Sitting of 2 November 1967

Preamble
The House met at half-past Two o'clock
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]
PRAYERS

  BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
  Mr. Heath: May I ask the Leader of the House to state the business of the House for next week?
  The Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons (Mr. Richard Crossman): Yes, Sir. The business for next week will be as follows:
  As the House is aware, the debate on the Address in reply to the Gracious Speech will be continued tomorrow and on MONDAY, and brought to a conclusion On TUESDAY, 7TH NOVEMBER
  At the end on Monday, six Prayers relating to Road Traffic Statutory Instruments will be considered.
  WEDNESDAY, 8TH NOVEMBER—Second Reading of the Family Allowances and National Insurance Bill and of the Expiring Laws Continuance Bill.
  Motion on the Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965 (Continuation) Order.
  THURSDAY, 9TH NOVEMBER—Second Reading of the Agriculture (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill.
  Prayer on the Artificial Sweeteners in Food Regulations, 1967.
  FRIDAY, 10TH NOVEMBER—Second Reading of the Countryside Bill.
  MONDAY, 13TH NOVEMBER—The proposed business will be: 1st Allotted Supply Day.
  Debate on a Motion to take note of the Fifth Report from the Public Accounts Committee, Session 1966–67.
  Mr. Heath: Is the Leader of the House aware that we shall be putting down an Amendment today dealing with transport for Monday and with the economic situation for Tuesday?
  Mr. Crossman: I am grateful to the Leader of the Opposition for informing the House of the topics for Monday and Tuesday.
  Dame Irene Ward: Has the Leader of the House noticed Motion No. 12, standing in my name on the subject, of the dumb Minister? Will he say whether there will be an opportunity during the business of next week for the House to be told what is the constitutional position of the Minister concerned, who was appointed to do certain duties, but who is prevented from answering Questions on the duties for which he has been appointed and for which, presumably, he is being paid?
  [That, in the opinion of this House, the Prime Minister will add to the scepticism of the North at the appointment of Mr. Frederick Lee as special Minister by refusing Members of Parliament the right to question him on his activities on matters of vital importance to the North-East Coast such as the future of the Consett Steel Works, the protection and development of the Tyne, the increase in the price of steel for shipbuilding, and the situation regarding C. A. Parsons, all of which require a vocal, not a dumb, Minister.]
  Is not this an odd constitutional arrangement? I should like to clear up—
  Mr. Speaker: Order. Business questions must be brief.
  Mr. Crossman: I had noted the Motion. I have nothing to add to what my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said in a Written Answer on Tuesday, 24th October.
  Mr. Thorpe: Is it again proposed that the Rhodesia Measure will be taken formally?
  Mr. Crossman: I do not know about taken formally; I have a suspicion that some discussion will take place.
  Mr. Bessell: Will there be an early opportunity to debate the question of retirement, old-age and Service pensions?
  Mr. Crossman: I can give the hon. Gentleman the assurance that some of the legislation which we are likely to consider may bring the subject in.
  Mr. Gibson-Watt: When is it intended to have a debate on Welsh affairs on the Floor of the House? The right hon. Gentleman made some fairly sympathetic noises to me in July on this subject.
  Mr. Crossman: I shall certainly bring it into account. This is, I agree, the season of the year when we could well find time for it.
  Mr. Emery: Will the Leader of the House try to find time, either next week or in the immediate future, for a debate on the Report of the South-West Economic Planning Committee, the Tress Report, which has been out now for three months and which ought to be debated in the House?
  Mr. Crossman: I shall consider that possibility.
  Mr. Maxwell: Could my right hon. Friend tell us when the Government intend to introduce the Bill for compensation for tenant farmers, as my constituents are concerned about new town development and are most anxious about the consequences of that Bill?
  Mr. Crossman: I think that my hon. Friend may not have realised that, when I said that there would be a Bill entitled "Agriculture", it included this particular recommendation.
  Mr. William Hamilton: Will my right hon. Friend give an assurance that there will be an early opportunity for a full day's debate on his important proposals for reform of the procedure of the House?
  Mr. Crossman: I have been considering the right way to deal with this matter.
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  I hope that right hon. and hon. Members have noticed that we have put down in a Written Answer, for the convenience of the House, a full list of the subjects. I suggest to the House that we should take two full days on procedure, in one of which I shall start with a general picture, and in the second, perhaps, we might deal with detail. I want to avoid last year's mistake of trying to jam it all into one day. This is important enough for two days.
  Mr. Peyton: Shall we have an opportunity of discussing the British Museum Library, on which it seems that the Government have got themselves into an extraordinary and very unpleasant position?
  Mr. Crossman: It is not for me to advise hon. Members opposite how to use their opportunities for debate, but the subjects selected by the Opposition side for tomorrow would not seem to exclude a reference to the British Museum.
  Mr. Edward M. Taylor: Would the Leader of the House allow time next week to clarify the Government's attitude on the question whether the Scottish Grand Committee will meet in Scotland, bearing in mind that last night the Secretary of State for Scotland said that he welcomed the proposal, and that last month the Leader of the House said that he thought that it was nonsense?
  Mr. Crossman: It is not for me to comment on the content of Adjournment speeches. I should have thought that from the hon. Gentleman's point of view a change of that sort was in the right direction.

  ORDERS OF THE DAY
    QUEEN'S SPEECH

      DEBATE ON THE ADDRESS
      [THIRD DAY]
      Order read for resuming adjourned debate on Question [31st October]:
      That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, as follows:—
      Most Gracious Sovereign,
      We, Your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects, the Commons of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, in Parliament assembled, beg leave to offer our humble thanks to Your Majesty for the Gracious Speech which Your Majesty has addressed to both Houses of Parliament.
      Question again proposed.

      FOREIGN AFFAIRS
      2.41 p.m.
      Sir Alec Douglas-Home: The House may have noticed in this morning's newspapers that I have been cast for a number of rôles, few of which make much appeal to me. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has held that office for some time, and so did I, and it would be an impertinence of me even to remind him that to a very particular and peculiar degree the Foreign Secretary holds the reputation of his country in trust. He will accent that as being so. But I want to make it quite clear that if we think that the conduct of foreign policy is at fault we censure the Government as a whole and not the right hon. Gentleman in particular. Certainly we do not deal in personal affairs, which are his own matter for him to decide.
      The speech from the Throne is a traditional occasion on which the Foreign Secretary has the opportunity to review the world situation, and that section of the speech which deals with foreign affairs contains a number of sentiments that are quite unexceptionable. I miss one time-honoured phrase, which used to record that, "My Government's relations with foreign countries are friendly". Had the right hon. Gentleman put that in, I think that it would have had a somewhat wry reception. The melancholy truth is,
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      as my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition said only a day or two ago, that there are few political developments in the world which hold much comfort for Britain.
      I want to start on our own doorstep. When in the spring the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary toured Europe selling Britain's case for entry into the European Economic Community they went there cocky and buoyant, unlike the country bumpkins who negotiated in 1962. The ramparts of Europe would be stormed by a nice, judicious mixture of intellect—cold intellect—and charm—warm, sometimes over-warm, charm. I doubt if they are now wiser men but they are at any rate sadder. The Foreign Secretary, whatever brave words he may use, cannot doubt that there has been a pretty serious setback to the British intention to enter the European Economic Community, and that the road into Europe is by no means a smooth journey.
      We support the Government's purpose and policy to enter the European Economic Community. The right hon. Gentleman may absolutely rely on that. I was able one day to follow the Prime Minister in the Council of Europe immediately after his speech and to assure the British Government of support on the Continent and of our support in the Lobby in Parliament. We have certain misgivings about the Government's tactics. There are certain questions which we think should have been considered in depth and an attempt made to clear them up long before this, particularly with the French. The most important for us and for the European Community are the rôle of sterling and the practicability of devising an alternative reserve currency which would reflect Europe's economic integration after Britain became a partner.
      The Government are now right to wait until 20th November to see the result of the discussions in Brussels. I hope that we shall reach the negotiating table, but if we do not I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will have in mind fresh initiatives to ensure that there are detailed discussions of these outstanding issues, on which there must be understanding before Britain can become a member of the Community.
      One thing is certain, and that is that bluster is useless. When the stories

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      began to circulate that the Minister allocated the job of carrying out the negotiations in Brussels had adopted a posture of threat and given a hint of reprisal which included reprisal in the European security system—incidentally, the security system is our own as well—and bringing in Berlin, the folly of it was so egregious and the dangers for Britain and Europe so stark that when I was asked my reaction I immediately said that the report was totally incredible. I could not see that any other conclusion was possible.
      The Prime Minister, a day or two ago, denied the implications drawn from Lord Chalfont's Press interview. I am afraid that I must press the Foreign Secretary a little further on this. The interview was apparently spread over a good many hours. It was interrupted and the journalists were brought back in order that it should be made quite clear to them what Lord Chalfont's views were. Three German journalists have since confirmed that Lord Chalfont used almost exactly identical language to them. The Prime Minister said that the Press conference was unattributable and off the record. He knows enough about these matters to know that it must have been one or the other. If it had been off the record, nothing would have been printed. If it was unattributable, that means that the name of the Minister concerned must not be used but that the views can be broadcast. The journalists interpreted this as being an unattributable meeting.
      The damage is not that Socialist Ministers think aloud. It is that when they do, the thoughts they reveal are so awful. Lord Chalfont has offered to resign, but the Prime Minister could not accept his resignation. Of course, he could not. It would be very odd if the pupil had been sacked by the master of the double-entendre. What sort of a Government is it, one might ask, when the Prime Minister must call on three officials to see if the report given by his Minister was accurate? My conclusion on this sad episode is that the Government are a poor thing, misrepresented, misreported, misphotographed and miscast, a total liability to us at home and overseas as well.
      There is another area in which Britain alone had the opportunity to support and
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      assist order and stability, and where failure has been abject. I of course refer to Aden and South Arabia.
      Mr. Eric S. Heffer Mr. Eric S. Heffer(Liverpool, Walton)rose—
      Sir Alec Douglas-Home: The hon. Gentleman need not worry. I am coming to Vietnam later.
      Mr. Heffer Mr. Heffer rose—
      Mr. Speaker: Order. If the right hon. Gentleman does not give way, the hon. Gentleman must resume his seat.
      Mr. Heffer: It was not on Vietnam but on Europe—the Chalfont affair.
      Sir Alec Douglas-Home: There is one other region, Aden and South Arabia, on which I should like to say a few words. I have no firm knowledge of the right hon. Gentleman's plans, but there is reason to assume that the evacuation from Aden may be at a very early date. I want to make plain to the right hon. Gentleman that if it is the conclusion of the High Commissioner and the military advisers that this is the only course consistent with safety for the lives of British Service men and British civilians, then we must support him in his timetable. I think that that is the duty of a responsible Opposition if this is necessary to save British lives.
      Nevertheless, some pertinent questions have to be asked. Who are the British subjects who are going to be left behind? Will they be the employees of the British Petroleum Company? If so, what arrangements are to be made for their protection when all British troops are out? What are the terms of compensation that will be arranged for the British property taken over by the Government of South Arabia? What will be the cost of compensation by Her Majesty's Government to British subjects whose career in Aden is at an end? If the right hon. Gentleman for some reasons of security cannot answer some of these questions—I hope that he will be able to answer some—I shall understand, but I hope that he understands how important they are and that the lives of British subjects and the property of British subjects are at stake.
      On the larger political issue I cannot disguise the disgust that we feel at the

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      Government's mishandling of South Arabia's future. They have achieved exactly—
      Mr. Robert Maxwell: What about the right hon. Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys)?
      Sir Alec Douglas-Home: The hon. Member for Buckingham (Mr. Maxwell) is vocal sitting down, but he has taken the words out of my mouth. The Government have achieved more than my right hon. Friend the Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys) forecast, and that is total political confusion in that area.
      Mr. Maxwell: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way? I am very much obliged to him. [Interruption.]
      Mr. Speaker: Order. We have had an orderly debate so far this week. It ought to go on that way.
      Mr. Maxwell: I sense that we on this side are grateful for the way in which the right hon. Gentleman has tackled this debate so far. However, I must ask him in what conceivable circumstances he can justify the mess made by the right hon. Member for Streatham with which my right hon. Friend has been landed. My right hon. Friend is now having to clear it up. How can the right hon. Gentleman blame my right hon. Friend for the troubles caused to us by the right hon. Member for Streatham?
      Sir Alec Douglas-Home: One of the things that I have noticed in contemporary politics is that my right hon. Friend the Member for Streatham is capable of speaking for himself.
      The Government seem to me to have achieved more than my right hon. Friend the Member for Streatham forecast, and that is total political confusion in the area. They apparently contemplate with equanimity handing over the government of South Arabia to F.L.O.S.Y. and N.L.F., F.L.O.S.Y. being an Egyptian organisation recruited not for government but for terrorism. The only conceivable element of stability left is the Federal Army, which Sir Humphrey Trevelyan—let us pay tribute to him—has very skilfully kept in being. But even there the right hon. Gentleman knows very well that the subverters are active among the tribal elements.
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      The future of Arabia seems to me now to rest on the outcome of the Yemen war. Either it will be dominated by an Egyptian-based Yemeni Republic or by the Royalists if they and their sympathisers win the day. That is the state of a once-thriving British Colony, of a country which we were leading to independence, and I think that it is a monument of reproach in the history of our colonial record to Her Majesty's Government's lack of purpose and will.
      It is at this point that the right hon. Gentleman proposes to renew diplomatic relations with Egypt. Let him be clear as to the principle here. Diplomatic recognition does not mean approval of another country's political policies, but in this case I believe that there are certain circumstances which the right hon. Gentleman must consider. British subjects are being illegally restrained. Property compensation is due and has illegally been withheld. The Canal is closed to British shipping, also illegally. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman is paying particular attention to the contents today of Cairo Radio. During and following the talks of this month with Sir Harold Beeley that radio has been directed against British interests in the Persian Gulf. We have been accused in the last few days of robbery, killing, treachery, torturing and pauperising. Seldom does one hear such political vitriol poured out of any Government publicity instrument, and this while Sir Harold Beeley and President Nasser were, according to the communiqué, embraced in an atmosphere of friendship and understanding.
      But President Nasser's renewed interests in relation with Britain—I hope that the right hon. Gentleman realises this—are twofold. First, President Nasser has achieved a good many of his objectives, including that in Aden. Secondly, he wants the right hon. Gentleman—not without cause from some of the things which the right hon. Gentleman has previously said—to tip the balance in Egypt's favour during the settlement of the Israel-Arab war. Those are President Nasser's interests in renewed diplomatic relations. I am not saying that they are wrong, but I beg the right hon. Gentleman not to humiliate this country when he resumes diplomatic relations, because the country is in no mood for any more of that.

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      It would be interesting to hear what the right hon. Gentleman has to say on the chances of a negotiated peace between the Arabs and the Jews either with or without the assistance of the United Nations. Cutting through the emotion of the situation, two facts seem to be clear. The first is that Israel as a State exists; surely that cannot be denied. The second is that it is useless to invite her to concede territory taken in war without compensating guarantees of security which are more absolute than anything yet devised.
      The present deadlock is due to the fact that the Arabs will not come to the table. The anxiety is that United Nations forces, which left at the drop of a hat only a few weeks ago, will not in future be acceptable as a guarantor. In this context I have one suggestion to make. If demilitarised zones consistent with the security of the neighbouring States could be defined—let us admit that it is a big "if"—United Nations forces could be deployed in them. Might it not be possible for the great Powers to guarantee that force and say that the force would be kept by them inviolable? It seems to me that in these days in a turbulent area it is very difficult for any of the great Powers to give a guarantee in respect of a frontier. The inherent risks involved in the fact that one never knows who started the trouble are too great. That is really what led to the end of the Tripartite Declaration.
      But this is a somewhat different conception. It is that the great Powers should guarantee the existence of a United Nations force in a demilitarised zone. I put that forward for the Foreign Secretary's consideration. It is a slightly different conception but it is one which I think Israel, Egypt and Syria might be prepared to consider. It is conceivable, too, that the Soviet Union might cooperate in this or at any rate might not veto the proposal. Anyhow, it is an idea in a context where ideas seem to be in short supply.
      Mr. Frank Hooley: This is an interesting and valuable suggestion. Does it include the principle that such United Nations forces should be stationed on both sides of the frontier?
      Sir Alec Douglas-Home: That could be so. It depends where the demilitarised zone is.
      Finally, I turn to Vietnam. Two years ago, I believe in the corresponding debate, I said that I thought that no third party could do much to end the war and that it would only end either if North Vietnam became tired under the strain or if the Soviet Union took steps to stop it. I think that until now, whatever the impression left by Mr. Kosygin on the Prime Minister when they met in London some time ago, the Russians have not been interested in ending this war. The involvement of the United States in Asia and the unpopularity incurred by the United States in this war were too useful a stick with which to beat the West.
      But the military evidence now is that North Vietnam is beginning to tire. The recruits coming into South Vietnam from North Vietnam are now in the 15 to 16 age group—a really terrible thought. The rate of desertion has lately doubled. This is going to be a slow business but nevertheless these are, I believe, the signals of exhaustion. It may be that, before long, although the American elections are, as usual, an inconvenience, there will be an increased willingness in North Vietnam to talk directly with South Vietnam or for North Vietnam in conjunction with her Russian allies to talk with South Vietnam and the Americans.
      Pending that day, I do not think that Britain can do much to hasten it. I have only one suggestion to make. I believe that the Secretary-General of the United Nations could with great advantage put out a plan, using all the organs of publicity at his command, for the future of all South-East Asia—Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia—based on nonalignment and on a co-operative economic programme assisted from outside. To begin with it would, of course, have to be internationally policed, but its appeal would, I believe, be that it would hold out the prospect, which is not there now, of an honourable alternative to the policy of vendetta and revenge which is the only one which rules the circumstances today. It would be an honourable political alternative and it would hold out some economic alternative to the poverty

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      to which all these countries look forward unless the war can be brought to an end. I think that such an act now might well assist the move from war to peace.
      There are many other subjects one would have liked to raise. There is the question of the U.N.C.T.A.D. meeting in New Delhi to which, I hope, the Government will make a positive contribution to assist the developing countries, particularly through new arrangements about commodity agreements. I hope that we shall have an opportunity perhaps to debate that matter. One would like to have raised the general strategy of foreign policy in a world in which power still tells but in which there are great changes, largely due to China's appearance on the world scene. But power itself at the moment rules the circumstances of the world.
      In Britain, we have not as much power as we had but that is all the more reason why we should make the most of what we do have, both to protect our real assets and to assist in the security of the free world. Where we feel that the Government have recklessly abandoned British assets and interests and have needlessly left our friends in the lurch, we must criticise them, but our purpose in this Session, as it has been all along, is to try and assist the Government to create a strong economic base for Britain by entry into the E.E.C. and to make sure that, with such power as we have left at our elbow, we are a partner valued in the Commonwealth and an ally which is worth while.
      3.5 p.m.
      The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. George Brown): I am sure that I reflect the views of the whole House in genuinely complimenting the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) on a speech which we all found not only easy to listen to, but agreeable to listen to.
      The right hon. Gentleman began in terms that were characteristically very kindly in relation to myself and, of course, I was therefore softened up for what was to come. I was, however, rather sorry that he departed from that high level and seemed as he went on to mistake the House of Commons for
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      Brighton. Most of what he said afterwards I will be commenting on and, I trust, answering directly, but I think that I should take one matter up at once.
      The right hon. Gentleman referred, in rather less charitable terms than he had done to me, to my noble Friend Lord Chalfont. I want to get one thing absolutely clear. Lord Chalfont made it absolutely plain—there is no doubt about this; and reputable newspapers have printed it and made it plain—in responding to the repeated requests that the correspondents should have, as it were, a "think session" with him, that he was doing it both unattributably and off the record.
      The right hon. Gentleman is quite wrong in saying that these two things cannot both be so. I must say that I think that, for Lord Chalfont, it is a pretty awful business if people press him to talk with them on these terms, and he agrees—and this situation could apply to right hon. Gentlemen opposite as well as to the Government—and makes it clear not once but many times that he is both speaking non-attributably and off the record, only to find his trust betrayed. Then something changes in the way in which we conduct our political life.
      Lord Chalfont will draw the lessons from this incident and so will many of us. But I say firmly in this House that the lessons to be drawn from that incident, like the lessons from some other incidents, will weaken the basis on which political-journalistic life has been conducted over a very long time.
      If I do not pick up other points made by the right hon. Gentleman, my right hon. Friend who is replying will do so.
      It is no exaggeration to say that 1967 has been a year of enormous importance for Britain's position and rôle in the world. During this year, a whole complex of policy decisions have been taken which are affecting and will affect profoundly the position of this country in international affairs.
      First and foremost is the decision of last May to apply for membership of the European Communities. Secondly, and perhaps just as fundamental, is the whole range of decisions on our rôle and position east of Suez which were contained in the Defence Review.

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      We are moving towards a more European based policy. These decisions reflect the end of the imperial era of our history and with it the inevitable change in our pattern of interest and obligation in the world. They also reflect the fact that we are determined not to allow our overseas commitments, defence arrangements and external policy to outrun the economic resources of our country.
      Of course, this whole process of adjustment to new realities is nothing new or sudden. It has been a continuous process reflected in the policies of all post-war Governments, of whatever party. But I am not sure that when the right hon. Gentleman opposite were doing this they were always conscious of what they were doing or the consequences. In 1967, we have given this process a very decisive impetus and deliberate drive in what we regard as the right direction.
      I would like at this moment to discuss, as the right hon. Gentleman did, the question of Britain and the European Communities. Although our commitments are still worldwide, our major field of operations from now on must be in and through Europe. In Europe, because that is where we are through Europe, because only by means of a united Europe can we and our fellow Europeans play our part in the world. And there is a great and influential part which European unity will enable we Britons to play in furthering the process of peaceful change in the world and in helping the poorer nations to tackle the enormous problems of development.
      These are the impelling motives of our European policies, and of our application to join the European Communities. We have said quite plainly that we want to work out in Europe and with other Europeans our common destiny—and not just our economic destiny, but our political one, too. Our commitment is total.
      Our sincerity in this is, I believe, no longer doubted. Time and again over the past few months, we have been able to demonstrate the support which the Government's European policies command. I will mention only the overwhelming all-party vote here in this House on 10th May; and the substantial majority given at the Labour Party conference for our policy.
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      This support within the country has, naturally, had its effects abroad. For we have been able to remove the last doubts which some of our friends still held about our motives, and also to cause them in their turn to see more clearly than they did before the greater opportunities which are now within Europe's grasp if only we can unite.
      There is a tide of public opinion now flowing throughout Western Europe which is pressing us all forward to achieving the really effective European unity we want, and—the essential prerequisite—the admission of Britain into the European Communities is accepted as part of that.
      Mr. Roy Roebuck: Do I understand my right hon. Friend to be advocating a form of federalism? If we are to have this united Europe pursuing a solid policy, surely that argument presupposes that we have one Foreign Secretary in a federal society.
      Mr. Brown: On the contrary, if my hon. Friend will sit back and think about what I am saying he will see that what he has raised is contrary to what I have been saying.
      Whenever one thinks of anything as an irresistible force, one's thoughts turn immediately to the immovable object. Let me say, first, that I do not believe anything in the real world of international relations and historical developments is immovable. [An HON. MEMBER: "Or irresistible."] I believe the irresistible part, but I do not believe the immovable part. If the right hon. Gentleman opposite will reflect a little on history he will see why I say that and how right I am.
      Besides—and this is very important to grasp—the forces which are building up more and more in support of our entry into the European Communities are not ranged against France or against the French Government. The tide of public opinion of which I have spoken is for Europe; and France, no less than Britain, is an essential part of that Europe. So let no one say that we are ganging up against France or are seeking to encourage others to do so. France, so long our ally, is our prospective partner in the European Communities. We must seek to build the house together.

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      Last week, the Council of Ministers of the Six began in earnest their discussions about our application. The differences of view between France and the other Five countries were, as we all know, not resolved; and the Council of Ministers is to meet again on 20th November.
      In my statement to the House last week, I said that we should not rush to draw conclusions—and I was glad to note that the right hon. Gentlemen did not today—from what is said to have transpired at that last meeting of the Six. That remains my view. Nevertheless, in the hope that what I say here might clear away some doubts and make it easier for the Six to reach an agreement when next they meet, let me take up what now appear to be the chief points of difficulty for the French.
      The objections which, we understand, were made at Luxembourg, and some others which were not made, have often been discussed between us and the French, notably when my right hon. Friend, the Prime Minister and I visited France and spoke to General de Gaulle earlier this year. So we have nothing new confronting us, as a result of the Luxembourg meeting. We discussed at the utmost length the problems that are now paraded.
      But it does seem that there has been a change of emphasis. To judge from accounts of the Luxembourg meeting, France may now be less worried than she seemed to be that our entry into the European Communities would in some manner introduce unwelcome "Atlantic" features and thereby, so it was said, damage the prospects for détente between East and West Europe. Instead, the French apparently now claim to see the rôle of sterling and our economic position as the principal obstacles to our entry.
      These issues were already touched on, as the House knows, in the Report of the European Commission. The conclusion there recorded was that the Community would need to discuss with us a number of questions about the prospect of our economy and how sterling could best be fitted into the Community's own monetary and economic arrangements. Therefore, let me say straight away that we think it not a bit unusual that the Community should want to do this.
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      We are, after all, a sizeable country with substantial resources. What happens to our economy will affect theirs, and the addition to the Community of an international currency such as sterling will be no small detail.
      We ourselves think that this, which will have to be tackled like other problems, when the negotiations begin, is soluble. We think that it offers them new opportunities for financial and commercial expansion and could add greatly to the Community's collective influence in the world at large. But the Community is entitled to be reassured on these points and we are very willing to discuss them.
      We shall, of course, assume that whatever doubts the Community may express on this subject will be serious ones; not just difficulties raised for the sake of delaying progress. We should expect the objective of any such discussions to be clearly formulated and any proposals for change would have to be realistic. We would not, for example, think it realistic if anyone were to propose that sterling's international rôle could suddenly be abandoned.
      Sterling is an important part of the world monetary system. The Six, like ourselves, have substantial interest in maintaining that system in working order. The system has evolved in the past, is evolving now, and will continue to evolve whether we join the Community or not. Historically, evolution is slow. It involves consultation with other interested parties, including, of course, the holders of sterling, but there is no reason why one of the possible alternatives should not be to work out with the Six a European approach to these problems.
      In the same way, we are prepared to discuss the prospects for the British economy. Our views on this in relation to the E.E.C. remain what we said they were at the very outset of our approach to the Community when we made the visits round the capitals, to which the right hon. Gentleman was kind enough to refer. We have embarked on a course which will secure a healthy economy and a strong balance of payments. The measures we have taken are bearing fruit. We have had setbacks in recent months, but I am confident that we shall be able to demonstrate to the Community that before there can be any question of our entry having effective consequences for

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      them a healthy economy, a strong balance of payments will have been achieved.
      Our position, I submit, is clear and cogent. I do not believe that there is any real or justifiable reason why negotiations between us and the Six should not be entered into immediately. We know that this is the view of the Five. We know it to be the wish of the overwhelming majority of public opinion in Europe. We are, therefore, waiting with confidence the outcome of the deliberations of the Six. It is they, the Community as a whole, who must reply to our application, and if the Community remains true to itself, and to the spirit and the letter of the Rome Treaty, there can be only one reply—let negotiations begin.
      Sir Cyril Osborne: What evidence can I the right hon. Gentleman offer to Europe and to this country that within a reasonable time our balance of payments problem will have been solved?
      Mr. Brown: First, the progress that we are already making, and, secondly, the issues which we shall discuss with them once we start negotiations, which I hope will be very soon.
      I want, now, to turn to another aspect of the decisions in 1967, which the right hon. Gentleman also covered, and which, as I said at the beginning, are giving us a more European based policy. If I may, I would like to ask the House to look with me east of Suez, at South-East Asia, and at our part in the development of events there.
      Vietnam, because of the appalling war which still rages unabated, is of the greatest concern not only to this House, but to most opinion throughout the world. I wish I could say that there was a good prospect of negotiations to end the conflict, but, frankly, I cannot, because the gulf between the combatants seems at the moment to be much too wide. The Americans—and this I must say quite frankly—stand ready to bridge that gulf. Indeed, the idea which the right hon. Gentleman put forward—in all fairness let us recognise this—has already been put forward by President Johnson.
      The newly-elected President of South Vietnam is about to try. Somehow, some time, there will be an understanding
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      with Hanoi, but, equally, there must be understanding in Hanoi that the Americans desire, above all, an honourable settlement which will leave the South Vietnamese in peace. Until we get that understanding I fear that the fighting will go on.
      Mr. J. J. Mendelson Mr. J. J. Mendelson (Penistone)rose—
      Mr. Brown: Not at the moment, perhaps later.
      The cessation of the bombing is a much canvassed way to peace. I repeat that we would like to see the bombing stopped, as we want all the killing in Vietnam stopped. What is more, I am convinced that it will stop as soon as it is clear that the possibility of progress to negotiations and to peace is in sight. But with no indication from the other side as to what might or might not flow from a decision to stop the bombing, the cost has to be counted in terms of Vietnamese, American, and, let us not forget, Australian and New Zealand lives—[An HON. MEMBER: "What are they doing there?"]—and of continued conflict in South Vietnam, as well as in terms of the possibility of an assured peace.
      Mr. Mendelson Mr. Mendelson rose—
      Mr. Brown: Not at the moment.
      Hon. Members: Give way.
      Mr. Brown: When I have finished this passage, yes, but I hope that my hon. Friend will hear it through. My view, and that of the Government, is that this is an assessment which only those who are closely engaged in the conflict can be asked or expected to make.
      Mr. Mendelson: Will my right hon. Friend recall that the Secretary-General has made precise proposals which are now supported by the Governments of Canada, India, France, Belgium and the Scandinavian countries, all our major and closest allies? Will he now join them and put pressure on the President and the United States Government to implement the Secretary-General's proposals and stop the bombing unconditionally so that negotiations can start?
      Mr. Brown: My hon. Friend knows that I have answered him and many others in this House. We take the view

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      that the Secretary General's proposals, taken together, are the same as those which we ourselves put forward, and, therefore, we support them, but the operative phrase is "taken together", and I have tried this afternoon to set out the reasons why I believe that this must be so.
      There is no easy solution to a conflict of this complexity. The combatants are deeply involved, and deeply committed. We, Britain, stand ready at all times to help if we can. Meanwhile, while acknowledging the frustration and the disappointment, we must keep our attention on the essential objective, which is to bring about an end to the fighting, and negotiations which will lead to a lasting political settlement.
      I ask the House to view Vietnam in the perspective of all South-East Asia, because we tend, in a way quite understandably, and in a way quite rightly, to be so mesmerised by the continuing horrors of the war that we often forget that elsewhere in the area the picture is increasingly encouraging. There are many signs from South-East Asia that events there are on the move, and on the move in the right direction. Except where the war casts its shadow, we are seeing political advance, and we are seeing economic progress, and this is what is needed, after all, to ensure a better living for the people in the area. In South Vietnam, too, despite the war, there has been political progress. Formidable problems abound, and the pattern is not, of course, uniform, but for the area as a whole it is one of progress.
      We welcomed the formation in August of the Association of South-East Asian Nations. The Bangkok Declaration recognises, and perhaps I might be allowed to quote it:
      "The collective will of the nations of South-East Asia to bind themselves together in friendship and co-operation and through joint efforts and sacrifices, secure for their people and for posterity blessings of peace, freedom and prosperity."
      It is this sort of regional co-operation which is in our interests as well as in the interests of the people of South-East Asia.
      Mrs. Anne Kerr: Which does my right hon. Friend think comes first—
      Mr. Speaker: Order.
      Mr. Brown: We have taken vital decisions that our military presence east of Suez should be progressively reduced. One reason why we could take those decisions was that we were confident in the independent future and stability of South-East Asia. Our deep concern with the region will continue, but in future we shall be demonstrating that concern in different, practical ways.
      Indonesia is emerging from a dark period, though its economic problems are far from solved. We are helping her, and hope to keep on doing so, and our own trade will benefit thereby. In Thailand, too, the picture is one of effective economic progress. Thailand has launched its second development plan, an imaginative programme envisaging expenditure of more than £900 million over the next five years. We are now talking with the Thais about this. Already, Thailand gets more British technical assistance than any other foreign country in the region. British industry will have abundant opportunities to participate in the development plan.
      Over a wide area the desire for economic and social progress is one that we can and, in our view, must support, as we are already doing through organisations like the Colombo Plan and the Asian Development Bank, and we will continue this. South-East Asia has great natural wealth, and the more we help the region towards prosperity the better for everyone, including ourselves. Even now, when the Vietnam war is a terrible brake on progress, the prospects look bright. When it ends they will be enormous. Just because we do not often enough remind ourselves of what is going on I thought it right to include it this afternoon.
      Mrs. Anne Kerr: Does my right hon. Friend think that the interests of this country and the so-called West are more important, or the interests of the people of South-East Asia? Does not he also understand that Thailand has no semblance of democracy; that it is run by 20 men dressed as generals, who call themselves the Cabinet of Thailand, and that there is no freedom there whatsoever? The Thai people have absolutely no freedom whatsoever—
      Mr. Speaker: Order. Interventions must not be speeches.
      Mr. Brown: I dislike seeming to be discourteous, but that is one of the reasons why I hesitate to give way. So often when one gives way to an interjection it is not one that is relevant to the speech that one is making, but to the speech which the hon. Member who is interjecting fears that he or she will not be able to make later on.
      I should like to turn to another area of the world to which the right hon. Gentleman also referred. I now want to look at South Arabia.
      Several Hon. Members Several Hon. Members rose—
      Mr. Speaker: Order. Hon. Members must resume their seats if the right hon. Gentleman is not prepared to give way.
      Mr. Brown: So far, I have not been unreasonable about giving way.
      Just as in Asia, the pattern of our interest and obligation is altering in South Arabia as we move towards a more Europe-based policy. This is true of the whole of the Middle East. Our long declared decision to bring South Arabia to an early independence must be seen as part of the process of which I spoke at the beginning of my speech—the ending of the imperial era.
      Conditions in South-Western Arabia as a whole have been transformed since we last discussed the subject in the summer. The Government of the United Arab Republic have decided to withdraw their forces entirely from the Yemen by the middle of December, and the movement is well under way. In South Arabia, the Federal Government threw away the last chance they had of broadening their base. In consequence, a ground swell of revolt overwhelmed the Arab State authorities in the Protectorate and the Federal Government ceased to function.
      This was not the work of a single group, as the right hon. Gentleman seemed to think. Many old divisions in tribes and States persist, and it can be misleading to rely on political labels. However, in general terms the National Liberation Front played the major part, and has established ascendancy in most of the States. The South Arabian forces and the Federal Civil Service have held
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      the structure of the Federation together. The forces refused to take over political control. Instead, they told the High Commissioner that the Nationalists had in their view become representative of the country as a whole and that it was imperative that Her Majesty's Government should recognise them as such and express readiness to negotiate with them.
      Her Majesty's Government accepted this judgment. The High Commissioner issued accordingly—with my authority—a statement on 5th September. The South Arabian forces immediately called upon the two factions to resolve their differences, to form a common front and negotiate with the High Commissioner. It is over eight weeks since that happened. It is a month since the groups finally started talks between themselves in Cairo. Despite appeals to them from many quarters there was no sign until literally yesterday evening that any progress was being made. On the contrary, there was increasing tension between the factions in South Arabia itself, who continued to contest for supremacy.
      We had to take account of the consequences of this prolonged uncertainty, with its constant danger that the divisions in the country might divide the South Arabian forces. Last night, the groups negotiating in Cairo announced that they had reached agreement on matters they had discussed so far and would shortly be able to reach agreement on the composition of a delegation to negotiate with us. We welcome this and we look forward to negotiations at the earliest possible moment.
      I told the House on 19th June of the measures that Her Majesty's Government thought it right to take in the circumstances prevailing at that time. I warned the House, however, that events in the Yemen, South Arabia and the Middle East in general could have effects which might make it essential to reconsider the proposals I was then announcing. I also made it quite clear that the Government had serious doubts about the soundness and durability of the Federation of South Arabia.
      Events since have justified those warnings and those reservations. We retain the objectives we have so often stated—to withdraw our forces in good order

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      and, if possible, to leave behind us a united, stable and independent country. But the events since June have caused us to reconsider how best to achieve these objectives and to take some new and firm decisions.
      I respond to the right hon. Gentleman's request; I shall say clearly what they are. Our first decision is that the independence of South Arabia will now take place in the second half of November and that all British forces will be withdrawn from South Arabia at that time. We shall, by the middle of this month, fix and announce the precise date for independence and withdrawal. The precise date, which will be in the second half of November, will depend on events and on whether a few days one way or the other will help us to start negotiations with an emerging Government.
      It is quite clear to us that the radical nationalists and other groups must face their own problems and resolve them themselves. We can complete the removal of our forces from the country at any time after mid-November. Early withdrawal—and this bears on something rightly said by the right hon. Gentleman—will reduce any danger that our forces may become involved, and sustain casualties, in any renewed violence by or among the South Arabian factions.
      In these circumstances, some things which we had expected to settle before independence may have to be left pending, but that, in the circumstances, must be accepted. Early withdrawal will also, in our view, help the South Arabian forces. In the changed circumstances, they are ready to take over fully now. The High Commissioner and the Commander in Chief are satisfied that the South Arabian forces will no longer expect the support of British units.
      Secondly, the changed circumstances in the Yemen remove the danger which the Federal Government and Federal armed forces faced in June; that, in the difficult period immediately after independence, there might be the threat of organised military attack across their frontiers supported by modern air power.
      Thus, our offer of deterrent naval and air forces for a period after independence has become irrelevant. Consequently, we have cancelled our plans for naval and V-bomber deterrent forces, though,
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      as the House will know, a substantial naval force has concentrated at Aden to cover the period of our withdrawal and independence—
      Mr. Victor Goodhew: In view of the Far East Fleet commitment to cover the withdrawal from Aden, will the right hon. Gentleman tell the House whether he will now withdraw the Beira patrol which is at present occupying or pinning down one-third or more of our frigate and destroyer fleet?
      Mr. Brown: I will be happy on another occasion to discuss the question of Beira, but, as the hon. Gentleman knows, it is not part of this and has a totally different connotation—
      Mr. Goodhew Mr. Goodhew rose—
      Mr. Brown:—and is part of a totally different argument—
      Mr. Edward Heath: Could the right hon. Gentleman perhaps clarify one point? He said that the Federal forces are ready and willing to take over now. Does that mean that they are going to take over now, or will they not take over until after the withdrawal of the British forces? If they are to take over now, to whom will they be responsible—to the High Commissioner? —because there is apparently no Government.
      Mr. Brown: Obviously, there cannot be divided authority during the interim period. They will take over when we go, but they would be able to take over now were we to go now. However, for reasons which I have explained, we have decided that the right time to bring about independence and withdrawal is in the second half of November, and the Federal forces are ready and able to assume responsibility at that time—
      Mr. Keith Staiinton Mr. Keith Staiinton (Sudbury and Woodbridge)rose
      Mr. Brown: Thirdly, there remain the questions of the financial support offered to the Federal Government for three years after independence and the offer of support for the Eastern Aden Protectorate forces which was made last June. Those offers always carried the condition that they were subject to review if political circumstances made their continuance inappropriate. I think, however—I hope—that the House will agree with me that it would be right to leave these questions

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      for decision rather later, when the future may be clearer. The formation and attitude of a new Government will be important factors, but it is impossible, especially in the light of what I have just said, to prejudge these at this moment.
      I now turn to a related question, that of the clear opinion of this House, which I represented to the United Nations, that the island of Perim should be internationalised under the United Nations. I am sorry to tell the House that, though the Secretary-General is not yet in a position to reply formally to our approach to him, both he and the Chairman of the U.N. Mission have said that the latter could not entertain the proposal since, in their view, it was contrary to the letter and spirit of the U.N. resolutions which include Perim in what they call the territory of Aden.
      Moreover, the delegates of all Arab countries represented at the U.N. sent a joint, formal communication to the Secretary-General in August opposing the separation of Perim from South Arabia. It is, on that basis, clear that, when the question of South Arabia is debated at the U.N., the proposal we made will be rejected. There is, as I told the House in June, no question of our retaining sovereignty or responsibility for Perim after the independence of South Arabia. The island will, therefore, unless its inhabitants, against expectation, were to demand otherwise, stay with South Arabia.
      I would like now to turn, still in this area, from South Arabia to the wider Middle Eastern problem, which the right hon. Gentleman also raised, the Arab-Israeli dispute—
      Mr. Slainton: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?
      Mr. Brown: The situation between these countries, as the right hon. Gentleman clearly saw, remains very dangerous—
      Mr. Heath: I hesitate to interrupt the right hon. Gentleman again, but he has dealt fully with the question of the Federation and that of Aden, except for the European population who will be left behind there. What arrangements are to be made about them?
      Mr. Brown: We were discussing the arrangements for this with the Federal Government when it seemed as though that Government would succeed. We will, of course, have to discuss this and make arrangements with whatever authority succeeds us. I simply cannot forecast how those negotiations will go: I can only say that it will, of course, be the duty of Her Majesty's Government, as of any Government, to ensure that arrangements are made to cover those people and also to cover the compensation for those who are entitled to it.
      The right hon. Gentleman has my firm assurance that these matters are being taken care of at the moment and will be taken care of the moment that we can negotiate with the succeeding authority. This is one of the reasons why we are working so hard to ensure that we hand over to a successor authority which has power and authority to carry on.
      I was turning to the Arab-Israeli dispute. It is now nearly five months since the June war, and far there has been little progress towards a settlement. The urgent humanitarian problem of Arab refugees, both old and new, is no nearer a solution, and the plight, as winter starts, of those who left their homes or camps on the West Bank as a result of the war is an appalling reminder of the consequences of war which will be far more terrible if large-scale fighting breaks out again.
      Recent events, the sinking of the destroyer and the severe damage to Egyptian oil installations at Suez have further underlined the dangers inherent in the present tense situation.
      It is my firm conviction that, as matters stand, time is on nobody's side. On all sides nerves will get strained; public opinion will become impatient; positions will become harder and more inflexible, and the pressures on national leaders will make it harder for them to display the spirit of compromise and realism which will he necessary if we are ever to reach a just settlement.
      And yet I believe that there are no elements in the problem which are fundamentally insoluble, no vital interests of either side which cannot be met by the other, given the will to do so. It is the cloud of suspicion, fear and recrimination which prevents progress. So dense is this cloud that it seems unrealistic to

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      think that the mere pressure of events will bring the two sides together in negotiations.
      This is why we think that the rôle of the U.N. is so vital. This is why I have been pressing, ever since the crisis started, long before hostilities broke out, for the appointment of a representative of the Secretary-General who could establish communications between the two sides.
      It is obviously desirable that an emissary of the U.N. should be fortified by a directive setting out the broad framework which the Security Council regards as appropriate to a just and lasting settlement. Without such a directive, his counsel and persuasion would not command the necessary respect. That is why my noble Friend the Minister of State, Lord Caradon, has been working hard at the U.N. for a balanced resolution setting out the essential broad principles.
      I have been glad to note, in my talks with foreign representatives in New York and subsequently here, the very wide measure of international agreement on the need to move forward as quickly as possible on these lines. It has been all the more disappointing, therefore, that an agreed text for a Security Council resolution has not yet emerged.
      The responsibilities of all members of the U.N., and especially of members of the Security Council, to promote action towards a settlement of this dangerous problem are very heavy. There must be no compromise on principles. But, equally, no insistence on any particular approach should be allowed to obstruct progress. [Laughter.] Hon. Members opposite may not realise it, but what we are saying here today could have a very considerable effect on the events in New York at this crucial time.
      The non-permanent members of the Security Council are meeting constantly in New York in an attempt to arrive at an acceptable formula. I do not want to go further at this stage than to say that Lord Caradon is doing and will continue to do all that he can to encourage and assist their efforts. We, for our part, will be prepared to support any fair and balanced formulation which commands substantial support.
      Within the whole complex of these problems, there is one matter of particular
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      concern not only to the Government, but also to other nations who use or are served by the Suez Canal, including, of course, the countries east of Suez. This matter is the opening of that great waterway as soon as possible to the shipping of all nations. But there is obviously a close link between this particular problem and the wider problems of the Middle East about which I was talking just now. Our over-riding concern is with the peace and stability of the whole area, and we shall not allow any narrower interests to affect the policies which we are pursuing to that end.
      However, it does seem to me that there is one aspect of the problem of the Canal, to which the right hon. Gentleman often referred, which could be dealt with without prejudice to the wider issues. It ought to be possible to arrange for the clearing of the southern part of the Canal and, therefore, to ensure the release of the ships of eight nations, including four British vessels, that are now blocked in the Great Bitter Lake. I have represented and continue to represent very strongly indeed that this should be done.
      I instructed Sir Harold Beeley to take this up with the U.A.R. authorities when he visited Cairo the week before last. [HON. MEMBERS: "What did they say?"] They undertook to examine the matter carefully, and I am expecting them to do so, and I am reminding them that I am waiting for the answer. I do not know how hon. Members opposite think that one conducts foreign affairs if it is not in this way. Perhaps some of these days the right hon. Gentleman will instruct his hon. Friends on these matters.
      That apart, the purpose of Sir Harold Beeley's mission was to discuss the resumption of diplomatic relations between the United Kingdom and the United Arab Republic. I heard what the right hon. Gentleman said at Brighton and I heard what he said this afternoon. For my part, I am glad to be able to say that progress was made. The Government of the United Arab Republic shares our desire for this, and I expect to be able to make an announcement soon. I think that the House will agree that at present it is more than ever desirable that we should have regular access to the U.A.R. Government at a high level. We cannot lose by so doing, as the right hon. Gentleman clearly saw. As General Dayan

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      said at a Press conference on Egypt the other day, many people could easily gain from our having that sort of contact and that sort of influence there.
      I apologise if my speech has been a longer speech than some hon. Members would have liked, but we have not had a foreign affairs debate for some time and there were a number of issues on which I thought the House would like to hear the Government set out as clearly as they could what their position was. Like the right hon. Gentleman, I have had to leave a number of issues unexamined. I decided to leave out the Question of China, which is a very big subject to leave out, simply on account of time.
      Perhaps at the end I may return to my broad theme of our move towards a more European-based policy. Two things need to be stated quite clearly, First, this does not conflict with our policy towards the Atlantic Alliance. We want to see greater unity in Europe, and, as part of that, for Europe to express its own view within the Alliance in the defence field. But the defence of Western Europe makes absolutely no sense without the wider framework of the Atlantic Alliance. We remain, therefore. firmy committed to the alliance as the basis of the security of this country.
      Secondly, a more European-based policy does not mean a rejection of or a turning away from exercising our influence in other continents. On the contrary, by providing the firm base here in Europe, I believe that Europe, and through Europe this country, will have a renewed strength and influence which can and must be brought to bear on those problems of peace and development in other continents of the world. On that policy the Government will continue to act.
      3.56 p.m.
      Mr. Jeremy Thorpe: The House will be grateful to the Foreign Secretary for at least having covered the ground. After that neutral sentence, I must say that I thought that his remarks about Vietnam were bitterly disappointing. It is certainly a very ill day for this country when the Foreign Secretary of a country which is co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference says that he is unable in any way to dissociate himself from the bombing by a third country of the territory of another country—and that particularly from a Foreign Secretary who
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      was the first to indicate that Israel, whatever the merits of her case, must immediately give up the territory, particularly Jerusalem, that she had occupied.
      I also thought that the right hon. Gentleman underestimated the difficulties which face us in Europe, so that there is a real possibility that he will not take the necessary initiative to overcome those difficulties which I sincerely hope that he will succeed in overcoming.
      I think that the Government are at last doing the right thing in Aden, although they have left it until the eleventh hour and the fifty-fifth second. This means that we shall leave in emergency circumstances, with the result that we probably shall not get the political permanency in the situation which we could have obtained had we recognised the situation months or even weeks ago. I well remember that when the Foreign Secretary was speaking on Aden on the last occasion, he said that our policy was based upon a coalition between the nationalists and the feudal rulers.
      Some of us then said that that would not work, that it was doomed to failure, and that the sooner that political objective was abandoned, the better it would be. Indeed, my right hon. and hon. Friends on the Liberal benches divided the House on that occasion. The hon. Member for Swindon (Mr. Francis Noel-Baker), to his great credit, came into the Lobby with us, in a very honourable tradition.
      Mr. Michael Foot: Does the right hon. Gentleman recall that the matter on which he divided the House was to deny the Government the right to withdraw troops? If his vote had been carried, the Government would not have been able to withdraw at the time at which they now propose to withdraw.
      Mr. Thorpe: The hon. Member may recall that I followed him in that debate and pointed out that what he was saying was "We want to get the troops out. We do not mind what political settlement we get, even if we leave a Duncan Sandys Federation behind. That does not matter. We have no responsibility." What I maintained then, and still maintain, is that before we withdrew we should in a matter of weeks either have dismembered that federation—as we did following the Monckton Report in Central Africa, unfortunately, too late—or, alternatively,

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      we should have given up any pretence that the nationalists and the feudal rulers could form a coalition.
      I said that merely because we wanted to cut our commitments east of Suez—and no one is more passionate in wanting to do that than I am—it did not relieve us of the obligation to leave behind an orderly political set-up, the possibility of which had been made all the more difficult by reason of the Government's policies, inherited from the hon. Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys).
      Yesterday, the First Secretary of State said that, if we wanted to get expansion in our social services and tackle the problem of poverty and unemployment, we had to have a strong economy. If that is right for our domestic affairs, it is equally right in our foreign affairs, because the effectiveness of Britain in foreign affairs, our ability to take an initiative in spheres where there is a British interest, has time and again been affected by our economic weakness.
      Who can doubt that, if our economic situation had been stronger in 1964, we might have had very much greater influence over our American allies in regard to Vietnam? Who can doubt that, if we were not facing a very real balance of payments problem, we could have taken a far greater political initiative in the Middle East, instead of taking a position of neutrality—not, I suggest, out of any great morality, but simply out of economic weakness?
      Who can deny that doubts which have been expressed as to Britain's application to join the European Community would not be as strong were it not for the weakness of sterling, both as to its valuation and as to its reserve status? Who would doubt that we would have taken far swifter and more effective action in regard to Rhodesia were it not again for overriding economic considerations? Therefore, I believe that to have an effective and credible foreign policy it is vital that we have a strong economy. This cannot be overlooked.
      This is one of the reasons why I want to see Britain successfully join the European Community. But what we must realise is that the doubts of Couve de Murville at Luxembourg not only represented the views of the Republic of
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      France, but very largely reflected the views of the Report of the Commission itself, to which the Foreign Secretary made no reference.
      For the benefit of the many hon. Members who were not able to be present on the Monday before last, perhaps I may be forgiven if I repeat one or two of the passages in that Report. The Report says—this was not General de Gaulle; this was not a leading de Gaullist; this is the Report of a European Commission:
      "Sterling … will be a problem for the Community, and even the modest 3 per cent. growth rate between now and 1970 may overstrain the economy."
      These people went on to say that they wanted a detailed elaboration of Article 2 and Article 104. They also said this:
      "This would particularly include the sterling problem. It is not enough for the British Government to say that it would give up the advantage of Article 108 of the Treaty. This does not constitute a valid reply to the Community."
      The House will recollect that under Article 108 members of the Community must come to the aid of any other member of the Community whose currency is under pressure. This is a great fear that we would be a prospective liability for the Six were Britain to join them. What the Prime Minister said in the House was that it was possible to differentiate between external pressures on sterling—that is, pressure from outside nations which were not members of the Six—and internal pressure on sterling by reason of our joining the Community.
      I remember suggesting at the time that this was an artificial distinction which could not be drawn, and it was certainly one which would not satisfy our prospective partners in the Community, because I believe that external and internal pressures cannot be separated. This is certainly the view which the Commission has put forward in its Report.
      Mr. Robert Maclennan: The right hon. Gentleman, like a number of others, had been misrepresenting my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary. The right hon. Gentleman has said that my right hon. Friend made no reference in his speech to the Report of the Commission. In fact, my right hon. Friend referred to it at great length and pointed out that matters to which the right hon. Gentleman has been

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      referring were capable of negotiation once negotiations started. The points which the right hon. Gentleman has been raising can be negotiated. These are details which do not stand in the way of our application.
      Mr. Thorpe: I must first say, to my own credit, that it is a brave man that seeks to misrepresent the Foreign Secretary and face the consequences. It is the very fact that the Foreign Secretary has not indicated the extent of the fears of our prospective European partners in regard to sterling, and has not referred to the suggestion that
      "no national currency could assume the rôle of a Community currency. The E.E.C. monetary system should be achieved by progressive co-ordination of the policies of the Member States. The disequilibrium of the economy is such as to make it difficult for Britain to shoulder her community obligations",
      that causes me to suggest that the right hon. Gentleman has underestimated the difficulties facing us in our application and is therefore unlikely to take the necessary initiatives to overcome them.
      Mr. George Brown: I will leave the House to decide, when hon. Members have read both speeches, who is misrepresenting whom. Just as my hon. Friend the Member for Caithness and Sutherland (Mr. Maclennan) did, I ask the right hon. Gentleman to be fair to himself. Will he now go on to read that passage of the Community's Report which states:
      "And we believe that negotiations should now start''?
      Mr. Thorpe: I entirely accept that.
      Mr. George Brown: The right hon. Gentleman forgot to mention it.
      Mr. Thorpe: The Foreign Secretary must be patient. As he said to one of his hon. Friends, sometimes one is interrupted at a rather difficult moment and it is rather inconvenient to one's train of thought.
      It is true that the Commission did not recommend, nor could it recommend, that we should change the valuation of sterling. Nor did it say that there should be any bar to opening negotiations—quite the reverse. The Commission wanted negotiations to begin, and it so recommended.
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      We had a very helpful speech from the Chancellor of the Exchequer in Rio, which I welcomed and which reiterated the Government's undertaking to have discussions on the possible future rôle of sterling and on the question whether there could not be a European reserve currency. How far have the Government taken their investigations into the matter of contingency planning for transforming sterling into a European currency? To what extent have they consulted the Bank of England about our existing contractual obligations to those who bank with us and on the extent to which sterling could be transformed into a European reserve currency? Have the Government done their contingency planning? I can think of a hundred and one other cases, from the case of the Governor's radio in Salisbury to many others, where they have not done their contingency planning and have waited almost for events to overtake them. I implore the Foreign Secretary not to underestimate the very real feelings, fears and doubts in the Six about sterling. If we are to get into the Six, I suggest to the right hon. Gentleman that this is something on which we ought to come forward with an initiative in regard to a European reserve currency.
      Mr. William Molloy: The right hon. Gentleman speaks about Article 108, the recommendations of the Commission, the proposals it will make, and the powers it already has. Is he not concerned about the fact that, if we were to join the Common Market, these could all have a very saddening and deleterious effect on our Parliamentary system, which would be utterly objectionable to the British people?
      Mr. Thorpe: The hon. Gentleman is entitled to his view. It so happens, rightly or wrongly, that the majority of right hon. and hon. Members are in favour of Britain's going into Europe and accept the political implications of our going in. I personally would like to see Britain playing a very great part in the political leadership of Europe. It is for this reason that my party at least has been entirely consistent—
      Mr E. Shinwell: Consistently wrong.
      Mr. Thorpe: —and has wanted to get in from the very beginning.

