Sitting of 7 December 1966

Preamble
The House met at half-past Two o'clock
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]
PRIVATE BUSINESS
  LIVERPOOL CORPORATION BILL
  Lords Amendments considered and agreed to.
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
  WIRELESS AND TELEVISION

    White Paper
    Mr. Stratton Millsasked the Postmaster-General (1) when he will make a statement on the White Paper on Broadcasting;
    (2) what negotiations he has had with the British Broadcasting Corporation to keep the licence fee at £5 until 1968.
    Mr. Evelyn Kingasked the Postmaster-General what progress he has made in his consideration of setting up a Viewers and Listeners Council.
    Mr. Hamlingasked the Postmaster-General whether he will now make a statement on the proposals he will introduce to replace facilities provided by pirate radio stations by balanced programmes of light entertainment to be broadcast under the auspices of a public authority.
    Mr. Ian Gilmourasked the Postmaster-General when he will publish his White Paper on the Government's Broadcasting Policy.
    Sir B. Jannerasked the Postmaster General when it is now intended to produce the White Paper indicating the Government's future policy with regard to sound broadcasting.
    The Postmaster-General (Mr. Edward Short): With permission I will answer this Question and Questions Nos. 2, 8, 12, 23 and 54 together.
    I have nothing to add at present to my reply last week to the hon. Member for Chelmsford (Mr. St. John-Stevas) and other hon. Gentlemen.—[Vol. 737, c. 454.]
    Mr. Stratton Mills: I refer specifically to Question No. 2. Has the right hon. Gentleman studied the Press conference held by Lord Normanbrook and the very different complexion it placed on the then Postmaster-General's remarks of 3rd March? As it is clear that some deal was come to with Lord Normanbrook by the right hon. Gentleman's predecessor to hold the B.B.C. licence fee, would it not be fair that details be given to the House?
    Mr. Short: I quite agree. I have seen press reports of the B.B.C. Press conference on publication of its annual report. The whole of the details of the negotiations with the B.B.C. and the financial arrangements at which we have arrived will appear in the White Paper, which will be out very shortly.
    Mr. Hambling: I thank my right hon. Friend for his courtesy in writing to me on this subject, but may I ask him, in his proposals, to do nothing to upset the public aspect of radio broadcasting?
    Mr. Short: I did give that assurance some time ago to the House and I reaffirm that I shall preserve the public service aspect of sound broadcasting.
    Mr. Gilmour: The right hon. Gentleman has refused to give an assurance that the White Paper will be published before the Bill to deal with pirate radio stations is debated, while the Leader of the House has unequivocally given that assurance. Which Minister are we expected to believe?
    Mr. Short: I am not responsible for what my right hon. Friend says and he is not responsible for what I say. I simply answer questions put to me.
    Mr. Bryan: I know that the Government have had difficulty in forecasting within a year the date of the publication of the White Paper but, as there are only 10 Parliamentary days before Christmas,

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    cannot the right hon. Gentleman name the day?
    Mr. Short: I cannot. Printing is a long process but I assure the hon. Gentleman that I will try to keep my promise. I did not give a specific promise on the subject. I said that I would do my best to get it out before the House rises for Christmas.
    Sir R. Cary: Does not the right hon. Gentleman agree that, even if the B.B.C. licence were raised to £6, it would still be one of the cheapest in the world?
    Mr. Short.

    Pirate Radio Stations
    Mr. Ridsdaleasked the Postmaster-General how many people have either written to or petitioned him on behalf of the pirate radio stations.
    Mr. Edward Short: Over the past few months, I have received about 3,000 letters and 15,000 names on petition forms.
    Mr. Ridsdale: As a lot of these come from outlying areas, what does the Postmaster-General propose to do to help these listeners when the pirate radio stations close down?
    Mr. Short: The hon. Gentleman must await the White Paper. To deal with the contents of the hon. Member's Question, he will be interested to know that one of my hon. Friends recently analysed the names on a petition. The Chartists' Petition paled into insignificance against the fraudulent nature of this petition.
    Mr. O'Malley: Is the Postmaster-General aware that I have had complaints from traders in my constituency, being pestered by representatives of Radio Scarborough, seeking advertising revenue? How much longer are these disreputable people to be allowed to carry on with this?
    Mr. Short: Radio Scarborough is the one about which I read a letter about the Scarborough lifeboat in the House last time I answered a Question on this matter. It is also the one which the hon. Gentleman the Member for Howden (Mr. Bryan) visited, with such a fanfare of trumpets recently.

    Radio Albania
    Mr. Ian Gilmourasked the Postmaster-General what effect Radio Albania is having on the reception of British Broadcasting Corporation sound broadcasts.
    Mr. Edward Short: Radio Albania is causing severe interference after dark to the B.B.C. Light Programme broadcast on 247 metres from the Brookmans Park, Moorside Edge and Newcastle transmitters. It causes somewhat less interference to transmissions on 247 metres from other B.B.C. stations.
    Mr. Gilmour: What steps is the hon. Gentleman taking to ensure that European transmissions do not interfere with broadcasts from this country?
    Mr. Short: We are in a difficulty here, because we have no diplomatic relations with Albania. Any diplomatic approach must be made through the French Government. The Post Office has written to this station on the technical level, but so far we have not received a reply.
    Mr. Rowland: Would my right hon. Friend say why he thinks that some hon. Members opposite are so concerned about interference by Radio Albania and are so little concerned with interference caused by pirate stations about which nine European stations have complaints?
    Mr. Short: The Devil himself knoweth not the mind of the party opposite.

    New Houses (Combined Broadcasting and Telephone Cables)
    Mr. Roebuckasked the Postmaster-General if he will initiate research into the possibility of supplying each new dwelling with a combined telephone, television and radio cable.
    Mr. Edward Short: A scheme using a common cable for broadcast distribution and individual wires for telephone is already being studied, and will be given a trial in a future new town. The possibilities of a combined system such as my hon. Friend suggests, are also being examined as part of our longer term programme.
    Mr. Roebuck: In thanking my right hon. Friend for that Answer—and I yield

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    to no one in my appreciation of his zeal for technological advance—may I ask whether he is in a position to give a date when these things will be put to some practical test?
    Mr. Short: We are at present costing this possibility. It is a very attractive idea. It can do away with all the unsightly television aerials. The one lead will serve for sound broadcasting, television, telephone, the reading of meters, and so on. We intend to try this out in an appropriate new town in the near future. I am sorry that I cannot give a date when it will be done, but we are pressing on with it.
    Mr. Gresham Cooke: Is it necessary to make any lengthy experiments with this system? Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that combined radio and telephone wires have been common practice in Switzerland for years?
    Mr. Short: This is a much more sophisticated one than the Swiss. It is necessary to have a field experiment. The costing is rather more complicated than at first appeared, but we are going into it carefully.

    Television Licences
    Mr. Ellisasked the Postmaster-General what is his estimate of the numbers of people evading the television licence fee in the Bristol area; what percentage this number is of the total number or estimated number of sets in the area; and how this compares with the national numbers.
    Mr. William Hamiltonasked the Postmaster-General what estimate he has made of the number of television sets in Scotland being operated without licences; and what steps he is taking to deal with the culprits.
    Mr. Frank Allaunasked the Postmaster-General if he will introduce legislation requiring wireless and television licences to be produced when television sets are sold or rented.
    Mr. Short: As I told my hon. Friends the Members for South Shields (Mr. Blenkinsop) and The Hartlepools (Mr. Leadbitter) on 16th November, I am discussing with the various trade associations concerned ways of enlisting their mem-
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    bers' help. I intend to bring legislation before Parliament at an early date. I have made no estimates of the number of licence evaders in particular areas. The national number is estimated at 2 million.—[Vol. 736, Col. 127.]
    Mr. Ellis: Will my right hon. Friend, in recognition of the anti-social nature of this offence, take immediate steps to enforce the existing arrangements? Many people are getting an excellent service, and excellent enjoyment, while a rather large selfish minority is getting the service without paying for it, and this should be stopped.
    Mr. Short: I agree about the small selfish minority. The fact is that 12s. of the licence fee goes to make up for what is lost by people avoiding paying for licences. There is no method of enforcing it rigidly at the present time, and I shall very soon bring legislation before the House to deal with this.
    Mr. Hamilton: Can my right hon. Friend say what has been the increase in the last few months in the number of detector vans available, first, in England and Wales, and, secondly, in Scotland? Does not my right hon. Friend think that it would be a sound investment to increase the number still further if this will result in a considerable increase in detection?
    Mr. Short: Yes, Sir. We are at present doubling the number from six to twelve. I am not sure how far we had got and and how many of these are in service.
    Mr. Allaun: Does not my right hon. Friend agree that rental companies should be required immediately to notify the Post Office of their current subscribers? Secondly, does my right hon. Friend agree that contact with retailers could help to avoid £10 million worth of evasion a year, which is most unfair to those who pay their licence fees?
    Mr. Short: I agree with the hon. Member's second point. With regard to the first, this is an idea that we are looking at, and it is probably one that we shall adopt.
    Mr. Kitson: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that many people in my constituency pay their television licence fee but cannot get any reception?
    Mr. Short: This is a perpetual problem which has bothered Governments ever since we have had broadcasting. I understand that the hon. Gentleman has a Question down on the subject.

  POST OFFICE

    Offices (Closing Times)
    Sir D. Gloverasked the Postmaster-General whether post offices in the Liverpool district are to close at 5.30 p.m.; and, in view of the hardship and inconvenience to the residents of Ormskirk and surrounding district, whether he will arrange for some of these offices to stay open until a later hour.
    Mr. Evelyn Kingasked the Postmaster-General why the post office at Swanage is now to close at 4.30 p.m. instead of 5.30 p.m. on Saturdays.
    Mr. Gwilym Robertsasked the Postmaster-General what representations he has received on the recent curtailment of Post Office hours; and if, in view of these representations, he will reconsider these hours.
    Mr. A. Royleasked the Postmaster-General if, in view of the representations he has received, he will reconsider his decision to institute early closing on Saturdays of Richmond Post Office.
    Mr. Edward Short: I have received representations from several hon. Members, local authorities and others.
    The changes in hours are part of the drive we are making to cope with rising costs and manpower problems and I am afraid they must go on. I have looked carefully into the position in Ormskirk, Richmond and Swanage; I am satisfied that the circumstances are not such that I should be justified in making an exception to the new general closing times of 5.30 p.m. Monday to Friday and 4.30 p.m. Saturday. In Liverpool, however, three Post Offices, which are amongst the busiest in the country, are to stay open until 6 p.m. or 6.30 p.m. Monday to Friday: other offices are closing at 5.30 p.m.
    Sir D. Glover: Does the right hon. Gentleman realise that his reply will give great dissatisfaction to a great number of
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    people all over the country? Is he aware that, in the Ormskirk area, there are probably a greater number of salesmen and travellers than anywhere else in the North-West, that they do not finish work until after 5.30 and that to have no postal facilities or post office open presents a great many problems to them? Will he look at this again?
    Mr. Short: The hon. Gentleman will also realise that in most of our operations in the Post Office the ratio of labour costs is very high indeed. Virtually the only way we can economise in many of these services is on labour. That is one of the objectives in these operations. The other, of course, is to make work in the Post Office more attractive to try and get more labour.
    Mr. Evelyn King: Would not the right hon. Gentleman concede that Swanage—and other towns like it—is a special case because its population increases by tens of thousands during the summer while the post office facilities remain the same? If there is a problem will he consider staggering the hours of the staff?
    Mr. Short: I looked into the case of Swanage very carefully but concluded that there is not really a special problem. The post office there is very little used in the last half hour. Indeed, if post offices remained open until 10 p.m. some people would still come in at five minutes to.
    Mr. Boardman: While my right hon. Friend is closing post offices earlier, the Home Secretary is trying to get retail shops to close later. Will these two Ministers get together?
    Mr. Short: I have been into the case of Ince very carefully. The only shop which stays open later than the post office is the local "Co-op". All the other shops close and the "Co-op"—in fairness to the post office workers—closes for another half day when the post office is open, and another whole day when the post office is open. I think that, on balance, we are being fair. The number of people using the post office in the last half hour is 32.
    Mr. Roberts: Is my right hon. Friend aware that this curtailment will cause considerable difficulty to working people?

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    Is he aware that I have had dozens of representations, including some from Luton, Bedford and Leighton Buzzard Councils, about this matter? Would he not agree that expansion must be the keynote of our Government's attitude to the social services and that curtailment and contract ion belong to the party opposite?
    Mr. Short: There is no curtailment or contraction of the services, which are better than they have ever been. All we are doing is to close post offices at a reasonable time because very few people use them in the last half hour.
    Mr. Royle: Will the right hon. Gentleman look at this matter again and reconsider his decision? Is he aware that Richmond has a special case? Is he aware that relations between the general public and the General Post Office are at an all-time low and that this sort of decision does not improve relationships between his Department and its customers?
    Mr. Short: It is quite untrue that re-relationships between the public and the General Post Office are at an all-time low. Relations are extremely good. The number of people who are using the post office at Richmond in the last half-hour of its opening is very small.
    Mr. Bryan: While acknowledging that the Post Office is in exactly the same difficulty with costs as the whole of industry, will the Postmaster-General tell the House whether he considers that the Post Office policy of giving less service at higher prices is in line with the Government's prices and incomes policy?
    Mr. Short: The 400,000 people who work in the Post Office will notice that the hon. Gentleman loses no opportunity to knock them for purely party political purposes. The services of the men and women in the Post Office are quite the best in the world.
    Sir D. Glover: On a point of order. Owing to the unsatisfactory nature of that reply, I propose to raise the matter on the Adjournment.

    Contracts (Development Areas)
    Mr. Dalyellasked the Postmaster-General what general considerations guide him in placing contracts in development areas.
    The Assistant Postmaster-General (Mr. Joseph Slater): That we should give suppliers in development areas preference over others, consistently with our paying no more in total for what we buy.
    Mr. Dalyell: Is there not more scope for relating the considerable purchasing power of the Post Office to the Government's medium-term regional development policy?
    Mr. Slater: The recent extension of the old development district preference scheme to the much bigger development areas is itself a step in that direction, but I cannot see any scope for a further widening of that kind of preference.

    Contracts (Bathgate)
    Mr. Dalyellasked the Postmaster-General what is the value of contracts placed in 1965-66 in the area of the Bathgate Employment Exchange by his Department.
    Mr. Joseph Slater: Two hundred and thirty-three thousand pounds.
    Mr. Dalyell: In view of what Galbraith and others have been saying about relations between the State and industry, will the Post Office consider discussing its long-term needs with those sections of the electronics industry which are still in the planning stage of development in areas such as Bathgate?
    Mr. Slater: I can assure my hon. Friend that we try to keep in touch with our main suppliers about our future needs. If he has in mind any particular firm which we can help in this way, perhaps he will let me know.

    Satellite Communications
    Mr. Martenasked the Postmaster-General what is the Government's policy towards a local and regional satellite communications system on a national and European basis.
    Mr. Edward Short: The Government's policy is based on the concept of a single global system of satellite communication embodied in the Interim Communications Satellite Agreements. All posibilities will, of course, be explored when these agreements are renegotiated, and that will be in 1970.
    Mr. Marten: Does not the right hon. Gentleman realise that unless Britain and Europe have their own independent satellites on a regional or national basis for the purposes of television and telecommunications and so on, Britain will not have the technological capacity to compete when it comes to renegotiating the COMSAT agreement in 1970? Will he look at this matter again and perhaps give the country a strong lead on this issue?
    Mr. Short: We have agreed to cooperate in a preliminary study and design project which is being initiated by C.E.T.S. and undertaken by E.S.R.O.
    Mr. Speaker: Question No. 10. Mr. Winnick.
    Mr. Evelyn King: On a point of order. You have not called my Question No. 8, Mr. Speaker.
    Mr. Speaker: It was answered with Question No. 1.
    Sir Ian Orr-Ewingasked the Postmaster-General what action he is taking to ensure that British industry plays a part in the development of communications satellites and related space activities as recommended in the National Economic Development Council Report on the Electronics Industry.
    Mr. Edward Short: The Post Office is in continuous consultation with British industry about the development of satellite communications and the activities of the Interim Communications Satellite Committee.
    Under Article X of the Agreement for the Interim Arrangements for a Global Commercial communications Satellite system, British industry has the opportunity to quote for studies and for the supply of material.
    Sir Ian Orr-Ewing: Would the right hon. Gentleman press as hard as he can to see that we get a fair share of the international system, because there is a feeling that, in the past, although we have committed lots of funds to this system, we have not had our fair share of contracts. Is he aware that, unless we do get our fair share we cannot possibly play a part in the world satellite communications system for 1970?
    Mr. Short: I think that the hon. Gentleman has a point here. We invest heavily
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    in this programme. Intelsat places contracts with the Post Office and we let them out to industry. This year they amounted to £250,000, which I agree is below our annual investment. Nevertheless, it is a beginning.
    Mr. Bryan: With great respect, Mr. Speaker, may I ask whether or not there has been some mistake? Question No. 8 is about the Viewers and Listeners Council. We have not had any previous Question 'which could be faintly related to it.
    Mr. Speaker: Order. I am not responsible for the grouping of the Answers. The facts are as I have stated.
    Mr. Marten: Reverting to the earlier supplementary question, would the Minister agree that the only way in which we shall really get good contracts from Intelsat is if we have our own national satellite organisation?
    Mr. Short: No. We have gone into this with very great care and, as things are at present and as they will be for many years to come, in a small country like ours it is not an economic proposition.
    Sir Ian Orr-Ewing: In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the reply, I beg to give notice that I shall seek to raise this matter on the Adjournment at the earliest opportunity.

    Submarine Cables (United Kingdom, Portugal and South Africa)
    Mr. Pavittasked the Postmaster-General what will be the final cost of the submarine cable to be laid between England, Portugal and South Africa; and what proportions of the costs will be borne by the other countries.
    Mr. Edward Short: The United Kingdom-Portugal cable will cost about £5 million which we shall bear in full. The Portugal-South Africa cable is a South African project the cost of which will be borne by that country. Exchanges of traffic rights in the two cables will cost us about another £5 million net, for the life of the cables.
    Mr. Pavitt: In view of the help and co-operation which we have given to these two countries in this project which will help their economy, would my right

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    hon. Friend seek some help and co-operation from them in relation to our economy and the problem of Rhodesia?
    Mr. Short: This is not a question for me and it is not related to this Question.

    Letters and Telegrams (Delays)
    Mr. Ridsdaleasked the Postmaster-General how many cases have been brought to his notice recently where the delay in delivering letters and telegrams is causing loss to business and consequently to the export orders.
    Mr. Joseph Slater: Three in the last three months.
    Mr. Ridsdale: Is it really good enough that telegrams or letters of great importance to the country, such as bids of contract, should be lost without anyone assuming either moral responsibility or giving any monetary redress? Is the hon. Gentleman aware that recently one was lost, resulting in a loss of £37,000 in hard currency?
    Mr. Slater: The level of complaint has fallen since last year. The hon. Gentleman's remarks in the latter part of his supplementary question are to do with loss and not delay, which does not enter into this question. Talks are still taking place and I will write to the hon. Gentleman.
    Mr. Bryan: Does the Post Office keep a record of known losses of this type for which is responsible but on the other hand not liable?
    Mr. Slater: What we seek to do, whenever there is a complaint from a Member of Parliament, or from anyone else, is to get details onto a form. The complaint is then investigated and answers given to the questions which arise.
    Mr. Ridsdale: In view of the unsatisfactory nature of this reply, I beg to give notice that I shall seek to raise this matter on the Adjournment at the earliest opportunity.

    Post Office Messengers
    Mr. Hooleyasked the Postmaster-General how many Post Office messengers under the age of 18 years are regularly required to work a six- or seven-day week; what percentage of messengers under 18 years of age this represents;
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    and whether he will give instructions that messengers under the age of 18 years shall not be required to work more than 40 hours in a period of seven days.
    Mr. Joseph Slater: Of 2,958 young postmen, 47 per cent. work a six-day week, none a regular seven-day week. Standard net hours are under 40 a week but some unavoidable weekday and Sunday overtime is worked, volunteers being used as far as possible.
    Mr. Hooley: Would the Minister agree that it is undesirable that young persons should be required to work more than a 40-hour week? Could steps be taken to see that this is not necessary?
    Mr. Slater: We do whatever we can in accordance with the standard hours for young postmen and adults. If my hon. Friend has any complaints in regard to this matter, I will have them investigated if he will send them to me.

    Greeting Telegrams
    Mr. Henry Clarkasked the Postmaster-General what is the cost of the forms and envelopes used for 5s. 6d. and 7s. greeting telegrams, respectively.
    Mr. Joseph Slater: The printing costs, per 1,000 forms and envelopes, are respectively £2 17s. 6d. and £6 15s. 0d.
    Mr. Clark: Does not the cost of the cards represent rather a high profit margin when one is charging a 2s. premium, and is this not one cost of a nationalised industry which should be cut?
    Mr. Slater: No, Sir. The average loss per telegram last year was 4s. It is reasonable that users of this service or the greetings service should pay something near to the economic price.

    Christmas Day
    Mr. John Pageasked the Postmaster-General whether he will give instructions that Post Office telephonists and other employees who work on Sunday 25th December shall be paid at double normal Sunday rates; and what the cost of this would be.
    Mr. Edward Short: No, Sir. Civil Service agreements provide that Christmas day will be treated as a normal Sunday and that staff will benefit from the additional holiday that has been declared.

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    To double the agreed rates of compensation for Post Office staff working on Christmas Day would cost about £60,000.
    Mr. Page: Is the Postmaster-General aware that many people using public services such as the telephone on Christmas Day would like and expect to pay more for those services so as to compensate properly people who are having to work on that day and who are away from their families? Would he consider this again? It happens only once every seven years.
    Mr. Short: So far as the public are concerned, I am following the practice of previous years and appealing to them to make their telephone calls before Christmas Eve. We are charging the normal rate for operator calls during the three days, and I hope that the public will co-operate to lighten the burden of the Post Office. The pay is reached by agreement with the staff associations and, for the overtime grades, the rate is time and a half.
    Mr. Manuel: Can my right hon. Friend tell the House whether he has discussed these questions with the appropriate trade unions? Would he take care to see that relations with the unions are not destroyed by private enterprise of this kind?
    Mr. Short: There are two agreements, the Civil Service agreement for Christmas Day, which is paid as an ordinary Sunday, and the staff association agreements as to how one pays people for Sundays, and these two are binding.

    "Buy British" Postmark
    Mr. Biggs-Davisonasked the Postmaster-General why he will not assist the sale of British products and the balance of payments by instituting a "Buy British" postmark.
    Mr. Edward Short: The Government welcome action by industry to emphasise the merits of British products, but they do not consider that a "Buy British" postmark would help in this process. Successful advertising has to be directed at the sales of particular products. The institution of an undirected postmark of this kind would, we believe, not be very productive.

    Letter Packets
    Mr. Eldon Griffithsasked the Postmaster-General to what extent it is his policy that letter packets, paid at letter rate, should be included with parcels for delivery.
    Mr. Joseph Slater: When, because of weight or bulk, it is not practicable to deliver large or heavy packets on letter deliveries, they are usually diverted to parcel deliveries.
    Mr. Griffiths: Does not this mean that, while people pay the higher charges for letter delivery, the letters are not arriving at their destination except by the very much slower parcel post? Do not the public have some reason for objecting to a practice whereby they pay for something which they are not getting?
    Mr. Slater: I do not agree with the hon. Gentleman. They are conveyed in the same mails as letters, but there are limits to what the letter postman can carry on deliveries. If packets have to be excluded—I take it that the hon. Gentleman would not like that, especially since he represents a rural area; we seek to give service to people in outlying districts—it is surely sensible to deliver them by the next delivery of parcels.

    Sub-Post Offices
    Mr. Peter Millsasked the Postmaster-General (1) what steps he will take to improve the financial position of small sub-post offices so that the facilities of rural post offices can be maintained;
    (2) if he will give an assurance that, when his Department carry out reorganisation of sub-post offices and their work, he will take full account of the social benefits of these offices.
    Mr. Joseph Slater: Sub-postmasters' remuneration is based on the amount of Post Office business they transact, subject to minimum payments at the smallest offices. The level of payment is reviewed at intervals in conjunction with the National Federation of Sub-Postmasters, subject to Government policy on prices and incomes. I can assure the hon. Member that, when considering the matters he mentions, we take full account of the social benefits of sub-post offices.
    Mr. Mills: The small increases which these people have received over the last few years do nothing to help them in their present position, with very rapidly rising costs. Would the Assistant Postmaster-General bear in mind thta postmen are being transferred to main offices and that this reduces the financial return to the sub-post offices very considerably? Would he also bear in mind that the social benefits of sub-post offices are of tremendous value in stopping the depopulation of our villages?
    Mr. Slater: We shall bear the latter part of the hon. Gentleman's supplementary question in mind when the talks are continued. But let me remind him when he talks about the rate of sub-postmasters' remuneration that over the last two years there has been a 12 per cent. increase with a further increase of about 10 per cent. for sub-postmasters responsible for sorting and the delivery of mail. This includes the cost of accommodation for necessary staff and other expenses involved in running the sub-post office.
    Dr. Winstanley: In the light of the hon. Gentleman's reply to the supplementary question and the Postmaster-General's Answer to the Question on Post Office hours, may I ask whether the Postmaster. General will press ahead with the provision of Post Office vending machines and the expansion of their scope to provide for people who cannot visit post offices either in places where or at times when they are available?
    Hon. Members: No.
    Mr. Sater: It would appear that the hon. Gentleman's supplementary question does not meet with the approval of the House. His observations will be given every consideration.

    Parcel Post
    Mr. Kenneth Lewisasked the Postmaster-General what changes have taken place in the parcel rate since October, 1964; and whether he will consider introducing a special reduced rate for the Christmas perod.
    Mr. Edward Short: There were general increases in inland parcel rates on 17th May, 1965, and 3rd October this year. But also on October 3rd the rate for
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    parcels weighing up to 1½ lb. was reduced and new rates for local parcels, at 1s. less than those for other parcels, were introduced. I am sorry that I cannot introduce reduced rates for the Christmas period.
    Mr. Lewis: Does the Postmaster-General realise that at Christmas a very large number of parcels are not local? Does he also realise that the cost of being Santa Claus through the Post Office is now very prohibitive and that he is getting to the point of no return? There is a reducing use of this service because the cost of sending a parcel is almost as much as the cost of the gift. Cannot the right hon. Gentleman do something about this?
    Mr. Short: Being Santa Claus always was a difficult and expensive operation. We should lose £1.3 million if we were to put the prices back to what they were before 3rd October. As it is, the inland parcel service will just about break even this year.
    Sir R. Cary: The burden of the substantial increase in the parcel post charge whereby a parcel which previously cost 5s. 6d. now costs 7s. 6d. to send is fairly onerous. Is not this completely out of line with the Government's policy of keeping prices stable?
    Mr. Short: We had a debate on this in the House some weeks ago. The choice is quite simple. The hon. Gentleman understands the financing of the Post Office. We plough back all our profits and borrow the rest from the Exchequer. Therefore, if we do not make a profit over the counter the cost has to be paid for by the taxpayer in some other way.
    Mr. Fisherasked the Postmaster-General if he is aware of the poor parcel post service; and what proposals he has to improve this.
    Mr. Bryanasked the Postmaster-General if he will employ an independent professional agency to make regular surveys of postal deliveries for the information of the public.
    Mr. Edward Short: The parcel post service is not as good as I would like it to be, but it is better than last year. During September and October this year, 79·2 per cent. and 78·9 per cent., respectively, of the traffic was delivered by the

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    next day but one after posting: this compares with 78·1 per cent. and 72·3 per cent. last year. In collaboration with British Railways, we are continuing our efforts to improve the service.
    With regard to the employment of an independent professional agency, I am satisfied that the regular monthly statistics we obtain from our main delivery offices in the country already give us a fully representative and statistically accurate picture.
    Mr. Fisher: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that I have sent his Parliamentary Secretary some constituency complaints on this matter which have so far produced no improvement, including one example of a parcel which took eight days to travel 15 miles? Can he hold out some prospect of a quicker service than this in future?
    Mr. Short: As I have said all along, we are quite willing to look at valid criticisms, and I think that this is a valid criticism. If I recall aright the case raised by the hon. Member, this parcels traffic has to come through Waterloo, where there has been great difficulty with regard to portering staff. I think, however, that this has now been put right and we are hoping for a considerable improvement. We have been in discussion with the railways about it.
    Mr. Bryan: Is the Postmaster-General aware that to many people there seems to be a great discrepancy between his statistics on postal delivery efficiency and the experience of the public? Would it not increase the confidence of the public and be fairer to the right hon. Gentleman's own staff if he were to employ an independent agency to make regular public announcements on their surveys from month to month?
    Mr. Short: We have a first-rate statistics and business centre in the Post Office. I offered to the hon. Member last time I answered Questions—and I renew this offer and extend it to any hon. Member who cares to come—to show him the centre and explain how the work is done. I am sure that if the hon. Member were to see the care with which it is done and the modern techniques which are used, he would have a great deal more confidence in it.

    Sub-Postmasters (Contracts)
    Mr. Iremongerasked the Postmaster-General what changes he proposes in the standard form of contract with sub-postmasters, with special reference to their liability to assault and robbery.
    Mr. Joseph Slater: No such changes are envisaged. Our security advisers are in constant consultation with representatives of the sub-postmasters on ways and means of improving safeguards against robbery with violence.
    Mr. Iremonger: That is all very well, but could the hon. Gentleman say what representations have been made to him by the sub-postmasters and what answer he has given to their National Federation?
    Mr. Slater: Representations have been made through the organisation of the sub-postmasters. Whenever there is an opportunity for us to assist them in security—and we have done much in this respect—we take it.
    Sir C. Osborne: About a year ago I was promised that new steps would be taken to protect the sub-postmasters, especially in rural areas, who has been subject to these violent attacks. Is the hon. Gentleman satisfied with the action which has been taken subsequently?
    Mr. Slater: The hon. Gentleman is quite right: he did raise this matter. As a result of the publicity given to what happened at one sub-post office, talks were immediately set in motion at my instruction between our people and the Sub-Postmasters' Federation.

    Advertising Literature
    Dr. Dunwoodyasked the Postmaster-General what estimate he has made of the loss of income to the Post Office as the result of British-based companies posting advertising literature to British addresses from abroad.
    Mr. Joseph Slater: It would be difficult to put a figure on the loss of revenue, but if the reason for such postings is to economise in postage my right hon. Friend has powers to refuse to deliver them. We keep constant watch on the position and will not hesitate to refuse to handle these postings if we feel such action is justified.
    Dr. Dunwoody: While thanking my hon. Friend for that reply, may I ask whether he would not agree that this practice not only causes a loss of revenue to the Post Office but also has an adverse effect on our balance of payments, and that at this time of economic crisis this practice by British-based companies is completely irresponsible? Could not my hon. Friend consider taking some further actions?
    Mr. Slater: I agree with the sentiments expressed by my hon. Friend. As I have indicated, we have powers which enable us to refuse to handle any material posted by these British firms abroad to addresses in this country if their intention is solely to save on postage, but in no case that we have taken up have we been satisfied that where postage was saved, that was the sole reason for posting abroad.
    Mrs. Knight: Would not the hon. Gentleman accept that if British-based companies are posting literature from abroad because the service is better or the cost is lower, the answer is not to introduce legislation to stop the practice, but to improve the service in this country?
    Mr. Slater: That may be the view of the hon. Lady and of hon. Members opposite, but we must in all circumstances look after the interest of our services in this country.

    Inland Post (Shotguns)
    Mr. McNamaraasked the Postmaster-General what regulations cover the dispatch of shotguns by post.
    Mr. Joseph Slater: Provided they come within the normal weight and size limits, are unloaded and adequately packed, shotguns are admissible in the inland post.
    Mr. McNamara: Would not my hon. Friend agree that in view of the publicity about the ease of getting shotguns, the sale of them by mail order stores should be stopped?
    Mr. Slater: I know that this matter has received publicity, but I must remind my hon. Friend that the question of measures for controlling the availability of firearms is a matter for my right hon. Friend the Home secretary.

  TELEPHONE SERVICE

    Exchange Equipment (Supply)
    Mr. Martenasked the Postmaster-General if he will make a statement on the availability and supply of telephone exchange equipment.
    Mr. Hamlingasked the Postmaster-General whether he is satisfied that telephone equipment from private contractors is being delivered to his Department within the time limits agreed in the contracts; and whether he will make a statement.
    Mr. Edward Short: Over the last two years Post Office requirements for telephone exchange equipment have more than doubled and many contract delivery dates are not being met because of lack of capacity in the industry. Output is being stepped up as quickly as possible, but it will be some time before the accumulated backlog is overcome.
    Mr. Marten: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that this lack of equipment is a great handicap to the efficiency of towns which are expanding? Can he give an assurance that when equipment is available, it will be supplied not only to make up the backlog, but also to cater for a reasonable forward amount?
    Mr. Short: As I have pointed out before, the trouble—and I do not think that anybody is to blame for this—is that in the 1950s forecasting of demand and capacity of the industry was inadequate. Forecasting the demand for telephones 10 years ahead is one of the most difficult things of all. Basically, that is the difficulty. We are taking everything which the industry can produce, but we are in difficulty. Out of 1,250 contracts, 900 are behind delivery date now, but the industry is co-operating and is doing its best to step up output.
    Mr. Hamling: Is my right hon. Friend telling the House that the last Government signally failed to meet the rising demand for telephones?
    Mr. Short: I try to be fair and objective about these things, but in forecasting telephone demand a decade ahead many social, economic and other factors are involved and it is an extremely difficult exercise. We are now trying to put this

    1347
    position right and trying to have in hand some surplus capacity for the years ahead.
    Mr. Bryan: Can the right hon. Gentleman say to what extent supplies may increase when the bulk supply agreements lapse in 1968? Will new firms come in?
    Mr. Short: We should be clear about this. Only two bulk agreements still exist, one for apparatus and one for exchange equipment. I have already announced that we are ending the apparatus agreement and going over to completely free competitive tendering. However, with the supply of exchange equipment the position is very different. We are taking everything the industry can produce and, obviously, competitive tendering would not be appropriate in this case. We are considering what to put in place of the present agreement when it ends in 1968.
    Mr. Bob Brown: Will my right hon. Friend consider seeking powers to enable him to establish factories in development areas for the Post Office to produce this type of equipment itself?
    Mr. Short: I ask my hon. Friend to await the White Paper on the status of the Post Office which will have something important to say in this respect.

    Waiting List (Croydon)
    Mr. Winnickasked the Postmaster-General what is the position of the waiting list for telephones in the Croydon area; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Joseph Slater: 1,096 were awaiting service at 31st October not counting orders under inquiry or being met. About 400 should be connected next month, and the remainder during the early months of 1968.
    Mr. Winnick: Can anything be done to speed up the supply of telephones due in 1968? That would be most appreciated in Croydon. Is my hon. Friend aware that I am most grateful for the action taken locally about a compassionate case of mine?
    Mr. Slater: I am aware of my hon. Friend's interest in this matter from con-
    1348
    versations which I have had with him about it, but I regret that at the moment there cannot be any acceleration. The shortage of exchange equipment is a national and not a local problem.

    Subscriber Trunk Dialling
    Mr. Wolrige-Gordonasked the Postmaster-General what redress is open to members of the general public when, owing to congestion or some other technical reason, they are unable to get through to the required number by dialling subscriber trunk dialling.
    Mr. Joseph Slater: Customers who do not get through at the first attempt are advised to wait a few minutes and then dial again. Alternatively, the operator can be asked to control the call or to assist in case of difficulty.
    Mr. Wolrige-Gordon: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that when this happened the public is affected in two ways: first, by the inconvenience of their getting their S.T.D. call at all, and, secondly, by the higher charges involved in employing the operator? May we be assured that in Aberdeenshire, anyway, from this month on the necessary circuits will be completed to put an end to this delay and difficulty for people?
    Mr. Slater: I am sorry that some customers encounter these difficulties which are primarily due to congestion because of the tremendous increase in the number of calls since S.T.D. was introduced. But, as the hon. Gentleman knows, operator-controlled trunk calls are charged on the basis of a minimum of three minutes and they are more expensive to handle than subscribed trunk dialled calls. Therefore, we cannot make any concession to the customer who seeks to make a call via the operator.
    Mr. Bryan: Is the hon. Gentleman able to report on the findings of the questionnaire on the telephone service sent out to 1,500 firms on 4th November and say whether, when there is a report, it will be publicised?
    Mr. Slater: If the hon. Gentleman puts down a Question on that point, I will seek to give him an answer.

  HOUSE OF COMMONS

    New Palace Yard (Cars)
    Mr. Wingfield Digbyasked the Lord President of the Council whether he is aware that parking in New Palace Yard would be facilitated if Members did not lock their cars; and if he will seek to make arrangements for cars there to be left unlocked.
    The Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons (Mr. Richard Crossman): Yes, Sir. It occasionally becomes necessary for the police to move cars in New Palace Yard, and this is hampered if Members lock their cars when parking them. I hope Members will assist by leaving their cars unlocked and by removing valuables.
    Mr. Digby: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that parking is becoming increasingly difficult for Members in New Palace Yard, and in the precincts, too, particularly at peak hours, and that anything that can be done to facilitate it will be welcome to many hon. Members?
    Mr. Crossman: I am grateful to the hon. Member for giving me the chance of reminding other hon. Members of the inconvenience that is caused by this action.
    Mr. Pannell: Will my right hon. Friend think again about this? Leaving cars unlocked in New Palace Yard is not a good idea. The hon. Member for Surbiton (Mr. Fisher) once had a car taken out with his dog in it, my hon. Friend the Member for Brixton (Mr. Lipton) once had his car taken away, and I know of cars that have been—
    Mr. Speaker: Order. Will the hon. Member ask his question?
    Mr. Pannell: I do not know whether my right hon. Friend is aware of this. Is he also aware that souvenir hunters have taken away the House of Commons badges on more than one occasion? This sort of thing—
    Mr. Speaker: Order. That is long enough to answer.
    Mr. Crossman: My hon. Friend's awareness differs from mine. I am aware of agreeing with the hon. Member for Dorset, West (Mr. Wingfield Digby) that cars should be left unlocked in New Palace Yard.

