Colville of Culross.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
House adjourned at ten minutes past eleven o'clock.