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      The right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) and the hon. Member for Ealing, North (Mr. Molloy) have a point of view. I respect their point of view, though I disagree with it. I do not think that this is the time to discuss the rights and wrongs of whether we should give up sovereignty, whether there should be weighted voting, whether we should have greater powers over the Commission, and so on. These are matters more for internal discussion within the Labour Party than across the Floor of the House.
      Do not let us underestimate the very real difficulties. I hope that the Foreign Secretary will overcome them. Unless he faces the problem of sterling, I think that he will be in very real difficulties. What worries me is that, if we are rejected, opinion in this country could go sour. If the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, had made that speech which we now all know he did not make—it was part of a discussion; I accept that—it would have been an extremely acute analysis of what could happen in Britain if we fail to get into Europe and are rejected for the second time.
      We might either want to have a highly directed economy of a neutralist variety rather like a super Sweden, in which case we should be a high tariff area, probably attracting the same sort of trading relations from America; alternatively, there might be a move for a North Atlantic free trade area, possibly to include Australia, which again would give us very little political influence. We are already seeing pressures on Canada from the very high rate of American investment and domination, and I personally think that both of those are poor alternatives. For that reason, I hope that, even if we do not get in on this occasion, we shall keep on trying and not allow this country to become isolationist.
      There has been a suggestion about delayed entry and whether or not we should agree, at the end of six years, that we should become full members, having passed through a transitional phase in that period. I know that the Government cannot say that they are in favour of that, because obviously we want full entry. However, it may be that this could be a solution if we were not able to get full and immediate entry.
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      Turning to the Middle East, events have proved that the balance of terror in the Middle East kept the super Powers, Russia and America, from intervening. I do not think that there will ever be lasting peace in the area unless certain factors flow. Obviously, the first is an international arms control agreement. It is staggering that Britain, America, France and Russia should have been supplying thousands of millions of pounds worth of military equipment over the years and should then throw up our hands in surprise when our customers use the products which we have sold them. It may be that the build-up has already started. The Americans are lifting their ban on arms supplies to Israel. The Russians have already re-equipped the Egyptian air force, and Russian warships are at present in the Mediterranean.
      There will not be a permanent solution unless and until the big Powers recognise that they have a real responsibility for the limitation of arms supplies. I agree with the right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) that Israel is entitled to have her frontiers guaranteed, not by an Armistice agreement which can be broken at will, but by a properly negotiated peace treaty between the countries involved.
      The failure of Britain during the events of June was that, while we were prepared to put extreme pressure on Israel and while it was partly through British and American initiative that Israel was prevented from going to war on 23rd May as a preventive measure—in which case she would have taken on Egypt alone—no comparable pressures were put on the Arab states to desist, particularly on Jordan. As a result, we were somewhat unbalanced before going into our period of neutrality if we were prepared to put pressure on Israel but little on our Arab friends. After all, Israel was faced with extinction.
      Obviously, we want diplomatic relations with Egypt, as we do with almost any country. However, I hope that the Foreign Secretary will not regain the friendship of Egypt by derogating in any way from any of the principles which we have supported in regard to Israel and her right to protect herself and her people.

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      There is the great problem of the refugees. Anyone who has been to the refugee camps on the West Bank of the Jordan and seen people living in temporary tents will know that it is a tremendous human problem. The Jordanians have been very unwise in the inflammatory speeches which they have made that the refugees must go back to be a thorn in the side of Israel. But, accepting that the Israelis are entitled to exclude those who are a security risk, I hope that they will accept as many of those refugees as possible back to their homes and to permanent camps on the west bank at the earliest possible moment. That must be followed by a settlement of the more intractable problem of the 200,000 refugees in the Gaza Strip, who have been cooped up like a human zoo there for 20 years.
      I hope that the world will realise that it is in the interests of peace in the area that as many refugees as possible are settled in permanent conditions with some economic basis on which to survive. There have been suggestions of desalination plants being established round El Arish, but that is a problem for the world to solve and not one which it is economically possible for Israel to do unaided.
      As for the Far East, we in this country have little influence in regard to the war in Vietnam. I deplore it, particularly when one reads the article of Joergen Petersen in The Guardian this morning about the use of pellet bombs which have inflicted grave suffering on the civilian population. However, we are far too committed. The only difference between us and our co-Chairman, Russia, is that we pretend that we take a neutral line and Russia comes out quite openly and denies that she does.
      We are supplying Royal Navy barges on charter for use in raising wrecks in the Mekong Delta. I hope that they are not operating from Hong Kong, because that would add to the difficulties of that territory. We have built a runway in Thailand. It is true that it is for civil purposes, but one would like to know how much pressure it has taken off other airfields used for military purposes. We have not condemned the bombing of the North. We are the only European Power which is so involved, and it is unlikely that we can bring much pressure to bear—
      Mr. Eldon Griffiths: I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman will appreciate that there has been a 400 per cent. increase in British maritime trade to South Vietnam over the last two years, amounting to nearly £5 million worth of goods. Since that trade has to go into the harbours of South Vietnam, does he object if British Servicemen assist in clearing wrecks?
      Mr. Thorpe: The right hon. Gentleman is saying that since we have important trading interests involved, are we not justified in taking action which will make it clear that we are supporting the military effort of the Americans in Vietnam? Without wishing to be offensive, this is a very conservative argument. We support sanctions in Rhodesia, provided that they are not expensive. The minute that they become expensive, we have to call them off.
      Principles are principles, whether they are cheap to put into practice or expensive. It is not part of this country's job as one of the co-Chairman to have Royal Navy ships on charter to the Americans to raise wrecks which have been sunk in the Mekong Delta by the Vietcong as a consequence of a war in which we should not be involved.
      In many respects, in Europe, in Aden, in the Government's withdrawal from east of Suez, we are moving in the right direction. I do not think that they are wrong. What I find so disappointing is that, when they are right, they are usually right only at the eleventh hour and fifty-fifth second, and that their conversion comes too late in the day to have the effect that it might.
      If we had real economic strength, which we quite clearly have not, if we had a strongly based economy and much more foresight on matters like our rôle in Aden, the need to have broken up the Federation there much earlier, the need to have withdrawn from east of Suez much earlier, the need to have taken a European initiative much earlier, coupled with economic strength, the rôle and authority of this country in foreign affairs would be ten times what it is today.
      It is for those reasons that, more in sorrow than in anger, I plead with the Government that, when they show foresight, they should try and show it at the beginning rather than at the end and, in

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      tackling those problems, to have behind them a strong economy from which to operate.
      4.20 p.m.
      Mr. E. Shinwell: At a moment when the whole world is looking forward expectantly to an exhibition of fireworks in this assembly, to a clash of personalities, to a demonstration of acrimony and acerbity, we have descended to an insipid, tame repetitive foreign affairs debate. We have had this sort of thing before. It is just the mixture as before. Neither from the Opposition Front Bench—despite my respect for the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) —nor from our Front Bench, and certainly not, if I may say so, from the somewhat irrelevant speech of the Leader of the Liberal Party to which we have just listened, have we had anything more than a muted exhibition such as could have been provided by a gang of assistants to a funeral undertaker.
      I am very disappointed. I came this afternoon with the full intention of supporting my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary 100 per cent. I was delighted when I learned that he was facing up to the newspaper barons, the Cecil Kings, the Max Aitkens and, particularly, to the Lord Thomsons. I wish to make clear beyond a peradventure that I take no exception to Press criticism. We are not immune from criticism. Besides, it is a corrective. But the remarkable fact, also beyond doubt, is that if we politicians, whether those occupying Government positions or those on the back benches, dare to respond or even say a word in our behalf against Press criticism, which is usually, though not always, of a mischievous and malicious character, the Press lords squeal like anything, like a lot of apprehensive pigs.
      It is as well to be realistic. It is about time there was some straight talking in the House, and, as some members of the Government are a bit reluctant to indulge in straight talking—they usually prefer double talking—I venture to step into the breach.
      However, as I say, I am disappointed. I thought that it might be possible to defend my right hon. Friend. I say just this about the incident which historians of the future will call the Savoy affair.
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      It occurs to me that I have many words in my vocabulary which I have not yet used, and I dare not use some adjectives here because this is a respectable assembly, but, if I were invited to the Savoy, I could let my hair down. However, that is not likely to happen; back benchers like myself are not invited.
      We are discussing certain fundamental issues. I take, first, the question whether we should enter the Common Market, and I put this question to the Government. I am sorry that my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary has disappeared. I wanted to ask him. I do not think that it is much use asking his subordinate, because we shall not get even a dusty answer at the end of the debate. My question is this: do the Government accept decisions of the annual conference of the Labour Party? It is a fair question.
      I know the constitutional position. I was involved in it way back in 1920 when I ventured to make a speech at a Labour Party conference and demanded that our Members of Parliament—there were only a few at that time representing Labour—should respect decisions of the Labour Party conference. I was told that that would be highly unconstitutional. The constitutional position is that we take no notice of what happens at the Labour Party conference. We listen, but that is all.
      However, it is a remarkable feature of the situation in today's debate that my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary made it perfectly clear on the issue of the Common Market that he had the backing of the Labour Party conference, though when we come to the question of Vietnam, of course, that is a horse of another colour. One cannot have it both ways.
      Let us deal with the first point. How did the Government get the decision at the Labour Party conference? [An HON. MEMBER: "Oh."] Is it a secret? I am merely asking a question. Was there a deal? Was it not likely that a very large section of votes would be cast against the Government, but those concerned were pursuaded, as a result of an offer made to them, to change their course at the last minute? It does not do for the Government, on the issue of British entry into the Common Market, to pretend that

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      they have the complete backing of Labour people in this country. They have not.
      Mr. Donald Anderson: Will my right hon. Friend give way?
      Mr. Shinwell: I do not know why I should. I understand my hon. Friend's opinions, and I shall reject them out of hand anyway.
      Mr. Anderson Mr. Anderson rose—
      Mr. Shinwell: Do not waste my time. [HON. MEMBERS: "Give way."] I believe in being realistic. I am quite honest. I do not wish to pay attention to someone whose views I know. He need not accept my point of view. Why should I be interrupted? I lose the thread of my discourse as a result, and it takes time.
      My right hon. Friend boasted that he had the support of this House in the debate which took place last May. He had the support of the majority of Tories. If that is the sort of thing he wants, he can have it. I extract no enjoyment from support provided by a majority on the other side. My right hon. Friend had a large majority. There were 110 members of the Government who voted under threat of resignation. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] It was said at the time. Members of the Government were told, "Either you accept this or, perhaps, you had better go". There were 110 of them. If we subtract the members of the Government who voted with the Tories on this issue on the last occasion in May and look at the remainder, we find that practically 100 hon. Members on this side of the House either abstained or voted against the Government.
      The Government have not got the majority of Members of Parliament, except under threat of resignation, withdrawing the Whip or something like that. It is not good enough. The same applies to the country. The people of this country have not been fully informed about all the facts of the situation.
      There has been a lot of talk about sterling. I am sorry that I may have offended the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Liberal Party by describing his speech as irrelevant. What I meant was this. He talked about sterling and the reserve currency. This is supposed to be an obstacle, although, of course, my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary
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      dismisses all the obstacles; nothing is insurmountable. But what are the facts? If the Government said to General de Gaulle, his Foreign Minister and their friends in the French Government, "We will accept anything you want—sterling, the reserve currency, your agricultural policy, whatever you want", they would not have us in. They do not want us in. It is as plain as that. They do not want us in. All the pleadings and all the propaganda, some of it unofficial but subsidised by the Foreign Office—let them deny it—would be of no avail.
      It is said that General de Gaulle will disappear some day. That is the sort of thing that is said about people like myself. Of course, it can happen. But General de Gaulle may outlive most of them. Even if he does disappear under God's will, he will leave behind him an important, intellectual and determined number of politicians who do not want Britain in, because they are afraid that Britain might lead. They do not want anything like that to happen.
      Therefore, when my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary speaks about pressing on with determination it is an obsession with him. If at the end of the day he fails, what is the alternative? People are always asking what is the alternative. There are a number of alternatives. I wonder whether right hon. and hon. Members read the speech made by Sir Robert Menzies, the former Australian Prime Minister, at the Ditchley Foundation in May. The right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire was present. He must have heard the speech by Sir Robert Menzies. I happen to have read it.
      Sir Robert Menzies, who is no mean authority in these matters, made it clear beyond doubt that, whether we like it or not, going into the Common Market means the abandonment of the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth could not be sustained. If some hon. Members want that, they can have it, but I dislike it. I believe that the great majority of people in the country equally dislike it, perhaps even more intensely than I do.
      These are realities. This is not fiction. The fiction resides in the members of the Government who are pressing on with something which, in the long run, would

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      be of no benefit to this country. Besides, look at the contradictions that we have had this afternoon. At one moment my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary talked about security being vested in Europe and said that we cannot abandon it. Then he talked about the security which is vested in the Atlantic Alliance. General de Gaulle, however, does not care much about the security which is vested in the Atlantic Alliance. The two cannot be reconciled.
      Let us come to the question of Lord Chalfont. The last thing I would like to do is to indulge in derogatory terms of Lord Chalfont. It is alleged, however, that he made certain statements which were a kind of threat if we do not get into the Common Market. I do not know whether he said it or not, but if he did not say it, I would like to say it for him. As for these off-the-record speeches and observations, even if a Minister says something off the record, one can depend upon its whispering right through the environs of Whitehall immediately afterwards. Anybody knows that.
      Lord Chalfont is alleged to have said that if we are not allowed to go into the Common Market we must look around and consider our situation and that we might have to withdraw troops from Europe. Some of my hon. Friends would agree with that. There is nothing remarkable about it, except that my hon. Friends are not members of the Government, although some of them hope to be.
      Lord Chalfont apparently spoke in that fashion. I should not be at all surprised if he said it. It is the kind of thing I would have said, sitting along with a lot of foreign journalists, probably jibing at us and using the language about which we have read in the Press, which seems to emanate from the French or somebody on the Continent. They say that we are not fit to come in. One can understand Lord Chalfont reacting against that. He is an honourable man. So why are we getting excited about it?
      Therefore, if my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary wants an obsession, he can have it, but let him not inject us with the obsession. He expects that in two or, perhaps, three months' time negotiations will begin. If it does not happen, where are we then? Does this mean disaster
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      for the United Kingdom? That was denied by the late Hugh Gaitskell and it has been denied by the Prime Minister. It might be good to get in, but it might not be bad if we are out. I leave that because there is not much time to develop it.
      Now, about the Middle East. I have not the least doubt that my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary is naturally anxious to bring that deplorable affair to a satisfactory conclusion, but he is going the wrong way about it. I do not believe that one can get anything out of Nasser by appeasing or encouraging him. Only recently, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Ipswich (Sir Dingle Foot) made an excursion to the United Arab Republic. I had the suspicion at the time that it was probably inspired by the Foreign Office, but I understand that he was invited by Nasser. Why should Nasser invite him, I asked myself. I was not able to give a satisfactory answer. My right hon. and learned Friend did not succeed in what he was up to. What he was up to, I do not know, but he did not succeed.
      So Sir Harold Beeley, of the Foreign Office, was sent out. We know that a large section of the Foreign Office—I regard it as deplorable and regrettable, but I know it to be the case; it has been the case for many years, long before my right hon. Friend came to the House—is, generally speaking, pro-Arab. They can deny it as much as they like, but that is their point of view. No doubt, it is a genuine and sincere point of view and conviction.
      Sir Harold Beeley went out and has come back. My right hon. Friend this afternoon said in muted fashion that there has been some progress. I would like to know what progress. Does it mean that British ships have been released from the Canal or that the Canal is likely to be opened? Of course not. This is the real trouble ever since we had the last debate. My right hon. Friend will remember it. Incidentally—I say this parenthetically, but I mean it—there is nothing personal about this. Before my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary came back into the Chamber a moment ago, I was telling the House that I wanted to defend him today 100 per cent. but he disappointed me. However, that is by the way.

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      When we had the last debate, my right hon. Friend objected when I said that I took sides. Of course, I take sides. Most of us take sides one way or the other. My right hon. Friend denied that he was taking sides—he was neutral, non-aligned; that is the jargon of the Foreign Office. There was no evidence however, of non-alignment. My right hon. Friend did not send out my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Ipswich, but he sent Sir Harold Beeley. He has been trying to appease Nasser.
      Mr. George Brown Mr. George Brown indicated dissent.
      Mr. Shinwell: My right hon. Friend does not agree. Then why was Sir Harold Beeley sent out to restore diplomatic relations? What do we expect from the resumption of diplomatic relations with the United Arab Republic? Would my right hon. Friend care to tell me?
      Mr. George Brown: A charming way my right hon. Friend has. I enjoy it. But let me make it absolutely plain so that there is no misunderstanding anywhere that the visit of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Ipswich (Sir Dingle Foot) was his own affair; it had absolutely nothing to do with me. The visit of Sir Harold Beeley was on my own authority and instigation. Its purpose was to discuss the possibilities of resuming relations with the United Arab Republic. No other negotiations were conducted. Any question of appeasement is an emotive issue which only clouds the whole thing. As I said earlier, I regard the resumption of diplomatic relations with the United Arab Republic as important for our national interests, important for our arrangements with Arab countries, and, as General Dayan said the other day, possibly also of very great value to other people in the area.
      Mr. Shinwell: I accept what my right hon. Friend says, and of course we want diplomatic relations with all countries. Of course we do. It is the proper thing. But what is to be the result of resumption of diplomatic relations with Egypt? Do they want more money? Or do they want equipment?
      They have been getting plenty from Russia. And, by the way, that is one of the most tragic things that has happened in recent times. I should like to know what the Russians are up to. I
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      have a suspicion of what they are up to. There is a great deal to be said about that in the debate; perhaps in the next foreign affairs debate we may be able to analyse the Russian situation, and what their game is—and we ought not to be afraid of speaking up to them. I know it is difficult for the Foreign Secretary, but it is not difficult for some of us.
      Let me deal with one other point. It has been argued—my right hon. Friend has argued this in the House or outside—that the Israelis must abandon the occupied territories It is remarkable this argument that it is immoral, if one has won a victory, to occupy the territory one has gained. If that argument is sound we should never have had a British Empire. [An HON MEMBER: "Have we?"] I hope what I have said is not regarded as offensive. [Interruption.] It is a bad argument? If my hon. Friend the Member for Penistone (Mr Mendelson), with his authority, says this is a bad argument, I withdraw it at once. All I say is that I hope, whether it is a good or a bad argument, the Israelis will not give way. That may be regarded as a bad argument, but I mean what I say, because they will gain nothing by showing any sign of weakness—not in the face of the United Arab Republic.
      But there it is. I leave it at that. I have only one final word to say, and it is about the Gracious Speech itself.
      I read the Gracious Speech with the utmost enjoyment. Every item was agreeable to me. There was an omission to which my hon. Friend the Member for Morpeth (Mr Will Owen) has already directed attention, namely, that there was no reference to a national fuel and power policy. We must deal with that later on. Generally speaking, however, I accept all the items contained in the Gracious Speech.
      The only question I venture to ask is, are they going to be implemented? I say that if by mid-summer of 1968 there is no diminution in unemployment, if there is no evidence of growth and industrial expansion, if the balance of payments has not been corrected, if that is the position by mid-summer, the economic crisis will remain but, just as serious, there will be a political crisis. I do not think this country will stand for

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      it. There is far too much disquiet already, a feeling of depression, almost of melancholy, among our people: apathy.
      I am not blaming the Government for the present situation. I am not going to waste any time attacking the Opposition for the last 13 or 15 or 20 years. Most of our troubles derive from the last war. We were bankrupt at the end of the last war. That was not the fault of the Labour Party. We, in 1945, inherited a condition of bankruptcy. We have never recovered from that. We have been living on borrowed money all the time, borrowed either by the Tories or by us. That is the position. There is no use denying it. When we indulge in acrimony, imputing blame to one side or the other, we are not realistic. Let us face the fact.
      But the people in this country are beginning to be worried about the situation, and I beg my right hon. Friend to use all the influence and the power he possesses—and I know that much power and influence reside in him, and he has humanity: that is the one certain thing he has—to use all his power and influence in the Cabinet to ensure that those items contained in the Gracious Speech are implemented as rapidly as possible, and so give us reassurance, and implant some confidence in our breasts. We need it badly. If that is done it will be all the better for the Government and, what is even more important, better for the country.
      4.46 p.m.
      Mr. Sandys: I wish this afternoon to speak about Aden, but before doing so I would like to clarify one point made by the Foreign Secretary in his speech about what has been called the "Chalfont affair". I understood the right hon. Gentleman to say that Lord Chalfont's talk to the Press was not only on a non-attributable basis, but was actually off the record. I see that the right hon. Gentleman confirms that. But that does amount to accusing the entire British Press of a breach of confidence, and I would like the Foreign Secretary to confirm that that was really his intention.
      I shall confine the rest of my remarks today to the shameful events in South Arabia. Since our last debate the Gov-
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      ernment's policy has totally disintegrated. All their proudly proclaimed objectives have been abandoned—the creation of a stable Government, the establishment of democratic institutions, the orderly transfer of power. All that has come out of these fine promises is chaos and bloodshed.
      What is the Government's explanation of the total collapse of their policy. After being in charge for three whole years all they can think of is to blame their predecessors, and me in particular.
      We have been criticised for the original decision to form the Federation. But was it really such a bad idea? There were a score or more sheikhdoms of various sizes in that area, each with its separate treaty of protection with Britain, its separate little army and separate customs barriers, often quarrelling with one another. Surely the only sensible thing was to encourage them to join together.
      Those hon. Members opposite who now criticise us for having formed the Federation may be interested to know that, having searched HANSARD, I can find no word of objection from the then Labour Opposition. They did not even feel it necessary to debate the decision to form the Federation of South Arabia. It is only now that they are thinking up these criticisms and objections.
      I have repeatedly been accused of having forced what has been called the sophisticated people of Aden against their will to join a Federation controlled by feudal sheikhs. This has sometimes been referred to as a shot-gun marriage. But that is not borne out by the facts.
      The initiative came not from me, but from South Arabia. Within a few weeks of my becoming Colonial Secretary in 1962, a delegation of representatives of both the Federal Government and the Aden Government came to London to ask me to unite Aden and the Federation. Their views were set out in a joint letter which has been published in Cmnd. 1814 of August, 1962. The relevant passage in that letter reads as follows:
      "We, the Ministers of the Federation of South Arabia and Ministers of Aden, have, over a period of months, held meetings together in Aden to discuss the future relationship between Aden and the Federation.
      The inhabitants of Aden and of the Federation are predominantly of Arab race and Muslim religion. They share a common language and regard themselves as one people.

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      The Port of Aden is the main outlet for the surrounding territories, which form its hinterland; and the economic interests of both are closely inter-woven. For these reasons Aden and the Federation belong essentially together.
      We are accordingly convinced that the ending of this unnatural division between them, which is due to the accident of history, would be in the true interests of all who live in this area, and would contribute greatly to their prosperity and safety. Moreover, we trust that, by increasing their economic strength and political stability, the union between Aden and the Federation will bring nearer the achievement of full independence, to which we attach the highest importance.
      We therefore earnestly request the British Government to give favourable consideration to the entry of Aden into the Federation."
      Incidentally, the principle of uniting Aden with the Federation was not only put forward by the Aden Ministers, but endorsed by all the political elements, in Aden, including even Al Asnag's party, which issued a statement of policy including these words:
      Aden has to accede and should accede."
      So much for the shotgun marriage. I hope that we shall hear no more of that utterly unfair and untrue accusation.
      Then, it is said that we should not have backed the sultans. But who else could we have dealt with? They were the lawful Governments of the States, with whom Britain had treaties of protection. I did, however, persuade them to agree to modernise the Federal Constitution, to separate the functions of State rulers from those of Federal Ministers, and progressively to introduce democratic elections. These and other reforms were unanimously approved in principle at a conference in London, over which I presided in July, 1964.
      At this meeting, it was agreed that the Federation should secure independence not later than 1968, on the understanding that Britain would, for a period thereafter, continue to afford it protection against external aggression. It was decided that a further conference should be held as soon as possible after the Aden elections, which were due three months later, to work out the detailed application of these principles. As a result of these elections, the Aden Government retained its majority and Baharoon, who had led the Aden delegation at the London Conference and had approved its decisions, was confirmed as Chief Minister.
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      The stage was thus set for the completion of a fair and workable settlement. That is what the Foreign Secretary likes to call the "mess" which Labour inherited from the Conservatives. The truth is that they wantonly threw away all the fruits of our painstaking preparations.
      The new Colonial Secretary, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Rossendale (Mr. Greenwood), like other members of the Labour Party, started with a strong prejudice against the Federal Government. He seemed to imagine that the solution to the problem lay in collaboration with Al Asnag and his group. The right hon. Gentleman soon dispensed with the services of the man who knew most about South Arabia, the High Commissioner, Sir Kennedy Trevaskis, no doubt because he was "well in" with the Federal Government, and was not on particularly cordial terms with the extremists, who had tried to assassinate him. He was replaced by a man who had had a distinguished career in East Africa, but who knew nothing about Arabia and spoke no word of Arabic.
      The Colonial Secretary's attempt to woo Al Asnag was from the start doomed to failure. Al Asnag was no longer a free agent. He and his party had become entirely dependent upon their paymaster in Cairo. The Chief Minister, Baharoon, not unnaturally, resented the British Government's flirtation with his opponents, and he soon resigned. The High Commissioner instantly invited Mackawee, a close collaborator of Al Asnag, to take his place. I do not know what the Colonial Secretary expected. But, far from helping him, the new Chief Minister openly sided immediately with the terrorists and demanded the release of all detainees suspected of terrorist activities. That was something which even the Labour Government felt obliged to refuse.
      Having thus alienated all elements in Aden, and having run out of ideas of his own, the right hon. Gentleman announced his intention to send a Commonwealth Mission to study the situation. But this never got off the ground. Mackawee turned it down fiat and threatened to arrest the members of the mission if they set foot in Aden. The Colonial Secretary then rushed out to Aden himself to try to sort things out.

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      All that he could achieve was the setting up of a working party to draw up an agenda for a conference. But the working party failed to agree on anything, since Mackawee and Al Asnag would discuss nothing except the release of the detainees.
      From then on, terrorism began to be organised from Cairo as a military operation. One by one, members of the intelligence branch, upon whom the British authorities were wholly dependent for information, were assassinated. Soon, our security forces were left groping in the dark. Although the Federal Government had extensive contacts among the Arab population, which would have been invaluable, they were still not allowed to play any major part in the work of restoring order.
      The Government then decided to send the Minister of State, the right hon. Member for Dundee, East (Mr. George Thomson), to Cairo to beseech Nasser not to be beastly to the British. By an act of supreme ineptitude, the Government chose this very moment, when the right hon. Gentleman was in Cairo, to suspend the Aden Constitution and to dismiss Mackawee, who was Nasser's protégé. Nasser reacted, as might have been expected, by refusing to see the right hon. Gentleman, who had to fly back to London humiliated.
      The provocative decision to suspend the Constitution and introduce direct Governor's rule could have been justified only as a perelude to strong action to suppress terrorism. But the British authorities neither acted with firmness themselves nor allowed the Federal Government to do so. As a result, the internal situation in Aden went from bad to worse.
      The Government's next and most serious blunder was the announcement in February, 1966, in the Defence White Paper, of their intention to abandon the base in Aden and to withdraw protection after independence. Apart from being a flagrant breach of a solemn undertaking, it played right into the hands of Nasser, who took the credit for driving the British out.
      If the Government thought that the announcement of this withdrawal would take the heat out of the internal situation,
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      they were very sadly mistaken. The terrorists responded to this sign of weakness by stepping up their campaign of murder. As law and order disintegrated, the Foreign Secretary—who by then had taken over responsibility for Aden—looked around frantically for someone to pull his chestnuts out of the fire. He started writing letters to his friend Nasser. When this got him nowhere, he revived the proposal for a United Nations mission. As we warned him it would, the U.N. mission, like the Commonwealth mission before it, was a complete fiasco. Both F.L.O.S.Y. and the N.L.F. boycotted the mission and the mission, in turn, refused to talk to the Federal Government. As a result, the mission met nobody.
      Having by then exhausted all other possibilities, the right hon. Gentleman at long last decided to turn to the Federal Government, whom he had hitherto despised and cold-shouldered. He sent the Minister of State to confer with the Federal Ministers in Aden, and then invited them to come and see him in London. In a speech last June, which we all remember, the Foreign Secretary virtually announced the reversal of his previous policy. He accepted the Federal Government's constitutional proposals, which he had previously ignored: he agreed to the suspension of trial by jury, for which I had long been pressing; and he even announced that, contrary to his previous declarations, British forces would be maintained in the area to protect the Federation after independence.
      Although very belated, the right hon. Gentleman's dramatic change of policy might still have saved the situation, if only he had pursued his new course with consistency. The urgent task was to restore the prestige of the Federal Government and the morale of the Federal Army, which he had done so much to undermine. There was only one way to achieve this. That was to allow them at last to launch an all-out drive to suppress terrorism, using whatever force was necessary to restore order. Given a free hand, I have no doubt that they would have been able to do it.
      Instead, the right hon. Gentleman chose this moment to lift the ban on the N.L.F. He thus undid with one hand what he had done with the other. By legalising terrorism he broke what was left of the spirit of the Federal Army and encouraged open

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      rebellion. Within a few days the flags of the N.L.F. were flying from the house tops and the British forces were driven out of a large part of Aden.
      Finally, the right hon. Gentleman's nerve broke. He hoisted the white flag. As he told us today, he authorised the British High Commissioner to mouth—there is no other word for it—the formula dictated to him by the terrorists. He had to declare over the radio that he recognised this band of gangsters and assassins as the true representatives of the people. Representatives of the people indeed! Their sole claim to recognition rests upon murder and intimidation. But even this act of abject surrender did not achieve peace. British soldiers and civilians continued to be killed in the streets of Aden, as before.
      Answering Questions only a few months ago, the Prime Minister scoffed at the idea of capitulating to terrorism. His words were cheered in the House, but today they have rather a hollow ring. "Capitulation to terrorism"—does not exactly describe the outcome of the Government's disastrous mishandling of this whole problem? That is the shameful end of this melancholy story of betrayal and vacillation.
      Mr. Christopher Mayhew: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?
      Mr. Sandys: I would sooner not.
      Mr. Mayhew Mr. Mayhew rose—
      Lieut.-Colonel Sir Walter Bromley-Davenport: Sit down.
      Mr. Sandys: I do not think that it is really a good thing for back benchers to spend the time of the House interrupting each other.
      Mr. Mayhew: I have quite an easy question to ask.
      Mr. Sandys: Many other hon. Members wish to speak, but I will give way to the hon. Gentleman.
      Mr. Mayhew: Is not the right hon. Gentleman aware that the difficulty was that the more support the Government gave to the Federal Government, the more the Federal Government appeared as a puppet and lost local support? Is it not quite clear, looking back on the situation,
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      that the Federal Government, which he established, never really had a hope of gaining sufficient public support? Is it not, therefore, rather presumptuous of the right hon. Gentleman now to lecture the House on this subject?
      Mr. Sandys: Not at all. The Federal Government was the only possible Government on whom a future stable administration in South Arabia could have been based. Of course, we all wanted their composition broadened, and we were in the process of doing it. In the last debate, in June, I urged Her Majesty's Government to try to introduce some leading personalities from the Federal Army into the Federal Government, because I felt that the Federal Army held a key position in this situation. It was never any good running after people who were controlled by Cairo. That is what the present Government did from the start, and the result was disastrous. [An HON. MEMBER: "What would you do now?"] The hon. Member may ask what I would do now. It is rather like somebody taking a glass bowl, dashing it on a stone floor and then saying, "What would you do about it?" If I had continued to be responsible, this situation would never have come about. [HON. MEMBERS: "You have done enough."] I will not shirk the issue.
      It is no good pretending that we can any longer exercise any effective influence on the course of events in South Arabia. But if we can take that little positive action let us at least not mortgage the future. I consider that, for the time being, the Government should refrain from entering into any commitments of any kind, economic or military; and this seems also to be the view of the Foreign Secretary, judging from his speech today. Above all, there should be no question of using British forces to bolster up any gang of thugs who may call themselves a Government. I therefore welcome the cancellation of the previous defence undertakings.
      I was, however, far from satisfied with the assurances of the Foreign Secretary about the measures to protect the British civilians who will remain behind. I will not press him now. But, since time is short and these people are living in great anxiety, I hope he will find it possible to make a much fuller statement next week. Now that all Britain's physical power and moral influence in the Middle

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      East have been thrown away, there is really no purpose in our delaying our departure. Having reached the point of no return, the Government may as well complete their ignominous scuttle.
      Within the next few weeks the last British soldier will leave Aden, and South Arabia will be abandoned to anarchy and civil war. Blood and chaos—that is the legacy which Britain is bequeathing to that unhappy land. Whatever the consequences, and they are quite incalculable, the responsibility will rest fairly and squarely on the shoulders of this disastrous Government.
      5.11 p.m.
      Mr. Douglas Jay: With apologies to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys), I am afraid that I must turn from Aden to Western Europe. This is the first speech I have ever made in this House on the European Common Market, and in many ways I hope that it may be the last. I share this with the right hon. Gentleman, that I propose to say what I think the Government should do now in this situation, and what it should not do.
      Since the House last debated this issue two major changes have occurred in the scene. First, the E.E.C. Commission has produced its massive report arguing that the United Kingdom economy is not now capable of assuming what the Commission itself calls the "additional burdens" of entering the E.E.C. on the terms which it proposes. Secondly, we have had M. Couve de Murville's speech demanding that this country should, before entry, accept wholesale the common agricultural policy, the common external tariff and the rest of the Rome Treaty, and should, in addition, revolutionise sterling in some so far unspecified fashion.
      As to the Commission's report, it is. unfortunately, true and undeniable that the United Kingdom balance of payments is not at this moment capable of taking on enormous new burdens, and is not likely to be able to do so in any near future. As to M. Couve de Murville's conditions, they are, in my view, manifestly and totally unacceptable to this country, and I could wish that the Government had already said so plainly. Nevertheless, I believe
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      that there is a positive solution now open to us which would be beneficial, and not burdensome, to this country, and which would avoid all harm to the Commonwealth, to E.F.T.A. and to the outside world. To see this clearly, however, we want to analyse the real problem, and I wish that more time could have been spent on this in the last year than on some of the long discussions we have had on short-term tactics.
      The key to the real problem is to realise that the United Kingdom's greatest single necessity is the restoration of our balance of payments to strength—and here I think that I would carry the leader of the Liberal Party with me, judging by what he has said this afternoon. In the light of that—and I hope that the right hon. Gentleman agrees here, too—it is at once plain that the common agricultural policy and dear food régime of the E.E.C. must be so damaging as to be quite insupportable to the United Kingdom. For the E.E.C. Six, of course, who have practised high agricultural protection for the last hundred years, to continue this régime is no more damaging than it was before. But for us, who abandoned it 120 years ago, to accept it now would be economically ruinous.
      I am glad that on this matter there is a measure of unanimity between the two Front Benches, and particularly between the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Barnet (Mr. Maudling) and my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister. Speaking in a debate in this chamber on 12th February, 1959, the right hon. Member for Barnet said:
      "It would be wrong for us and for the whole free world for us to adopt a policy of new duties on foodstuffs and raw materials, many of which come from under-developed countries, at present entering a major market"—
      that is us:
      "duty free."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 12th February, 1959; Vol. 599, c. 1381.]
      Those very wise words from the right hon. Gentleman actually converted me at the time to the views I have held on this issue ever since, and the much more intensive study I have given it thereafter has persuaded me again and again that he was right.
      It may be said that 1959 was a long time ago. But the Prime Minister reaffirmed the same truth even more forcefully and eloquently in a speech at Bristol

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      as recently as 18th March, 1966, at the time of the last General Election. Explaining what he thought the conditions for entering the E.E.C. were to which the Labour Party and the Government were pledged in their election manifesto, the Prime Minister said:
      "We will negotiate our way into the Common Market, head held high, not crawl in. And we shall go in if the conditions are right. And those conditions require that we must be free to go on buying food and raw materials, as we have for a hundred years, in the cheapest markets—in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and other Commonwealth countries"—
      and I still quote him here:
      "and not have this trade wrecked by the levies the Tories are so keen to impose. For what the Tories propose"—
      and by this he meant the levies:
      "would mean, first, an unacceptable increase in the cost of living, and hence in wages and export costs; secondly, an unacceptable increase in our imports bill, which would wreck any hope of paying our way, and, thirdly, a total disruption of our trade with Commonwealth countries."
      I agree wholeheartedly with both right hon. Gentlemen. I regard the latter statement as an election pledge, and I want to elucidate it a bit further this afternoon.
      The first effect of saddling the United Kingdom with the E.E.C. high agricultural protectionist policy and the food levies would be to force our living costs indefinitely thereafter to a level higher than would otherwise have prevailed. Both our own Government and the E.E.C. Commission now estimate the additional burden on our cost of living at around 3 per cent. Though I personally think it an underestimate, let us accept it as the minimum for the purpose of calculating the effect on our balance of payments.
      The next effect would be the payment back by this country across the exchanges of most of the proceeds of the levies to the E.E.C. and, in effect, very largely to France. The Commission's new report, most strikingly, insists that there can be no concession on the principle that 90 per cent. of the levy proceeds must be paid hack across the exchanges to the Community. According to our own Government's estimate—this is not in dispute—we start, therefore, with a new burden on the balance of payments resulting from higher food import prices
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      and these levy payments alone of rather over £200 million a year.
      The next effect on our economy would be the rise in money wage rates, also predicted in the Prime Minister's speech, and, therefore, in our export costs. The C.B.I., which has produced a report on this which is often quoted, interestingly enough assumes that we could push up living costs in this country without pushing up wage rates at all. That may conceivably be what some of those in the C.B.I. want; but, of course, it is not remotely realistic. If the cost of living went up and wage rates did not, as the C.B.I. assumes, the net effect of entering the E.E.C.—which some people used to hold out as a great economic prize for this country—would be to leave the real standard of living of the mass of our population lower than it otherwise would have been; which is a curious effect for a major economic policy.
      But that is not what would happen. All experience shows—and, indeed, all incomes policy assumes—that if we force up living costs we will force up wage rates and manufacturing costs in sterling at the same time. My estimate, having studied the other expert forecasts made in the past year, is that a 3 per cent. extra burden on the cost of living would mean an extra burden on export costs and export prices at the very least of somewhere between 1 per cent. and 2 per cent. That in turn of course would damage our exports in all markets all over the world.
      The next stage in the process, if we accepted the common agricultural policy, would be loss of present preferences for our exports throughout the Commonwealth and to a less extent in E.F.T.A. at the same time. Efforts have been made to pretend that this would not matter very much; but that is wholly a misconception based largely on ignorance or disregard of the figures. Our exports to the Commonwealth and E.F.T.A. together are more than double our exports to the E.E.C. The countries in the Commonwealth which matter from the point of view of British exports are not the smaller countries where our preferences are pretty minor anyway, but the four great preference markets of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, which, although she is not in the Commonwealth,

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      is still in the preference area. Australia is of course one of the great expanding markets of the world and is likely to remain so.
      To these four markets now we export £900 million a year, rising from year to year, and some 50 per cent. of this enters those great markets entirely duty-free and over 50 per cent. under some preference. There is no reason to think, as the Kennedy Round showed, that if we maintain our free entry here for those countries' primary products, they will seriously modify our reciprocal privileges. But, if we place reverse preferences on their goods it is inevitable that they would withdraw the bulk, if not the whole, of their privileges in their markets. We have to take this into the balance. We would also lose the preference in E.F.T.A. we have now over the exports of the Six; and in those E.F.T.A. countries which did not join the group, we would lose the right of free entry altogether.
      The next effect of higher living costs and manufacturing costs in the United Kingdom would be a further rise in manufacturing imports here, inevitably caused by the fact that our costs of living and production costs, relative to our competitors, and therefore our prices, would have risen not merely overseas, but in our own home market at the same time.
      The final item of the balance of payments calculation is the extra burden on capital account, which we would be bound to suffer due to the total dismantling of exchange control even on outflow of capital by British residents, which is laid down categorically in the Rome Treaty. Decontrol of exchange control of this kind has not been operated in this country since September, 1939; and the really dangerous result would be not simply capital outflow for either portfolio or direct investment overseas, but flights of speculative and refugee capital by United Kingdom residents. In a year when balance of payments or sterling was weak—and no informed person could say there will never be such a year—such total decontrol might cost many hundreds of millions across the exchanges.
      The total net burden on our balance of payments can be calculated within some margin of error, and has been by
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      many experts and statisticians in the past year. The first two items, higher food prices and levy payments, are officially put at a middle figure of rather over £200 million. If we take the official estimate of a 3 per cent. rise in the cost of living and the resulting effects I have mentioned on export costs and preferences, there would be a further net loss of about £200 million in exports to the world outside the E.E.C. and a further addition to our imports probably of about £100 million. In our trade exchanges with the E.E.C. their imports to us would be bound to rise by more than our exports to them. These estimates are in fact very moderate. I have estimated the total loss in exports to the whole Commonwealth at about £100 million, whereas the Australian Government estimates that to Australia alone the loss would be near to £100 million.
      If we take these figures together, the minimum estimate of the net loss to our current balance of payments must be at least £500 million a year. To that must be added the extra capital outflow, which I think very few experts would put at less than an average of £100 million a year and in years of weakness very much greater. The lowest estimate, therefore, that can be made of the common agricultural policy and the dismantling of exchange control together would be an extra £600 million a year on the United Kingdom balance of payments. As most of these estimates are minima, and, frankly, almost all our balance of payments forecasts since the war have tended to be too optimistic rather than pessimistic, my belief is that it would be more likely to be £1,000 million than £600 million.
      For the United Kingdom, after the experience of the last 20 years, to take on an extra burden of even £600 million gratuitously, when we need not do so, is an act so frivolous as to be well nigh irresponsible. As a serious economic policy it is out of the question. For, of course, this is not a short-term burden. It would handicap and weaken us indefinitely as a nation, for as long as the common agricultural policy remained in force. Nor would it in the least be alleviated by the device of a so-called "transition" to this state of affairs. After the transition the burden would be as great as if there had been no transition.

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      A transition to something better may be comforting, but a transition to something less good is not so comforting.
      The teal result of such an "adventure" as this—if I may use Lord Chalfont's favourite word—would be even more damaging. For not merely should we force ourselves deeper and deeper into deficit through the higher import prices and higher export costs, but the Rome Treaty would then deprive us of the two main defences which have enabled us at least to survive, if not exactly to overcome, the balance of payments crises of the last 15 or 20 years.
      Under both the G.A.T.T. and E.F.T.A. Stockholm Treaties we have entire liberty to maintain exchange control as we wish for U.K. residents, as we have had since 1939, and to impose import quotas when our reserves are threatened. Under the Rome Treaty we cannot do either of these vital things without the leave of the Commission. I should have thought that no one with even a nodding acquaintance with the last 20 years of economic history of this country could seriously think that, in these circumstances, with a huge extra burden on balance of payments, we could long escape becoming a suppliant nation, asking for financial help from lenders who could impose what conditions they like, and would be likely to be a great deal less friendly to us than those from whom we have been borrowing from time to time in the last 15 years. Hon. Members, whatever their views have been up till now, should seriously and impartially consider into how extreme a position of political weakness this process would thrust Britain.
      Another effect which we should not overlook of total decontrol of the exchanges, even on British residents, would be, in my view, greatly to undermine our present distribution of industry policy and the success of our efforts for bringing new industry into the development areas. If a firm now asks the Board of Trade for an industrial development certificate in the Midlands or the South-East and is told that it can have one only in a development area, which has been the policy of this Government, the firm cannot reply that in that case it will build its factory across the Channel, because our exchange control effectively prevents
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      it from transferring its capital from out of its country.
      Mr. Heffer: I am sorry to have to interrupt my right hon. Friend. I hope that he will not think I am being offensive by putting this question to him. If he felt so strongly about this matter at the time that this Government applied to join the Community, why did he remain in the Government? Surely the important thing was to come out and express his opinion at that time?
      Mr. Jay: That is not offensive at all. The reason was that the Prime Minister and other Government spokesmen gave the assurances they did last summer, one of which I shall quote later in my speech, if I have time. I was in the middle of saying that, if the sanction of exchange control is removed, any firm can say to the Government, "If you do not give us an I.D.C. in the South-East of England or the Midlands, we will transfer", as I think many of them would, "to Belgium or to Holland". I have little doubt that that would seriously undermine the greater part of our development area policy. Our development area policy in fact depends far more on the I.D.C. control than it does on the grants and payments of money which the Government make.
      We should remember that, although we are told sometimes that there are what are piously called "regional policies" in the member countries of the Six, none of them has any I.D.C. system. This is very largely why, even in the case of Southern Italy, their efforts have not been nearly as successful as ours.
      The full provisions of the Treaty of Rome would be a serious threat to Britain's coalmining areas. Not merely would our development area policy be undermined in this fashion. But, in addition—it is interesting to note that the E.E.C. Commission's new Report makes this point—we would not be able to shut out E.E.C. coal imports into Britain any longer.
      Faced with this threat of a huge new burden on our balance of payments, some people still try to argue that it would not be as heavy as I have estimated. The main reason such people advance is that the present gap between food prices in the E.E.C. and food prices in the outside world may well be narrowed, if a rise

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      occurs in world food prices. Unfortunately for that argument, during the last two years during which it has been repeatedly advanced, food prices in the world have been tending to fall, and it is anybody's guess how they will move over the years ahead. Even if world food prices rose, however, the odds are overwhelming that farm prices in the E.E.C. would also rise. At present, the E.E.C. Commission is proposing higher food prices, and the French farmers are angrily demanding that they should be raised more steeply still. To base our national policy on a forecast of this gap narrowing would be a somewhat reckless gamble.
      Sir Harry Legge-Bourke: In view of the very considerable disparity between the figures which the Government gave at the time they asked the House to approve the policy of Britain's applying to enter the Common Market and the figures the right hon. Gentleman has given today, may I ask him whether the figures he has given today were available to the Government at that time; and, if they were, what were the arguments which they used to refute the right hon. Gentleman's figures?
      Mr. Jay: The figures I am using today are the official figures which the Government, so far as they have given any figures at all, have given to the House. I personally think that they are somewhat under-estimates, but, for the purposes of the argument, I am accepting them today, adding a few of my own. I am, however, in no way questioning the figures the Government advanced.
      Again, it is said by some that, if we do not join the E.E.C., E.F.T.A. will break up and Commonwealth trade will decline. I believe that there is no truth in these oft-repeated myths either. Of the E.F.T.A. countries, Switzerland, Sweden, Finland and Portugal are deeply anxious to preserve and strengthen E.F.T.A. Norway and Denmark will certainly remain members if we and those other countries do. Austria, which wants to join the E.E.C., has been trying for five years, wholly unsuccessfully, to do so. E.F.T.A. will certainly keep going if we have the sense to preserve it, and it is vital to us that it should be preserved.
      As to the Commonwealth, there is no reason to believe that the really important
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      preferences would be lost if we show that we value them and maintain the reciprocal preferences in return. Nor, indeed, is the oft-repeated story of declining Commonwealth trade anything but a gross distortion of the facts. Our exports to the Commonwealth are 80 per cent. higher today in volume than they were in 1938 and our imports are nearly 80 per cent. higher. All that has happened to the percentage of our trade with the Commonwealth is that the share of our total trade which we do with the Commonwealth increased, for fairly obvious reasons, from 1938 to about 1950 and since then, as wartime conditions have wore off, and as great nations like Japan, Russia and the United States have increased their economic weight in the world, the percentages have returned nearer to where they were before.
      In any case, if it really were true that our trade with the Commonwealth or with any other part of the world were declining, that would surely be a reason for building it up and not letting it dwindle further. Indeed, at the moment the main factor losing us markets in the Commonwealth, particularly in Australia and New Zealand, is constant and unsuccessful efforts by Britain to join the E.E.C.
      It is also argued that all the extra burden on our balance of payments that I have described would be offset by alleged economies of scale derived from a supposed "larger market" and greater technical co-operation. This argument rests on a plain misconception. What determines the economies of scale for a firm is its total sales everywhere in the world, not just its sales in one area. As I have already said, if we were to adopt the common agricultural policy, with all its consequences, our total exports would be lower in total, and our imports would be higher than they otherwise would have been. Therefore, the market would in fact be narrowed and not widened.
      As to technical co-operation, there are a few industries, like aircraft and missile production, which benefit from very large-scale manufacture. But those industries do not depend for their orders on tariffs. They depend on co-operation between Governments, as the story of the Concord, the European airbus, and other such enterprises have shown. Signing the Rome Treaty and raising our cost of

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      living would make virtually no difference to technical co-operation of this kind, as is interestingly shown by the fact that there is almost no technical co-operation between the existing members of the Six, eight or nine years after the Treaty of Rome started operating.
      Therefore, if the whole argument is taken seriously, the alleged more distant economic benefits which are somehow to offset this certain and lasting additional burden to the balance of payments turn out, on examination, to be illusory or almost totally non-existent.
      We are then told that there are political wins which would somehow make up for these economic losses. It is still very far from clear what these huge political gains are which would justify so enormous a cost. I am not much impressed by the sweeping and rather cloudy assertion that as a nation we must become a member of some super-bloc if we are to survive. I would have thought that Canada, Sweden or even Switzerland had at least as much influence in the world as Pennsylvania or the Ukraine. However, I do not press the point. One could argue it for a very long time without coming to any very clear conclusion.
      There are, however, at least three plain facts in the political prospect which seem to emerge from what is otherwise a cloud of uncertainty. The first is—and here I follow the Leader of the Liberal Party this afternoon—that we should grievously weaken ourselves politically if our balance of payments become so adverse, and our economic defences so disarmed, that we become chronic suppliants for financial help from other countries.
      The second is—and I ask hon. Members to reflect on this—that for inexorable reasons of population, if we become a purely European power, we are bound to he second to Germany in strength and influence. If anyone argues that we can only resist this by joining a tightly-knit West European unit, I am afraid the answer is that in hard economic and military reality we can only maintain our influence as against Germany in the future, as in the past, by preserving our links with our real and tried friends in other continents.
      Thirdly, in the political balance, one cannot avert one's eyes from the fact that
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      the E.E.C. Commission's present power of legislating for the internal affairs of member countries, in some cases without even the approval of the Council of Ministers—because that is the constitution—in certain social and economic spheres is contrary, not merely to democratic principle, but to the whole Parliamentary tradition of this country. That, although it is not my main point this afternoon, does not seem to me to be something which can be taken lightly.
      This is not just a known and explicit limitation of sovereignty such as this House accepts from time to time when it ratifies an international treaty. It would be a wholly unprecedented decision by this Parliament to hand over to an outside undemocratic body the power to legislate in the future for our internal affairs in ways not now known. I do not believe that in principle we here have any right to do this unless and until the issue has been plainly put to the electorate and they have been given a chance to give an answer.
      For all these reasons, I believe that we should aim at a different solution, which is, in fact, now more likely to be open to us than full membership, and which would avoid the crippling burden of the common agricultural policy, the loss of our ability to protect the £, the undemocratic powers of the Commission and the damage to the outside world. This would be for us to work towards an association between E.F.T.A. members and the E.E.C., on the basis of industrial free trade for the whole wider group within the common external tariff, but a free choice for each country, whether or not in addition to accept the common agriculture policy, together with membership of and control by the E.E.C.'s ruling bodies. Technically and economically that is a perfectly workable arrangement, and I hope that those who do not like it will not just summarily denounce it as second-class citizenship or some easy slogan of that kind.
      Mr. Nigel Birch: I entirely agree with the right hon. Gentleman. What he is asking for would be admirable if we could get it. Would he not agree that it was precisely what we tried to do with the Free Trade Area and failed to do after three or four years of negotiation?
      Mr. Jay: Yes, I am coming to that.
      This would mean essentially that there would be an inner group accepting the common agricultural policy and the whole Rome Treaty mechanism, and an outer group accepting the industrial external tariff only, with each country free to choose which group it wished to belong to.
      For Britain, who would clearly in those circumstances join the outer group, this would involve placing the common external tariff on manufactured goods imported here from the Commonwealth, but these are, of course, relatively unimportant, and I think there is no sense—here I think the right hon. Gentleman will agree—in the largely one-sided free trade in manufactured goods which we now practise with developed countries such as Canada and Australia in particular.
      It would, however, leave us entitled to import our food and raw materials duty free, and so avoid all the damaging consequences to our balance of payments which I have described. In return, we and other members of the outer group would obviously not be able to export food products to the inner group except over the levies and other barriers which they maintain. We would not for a time, at any rate, claim voting rights in, or accept the authority of, the E.E.C. ruling bodies.
      That solution would avoid the whole damage to the United Kingdom, to E.F.T.A., to the Commonwealth and to developing countries involved in the full C.A.P. and Rome Treaty paraphernalia. It would also end the main economic split in Europe, and be far more liberal and outward looking than the present E.E.C. It would leave the option open for wider association by countries like Poland and Yugoslavia, and conceivably possibly for a still wider Atlantic free trade area. In the sphere of realities rather than the myths and slogans that we have heard, it would offer every advantage and no disadvantage.
      What is there against it? Here I come to the right hon. Gentleman's point. We have repeatedly been told that the French would never accept it, or anything like it, in practice. The irony of the situation is
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      that, on all the evidence, this is something very like what the French are now proposing. I am not speaking of the right hon. Gentleman—that would not be courteous—but there are some doctrinaires in this country who have got themselves into a position of arguing that we must not accept what is the best solution for Britain, on the ground that the French will not have it, when in fact the French are urging something very like it upon us.
      It would be certainly overwhelmingly worth our while to avoid all the damage involved in the common agricultural policy, at the cost of renouncing the rather dubious privilege for some time ahead of voting among a number of others in the Council of Ministers of the E.E.C. General de Gaulle, on his side, may very well on the evidence of his recent statement—he usually goes on saying the same thing—be willing to grant us the economic concessions vital to us, if he can avoid a number of new nations threatening to outvote him inside the Community. It seems to me that there is at least the plain opportunity here for a bargain which is, at any rate, very well worth exploring and which would bring immense relief to E.F.T.A. and the Commonwealth and would avoid another damaging head-on political clash with France. Surely we would be wiser to explore the possibilities of this rather than to continue on our present collision course.
      To keep repeating that we will not take "No" for an answer is not a policy. If the right hon. Gentleman at the next General Election were to find himself at the bottom of the poll and went to the returning officer and said "I am not taking 'No' for an answer "that would not be an act of statesmanship. He would merely be making himself ridiculous, and that applies to all of us.
      What is the real prospect this autumn and winter if the Government go on banging their heads against the wall? To demand negotiations, from a position of obvious economic weakness, with a nation which does not want to negotiate, and which will at the very best insist on highly injurious as well as humiliating terms, does not seem a very sensible course. Yet at the moment, for the sake of this strange objective, we