    Members (Telephone Calls)
    Mr. Milneasked the Lord President of the Council whether he will make arrangements for telephone calls to Members of Parliament to be received and messages taken at a time earlier in the day than present arrangements permit.
    Mr. Crossman: The Members' Telephone Room is manned by G.P.O. staff from 9 a.m. to the Rising of the House on every sitting day. Throughout these hours telephone calls are received and messages taken for Members of Parliament. These hours are considered to be adequate.
    Mr. Milne: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the hour of 9 o'clock seems to be inaccurate, because numerous messages have been taken before 10 o'clock and the callers have been told that nothing can be done with messages for Members before 10 a.m.? Will my right hon. Friend look more closely into the matter?
    Mr. Crossman: I anticipated my hon. Friend's question. The trouble may be due to the fact that the letter board is manned from 10 a.m. and the telephones from 9 a.m. If hon. Members approach the telephone side, they will get all the help they can from there with messages received between 9 and 10 o'clock. I am grateful for the opportunity of announcing this service to hon. Members.

    Aviation (Questions to Ministers)
    Mr. Rankinasked the Lord President of the Council if he will give an assurance that a Minister responsible for aviation matters will answer Questions on Wednesdays as at present.
    Mr. Crossman: Civil aviation Questions are answered by my right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade. Until the Ministry of Aviation is absorbed into the Ministry of Technology, other aviation Questions will be dealt with on Wednesdays as at present.
    Mr. Rankin: That is quite satisfactory. As my right hon. Friend knows, I have been trying to meet him to have a talk on this matter. Could he spare the time to discuss the future of this matter with those of us on this side of the House who are interested in it?
    Mr. Crossman: Yes, I am always willing and anxious to discuss all questions with my hon. Friend. I remind him, however, that we try to compile the roster in very careful consultation with all sides of the House. I am satisfied that when we shift aviation should shift with technology. I foresee no difficulty arising from it.
    Mr. R. Carr: Will the Lord President take into account the fact that part of aviation has been transferred to the Board of Trade? Does he realise that there is a fairly heavy log jam of Questions to the President of the Board of Trade? Is there a possibility of the President having a second day for Questions?
    Mr. Crossman: I will certainly consider that.

  LEGAL AID ACT, 1964
  Mr. Fletcher-Cookeasked the Attorney-General how much of the fund of £48,000 set aside under the Legal Aid Act, 1964, to satisfy the costs of non-legally aided persons engaged in litigation with legally-aided persons, was paid out in 1965 and 1966, respectively.
  The Attorney-General (Sir Elwyn Jones): £216 in 1965 and £117 to 30th November, 1966.
  Mr. Fletcher-Cooke: Do not these tiny figures show that the good purpose of the Act is being defeated in its operation? Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman consider amending the Act to allow more to get through, because otherwise it will become a dead letter?
  The Attorney-General: The main reason for the smallness of the figures is, I think, the very large success of legally-aided proceedings. But the provisions of the law certainly are restrictive. They have to be construed by the courts. My noble Friend will gladly look at them in the light of what the hon. Member has said.
  Mr. Hooson: Can the Attorney-General say how many applications were made under these heads and how many were refused?
  The Attorney-General: Not without notice.

  JUSTICES OF THE PEACE (QUESTIONNAIRE)
  Mr. Huntasked the Attorney-General what consultations he had on the terms of the instructions recently issued to the South-East London Area Advisory Committee regarding inquiries into the personal and business background of justices of the peace within the area; and by what authority a questionnaire was sent to justices asking them to state, among other things, their political views.
  The Attorney-General: The consultations between my noble friend the Lord Chancellor and his Advisory Committees are confidential. He has, however, authorised me to say that, to assist him in implementing his policy that justices should be drawn from all sections of the community and represent all shades of opinion, he, like his predecessors since 1948, has asked his advisory committees to inform him of the political complexion of the benches in their respective areas, so that there should be no undue preponderance drawn from any one political party. It was for this purpose that the Advisory Committee for South-East London, which was only set up in 1965 when Greater London was established has approached the existing justices in its areas.
  Mr. Hunt: Is the Attorney-General aware that while we all accept the need for justices to be drawn from all sections of the community, a political test of this kind is totally irrelevant to the administration of justice in this country and is highly undesirable, and will he therefore now give instructions for the withdrawal of this offensive questionnaire which is deeply resented by many magistrates in the Bromley area and elsewhere?
  The Attorney-General: Certainly not, Sir. The Lord Chancellor, in his circular to advisory committees, has said that he cannot emphasise too often or too emphatically that the first and much the most important consideration in the selection and appointment of justices is that the candidate should be personally suitable on points of character, integrity and understanding and should be generally recognised as such by those among whom they live and work. Nevertheless, my

  1353
  noble Friend has faithfully carried out the recommendation of the Royal Commissions of 1910 and 1948 that justices should be drawn from all sections of the population, and that steps should be taken to ensure that no unfair preponderance is given to any particular party. Hitherto it would seem that a preponderance has been given to a particular party.
  Mr. Orme: Would not my right hon. and learned Friend agree that this has happened under previous Tory Administration, and is it not better that it is known openly what are the political affiliations of the applicants?
  The Attorney-General: I should have thought that to achieve fairness, and in the interests of justice, the steps taken are reasonable.
  Sir J. Hobson: Will the Attorney-General draw a distinction between the problem of appointing new justices—I agree with everything that he said about that—and the very unjustified practice of asking justices who have already been appointed to state their political views? Would not he agree that the politics of those who discharge judicial offices should be totally irrelevant to their judgment once they have been appointed? Would he agree also, and make clear, that any justice of the peace who receives this circular is not under any obligation of any sort to answer the questions?
  The Attorney-General: I readily agree that in the discharge of his duties the justice of the peace should not be affected by political considerations, and I believe that this has been the basic approach of the benches. Nevertheless, in order to achieve a proper balance now, it really is not sufficient to direct these inquiries to new justices but to be satisfied that as of now a reasonable balance is being maintained and will be maintained in future appointments.
  Sir Harmar Nicholls: While not questioning the good intentions behind the attempts being made by the Lord Chancellor, may I ask the Attorney-General whether he is aware that this sort of questionnaire may well bring about a division within the ranks of the magistrates, which has not been recognised up to now? That is the view of magistrates who have been sitting for a
  1354
  good number of years, of which I claim to be one.
  The Attorney-General: I venture to disagree with that. I do not think that justices, apart, apparently, from those in Bromley, have taken any objection to this. It is a reasonable course, and magistrates have co-operated quite cheerfully in this important exercise in maintaining public confidence in the quality and character of the benches.
  Mr. Whitaker: Would not the Attorney-General agree, first, that there must be a greater proportion of people on the bench who hitherto have not been able to afford the time because they have been earning their living? Nevertheless, would he also agree that there must be a number of suitable magistrates who are not politically active, and therefore would not it be better to appoint solely on grounds of merit and not the nominees of any political party?
  The Attorney-General: I have said that merit and qualification for the job are the primary considerations, but we are a politically-minded nation and politics cannot be entirely detached from a consideration of this matter.
  Mr. Hunt: In view of the totally unsatisfactory nature of that reply, I beg to give notice that I shall seek to raise the matter on the Adjournment.

  MERCHANT SHIPPING ACTS
  Sir Knox Cunninghamasked the Attorney General if he will ask the Law Commission to consider, as a matter of priority, the consolidation of the Merchant Shipping Acts.
  The Attorney-General: No. As the Law Commission has said, any attempt to consolidate these Acts now would call for an expenditure of effort which would not be justified, because what the Acts need is complete modernisation. Lord Pearson's Committee (whose Report is expected in the New Year) has been asked to review, in particular, Part II of the Act of 1894, which deals with the rights and duties of seamen.
  Sir Knox Cunningham: Would it not be advisable, as the 1894 Act was a

  1355
  consolidated Measure and as it has been amended on about 60 subsequent occasions, for some consolidation to take place, even though substantial alterations to the Act are proposed? Would it not be advisable first to consolidate and then to proceed with the alterations which the Attorney-General has said will take place?
  The Attorney-General: The view which has been expressed on this by the Law Commission, with which I agree, is that, useful as it may be to reproduce the Merchant Shipping Acts in a single modern Statute, it would call for expenditure and effort necessarily to be diverted from other things, which could not be justified when the Acts, at many points, in the view of the Board of Trade and ourselves, are in need of modernisation and substance. I think that on reflection the hon. and learned Gentleman will come to the same conclusion.
  Sir. J. Hobson: Can the Attorney-General say when he expects the new legislation will be introduced to reform the Merchant Shipping Acts?
  The Attorney-General: I am afraid that I cannot give a date for that.

BRIGADE OF GURKHAS
The following Questions stood upon the Order Paper:
Mr. BOSTON: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will now make a statement about the future of the Gurkha Brigade.
Mr. ALLASON: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on the future of the Gurkha Brigade.
Sir J. EDEN: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will now make a statement about the future strength of the Brigade of Gurkhas.
The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Denis Healey): With permission, I will now answer Questions Nos. 84, 85, and 86.
With the ending of Indonesian confrontation and the need to achieve economies throughout the Armed Forces, Her Majesty's Government are making
1356
early reductions in force levels in the Far East theatre. As part of these reductions, it is proposed to implement the rundown of the Brigade of Gurkhas to a strength of 10,000 as originally announced in 1963. It is expected that this reduction will be completed during 1969. Changing circumstances, including the outcome of a detailed examination now taking place on the future structure of the Army, may make it necessary at some future date to reduce the Brigade of Gurkhas below that strength.
It is the present intention of Her Majesty's Government to retain a substantial force of Gurkhas until the future becomes clearer, but a final decision cannot yet be taken. No further reductions will be implemented without discussion with the Government of Nepal.
Fair compensation will be given, based on the following principles. All soldiers leaving the service during the redundancy period will be entitled to a basic gratuity. Those declared redundant will be entitled to additional gratuities varying according to rank and service. In addition, specially calculated pensions will be payable to redundant soldiers who have completed 10 years of service.
I will, with permission, arrange for examples of compensation payments to be published in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
Mr. Boston: Can my right hon. Friend say how the compensation terms which he has just mentioned compare with those envisaged when the reduction to 10,000 men was under consideration, in 1963? Can he say whether they are more or less favourable? Can he also say whether these proposals have the concurrence of the Nepalese Government and whether, by tacit agreement, the figure of men might be allowed to go higher, if need be, as it has been up to now?
Mr. Healey: On the first part of my hon. Friend's supplementary question, I think that I am right in saying that no final decision was taken by the previous Government—particularly by the Treasury of the previous Conservative Government—as to what the terms should be, but the terms that we have now decided are much more favourable in money terms and a little more favourable in real terms, than the terms requested by the Services when the last run-down was under consideration.

1357
On the question of consultation with the Government of Nepal, my hon. Friend the Minister of Defence for the Army met the King of Nepal yesterday and informed him of our proposals.
Mr. Allason: In view of a possible further reduction below 10,000, will the eight traditional infantry battalions remain in being, or is there any possibility of a reduction in that number? Will the Minister now withdraw the contemptuous reference that he made to the previous Government's plans on 15th February, 1965?
Mr. Healey: On the latter part of the supplementary question, "No, Sir".
On the first part, it is intended, in order to implement the reduction to 10,000, to reduce the number of battalions from eight to six, which means that two regiments—the Tenth Gurkha Rifles and the Sixth Gurkha Rifles—will each have their two battalions amalgamated into one.
Sir J. Eden: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that no fighting force has given more loyal or gallant service to the Crown than the Gurkhas? Will he do his best to ensure that no damage is done to the trust and confidence which exists between the people of this country and the Gurkhas?
Mr. Healey: Yes, Sir. I am very grateful to the hon. Gentleman for saying that. I think that all of us who know anything of the Gurkhas in action, or have read anything of them in action in recent years will know that they are unsurpassed as jungle fighters. They have done the country great service not only in the confrontation campaign of the last three years, but for 150 years past, and nothing should be allowed to dim the gratitude and respect that we owe them. This was taken into account when we decided on the compensation terms which are to be offered.
Mr. Powell: I associate myself entirely with the last sentiments which the right hon. Gentleman has expressed, but can he state whether, in carrying out this reduction to the number envisaged under the standing agreement with Nepal, he will have regard to the principles which we announced in 1963, and in particular
1358
to the desirability of carrying out the reduction by way of wastage?
Secondly, will the right hon. Gentleman reconsider the necessity—which was not thought to be a necessity three years ago—of reducing the number of battalions from eight to six?
Mr. Healey: On the latter question, we have very carefully considered the situation, but we think it very important that the battalions should be up to fighting strength. It would not be possible to maintain eight battalions up to fighting strength with a total force of 10,000 men. This stands to reason. If we are reducing a force by a third, there must be a reduction in the number of units concerned.
We have considered the question of wastage very carefully. The reason why we have spread the rundown of 5,000 over a two-and-a-half year period is to ensure as far as possible that it is effected by wastage, and that on no account should the release of Gurkhas into the normal economy and society of Nepal be greater than that society and economy can absorb.
Mr. Paget: Has my right hon. Friend discussed this matter with the Governor or Government of Hong Kong? Is there any reason why, if there are surplus Gurkhas, Hong Kong should not employ them at its own expense, in order to release British troops.
Mr. Healey: This aspect of the problem has been fully considered. Discussions are taking place at this moment—I believe—between my right hon. Friend the Colonial Secretary and the Government of Hong Kong on this and related matters.
Mr. Barnett: Can my right hon. Friend tell us what is the effect of his statement on the reduction of £100 million in total defence costs east of Suez, referred to by the Prime Minister in his statement on 20th July?
Mr. Healey: I can assure my hon. Friend that the effect will be a healthy one.
Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop: Will the right hon. Gentleman tell the House what his reason is for believing that the future will ever become clear?
Mr. Healey: I hope that I did not suggest that the future would ever be clear—but as time proceeds, and with the natural evolution of events, it may be a little clearer that it is today.
Sir H. Harrison: Has the right hon. Gentleman made any representations to the Governments of Australia or New Zealand, who now take great responsibilities in this area, to the effect that these Gurkhas might be of help to them?
Mr. Healey: With respect, that is not a matter for us to raise with the Governments of Australia and New Zealand. If this were to be raised it would be a matter for the Government of Nepal.
Mr. Dalyell: None of us who have visited the Gurkhas in Borneo can doubt their effective service or their loyalty to this country, but are not there better ways of helping to solve the economic problems of Nepal, such as relating British economic co-operation with Nepal to under-used industrial capacity in Britain?
Mr. Healey: There are some aspects of that question which are not for me. I can assure my hon. Friend that, given the very generous resettlement grants which these Gurkhas will take back with them, the economy of Nepal will gain rather than suffer as a result of the action that we are taking.
Following are some typical examples of the compensation payments for which redundant Gurkhas will qualify:
1360

Gratuity

Pension

£

£ per annum

Rifleman

3 years' service

87

NIL

6 years' service

237

NIL

9 years' service

360

NIL

11 years' service

200

19

12

5

16 years' service

50

22

10

0

Sergeant

6 years' service

425

NIL

9 years' service

600

NIL

11 years' service

350

27

0

0

16 years' service

200

36

0

0

W.O. II

11 years' service

415

35

2

0

16 years' service

415

39

12

0

Sir Harmar Nicholls: On a point of order, which is more a point of information, Sir. When a Minister receives permission to answer three Questions like this, it becomes tantamount to a Ministerial statement. Under these circumstances, does the Opposition Front Bench get an advance copy of what is to be said, so that pre-consideration can be given to it by my right hon. Friends?
Mr. Speaker: This is not a question for me, but a question between the two Front Benches.

BILL PRESENTED
  EXPORT GUARANTEES
  Bill to raise the limits on the liabilities which may be undertaken by the Board of Trade in respect of guarantees under sections 1 and 2 of the Export Guarantees Act 1949 and certain other transactions under the Export Guarantees Acts 1949 to 1964, presented by Mr. Douglas Jay; supported by Mr. Michael Stewart, Mr. Anthony Wedgwood Benn, Mr. Niall MacDermot, and Mr. George Darling; read the First time; to be read a Second time tomorrow and to be printed. [Bill 151.]

TRADE UNIONS (CONTRIBUTIONS TO POLITICAL FUND)
3.41 p.m.
Mr. T. L. Iremonger: I beg to move,
That leave be given to bring in a Bill to amend the law relating to trade unions to make it unlawful for any member of a trade union to contribute to the political fund of a trade union unless he has signified that he is willing to do so, and for other purposes.
The momentousness and urgency—[Interruption.]
Mr. Speaker: Order. The House insisted that Ten Minute Rule Bills should be taken at this time of the day, rather than at 10 o'clock. It must be consistent and maintain order.
Mr. Iremonger: With reference to your call to order, Mr. Speaker, I was just saying that the momentousness and urgency of the next business is such that I shall move this Motion with the utmost dispatch. But the essential rights and liberties of our own people in this country, with which the Bill is concerned, are not trivial matters, even in the perspective of the rights and liberties of people in other parts of the world, for whom we have assumed responsibility.
The situation which the Bill seeks to remedy is as follows. When a trade union has a political fund, every member of that trade union automatically pays a contribution into that fund as part of his membership dues which are collected from him. This is so, in the case of certain of the nationalised industries, even to the extent of the political contribution being stopped out of a man's wages, as though it were on a par with Pay As You Earn Income Tax or National Insurance contributions.
If any member of a trade union is unwilling, on the grounds of conscience or conviction, to pay this contribution, and so support a particular political purpose, he has to take the positive and active step of refusing to pay. In many cases, he may have to do this by personally confronting a trade union official who may be an important person in his life and may resent his refusal. In other words, under the present law, a man who may object or be indifferent to a particular political purpose is obliged to support it with a contribution in cash regularly
1362
and continuously unless he "contracts out" of doing so.
My Bill would relieve such a man of that obligation, and would put upon the willing supporter the onus of "contracting in" to pay a contribution to the political fund, the purpose of which he actively approves. The Bill is founded simply on the proposition—as many of the people we represent believe—that the present arrangement is wrong in principle and that the reverse would be right.
The Motion does no more than offer the House an opportunity, sometime in the future, on Second Reading of the proposed Bill, to debate that proposition. The House might feel, after such a debate, that the present arrangement is right in principle and that it ought to continue. The House might feel, after debate, that the present situation is wrong in principle and that it ought to be reversed. I am not asking for a decision on that now. In this Motion I am merely asking the House to allow the question to be debated and considered, some time in the future.
In doing so, I would say no more to the House than this: it is not self-evident that the present situation is right. Its rightness calls for explanation and vindication. It is necessary to justify what might seem to some to be an infringement of the liberty which we otherwise seek to preserve in the secrecy of the ballot. It is necessary to justify what many people suspect may develop into a form of intimidation. It is necessary to justify what to some may seem a questionable situation which may arise in a closed shop, that is to say, when membership of a particular union is a condition of employment, when influential trade union officials may hold—[Interruption.]
Mr. Speaker: Order. Speeches under the Ten Minute Rule are not usually interrupted in this way.
Mr. Iremonger: I am obliged, Sir. I hope that I am not provoking hon. Gentlemen opposite.
I was saying that a questionable situation may arise when membership of a particular union is a condition of employment. Influential union officials may possibly hold political views strongly opposed to those of the member of the union who wants to "contract out" of

1363
paying the levy. It is necessary, then, finally, to justify what might seem a questionable bias against electoral equity when the negative forces of intertia are caused to work positively and financially in favour of one Parliamentary candidate in a contested election.
These are all matters which the House ought to consider. I am sure that no hon. Member would believe the House to be so infirm and so palsied as to suggest that this is a matter which ought to be deferred until the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Organisations has reported. The House ought not to deny to any hon. Member who feels that he can do so an opportunity to justify a seemingly questionable situation. And no hon. Member should be tempted to vote for a refusal to debate this matter simply because he might calculate that, if such a system lends itself to corruption and is allowed to proceed under the protection of the House, he might gain from it.
Hon. Members: Sit down.
Mr. Speaker: Order.
3.47 p.m.
Mr. Charles Pannell: Has the hon. Gentleman finished?
First of all, I think that anyone proposing to bring in a Bill like this, or anyone opposing such a Bill, should state his interest. I wish to state mine. I joined a trade union in 1918, 48 years ago. Since the age of 21, the earliest that I was allowed to do so, for 43 years, I have contributed to the political levy. It may be said that, as a sponsored A.E.U. Member of Parliament, I have an advantage from this and I have, but I still account it a great honour that those with whom I worked are prepared nationally to support my candidature. I have never known—I speak from practical experience to the hon. Gentleman and not with innuendo, or from ignorance or prejudice—any person who has contracted out to be discriminated against within my union.
Indeed, the lie is given to this in a Motion in the name of the hon. Member for Harrow, West (Mr. John Page), supported by others—including the hon. Member for Derbyshire, West (Mr. Crawley), who voted in favour of the
1364
1946 Act—which calls attention to the 1,556,000 members who have contracted out. What sort of spineless individuals does the hon. Member for Ilford, North (Mr. Iremonger) speak for?
A word or two is necessary on the history of this matter. Until the Osborne judgment, trade unions had always considered that they had the right to use the funds for political purposes. The Osborne judgment of the House of Lords, by a majority decision, ended that belief and gave rise to the Trade Union Act of 1913. It was largely a political decision. The 1913 Trade Union Act allowed a political fund following a ballot of members, and allowed the dissenters to "contract out".
In 1927, in revenge in the aftermath of the General Strike, the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act was brought in to reverse this. Those who were in favour of a majority decision were compelled to "contract in". In 1946, following the overwhelming victory of the Labour Party, this was again reversed. The 1913 position was restored and members could "contract out". The hon. Member for Ilford, North wants to turn the clock back 40 years, to 1927.
Are there any abuses of the present law? Let us get away from the tittle-tattle, innuendo and nonsense and consider the only evidence which is worth quoting to the House. [HON. MEMBERS: "The right hon. Gentleman's?"] Hon. Gentlemen opposite had better be quiet and listen to this, because it was the evidence given by the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies to the Royal Commission on Trade Union and Employers Associations. He said:
"No union, registered or unregistered, may spend money on political objects unless a resolution for the furtherance of those objects has been approved by a ballot vote of the members. The ballot vote has to be taken under rules approved for the purpose by the Registrar, who is forbidden to approve them unless satisfied that every member has equal right, and, if reasonably possible, a fair opportunity of voting, and that the secrecy of the ballot is properly secured' (Trade Union Act 1913, Sections 3(1), 4(1))."
The Registrar went on:
"If the resolution is passed, the union has"—
I repeat "has"—
"to adopt rules approved by the Registrar providing for a separate political fund; for the right to contract out of contributing to that

1365
fund; that a contracted-out member is not to be victimised; and that contribution to the fund is not to he a condition of admission to the union … Model rules for the above purposes are issued by the Registrar and have been adopted by unions with only minor variations."
That is the answer to the hon. Member for Ilford, North.
The Chief Registrar went on:
"A member who alleges that he is aggrieved by a breach of any of these rules may complain to the Registrar, who after hearing the complainant and the union may, if he thinks a breach has been committed, 'make such order for remedying the breach as he thinks just in the circumstances'. The order is enforceable in the county court."
What is the result of that?
The Chief Registrar continued:
"Complaints necessitating a formal hearing do not average more than one or two in a year."
That means that of the 1½ million members contracting out, not more than one or two have been complaining each year to the Registrar. He continued:
"On a rough estimate some 20–30 letters of complaint are received each year. Of these some are obviously misconceived "—
as misconceived as the argument of the hon. Member for Ilford, North
"and the majority of the rest are satisfactorily settled after correspondence with the union."
As we see, these people have a number of built-in safeguards. I refuse to believe that people who feel strongly on this issue—and many of my hon. Friends do feel strongly; and I have worked with and represented people on the shop floor
—are as spineless as the hon. Gentleman suggests.
Hon. Members: Too long.
Mr. Speaker: Order. The Chair will control the length of a speech in opposition. The right hon. Gentleman has one minute more.
Mr. Pannell: I will use that one minute to ask the House to compare this with the way in which hon. Gentlemen opposite get their funds.
Compare these built-in safeguards with their hole in the corner, hand in the hat system—the Economic League and the Aims of Industry. Compare it with the subventions of Fisons, of Ipswich. I ask the House to compare all these things and I hope, in doing so, that we can say that this business has been buried.
However, the Leader of the Opposition said something last week that should be remembered. He said that one thing that was called for more than anything else was a complete recasting of trade union legislation. Is this where he begins? Is this where we go for the first instalment; into the Lobby? I ask the House to reject the Motion and I assure the Leader of the Opposition that we will watch which way he votes today.
Question put, pursuant to Standing Order No. 13 (Motions for leave to bring in Bills and nomination of Select Committees at commencement of Public Business):—
The House divided: Ayes 131, Noes 281.

Division No. 222.]

AYES

[3.55 p.m.

Allason, James (Hemel Hempstead)

Davidson, James (Aberdeenshire, W.)

Higgins, Terence L.

Astor, John

Digby, Simon Wingfield

Hirst, Geoffrey

Awdry, Daniel

Eden, Sir John

Hornby, Richard

Baker, W. H. K.

Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)

Howell, David (Guildford)

Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torquay)

Errington, Sir Eric

Hunt, John

Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gos. & Fhm)

Farr, John

Hutchison, Michael Clark

Berry, Hn. Anthony

Fisher, Nigel

Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)

Bessell, Peter

Forrest, George

Jenkin, Patrick (Woodford)

Biffen, John

Fortescue, Tim

Jopling, Michael

Biggs-Davison, John

Fraser, Rt.Hn. Hugh (St'fford & Stone)

King, Evelyn (Dorset, S.)

Bossom, Sir Clive

Giles, Rear-Adm Morgan

Knight, Mrs. Jill

Braine, Bernard

Gilmour, Sir John (Fife, E.)

Lambton, Viscount

Brinton, Sir Tatton

Glover, Sir Douglas

Lancaster, Col. C. G.

Bruce-Gardyne, J.

Goodhart, Philip

Langford-Holt, Sir John

Buck, Antony (Colchester)

Gresham Cooke, R.

Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)

Bullus, Sir Eric

Grieve, Percy

Lloyd, Ian (P'tsm'th, Langstone)

Campbell, Gordon

Grimond, Rt. Hn. J.

Longden, Charles

Cordle, John

Hall-Davis, A. G. F

Lubbock, Eric

Corfield, F, V.

Hamilton, Marquess of (Fermanagh)

McAdden, Sir Stephen

Crawley, Aidan

Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)

Mackenzie, Alasdair (Ross&Crom'ty)

Crouch, David

Harris, Frederic (Croydon, N.W.)

Maclean, Sir Fitzroy

Cunningham, Sir Knox

Harrison, Brian (Maldon)

McMaster, Stanley

Currie, G. B. H.

Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)

Maddan, Martin

Dalkeith, Earl of

Hastings, Stephen

Maginnis, John E.

Dance, James

Hawkins, Paul

Maude, Angus

Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J.

Peyton, John

Temple, John M.

Mills, Peter (Torrington)

Powell, Rt. Hn. J. Enoch

Thorpe, Jeremy

Mills, Stratton (Belfast, N.)

Ramsden, Rt. Hn. James

Tilney, John

Miscampbell, Norman

Renton, Rt. Hn. Sir David

Turton, Rt. Hn. R. H.

Morgan, Geraint (Denbigh)

Ridley, Hn. Nicholas

Vaughan-Morgan, Rt. Hn. Sir John

Morrison, Charles (Devizes)

Ridsdale, Julian

Walker-Smith, Rt. Hn. Sir Derek

Mott-Radclyffe, Sir Charles

Rodgers, Sir John (Sevenoaks)

Walters, Dennis

Munro-Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh

Royle, Anthony

Weatherill, Bernard

Nabarro, Sir Gerald

Russell, Sir Ronald

Wells, John (Maidstone)

Neave, Airey

Sandys, Rt. Hn. D.

Wills, Sir Gerald (Bridgwater)

Nicholls, Sir Harmar

Scott, Nicholas

Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)

Onslow, Cranley

Shaw, Michael (Sc'b'gh & Whitby)

Winstanley, Dr. M. P.

Orr, Capt. L. P. S.

Sinclair, Sir George

Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick

Orr-Ewing, Sir Ian

Smith, John

Woodnutt, Mark

Osborn, John (Hallam)

Steel, David (Roxburgh)

Worsley, Marcus

Osborn, Sir Cyril (Louth)

Stodart, Anthony

Wylie, N. R.

Page, John (Harrow, W.)

Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir M. (Ripon)

Pardoe, John

Tapsell, Peter

TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

Pearson, Sir Frank (Clitheroe)

Taylor, Edward M. (G'gow, Cathcart)

Mr. Robert Cooke and

Peel, John

Teeling, Sir William

Mr. T. L. Iremonger.

NOES

Albu, Austen

Dobson, Ray

Hoy, James

Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)

Doig, Peter

Hughes, Emrys (Ayrshire, S.)

Alldritt, Walter

Driberg, Tom

Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)

Allen, Sholefield

Dunn, James A.

Hughes, Roy (Newport)

Anderson, Donald

Dunwoody, Mrs. Gwyneth (Exeter)

Hunter, Adam

Archer, Peter

Dunwoody, Dr. John (F'th & C'b'e)

Hynd, John

Armstrong, Ernest

Eadie, Alex

Irvine, A. J. (Edge Hill)

Ashley, Jack

Edwards, Rt. Hn. Ness (Caerphilly)

Jackson, Peter M. (High Peak)

Atkins, Ronald (Preston, N.)

Edwards, Robert (Bilston)

Janner, Sir Barnett

Atkinson, Norman (Tottenham)

Edwards, William (Merioneth)

Jeger, George (Goole)

Bacon, Rt. Hn. Alice

Ellis, John

Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)

Bagier, Gordon A. T.

English, Michael

Jenkins, Rt. Hn. Roy (Stechford)

Barnes, Michael

Ennals, David

Johnson, Carol (Lewisham, S.)

Barnett, Joel

Ensor, David

Johnson, James (K'ston-on-Hull, W.)

Baxter, William

Evans, Albert (Islington, S.W.)

Jones, Dan (Burnley)

Beaney, Alan

Evans, Ioan L. (Birm'h'm, Yardley)

Jones, Rt.Hn. Sir Elwyn (W. Ham, S.)

Bence, Cyril

Faulds, Andrew

Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)

Benn, Rt. Hn. Anthony Wedgwood

Fernyhough, E.

Judd, Frank

Bennett, James (G'gow, Bridgston)

Finch, Harold

Kerr, Mrs. Anne (R'ter & Chatham)

Binns, John

Fitch, Alan (Wigan)

Kerr, Dr. David (W'worth, Central)

Bishop, E. S.

Fitt, Gerard (Belfast, W.)

Kerr, Russell (Feltham)

Blackburn, F.

Fletcher, Raymond (Ilkeston)

Lawson, George

Blenkinsop, Arthur

Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)

Leadbitter, Ted

Boardman, H.

Foley, Maurice

Ledger, Ron

Booth, Albert

Foot, Michael (Ebbw Vale)

Lee, Rt. Hn, Frederick (Newton)

Boston, Terence

Forrester, John

Lestor, Miss Joan

Bowden, Rt. Hn. Herbert

Fowler, Gerry

Lewis, Arthur (W. Ham, N.)

Braddock, Mrs. E. M.

Fraser, John (Norwood)

Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)

Bradley, Tom

Fraser, Rt. Hn. Tom (Hamilton)

Lipton, Marcus

Bray, Dr. Jeremy

Freeson, Reginald

Lomas, Kenneth

Brooks, Edwin

Galpern, Sir Meyer

Loughlin, Charles

Brown, Bob (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, W.)

Gardner, Tony

Luard, Evan

Buchan, Norman

Garrett, W. E.

Lyon, Alexander W. (York)

Buchanan, Richard (G'gow, Sp'burn)

Garrow, Alex

Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.)

Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)

Ginsburg, David

Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson

Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)

Gordon Walker, Rt. Hn. P. C.

McBride, Neil

Callaghan, Rt. Hn. James

Gourlay, Harry

McCann, John

Cant, R. B.

Gray, Dr. Hugh (Yarmouth)

MacColl, James

Carmichael, Neil

Gregory, Arnold

Macdonald, A. H.

Castle, Rt. Hn. Barbara

Grey, Charles (Durham)

McGuire, Michael

Coe, Denis

Griffiths, David (RotherValley)

McKay, Mrs. Margaret

Coleman, Donald

Gunter, Rt. Hn. R. J.

Mackenzie, Gregor (Rutherglen)

Concannon, J. D.

Hale, Leslie (Oldham, W.)

Mackie, John

Conlan, Bernard

Hamilton, James (Bothwell)

Mackintosh, John P.

Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)

Hamilton, William (Fife, W.)

Maclennan, Robert

Crawshaw, Richard

Hamling, William

McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.)

Crosland, Rt. Hn. Anthony

Hannan, William

McNamara, J. Kevin

Crossman, Rt. Hn. Richard

Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)

MacPherson, Malcolm

Cullen, Mrs. Alice

Haseldine, Norman

Mahon, Peter (Preston, S.)

Dalyell, Tam

Hattersley, Roy

Mahon, Simon (Bootle)

Darling, Rt. Hn. George

Hazell, Bert

Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)

Davies, Dr. Ernest (Stretford)

Healey, Rt. Hn. Denis

Mallalieu, J.P.W. (Huddersfield, E.)

Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)

Heffer, Eric S.

Manuel, Archie

Davies, Ednyfed Hudson (Conway)

Henig, Stanley

Mapp, Charles

Davies, Harold (Leek)

Herbison, Rt. Hn. Margaret

Marquand, David

Davies, Ifor (Gower)

Hobden, Dennis (Brighton, K'town)

Marsh, Rt. Hn. Richard

Davies, Robert (Cambridge)

Hooley, Frank

Mayhew, Christopher

de Freitas, Sir Geoffrey

Horner, John

Mendelson, J. J.

Dell, Edmund

Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas

Mikardo, Ian

Dempsey, James

Howarth, Harry (Wellingborough)

Millan, Bruce

Dewar, Donald

Howarth, Robert (Bolton, E.)

Miller, Dr. M. S.

Dickens, James

Howle, W.

Milne, Edward (Blyth)

1368

1369

Mitchell, R. C. (S'th'pton, Test)

Redhead, Edward

Thornton, Ernest

Morgan, Elystan (Cardiganshire)

Rees, Merlyn

Tinn, James

Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)

Rhodes, Geoffrey

Tomney, Frank

Moyle, Roland

Richard, Ivor

Urwin, T. W.

Murray, Albert

Roberts, Gwilym (Bedfordshire, S.)

Varley, Eric G.

Newens, Stan

Robertson, John (Paisley)

Wainwright, Edwin (Dearne Valley)

Noel-Baker, Francis (Swindon)

Robinson, W. O. J. (Walth'stow, E.)

Walker, Harold (Doncaster)

Oakes, Gordon

Rodgers, William (Stockton)

Wallace, George

Ogden, Eric

Roebuck, Roy

Watkins, David (Consett)

O'Malley, Brian

Rose, Paul

Watkins, Tudor (Brecon & Radnor)

Oram, Albert E.

Ross, Rt. Hn. William

Wellbeloved, James

Orbach, Maurice

Rowland, Christopher (Meriden)

Wells, William (Walsall, N.)

Oswald, Thomas

Rowlands, E. (Cardiff, N.)

Whitaker, Ben

Owen, Dr. David (Plymouth, S'tn)

Ryan, John

White, Mrs. Eirene

Padley, Walter

Shaw, Arnold (Ilford, S.)

Whitlock, William

Paget, R. T.

Sheldon, Robert

Wigg, Rt. Hn. George

Palmer, Arthur

Shinwell, Rt. Hn. E.

Wilkins, W. A.

Pannell, Rt. Hn. Charles

Shore, Peter (Stepney)

Williams, Alan Lee (Hornchurch)

Park, Trevor

Short, Rt.Hn. Edward (N'c'tle-u-Tyne)

Williams, Clifford (Abertillery)

Parkyn, Brian (Bedford)

Silkin, Rt. Hn. John (Deptford)

Williams, Mrs. Shirley (Hitchin)

Pavitt, Laurence

Silverman, Julius (Aston)

Williams, W. T. (Warrington)

Pearson, Arthur (Pontypridd)

Skeffington, Arthur

Willis, George (Edinburgh, E.)

Pentland, Norman

Slater, Joseph

Wilson, William (Coventry, S.)

Perry, Ernest G. (Battersea, S.)

Small, William

Winnick, David

Perry, George H. (Nottingham, S.)

Spriggs, Leslie

Woodburn, Rt. Hn. A.

Prentice, Rt. Hn. R. E.

Steele, Thomas (Dumbartonshire, W.)

Woof, Robert

Price, Christopher (Perry Barr)

Stewart, Rt. Hn. Michael

Yates, Victor

Price, Thomas (Westhoughton)

Stonehouse, John

Zilliacus, K.

Price, William (Rugby)

Strauss, Rt. Hn. G. R.

Probert, Arthur

Swingler, Stephen

TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

Randall, Harry

Thomas, George (Cardiff, W.)

Mr. Ben Ford and

Rankin, John

Thomson, Rt. Hn. George

Mr. Stanley Orme.