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      are paralysed in our internal economic policies. We dare not reflate at home. We dare not even think of import quotas, which would enable our economy to expand. We are thus in danger, so it seems to me, of slipping into the worst situation of all—a paralysis of policy in which we hardly dare take any initiative for fear of imperilling negotiations which may wry likely not take place at all. Yet what we ought to be doing now is giving first priority this year and next to the rebuilding of our own economy and the resumption of growth and full employment. so that we may negotiate from strength thereafter.
      The Prime Minister said in the House last November, and repeated on 8th May this year—I see that my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) has left, but I am about to quote one of the Prime Minister's statements which I have always supported and supported during the summer—
      "… we should not seek to enter upon negotiations except on the basis of a strong balance of payments and a strong £".—[OFFICIAL REPORT. 8th May, 1967; Vol. 746, c. 1077.]
      I wholly supported it then, and I wholly support it today.
      Mr. George Brown: My right hon. Friend is not, of course, above using a quotation to suit himself. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] I imagine that
      Mr. Roebuck: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. My right hon. Friend is making an imputation of dishonesty against my right hon. Friend the Member for Battersea, North (Mr. Jay).
      Mr. Brown: My hon. Friend should have a better sense of humour.
      Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Sydney Irving): Order. I have heard nothing objectionable so far.
      Hon. Members: The Foreign Secretary should have heard all the speech.
      Mr. Brown: I have heard a very large part of my right hon. Friend's speech. I was about to say to him that, if he will refer to the passage in the Prime Minister's speech from which he is now quoting, he will find that my right hon. Friend was referring back to a speech which he had made earlier in which he made quite clear that, as I said today, entry would
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      be on that basis, but that does not preclude negotiations starting earlier.
      Mr. Jay: Anyone can look it up in HANSARD for himself. I do not want to argue about words, but what the Prime Minister said, in November which he repeated in May, was that
      "we should not seek to enter upon negotiations except on the basis of a strong balance of payments and a strong £."
      Mr. Brown: Look it up.
      Mr. Jay: Anyone can look it up in HANSARD for himself.
      In my view, the Government should now ascertain whether the French and the Five are willing to negotiate for the sort of settlement I have described. If by, say, the end of this year, that has not proved possible, we should, in my view, then withdraw our application, and concentrate all our efforts on restoring our own economic strength, and taking full advantage of E.F.T.A. and all the other outlets increasingly open to us in the Commonwealth and, still further, by the Kennedy Round cuts which are now coming into effect.
      To those who still refuse summarily to consider any solution other than conventional and full membership of the E.E.C., I say, "For heaven's sake, conceive of the possibility that you may be mistaken".
      5.54 p.m.
      Sir Derek Walker-Smith: I deem it a privilege to follow the thoughtful and penetrating speech just made by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Battersea, North (Mr. Jay). I am not sure that it is wholly appropriate for me to tender to him the formal congratulations of the House on his "maiden" speech from the back benches, but this I do say with great sincerity: the right hon. Gentleman has been known in the House for many years as a man of integrity, judgment and experience, and that is the sort of Minister whom no Government can lightly afford to lose—this Government, I venture to say, a good less easily than most.
      I shall confine what I have to say to the single topic of the present position in regard to Europe. I say that, albeit the Foreign Secretary's speech provoked several other thoughts in my mind. He apologised for the length of it. It

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      would have been more appropriate if he had apologised for the lack of clarity of certain passages which seemed to me to cry out for clarification by particularisation and interrogation. I have had much ado in resisting the temptation which my forensic nature moved me to indulge, but I shall resist it because it is right that backbench contributions should be limited to one subject.
      I shall limit my speech further in this way. I do not propose to go into the pros and cons of British adherence to the E.E.C., which were fully canvassed in the debate last May. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Battersea, North has made a massive and formidable onslaught on the case for entry, making it with all the triple authority of a former President of the Board of Trade, a Fellow of All Souls, and the father of the economics editor of The Times Business News.
      For myself, I start from the position that we debated the question in May, when I was privileged to take part. The House came to a decision. The Prime Minister has spoken of the large Parliamentary majority which the Government then secured. I respectfully doubt that in this particular case the size of the Parliamentary majority accurately reflected opinion in the country outside, but I am a good enough constitutionalist, I hope, to accept the decision which was then taken. For what I have to say now, I could be content even to assume that the decision was wisely taken in the context of those times, though I do not myself hold that view.
      It was a decision only to apply, that is to say, to seek to enter into negotiations with a view to entry. There is nothing irrevocable until membership is achieved, if it be achieved. At that stage, as we know, it becomes irrevocable under Article 240 of the Treaty of Rome. The die is then cast, and it would be foolish as well as useless to repine if that time comes, as it would be a breach of faith to try to undo the work which would then have been done. If those circumstances should arise, it would then be the duty of us all, whatever our views have been in the past, to work for the success of British membership, and there would
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      be a great deal of work to do, one can readily imagine, with like-minded people in Europe, in seeking to soften the supranational rigidities of the Common Market and to introduce more democratic procedures into it.
      But that is not a position at which we have yet arrived, and we may never arrive at it. The House still retains its sovereignty in respect of the affairs of this nation. There is, therefore, a particular and peremptory duty lying upon us now to undertake a vigilant scrutiny to ensure that there is no drift to a position of hurt and humiliation for this country.
      When the decision was taken in May, it was taken in the faith of the Government's representations as to the likely time table of events. Things, we understood, were to move speedily to the desired end. There was talk of negotiations starting by July and the position being clarified by Christmas. The Foreign Secretary—he has again left the Chamber—said,
      "We aim to join the E.E.C. without delay"
      and the Prime Minister's watchwords at that time, the House will recall, were, "Pace and momentum".
      I reminded him then that pace and momentum also characterised the action and dictated the fate of the Gadarene swine. In all fairness I should now withdraw that comparison. There is certainly nothing Gadarene about the pace at which the Government have pursued their objectives. It is more like that of the tortoise or the snail, or perhaps even that flatters the rate of progress and it is more like Alice in Wonderland, running hard to stay in exactly the same place.
      There would be no complaint if the necessary negotiations on these great issues took time, provided that they were promptly started and were real negotiations with a thorough examination of all the problems between equals, conducted on a basis of give and take. But this is not the position. There has been no start to the negotiations six months after this country's formal application. There may never be a start to negotiations and even if there is they may only be a series of unilateral retreats and concessions by the British Government.
      The present position is humiliating for Britain. It is a position that was not

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      within Parliament's contemplation when the decision was taken in May. It is humiliating for Britain to have to appear in the rôle of a suppliant standing at the outer gates petitioning for leave to enter and awaiting the pleasure of those within. It is doubly humiliating because the objections, objections to entering into negotiation let alone to admission, seem to derive not only, or not so much, from what we; might do or say in negotiations, but from the basic facts of the British position and policies.
      After all, even General de Gaulle can hardly object to entering into negotiations on this matter for fear of the concessions that the British Government might extract by tenacious and skilful bargaining. Of course not, because they are not trying to get any concessions. I understand that they are not attaching any conditions. When Mr. Macmillan made his application to enter in 1961 right hon. Gentlemen opposite said that the conditions he attached were insufficient, and so they drew up the Gaistkell conditions. Now those have been abandoned. Right hon. Members opposite say that time has overtaken them. Is it time that has overtaken them, or is it not rather time-serving, a desire by right hon. Gentlemen opposite, whatever the cost to the country, to seek to secure what they can present as a tactical triumph and be able to say that they have, succeeded where Mr. Macmillan failed? Now they have abandoned all conditions—the Gaitskell conditions and all others. I understand that they are now prepared to swallow the whole bitter draught without a qualm.
      Mr. Mendelson: I am following the right hon. and learned Gentleman's speech with interest. I know that he would want to be fair, but to be fair he must also put the appropriate blame on his right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, who has all the time harried the Government, demanding that the Gaitskell conditions should be abandoned.
      Sir D. Walker-Smith: My right hon. Friend attached three conditions in 1961, which at least was three better than right hon. Members opposite are now doing, because they are prepared to swallow the whole bitter draught without a qualm. They are prepared to impose reverse preferences on our friends of E.F.T.A. and the Commonwealth—
      Mr. D. Anderson Mr. D. Anderson rose
      Sir D. Walker-Smith: Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will allow me to reach the next semi-colon.
      They are prepared to dismantle the whole of our agricultural machinery, to extract vast sums from the consumers here to subsidise the less efficient farmers of Europe —
      Mr. Joel Barnett Mr. Joel Barnett (Heywood and Royton)rose— —
      Sir D. Walker-Smith: I shall give way, to one hon. Gentleman. They must decide it amongst themselves. I do not want to take up too much time. The Government are also prepared to put the traditional sovereignty of Parliament into a straitjacket.
      Mr. Barnett: The right hon. Gentleman made a point about agriculture. Is he not aware that he is a member of a party which supports dropping the whole of the present agricultural system, whether we go in or not?
      Sir D. Walker-Smith: That is a matter which I view with less enthusiasm than most of the wise principles advocated from these benches.
      All these things the Government are now prepared to do and all these concessions they are prepared to make, but still it is not enough. The door even to negotiation remains firmly shut so far, and the House might well ask what further concessions the most exigent bargainer could demand and what further concessions even the most pliant petitioner could concede.
      I think that the answer is that it now appears to be not enough for Britain to accept what the Treaty of Rome expressly provides. There must be further sacrifices, further concessions, not even as the price of certain entry, but as the price of being admitted to the negotiations. Devaluation and the abandonment of sterling are the sort of additional requirements which are now spoken of, beyond the heavy forfeits of the Treaty. Sterling is not to be abandoned suddenly, the Foreign Secreary said this afternoon. By implication, something less than suddenly it is to be abandoned.

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      The House is entitled to know where the Government stand on all these further concessions. Do they stand at all, or is it right, as has been unflatteringly suggested, that they have a different posture—on their knees? They are as profligate of concessions as the 18th century gamblers were of their patrimony. Their attitude to concessions is, "You name it, we give it". To what avail? It is humiliating to have to offer a large price, but it is still more humiliating to offer it and nevertheless be refused.
      We all recall the Prime Minister's famous reference to the spaniel rolling on his back for the favours of General de Gaulle. But the Prime Minister's position is not even that of a spaniel receiving the customary and requited affection. His attitude in this matter will ensure him in the verdict of history the uphappy description of the spurned spaniel.
      There is no proof that even all the concessions will procure entry. At the end of it all we can apparently still be told, having made all the concessions, abandoned all conditions and put the country in this humiliating position, "You are not the sort of members we want in our club". In that case the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary will be in the unhappy position of the millionaire who spent his fortune curing himself of halitosis only to discover that his friends did not like him anyway.
      There is a growing and widespread feeling in the country that Britain has been put, or is being put, into a position incompatible with her dignity and interests. There is a widespread feeling of humiliation and frustration, and it is by no means confined to those who have either opposed or had doubts about our application to join the E.E.C. in the past. It is a widespread, growing and natural feeling and one that a proud people will not bear indefinitely. They will expect action of the Government and expect it speedily, beginning with action to cure her economic weaknesses.
      We are tired of being thought of and referred to as the sick man of Europe in economic terms, of having the finger of scorn pointed at our balance of payments difficulties. It is essential, whether this country is inside the Community or with-
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      out, that action be taken to put us on a firm base of economic strength, because in the modern world there is no political influence without economic strength.
      Secondly, we should take action to strengthen our association with countries outside the Six so as to have constructive alternative arrangements. I stress "constructive" because I have not in mind at all the sort of action to which Lord Chalfont was said to be referring. I would not counsel or condone any action taken in a spirit of pique or petulance against our European, friends or in a spirit of revenge if they do not allow us in.
      On the contrary, I believe that this country should persevere with arrangements honourably entered into in the national interest. I think that that is the right approach, and I believe that it justifies the claim I made in the House on 10th May to be as good a European as the applicants for entry. It turns out, I think, that I am probably rather a better European than some of them.
      The action that I have in mind is the exploration of the possibilities of extending, on the basis of retained sovereignty, the scope of our association with E.F.T.A. and the Atlantic and Commonwealth countries. There has been considerable interest and support for this sort of exploration. I want to refer to two aspects.
      The Canadian-American Committee, non-governmental but a very influential and important body, recommended:
      "That as a first step the Governments of the United States and Canada initiate discussions with the United Kingdom and its partners in E.F.T.A. to explore their interest in establishing under G.A.T.T. rules, a broad free trade association of developed nations, recognising that special consideration must be given to less developed countries."
      Sir Robert Menzies, in a speech referred to already by the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell), said:
      "If, as appears to be the case, the consideration of the British application is indefinitely postponed, what is the most important task for the future? It seems to me that, in the period ahead, serious consultations should be put in hand by Britain, the developed countries of the Commonwealth, and the United States, to determine whether special economic arrangements cannot be established."

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      It is not, I believe, right to consider that we have a stark alternative between complete and unconditional absorption into the Community, on the one hand, and isolationism, on the other.
      There is one further consideration, and that is in regard to the time factor. Time is eminently not on our side in this matter. It very seldom is. The chances of making appropriate arrangements elsewhere will diminish with every day abortively spent awaiting the pleasure of the Six. We cannot, if we are realistic, expect the world to stand still to please us. We cannot expect other countries to keep the options indefinitely open and to gear their pace to ours. Therefore, it is not only humiliating to be kept waiting in the outer courtyards of the Community. Because it prejudices the chances of fruitful association elsewhere, it is also damaging to the national interest.
      Therefore, I conclude by urging the Government to stop this policy of drift and acquiescence and take note alike of the present frustrations and underlying determination of the British people and initiate action to ensure their future wellbeing and a rightful place for Britain in the councils of the world.
      6.14 p.m.
      Sir Dingle Foot: I should have liked to follow the remarks of my right hon. Friend the Member for Battersea, North (Mr. Jay) and the right hon. and learned Member for Hertfordshire, East (Sir D. Walker-Smith)—I have often observed that there is an unholy alliance between the isolationists of the Right and the isolationists of the Left—but I intervene for a somewhat different purpose.
      I wish to bring the House back for a few minutes to the situation in the Middle East. Twenty-two years ago I was selected by Sir Winston Churchill as one of the British delegates to San Francisco. That was in 1945, when we drew up the Charter of the United Nations.
      At that conference it was generally realised that we must take account of the realities of power. Hence the great Power veto in the Charter. We realised that the United Nations, at any rate until it became stronger than in its early days, could not prevent a clash between the great Powers. But it was intended to
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      create a peace-keeping organisation which could deal with all other threats to world peace. The situation which now prevails in the Middle East is precisely the kind of situation that the United Nations was originally intended to deal with. It will be a tragedy if it fails to do so, and a very heavy responsibility will rest upon any Government represented at the United Nations which contributes in any way to such a failure.
      Today is the 50th anniversary of the Balfour Declaration. We shall all, I think, acknowledge that, first, the creation of the Jewish National Home in Palestine and, second, the setting up of the State of Israel represent one of the greatest and most remarkable achievements in recorded history. But we must also acknowldege that this was achieved only at the price of gross, wicked and monumental injustice to the Arabs of Palestine. That injustice has persisted.
      Almost every year since 1948 the United Nations has called attention to the Arab refugees from Palestine, and has recommended—if that be the correct term—either that they be allowed to return to the homes from which they were expelled or that they should receive compensation. No effect has ever been given to those resolutions. That is tine underlying cause of Arab-Israeli enmity in the Middle East.
      I intervene because I believe that there is now an opportunity, although it may be only a very faint one, of achieving a settlement. My right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) exhibited some curiosity about my recent visit to Cairo. I assure him, as he was assured by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, that I did not go in any way as an emissary of the Foreign Office. If my right hon. Friend asks why I should have been invited by President Nasser, I will explain that I went on my own initiative. Because of an article which had appeared in the Press from the editor of Al-Ahram, which interested a great many of us, it seemed to me that there might be occasion to visit the Egyptian leaders, and that is why I went.
      During the course of the conversation that I had with him President Nasser made the suggestion that there should be a revival of the Armistice Commission

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      of 1949. He did not insist on any preconditions; he merely suggested that the Commission should be brought back to life. It consisted of three Israelis and three Egyptians in those days—they would now be representatives of the United Arab Republic—with a United Nations chairman. That seemed to me a very reasonable and constructive suggestion. It was made not only to rue, but through me, and it appeared in the Press all over the world. It must have been observed in Tel Aviv. I can only regret that no response has come to that suggestion from the Israelis.
      The other matter upon which President Nasser laid the greatest emphasis is that which I have already mentioned, the Palestine refugees. He made it abundantly clear that there could be no lasting settlement until that problem was solved.
      The meeting followed the Khartoum conference, where President Nasser's views prevailed and where the leaders of the Arab States adopted a line of extreme moderation. In spite, therefore, of the events which followed—the sinking of the Israeli destroyer and the firing of the Egyptian oil refinery—I believe that it may still be true that there is a chance of a settlement, one which could lead first to the acceptance by the Arab States of the existence of Israel and even the passage of Israeli ships through the Suez Canal.
      I am not saying that this was what was said to me by anybody. It was only the impression I was able to form. In return, there would have to be in the long run a solution of the refugee problem and in the shorter run a withdrawal from Egyptian territory now occupied by Israel.
      Mr. R. T. Paget: When my right hon. and learned Friend keeps on referring to a solution of the refugee problem, surely he is aware that, during these years, Israel has accepted refugees from Arab countries in considerably larger number than the Arabs expelled from Israel. Mesopotamia, for instance, has less population now than it had in Biblical times. There would be no difficulty in settling these people in Arab countries were it not for the political advantage of their existence which has been exploited.
      Sir D. Foot: Of course Israel has accepted immigrants from many quarters. I referred earlier to the plight of the Arab refugees who were driven from their homes, whose land it was and who have been referred to year after year in United Nations resolutions. I reiterate that no effect has ever been given to those resolutions by the Israeli Government.
      Mr. Sydney Silverman: Is it not the fact that the Egyptians, for 20 years, have refused to discuss anything with Israel, even the question of the refugees?
      Sir D. Foot: As I have pointed out, there was the Armistice Commission in 1949, which operated with three members from each side under United Nations chairmanship. It was precisely that arrangement that President Nasser proposed to revise.
      It seems to me that if this chance, if there be a chance, is lost, it is one which may never recur in our lifetime. For Israel, it is not just a question of formal recognition, because Israel's survival in the long run must depend upon coming to terms with the other nations of the Middle East. It is true that, so far, the Israelis have won every military encounter, twice by their own unaided efforts and once with Anglo-French connivance and support. But there is an historical analogy, to be drawn from the war between Sweden and Russia at the beginning of the 18th century.
      Sweden was a much more highly organised and progressive State than Russia and in 1700, at the Battle of Narva, a small Swedish Army led by King Charles XII was victorious over a Russian army ten times its size. When the news was reported to Peter the Great, he observed, "The Swedes will defeat us a hundred times, but in the end they will teach us how to defeat them." His prophecy was justified in the event.
      We have now an opportunity to restore our relations not only with the United Arab Republic, but with the whole Arab world. Those relations have, of course, been impaired by the memories of two events—and memories are very long in the Middle East. First, there is the memory of the dishonoured pledges given between 1915 and 1918 to the Arabs;

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      secondly, there is the memory of what happened 10 years ago at Suez.
      When I discussed this matter in Cairo, the editor of Al-Ahram repeated to me with considerable emphasis what he had already written in the Sunday Times, in which he stated:
      "Britain has made a positive contribution here and could do so again. She laid the basis of our civil service. We respect her scholars, teachers and doctors. We trust her machines and appreciate her type of efficiency which achieves results discreetly without show. We admire her courage and endurance of the Churchillian variety and her sense of fair play although our faith in this was sadly shaken by Suez. It was not so much that you attacked us. If you had said outright that you were invading Egypt we would have hated but respected you. But it was the deceit, the lies and the collusion, which took years to be revealed."
      In this, as in other matters, it falls to this Government to repair the errors of their predecessors. I believe that my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary has gone a long way to do so. We have the opportunity now for a fresh start. The war in Southern Arabia is being brought to an end and so is the war in the Yemen.
      Many of the causes of conflict have been removed. Certainly, I came back from Cairo with the impression that not only in official circles, but very widely indeed,t here was a desire for a rapprochement with this country. It was largely due to the speech made by my right hon. Friend at the United Nations at the end of the fighting last July. I think that we can now feel that we are entering a new and more hopeful chapter in Anglo-Arab relations.
      6.26 p.m.
      Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles: I hope that the right hon. and learned Member for Ipswich (Sir Dingle Foot) will forgive me if I do not follow him into the dust and sand of the Middle East, but turn, instead, to the paddy fields and mangrove swamps of Vietnam. These debates often tend to become something of a geographical patchwork quilt.
      The Gracious Speech says:
      "My Ministers will seek to use all available means to achieve a negotiated settlement … in Vietnam."
      Of course, that is an immaculate aim. No one here or outside would be other than delighted to see peace in Vietnam.
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      No one who has seen the extent and ferocity of the Vietnam war and the havoc and destruction that it is bringing, as I have myself during recent weeks, can doubt that the task of bring an end to the war is extremely urgent in every way.
      The only differences which we are discussing and which are likely to divide the House today concern the means by which peace in Vietnam is likely to be achieved. There are those who consider that this can be done by gimmicks, by sending special representatives to Hanoi, and so on. But I feel that these gimmicks are now discounted and that there is a general realisation of what a very large-scale problem this is.
      It is not too much to say that the situation in Vietnam has been developing for nearly 50 years. I suppose it started with the despatch of Borodin to the Far East by the Bolshevik Government. Since then, we have had the years of the warlords in China, the Japanese expansion and defeat, the Chinese civil war, the revolt against French colonialism with the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, one of the most remarkable battles in history, the Geneva Conference and years of subversion by the North against the South. So perhaps it is rather too much to hope that a problem of this magnitude and of such very long standing can be easily or quickly solved—at one stroke of a pen, so to speak.
      About this war, it is tempting to discuss "bombing pauses", "escalation", "hawks and doves"—the sort of slang which has arisen in connection with it. But these matters are really outside Britain's control. What we surely ought to be discussing is what Britain should do to assist the peace in Vietnam that we all wish to see. There are only two possible courses. Either we must support the American Government's action, broadly speaking, or we must dissociate ourselves from American intervention altogether, as recommended in an Amendment on the Order Paper.
      In saying this I discount the third possibility of sitting on the fence, which I fear is what the British Government have been doing so far. I discard this as being too despicable and, indeed, as liable to bring us the worst of both possible worlds in the long run.

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      I personally advocate—I have said this before—lending all possible support to the American intervention: and I will give a few reasons why. In the first place, much more than just the fate of South Vietnam is at stake. If South Vietnam were to be abandoned to her fate, President Eisenhower's "domino" theory, which I believe to be a valid theory and a very vivid way of expressing the situation, would operate and many other countries of Asia would quickly fall prey to militant Communism.
      If South Vietnam were abandoned to her fate we might, in the short term, have a temporary end to the loss of American, Australian, New Zealand and other soldiers. But there would inevitably very quickly be a resurgence of Vietcong activity. We must remember that the Vietcong from 1st January, 1967, have already murdered—I use the term advisedly—2,500 people, they have wounded another 3,500 and they have abducted from their homes and villages another 5,000.
      Mrs. Anne Kerr: I wonder whether the hon. and gallant Gentleman would care to list the number of people murdered by the Americans and by the Saigon puppets?
      Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles: I do not consider that the Americans have murdered anybody.
      If Vietnam were to be abandoned to her fate, we should inevitably have a much bigger war on our hands certainly for our children and probably in our own lifetime.
      In this context it is important to realise that physical fear is much nearer the surface in Asia than it is in the over-civilised countries of the West. Fundamentally what makes a peaceable peasant into a Vietcong guerrilla is fear of the consequences to himself and his family if he does not submit to intimidation. We in this country tend to take law and order for granted, but in countries where it does not occur naturally people are much more vulnerable to the sort of intimidation about which I am speaking. Countries like ours which have achieved, broadly speaking, a freedom from fear, have, I believe, a very strong moral duty to protect people who are in this predicament. The Australian De-
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      fence Review makes this point extremely well when it says that the countries of South-East Asia need the assurance of strong friends to protect themselves from external threats and from internal subversion so that their economic systems may evolve and their political systems may work out in the way which we all wish to see.
      Mr. David Winnick: The hon. and gallant Gentleman a moment ago, as the defender of American policy in Vietnam, denied that the Americans had murdered anybody. May I ask the hon. and gallant Gentleman whether he saw the letter published in the Sun and the Daily Mirror this week from a G.I. serving in Vietnam about what happened on his operations, and the report in The Guardian today of a correspondent who visited the casualties of American bombing when the Americans used anti-personned bombs and pellets? Yet the Americans claim that they are only interested in bombing military installations. How does he explain that?
      Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles: I have not read either the letter or the report which the hon. Gentleman has mentioned, but I have myself seen the war there.
      I agree with those who say that for peace in the world freedom from want must be achieved. This is not entirely a military problem. Freedom from want must be achieved if we are to make any progress in this vast problem which faces us. I believe that morally the West has an absolute responsibility to go to the economic rescue of these under-developed countries; but—and this is the essential point—no amount of economic aid can be of value unless peace and law and order can be achieved and guaranteed.
      The Mekong Delta alone could grow enough rice to feed the whole of Vietnam, North and South, with plenty to spare for millions and millions of other people in South East Asia if only peace and law and order prevailed. New strains of rice seeds developed in America could assist this process, but while there are still Vietcong bands terrorising the countryside and the paddy fields in the Mekong Delta it is impossible for anybody to use them. These Vietcong guerrillas must be cleared out first. After that has been accomplished the technology of the West could then move in and make a real onslaught

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      on hunger and disease and the other tribulations which face the under-developed countries.
      While I am on this subject, I would like to pay tribute to the British medical team which is working in Saigon. The activities of this team have not been sufficiently widely made known in this country. There are five doctors and a number of nurses who were sent out by the Ministry of Overseas Development. They are working in a children's hospital in Saigon. With enormous tact and patience they have completely gained the confidence of the Vietnamese doctors and medical staff in this hospital.
      It is a very moving experience to go to this hospital, which has about three times more patients in it that in has beds, and see cots with three children crawling round in each one like puppies in a basket in a pet shop. By their devoted work these doctors and nurses are doing a tremendous amount to overcome the difficulties of these children and, in particular, in dealing with cases of disease arising from under nourishment and malnutrition.
      I should also like to pay tribute to the Ministry of Overseas Development which, I was told by the doctor in charge, has been quite splendid in providing quickly the money and equipment and everything which his team could possibly need.
      This is all very fine, but it is a drop in a bucket, and I feel that it is important to realise that this kind of work, which is attractive and valuable, can only take place if security has first been guaranteed.
      The American military effort is vast and effective and extraordinarily impressive. I saw the United States Marines at Dah Nang. I went to sea with the American Seventh Fleet and saw its gigantic carriers operating at sea and flying off strikes. I also flew over the area where the Australians, who are making a tremendous reputation for themselves, were operating in the jungle.
      The fact is that the Americans are steadily gaining the upper hand militarily, but it will be a very long job. What a tragedy if this expenditure of blood and treasure were to be wasted by lack of patience in public opinion in the United States or in any other country. This is why I personally deplore the activities of
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      Vietnam International, World Congress of Peace and so on in London, Stockholm, Vienna, and other places who, by such curious coincidence, seem to stage their demonstrations on the same weekends. I believe that these are largely unashamedly Communist-run organisations, but which also largely consist of well-meaning people who wish to see peace, but who have not thought out the problem and who are duped by very cleverly organised Communist propaganda. [An HON. MEMBER: "Farcical."] I do not think that the subject of peace in Vietnam is farcical.
      Mr. Winnick: Why did the hon. and gallant Gentleman not answer the point that I made earlier?
      Mr. Speaker: Order.
      Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles: The Americans understand perfectly well that this war cannot be won by military power alone. American soldiers and sailors to whom one talks understand this. The United States is making vast efforts to assist the South Vietnamese Government with its classification and rural development programmes. In passing, I would like to pay tribute to the hospitality given by the South Vietnamese Government to Members of Parliament, from both sides of the House, who went there during the Summer Recess to inform themselves of the real conditions in Vietnam.
      I think that tribute should be paid too, to the South Vietnamese authorities for the work which they are doing under extreme difficulties. They have held an election, something which a democratic country like ours was not able, or was not willing, to do during war time. This holding of an election is an achievement in itself.
      The South Vietnam Government have under way a most imaginative scheme to deal with rural development and reconstruction. This is the so-called Revolutionary Development Corps, which has an enormous training camp at Vung Tao. There are 7,500 youths under training at any one time, and the object is to send them to areas recently liberated from the Vietcong. They are there to stiffen and support the morale of the local villagers, to use their arms to prevent any resurgence of Vietcong activity, to help with medical assistance, agricultural advice, and so on. It is an imaginative and large-scale activity.

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      In this context, what must Britain now do? What part can Britain most effectively play? I believe that there are three principal points which should be made. First, it is vitally important at this time, of all times, that Britain should remain in the Fast East. I think that the Government's policy of announcing a withdrawal from the Fast East at this time is catastrophic. We must stay in the Far East because of our stabilising influence. We must remain there to bear our fair share of peace-keeping. We are, incidentally, strongly requested to stay there not only by the Americans, whose motives are clear, but by Australia, New Zealand, and many South-East Asian countries. Mr. Lee Kuan Yew said:
      "I feel the fate of Asia—South and South-East Asia—will be decided in the next few years by what happens out in Vietnam."
      That is a clear understanding by a most notable South-East Asian statesman of the side on which his bread is buttered. It is as simple as that.
      While Britain has any forces at all, an Army, a Navy, or an Air Force, if they are not deployed in the Far East where the threat to peace is greatest, where should they go? A year ago the Foreign Secretary—I mean the present one—said:
      "..I cannot accept the proposition that our rôle east of Suez has come to an end. Are we to dissociate ourselves entirely, may I ask, from that part of the world in which the greatest danger to peace now lies. If you are an isolationist or a pacifist you can answer that question 'Yes' … the good old `I'm all right Jack' doctrine … but whether we like it or not we have still got responsibilities east of Suez. It is being said that we should plan to discard or transfer these by 1970 … Mr. Chairman, I do not think that would he a plan, I think that would be a plain scuttle."
      One must reflect that perhaps the Foreign Secretary's views are less "immovable" than he is.
      The second basic reason why Britain should continue to exert her influence in the Far East is to support Australia, about whom hon. Members on both sides have spoken today. Our relations with Australia have become rather strained because of the Common Market, although I think that the Australians are well on the way to understanding the problem now. They have been strained by our failure to support them actively in Vietnam, though when I was in Australia for
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      several weeks I was never reproached by anybody on this score, or at least not directly. The Australians have not agreed with the British Government's actions over Rhodesia, and they have bitter feelings about the present Chancellor's restrictions on the export of capital, which, as Sir Alexander Downer has pointed out, are extremely short-sighted and liable to do Britain more harm than anybody else in the long run.
      Most of all, the Australians feel that our withdrawal from the Far East now is quite incomprehensible. In April of this year, at the S.E.A.T.O. Conference, Mr. Hasluck, the Australian Minister for External Affairs, said
      "… Lack of interest in Asia today is isolation in its most feckless form."
      I think that one can sum up the Australians' attitude to Britain in the words of one of my Australian friends who said that they see the United Kingdom as a beloved old aunt who is beginning to behave a bit oddly in her old age; she is a bit eccentric.
      Finally, I believe that it is vitally important for the British Government to stop sitting on the fence. I believe that as a constructive contribution to peace in Vietnam we should send at least nominal military assistance to the United States. We should do this to show the world that we admit and recognise the moral right of what the Americans are doing out there for the peace of the world as a whole.
      6.48 p.m.
      Mrs. Renée Short: I am sure that the hon. and gallant Member for Winchester (Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles) will not be surprised to hear that I cannot accept a word of his interpretation of the situation in Vietnam. I think that most decent people in this country, and, in fact, throughout the world, accept that the Americans are carrying out an imperialistic war in a country where they have no right to be.
      It is clear that our party—and I think that it reflects public opinion in Britain as a whole—is completely opposed to the attitude taken so far, and is very anxious that the British Government should take more energetic and vigorous steps to bring the American Administration to a reasonable frame of mind.

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      I pay tribute, as the hon. and gallant Gentleman did, to the work being done by the pediatric team in Saigon, but we should not overlook the fact that, by a tremendous voluntary effort, people in this country have collected enormous sums of money to send to Vietnam as a whole to help the victims of American aggression. I have the honour to be the vice-chairman of this medical aid appeal. l hope that the hon. and gallant Gentleman is listening to me, because I am still addressing him. If he is concerned about the situation there, and would like to play his part in helping, perhaps he will join one of the blood donor sessions which are to be arranged in the near future for Members of Parliament.
      Mr. Eldon Griffiths Mr. Eldon Griffiths (Bury St. Edmunds)rose—
      Mrs. Short: The hon. Gentleman can give some of his blood, too.
      Mr. Eldon Griffiths: I would be delighted to offer some now.
      Mrs. Short: I am not going to bite on that one now. We are discussing the Gracious Speech. Many speakers seem to have overlooked that fact. We are all concerned to see that our economy is placed on a firm basis and that we overcome our balance of payments difficulties.
      In that context, if we look at the contents of the Gracious Speech to discover what is contemplated we are disappointed, because the key problems of industry are not to be tackled in the legislative programme for the coming Session. We are promised legislation to assist the modernisation and technological development of industry, but if we are to become only merchant bankers, as the Prime Minister suggested, there will be many discontented voices on this side of the House. If Government money is to be invested in private industry, it must be invested in the wisest way. We do not want to assist the down-and-outs. We must be certain that we have some control over the policy and a share in the profits of industries which are helped by public money.
      In his first-rate Bristol speech in March—which was referred to by my right hon. Friend the Member for Battersea, North (Mr. Jay)—the Prime Minister listed the
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      economic problems that will face us if we should be so unwise as to enter the Common Market. He said:
      "Unless we modernise and streamline our industries, base our attitude on a full day's work for a full day's pay at all levels within industry, unless we continue, as we have in the past eighteen months to strengthen sterling and our balance of payments—then the Common Market choice is simply between being a backwater inside Europe and a backwater outside Europe."
      The Prime Minister also said in that speech that the Common Market was not a cure-all for Britain's economic problems. We would all agree that we have to use the possibilities, talents and skills available here and to use every means at hand to get ourselves into a state of economic health.
      What the Prime Minister was referring to when he talked about modernising and streamlining our industry was productivity, the basic problem of industry. Here we come up against what was referred to recently by another gentleman outside—someone with whom I do not normally agree. He uttered some strictures about incompetent, inept and untrained managements, who made their contribution to the difficulties in which we find ourselves, and he was absolutely right. We must do everything we can to make sure that our industries are placed on a modern, streamlined basis, of the kind mentioned by the Prime Minister.
      Many industries are modernising, but others are far too slack, and this is something to which the Government must pay attention. The Government have it in their power—they wield enormous power—to concentrate on encouraging efficient industries to become even more efficient, and to encourage those who want to modernise to do so, by the simple expedient of using their purchasing power. This is not done, although certain industries rely, as to 70 per cent. or 80 per cent., on the work given to them by Government Departments and local authorities.
      The building industry is a classic example. But when I asked the Minister of Public Building and Works if he would see that orders were placed with those industries which had a certain number of technologically trained people on their boards of directors, his answer was "No". This is the way in which the Government could encourage industries to

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      become up to date and re-equip themselves.
      We must look for salvation at the means which are at our immediate disposal. I want to refer to the trade agreements that Britain has, but I want first to add a word to what my right hon. Friend the Member for Battersea, North said about Commonwealth trade. We are enjoying very considerable Commonwealth trade. No less than 25 per cent. of our total exports go to the Commonwealth. This represents a considerable amount of trade, which could not be replaced by trade with the Six if we went into the Common Market. Common Marketeers say that Commonwealth trade does not matter, but I do not agree. Commonwealth trade is tremendously important both to us and to the Commonwealth countries.
      Common Marketeers play down our Commonwealth trade and say that it is no longer as important as it was in the past. This may be so. Commonwealth trade has shown a tendency to fall off since our last ill-fated attempt to get into the Common Market, and it is not surprising if that trend continues, because Commonwealth countries must set up their own defence mechanisms, and we should not be surprised if they end by looking in other directions because of the way in which their economies will be affected if we go in with the Six.
      It is not surprising if important Commonwealth countries are now looking in other directions for their trade—looking to America and Japan. We must fight against this; we must not accept it. Commonwealth trade is valuable to us and we want to increase it, so as to get it back to the level at which it used to be, and even to do better than that. The first thing that the Government should do is to win back the Commonwealth trade that we have lost because of our attempts to get into the Common Market.
      Sir Frederic Bennett: I agree with the hon. Lady about the need to maintain and increase Commonwealth trade, but I cannot understand her argument about our losing it if we join the Six. The Six have increased their direct trade with the Commonwealth since the Community was first formed.
      Mrs. Short: But several Commonwealth countries have geared their whole
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      economies to the British market, and if they now find that British customers are not going to buy so much from them they will change direction and look to other areas for their trade.
      The problem of E.F.T.A. trade is not appreciated by those who are anxious to get us into the Common Market. Until 1966—seven years after the formation of E.F.T.A.—one of the most startling aspects of the situation was the lack of interest shown by British industry in E.F.T.A. trade. British industrialists thought that the E.F.T.A. market was not important. They were not interested in the small population of Norway—3 million—or the 5 million people of Switzerland. But the 20 million inhabitants of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, together with Finland, import more than twice as much as the 50 million people of France, and Switzerland's trade deficit with the Common Market was about 400 million by 1966.
      British industry, like certain sections of the British people, were fascinated by the idea of going into the Common Market, having been brainwashed by certain sections of the Press. They overlooked the possibilities of E.F.T.A., and neglected it. Only when the tariff wall was reduced did some British industrialists realise the full potential of E.F.T.A. trade.
      The result has been that our main competitor—West Germany—has been able to get into the E.F.T.A. countries and is now their main supplier of electrical goods. She also supplies a large proportion of their consumer goods, including cars. About seven out of 10 electrical appliances in E.F.T.A. countries come from West Germany. The West Germans also have about 60 per cent. of E.F.T.A.'s car market. This is a serious reflection on our industry and trade, because these are goods that we could supply E.F.T.A. countries just as well.
      In 1959, Britain had 35 per cent. of E.F.T.A. trade, about £1,300 million a year. In 1966, over 6 years after the Association began, it had fallen to 29 per cent. Clearly, we are allowing our trade in an important area in which we have influence to decline. If our percentage of trade with E.F.T.A. had remained at 35 per cent. we should have had about another £150 million of exports, which

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      would have been an important contribution to our balance of payments. The Government should give far more vigorous attention to the need to increase this trade. The possibilities are there and there is no reason why British industrialists, goods and skill should be pushed out of that market by West Germany.
      Another area in which we have considerable potential but are doing practically nothing is the Comecon countries in Eastern Europe, where our total trade, out of about £5,000 million-worth of exports a year is the almost unbelievably ridiculous figure of £150 million—to a market of about 350 million people. This is utterly stupid and indefensible.
      For example, last year we exported about £196 million-worth to Holland and £179 million-worth to the Irish Republic, but only £150 million-worth to the whole of Comecon, including the Soviet Union. That means that we send £19-Worth of goods per person per annum to Holland and about 5s-worth to Eastern Europe, which makes it clear that we have a good deal of leeway to make up.
      The interesting point about our trade with Eastern European countries is that they are very anxious to increase theirs with us and their spokesmen have said that they wish to see a considerable expansion of their trade with the West. I was in Rumania this summer and know that their target is to increase their trade with Western Europe by 55 per cent. by 1970. The Czech Prime Minister last year said that he wanted a 25 per cent. increase in exports from Western Europe.
      The potential of these countries is growing, to buy not only heavy machinery, including complete factories, but also consumer goods. As they are now increasing their gross national product by 6 per cent. to 11 per cent. a year, which is a significant increase—far more than we have been able to achieve—it is clear that there is scope here for a great increase in our foreign trade potential.
      Of course, we do something to stimulate the knowledge of British goods which are available. I congratulate the Board of Trade on what it has so far done in stimulating and supporting trade fairs and exhibitions of British goods. This should be continued; most industrialists
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      who have exhibited abroad would agree that they are well worthwhile and lead to valuable orders.
      There has also been an improvement in the commercial and scientific staff sent to our embassies, certainly since 1964, and this useful trend should also be continued. A commercial attaché can play a useful part in acting as a contact between the State buying organisations of a country and the British firms who want to export. I wonder whether the, Department is doing everything possible to promote interest in and knowledge of the potential market in Eastern Europe. The Board of Trade's Export Department dealing with Eastern Europe, for example, is staffed by only a handful. I hope that this will be extended, since many firms have proved that they can trade in Eastern Europe.
      Many in my constituency are really "swinging" and have invested in new machinery and sent selling teams and experts there, and have received substantial orders as a result. One now hopes to sell a complete factory to East Germany, which will bring us about £250,000. There are great possibilities here, and the Government need to stimulate this, to make sure that, in this area, we are not beaten again by West Germany and Japan.
      In all the countries that I visited recently—Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany to some extent, and Roumania—West German and Japanese electrical and consumer goods are to be found. The French have sold complete car factories to Roumania which will be producing large numbers by 1970. British firms which tendered for these were left out in the cold, partly because the prices and delivery dates were not right—these are the old arguments of those who want to buy from us—but partly because we were unwilling to engage in joint scientific and technological projects with the countries concerned. It is a great pity that we should lose car and plane orders for these reasons.
      I hope that some of the projects now in the pipeline with some of these countries will mean that we shall go all out to secure the orders and will not allow these considerations to prevent us from clinching the deals and these

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      valuable contributions to our trading position to go to West Germany or France.
      If the Prime Minister and the Government are concerned about the encroachment of American capital in Europe, and if this is the reason why we have to go into the Six to form a larger unit, we should look at the figures which the Foreign Secretary gave some time ago about the G.N.P. of the different groupings of nations. They show that we are looking in the wrong direction and for the wrong solutions.
      He said that the G.N.P. of the Common Market countries and the E.F.T.A. countries together was about £135 billion. It is not certain, of course, that all the E.F.T.A. countries would wish to enter the Common Market, and we know that some have serious reservations, but that is the total, taking the two together. The G.N.P. of the Soviet Union, without the rest of Eastern Europe, is about £72 billion. The G.N.P. of the United States of America is £210 billion. Therefore my arithmetic shows that the G.N.P. of the United States is the equivalent of that of E.F.T.A. and the Common Market and the Soviet Union together, but that the G.N.P. of the Common Market and E.F.T.A. and the whole of the Comecon bloc exceeds the United States G.N.P.
      I endorse the proposals that my right hon. Friend the Member for Battersea, North made for the inner and outer ring, but we should not at this stage cast off the potentiality of the Comecon bloc so easily. There is great trade potential there if we could bring together the three blocs now dividing Europe. I think that this is the rôle that Britain ought to be playing. She could not play it if she became swallowed up in the Six for she would have no room to manoeuvre and no credibility vis-á-vis the Comecon bloc. This is the part that I want Britain and the Labour Government to play. It is clear that if the three blocs of Europe could be brought together in a trading organisation it would do much to remove the political difficulties that divide us.
      There is, of course, the over-riding problem of the American war in Vietnam which poisons the atmosphere. There
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      are also other problems. When my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) congratulated the noble Lord upon what he had said and mentioned only the removal of British troops from West Germany and said that all of us would support that—we do—he did not refer to the other things the noble Lord had said. The noble Lord is alleged to have said that we should recognise the Oder-Neisse line. We should. It is stupid that 22 years after the war we do not recognise the frontiers established as the result of that war. Millions of people lost their lives to establish that frontier, and no one in his right mind would suggest that we should restart the war to change it.
      There is also the question of Germany. We should recognise East Germany. It is ridiculous that a State that has existed since 1948 should not be regarded as being on the map and that we should pay lip-service to what the West Germans say about East Germany—that it does not exist and that the West German is the only Government that can speak for the whole of the German people. This is nonsense, and we have said so at Labour Party conferences. What the noble Lord said was no more and no less than the policy of the Labour Party laid down at the party conferences, that the Oder-Neisse line should be recognised and that de facto recognition should be given to East Germany. At the 1961 Labour Party conference we carried a resolution moved by the present Foreign Secretary for the recognition of East Germany.
      If we could get such a kind of trading agreement between the three blocs and use the tremendous gross national product that exists between those blocs in the whole of Europe we could really go forward and not only trade but contemplate valuable and useful technological and scientific development that would put in the shade the ideas put forward for development within the Community.
      I hope very much that some of these ideas will be acceptable to some of my right hon. Friends. It is time that we got away from the sterile old ideas. I do not believe that the idea of going into the Common Market commands support in the country. I believe that the majority of our people are opposed to it. My right hon. Friend the Member for

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      Battersea, North put forward his case in very great detail today. Our entry would mean that our cost of living would rise and so there would be pressure on wage and salary levels. That would affect the cost-effectiveness of our export goods. Therefore, our trade in all the areas that I have mentioned would be affected. Our Commonwealth trade would be affected still more. Our E.F.T.A. trade would be affected. Our trade with the Comecon countries, small though it is, would be adversely affected.
      It is nonsense. How can the Labour Government contemplate putting this burden on the backs of the people? It is beyond all comprehension. They are following the policies that the Opposition unsuccessfully put forward. Why do we have to follow the same line? Is it not time that we looked in other directions, showed a little more adventurous spirit and were a little less conventional in our foreign policy and our home policy, too?
      We must consider these bread and butter things. We are in politics because politics means power. We have to consider the effect that this will have on us when the next General Election comes. [HON. MEMBERS "Oh."] Of course we have. If we have any sense we must do. We had the disastrous results of the local elections in April and May when all over the country local authorities which had been Labour-controlled became Conservative-controlled largely because of the disenchantment of the people with the economic policies being pursued by the Government.
      If the Government are to pursue this Common Market application, which everyone admits will have a very serious effect on the cost of living, what do my right hon. Friends on the Government Front Bench think will happen about our chances at the next General Election?
      The Minister of State for Common-wealth Affairs (Mr. George Thomas): We shall win.
      Mrs. Short: We shall not win.
      When the British housewife finds that she has to pay 8s. a lb. for butter, that milk may be rationed in the winter and that the Sunday joint may disappear from her table, does anybody suppose that she will continue to support the party that
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      brought these things about? Of course she will not.
      I hope, therefore, that my right hon. and hon. Friends will think very carefully about our Amendment on the Order Paper and that we shall not continue to go round begging and knocking on the doors of West Germany or France. I think that both those doors are closed to us; it is not only France. Herr Kiesinger made this very clear when he was here a few days ago. Once we find—I hope that this will he in a very short period of time—that the application will not be accepted we should withdraw it.
      Several Hon. Members Several Hon. Members rose—
      Mr. Speaker: I would remind the House that hon. Members have been sitting all day, some for two days, waiting to be called. Anyone who has the good fortune to be called might think of those still waiting.
      7.18 p.m.
      Mr. Douglas Dodds-Parker: I shall resist the temptation to follow the hon. Lady the Member for Wolverhampton, North-East (Mrs. Renée Short) in a number of the points that she raised. Eastern European trade is much tougher than she makes it sound. The hon. Lady talks about slack management. I was not sure whether she was talking about her own constituency. There are not many slack managements in this country. Most of them are working very hard. All know that they have shortcomings, but present conditions do not help.
      The hon. Lady is surprised at the fall in our E.F.T.A. trade in 1965–66. She does not seem to understand the resentment felt against the surcharge. However, I was glad to hear her talk about profits, knowing what a fervent admirer she is of the present Prime Minister. He was talking about profits the day before yesterday. "Profits" used to be a dirty word on the Government benches, but I am not surprised that after 20 years of nationalised industries they realise that someone has to make the surpluses out of which taxes can be paid.
      The hon. Lady talked of putting certain people on the boards of companies. I know a company which put a young Ph.D. technologist on the board and sent

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      him to Australia, but he never came back. These are the sort of practical realities that we are up against in this country.
      But I do not want to talk about those things. I wish to confine my remarks to paragraphs 5, 6 and 8 of the Gracious Speech. I fully support the statement of my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition that he "doubts whether at any time since 1945 the Speech has been read in a more dangerous situation overseas or a more disturbing one at home." I will confine my remarks to what is happening overseas.
      Readers of the newspapers can follow daily, almost hourly, the disasters that are taking place overseas. I doubt whether we have yet reached the trough, and my hon. Friends and I must watch with dismay and frustration as bad is made worse by Ministers of the present Government, despite the warnings and advice being given to them by us. I intend to come to the subject of Aden, in particular.
      First, however, there is one area in which the Government might usefully call in aid the growing potential of influence, if not of power, known personally to the present Foreign Secretary, the Minister of State and the Commonwealth Secretary, for they have been there and they are regarded as good comrades and colleagues. I refer to the Council of Europe and the Western European Union Assembly, to both of which I have had the privilege of being a delegate for the last three years.
      In the 'thirties, when I started taking an interest in public affairs, a great many journalists, diplomats and businessmen had a good idea of what was afoot in Europe—but, alas, with respect, this House did not seem to have such a good idea. Now, however, there is very much less excuse. I believe that there are in Europe several hundred politicians who have worked for 20 years or more to solve what they broadly understand to be each other's problems. They have been working towards creating a united Europe. I believe in our joining the Community and the importance of E.F.T.A. and, like many of these politicians, that we should be working for something beyond that. The hon. Lady the Member for Wolverhampton, North-East mentioned Eastern Europe. I
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      want to see Spain and Yugoslavia—two great countries of Europe.
      The present Foreign Secretary, in these Assemblies, is regarded—as are his two colleagues to whom I referred—as a good European, because, like those other two Ministers, he has been there for a number of years, including the visits he paid when in opposition, and, therefore, has a good following. But when these Ministers are in a position to do something constructive, then, like others, they often pay too little practical attention to what goes on. This is a pity, particularly since the great majority of Parliamentarians in the Council of Europe and elsewhere are working towards the same end.
      For example, Resolution 353 of the Council of Europe, which was passed unanimously on 28th September of this year, calls on those concerned
      "… to make the most determined efforts in a spirit of mutual understanding to resolve the problems"—
      which we are facing in Europe
      "and therefore to begin the negotiations with a minimum of delay".
      Despite what has been said in this House today, it is worth recalling that that Resolution was passed unanimously only a month ago. I will not say anything now which might in any way endanger the negotiations, which I hope will be entered into without too much delay.
      Having said that, there are three points which I must make. First, I spent a month in France at the Agricultural Committee meetings of the Council of Europe and I went on to the Assembly meeting, I met many, including a number of former war-time Gaullist comrades. Not a single one did anything but look forward to the time when we are members of the Community.
      Secondly, however, it should be made clear that the majority of them support General de Gaulle on domestic policies, as the referenda, which they from time to time hold, show. They prefer the stable Government which he has given them to the disarray of the Fourth Republic. This is a considerable warning to all politicians. It is a dangerous trend to those of my generation, a trend which we have seen before.
      Thirdly, I sincerely believe that this country sometimes looks rather odd from