RHODESIA
4.6 p.m.
The Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Herbert Bowden): beg to move,
That this House endorses the decision of Her Majesty's Government to accept the Working Document worked out by the Prime Minister and Mr. Ian Smith on 3rd December, deplores its rejection by the illegal régime; in Rhodesia, and supports the decision of Her Majesty's Government now to implement the undertakings given in the Commonwealth Prime Minister's Communiqué.
We have patiently listened to many speeches over the last year about the history of the present dispute, and I do not wish to weary the House unduly on this particular aspect of the matter. Nevertheless, the present problem goes hack over many years, during which time Britain has had the responsibility for Rhodesia, but without power. Since 1923, when Rhodesia formally became a Colony, while we have had certain constitutional powers connected with that country, we have had no civil servants, nor have we had an Army, on the spot. This is fundamentally different from the position in other Colonies.
Under the 1961 Constitution, which was never considered to be an independence Constitution—this was a view clearly expressed by the right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) and others—our practical powers were curtailed and the terms of this Constitution rested upon the belief that, in the hands of responsible men, the provisions, such as those concerning the Bill of Rights and the Constitutional Council, would ensure that Rhodesia would go forward in peace and stability. In saying this it must be borne in mind that legally, whatever the convention, the British Parliament—this Parliament—remained, and, indeed, still remains, constitutionally supreme.
It is for this reason that the Government and their predecessors made absolutely clear that any assumption of independence without the authority of this Parliament would be illegal and would be likely to have the most serious consequences. This was spelled out very clearly by our predecessors as well as by ourselves. The break-up of the Federation of what was then Nyasaland, Northern and Southern Rhodesia, led,
1372
and perhaps naturally led, to considerable pressure from Southern Rhodesia for her independence.
Because Southern Rhodesia was governed by a minority of her people, successive British Governments endeavoured to reach agreement with the Rhodesians on a Constitution which could be commended to her people as appropriate for independence and which would honourably comply with the principles which have always guided us. For over two years negotiations went on with the former Conservative Administration and ourselves to find the basis for a Constitution which would enshrine the principles, and clearly enshrine the principles, laid down by Britain. In this regard no efforts whatever were spared by British Ministers of either Administration.
The present Government, like their Conservative predecessor, made every effort to ensure that the Rhodesian leaders were fully aware of the consequences of seizing illegal independence. However, on 11th November, 1965, Mr. Smith, who was at that time the legal Prime Minister of Rhodesia, did, in fact, declare illegal independence. Despite many warnings from succesive British Governments, this illegal independence was declared in complete defiance of the British Crown and Parliament.
Mr. Smith had no clear mandate from his electorate, let alone from the people of Rhodesia as a whole, for such action. Should anyone seek to argue—and I have heard this argument-that the illegal seizure of independence was based on the popular will, then our answer could only be that this was, in fact, never tested. Thus, the British Government, on 11th November, 1965, were faced with an unprecedented situation. The House will know that the Prime Minister, my predecessor as Commonwealth Secretary, and the Attorney General, very clearly indicated to the House at the time the steps that would then have to be taken.
The House well knows the future action which we, and nearly every country in the world, took during the course of that year. As soon as I.D.I. took place, all the consequences of which Mr. Smith had been warned at the time, took effect. First, the Queen dismissed the Rhodesian Ministers. Secondly, the

1373
Declaration of Independence was denounced as illegal and invalid. Thirdly, sanctions were immediately applied and then progressively intensified. Fourthly, Britain reported the situation at once to the United Nations. Since that time no Government in the world has recognised the régime, and virtually all countries have co-operated in sanctions against them.
It is perhaps worth reminding the House, and the world outside, what Rhodesia is really like today under the illegal régime. The Governor, who is the Queen's representative, has remained at his post—despite the humiliation and the indignity which he has had to face at the hands of Mr. Smith and his colleagues. Sir Humphrey and Lady Gibbs, whom I now have the honour to know very intimately, deserve the highest praise from us all for their courage and loyalty during this very difficult year.
One of the first acts taken by the illegal régime was pettily to steal the Governor's car and to cut off his telephone. Today, a "stooge" governor rides around in the stolen car, but the telephone was reconnected when the talks started. It was most encouraging to the Governor, and, I hope, to us all, when, a few days ago, on 11th November, the anniversary of the illegal declaration of independence, over 3,000 loyal Rhodesians queued up outside Government House to sign the Governor's book—some of them members of the Armed Forces, some of them members of the British South African Police, who clearly stated they were members, and who, in fact, turned up in uniform.
Rhodesia today has, of course, a very tight newspaper censorship. How tight can best be demonstrated by the front page of the Rhodesia Herald on the day following the arrival of my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General and myself, which was almost a complete blank page. I commented to Mr. Smith that from my photograph, and that of my right hon Friend the Attorney-General and the Governor of Rhodesia, it would appear that we were rather pale on that occasion. Mr. Smith said, "I am very sorry about that".
This tight censorship continues. It may not perhaps be appreciated, but it is absolutely true, when I tell the House that even Church magazines have to be
1374
submitted for censorship. There are over 400 people in detention, most of them Africans serving a period of up to five years' detention, and this without charge or trial. I would not pretend for one moment that there has not been some intimidation and some burning, but what is equally certain is that of that 400 a large percentage are there simply because of their political opinions.
In the late 'thirties people in Central Europe became familiar with "a knock on the door at night". That is a reality and is happening in African townships in Rhodesia today. No political meetings may be held without police permission and approval. No African family in the townships is allowed a visitor to stay for even one night without police permission. It is a further offence, and I quote,
"to expose people holding public office to ridicule."
[Laughter.] Some hon. Members in this House would be in great difficulty. Nevertheless, it is an offence in Rhodesia today.
The Land Apportionment Act means segregation. One hears continually of schools for African children, many of them organised by sympathetic white Rhodesians, being closed down and, in a case, quoted last week in the newspapers, rased by bulldozers simply because they were not situated in the right place. This régime, whose own judges have pronounced their actions to be illegal, have strictly controlled their own television and radio programmes and jammed broadcasts from outside. The so-called 1965 Constitution, which, of course, is an illegal one, gives the Rhodesian Front power to amend any part of the Constitution whether it is entrenched or not.
The House will recall that during the summer the so-called talks about talks took place at official level without any progress being made. These talks were exhaustive and related mainly to constitutional detail. In early September the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference met in London, and although this Commonwealth meeting had many other important matters to discuss, its main preoccupation for the greater part of its time was naturally that of Rhodesia.
The Prime Minister reported to the House on 18th October that this was one

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of the most difficult of Commonwealth conferences. The House will have read the communiqué issued at the end of the Conference, and from this it will be seen that the British Government was under very great pressure, not only from the radically-minded members of the Commonwealth, but, in fact, from nearly every one of our Commonwealth partners. Nevertheless, we stuck firmly to the views we had previously taken. We made it clear, as we repeatedly told the House, that we were opposed to the use of force in order to bring about a constitutional solution. We also made it clear that the sanctions weapon, if it were allowed to get out of hand, would have an incalculable effect on the British and, indeed, on the whole world economy.
Hon. Members will also notice that the British Government were not prepared to accept that a new and tougher phase should be entered into until the illegal régime had been given a further chance to take those necessary steps which would lead to a restoration of constitutional legal government in Rhodesia.
Our Commonwealth colleagues at the conference were, naturally, incensed that a small white minority, in numbers about the size of an average provincial town in Britain, should get away with this illegal act, and were seeking to make subject some four and a quarter million Africans. Many of our Commonwealth colleagues found it difficult to understand why Britain persistently refused to use force to end the rebellion. I know that some of my hon. Friends hold the view that force should have been used at that time, but I would remind them that the results could easily be incalculable Many of our Commonwealth colleagues in attendance at the conference clearly stated that there should be no independence before majority rule was established in Rhodesia.
The British Government were firm in their view that we should at least try once more to get a Constitution on which independence could be granted if it was found to be acceptable to Rhodesian opinion as a whole. The Prime Ministers' conference agreed that we should try again before the end of this current year to get the illegal régime to return to legality and the acceptance of the six principles which had been laid down. This Constitution would have to
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give unimpeded progress to majority rule, with sufficient guarantees that this current situation could not arise again.
Following upon the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference, the British Government decided to inquire whether a visit from myself to Salisbury for discussions with the Smith régime would be likely to be helpful. This visit was, in fact, acceptable to the régime, and my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General and myself, with officials, visited Salisbury in September. We held a number of meetings with Mr. Smith in Government House, and one in the dining-room at police headquarters. We did this for protocol reasons, and we thought it not unreasonable. Mr. Smith and I had one or two private talks with a view to clearing the air before meetings at official level.
From the very outset of the first official meeting it became absolutely clear to me that the régime were not prepared to discuss a return to legality until, to use their own words, they saw what the constitutional arrangements they would be expected to accept were likely to be. Personally, I did not regard this as unreasonable, but, nevertheless, insisted that we should, at the same series of meetings, discuss the return to legality.
While these meetings made some progress, the régime insisted on a braking mechanism, the effect of which would be that when the Africans on the "A" roll reached parity with the Europeans on the "A" roll, the Rhodesian Government of the day should have the right to add additional European constituencies, and so delay advancement to majority rule. Mr. Smith described this, and these are his own words, as "his braking mechanism". In a subsequent discussion with me, he felt that the position could be met equally, from his point of view, if, as the Africans gained an "A" roll seat, an additional "A" roll European seat could be phased-in up to a total of 15. This, of course, meant that the Africans would have to win 16 "A" roll seats before gaining one. This series of talks in September ended on the exchange of a document setting out the differences between us.
About a fortnight ago I felt it worth while to go out to Salisbury again to see whether there was any change in the position because of the deadline promise made to the Prime Ministers'

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conference, which deadline was now drawing near. At this meeting, at first, there was little change, but I had a glimmer of hope during the last hour of the meeting when Mr. Smith agreed that he would entrench the whole of Chapter III, which was, of course, the main bone of contention earlier, and was, in fact, what he described as his braking mechanism. He said, in addition, that he was now prepared to consider the return to legality. We again exchanged between us a piece of paper and I returned to London to report to my colleagues. The meeting abroad H.M.S. "Tiger", last weekend, arose, therefore, out of my visit to Salisbury a fortnight ago.
I now turn to the proposals for an independence Constitution and for a return to legality which are contained in the working document which was produced in H.M.S. "Tiger". I would add here that the document in front of the House at the moment in the White Paper is the working document produced in H.M.S. "Tiger". It is the current situation, and takes a precedence over all the earlier discussions we had.
We believe that the document now in front of the House would have fully satisfied the six principles and provided the guarantees which all hon. Members would have wished to see. We believe, too, that the proposals set out in the document would have been perfectly fair and would in no way have been vindictive. The more reasonable members of the Rhodesia Front would, I hoped, have found that these proposals provided an honourable future for Rhodesia in which all her people could have played a constructive part. The document is produced as Annex B of the White Paper, and while I realise clearly that constitutional points are sometimes difficult to understand at first glance, I hope that the House will bear with me while I deal with them.
The House will see that instead of the present 50 "A" roll and 15 "B" roll seats the Legislative Assembly would have been rearranged to provide for 33 "A" roll seats, 17 "B" roll seats and 17 European reserved seats. The increase of the "B" roll from 15 to 17 would have assured the Africans of what is known as a blocking quarter. Had
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there been any effort to change any of the entrenched clauses it could have been blocked by the Africans. At the same time, by the introduction of the European reserved seats, the Europeans also would be permanently assured of a blocking quarter when the Africans gained a majority. The delimitation arrangements and the retention of cross voting, together with the extension of the "B" roll franchise to Africans over the age of 30 would have satisfied the third of the six principles. The House will recall that this principle required the Africans to be given a means of immediate political advance.
All this, and this is always the unknown quantity, assumes that Africans would take part in political activities, would register, and would vote. This is something which we sincerely hoped would happen if Rhodesia was given a fresh start with a Constitution found to be acceptable to the people of the country as a whole, which is Principle 5. Unimpeded progress to majority rule would be assured by the arrangements for adequate blocking mechanisms governing the amendment of the vital areas of the Constitution—the entrenched clauses, which we insisted on to meet the requirements of the principles.
The proposed Senate, which we discussed at an earlier meeting and which was acceptable to the Rhodesians, was to comprise 12 Europeans, eight elected Africans and six Chiefs and would have voted with the Lower House—the Legislative Assembly—on amendments of the specially entrenched provisions of the Constitution to alter which, as I have said, would require a vote of at least three-quarters of the total membership of both Houses. In other words, if any amendment had been repugnant to the Africans, or to the Europeans when there is an African majority, the blocking powers guaranteed could have been used to prevent it.
Additionally, there was to have been a system of appeal to a Constitutional Commission against such amendments. Even from this, a further right of appeal lay to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and I discussed with Mr. Smith on H.M.S. "Tiger" the number of Privy Councillors in Rhodesia available to form part of the Judicial Committee if it were

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necessary. Therefore, the House will see that our second principle—guarantees against retrogressive amendment to the Constitution—would also have been fully met. To give effect to the fourth principle, a Royal Commission would have been set up to make recommendations on the problem of racial discrimination and in particular of land apportionment.
Such a Constitution, which, we must remember, would have been commended to the people of Rhodesia as a whole as an independence Constitution, fully satisfied the six principles. Mr. Smith was persuaded by the Prime Minister and myself, after many hours of discussion, to move forward on the question of entrenching the number of seats in the Legislative Assembly. As hon. Members recognise, that was a matter of absolutely key importance. Up to that point, Mr. Smith had all along been attempting to keep power almost indefinitely in the hands of a minority by his braking mechanism, which I have already described. The position of Mr. Smith and his colleague, Mr. Howman, on this matter, on H.M.S. "Tiger", when they agreed to entrench paragraph 37 of Chapter III, was, therefore, an advance. But, unfortunately, in our final talk before Mr. Smith left H.M.S. "Tiger", he still came back to that point, which would seem to indicate that he was still unhappy with the proposed changes.
I wish to make it absolutely clear that when the prior discussions took place at official level to work out the details of our visit to H.M.S. "Tiger", it was clearly understood, certainly on our side and, I hope, on the other side, that both the Prime Minister and Mr. Smith would attend that meeting with full authority to settle. However, it became apparent very quickly after the beginning of our talks that Mr. Smith was not prepared to reach agreement without further reference to his colleagues.
Mr. Smith said that one or two new points had cropped up; and that is not unreasonable. One or two new things were, in fact, mentioned, and to meet him on this we placed signalling facilities at his disposal, and we even made an offer that if he wished some of his colleagues could be flown to meet him at Luanda or some other place, so that urgent discussions could take place between them.
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But he still insisted that when we finished our work on the document he would have to take it back to Salisbury and discuss it there with the other members of his régime. This was despite the fact that we were clearly under the impression that he could, if he wished, settle when he came there.
I suggested to Mr. Smith at that stage that if he had to take the document back he could perhaps agree, when we had finished our work on the document—and there was still a little work to do—to tell us whether he could or could not commend it to his colleagues. His reply was that he did not think that an unreasonable request, and that he would advise us before he left the ship if he could do that. Within the last 20 minutes before he was due to leave H.M.S. "Tiger" his answer to that question, which I regarded as a straight question, was rather mysterious. He said to me and my colleagues, "I must think about it, because I cannot yet convince myself." That did not strike me at the moment as being the action of a particularly strong man, which we have always understood him to be.
It is extremely difficult, in a speech of this sort, and without going into a great mass of detail, to try to convey an impression of the atmosphere of the talks. But I would like just to deal with one point which is very much in my mind because of some of the propaganda which has emanated from Salisbury within the past 24 hours. When we were considering the interim Government to be led by Mr. Smith, which would, under our proposals, be in existence for the short period of four months before an election was held, we got down to absolute detail. We got down to such detail as even to discuss with him the names of Europeans and Africans who would form the added members of what would then be a legal Rhodesian Government.
There were six of us present at the talks—my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and myself, Mr. Smith and Mr. Howman, and the Governor and the Chief Justice of Rhodesia. I was under the impression, when we began those talks, that Mr. Smith's so-called Cabinet comprised 10 members, but he corrected me and said that there were 13. On being asked how many he would need for the interim Government for four months his answer was, "Twelve".

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We had already discussed the addition of five non-Rhodesia Front members and, therefore, by a simple matter of subtraction, he was prepared to ask six of his present colleagues to stand down. He said in reply to a question that he did not find that difficult. The Press this morning reports the names of certain people we discussed with Mr. Smith. Strangely enough, it does not include one name of the five people who he agreed with us might be approached to take on this public duty for a period of four months.
I had a list of European and African people who would be sufficiently public spirited to do this work had they been approached—they had not been approached—and we agreed and went through it talking about each individual name. I had biographical details and I was corrected by Mr. Smith and Mr. Howman on many of them.
We reached a position in which we had three Europeans and two Africans, but I have no intention now or at any other time of telling the House or anyone else the names of those five gentlemen. They do not know that their names have been mentiond. They have not been invited to do the work and if I mentioned their names they might easily find themselves in detention tomorrow.
Mr. R. T. Paget: Does not Mr. Smith know the names?
Mr. Bowden: After our discussion the names of the five gentlemen chosen, three Europeans and two Africans were typed out on a piece of paper which I handed to the Governor, because it would have been his duty. I would assume that as the discussions went on Mr. Smith and Mr. Howman were doing precisely as I was—taking a note. What must be remembered is that those five names were agreed, and if that operation had been carried out they would have been invited by the Governor. That is why the names were handed to the Governor. [Interruption..] I find it a little difficult when one sees right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite sneering when one refers to the Governor of Rhodesia.
I want now to deal with some of the comments and criticisms—
Sir Tufton Beamish: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker.
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When the right hon. Gentleman says that any hon. Member on this side was sneering about the Governor, it is a gross and unfair insinuation, and I ask that he withdraw.
Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Sydney Irving): The right hon. Gentleman is responsible for the statements he makes to the House and I cannot at this point ask him to withdraw.
Mr. William Hamilton: Further to that point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Perhaps you were not aware that we were watching and we saw the hon. Member for Shipley (Mr. Hirst) and the hon. Member for—
Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. That is not a point of order.
Mr. Geoffrey Hirst: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Is it not disgraceful for the hon. Gentleman to say that? [HON. MEMBERS: "It is true."] I am raising a point of order with Mr. Deputy Speaker. I was laughing at the earlier remark made by the Minister, and I certainly did not and would not—it is unreasonable and improper for the hon. Gentleman to suggest otherwise—sneer at the Governor, who has carried on under very great difficulties.
Mr. William Hamilton: I repeat it.
Mr. Bowden: If it would help the House, I will accept that the sneers were directed to me and not to the Governor.
I want now to deal with some of the comments and criticisms which have already emerged from Salisbury. The real character of the regime in control in Rhodesia today is demonstrated pretty clearly by the dishonest Press statement which they issued yesterday. Most hon. Members will have seen it. The statement has been extensively quoted in the British Press this morning as though reflecting the regime's views on the possible settlement contained in the document signed on board H.M.S. "Tiger". In effect, however, the Press statement is related entirely to the position which had been reached in the exploratory discussions in the middle of October, up to 15th October. The further discussion a fortnight ago which I held in Salisbury and the discussion on H.M.S. "Tiger" superseded that. We both moved some way

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since then—let us accept the facts—but the regime is still fighting the battle of 15th October.
The statement says, for example, that the British proposals stipulated that there would be a permanent right for British troops to be based on Rhodesian soil. The document which Mr. Smith took back from "Tiger" did not impose any such condition. It says that no time limit is set for the interim government. The document clearly lays down a period of four months for the interim government, provided that the testing of opinion in Rhodesia as a whole has been completed in that period.
On the constitutional proposals, the document issued from Salisbury yesterday has no relevance whatever to the final constitutional arrangements which were evolved on H.M.S. "Tiger" and which, in his own statement on Monday night, Mr. Smith at that time said he accepted. The Press statement said that the regime could not accept that there should be any limitation upon the Rhodesian Parliament to determine the number of constituencies. So, despite the "Tiger" document, we are back again to paragraph 37 of Chapter III, where we started months and months ago. The Press statement says that the regime sees no reason whatever for increasing the number of "B" roll seats, whereas last weekend Mr. Smith agreed that the "B" roll seats should be increased from 15 to 17.
The Press statement says that the right of appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council would be inconsistent with sovereignty. As I have already said, last weekend Mr. Smith accepted a right of appeal on constitutional matters to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and we discussed the number of Privy Councillors in Rhodesia.
The statement of yesterday gives a clear indication of where the régime stand in a vital respect. During the course of the exploratory discussions, the British Government asked Mr. Smith whether it was still his position that the testing of opinion under principle 5 must take place before there had been a return to constitutional government and legality. He has now made clear, as a result of yesterday's statement from Salisbury, that that is still his position.
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How could a Royal Commission conduct a fair test with the illegal régime in existence, with its censorship, with its detention, with its ban on political discussion? What would the world think of us if we agreed to that? What do Her Majesty's Opposition think of it?
In rejecting our proposals, Mr. Smith has taken exception to the powers of the Governor during the interim Administration. Here again, what are the facts? There was no question in these proposals—hon. Members can read the document for themselves—of direct rule or rule from Whitehall. The Governor is himself a Rhodesian and his advisers and the members of the Administration would all have been Rhodesians. I see no colonial rule, I see no Whitehall rule in this at all. Further, once Mr. Smith had returned to legality, and until the new Constitution had been approved by the people of Rhodesia, the Government of Rhodesia during that interim period would have carried on under the 1961 Constitution, suitably amended.
The new broad-based Government would have had full executive authority under that Constitution. All its members would have been agreed with Mr. Smith, and the Government would have been headed by Mr. Smith. The Governor would have acted on the advice of those Ministers in all matters of administration. I cannot for the life of me see what is offensive to Mr. Smith in these proposals, because they are already all provided in the 1961 Constitution which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys) produced.
Mr. Duncan Sandys: On a point of clarification, the right hon. Gentleman has said that the new broad-based Government during the interim period would have full executive power under the 1961 Constitution. Did that include control of the police, which is a very important Government function?
Mr. Bowden: I am coming to the question of the armed forces and the police. In addition, under that Constitution, the Governor was already head of the armed forces and the police.
Mr. Sandys: Nominal.
Mr. Bowden: It is the right hon. Gentleman's own Constitution, if he says that he intended it only to be nominal.

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So there is nothing new about that and no reason at all to take offence at returning control of the armed forces to the Governor.
The only thing that was new in the proposal was the creation of a Defence and Security Council to advise the Governor in the discharge of responsibility for law and order. This Defence and Security Council would comprise six members, five of whom would be Rhodesians and one of whom would be a representative of the British High Commission, and this during the interim period of four months.
In all this welter of criticism of our proposals, what constructive suggestions has Mr. Smith made? One appears in the Press this morning. He suggests now a high-powered unbiased Commission to assess public opinion on the constitutional proposals. But this is no different from his original suggestion that the fifth principle test as to whether the new Constitution was acceptable to the Rhodesian people as a whole should take place before the return to legality. I have already pointed out that such a test carried out under the present conditions in Rhodesia could never be accepted as a fair and impartial test of Rhodesian opinion. We must ask ourselves: would Africans be able, or even allowed, to speak freely in these circumstances? Are the detainees going to speak freely in front of their warders?
Mr. Smith has now made it abundantly clear by his insistence on retaining his power during the test that, even if the test went against him, he would not accept its verdict. In answer to a direct question put to him in the "Tiger", whether, in these circumstances, he would have a second unilateral declaration of independence, he said, "I would have no alternative". Any test of opinion before a return to legality would be an absolute mockery of our fifth principle.
Mr. Patrick Wall: The right hon. Gentleman is making a very important statement about the proposed interim period of four months. Can he confirm that, if the document were accepted by the Smith Government, the Governor would be in a position to receive no instructions at all from this Government?
Mr. Bowden: It would have required, in the first instance, an Order from this House enabling the Governor to dismiss the Government and to form an interim Government for the period of four months.
Mr. Wall: I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for giving way again. This is an important matter. Is it correct that, during the four months' interim period, the Governor would have ruled with a new Government? During the period, would he receive any instructions from the British Government or Parliament, or would he act only on the advice of Rhodesian Ministers?
Mr. Bowden: The only instructions he would receive would be on the actual formation of the Government, which, in our view, would have included 12 Ministers—seven from the Rhodesian Front and the five others I have mentioned. This was agreed with Mr. Smith.
There has been a mistaken impression that the economic measures taken after the unilateral declaration of independence were ineffective. I have heard this so often that I would like briefly to deal with the situation. The Rhodesia Act, 1965, empowered the Government to make Orders over a wide range of subjects, and particularly with regard to economic sanctions. As a result, we took a number of economic measures.
We placed an almost complete ban on exports and imports between the United Kingdom and Rhodesia, the exceptions being essential items of a humanitarian character. The United Nations was informed of the position and of the actions the Government had taken. The immediate result was that, on 12th November, 1965, the Security Council, in Resolution No. 216, condemned the unilateral declaration of independence and called upon all States not to recognise the illegal régime and to refrain from rendering any assistance whatever to it.
The United Nations Resolution No. 217, of 20th November, 1965—eight days later—called on all States to do their utmost to break off economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, including an embargo on oil and petroleum products. The régime itself has admitted that, in the first half of the year following U.D.I., its exports were 17 per cent. below the

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1965 level and this figure excluded tobacco.
It has been widely reported in the Press—and it has not been denied in Salisbury—that the tobacco embargo is proving extremely effective, and it is likely that Rhodesia's exports are now running at a rate not much above half of the 1965 figure. Very recently, farmers' organisations have passed resolutions in Rhodesia critical of the régime and there is a widening rift between the farmers and the merchants. The farmers are getting restive about the strict credit controls and high prices of agricultural machinery. I spoke to a number of them when we were there in September. The motor industry has been particularly hard hit and production has been cut by about two-thirds. Assembly plants are likely to run out of components by February or March.
European emigration is rising and the drift of highly qualified workers is causing particular concern to the régime. Support of sanctions by countries outside Southern Africa has, on the whole, been encouraging and, by and large, has been effective. We estimate that the existing sanctions, the voluntary sanctions, have reduced Rhodesia's exports from an annual figure of £143 million to about £80 million.
The conclusion is inescapable. Our present sanctions are having a considerable effect despite the fact that there are some breaches in the sanctions wall which will now have to be closed. We are now ready, given the full support of the Commonwealth members at the United Nations, to propose in the Security Council a resolution providing for effective and selective mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia. The precise form of the resolution and the commodities to be included are under discussion with Commonwealth countries.
In deciding the formula of mandatory sanctions, we have had in mind the following considerations—that they should cause the maximum economic damage to the illegal régime, subject to the need to safeguard the economic interests of neighbouring Commonwealth countries, such as Zambia, Malawi and Botswana, and, of course, that we reserve our position over any proposal which may involve direct economic confrontation with third
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parties. Our draft resolution will obviously have to cover the commodities we have already specified as prohibited exports from Rhodesia by Order in Council and we shall be considering what other items should be included in our selective sanctions. Obvious candidates are copper, asbestos and meat.
As the House will be aware, there is considerable pressure for action to stop the oil leakages. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister made it clear that action must not be allowed to develop into confrontation, either economic or military, with the whole of Southern Africa. We shall be discussing with our Commonwealth colleagues at the United Nations how best the wishes of our Commonwealth partners with regard to an oil sanction can be met.
As the existing United Kingdom embargos on trade have resulted in a virtual cessation of Britain's trade with Rhodesia, mandatory sanctions will not involve the United Kingdom in any appreciable additional costs. I should, however, make it clear that, in going to the United Nations for mandatory sanctions, we are not abdicating responsibility for Rhodesia. Nor are we transferring responsibility for the Rhodesian problem to that organisation. This is simply a continuation of the steps we took last year at the United Nations.
Sir Derek Walker-Smith: Will the right hon. Gentleman be good enough to assist the House in these two respects? Can he give the House particulars of which countries have passed legislation so far to restrict the importation of Rhodesian exports similar to our own Orders-in-Council? Secondly, can he say what proportion of the 17 per cent. diminution of Rhodesian exports is attributable to exports to this country?
Mr. Bowden: Some countries are unable to prevent their importers from importing Rhodesian products without legislation. Mandatory sanctions will give them that authority. There are a number of examples of countries which have been taking exports from Rhodesia, although their Governments have wished otherwise, because of lack of legislation which, under mandatory sanctions, those Governments can now introduce.

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On the second point raised by the right hon. and learned Gentleman, the loss in a full year of British exports to Rhodesia is estimated at approximately £35 million.
Mr. Reginald Freeson: My right hon. Friend says that it is the Government's intention not to seek confrontation with South Africa, and I will not query that at the moment. But it is, in fact, understood that most of the oil seepage into Rhodesia is from the north rather than from South Africa. Is it the Government's intentions to take measures to prevent this seepage?
Mr. Bowden: I think that we should leave this stage to my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, who is discussing it in New York. We appreciate and understand that some of the oil is coming through Mozambique, but we should leave this stage for the discussions going on now in New York.
So much for sanctions. I turn again to the events of the last few days. Some hon. Members opposite may take the line that, with agreement reached on the Constitution, we are now allowing the whole business to break down because we rigidly insist on a few technicalities relating to the return to legality. That is a line which we have heard and which we shall hear again during the next two days. We are told that these are points purely of procedure or protocol which we should not allow to stand in the way of a settlement with the Rhodesian régime.
I want to meet this argument fairly and squarely. The procedure for the return to legality is not a matter of protocol or irrelevant trivia. It is a basic question of principle. I cannot for the life of me understand how anyone could accept that it is anything else. We in the Commonwealth have insisted on this procedure for the return to legality in order to provide some sort of guarantee that Mr. Smith and his colleagues will carry out sincerely and honestly any constitutional agreement which we would make with them.
For the first time in recent history, we were proposing to grant independence to a minority Government, a Government who, by their illegal declaration of independence, have seriously shaken world faith in their trustworthiness. Therefore, it does not seem to be asking too much
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in those circumstances that we should have some guarantee in future of their good behaviour. It does not seem to be asking too much as an earnest of their good faith that Mr. Smith should return to legality, should make his Government a national Government and vest certain powers in the hands of the Governor—and all this to be for a temporary period of four months. Otherwise, we would not be justified in handing over to him responsibility for seeing that 4 million Africans enjoy normal political and democratic rights and the unimpeded progress towards majority rule which they must have.
Sir Robert Cary: The Prime Minister had a triumph in gaining acceptance of the six principles. Why should we not have had a period of negotiation for the return to legality and not a timetable which stopped at 10 o'clock?
Mr. Bowden: I made it clear that, despite the fact that we were given to understand on H.M.S. "Tiger" that there was agreement on the procedural points, when Mr. Smith was about to leave us he came back again to the question of entrenchment in Chapter III.
On the subject of a timetable and further negotiation, this matter has been going on for a very long time, for 12 months. In our efforts in September to hold the Commonwealth together, it was absolutely necessary to give a firm assurance that we would endeavour to settle the problem quickly.
One way in which Mr. Smith could prove me to be wrong, if he so wished, about the assertion, made in other parts of the House and by himself, that he accepts the constitutional points but not the return to legality would be to introduce now into his own illegal 1965 Constitution, through his own illegal machinery, the necessary amendments to give effect to the constitutional agreement which we reached on H.M.S. "Tiger". He says that he accepts the constitutional agreement. He says that he accepts the six principles. He could now implement them if he so wished. This would be a test of good faith over the next few months.
Let Mr. Smith introduce the Senate and the blocking mechanism and immediate African advancement. Let us

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see whether he really believes in progress and majority rule.
Mr. A. J. Irvine: If Mr. Smith did what my right hon. Friend is suggesting, what would be the response from Her Majesty's Government?
Mr. Bowden: Let us first see what action Mr. Smith proposes. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] I can give an absolute assurance that we would treat this matter very seriously indeed, but we would have to see what action Mr. Smith took.
We have now reached the end of another chapter in this unfortunate, this tragic, story. I put the blame squarely on Mr. Smith and his colleagues. The settlement which we offered to them on H.M.S. "Tiger" was as favourable as any British Government could have offered to him after all that has happened, short of a complete sell-out.
We bent over backwards to make things easy for him. We met him on point after point after point. Within an hour of the final discussion of the constitutional points which formed the basis of this document, Mr. Smith brought forward three amendments, each of which we accepted. We bent over backwards. We conceded points to him which, while within the six principles and the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' communiqué, would probably be condemned by some of our Commonwealth colleagues, and I have no doubt that some of my hon. Friends may condemn us for them, also.
Yet, despite this, he rejected the offer. We were prepared to see Mr. Smith, as the acknowledged leader of the majority of Europeans in Rhodesia, as Prime Minister of an interim Government. We were prepared to allow him to keep at least seven of his Cabinet colleagues in the interim Administration. We would not have boggled at or fallen out about a figure of 14 instead of 12, or 10 instead of 12. We were prepared to see elections in four months, which would probably have returned his party to power—we do not know. All we asked was that if we gave him all this we should have some assurance that he would then genuinely and honestly work the constitutional proposals which we had agreed with him and
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honestly work for swift and unimpeded progress to majority rule. All this he rejected.
Everyone in Salisbury told me when I was there in September that if Mr. Smith went to the country and said that the British had made him an offer which he proposed for the good of Rhodesia to accept, then the bulk of Europeans in Rhodesia would have followed him without question, and his own extremists would have been powerless to do anything to stop him. I put this to Mr. Smith myself on at least three separate occasions. I appealed to him to use his personal authority, his prestige, to do what was right and what he knew to be best for his country.
We discussed the possibility of "ditching" his Right wing and taking only his moderates into the broad-based Government. We were as frank with each other as that. He told me on at least one occasion that at least 30 of his people were an embarrassment to him. [Laughter.] Tomorrow night's Division will probably show that to be true of Her Majesty's Opposition.
When it came to the point, he was unable to grasp the opportunity to set his own party and Rhodesia on the road to moderation. All our experience has shown that Mr. Smith takes decisions only when fixing a deadline, only when right up against it. It was right for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference to give him one more chance before the end of this year, but the future of Rhodesia and of the whole of Southern Africa is at stake.
Those of us who know Rhodesia know that there are many loyal and liberally-minded Rhodesians. They must now make their voices heard before it is too late. They have all got to stand up and be counted. What a tragedy it would be if, in his endeavours to save the totalitarian Rhodesian Front from splitting itself to pieces, Mr. Smith succeeded only in destroying Rhodesia.
Many right hon. and hon. Members opposite hold Her Majesty's commission, many of them gallantly and with great distinction. I therefore urge them to think very deeply before going into the Lobby tomorrow night in support of the Rhodesian rebel régime.
5.10 p.m.
Mr. Reginald Maudling Mr. Reginald Maudling (Barnet) rose—
Mr. Andrew Faulds: On a point of order. I did not wish to interrupt my right hon. Friend, but I have not quite so much hesitancy in interrupting the right hon. Gentleman. Are we not this afternoon discussing, not the affairs of a country called "Rhodesia", but the affairs of a British Colony called "Southern Rhodesia", and is not this White Paper wrongly titled?
Mr. Deputy Speaker: That is not a point of order.
Mr. Maudling: Everyone in the House today approaches this debate with a very heavy heart. This is without doubt the last of our great Imperial problems, the last and always in prospect the toughest; a problem which could become for us what Algeria was for France. Success in solving this problem would have crowned our history of Empire and of transition from Empire to Commonwealth, a history of which, with all its blemishes and mistakes, we are all very proud in this House.
On the other hand, failure will bring much that is already constructed tumbling down along with it. These are the issues about which we are concerned today. It is all the more bitter that the breakdown has come when hopes were so high, when success was within "hailing distance". In this atmosphere, I intend to devote myself to the issues as plainly and directly as I can.
May I just say one word to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs about his last remark. I feel that on reflection he may think it unwise. [Interruption.] He will accept that all hon. and right hon. Members on both sides of the House will vote at the end of this debate on the basis of what they believe to be right for this country and for the people of Rhodesia, and for nothing else. On that basis, I turn to the question—
Mr. James Johnson Mr. James Johnson (Kingston-upon Hull, West) rose—
Mr. Maudling: I will not give way at this early stage. I am sorry. I want to turn to the action proposed by Her Majesty's Government, of taking this matter to the United Nations and asking
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for mandatory sanctions. I and my colleagues believe this to be wrong. We are opposed to it for the clear reason that we believe it will do harm, not good, by adding a new dimension of danger to the situation and by hardening opposition to any possible solution.
There are four clear reasons for this, which I will spell out, because it is the issue which the Government are now proposing and for which they are asking our approval, upon which I wish to concentrate. Our first reason is that once the Government have gone to the United Nations it will not be possible to maintain British control of the situation. Secondly, even if this were possible, mandatory sanctions would not be effective without South African co-operation, and this co-operation would not be forthcoming.
Thirdly, there would clearly be a danger, of which the Prime Minister is acutely aware, of this escalating into a confrontation against Southern Africa as a whole, and the consequences of this, politically and economically, for the whole Western world are incalculable.
Mr. Archie Manuel: The right hon. Gentleman will lie down and give in?
Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. I must ask the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire (Mr. Manuel) not to make interruptions from a sedentary position.
Mr. Manuel: I thought that the right hon. Gentleman had given way.
Mr. Deputy Speaker: The hon. Gentleman can intervene only if the right hon. Gentleman has given way, and he has not done so.
Mr. Manuel: On a point of order. I accept your Ruling, of course, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I hope that you will apply it equally on both sides of the House.
Mr. Maudling: I am trying to deal with these issues with the seriousness which I believe the House thinks that they deserve, and I intend to set out, first, our objections to the course proposed by the Government, and secondly, the alternative which commends itself to us. I hope that the House will listen to what I have to say.