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      the other side of the Channel. The Community is a market economy. Few of them, three years later, believe the myth which the Labour Government here tried to put across about "the mess they had inherited" in 1964. On the other side of the Channel they have seen what has happened since 1964 and they realise who has made the mess. Even the Socialists among these Europeans do not want more nationalisation and more intervention in industry and commerce of the type the Prime Minister was talking about when speaking to the Address a couple of days ago. That is not the sort of development they find works, and that goes for the Socialists in their ranks.
      I need give only one example to illustrate this point. Within the Community at present there is a free movement of capital. Yet in this country, 22 years after the war—with our second bout of Socialism—one is allowed £50, if one has it, with which to go on holiday. The psychological effect of this on Europe is incalculable. It is deplorable that at this time we should still, for a fourth year under a second Socialist disaster, be maintaining that limit.
      I listened with some interest and some dismay to the speeches of three right hon. Members among the half-score of right hon. Members who have so far spoken in the debate, but for whom I have considerable regard. I refer to the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell), the right hon. Member for Battersea, North (Mr. Jay) and my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hertfordshire, East (Sir D. Walker-Smith). I listened to them putting forward the sort of objections to our closer association with Europe which one has heard so often voiced, both in this House and outside, in the last 10 years.
      I can only believe that the right hon. Member for Battersea, North, when President of the Board of Trade—with all the machinery of the Government behind him—must have worked out these proposals and put them forward to his colleagues and that they must have been turned down. They must have been seriously considered in the ranks of the Government and the Cabinet. And as my right hon. Friend the Member for Flint, West (Mr. Birch) pointed out, the proposals which the right hon. Member for
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      Battersea, North put forward were discussed in Europe 10 years or more ago. I believe that at present they are not negotiable. However willing we may be, I do not believe that the Europeans will find them acceptable, considering how far they have got with the Community. If we want to get associated with the free trade area in the Community we must accept not only industrial free trade but also the common agricultural policy.
      Like many of my hon. Friends, I have political aims for the Community beyond economic ones. I have always believed that if we had had the Community in years gone by we would have avoided at least one of the last two wars. The way the world is going, we must work harder and faster towards a common European policy. This being so, I particularly draw attention to Recommendation 498 of the Council of Europe, the last paragraph of which calls on the Committee of Ministers
      "… to take all appropriate steps in order to reach a common European stand on the Middle East crisis".
      For the past three years—indeed, since the war—many hon. Members on both sides of the House have tried to get European support for a common policy on the Middle East. The Middle East problem stems from the creation of Israel, which itself resulted directly from the anti-Semitism of Europe. Whatever the rights and wrongs of its creation, its existence has been accepted by the United Nations, and that is the basis on which we must all work.
      I find that in recent months—certainly since the war of June—there is a greater understanding of this problem, and of its origins, in Europe. It is for Europe to take a greater interest in this at Strasbourg and also at W.E.U. I find that this interest is growing, first, because they realise that the energy supplies—that is, oil—of the largest part of Western Europe, and of a great part of the free world in the Eastern hemisphere, depend on the free flow of oil from the Middle East.
      I commend the committee which was set up—and Her Majesty's Government took part in its establishment—under O.E.C.D. to organise the free flow of oil. The necessity for this organisation was vital following the June war. I pay

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      tribute to the Committee because I understand that, in effect, there has been no check in the flow of oil and no shortage of a serious nature to any consumer in the Eastern hemisphere. I should like to know whether the Government intend to maintain this committee permanently, or intend, at least, that it should do some contingency planning so that if such a situation should arise again the committee would have plans ready.
      My second reason for finding increasing interest in Europe in what is happening in the Middle East and the Mediterranean is on the strategic side. The French are about to cede Mers el Kébir—that port of great sadness to all in this country—to Algeria, and the British are about to abandon Aden. By about the end of 1968, therefore, it may well be that these great bases will be occupied and used by the Russians in a way that the Czarists would never have dreamt of achieving 50 years ago.
      On Aden, I recall the warnings given from these benches in the last few years, in particular about the deterioration that would take place if responsibility for internal security were not transferred in time. Nevertheless, there was delay in the transfer, and I believe that the result will be even greater chaos than there was in Palestine. Not many hon. Members now remember those days, but then we did not have the sort of warning we have had over Aden. It is now more a matter for the historians to record than for us.
      I believe that, when the time comes, one of the greatest condemnations of the Government or lack of government will be what the Socialists have done in the last two years over Aden. They will leave another running sore there, and a blot on the good name of this country, by the vacillation and incompetence in the last few months of our rule. One's sympathy and regrets go to the High Commissioner, the administrators, the troops, and particularly to those in the business community, of many other races besides our own, who thought that they had found prosperity and some sort of security in Aden but who are apparently, to be abandoned in the next four weeks without there being any definite plans about what is to be done for them.
      I only pray that the final stages will not be too prolonged or bloodstained,
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      and that we shall find some authority there to avoid the running sore of civil war such as we have seen in the Yemen. It is all very well for the Foreign Secretary to say that the situation is much better there but my information is that that is not the case. I trust, too, that we will not give aid to a successor Government in Aden unless they appear to be not only responsible but humanitarian. I hope that we shall not support one side in a civil war.
      When I heard what the Foreign Secretary had to say about Perim, I recalled what was said by my hon. Friend the Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Eldon Griffiths) during the Committee stage of the relevant Bill earlier this year. It is a great pity that the Foreign Secretary has not been able to persuade the United Nations to accept our suggestion to take an initiative which might have set a standard for peace-keeping activities in other parts of the world. Instead, that organisation appear again to have accepted sectional rather than universal interests in turning aside our offer.
      I have not been able to find the quotation, but I remember that soon after the Prime Minister took office he talked about the waste of expenditure on arms in developing countries. Hundreds of millions of pounds of aid are being poured out by this country and other countries to those who use their own resources to buy arms, and receive them also from Eastern Europe, in order to attack their neighbours. Egypt, I suppose, is the prime example. We all know the difficulties there have been in the Middle East since the breakdown of the 1950 declaration.
      Unless there is universal agreement on the supply of arms I do not believe that we can go on handing out arms indefinitely in the years ahead. We see the advocates of Marxist Socialism at home and overseas decrying, hindering and punishing free enterprise economy, yet expecting those countries which follow a successful market economy to continue with aid and arms so that those countries may go to war against each other. We had the so-called confrontation in South-East Asia, which I am glad to say has now come to an end.
      I would call the attention of the Foreign Secretary to the remarks of Sir Duncan

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      Oppenheim, at the International Chamber of Trade dinner. I see that the Secretary of State for Economic Affairs is present, and I hope that he will pay attention to what Sir Duncan said about overseas investment, the Reddaway Report and the C.B.I. booklet on overseas investment. Our balance of payments is as good as it is only because we have brought back £400 million from overseas capital investments this year.
      When Ministers give instructions for the reconvened U.N.C.T.A.D. conference in Delhi in February, 1968—which organisation was given such a splendid start by my right hon. Friend the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) and the present Leader of the Opposition—I pray that these will be linked with some agreed control of arms sales. Without such control, I believe that insanity will become criminal.
      7.36 p.m.
      Mr. Donald Anderson: Although I shall not follow the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Mr. Dodds-Parker), I admit to being somewhat intrigued by his ability to use the word "Socialism" as though it were a four-letter word. That has never been my own view. Like him, however, I can claim to be more representative than other hon. Members who have so far spoken in this debate of the eight-to-one decisive majority registered in the May vote for our application to join the E.E.C.
      Although I am a convinced European, and was a convinced European before it was fashionable in my own party to be so, I should like, in particularly, to compliment my right hon. Friend the Member for Battersea. North (Mr. Jay) on his presentation which was, perhaps, the best delivered in this Chamber on the Common Market issue. At the same time I felt that he was parading the arguments of yesteryear, the arguments before the decisive vote was taken here in May at a time when he was a member of the Government, and a member of the Government, too, when the Foreign Secretary laid out our conditions in his July speech to the Assembly of the Western European Union.
      I thought that my right hon. Friend's speech was marred by his selective quotations. He quoted from the right hon.
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      Member for Barnet (Mr. Maudling) in 1959, from my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister in 1964 and more recently, instead of tackling what is now said by the right hon. Gentleman and by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister on the European issue.
      My right hon. Friend's speech was marred, too, by his pessimistic assumptions, for example, about industrial development certificates. He argued that any firm denied the ability to go to one of the development areas will up and go to the Continent and be a complete loss to the country, but did not take into account the other side of the balance sheet—that European firms are more likely to settle here as a result of our entry. He forgot entirely the likely increase in U.S. investment here once we are part of this larger market, and U.S. investment which can be steered more easily to the development areas. This is a fact. There are particular attractions in our market for U.S. investors, partly because of the habit of relationships with our country and partly because of the influence of the London capital market. We are likely to gain substantially from an increase in U.S. investment which is more likely to be steered to development areas.
      Another pessimistic assumption was the £175 million to £240 million contribution to the agricultural fund which, in the White Paper prepared by the Minister of Agriculture, was put as the most pessimistic assumption, suggesting that when the prices are reviewed in 1969 the relationship between cereal prices and livestock prices will remain the same. It was a totting-up of the most pessimistic assumptions in each field, making a formidable total which of course no one would accept.
      The basic argument against the intellectual case put by my right hon. Friend is that it is entirely built on sand. It is based on a false alternative, on an association agreement with the Six, the association of the E.F.T.A. countries with the Six, which, as everyone knows, would be quite unacceptable to the E.E.C. and that we should gain the advantages of the industrial market with no attempt to align our policies on the agricultural side. This is not at all what the French Government have talked about when they have broached the idea of association. To

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      build his case on this alternative is to build on a false alternative and to build his whole structure on sand. Those are a few remarks I make about a speech which otherwise was perhaps the best which has been made on this subject in this House.
      Following the Luxembourg meeting last month, many are asking. "Where do we go from here?", as if there had been some sort of fundamental change in matters since the decision was made by this House in May to seek negotiations. This fundamental change in policy is desired by a minority in this House and many of their spokesmen have given their views in this debate as if at Luxembourg the French Government and M. Couve de Murville had imposed a new veto. This questioning as if things had changed fundamentally was increased by the Chalfont incident over last weekend, which I believe has been blown up out of all proportion by Press comments and incidentally by comments of some Opposition spokesmen who have not helped the Government in their attempt by parading it before public attention to make party capital out of this issue.
      What were merely hypothetical answers to hypothetical questions have been called by some official policy, but I pose the question, has anything fundamental changed in regard to our E.E.C. application following the Commission's report and following the Luxembourg meeting last month? Certainly the French position has not changed. I am sure that the position adopted by M. Couve de Murville was not unexpected by the Government at that time. The French attitude is quite consistent with the attitude adopted by the President during the visit of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister in March this year and consistent with the Press conference given by the President of the French Republic immediately after the debate in this House.
      The basic point is that the French Government have found that we in the United Kingdom have answered successfully their earlier objections to our entry. On the first objection—is Britain really prepared to accept the Treaty of Rome?—successive Government spokesmen have made clear that we are pre-
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      pared to accept the full implications of the Treaty. The second one was, what about the special relationships that the U.S.A. has with Britain? The difference between 1962, the time of the last negotiations, and 1967 is the difference between the Nassau Agreement and the Defence White Paper to which the Foreign Secretary drew attention in putting our emphasis on defence entirely in Europe.
      So, having had these two objections answered, the French have changed their tactics and are now raising the two new objections of the weakness of the United Kingdom economy and the rôle of sterling. These are real objections, but, as the Foreign Secretary said today, we are very ready to discuss them if the French and their partners are willing to discuss them on their side in a constructive spirit. I think the real French objection has not yet been brought forward. It is rather more a political objection based on French interests and not on the best interests of Europe. The French at the moment are playing a very dominating rôle within the E.E.C. Some people say the French have taught their partners to speak their own language and when forced many French spokesmen will argue that their fear is that their own comfortable position in the Six will be overcome by some sort of West German-United Kingdom dominance if we enter, that we in the United Kingdom who were unwilling to enter the train as it left the station have jumped into the guard's van and would like to make our way to the driver's seat.
      It is this sort of objection which we have to recognise at the basis of the French view of our attitude to the E.E.C. Therefore, if the French Governmental attitude has not changed since May and nor have the views of our friends in France, including those in the Gaullist Party and in the féderation, so the position of the Five has not changed since May—
      Mr. Roebuck: Would my hon. Friend consider that the views of a number of hon. Members have changed, for instance my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer), who hitherto has been a great supporter of the European movement? Would he take that into account?
      Mr. Anderson: If it is not mixing my metaphors, I would say that one Heffer does not make a summer.
      Mr. Roebuck: Nor does a bull at a gate.
      Mr. Anderson: I certainly have not noticed a fundamental change among my colleagues in this House. The position of the French Government has not changed, nor the position of our friends in France and the attitude of the Five has not changed in this E.E.C. context. There are limits, of course, to what they will do to help us. They will not wreck the E.E.C. undertaking because, largely as a result of agricultural policy, they are already too enmeshed in Europe and are gaining too much industrially and agriculturally from relationships with the E.E.C. at present.
      I think the domestic position in this country—this is the answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow, East (Mr. Roebuck)—has remained unchanged since May, underlined by the massive majority in this House in the vote following that debate and underlined by the Scarborough decision which removed the last domestic obstacle in the way of our entry. In parenthesis, I am a little saddened by the lack of evidence on the part of the Government of further research since May into the implications of our entry. I should hope that there would he now considerable attempts to analyse the effects region by region using the economic councils to prepare for entry.
      I have tried as best I can to work out the effects on my native Wales of our entry into the Community. I am not worried about the regional policies and I am less worried about the effects on coal and steel, but clearly the agricultural sector in Wales is highly vulnerable. I hope that much research is going on within the Government into how we can meet these difficulties. We say that we are going in basically for industrial, political and technological reasons. We must ensure that farmers do not suffer as a consequence. I hope that when we get to negotiations Ministers particularly concerned, in this case my right hon. Friends the Secretary of State for Wales and the Secretary of State for Scotland,
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      will sit in on negotiations to ensure a fair deal for their own peoples. I hope that more work is going on, both on the effect on regions and on a deal for sterling, than is so far evidenced by governmental publications.
      If there were a further veto by the French, clearly we could not enter this time round. Equally, if the price demanded were too high, which virtually is the same thing, it would be foolish for us to enter this time round. If there is a veto or if the terms offered are too high, I believe that we must avoid at all costs the very real danger of a hasty reaction on the part of the House and on the part of the country. At lowest, this could take the form of action of the type of the cancellation of Princess Margaret's visit to Paris, which I hope that the Tory Opposition will try to forget, following the last veto.
      People will come forward parading the same old alternatives. I understand that the Atlanticists, for example, are about to launch another offensive in Britain. This link-up on a North Atlantic basis will be no real alternative but will be a very unequal partnership with the U.S.A., with the danger of political domination, which I consider to be very unwelcome. There would be a danger of our reacting to a further veto by changing our course irrevocably and in a way which many of us on mature reflection would much regret.
      We must continue to make it clear, as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has made it clear in his speeches, that for us Europe is our first best. The big question is: have we chosen the European road? I believe that by the decisions of the House and by the decisions of the country we have proved that we have chosen Europe and that for us Europe is our first best alternative.
      The problem in the interim period before entry is that of doing nothing to stand in the way of possible entry and of looking at all our problems through European spectacles. For example, we must ensure that in new legislation nothing is done which would make us drift further apart, possibly irrevocably, from what we have decided firmly is our best alternative. We must not flirt with false alternatives from which we could not disengage when the right time comes.

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      The normally pro-French The Times said this in a leader on 26th July:
      "General de Gaulle's term as French president has another five years to run, and although it is perfectly possible that his successor will take over before 1972. … It is necessary for French and foreigner alike to prepare a general line of conduct to adopt during the long, sad process of the General's erratic decline. … The Common Market, and Germany in particular, must brace themselves for further chastisement and British policy must continue along its present lines of bearing with the General's provocations and preparing the ground for a speedy entry into the Common Market as soon as he departs."
      This is a difficult period for those who, like myself, were brought up with a profound veneration of French civilisation. It is a very difficult period for people who would normally be Francophile, as myself.
      In conclusion, the arguments in favour of our entry are still as they were at the time when the House made its decision. The political, economic and technological arguments put forward so convincingly by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary at Scarborough still apply. The degree of Europeanisation in this country is just as strong as it was then. The fundamentals remain unchanged. I believe that it will be a difficult and a long haul, but with stamina we will do it.
      7.55 p.m.
      Mr. Eldon Griffiths: I hope, Mr. Deputy Speaker, that you will not consider it impertinent if I start by complaining about the way in which we organise our foreign affairs debates.
      I have listened today to a series of admirable speeches on a very wide range of subjects, in particular, those in Europe and the most moving speech on Aden by my hon. Friend the Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys). I find it difficult to consider this a debate when, instead of dealing with one or two subjects, we try to deal with the whole range of world subjects. It ceases to be a debate. It becomes a series of intersecting monologues. The House should give some thought to dividing these foreign affairs debates in such a fashion that we attempt thoroughly to deal with one subject such as Europe rather than spot ourselves round the horizon and deal with nothing as thoroughly as it deserves.
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      That said, I will pass quickly from one subject—the Middle East—to the other theme that I want to deal with. I mention the Middle East briefly because of a phrase that the Foreign Secretary used today. He said that some of the problems of Aden had been dealt with. He then said that those problems which had not been dealt with by the date in November when British troops are to withdraw, would be "left pending".
      That was a most extraordinarily irresponsible statement. Always in the past, when British territories have come to independence, we have required and brought about four things—order, representative government, protection for minorities, and economic viability. I put it to the Minister that in Aden none of the prerequisites has been attained. There is no order, there is no representative government, there is no protection for minorities, and there is no economic viability. If these are to remain under the heading of "left pending" this will be the first time in our long and proud history that we have ever cut adrift a small country in so disgraceful a fashion.
      One of the problems left pending is the Island of Perim, in which a I have a special interest. I was very sorry to hear the Foreign Secretary say this afternoon that the United Nations would not accept a British offer for this vital strategic point to be internationalised. The Foreign Secretary undertook in the House to do his utmost. I am sure that he has. But it was a misconceived procedure that took him to the Special Committee of 24. The right hon. Gentleman would have been much wiser to have gone to the General Assembly so that this matter could have been debated in public by all the nations of the United Nations rather than being placed before the Committee of 24, which has a built-in majority of those who would in no circumstances have accepted the offer.
      I am sorry that the Foreign Secretary did it that way. It is also a humiliation that the letter sent by the British Government to U Thant making a unique offer to the United Nations is still, some four months later, unanswered. That is a very unsatisfactory situation and I wish to give the Minister notice that when we come to the Order in Council which the Government will need to cut Perim adrift, some of us on this side of the

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      House will want to hear much better arguments than we have been given this afternoon.
      I turn now to my main theme—the widespread sense of helplessness and frustration that many British people feel about our dwindling capacity to influence events in the world. Many Members have spoken about a mood of frustration and anxiety in our country, and nowhere is it more apparent than in foreign policy. Our diplomats have been beaten up and humiliated, in Peking if not in the Savoy, and there is nothing effective that Her Majesty's Government are able to do on their behalf. Our citizens, including our pilots, are seized and there is nothing that the British Government are able to do for them. The Suez Canal has been closed, and yet for all the protestations and all the sensible steps that I believe the Foreign Secretary is taking in Cairo, the Canal remains closed. Our ships are still locked in the Bitter Lakes and seem likely to remain there for some time.
      More important is the evidence of British powerlessness in the three great centres of world influence—the Soviet Union, the United States and Western Europe. I start with Russia. The Prime Minister knows a great deal about Russia, especially Russian timber. Yet on the 50th anniversary of the Bolshevik Resolution I doubt whether British influence in Moscow has ever stood so low as it does today. We heard not so long ago of Mr. Kosygin, the Soviet Prime Minister, flying to the United States to consult President Johnson on a possible settlement in the Middle East, a matter of vital importance to Britain.
      Mr. Kosygin flew to Paris and held meetings with General de Gaulle. He then proceeded to Washington, omitting to stop in London. On his return, once again he felt it right to stop in Paris. And once again he overflew London in spite of—so I am informed—private attempts by British Ministers toencourage him to come here. I think it is perfectly plain or the evidence of Mr. Kosygin's journey that the Soviet Union—not to put too fine a point upon it—simply does not give a damn for Her Majesty's Government's views on world affairs. British Ministers in Moscow have about as much influence as a flea in a bearskin.
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      Now I turn to the United States. A year ago I wrote an article in The Times in which I said that the Americans like us more as a people but respect us less as a Government. At that time the Prime Minister was furious. He complained that this was very damaging to the British case. But what does he say today, when we see in the American Congress the beginnings of protectionism against British goods, difficulties arising about the supply of American aircraft to the armed forces of this country, when we see the United States pre-empting the sale of British aircraft in Latin America and when we see the Foreign Secretary complaining, inaccurately as it turned out, that he was not consulted over the American decision to build an anti-ballistic missile screen? Against that background, who will doubt that British influence in Washington is waning?
      I turn to Western Europe, the third great area of power. I am proud to stand here as an ardent European. I wish the Government well in the policy that they are pursuing. I believe we have had a setback and I am sorry that the other day the Foreign Secretary denied that there had been a setback. But I am sure that it is right for our country to pursue a European policy, and though the way will be difficult and long, I believe that eventually we shall, as we must, succeed.
      Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that our influence in Western Europe is smaller today than it has been for a considerable time. There has opened up again a credibility gap. One of those achievements on which I would compliment the Foreign Secretary is that, representing a Labour Government which in their 1964 election manifesto made some very anti-European sounds, by hard work he has nevertheless convinced a majority of the Governments of Europe that this country really does want to get in. He got over the problem of disbelief that first existed and he deserves full credit for that.
      The unfortunate thing is that over the last two or three weeks much of his hard work has been thrown away. Our credibility once again is in doubt. The doubt perhaps was begun by the Prime Minister's casual statement after the Luxembourg talks that we should now have to strengthen E.F.T.A. No doubt, there is advantage in strengthening

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      E.F.T.A., but the Prime Minister should be very careful, for it is precisely that kind of remark at this particular stage which raises questions about the sincerity of the British Government.
      Again, we had the incident of Lord Chalfont. May I say, having myself attended innumerable off-the-record briefings with senior statesmen in this country and many others, that I can well understand how Lord Chalfont got himself into the difficulties that he did. I understand it, and I sympathise with him. Nevertheless, I am bound to make a comparison between this and those long and difficult months when my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, negotiating in Brussels over an infinitely more complex series of problems than Lord Chalfont has yet had to face, week after week saw members of the Press and helped them to understand what the Government were seeking to do, without making one single gaffe. It is the difference, if I may say so with the greatest respect, between a man and a boy. My right hon. Friend showed at that time how the handling of negotiations should be done.
      The credibility gap having been opened, I am sorry to say that it was widened still further two or three days ago by another incident which the Press, fortunately, has not reported widely in Europe and which I hope it will not do so. This time it was the Leader of the House, the right hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman), who, speaking in the by-election at Leicester, was taken to task about the increased cost of living in Britain. He replied that under the Tories it would be even worse because we stood for levies under the Common Market, whereas the Labour Party stood for subsidies. He said that at a public meeting last week.
      I am sure that the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, who is sitting on the Front Bench, will agree that if the present Government are to get into Europe, as he and I both hope they will, it is absolutely imperative that we accept the common agricultural policy, the levies, the financial regulations, and so on. This is an essential part of our negotiating position. So, for a senior member of the Cabinet to have gone to a by-election meeting and once again to have damaged
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      the Government's negotiating position in this fashion, is irresponsible and is likely to open further the credibility gap.
      I turn now to the reasons why, in those three main centres of power, the Soviet Union, the United States and Western Europe, our influence has sunk so low. The first is that we are throwing away a great deal of British power. In the first instance, it is economic power. Our balance of payments difficulties and our failure to develop a vibrant and dynamic economy have, without doubt, lowered our influence in the world, But there is too the doctrinaire abandonment of a good deal of our military power. This, too, unquestionably, is reducing our capacity to influence events.
      The third reason is a diplomatic one, the tendency of right hon. Gentlemen opposite to talk beyond their power. One example is Rhodesia. They would like to bring down Mr. Smith, but they cannot. In short, they have talked loud, but they have not been able to achieve.
      Then there is Vietnam. Not so long ago the Foreign Secretary was going to solve the problem for us. He has talked big, but he has not been able to achieve. Then again, there was the Prime Minister's statement when the latest Middle East crisis broke. He was going to reopen the Straits of Tiran with a multilateral fleet. He talked big, but he failed to deliver. Again and again, by using language in excess of the power available to Her Majesty's Ministers, the Government have devalued their own influence in the world.
      Yet the biggest reason for the dwindling of British influence is that Britain has not yet found a satisfactory rôle for the latter part of the 20th century. A distinguished American writing recently in the Atlantic Quarterly said that our situation was "post-imperial and pre-European". That accurately diagnoses our present situation. But I know what our rôle ought to be. It ought to be founded essentially on Europe, and, to that extent, I support the Foreign Secretary's efforts in the Common Market and wish him well in them. But beyond the Common Market there is the indispensable requirement for us to maintain the Atlantic Alliance. Quite simply, without N.A.T.O. we should be either Red or dead

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      But N.A.T.O. is out of date. The cold war has been replaced by something different; the Iron Curtain is punctured by "pop" music and by the motor car. There is today a majority of people in America and in Europe under the age of 21, and to these young people the pictures of Indian children starving or of the war in Vietnam are far more urgent than SACEUR's need for more or fewer troops on the Rhine.
      The Atlantic Alliance it is true is changing. But in some ways it is changing for the worse. France has resigned. The United States is preoccupied in Vietnam. There is an upsurge of neutralism and even pacifism in much of Scandinavia. Many young Germans are beginning to look to the East. Our own country's contribution dwindles in proportion to its economic difficulties.
      These are not the hallmarks of an alliance forging ahead. They are symptoms that all is not well. N.A.T.O.'s biggest problem is, quite literally, to make itself relevant to the generation of the Beetles. To do this, it must tackle, and must be seen to be tackling, the problems of today and tomorrow, not the problems of yesterday.
      The first problem is the growing disparity of power between the United States and Europe. The only answer to that problem is to make Europe stronger, and this requires British membership of the Common Market. I wish that those Europeans, French, Germans and others, who complain about United States dominance of Europe would recognise that there is no possibility of achieving equilibrium between the two sides of the Atlantic without British membership of Europe.
      The second problem which must be tackled is that of nuclear sharing. The M.L.F. is dead. The A.N.F. was always a farce. The McNamara committees have borne fruit, but it is urgent that we go much further towards finding a political answer to this awesome problem.
      Lastly, N.A.T.O. must find ways of more effective and quicker consultation over threats to peace and security, wherever they may occur. It is not good enough that the Suez Canal was closed, that the non-proliferation treaty was brought almost to the point of signature, or that the U.S. decided to develop an
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      Anti-missile screen, without N.A.T.O. having achieved a common front on these vital matters.
      It is therefore crucial that, in pursuing their European policy, which I support all the way, the Government should at the same time seek to make the Atlantic Alliance stronger and more relevant to the new generation. In the end, by going into Europe, it is my hope that Britain can serve as a hinge upon which the narrow Europe of the Treaty of Rome may swing open into a much wider Atlantic conception.
      8.16 p.m.
      Mr. Hugh Jenkins: I hope that the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Eldon Griffiths) will forgive me if I do not follow him in his interesting speech. The moments of perception which characterised his latter remarks, when he referred to the nature of the widespread feelings among the younger people of Europe, led me to think that, for a moment at least, I was with him in his diagnosis even though I profoundly disagreed with his remedies.
      I wish to refer to the Amendment which stands in the name of several of my hon. Friends and myself, in which we ask the House
      "humbly to regret that the Gracious Speech contains no undertaking to implement the new official Labour Party policy of dissociation from the United States Government's intervention in Vietnam".
      Lest some hon. Members may not be conversant with the precise terms of the resolution there referred to, I shall quote it. It was a resolution carried at the last Labour Party conference in Scarborough,
      "That this Conference calls upon the Labour Government to dissociate itself completely from the policy of the United States Government in Vietnam and urges it to support U Thant and the overwhelming majority of the United Nations in trying to persuade the Government of the U.S.A. to end the bombing of North Vietnam immediately, permanently and unconditionally.
      "Conference believes that any settlement must he based upon the 1954 Geneva Agreement, which required the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Vietnamese soil, and the reunification of Vietnam under the government chosen by the Vietnamese people".
      In his interesting speech today, the Foreign Secretary prayed in aid of the Government's policy for entering the Common Market the support which the Scarborough conference had given to that

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      policy in one of its resolutions. In these matters, the Government cannot be selective. They must not say, "The party supports us in this resolution, and we therefore act with that support", without saying, equally, that they will act in the light of the party's resolutions when those resolutions are ones they do not want.
      The resolution on Vietnam which I have read was carried. My right hon. Friend has pointed out that it was carried by a narrow majority. Precisely what we are meant to infer from that I do not know. A resolution is either carried or lost. If it is carried, it becomes the official party policy. This means that those of us who support the resolution are free to advocate, inside this Chamber and everywhere else, that it be carried out and in so doing we are the custodians of official party policy. As members of the party, we should in those circumstances expect members on the Front Bench to take due note of what the party considers the Government should do. I hope that the Government will not reject that proposition. It is fashionable nowadays to depreciate the rôle of party in the processes of democracy, but I think that it was Disraeli who first pointed out that in modern society without party there is no democracy.
      I deplore the tendency to play down the importance of conferences and congress. Our democratic system really consists of two stages. We tell people that it is their duty and privilege to vote every so often, but we also say that if they want to go a little further, and not only make choices but take a part in deciding the nature of the choices, they can do that by joining a party. If we do not take due account of party decisions, therefore, we destroy a fundamental upon which our democratic process is based. Accordingly, while it is true that the Government in power are the Government of the country and must make their own decisions, and that party decisions are binding upon them, it is equally true that a Government will ignore the decisions of party conferences at their peril.
      The right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) referred in his speech to the possibility of finding a solution to the prob-
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      lems of Vietnam, and it struck me how very similar was the solution he sought to that which was found in 1954. That was perhaps the last time when this country played an essential peace-keeping rôle in the world, and it is to the credit of the party opposite that they had a part in it. Since then, the peace has been kept significantly not by this country but by others. For example, it was the United States which intervened to rescue the party opposite from the folly of Suez, which followed so quickly and tragically after their much more satisfactory intervention in the Vietnam troubles in 1954. It was the Soviet Union which intervened between India and Pakistan in Tashkent and re-established the peace there.
      We have an opportunity to play a really adequate peace-keeping rôle in Vietnam on the line of the Labour Party conference resolution. We should take the first step of not following the United States in every twist and turn of its policy. That is what we seem to have done ever since we took the tentative step of dissociating ourselves a little from the bombing and then drawing back quickly in case we should have offended. It is not a position in which we can take great pride. It does not seem to me that the United States will take offence if we speak openly and plainly, as the Americans spoke to us when they disagreed with us on policy. I am persuaded that my right hon. Friends cannot have that complete identity of view with United States policy which seems to be suggested by their failure to protest at some of its manifestations.
      The 1954 solution which the right hon. Gentleman recommended we should attempt to re-create was sabotaged chiefly, if not solely, by the United States, which failed to follow it. It did not sign or ratify the Geneva Agreements. It established in Saigon a series of Governments—military dictatorships—which are a travesty of democracy. The present Government in Saigon, is not subject to an election which would be ratified had it been overseen by outside observers.
      Mr. Eldon Griffiths: If that is so and the United States established a series of monstrous Governments in Saigon, how does the hon. Gentleman explain that nearly 1 million people, voting with their feet, left the North and went to live in the

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      South under the Governments he is disparaging?
      Mr. Jenkins: There is a very simple explanation. The people who came from the North to the South are sometimes described as people who have left the North and sought refuge in the South, and on other occasions as infiltrators who have come from the North to the South to sabotage the Government and have had to be rounded up, kept in corrals and so on and prevented from having effective participation in the affairs of the South. I shall be glad to go into the history of the war in Vietnam on another occasion with the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds. We might stage a debate on it. If I did so now I should exceed the time limit which I want to place on myself.
      The nature of the decision taken by the Labour Party is not one which the Government should try to throw off. The day after the decision was taken, The Times said:
      "… there might be a little temptation for a few members of the Cabinet to begin pressing for the conference motion to be acted on."—
      as though it was something rather reprehensible that a member of a Labour Cabinet should go so far as to suggest that the party policy was something of which the Government should take note. The Times added that Mr. Brown was so committed on the Government's present Vietnam policy that a Cabinet decision on the lines of the conference resolution might oblige him to resign. It said that Mr. Wilson's attitude was likely to be decisive, for where he went the rest of the Cabinet was likely to follow without hesitation. I do not know whether that is true, but let us hope that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister will decide to go in the direction in which party policy advises him to go. He says that he will go that way on the question of Europe. Let us hope that equally he will go that way over Vietnam.
      On the same day the Daily Telegraph said of the resolution:
      "It will strengthen the hand of the 'rebels', by no means confined to Left-wing MPs, who will be satisfied with nothing short of complete dissociation from American policy."
      In fact, they actually want to see the resolution honoured. What is wrong in that?
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      The Daily Telegraph points out that if M.P.s do not support the Government at the next Division on a policy that conflicts with the resolution they can hardly be disciplined. I hope that the Daily Telegraph is right in that assumption.
      I should like finally to refer to the article in this morning's Guardian. The article states again something about which we should know—the intense savagery of the war in Vietnam. It has been the custom of the Front Benches to equate guerrilla activity with aerial activity, but I believe that it is a false equation. The right of a man to defend himself on his own soil by means that are sometimes very savage is deep in history, and if there is any fighting that is right that is it. It is the sort of fighting we can all understand. It is instinctive in most people. But the sort of warfare which employs the most sophisticated weaponry from overseas and is now admittedly based on a policy of endeavouring to terrorise the civilian population is the sort of war which is utterly unworthy of the United States and which our Government ought to have the courage to denounce.
      I hope that the Government will think again about their policy in respect of Vietnam. I hope that if another group of students attempt to come here from Vietnam the Government will not feel frightened and refuse to let them in. I met some of them. They were, perhaps more than students. Whatever people come here from that country, I do not think that there is anything that they can say which will reveal more to our people then the very respected journalists who have time after time made the sort of report that appeared in The Guardian this morning.
      I do not know whether the Amendment to the Gracious Speech which we have tabled will be called. If it is, I hope that many of us will go into the Lobby in support of it. Even if it is not called, I trust that the Government will take note of it and act in the light of it.
      8.30 p.m.
      Sir Frederic Bennett: I am sure that the hon. Member for Putney (Mr. Hugh Jenkin) will not be altogether surprised if I say that there was very little that I found in his speech with which I

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      could agree, except his remark that, whatever one's views are, the Government's present policies towards the Vietnam war represent in undignified and illogical posture. Having spent a substantial amount of the Recess in Australia, New Zealand and South-East Asia and Vietnam in particular, I want to address most of my remarks to that subject.
      Before doing so, I want to comment on one point that the Foreign Secretary made because it seemed to be of over-riding importance. It is in regard to Aden. I say this in a spirit of inquiry and not just of criticism. As I understand it, we are now going to take our forces out of Aden and bring our influence in Aden to an end within a week or two before the end of November, whatever the situation reigning there at the time. It was said that we should meanwhile negotiate various matters about the future government of South Arabia with whatever authority would emerge within the next week or two, and that we should also negotiate the security of British civilian subjects remaining there and of British assets remaining there. Nothing was said by the Foreign Secretary about how we should do these things if there was no effective authority there. The Government owe us a genuine explanation about what will happen if the right hon. Gentleman's optimistic prognostication that a Government is in process of formation is not fulfilled. Do we then change the date, or do we go out openly leaving a situation of chaos? The House deserves a definite answer tonight.
      There has been a good deal of talk today about our abandonment East of Suez. I speak with particular reference to Australia, New Zealand and South-East Asia. Even some of my hon. Friends may have fallen into the error of thinking that this is a price that we have to pay for closer association with Europe. I do not think that this is so. It is a very valuable asset to the peace and security of the whole world if British influence, in whatever form, remains strong in South-East Asia and Australasia. Certainly people in that part of the world, of all colours and races, concur with what I have said.
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      My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hertfordshire, East (Sir D. Walker-Smith) spoke about closing options. I wonder whether we are being so fervent about our abandonment of responsibilities in that part of the world in order to try harder to get into Europe and to convince our European partners that that is what we have in mind. If that is so, it is a great error, because if by chance the present series of negotiations should fail we should have closed the options and caused very considerable disturbance in South-East Asia and Australasia and still not have achieved our object.
      There is an unfortunate concatenation of circumstances which has made our threatened withdrawal appear all the more serious to the people of the countries that I have just visited. In the first place, there is the announcement of our fast military rundown. There may well be for economic reasons good grounds for a British rundown, but far too much emphasis and definiteness has been given to the final date of British withdrawal without any regard to the circumstances which may be obtaining at that time. There are those who say, "Why worry about trade influence in that part of the world just because troops are withdrawn?" We are told to look at Japan and other countries which have no forces in that part of the world and how successful their trade relations are. But there is a great difference between not having had a military presence there and taking one away which has been there a long time, along with the influence it gives.
      At the same time, the Chancellor of the Exchequer—and again it is an appalling sequence of ill-considered decisions that this should all happen at the same time—has made it very difficult for British investment to continue in Australia and elsewhere just at a time when it would start to prove most profitable to this country.
      Our friends in Australasia take note of this. They do not just look at one item in isolation. They do not only note that the British are withdrawing their forces, but that they are also cutting investment out there. They take it that this means that the British are losing interest in that

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      part of the world. The two things are put together in their minds and strengthen their apprehensions about the total withdrawal of British interests.
      Some of my Australian friends have said to me, "You British must be going mad. For many years you have been spending blood and treasure to bring about security and stability in this part of the world. Now, when it looks as though Australia is beginning to find its feet, when almost every day you read that a new mineral mine has been found, and when one can start thinking in terms of dividends, you are giving up your commitments on this part of the world on the basis that you cannot afford them."
      Over the past 50 or 60 years, irrespective of what Government have been in power here, we have never, except for seven years, balanced our trade by open exports as such. We have always only been able to balance our trade because of invisibles—through facilities granted to our ancestors to invest in other countries and ultimately to draw dividends after a period of time. It is not now or in five or 10 years but in 20 or 30 years that we shall find ourselves in serious difficulties with overseas earnings because of the Government's short-sighted policy of cutting investment in one of the few really pioneering and profitable parts of the world, Australasia.
      Also noted out there is the political dissociation from our Australian and New Zealand colleagues in their efforts in Vietnam. I join with my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Winchester (Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles) in his view of what is happening in Vietnam. When I was there I never received any reproof from Australians and New Zealanders. Indeed, there was a marked lack of bitterness, for which we should be grateful.
      But earlier, when Australian intervention in the Vietnam war was mentioned, there were cries from below the Gangway opposite, "What are they doing there? Let them go home". That is an unfortunate sort of remark because, I remind the House, the Rhine is as far from Australia as Vietnam is from London. Twice, once in my lifetime and once before, we were only too pleased that the Australians and New Zealanders
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      did not go home but fought for us when our interests and security were threatened. We can be grateful that no remarks like that were then made in the Australian or New Zealand Parliaments.
      I was delighted that my right hon. Friend the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) made the point that there are signs now of a war weariness and exhaustion in North Vietnam. I am talking facts now and not morality. Any visitor looking objectively at the scene will agree that this is so. The signs are there for all to see who care to see them.
      In the first place, the number of defectors from the Vietcong, both from the North and from the South, is increasing all the time. They are beginning to lose heart and that is shown also by the reduced ages of those still coming from the North to fight in the South. At the same time—and this is significant—the tails are going up in the South Vietnam Army. Morale is rising and desertions are falling.
      Perhaps even only seven or eight months ago, in every five Vietcong captured in South Vietnam there were usually four local recruits, with one "stiffener" from the North. Those figures are now precisely reversed. Nowadays, the Vietcong is finding it difficult to get any recruits from South Vietnamese villages because, for the first time, throughout South Vietnam there is growing a feeling in the villages that, after all, they may not indefinitely have to put up with the intimidation and attacks of the Vietcong and that maybe it is no longer in their interests to bow to the threats of the Vietcong. With this there has been an increase in the resistance of the local home guards, and all the other factors show a building up of morale in the South.
      Mrs. Anne Kerr: Does not the hon. Gentleman find it rather strange that it is terribly difficult for people who are trying to lay on teach-ins in this country to find anyone who will put up a case for either the Saigon Government or the United States approach on their aggression in Vietnam?
      Sir F. Bennett: I do not think that that comes within the purview of this debate. I should have thought that I was

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      doing the best job I could in being temporarily committed to it tonight and I propose to go on doing so for the next few minutes before giving others a chance to speak.
      The other important point is that we notice that the actual fighting is moving northwards towards the demilitarised zone. Why is that happening? There is a military answer. It is because the Vietcong are finding it increasingly difficult to fight with longer lines of communication, because they have lost the confidence of the local people, and, therefore, are having to fight nearer their own sources of supply north of the demilitarised zone.
      With reference to the British rôle in Vietnam, there are two possible views about it. One, which I would not agree with is that we should dissociate ourselves as those who say that this is a bad war for the wrong reasons in the wrong place at the wrong time. I can understand that, but there is also the point of view, which I understand to be the view of Her Majesty's Government, and which I share, that the Americans are doing a valuable job in preventing the expansion of Communist aggression in that part of the world. I understand that that is the Government's present attitude towards the war, yet in other words it could be summed up that we are behind the Americans as long as we are allowed to stay far enough behind. If that is not so, I would like the Foreign Secretary to tell us what is the British rôle. If we think that the Americans are doing a bad job and should not be doing what they are doing, we should dissociate ourselves from the war that is going on there. I take a different view, in favour of more active support but at least the former would be an honest and straight view and would be more appreciated by the Americans and people in South-East Asia than is our present equivocal attitude.
      Finally, very little has been said today about Indo-Pakistan relations. I think that in this case we should realise that, despite the temporary settlement that was reached at Tashkent, this was really only cramming the lid on a simmering kettle for a little longer. Conditions are particularly bad in India. They are rapidly getting better in Pakistan, for rea-
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      sons too long to go into now, but both countries are devoting too much of their resources to arms. The differences between India and Pakistan, with particular reference to Kashmir, are not only upsetting relations between two great countries, but are distorting the entire pattern of political relations outside the Indian sub-continent at the present time.
      In the past the Soviet Union has not been particularly helpful in trying to bring any pressure towards an amicable getting together of India and Pakistan on these problems. There are signs not only at Tashkent, but otherwise, that the situation may have been improved in recent times. I think that if we in the Western countries and the Soviet Union are to continue sending taxpayers' money to these countries, we have a right to insist that they sit round the table and try to reach a settlement on the problems that are not only dividing the sub-continent, but distorting the entire economy throughout South Asia.
      My hon. Friend the Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Eldon Griffiths) referred to Britain's falling influence and standing abroad. I do not think that even the Foreign Secretary can deny that this is so. I have been on a Commonwealth tour, and it is a tragedy to find that wherever one goes one is regarded with pity by one's friends, and with contempt by those who are hostile to us. Occasionally one finds bewilderment on their part as to how the British nation has fallen into the state in which it is today. If the Foreign Secretary thinks that the standing of this country is as good now as it was when he took office, let alone when the Labour Government first came to power, he is capable of greater self-delusion than I imagined, and is the greatest self-delusionist in the House.
      8.46 p.m.
      Mr. Frank Judd: I have great pleasure in congratulating the Government on what I regard as increasing evidence of an effective and constructive foreign policy. I believe that this policy and this trend is well evidenced in the current policies in Southern Arabia.
      During the debate a good deal has been said about direct and outright opposition to the European Economic Community. I believe that more characteristic of the trend of public opinion is a degree of

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      hesitation and reservation about what is involved. I think that those who share this hesitation and reservation want to know more about possible alternatives, and, therefore, are not necessarily disturbed by the remarks attributed to Lord Chalfont.
      They want to know more about the alternatives because they want to know what insurance policy is being studied by the Government in case we are not able to achieve entry to the Community. They also want more information about the alternatives because they believe that if it were demonstrated that we were actively considering viable alternatives this would, in itself, be evidence that we were fundamentally seeking to belong to wider economic and political groupings. I think, too, that some of those with hesitations want to know more about how not so much the interests of the old Commonwealth will be preserved—although this is very important—but about the position of the new Commonwealth if we enter the Community.
      On the political level, some of us with reservations are a little disturbed by the argument which is creeping in that by entering the Community we will somehow to create a new viable Power bloc in international society. We believe that this is the very time to be moving away from traditional concepts of power politics, and that what matters is flexibility in international affairs, a flexibility which, traditionally, Britain has been in a good position to exploit. When we look at the international scene, we realise that there are two super-Powers, the Soviet Union and America, and we want to see demonstrated how, by entering the Community, we will be in a better position to influence these two Powers in their actions in the international community.
      In the long run the most serious threat to international stability and world security arises from the world's population explosion, from the increasing world food shortage, and from the growing gap between the affluent and the poor nations of the world. In the past, traditionally on this side of the House a great deal of attention has been paid to this problem. It was expressed in our manifestos at the last two General Elections. It has been stressed in countless official party publications, and my right hon. Friends the Prime Minister, the Minister of Trans-
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      port, and the present President of the Board of Trade are all on record, in strong terms, as supporting the importance of policies to combat it.
      Soon after the Labour Government came to office we saw the creation of the Ministry of Overseas Development, with a Minister of Cabinet rank, and a most encouraging White Paper, but, following the publication of this White Paper, the counter-pressures became obvious. The National Plan suggested that perhaps we had been doing more in this respect than we could afford, and when discussing how the extra wealth to be created during the next five years was to be shared said little about doing more in the fight against world ignorance, poverty and disease. Early this year we saw excessive cuts in the aid programme—cuts of about 10 per cent., amounting to £20 million out of £225 million. Then we saw the increases in fees for overseas students, and the Minister of Overseas Development put out from the Cabinet.
      There is a grave omission from the Gracious Speech. There is no reference to overseas aid and development policies. Some of us are deeply distressed at this omission. We have to look at this in the context of the present economic situation and make three highly relevant observations.
      First, people frequently suggest that because of the present economic situation and balance of payments crisis it is difficult for Britain to continue with aid at the same level. I believe that the balance of payments cost of our aid programme is grossly exaggerated. Earlier this year figures were quoted in the House which indicated that, in terms of our contribution to the International Development Association, for every £1 we contribute we receive 30s. worth of orders.
      Secondly, just as, since the Industrial Revolution, we have seen the sustained growth of our economy by the increased purchasing power of the artisan and working classes, so it is true that as a trading nation we can see our economy continue to expand only if we seek to expand the purchasing power of the developing nations.
      Finally, we spend ten times as much on a negative insurance policy against the outbreak of violence and conflict in world

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      society as we spend on the vital fight against the causes of tension and conflict.
      I suggest that this serious omission in the Gracious Speech can be put right only by a categorical assurance from the Dispatch Box that the Government intend to put the Minister of Overseas Development back into the Cabinet; intend, as soon as possible, to restore the cuts made in overseas aid and development programmes, and intend to increase the targets of those programmes.
      We must have from the Dispatch Box a reassurance of the Government's attitude towards the forthcoming conference of U.N.C.T.A.D. at New Delhi. As I have said before in the House, it would be churlish not to accept that the Opposition, when in power, established a fine record on behalf of Britain at the U.N.C.T.A.D. conference, and we want to see the present Government improving on that record in the forthcoming conference at New Delhi.
      I want to make three other points. First, on Vietnam, in keeping with the new sense of realism which is present in our foreign policy we should have more honesty from the Government in their references to the position of the Secretary-General of the United Nations towards this crisis. As I have understood it, the Secretary-General has said categorically that the unconditional cessation of bombing of North Vietnam by the Americans is a precondition to achieving further steps towards the solution of this critical problem. I cannot see how the Government can constantly say that they fundamentally accept and support the Secretary-General when, at the same time, they fail to support him in what he sees as the essential first step.
      Secondly, I want briefly to refer to the crisis in Rhodesia. In historical perspective this may be seen as the biggest single issue confronting the present Government. Inevitably, in the long run we shall see African majority rule in Rhodesia. The basic question it how it comes. The harder and more firmly it is resisted at the moment the more likely is violent conflict and large scale bloodshed. In historical perspective it will be seen that we have a direct responsibility in this sphere—more direct than our inevitably marginal influence on the present situation in Vietnam.
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      Also, we should see the wider implications of the Rhodesian situation, extending beyond the problem of displacing the present illegal régime to the fact that it is the nerve centre of the racial conflict which threatens to divide the world community in a way never known before and that, having failed to deal effectively with the situation on our own and having called in the U.N. to assist us in displacing the régime, we should never be forgiven by international society if it were believed that what had happened was that, having seen that we were impotent, we decided to try to spread the blame for that impotence to the international community, calling into question the viability of the U.N. itself.
      The only possible future policy in Rhodesia and the course which we have now taken is to follow the logic of sanctions, to extend them, and to take any necessary action to police them and make them effective. We would start to build up public support in Britain for such action if the Government would spell out in greater detail what the régime there means, the fact that, in our name—for we are the responsible authority—people are being imprisoned without proper trial, that there is no free education as we understand it, at either secondary or university level, and that none of the elementary human rights and freedoms which we possess are shared by the people in Rhodesia for whom we are responsible.
      We must also recognise that, however relevant the six principles may have been in the past, we can now have no confidence that the present Rhodesian Government would abide by any agreement signed or made by this country guaranteeing majority rule in the future. For this reason, Nibmar is absolutely fundamental. The issues in this crisis are too vital for empty sentimentalism. We shall be judged in historical perspective not by our words at this juncture, but by our deeds.
      After that firm comment to the Government, I would refer now to the situation in the Middle East, because it is there that the present Government and Foreign Secretary are building up immense respect for the Government's foreign policy and for their leadership in the international community. We must recognise that there are strong arguments on both sides in the Middle East.