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The fourth reason why we believe the Government's action to be wrong is because it brings into effect paragraph 10(a) and 10(b) of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Communiqué, which, in effect, demand from now on unconditional surrender and which give up any attempt to find an agreed solution. These are our four reasons, and because we intend to take the serious step of opposing the Government on this matter I want to explain precisely what lies behind these reasons.
How can this be kept under the control of the British Government once reference has been made to the United Nations? There are very clear dangers. They are, first, that an attempt will be made to extend the mandatory sanctions to commodities that the British Government are not proposing, and second, that an attempt will be made to extend them to countries which the British Government do not wish to include. The other danger arises from the question: once mandatory sanctions have been imposed, will it be within the decision of the British Government alone to decide when they should be lifted? I do not believe that this will be so.
Will the Prime Minister give a clear answer on the first point, because it is of the utmost importance? Will he make it absolutely clear, in advance, that the Government will use their power of veto to prevent any extension of mandatory sanctions, either in commodity or in country, beyond what they are proposing? If he is not prepared to declare that the Government will use this veto, then it cannot conceivably be said that the Government are retaining control over the march of events. This is of fundamental importance.
Secondly, I want to ask how we can ensure that the time of removal of sanctions lies within our hands. How can we prevent a situation arising when, an agreement having been reached with the Smith régime, other members of the Security Council, not being satisfied with it, are not prepared to remove the mandatory sanctions? In theory, it might be possible to do this by having the initial resolution imposing the sanctions limited either in time or by some objective test.
Does the Prime Minister really think that this can be done? Does he really
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think that he can confine the resolution imposing the sanctions to some definite time or base it upon an objective test? If he cannot do that, then clearly it will not be within the power of the British Government alone, without the approval of the Security Council, to bring sanctions to an end. For this reason, I maintain that, by going to the United Nations and asking for these mandatory sanctions, the British Government are losing control of an essentially British problem.
My next point relates to the effect of these sanctions. I do not think that they will be effective without the co-operation of South Africa. It is difficult to be certain about the effects of sanctions to date. No one knows exactly how much the exports of Southern Rhodesia have been cut down. This is quite clear from the estimates given by the Government, which were wildly wrong. They totally over-estimated the initial effects of sanctions. On the other hand, I accept that making sanctions mandatory will have some additional effect upon Rhodesia's exports, but the effects will be very small and very slow.
In order to make these mandatory sanctions effective, it is not only a question of a resolution in the United Nations, but a question of enacting legislation in many countries, as the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs said. How long will it take for these countries to pass that legislation? Can the Government be certain that in the United States, for example, legislation will be passed by Congress? What happens in important countries not members of the United Nations? All that we can be certain of is that, although making sanctions mandatory will have some effect upon the exports of Rhodesia, it will be much smaller and much later than the Government imagine, and its political effect will be precisely nil. If these mandatory sanctions are put on, the life of Rhodesia will continue, even if exports are cut back severely.
Rhodesian exports were very high before U.D.I. because her economy was expanding rapidly. She can withstand a very severe cut-back in her imports, and is doing so. She can largely feed herself and provide many things from her own resources which up to now she has been importing, and she can draw

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for supplies of many kinds on neighbouring countries. Over a long period mandatory sanctions would cause hardship, especially, incidentally, to the African population; but it will be a long time, and it will not produce political change among a people now threatened with unconditional surrender. The Government must be absolutely clear on that.
The only way to break the Rhodesian economy—and this is now the Government's objective—is by the co-operation of South Africa, especially in the matter of vital oil imports. I think that it is absolutely clear that this co-operation will not be forthcoming. I went to South Africa recently. I saw Mr. Vorster and asked for his view on this. He made it absolutely clear, as he has made it clear in public, that, from the point of view of South Africa, maintaining the principle of regular trade with her neighbours is to them of fundamental importance. It is clear that co-operation will not be forthcoming from the South Africa Government for reasons which they believe to be fundamental to their interests.
Co-operation from South Africa is even less likely now, because she has, as one can see, an immense interest in ensuring that mandatory sanctions do not bring down the Government of Rhodesia, since they realise perfectly well that if once this weapon is fired and is successful it will be turned on them next time.
Therefore, it seems to me that the pressure for widening the attack and for bringing mandatory sanctions to bear against the whole of Southern Africa would grow rapidly, presenting the Prime Minister with a dilemma of the most terrible kind, namely, either that he will accept that his mandatory sanctions are useless, or will yield to the pressure to bring himself and this country into that confrontation with Southern Africa which he is so strenuously denying.
Mr. Jack Ashley Mr. Jack Ashley (Stoke-on-Trent, South) rose—
Mr. Maudling: I want to finish this part of my speech.
I deal, finally, with the threat in paragraphs 10(a) and 10(b) of the Communiqué. It is, I think, clear from the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Communi-
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qué that once mandatory sanctions are sought and the Government join in sponsoring them in the United Nations the British Government will withdraw all previous proposals for a constitutional settlement which have been made. In particular, they will not thereafter be prepared to submit to the British Parliament any settlement which involves independence before majority rule. This cannot be right. What was right yesterday cannot become wrong tomorrow.
If it is a fact that from now on there is no prospect of a settlement with independence before majority rule, it is for people in Rhodesia a fight to the finish. Let us face that. I must warn the Prime Minister that loyal and Liberal Rhodesians to whom the Commonwealth Secreary referred, people whom he knows and I know, people of independent stature who might well have been admirable members of a broad-based Government told me when I was in Salisbury why they disapprove of U.D.I. and disagree with the Rhodesia Front. But they said, "We believe as Rhodesians that once you talk about direct rule and bring in the United Nations with mandatory sanctions we will all join Smith and fight to the end". This is what they think.
Mr. James Johnson: Earlier the right hon. Gentleman compared the situation in Algeria with that in Rhodesia. In Algeria it was a fight to the finish. There was opposition to de Gaulle and to those who supported the Government of the day. Why does not the right hon. Gentleman follow his logic in our difficulties with Rhodesia?
Mr. Maudling: I intend to develop my alternative as to how the situation should be handled. I have been giving four reasons which seem to me substantial and which I hope the Government will consider. I have set out the four reasons why we on this side of the House believe that going to the United Nations for mandatory sanctions will make the situation worse, not better, and can do infinite damage to this country and many other countries in the Western world. It is for that very good reason that we shall oppose the Government in the Lobbies on this question.
Mr. John P. Mackintosh: When the right hon.

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Gentleman was drawing up his balance sheet in this fashion, he might have included the fact that if the Government proceeded in the way that he recommends it would destroy the Commonwealth. Is he prepared to face that?
Mr. Maudling: I fear that the procedure which the Government are adopting may destroy many things of great value to the House and this country. [HON MEMBERS: "Answer."] I shall come to that, because it is—[Interruption.] That is a silly remark. As I have said, I shall explain how we believe that this problem can be solved within the terms of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Communiqué without recourse to mandatory sanctions.
The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Wilson): The right hon. Gentleman cannot run away from this question. He said that this was a new dimension of danger. He must know that if we had not, after the most terrific struggle at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference three months ago, given Mr. Smith a last chance to return to constitutional rule, the situation would have got totally out of our hands in the United Nations in September. We should have been powerless to prevent it and the Commonwealth would have broken up. Will the right hon. Gentleman now say that we were wrong to fight for that last chance and that we were wrong to give the pledges which we did? Is he saying that we should break the obligations which we have given to the Commonwealth?
Mr. Maudling: That is the Prime Minister's judgment of what would have happened. Our judgment is what is now proposed will be disastrous for the Commonwealth and for the Western world, and that there is a way of tackling this problem different from the way which the Prime Minister suggests which is consistent with the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Communiqué. That is what I want to address myself to.
Before I come to the alternative, I wish to deal with the present situation, because a good deal of clarification is needed. We want to see clearly how we have got into this situation before we can be certain how best we can get out of it. Obviously this is not the occasion for a
1400
lengthy analysis of responsibility, but some things should be said.
To me it seems clear that the initial blame lies fairly and squarely on the shoulders of Mr. Smith for his action in declaring independence—an action of historic unwisdom, the consequences of which are unfolding all the time; an action which from the start we on these benches have opposed, as we have opposed and criticised violently many of his other actions, such as his treatment of the Governor, his Press censorship, which is totally repugnant and, I am afraid, effectively preventing many people, if not the majority of people, in Rhodesia from fully appreciating the true facts of the situation.
Mr. Ben Whitaker Mr. Ben Whitaker (Hampstead)rose——
Mr. Maudling: No; I have given way too much.
In the last few days, Mr. Smith, by refusing to bring independents into his Government, has given the impression of being more concerned with the Rhodesia Front than with Rhodesia. I think that he has shown a disappointing lack of strength and determination to exert his undoubted influence in his country in the last 48 hours. Let us be clear: I believe that that is where part of the blame lies. But I am also clear that blame lies on the Prime Minister and his colleagues for their conduct of these affairs in recent months. I will give examples: their total misjudgment, both of the effect of economic measures and of the strength of Mr. Smith's position in Rhodesia——
Mr. Eric S. Heffer Mr. Eric S. Heffer (Liverpool, Walton) rose——
Mr. Maudling: I am sorry, I cannot give way; by Ministers' use of language which appeared to make negotiation with Mr. Smith impossible when it was obvious all the time that it would have to come about; the talk of direct rule, which did immense harm in Rhodesia to the prospects of a settlement; and finally, the technique of the ultimatum, which is not the right technique to handle a problem of this kind with people like the people of Rhodesia. [An HON. MEMBER: "Answer the Prime Minister's question."] I will if hon. Members opposite will keep quiet and listen. [HON. MEMBERS: "Get on with it."]

1401
Whatever the cause of the present situation, we have to face the fact that it is quite astonishing that so much agreement should have been reached on the Constitution. Very few people would have thought only a short while ago that so much agreement could be reached on the Constitution. It is, therefore, all the more tragic that when the Constitution, which is to last indefinitely, has been agreed, there should be a breakdown on the arrangements for a few weeks of transitional period.
Both the British Government and Mr. Smith have made contributions to this agreement, Her Majesty's Government by accepting a very long time for the achievement of majority rule—I do not know how long they calculated; it might be 20 years or more under the proposals —and by accepting the idea of a European blocking quarter. Mr. Smith has abandoned the braking mechanism, I am glad to know; he has accepted the idea of a treaty, and he has accepted the idea of appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. When so much agreement has been reached, is it not all the more tragic and incomprehensible that there should have been a breakdown on the mechanism of transition?
Mr. Whitaker: When the right hon. Gentleman condemns the régime and supports the Governor, does he not agree that it is all the more lamentable and contemptible that some of his colleagues on a visit to Rhodesia paid obsequies to Mr. Dupont?
Mr. Maudling: Even if that were true, it would not be a contribution to this serious debate.
It is not easy to be clear what is the exact position about the proposals for interim rule which are set out in the White Paper, and the Secretary of State's speech this afternoon made it no clearer. Certainly the propaganda emanating from Salisbury is a very long way indeed from the terms of the White Paper. Equally, the terms of the White Paper are a little way from the impression given by the Prime Minister and given this afternoon by the Commonwealth Secretary.
We want to know clearly whether the Amendments to the 1961 Constitution referred to in the White Paper are amendments of major importance. The impres-
1402
sion that we were given this afternoon was that they were not. I think that they are. If they are of major importance, let us be told. If, however, they are only of minor importance why make them a sticking point for the whole future of Southern Africa? Which is it? The Prime Minister must be sure which it is.
I hope that if the Prime Minister knows he will tell us the facts, because there are two points on which the House would require information: first, about the selection and position of Ministers in the interim Government, and secondly—this was touched upon only this afternoon by the Commonwealth Secretary—the extent to which the Governor would be a constitutional or an executive Governor. This is a fundamental point.
As to Ministers, the White Paper states that the Government would be appointed by the Governor in his discretion, but we heard that it had been agreed beforehand on H.M.S. "Tiger", and I believe that it was said by the Prime Minister in his broadcast last night that Mr. Smith could have left Gibraltar as Prime Minister-designate of Rhodesia authorised to form a broad-based Government. Was it for Mr. Smith to form the Government, or was it in the Governor's discretion?
The Prime Minister: I could wait until tomorrow to deal with this, but it might save a lot of time in debate if I deal with it now. The position was that we reached interim agreement on H.M.S. "Tiger" about the names of the members of the Government who would be added. We also had discussion about some of those who would be subtracted. The phrase about the discretion of the Governor means that he would appoint a Government on which informal agreement would have been reached between us on H.M.S. "Tiger", and the names of the members of the Government would have been those agreed between Mr. Smith and ourselves before he left the ship.
That was the only point of discretion involved. The Governor would have had no executive authority. That would have been within the hands of the legal 1961 Constitution Government. If there were a dissolution of Parliament, it would be exactly the same as with any other dissolution of Parliament. The position about the dissolution of Parliament was

1403
that we asked Mr. Smith whether he wanted it and we would be guided by his decision.
Mr. Maudling: I am glad that the Prime Minister has cleared up that point about the appointment of Ministers. It sounds a rather strange use of the word "discretion" in the White Paper.
The second point is the position of the Governor. We must know more clearly because this is the point, according to Mr. Smith at least, on which things broke down. To what extent will the Governor act as a constitutional Governor on the advice of his Ministers? The White Paper states that he will do this
"except in those cases where he is empowered to act in his own discretion".
We want to know what those cases are. Does this apply to defence and to the police?
Paragraph 14 of the White Paper states that the Governor will be advised by a Defence and Security Council. Does this mean that he will be constitutionally advised or not? This is the Prime Minister's dilemma. He may try to cover up the fact that he is departing from the idea of direct rule which he talked about in the Prime Minister's Communiqué, but the Governor has either executive authority or purely constitutional authority. Which is it?
We must be clear about this. If the Governor has executive authority, it is right to say that direct control of the forces has been returned to this country. If he does not have executive authority, if he merely takes the advice of his Ministers, what is the purpose of all this farrago?
I come now to what I suggest can be done and what would be a better way of tackling this problem now than the method which the Government are proposing.
Mr. Jeremy Thorpe: Before the right hon. Gentleman comes to that, may I ask him a question. Will he tell us whether he regards the matters on which there has been a breakdown as of minor or major significance? Would he agree that what Mr. Smith has refused to do is to call off the rebellion, reinstate the Governor, dismantle the police State and empty the concentration
1404
camps? Does the right hon. Gentleman regard this as minor?
Mr. Maudling: That is not a statement of Mr. Smith's position in any sense at all. [HON. MEMBERS: "The right hon. Gentleman cannot answer."] The position is that there is agreement—[Interruption.] I am sorry that the Prime Minister has sympathy for me. I have sympathy for a man who may lead this country into one of the greatest disasters in its history.
The Prime Minister: I am sorry only for the right hon. Gentleman, in view of his own great record in colonial affairs, that he is now having to answer a question from the hon. Member for Devon, North (Mr. Thorpe) and to speak as though he has been reduced to an apologist and a spokesman for Mr. Smith.
Mr. Ian Lloyd: On a point of order. Is there any way, Mr. Deputy Speaker, in which the House can protect itself against the contemptuous arrogance of the Prime Minister?
Mr. Deputy Speaker: That is not a point of order. It would be better to allow the debate to proceed.
Mr. Maudling Mr. Maudling rose——
Hon. Members: Answer.
Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. It would be better if we heard the debate in silence.
Mr. Maudling: I have made it clear in what I said earlier that I place the primary blame for this situation clearly on Mr. Smith's act of unilateral declaration of independence. That is not an apology in any sense whatever.
What I have endeavoured to do so far is to point out what seem to be the inevitable perils of the course chosen by the Government, and now I want to suggest what alternatives they should pursue.
As the House knows, there is this remarkable agreement on what the Constitution should be, and surely the Government, Mr. Smith, the Opposition, and all concerned profoundly hope that this proposed Constitution will commend itself to the people of Rhodesia? This must be our hope, because this would solve the problem. I cannot see any other solution to it at the moment.

1405
The only outstanding question is the reference of the proposed Constitution to public opinion in Rhodesia under Principle 5. If approval could be given, legal independence could be achieved in permanency. This is what we all want to see. The only valid reason for insisting on rigid conditions in this brief interim period is to ensure that the Royal Commission can do its work of carrying out Principle 5 and ensuring what public opinion really is. I am certain that both sides of the House, and certainly the Governor, would dearly like to see the Royal Commission in a position to do this and to declare that the Constitution as proposed is acceptable, and so solve the problem which threatens our country so grievously.
It is right to lay stress on the importance of the Royal Commission being able to do its work, but I think that it is perhaps fair to point out that what the Prime Minister fears is that there may be undue pressure brought to bear by the régime on people in Rhodesia to accept a Constitution which the right hon. Gentleman himself thinks is fair and right. I agree that there should not be undue pressure, but let us see what it might be.
Apart from the need for the Royal Commission to be able to make its inquiries effectively, there is clearly a fear on both sides of what the position would be if the Royal Commission's Report was negative, if it said that public opinion did not accept this. If that were so, the British Government would have abandoned their sanctions, and it would be very hard to reinstate them, as the Prime Minister emphasised.
On the other hand, Mr. Smith in those circumstances would virtually have thrown in his entire hand and be helpless. I am looking at the realities. This, I think, is why at the present moment the position is stuck as it is. I suggest that this can be met in this way: First, by appointing a Royal Commission straightaway, a Royal Commission of men of independence and standing. Such people are still available, even in this cynical modern world, as the Prime Minister knows, because he wants a Royal Commission. Appoint it now, and if it is to operate, clearly paragraph 15 of the White Paper must be carried out. Censorship must be removed, there must be normal political
1406
activities, and there must be an impartial judicial tribunal to examine individual cases. None of these things, to my knowledge, has Mr. Smith ever repudiated. All these conditions in paragraph 15 are laid down. That is my answer to the hon. Member for Devon, North.
Thirdly, let the members of the Royal Commission be the judge of whether they can carry out their appointed tasks, but let it be made clear that if they say that their efforts are impeded, if they say that they cannot carry through their task, that they cannot properly test opinion in Rhodesia, the offer falls to the ground. Surely it is right to give this body of responsible men the task of testing opinion to try to bring out the result which we all want, agreement on the Constitution? If they are satisfied that they can do it in conditions as they find them, let it be so. Mr. Smith would have to recognise the legal authority of the Governor, I do not think that he should be pressed in these circumstances to accept those elements of direct rule which he thinks exist in the White Paper, and which, if they do not exist, clearly should create no obstacle.
Finally, I think that the British Government should not in any way depart from the present level of economic sanctions which they are imposing on Rhodesia.
This is my proposal, put forward seriously, as an attempt to find a way out of what is a tragic situation—to appoint a Royal Commission, to ensure that censorship is removed, that all the other things in paragraph 15 are attained, that Mr. Smith accepts the constitutional authority of the Governor, and at the same time sanctions to be continued at the present level. Therefore neither side will prejudice its position, and a chance will exist to solve this problem.
I beg the Government and hon. Gentlemen opposite earnestly and sincerely to recognise the dangers which our country is facing. Let us not turn down any solution which offers any prospects of success. This will be consistent with the Commonwealth communiqué, because it is wholly consistent with the six principles. The Prime Minister said earlier that the Constitution which is being proposed, which is being put to the people of Rhodesia, is wholly consistent with the six principles. This is a way of finding

1407
a solution. It may not suit the constitutional niceties, but it is a practical way of finding what everyone in this country wants to see, namely, a solution to this problem—[Interruption.]
Mr. Charles Doughty: On a point of order. Hon. Members on this side of the House want to hear both Front Bench speakers. We listened in silence to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs. We would be much obliged if we could also hear my right hon. Friend.
Mr. Deputy Speaker: The hon. and learned Member must leave it to the Chair to maintain order.
Mr. Stanley Orme: Can the right hon. Gentleman explain to the House how his proposals can be carried out on the terms which he has enunciated under a régime which not long ago imprisoned such people as Garfield Todd, and how there can be a free expression of political opinion when one is not allowed—and the right hon. Gentleman has said so—under an illegal régime?
Mr. Maudling: I explained clearly that that is covered by carrying out paragraph 15 of the White Paper which, to my knowledge, Mr. Smith has not repudiated.
I have put my proposals before the House. I have explained why we on this side believe with considerable intensity that the course being pursued by the Government is wrong. I have tried to outline what to my mind, though not a perfect solution, is a way out of a tragic situation. This is no time for personal recriminations or exercises in saving face. It is a stark choice between agreement and disaster, and a solution can be found. The verdict of history will lie heavy on anyone who by reason either of timidity or false pride allows prejudice or faction or excessive regard to constitutional niceties to condemn the people of Britain and Rhodesia alike to a long dark night of struggle and anguish.
5.48 p.m.
Mr. Paul B. Rose: The right hon. Member for Barnet (Mr. Maudling) has drawn an analogy with Algeria and France. It
1408
seems that he wishes to support that analogy by emulating the O.A.S. and the extremists in France who tried to sabotage de Gaulle when he was trying to impose a peaceful settlement on Algeria.
The right hon. Gentleman also referred to the position with regard to sanctions and said that we have to keep this as a domestic British concern, but if we do not go to the United Nations and ask for the imposition of sanctions, other people will, and it is therefore imperative that the Government take action.
Perhaps the key to the result of the Prime Minister's negotiations with Ian Smith lies in a small paragraph which has been tucked away in the documents relating to the negotiations between the United Kingdom Government and the Southern Rhodesian Government, which took place partly during the period of office of the former Conservative Government. At the foot of page 72 of the Report of these negotiations Mr. Smith admitted that
"He must make it clear that the Government party in Rhodesia did not believe in majority rule. They accepted that the 1961 Constitution would eventually bring it about; but they would not take any action to hasten this process."
It is fundamentally because the Smith rebel régime is not willing to countenance majority rule within a reasonable time that the negotiations are doomed to failure. It is not a question of bridging a minor gap; it is a question of a fundamental unwillingness on the part of the Smith régime over a long period to accept the inevitability of African rule. No man could have gone further—some would say that he has gone too far already—than the Prime Minister to meet the viewpoint of the Rhodesian rebel régime. To say, as the Leader of the Opposition did only the other night:
"It would be a matter of the utmost regret if the dire consequences which are to follow which the Prime Minister has foretold were to come about as a result of differences about the return to legality…".—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 5th December, 1966; Vol. 737, c. 1063.]
is to ignore the underlying differences which these formulae are intended to cover.
Without real guarantees by Southern Rhodesia there can be no honourable settlement, short of a Munich-type piece of paper which could be torn to shreds

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by the Rhodesian régime in years to come, just as guarantees were torn to shreds by the South African Government and their predecessor, Adolf Hitler That Ian Smith has never genuinely accepted the reality of the possibilities of majority rule was illustrated as far back as 7th June, 1964, when, in a speech in Bulawayo, he said:
"As long as even the thread of an apron string attaches us to the British Government African Nationalist politicians will continue to go to London and press Britain to exert influence on our affairs. That is one reason why we cannot relinquish our pursuit of independence."
I wonder why hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite place any credence in the good faith of Mr. Smith during these negotiators. The litmus test of good faith on the part of the Rhodesian régime lies in the fact that only last year they took action with regard to the schooling of African children which made it quite impossible for the majority of Africans to obtain an education. They refused the genuine offers made by this Government to help African advancement. According to the Conference of Missionary Societies, the Land Apportionment Act was recently used to order both Anglican and Catholic secondary boarding schools not to enrol African pupils.
I want to deal primarily with the policy of sanctions, but there are one or two points that I want to put to my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister. First, after the actions of Smith and his friends there can be no question of independence for Rhodesia before majority rule. There can be no going back after this to square one. We have been on the hook long enough, and our patience is not inexhaustible. The Prime Minister went further than many of my hon. Friends would have been prepared to go in trying to meet Smith's demands, but I understand his reasons for this, and there are safeguards in the working document which should not be overlooked. Paragraph 17 makes it clear that an agreed settlement would have to be submitted to the test of acceptability by the people of Rhodesia as a whole, and paragraph 19 states that:
"The two Governments will also negotiate the terms of a Treaty"
and discuss the desirability of negotiating a defence agreement.
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The latter, to my mind, falls short of the guarantee that I would have liked to see—copper-bottomed or otherwise—because there would be no certainty that a defence agreement would be negotiated, but I am somewhat reassured by the Prime Minister's statement of 5th December that any breach of the Treaty would entitle us to use sanctions and
"not necessarily confined to economic sanetions."—[OEFICIAL REPORT, 5th December, 1966; Vol. 737, c. 1057.]
I have never before in this House advocated the use of force in Rhodesia—although I believe that the use of force prior to the declaration of independence might well have averted this tragedy without any bloodshed—but I believe that the use of force now is a somewhat different matter. The action of the Smith régime in refusing every reasonable offer made to it in these negotiations has put it beyond the bounds of civilised negotiations and it makes a limited use of force a not unreasonable demand. I include force not only to seal off Rhodesia's lines of communications and the oil flow but also to back up economic sanctions.
Before dealing with the implications of a policy of mandatory sanctions which only the faint-hearted would resist I want to say something about the people whom we are facing in Rhodesia. If the Opposition, for political advantage—although I do not think that they will get political advantage out of it—oppose economic sanctions let them have no doubt what they are supporting in Africa. Let them have no doubt that the result of failure to take action against the Smith régime will mean the polarisation of the world into black and white nations—a polarisation far more dangerous than any previous division on ideological lines. It will mean the breakup of the British Commonwealth.
At no time let use forget the nature of the Rhodesian régime which we are facing. Let us not forget the Land Apportionment Act, which writes in permanent second-class status for the African in Rhodesia. Let us not forget the unbridled censorship of a very courageous and democratic Press. Let us not forget the obstruction of the right to assembly and to free association of the people of Rhodesia. Let us not forget

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the philisophy which orders the destruction of African schools and African churches because they happen to be situated in white areas. Let us not forget the restriction and the detention of the real leaders—the genuine leaders—of African opinion in Rhodesia and the sentences of death and imprisonment, some of which are pending, by the members of this illegal régime of people whose only crime is to seek majority and democratic rule. Let us not forget, when we hear talk of kith and kin, that Garfield Todd, missionaries, churchmen and businessmen who oppose Ian Smith are also our kith and kin, and that it is as much for the future of the white Rhodesians as the black Rhodesians that we have to take the most drastic and effective political measures available.
As far as I am concerned this implies immediate mandatory implementation and enforcement of sanctions, and these will have to be imposed by the United Nations. It may be that aid will have to be given to Zambia and other States by the United Nations where they are seriously and adversely affected economically, by this decision to impose political sanctions. Ultimately the success or otherwise of sanctions will depend upon the cooperation and support of the other members of the United Nations. The key may well be the enthusiasm with which the United States of America takes part in any action with regard to sanctions. There are those who say that in any event sanctions will not work.
There is a danger that this will be true if the sanctions are not backed up. Here I refer to the Financial Times of 11th November of this year, referring to the current sanctions, which pointed out that
"it is still too early to write them off altogether".
Only 40 per cent. of the tobacco crop has been sold, and of this half has gone to South Africa. We know that an increased amount last year went to the United States, who presumably will now join in mandatory sanctions. Co-operation on her part is therefore vital. After a year of sanctions, albeit limited sanctions, Rhodesia's national income has fallen by £35 million, or about 10 per cent., and the country has been put back economically by about two years. Had Zambia also been able to find alternative sources of supply,
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these sanctions would have hit harder, because imports from Rhodesia to Zambia were down by only 25 per cent. This is a serious problem, which the United Nations will have to face.
Rhodesian textiles have suffered. Sugar has been adversely affected, as have the motor, agricultural machinery, and spare parts businesses. But no policy of sanctions will be complete without an absolute embargo on oil. This must be backed up, if necessary, by the threat of physical action to prevent a deliberate breach by those States bordering on Rhodesia. It is true that the current supply of oil is not coming principally from South Africa—this has virtually ended for the time being, but it could be introduced in the event of mandatory sanctions on oil. The prime offender is not South Africa but Portugal, since most of Rhodesia's petrol comes in from Mozambique and the oil company involved is the French Total Group. Storage tanks have been built at the railhead at Lourenço Marques. One of the things which we ought, therefore, to be considering is diplomatic pressure, not necessarily on Governments or heads of Governments, but on the oil companies themselves, many of whom are extremely vulnerable to pressure from the British Government.
That sanctions have already had an effect is supported by other sources. The view of the Scotsman of 10th November this year is that the Rhodesian success story is largely artificial. The Guardian on 12th September emphasised this point in saying:
"Zambia's failure to take a full part in the embargo may be the biggest single reason why the Rhodesian economy has been able to keep its head above water."
Therefore, I hope that my right hon. Friend will give a good deal of attention to the problem of aiding Zambia in the months to come.
Inevitably, however—this is something which people have steered clear of up to now—sanctions and the policy of sanctions will bring us into collision with South Africa. I do not think that we ought to shy away from this. There is no doubt that South Africa is most perturbed about this, because it obviously had some hand in putting pressure on Mr. Ian Smith to negotiate in recent weeks. South Africa can hardly view with relish

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the prospect of an additional 4 million Africans within its sphere of influence, when the only compensation would be 200,000 whites in a particularly weak and vulnerable position.
Nor can South Africa relish the idea of a confrontation with the rest of the world, which it might otherwise have avoided, merely for the sake of Rhodesia. But there is a chance—we must recognise it—that it will be politically impossible, as the right hon. Member for Barnet said, for South Africa to allow Mr. Smith and his white supremacist r—gime to be destroyed through the application of sanctions, for fear that sanctions might later be applied to South Africa. It is probable that on this point it is banking, partly because of the attitude of the Opposition, upon our unwillingness to carry sanctions to their ultimate conclusion.
This is why I believe that there must be no room for doubt about our intention. The full rigour of sanctions must be applied from the start; we should not turn the screw and accelerate sanctions slowly. Over a long period, this is the most costly and least effective way. We must start and continue at our toughest. We will also have to be tough on some occasions with our own people: some of the biggest breakers of the British law over Rhodesia have been major British companies, and this is something with which we will have to deal.
We must also be prepared to go to the brink with South Africa. We might take a little courage—hon. Gentlemen opposite might also—from the fact that, when Zambia had its dispute with Rhodesia over the advance payment for railway freight, it was Rhodesia which climbed down in the last analysis. In the same way, I believe, South Africa will not easily risk the destruction of all she has striven to preserve for what she regards as essentially a domestic squabble between Britain and Rhodesia.
Whether we like it or not, and whether or not the South Africans are prepared to climb down, this collision is inevitable in the world as it is today. Whatever it costs to put it to the test, this is something which one day, sooner or later, a British Government will have to face. We have certain economic measures available which could aid us to deal with any diffi-
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cult economic situation, but this was dealt with in our debate last week and I will not trespass into that subject.
One reputable correspondent of The Observer considers that South Africa will not be prepared to go to the brink. He points out, what we all know, that it would be our Government's intention, by their selectivity, to try to avoid confrontation with South Africa. But South Africa must realise the risk of escalation if it fails to co-operate. The correspondent concluded that, in the last analysis,
"…South Africa is ready to swim with Rhodesia; it is not ready to sink with it"
Mr. Paget: Is my hon. Friend aware that that is the same correspondent who assured us with complete certainty that South Africa would not give Rhodesia any oil?
Mr. Rose: I am certainly aware of my hon. and learned Friend's views. I share a room with him, but not necessarily his views on Rhodesia. I think that my hon. and learned Friend will agree that I have said that there is a possibility that South Africa will not give way and it is not a possibility which I seek to minimise or to gloss over.
My point is that we must have the courage to face this problem and to go to the brink, and, if necessary, over it, because it is inevitable that one day the world will have to face South Africa. It would not be a very opportune moment today, because of the economic difficulties which we face, but we cannot always choose the terrain on which we fight battles which must be fought. This is something which hon. Members opposite should have learned from the days of Munich. We may have to face the South Africans, to use the words of another statesman, very shortly "eyeball to eyeball"…
Mr. K. Zilliacus: Does my hon. Friend know that, whereas only 5 per cent. of our total exports go to South Africa, 30 per cent. of their total exports come to this country, so that it is not we who should be afraid of South Africa but South Africa which should be afraid of us?
Mr. Rose: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his helpful intervention. I know that he has a great deal of experience of what happened at the time of

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Munich, even if I was probably only an embryo at the time—[Interruption.]—I was more than a twinkle at that stage.
What of the Opposition and their approach to this issue? Are they again to play the rôle of Chamberlain and the rôle of appeasers, or will they stand up like men, as some of them did in those days, and dissociate themselves from the dishonourable rôle which their leaders are playing at the moment——
Mr. Richard Hornby: As one of those who supported the oil sanctions, perhaps I might say in answer to the point which the hon. Gentleman has just made, that the proposals of my right hon. Friend the Member for Barnet (Mr. Maudling) both made it clear that he put blame throughout on Ian Smith and that he did not want to relax in any sense the measures which have been going on. However, he then went on to suggest constructive proposals, which I hope the Government will consider in this debate.
Mr. Rose: I am sure that the same sort of right hon. Gentlemen voiced opposition to Adolf Hitler in the 1930s, but they did not take effective action against him. We are not concerned about words but about deeds to bring this rebel Government to heel. For me, the right hon. Gentleman's suggestions are totally inadequate to deal with this problem.
It was the right hon. Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys) who, in 1964, said that Rhodesia would increasingly become a target for subversion, for trade boycotts, air transport bans and other hostile activities. He warned them at that time of the likely consequences and he said that U.D.I. would be generally regarded as an act of open defiance. Both he and the right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) behaved honourably at that time.
What I want to know is why now, in Opposition, they are playing a silly, irresponsible and ultimately dangerous game in giving comfort to the rebel régime——
Mr. Peter Tapsell: The hon. Gentleman has made a number of times this point about Munich, which I personally think has some relevance, but,
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as he mentioned, in the same breath almost, my right hon. Friend the Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys) would he not agree that the right hon. Member's record over Munich was second to none?
Mr. Rose: I will not dispute that. I said only a moment ago that he behaved very honourably until recently over Rhodesia. His dishonourable—if I may use that word—behaviour with regard to Munich has started only very recently. I am not condemning the right hon. Gentleman for anything he did prior to recent months. I want to know what prompts this peculiar change of attitude.
I wonder if the party opposite feels that it might obtain some curious political advantage by appearing to be on the side of the white settlers in Rhodesia. I repeat the warning which was given in the Economist on 19th November:
"The Right should take note that Mr. Wilson has gone as far as any British Prime Minister reasonably could—a lot of people will say further—to offer a negotiated settlement to Mr. Smith, but Mr. Smith has spurned it. It is therefore necessary to resort to new measures."
Since then the Prime Minister has gone a lot further because of his desire to effect a settlement and leave no stone unturned to achieve a settlement. Yet hon. Gentlemen opposite still display sympathy towards the racialist r—gime in Rhodesia and are far more willing to impute bad faith to my right hon. Friend than they are to impute it to Mr. Smith. The Economist went on the following week to comment:
"Will the Conservative Party act as it acted in Government and as Mr. Heath, Sir Alec Douglas-Home and Mr. Maudling would act if they were now in Government; or will it, with the exception of an honourable minority, play some silly game?"
We have seen today that the right hon. Member for Barnet is unfortunately prepared to play that silly game. It is not only a silly game but an extremely dangerous one which, I fear, will eventually lead to the polarisation of the world into black and white and the break-up of the British Commonwealth.
If hon. Gentlemen opposite play that game they will never be forgiven by the British people or by the Commonwealth and the world. If they play that game it is to be hoped that at least some hon. Gentlemen opposite will remember their

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party's history, will remember Munich, and will act accordingly by not following their leaders into the Lobby when we vote tomorrow night.
6.12 p.m.
Mr. J. Grimond: This is indeed a tragedy. I was glad and impressed to hear the right hon. Member for Barnet (Mr. Maudling) say that the responsibility for his tragedy lay solely on the shoulders of Mr. Smith. Not only is it a tragedy for this country and Rhodesia and the people concerned, but it is making it very difficult for Britain to pursue the important matters of putting its economy right and getting into the Common Market.
There is a general lesson which we can learn from this experience. It is that we should give up undertaking commitments which we cannot discharge. I was not in favour of invading Rhodesia, but when I am told that it would be impossible for us to do so, then it indeed seems that the whole cost effectiveness of the British defence policy must be called into question. Some of the very people who now say that it is impossible to settle the Rhodesian situation are the people who are keen to take on large and growing commitments east of Suez. I do not see the logic of Britain failing to solve a matter which concerns a quite small number of people and, at the same time, saying to the world that we will take on ever-larger commitments in the Far East.
We should explore how far there is common ground and I was, therefore, interested in the proposals put forward by the right hon. Member for Barnet. I hope that, at some point during the debate, those proposals will be explained further. As I understand it, the right hon. Gentleman is recommending that the present rebel régime should continue in power in Rhodesia in exactly the same form in which it exists today. I draw his attention to the fact that his right hon. Friend the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) is recorded in the Blue Book as having said that the United Kingdom would have to maintain that the declaration—that is, the declaration of illegal independence—had no legal validity, that Her Majesty's Government were not prepared to recognise it and that we would have to emphasise that the Government of
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Southern Rhodesia would be in revolt against the Crown.
It is one thing to carry on certain negotiations with a rebel, but it is another to confirm him in his rebellion. If that is what the right hon. Member for Barnet means, then the House should be clear about it because that would be contrary to the position taken by the Conservative Party up to now on this issue and, I should have thought, contrary to the general tenor of Conservative thinking, which is usually in favour of enforcing the law in all its vigour.
The present Leader of the Opposition said in November, 1965:
"We recognise that it is an illegal Government and that the Government of this country can have no dealings with it."—[OFFICIAL, REPORT, 12th November, 1965; Vol. 720, c. 539.]
Would not this be dealing with it in a very considerable way indeed? It was also the present Leader of the Opposition who stigmatised the Smith régime as a police state. We should, therefore, need some convincing that we should approve of, and put our seal of approval on, the continuation of a police state, even for a matter of months; and I draw the attention of the right hon. Member for Barnet to his own words, when he said, "What was wrong yesterday cannot be right today".
Mr. Maudling: The right hon. Gentleman may not have heard me properly. I said that Mr. Smith would, of course, have to accept the constitutional authority of the Governor, that he would have to do away with the police state, as set out in paragraph 15 of the White Paper, and that the only difference between this and the Government's proposal is the removal of this element of direct rule by the Government, which the Prime Minister denies exists.
Mr. Grimond: I am glad that the right hon. Gentleman has made that clear, but the only element of direct rule is that there should be one representative of Her Majesty's Government on the Council which would advise the Government and that the Governor should be reinstated as the nominal head of the police and armed forces. It is to these points that Mr. Smith has taken exception. I see no reason to suppose that he would agree now to this document—which is called a "working paper"—

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even if these matters, which may or may not be basic to the situation, could be overcome.
Mr. Scholefield Allen: Does not the right hon. Gentleman agree that, with the miracle of swift communications, there is no reason why Ian Smith should not reply, before the end of this debate, saying that he accepts, in the letter and spirit, everything proposed by the right hon. Member for Barnet (Mr. Maudling)?
Mr. Grimond: I agree, but the curious conduct of the Rhodesian Government since the meeting on H.M.S. "Tiger" shakes one's confidence that they would be bound by any agreement or that they know what they are doing. After all, they have been fairly frank about this, since in the earlier discussions Mr. Smith made it clear that if his Government found that advance towards majority rule was going too fast, they would have no scruple in slowing it up. That appears in the Blue Book. This House must be more convinced than it can be today of the sincerity of Mr. Smith and of his ability to carry his Government with him.
I am not at all clear that the right hon. Member for Barnet has faced the difficulties concerning the Commonwealth. I am not one of those who ever thought that the Commonwealth could be an alternative to the Common Market, like many hon. Members did, including some Conservative hon. Members, I have never set myself up as one who believes that the Commonwealth could be a tightly knit political entity. Nevertheless, it has some importance and the Prime Minister has a point when he says that it would be absurd to destroy the Commonwealth for the sake of placating a quarter of a million people embedded in 4 million Africans in Rhodesia.
I am not clear at this stage, if we were to withdraw from the United Nations and accept the proposals put forward by the right hon. Member for Barnet, that the Commonwealth would accept such a state of affairs. I believe that it would not. I think that the Members of the Commonwealth now consider that our Government are bound by the promise made in the comuniqué of the Commonwealth Agreement. But right hon. Gentlemen opposite are better able to
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speak than I am about the probable reaction of the Commonwealth.
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: I may deal with this matter tomorrow. Did not the Prime Minister, in accepting the document, accept it on behalf of the Commonwealth?
Mr. Grimond: He accepted the document on behalf of the Commonwealth only if Mr. Smith accepted it; but Mr. Smith has not accepted it.
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: Mr. Smith and his Cabinet have accepted the document. [Laughter.]
Mr. Grimond: Let us be clear about this.
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: Perhaps I have not made myself clear. Surely the Rhodesian Cabinet has accepted the constitutional proposals in the document.
Mr. Grimond: This is very reminiscent of the 1930s.
Hon. Members: Hear, hear.
Mr. Grimond: A document is drawn up and it is rejected. But then one side says, "It is not all rejected. We accept most of it. We have a few amendments to it, but we accept most of it. We accept the broad issues, but we do not like various things." This is a technique which can go on for a long time. I am extremely doubtful whether we should embark upon it. I agree, of course, that it is a great step forward that Mr. Smith should have accepted the six principles, but I do not think that it was such a good thing that he should have returned to his country and begun issuing a series of statements which gave me the impression that at any rate the rest of his Government repudiated the whole thing, that he was not strong enough to override them, and that he himself has now rejected this document. However, if he is prepared now to go back on it once again, no doubt this will create a new situation.
At the moment the British Government's policy is that sanctions be made mandatory through the United Nations. The House should look rather closely at what this entails, because we have been through this experience before. The League of Nations attempted to impose sanctions against Italy. What happened?