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      We must recognise Israel's need for survival, but, on the other hand, we must recognise that the Arab world has to pay a price in territorial sacrifice for Israel's existence which no one else in the international community has to pay.
      For all those who care for Israel's survival again this is no time for sentimentalism. We must point out firmly to her that she is defeating her own objectives of stability and security by her present policy. Less than three weeks ago, I was on the Allenby Bridge between Jordan and Israel and saw refugees still coming across, this time mainly from Gaza at the rate of about 500 a day. There are now 220,000 new refugees in Jordan alone, a country denied the most prosperous part of her territory, on the West Bank. We know that 175,000 of them had applied to go back, that only 18,000 were invited back and that, of the 14,000 who went, only 3,000 were displaced persons, 11,000 being skilled people whom the Israelis need to run society on the West Bank.
      We know that the refugees in their camps on the East Bank can see the better facilities of the camps in Jericho, within four miles of their shocking conditions. That is obviously generating tension. We know that there can be no question of imposing unilateral solutions of the frontier problems between Israel and her neighbours, since this will only perpetuate tension. Therefore, we ought to lend the Foreign Secretary outspoken support when he says that we recognise Israel's right to survival, but cannot, therefore, automatically endorse her present policies.
      The Government have stressed their commitment to the United Nations and, in our present Foreign Secretary and Lord Caradon, we have two Ministers who are demonstrating effectively our determination to work through the U.N. I believe that the interesting challenge before the Government, which they are beginning, perhaps in a fumbling way in some respects to answer, is that as a nation we have to relate our foreign policy to international institutions. In the nuclear age there is in a very new sense no divisibility of peace. Peace is essentially indivisible, because of the constant threat of the escalation of any international crisis. It is impossible in
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      these days to look to the national interest other than its being essentially related to the international interest.
      9.1 p.m.
      Mr. Dennis Walters: In his excellent speech, my hon. Friend the Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Eldon Griffiths) said that the debate had ranged so widely over many topics that it made it difficult at times to follow previous speeches because one had to jump from one part of the world to another. In the few minutes which I have available, I find myself in much of the same predicament, and I shall therefore confine my remarks to the Middle East.
      It is perhaps appropriate that I should be speaking on the Middle East today, the fiftieth anniversary of the Balfour Declaration—that declaration which was described by a distinguished Member of the House in 1939 as
      "invalid in origin and essence because it was promising to an undefined and unidentifiable party something which the promising party did not own and had no right to promise and could not promise except at the expense of a third party."
      There is a good deal of truth in that remark, but it is irrelevant today because too much water and too much blood have flowed under the bridge—irrelevant except to explain the deep sense of grievance which exists among the Arabs about the situation in Israel and Palestine, a grievance which is not confined, as some people in this country believe, to Egypt or Syria but which is spread throughout the Arab world.
      It is irrelevant, moreover, because Israel exists, a fact which it is difficult to contest. It is a member of the United Nations. International morality rightly calls for its protection. International morality, however, also calls for the protection of the rights of the Palestinian Arabs and of the refugees who are in camps on the east bank of the Jordan.
      It is, I believe, in the genuine interests of Israel more than anything else that an acceptable settlement should be reached.
      A great deal is spoken about the military importance of particular frontier lines, but I wonder how important they really are. Is it so important strategically for Israel to have its frontiers on the

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      Jordan and the Suez Canal? When one looks in retrospect at the war in June it seems to me that the overwhelming lesson is that the war was decided in a couple of hours by a massive air attack which wiped out the Arab air forces. It is conceivable that if an acceptable settlement is not reached, at another stage, at another time, there could be an air attack on the other side, and this time it could be the Israeli Air Force which was wiped out in a single blow. If that were so, what would be the strategic value of the frontier lines which have been extended to what would militarily appear to be more defensible positions? I suggest, practically none. It is, therefore, important that a settlement should be reached which enables peace to come to the area, and if that is to be so, there must be a settlement which is acceptable to the Arab countries, a settlement which allows for the ending of the state of war and for the acceptance once and for all of Israel as a permanent factor and a part of the Middle East.
      The war should be ended and there should be cast-iron guarantees by the great Powers on the lines suggested by my right hon. Friend the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Doulgas-Home), with a United Nations presence. When I say "cast-iron", I mean that they must be guarantees which ensure that the U.N. presence will not be withdrawn at the beck and call of anyone, as it unfortunately was at the time of the crisis in June. Such guarantees would give Israel much better protection than occupying more Arab land on the west bank or in Sinai.
      There must also be an acceptable settlement over Jerusalem because while the Old City is deeply important to the Jews, it is equally deeply and emotionally important to the Muslims and Christians. There must be a status for the Old City which protects the interests and the religious feelings of the Muslims, Jews and Christians. It was wrong that for so many years the Jews could not go to the Wailing Wall. It would be equally wrong if the mosques of the Muslims were not protected by some sort of international status, and the same should apply for the sacred places of the Christians.
      If a solution on these lines is reached, there will be a chance for this terrible
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      danger spot being removed. If not, there will be an armistice for a time and then, in due course, at some unforeseen moment, there will be another conflict. This is a time for moderation and for taking a long view by both sides. There must be moderation and realism on the part of the Arabs, but also on the part of the Israelis. If they do not show this moderation and realism they will not be protecting their long-term interests.
      Britain's function must be to show that we have sympathy and understanding for both sides. If we cannot do that, we will not be able to exercise any influence in this crucial area which is so important to us.
      9.9 p.m.
      Mr. Richard Wood: Some of us listened on Tuesday to an argument between the Prime Minister and my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition about the relative degree of international gloom surrounding this and other Gracious Speeches. It was not a very important argument. All the speeches today have made perfectly clear the degree of apprehension that exists on both sides of the House and the concern, in particular, that some of the Government's policies have added to the darkness which today surrounds us.
      I hope that the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs will not be offended by any criticisms I have to offer. They will almost certainly be less severe than those offered by his hon. Friend, if that is the way to describe the hon. Lady the Member for Wolverhampton, North-East (Mrs. Renée Short).
      The diffuse character of these general debates, which was brought to your attention, Mr. Deputy Speaker, if it was not already there, by my hon. Friend the Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Eldon Griffiths), creates a number of problems, especially for those who speak towards the end. In this debate, so many parts of the world have been included in the score of speeches we have had that it is harder than usual even to attempt intelligent comment on them all. For instance, several of the most sincere and best-informed speeches were, naturally and expectedly, concerned with the question of Britain's entry into Europe, but partly because I have a feeling that a specific debate on this subject is fairly

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      certain before very long, and partly because my right hon. Friend has already expressed the Opposition's views on the present position and on the recent activities of the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, I hope that I shall be forgiven if I turn to other matters.
      It is in some ways unfortunate that the debate on foreign affairs has preceded our economic discussion. One of the right hon. Gentleman's distinguished former colleagues spoke of being forced to go naked into the council chamber. It was a graphic phrase, and a number of us would be tempted to sympathise with the right hon. Gentleman's metaphorical nakedness imposed by the present economic weakness of Britain if he himself had not for nearly two years occupied important economic office producing the particularly futile National Plan, and, therefore, shares abundantly the responsibility for our economic problems at home and for part of our alleged disability for entry into the European Community. Moreover, when this present incapacity of Britain is augmented by the Government's anxiety to contract out as speedily as possible from international responsibilities, not only the security of Britain but the peace of the world is likely to be seriously undermined.
      We would all agree that the burden of maintaining world peace has seldom in history been effectively shared by more than a very few nations at a time. Through the United Nations at present a very large number of nations is charged with the responsibility for world peace, but the preservation, or the restoration, of peace must ultimately depend on the resolution—and I use the word in the non-technical sense of will backed up by courage—of still a very few nations. Anyone who emphasises today the continuing great importance of Britain in the world of 1967 is very often liable to be accused of living a century or at least half a century too late, but I believe that it may not be we, but others, who are blind to the significance of the changes in our international responsibility.
      It is obvious, of course, that the present multiplication of our military strength—now many times greater than the strength at the disposal of Lord Nelson and the Duke of Wellington—has, at the same time, been overshadowed by a decline in strength relative to other nations which
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      are now more powerful. But this consequent disappearance, I think forever, of the rôle that Britain played in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries—it was described by the right hon. Gentleman as an imperial era—certainly does not compel the acceptance of the directly opposite philosophy, as the right hon. Gentleman seemed to me to suggest this afternoon. In other words, because Britain will not again play the dominant part it used to play, it by no means follows that there is not a part for us to play of the utmost significance. In conjunction with our friends in the Commonwealth and our other allies British action can and will frequently be decisive.
      Moreover, if we opt out, we make certain that issues will be decided by the United States of America—not necessarily popular in every quarter of this House—by the European Community possibly with Britain outside it, by the Soviet Union, or by Communist China. Any views we in Britain might hold would be treated with exactly the consideration which our lack of involvement would earn for them.
      If we reflect for a moment on the changes and fluctuations in international alignments, even over the last 50 years, it is tempting, and perhaps not wholly unrealistic, to think that almost anything is possible in the future. In addition to the changing alignments among the main powers today, there will be the new alignments of a whole host of modern nations whose various choices in future cannot fail to increase in significance over the rest of this century; and above all, a potential conflict, far greater in terms of power than the world has ever seen, the struggle between Russia and China, economic, ideological, territorial and possibly also racial.
      In the shadow of all this and in the wake of the rapid relative decline in the authority of Britain, it is perhaps not surprising that we should ask ourselves as a nation the question which a great many of us in our introspective moments ask ourselves as individuals, can our own efforts really exercise a decisive influence? I beg the Government to reconsider the negative answer they appear to have given to this self-searching question. It is because of the fluidity and the very uncertainty of international relations, and because of the immensity of

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      the issues involved, that Britain's contribution, although relatively smaller than in the past, was never so important as it is today.
      If the right hon. Gentleman attaches the weight, which I believe he does in his heart, to the world's continuing need of Britain, I hope that he will express it—as he certainly can express it—with both clarity and realism. I give two examples of what I mean. One concerns the small territory of Gibraltar. There over the last year we have seen a marked lack of clarity in the expression of policy of the present Government; and repeated evasions earlier this year of questions from this side of the House led to a dangerous lack of confidence on the Rock, anxious doubts within this country, with a corresponding and comprehensible rise in the hopes of Spain. I am certain that clear statements earlier both of our claim and our intentions could have avoided much confusion and brought nearer the settlement which we should all like to see.
      On the other side, the need for realism is most evident at the other end of the world. In connection with the Government's proposals for the Far East I understand that the Government intend to continue to provide military support for Singapore and Malaysia in the late 1970s and beyond. The effect of this welcome intention obviously depends on whether it can be believed—on its credibility. There are a great many questions which we should like to ask the right hon. Gentleman and the Secretary of State for Defence before we are convinced that the Government's intention can be translated into a sufficient reality to provide an effective guarantee of freedom in Southern Asia.
      This afternoon the right hon. Gentleman made a most serious statement, which has been referred to in several speeches since, about Aden and South Arabia. It has been most authoritatively commented upon by my right hon. Friend the Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys), but mixed with the seriousness of his statement I found, as I think several of my hon. Friends found, an almost frightening levity.
      The right hon. Gentleman told us that the future security of people from this
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      country after the British withdrawal was a matter to be discussed. The position is only a few days off. I must repeat what my right hon. Friend the Member for Streatham said when dealing with this question, that we shall certainly press very strongly indeed next week for a progress report on the action to be taken to secure the well-being of these people when we withdraw in the middle of this month.
      Also, in his statement on Aden, the Foreign Secretary gave discouraging news to my hon. Friend the Member for Bury St. Edmunds in connection with his imaginative suggestion for the future of the Island of Perim. My hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Mr. Dodds-Parker) also referred to this. I understand, if my hon. Friend is right, that an Order in Council will be necessary finally to decide the status of the island. We certainly intend on that occasion to discuss what seems to be an important opportunity that has been missed.
      Apart from this, the Minister of State has been asked a good many questions. I shall not waste his time, nor that of the House, by repeating them. Before I finish, I should like to touch on a topic which I have always considered to be highly relevant to the important questions we have been considering today. This is the question which was dealt with by the hon. Member for Portsmouth, West (Mr. Judd), the question of overseas aid. He spoke of it with the deep conviction which I know he holds. We have had now seven years of the Development Decade which was inaugurated in 1960. In spite of great efforts by both this and other countries, the gap between the developed economies and the less developed is not narrowing; it is growing wider. Most of us know some of the reasons for this, but it points clearly to the need for increasing the effort we are making.
      Unfortunately, since 1964 the Government appear to have been attaching to aid a very much lower priority than the seductive promises of the right hon. Lady the present Minister of Transport led us to expect before the last General Election but one. The present Minister of Overseas Development, a right hon. Member for whom we all have great respect, no

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      longer sits in the Cabinet, but from outside the Cabinet Room this Minister speaks, if I may quote from a recent speech of his, of the need to be
      "fired with the same dedication and determination as those reformers of the last century."
      Well might he use those words, because before he became responsible the target of aid for 1967–68 was cut from £225 million to £205 million. Under the Conservative Government—the Secretary of State will remember the "thirteen wasted years"—
      Mr. George Brown: We do.
      Mr. Wood: —aid grew at the rate of £10 million a year.
      Over the last three years the Socialist Government's annual increase is fractionally just over half our performance. Unless the present Minister can do better in the remaining years or months of this Parliament, this comparison with the reformers of the last century will begin to wear a little thin. Moreover, I am doubtful—I think that some of my hon. Friends share my doubts—whether the Government will hit the target of 1 per cent. of the gross national income to be devoted to aid and private investment in the developing countries during the financial year 1967–68.
      Now we await the U.N.C.T.A.D. conference to be held in Delhi next February. Like the hon. Member for Portsmouth, West, I shall be very anxious to know how the Government approaches this important conference. Before the conference in 1964, there was a conference of Commonwealth Finance Ministers. What is happening about the possibility of a similar meeting of Commonwealth Finance Ministers before the U.N.C.T.A.D. conference on this occasion? Secondly, has any agreement yet been reached about replenishing the funds of the International Development Association? The information that I have is that the Government have offered a substantial increase if other countries will co-operate. I should like him to tell us what has happened to this important initiative and what will happen to the Government offer if other countries do not come up to scratch.
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      Thirdly, could he tell us, after the many attempts that we have made to question his right hon. Friend the Minister of Overseas Development, where will this proposed cut of £20 million be made? I do not see his advantage or the advantage of his right hon. Friend in continuing to be coy. I know the infinite resources of Ministers in refusing answers, but we shall certainly receive the answer eventually, almost certainly before the next General Election, and so I would be grateful if the right hon. Gentleman, on behalf of his right hon. Friend, would give us a clear answer tonight where this cut will be made and what countries will unfortunately suffer.
      My hon. Friends and others have asked the Government a number of questions and have made a number of suggestions. I have added a few questions of my own, and I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will have time to answer all of them. But, more important than answering these questions that we have put to him, I beg that in the speech that he is to make at the end of this important debate he will declare his faith in the work that he believes lies ahead of Britain and that he will commit this country to a continuing international responsibility in the future.
      Above all, I ask that his right hon. Friend, who, I hope, is listening to the debate, will never disregard either clarity or realism, nor be afraid—here, I fervently appeal to him—that our countrymen will be unwilling to answer any summons to continue to serve the world, certainly in different ways and by different methods, but in the same spirit as that in which Britain has served the world for many centuries.
      9.27 p.m.
      The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Frederick Mulley): This has been an extremely good debate, although naturally on an occasion like this it has ranged very widely. It has been a serious debate and I think it has done a better service than the fireworks that my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) said he came to the House this evening to witness—or, I would suspect, take part in. [HON. MEMBERS: "Where is he?"] In case any hon. Member should think that my right hon. Friend is discourteous, I should tell the House that he explained to me that he had another pressing engagement. In

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      fact, I think he came to the House at some personal inconvenience expressly so that he could give his 100 per cent. support to my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary. Therefore, the House will understand why he is not able to be here with us at the moment.
      It is completely wrong to say that our debate has been, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington said, a muted exhibition such as an assistant to a funeral undertaker would put on. In the context of his remarks, I rather suspected that he was very critical of me because I had not been subjected to either the criticism or the praise of the Press in recent months. In reply to a debate of this kind at this stage it is certainly my ambition not to upset that state of affairs, at least so far as today goes.
      In following the right hon. Member for Bridlington (Mr. Wood), I should like to express a welcome to him in what I think is his first speech since his appointment as a foreign affairs spokesman for the Opposition, although I think I am right in recalling that it is not the first occasion on which he has wound up a debate of this kind from the other side of the House. In that particular respect he has an advantage over me because this is the first occasion that I have had the privilege of replying to a general foreign affairs debate, and I am indeed acutely aware of the great difficulty of trying to cover in half an hour the great variety of topics and views which have been expressed by hon. Members.
      Indeed, if I were to do justice to the questions posed by the right hon. Member for Bridlington, that would pre-empt most of my time. I have great sympathy for the point made by the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Eldon Griffiths), when he suggests that we ought to try to find a way to debate some of these subjects separately instead of, as the pressure of time usually requires, trying to cover them all in a single debate.
      I have been greatly assisted by the full and comprehensive speech which my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary made at the beginning of the debate. He gave a clear and cogent statement of the Government's policy on all the issues which have been the main burden of our debate today—Europe, Vietnam, South-
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      East Asia, Aden and the Middle East. However, before I come to those matters, I shall try to deal with the important points raised by the right hon. Member for Bridlington about our aid programme, points which had been put forcefully a little earlier by my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth, West (Mr. Judd).
      We are making preparations to play as positive a part as possible in the second United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, which is due to open in New Delhi next February. Last month, the developing countries met together in Algiers to concert their policy for the conference. We have not yet heard officially what they agreed, but we are to meet a small mission of representatives of these countries. We shall study their views with great care. It will be our object to do all we can legitimately to meet the aspirations of the developing countries, whose progress and economic development are of vital concern to us all. In the long run, it is by trade and by their development of their own resources and the skills of their people that the developing countries will attain prosperity, not simply by aid. We shall in this process keep closely in touch with the Commonwealth and our other friends and allies.
      On the general question of aid, I am sure that the right hon. Member for Bridlington will not, on reflection, expect me to go into great detail at this juncture, particularly as the main responsibility rests with my right hon. Friend the Minister concerned. We found it necessary, for this financial year, 1967–68, to reduce our aid target from £225 million to £205 million. The House knows that this must be seen against the background of serious international payments problems. Such reductions had to be made.
      Although the right hon. Gentleman was somewhat critical of the percentage rate of growth in the aid programme under this Government as compared with that under previous Governments, what he did not tell us was the point at which we start. It is the total amount of resources which are given to the aid programme that counts, not whether it is X or X minus 1 per cent. Having regard to our economic position, we have made and are making a substantial contribution.
      Mr. Judd: For the sake of clarification, could my right hon. Friend give the precise savings on the balance of payments from the £20 million cut-back in the aid programme?
      Mr. Mulley: I cannot give my hon. Friend the precise figure, but I shall write to him, or if, as I think may be the case, the information is available only from the Ministry of Overseas Development, I shall arrange for him to have it, if at all possible.
      The House will be glad to know that we have decided to give more aid next year than this. We cannot at this stage say exactly how much because it depends on several factors which are still under discussion. One of them, which the right hon. Gentleman and my hon. Friend mentioned, is the replenishment of the International Development Association funds.
      We have also promised to give significant aid to Malaysia and Singapore, to help them adjust their economies to the changes in our defence expenditure. We have undertaken to provide over £5 million of food aid in connection with the cereals agreement in the course of the Kennedy Round. Not only shall we give much more aid, but we expect much of it to be more effective. In accordance with the decisions we made in 1965, many of our loans will be on interest-free terms, thus greatly assisting those developing countries where serious problems of international indebtedness threatened to prejudice development.
      On the question of the replenishment of the resources of the International Development Association, I should like to join in the tributes paid to the work of the I.D.A. We want very much to see its work extended, and are prepared to make our proper contribution to such an increase. As the right hon. Gentleman said, we have taken an initiative; we have made a firm proposal to double the resources of I.D.A. We are pressing the other members for a successful and speedy decision on the proposal, but we are not yet in a position to know what the outcome will be. We shall certainly do all we can to increase the resources available.
      I should like to say something about my own particular responsibility for disarmament. Our major concern in the
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      18-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva over the past few months has been the negotiations for a treaty to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons to fresh countries.
      Mrs. Anne Kerr: Will my right hon. Friend be attending the launching of the Polaris submarine at Barrow-in-Furness on Saturday?
      Mr. Mulley: I do not see that that is relevant, but I have no intention of being present at any ceremony on Saturday.
      At Geneva I have not disguised my disappointment at the delays in bringing a draft text before the Committee for consideration. As the House knows, the Soviet and United States co-Chairmen tabled identical draft texts on 24th August, though the important Article 3 of the treaty, which is to deal with the safeguards to ensure that there is no transfer of nuclear weapons—or materials which might be made into weapons—to those countries which do not at present possess them, was left blank in the absence of agreement on a text for that article.
      Negotiations to produce an agreed draft safeguards article have been in progress since August, and I hope that in the very near future we shall have before us a text that is generally acceptable. In addition, a solution must be found—perhaps outside the Treaty—to the problem of a security guarantee from the nuclear weapon States to the non-nuclear weapon countries, which will satisfy the latters' apprehensions of the possible danger to their security of renouncing in a treaty the intention to acquire nuclear armaments for themselves.
      Time is now short if we are to reach the goal of getting agreement on the draft treaty at Geneva in time to discuss it in the United Nations before the end of the year. Not only will a great opportunity be lost if we are not able to meet the timetable, but we shall also lose the opportunity of lessening tension between East and West and resuming progress for further measures towards complete and general disarmament.
      The need to press forward with more ambitious work in disarmament is underlined by the recent announcement by the United States Government of their decision to undertake the development and deployment of a limited system of

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      anti-ballistic missiles, designed essentially against possible attack from China. The announcement followed what was already known to be a Soviet decision some time previously to implement a limited deployment of such missiles in the Soviet Union.
      Her Majesty's Government have for some time been concerned about the possibility that deployment of antiballistic missiles might add a new dimension to the arms race and make progress in arms control and disarmament negotiations more difficult. Ministers have drawn attention to these dangers in public, and we have made our misgivings known to both the United States Government and the Soviet Union Government at the highest level.
      While we understand why the United States Government have decided to go ahead with a limited A.B.M. deployment, we have made clear our regret that they should have found it necessary to take this step, although it is important to note that this decision was taken in view of the development of Chinese military nuclear capability and that it is against a possible Chinese attack that their system will be deployed.
      Now that both super-Powers have actually decided to deploy A.B.M.s, it is most important that the adverse consequences should be kept to a minimum. The United States Government have stated that their decision in no way indicates that they regard an agreement with the Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive forces as any the less urgent or desirable, and they are continuing with their efforts to initiate discussions with the Russians to this end. We very much hope that it will be possible for the United States and the Soviet Union to move towards an understanding. These two countries carry a very special responsibility in regard to nuclear weapons.
      Perhaps I could mention briefly another development about which I have answered Questions in the House, namely, the attitude of this Government to the treaty for the denuclearisation of Latin-America. It may have escaped the attention of hon. Members that the Government announced at the General Assembly last week that it is our intention to sign
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      the two protocols, one covering our dependent territories in the area and the other in our capacity as a nuclear Power. We are the first, and at the moment the only, nuclear Power to have taken a step of this kind, and to have made its situation clear. I think that it was absolutely right that we should on the one hand support, where we can, all initiatives towards disarmament and arms control and, on the other hand, give full support to this welcome initiative of countries in Latin-America.
      Mr. Eldon Griffiths: Could the right hon. Gentleman clear up one question? When the American announcement was made that they were going to construct the A.B.M. screen, the Foreign Secretary, I believe, said that he had not been consulted. At Ankara some three weeks later, Mr. McNamara made it clear that the Government had been consulted. Can he say which of the statements is correct?
      Mr. Mulley: I do not think I ought to get into an argument of that kind.
      Disarmament is one field in which Her Majesty's Government have been playing a leading part in co-operation with our Allies and with the international community at large. We have also continued to play our part to the utmost of our ability in the various alliances to which we belong. In view of the very important speech on N.A.T.O. by the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds, I should like to say a word about the recent developments in N.A.T.O., because I agree very much with him that it is the problem now to show the relevance of N.A.T.O. to the problems of the future and not only to the problems of the past.
      N.A.T.O. is now sometimes criticised as an outworn relic of the cold war and as irrelevant to our present needs. It is certainly true that N.A.T.O. has served one of its purposes, and served it supremely well. It has succeeded in keeping the peace in Europe for 20 years, and because of the strength and cohesion that this gives the West the prospects of aggression, which are now perhaps too easily forgotten, have receded in Europe. This is the success story of N.A.T.O.
      Last year the unity of the Alliance and of its military organisation was subjected to a more tangible test when the French Government decided to withdraw from the military side. That strain has been happily and most effectively overcome.

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      The move of S.H.A.P.E. to Belgium was completed earlier this year and last month the North Atlantic Council itself moved to the new N.A.T.O. headquarters outside Brussels. Much of the credit for this smooth transfer is due to the Belgian Government. The new N.A.T.O. headquarters, which I had the opportunity to visit last week, was built with miraculous speed. The building, which was begun only in March, was used by the Council on 18th October. On behalf of the allies, and certainly of the British Government, I should like to express our thanks and appreciation to Belgium.
      The military side of the alliance—
      Mrs. ,Anne Kerr: Is my right hon. Friend the Minister for disarmament or have I misunderstood his place in the Government?
      Mr. Mulley: I have responsibilities for disarmament and a number of other matters, all of which have been explained by my right hon. Friend.
      The military side of the alliance and its constant state of readiness are not, however, the whole story. The other purpose of N.A.T.O. is political. Its purposes here include the promotion of détente—which I am sure my hon. Friend will agree with—and also closer political consultation and co-operation between the members of the alliance in the many common political problems they face.
      We believe that real progress in improving relations with the countries of Eastern Europe can best be made in close consultation and co-operation with our allies. And this we believe is also true, for example, in pursuing disarmament and arms control policies.
      This positive and constructive view of what ought to be the future political rôle of N.A.T.O. is now being reviewed within the N.A.T.O. Council on the initiative of the Belgian Foreign Minister, M. Harmel. The results of this review are to come before the next Ministerial meeting in December and we shall do all we can to see that the outcome is both constructive and positive. I am confident that a successful outcome of what is called the Harmel review will enable us the better to serve the second and perhaps more important purpose—the political purpose—of the alliance.
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      Aden and our European policy were two of the subjects occupying the time of the House today. The right hon. Member for Kinross and East Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) asked a number of questions concerning the position of expatriate public servants and about compensation. We had, as he knows, reached agreement in principle with the Federal Government on the normal arrangement for decolonization—a public officers' agreement under which that Government would assume responsibility for pensions and comparable benefit.
      We intend to tackle this afresh with the new Government as soon as we can. I can assure the House that we do not intend to allow British public servants to go without their due. But I would prefer not to go beyond that until we have been able to negotiate with the new Government.
      The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition and a number of other hon. Members opposite also raised the question of the security of British subjects who will remain in South Arabia after independence. As my right hon. Friend said, there is an obvious obligation on Her Majesty's Government to seek appropriate safeguards for this from the successor Government.
      Since the discussion of this matter with the Federal Government is now a matter of the past, the question will be one of the most urgent to be discussed with the successor Government as soon as they emerge. Meanwhile, the High Commissioner has, in the recent difficult months, kept in touch with the representatives of the British business community, including B.P. and also with the foreign consuls in Aden. They have, therefore, been aware of his assessment as events have developed. He will naturally keep under constant review the question of what advice, if any, should be given to the community for the future.
      Mr. Thorpe: Could the right hon. Gentleman say when the Government hope that a government might emerge?
      Mr. Mulley: If the right hon. Gentleman had listened carefully to my right hon. Friend this afternoon, he did indicate the nature of the problems and the fact that there was some encouragement now, which we hope will turn out to be

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      well-founded, that, arising from the agreement in Cairo yesterday, we shall be able shortly to get into the kind of discussions that I think the whole House would wish us to conduct.
      Mr. Sandys: I wonder if the Minister could assure us that the Foreign Secretary will make some statement early next week about the position of the British civilians who will remain behind. Our tenure in Aden is now numbered in days, and these people are living in great anxiety. We cannot meander on, waiting for some government to be formed, which may not be formed before we leave.
      Mr. Mulley: I can assure the right hon. Gentleman my right hon. Friend's intention is to keep the House as fully informed as possible, but it is difficult in these circumstances, for the reason that the right hon. Gentleman mentioned, to give a particular date. The High Commissioner is constantly in touch with all the people concerned and will give all the advice that is possible in what we all concede are extremely difficult circumstances.
      Mr. Sandys: That is not enough.
      Mr. Mulley: It may well not be enough, but it is an extremely difficult position. This at least is a point on which the whole House can agree. In fact in the debate today—
      Mr. Sandys Mr. Sandys rose—
      Mr. Mulley: I cannot give way, because I have less than 10 minutes in which to complete the discussion.
      Mr. Sandys: We cannot walk out and leave them to be massacred.
      Mr. Mulley: The right hon. Gentleman knows the situation perfectly well. Although he was not pressed, as I am, to a deadline, he declined for a long time to give way. I do not think that he has any complaint on that score.
      As I understood it, both the right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire and the right hon. Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys) agreed in their assessments that to depart early was the right course in present circumstances. However, there were differences between them on which, had time permitted, I would have liked to comment, but I can only do so extremely briefly.
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      I should like to draw the attention of the House to what seemed to me a very significant development, and that was the extremely defensive and apologetic explanation that the right hon. Member for Streatham gave about his difficulties over Aden and the Federation. Indeed, he might well have left it there, but I feel that he spoiled his speech by going on to a highly selective account of recent history which, had time permitted, I would have liked to take, point by point. On the other hand, all the points that he has made have been discussed and countered time and again in the many debates on this subject that we have had.
      In the remaining minutes I should like to say a word about the discussion that we have had on Europe following the important statement that my right hon. Friend made last Thursday and the much longer statement he made at the opening of the debate. He made it clear that we shall continue to press hard for negotiations to open. Our application is on tile table. We, for our part, are ready to start negotiations now.
      Various points have been produced in the debate, and inevitably there has been great discussion about figures—the, effect of joining the Communities on the cost of living, export costs, and so on. But again one needs to make clear that we are talking not about conditions now, but conditions when we join the E.E.C. In a three-day debate last May the lines on which we would seek certain arrangements were made clear.
      I think that the House would expect me to make some reference to what I am sure we all thought was a most important maiden speech, the maiden speech from the back benches of my right hon. Friend the Member for Battersea, North (Mr. Jay). If I had the time I would like to debate the figures which he put before us, and indeed some of the arguments, but I must make clew that the suggestion which he made, and which seemed to find favour with others. that instead of trying for full membership of the European Community we should aim at a form of association, a kind of industrial free trade area built around the central core of the Treaty of Rome, is totally unacceptable. The right hon. Member for Flint, West (Mr. Birch) reminded us that this was rather the kind of thing which his right hon. Friend the

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      Member for Barnet (Mr. Maudling), and others, had tried during the Free Trade Area negotiations in 1959. I think that it is wishful thinking to believe that we can possibly negotiate anything on the lines suggested by my right hon. Friend.
      The main reason why we are not interested in the idea of any form of association however is that it would not give us the advantages of membership. As my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has made clear, we would regard this kind of solution as very unsatisfactory, and it would involve forgoing just about all the political benefits which a united Europe would bring, and which we and our prospective partners in the Community regard as so important an element in our application.
      I would have liked to go on to deal with the points made about sterling and capital movements, but time does not permit. I will write to the Leader of the Liberal Party giving chapter and verse to refute his suggestion that we are in any way involved in the prosecution of the war in Vietnam. Time does not permit me to go through the three points that he made, but I will write to him fully setting out the position.
      I conclude on the note with which my right hon. Friend began the debate, the changing rôle of Britain in a changing world. think that we have only to look at the vastly increased membership of the United Nations in the last 20 years to realise the great changes which have taken place, and are taking place in the world.
      Mrs. Anne Kerr: Why is China not in it?
      Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Lady must contain herself.
      Mr. Mulley: We have taken decisive steps in Europe and in reshaping our commitments east of Suez. Such a transformation is bound to lead to difficult, and, at times, inevitably, painful decisions, but I believe, as my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth, West said in his thoughtful speech, that my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary today presented to the House and to the country a constructive and positive foreign policy designed, in conjunction with our allies and friends, to try to solve the difficult problems which we and the world face today.
      Sir Alec Douglas-Home: Before the right hon. Gentleman sits down, will he tell the House definitely that either his right hon. Friend or he will make a statement next week, and early next week, on how the British subjects in Aden are to be protected?
      Mr. Mulley: My right hon. Friend has indicated, and I confirm it, that he will do his best to meet the desires and convenience of the House in this, but in a very difficult and changing situation I think that it would be not only unreasonable but unwise to tie him to a particular date, because this in itself is a factor in the situation.
      Debate adjourned.—[Mr. Varley.]
      Debate to be resumed Tomorrow.

    STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS
    Select Committee appointed to consider every Statutory Instrument, every Scheme, or Amendment of a Scheme, requiring approval by Statutory Instrument, and every Draft of such an Instrument, Scheme or Amendment, being an Instrument, Scheme, Amendment or Draft which is laid before the House and upon which proceedings may be or might have been taken in the House in pursuance of any Act of Parliament, and every Order which is subject to Special Parliamentary Procedure, with a view to determining whether the special attention of the House should be drawn to it on any of the following grounds:—
    (i) that it imposes a charge on the public revenues or contains provisions requiring payments to be made to the Exchequer or any Government Department or to any local or public authority in consideration of any licence or consent or of any services to be rendered, or prescribes the amount of any such charge or payments;
    (ii) that it is made in pursuance of an enactment containing specific provisions excluding it from challenge in the courts, either at all times or after the expiration of a specified period;
    (iii) that it appears to make some unusual or unexpected use of the powers conferred by the Statute under which it is made;
    (iv) that it purports to have retrospective effect where the parent Statute

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    confers no express authority so to provide:
    (v) that there appears to have been unjustifiable delay in the publication or in the laying of it before Parliament:
    (vi) that there appears to have been unjustifiable delay in sending a notification to Mr. Speaker under the proviso to subsection (1) of section four of the Statutory Instruments Act 1946, where an Instrument has come into operation before it has been laid before Parliament:
    (viii) that for any special reason its form or purport calls for elucidation; and if they so determine, to report to that effect:
    Mr. Ronald Bell, Mr. Walter Clegg, Sir Beresford Craddock, Mr. Arthur Davidson, Mr. James Dickens, Mr. Jack Dunnett, Mr. Leslie Huckfield, Mr. Gregor Mackenzie, Mr. R. Graham Page, Mr. William Robinson and Mr. Christopher Rowland:
    To have the assistance of the Counsel to Mr. Speaker:
    Power to sit notwithstanding any Adjournment of the House, to report from time to time, and to report the Minutes of their Proceedings from time to time:
    Power to require any Government department concerned to submit a memorandum explaining any Instrument or other Document which may be under their consideration or to depute a representative to appear before them as a Witness for the purpose of explaining any such Instrument or other Document:
    Three to be the Quorum:
    Instruction to the Committee that before reporting that the special attention of the House be drawn to any Instrument or other Document the Committee to afford to any Government Department concerned therewith an opportunity of furnishing orally or in writing such explanations as the Department think fit:
    Power to report to the House from time to time any Memoranda submitted or other evidence given to the Committee by any Government Department in explanation of any Instrument or other Document:
    Power to take evidence, written or oral, from Her Majesty's Stationery Office, relating to the printing and publication of any Instrument or other Document.—[Mr. Varley.]

    HYDROFOILS AND HOVERCRAFT
    Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Varley.]
    10.2 p.m.
    Mr. R. Gresham Cooke: I am pleased to have the opportunity of raising the subject of the future of hydrofoils and hovercraft tonight, particularly as, last July, I tried to get the matter on the Order Paper but these unfortunate craft were sunk by the steep waves of the Consolidated Fund Bill debate. It is time to examine the progress particularly of the hovercraft, because it is now 10 years old. There has been the rolling out of the biggest one yet made—the 160-ton SRN4.
    I confess to some disappointment with the progress of the hovercraft, looking back on the hopes raised in the Adjournment debates that I initiated four years ago, in August, 1963. We have spent about £5½ million on research and development, but we have sold or made only about 40 or 50 of all types.
    There are three doubts arising about the original brilliant hovercraft design of Mr. Christopher Cockerel]. First, they are turning out to be very expensive to build, especially as built by aircraft manufacturers. The SRN6 is costing £1½ million. Secondly, they seem tricky to control and manœuvre in strong cross winds and, thirdly, despite what is said by some of their advocates, the design reacts to the sea—in other words, it contours over the surface of the sea—instead of, as we had hoped, riding completely above it.
    Another point is that although these vehicles have amphibious capabilities, being able to go on land and sea, some people are trying to use them in harbours. Their value is lost in this way.
    During the last 10 years we have been concentrating on hovercraft, and I ask myself whether we have had a blind spot about what is going on in the rest of the

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    world in respect of non-displacement marine craft generally. Against the 40 or so hovercraft which we have built, nearly 1,000 hydrofoil craft are operating in Russia, Italy, Greece, Norway, Denmark, Japan, Australia, the U.S.A. and the Caribbean, and that does not include the whole list. By hydrofoil, I mean a boat lifted up on its foils by its speed, as if skiing over the water.
    I raised this subject about five years ago in an interview with the Admiralty, at which it was very sceptical about the future and possibilities of these craft. It did not think that the hydrofoil would ever be able to operate in the North Sea. After a few Questions in the House, I then dropped the subject.
    However, a year or so ago I had a tremendous shock when I went from Ismail, in the mouth of the Danube, across the Black Sea, to Odessa, a distance of 150 miles, in a Russian hydrofoil craft in a rough sea—about Force 4 or 5 swell—and the journey took about five hours at an average speed of 30 knots. That was in the Russian Koneta, a 100-seater. It was not a smooth ride, I admit, but we got there and my wife and I upheld British dignity, as some others did not. I also went on their Raketa in the Baltic at 40 knots, so I was deeply impressed by hydrofoil craft.
    At Whitsun this year, I examined the Condor Service operated by Mr. Peter Dorey between Jersey and Guernsey and the French coast. I found the Supramar PT-50, a 120-seater built in Italy to German-Swiss designs, very favourable, again in Force 4 or 5 wind and swell. We averaged 32 knots and a much smoother ride than on the Russian craft, which were originally built mainly for river operation.
    While in Montreal this summer, at Expo, I was kindly shown the Canadian FHE400 being built at Sorrel near Montreal by the De Havilland Aircraft Company of Canada. This is a huge military craft, about 200 tons or more, 150 feet long, with a foil span of 66 feet, and it is designed to do 50 knots in Atlantic conditions and 60 knots in smooth water.
    I am very glad to say—I am sure that the Parliamentary Secretary will confirm this—that the National Physical Laboratory (Ship Division), in my constituency,
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    has helped in the design of this Canadian craft. If it is successful, it will, of course operate, with one-tenth the crew of a destroyer, although almost the size of a small destroyer. I do not advocate that we should build this, because it is a military problem, but we do want commercial craft operating in the 30 or 40 knot bracket and I believe that hydrofoil craft can do that successfully.
    The cost of the different forms of craft work out as follows. For a conventional ship, the cost is about £1,000 per passenger seat, for a hydrofoil craft, about £2,000 and for a hovercraft about £3,000. The Norwegian experience of running both hovercraft and hydrofoils shows us that the running costs of the latter are lower than those of the former. This is done by the Norwegian Institute of Transport.
    I was interested in an article by Mr. Christopher Cockerell, in Flight International on 19th October this year, in which he said:
    "It is going to be interesting to see whether hydrofoils oust hovercraft or vice versa. My own opinion is that there will always be a place for hydrofoils, but that above a certain size, which might be 100 tons, and above a certain speed, which might be 40 knots, hovercraft are likely to take over."
    I think that he implied that under 100 tons and under 40 knots there is a place for hydrofoil craft, as I am sure there is. The seagoing capabilities of the hydrofoil should not be underestimated. It has its platform over the waves, and the ride comfort of the hydrofoil may turn out to be superior to that of the hovercraft. For instance, the Boeing PCH1 Highpoint, which the American Navy has been developing, encountered waves of an average height of 6 ft., with an occasional 10 ft. wave, and it did 100 miles in 3 hours 19 minutes.
    In those conditions, when it was floating hull-borne a large percentage of the crew were seasick, but when it became foil-borne, there were only four mild cases of seasickness. Previously, it had achieved speeds of 80 knots, a remarkable achievement. The Americans are developing and have just launched a larger craft—the Grumman PGH I with the Rolls-Royce engines and the Boeing PGH2, with the Bristol Proteus engines. Sud Aviation, of France is developing hydrofoils, and I am glad to hear that Southern, Hydrofoils and other people in

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    this country are still trying to develop these craft.
    I was glad to hear in April that the Minister had appointed a working party to look into the subject of hydrofoils, we are eagerly awaiting its report. I feel that we must press on to find an answer to the problem whether we should take up hydrofoils as well as hovercraft. The answer may well be that we should take licences from the U.S.A. for building such craft in this country. The future may lie with a hydrofoil of aircraft configuration with submerged foils driven by water jets or it may lie with surface-piercing foils with automatic controls. I rather favour the aircraft configuration with submerged foils, but that is a technical matter. In a great maritime nation such as this, it is shameful that the shipbuilding industry has taken no interest or not more than a passing interest in hydrofoil development during the past 10 years.
    I will turn for a few minutes to hovercraft. The British Hovercraft Corporation has 90 per cent. of the market and it made the very big and bold jump from the 7 to 10 tons SRN5 and 6 to the huge SRN4, just launched. But technically the new hovercraft is not very different in design and layout from the small vessels. Will this new craft be commercially viable at a capital cost of £1½ million? It was designed at a time of shortage in cross-Channel shipping, but now that there are 16 to 18 ships a day crossing the Channel, competition will be severe.
    I ask the Minister: what is to be our policy towards hovercraft? As well as large craft, there will surely be a market for very small craft such as two-seaters at £1,500 each, perhaps pleasure craft, or four-seaters at £5,000 each, or 12-seaters at perhaps £18,000 each. If there is such a market, as I believe there is, who will build them? I doubt whether the British Hovercraft Corporation has enough operational experience of its own to provide the required modifications to vehicles. For instance, Hovertravel Limited, a gallant little company, operating in the Solent for the last two-and-a-half years with the SRN6, has carried 800,000 passengers at almost no profit. It has had to suffer very high maintenance costs—wear and tear at £15 an hour and five times the cost of fuel.
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    But it has provided endless experience of skirt wear of great value to manufacturers. Should not operators such as these, with experimental craft, get some relief for their excess maintenance costs in future? Should not some help be given? Anything that the Parliamentary Secretary can say on this point will be helpful. Instead of being able to operate untramelled, this little company is threatened by the subsidised British Railways Seaspeed Services who, it appears from their accounts last year, carried 100,000 passengers in the Solent and lost £68,000.
    When I went to Montreal and rode on the enterprising hovercraft service operated by Hovertravel Limited, on the St. Lawrence River, and heard of their possible future developments there, I was horrified to hear later that it was the competition of British Railways at home that had induced the firm to pack up its promising Canadian venture and come back home. I hope, therefore, that British Railways will not be the nigger in the woodpile over hovercraft.
    Investors from Sweden, Hoverlloyd, are putting up £3 million to operate two cross-Channel hovercraft from Pegwell Bay—about which my hon. Friend the Member for the Isle of Thanet (Mr. Rees-Davies) knows—an open site suitable for an amphibious vehicle with plenty of room on the beaches, as recommended by the inspector of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government. British Railways are apparently intending to operate from Dover Harbour and this has caused the Minister to reopen the inquiry and delay the start of this service, which will cause considerable cost. No wonder Mr. Karl Bokman, Chairman of Swedish Lloyd, is angry.
    To consider Dover, with its narrow harbour entrance—of just a few hundred feet—and the dangerous tidal race, with the serious risk of a major extent involving a machine which must crash across shipping lanes at 70 knots with 700 passengers on board in a heavy cross wind—is something I would not like to contemplate.
    I return to the subject of manufacturing. I was glad to read of the coming introduction of sidewall hovercraft by Hovermarine Ltd. I have for long been convinced that for controllability in estuary work, to avoid risking sideways

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    drift, immersed sidewalls would be the answer—a sort of catamaran hovercraft which is able to use conventional piers and pontoons. However, I understand that a private enterprise company which had put down a deposit for the first such craft had it snatched from under its nose by the superior purchasing power of British Rail.
    We must face the fact that marine hovercraft are much nearer ships than aircraft. They should be built by shipbuilders instead of by aircraft people, because aircraft costs are two or three times those of conventional engineering, as I know from personal experience in the motor industry. I was glad to hear that Vosper-Thorneycroft is entering the hovercraft field. We may get some economic shipbuilding with the assistance of such a company.
    I do not want to be depressing about the future of hovercraft. Obviously, there is a future for both hovercraft and hydrofoils, and I pay tribute to the huge amount of work that has been done by Hovercraft Development Ltd. and the British Hovercraft Corporation. We must look at the whole of this question from the point of view of the non-displacement ship problem commercially—treating the military side as a sideline—keep our lead in commercial hovercraft and catch up with the thousands of sea miles we have fallen behind in the sphere of hydrofoils.
    10.19 p.m.
    The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Technology (Dr. Jeremy Bray): I apologise to hon. Members who would have wished to take part in this debate. Time is short and a large number of points have been raised. I appreciate the interest which the hon. Member for Twickenham (Mr. Gresham Cooke) has taken in these craft over the years. We in the Ministry of Technology have been happy to put him in touch with the National Physical Laboratory and others, including the Canadian craft which he visited during the summer. I assure him that we are interested to hear his views.
    The hon. Gentleman expressed a number of reservations about hovercraft; first, that they are expensive to build. We have had the idea of hovercraft for only about 10 years. They must still be regarded as going through a very rapidly
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    moving development phase and inevitably at this time they are expensive. Perhaps there is a good deal of justice in the hon. Member's criticism of the technology brought to bear, but as he himself has said the range of manufacturers is expanding, and with Vosper's coming into the field, any padding out, as it were, of design costs that may have taken place will be brought under the scrutiny of heavy competition.
    Manœuvrability is something about which it is clearly necessary to gain operating experience with the big craft, and short of operating the SRN 4 in a wide variety of sea conditions one cannot pre-judge the question of hovercraft. The hon. Member said that British Rail was prepared to operate in and out of Dover Harbour, but the very fact that British Rail is prepared to do so is a tribute to the manœuvrability of the craft and not merely a criticism of British Rail.
    As to the response to the surface of the sea, it is certainly the case that the craft does not ride without any interference at all in rough sea conditions, and there is a learned discussion by Mr. Cockerell in the article which the hon. Member quoted about the effect of sea conditions. He suggested that, for these reasons, the hovercraft is not the sole solution of all high-speed seaborne craft problems and it is certainly very well worth while looking at hydrofoils. This is what we are already doing.
    The working party to which he referred is chaired by Mr. Silverleaf, an acknowledged expert in both hovercraft and hydrofoil technology, and deputy director of the National Physical Laboratory. On this working party we have Mr. Dorey of Condor Limited, to which firm the hon. Member referred, and Commander Du Cane of Vosper's, as well as representatives of the Ship Research Association, the N.R.D.C., the Ministry of Defence, the Board of Trade and our own Department. I therefore think that the hon. Gentleman can be satisfied that a dispassionate and technically highly competent view will be taken of the rôle and support will be given to hydrofoil development in this country.
    Sir Eric Errington: I was very grateful for the opportunity given

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    to me by the Minister to see some of these things, but when he is dealing with the question of a number of people getting down to settling these matters, may I ask whether there is anyone who represents the radar industry, with the idea of using radar to control the craft as it approaches the oncoming waves?
    Dr. Bray: This idea may not require the presence of a radar expert, but a number of the members of the committee can certainly call on any such advice that is helpful to them.
    The ultimate rôle of hovercraft versus hydofoil requires much more experience. The hon. Gentleman was right in pointing out that we have so far put relatively more development effort into hovercraft than have other nations, but it is not unreasonable for nations to specialise, and it is right, I think, that we should examine and plan a thoroughgoing research and development programme and a technique that looks promising, bringing to bear precisely the criteria to which he points, but not being discouraged at the first batch of technical problems, which inevitably have their cost penalties attached to them.
    The hon. Gentleman cannot complain about slow progress and, at the same time, urge commercial discretion. We have made pretty rapid progress. He mentioned the very considerable size of the SRN 4, which would take up the greater part of this Chamber and carry on board every Member of the House across the Channel in about 35 minutes—and no doubt it will do so some day. But this is a very great advance of a totally new form of transport in the bare span of eight years since we had the first hovercraft moving over water.
    If, however, we are to get the successful exploitation of this on a much wider scale, it is necessary not only to look at the operating requirements, the commercial environment in this country, but the commercial environment in a world-wide market.
    It is very significant that of the 40 or 50 hovercraft to which the hon. Member referred, about half have been exported and are being tried out in a very wide variety of different operations. The hon. Member took a great interest in the possibility of winter trials of SRN6 which
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    has been operating at Expo. A tender has been submitted for these winter trials and we expect the result of these in a very few days.
    When hon. Members from their travels throughout the world come back, as I am very glad that many do, with stories about the interest being taken in hovercraft in other markets overseas, I follow these up with interest and I often find that in practically every case one or other of the hovercraft agencies has already been there and talked to the people and carried out an evaluation of the market. They have fed back the experience into the development programme in this country.
    I am certainly not saying that there are not problems. We have had to improve our own organisation in government to handle hovercraft generally and now we have a hovercraft directorate which did not exist in the early years of hovercraft development. Now we bring together the civil and military requirements and deal with the whole industry and the research and development programme in a single directorate in the Ministry of Technology.
    Mr. W. R. Ress-Davies: Can the hon. Gentleman say that his Ministry now has control over this development so that British Railways, who have their separate department, are under the control of the Ministry in securing rapid development of hovercraft?
    Dr. Bray: No. British Railways are under the control of my right hon. Friend the Minister of Transport—
    Mr. Rees-Davies: That is the trouble.
    Dr. Bray: I assure the hon. Member that it is not a trouble at all. If hovercraft are to sell throughout the world their viability in the hands of operators must be established. It is, therefore, absolutely essential that British Rail should operate this service in competition with seaborne and other methods of travel.
    The hon. Member for Twickenham raised the question of unfair competition with private operators. When we have one hon. Member advocating greater British Rail operation and another advocating less, it seems to leave the matter more or less in balance. The rôle of

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    Hovertravel in the Solent is well recognised. Certainly one cannot but admire the work put in by this firm. It has been of immense value to hovercraft. It has collected an immense amount of data and I am glad to say that we have given the firm information contracts to make sure that the know-how that it has collected is fed back into the development programme. We shall, of course, continue to keep in touch with the firm as its work develops.
    I think the year ahead will be very interesting. SRN4 will go into cross-Channel operation next year. We have a widening range of firms with hovercraft licences. We have the very advanced
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    Hydrofoil craft under development in Canada to which we contribute very much from the National Physical Laboratory. Certainly Britain needs to pay a great deal of attention in this field and I think it is doing so. I think we shall reap the fruits of success in future. This has not only been in seaborne craft. In other applications of hovercraft we have the hovertrain development which is in its first stage and has been launched with the support of the N.R.D.C. and which leads to very interesting possibilities.
    Question put and agreed to.
    Adjourned accordingly at half-past Ten o'clock.

AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD
  Farm Amalgamations and Boundary Adjustments Scheme, 1967
  Farm Amalgamations and Boundary Adjustments Scheme, 1967
  CBR Jersey Mills, Brighton (Dispute)
  CBR Jersey Mills, Brighton (Dispute)
MINISTRY OF LABOUR
  Unemployment
  Unemployment
HOSPITALS
  Geriatric Beds
  Geriatric Beds
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
  Buchanan Report
  Buchanan Report
OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT
  Gilbert and Ellice Islands (Survey)
  Gilbert and Ellice Islands (Survey)
MINISTRY OF POWER
  Power Stations (Coal and Oil Consumption)
  Power Stations (Coal and Oil Consumption)
  North Sea Gas
  North Sea Gas
SCOTLAND
  National Gallery of Scotland (Raeburn Painting)
  National Gallery of Scotland (Raeburn Painting)
BOARD OF TRADE
  Overseas Marketing Corporation Ltd.
  Overseas Marketing Corporation Ltd.
  South Africa (Private Investment)
  South Africa (Private Investment)
NATIONAL FINANCE
  Balance of Payments
  Balance of Payments
  £ Sterling
  £ Sterling
  Selective Employment Tax
  Selective Employment Tax
  Regional Employment Premium
  Regional Employment Premium
WALES
  Mid-Wales (Development)
  Mid-Wales (Development)
  Dual Carriageway (Brecon-Carmarthen-St. Clears)
  Dual Carriageway (Brecon-Carmarthen-St. Clears)
  Local Government Reorganisation
  Local Government Reorganisation

Preamble
The House met at three of the clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Leicester

BREATHALYSER TESTS: POLICE RECORDS
3.5 p.m.
LORD NUGENT OF GUILDFORD: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the first Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government to state whether arrangements have been made for the police to keep records of the numbers of drivers who are required to submit to breath tests in connection with the new drink and driving laws, of the numbers required to go to a police station for a blood or urine test, and of the numbers of such cases in which it is subsequently discovered that the blood/alcohol level was not in excess of the prescribed limit.]
THE MINISTER OF STATE, HOME OFFICE (LORD STONHAM): My Lords, my right honourable friend the Home Secretary intends to keep a careful watch upon how Part I of the Road Safety Act 1967 is working in practice; and chief officers of police in England and Wales have agreed to send him, for a time at least, special statistical returns which will include information upon the items specified in the noble Lord's Question.
LORD NUGENT OF GUILDFORD: My Lords, may I thank the noble Lord for his reply to my Question, and ask him whether he is aware that there is great public interest in the method of these tests and the results of them? Could he tell us what have been the results of the tests so far; how many have been made and what the results have been; and, in particular, in answer to the last part of my Question, what number of false results there have been where innocent motorists have been arrested and taken to the police station?
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I cannot give the figures for the country as a whole, but a special statistical return has been devised which is also used as a police working sheet during the progress of each case. It is sent in, therefore, when police action is completed, so some cases will not be reported for several weeks. It is too soon to begin to collect the figures for the whole country, but we hope to begin to do so next month. I can, however, give the figures for the first 21 days ended midnight, October 29/30 in the Metropolitan Police District. Roadside breath tests were required on 823 occasions. In 299 cases a result indicating a blood alcohol concentration above the statutory limit was Obtained. In 501 cases the result did not indicate a fixed level offence. In 23 cases the person failed or refused to undertake the test.
LORD NUGENT OF GUILDFORD: My Lords, may I thank the noble Lord for those figures and that information, which is very interesting? Would the noble Lord add to the information he has given us the last piece of information I asked for; that is, in how many cases where the motorist failed the breath test was he found, when taken to the station, in fact to have an alcohol level in the blood below the 80-milligramme level?
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I am afraid that that information is not available. Nor have I the information in how many of the 501 cases where there was no fixed level offence the motorist was taken to the station because the police officer thought there was a reason under the 1960 Act.
LORD NUGENT OF GUILDFORD: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that there is a very serious implication about a test which shows a positive reading and which, after the motorist has been arrested and taken to the station, is found to be incorrect because on the blood test the alcohol content is found to be below the 80 mg. level? It means that an innocent man or woman has been arrested, with all the unpleasantness thus entailed, and taken to the police station under police charge. That has a very unpleasant implication indeed. It is that information we want, because we feel that it is necessary to have substantial safeguards here.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, the noble Lord is wrong in saying that the motorist is taken to the police station under police charge. He may be taken under police care. He is not charged at that time because the breathalyser test is only an indication. It is only when the motorist subsequently has a blood or urine test and that test shows a content of alcohol above the fixed limit that any charge would lie.
LORD NUGENT OF GUILDFORD: Is he not arrested by the police?
LORD STONHAM: He is not charged: he is asked to go to the police station; and, indeed, he must go to the police station.
VISCOUNT BRENTFORD: My Lords, may I ask the Minister, arising out of a previous answer he gave, which I think was to the effect that he had not particulars of the number of people who were taken by the police to the police station after they had successfully passed the breathalyser test, whether he is indicating that there are such people who, having passed the breathalyser test, are nevertheless taken to the police station by the police? If so, I do not think there is any justification for that.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, the noble Lord is surprisingly unaware of the 1960 Act, under which a police officer who thought there was something wrong with a person's driving could take him to the police station. The noble Lord may well be aware that people may be unfit to drive, or may be considered so by the police, although they have a blood alcohol content of less than 80 mg. per 100 millilitres of blood. Furthermore, a person may not have been drinking at all but may still be liable to be taken to the station if he was driving, or was thought by the police to be driving, under the influence of drugs or drink.
LORD POPPLEWELL: My Lords, is my noble friend aware that the whole House and the country will be extremely interested in the figures he has given? According to the figures, over one-third of the people who have been involved in
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some kind of motoring offence have been proved to have more than 80 mg. of alcohol per 100 ml. in their bloodstream. This indicates that the breathalyser test is proving eminently successful, and anything that can be done with a view to reducing accident rates must be welcomed by all.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I entirely agree with my noble friend.
LORD NUGENT OF GUILDFORD: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that I shall ask him again for the information for which I have asked him to-day?
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I shall be pleased to answer it when the information is available. I should inform your Lordships that the statistical return which is now being made—and, as I indicated, is being made for a provisional trial period—may prove to give information which we do not want, may prove that essential information is not obtainable; and in that case we should modify the form. But I assure the noble Lord that I, too, was extremely interested in the answer to the question which he raised. We have been only 21 days on this, and I think it is pretty good to be able to give the figures that I have given.
LORD NUGENT OF GUILDFORD: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord.
BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER: My Lords, can my noble friend answer this question, which greatly puzzles me? If a person appears on the breathalyser to show an alcohol content of over 80 mg., he is then arrested and taken to the police station where a blood test is taken; but the result of the blood test is not known for a considerable time. At what point is the charge made; and also, how does he get home?
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, so far as the question of a charge being made is concerned, assuming that a blood test has been taken the charge is made when the result of the test is known. As to how a driver gets home, that will depend on two things: his condition and the discretion of the police.

BREATHALYSER TESTS: ACCURACY OF EQUIPMENT
3.14 p.m.
LORD NUGENT OF GUILDFORD: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the second Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government to state whether, in view of the limited scope of the earlier tests, arrangements are being made to conduct any further research on a more extensive scale to check the accuracy of the breath-testing equipment used by the police to enforce the new drink and driving laws or to approve the use of other breath-testing equipment which may be more accurate than the equipment used at present.]
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, the breath-testing device at present in use by the police was fully tested before it was approved by my right honourable friend the Home Secretary for the purposes of the Road Safety Act 1967. I welcome this opportunity of pointing out that it is open to manufacturers at any time to submit breath-testing devices for the Home Secretary's approval, which will be given to any device that reaches a satisfactory standard of reliability.
LORD NUGENT OF GUILDFORD: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his reply to my Question. May I ask him whether he remembers that the information which he gave us on the Home Office tests earlier in the year covered only 77 tests? Is he aware that expert opinion was most surprised that the Home Office was satisfied by such a limited sample of tests when these testing machines must deal with many tens of thousands of cases in a year? Further, is the noble Lord aware that, in the light of that limitation, it seems desirable to have more extensive tests?
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, the actual tests are more extensive than the figure of 77 which the noble Lord rightly mentioned. Three hundred devices are taken from the manufacturer who submits them for approval, and they are tested by means of random sampling. Of the first 300 samples of the device that was approved, 75 per cent. were in fact
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used. Any manufacturer who submits a device for approval must submit 300 devices, 300 samples for testing. We have so far had five different devices submitted, all of which have had to be rejected because they were not of a satisfactory standard of reliability. I agree that they must be carefully tested. They have been, and they will continue to be.
LORD NUGENT OF GUILDFORD: My Lords, may I thank the noble Lord for explaining the Home Office approach in this matter? May I thank him, too, for giving us this information on this interim report, and also for undertaking to keep us fully in the picture as further information comes to hand?
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, may I ask a supplementary Question? Is the noble Lord aware that breathalysers are being placed on the market at the present time? Is he able to say whether those breathalysers have already received the approval of the Home Secretary, so far as their pattern is concerned?
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, only one breathalyser has so far been approved by my right honourable friend, and that is the one which is now in use by police forces. I think the others to which the noble Lord referred are odd things which are supplied in all sorts of ways. Most certainly they have not been approved by my right honourable friend, nor, so far as I am aware, by anyone else.

EGYPT: RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN
3.18 p.m.
LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper. May I direct attention to a small misprint? The words which appear, "seized property of British nations" should read, "seized property of British nationals".
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will ensure that any resumption of diplomatic relations with Egypt shall carry with this resumption an undertaking by Egypt to restore seized property of British nationals and proper compensation for losses incurred.]
THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (LORD CHALFONT): My Lords, Her Majesty's Government have very much in mind the interests both of the British subjects who have had property nationalised in the United Arab Republic and of those whose property has been sequestrated. The House will be aware that over the years we have carried out a series of complicated negotiations on these matters with the United Arab Republic authorities. Several matters still remain for negotiation, and this would be much facilitated by a resumption of diplomatic relations.
LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE: My Lords, is the Minister aware that I was not referring to the previous settlement some years past, but to British nationals who have had their property and money seized during the recent troubles with Egypt?
LORD CHALFONT: My Lords, I am afraid I know, and the Foreign Office knows, of no British property which has been seized by the authorities in Egypt during the events in June.
LORD BLYTON: My Lords, is my noble friend aware that I hope we do not bend over backwards to appease Nasser and get the worst of both worlds in the Middle East?
LORD CHALFONT: My Lords, while I take the point of what my noble friend has said, I think nothing could be lost, and a good deal gained, by resuming proper relations with one of the most influential Arab States. I do not see how it can be in the interests of ourselves or of our friends that we should be denied regular access to this Government.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, can the Minister say whether the request to resume diplomatic relations was made by Her Majesty's Government, or by Egypt?
LORD CHALFONT: My Lords, I think it would be unwise to go too deeply into the question of who actually made the approaches. I am sure your Lordships will recall that in August and September we were receiving indications from the United Arab Republic that they wanted to get on better terms with us, and there was an article in the Sunday Times by the Editor of the very influential Egyptian newspaper El Ahram. He wrote then that in his view it was time
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the dialogue began. I think it would have been very inconsistent and unwise of us to have ignored that indication.
LORD SEGAL: My Lords, quite apart from the matter of the resumption of diplomatic relations, may I ask whether my noble friend is aware that this problem has now been dragging on for over ten years, and that the hardships to many British nationals have increased with each successive year? Would he urge on his right honourable friend that a final settlement should first be reached before any question of financial assistance is negotiated with the Egyptian Government.
LORD CHALFONT: My Lords, of course I shall take note of what my noble friend has said, but I think that we shall be in a much better position to solve this and all the other problems with the United Arab Republic if we resume normal diplomatic relations with them.
LORD BYLTON: My Lords, in view of the fact that Nasser has the full backing of Russia, does my noble friend not think that, in the light of international events, we ought to take care where we travel as a nation?
LORD CHALFONT: My Lords, I think that we must be very careful where we travel on any issue, but it is my view, and that of the Foreign Office and of Her Majesty's Government, that it cannot possibly be in our interest to be denied diplomatic relations with and regular access to any Government, and particularly with one of the most influential Governments of the Middle East.
LORD ILFORD: My Lords, will the noble Lord say whether the compensation awarded to British nationals expelled from Egypt in 1956 has been met in full by the Egyptian Government?
LORD CHALFONT: My Lords, I have not that information with me, but I can find out and let the noble Lord know. We still reserve our right to claim compensation for any damage which has been done either in the past or during the recent events. But so far as the specific question is concerned, I will get the information and let the noble Lord have it.
LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE: My Lords, will the Minister bear in mind

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that his optimistic hope that things will be better as regards prospects of compensation once we have resumed diplomatic relations is not borne out by the history of previous years?
LORD CHALFONT: My Lords, this may be the view of the noble Lord. I can only say that I think bilateral relations with any country are made much better when we are in normal diplomatic relations.

B.E.A. AND REPLACEMENT OF AIRCRAFT
3.24 p.m.
THE EARL OF KINNOULL: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
[To ask Her Majesty's Government how they expect B.E.A. to remain over the next four years a fully commercial undertaking when a decision on their passenger aircraft replacement has been blocked by the Government for over 18 months and their European competitors have been able to place orders for commercially superior passenger aircraft to come into operation by 1969–70.]
LORD BESWICK: My Lords there has been no unnecessary delay. After the Government's decision in August, 1966, not to approve B.E.A.'s proposed purchase of American aircraft, it rested with B.E.A., in conjunction with the manufacturers, to propose the most suitable British aircraft. For the first and most urgent part of their requirement they proposed the newly conceived BAC 1–11/500, which was approved by the Government in December, 1966. For the second part they proposed in February, 1967, another newly conceived type, the BAC 2–11. Subsequently it has been necessary to assess all the implications of this purchase for B.E.A., the manufacturers and the Government, and to consider alternatives. It has also been essential to relate B.E.A.'s requirement to the Government's plans for the European air-bus on which Anglo-French-German agreement was reached in Sep
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tember. Meanwhile, the manufacturers have undertaken preparatory work on the BAC 2–11, as well as on a further version of the Trident which could be an alternative, and this work has resulted in changes in recent weeks both in the characteristics of the aircraft and in the estimated costs. The factors are now sufficiently defined and an early decision can be made.
THE EARL OF KINNOULL: My Lords, while thanking the noble Lord for his long reply, may I ask whether the Government accept that B.E.A. will require a new aircraft before the air-bus becomes available to them? Secondly, in view of the acute shortage of time, would the noble Lord confirm whether Her Majesty's Government may have to reconsider ordering the Boeing 727.
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, B.E.A. have already ordered a new aircraft, the BAC 1–11/500 series. That will be in operation some time before the air-bus is available. As for the possibility of the American purchase, that, of course, has been ruled out.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (THE EARL OF LONGFORD): My Lords, I beg to move the Motion which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
Moved, That this House do attend the Memorial Service for the late Earl Attlee in Westminster Abbey next Tuesday morning.—(The Earl of Longford.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

GOVERNMENT OF WALES BILL [H.L.]
LORD OGMORE: My Lords, I beg leave to introduce a Bill to provide a scheme for the domestic self-government of Wales; and for connected purposes. I beg to move that the Bill be now read a first time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 1a.— (Lord Ogmore.)
On Question, Bill read 1a, and to be printed.

HOUSE OF LORDS (COMPOSITION AND FUNCTIONS) BILL [H.L.]
LORD ALPORT: My Lords, I beg leave to introduce a Bill to make provision with respect to the composition and functions of the House of Lords. I beg to move that the Bill be now read a first time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 1a.—(Lord Alport.)
On Question, Bill read 1a, and to be printed.

SPECIAL ORDERS COMMITTEE
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (THE EARL OF LISTOWEL): My Lords, I beg to move the Motion which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
Moved, That a Select Committee be appointed to consider all Special Orders of the present Session; and that the Lords following, with the Chairman of Committees, be named of the Committee:

D. Atholl,

M. Willingdon,

V. Soulbury,

L. Airedale,

L. Archibald,

L. Auckland,

L. Cawley,

L. Coutanche,

L. Crawshaw,

L. Faringdon,

L. Jessel,

L. MacAndrew,

L. Meston,

L. Morton of Henryton,

L. Peddie,

B. Plummer,

L. Royle,

L. Silsoe,

L. Strang,

L. Terrington.—(The Earl of Listowel.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMITTEE OF SELECTION
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: My Lords, I beg to move the Motion which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
Moved, That a Committee be appointed to select and propose to the House the names of the five Lords to form a Select Committee for the consideration of each opposed Private Bill; and that the Lords following, with the Lord Chancellor and the Chairman of Committees, be named of the Committee:

M. Salisbury,

M. Willingdon,

E. St. Aldwyn,

E. Swinton,

L. Amulree,

L. Chorley,

L. Ogmore,

L. Beswick,

L. Silkin,

L. Strang.—(The Earl of Listowel.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, I beg to move the Motion which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
Moved, That a Select Committee be appointed for the general supervision of arrangements relating to leave of absence, and that the Lords following, with the Chairman of Committees, be named of the Committee:

E. St. Aldwyn,

L. Amulree,

L. Beswick.—(The Earl of Longford.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

ADDRESS IN REPLY TO HER MAJESTY'S MOST GRACIOUS SPEECH
3.29 p.m.
Debate resumed on the Motion moved on Tuesday last by Lord Cooper of Stockton Heath—namely, That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty as follows:—
"Most Gracious Sovereign—We, Your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, in Parliament assembled, beg leave to thank Your Majesty for the most gracious Speech which Your Majesty has addressed to both Houses of Parliament."
LORD CARRINGTON: My Lords, in some ways it is a pity (though I realise it cannot be helped) that we should be debating foreign affairs before we have had a day on the economic situation. For there can be no doubt that in large measure the problems which confront us around the world are due to our economic weakness and the Government's failure to find a solution. I will say in passing—though no doubt my noble friend Lord Jellicoe will have more to say on this subject—that there is not much sign in the gracious Speech of anything more than good intentions and platitudes in that direction. I must also say, and this is not an agreeable thing to say, that I do not recollect a time in my lifetime when British prestige abroad has been so low or this country has been held in such low a regard. I recollect that the Foreign Secretary once said that now, once again, Britain's voice was being listened to in world affairs. I fear that nothing is more untrue than that remark, and that our relations with our friends and allies have deteriorated and weakened in a way which I, for one, find alarming. I shall have more to say about that later.
But the problem which concerns us above all at this present time, and it has been highlighted by the speech of M. Couve de Murville and the statements said to have been made by the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, at his Press conference in Lausanne the other day, is that of Britain's entry into the Common Market. I do not think it is necessary for me to say yet again that I am wholeheartedly a European; that is to say, I
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think it essential for the future of this country that we should join the European Economic Community. Europe without Britain is as incomplete as Europe without France; and to imagine the perpetuation of such a state of affairs over any length of time would gravely damage the fabric of the Free World—for a strong Europe, united with Britain as a leading member, must be a vital ingredient in the balance of power between East and West.
Broadly speaking, I think that, with one or two notable exceptions, there is an overwhelming majority in support in both Houses. Therefore, we on this side of the House have supported the actions taken by the Government, though naturally we have no responsibility for them or for the sequence of events. But I should like to ask the noble Lords who are going to reply one or two broad questions.
When the Prime Minister—and it will be recalled that it was the Prime Minister personally—decided to make exploratory journeys round the capitals of Europe to test opinion, presumably in the conversations that he had with the French he was faced with the same objections which were raised last week by M. Couve de Murville. I have no doubt that he sought to answer them as best he might, and they seem to me to be capable of answer. What then were the reactions of the French? Presumably the Prime Minister felt that he had satisfied them, since otherwise he would hardly have come back to this country and almost immediately afterwards made public the decision to seek membership of the Community; for the timing of the application is the Government's, taken on their inside knowledge of the situation. But if he did not feel that he had satisfied the French, what policy did the Prime Minister envisage would overcome their objections? Did he propose to rely on the advocacy of the other five to overcome French objections, or did he think that General de Gaulle was bluffing?
These are questions which are becoming increasingly of importance, for if the French really mean what they say, and in fact intend to veto our entry—and it seems to me that events are heading that way—the Government must make it abundantly clear what they intend to do. Oddly enough, I agree with something which I read in the Daily Express when it said that it is no good just saying that

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we will not take "No" for an answer. That is an attitude and not a policy. I believe that is right. Surely the Government will have to make their position a good deal plainer than it is to me at the present time.
I know what I would do if there were a French veto. If we were faced with yet another French refusal to accept Britain as a member, I would make it abundantly clear that we regarded this as only a temporary encumbrance to our eventual membership—as surely it will be. There is—and I say this with great respect to some very eminent people whose judgment I greatly admire—no alternative policy for Britain which can be substituted for membership in Europe. I do not believe that any closer economic situation with the United States or the old Commonwealth countries is a practical proposition; nor do I believe that it would be welcomed by the other parties concerned.
If, indeed, it should be that once again the answer is "No", we must set to work to restore our economy by our own efforts, to seek to overcome the great economic difficulties which will be put in our way by our exclusion, but to do it on our own, by our own determination and with our own resources, and make it clear to our friends on the Continent that our ultimate aim, whatever General de Gaulle may say now, is to become a member of the European Community.
If that is the right policy—and I believe it is the right policy—it is most unfortunate that the sort of headlines which we read on Sunday and Monday have been allowed to gain credence. All of us who have been Ministers know how much more difficult it is to deny statements of that kind once they are made; and, alas!, one can visualise how gratefully those headlines were received in some circles in France. In the first place, it is totally unrealistic to suppose that Britain could, or would, do any of the things which were reported—withdrawal from NATO, for example, or recognition of East Germany in a fit of pique. It is really inconceivable that foreign policy could be conducted in so childish a fashion—at least, it used to be.
I am extremely loth to blame the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, whose name
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has been associated with these rumours. We in this House know what a conscientious and able Minister he is. But this cannot be just a question of misunderstanding. Headlines of that kind cannot possibly come about unless there is some substance of truth behind the story, and certainly not from someone like the noble Lord, who was an experienced correspondent before he became a Minister and knows better than most of us, I think, how to operate at this level. Ministers in this Government—and I am not particularly talking about the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont—are very inclined to fly kites. There are a good many premeditated leaks to the Press, leaks to one or two of the most specially favoured correspondents, and with a special purpose—to alter the climate, or to set the climate, or to find out what the climate is. These are dangerous manœuvres and it looks very much as if, on this occasion, it was a manœuvre which has been conspicuously damaging and unsuccessful.
Whatever the result of our application to join the Common Market—and I confess to being gloomy about our prospects at the moment—our relations with our friends and allies around the world will be of the utmost importance in the next few years. Are these alliances in good repair? It does not seem to me that Anglo-American relations can be said to be at a very high and very happy level. The decision by Her Majesty's Government to announce a date for their withdrawal from our positions East of Suez can hardly have helped. If we in this country, and having first-hand knowledge of our economic problems, find it impossible to understand why the Government should announce years in advance what they intend to do in a set of circumstances which they cannot conceivably know anything about, how much more difficult it must be for the Americans.
I do not find it at all strange that we should now be treated in Washington as being of no more influence than the other countries in the Western Alliance. Our special position surely has been because we were helping to contain Communism, not only in Europe, but in the Middle East and in the Far East as well. That gave us a rather closer relationship with the Americans than other countries enjoyed; not because we

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spoke the same language, but because they thought we were better allies. In my view, it was to the advantage of Britain that that should be so. By their announcement about Singapore and Malaysia, and by some of their other actions in the Middle East to which I shall come, the Government seem to me to have abandoned that position and received nothing whatever in return.
But it is more particularly about Anglo-Australian relations that I wish to speak for a moment, and my excuse for doing so is that I have been associated with Australia over a number of years. I would say that I am not at all happy about the way things are going at the present time. Some of it is our fault and some of it is not. There are, I think, four reasons which, taken together, cause grave anxiety in Australia about Britain and her intentions in Australia and the Far East generally. The first is the fact that for the very first time Australia is engaged in a war in which no British soldier is fighting alongside the Australians. It is a war which seems to the Australians vital to their security and safety, and they find it difficult to understand why Britain is not alongside helping them as they used to help us.
My Lords, I do not share that point of view, but I understand it, and I should find it much easier to convince the Australians of our determination to remain as an important part of the defences of the West against Communism in that part of the world had the Government not decided to announce their decision to leave the Far East. If that decision caused some consternation in the United States, it certainly received a good deal of unfavourable publicity in Australia: for ever since the fall of Singapore in 1942 the Australians have been doubtful about Britain's intention to play a continuing part in the Pacific area. Time and time again British Ministers have reassured them, and only a short time ago, in Canberra, Mr. Healey gave in effect a pledge that we would not leave that area. My Lords, coupled with our non-participation in Vietnam, the abandonment of British positions in South-East Asia is a great psychological shock to the Australian and New Zealand people.
Thirdly, there has been the decision to apply for membership of the Common
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Market. I think that on this occasion the decision has been less misunderstood and less criticised than it was previously; nevertheless, it seems to the Australians yet another indication of a loosening of ties and of interest in the Commonwealth, and, in particular, in Australia. I personally do not think that that is so; nor do I share the indignation voiced by some of my Australian friends about Britain's decision. After all, Australia—and quite understandably—has had to look to her own economic problems. If she sells wool and minerals to Japan she must allow Japan access to her markets—and she has done. The same is true of her relationship with the United States and her increasing dependence on American defences and American weapons, as opposed to British ones. These things are not all one way, although they may seem so from an Australian standpoint.
Fourthly and lastly, there is the restriction on the export of British capital to Australia. Your Lordships will know that at the present time there is an enormous boom in Australia. Great discoveries of metals, ores and oil are being made almost daily. It is a most exciting and stimulating time for the Australian people. But they have not got sufficient capital of their own to develop their enormous potential, and they look for help from outside. Broadly speaking, this means the United States and ourselves; and until only recently we provided much more of that capital than did the United States. The restriction of capital, although this may be a temporary necessity and understood by some of the more sophisticated Australians, is totally misunderstood by large numbers of them, who think that this is yet another example of Britain's increasing apathy to Australia, Australians and the South-East Asian and Pacific area.
My Lords, I am well aware that we have been, and still are, going through an economic crisis, and that some restrictions on the export of capital have been necessary. But what worries me is what seems to be the antipathy of those in authority against investment of British capital overseas. And, much more serious, there seems to be a growing disenchantment in Whitehall, among civil servants and Ministers, with the old Commonwealth. This is the impression that I get. This attitude is very disturbing, and

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I hope to hear from one or other of the noble Lords who are to reply this afternoon some encouraging words about investment overseas. For overseas investment brings with it a fall-out of the sale of capital goods, and a good deal more in influence and prestige.
All these four reasons which I have given—Vietnam, Singapore, the Common Market and capital restrictions—add up to a great deal of uneasiness. I believe that Australia is one of the coming countries of the world; that her future and her potential are truly limitless. I beg the Government to do something to mend the fences which have so sadly been broken in these last two years. There is an abundance of good will in Australia for this country. Do not let us throw it away for the wrong reasons, or through lethargy. For while Australia will hold a very important position in the Pacific area, Britain still has enormous interests there, and our influence can still be of great importance, if only the Government will recognise the need and be prepared to do something about it.
LORD BLYTON: My Lords, will the noble Lord forgive me for one moment? Can he tell me how he can reconcile that with his attitude in recommending us to go into the Common Market, which means the destruction of the Commonwealth? Because you have got to withdraw from Asia to get into the Common Market. All the arguments he has put forward to-day are absolutely fallacious.
LORD CARRINGTON: I do not accept that that is the choice, and I do not accept that that would be the result. But perhaps we could debate it on another occasion. Sad though I think it is, I do not believe that Her Majesty's Government on their own can settle the issues which divide Israel and the Arab world. Nor do I think that by themselves they can ensure the opening of the Suez Canal. But I shall be interested to hear from the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, what steps they are taking to achieve this end, for I have heard of none recently.
At Question Time earlier on questions were asked about our relations with the United Arab Republic. All of us wish to see good relations with the Arabs and with the United Arab Republic—and,
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goodness knows! we have gone enough out of our way to achieve that in the last few years. But I must admit to your Lordships that I have some grave misgivings about the activities of the Foreign Secretary with regard to Egypt and President Nasser. I should have thought that there was ample evidence on hand in the Foreign Office and elsewhere to convince even the most starry-eyed that the policy of President Nasser and the Egyptian Government has been for many years directed against Britain and her colonial possessions and protectorates. Indeed, I would suppose that there is no one man or one country which has done more to undermine our position in the Middle East by every means, including terrorism, bribery, subversion and murder. Even now, Cairo Radio is still pouring out vicious propaganda about the British in the Gulf States. British subjects have been illegally held, and even now—I can give the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, this information—compensation is still due to British subjects for property illegally held from them by the Egyptians. I do not understand why Mr. Brown should think that President Nasser has changed his spots, or that a kind word from him will alter the situation.
My Lords, as I see it—and it is best to be frank about these matters—President Nasser has suffered an overwhelming military and political defeat at the hands of the Israelis, and he has been discredited and humiliated in the eyes of his Arabian neighbours. How agreeable for him, then, to be wooed by the British, and how even more agreeable for the British to be seen to be restoring him to the position of importance that he once had! No doubt the crowning success of this achievement would be for us to lend a large sum of money to President Nasser to put him on his feet again. My Lords, what a nonsense! I very much hope that the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, or the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, will deny that there is any truth in the rumour that such a loan is contemplated.
To me perhaps the most distasteful part of this story is the events which have led up to the present situation in Aden and South Arabia. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, is to make a Statement later to-day, but since I shall not have the opportunity of doing anything other than comment after my

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speech is finished, I cannot end without some mention of this. Over the past years at the instigation of Egypt (and of Egyptians over the Yemen border) British civilians and soldiers doing their duty in that colony have been brutally murdered. In order to preserve law and order and ensure a proper transition to independence, they have undergone great dangers and great discomforts. They have been shot at by two organisations, both of them labelled by the present Administration at one time or another as terrorists—FLOSY and the N.L.F. Now these two organisations are meeting—and meeting in Cairo of all places—to decide which, or what combination of both, is to become the next Government of South Arabia.
Even now British soldiers and innocent civilians are being shot in the streets of Aden by these two organisations. God knows why!—since everyone knows that the British are going to move out. The Federal Government to whom we gave our support has collapsed; the Federal Army is deeply divided, and the only thing that we can be certain of is that those who were loyal to Britain and gave her their support may retain their lives but certainly not much else. I do not blame the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, for this; indeed, I think if he had been asked to go there earlier there is a good chance that none of this would have happened. But I cannot disguise from your Lordships a feeling of deep humiliation and distress at what has happened, and is happening, in South Arabia; and a very large part of it is undeniably the responsibility of Her Majesty's Government and flows from the decisions they took at the beginning of their term of office.
My Lords, no one who looks round the world and sees it from a British standpoint can be happy with the position of Britain, British interests and British influence. Some of the blame for this lies with all of us. We have as a country recently been much too much inclined to run ourselves down and take ourselves at the valuation of others who are not very well disposed towards us. We seem to have lost our self-confidence and are beginning to believe those very articulate writers and commentators who are continually reminding us of their opinion that we are a second-rate Power and no
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longer of any account. Of course, we must be realistic about our changed situation; but surely the time has come to stop this state of denigration and stop believing it. But at the same time we must have from the Government a policy designed firmly to retain Britain's influence, to protect her world-wide interests and restore the image of this country tarnished, I think, by lack of leadership, by mismanagement and by weakness.
3.53 p.m.
LORD GLADWYN: My Lords, it looks as if we are going to have to face all kinds of troubles abroad during the present Session; that is to say, during a period—and here I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Carrington—when our prestige, for one reason or another, seems to be at rather low ebb. There will almost certainly, of course, not be any major war. Both the super-Powers are absolutely determined to prevent this; and prevent it I believe they will. I have already discussed with your Lordships on a previous occasion what seems to be the effects of the so-called "balance of terror"; namely, the ability of both super-Powers to knock each other out at one and the same moment should war break out. This balance still holds, though possibly it may be affected one day by the introduction of what is called a "credible" anti-ballistic missile system (A.B.M.), which, as we all know, is still quite a long way away.
The effect of the balance of terror, therefore, is the maintenance of the territorial status quo in all areas where the two giants are actually confronting each other and a rather grim balance of power in areas where they confront each other more or less at one remove, the result of which, in those areas, is that neither of their protegés is allowed to be knocked out completely; therefore a sort of draw is inevitably imposed. If anything demonstrated the truth of this theory—because it is only a theory—it was, and is, the behaviour of the two giants during the crisis in the Middle East, where Britain and France themselves can now only play—regrettable though it may be—a minor role. Even if they combined they could hardly expect to play a major role in the Middle East. I should have thought that that, for once and all, was proved by Suez. Only if a European Political Community establishes itself

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can the voice of Europe still be heard in vital matters affecting peace and war—whether in the Middle East or elsewhere. So I expect we may have all kinds of crises arising during this Session; and I should hope that the United Nations—and we must trust that this will be so—will play a greater role in their settlement than they have done up to now. It is possible that if we now combine to reinforce the authority of U Thant this may have a good effect, and I am sure the Government will do everything to reinforce his authority if they can.
Meanwhile, the war in Vietnam continues on its hideous course, and here, too, in the absence of any concerted European policy, our voice, I am afraid, has absolutely no effect. We can only hope that by one means or another the war will effectively be over by, or immediately after, the coming American Presidential Election, which happens in almost exactly one year from now. There is some reason to suppose that, for purely political reasons, this may come about. Anybody who has the interests of the Western World at heart could not, I think, wish the Americans to be forced to withdraw all their forces in humiliating circumstances; but, equally, nobody—on these Benches, at any rate—could believe that the present policy of bombing the North and threatening to escalate the war further will have anything except a definitely counter-productive effect.
My Lords, while on foreign policy generally, I may say that we congratulate the Government on their determination to evacuate Aden, even (if we may believe the Press) in advance of the timetable; and in this they may be assisted—I think they will—by the recent withdrawal of the Egyptian Army from the Yemen, which is surely a good thing in itself. It will not be long—as the Liberal Party thinks, at any rate, with all due respect to the views of the Tory Party—before the Government announce some similar withdrawal from the Persian Gulf and give up any proposal for the construction at great expense of staging bases in the Indian Ocean such as Aldabra. We await such developments with interest. But, naturally, in all these things the time will depend on what happens in Europe. We also congratulate the Government on their admirably firm
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handling of a potentially explosive situation in Hong Kong.
But, my Lords—and this is, as you know, my "King Charles's head"—it really all comes back to one problem; namely, whether we can join the European Economic Community and then form, or attempt to form, some political entity in Europe with the E.E.C. as its base. Noble Lords will not, I am sure, accuse me of having been particularly optimistic about the likely reaction of General de Gaulle to our application; but there is no doubt that if we can successfully insert our toe in the door and then keep it there for at any rate a while, we shall eventually end up as members of E.E.C.—although it may take longer than some people think. This, naturally, is what the present crisis is all about: for the General himself realises perfectly well that if he can keep our toe out of the door we may, in the long run, be forced to adopt something other than a purely European policy, and this is precisely what he wants.
Well, my Lords, what could those other policies be? I suggest that there is no more harm in discussing them now than there has been in discussing them, as we have frequently done, during the last ten years or so. I remember alluding to them myself in this House as early as March, 1961, and nothing which has happened since has affected my own judgment: that the alternatives to joining the European Economic Community, always supposing (and this is an important proviso) that it continues to exist, are twofold. I might describe them shortly as follows.
In the first place, we might become a neutralist country with a highly directed economy. This is sometimes known as the super-Sweden solution. It would naturally involve withdrawal from the Atlantic Alliance which, in turn, would involve the withdrawal of our armed forces in Europe. The first sign of a step in this direction might well be, I feel, the institution of some system of imports control, which would no doubt in its turn imply a return to some form of wartime austerity, at any rate for the time being. It need hardly be said that this might well, if it were done, encourage protectionism like nothing else in the United States and elsewhere. Altogether

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this solution seems, to us here at any any rate, wholly lamentable, and might well end up in our becoming some kind of associate of the Soviet Union—which may, incidentally, be the ultimate fate of France if she is so misguided as to allow her great chief to take her out of the Atlantic Alliance altogether. Nobody now suggests that Her Majesty's present Government would contemplate anything so disastrous as this. I am sure that they would not.
In the second place—and perhaps much more likely, or less improbable, shall we say?—we might become an increasingly close associate of North America and Australia, perhaps in some kind of Free Trade Area. This is undoubtedly possible economically and prehaps some may think—some do think—even desirable from the point of view of the maintenance of a reasonable standard of living in this country; even though, as a very broad generalization—but it is fundamentally true—we should probably find ourselves making the trouser-buttons while the Americans made the computers. But would that really matter? For we might, I suppose, ultimately be part of a large prosperous community in the same way that New England is now part of the United States. The so-called "brain drain" would naturally not be curbed, it would indeed be encouraged; it would have to be. The bond of language alone might hold us all together and eventually make us collectively some great force in the world. I would not deny that.
Such a system would be naturally consonant with the continuance of the Western Alliance, even if France should pull out of that; though if she did, I think that the Western Germans would be faced with a grave decision, namely, whether to put the Franco-German Alliance in front of everything else or not. The greatest disadvantage of such a system, as I see it—and it would be a real one—would be that we should presumably have no political representation at the centre, which would, naturally, be in Washington: that is, until the United States Congress agreed that we should become an actual part of the United States, or possibly of some larger political federation.
At this point I think I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, that both these solutions are almost out of the ques
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tion for the time being—at least we sincerely suppose that they would be. I cannot say that they would be always, but I think that they would be now. For the real difficulty about both those solutions, my Lords, is the question mark which would continue to hang over Western Europe, and indeed over Europe generally. Would it be possible for the present Six, under the leadership of France, to conclude some kind of European settlement direct with the Soviet Union; or would it be more likely that the Soviet Union would exploit the contradictions in Western Europe in order to impose some kind of Russian hegemony?
If noble Lords have not done so already, they may be interested to read the report of the late Foreign Minister of Denmark, Mr. Per Haekkerup, which was published recently in the Council of Europe, on the present position and future prospects of the European Economic Community. This is, in my opinion, a first-class analysis, and Mr. Haekkerup comes to the conclusion that it is by no means inevitable that the Six will continue in being anyhow as a Community. If they are to continue, so he says—and I think he is right—they must make progress towards some kind of economic union, and that at the moment, as we all know, is anathema to the present ruler of France.
My Lords, I should also like to mention a recent article by M. Maurice Duverger in Le Monde in which he comes to the conclusion that in order to avoid what he calls American "colonialism" the Western European States, incapable, as he thinks they would be, of constructing a real Political Community, would have, in practice, to call in the Soviet Union for the purpose of rationalising their economies and inducing their great industrialists to form larger groups. That is what he says. These are disquieting symptoms, my Lords, of a certain tendency on the other side of the Channel to look East rather than to look West, a tendency which may yet prevail if by any chance General de Gaulle is successful in permanently excluding us from the European Economic Community.
Now, my Lords, if it were only to draw attention to such depressing possibilities as these that the noble Lord,

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Lord Chalfont, who saw the journalists recently at the Beau Rivage Hotel in Lausanne, then I cannot see that he did anything but good. It would, of course, have been different if he had suggested that Her Majesty's Government had actually contemplated an alternative policy on the lines perhaps of the ones I am suggesting. But there is no suggestion, I think, that he did. Indeed we have had the Prime Minister's solemn assurance in the House of Commons the day before yesterday that he did not.
Everybody who knows anything about foreign affairs knows that the alternatives to our joining the European Economic Community would be bad for us in many ways, just as they would be bad from the point of view of our European neighbours. Presumably, therefore, we should go in either of the directions indicated only if our efforts to enter the Community had definitely failed, if another Government had come into power, or if our failure to enter had resulted in some crack-up of the present E.E.C. But what in any case we should not do—and here I have a certain sympathy, I think, with Lord Carrington's colleague, Mr. Quintin Hogg—is to leave our Continental friends under the impression that if they are terrorised by the French Government into acquiescing in what is actually an illegal veto on negotiations, we can all just carry on as if nothing had happened. On the contrary, they must realise that we should be entering a highly dangerous period in which only one country could possibly stand to gain, and that would be the Soviet Union.
So what we must do now is what the Government are, in fact, doing; namely, to make every conceivable effort to get negotiations started. If the French really place a veto on the negotiations, then before allowing ourselves, as it were, by the force of things to be pushed away from Europe, we might perhaps in the first place try to negotiate with the Five. In any case, as the Foreign Secretary previously did, we should certainly be well advised to raise the whole question again in Western European Union. We probably may not, even so, be able to count on the Five exercising real pressure on the French, but if we made a great fuss, they would probably exercise
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some pressure. The thing would be to keep the idea alive, at least during the coming critical period, when it is to be expected that General de Gaulle will do his best to take France right out of the Alliance, which would in itself of course, produce a changed situation, depending on whether he succeeds or fails. The more during this uneasy period we could declare our desire to construct a real European Political Community the better it would be; and this, too, I am quite certain, is the best card to trump the General's ace.
Admittedly it may be difficult to pursue this path indefinitely. In a way it is a question of a vicious circle. We cannot, we are told, join the Common Market until our economic situation has been put right; and we cannot put the economy right until we join the Community. But really it is a contest of wills, and the stakes are very high. We must therefore put everything we have on the table—indeed, we have now almost done that by stating our willingness to discuss the role of sterling and to take measures, in common with our prospective partners, to solve our balance-of-payments problems together. If we could finally abandon our Great Power pretensions—and here, I am afraid, I differ from the noble Lords on the Opposition Front Bench—that would help, too; but everybody knows that we shall not be in the Indian Ocean very much longer anyhow. There is thus no reason why we should not discuss defence, too, from this particular aspect.
But there is another card that we could play if we wanted to—and in a sense it might only be making a virtue of necessity; that is, the proposal for a delayed entry into the E.E.C. which, I need hardly say, with the utmost emphasis, has nothing to do with what is called "association". It is a different thing. Association seems to me to be out, for the simple reason that an associate has no control of policy and no certainty of entry. Besides, how could the Six agree to a complete abolition of tariffs on industrial goods while Britain retained a competitive advantage owing to being free from all agricultural obligations? How could that work? And if there was not to be free trade in industrial goods, what exactly should we get out of association? The idea is

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bogus, and it is probably known to be bogus by those who put it forward.
But the delayed entry idea is not bogus. It means essentially that Britain would have certainty of full membership at the end of a period of time, during which her economy could be slowly geared to those of the Six, and theirs, of course, to ours. It also contemplates close consultation with the Six during the interval. It might well not be agreeable to General de Gaulle, though there are those who say he might accept it, or something like it, in the last resort if it were really pressed upon him by the Five. But, in any case, if he vetoed even this, there would probably be a crisis in the Community, and again we should be confronted with a new situation.
The proposal to this broad effect which I outlined last June was, as your Lordships will be aware, immediately repudiated by the Foreign Office. Perhaps they were then labouring under some delusion as to the effect on the Walls of Jericho of the first blast of the trumpet. Perhaps they really did—wrongly, as I think—equate the proposal with some kind of association. Anyhow there are many variants of the idea, and I hold no copyright. All I do say is that it seems to me that we are approaching a time when it, or something like it, might at least be considered. In June this was not official Liberal policy; nor is it now, in the sense that it has not been the subject of any Party resolution. But I have consulted some of my friends, and I believe that it would be generally agreed in Liberal circles that, so to speak, half a loaf would be better than no bread. Much would depend, of course, on the actual nature of the arrangements.
So, in a nutshell, our attitude on these Benches is as follows. We strongly support the Government in the efforts they are making to enter the E.E.C. We approve in general of the way they are going about things. We should hope that they could lay greater emphasis on their desire to construct a real Political Community in Europe of a frankly supranational character. And, lastly, we hope that they will not discard a priori any plan for circumventing or, alternatively, frustrating the evident desire of the present French Government, in the pursuit of their nationalistic policy of dominance, to place a veto even on the
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start of negotiations for a lasting democratic union of the Six, the British Isles and Scandinavia, the centre, so we must believe, one day, of a still wider Europe.
4.17 p.m.
THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO (LORD SHACKLETON): My Lords, the gracious Speech has mentioned a great many aspects of foreign policy, and I shall not attempt to deal with them all, though I shall probably touch on a few more than did the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, in his meritoriously short but rather unhelpful speech. Indeed, I hope that the noble Lord is well—I know that he has not been well lately. I thought that his lack of confidence and tetchiness was of a kind that, if it had come from the, Labour Party when we were in Opposition, it would have immediately have brought cries of lack of patriotism. So often this has happened in the past with the noble Lord that I do not think there would be much point in my attempting to reply in the same sort of tone, because I regard a debate on foreign policy as an occasion when on the whole we refrain as much as possible from making—
LORD CARRINGTON: My Lords, I hope that we have not yet reached the stage when it is unpatriotic to disagree with the Government.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, I never thought so, but so often, when the noble Lord was in the Government, he used to arouse the utmost fury of my noble friend Lord Alexander of Hillsborough by actually accusing him of lack of patriotism. I am certainly not doing this to the noble Lord. I am just saying that he is in rather a tetchy mood, that is all.
LORD ST. OSWALD: This is casuistry!
LORD SHACKLETON: That is exactly the right word, as the noble Lord says.
LORD ST. OSWALD: The noble Lord accepts it.
LORD SHACKLETON: Certainly, my Lords, if he accepts it on behalf of his noble friend. The noble Lord jumps round between Benches. Now he is speaking officially for the Opposition. I shall leave the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, and deal primarily with four

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main subjects—Vietnam, NATO, the Middle East and particularly Southern Arabia—and leave to my noble friend Lord Chalfont the subject of Britain and the European Communities.
It is not possible—and we never find it possible in these debates—to cover every aspect. On previous occasions areas of the world like India and Malaysia have played a major part. Not so long ago we had a good deal of discussion on China. It is not because these areas are not of the utmost importance that I do not cover them to-day, but because I think your Lordships will for the most part want to concentrate on those areas of the world which are of immediate concern from the policy point of view.
I should like to begin, therefore, by talking about the Middle East. During the last few months the Middle East has never been wholly absent from our minds. At the moment we are witnessing an uneasy truce in Arab/Israel hostilities—a truce broken by incidents of great gravity, which serve to remind us how important it is to work rapidly towards a lasting settlement in the area. The passions and the bitterness surrounding the Arab/Israel dispute, unfortunately, make it unrealistic to expect either to find quick solutions or to expect direct talks between the parties concerned in order to reach solutions. Her Majesty's Government continue to look to the United Nations, and I think there will be no difference even with those who have little confidence in the United Nations that it is the most suitable and indeed the only organisation to help us find a way out of the impasse. We believe that the Security Council is the right forum for this, and most other Governments share this view.
At the moment, talks are going on in New York which will, we hope, lead to an early meeting of the Council. If the Security Council could pass a constructive resolution—and, fortunately, there is a considerable measure of international agreement on the need for such a resolution—a major step will have been taken towards securing peace in the area. Such a resolution, to be successful in that aim, would have to be very carefully balanced. There is no simple clear-cut solution here. For example, while recognising
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the principle of Israeli withdrawal, it would at the same time have to acknowledge that Israel's withdrawal must be linked to the Arab States' recognising the right of Israel to exist in peace and security. That would be a start, but only a start. But we hope that from such a reasonable and practical basis there would flow the work and decisions which would result in the settlement which is vital for the future peace and stability of the area.
We have always thought—and we said this in May, even before the fighting started—that a really constructive element in working for peace in this area would be the appointment by the Secretary-General of the United Nations of a representative to go to the Middle East, to contact the parties concerned and to make suggestions. We hope, therefore, that any resolution passed by the Security Council would provide for a personal representative to be appointed by U Thant, and that the resolution itself would supply the balanced statement of principles which could act as a framework within which the representative could act.
Britain has a general and important interest in the peace of the Middle East. We also have a particular interest in one aspect; namely, the Suez Canal. Certainly our interest, which is considerable, has not lessened in the past decade. But we must remember that there are others involved, and they include many developing countries East of Suez who are seriously affected by the closure of the Canal. In our view, the particular problem of the Suez Canal has to be seen as part of the larger problem of the Arab/Israel dispute, and at the moment it is difficult to see how there can be progress in solving the problem of the Canal without progress towards a general settlement on those lines which I have mentioned.
There is, however, one aspect of the problem of the Canal which could be dealt with separately (it is one that noble Lords have several, times raised in this House), and this is the release of those ships which are now blocked in the Great Bitter Lake. There are four British vessels there, but ships of no fewer than eight nations are in fact involved. Perhaps one of the encouraging, if minor, aspects of adversity is the very high

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morale and mutual support that is to be found among the crews of these ships. The adversity in this case has at least produced something of an international entente among the nations concerned. We have suggested to the authorities of the United Arab Republic—and Sir Harold Beeley did this most recently two weeks ago—that the southern part of the Canal could be cleared in advance of a general settlement to enable these ships to leave. The United Arab Republic authorities have undertaken to examine this suggestion carefully.
The noble Lord, Lord Carrington, raised a number of points with regard to our relations with Egypt. I do not dissent from him in what he has said about the hostility that has been shown to this country; not do I wish, in the interests, I hope, of constructive debate, to trace the causes of that hostility. Certainly there have been incidents since the war which could have given rise to hostility, and the noble Lord will be aware of some of the things that I mean. But I think we should all be agreed—at any rate, I hope that we should, despite some of the questioning that took place this afternoon—that a step towards the reopening of negotiations, the reopening of diplomatic relations and the exchange of ambassadors can only be helpful at this moment.
I am afraid that I am unable to answer the noble Lord's question about a possible loan, because, apart from items that I have seen in the Press, I have heard nothing at all of this. As to whether there is anything in the offing, I should have thought at this moment that it would be rather surprising if there were, because I should have thought that it was exceedingly premature.
I should like now to turn to South Arabia. I do not propose here, either, to go into the past history. We debated this in the past, and there was a real difference of opinion, between some of us, anyway, on what was the correct national policy to follow in that area. I hold very strongly that the policies that Her Majesty's Government have followed in the decision to withdraw from that area without a defence treaty are correct. But I do not think your Lordships would wish now to debate this again, because we have debated it so often. I should
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therefore like to deal with the present situation.
As your Lordships know, I have been closely involved in this, and we are at the present moment facing very important decisions before independence. The High Commissioner, Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, returned to London for consultations a week ago, and in the light of his discussions with the Foreign Secretary the problems before us were sufficiently clarified—and this is an area of the world where it is exceedingly difficult to clarify anything—for certain decisions to be taken. I will come to those in a moment, but first I should like to set out the background to these decisions, and I wish to set them out as objectively as I can. Since our statement of Government policy on South Arabia in the summer, the situation in the Southern Arabian peninsula has been radically changed. First of all, the Government of the United Arab Republic has decided to withdraw its forces from the Yemen by mid-December. I personally am confident that this is not only taking place, but will be complete very soon. And in South Arabia itself the Federal Government has ceased to exist.
In the aftermath of the events of June 19, which were themselves exacerbated and partly brought about by the general tensions arising out of the Arab/Israel war, the prestige and standing of the Federal Government suffered a considerable blow from which it never recovered. During the summer a ground swell of revolt grew in the up-country States. The tribes, which were generally believed to be the basis of the authority of the State rulers and of the Federal Government, acquiesced or actually sided with the nationalist groups, and the traditional authorities accordingly disintegrated. I do not propose to analyse this, unless your Lordships wish me to, in any greater detail, or to apportion blame for these events. The situation in the States is still far from clear, and nationalist political labels which have been adopted are in many cases really only covers for old tribal divisions. In general terms, however, the National Liberation Front, which is much more of an indigenous nationalist movement, led the revolt and has established ascendancy in almost all the Federation and in the Eastern Aden Protectorate. One of the things which

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I must say has surprised me was the rapidity with which these feudal authorities collapsed, and with them went men, some of whom may not have been very worthy, although some were men for whom I personally had a considerable respect.
South Arabia was saved from total disintegration only by the ability of the Federal civil servants, including some of the British, and especially of the South Arabian forces, to hold the structure together, despite the fact that the South Arabian forces are themselves considerably divided on the same tribal and factional lines as the country as a whole. It was for this reason that the army refused—and volunteered the fact—to take over political control. In their view, however, the nationalists—and I must put in my own interpretation here: by "the nationalists" they mean the National Liberation Front and FLOSY; I have used the word "nationalists" in another way—had become representative of the country as a whole, and they pressed upon the High Commissioner the need for Her Majesty's Government to recognise them as such and to express our readiness to negotiate with them. Her Majesty's Government judged this was the right course to pursue. I have no doubt that it was the right course and that any other course would have led to chaos and ended any chance of a political settlement. The High Commissioner issued a statement accordingly on September 5. The South Arabian forces immediately called on the two factions to resolve their differences and to form a common front for negotiations with the High Commissioner.
It is now two months later, and we still have no one to negotiate with. It was a month before the two factions started their meetings in Cairo—and, quite frankly, I do not see why they should not meet in Cairo just as well as anywhere else. The great problem was to get the National Liberation Front to go to Cairo at all. We heard only last night that these talks had resulted in agreement on all matters so far discussed. The announcement issued by the factions last night said they would shortly reach agreement on the composition of their delegation to negotiate with us. We naturally welcome this, since it is what we have
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been pressing for since the beginning of September, and we look forward to negotiations at the earliest possible date. Indeed, we have always sought talks with all parties.
I have, if not to the satisfaction of the noble Lord, Lord St. Oswald, given the Irish analogy for the desirability of talks with people, whether they are called terrorists or not, and he will not expect me to follow the exchange we had on this subject on another occasion. I can only say that both the United Nations and ourselves have constantly tried to bring them to the conference table. We hope that at last this will come about, and that the threat that the divisions in the country would split the South Arabian forces should now, if all goes well, be averted, although it cannot be expected that old rivalries will evaporate overnight, and difficulties will certainly persist. But it is interesting and important that here again the inheritance of British training and steadfastness of some of the South Arabian military leaders has played a major part in averting a disaster.
This is the context in which our policy has to be reviewed in the light of the two main objectives which I in this House, and the Foreign Secretary in another place, reiterated on June 19. Our policy then, as now, was to withdraw our forces in good order and to seek to establish a united, stable and independent South Arabia. The Egyptian withdrawal from the Yemen—and in some ways Egyptian troubles in the Yemen have been at least as bad as, if not worse than, ours in South Arabia—and the transformation of the political scene with the collapse of the Federal Government, have caused us to look again at how we can best secure those objectives, and to take new and firm decisions.
Our first decision is based on the judgment that our continued presence in South Arabia cannot contribute to a political settlement. The radical nationalists, whether with or without other groups, have rejected any help which we might have been able to give, and they must solve their own problems. Our prompt withdrawal is therefore the right course to adopt in the interests of the people of South Arabia. On the military side, our forces can be removed from the country at any time after mid-November. An early withdrawal will reduce the

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dangers that they may become involved in, and suffer casualties from, attacks by South Arabians on each other or on us. I echo the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, about the senseless killing that is still going on at this moment, killing which to us seems quite inexplicable and tied to a misguided sense of a particular political purpose—the fear that anyone who does not kill the British is inevitably a British stooge.
An early withdrawal will reduce the danger, and the South Arabian forces, in the opinion of their own officers, the High Commissioner and the Commander-in-Chief, will be in a position—and again I stress, in the changed circumstances when the risk of possible aggression has very largely disappeared from across the border—to take over full responsibility for internal security any time from now, without the backing of British forces.
So the Government have now decided that the independence of South Arabia will take place in the second half of November, and all British forces will be withdrawn from South Arabia at that time. We shall fix a precise date for independence and withdrawal by the middle of this month. Which date within the second half of November it will be will depend on events and on whether a few days either way within that period will help us start negotiations with an emerging Government. In any case, we accept that some things which would normally be expected to be settled before independence might have to be left pending.
LORD CARRINGTON: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord one question about that matter, because he is making a very important statement, and I was not in a position to know what he was going to say. Does that mean that the Government have decided to withdraw from South Arabia without knowing to whom they are going to hand over and before negotiations begin?
LORD SHACKLETON: It does indeed, my Lords. It means that we consider we are not in a position to help the South Arabians any more by our presence. But we still hope—and I hope the noble Lord will accept this—that there will be a Government. One of the factors—and I sincerely stress this—that has helped bring the various forces together has been the
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imminence of the British withdrawal. There is still time. This is a concept I put most sincerely. The deadline is itself a meaningful thing in this particular context.
LORD WEDGWOOD: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord how the Government can say they will fix a date for independence when they do not know with whom they will be treating?
LORD SHACKLETON: I do not think I will again say what I have just said. I have just said to the House that the Government are going to withdraw and South Arabia will be independent. I hope very much that there will be a Government to exercise independence.
LORD ST. OSWALD: My Lords, nobody doubts the noble Lord's hope. But suppose there is not a Government at that time. To whom will Her Majesty's Government hand over? It is a very interesting point.
LORD SHACKLETON: It is so interesting that it seems to me to be quite obvious that if there is not a Government to hand over to, you do not hand over to a Government.
LORD ST. OSWALD: Ah!
LORD SHACKLETON: I congratulate the noble Lord on his powers of comprehension, and I hope that this is now understood. I hope that noble Lords, having taken this point, will see that we do not believe that our continued presence is likely to facilitate the establishment of a stable Government. I agree that there could be arguments on this, but I am convinced, and indeed I do not know anybody in a senior position in south Arabia to-day who would doubt, that this is the only policy open to us.
The second decision relates to our offer of a deterrent Naval and Air Force for a period after independence. This offer was designed to meet, in the difficult period after independence, any threat of organised military attack across South Arabia's frontier supported by modern air power. I explained this to your Lordships and in particular to the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, who I think talked about gas warfare—at any rate, other noble Lords have done so. This was the danger of attack from across the border, and in this changed political situation,