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France and Britain made it quite clear that those sanctions were to be carried up to a point where they would not hurt. They made it quite clear that, if there was any danger of the sanctions escalating to the point at which there might be some hostile reaction from the people involved, they were to be stopped.
This is singularly like the attitude of the British Government today. I should have thought that it was extremely foolish for anyone going into a situation such as this to say in advance what they will not do. I personally hope that we shall not have to use force, but to say in advance that we shall not use force and that in no circumstances do we want to be embroiled in Southern Africa is to tie our hands behind our backs before we start.
What does force mean? We have already got United Nations authority to use force, and we have used it to stop tankers. Force does not mean the invasion of the country involved. It means the effective implementation of the policy of sanctions. If the British Government are serious about sanctions, it is madness for them to say at once, at the very opening stage of the proceedings, "We shall not use force. We shall not hurt anyone who may react".
We know exactly what happened in 1935. The process of sanctions started rather well, because people thought that they were to be enforced. But, when it became apparent that Mr. Hoare and Mr. Laval had no intention of making sanctions effective, the whole thing crumbled like a house built of cards. We were promised by the Government that sanctions would be effective in a matter of months; but they have not been. [An HON. MEMBER: "Weeks."] I am corrected. It was said that sanctions would be effective in weeks, but they have not been. I think that Parliament should have a far firmer assurance from the Government that this time they are determined that sanctions will be effective.
I maintain my view that ineffective sanctions are the worst of every world and that, if we are not prepared to make them effective, it would be much better not to have them and to admit that we are impotent to deal with the Rhodesian situation. Further, have we explored what backing we shall get in imposing sanctions? There are rumours, on the one hand, that America will not back us.
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Then there are rumours, on the other hand, that she is pressing us all the time to go further. Is it conceivable that we have had no soundings before we embark on sanctions? Are we going into this with no plans or strategy for the future? I should find it incredible to believe that had it not happened before. I very much hope that we shall be told that we are to receive support in this matter.
Then there is the question of oil. I should have thought that, as in 1935, a decision in relation to oil sanctions is important if it is desired that sanctions are to have a significant effect on Rhodesia's economy. I am at a loss to know whether the British Government are recommending that oil sanctions be enforced. Again, there is the certainty, as there was in 1935, that there will be an outcry from other countries, and there already is one from Zambia, about the penalties they will have to pay because of sanctions. There is provision in Article 50 of the United Nations Charter for assistance to such countries. I hope that we shall invoke that Article.
What there is not under the Charter is any machinery for the carrying out of the policy of sanctions. I wonder whether it should not be suggested to the United Nations that they might send inspectors to such neighbouring countries of Rhodesia as will accept them to see how this policy is working out.
I have very grave fears that, unless the British Government, first, appear to be far more determined to make this policy work than they have been in their policy of sanctions up to now and, secondly, unless they can rally behind this policy a firm body of world opinion, gradually it will disintegrate; gradually trade will begin to move through the sanctions and not only we but the United Nations will suffer very severe loss of prestige.
Let me look for a moment at the difficulties in regard to South Africa. I find it very difficult to believe that Britain should be more frightened of provoking South Africa than South Africa is of provoking the rest of the world. What sort of people are we? We ape the Churchillian attitudes. The Prime Minister goes off in a cruiser as if it were a world-shaking event. But when South Africa says "Shut up", we shut up. Is that really the British Government's

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position? If so, they had better take off their "SuperMac" clothes and get back into a much humbler station of life. I cannot understand how the Government can contemplate treading this very dangerous path without facing the realities.
I know that it is now unfashionable to make any great appeal to any morals or principles. I would not do this if the British had not already paid endless tributes to their position in the Commonwealth, to their rôle in running a multiracial society, to their belief in the rule of law, and to their belief in democracy. This is the small talk of British politics. If we intend to talk about this, we must do something to enforce it. If we do not intend to carry these principles into action let us say that we no longer believe in the Commonwealth and that we have no power to enforce the principles on which we are supposed to run our country; and let us pull out of the business at any rate of trying to be a world influence.
Although I may seem extremely critical of the proposals put forward by the right hon. Member for Barnet, I would certainly be in favour of their being fully examined. If, as I suspect, the time for them has passed, and passed, as the right hon. Gentleman rightly said, because of Mr. Smith's intransigence and folly, and we are now to embark upon this dangerous course, we must be clear of at least one thing. I think that this course is dangerous. I do not say that because I object to the United Nations having to act. I have always thought that this country was a great supporter of the United Nations. I have always understood that the Conservatives were great supporters of the United Nations and have believed that it should be used to settle international differences. I understand that all that we are doing is asking the United Nations to back up what is our policy of sanctions. This does not seem to be unreasonable, but it has certain dangers. If we are to invoke this policy, let us then be clear where we are going and let us be determined in our efforts this time to make our policy a success.
6.28 p.m.
Mr. Michael Foot: I am sure that there are many of my hon. Friends who greatly appreciate almost everything that the right hon. Member for
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Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grimond) said. The right hon. Gentleman spoke for a great number of people who regard themselves as upholders of liberal ideas in this country. I express my gratitude to him for the way he spoke.
Like the right hon. Gentleman, I want to begin by examining the speech made by the right hon. Member for Barnet (Mr. Maudling), who had many important considerations to put to the House that I think should be seriously studied. The right hon. Gentleman said, first, that we were dealing with probably the last great imperial problem that this country had to face. I think that this is so. That makes it all the more necessary for the reputation of this country that we should deal with this problem properly, that we should make no mistake. If we were to make a mistake in dealing with this problem we might destroy all the credit which this country has built up over years and generations.
Therefore, we must deal with it with the utmost care. That is why some of us find it so strange that the official Opposition do not appear to abide by the principles which they themselves laid down on this issue and which they laid down so specifically in their discussions with the previous régime. I refer hon. Members to the statements which were made by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys) when he was Commonwealth Secretary in the previous Government. In the message which he sent on 7th December, 1963, to Mr. Winston Field, at that time the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, he said:
"The present difficulty arises from your desire to secure independence on the basis of a franchise which is incomparably more restricted than that of any other British territory to which independence has hitherto been granted."
Although we know that there have been changes in that Constitution, and changes in the proposition that was discussed, in my opinion the changes are not so great, and, indeed, the changes accepted by Mr. Smith, are, in some sense in two directions. Although this indicates that Mr. Smith has in a liberal sense made some concessions from the 1961 Constitution—some—it is also true, as my right hon. Friend underlined, that he introduced and insisted upon a braking mechanism which did not exist in the previous Constitution. My right hon. Friend said that

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at the end of the discussions on H.M.S. "Tiger"—and this is the point to which the right hon. Gentleman was referring just now—it was not a case of Mr. Smith accepting in their entirety the whole of the constitutional proposals put forward by the Government, but that he withdrew the offer at the last moment and tried to re-insert into those proposals the same braking mechanism to which my right hon. Friend had objected earlier. Therefore, the Conservative Opposition have to explain to the country why they have departed from that first principle.
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: It is important to establish this point. I understood, and I think the whole House understood, that Mr. Smith and his Cabinet officially notified the Prime Minister—the Commonwealth Secretary can correct me if I am wrong—that they accepted the constitutional proposals in the document.
Mr. Bowden: I will endeavour to explain the position precisely. At the end of the discussions on H.M.S. "Tiger", Mr. Smith said that there were still in his mind three points which he wished to refer to his colleagues. One, that he was still unhappy about the entrenchment of paragraph 37 of section III. So he had returned to his original position. In the statement issued from Salisbury afterwards—after 11 hours' discussion—they did not refer to this particular point but to the other points.
Mr. Foot: My right hon. Friend has underlined what I said. The fact remains that at the beginning of all these controversies, when the right hon. Gentleman and his friends were in charge, they said to the Government of Southern Rhodesia, "Here, you are asking us to give you independence on terms which no British territory for generations has had, and we find that most objectionable." I want to know from the official Opposition why they still do not find that to be objectionable.
I come now to the second point referred to by the right hon. Gentleman. He was asked how much weight he put on the possibility of the effects of the acceptance of Mr. Smith's proposals on the future existence of the Commonwealth. He did not answer that question. I should like to know from the official Opposition, before the end of
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the debate, how interested they are in the maintenance of the British Commonwealth.
I quote further from the same page of the message sent by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Streatham to Mr. Winston Field, and which was repeated by hon. Gentlemen opposite. I quote from paragraph 6, page 7, of the Blue Book, which says:
"If Southern Rhodesia were to be offered independence on a basis which was unacceptable to Commonwealth opinion, not only would Southern Rhodesia's application for membership certainly be rejected, but the unity of the Commonwealth itself might be seriously threatened."
The right hon. Gentleman went on to say:
"The second is a risk which we would be most unwilling to take."
This was before Mr. Smith had declared U.D.I., before he had taken the whole series of measures in defiance of the British Crown. This was before he took the measures mentioned by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Barnet. They were better reasons then for trusting Mr. Smith, if there were ever any good reasons for trusting him. At that time right hon. Gentlemen on the other side of the House said, "Oh no, we can't take this action because we think it would threaten the unity of the Commonwealth itself."
If they believed in sustaining the unity of the Commonwealth at that time, we want to know, before the end of the debate, how much weight they place upon it today, because it appears that they have changed their opinion entirely, that they place very little weight on maintaining its unity.
Mr. Maudling: I do not think the hon. Gentleman could have heard what I said earlier. The answer is quite simple. We propose that the Constitution that should be put to the test of public opinion is the Constitution which, on the Prime Minister's own evidence, falls entirely within the terms of the Commonwealth Prime Minister's communiqué.
Mr. Foot: The right hon. Gentleman must listen to facts. The 1961 Constitution was not so different from the one which is described here. In some respects it was more liberal, and in some respects

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it was less liberal. In my opinion the 1961 Constitution should have been abandoned as a working basis for any negotiation after the declaration of U.D.I. That is my opinion. I am talking about what were the commitments of hon. Gentlemen opposite years ago. I want to know why they insisted upon them then, and why they have abandoned them now.
I come now to the new proposals which were made by the right hon. Gentleman, which of course he put forward with his usual skill and appeal. Some of my hon. Friends might be tempted to bite, but it would be extremely dangerous, in my opinion, partly because of the reply that was given by the Leader of the Liberal Party. The right hon. Gentleman is proposing that a Commission should be sent to Rhodesia even though the Government of that country is still in defiance of the Crown —that is one objection—even though there are no guarantees—and I know that the right hon. Gentleman is asking for them—that they will leave aside all the apparatus of the police state.
But that is not the only objection. What would happen at the end of the period? If we were to accept the right hon. Gentleman's proposal, and Mr. Smith were to accept that a Royal Commission should be sent to Rhodesia to operate, even though the Rhodesian régime has not accepted my hon. Friend's proposal to a return to legality, what would be the position at the end? It would be the same position as was described by my right hon. Friend when he discussed this matter with Mr. Smith. If the Commission reported in favour of Mr. Smith, then that would suit him fine; but if the Commission reported against him, he would continue with his unilateral declaration of independence. He would continue with the same course which my right hon. Friend described when he put the case to him directly. We had the answer today. Hon. Gentlemen opposite do not listen or even try to deal with the facts. What would we do if the Commission went against Mr. Smith? He said, "I would have no alternative but to declare U.D.I. again".
The whole of this proposal is a monstrous piece of trickery. The right hon. Gentleman shakes his head, but he knows as well as I do what would be the effect
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of the acceptance of such a proposition on the British Commonwealth. We all know that the Commonwealth was almost within a hair's breadth of being destroyed at the time of the Commonwealth Conference. We know that commitments were entered into by the British Government; that firm pledges were made. The right hon. Gentleman now suggests that those pledges should be thrown overboard, and that we should place our trust in Mr. Smith even though we have had all these indications of his untrustworthiness. Such action by the British Government would cause something much worse than disappointment—it would spread a sense of betrayal throughout the whole Commonwealth.
I am not sure whether the right hon. Gentleman really intended his proposals seriously, because their acceptance would spread from one end of the Commonwealth to the other a sense that the British Government were not prepared to carry out commitments they had entered into at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference. I believe that the Government are prepared to carry out those commitments. Indeed, if they are not prepared to carry out the most solemn undertakings that were made to the Commonwealth only a few months ago, they have no right to expect that the Commonwealth should continue. One of the things we are debating in these two days is whether the Commonwealth is to continue to exist. We on this side are in favour of its continuance, and we want to know the opinion of right hon. and hon. Members opposite.
That is why I think that our two-day debate is the most important in this House since Suez. If the Conservative Opposition vote against the Government tomorrow night, they will be touching the same depths they touched at Suez—and in spite of the outward look of dissimilarity, there are many points in their attitude that are very similar to their attitude then. There is the same contempt for human rights, the same total lack of understanding of the rights of the people in Africa, the same restless detestation of the authority of the United Nations, the same disregard for the Commonwealth now that it has become a free institution. That is the outlook Conservatives showed on Suez—the same will be revealed in

1429
these debates if they vote against the Government tomorrow.
I believe, therefore, that these are very serious discussions—
Viscount Lambton: Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will answer a very simple question. Does he believe that it would be right for the British Government to vote against the imposition of oil sanctions proposed to the United Nations?
Mr. Foot: I will come directly to that point—because I wish also to discuss the future—but since the right hon. Gentleman had made a new proposal to the House I thought it only right that we should seek to examine it. For the reasons I have given, I think that if the Government were to accept the proposals made by the Conservative Opposition for dealing with the problem—proposals that I think have been advanced much more for domestic political reasons than for any real desire on their part—they might gain some votes on that side, but they would certainly lose plenty of votes on this. That is my opinion of the right hon. Gentleman's proposals.
We have now reached a situation in which we have to deal properly with the subject. I agree here with the hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Viscount Lambton). The Government have now reached a conclusion—though they have reached it very slowly—that they cannot deal with the Smith regime on any basis of trust whatsoever. The Government's good will towards the régime—not exactly their good will, but rather their attempt to solve the problem in an atmosphere of good will—has been betrayed by the Smith régime entirely, and for a reason which many of us on this side have understood from the beginning, and which, I am sure, many members of the Government have understood—the deep-rooted incipient Fascist nature of the regime in Rhodesia. It is a totalitarian Government. The Rhodesian Front was formed for the very purpose of preventing majority rule in Southern Rhodesia.
What the members of that régime have had to do has been to manœuvre to try to prevent the consequences of the situation. They have come forward with one proposal after another, but when we
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have got near to agreement each proposal has been abandoned. When the Government have stepped forward to meet them, they have stepped further back. None of their undertakings were ever carried out—even those given by Mr. Smith in H.M.S. "Tiger". As my right hon. Friend has shown today, one undertaking after another have been broken—and broken, in particular, on this essential matter on which the final breakdown took place.
Here the right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) has a special responsibility. As the Leader of the Liberal Party has said, the right hon. Gentleman and his friends are today proposing another retreat in favour of Mr. Smith's demands. That is what we think, too. It should be understood that the breakdown is not on some minor matter, on some question of procedure, but specifically on the issue of the application of one of the six principles; the principle that any plan devised must be acceptable to all the Rhodesian people. Mr. Smith has tried to escape from the commitment on that point.
The right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire suggests that we should now send a Commission there even though the illegal régime is still in operation. That is a big retreat from what he said in Government. If he looks at his own Blue Book on the matter he will see that what the British Government were proposing for Rhodesia just over two years ago was a referendum. The right hon. Gentleman himself said that a referendum was the best way to deal with this particular point, and I quite agree. But Mr. Smith would not have it. He has moved from it time and time again. Every time there has been an attempt by this Government or by the previous Government to tie him down, Mr. Smith has wriggled out, because the whole purpose of the régime is to escape from the possibility of majority rule in Southern Rhodesia.
The question is whether we will tolerate it, and whether a British Government think they can survive tolerating it or whether we turn to different methods. I am glad that the British Government have turned to different methods, but I am sorry that they have retreated so far. My

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right hon. Friend said that we gave way on point after point. In the earlier discussions there was a proposal that British troops should be put in the country. That was in the earlier document—I am sorry that it has now been taken out.
The Government have made concessions, and I am sure that they made them in good faith, but that makes it all the more discreditable for the official Opposition to pretend that there has been a demand for unconditional surrender. I hope that the Leader of the Opposition will apply his mind directly to whether he supports the view enunciated by the right hon. Member for Barnet this afternoon that what had been demanded was unconditional surrender. It was not unconditional surrender at all. It was almost an appeasing offer that was rejected, and the Opposition know it—that is why there is such division between the Opposition Front Bench and the back benches.
I turn briefly to how we are to carry this policy into effect in future. We must be prepared to carry it through to the end. We cannot have the Smith regime surviving and the Commonwealth surviving—it must be one of them. Some of us said this after the unilateral declaration of independence a year ago. We said: "You have to choose. You cannot have both." We now have to choose even more directly. We have to make sanctions effective. We have to make our commitments to the Commonwealth effective, and even before we go on to sanctions there is something else we must do.
In our commitment to the Commonwealth we said that once we had made the offer to Mr. Smith—this last offer—and it was rejected, and if the sanctions proposals are supported by other members of the Commonwealth, we would agree to the proposition which we have applied in all other British territories, that there shall be no grant of independence without majority rule. We are committed to that and I should like the Government to tell us exactly when that commitment starts. In my opinion it should, in honour, start now.
Suppose the Government were to deny that proposition and say to the House and the world, "We only carry out that commitment if we find that the sanctions
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are supported in the precise way we desire at the United Nations by all the Commonwealth countries. That is the only way in which our commitments come into effect." If the Government said that, they would be in a very pitiful state, because they would be saying to the world," If some Commonwealth countries do not support us in exactly the way we want, we would be prepared in certain circumstances to grant independence before majority rule."
It would be much better for the Government to try to rally the support in the Commonwealth that they came so near to losing. One of the ways they can do that is by making a declaration in this debate that we accept the principle, which almost all the Commonwealth countries required of us at the Commonwealth Conference, that in the case of Southern Rhodesia, as in all previous cases—except South Africa, which has an ominous inference—there shall be no independence without majority rule. That is the first thing we can do right away and the sooner we do it, the better.
The second course must be to make the sanctions fully effective. I agree with what has already been said by my hon. Friend about that. It is an absurdity if the Government say that they will stop short of oil sanctions. It is an absurdity if they say, "We will not carry this sufficiently far to risk a conflict with South Africa." That might cost the country quite a lot, but we should count the cost, tell the country what it is, and be prepared to pay it. If we do not, we shall dishonour ourselves through all history. We must make sanctions effective now.
When we had the discussions after the declaration of U.D.I. some of us said that we thought that the Government were embarked on a very serious course, but we thought that it was the right one. That is the case. I do not believe that it is possible that we shall see the end of this story, and maybe even the end of the regime in Rhodesia, without a confrontation—to use the horrible word—with South Africa.
South Africa is the place of origin of this bestial doctrine, it is the place where it is preached and it is the Mecca from which these doctrines have been sent throughout the world. The idea that we shall invite South Africa's support to

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enable us to carry out our policy in respect of Rhodesia is a piece of sophistication that will never be understood by anybody.
We must go to the United Nations proudly. Hon. Gentlemen opposite will not come with us, but that should not disconcert us. We should say that we have come to the authority which we wish to see more fully established in the world than ever before, that we have no compunction in wanting to see the authority of the United Nations established more widely throughout the world, and that we have come to it to demand that all the countries of the world should come with us in carrying out a policy in defence of human freedom.
That is what we want, and if there are countries that will not come with us we should say, "Very well. We will have to take sanctions against you." If people say, "That will cost you too much money'', I reply that the Government of this country, particularly a Labour Government, cannot reckon the freedom of great masses of African people in terms of £s, shilling and pence. If we did so, I would rather see that Government destroyed than say that to the world.
We must carry through this policy until majority, democratic rule is established in Southern Rhodesia, as we wish to see it established throughout the rest of the world. When we achieve that, it will be a great and proud day in the history of this country and of this Government. That is what we should work for, and if there are people who will not come with us, let them stay behind and preach their racialist doctrines as they will.
Let us go forward and show that a Labour Government in this country can still lead the world.
6.55 p.m.
Mr. Hugh Fraser: The House is always impressed by the sense of urgency and spirit of the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Michael Foot), but there is now emerging under his leadership a considerable number of Members who are delighted that the talks have broken down. That is a sinister and dangerous fact in the situation we face today. That position must give embarrassment to right hon. Gentlemen on the Front Bench opposite and
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to hon. Members who support the Labour Party. It is now quite clear that there is on that side of the House a considerable body that gives three rousing cheers for the failure of the talks.
Mr. James Johnson: That is sheer nonsense. Will the right hon. Gentleman name any speaker on this side of the House, whether in Question Time or otherwise, who has given cause for the statements he is making.
Mr. Fraser: I have just listened to the powerful, logical and sincere speech of the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale.
Mr. Johnson: He did not say that.
Mr. Fraser: It had a logic about it which flowed from that premise.
I hope not to detain the House for long, but I regard this as a very serious debate and one which is made all the more serious by the tragedy of the situation in Rhodesia today. It is a tragedy for which everyone in the House is in some measure responsible. It goes right back to 1923, when the British Government simultaneously declared that in Kenya the interests of the native were paramount and that in Southern Rhodesia a quite different form of constitution was to be imposed. It goes right through the problems of the Central African Federation, and the offer by a previous Labour Government to give independence to Rhodesia in the middle 1940s.
It boils down to the fact that we now have two matters which are incredibly difficult to reconcile: the irresistible argument of principle, if one may call it that, in the mouth of hon. Members like the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale, and, on the other hand, the insurmountable facts of history, in that part of the world. We are faced today with a very grave situation which seemed almost to be resolved a few days ago. The hon. Member for Ebbw Vale is right in saying that the Government's Constitution offer was an advance for Smith's people on the Constitution offered them when we were in office. It is considerably more to the advantage of the Europeans in Rhodesia than was ever offered before. But that is part of the process of history, and part of the history which we ourselves must face.

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We must decide in the House what are our paramount interests, and where they lie today. I believe that the paramount interests of the British people have been confused by some of the situations created by the Prime Minister in his own confusion of the concept of sovereignty—whether or not we are sovereign in Southern Rhodesia, and whether in some mysterious way the rest of the Commonwealth can control that sovereignty through conferences.
That has led to a great many of the difficulties. It led to the position in Lagos, where a ridiculous and dangerous situation was created by the promise that rebellion would be ended in three weeks, and by the Prime Minister's other statement that there would be a return to direct rule. All this has led to a most dangerous situation, a situation which need never have arisen if we had been firm, if the Government had been firm throughout that the matter of Rhodesia was a matter for the sovereign power of this country alone. Once that was abandoned, once we said that other people could intervene, immediately all those forces, which, naturally, perhaps, because of their suffering—their imagined suffering or real suffering—are opposed to the interests of this country, inevitably intervened.
When we go to the United Nations, we shall see the unleashing of those forces against our interests. If right hon. and hon. Members believe that the Foreign Secretary can ride the whirlwind at the United Nations, they have another think coming to them.
Mr. Gordon Walker: If the right hon. Gentleman thinks it wrong to consider the possible splitting of the Commonwealth as a result of all this, will he direct his first attacks on his own Front Bench who asserted that principle when in office?
Mr. Fraser: I am directing my attack at the moment on the one who bears guilt for the immediate situation in which we find ourselves, that is, the Prime Minister, because of his handling of these negotiations.
It is only right that, before the debate proceeds much further, a simple question should be answered by the Government. What has been the cost of sanctions to
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this country up to the present? We have had no specific answer in £s, shillings and pence to that question yet, and I put it again under four heads: first, the direct cost; second, the cost of loss of exports; third, the cost of imports of substitute materials; fourth, the loss of revenue from invisibles. The facts on those matters and others should be put to the British people before they determine what should be done.
Mr. Paget: There is a fifth, and most important of all, the rise in the price of copper.
Mr. Fraser: I shall come to the rise in the price of copper in a moment. Already it has cost this country a great deal of money. I know that the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale thinks that these matters are unimportant, but at this stage, when the whole of our economy is teetering and in danger of collapse, as it has been for two years, they must be the paramount interest of our people.
Mr. Alexander W. Lyon Mr. Alexander W. Lyon(York)
rose——
Mr. Fraser: I am sorry, but I cannot give way. Other hon. Members want to make speeches which, I am sure, will be infinitely better than mine, and I do not want to take too long.
I come now to the situation into which we are moving, the proposal to go forward with two kinds of sanctions, the nature of which has not yet been revealed to the House. Perhaps the details will be revealed by the Prime Minister tomorrow when he addresses us. First, there are to be what are called controlled or limited mandatory sanctions. We do not know precisely what this will mean, but there is grave danger that, if these limited mandatory sanctions, that is to say, sanctions which do not attach to oil, are imposed, the House and the country will face considerable danger. There must be a redefinition of the position of Zambia and of Malawi in regard to these matters.
Let us suppose that the Smith régime, rebellious and illegal though it may be, finds that its patience has become exhausted. The wealth and prosperity of these people is largely agricultural. Let us suppose that they decide that they will cut off the supply of coal to the North.

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Let us suppose that they decide that they will not move copper through. I hope that hon. and right hon. Members have considered this possibility and they realise that Britain depends on 250,000 tons of copper, paid for each year in sterling, from the Copper Belt.
Let us suppose that this supply is cut off. The hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) referred a moment ago to the rise in the price of copper. It has gone up by £40, or perhaps, by as much as £100, over the whole period. It is interesting to note what has happened to the price we have had to pay for the copper we have imported. In the first nine months of this year, we got through 152,000 tons of copper from Zambia costing £53 million. In the first nine months of last year, we got through 186,000 tons, that is, 30,000 tons more, but it cost us £3 million less. Those are significant figures, and I hope their significance is appreciated by those who are watching our economy and who have the employment and livelihood of the people of Britain at heart.
What about the other extension of what could happen at the United Nations? The hon. Member for Ebbw Vale would like to see the pushing of sanctions á I'outrance, that is to say, pushing them to control oil supplies, which would mean a confrontation or an economic war with Southern Africa, Portuguese East and West Africa and, of course, the Union. I know that these are matters of trivial account to the hon. Gentleman, and he is carried away by his exuberant enthusiasm for the matter of principle. I am carried away by my fear for the ordinary people of this country. We should be faced by a switching of gold supply to France and to Zurich. We should be faced with the loss of £200 million or £300 million a year of exports, and we should face——
Mr. Ivor Richard Mr. Ivor Richard(Barons Court)
rose——
Mr. Fraser: Not while I am in full flight. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will stay in his seat for a moment. All right—carry on—I have forgotten what I was about to say.
Mr. Richard: I have been listening to the right hon. Gentleman with great in-
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terest and, if I may say so, a certain amount of disdain. I understand what he is saying as an argument against something, but will he now tell us what it is an argument for?
Mr. Fraser: As the hon. Gentleman deigned to use the word "disdain" to me, I remind him of one of the principles of debate in this place. If the case put forward by the Government can be destroyed—as I think it can be and will be by the people of this country over the next few months—it is the first task of the Opposition to destroy it. The truth of what we say will be shown by what happens when their policy fails in the way we know it will fail. I shall come in a moment to what I believe should be done.
What is intended and proposed by the Government will lead either to the continuation of the expensive farce which has so far cost us, I believe, about £90 million, without any effect, or to economic disaster for this country and in Africa ruination for many of those living in Rhodesia, including the 4 million Africans, and to the building up of a bitterness which will leave its mark on history for scores of years. At the end of it all, nothing will have been achieved. This is the policy on which right hon. and hon. Members opposite are embarked, having failed to see the reason of continuing negotiations.
Having come so far, they should continue to negotiate. A fatal decision was reached at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, first, in the withdrawal of any kind of negotiation after the end of this year and, second, in the insistence on one man, one vote accompanied by a refusal to negotiate further. What my right hon. Friend the Member for Barnet (Mr. Maudling) said today, on the other hand, was not said to win votes from his supporters inside our party. What he said was a genuine contribution to getting out of the impossible morass into which the Government are leading this country.
7.10 p.m.
Mr. A. J. Irvine: I have followed, as has every right hon. and hon. Member over a considerable period, the treatment by the Government of the problem of Rhodesia, and I am bound to say that, from beginning

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to end, I can find very little to fault in it. The Government have shown very great patience and restraint. They have not been ungenerous. If it occurred to one's mind at any point that a proposition made by the Government went marginally too far, it could always be said, on analysis, either that it was tactically sound—in a matter which, after all, was intrinsically a bargaining process—or that it was not persisted in to the point where it could obstruct the prospect of a settlement.
The thing that has interested me in this debate is that the critics have not thus far pointed to a single requirement of the British Government which it was unreasonable to ask the Rhodesians to meet, or to the existence of any demand which brought about the breakdown in the attempt to achieve a settlement. It is, over a considerable period of months, a great achievement by the Government that the critics have not been able to point to a single instance of a lapse or requirement which has been the occasion for breaking down the prospects of a settlement.
The second point which has struck me over these recent months—and I attach great importance to it—is that the exercise of trying to restore legality has not been assisted by the Opposition. It was understandable that there should be differences among them. They divided into three parts—as parties and territories sometimes do. But the important thing is that this prevented an appearance of total unity in this country which would have vastly helped the process of dealing with illegality, and it has seemed to me throughout this controversy for a long time that the Opposition carry a great responsibility for that. In addition, it must be borne in mind that utterances in another place, from certain quarters, have not helped.
The problem of Rhodesia has developed at a time when the Tory Party has lost its bearings and really has not known where it stood. All I am suggesting, without venturing to carry my criticism further than this point, is that the fact that the Opposition was divided, that the Tory Party was at this phase in its history disunited for reasons that can be understood, has been of comfort to Mr. Smith.
Mr. Stephen Hastings: Does the hon. and learned Gentleman suggest that there is unanimity in the country on this issue? Does not he think that the division of opinion in this last year in the Opposition probably more accurately represents the opinion in the country than opinion on his side of the House?
Mr. Irvine: I am not suggesting that there is not in the country some division of opinion upon a matter of this kind as to what should be done. What I am saying is that it is a grievous pity that the House of Commons was not able to present a united front in its attempt to deal with a case of unquestioned illegality, and I would expect reasonable hon. and right hon. Members opposite to acknowledge that it was an undoubted misfortune for the country that that could not occur.
The Government's burden has been that they have had to aim at satisfying the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference while at the same time keeping open the possibility of a settlement. It was quite a remarkable achievement that they came so near to success as they did. One looks at the proposals for a settlement—which, after all, achieved initialling by Mr. Smith and my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister—and sees a substantial degree of generosity on the part of the British Government. There was to be no delay or deferment in the making of an Order in Council permitting the appointment of a Prime Minister. That Order, under the terms of the working document, should, it was agreed, be made as soon as possible. As soon as it was made, the Governor was to invite Mr. Smith to head an interim Government.
There is nothing ungenerous about that, whatever may be said. It may be over-generous. It may be incautious. But no right hon. or hon. Member opposite can suggest that this is an ungenerous proposal. It is a way of treating someone who is at the head of an illegal régime that one would not expect from an oppressive or illiberal Administration.
Mr. Wall: Might not one of the reasons have been that the Prime Minister recognised that there was no other alternative?
Mr. Irvine: It was open to my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, if he had less good sense in these matters, to have taken up a dog-in-the-manger attitude. The point I am on is that he did not do that, and here, in the agreed document, is an acceptance of the suggestion that, after the Order in Council, the Governor should invite Mr. Smith to head an interim Government. All I am saying is that this is a generous proposal to make to a rebel, and I believe that it will be recognised as such by the British people.
It is true that, in the working document, the restored Constitutional Government in Rhodesia was to be based on the 1961 Constitution. It would have been hopelessly irrational—and I invite hon. Members opposite to agree with me on this—to suggest otherwise. If there was to be a settlement, if there was to be a basis of agreement, it could only derive in all reason from a constitution legally established.
It is provided in the working document that new elections were to be held not later than four months from the dissolution of the Legislature. That is reasonable and fair enough, and, of course, the period of four months before the new elections had to be subject to the test of acceptability having been completed in the meanwhile. But that was an inescapable restriction upon any proposal under this head. Any possible delay from that cause, from the failure of the proposal to pass the test of acceptability, was surely implicit in the fifth principle, and that was the principle to which Mr. Smith himself has said that he adheres.
That is my view about these rather tragic matters which have lingered so long, absorbing our attention and concern. In the nature of things, a good deal has been going on about which one could not know anything like the whole story. One has had that in mind in one's reflections on the problem.
What I am bound to say in this connection on this historic occasion is that I find it intensely revealing to study what the reaction of the Salisbury regime has been to proposals which have had the generous and reasonable character which I have described. The statement issued in Salisbury is an appalling give-away. It has revealed to people in this country and to students of this matter the nature
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of the difficulty which has confronted the Government. It has done that more effectively than anything else which I can imagine.
According to The Times, the Salisbury statement says that
"the proposed interim Government would be the Trojan horse to allow British troops to impose a constitution."
We are beginning to learn, are we not, who these people are and what they are like and what their disposition is? The statement says:
"It would be a Quisling government with a tough British proconsul supported by British troops…"
That is pretty offensive language, but that is the language employed in the statement authorised in Salisbury.
Of course, there is not a shadow of evidence to support the view that there is any intention by the British Government to do the kind of things to which the statement refers. I fear that this language shows up much more clearly than anything else could have done what we are up against in dealing with the problem of Rhodesia. If anything could be thought of calculated to strengthen the hand of those who are pressing for extreme measures, it is this kind of language.
Viscount Lambton: Would the hon. and learned Gentleman say that about the language used by the Prime Minister a year ago?
Mr. Irvine: The whole trend of my observations has been to suggest that the Government's handling and my right hon. Friend's handling of this matter has been generous, restrained, cautious and statesmanlike throughout, and that is the contrast which I seek to draw between the Government's proposals and the language and tenor of the statement published in Salisbury.
We are told that the statement was prepared and composed before the Gibraltar talks. Even so—and I think that hon. Members opposite would have difficulty in resisting this conclusion—it is extraordinarily revealing of the state of mind into which the regime in Salisbury has sunk that it should have chosen after the Gibraltar talks to give publicity to such a statement, representing as it does a disposition towards this country and towards