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both in the Yemen and in South Arabia, it is no longer necessary or appropriate to provide this aid. Therefore we have cancelled our plans for naval and V-bomber deterrent forces, though a substantial naval force is concentrated at Aden to cover the period of our withdrawal and independence.
Thirdly, there are the questions of the financial support offered to the Federal Government for three years after independence and the offer of support for the Eastern Aden Protectorate forces, and this extra support that we promised last June has been an important factor in keeping the Hadrami-Bedouin legion together and preventing chaos breaking out. These intentions were always subject to the condition that they could be reviewed if political circumstances changed.
LORD GLADWYN: My Lords, I may not have an opportunity to put questions to the noble Lord when he has finished speaking. I thought I heard him say that the Nationalist forces had rejected such aid as might be offered. I should like to know whether that also applies to financial aid?
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, I am sorry: there may be an ambiguity there. The word "aid" was used in connection with bringing the country to independence and in the formation of the Government. We do not know whether, in fact, they would reject such aid, and it was always subject to the condition that it could be reviewed if political circumstances changed. However, the Government consider that it would not be right to take a decision on these matters now, but that they should wait until the future is clearer. The formation and attitude of a new Government will be important factors, but it is clearly impossible to prejudge this at this moment.
My Lords, I am trying to grasp all the points which I know have worried the Opposition in the past, and I am sorry to take so long over it. Finally, there is our undertaking to try to obtain the internationalisation of Perim under the United Nations. I have, with regret, to inform the House that although the Secretary-General is not yet in a position to reply formally to our approach to him, both he and the Chairman of the U.N. Commission have said that the proposal could
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not be entertained because it was contrary to the letter and spirit of the U.N. resolutions, under which Perim is part of what they call the territory of Aden. The delegates of all 13 Arab Member States at the U.N. have also rejected the proposal in a formal communication to the Secretary-General.
In these circumstances there can be no doubt (I am convinced of this; and I was convinced of it at a pretty early stage after we began our efforts) that the proposal cannot succeed when it comes to be debated at the United Nations. The Government have made it clear that there can be no question of our continuing responsibility in Perim after the independence of South Arabia. Subject to confirmation that this is the will of the inhabitants, the island will therefore stay with South Arabia.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, the noble Lord says:
"Subject to confirmation that this is the will of the inhabitants, the island will therefore stay with South Arabia."
Can he say what steps will be taken to confirm that this is the will of the inhabitants? And if it should turn out not to be the will of the inhabitants, what will be done about it?
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, without in any way suggesting that there should be a "phoney" plebiscite, I would say that all the evidence is that the inhabitants will elect to belong to South Arabia; but there will in fact be consultation.
I should like to say one further word in conclusion; and in this connection I hope noble Lords will acquit me of any desire to ride out on the responsibilities that this Government, and indeed any other Government, have had for South Arabia. We are now seeing the closing chapters in regard to the British responsibility, and, whatever mistakes have been made (and I have been careful not to criticise the previous Government on policy), it is right that we should recognise certain factors. In the first place, we really ought to recognise—and I am sure your Lordships will—the achievement of individual, and in many cases forgotten, servants of the Crown. It is my hope and expectation that the work which they have done for South Arabia will not be

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lost. It is another example of the enduring contribution derived from the traditions of the old British Empire when men, some of whom went out to serve either their own interests or those of their own country, made their greatest contribution in serving the people among whom they lived.
The final stages of the withdrawal, sad though some of the circumstances may be, and particularly the tragic loss of life—and of course there is still that risk—has a credit side; and again I think we should recognise the particular contribution of the incomparable British Army. Without their steadfastness and restraint (and this comes through in every observation of what has happened at crucial moments) there would have been wholesale loss of life. I have said this before, but I think it cannot be said too often: few people in this country realise how near the brink South Arabia has been, and perhaps still is, and how much we owe to those who have borne these heavy responsibilities.
My Lords, South Arabia after independence will have serious problems to face, but responsibility will now lie where, in my view, it should lie—with the people of South Arabia themselves—and the risk of foreign intervention, which has concerned so many of your Lordships in the past, has now greatly receded. I hope that a time will come when the misunderstandings will be removed and we shall be able to welcome South Arabia to the international community of nations. I hope that we can look forward to the revival of the great port of Aden—it is tragic to think of Aden now, with its activity so enormously reduced—and also to the economic progress of the country in peaceful conditions in the interests not only of South Arabia but also of the whole area.
LORD WEDGWOOD: My Lords, may I ask one question? If it comes about that no date for independence can be set, because there is no emerging Government in the South Arabian Federation to which we can hand over independence, is the noble Lord saying that Her Majesty's Government have no further responsibility in the matter and that it is entirely up to the inhabitants to settle their own particular fratricidal affairs?
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, I think I could go on almost indefinitely
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trying to explain this to the noble Lord. I appreciate that he has in mind that there should be a formal act of independence and a handing over to the Government. This is clearly the right and proper and usual way. What I am saying is that the British will withdraw; and they will withdraw because we believe that in the present circumstances our continued presence in South Arabia is more likely to increase the risk of fractricidal strife than reduce it. And certainly, as I have said before, I see no other policy that is possible. I hope that I have answered the noble Lord on that point.
LORD HANKEY: My Lords, before the noble Lord leaves this subject, would he kindly inform the House whether the Government will find some means of providing for the protection of the British High Commissioner and his staff, if complete chaos results?
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, this is certainly a matter of very great concern to the Government. The British High Commissioner will, of course, be withdrawn on independence; but there is every intention and hope to leave a British Embassy. It is hoped that a number of British will remain. We know that there are in the oil refinery a number of British living at the present moment under the protection of one of the terrorist groups as well as the South Arabian Army. It is always a responsibility of Her Majesty's Government to provide the protection necessary, even though that may mean only the withdrawal of the individuals concerned.
I hope noble Lords will not ask me to speculate too far on this point, because I still hope that it will be possible to have—indeed, the Government are making plans on the basis, that we shall continue to have—an Embassy, and that there will be expatriates working in Aden. For, as always, the disaster that will confront any country if it suddenly loses all its expatriate civil servants will be even greater.
LORD WILLIS: My Lords, before the noble Lord leaves Aden—before the Government do—would he not also add to his words of praise the Aden police force, which is under British officers but is a mixed force, and which I think in difficult circumstances has carried out

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in an exemplary manner a peacemaking role and very dangerous role?
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, the noble Lord has asked me a very delicate and difficult question. I think what he is asking for was incorporated in my general praise for all those, British and official, who did in fact play such a stalwart part.
My Lords, I have something to say on Vietnam, but I think perhaps my remarks on the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation will have to be reserved to another time. All I will say is that we have here a tragic situation which carries with it the constant danger of escalation. It is a basic assumption of our policy that a solution to the war in Vietnam, if it is to be lasting, cannot be achieved by military conquest. I do not think there is much difference between us on this. A solution must come through negotiations leading to a settlement that will secure the legitimate interests of all concerned. I do not doubt that noble Lords will accept that the Government have been engaged in constant activity to try to reduce or end this horrible conflict. Time and again the Foreign Secretary has called upon his Soviet co-Chairman to reconvene the Geneva Conference. Time and again the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, in discussions with colleagues from many other countries, have pursued the question of a settlement in Vietnam and have taken initiatives, either of our own or in support of others.
But there cannot be a movement towards a settlement, let alone a settlement itself, unless there is a willingness to compromise on both sides. I must say that it appears clear to me that the Americans do not lack this willingness. They have made it clear that they will talk to-morrow if only the other side will also talk. I am forced to believe, from the very best indications that we have at present, that Hanoi has not yet grasped the fact that the interests not only of North Vietnam but also of South Vietnam can best be served by agreeing to negotiation. We hate this war and we want it stopped. But there is not necessarily an easy solution to something which is hateful, and especially a problem as complex as this. I can only say that Her Majesty's Government will do their utmost, by official, unofficial, private or
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public initiative, with all the Governments concerned, to enable us, or anyone else, to help to mediate, and in this it is of importance that we should adopt a position in which it will be possible for us to play this role.
We have frequently debated the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance. I mention it again only because it is again stated in the gracious Speech, as it has been year after year, that the support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is a cardinal point in British policy. In our debates in your Lordships' House I am sure we are united that this is as it should be. A year ago NATO went through a difficult period, but we have managed pretty successfully to adapt the Alliance to the consequences of the French withdrawal. If the Alliance is to become an even more constructive body, then we must improve our consideration and our methods in framing an approach to a détente, and we believe that when the situation calls for this then political consultation must play an even greater part in NATO than it does at present. That is why we think that some of the present studies associated with the name of M. Harmel are of great importance for the future. This particular study will be completed in time for the NATO Ministerial meeting in December. We hope the NATO Ministers will then be able to agree on a statement which will show the Alliance to be a lively and vigorous organisation.
I shall have to leave to my noble friend, Lord Chalfont, questions of nonproliferation, and indeed major questions of disarmament. I should like to conclude only by saying that I do not share Lord Carrington's (may I call it?) lack of confidence, or pessimism—I do not wish to put words into his mouth or misinterpret his attitude. I certainly do not lack, and I do not believe Her Majesty's Government lack, confidence in the role that the British must play. I am supremely sure that we have a very important part to play in the world, and surely there can be no doubt among us that the British have a great contribution and we must continue to make that contribution. I share the views of those noble Lords, of whom there are a majority, that the right place for this country is now in Europe. But that does not mean that we must turn our back on

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the rest of the world, and it does not mean—and I repeat this to the noble Lord, Lord Carrington—that we must run down our own effort and contribution. The British have carried a very heavy burden in different parts of the world, and if it seems wise and in the interests of the world that we should seek to curtail responsibilities we are no longer in a position to fulfil, that does not suggest that we have not a consistent foreign policy which the Government will continue to pursue and which will benefit not just this country but the world.
THE EARL OF SELKIRK: My Lords, may I put a question on Aden to the noble Lord? Does it mean that the hand-over will be constitutional, or a pragmatic recognition of the true situation?
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, it strikes me that it is going to be a pretty abrasive affair altogether. It certainly will not be a constitutional handover, because there is no Government to hand over to, and there are all sorts of very tricky problems involved. But it is certainly pragmatic in the sense that we have accepted the realities of the situation.
5.0 p.m.
THE EARL OF BUCKINGHAMSHIRE: My Lords, having spent nearly thirty years in the two Commonwealth countries of Australia and New Zealand, and knowing their feelings towards the mother country, I have no doubt in my mind that Britain's membership of the E.E.C. would mean the end of the British Commonwealth; and this has been made abundantly clear by the uncompromising reactions of Commonwealth leaders. I can refer back to Accra in September, 1961, when every single one of the Commonwealth countries expressed opposition for both political and economic reasons. In London in September, 1962, 14 out of 16 Commonwealth countries expressed their opposition, and so on up to the present time.
Only last week Sir Robert Menzies, a sincere and far-seeing statesman, agreed that if we go into the Common Market and accept the Treaty of Rome unconditionally, it will be bound to interfere with many of our internal affairs, including social services. I heard that same man in 1939 announce that we—I repeat "we"—were at war with Germany. They
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came in their thousands from both Australia and New Zealand to help the Motherland, as they did in 1914.
Surely our first duty, before anything else, is to be loyal to these countries who have never asked anything from Britain, but have given us much and lost much in the lives of men in two World Wars. Therefore, I cannot accept a policy which must lead to Australia, Canada and New Zealand particularly, being given much less favourable treatment by Britain than we give to continental Europe. Common Market advocates suggest that Britain has no choice but to join—that we must move in or face economic stagnation. Such is the case at the present moment. We are faced with economic stagnation.
This defeatist attitude is not based on facts, and staying out of the Common Market would be no disaster. Only a small percentage of our exports go to the Six compared with what goes to the Commonwealth. The economies of Europe and Britain are directly competitive—the importing of raw materials and the exporting of manufactured goods—whereas the economies of the Commonwealth countries and Britain are basically complementary. We buy their raw materials and food in exchange for our finished products and services, including shipping; and so to my mind there is no natural outlet for British goods within the six countries of the Common Market.
The negotiations now in progress in Brussels are confined, I believe, to trade and agricultural problems. The political issues are not being discussed, and so it seems to me that the Government are content to abdicate our position as head of the British Commonwealth, to become a one-seventh or one-eighth part of an intended United States of Europe. If the consequences of the integration of the Common Market involve the continental member States, with an essentially similar legal structure, what will be the consequences for Britain as a party to the Treaty of Rome?
The Treaty of Rome is a continental Treaty, based on continental concepts which differ from British concepts of law, order and good government. Many of the Treaty's concepts, and even some of its words, have no equivalent under British law. I apologise to your Lordships. I am afraid I have lost some of

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my speech. However, in conclusion, I should like to say that the vital issue is one in which country comes before Party, and as a true and loyal Britisher and a staunch Commonwealth supporter I say to your Lordships from this side of the House, "Long live Great Britain and the Commonwealth."
5.5 p.m.
VISCOUNT HEAD: My Lords, at the start of my remarks I should like to congratulate the noble Earl who has just spoken. I think that we can derive nothing but benefit from hearing remarks from one who knows Australia as well as he does. I stand second to none as a fan of Australia. I am also aware of their views at the present time, and I think that the more matters concerning Anglo-Australian relations are kept before the House and the more we are aware of them, the better. I sincerely hope that we shall hear again from the noble Earl. Not long ago I made my own maiden speech here, but it never gets any easier or less alarming. I should like, without any presumption, to commiserate with the noble Earl on his complication over notes. I, too, have encountered this tribulation and, quite seriously, after a certain amount of effort and worry I finally gave them up and, as he did I may well break down in my speech. I should like to commiserate with him, and assure him that this misfortune can in no way detract from the force of his speech; and I am sure we should all wish to hear from him again in the near future.
First of all, I should like to associate myself with the remarks that the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, made about the good nature, restraint and efficiency of the British Army in Aden. My own experience over a long time with the Army is that there is no Army in the world which is as good, under really trying circumstances, at showing great restraint, retaining its sense of balance and its sense of humour. Although I have not been to Aden, I am quite certain and convinced that everything he said about the Army is completely true.
A situation of gravity and immediacy confronts the world to-day, and over it all hangs the shadow of the possibility of total war and the bomb. I feel that in this general climate of the world situa
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tion your Lordships may feel that the subject on which I venture to address you in this debate may be inopportune or even ill-chosen, but my excuse for raising it is that I am proposing to talk about a bomb which, unless quite radical steps are taken, is bound to explode, bound to kill hundreds of millions of people and to bring illness and suffering to countless other millions. But the reason that there is no mention of this in the gracious Speech, the reason that it is not spoken of very much, and the reason why the Press say little about it is, firstly, that this particular bomb will not drop on us in the Western world and, secondly, it is unlikely to explode before about twenty or thirty years have elapsed. Therefore, there is every reason in this difficult world for putting it in the "Pending" tray. There is every reason to think, "Well, maybe it will be all right on the day." There are no electoral votes in it, nor, frankly, is there enormous interest in it.
Your Lordships will no doubt have guessed that I am referring to the terrifying increase of population compared to the barely perceptible increase in the production of food in the world to-day. I do not wish to bore your Lordships with this problem, but I venture to address you because I think that if everybody ceases to talk about it, if we let it slip from our minds, it is cumulatively a situation for which we will never forgive the statesmen of the world to-day for letting the next twenty years go by—and that is the period when it is possible to do something about it. Leave it too long, and it will be too late. Leave it too long, and enormous sums of money will be spent on remedial efforts made by growing extra corn and in building ships to deliver it to relieve famine. That effort is merely remedial, but if started now we could achieve far more.
I do not wish to bore your Lordships with data and statistics—I think it was Disraeli who said "Bore them with statistics", but I think they are difficult. Nevertheless, experts who have been studying these matters, even allowing for birth control, and making all allowances for the trends since the war up to the present time and projecting that trend onwards, feel that the population in the world from now to the year 2000 will

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almost certainly double; that is to say, it will grow at about 60 million a year. It is a terrifying thought, and is very difficult to assimilate. I have been addressing your Lordships now for some five minutes, and if it brings it home at all I would point out that during the course of my remarks so far the population of the world has increased by 1,500 people. Some noble Lords may say, "You'd better sit down". But the consequence is not due to me: it is going on day and night, and gradually increasing because it is doing so at compound interest.
In the past many people have cried, "Wolf!" about this—the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Orr used to talk about the subject with great effect—and perhaps sometimes overstressed its immediacy. But the point is that if the population of the world doubles, dramatic consequences follow. If one takes the cities of the world and remembers that urbanisation is increasing, whether it be in the underdeveloped or the developed countries, I would invite your Lordships to try to imagine Calcutta double its present size—or Tokyo, for that matter. There are problems of this kind in many countries. Canada has the problem, as we have, of effluent polluting our rivers and seas. One ingenious gentleman says that the total annual effluent of the world is a mountain four miles long, four miles broad and four miles high. That is a very big effluent mountain and in the year 2000 it will be twice the size.
The biggest problem of all, of course, is what we are going to eat. There are the people who say: "Something will turn up. The scientists will produce something. We can live on plankton from the sea, and we shall be all right." Shell are making a protein out of mineral oil, but it is so disgusting that no one has been able to eat it. There are the people who think that something will turn up, but hardly anybody who has studied the problems will disagree with the view that if we allow too many years to go by we shall not be able to cope with the problem. The experts are at one on the fact that, for the first time in the history of the world, man has his destiny in his own hands. We have sat on this planet, we have fought one another and been very wasteful of natural resources, and in the past have got away with it.
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There has been room, and great resources have been available, but if the population of the world is allowed to double we could create a kind of cancer of overpopulation that would ruin our own world.
It is a little paradoxical that when this fearful problem is before us—and it is—man is literally turning his back on it. And billions of pounds are being spent, and the best brains directed, in going to look at a lot of small, uninhabited, sterile, satellites whirling round the sun, while we allow this threat in relation to over-population to continue. It is easy to say that my sort of attitude is alarmist or rubbish, that all this is twenty or thirty years ahead; or to say, "We shall all be dead by then". For I doubt whether many noble Lords will be here in the year 2000.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Oh!
VISCOUNT HEAD: Well, I will with draw that—perhaps I am unduly pessimistic. I will say that there will be a good number of noble Lords who will not be here then, but not the present ones.
I doubt whether ever before people have been put in a position that, if in the next twenty or thirty years they do nothing about the population problem, they will put the generation which is now at university, or just leaving it, in an almost impossible position. That generation will say, "Why didn't they do something about it while there was still time?". If from the grave one can answer, the reason would be, "The immediacy of the fearful problems which confronted us, our own economic problems; elections; that it was a matter of politics; that there was not a vote in it, and that nobody has much money". These are all perhaps arguments which could be used, but when one has before one a situation such as that and nothing is done, they will not sound very convincing to those who follow.
It is quite beyond the scope of my remarks to go into the matter of cures. Of course there is the question of birth control, which could be extended; and perhaps something could be done in the way of taxes to limit population. There are the problems of how to plan cities, how to deal with effluents, and so on; but

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I will not go into all those matters. I propose only to make a few remarks based purely on personal experience on the question of the growing of food for this vastly increasing world population.
At the outset I would say that the majority of the countries concerned have been colonial territories. When any Americans go to these colonial territories, in the really backward areas, they are startled to find peasant agriculture exactly as it was 200 or 300 years ago. What is typical of practically all the colonial territories—and I am not blaming the Colonial Powers—is that they concentrated on exportable cash crops, such as cocoa, groundnuts, oil palm, and they ruled by indirect rule, leaving the Sultan or Sheikh to run the country, so that peasant agriculture was never touched. All over Nigeria and Malaya one finds peasant agriculture still at the stage it was 200 or 300 years ago. One finds this also in Indonesia, in the ex-Dutch Colonies and in the French Colonies as well.
It is said, "Well, some twenty years have passed since the war, with vast amounts of aid being poured into the emerging countries. Surely that has helped". My Lords, it is sad, but it has not helped in regard to agriculture—or it has helped only marginally. Agriculture is the Cinderella of aid. You may have a lovely five-year plan for some emerging country, and along come the donor countries and say, "Our steel industry is in a bad state; we will supply railway engines and lines." Somebody else says, "We should like to export some turbines, so we shall put in a dam." In one case the Americans said, "Our telecommunications industry is rather weak at the moment. We will build you a whacking great broadcasting station and a T.V. station"—right out of priority. So they all nab these things.
When it comes to an agricultural scheme, what the Treasury (whether the American Treasury or our own) wish to avoid is a scheme with a very small offshore-purchase element. But there are a few who agree to help in agricultural schemes. A scheme is prepared for a small part of the territory, with a few lucky workers and their families being brought into an enclave, and the scheme is set up at a very high cost. But that
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expertise and knowledge does not spread throughout the country. Therefore the peasant system of agriculture, which has remained the same for 200 years, remains very primitive. It is perhaps a nice place to take V.I.Ps, but it is expensive and not a great deal of good for the whole of the country concerned.
Your Lordships may say, "When you are talking about this vast problem and are getting down to agricultural settlements in developing countries, you may be getting down to too much detail." But I promise you that this business of improving peasant agriculture is the nub of the food problem. Population is another matter. Your Lordships may well ask, "What is the answer?" I venture to say that there is only one way of improving world-wide peasant agriculture, and that is by what is called "extension services". That is really a grand name for a man, who has tenacity, knowledge, and has been educated, going round on a motor bike. Your Lordships may say, "That is all very well, but how do you know that it would work if it were done?" Well, of course, it has been tried already, but the pay is too small, the education is inadequate and the quality of the men is often inadequate. A man has to be "a hell of a chap" to convince someone who has been farming in a country which has used the same methods for 200 years to change his methods.
But I maintain that it can be done, and for this reason. In both Nigeria and Malaya the British-American Tobacco Company (out of self-interest, I admit, but it is none the worse for that) said, "We will grow tobacco." Then they said, "How shall we do it? Shall we grow it in a plantation and run the whole business ourselves, or not?" They decided not to have a plantation, and said that they would teach the farmer to grow his seedlings and would then buy back the tobacco. So they had an extension service—and they had a good one. They had education; they paid the people well; they bought motor-cycles; they picked very good people, and they started off the scheme. The farmers grew the tobacco and dried it, and the scheme was a success. But the significant point is that in Nigeria and Malaya, where the tobacco areas were—and they were very small—the whole standard of peasant agriculture went up. The reason was

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that when those men went around the farmers said to them, "My yams are awful," and the extension man would ask them, "What did you grow last year?" When the farmer replied, "Cassava", he was then told, "You cannot grow yams after Cassava."
All I am saying, my Lords, is that it is now 22 years since the war ended, and no decent extension services anywhere in the world—India, Nigeria or anywhere else—have been set up. What has been done? There have been marvellous schemes of research, marvellous schemes of educating young men. But they want to go into the laboratories; they want to keep their white coats, and they do not want to get their hands dirty. So the application of the knowledge that comes out of the universities is not reaching the present farmer. This has gone on for 22 years, and if it goes on for another 22 years we are not going a yard towards solving this problem.
Much has been done by the Food and Agriculture Organisation, but, quite frankly, it is not a satisfactory organisation. A lot has been done by aid, but bilateral aid is a ghastly mistake. First, people think that they are going to get kudos from it, and they hardly ever do. Secondly, if you talk as a nation about aid you are up against trouble if you want to be tough with the recipient country. The biggest success since the war has been the World Bank, and that is multilateral aid. Apart from my remarks about the extension service, if we could have multilateral aid and if it could in-corporate a lot of the F.A.O., and if the nations of the world got together to help grow more food, I believe it would be very inspiring to this troubled world.
I hope that I am not being Utopian or thinking World Government wise. But man has this ghastly problem and has hardly scratched the surface of it after 22 years, and he has only about thirty years left. It is not worth a vote in the Election. Hardly any of our leaders talk about this, because it is boring and the voters are not interested. I make these remarks solely because I hope that even one or more here to-day may say something more about it. I know that things have been said already, but we must continue to say it. If not, I believe that we shall be letting down the generation now at the universities; and if they say
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in the next twenty years that we have done nothing about it, then we shall prove to be a generation which history will condemn.
5.25 p.m.
LORD WALSTON: My Lords, I am happy to be the first from these Benches to congratulate my noble friend Lord Buckinghamshire on his maiden speech. It may not have been entirely consistent with the strictest standards concerning controversial subjects, which some people feel we should practise in this House, but I am quite sure that the sincerity and the force with which it was delivered make us all feel that we look forward a great deal to hearing further from my noble friend.
I am extremely tempted to follow the noble Viscount who has just sat down, because he has raised a subject that is not only of enormous importance—and I am extremely glad that he did—but very close to my own heart. But I think I should refrain from that temptation, strong though it is, and confine myself, in this debate on foreign affairs, merely to two parts of the world. One of them is Vietnam, which has already been mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, and, in passing, by my noble friend Lord Shackleton, and the other is Africa. Australia I shall leave out.
Whatever our views about the war in Vietnam, there is one thing on which I think all of us are agreed, and that is that we are friends and allies of the United States and share all important values with them. They are fighting in Vietnam right now, and we must do nothing whatsoever to make their job any harder. But because we must not make their job any harder, because we are their friends, that does not in any way mean that we must give 100 per cent. allegiance to everything they do. It is the duty of a true friend to criticise in an honest way, if he thinks that criticism is going to be of help. We must speak the truth, even though it is not always palatable. I am certain that the Americans cannot win in Vietnam by force alone. They have the force to do it. They could do it if they really wished; but, thank God, they do not wish. They are not prepared to use the overwhelming force which they have, and they have quite rightly decided that this

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battle must be fought with at least one arm tied behind their back.
The Americans themselves have often said that this is a battle for the hearts and minds of people. My Lords, you cannot win people's hearts and minds by bombs. This is not 1945: this is a new type of war. This is a war of subversion and infiltration, and it is only the road to disaster to think that the methods which were successful in 1945 will automatically be successful, if applied with some more force and some more strength in the conditions in Vietnam to-day That is something which I should be happy if the noble Lord, Lord Carrington (I am sorry that he has just left his seat) were to remember and to remind his friends in Australia about.
The noble Lord rightly said that we are not in this war in Vietnam fighting side by side with the Australians. It is the first war in which they have participated where we have not been with them, and they have not been with us. But, I repeat, this war cannot be won by soldiers, by bombs and by the methods of what is technically called "modern warfare". The fact that we are not fighting in the trenches or in the air with them, does not mean to say that we are not engaged, and do not want to be engaged, in this whole conflict which is taking place throughout South-East Asia. But I am quite sure that there are far more effective ways of giving help to our common cause than simply by aiding in the purely military effort.
Perhaps also, in passing, I may remind the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, when he talks of Australia now turning more to Japan than to the United Kingdom for their trade, that although that is true—and nobody can blame them for doing that—this trend started when the Government of which the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, was a member—a Conservative Government—took, and quite rightly in my view, the initial steps of trying to get into the Common Market.
The important point that we must bring home to the United States and to many of the people there (though many of them know it already) is that the only way this war can be won is in the villages and the hamlets of Vietnam and among the peasants—those people who
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are today producing the food about which the noble Viscount, Lord Head, spoke, and who must produce still more food for themselves and for the coming generations. It is perfectly correct to say that bombing gives marginal advantages, but in my view these advantages are grossly exaggerated by the generals, who learned their fighting in the last war. It also gives great disadvantages, and these disadvantages are recognised by very many wise Americans, both in Vietnam and in the United States itself. But, unfortunately, most of those people are not in the highest positions.
My Lords, sooner or later the United States must take the decision to stop the bombing. It is a question of timing, and I freely admit that only those who have full access to all the information can decide when the time is right. I am not attempting to stand up here to say that the time is right now, or was, or will be, although I have a strong suspicion that the time was right some months ago. If it was not then, if it is not now, it certainly will come very soon. It will require very great statesmanship on the part of the United States to recognise this time and to have the courage to act. For the sake of our friends and for the sake of the whole world, I hope that that statesmanship will not be lacking.
Now, my Lords, let me turn to the continent of Africa, starting with South Africa itself. First of all, let me repeat what I think all of us here would agree: that to us in this country apartheid is repulsive. It is a repugnant theory and it is a repugnant practice. The people of South Africa must not be in any doubt at all about our wholehearted condemnation of it. But, while we condemn it, I do not believe that it does any good whatsoever for us to attempt to ostracise South Africa. Ostracism can do no good: it can do only harm. We must keep our contacts with South Africa at all levels: at governmental level—and I am glad that those contacts have been going on recently—at the business level, at the cultural level, at the level of sport and in every way in which it can be done.
I know that many of my friends condemn Her Majesty's Government for encouraging trade with South Africa. I believe that such people are wrong. After all, we trade with Russia, we trade with China, Spain, Portugal, Cuba, and

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with many countries of whose methods of government we disapprove, whose activities we consider against all that civilised nations should hold true and dear. But we trade with them, and I believe that it is right for us to trade also with South Africa. After all, as individuals I hope that none of us would remove our trade from a shopkeeper because we knew him to be an alcoholic, an adulterer or a homosexual, or that he was practising some form of life that we held to be abhorrent. Because if decent society—and we consider ourselves, rightly or wrongly, to be decent society—turns its back upon individuals of whom it disapproves, what possible chance is there of any reform at all? It is only by contact with decent people with decent views that there can be any hope of improvement. It is the sin that we should hate, not the sinner. That is something that in our dealings with many countries in the world, including South Africa, we must never forget. We must not forget, either, the feeling of isolation among the liberals (using that word in its widest sense) in South Africa. We owe to those courageous and lonely people all the encouragement we can give, and I am quite sure that contacts with South Africa are, to them, an encouragement.
As to Rhodesia, I do not think it would be suitable to dwell at length on that country, but I am happy to know from the gracious Speech that Her Majesty's Government still stand firm on their earlier policies. The sanctions there, we all know, are far from perfect. They have not achieved the effects that many people hoped they might. They harm the Rhodesians; and among them, of course, many hundreds, many thousands, of innocent people are harmed—and that is sad. But I am afraid, my Lords, that it is one of the inevitable consequences of U.D.I. After all, bombing and blockades, which harmed many innocent people, were the inevitable consequences of the last war.
Sanctions hurt us, too. There is no point in denying that. People tell us that they cost us something in the neighbourhood of £80 million a year. That is a significant amount, particularly in our present economic situation. But surely economic considerations are not all that a great nation should be concerned with. We do not act solely because it is to our economic or material
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benefit. There is a thing called honour, my Lords, and we are compelled by honour to do what we can for those 4 million of Her Majesty's subjects who are not followers of Mr. Ian Smith. Can anyone really assert that our honour is rot worth £80 million a year—that is 30s. per head of the population, something under 9d. a week? Surely nobody can really suggest that we should sell our honour for 9d. a week.
South Africa and Rhodesia are the two headline subjects of Africa, but we must not let ourselves be hypnotised by them and forget all the rest of Africa. In that vast area South of the Sahara there are over 30 countries, and something like 200 million people. They are all, or almost all, struggling to emerge from a primitive life to a life of sophistication and what we call civilisation. We have already helped them a great deal. Possibly the noble Viscount, Lord Head, would not think we had helped them in the right way, but we have given a great deal of help, and we must help some more—far more—and in different and better directions. But our help is not confined only to material help. That is welcome, and we give all that we can afford, but they need other help, too.
There were many people in those emerging countries who had great hopes of a Labour Government. They believed that we in the Labour Party shared common hopes and common ideals with them. We do; but—and I have to say it, unhappily—we have failed to give them the sympathy and the understanding that they expected from us and that they deserved from us. I am delighted that my right honourable friend the Commonwealth Secretary is out there now. There can be no better understander and proponent of the British Government's policies than he, and I am very happy that he is going to many of the Commonwealth countries. I hope that his visit will be followed up, not only to Commonwealth countries but to other African countries, by many of his colleagues. Because there must be far more of these contacts, far more frank talks between us, far more a sharing of problems, so that we realise better what they are trying to do and where their difficulties principally lie, and so that they can understand why it is that we are not doing all to help them that they hoped we would do.

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Our Ambassadors and our High Commissioners have a large part to play here. They cannot do it all by themselves, but they can do a great deal. Many of them are admirable people, but it is a fact, I am afraid, that even now we are still inclined to send senior, elderly and often unsuitable people out there. We are sending sucn people, nearing the end of their career, out to these posts, where, instead of these experienced and (shall I say?) European-type diplomats, what is needed is a young man, younger than the normal Ambassador or High Commissioner, with vigour and understanding and able to get about (if not on the motor cycle that the noble Viscount spoke about) and to travel through the country with enthusiasm and sympathy for his surroundings. We have made some of those appointments, I know, and they are good. I hope my noble friend, when he comes to reply, can assure us that more of such appointments will be made.
Of course, Europe, the Middle East and Latin America—and I am sorry that nobody has so far mentioned Latin America—are all vital areas of the world and perhaps, for the immediate future, are more important than Africa and what is taking place there. But our job is not to concern ourselves solely with the problems of to-day and to-morrow; we must look ahead, for there is little we can do to affect what is going to happen to-day and to-morrow. What we can do, if we are lucky and wise, is to affect what is going to happen the day after tomorrow and the day after that. That we must think about now. In Africa there is virgin territory and people with new ideas, new hopes and new ambitions, struggling to create a new and better system based on the experience, the successes and the failures of the older parts of the world. It is here that we can, and we must, help.
5.42 p.m.
BARONESS EMMET OF AMBERLEY: My Lords, may I first apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, if I am not here at end of the debate. I have accepted an invitation from his Ministry for this evening, and I may have to slip away. May I also offer congratulations and sympathy to the noble Earl, Lord Buckinghamshire, on his maiden speech.
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May I tell him that on the second occasion I spoke in public I completely lost my notes—and that was the best thing that ever happened to me. He has got over the first hurdle and will enjoy the next—as I know we shall also. Following on the speech of the noble Viscount, Lord Head, on the fascinating and vitally important subject of the shortage of food may I say that I was at the I.C.I. factory in the Midlands a fortnight ago and their overseas salesmen told me that famine was coming, not in the year 2000 but in the year 1975. So I am afraid that we must move faster even than the noble Viscount advocated.
My Lords, I do not think that at any time in my experience—in a humble way; but going back a long time—of foreign affairs, has our foreign policy appeared to be in such complete ruin. Where are our friends? Who are our friends? What is our country's future? Where is the voice of Europe? These are the questions which we may ask, but they are questions also being asked by the ordinary man and woman in the street who are becoming interested in and involved in the European question.
Recalling Lord Grey's remarks in 1914, it would really seem as though the lights of Europe have gone out at the moment—although only temporarily, we hope. The essential principles of foreign affairs appear to have been mislaid, and when the Government act they act so clumsily that it seems to be with a total lack of appreciation of the feelings and values of other countries; as, for instance, in our recent approaches to Cairo. Was that quite the right moment to start these negotiations?—with the whole of the Israel and Middle East questions unsettled. It seems to me that the (what shall I call it?) bonhomie of our Foreign Secretary is hardly a sufficient substitute for strength—and strength is the only thing the Egyptians understand. That is what they are getting from Russia at the present time. There were also the unfortunate remarks last week in our Press and in the European Press. Here I must say that I have great sympathy with the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, for I fear he was the victim of circumstances. I do not think the Press was to blame; I think the blame lay very much elsewhere.

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There is an important factor in foreign affairs which I believe to be worth consideration. Looking round the world, what do we see? It is not enough to take into consideration the physical strength on land, sea and in the air; there must be the will to survive. Nothing less than this would have brought us through the last two wars, and nothing less than this would have given the Israelis victory over the Egyptians. There is a danger in a country being too large. There is advantage in good geographical boundaries and a homogenous population. I believe that these two facts have been part of our strength in the past and we should cherish and bear them in mind.
Countries can be too large for comfort. It is difficult, for example, to promote a national will in the U.S.A., with its immense territory, an undigested population, a colour problem—and not even a national paper. Russia, too, has her troubles from size in a similar degree, and her subordinate countries now seem to be fraying round the edges rather like old lace. China, with a vast multitude, hungry, undisciplined and losing their way between differing war lords; India, in danger of splitting and appearing to be turning her back on the West and leaning over more heavily on one neighbour in the North, while, with good reason, becoming more and more suspicious of the other. I think it is sad that for almost twelve months the Indian High Commission in London has been without a head. There is an excellent Deputy High Commissioner, but no High Commissioner. I am wondering why London now does not seem to be so important. Africa, where the boundaries (accidentally set by the Colonial powers) cut across strong tribal and national feelings will take several generations to solve their parochial problems. South America, a very neglected continent, with its roots in our European civilisation but still in the throes of reaching stable democratic solutions; and lastly Canada, Australia and New Zealand, fortunate in their homogeneity, although the older country tries to drive two horses.
So, My Lords, back to Europe and the small compact nations. If they could speak with one voice they would command attention and regain immense importance in the world at moments of crisis and uncertainty. It is strange that
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General de Gaulle, who has experienced so much strife in his life, does not realise that Europe split in half must remain an impotent and silent body ignored by the big Powers. The leadership he has assumed is valueless because it does not carry conviction in moments of danger. We saw this in the recent Middle East crisis. The elements for the will to survive are there in NATO, in W.E.U., in the Assembly at Strasbourg and so on. Trading and economic alliances are all very well in peace time but are too easily disrupted in times of war—and I am not one of those who think that the millenium has already arrived.
Surely, therefore, the first duty of any Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary is to reorientate their policy so that the will to survive is fostered and strengthened, not only by the provision of proper measures of defence but in the spiritual forces in a nation which give it strength to carry on in the darkest days. This is what carried us through the wars; this is what gave us the victory, and this will to survive should also be the impetus to bring Europe together, and that as soon as possible.
My Lords, that we have a deep-rooted survival quality bred in us by our history, by our geographical advantage and by the compactedness of our people I have no doubt. I am not sure that the present Government are encouraging that quality. It is better to survive with friends, and friends who are close at hand will be vial if war comes, because it will be fast and furious. The German Chancellor has recently been our guest. I am sure that he is a friend—and I have the privilege of knowing him personally. How tragic that at this moment injudicious words, so easily misinterpreted in European countries, should perhaps shake his confidence and undermine the help he cal give us. We must trust that nothing more will be said which may give General de Gaulle any encouragement or justification for his lack of confidence in us. A unified Europe presents security, prosperity and an interesting future for our children, and I would conclude with the words of Chancellor Kiesinger who said, "Where there is a will, there is a way". Let there be a combined European will for survival, and our future will thereby be assured.
5.55 p.m.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, I rise with considerable diffidence to take part in this debate. I suppose that is not my normal state of mind when addressing your Lordships' House, but on this occasion I feel that I ought almost to offer an apology. I am going to speak on two matters which my noble friend Lord Walston has already touched on; namely, South Africa and Rhodesia. I do so because during the Recess I spent six weeks in those two countries. Although I cannot claim that six weeks is an adequate time to enable one to speak with authority, I can say that it is a considerably longer time than has been spent in them by a good many people, in the Government and outside, who have made important decisions about them. I should like to give some of my impressions, and certain tentative conclusions at which I have arrived as a result of those impressions.
First, I should like to say something about Rhodesia. From the Press, and everything one had heard here, I anticipated that it was an almost daring thing to go to Rhodesia at all at the present time; that one would be received at best in an unfriendly spirit; that people would be resentful against anybody from this country and that one would be cold-shouldered. In fact, I found the very reverse. The people of Rhodesia are most friendly, most cordial, most eager to retain their relationship with this country and most distressed at the possibility of having to break it off. I did not find them hard-bitten or dogmatic about the position and the relationship between our countries. They were very eager to talk about it. In fact as soon as they discovered that my wife and I were British they immediately opened up the subject. This is true of all sections of the community—humble workers, shop assistants, shopkeepers, professional men and businessmen. They were all alike, as I found, in their desire to maintain friendly relations with this country—in fact, not merely friendly but affectionate relations. I have never come across a people who felt as well disposed towards this country as the people of Rhodesia.
Most of the people to whom I spoke were either immigrants from this country or first-generation Rhodesians. Of course they regard Rhodesia as the loveliest country in the world, and very few,
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I think, would wish to come back here. Nevertheless they did want—and I wish to emphasise it again—to retain their ties with this country. Rhodesia is one of the loveliest countries in the world, as anyone who has spent a few days in Salisbury in jacaranda time will appreciate. I hope that some of your Lordships may know that jacaranda time is when the jacaranda trees are in full bloom; and they are probably one of the most beautiful trees in the world. I think that Salisbury is the loveliest city in the world.
Naturally, my Lords, I made inquiries about the effect of sanctions. I will not say that some of the people had not heard of sanctions, but their effect was certainly not visible in the shops of Salisbury and other towns that I visited. One could get anything one liked in the shops, including, in a pharmacy for instance, goods (possibly old stock, but at any rate it had come from this country) provided by Boots. There was not even a shortage of petrol. Nominally there was some kind of rationing, but in actual practice there was no shortage at all. People were always prepared to give you a lift for any distance or take you round the country for a drive to see beautiful Rhodesia. Therefore there was not quite the resentment against sanctions that one would have expected.
My noble friend Lord Walston sought to justify sanctions because he thought that to stand by the 4 million Africans was the honourable thing to do. I will not for the moment argue whether or not the imposition of sanctions is desirable. All I would say is that it is not effective. A measure of this kind, which in the last resort is designed to starve out the population of Rhodesia, can be justified only if it is entirely successful. And, so far, the imposition of sanctions is almost completely ineffective. I understand that in the last few months imports in Rhodesia have gone up, and not down, as one would expect. It is true that a large part of the tobacco crop is unsaleable, and to that extent the tobacco growers have been hit rather hard. But apart from that—and I spoke to a large number of leading men in the country—sanctions have had practically no effect at all.
The relationship between the white people and the black is very different in Rhodesia from what it is in South Africa.

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In South Africa you find in open spaces seats marked, "For non-Europeans only". Noble Lords who know Salisbury will know Cecil Square, a lovely square at this time of year. There are seats there, and I actually saw, on a number of them, black and white people sitting together; and I saw black and white children playing together. There is not in Rhodesia the kind of relationship between the two races that exists in South Africa.
In Rhodesia, there is universal education of black people. There are secondary schools and universities which are multiracial. The position is that it is not possible at present to give the black children full primary education. There are not enough schools and not enough teachers. But so far as I could gather, progress is being made, and the Rhodesian people are conscious of the fact that more has to be done; that more schools have to be provided, and more teachers trained; and that children of the black races should have the opportunity of full-time education.
It would give the attitude of the majority of white people I spoke to as progressive and broad-minded. I deliberately did not try to see any official people, because my wife and I were there on holiday and did not want to give the impression that we had any official or semi-official object in visiting the country. We did not even see Sir Humphrey Gibb. We kept right away from any official persons; but we saw a large number of other people. From what I gathered even Mr. Smith himself is taking a pretty progressive view. His trouble is that he has a number of reactionary members of his Government who are putting pressure upon him, which I am afraid he is either not strong enough, or able, to resist. I have no doubt that, left to himself, a settlement could easily be arrived at; and I have equally no doubt that if all the Rhodesian people, black and white, were free to express their own opinions, there would be no difficulty in arriving at a solution.
Greatly daring, I should like to say a few words about what I think should be done. The first thing we need is flexibility in our discussions—flexibility on both sides: on our side and on the Rhodesian side. It is no good our going along with five points, and saying, "Here
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you are; I have two days to spare. You have to accept these five points, or there is no settlement." In all friendliness and affection, I ask: is it any good for the Prime Minister to say that he has very little hope of a settlement being arrived t? If, as a condition of settlement, the other side have to accept every one of his conditions in advance, then it is obvious that we are not going to get a settlement. But, as I say, if there is flexibility on both sides I am satisfied that a settlement is possible.
One of the conditions that we laid down, I understand, is no independence before majority African rule. I made a point of seeing as many black people as I could, and I must say, with the greatest affection for them all—and they are very nice chaps—that they are not really ready to make decisions on forms of government. I do not think that the time has yet arrived when they can be trusted to take part in majority rule. I understand that at one time the Prime Minister appreciated this, and would have been satisfied with an assurance that genuine steps were being taken as quickly as possible to fit the people of Rhodesia for majority rule. Why he has departed from that, I do not understand. But if we were prepared to accept that, and if we were satisfied of the sincerity of it, I think that we should be going a long way towards arriving at a settlement.
I would say to the people of Rhodesia that it is in their own interest to arrive at a peaceful settlement, agreeable to all sections of the community. The white people in Rhodesia are outnumbered by something like eighteen to one. Nobody in his senses can imagine that this is a position of stable equilibrium and that it will last for ever. The domination of the white people could not possibly last for ever, and unless a settlement agreeable to all parties is arrived at, there is very little hope for Rhodesia. I think that most of the people I spoke to realise that, and are most anxious that a settlement should be arrived at which would be acceptable to the whole of the people, and not merely to a section of it. They recognise also—and this is another condition—that much greater progress has to be made towards equipping the black people to take their part in government than is being made at the present time. It may well be that we may offer them

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some assistance in this direction. I think that if we did offer them some kind of help it would be money well spent.
Above all, I think that we should put an end to sanctions. Sanctions which are useless, futile, are not going to bring about what we have in mind. Sanctions, as a means of putting pressure on a people, our own kith and kin, are a hateful thing. What they mean is that we are trying to starve the people there into submission. As your Lordships well know, we shall never do it. I am quite satisfied that they will do anything rather than submit to starvation.
There are only three ways in which this matter can be settled. The first is by force, which we have already ruled out—and quite rightly. Nobody would dream of exercising force in Rhodesia. The second is by means of sanctions, which are simply another way of exercising force, and the third way is by arriving at agreement. I hope and believe that at the present time this is still possible, provided that we are flexible in our attitude towards the matter. It will be a deplorable thing if this very fine people—and they really are the salt of the earth—are forced into hostility towards this country, forced away from their present attitude into taking action which would entirely separate them for all time from the Commonwealth and set them up as a Republic. I hope and pray that this will not be necessary.
I should like now to say a word or two about South Africa. I very much agree with the noble Lord, Lord Walston, in the attitude which he thinks we should take towards South Africa—and I would say very much the same thing about Rhodesia. When you see apartheid at close quarters, and you see the South African people at close quarters, you realise that the situation is not so easy as it looks from London. It is a far more difficult position. I do not know whether apartheid is the right solution; I am inclined to think it is not, especially as it is being administered at the present time. I will not go into that in any detail. I would say, however, that I met hardly a South African who did not take exactly the same view. They are really groping very much in the dark. I think they are quite sincerely trying to do what they think is right.
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To them apartheid seems to be the best possible solution and making the best of a bad job. To my great surprise and relief, I found very few people who were confident that it was the right solution. They were quite prepared to regard it as an experiment; to try other things; to improve their methods, and generally to see if they could find a peaceful and sensible solution to what is indeed a great problem. It is no good our pretending that it is not a problem: it is a very serious problem indeed. I feel, after my visit to them and the many contacts that I made there, that the greatest help we can give them is to show some sympathy and understanding of their problem, while not forgetting, of course, our responsibility in Rhodesia, as my noble friend said, for 4 million black people.
I hope your Lordships will forgive me, and that my noble friends will forgive me, for taking a line which I am afraid will not enhance my popularity with my noble friends, but I felt it right to say this. I feel it right, even in a speech on the humble Address, to say things which are not always palatable to one's noble friends. If I were to stand up and make a speech which was agreeable to all my noble friends I should be wasting my time and should be far better employed doing something else. I felt that it might be helpful if I gave vent to my own feelings and experiences, and I sincerely hope, certainly as regards Rhodesia, that good may come of it and that we shall be able to arrive at a helpful solution.
6.15 p.m.
LORD GRANTCHESTER: My Lords, what has surprised me about the present Government is their curious sense of timing. Nor has the example set by them always been very happy, containing too much of the maxim: "Do as we say and not as we do." This lack of perception of what people think and feel has bedevilled much of their effort, both at home and abroad. I know it is easy to be critical, but it is not unfair to challenge Her Majesty's Government, as the noble Lord, Lord Carrington did, and as other noble Lords have done, to point to any part of the world where it can be said that this Government have improved respect for this country by the policies which they have pursued. May I ask them if they would make a start at trying to change this—and perhaps the courageous

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words of the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, who has just sat down, suggest a field in which a new start could be made.
This failure of Her Majesty's Government is not because Ministers have not been well-meaning. They have been rushing from country to country explaining their motives and expressing good will, while at the same time evading the practical issues. They must be exhausted as a result of the efforts they have made, and from their travels. It seems to me to be the latest example of bad timing that this moment should be chosen to dissipate further the energies of Ministers and occupy valuable time on the pressing problem of removing what the noble Earl the Leader of the House on Tuesday called the emotional obstacle which your Lordships' House, in its present form, presents to our constructive future. It is hoped by the Government that it will also occupy some of the time and energy of the Opposition, who might otherwise concentrate on the really mundane problem of restoring prosperity to our country.
For the rest, in order to be as brief as possible, I shall confine myself to asking a few questions on matters which baffle me. Once again the gracious Speech starts with a reference to support for the work of the United Nations. I believe that the present Government once said that they wished to make this support the keystone of their foreign policy, or words to that effect. At the moment, Her Majesty's Government have, I understand, felt it necessary to dissociate themselves from the recommendations of two committees of the United Nations to which they object, and in one of these cases to question the constitutional competence of the committee to discuss the matter at all. These two resolutions concerned, of course, Gibraltar, in one case, and Rhodesia, in the other.
My Lords, I understand that our Foreign Minister, on his last visit to New York last month, indulged in what I am sure he would describe as some plain speaking on what he felt was unjustifiable harassment of this country, which pays, as he observed, one of the largest contributions to the expenses of the United Nations Organisation. Unfortunately I was unable to find any report of this speech in The Times. I make no complaint about these matters, but I would ask whether the reference in the gracious
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Speech to the United Nations may not, in the circumstances, suffer from an economy of truth calculated to lull us into undesirable complacency.
I want to ask further, and even more insistently, as problems keep coming up in this fast changing world, of which the trouble in the Middle East is just one example, whether the United Nations is fulfilling a constructive mission as an organ to secure peaceful change under proper safeguards, or has it, because of lack of leadership, become obsessed with the maintenance of the status quo, however unrealistic that may have become? I did not feel reassured by the hint given by the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, on the thinking which might be reflected in a resolution to be sponsored by the Security Council. King Hussein was rather more specific in the same sense in an interview last night with David Frost.
May I now refer briefly to the repeated demands for the opening of negotiation on our application to join the European Economic Community, over which so many words are being poured out in public and private, and semi-private or semi-public? May I try to make two points again, and seek help from Her Majesty's Government by asking a few questions? I have never accepted the view, held by many, that the attitude of the French Government is purely negative and, in particular, inimical to cooperation with this country. I believe that there is substance in some of the questions involved which are outside the scope of any negotiations envisaged under the Treaty of Rome.
It has been known to the British Government at least since 1963 that the international monetary system was not generally considered to be functioning satisfactorily in current conditions, and that the French Government, particularly, felt it was not being operated by some other Governments in accordance with the rules commonly understood by bankers to be basic for the maintenance of a reasonable equilibrium in national accounts. Although the French Government led the request for a review without any restrictions imposed on its scope—and I repeat those words: without any restrictions imposed on its scope—the need for a review was agreed by most experienced bankers on the Continent. My

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Lords, this is no minor matter. It is upon a sound basic mechanism, honestly operated by Governments within agreed rules, that the expansion of world trade depends.
The American Administration, on the other hand, is inflexibly opposed to any review of this far-reaching character; that is to say, without any limitation for its scope. And, so far as I can judge, the British Government are still taking the same line, although the Chancellor of the Exchequer now seems to suggest that the role of sterling, one of the reserve currencies, could be discussed as a concession to French fears. So I would ask Her Majesty's Government whether they really believe that the role of sterling could be discussed in isolation. Would not any such discussion also involve the other reserve currency? Anyway, I do not believe that the French Government would be interested in such a limited proposal, which, if mixed up with our application, would be, I suggest, discussed in the wrong place and in the wrong setting. The French Government, as we all know, does not approve of the gold exchange standard because the use of a national currency also as a reserve currency enables the country concerned to avoid monetary discipline and spreads inflation. Perhaps at this point I may be permitted to apologise for the fact that I cannot be present next week for the conclusion of this debate, as I have an engagement in the United States for the purpose of discussing this particular subject.
My Lords, our attitude has surprised and disappointed the French, for we were credited with having traditional wisdom and experience in this field. The French Government has at least refrained from suggesting that the British Government should fight the Americans on this issue, which, although it might be considered tit-for-tat, for what we seemed to think that the Germans should do to the French, is not the way to resolve differences on a complicated issue.
I would remind Her Majesty's Government that they have applied to join a Community. So long as Her Majesty's Government even appear to be playing one member against another, I believe that they will find their entry barred. Does not the suggestion that they will
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not invoke Article 108 in their favour demonstrate to the logically-minded that Her Majesty's Government have not yet grasped the Community idea, of which Article 108, pledging mutual help, is an essential bastion? Further, I would ask, do they not agree that to seek to exclude capital movements, except temporarily, with a realisable and practical plan to free them, as the Commission in Brussels would insist, makes nonsense of any statement that they accept the Treaty of Rome, of which it is an essential provision for the realisation of economic unity?
I find it difficult to understand the extreme irritation and obvious annoyance of Her Majesty's Government. I understood that the decision to apply was taken after a careful survey of advantages and disadvantages had convinced the Prime Minister (who up to that time thought otherwise) that the balance of advantage was in favour of membership. In the view of the Prime Minister it was the prospect of political co-operation that made the move worth while. Why then the storm over what has happened? Could we be told, for example, how many British companies need for their survival a market of 200 million people, and how many of those who need to talk in such terms have already made arrangements while the Governments have talked and quarrelled? Or are the Government themselves disappointed because they cannot secure the services of Monsieur Jean Rey and his colleagues, to advise them on the management of the economy of this country?
Many people recently have been telling us that there is no alternative for this country but to join the European Community. If this is so, why do we talk of negotiations at all? If such an opinion is held by any member of the Cabinet I suggest that that member should resign forthwith, so that if and when there are negotiations, they can be real negotiations without any empty or unworthy threats.
I notice that in the present impasse Her Majesty's Government wish to strengthen our ties with the EFTA countries. The Times on Saturday carried a leading article in favour of a proposal for European citizenship started among the EFTA countries. This was discussed at the first meeting of EFTA Parliamentarians in