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the Government which on any reasonable and fair view is not warranted by the facts.
The Government's policy in this matter has been right throughout. I cannot fault it. It has had the character of patience. The problem has been intensely difficult and now reluctantly—and of course it is done reluctantly—recourse is had to sanctions. I am bound to say that I regard sanctions against an aggressor as a much more appropriate concept than sanctions applied in an attempt to discipline a rebel régime on British territory. I acknowledge that. This is not the occasion, nor would the House wish me, to pursue the reasoning behind that conclusion. I think that sanctions are much more evidently appropriate for the treatment of an aggressor than for the purpose of bringing down an illegal régime inside the Commonwealth.
Be that as it may, the fact that the ideal, the perfect, weapon is not available for the British Government to bring to bear in the new situation cannot be an excuse for taking no action at all. Therefore, I am entirely prepared to support the action now being taken in the United Nations, and I say that without reservation. In the course of his speech, I asked my right hon. Friend—because even at this stage one cannot entirely exclude the possibility of a change of heart on the part of Mr. Smith—what would be the Government's response to an overt readiness to carry out what are the British proposals within the context of the 1965 constitution.
What was in my mind when I put that question was, among other matters, the point made by the right hon. Member for Barnet (Mr. Maudling) who regretted very fairly the circumstance that in recent days Mr. Smith had thought far more of the Rhodesian Front than he had thought of Rhodesia. One cannot utterly exclude the possibility of a change of heart, although I fear that it is unlikely. One cannot utterly exclude the possibility of a fundamental split in the governing party in Rhodesia. It was this which led me to put my question to my right hon. Friend, and he gave an answer which was not without importance.
In the situation which exists, let me make it clear that I think that the British Government have handled this difficult
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problem admirably from the beginning right up to the present moment. I support the Government in their current action and, with all my right hon. and hon. Friends, trust that the outcome of so much patience and effort may eventually be a solution acceptable to all reasonable men.
7.28 p.m.
Sir Derek Walker-Smith: I propose to follow the line of thought of the hon. and learned Member for Liverpool, Edge Hill (Mr. A. J. Irvine) in only one respect. That is not because I would not like to enter into the constitutional problems and implications set out in the working document; but in a debate such as this, when many hon. Members want to speak, perhaps it is better that I confine myself to only one aspect of this important and tragic matter.
For the rest, in language which the hon. and learned Gentleman will readily understand, I must content myself with entering a general traverse to his claim that the Government have conducted this business admirably from the beginning, as he said, or at all. No doubt others will be able to reinforce the case against that surprising and hyperbolic asseveration on his part.
The matter with which I wish to detain the House is in the context of sanctions and the reference to the United Nations. The hon. and learned Gentleman made one short reference to this, and I thought that the best part of his speech was when he said that clearly sanctions were less appropriate in a case such as this than in the restraint of an aggressor.
I go further than that and say that U.N. sanctions are not appropriate in this case at all. In substance, I make these two points which I will develop briefly. First, the situation here is not one within the contemplation of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and the British Government, in their no doubt understandable anxiety to obtain cooperation for their sanctions policy, have given to the United Nations a jurisdiction which is not appropriate to the circumstances.
Secondly, I say that having done so, the Government have put at risk the power of Britain to control events in what is basically a matter within her own sovereignty. The hon. Gentleman

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the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Michael Foot) made references to the authority of the United Nations. If he will forgive my saying so, the references, though enthusiastic, were singularly imprecise. The jurisdiction of the United Nations is bounded and defined by the Charter and the right to impose economic sanctions by members of the United Nations derives from Article 41, and from that alone.
Article 41 and the whole of Chapter VII, dealing with sanctions and punitive measures, can operate only when an appropriate determination has been made under Article 39. As the House knows, Article 39 permits the Security Council to do this on three grounds. In ascending order of gravity they are, first the existence of a threat to peace, secondly a breach of the peace and thirdly an act of aggression.
In regard to the second and third of those matters, no question arises here. No one has ever suggested that there is a breach of the peace or an act of aggression. The jurisdiction of the Security Council to impose economic sanctions rests entirely upon the determination that there is a threat to peace. This determination was made by the Resolution of the United Nations on 9th April last. It was, the House will recall, a British Resolution, arising immediately from an apprehension then felt regarding the Portuguese supply of oil to Rhodesia.
The British Government had already raised this matter with the United Nations in the Security Council in November of last year, on the basis that the situation at that time was one the continuance of which could be a menace to international peace and security. The Resolution adopted the then Foreign Minister's suggestion that this was the position. Therefore as early as this time last year the Government had paved the way for giving jurisdiction to the United Nations for sanctions or the use of force on the basis of the first of the three grounds in Article 39, namely, the existence of a threat to peace.
My submission to the House is that this is not a situation which is contemplated by Article 39. As the House will appreciate, the other two grounds are easily judged. They are matters of fact —a breach of the peace and an act of
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aggression. The first ground, which is relevant here, is a matter of interpretation and judgment. Article 39, in its references to determination that a threat to peace exists, on which hinges the whole of the right of the United Nations in regard to the imposition of sanctions and the ultimate use of force, can be understood only against the background, not only of Chapter VII but of Chapter VI.
Chapter VI, as the House will remember, deals with pacific settlements of dispute. Reading these two Chapters together, it is quite clear that two assumptions are made before there can be such a determination under Article 39. They are, first, that there is an unsettled dispute, the parties to which are sovereign States; and, secondly, that both parties to such disputes will be heard by the Security Council in regard to the disputes and that the conciliation procedures of Chapter VI have been exhausted. Clearly that is not this case. It could only be the case if Britain accepted, which she does not, Mr. Smith's claim to be an independent sovereign State.
Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: The right hon. and learned Gentleman says that clearly this is not the case, but who is the final court of appeal in this matter, the right hon. and learned Gentleman or the Security Council, which is the arbiter of its own rules? If the Security Council has already said that this is the case, how can the right hon. and learned Gentleman now say that clearly it is not?
Sir D. Walker-Smith: I have said that since the Resolution of 9th April, the Security Council have assumed jurisdiction on a British initiative and it will retain jurisdiction. What I am saying is that there has been a basic misinterpretation of the Charter by this Government in so referring the matter. For that reason, even if it were that reason alone, hon. and right hon. Gentlemen would be justified in voting against this Motion tomorrow night.
These assumptions to which I refer are supported by the terms of the Charter and by common sense. If hon. and right hon. Gentlemen will refer to Article 33 it will be seen that it reads:
"The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security,—"

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and there we see the origin of that phrase—
"shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies, or arangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice."
Of course there have to be two parties to a dispute in order to found a determination under Article 39 and they have to be sovereign States.
There has to be some action or dispute outside of a country's own area of sovereignty. A country cannot constitute a threat to peace by what it does within its own borders. Obviously one could not accept that a country should be liable for the imposition of sanction procedure simply because the conduct of its own internal affairs for example, its attitude to the rule of law or democratic government, made other countries so angry that they felt like attacking it or doing something hostile to them. If that were the criterion the United Nations would be very busy indeed in taking action under Chapter VII, involving some of its more prominent members into the bargain. The position is quite different and quite clear. The Charter goes on the basis of excluding from the jurisdiction of the United Nations matters within the domestic jurisdiction of States.
In an ideal world that might well not be so. In an ideal world, one might say that the United Nations should be able to impose the practices of the rule of law and democratic government in all its member States—and very busy it would have to be. But the Charter takes a practical view and has adopted a practical working rule, consonant with the general facts of life. Article 2(7) says:
"Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII".
So we get this position, that member nations are expected to deal, without recourse to the United Nations, with matters in their own area of sovereignty. That is what countries normally do. Some do it well, decently and liberally. Others do it less well, decently and
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liberally But they assume the responsibility of dealing with matters in their own area of sovereignty.
The Government have abandoned that principle. They have derogated from their sovereignty. They have not made use of the excepting provisions of the Charter. They have turned their back on the challenge to statesmanship which other countries accept to solve the problems which lie within their jurisdiction. Will that enhance their prestige in the United Nations or the world? I should hardly think so.
The unsuitability of the reference to the United Nations can be seen by referring to its provisions. If the matter were within the jurisdiction of the United Nations, it would only be because Rhodesia was a party to the dispute which gave rise to that jurisdiction. As such, Rhodesia would have been entitled to a hearing and to participate in the discussion in the Security Council even though not a member of the United Nations. The House will find that in Article 32 of the Charter:
…any State which is not a Member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute."
Rhodesia is not so entitled. Why?—because it is not as a sovereign state a party in dispute, and not being a sovereign state the dispute is excluded from the jurisdiction of the United Nations as being something within Britain's domestic jurisdiction.
Mr. Robert Maclennan Mr. Robert Maclennan (Caithness and Sutherland) rose—
Sir D. Walker-Smith: There are many other Members who wish to speak. I will give way, but I hope that if Mr. Speaker is inclined to cast reproachful glances he will be good enough to cast them at the hon. Member and not at me.
Mr. Maclennan: I am obliged to the right hon. and learned Gentleman for giving way. He has been attempting to urge that the domestic jurisdiction provision of the Charter precludes United Nations consideration of the matter. But the proviso is clear, that Chapter VII questions are not precluded from consideration. At no time has this matter

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been considered to be susceptible of treatment by the United Nations save under Chapter VII. This was made clear in the Commonwealth Prime Minister's communiqué.
Sir D. Walker-Smith: I am less sorry that I gave way to the hon. Gentleman because he has raised an interesting point and I will answer it as shortly as I can. I read out the proviso. In my view, it is clearly to safeguard the application of procedures where there was a determination under the second and third grounds of Article 39. If I am right in my construction, as I think I must be, it cannot apply to this case because a determination on the first ground can arise only when Chapter VI has been brought into operation and that cannot be so where there is no dispute between sovereign states.
The Government, who the hon. and learned Member for Edge Hill said had conducted the whole matter admirably, patently bungled the reference to the United Nations in November, 1965. They do not even know under what Article the initial reference of November, 1965, was purported to have been made. They have not even said clearly whether it was under Chapter VI or Chapter VII. The Prime Minister said that it was not under Chapter VII; he said that it was a compromise. But the Charter does not provide for that.
What happened was this. They made this reference, presumably under Article 35. Perhaps the Secretary of State can tell us. Apparently he cannot tell us. The reference may have been under Article 35. But the curious fact is that if the Prime Minister said that it was not a Chapter VII reference then it must have been a Chapter VI reference. But if hon. Members look at Article 27(3) they will see that on Chapter VI references the party in dispute may not vote. But Britain did vote. Therefore, the only justification of their vote obviously was that Rhodesia was not a party to dispute and so the Article did not apply.
That brings us to the same inescapable point to which all roads lead back. There was not a dispute in that sense of the word because Rhodesia is not a sovereign state and therefore the matter should never have been referred to the United Nations. We are forced to the conclusion that the Government have misinterpreted
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and misapplied the Charter and have certainly mishandled the situation. We are left with the consequences. They have now said that they have jurisdiction, and they are unlikely to part with it, one would imagine. In those circumstances, we must face the question of what will happen under Article 41.
I have considerable misgivings about that matter and still greater misgivings about the possible application of Article 42. We are told that there are to be selective mandatory sanctions. But I hope that we shall get some more precise elucidation about the procedures than the Secretary of State gave this afternoon. He made lengthy references to the past, but very sketchy references to the future in his long speech. He told us that the resolution would specify precise commodities, although he did not say what the resolution would be. Presumably the resolution can be amended.
Would the Secretary of State or one of his right hon. Friends tell us this: Would any change in or addition to these commodities involve a fresh resolution under Article 41? Does such a resolution require the concurring votes of the permanent members under Article 27(3)? In other words, is there a power of veto or not? The hon. Lady the Minister of State, Commonwealth Affairs, should take note of these points. The House will expect an answer on them. Would Britain be in a position to veto any unwanted addition? Perhaps we can be told that. Perhaps we can also be told whether they have the power to do so, although I must say that I ask questions relating to the interpretation of the Charter without great confidence having regard to the Government's record in this matter. Will they say whether they think they have the power and, if they have, whether there are any commodities, and, if so, which, in respect of which they would be prepared to use their power of veto?
Article 41 does not prescribe any machinery for the application of economic sanctions. There is no equivalent to the Military Staff Committee, which is prescribed in regard to military sanctions. Is there any such machinery? May we be told that? The enforcement procedures depend on legislative action being taken in each independent state. The Secretary

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of State, who was good enough to give way to me during his speech this afternoon, made it clear that there were considerable difficulties in getting legislation passed in the independent member countries of the United Nations. These are very slow and uncertain processes.
The House will have observed what The Times said about that this morning:
"The difficulty will be to keep Governments in line during a process which is bound to be long—and still more, to keep their nationals in line… Some of these are countries which, over the past year, have given lip service to the boycott of Rhodesian goods, but little more. If that is to change, the United Nations will have to devise means for checking the effectiveness of its measures."
What are those means? Has the Foreign Secretary gone with a blueprint to suggest how the methods of enforcement can be improved? I can envisage a situation in which we may be left with the worst of all worlds: no settlement with Rhodesia, and substantial and permanent loss of British trade to nations in the category which The Times has described.
My apprehensions in regard to Article 42 are still graver. Article 42 gives to the Security Council the right to decide to use force if economic sanctions have proved to be inadequate. That is the test in Article 42, that and no more; there is no definition of it, no reference to any reasons for inadequacy.
If what The Times complains about goes on, if there is widespread evasion of sanctions and if there is great delay in enforcing them, sanctions will be inadequate. What will be the position then? Would not Britain be compelled to join in the use of force under Article 42 because other countries had defaulted in the application of economic sanctions and, in so doing, had taken from Britain unto themselves the trade that used to be ours? Is that not a paradoxical situation? Is it not a Gilbertian situation? But is it not a possible situation? May it not even be a probable situation?
What safeguards have we against these matters? [HON. MEMBERS: "The veto."] Of course. The veto would be our one safeguard. Clearly, as a permanent member, Britain has a right of veto under Article 27. Therefore, the questions to which we want answers are simpler. There is no need to ask whether we have the power. We have it. The other ques-
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tion is the important one: would the Government use the power? Could they logically use it? That would be their difficulty, whatever their feelings.
Would it not be argued in this way, perhaps, by other members of the Security Council? It could be said that Britain had asked for the economic sanctions and that where economic sanctions are inadequate, the Charter specifies force as the next step under Article 42. How then, might they not say, could Britain use the veto? Those are the dangerous waters into which we are now entering. Anybody with imagination and foresight cannot but feel disturbed at the prospect that lies ahead.
I believe that the reference to the United Nations, as I have sought to show from the text of the Charter, was misconceived in its origin. I believe that it gives rise to the possibility of considerable economic detriment, not only to Rhodesia, but to this country as well and to other friendly nations. I believe that it is fraught with a graver and, it may be, an inescapable hazard for the future.
In the lamentable event of resort to force, there will, I believe, be no victors as between Britain and Rhodesia. Both will lose irreparably thereby. The only beneficiaries——
Mrs. Anne Kerr Mrs. Anne Kerr (Rochester and Chatham) rose——
Sir D. Walker-Smith: —of the use of force will be the evil things in the world —extremism, violence, privation and suffering. Those will be the things which will follow from resort to force.
An hon. Member this afternoon said that he believed in force of a limited nature. Those words have been used before, but they have rarely come true. It is quite unrealistic to think that such things can be contained within a narrow compass. We know on high authority that those who take to the sword are liable to perish by the sword. [HoN. MEMBERS: "Suez."] I do not propose at this stage to argue Suez but suppose that hon. Members opposite are right in the view they take. Why should they then repeat what they say was an error made by the Conservative Government? Surely, that would be an unstatesmanlike and illogical approach.
Mrs. Anne Kerr Mrs. Anne Kerr rose—
Sir D. Walker-Smith: I am sorry. The hon. Lady will understand that I have given way earlier, and I am just finishing and do not want to take up more time.
That is the prospect that opens up before us. But even if sanctions succeed, even if we get round all these hazards and overcome all these difficulties, we still have the unsatisfactory position that only two courses are then open. Either Britain will have to grant immediate independence based on majority rule, for which it is generally agreed that the Rhodesians are not yet ready, although they soon will be. We would be in danger of reproducing a mirror image of the Congo situation. That is something which must give pause to all thinking people.
The other alternative is that if there was to be any waiting period before full independence with majority rule, Britain would have to go back to the exercise of colonial rule from Whitehall. [An HON. MEMBER: "Quite right."] An hon. Member says, "Quite right." That is quite unrealistic after 40 years. We cannot put the clock back. There would be no viable machinery for so doing. Therefore, we get the position that even if sanctions succeed, even if we avoid all these difficulties, we still do not have a satisfactory solution at the end of it.
Surely, those circumstances being so, it would be far wiser, even at this late hour, to take the course which my right hon. Friend the Member for Barnet (Mr. Maudling) suggested this afternoon and see whether we cannot get a satisfactory settlement which would avoid these difficulties and serve well the future of the Commonwealth.
7.57 p.m.
Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: The right hon. and learned Member for Hertfordshire, East (Sir D. Walker-Smith) referred in one of his phrases to the "highest authority". I remind him that the same highest authority also enjoined us to remember that
"Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me."
This is really the fundamental moral problem that is before us in this debate.
This is the most dangerous situation which has faced us since Suez. Every-
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one who goes into the Lobbies tomorrow night must recognise that whatever course is taken in this situation is fraught with danger. Equally, this is probably the greatest moral issue that has faced us since 1939. I listened with great attention to the words of the right hon. Member for Stafford and Stone (Mr. Hugh Fraser) and also to the words of the right hon. and learned Member for Hertfordshire, East. If, however, their attitude had been typical of the Members of the House of Commons at the time when Hitler invaded Poland, every one of the considerations which they have moved would have moved the House at that stage.
We decided in 1939 that there were other things that were more important in life than the financial considerations of our future actions. Because we believed that there were moral considerations which were important in our deliberations, we led the country towards even the use of violence against what we thought was a common enemy. We succeeded because the House gave a united lead to the country at a moment of real moral dilemma. If the country had not been faced with that united lead from the House, it may be that even in 1939 there would have been a split in the country, and a debility in its will to resist, and I suggest that at this moment we are facing a somewhat similar situation.
I believe that the Government have leaned over backwards to try to accommodate Mr. Smith and to try to reach a settlement. Indeed, they have leaned rather further than I would have wanted. They have leaned so far that I cannot see in this document any copper-bottomed guarantees for unimpeded progress towards majority rule, and what astonishes me is that Mr. Ian Smith did not seize the opportunity at this moment to take his independence on the terms which were offered, and in two, three, or four years, decide to rat on the whole Constitution and get round the entrenched clauses by the use of force. It would seem to me that we would have had no opportunity to intervene at all. But he has not done that. He has been given almost everything that he could have desired, and still he has failed to swallow the gnat, having taken the camel.
Why did he stop at what has been called this last technicality? Surely it

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can only be a technicality because he and those who support him were determined that there should never be an agreement, and they simply wanted to break off negotiations at the point which would look best in the eyes of the world?
I was interested last night to read the comment by the Evening Standard's correspondent in Salisbury. He said that the dispute in the Cabinet on Monday morning had taken so long because Mr. Smith wanted the Right-wingers to accept the Constitution, but to break off simply on the method of handover, the method of establishing legality. Why? The answer is that he knew that if he broke off negotiations on the basic conditions of what the Constitution would be like under independence he could have no support in this House, but that if he broke off negotiations on what could be interpreted as a mere technical difference, there would be the inevitable cries from hon. Gentlemen opposite that we should have gone on yet further to prolong the agony in Rhodesia, simply to keep putting off the, in my view, inevitable resort to the United Nations.
There must come a time when hon. Members in this House have to make up their minds about where they stand. We cannot for ever go on with this shilly-shallying about terms and conditions if it is plain, as in my submission it is, that the Rhodesian Cabinet will never accept any settlement which could commend itself to this House. I therefore ask those on the benches opposite who had grave reservations at the time when we were discussing economic sanctions earlier this year to think again about their position. I do not appeal to their military records, as my right hon. Friend did this afternoon. I appeal simply to their consciences. This is a moral issue, and those who go into the Lobby against the Government tomorrow brand themselves as having accepted the inevitable stigma that they were failing at the moment when a moral issue had to be decided. I ask them to reconsider this matter of opposing the Government.
What is it that brought about this final end to negotiations? Was it really simply a technicality? It was that for a period of four months Mr. Ian Smith would still be in control of affairs in Rhodesia. He would
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still be the Prime Minister of that country. He would still be the head of a Cabinet in which the majority were Ministers of the present Cabinet. He would have to take into the Cabinet only two African members, who could in any event be outvoted. There would be no British military presence, even in this period of changeover, and during that time he would be subject, really, to no control from this country. As my right hon. Friend made clear this afternoon, there was no intention that the Government in Westminster would be able to dictate to the Government in Rhodesia through the Governor, but simply that they may take a hand in the choice of the five new members of the Cabinet, which in any case had already been agreed. Beyond that there would be no interference in the affairs of Rhodesia, even in this change-over period.
Why did they refuse to take the gnat? Simply, I suggest, because this was a crucial test of their good will. This is the point. It is not a technicality. If we are to trust Ian Smith and his Cabinet to go into independence to rule over the destiny not only of 200,000 Europeans, but of 4 million Africans who owe their future to us, if we are to decide now whether they ought to have this responsibility, we must be shown some earnest of their good faith. All that we asked was that Mr. Smith should give up the outward pretence of independence for four months, and after that he would go into a Constitution which could give him all that anyone could reasonably expect him to get.
During that period up to four months there would be no intervention by the British Government, no presence of military troops, and therefore throughout that period he could always say, "No, I go back on my word, I want another U.D.I." We would have taken off economic sanctions, and it would have been very difficult to put them back again. This is all that we required. We required one little sign that he really meant it when he said that he had the interests of Rhodesia as a whole at heart. If we had been given a sign, there would have been an agreement now, an agreement which I would have had to accept with misgivings, but there would have been an agreement.
Can we really say that this was a mere technicality? Can we go forth to the

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country and mislead the electorate into presuming that there was any course other than the one which the Government have decided to take? I do not believe that we can. Indeed, I thought that we should have gone further, and I still think that we should. I believe that this is such an important moral issue that we must be clear that we must win in this fight, and we must win for the future standing of this country.
If we were to do nothing, as some hon. Gentlemen opposite hope we shall, we would lose our standing in the world. I remember in July of this year going to a Conference of the World Council of Churches in Geneva. There were representatives from every nation under the sun, save three. There were present people who held important positions in their countries, in business, in politics, in Government, and in administration, and yet the unanimous view was that there was only one touchstone to our standing in the world, and that was how we handled this problem of Rhodesia. I believe that we may, indeed, suffer grave financial consequences by taking on Southern Africa, but we shall suffer very grave consequences if we fail to do our duty there.
I therefore say to the Government that they have to decide which course will most effectively bring about the result which they require, namely, the downfall of the régime. There seem to be only two. One is the course of mandatory sanctions. It is suggested that they should be selective mandatory sanctions, in order to exclude South Africa, but can they be effective? I doubt it. In my opinion they can be effective only if we take on South Africa. If we take on South Africa, as has been pointed out so many times by hon. Members opposite, we involve ourselves in an economic war which will be gravely damaging to our own economy. We must therefore ask ourselves: is this moral principle worth that cost?
But cannot we also ask ourselves whether there is another way in which we can enforce the sanctions that we have been applying? Is there no way in which we can cut off the lines of communication between South Africa and Rhodesia? Is it not possible at this stage to mount the kind of military force which would be required in order to
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see that Rhodesia was sealed off from the outside world? If this is now possible, whatever the cost, should not we weigh that cost against the cost of economic sanctions which might involve South Africa? Is not this a practical alternative which should be considered? I suggest that it might be. If the Government came to the conclusion that in those circumstances military force was more dangerous and more expensive than mandatory sanctions I would accept their conclusion and would be only too willing wholly to endorse this appeal to the United Nations to use mandatory sanctions.
If they were to decide to use force it would please me more if that force was under United Nations supervision. I would prefer that we acted within the scope of the Charter even in using military force. But I leave that as an alternative before the Government. I am convinced that this is an issue which we cannot shirk. This is an issue in respect of which economic considerations are important but not paramount. What is paramount is our whole future position in Africa and, more important, the whole future of the Africans who live in that benighted Continent.
8.13 p.m.
Mr. John Biggs-Davison: The hon. Member for York (Mr. Alexander W. Lyon) has spoken with great candour and sincerity. I ask him, however, not to say, or to believe, that because hon. Members on this side of the House may disagree with him they are devoid of any moral principles in this grave matter. In the early part of his speech he said that this was a very serious situation. When he said that it was perhaps the most serious situation since 1939, I thought that he was saying something rather far-fetched, but later on, as he developed his argument, he made it clear that he was willing to face warlike operations in Southern Africa. At least he has stated his position very frankly and has accepted the dire consequences that this would involve for his constituents, for my constituents, and for us all.
But very terrible would be the consequences for those African people in whose welfare he is particularly interested. He said that the Africans of Rhodesia

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look to us and owed their future to us. That sounds all very well, but there has never been a time when the trusteeship of this country for Rhodesia has been effective. The Rhodesian rulers themselves have always been responsible for the welfare of the Africans. When we had those reserve powers in earlier times —including the power to uphold the rights of the Africans—they were never invoked by any British Government, Conservative or Labour. I am speaking of the time before Federation.
When we talk bravely about the Africans of Rhodesia owing their future to us we must remember that it is precious little aid that this House has ever voted for the Africans of Rhodesia. We have probably voted more aid to Yugoslavia than to these people for whom we claim responsibility. The very high standard of living, of education and of conditions of work that have been achieved in Rhodesia—they are not perfect, but for Africa they are very good—[Interruption.] If anyone doubts that, let him study what U.N.E.S.C.O. has to say about the Rhodesian achievement in education. This has been achieved by a very small European community.
I now want to turn to the present and the future. I predict that sooner or later, however unpalatable it may be to some hon. Members, the House will recognise the fact—I am not speaking in terms of jurisprudence—of Rhodesian independence. This fact has been asserted in a judgment of the High Court in Salisbury. The Commonwealth Secretary referred to the High Court. It has never been impugned; its integrity is unassailable. Mr. Justice Evans said that this illegal regime which had seized power in Rhodesia was the de facto Government of Rhodesia. Despite sanctions—or perhaps because of sanctions— Mr. Ian Smith still heads this illegal but very real Government.
The Prime Minister has said many things about Rhodesia. Sometimes they have been contradictory. I do not know whether it was the tossing of the "Tiger" or the fact that his knowledge of Africa is not very deep—I believe that in his one visit to the continent he did not go very far from Government House in Salisbury—but I was astonished to hear
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the words he uttered in the House on 5th December, when he said:
"I feel also that it is not much that we have had to ask the regime in Rhodesia—not to give up anything of value, not to give up independence, because it has no independence, but to give up a titular independence which they and they alone believe in. It is a delusion from which they suffer."—[OFFICIAL REPORT. 5th December, 1966; Vol. 737, c. 1078.]
Any hon. Member—on either side of the House, and whatever his opinions—who has been to Rhodesia recently knows that this independence is a fact and not a delusion. They are in control of the situation and it is our power to influence them which is so pitifully limited at present.
The Minister of State, Commonwealth Affairs (Mrs. Judith Hart): I must correct the hon. Member on two points. First, he will agree that the judgment of the High Court in Salisbury was that the regime might be de facto but it was not de jure. Secondly, in the passage from my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister's speech which the hon. Member quoted he made it clear that no country in the world has recognised the illegal régime.
Mr. Biggs-Davison: I do not know what the hon. Lady was correcting me about. I quoted from the judgment of Mr. Justice Evans that this was an illegal régime and a de facto Government. I said that I was not entering into the de jure aspect of the situation. It is true that it has not been recognised by a single sovereign State—although the retention of certain diplomatic and consular officials in Salisbury could be considered by some people as some sort of recognition. But I do not disagree with anything that the hon. Lady has thought it necessary to put to me.
In Rhodesia, I was informed—and I think that others may have been informed on the same thing; it is very difficult to check—that not only has Mr. Smith, through this period of sanctions, gained in support from the Europeans—and my right hon. Friend the Member for Barnet (Mr. Maudling) told us how most liberal people would rally to Mr. Smith if there were any question of direct rule—but also that he is gaining African support at the same time. This is very difficult to verify. I am not referring to the opinion of the Indaba about independence, but it is a

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reasonable assumption that, because this régime has removed from the townships and the tribal areas the very brutal political terrorism which made the lives of ordinary people wretched, admittedly at the price of one in 10,000 of the population being in detention or restricted——
Mr. William Hamilton: That is what Hitler said.
Mr. Biggs-Davison: This is the price which has been paid for ending the rule of the bicycle chain and the petrol bomb.
An hon. Member referred to the closing by this régime of churches and schools because they were in the wrong places, but the stuff of politics for the Z.A.P.U. and Z A.N.U. was the burning of churches, schools and clinics. This is why it may be the case that there is a certain increase of African support for Mr. Ian Smith's régime——
Mr. Whitaker Mr. Whitaker rose——
Mr. Biggs-Davison: I am only trying to lay before the House certain impressions which I gained in Rhodesia and which I think may interest the House——
Mr. Cyril Bence: The hon. Gentleman is telling the House of information given to him in Rhodesia. I was in Salisbury with the right hon. Member for Leeds, North-East (Sir K. Joseph) six years ago with another group of M.P.s and we were assured by members of the dominant party and members of the Salisbury Government that the then Commonwealth Secretary, the right hon. Member for Enfield, West (Mr. Iain Macleod), was, to their certain knowledge, a secret member of the Communist Party and directed from Moscow.
Mr. Biggs-Davison: This is great fun, but I am not sure that it is germane to my argument—[Interruption.] One must weigh up the information which one receives from different sides and try to get the best picture one can.
There is something else of importance here. Hon. Members know of these groups, who are called terrorists by one side and freedom fighters by the other, who infiltrate across the Zambesi. This started before U.D.I., but it has been going on since. Some of these guerrilla fighters have been captured by security
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forces who have found on their persons pamphlets by such dignitaries of the Communist world as Mao Tse-Tung and his "Number 2", Marshal Lin-Piao. It was Mao Tse-Tung who said that, in a people's war, one should draw one's soldiers from the peasantry of the country one intends to liberate. The guerrilla groups can then move safely and freely in their own element, like fish in the sea.
What is happening in Rhodesia—this is beyond dispute—is that these subversive groups crossing the Zambesi are having no success whatever. They are not fish in the sea but fish out of water, because the African people of Rhodesia are against them. This is another factor which we must keep in mind. I suggest that there is a degree of African support for the present system in that country——
Mr. James Johnson Mr. James Johnson rose——
Mr. Biggs-Davison: It would be impossible for perhaps a quarter of a million Europeans to hold down this African population if there was no degree of government by consent. These groups are well-armed, well-indoctrinated and well-trained further north in Africa. If the African population really were seething with discontent, I am sure that they would be able to build a basis of revolt, as we have seen in other parts of the world, such as Vietnam——
Mr. Sydney Silverman: Would the hon. Gentleman not agree that the de facto claim for the validity of the Smith régime which he is making could have been made throughout the last part of the war by Hitler for his rule over the greater part of Europe, at a time when we were appealing to the people subject to that rule to rise in revolt against him? Would he have accepted Hitler's claim to being a validly created de facto Government throughout the years of the war?
Mr. Biggs-Davison: I do not think that the parallels—[HON. MEMBERS: "Answer."] I am trying to answer. The parallels are not at all exact. What I am trying to say is simply that here we have a de facto but illegal régime which is in control of Rhodesia and which has a degree of popular support. It has a state of emergency, but what State in Africa has not a state of emergency——
Mr. Sydney Silverman: So had Hitler in Germany.
Mr. Biggs-Davison: But we are not proposing to have a crusade to destroy every Government in the world which is using repressive power——
Mr. Michael Foot: We are responsible for Rhodesia.
Mr. Biggs-Davison: I merely think that it is proper for us to consider the fact of power in Rhodesia today and the very limited ability which we in this House have to influence—alas—what is happening there——
Mr. Sydney Silverman: Would the hon. Gentleman not make an effort to realise that what is being said to him is this—that a Government which manages to maintain a de facto régime on the basis of a denial of all human rights is not making a claim which would be recognised by anybody in the House except himself?
Mr. Biggs-Davison: I am making no claims and no moral judgments—[An HON. MEMBER: "It is a moral judgment."] I am merely asserting that this is a de facto régime. Those Powers in the United Nations to which right hon. and hon. Gentlemen are willing to submit the question of this particular illegal regime have, in many cases, Governments far more repressive than anything which has happened in Rhodesia—[An HON. MEMBER: "Canada, Sweden?"]The double standards which apply in the United Nations and have been applied to this question throughout this tragic time are, of course, explained by the fact that the Southern African complex of which Rhodesia is a part is a main target in the struggle in the world today.
Many of the Powers which are now so interested in extending this internal British matter to an all-out war against South Africa are doing so not because they care tuppence about the welfare of anyone in Rhodesia but because—[An HON. MEMBER: "That applies to us."] I am not referring to hon. Gentlemen here but to people and Powers outside this House—the Powers which exploit the difficulties and instability and immaturity of African States. Their target is Southern Africa, because the wealth and
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strategic situation of Southern Africa is a crucial fact of power and survival.
As Mao Tse-Tung also said—if I may be permitted another quotation from him—"Once Asia and Africa are separated from the capitalistic centres of Europe, the European continent will completely collapse economically."
Several Hon. Members Several Hon. Members rose——
Mr. Biggs-Davison: Although I have given way a good deal, I will not use that as an excuse for speaking at greater length and for using the time which other hon. Members are anxious to have. Our power in this matter is strictly limited. That has been confessed by the Government because they have shuffled off their responsibilities. However, the longer the situation goes on and the longer we delay talking again and trying to reach an honourable solution with these people who hold the power in Rhodesia, the more we shall lose of our trade and influence.
I say that we will lose our influence because some hon. Members have been speaking as though Rhodesia were South Africa. I suggest that some hon. Members are burning to take on both Rhodesia and South Africa, but they should not make the mistake of thinking that they are the same thing. Responsible Government came in Rhodesia because the electors of that country voted in a referendum to remain separate. One need only talk to Europeans in Rhodesia to discover that while they like to take their holidays in South Africa, they do not want to live there. They prefer the British type of institutions which have been developing in Rhodesia and which are endangered, together with all liberal tendencies in that country, by the continuation of economic and psychological warfare against them.
It is distressing for an Englishman in Rhodesia today to find the extent of anti-British sentiment, directed not just against the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister and his Administration but now unfortunately against Britain.
Mr. Bence: That has been the case for a long time.
Mr. Biggs-Davison: If the hon. Gentleman wishes to intervene he should rise to his feet to do so. At least I am glad

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he shares my sorrow that today in Rhodesia—a country which has been conspicuous in the past for its devotion to Crown and Commonwealth; proved in war and peace—young people are beginning to tear the Union Jack from the corner of the Rhodesian flag and once again the possibility of a republic is being mooted.
When we think of a republic in this connection we may think also of the first U.D.I.—the U.D.I. of the U.S.A. [Interruption.]—and, in this comparison, I am merely saying that in that case the British Parliament also thought that it had the power to dispose of the future of that territory but found that it did not have that power. One of the reasons for the American Revolution was that our predecessors in this House thought that they could reserve all that continent west of the Alleghenies for the native population. It was a good idea, but they were unable to impose their will. We are deceiving ourselves if we think that we shall be able to impose our will in this matter.
Either mandatory sanctions through the United Nations will be a catastrophe, because to make them effective we will drift into a warlike situation—which would be disastrous for the world and certainly for Britain—or they will just be a charade and will only have the effect of making the present rulers of Rhodesia the more determined to assert their position; and extremism there will be given more and more opportunity.
In the matter of the earlier U.D.I., Chatham said:
"You may ravage but you will not conquer."
I believe, and hon. Gentlemen opposite will regret very much, that those words are applicable today.
8.34 p.m.
Mr. Ivor Richard: hope that the hon. Member for Chigwell (Mr. Biggs-Davison) will forgive me if I do not follow him into some of his constitutional byways. It seemed that the burden of his speech—as of all his speeches on Rhodesia since the crisis startedw—as that this country and the present Government should make what he pleases to call a de facto illegal régime a de jure legal one, something which my hon. Friends have never been prepared to accept and, I hope, will not accept tonight.
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I very much regret that Mr. Ian Smith and his Government thought fit not to accept the considerable concessions made by Her Majesty's Government last weekend. A settlement would clearly have been desirable, and I do not share the feeling of some of my hon. Friends, astonishing though it is, of pleasure at the fact that the negotiations broke down. This is a sad debate. There are difficult 'decisions to be taken. Difficult times clearly face this nation. If they are to be dealt with, with the courage and with the resolution that the decisions demand, the one thing which must happen is that in the House of Commons Her Majesty's Opposition make their position as crystal clear now on this issue as they did some years ago.
My hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Michael Foot) quoted some words which the right hon. Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys) used in December, 1963. I should like to go just one higher and quote from a message dated 20th May, 1964, from the then Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home), to the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, the Hon. Ian Smith, M.P. I am very pleased to see the right hon. Member for Barnet (Mr. Maudling) here, because I hope that he will note this phrase. Perhaps somebody on the other side of the House in the course of the next few days will give us the reasons for this compelte change of heart on the part of the Conservative Party.
The right hon. Gentleman who was then Prime Minister wrote to Mr. Ian Smith in these words:
"Towards the end of your letter you ask me to explain why the British Government is unable to grant independence to Southern Rhodesia."
The right hon. Gentleman then went on to quote the message from the right hon. Member for Streatham, which said:
"The present difficulty arises from your desire to secure independence on the basis of a franchise which is incomparably more restrictive than that of any other British territory to which independence has hitherto been granted."
The right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire went further. He then wrote these words, and I hope that right hon. and hon. Members opposite realise that it was the Prime Minister of their