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Strasbourg in September, 1963. Unfortunately, one of the Scandinavian countries was not very kindly disposed towards this suggestion at the time, but now The Times has taken it up perhaps Her Majesty's Government would arrange for it to be placed on the agenda of the next meeting of the EFTA Ministers. I am sure that there would be a much greater chance of making progress with the Community if countries at present outside it could make some imaginative contribution to the European ideal, and I regard this proposal for European citizenship as an imaginative contribution to the European ideal.
But surely, in the end, a European community can be built only if the members of the Community are agreed on a common policy on fundamental issues, and it is not unreasonable for the extent of such agreement to be explored before an answer is given to any application for admission to it. There is, for instance, a great deal of divergence of opinion in the EFTA countries, who certainly do not speak as one. One way of improving the chances of our current application would be a greater degree of common thought and action among EFTA members. So may I conclude by suggesting that this aspect should also be carefully considered at all meetings of EFTA Ministers?
6.38 p.m.
LORD ROWLEY: My Lords, this debate has been noteworthy for a very important statement by my noble friend Lord Shackleton with regard to the policy of Her Majesty's Government as to independence for South Arabia. As I understood him, he indicated that towards the middle of this month the British land forces and the British administration will be withdrawn from Aden, and from that day, so far as we are concerned, South Arabia will be an independent country.
Some doubts were expressed by noble Lords opposite, including the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition, as to the consequences of carrying out such a policy, and I am bound to say that I should be most disturbed, and should regret it very much, if we had to leave a vacuum in South Arabia by reason of the fact that there is not even a provisional Government to which we could hand over some degree of authority. On the other hand, it is not our fault if there
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is a vacuum, except in so far as we do carry out this policy. For months, if not for years, the political leaders (apart from those who control the Federation) have been pressing us to leave the country, and I believe it was stated this afternoon that the two main parties, the N.L.F. and FLOSY, are actually meeting in Cairo at the present time with a view to arriving at an agreement to form a Government to which we can hand over. If they do not agree to form a Government to take over over the independence far which they have been agitating for years, that cannot be held to be our responsibility. It is a form of blackmail, that we have to remain there until they see fit to form an alternative Government to which we can hand over authority.
I very much welcomed the statement made by my noble friend. I agree that there might be some consequences which we should all regret if there were a state of anarchy. I personally would rather assume that there is sufficient intelligence in the minds of the leaders of the N.L.F. and FLOSY to come to an agreement. But in any event there will be a number of British subjects who will be left, for example, in Aden. I hope that I shall be corrected by my noble friend Lord Chalfont, when he comes to wind up, or by my noble friend Lord Shackleton, if I am wrong when I say that I remember a statement made in this House to the effect that part of the understanding was that we would leave naval forces, including an aircraft carrier on which there would be a commando unit, within sailing distance of Aden as part of a measure of reassurance to the new Government that would take over. That, of course, was part of an agreement with the Federal Government, but I have no reason to believe—certainly we have not been told this afternoon—that that naval force would be withdrawn. And I hope I am right in assuming that if there were any question of the safety of our Legation, or whatever it would be or of British citizens living in Aden, being jeopardised as a result of our withdrawal, this force and these very fine commando troops would be available to go in and safeguard the lives of British subjects who remain after we have officially left. I hope that is so.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, I used my words very carefully. I said that

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a substantial naval force is concentrated at Aden to cover the period of our withdrawal and independence. It will also give, I think, very great reassurance to those Europeans and British who remain there. This commando carrier force, as opposed to the strike carrier force, was always going to be there for that purpose. But obviously it was not so desirable to underline that precautionary aspect of it at an earlier stage.
LORD ROWLEY: My Lords, I appreciate that statement. I should still like to suggest that it will be an extraordinary position if the rival political parties do not reach an agreement and take over the Government—what sort of Government they will make is another matter, but that is their business—of South Arabia from the date on which we evacuate troops and take away our administrative officials.
My noble friend also made a very interesting statement with regard to the Middle East problem. He said that a resolution was being considered at this time by the Security Council which had two main principles. The first was that the State of Israel should be given de jure recognition by the Arab States; and the second that the principle of Israeli withdrawal should also be accepted. None of us knows at this moment whether that resolution will get through the Security Council there is some doubt as to whether it will. But assuming that it does, in my opinion it will be a great step forward in dealing with this very difficult Middle East problem. I believe that if the Arab States would recognise the existence of the State of Israel it would transform the situation overnight.
For twenty years the Arab States have acted on the basis that there was no State of Israel. I do not believe for one moment that the Israeli forces under the instructions of the Israeli Government are going to consider withdrawing from one inch of territory they now occupy unless they get that recognition of their existence as a nation which is essential to the security of their people. After all, the United Nations has a direct responsibility because it was the United Nations which created the State of Israel twenty years ago. And the fact that the Israelis occupy territories to-day much greater
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than those that were allotted to her by the United Nations General Assembly is not due to a policy of Israeli expansionism: it is due to the fact that, following three wars with her Arab neighbours, she has been victorious and at the time when the cease-fires were arranged occupied the territories she occupies to-day.
Obviously, therefore, unless the Israelis are given some guarantee as to their future security, it is going to be extremely difficult to persuade them, or for them to agree, to go back to the boundaries which they occupied on June 1. But if they are given this recognition of their existence as a State, that presupposes they will have the same rights as any other nation of free passage through the Suez Canal when the Canal is cleared. That is why I disagree with noble Lords on the other side. I believe that it is essential—and I say this as one who is a friend of Israel; and I have shown that I am a friend of Israel—for us to resume diplomatic relations with Egypt. If we are going to play any part in influencing a settlement, we cannot pretend that Egypt is not there. And, after all, there are many examples of Governments which have treated us extremely badly, going right back to the days of the cold war.
The noble Lord, Lord Carrington, referred to the vicious attacks—and he is right—that have been made over the Cairo Radio with regard to this country. I can enumerate half a dozen other countries which in the last twenty years have allowed their radios to carry vicious attacks upon this country, starting with the Soviet Union. Yet our relations with the Soviet Union have never been so good as they are to-day, and those vicious attacks did not prevent our having our Ambassador in Moscow. Therefore I hope that the Government will pursue this policy.
I am afraid that it is going to take some time before we get all these problems resolved, and when the time does come, if it does come, I believe that not only the United Nations must play its part: I hope that the proposal of Her Majesty's Government that U Thant should send a special representative will be accepted by the Security Council. I do not think he is going to be able to carry out the role of mediator in the first place, but I think he could carry out the role of conciliator to prepare the way

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for subsequent direct negotiations, which up to date have been refused by the Arab States, although the Israeli Government have been willing to accept them.
No reference has been made in the debate to-day to what I think is a problem that has the most appalling consequences for the future of mankind. About a week ago the Secretary-General published a report which was written by 12 scientists, scientists from Communist countries and non-Communist countries. They included, from our own country, Sir Solly Zuckerman, one of the ablest scientists in the Western World; an American scientist, Russian, Polish, Indian—numbering together 12. This is not a propaganda document, but it makes grim reading, and it shows that the world is almost living on the brink of a holocaust, a disaster which, according to them, could destroy our civilisation. I am not a scientist and I could not refute them, and I doubt if there is anyone else who can refute them.
They point out in this very grim document that a 20-megaton bomb is available in the nuclear arsenals of the two super-Powers, Russia and the United States; and that a 20-megaton bomb, if it were exploded in the air over a city the size of London or New York or Moscow—and they cite the case of New York with its 8 million people, the same as ours in London—might well kill 6 million out of the 8 million. They say that the 40-megaton and 50-megaton bombs have been successfully tested, and that if they were used in any numbers hundreds of millions of people might be killed. They also say that there is no reason why 100-megaton bombs should not also be tested and find their way into the armouries of these two great Powers. They also point out that, in addition to France and Britain and China, there are six other countries who are well able to become nuclear Powers on a more modest scale.
For the last two or three years my noble friend Lord Chalfont has played his part and has done everything he could to forward the achievement of this Agreement for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. I should have thought that this book would have galvanized all 17 Governments who are at Geneva, and other Governments, into ensuring that an agreement is reached for stopping this
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possibility of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
I hope that my noble friend will refer shortly to the conference which is to be held in June next year, a United Nations conference of the non-nuclear Powers. I imagine that will be a conference representing a large number of countries, perhaps 100. How can they hope to make any progress if no agreement is reached on the present draft non-proliferation Agreement which is on the table at Geneva? I hope moreover that he will be able to give us a little encouragement as to the possibility of bridging the difference between the United States and Russia, so that this Agreement can be arrived at.
Finally, may I make this one short point? Two British pilots were recently hijacked along with their machine. They were held in Algeria, a member of the United Nations, for a period of three months without ever being brought to trial. No attempt was made to bring them to trial. In my view, the time has come when the Statutes of the International Court of Justice should be examined. Why cannot we have an international writ of habeas corpus which would mean that when a national is held without trial by the Government of another country there should be a right to go to the International Court? All I am asking tonight is that Her Majesty's Goverment should consider this proposal and, if they think it is a worthy one, should put it to the Legal Committee of the United Nations for their examination. There may be insuperable difficulties—I do not know—but surely it might be worth considering whether the International Court of Justice Statutes should not be revised to give them jurisdiction and power to take action in these cases.
My last observation is this. The young people of this country and of many other countries are cynical and disillusioned because they have the knowledge that in the last fifty years there have been two world wars costing millions in lives and untold treasure and a lowering of the economies of many of the countries concerned. They know that to-day there are two great Powers with nuclear arsenals stocked with nuclear weapons which could destroy our civilisation. If we want to encourage them to look forward to the future on a basis of ideals,

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we must do everything we can to make them realise that by starting on the road to disarmament and creating one world under the rule of law they and their generation may have something to live and to work for.
6.55 p.m.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, one of the difficulties in a debate on Foreign Affairs is that it covers so many subjects. One is interested in Europe, in the Middle East, in Aden and Southern Arabia, and intensely interested in the United Nations report on nuclear weapons to which my noble friend Lord Rowley has referred so eloquently. It is therefore difficult to decide on what issues in a limited time one should address your Lordships. I have selected Vietnam and Rhodesia. I was a little doubtful about Rhodesia, because strictly it is not within the sphere of Foreign Affairs but rather that of the Commonwealth Office. But associated with it is South Africa and Portugal and the United Nations, and the speeches which my noble friends Lord Walston and Lord Silkin have delivered encourage me to refer to it as well.
But first Vietnam. I think the whole world is now becoming stirred in its conscience by what is happening in Vietnam: not merely the awful deaths and deformities of children and others by the napalm bomb and the fragmentation bombs, but the news this morning in such a responsible newspaper as The Times that the Americans are now considering using Polaris missiles in that war.
I have been distressed by the attitude both of the Government and of the Opposition on the issue of the Vietnam war. The Opposition has particular reason to take pride in the fact that it was Lord Avon, when he was Foreign Secretary, who was one of the architects of the Geneva Agreement. That Agreement laid down in clear terms that Vietnam deserved recognition in its integrity as a union; laid down definitely that all foreign forces must be withdrawn from its territories; laid down that there should be an opportunity for an election for that union, and laid down that Vietnam should be neutral between the two great military blocs. I believe that the principles of the Geneva Agree
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ment are still those upon which the problem of Vietnam should be solved.
I have been perplexed that the Opposition, one of whose leaders was the author of that Agreement, and still more that our Labour Government should in this war have supported the American Government which, in its actions, has repudiated that Agreement from A to Z. America was at Geneva and did not accept the Agreement, though its spokesman did give the promise that they would not obstruct it by forceful means. Geneva appointed an independent Commission, composed of Canada, India and Poland, to supervise the application of the Agreement. I have read its annual reports from its appointment in 1954 until 1959, in every one of which it placed the major responsibility for the breach of the Geneva Agreement upon the American Government.
My particular concern with my own Government is that they have retreated on this issue. They did at one point dissociate themselves from America when its Government bombed in the neighbourhood of Hanoi and Haiphong. They have gone back on that. They have failed to make any condemnation of the much more flagrant attacks on civilian populations of which America is now guilty. Last week, not in the neighbourhood of Hanoi but in Hanoi itself, there was the heaviest bombardment of civilians, both by night and by day, that there has been during the whole period of the war, and our Government—who in the first instance dissociated themselves from attacks in the neighbourhood of these cities—have been absolutely silent upon that event.
I speak with great confidence tonight, as I am quite sure that in what I am saying I reflect not only the great majority within the Labour Party itself, as was indicated at the recent Labour Party Conference, but the great majority of British public opinion which is politically alert. The attitude of the Churches has been splendid. The universities of Great Britain, not only students in aggressive action but the professors in every university, have spoken out. The United Nations Association, a neutral body, has come out in the strongest terms, as have the Trades Union Congress and the youth movements. At this moment our Government, as well as the American Government, should be aware that the majority of alert

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public opinion in this country is against the continuation of the war in Vietnam and is against the association of our Government with the American Government in the continuation of that war. And it is not only public opinion in this country; it is international opinion. During the recent discussions in the General Assembly of the United Nations there has been overwhelming support for the proposal that the American Government should stop, permanently and unconditionally, its bombing of North Vietnam, with a view to bringing about talks for peace.
We have the right to ask whether this step will bring about the negotiations which we desire. It is repeatedly stated that Hanoi has rejected constant offers by the American Government for negotiations. That is just not true. As far away as January 28 last, Pham Van Dong, the Prime Minister of North Vietnam, said that if the United States wished for talks it must stop bombing unconditionally. He described this as
"a very important diplomatic move of ours. It shows that we are ready to talk, as the United States claim it is ready to talk, at any time. We have made clear our views on this subject."
I myself have heard from official representatives of North Vietnam and from the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam a similar statement: that if America will stop its bombing of the North negotiations can begin. U Thant has said this. Is there any one of your Lordships who believes that U Thant would take the responsibility of making such a statement unless he had evidence which was overwhelmingly behind it?
Nevertheless, I want to make my appeal to Ho Chi Minh, the head of North Vietnam—despite the fact that this statement has been made repeatedly during the last twleve months—to say it again now in such an authoritative way that it will so gain international attention that it may be possible for the negotiations to take place.
My Lords, because of the time I will omit other considerations from my speech, but on the problem of Vietnam I conclude by quoting from The Times in its issue of August 15 last. It said:
"If he"—
that is President Johnson—
"wants a settlement, which is the only sensible thing to want, then he must pursue it
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openly and realistically, which means as a first step a stop to the bombing of the North and an attempt to reduce the level of the conflict in the South."
Surely I can suggest that our Labour Government should be as outspoken in the cause of peace as is The Times newspaper. I ask them tonight to support, openly and publicly, the appeal that America shall stop its bombing of North Vietnam, permanently and unconditionally, so that peace negotiations can begin. I am asking the Government now not only to make that statement publicly but to bring pressure upon Washington to carry it out, to seek co-operation with the Soviet Union in carrying it out, and to go to the United Nations—the General Assembly and the Security Council—in order to ensure that the utmost international pressure is brought to bear in achieving this hope of peace.
In turning to Rhodesia, I must make some reference to the speech which has been delivered in this debate by my noble friend Lord Silkin. As one who has constantly been in minorities, both in another place and in this place, I do not complain at all because he expressed views in this House which he holds sincerely, even if the majority of his Party do not agree with him. But I am a little surprised—in view of his own record, the reasons for which we quite understand, in opposing racial discrimination in this and in other countries—that he should have made the speech to which we have listened. I want to congratulate him, if I may, upon the white people whom he met in Southern Rhodesia. I think it must have been partly due to the fact that like attracts like, and the charm of himself and of Lady Silkin will have drawn such to them. I think the friends he met must have been rather rare, because the Rhodesian Front Party has carried its elections by overwhelming majorities, and the Rhodesian Front Party stands for the policy of segregation and separation.
My noble friend said that in the parks he had seen whites and blacks associating closely together, sitting on seats together, and that he saw little racial discrimination. Is he aware that last week the régime of Mr. Smith introduced a Bill into the Rhodesian Parliament which would allow councils to segregate recreational facilities in the parks of which he

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spoke, and in the playgrounds and swimming baths? Is he aware that this Bill was regarded as so discriminatory that the Constitutional Council, which was set up under the 1961 Constitution to safeguard against discrimination, rejected the Bill as unconstitutional? Is he aware, also, that the Smith régime, because it can count on a two-thirds majority in the Rhodesian Parliament, is proceeding with the Bill and it will therefore become law?
Is my noble friend aware that a fortnight ago there was introduced into the Rhodesian Parliament a Bill which gave local authorities, where there is a petition signed by 50 per cent. of the householders, easy to obtain in white areas, the power to refuse permission to any non-whites—not only Africans but also Asians—to live in that locality? The most frightening thing about what is happening in Rhodesia to-day is that it is so closely following the pattern of apartheid in South Africa, and adopting the humiliating view that members of parts of the human family are inferior, just because of the different colour of their skins.
I add with some regret that I agree with what my noble friend Lord Silkin has said about the failure of the sanctions policy, though not entirely. The statements of members of the Administration have indicated the success of the sanctions policy in many respects, particularly in tobacco, which he mentioned. Only last week Mr. Douglas Young, the Secretary to the Treasury in the Smith régime, at the constitutional test appeal admitted a 35 per cent. reduction in exports from £165 million in 1965 to £105 million in 1966, which does not suggest that the policy of sanctions has been the complete failure which my noble friend indicated. Nevertheless, I want to accept at once that it has not succeeded. In the same statement in court, where he had taken the oath, Mr. Douglas Young used these words:
"In the first eight months of 1967 imports were sustained at a level of 20 per cent. higher than for the corresponding period of 1966."
While acknowledging the drop in exports to which I have referred, he said that this resulted in a decline of only 1·9 per cent. in the gross national product. I
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agree that if sanctions are to succeed it will be a long time, if present methods only are pursued, before that goal is realised.
I had intended to say a word on the question of the use of force, but again, out of consideration for the House, I shall omit that. But those who are opposed to the use of force must prove the effectiveness of alternative action, and I put two points to Her Majesty's Government. The first is that there is evidence that United Nations countries are not applying the sanctions to which the United Nations have agreed. I would urge very strongly that this matter should be raised by our representative, Lord Caradon, both in the General Assembly and in the Security Council. They should be asked to authorise the Secretary-General to report on this matter, to expose failures and to make a subject of indictment before the General Assembly any nation which is failing to fulfil its commitments on this matter.
The second proposal which I want to make is this. The bulk of imports into Rhodesia at this moment are coming through Portugese-occupied Mozambique and South Africa. I would urge Her Majesty's Government to ask the United Nations for authority to extend the blockade, which is at present on the port of Beira, to the port of Lourenco Marques through which most of these imports come. It would be logical to extend this blockade to South Africa also, but we must face the fact that it has stocks adequate for many years. Nevertheless, I ask the Government to bring the strongest pressure to bear upon South Africa. We hesitate, because of trade, but we are as essential to South Africa as South Africa is to us. There is a fear there of United Nations sanctions. There is uncertainty among the population about its future, of which my noble friend Lord Silkin spoke. It is not at all certain that South Africa wants on its borders conflicts in Southern Rhodesia, with its eighteen to one African majority. I would say to our Government that they can afford to speak in the strongest possible terms to the South African Government upon this issue.
It is urgent that effective action be taken in Rhodesia, first, to achieve adoption of the principle of inter-racial

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equality and no discrimination, which involves majority rule; secondly, to gain acceptance of this principle in Southern Rhodesia as a contribution towards its acceptance in the whole of Southern Africa; and, thirdly—and I emphasise this—to stop the drift towards a physical conflict in Southern Africa, the effects of which we cannot contemplate. The Commonwealth Minister is visiting African States and Southern Rhodesia. It is admitted that there appears to be little hope of a setttlement with Mr. Ian Smith while he rejects the five principles, as he does; but there is the hope that at least he may convince African Governments of our determination. He can do that only if our Government express their will in effective action.
7.20 p.m.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, I should like to add my congratulations to the noble Earl, Lord Buckinghamshire, on his maiden speech. It was a very good speech, and when I heard his admirable peroration I felt that perhaps it would have been even better if he had lost his notes at the beginning rather than losing them at the end. Perhaps there is a lesson there from which all of us might profit.
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Carrington has spoken about the Middle East. It is undoubtedly there at this moment that the greatest and gravest danger to the peace of the world exists, and may continue for some time. It may be that your Lordships will wish to have a debate on the Middle East later this Session. The subject cannot be properly covered in the course of a general debate on foreign affairs such as this, and I shall therefore make only a very brief reference to it. Whatever may be the merits of the unhappy enmity between Israel and the Arabs, this country cannot be blamed for it. We did our level best, under the mandate, to import as many Jews as we possibly could without displacing any Arabs. That is what we honestly tried to do. We were not allowed to go on doing that by the United Nations, who insisted that more should come in. So we had to go; and since then there has been continual war between Arab and Jew.
However that may be, the present position is that there are 2½ million Jews
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there, and you cannot expect them not to fight for their existence—for that is the position. Any creature of any kind will fight for its life; and what they are threatened with is not merely inconvenience, or even defeat, but extinction. I think we have very little influence left in the Middle East. We can do nothing to bring about peace there by ourselves. I doubt whether the Americans can do much. I do not think the United Nations can do anything. No one can do much to bring about peace so long as the Russians decide that it is to their advantage to prolong insecurity and armed tension in the Middle East, which they evidently do. So long as they go on supplying Egypt with vast quantities of the most modern tanks, aeroplanes and missiles, you cannot expect peace to come about merely by wishing for it. I think we must be prepared for perhaps a lengthy period in which the present tension will continue.
Of course, what we hope for is that the Russians will change their views and decide that it is not worth their while to prolong this situation. That is our first and most obvious hope. Failing that, I think that perhaps the best thing we or the United Nations could do would be to raise a big loan through the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank. America and ourselves would probably be the only subscribers, and our subscription might depend upon our financial position next year; but if the United Nations could raise a substantial loan for the purpose of irrigating those parts of the Sinai Desert—and there are some—which can be irrigated, and could settle several hundred thousand Arab refugees there, I believe that not only would it do more good than most aid to under-developed countries but that it would also be a factor making for peace, because it would show the Arabs how much more profitable it is to co-operate with the Israelis than to continue war and misery.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, said that we must continue to support the United Nations and the decisions of the Security Council, and so on, because the hopes of peace depended upon it. I think we would agree with that. We ought to be loyal to the United Nations, in the same way as we are loyal to our own country. But our loyalty to our own country does not prevent us from strenuously and vigorously opposing

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and attacking those of our countrymen who support policies or do things which we think are wrong and disastrous; and the more seriously we take the United Nations, the more we wish it to be effective, the more outspoken we should be, in my view, in telling it or the majority of nations who attend it when we think they are wrong.
It seems to be rather unfashionable at the moment to speak in commendatory terms of anything which is said by the Foreign Secretary. He seems to have a kind of proneness to say things of which people do not altogether approve. But if I may be unfashionable for a moment, there is one speech which he recently made upon which I wish to comment very favourably indeed, and which I greatly admired. It is his speech on September 26 to the United Nations in the General Assembly about the Trusteeship Committee. What he said was this:
"The ordinary Briton feels puzzled, indeed resentful, when he hears that we of all people are being attacked about our attitude towards the great issues of freedom and independence. This is something which could seriously erode the strong support which the United Nations has always commanded in my country".
I think that was a very sensible and necessary thing to say.
After severely castigating the Committee of 24 at some length on all the mischief which they had been doing in Aden, Gibraltar and many other places within the last two or three years, the Foreign Secretary went on to say:
"Sometimes I think we fail to see the warning lights. The Assembly or its committees are then tempted to think that the resolution is a substitute for action. But sweeping declarations which take no account of facts do nothing to further the aims of the Charter. On the contrary, they set them back; they destroy confidence in the right-mindedness of the United Nations. I think the Assembly's action on South-West Africa last spring illustrates very clearly what I mean."
When I read that speech—which, as I say, I admired—the first thing that occurred to me was that it was very much more forthright, blunt and true than the speech of Sir Alec Douglas-Home at Berwick on December 28, 1961—a speech which was not at all welcomed or praised by the Party opposite. He said much more gently and much more mildly only a few of the things which Mr. Brown
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said at the United Nations last month, but the present Prime Minister was very angry about it. He said that this speech:
"has aroused great consternation among our friends and allies all over the world, all of whom have read every word of the text of the Foreign Secretary's speech. The reference in the speech to the anti-colonial resolution in the United Nations, which was supported by the vast majority of the United Nations, has suggested to the world that Britain is content to ally herself to Portugal and two or three other ex-colonial Powers".
The Labour Party seems to have come on a lot since then; and I am thoroughly glad to see the Foreign Secretary using such sensible and timely language, and saying so many things which were so long overdue—and, in particular, in regard to this Committee of 24. I remember that when it was first instituted at the end of 1961 we undertook to supply it with information. Although we knew that it was very apt to make itself a nuisance, we undertook to co-operate with it and supply it with information. With the best will in the world, I am bound to say it has so inexcusably and mischievously failed to do any good that we should no longer supply it with information, but should tell it that these matters are none of its business and that we are not going to help or countenance it any more.
In view of the very interesting and valuable speech of the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, I should like to add that in my view the United Nations (I do not now refer to the Committee of 24 but to the Trusteeship Committee, the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly) bears a great deal of the blame for the present situation in Rhodesia. I do not ask the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, to reply to this point, but I suggest that he might study—if he has not already done so—the circumstances of Sir Edgar Whitehead's visit to the United Nations at New York in 1962.
At that time Whitehead was putting forward proposals for a new Rhodesian Constitution which I think would have been more liberal than some of those which have been favourably considered now by the Government—and certainly more liberal than those considered on board "Tiger". He went to New York and made a very long, earnest and courteous speech to the Fourth Committee, explaining what he was trying to do. What happened? He was received

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with derision; the moment his speech was concluded a member of the Committee moved the closure in order that a resolution might be passed demanding immediate majority rule for Rhodesia and declaring that no elections in Rhodesia before majority rule would be regarded as valid.
You may think that that was only a resolution; that we should not pay too much attention to it. But what an effect it had in Rhodesia, in that small community! Some Rhodesians had criticised Sir Edgar Whitehead for going to New York. This action of the General Assembly, or of its Committee, had two very unfortunate effects. First, it encouraged black extremism in Rhodesia, and one result of that was that the two national Parties there refused to take part in the coming elections and boycotted them. The second, and rather more serious effect, was that Sir Edgar Whitehead, who had been criticised for going to New York at all, lost support among his own Party and was beaten at the election by Mr. Winston Field. That was the beginning of the present difficulties in Rhodesia; and I blame the United Nations very much for it on account of their interference.
I heard with great sympathy what the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, said about his visit to Rhodesia. I wish that some members of the Government would pay an equally informal and incognito visit and see what he saw. I will not say anything about sanctions in case I might say something non-attributable; but I do think it is very important indeed (possibly for the peace of the whole of South Africa) that we should come to an agreement with Rhodesia as soon as possible. Two conditions for that must be, first, that we should abandon the imbecility of NIBMAR—it should never have been brought in at all—and, second, that the proposals, the very acceptable proposals, agreed on "Tiger" should not be accompanied by the conditions for a short, intermediate régime, which seemed to me wholly unacceptable and which were in any case probably misunderstood.
Finally, my Lords, I must say something about the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, who is going to reply. I hope he will not think it necessary to say every-thing
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which Lord Shackleton did not have time to ay on subjects like nuclear nonproliferation. I should have thought that that matter could easily wait until some other occasion. But I should like to offer my sympathy to the noble Lord over the little difficulty he ran into last week and to express the hope that normal diplomatic relations may soon be restored between himself and the Daily Mirror. I would similarly hope that normal diplomatic relations will soon be restored between the Foreign Secretary and the Sunday Times.
I wonder whether the noble Lord would allow me to tell him about an interview which I had three or four years ago—just after January, 1963, when we were vetoed for the Common Market—with some representatives of one of the leading German parties who had come over on a visit. The interview took place at the Foreign Office. I was then Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, as the noble Lord is now. I had a long talk with them. I will tell the noble Lord what I said—and I am sure that he will understand it was all off the record, non-attributable and entirely without foundation. I did not say anything at all about East Germany or about the Oder-Neisse line—and I very much doubt whether Lord Chalfont did either—because it was then, and is now, utterly irrelevant. What I did say was this: that the countries of the E.E.C. and also of the O.E.E.C. (which is quite different) were in the habit of continually criticising Britain because we were always getting in balance-of-payments difficulties and therefore could not be very good at managing our economy.
But I pointed out—which I think was a reasonable thing to do—that we were the only country in Europe who were spending something like £300 million outside our own frontiers on the defence of the Free World; and that none of the other countries in Europe who criticised us was spending one penny in that way. We were spending nearly one-third of this on the Army in Germany; and I said to the Germans that if Britain were to be permanently excluded economically from Europe then it might, of course, be a possibility that the British people would get tired of spending so much of their money in unrequited exports and runing into balance-of-payments difficulties in order to defend a group of countries

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which excluded them economically from their society. I think that saying that was in no way a threat; neither was it even a warning. I think it was simply a common-sense appreciation of future possibilities which we all hoped would never arise but which must be present in the mind of anyone who seriously thought about this problem.
But I wish we could get away from the idea that our main purpose in seeking entry into the Common Market is to gain something for ourselves. That is not our main purpose—nor even that of conferring some benefit on Europe. To put it shortly, the main purpose of our application, as everybody realises now, is that if the Free World, instead of being divided into one large economic power in America and a whole lot of fragments in Europe, could consist of two large economic groups associated with each other and acting in concert with each other, then—and I would not put it lower than this—the peace and freedom of the Free World, which are so uncertain now, would almost certainly be secure by the end of this century. That is the reason why we want to join, and why so many progressive and intelligent people in Europe want us to join the European Common Market. We should certainly be able to do vastly more for the underdeveloped countries; and it is a legitimate reason for the Americans to wish us to join the Common Market that the building up of this economic unit would partly relieve them of, or at least help them with, the very unfair burden of helping the rest of the Free World which they now have to bear almost single-handed. My noble friend Lord Head is not present, but I was going to say that if we could have these two great economic bases producing so much power and wealth in the world, we could almost manage to feed the 2,500 million babies whose birth he looks forward to with so much apprehension, and about 45,000 of whom must have been born since we started this debate.
As my noble friend Lord Carrington said—I think the majority of people in this country and the majority of people in nearly every European country are agreed on those beliefs.
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But our chief adversaries are General de Gaulle and those of his subordinates who repeat what he says. General de Gaulle is not a man of the common sort. He is a man of great ideas, some of which are very fine ideas. But I believe very strongly that he has a psychopathic obsession about the danger of American predominance in the civilised world, the predominance of American power and culture. I think that this obsession affects his judgment, and I should like to give one instance of that which the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, may have studied, though it was before he came into politics.
About six or seven years ago Brazil elected a new President called Quadros of whom great hopes were entertained that he would pull the country out of its economic difficulties. He was a Left-Wing radical who already had a great dynamic reputation for getting a move on which he had earned while he was Governor of Sao Paulo. He remained in office for just over a year, and then he did a thing of which I know of no example of any other prominent politician doing—although I daresay that many people would like to see some politicians doing it here. He got so upset by all his colleagues and all his civil servants, who he thought were not quite co-operating as well as they should, that he left the country. But he delayed his aeroplane by 36 hours, in the confident expectation that his colleagues would send him an urgent deputation telling him that they could not get on without him and asking him to return. But it turned out that they did not miss him quite so much as that, so he left.
The Brazilians are very good constitutionalists. They always obey the law if they can, and their Constitution requires that if a President dies or becomes incapable he must be succeeded for the rest of his term of office by the Vice-President. So they agreed, with great misgivings, that the new President should be the one who had been Vice-President—Goulart, one of the most evil men who has ever ruled a country in modern times. He was immensely rich, a multi-millionaire playboy, who loved himself better than other people and better than his country. He hated the United States—as indeed quite a lot of Brazilians do, because the United States is sometimes

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a little tactless and patronising when trying to help its Latin American allies. But Goulart also hated liberty. His great objective was to create in Brazil a personal Left-Wing dictatorship, on the lines of Castro, and to become an ally of Castro's Cuba.
In order to achieve this end he did not scruple to obstruct measures taken for the economic benefit of the country, to allow inflation to accelerate at a ruinous rate and poverty to increase, because he thought that these things would give him an excuse for suspending the Constitution and proclaiming a state of emergency. General de Gaulle thought he saw a great opportunity here of destroying the influence of United States in Latin America. He arranged a grand tour, in the early summer of 1964, which was to end up by his visiting Brazil. It was proclaimed in advance by the French Press that France might give Brazil an economic loan of £300 million, and that there would be a great economic and political alliance between France and the régime of Goulart.
But just before General de Gaulle got to the country Goulart went a little too far. He used his agents to try to foment a mutiny in some of his own armed units, in order that he might have a rather stronger reason for declaring a state of emergency and suspending Parliament. That was too much, even for the tolerant, kindly, easy-going people of Brazil. They all rose up—the Governors of three Provinces and nearly all the armed forces; in fact, nearly all the people except the Communists—and they kicked Goulart well and truly out of their country for good, in every sense of the term. So that when de Gaulle arrived there his visit was a monumental flop, to his own mortification, but to the great relief and thankfulness of everyone who loved freedom in both hemispheres.
Now, my Lords, I do not believe that General de Gaulle really desires to destroy freedom and to establish tyranny, but I do not think he would have followed this policy in Latin America if he had not been suffering from an anti-United States obsession which is strong enough to overcome the normal processes of human reason. I think he has an obsession about this, and I think that we must always bear it in mind while we are pursuing our present negotiations. Maybe you can
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never convert him, but the only hope of doing it or of leaving him alone with so, little support that he will have to agree, is to keep on repeating your case simply, and again and again, without taking your eye off the target; without going off the point. If you become distracted and allow yourself to get into irrelevancies—not irrelevancies but ancillary matters like our attitude to NATO and so on—you will be doing exactly what your psychopath wants; you will enable him to confuse the issue and to throw dust into the eyes of other people. The only hope is to stick to the point.
That, my Lords, is why I said a week ago to-day, when the Statement about the Common Market was read to your Lordships, that I think it quite possible that in the next few months the French may do and say a great many things which are deliberately calculated to provoke and encourage opposition to the Common Market, in this country and elsewhere. That is why I said that we should be very patient. We may have to be almost heroically patient for quite a long time; but also confident that in the end reason and good sense will prevail.
7.50 p.m.
THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (LORD CHALFONT): My Lords, may I begin by saying how much I appreciate the spirit in which the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, approached not only the great problem that faces us, the problem of European unity, but also the incidents of the past few days. In showing my appreciation of that, I hope to take note of his gentle hint about the length of my winding up speech. I shall make it as brief as I possible can.
May I add my congratulations to the noble Earl, Lord Buckinghamshire, on his maiden speech. I think that the noble Earl opposite dealt elegantly with the minor mishap which the noble Earl suffered and from which I thought he emerged with such great dignity. I hope that we shall hear from him often again. May I say, too, how good it was to hear my noble friend Lord Walston, as wise and thoughtful as always. We in the Government will certainly bear in mind his interesting views on the selection of men for posts and missions in developing countries.

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He mentioned Rhodesia, as also did my noble friends Lord Silkin and Lord Brockway. My noble friend Lord Silkin suggested that he might need some forgiveness from his friends on these Benches. I can assure him that nothing of the sort enters into it at all. Like my noble friend Lord Brockway, I am not one to deny anyone the right to state his views, even when they are minority views. I should like to say, however, that I, and I am certain many others on these Benches, will have experienced a feeling of sadness at some of the things which my noble friend had to say to-night about the problems in Rhodesia and South Africa.
The problems of the United Nations and disarmament are not ones, I think, that I can leave completely out of my remarks this evening, although I shall deal with them briefly. We do not believe that alliances are an ideal basis of permanent security in the world, but we cannot possibly do without them until the United Nations becomes a real alternative. I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, that it is precisely because we want to make the United Nations a real alternative that we have worked, and will work, within the United Nations to make its peaceful and peace-keeping work far more effective. And outside the United Nations we must see to it that our alliances work for and towards the improvement of relations with the countries of Eastern Europe. This détente can, in its turn, prepare the way for a system in which the United Nations can play a wider and more effective role in the world. I was glad to hear the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, referring in such warm and appreciative terms of the speech at the United Nations of my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary, one of the many effective contributions, I may say, that he has made, and is making, to the conduct of international affairs.
Disarmament is a subject which has been mentioned by my noble friend Lord Rowley, among other noble Lords. It is an aspect that certainly remains one of deep concern to me and I think to most of us. My noble friend made mention of the report of the Secretary-General on nuclear weapons, a most important docu
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ment. It is the kind of thinking that has been reflected in that document that has led us to concentrate so much of our effort and attention over the past year on the negotiations for a treaty to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. The General Assembly overwhelmingly approved this proposal at their last session, but the difficulty is that since then—and my noble friend will know this as well as I do—the co-chairmen of the Disarmament Committee have now tabled an agreed draft of a treaty at Geneva. It is true that it is a draft from which one important article has been left blank; but after so many disappointments and delays, even this is something which all of us, I think, would welcome whole-heartedly.
But the Non-proliferation Treaty is not an end in itself. It will not succeed in its purpose and may not even last very long, if it is not followed by other agrements. There is the extension of the Test Ban Treaty to cover nuclear tests in all their environments, and there remains the vital task of real disarmament, particularly in the use of nuclear weapons. But it is, as always, the first step that counts, and we believe that the Non-proliferation Treaty is this first step and will make others possible.
Before I pass on to the other main area of international relations with which I intend to deal, perhaps I may mention, to make note of it, the interesting suggestion of my noble friend Lord Rowley about an international writ of habeas corpus. He must know better than most of us what the legal difficulties and complications of this are, but it seems to me, as a layman, to be an interesting suggestion, and we will certainly take note of it.
I should like to come to the main part of my remarks which, as my noble friend Lord Shackleton said earlier, deal with Britain and the Common Market. Your Lordships will obviously want me to say something about what has now come to be called the Lausanne incident. My right honourable friends the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary have dealt with this at length in another place, but I shall wish to make one or two brief remarks about it later. For the moment, let me concentrate on the important issue, which is Britain's application for its membership of the European Community. And perhaps I may begin, simply and I hope

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briefly, by reminding your Lordships of the main considerations that led us to apply for this membership.
The first and most important reasons are political. The past few years have brought home to us with increasing urgency the need for closer political co-operation in Europe. Without it, as we have heard from other noble Lords to-day, we can expect world issues to be dealt with increasingly by the super-Powers—the United States and the Soviet Union—while the European countries, divided among themselves, will have no alternative but to fall in with whatever arrangements result. Europe will be unable to make the beneficial contribution which her mature experience, her skill and her traditions would entitle her to make. Perhaps, in parenthesis, I may pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, who has been such a consistent, steadfast and imaginative proponent of the whole idea of European unity.
The changing relationship between Eastern and Western Europe provides an example of the way in which this European influence could be exerted. In recent years this relationship has improved to a point at which there seems to be a real prospect of reaching a lasting settlement of the problems left over from the last war, a settlement which I am sure both sides earnestly seek and which could be of real benefit to us all. It is not hard to picture the nature of it. It lies within our collective grasp, but it will be much harder to reach if we strive for it separately, as we are doing at present. What is perhaps more important, the nature of the settlement, when it ultimately comes, is likely to be less satisfactory for European countries if they have not had the effective say in it which a co-ordination of our policies could give.
We have heard mention, too, of the problems of the emergent nations, the developing countries of the world. We can help these countries in a great variety of ways, bilaterally and multilaterally, but the aid which we are giving to the poor countries of the world would be so much more effective and the influence of Europe in those countries so much more marked if our efforts were better co-ordinated. Europe's very capacity to give aid would be enhanced if her own prosperity were growing, as we believe it would be in a wider Common Market.
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There are many other examples that I could give of the way in which the voice of Europe could be heard in the world if we could get towards greater political integration and unity. It is not necessary to look any further back than last June and the crisis in the Middle East to find a case where Western Europe should have been able to act together in a common interest, but where instead we were in disarray. The result was that, by and large, as the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, pointed out in his speech, we were impotent in influencing events. The Government therefore see the widening of the Common Market, to include ourselves and other Western European countries, as the means of bring about this closer political unity. That was the primary motive behind our decision to apply for membership of the Communities.
Your Lordships will also be aware of the technological advantages which the Government expect would flow from their membership. I agree entirely with the point the noble Earl made that these are not advantages simply to us; we are not going into this simply as an exercise in self-interest. These are advantages that would flow to everyone in Europe. They flow, I believe, from the fact that we have a great technological potential which we can offer to Europe; and I believe the advantages are clearly understood among the other Governments and Parliaments of Western Europe. They are as keen to realise these advantages as we are. This was demonstrated very clearly in the debate about European unity, which I was glad to be able to attend in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe last September. There is, I believe, increasing concern in Europe about the future of those of its industries which, though they have a high rate of expansion, also demand substantial forward investment in research and development and, consequently, expanding home markets in which they can be sure of finding customers. These are the industries of the future, and without the prospect of a wider market it is difficult to see how they will be able to survive in Europe and, what is more important, how they will be able to survive under European control.
These are, quite briefly and hurriedly, the basic reasons for the initiative which

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the Government have taken. The problems of Europe's political and technical future are, I believe, real and are recognised by all informed opinion. Those who are opposed to the idea of Britain accepting the Treaty of Rome and joining the Common Market all too often forget that if they condemn our policy the onus is on them to propose another way of solving these problems which will be equally effective. Alternative solutions exist. We have never denied that. But we firmly believe, as I believe noble Lords opposite do, that none of them would be as advantageous and beneficial for us, for Europe and, indeed, for the world as the course we have chosen to embark upon.
Your Lordships' House fully endorsed the Government's decision to apply for membership, and I was glad to hear both the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, and the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, repeat and endorse that support to-day. The decision was taken in full knowledge of all the difficulties that we were likely to encounter. I may say that in the interval which has passed between the submission of our application and today's debate, no difficulty has arisen which we had not foreseen, nor have any of the difficulties turned out to be greater than we estimated.
From the outset the Six decided to treat our application in strict conformity with the Treaty of Rome, and in particular with Article 237 under which we made our application. Here it might perhaps be appropriate to say a brief word on the subject which the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, raised about what went on when the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary visited Paris. I think it is quite simple to say that the French said then, and they say now, that there will be no veto. They emphasised then, as they emphasise now, the gravity of the problems involved for our entry. We believe these problems to be soluble in negotiations. General de Gaulle has said at his Paris Press Conference, "Pas question de veto". Couve de Murville is reported by the Press after his meeting in Luxembourg as having said in the Council that there was no objection in principle to British entry. I think it is fair and safe to say that it was this picture that my right honourable friends the
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Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary brought back from Paris.
It has, of course, now become clear that there is difficulty about agreeing on the opening of negotiations. When it became clear that they could not be opened before the Summer Recess, your Lordships will recall that the Foreign Secretary made a statement in the Council of Western European Union on July 4 in which he set out the case for British membership and the major issues on which we sought to negotiate. The purpose of this statement was to help the Ministerial Council of the Community in their consideration of our application, and to help the Commission of the E.E.C. in preparing their "opinion" on the application, which they are required to produce under the appropriate Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome. This "opinion" the Commission duly produced on September 30. When your Lordships consider the complexity and importance of the subject with which they dealt, I think you will agree that the Commission, under their new President M. Jean Rey, did extremely well to complete their work in that short time, especially as most of the work was done in the month of August, a month in which, particularly on the Continent, people are accustomed to take their annual holiday.
This Report, the advice or "opinion" of the Commission, deals with all the applications for membership which are before the E.E.C. Council; and this means not only our own, but the applications of Denmark, Norway and the Republic of Ireland. This "opinion" was on the Agenda of the Council of Ministers of the Common Market for the first time immediately after it was received; that is to say, on October 2 and 3, though the first substantial discussion of it took place at the Council's next meeting—and this, indeed, was their last meeting—on October 23 and 24; and it will be discussed again when the Council meet on November 20. This "opinion" is an internal document, a document between the Commission and the Governments of the Six, and there is no call, nor would it be appropriate, for Her Majesty's Government to take a position on it. However, it has, as your Lordships will know, been published, and there are just one or two interesting features of it to which

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I should like to draw your Lordships' attention.
The Report is a helpful document. It is helpful in that it comes down firmly in favour of the enlargement of the Community. It recognises that this might entail certain risks for the future progress of the Community towards economic union, but it recommends workable safeguards to ensure that progress is maintained. The Report concludes that, provided new members can accept the Treaties of Rome and Paris—the Treaty of Paris being that dealing with the Coal and Steel Community—the objectives of political union and the substance of decisions taken under the Treaties, the new members would reinforce the Community without altering its character and methods. The statement which my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary made in The Hague on July 4 made it sufficiently clear that we can agree completely with this conclusion.
In the context of future relations between the widened Community and third countries, the Commission take the view that any adverse effects on trade which might result from the widening of the Community would be more than offset by the very rapid expansion of the economies of the member countries, and therefore of their trade with third countries. With this, too, we agree. The section on financial and economic problems, however, takes a different view—we think an unduly gloomy view—of the future of the British economy and of the future of sterling as a reserve currency. As this subject was brought up in some detail in your Lordships' House this afternoon, perhaps I may take a few minutes to explain our point of view on these two topics.
It is quite natural, we agree, that the Six should now want to consider carefully how sterling as a world currency could best be fitted into the monetary and economic pattern of Europe. The world monetary system is not a static thing: it is constantly evolving. New assets are developed—for example, the new special drawing rights, on which agreement was reached recently in Rio de Janeiro. Cooperation between monetary authorities grows closer. Sterling as an international reserve and commercial trading currency is a part of the world monetary system, and any major change in its
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functions would have implications for the monetary system as a whole. But the role of sterling itself is not a static thing, either. The sterling area system has evolved over the period since the war, and the process of change will continue, whether or not we join the European Economic Community.
There seems to be an idea in some quarters that the international role of sterling is something we cling to as a matter of prestige, privilege. I do not believe it is a matter of prestige, and although it brings us certain benefits it certainly brings us burdens as well. The mere fact that the functions of sterling are rather different from those of Continental currencies—although I think it worth noting that within the franc zone the French franc plays a similar role, although to a more limited extent—does not seem to us any reason why it should not be integrated into the European economic system. The question now is whether the Community wishes to take advantage of our application to join it to propel the monetary evolution in a particular direction, and so gain greater influence for the Community as a whole. But in discussing the international role of sterling, I think there are a few important points which should be remembered but which are sometimes, unfortunately, overlooked. I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, that Her Majesty's Government have certainly not overlooked them.
First, the international financial community has nothing to gain from any attack on a particular national currency. The object, in all our interests, must be to strengthen rather than to weaken the system. Secondly, sterling is an international currency, for the very simple reason that Governments, bankers, and traders all over the world choose to use sterling. Its use has developed with the growth of world trade. It follows that, even if it were agreed—and it is still very far from having been agreed—that there should be a reduction in the use of sterling as a reserve currency, it would then be necessary to decide who should share Britain's role as a world banker. This is a problem that cannot be brushed lightly aside. Finally, it is necessary always to bear in mind that the future of sterling is not a matter which can be disposed of without consulting the present

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holders of sterling and safeguarding their rights.
But none of this, my Lords, need prevent us from discussing with the Six the aspects of this subject that seem to cause them concern. We think it entirely reasonable that we should do so when the negotiations for our entry begin, on the assumption that the discussion will be approached in a constructive and European spirit and that the objectives will be realistic. It would, for example, be unrealistic to suppose that arrangements involving a substantial change in sterling's international role could be worked out satisfactorily in a short space of time. The Rio Agreement took four years to work out, after all, and even now it is not in its final form. This is a rough measure of the size of the question we would be discussing here.
In the Government's view, then, the sterling balances do not present a problem which needs to be settled before Britain enters the Common Market. We are also very willing to take part in a discussion with the Community on the prospects of the British economy as a whole.
LORD GRANTCHESTER: My Lords, before the noble Lord passes from the role of sterling, would he give his opinion on the question I asked: whether this can be discussed in isolation without involving the other reserve currency?
LORD CHALFONT: My Lords, I thought I made the point that this is not a matter that could be discussed in isolation. If the noble Lord is referring to the Government's comments on Article 108 of the Treaty, I would remind him that we said at an early stage in this debate (I am talking now of the international debate) that we would not invoke Article 108 of the Treaty of Rome. This undertaking was made in the light of the discussions which my right honourable friends, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, took part in in the capitals of the Six.
LORD GRANTCHESTER: My Lords, that was not my point. The question involves the other reserve currency.
LORD CHALFONT: My Lords, as I explained at the beginning of this section
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of my remarks, we realise that this question of the role of sterling is a complex one which cannot be settled overnight. What we say is that all these matters, including the point raised by the noble Lord, must be discussed in a quiet atmosphere, and in the atmosphere of international diplomacy, secret diplomacy, and not of public debate.
LORD GRANTCHESTER: My Lords, it involves the Americans and the International Monetary Fund.
LORD CHALFONT: My Lords, I take the noble Lord's point. As I say, these and other matters must all be discussed when we are discussing the role of sterling I entirely agree. I apologise. I thought the noble Lord was referring to his comments on Article 108 of the Treaty of Rome.
As I was saying, we are also willing to take part in a discussion on the general economy. We have always said that it was our intention to enter the Community only when we had secured a healthy economy and a strong balance of payments. This remains our position, and we have taken, as everyone will be aware, measures to ensure that there could be no doubts on the score of the health of our economy. These measures have already had a considerable effect. I think I must make the point that it must in any event be some time—what with the period of negotiation of our entry, the period of ratification, and the transitional periods which we should seek to negotiate for our entry—before there would be any question of our entry having effective consequences for the Community.
My Lords, one of the brighter aspects of events since our application was submitted has been the growing evidence of massive support for it. I have already mentioned the debate in the Council of Europe Assembly in which I took part. This left no room for doubt about the views of the great majority of that Assembly. They are eager, even impatient, to see us in the Community, and they are as confident as we are that the problems, the real problems, involved can be solved, given the political will.
The Commission's Report, to which I have already referred, with its constructive approach to the whole question of

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enlarging the Community, gives further evidence of the support we can expect. The Report was discussed on October 23 and 24 in the Council of Ministers of the Six, and there, too, there was strong and solid support for us. The visit to this country of the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, referred to by the noble Baroness, was a visit which happened to coincide with the meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Common Market. It provided a useful opportunity for a full discussion of the issues, and we found that discussion most encouraging. Her Majesty's Government are most grateful for the support which we have received, and which we continue to receive, from the Federal Republic and from other members of the Community.
I said at the beginning that I thought your Lordships would want me to say something about the events of the past few days and about the reports which have appeared regarding our Common Market policy. Let me begin by making it quite clear, in case there are any doubts in people's minds—and there seem to be—that I do not regard this as a Press conspiracy or as an anti-Common Market plot. In fact, I do not regard it as a conspiracy or a plot of any kind. In so far as there have been misunderstandings, I should like to say that for my part I bear no malice towards anybody involved in this unfortunate affair; and it is certainly not for me to try to pass judgment on how newspapers do their job. Therefore, with your Lordships' indulgence, I do not propose to enter into any unproductive jobbing-back or recrimination. I should just like to put the record straight by stating clearly and unambiguously my own position in this matter. I am, of course—and this scarcely needs saying—committed without reservation to the policy of Her Majesty's Government. That is a policy with which everyone in this House will be familiar.
I believe strongly, as I have said many times in public, that Britain's future lies in Europe; and the first step towards that
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future is that Britain should join the Common Market. This is no time to waver in our determination to pursue those policies, which I am confident will be successful. Britain is a part of Europe, and it would be foolish of me or of anyone else to suggest that we should just turn our backs on Europe, or threaten to do so, for some doubtful reason of tactics.
In this situation we see no reason whatsoever to conclude (and this point was made by the noble Lords, Lord Gladwyn and Lord Carrington) that we should contemplate any alternatives to membership of the E.E.C. in the expectation of being excluded from it. We know that these alternatives exist, and we have always said so—indeed, the noble Earl has underlined this point this evening. But I should like to make it clear again that we believe these alternatives to be second best. Our purpose is to enter, and thereby to strengthen and develop, the European Communities. As my right honourable friends the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary have emphasised in another place, that remains, and will remain, our purpose: our application for membership is in, and it will stay in.
Naturally we should have liked more rapid progress on our application since it was submitted last May, and we had hoped that by now negotiations could have begun. This is because we believe—and the Commission's report, coupled with the views of so many of our potential partners in the Six, strongly reinforce this belief—that the best way to resolve these difficulties is to discuss and negotiate about them. As a concluding word, perhaps I may say that we are ready for such negotiations now, and we confidently believe that they will be successful.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, I beg to move that this debate be now adjourned until Tuesday next.
Moved, That the debate be adjourned until Tuesday next.—(Earl Jellicoe.)
Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.

CITY OF LONDON (VARIOUS POWERS) BILL [H.L.]
The CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES acquainted the House, That (pursuant to the Resolution of October 24 last) the Bill had been deposited in the Private Bill Office, together with the declaration of the Agent: Bill presented, and read 1a, and pro forma read 2a, and committed to a Select Committee; Bill reported from the Select Committee with Amendments and, pro forma, read 3a, and sent to the Commons.

EPPING FOREST (WATERWORKS CORNER) BILL [H.L.]
The CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES acquainted the House, That (pursuant to the Resolution of July 21 last) the Bill had been deposited in the Private Bill Office, together with the declaration of the Agent: Bill presented, and read 1a, and pro forma read 2a, and committed to a Select Committee; Bill reported from the Select Committee with Amendments.
House adjourned at twenty-four minutes past eight o'clock.