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Government and of our country who wrote them:
"Having dealt with the questions in your letter, I want you to know that I fully understand the desire of the people of Southern Rhodesia to achieve early independence. With this in mind I venture to suggest that you might consider the possibility of initiating some new proposal."
What was the new proposal? It was this:
"While not going so far as extreme African opinion in Southern Rhodesia is demanding, you could perhaps offer a sufficient advance to provide the basis for a compromise settlement in which all might be persuaded to acquiesce. I need not tell you that the British Government… will be glad to help in any way they can to bring about a generally acceptable solution."
So it would appear that in 1963 and 1964 not only were the then Government not prepared to grant the then Government of Southern Rhodesia independence on the basis of the franchise as it then was, but they themselves were demanding substantial increases in African representation before they would consider it. But we have heard nothing today from the right hon. Member for Barnet as to the necessary increases in African representation which he considers necessary and which his party considers necessary before that independence ought to be granted now.
Not a word have we heard from the right hon. Gentleman. All we have heard from him and all we have heard from his party has been an attack on the Government based, as I understood it, on two main grounds—first, that somehow the Government's conduct in the negotiations was wrong and, secondly, that the decision to go to the United Nations was also wrong. I cannot go into the second point now in any great detail, because of the shortage of time, and also because the right hon. Member for Barnet raised what at first sight seemed rather attractive new proposals. It is therefore only right that one should consider what the right hon. Gentleman said, examine it in the light of past history, and see whether it is in advance on anything which has gone before.
I find the Opposition's attitude tonight thoroughly irritating, for two main reasons, although I realise that it is part of the business of an Opposition to irritate. All of us on this side realise that. I have no doubt that some of my right
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hon. and hon. Friends when they were in opposition were equally irritating. I hope that, irritating though they may have been, they had a much greater degree of what the other side would probably be pleased to call "patriotism" than has been shown in some of the things which have come from the other side of the House this evening. It is obviously essential that the Opposition should get off the fence and make their position crystal clear, which they have not done so far.
The right hon. Gentleman attacks us. He says that the imposition of a deadline, an ultimatum, in the course of the negotiations, was wrong. But there was no movement at all until the deadline was imposed. There was no concession from Mr. Smith until what the right hon. Gentleman is pleased to call the ultimatum was delivered. Without the deadline, without the ultimatum, this debate would not be taking place. We would still be in the same position as we were in some months ago. We would still have voluntary sanctions, the Commonwealth would still be crying for mandatory sanctions, and we would be in the position of having to go to the United Nations for those mandatory sanctions without first having had an opportunity to make a last attempt to settle this unfortunate dispute. I suggest that there is precious little in that line of attack.
Secondly, it seems to be argued that we took too much account of Commonwealth opinion in the course of the negotiations. I fail to understand how the right hon. Gentleman can now so disregard the position of the Commonwealth. He is now telling the Government what they ought to do at this stage. Does he not realise the danger which the Commonwealth was in at the time of the last Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference? Does he not realise the pressures that were upon the Prime Minister at that time?
Mr. Maudling Mr. Maudling rose——
Mr. Richard: The right hon. Gentleman has interrupted twice on this already, but on neither occasion did he deal with the point. All he said was that, however inconvenient it might be, his scheme was within the six principles which the Commonwealth had accepted. But does he really believe that, if we go back and

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try to negotiate on the basis of his suggestion, there will not be a violent reaction from the Commonwealth? Of course there will be. It will be of the kind that I do not really think the Commonwealth will be in a very strong position to withstand.
Mr. Maudling: Could I say once again that what I was suggesting this afternoon was designed to bring about in Rhodesia an independence Constitution of a character which in the view of the Government would be acceptable to the Commonwealth.
Mr. Richard: But those negotiations have to take place now, at a time when the Commonwealth Prime Ministers have already met, and when there was an agreed Commonwealth communiqué—I think the hon. Gentleman will agree with this—which the Government had to accept or face the break-up of the Commonwealth. We cannot now come along, after the deadline, produce another set of negotiating principles, and expect the Commonwealth not to be placed under a severe strain. Of course, it will be. The hon. Gentleman must surely realise as well as any hon. Member the effect that would have upon the Commonwealth.
The right hon. Gentleman gave the House new suggestions for settling this dispute. What were they? I gathered they were about three in number: first, that Mr. Smith should recognise the Governor; secondly, that the régime should continue; and thirdly, that censorship should be lifted. When the right hon. Gentleman said that censorship should be lifted, the first words which came into my mind were, "What a hope." I would ask the right hon. Gentleman to go away and look again at paragraph 15 of the White Paper and then ask himself whether, in the past two years since Mr. Smith has been running the affairs of this unhappy nation, there has been any indication that he is prepared to lessen restrictions rather than tighten them. I have not yet seen any evidence of the former.
Let us take the three points. The first is that Mr. Smith must recognise the Governor. I ask the right hon. Gentleman—recognise him as what? As the Governor of Rhodesia? The right hon. Gentleman nods his head. I cannot be-
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lieve that there could be two Heads of State, even under the Smith régime. If he recognises the Governor as the Governor of Rhodesia, and therefore as the Head of the State of Rhodesia, if such a thing exists, what happens to the poor unfortunate Mr. Dupont? Shall there be two Head of State? Is Mr. Dupont to be sacked? The right hon. Gentleman has to face that point. It is no good the right hon. Gentleman benevolently shaking his head. He said that Mr. Smith must go to the Governor, and recognise him as the Governor. But if that happens, then it follows that Mr. Dupont must go. The right hon. Gentleman also said that illegality must come to an end. But once Mr. Smith recognises the responsibility and authority of the Governor, then his illegal régime must come to an end, and this he is not prepared to accept. It is on this point that the argument, such as it is, becomes so transparent. Mr. Smith has said time and time again in negotiations, and even over the last weekend, that he is not prepared to cease his illegality while the consultation with the Rhodesian people is taking place.
The Prime Minister said on 5th December:
"…I expressed to Mr. Smith that in these circumstances, if complete agreement had been reached, Mr. Smith, if the Royal Commission reported adversely, might perhaps again illegally declare independence. Nor did Mr. Smith's reply to my expression of anxiety do anything to dispel those suspicions."
A little later my right hon. Friend said
…he made clear—that if the verdict went against him he would insist on maintaining his present illegal powers indefinitely."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 5th December, 1966; Vol. 737, c. 1057–9.]
Is the right hon. Gentleman seriously putting forward as a suggestion for the consideration of this House, this Government and the country, that in our negotiations with Rhodesia it is possible to settle the dispute by saying to Smith, "Go to the Governor. Cease being illegal, become a legal régime", when this is the one factor on which the negotiations have so far interminably foundered? It is the one thing that Smith has never been prepared to accept, and I see no evidence which makes me think that there has been any change in Smith's position.
At some stage in this sort of negotiation, there has to be a sticking point. One

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can go on arguing and trying to settle an issue for so long, but at some stage one comes up against a fundamental point on which neither party can move. I beg hon. Members opposite to face this, and I earnestly appeal to them to appreciate that the sticking point that any British Government had to come to was a return to legality before a new Constitution could be introduced.
I do not believe that the right hon. Member for Barnet would have done less than has my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister. He would have insisted—and in my view and the view of my hon. Friends, would rightly have insisted—on a return to legality before any question of a Royal Commission arose. It is for this reason that I must say that the sort of speech we had this afternoon from the Opposition was—and I use the word with regret—squalid. It was unworthy of the Conservative Party, it was unworthy of the right hon. Member for Barnet, it was unworthy of the issue, and it was unworthy of this nation.
8.47 p.m.
Mr. Peter Tapsell: This is one of those rare debates in which hon. Members are forced to re-examine the basic principles by which they seek to live in public life. We hear a great deal about the six principles which we have all agreed should govern our approach to a Rhodesian settlement. Of no less importance are the principles by which this House of Commons, and each of us as temporary Members of it, choose to govern our own political conduct.
Many of my hon. Friends must share with me certain beliefs by comparison with which party political considerations are as nothing: loyalty to the Crown; respect for the rule of law; belief in the sovereignty of Parliament; the defence of the Realm; and the safeguarding of Britain's honour and integrity in world affairs. Many of us also hold certain other basic beliefs important to us, but which we recognise as being less fundamental. Among these are contempt for racialists, whatever their colour; and a belief that the Commonwealth, despite its problems, is still a worth-while experiment in international affairs deserving of support. These are certainly seven of my own principles. Judged against each and
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every one of them, I find the illegal régime in Rhodesia utterly repugnant.
I think that is worth saying, because the attitude of most of us to the details of the problem is inevitably influenced, to some extent, by our basic attitude to the régime. I therefore hope that I shall not be accused of absurd political naivety if I say that simple consideration of right and wrong must still play a part in our affairs.
The details themselves, although of infinite complexity, can be placed under two main headings. First, what is our attitude to be to the long drawn out negotiations with Rhodesia by this Government and its predecessor? Secondly, what is our attitude to be to economic sanctions in general and to the proposed selective mandatory sanctions in particular?
On the first, my view is that British statesmen could not have tried harder to reach an honourable settlement with the Rhodesia Front than have my right hon. Friends when they held responsibility, and their successors in the present Government. Indeed, the terms offered to Mr. Smith by the Prime Minister on H.M.S. "Tiger" went as far, in my view, as any British Government could honourably go, bearing in mind our own traditions and our international obligations and undertakings.
There are those who complain that, having reached agreement on the Constitutional settlement within the terms of the six principles, it is folly to allow negotiations to break down over what is described as "the procedural arrangements". On that, I would say that it is no good signing a treaty unless there are safeguards that it will be honoured. It is absurd to rely on trust where trust does not exist.
We were not ready merely to sign a piece of paper agreeing to ban nuclear tests in the atmosphere. We spent months negotiating about the procedural arrangements for ensuring that the treaty would be observed. Mr. Neville Chamberlain is rightly criticised for not paying sufficient attention to safeguards at the time of Munich.
Many hon. Members who, like myself, have had frank and private conversations with leading members of the Rhodesia Front in Salisbury must surely agree that

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it was necessary for the Prime Minister to insist on sensibly guaranteed arrangements for a return to constitutional government. Nor can he be fairly accused, in so doing, of trying to rub Mr. Smith's nose in the dust. Indeed, the proposed procedural arrangements seem to me to have been generous—and to have shown understanding of Mr. Smith's own problems.
Finally, there is the very difficult question of mandatory sanctions. There is all-party support for a policy of sanctions, and the issue is simply whether they are to be made obligatory. I share many of the misgivings about the possible economic dangers to this country of a policy of economic sanctions, misgivings which must be felt in all parts of the House. I am Sure that the Chancellor of the Exchequer will have left his Cabinet colleagues in no doubt on this point and I am sure that the country is in no doubt.
On the other hand, we should not underestimate the impact of sanctions, particularly on Rhodesia's exports. Events on H.M.S. "Tiger" seem to me to confirm that. I do not believe that Mr. Smith and our Prime Minister would have come as close to agreement as it appears that they did if there had been no use of sanctions.
What is the alternative now to going a stage further and seeking mandatory sanctions from the United Nations? This, it seems to me, is the crux of the problem. In the debate today, two possible alternatives seem to have emerged. One was put forward in a very interesting and helpful speech by my right hon. Friend the Member for Barnet (Mr. Maudling). I listened with great attention and a great deal of agreement to what he said. I very much hope that we shall have a response from Salisbury indicating that the new proposals which he put to the House meet with a sufficient degree of approval and confidence in Salisbury to enable some further progress to be made.
The other proposal which came forward seemed to me to emerge from a most interesting reply from the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs when, in answer to a question from one of his hon. Friends, he said that the Government would look very seriously at any initiative by the
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Rhodesian régime to give effect, under its existing illegal 1965 Constitution, to the constitutional arrangements agreed on H.M.S. "Tiger" between the Prime Minister and Mr. Smith. This is interesting for two reasons. One, because it leaves the door open, even at this late hour, for some response from Mr. Smith. Two, because it seeems to me to soften what I have always felt was the least wise section of the 1966 Commonwealth Prime Ministers' communique, paragraph 10(a) to which my right hon. Friend referred today. This reads—it is to apply if negotiations break down, as they now have—
"The British Government will withdraw all previous proposals for a constitutional settlement which have been made; in particular they will not thereafter be prepared to submit to the British Parliament any settlement which involves independence before majority rule".
As my right hon. Friend so rightly said, that is tantamount to telling Rhodesian Europeans at this moment that it is a fight to the death. I was, therefore, very glad to hear the Secretary of State say that that is not, in fact, the position and that even at this late stage, if Mr. Smith would start giving effect within his own illegal Constitution to the constitutional arrangements agreed on H.M.S. "Tiger", Her Majesty's Government would be prepared to consider it.
Failing that, failing either the alternative put forward by my right hon. Friend or that suggested by the Secretary of State, it seems to me that the alternatives facing this country remain what they have always been. There have been four possible alternatives throughout: the use of armed force, acceptance of U.D.I. as a fait accompli, continued negotiation with the present permissive degree of sanctions, or mandatory sanctions still under our own control but backed by the authority of the United Nations.
By general consent in this country, the use of armed force and the abandonment of all sense of responsibility for the 4 million Africans in Rhodesia are ruled out as possibilities. Today's debate and tomorrow's vote, if there is one, appear to turn, therefore, on a choice between the other two alternatives, between permissive sanctions as at present and the mandatory sanctions for which the Government are to apply through the United Nations.

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I do not, however, believe that this apparent choice of alternatives is a real one. These events are not occurring in a vacuum. The whole world is watching and is deeply interested. It is not seen simply as a Rhodesian problem. Great moral issues are at stake. Indeed, it is in essence, as are most great political issues, a moral question.
The world is waiting to see whether Britain will come down on the side of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the United States and the whole of the new Commonwealth, or whether, for economic reasons, we will repudiate our undertakings and so, in effect, give comfort to South Africa, Portugal and the Smith régime.
Those, grossly oversimplified as they are, will be the terms in which the world will judge us. If, after the great lengths to which the Prime Minister has gone to secure a settlement, we now passively accept its rejection and go on exactly as before, talking and applying permissive sanctions only—which would, incidentally, put this country in breach of its pledged word at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference—then I think that the United Nations, led by the Commonwealth, would insist on taking the handling of the Rhodesian problem out of our hands.
I believe that, with all its difficulties and economic dangers, the honouring of our undertaking to the Commonwealth now to seek the support of the United Nations for our policy of selective mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia, at our instance, on our terms, and within our control, offers a way of keeping the situation in our hands. It also offers a continuing hope of an ultimately peaceful solution to a deeply tragic situation.
9.1 p.m.
Mr. R. T. Paget: I respect the hon. Member for Horncastle (Mr. Tapsell), who has spoken against his party. I am going to speak against mine, and I hope that he will give me credit for equal sincerity.
The other day the Prime Minister said that this was an illusory, Walter Mitty independence. That was the attitude which I begged him to take a year ago. I warned him at the time, with
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my knowledge of Rhodesia, that U.D.I. would certainly happen. I begged him not to play it up but to treat it as an illusory declaration that meant nothing. It did mean nothing. It had no effect. The Rhodesians—and I suggested to my right hon. Friend that he should say this to Mr. Smith—must travel on our passports, must post their letters under our postal authority, must communicate with other countries through us. I said that anything they did outside the Constitution should be treated as illegal and of no effect by their own courts.
Unfortunately, my right hon. Friend did play it up. It is no illusory Walter Mitty thing now. It is a great emotion, an event. Rhodesia is an independent country in its effect and in its emotions. I believe that we made it so.
Let us go back some time, because it is all-important to know what the issue was about. The issue was never about the advancement of the Africans—never. This police state which the Prime Minister constantly denounces is not the state of U.D.I. The police State was under the 1961 Constitution. Whitehead had nearly 4,000 people under detention—Smith has about 400. The police State was there before U.D.I.
Under the 1961 Constitution, quite legally a permanent majority of seats could be assigned to areas reserved for the whites, and the Prime Minister, in his final telephone conversation, promised Smith that, if he would stick to the 1961 Constitution, there would be no interference from the British Government. In other words, my right hon. Friend said to Smith, "You can have your police state. You can hold your minority Government as long as you like as long as you do not embarrass me by declaring U.D.I." It has been an issue of punctilio. It has never been an issue of principle.
When I went to Rhodesia in January, I went because I was tremendously interested in the Africans of Rhodesia, as I have been for twenty years. My hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull, West (Mr. James Johnson) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Leyton (Mr. Gordon Walker) know that for twenty years I have been fighting the cause of the Africans of Rhodesia. I thought that it was all-important to try to get them their advancement.

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I am no great believer in written constitutions. I believe that a written constitution works if it reflects the actual power relationships and does not work if it does not reflect them. I know of no reserve clauses which have ever effectively protected a minority if that minority has not had effective power. It is the social relationships which grow up which matter. Rhodesia will be ruled by Africans when those Africans are effective enough in their education and in their positions in the economy to rule it. At that point they will rule Rhodesia and nobody will be able to prevent them. When they have not reached that point, nobody will be able to impose them.
Therefore, when I talked to Mr. Smith, that was what I aimed at. I said that the first: important thing was education, and I suggested to him, "Your spending on African education is the largest item in your Budget, but it is on primary education. Suppose that we were to spend an equal amount on secondary education and that we did that together with an agency to run African education independent of the Government." He agreed to that as a proposal, provided that it was fitted into a plan for the economic development of Rhodesia, so that the Africans who came through the educational system went straight into jobs for educated people, reserved for them under the economic plan, at the same wages and on a basis of equality with white men with the same education.
This was accepted. He also accepted the entrenchment clauses and the reconsideration of the Land Apportionment Act and the handing over of constituency management and so on to the courts. These were the proposals with which I returned, and I talked about them to the Prime Minister for an hour. He gave me a wonderful hearing, but the breakdown in our conversation was on this same point—that there must be a return to legality, the point of punctilio and not a point of substance.
Mr. James Johnson Mr. James Johnson rose——
Mr. Paget: I cannot give way. I have a time limit.
The next time I went to Africa, last October, I went largely to ascertain what the South African position was. I got the clearest information. I saw the
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Government, bankers and businessmen, and I asked what would happen about mandatory sanctions. It was made absolutely plain to me that on the import sanctions Rhodesia was to have all she wanted. South Africa has built up her oil reserves and by February had three years' supply. She has printed the coupons if she has to ration and has printed coupons for Rhodesia. There is no question about this. There is a complete will, and the right hon. Member for Barnet (Mr. Maudling) knows it, for he was there, too.
The second issue is that of exports. If there be a gap—and, after all, one only exports in order to get money and none of the South Africans to whom I spoke thought that there would be a gap —the Rand businessmen are determined to fill it for Rhodesia. I ask hon. Members to consider what a simple task this is. The Rhodesian Budget is about £85 million, which is half the budget of De Beers Consolidated, a single company on the Rand.
I was sitting at a lunch with eight busines men. The gross national product of Rhodesia is £335 million. The men at that table said that the sales of the companies they represented were double the gross national product of Rhodesia. It can be seen that it is not a difficult job for South Africa to support Rhodesia if she is determined to do so. That was the information that I brought back, and it was subsequently confirmed by the South African Government.
I pass now to the events on the "Tiger". To my joy the six principles were agreed. But a condition was imposed. The important thing is to realise how that condition looked in Rhodesia. Journalists on papers of every colour and opinion in Rhodesia all agreed that they could not find one person in Rhodesia who believed that it would have been possible to accept those conditions. No newspaper in Rhodesia could find anyone, liberal or opponent, who thought that it would have been possible for the Rhodesian Government to accept the condition.
Mr. Orme: They had not seen it.
Mr. Paget: Certainly they had. The details were published. In Rhodesia it looked as if it was to be a Government

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appointed by a Governor in his discretion, who will normally act on advice, but who would have command of the Forces. This was in the background of their having been told that they would be submitted to direct rule. They were to surrender their independence indefinitely unless a Commission to be appointed by our Prime Minister decided otherwise.
What has to be realised is that the Prime Minister is not trusted in Rhodesia. [Interruption.] Let us face it, there are a good many places where he is not trusted —Zambia, for instance. The Prime Minister is a very great man but, like David Lloyd George and like Napoleon, he has a remarkable capacity for getting himself distrusted. It may be that he is too clever.
Hon. Members: Shame.
Mr. Paget: He has done a lot to make himself distrusted. There have been ultimatums. There is this question of union, suddenly produced out of the hat yesterday. We are told that he suggested union. We have the same question about Malta. The snag was social services. Did it mean free immigration? Are we to pay family allowance for the African families? Half the population is under 16 years of age. Will they get rating equalisation? If not, why not? When one produces this sort of gimmick one gets oneself distrusted.
The result is that the Prime Minister has been distrusted. The great achievement of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs was that he got himself trusted. The change in the air that made the new approach possible was entirely due to the effect which my right hon. Friend had in Salisbury. They had found a man whom they could trust. Then came the trouble with the Prime Minister, who was back again on the scene. There was this performance on the "Tiger"—this dash to a warship, this Winston Churchill show. There was this attempt to humiliate, with the Prime Minister in the Admiral's cabin and the visiting Prime Minister in the marine lieutenant's quarters. Of course this created the worst possible atmosphere. The last thing which the Prime Minister said—it was one of these ultimatums—was that there would be no question of Mr. Smith being allowed to
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return and consult his Cabinet. Of course he had to do so. Then there was to be a deadline at ten o'clock. That did not apply either. All this builds up to the sense of mistrust which is at the basis of all this.
I beg the Government to face the realities. We cannot say, "We do not trust Mr. Smith". We must look at it from the Rhodesians' points of view. We should not break on a point of prestige, a point which has nothing whatever to do with the African interest. At no point has the African interest been primary. It has all been a question of prestige.
At least let us try the commission. Let us try sending a commission. What is the alternative? Would the alternative improve our relations with the Commonwealth? How do we think that things will work out in the next few months when we are vetoing the Commonwealth's proposals at the United Nations? Do we think that this will work out with the Commonwealth if we allow it to drift on?
We shall have to take action at some point. We shall have to negotiate again. I said this a year ago, and I was hissed at. I said that we should have to negotiate with Smith. I say again that we have to keep on negotiating with Smith, and we shall negotiate. Let a commission composed of men of great authority decide whether the conditions are such that it can do its task. That is Mr. Smith's challenge. Take him up on it. Let us try it. It would make us no worse off. Why would we be worse off? I am not suggesting that the sanctions should be stopped. We should be in the same position if we postponed negotiations for one month, two months or six months.
We still have to negotiate, and I hope that we shall succeed in making the positive approach which I attempted last January—the attempt through education, the attempt through common economic development, the attempt to create the kind of positive conditions which will work. I urge this party to make this final effort. If it is refused, I regret to say that for the first time in 21 years I shall find myself in the other Lobby.
9.18 p.m.
Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: Many Members have said that this is a sad debate. I think that most of us feel that. It has run more or less on party lines

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until the last two speeches. I do not think that there is any political honey in this for any party in this country.
I have always taken the view that U.D.I. was an unnecessary tragedy. When I was in Rhodesia, I told every Rhodesian to whom I spoke, particularly members of the Rhodesian Front, that that was what I thought it was. It was illegal and unnecessary, and would bring great trouble on Rhodesia. I told them that they had to be prepared to share power with African Rhodesians and that they had a great deal of leeway to make up on racial discrimination. I also said that they must realise that the British Parliament retained its responsibility for all Rhodesians.
Therefore, our opposition to this Motion in no way accepts or condones U.D.I. We shall not go into the Lobby in support of the illegal régime. There is no question of the abandonment of the six principles. We oppose the Government's decision to go on 8th or 9th December to the United Nations for mandatory sanctions. That is what we propose to vote against. I shall try to state that point of view without invoking the degree of interruption which my right hon. Friend the Member for Barnet (Mr. Maudling) received. In this place we ought to be able to make speeches without constant interruption.
Although U.D.I. was wrong, I cannot accept that the Government's handling of the situation has been perfect. The Prime Minister is a very good politician, but there is no man who makes bipartisanship more difficult. Consciously or unconsciously, the Prime Minister has infinite capacity for rubbing up his opponents the wrong way. He certainly did that on Monday and he did it, I thought, in his interventions today.
Without doubt the right hon. Gentleman worked hard for a settlement, and I give him full credit for his efforts, but I also think that the Government have consistently misjudged the situation. In my opinion, they thought last November that they had frightened Mr. Smith out of U.D.I. They thought that sanctions would bring the Rhodesian régime to its knees in a matter of weeks and they thought that an alternative Government was available. The Prime Minister made a basic psychological mistake in using words like "frightened men" of Mr. Smith and his colleagues.
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The Prime Minister said on 25th January in this House that he would not negotiate with the illegal régime but he has been negotiating with them. He said in this House on 30th January that he would not have any dealings with them. He has had dealings with them. He told us in February that he thought that the Rhodesians would give in. Then it was February, then March and then after the tobacco auctions, and then at the end of the summer and then in the autumn.
In the immediate past the Prime Minister made another misjudgment in thinking that Mr. Smith could, or would, sell Part II in its present form to his colleagues. The Prime Minister's final misjudgment is about the consequences of the steps which he proposes to take. For a man of his intelligence, it is surprising that he should be consistently wrong about so much.
The Prime Minister has, however, genuinely tried and in one important respect he can claim success. I have always thought that agreement was possible to give effect to the six principles. I said so before U.D.I. I said it in this House after U.D.I. on 12th November, 1965, I said it in Bulawayo and in Salisbury in February and I said it in this House in May. The scheme worked out in the White Paper to deal with the first four and the sixth principles seemed to me to be sound and cleverly constructed. I am a little surprised that there is nothing in the White Paper about education.
Nevertheless, I congratulate right hon. Gentlemen opposite on the way they have worked out what seem to me to be good arrangements to deal with those five principles.
The fifth principle is extremely important. We now begin to realise that the phrases in the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' communiqué about most Heads of Government thinking that the answer rested in a one-man one-vote referendum are not a very good way of taking opinion in Africa. We realise this when we consider what has happened in many other African countries. I think that the only way is to have a Royal Commission of men of experience who know how Africans make up their minds.
To give an example, I visited an African township just outside Salisbury.

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I went with an official who was not a politician. I gather that he profoundly disapproved of U.D.I., but he said that there had been a recent incident when some nationalist youths had tried to beat up the people in the name of freedom. The inhabitants put down road blocks, caught the youths and sent them away.
The official told me that that would not have happened a year before, but he was absolutely sure that if certain people were released from detention the inhabitants of the town would be out in the streets to cheer them because they knew that the alternative was to have a petrol bomb through the window. Reference has been made to men under sentence. I hope that the Rhodesian authorities will not be so foolish as to carry out the sentences, but there have been ghastly incidents of people being killed by petrol bombs coming through the window. That is the difficulty of getting genuine expressions of opinion. The only way to do it is to have a Royal Commission.
Another reason why I thought that Mr. Smith would have difficulty in selling Part II to his colleagues was the extreme vagueness of paragraph 17, concerning the working out of the terms of reference and composition of this Royal Commission. It would be difficult to go further without more precision. Notwithstanding that reservation, I congratulate all those concerned on the results as shown in this White Paper regarding the six principles. It is the result of long and patient effort.
Why is that to be lost, and what should we do about it? I do not contend that Mr. Smith has been right throughout. He was wrong over U.D.I. and over the treatment of the Governor. He was wrong about censorship. He was wrong in not broadening the basis of his Government. He has been timid in dealing with racial discrimination. He has been slow to assert his authority, and I told him this more than once.
From discussions with Mr. Smith and his colleagues, I know how difficult it is to make progress. What, therefore, should happen next? I am convinced that it is wrong to go for mandatory sanctions. During the debate on 12th November I
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expressed reservations about sanctions. I agreed that the illegal régime had brought certain economic consequences on itself—loss of preferences, exclusion from the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, and so on—but I expressed doubt then about further sanctions, and made three points. I said would they consolidate support behind the régime which they were supposed to weaken? Would they hurt the innocent more than the offenders? I asked whether they would be effective in subduing the opponent.
Let us face it. They have strengthened Mr. Smith's own position, they have hurt Zambia more than Rhodesia, and they have not subdued the opponent. Nevertheless, I accepted that as time went on they would be a persuasive force towards a settlement and that is why I did not oppose them. That is what they are now, although they have been very costly to us. The Prime Minister said that there was a loss of £35 million of exports. I see that The Guardian today mentions a figure of £100 million. They also lost us much good will and created a great deal of bitterness.
The same questions have to be asked about these new proposals for mandatory sanctions. I think that they will strengthen the position of the extremists in Rhodesia. I do not want to see this. This is the sadness of the way in which the hand is being played. It is the extremists who will gain, and the moderates will be silenced. We have been accused of various things today, but this action is the most friendly that the Government could take towards the extremists in Rhodesia.
On the supposition that the sanctions do not escalate, we will carry the loss. There will be countries which will say that their laws do not enable them to forbid their merchants to trade. The United States of America have increased imports of Rhodesian goods this year. Germany is not in the United Nations. Other countries will be cynical and will pay lip-service, and as so often Mr. Osbert Lancaster's cartoon in the Daily Express today was right when it showed a Japanese and a German salesman lifting their hats and saying, "God bless Wilson". There will be continual friction with South Africa and we will lose trade. That is if they do not escalate.

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But I do not take that view, and I come to the Prime Minister's final misjudgment, and I link a misjudgment made by my hon. Friend the Member for Horncastle (Mr. Tapsell) earlier on. On 5th December the Prime Minister, talking of his discussions with Commonwealth Prime Ministers, said:
…as we said, and they agreed, that this must not be allowed to develop—they understood this—into a confrontation whether economic or military involving the whole of Southern Africa. As the House will join my Commonwealth colleagues in recognising such a confrontation, economic—and economic might lead to military—could have incalculable consequences for Southern and Central Africa going far beyond the issues raised by the Rhodesian problem. Indeed, as I told my Commonwealth colleagues, it could rapidly dwarf the Rhodesian problem, and nothing would ever be the same in Central Africa again, whether in Rhodesia or some of their own States."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 5th December, 1966; Vol. 737, c. 1070–1.]
I think that the Prime Minister believed that when he said it, but I am not so certain that his Commonwealth colleagues really agreed with it. I think that that is the real issue of the debate.
The hon. Member for Manchester, Blackley (Mr. Rose) and the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Michael Foot) were in full cry. They want confrontation with Southern Africa Like Samson, they want to pull the temple down, but, unlike him, on the innocent as well as the guilty, but they are logical. I do not believe that what the Prime Minister is proposing can be effective unless there is an economic and a military confrontation with Southern Africa. I believe that that would be disastrous for our economy and for the economies of other countries in Africa, as well as for the defence of the Western World. It would be much more likely than anything else to break up the Commonwealth, and the African Commonwealth. I therefore oppose the Motion.
I do not say that the United Nations will never have a rôle to play in this. The word "never" is a foolish one to use in diplomacy. But to take this decision tomorrow is most unwise. It is on that that we are voting.
We ought, therefore, to turn our thoughts in a different direction. I agree with the criticisms made of paragraph 10(a) of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Communiqué. We ought to
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be considering how to get agreement on the way to obtain constitutional Government in Rhodesia, and agree on the method whereby it can be done. If so much could be done in 48 hours on the "Tiger" why not make a further effort? I do not minimise the importance of procedures. There are two points of difficulty, but I feel that if they could have been resolved it might have been possible for the Rhodesian régime to agree upon the whole paper.
I can understand Her Majesty's Government's concern about a second U.D.I. If agreement is not reached about the tasks, and the composition of the "acceptability" Commission, or if its conclusions are adverse to Mr. Smith and he does not accept them, or if there are other difficulties which prevent his accepting them, and if Rhodesia, in the meantime, has replenished its reserves and resources, it may refuse to carry out the agreement so that, in effect, there would be a second U.D.I.
To meet that point, Rhodesia must accept that sanctions will continue until an independence Bill has been through the House. I believe that there must be an interim Government. I hope that the Prime Minister will clarify his idea of the exact functions of the interim Government. At one time, judging by what was said in the paper, I thought that he was giving a degree of direct responsibility to the Governor. He seemed to qualify that today. I hope that he will clear the position up. The Rhodesians are afraid that once the interim Government are in the saddle British troops will be introduced into Rhodesia to enable the United Kingdom to use force. That is the "Trojan horse" to which reference is made in the papers. The answer is that Her Majesty's Government should guarantee that Sir Humphrey Gibbs will remain Governor. I join warmly in the words of tribute that have been paid to him. If he remains as Governor it is absurd for the Rhodesians to talk about a Quisling Government, especially with Mr. Smith as Prime Minister.
Her Majesty's Government should agree not to bring in British troops unless both the Governor and Mr. Smith both ask for them.
If those two points can be dealt with in that way we would be well on the path

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to getting agreement on what methods should be used. Those are two suggestions I put forward.
There are other difficulties, but I firmly believe that they can be surmounted. Therefore I beg the Government to think again. I hope that Mr. Smith and his colleagues will do nothing to make the situation more difficult, for example, by declaring a republic.
Let both sides propose some mutually respected intermediary and get to work at once on Part II. Meanwhile, it is utterly wrong and irresponsible to decide that tomorrow, whatever may be right or wrong in the future, without a further effort at agreement, we shall go to the United Nations for mandatory sanctions. It is utterly wrong to break off negotiations, even with an illegal régime, when there is a hope of settlement. The course upon which the Government are embarked is fraught with the gravest dangers. I therefore ask the House to reject the Motion.
9.35 p.m.
Sir Geoffrey de Freitas: I agree with the right hon. and learned Member for the Wirral (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd) that this is a sad debate. Like all others who have spoken, I have been to Africa and, like many of them, I have lived and worked there. The right hon. and learned Gentleman was responsible for my final step of going to work as a civil servant in Africa. He was Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time, and I had to write to him to ask if he would kindly appoint me to the Chiltern Hundreds. He gave me the Manor of Northstead. I make no complaint. It was an office of profit. After having held it with great distinction for four months, receiving no profit, I received a letter from him saying that someone else had it and that I was relieved of the office.
The important thing is that when he wrote to me he added a postscript, which he may remember, saying that he liked West Africa and he hoped that he would have another chance of going out there, when he would learn the high life, which apparently he had not learned on his previous visit. In West Africa, as a Minister in the British Government which had done more than any other to lead the African Colonies to self-government, he and all his colleagues were welcome.
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Let me remind the House of the stages of turning the African Empire into a Commonwealth, which came to their final stage when the right hon. and learned Gentleman was a member of the Cabinet. The African countries saw this period of our history, the very important period of decolonisation, as an all-party effort, something upon which all parties had agreed.
I was reminded when it was quoted to me—I did not know about it before—that it was a Coalition Government during the war, when we had many other problems on our hands, which put up a Conservative Cabinet Minister to say that the aim of the British Government was self-government for the Colonies. This was in 1943. So over the last 23 years—this is the background of this matter—consecutive Governments — Coalition, Labour and Conservative—have adopted it as their policy and worked towards it.
Getting back to the fundamentals, there has been world-wide admiration—there is no question about it—for the fact that our decolonisation has, on the whole, been much better than that of other European colonial Powers. This is why I am worried by what appears to be the attitude on the Conservative benches today. It appears to me, and I am sure that it will appear to many people in the African Commonwealth, that this House is not united in trying to work above all to preserve this African Commonwealth which has been created from a Colonial Empire.
It is important that we should realise how this seems to people far away. Mr. Harold Macmillan was the first man to use the phrase "wind of change." I was proud indeed to work for him and for the right hon. Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys) who, up to Polling Day 1964, was consistently firm, and consistently right in my opinion, on Rhodesia. It is clear from the White Paper and all the documents which have been published that the then Government had taken a strong and determined line.
At that time the wind of change was blowing very strong indeed. It was blowing from the North into Central Africa and down into the South. At nearly all social occasions in Africa I was drawn into discussion about the future of

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Southern Rhodesia. Hon. Members should realise that it is not the same talking about these problems in Britain, because we are worried about other things as well. In Africa it was an obsession, and in those days it was a subject which challenged everything for which Britain stood. They feared that a British Government would one day hand over 4½ million black Africans to the rule of a small minority of whites. Time and again I assured them that no British Government would do that. I said that from my knowledge of the Conservatives and of my political friends, British Ministers could not possibly do that.
Last autumn I was not surprised to learn that most of the Commonwealth leaders at the Conference could not understand why we had not ended the rebellion by force. Reference has been made, in a different context, to Algeria. In Africa it was always quoted to me as an example. However, the conditions applying there, even if we consider them only logistically, were completely different. Nevertheless, it is hard to say that when they see what France did in what seems to black Africans to be a comparable situation. Logistically it is not comparable, but that is what they feel.
As said, it came as no surprise to me when I learned that most of the Commonwealth leaders last autumn could not understand why we had not put down the rebellion by force. I quoted the logistic difficulties to them, but one could not get away from the fact that from the very beginning Her Majesty's Government had undertaken not to use force. Many of my hon. Friends have criticised that, but we must accept it as a declared part of Government policy.
We have turned our Colonial Empire into a self-governing Commonwealth. The least we can do is to keep to the agreement reached at the last Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference. I have no inside information, but I believe, from everything I read and hear, that it was extremely difficult to get agreement so charged was the atmosphere and so great were the problems. However, agreement was reached and, whatever we do, we must keep within the terms of that agreement.
I do not think that many right hon. and hon. Members opposite have in any
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way been affected by a change in the wind, but I wonder if they realise what is at stake if we want to try to preserve this new Commonwealth. History may tell us that it was silly to have spent 300 years of our national existence chasing all over the world acquiring Colonies. We may have been better employed if we had concentrated on being a European Power. However, that is not the point.
The stage we are at today is that we have created this multi-racial and, in this context, this black African Commonwealth. The average politician there says hard things about us, but they are very new countries and, without being patronising, surely it is our duty to understand that they are young and that they resent the paternal hand. But that will not happen for ever. We have good friends there. To begin with, they speak our language. If we cannot in the long run get our ideas across to them when they speak our language, we do not deserve to get our ideas across.
For the next few years, we face a most difficult period, in which these countries feel for the first time that they have power, especially at the United Nations. If we can succeed by diplomatic skill in getting the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth, especially the African Commonwealth, round the table to make an agreement, we must meticulously follow it, otherwise the years which have gone will have been wasted. I believe that this must above all be a guide to us.
I was distressed when the right hon. Member for Barnet (Mr. Maudling) dismissed as frivolous the criticisms which have been made of Members of Parliament who have appeared to give respect to Mr. Dupont. These criticisms are not frivolous, especially when this behaviour has taken place in a continent like Africa where status means a great deal—chief, governor, president, or the Queen's representative. It is important that we should not appear to give credit to and go out of our way to raise the dignity of a man who is really a usurper driving round in a stolen car.
I come to one of the Members of Parliament who has recently visited Rhodesia. I do not quote from any tape recording of a private conversation or anything like that. I do not have one. I do not know

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if anybody has. However, anyone can get the B.B.C. monitoring service. I think that it can be obtained from the Library. At any rate, it is easy to get it. One can see a Member of Parliament going there and not only expressing the opinion that he was very grateful that the sanctions had failed——
An Hon. Member: Who was this?
Sir G. de Freitas: The hon. and gallant Member for New Forest (Sir O. Crosthwaite-Eyre). There was much publicity about this. He also likened the B.B.C. to Lord Haw-Haw. This is going far, because the one thing we know about the B.B.C. is that its service to Rhodesia is a B.B.C. service. It is not a British Government service, because the B.B.C. does not relay Government propaganda to Rhodesia, although that is what this hon. Member appears to corroborate. It is an independent B.B.C. service.
Mr. R. H. Turton: Has the hon. Gentleman given notice to the hon. and Gallant Member for the New Forest (Sir O. CrosthwaiteEyre) that he was going to make an attack on him?
Sir G. de Freitas: I am sorry. It never entered my head that he would not be here. [Interruption.] I hope hon. Members will acquit me of any discourtesy in this matter, because if any hon. Member gets himself so closely involved in a matter such as this I thought it was inevitable——
Mr. Thorpe: Since, as far as I heard, the hon. Gentleman did not mention a constituency——
Hon. Members: He did.
Sir G. de Freitas: I was asked a question by one of my hon. Friends, and I did say the hon. and gallant Member for the New Forest.
Sir D. Walker-Smith: This raises a matter of some general principle. All hon. Members accept what the hon. Gentleman said as to his expectation, and with his customary courtesy and fairness one would acquit him of any impropriety in this matter. But debates in the House go on for about eight hours and it is physically impossible for hon. Members, however interested they might be, to
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be here all the time. Perhaps it may be thought appropriate that notice should always be given.
Mr. Speaker: I hope that we can get back to Rhodesia.
Sir G. de Freitas: I take the point. It did not occur to me that it was necessary to give him notice, because I had some other quotations from him with which I shall not now weary the House. He got so deeply involved in this matter when he was in Rhodesia that I certainly thought he would be here. However, I should have given him notice.
The point which we should not forget is that if the Rhodesian Government feel so strongly, as they do, about the B.B.C. and say that it is just British Government propaganda, it is merely the people who run a police State trying to keep the inhabitants of that State isolated and insulated from views from outside. They regret outside views and news getting through.
It seems that nearly every hon. Member who has spoken has visited Rhodesia recently. I find it important to recall that as late as 2½ years ago I, too, visited Rhodesia. I went on to South Africa, and the difference encouraged me enormously. There may have been a police State in Rhodesia then, but the fact was that in 1964 I was able to have a social lunch with black Africans as well as white Africans, which was quite impossible in South Africa. My fear is that the Rhodesia Front is driving the two countries together so that they become more and more similar with less and less difference between them.
I do, however, concede one important point, because I am going to talk about Kenya. There are a lot of things that we can learn from Kenya. I concede that during the latter period of the Colonial Administration in Kenya, the British Colonial Government was able to deal with one man who was the acknowledged leader. They may have dealt with him in the wrong way, but they knew that they had to deal with only one man. Mr. Odinga was then extremely loyal to Mr. Kenyatta. There was real loyalty there. When we think of the future of Rhodesia, we must recognise as an enormous problem the division in the African leadership in Rhodesia. There have been social occasions of which both

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leaders were present: I have been at a function where as soon as one of them left the other stood by the door and distributed pamphlets attacking him, and the next night the other leader was attacked and we again received pamphlets. It was tragic, but it was a fact.
I want now to turn to Kenya and to quote from a letter written to The Times of 27th October last by the hon. Member for Westmorland (Mr. Jopling). In that letter the hon. Member expressed confidence in the future of Kenya, and referred to a letter in which a number of people, not all British subjects but all of British descent—some Kenyan and some British—had said that opponents of majority rule had nothing to fear.
The hon. Member wrote:
"I have been very impressed on a recent…visit to Kenya to hear from most of those of British descent whom I met, of their enthusiasm for the way in which Kenya is developing. They expressed to me their pride in being associated with this developing experiment in multiracialism.
A large number of them expressed their grave disquiet at the effect of a continuing impasse between Britain and Rhodesia and the refusal of Rhodesia's leaders to move towards majority rule in a more realistic way. They felt that before long this could only lead to deteriorating race relations in Kenya.
While things are going well in Kenya, there can be no doubt that they are still at a delicate stage; it would be a tragedy if everything was to be ruined by intransigence farther south."
The declaration to which the hon. Member referred was drawn up on 21st October of last year. It was signed by people as distinguished as Lord Delamere, the Speaker of the House, Sir Michael Blundell, a former politician and leaders in politics, leaders in the British community, leaders on the land, leaders in British business and retired senior officers from the Services. They make this point right through: that at the time they feared that Kenya got its independence too quickly. Some others thought that, too. They now say
"Most of us had perfectly sincere reservations about the speed with which independence was granted…"
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They now quite definitely say that Kenyatta's Government have kept their pledge to respect the rights of all races, and the bitterness of the past has been largely forgotten in the spirit of Harambee. That is Swahili for "pull together":
"Racial prejudice is minimal, the rule of law has been preserved. Freedom of religion, speech and of the Press has been generally respected. Law and order has been maintained by a first-class police force under African command."
I wonder how many hon. Members saw in the newspapers yesterday or today that President Kenyatta has asked a British general—no racial prejudice there —to be his defence adviser? And how many hon. Members know that the number of Europeans entering Kenya last year was greater than the number leaving?
Of course, there are far fewer white mixed farmers in Kenya, but more white business men are going there and more white teachers—more people to serve the community—because there is no racial prejudice. There is a black Government which even has a white Minister: the Minister of Agriculture.
Multiracialism can work, and it is up to us never to lose sight of that fact in any consideration of the future of Rhodesia. When sanity returns to Rhodesia, let the Rhodesian Front look north to see what has been achieved. What has been achieved is a very simple thing, and it is that so far—and "so far" is the key word—we have been able to have a multiracial community living in peace under black rule.
Debate adjourned.—[Mr. McBride.]
Debate to be resumed Tomorrow.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
Ordered,
That the Proceedings on Consideration of the Lords Amendments to the Local Government Bill may be entered upon and proceeded with at this day's Sitting at any hour, though opposed.—[Mr. Greenwood.]

ORDERS OF THE DAY

  LOCAL GOVERNMENT BILL
  Lords Amendments considered.
  10.0 p.m.
  Mr. Speaker: Before the Clerk reads the first Amendment I should like to draw hon. Members' attention to the form of the present Paper, which is prepared under my directions. In order to clarify the Paper and to facilitate our debate, I have arranged for the Lords Amendments to the Title to be printed at the end, being the place at which they are considered by the House, instead of at the beginning of the Paper as hitherto.
  I hope that this change in printing the Lords Amendments will prove acceptable to the House, since it saves the House the inconvenient formality of first moving to postpone the Lords Amendments to the Title.

  LOCAL GOVERNMENT BILL

    Clause 20.—(APPLICATION OF SECTIONS 21 AND 22.)
    Lords Amendment No. 1: In page 16, leave out line 2 and insert
    "The provisions of the next two following sections".
    The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government (Mr. James MacColl): I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
    It might be for the convenience of the House if we could take with this Amendment the following Amendments:
    No. 2: In page 16, line 40, leave out from third "the" to "rate' "in line 41 and insert "next two following sections"
    No. 4: In Clause 21, page 16, line 46, leave out "Part of this Act" and insert "and the next following section"
    No. 5: In Clause 21, page 17, line 2, leave out "Part of this Act" and insert
    "section and to the provisions of the next following section"
    Mr. Speaker: Order. It would be convenient if the Chair knew which Amendments the Government propose to take together. I have no objection if the House has no objection.
    Mr. MacColl: These are drafting Amendments consequential upon the
    1496
    inclusion of new Clauses in Part II of the Bill since its presentation.
    Question put and agreed to.
    Lords Amendment No. 2: In page 16, line 40, leave out from third "the" to "rate' "in line 41 and insert "next two following sections"
    Mr. Speaker: This was an Amendment of which the Chair had notice at the last moment that it would be taken with others.
    Amendment agreed to.

    Clause 21.—(LIABILITY TO BE RATED IN RESPECT OF CERTAIN UNOCCUPIED PROPERTY.)
    Lords Amendment No. 3: In page 16, line 45, leave out "three" and insert "six".
    The Minister of Housing and Local Government (Mr. Anthony Greenwood): I beg to move, That the house doth disagree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
    It might be for the convenience of the House, as the Amendments involve the same principle, if I deployed my argument on this and the following Amendments;
    Amendment No. 6: In page 17, line 21, leave out "three" and insert "six".
    No. 8: In page 17, line 30, leave out "three" and insert "six".
    No. 9: In Clause 22, page 17, line 42, leave out "three" and insert "six".
    No. 10: In Clause 22, page 17, line 43, leave out "six" and insert "twelve".
    No. 11: In Clause 22, page 17, line 45, leave out "three" and insert "six".
    Is that acceptable to you, Mr. Speaker?
    Mr. Speaker: May I say, for the convenience of the House, that it would help the Chair and the House if the Chair knew of the Amendments it was proposed to take together. If there is no objection, so be it.
    Mr. Greenwood: I very much apologise, Mr. Speaker, if there was any omission and discourtesy on my part, and I am grateful to you for your Ruling.
    The Amendments to which I have referred involve the same issue, and I hope that it will not be necessary to detain

    1497
    the House long, but this is a point to which we attach a good deal of importance and I shall explain briefly why we do so.
    In previous debates both sides have accepted the proposal to rate unoccupied property, and the hon. Member for City of Chester (Mr. Temple) made the very fair point in Committee that the decision as to the length of the free periods was a matter of judgment. I entirely agree with him about that and that is really the issue in question tonight.
    When the Bill left this House it provided that half rates could be charged upon empty old properties after three months and upon empty new properties after six months. We included those provisions to discourage the withholding of usable accommodation from occupation. Some of my hon. Friends may feel that we went too far and made the provisions weaker than we should have done if they are to achieve the purpose we had in mind.
    The basis upon which we proceeded was to try to strike a balance between two alternatives. We tried to strike a balance between effective action against anti-social behaviour, on the one hand, and harshness to owners, on the other. We believe that in the course of action we commended to the House at that time we struck the right balance. In my submission, the Lords Amendments would tilt the balance the wrong way and seriously weaken the effect of the Bill, and I shall now explain why, after very serious consideration, we have decided to ask the House to disagree with the Lords on this aspect of the Bill.
    I ask the House to bear in mind that this is a discretionary power which local authorities may or may not choose to exercise. The Lords proposals would mean that empty old property could be empty for six months before it began to be liable for half rates; in other words, it could be empty for a year at a cost of three months' rates. Empty new property would not be liable for rates until after 12 months, so that it could be empty for 18 months' at a cost of three months' rates.
    I believe that the Amendments which the Lords have proposed might deter local authorities from adopting the scheme
    1498
    because the scheme so amended might well cost more to administer than the revenue it would produce, and their reluctance might well be strengthened by the realisation that the "penalty"—I put that word in inverted commas—for an anti-social owner would be almost derisory. In short, we believe that these Amendments would do great damage to the purposes of the Bill, and I ask the House to reject them.
    Mr. Oscar Murton: The right hon. Gentleman feels that, if the Amendments were accepted, local authorities might be reluctant to take up the question of rating unoccupied properties. It should not be forgotten that, once they adopt these powers, local authorities have to undertake them for seven years. This is what makes them reluctant, and I put it to the right hon. Gentleman that acceptance of his argument would be likely to make them more reluctant than acceptance of the Lords Amendments.
    Sir Douglas Glover: I regard the Lords Amendments in this case as right. Let us consider the present circumstances of a credit squeeze. In Manchester, for example, there is a lot of new property standing empty which the developers are urgently trying to let. The only reason they cannot let is that the economy, because of the Government's mistaken policies, is not growing, while, at the same time, local government expenses and the demand for increased rate revenue are putting on the City of Manchester a growing burden. There is, therefore, a strong temptation to make use of these discretionary powers.
    In these circumstances, as it is the Government's own action which is creating the certainty of buildings remaining empty, does not the right hon. Gentleman consider that there is a good deal to be said for protection of the individual by these Lords Amendments which would lengthen the period?
    Mr. Arthur Jones (Northants, South): We dealt with this matter at some length in Standing Committee, and we were able to carry a substantial measure of agreement with us in our argument that three months was an unreasonably short period. At that time, the property market was active, and people wishing to sell unoccupied property were able to do so fairly

    1499
    readily and promptly. But now, particularly in the southern part ofthe country, the estate market is "on the floor".
    People just cannot sell their properties. This is a great disadvantage to those who want to move and take another property. The mobility of labour is being hampered by the fact that people are unable to sell their houses, and if we insist that, if a person moves out of a house and after three months will have to bear a rate upon it, this will be an added disincentive to the risk of moving jobs. A man will have to pay rates on his new house and, after a short period, will find himself paying rates on the property he has left as well.
    This is a very great disadvantage and is surely against the whole wish of the Government to encourage the mobility of labour so that people, when they are "shaken out"—to use the Prime Minister's phrase—can find work elsewhere. In the context of Government policy as a whole, this is a very unwise period to adopt. We tried to make this point earlier under circumstances far more favourable than those of today. I hope that this is not the final thought of the right hon. Gentleman on this subject.
    Mr. John M. Temple: I am glad to be following the Minister on the third occasion that this matter has been debated either in this House or in another place. I still hold the view I expressed previously and which the Minister has repeated—that this is a matter of judgment. What we want to achieve is social justice in this matter and the question is, "How shall we achieve that social justice?"
    I believe that the period of six months for the older properties is the right period, and I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that there must be a difference as between the new and the older properties. But when one is considering this matter in a mature manner, one must realise that the scheme is optional on local authorities and, therefore, they must be keen to take it up.
    What weighed with me in coming to a decision was whether it would be worth while for a local authority to enter into the scheme at all if the half rates are payable only after a period of three months. I would say that, if local
    1500
    authorities were certain that rates would be levied at a half rate after six months, they would be much more likely to opt for the scheme. What the local authorities would have in mind would be the fact that there is considerable administrative expense in tracing owners.
    As my hon. Friend the Member for Northants, South (Mr. Arthur Jones) said, it is very difficult at present to effect a change of tenancy within a period of three months. The legal formalities, the formalities of getting mortgages fixed up, and even the domestic formality of getting decorations done—all this will probably exceed a period of three months. I suggest that it is unrealistic to think that property is being kept vacant for antisocial reasons unless it has been vacant for a period in excess of six months.
    In these circumstances, believing that it will encourage rather than discourage local authorities to opt for a scheme of this nature, I have no hesitation in saying that I come down firmly on the side of six months in the case of older houses and of 12 months in the case of newer properties. Very significantly, an organisation with no axe to grind, the Rating and Valuation Association, has weighed this matter dispassionately and come to the same answer for more or less the same reasons. I believe, therefore, that it is a sensible answer.
    It is a matter of judgment. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will have second thoughts, because I think that both of us want this scheme to be put into operation under which the local authorities can get half rates for property that is unoccupied for a long time. Believing that, if this Amendment is disagreed with, such a situation will not come about, I think that it would be much wiser for the Government to accept the Lords Amendment.
    I know that my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hexham (Mr. Rippon) wants to speak about this matter, because he feels very strongly about it, and I therefore now resume my seat in the expectation that he will get up.
    10.15 p.m.
    Mr. Geoffrey Rippon: I was amazed that the Minister should have expressed the view that local

    1501
    authorities would be encouraged to opt for this scheme if the period were the shorter rather than the longer. I shall be interested to know whether he has had any advice on this matter from local authority associations. Undoubtedly the Rating and Valuation Association has reached a different view. It points out that it is within the discretion of a local authority to use these permissive powers, but that, once it has exercised the option, its resolution remains in force for seven years. It is felt that with the shorter period the cost of inspection and administration would be greater rather than less.
    In all the circumstances, I would have thought that the Minister would have gladly accepted the Amendment, which is not of enormous substance. One would imagine that on a matter of this kind the Government would listen to the advice of those who in these matters have rather more practical experience than the right hon. Gentleman's Ministry.
    Mr. MacColl: As the hon. Member for City of Chester (Mr. Temple) said, and as his right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hexham (Mr. Rippon) repeated, this is an option, and, therefore, when a local authority introduces it is a matter of judgment. It is unlikely that a local authority would choose to intro-
    duce the scheme at a time when there was property stagnation, and therefore one can reasonably expect that local authorities will regard the scheme as useful particularly at a time when there is a shortage of property and it is desired to make property move more quickly from one person to another.
    It is true that they would take a seven-year vow, but my right hon. Friend has power if he thinks fit to accept a proposal to change that, and a startling alteration in the property situation would be a ground for such a change. The short point is that if it is to be worth doing at all, it is necessary to avoid too much evasion and if the property could not be touched for six months, evasion would be encouraged and people would be encouraged to leave their property empty for the maximum time.
    I think that this provision would encourage the mobility of labour, because anything which discourages people from leaving their property empty means that they will move more quickly and dispose of it more quickly and, on the whole, I think that this provision will facilitate change rather than cause a lag.
    Question put:—
    The House divided: Ayes 184, Noes 101.

    Division No. 223.]

    AYES

    [10.20 p.m.

    Alldritt, Walter

    Davies, Ednyfed Hudson (Conway)

    Gregory, Arnold

    Allen, Scholefield

    Davies, Robert (Cambridge)

    Grey, Charles (Durham)

    Archer, Peter

    de Freitas, Sir Geoffrey

    Griffiths, Will (Exchange)

    Armstrong, Ernest

    Delargy, Hugh

    Hale, Leslie (Oldham, w.)

    Ashley, Jack

    Dell, Edmund

    Hamilton, William (Fife, W.)

    Atkins, Ronald (Preston, N.)

    Dempsey, James

    Hannan, William

    Atkinson, Norman (Tottenham)

    Dewar, Donald

    Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)

    Barnes, Michael

    Dobson, Ray

    Haseldine, Norman

    Baxter, William

    Doig, Peter

    Hattersley, Roy

    Beaney, Alan

    Driberg, Tom

    Hazell, Bert

    Bence, Cyril

    Dunn, James A.

    Heffer, Eric S.

    Bishop, E. S.

    Dunwoody, Mrs. Gwyneth (Exeter)

    Henig, Stanley

    Blackburn, F.

    Dunwoody, Dr. John (F'th & C'b'e)

    Hooley, Frank

    Boardman, H.

    Eadle, Alex

    Horner, John

    Booth, Albert

    Edwards, Rt. Hn. Ness (Caerphilly)

    Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas

    Braddock, Mrs. E. M.

    Ellis, John

    Howarth, Robert (Bolton, E.)

    Bradley, Tom

    English, Michael

    Howie, W.

    Brooks, Edwin

    Ennals, David

    Hughes, Emrys (Ayrshire, S.)

    Brown, Bob (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, W.)

    Evans, Gwynfor (C'marthen)

    Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)

    Buchan, Norman

    Faulds, Andrew

    Hughes, Roy (Newport)

    Buchanan, Richard (G'gow, Sp'burn)

    Fernyhough, E.

    Hunter, Adam

    Cant, R. B.

    Fitch, Alan (Wigan)

    Hynd, John

    Carmichael, Neil

    Fitt, Gerard (Belfast, W.)

    Jackson, Colin (B'h'se & Spenb'gh)

    Carter-Jones, Lewis

    Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)

    Jackson, Peter M. (High Peak)

    Coe, Denis

    Forrester, John

    Janner, Sir Barnett

    Concannon, J. D.

    Fraser, Rt. Hn. Tom (Hamilton)

    Johnson, James (K'ston-on-Hulf, W.)

    Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)

    Galpern, Sir Myer

    Jones, Dan (Bumley)

    Crawshaw, Richard

    Garrett, W. E.

    Jones, Rt.Hn. Sir Elwyn (W. Ham, S.)

    Cullen, Mis. Alice

    Garrow, Alex

    Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)

    Dalyell, Tarn

    Gordon Walker, Rt. Hn. P. C.

    Judd, Frank

    Davidson, Arthur (Accrington)

    Gourlay, Harry

    Kelley, Richard

    Davies, Dr. Ernest (Stretford)

    Gray, Dr. Hugh (Yarmouth)

    Kenyon, Clifford

    Davies, C Elfed (Rhondda, E.)

    Greenwood, Rt. Hn. Anthony

    Lawson, George

    Leadbitter, Ted

    O'Malley, Brian

    Swingler, Stephen

    Lever, L. M. (Ardwick)

    Orbach, Maurice

    Thomas, George (Cardiff, W.)

    Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)

    Orme, Stanley

    Thornton, Ernest

    Lomas, Kenneth

    Oswald, Thomas

    Tinn, James

    Loughlin, Charles

    Owen, Dr. David (Plymouth, S'tn)

    Urwin, T. W.

    Lyon, Alexander W. (York)

    Paget, R. T.

    Varley, Eric G.

    Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.)

    Palmer, Arthur

    Wainwright, Richard (Colne Valley)

    McCann, John

    Park, Trevor

    Walker, Harold (Doncaster)

    MacColl, James

    Parker, John (Dagenham)

    Wallace, George

    Macdonald, A. H.

    Parkyn, Brian (Bedford)

    Watkins, David (Consett)

    McGuire, Michael

    Pearson, Arthur (Pontypridd)

    Watkins, Tudor (Brecon & Radnor)

    Mackenzie, Gregor (Ruthergten)

    Perry, George H. (Nottingham, S.)

    Wellbeloved, James

    Mackintosh, John P.

    Price, Thomas (Westhoughton)

    Wells, William (Walsall, N.)

    Maclennan, Robert

    Price, William (Rugby)

    Whitlock, William

    McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.)

    Probert, Arthur

    Wilkins, W. A.

    McNamara, J. Kevin

    Redhead, Edward

    Willey, Rt. Hn. Frederick

    Mahon, Peter (Preston, S.)

    Rhodes, Geoffrey

    Williams, Alan (Swansea, W.)

    Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)

    Richard, Ivor

    Williams, Alan Lee (Hornchurch)

    Manuel, Archie

    Roberts, Albert (Normanton)

    Williams, Clifford (Abertillery)

    Mapp, Charles

    Robertson, John (Paisley)

    Williams, Mrs. Shirley (Hitchin)

    Marsh, Rt. Hn, Richard

    Robinson, W. O. J. (Walth'stow, E.)

    Williams, W. T. (Warrington)

    Mendelson, J. J.

    Roebuck, Roy

    Willis, George (Edinburgh, E.)

    Millan, Bruce

    Rose, Paul

    Woodbum, Rt. Hn. A.

    Milne, Edward (Blyth)

    Ross, Rt. Hn. William

    Woof, Robert

    Mitchell, R. C. (S'th'pton, Test)

    Shaw, Arnold (Ilford, S.)

    Yates, Victor

    Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)

    Sheldon, Robert

    Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)

    Short, Mrs. Renée (W'hampton, N.E.)

    TELLERS FOR THE AYES

    Newens, Stan

    Silkin, Rt. Hn. John (Deptford)

    Mr. Neil McBride and

    Oakes, Gordon

    Silverman, Julius (Aston)

    Mr. Ioan L. Evans.

    Ogden, Eric

    Spriggs, Leslie

    NOES

    Allason, James (Hemel Hempstead)

    Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)

    Onslow, Cranley

    Astor, John

    Hawkins, Paul

    Osborn, John (Hallam)

    Batsfotd, Brian

    Heald, Rt. Hn. Sir Lionel

    Page, Graham (Crosby)

    Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torquay)

    Heseltine, Michael

    Peel, John

    Bessell, Peter

    Hobson, Rt. Hn. Sir John

    Pink, R. Bonner

    Biffen, John

    Holland, Philip

    Pym, Francis

    Biggs-Davison, John

    Hooson, Emlyn

    Rippon, Rt. Hn. Geoffrey

    Blaker, Peter

    Hunt, John

    Rodgers, Sir John (Sevenoaks)

    Bossom, Sir Clive

    Hutchison, Michael Clark

    Russell, Sir Ronald

    Brewis, John

    Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)

    Sharples, Richard

    Brinton, Sir Tatton

    Johnston, Russell (Inverness)

    Shaw, Michael (Sc'b'gh & Whitby)

    Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. Sir Walter

    Jones, Arthur (Northants, S.)

    Sinclair, Sir George

    Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)

    Jopling, Michael

    Smith, John

    Buchanan-Smith, Alick (Angus, N&M)

    Kimball, Marcus

    Steel, David (Roxburgh)

    Burden, F, A.

    King, Evelyn (Dorset, S.)

    Stodart, Anthony

    Chichester-Clark, R.

    Kirk, Peter

    Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)

    Clark, Henry

    Kitson, Timothy

    Taylor, Edward M. (G'gow, Cathcart)

    Cooke, Robert

    Lambton, Viscount

    Taylor, Frank (Moss Side)

    Dalkeith, Earl of

    Lancaster, Col. C. G.

    Temple, John M.

    Davidson, James (Aberdeenshire, W.)

    Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry

    Thorpe, Jeremy

    Dean, Paul (Somerset, N.)

    Lubbock, Eric

    Turton, Rt. Hn. R. H.

    Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)

    MacArthur, Ian

    Walker-Smith, Rt. Hn. Sir Derek

    Elliott, R.W. (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, N.)

    Mackenzie, Alasdair (Ross&Crom'ty)

    Wall, Patrick

    Errington, Sir Eric

    Maginnis, John E.

    Weatherill, Bernard

    Fair, John

    Maude, Angus

    Wells, John (Maidstone)

    Forrest, George

    Miscampbell, Norman

    Whitelaw, William

    Fortescue, Tim

    Mitchell, David (Basingstoke)

    Wills, Sir Gerald (Bridgwater)

    Foster, Sir John

    Monro, Hector

    Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)

    Giles, Rear. Adm. Morgan

    More, Jasper

    Winetanley, Dr. M. P.

    Gilmour, Sir John (Fife, E.)

    Morrison, Charles (Devizes)

    Wylie, N. R.

    Glover, Sir Douglas

    Munro-Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh

    Younger, Hn. George

    Gresham Cooke, R.

    Murton, Oscar

    Gurden, Harold

    Nabarro, Sir Gerald

    TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

    Hall-Davis, A. C. F.

    Neave, Airey

    Mr. Anthony Grant and

    Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)

    Noble, Rt. Hn. Michael

    Mr. Reginald Eyre.

    Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

    Clause 23.—(RATING OF CERTAIN OFFICE PREMISES OF NATIONALISED BOARDS &C.)
    Lords Amendment No. 12: In page 19, line 6, at end add:
    "(1A) In determining the rateable value of any office premises which are to be rated by virtue of subsection (1) of this section, any part of the premises which is not used as an office or for office purposes, or for purposes ancillary to the use of the premises as an office or for office purposes, shall he disregarded."
    10.30 p.m.
    Mr. MacColl: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
    When I moved this Clause on Report I said that there was a danger that we might have to make alterations in the Clause before it finally reached a workable form, and I am afraid that prophecy has been shown to be only too true. We have had to make very substantial alterations. This Amendment provides for cases where office premises which are liable to be rated under the Clause may be used partly for operational purposes, in which case they would not be subject to rating. It is not intended that they should be rated separately, so the Amendment provides that the parts which are used for operational purposes shall be disregarded in determining the rateable value of the office premises.
    Question put and agreed to. [Special Entry.]
    Lords Amendment No. 13: In page 19, line 7, after "shall" insert "from time to time."
    Mr. MacColl: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
    This Amendment goes with the next one, in page 19, line 9. These Amendments pave the way for the Amendment in page 19, line 10 which is rather long and complicated. It enables the valuation officer to go to the appropriate Minister in cases of difficulty.
    Question put and agreed to.
    Subsequent Lords Amendment agreed to.
    Lords Amendment No. 15: In page 19, line 10, at end insert:
    1506
    "(2A) A valuation officer may if he thinks fit, before making a proposal in pursuance of subsection (2) of this section in respect of any premises,—

    (a) raise a question as to whether the premises are situated on operational land of an authority to which this section applies; and

    (b) make an application to the appropriate Minister for the determination of the question in pursuance of the following provisions of this section;

    and where a valuation officer makes such an application he shall, before the expiration of the period of seven days beginning with the date of the application, serve notice of it on the occupier of the premises and the rating authority for the area in which the premises are situated; and section 59 of the Rating and Valuation Act 1925 (which relates to the service of documents) shall apply to such a notice as it applies to the documents mentioned in that section.
    (2B) Where it is determined in consequence of an application under subsection (2A) of this section that the premises to which the application relates are not situated on operational land of the relevant authority to which this section applies, then—

    (a) the valuation officer may make a proposal in respect of the premises by reference to the same considerations as would have been applicable if the proposal had been made on the date of the application; and

    (b) any alteration in a valuation list made in pursuance of a proposal certified by the valuation officer to have been made by him in consequence of the determination shall have effect as if any notice of the proposal served on the occupier of the premises had been so served at the same time as the notice of the application served on him under subsection (2A) of this section.

    (2C) Any question as to whether, for the purposes of this section, any premises are situated on operational land of an authority to which this section applies shall be determined—

    (a) where the authority is the British Railways Board, the London Transport Board or the British Waterways Board, by the Minister of Transport;

    (b) in any case, by the Minister of Power.

    (2D) The Minister may by regulations make such provisions as he considers appropriate for securing, in the case of premises liable to be rated under this section and under another enactment and premises of which a part is liable to be rated under this section and another part is liable to be rated under another enactment, that the premises are included in the valuation list as a single hereditament with a single rateable value; and the regulations may make different provision for different circumstances and may contain such supplemental, consequential and incidental provisions, including provisions modifying any enactment, as the Minister considers expedient for the purposes of the regulations."
    Mr. MacColl: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
    This Amendment involves a long insertion into the Clause. The difficulty here was that an attempt to restrict the application of the Clause to offices—
    Mr. Temple: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Are we actually discussing subsection (2D) in this Amendment, or is that being taken separately? I was advised that it was, in fact, to be taken separately. So far as I am concerned, it will be in order if all of the subsections are dealt with together, but I was under the impression that subsections (2A), (2B) and (2C) were to be taken together and that subsection (2D) would be taken separately.
    Mr. Speaker: If the hon. Gentleman will refer to the Amendment by its number, I shall understand what he is referring to. We are taking Amendment No. 15.
    Mr. Temple: The whole of Amendment No. 15?
    Mr. Speaker: Yes.
    Mr. MacColl: I ought to make it clear, because I am in the doghouse anyway, that my difficulty was that I was in trouble with Mr. Speaker for grouping the Amendments without warning. I thought that if the Amendment was separated it would be extremely difficult for Mr. Speaker and that the best course would be to take all the subsections together. That has got me into trouble with the hon. Member for the City of Chester (Mr. Temple) who is always so acute in noticing these little difficulties.
    The Clause was introduced to deal with the fact that offices not situated on operational land might lead to rather uncertain results, and we have had great difficulty in finding a way of amending the definition to make it more certain. The area of uncertainty is limited. The typical case, which hon. Members from Croydon in particular have talked about, is that of offices which are situated a long way from the railway. That is not difficulty, because they can be seen. The difficulty comes in the marginal cases which are near the operational area.
    The proposal in the Amendment is simply to enable the valuation officer to
    1508
    go to the appropriate Minister to get his advice about it, because it so happens that he is the person who knows best and is accustomed to have to deal with this kind of problem. The first subsection provides that the valuation officer can raise that question with the appropriate Minister. The second provides that the application for a determination is to be treated as the first stage of any subsequent proposal which may be made. The third subsection nominates the appropriate Minister in each case.
    The further new subsection concerns a different point and deals with the various cases where one part of the premises is already separately rated under a previous enactment and another part becomes separately rated under this Clause, of which the most obvious example is the case where an electricity or gas board showrooms have already become rateable, and offices which they now have over them become rateable under the Bill. If the building had been in private occupation, it would appear in the valuation list as one hereditament with one value. The intention is to secure a similar result, in this case, for a nationalised industry.
    It may be necessary to have regulations. Therefore, provision is taken to give the Minister power to make regulations, although we hope to deal with most of the difficulties without delegated legislation. I cannot give any guarantee about whether it will be necessary—we hope not—but the precaution is taken to enable it to be done by regulation if necessary.
    Sir D. Glover: If this is the right moment to raise the question of these Amendments being a matter of Privilege, I should like to address a few words to the House. I have no objection, and I am certain that nobody on this side has any objection, to accepting these Amendments from another place as though they are privileged Amendments, but I have read recently in the Press of the Lord Chancellor making various statements about what another place should do about this sort of Amendment and appealing to that other place not to take certain action.
    What I want to make clear is that the practice of this place in accepting from another place Amendments which are a question of Privilege should be

    1509
    quite impartial. It should not be used simply when it is for the convenience of the Government of the day. If these Amendments are inserted in another place because they are thought right and proper, they should receive the same attention and, I would say, the same acceptance from this House for debate.
    I make this statement of view—"protest" would be the wrong word—because shortly we shall probably be receiving similar Amendments to which the Government would object and which, they would say, should not have been inserted in another place. The other place must have a right to submit Amendments which it thinks right and proper to insert in a Bill. We should then consider them in detail when they come here, not merely when they are in conformity with the Government's attitude, but even when they are opposed to it.
    Question put and agreed to. [Special entry.]
    Subsequent Lords Amendment agreed to. [Special entry.]
    Lords Amendment No. 17: In page 19, line 23, leave out from "undertaking" to "not" in line 24.
    Mr. MacColl: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
    What I have to say about this Amendment applies also to Amendment No. 18, in line 26, which goes with it. These are really drafting Amendments, and have the highly desirable effect of removing some unnecessary words from the definition.
    Question put and agreed to.
    Subsequent Lords Amendment agreed to.
    Lords Amendment No. 19: In page 19, line 30, leave out from "work" to "clerical" in line 32 and insert "and handling money".
    Mr. MacColl: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
    This Amendment again is concerned with definition. The definition of "office purposes" which was originally in the Bill went rather wider than was intended, because there are cases in which, for example, computers and telegraphs may be used in some cases for operational
    1510
    purposes, and in some cases for office purposes. Where they are used for office purposes they will come within this definition, but where they are used for operational purposes they will not.
    Question put and agreed to.
    Lords Amendment No. 20: In page 19, line 37, at end insert:

    New Clause "A"—(POWER TO ALTER DISTRIBUTION OF CERTAIN PAYMENTS MADE BY NATIONALISED BOARDS IN LIEU OR BY WAY OF RATES.)
    "A.—(1) The Minister may by order provide—

    (a) that the sums paid to the Minister by the British Railways Board, the London Transport Board and the British Waterways Board or any of those Boards in pursuance of section 100 of the Local Government Act 1948 (which relates to payments by those Boards in lieu of rates) shall, instead of being distributed as provided by subsection (2) of that section (which provides for their distribution among the rating authorities in England or Wales in proportion to the rateable values of the authorities' areas for the relevant year) be distributed as provided by the order;

    (b) that the adjusted basic total of rateable values mentioned in sub-paragraph (3) of paragraph 4 of Schedule 3 to the Rating and Valuation (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1955 (which relates to the rating of Gas Boards) shall, in the case of all Gas Boards or any Gas Board specified by the order, instead of being apportioned and allocated as provided by that sub-paragraph (which provides for its apportionment and allocation among all the rating areas in which, in the relevant year, gas was, or was treated as, supplied to consumers or manufactured by the relevant Board) be apportioned and allocated for the purposes of that Schedule as provided by the order;

    (c) that the apportionment of the aggregate values of the distribution and generating activities mentioned in paragraph 2 of Schedule 2 to the Local Government Act 1958 (which relates to the rating of Electricity Boards) shall, in the case of all Electricity Boards or any Electricity Board specified by the order, instead of being made as provided by sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of that paragraph (which provide for the apportionment of those values by reference to net annual value and generating capacity) be made as provided by the order;

    (d) that sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 3 of the said Schedule 2 (which provides that the aggregate values of the generating and of the distribution activities of the Central Electricity Generating Board shall each be taken to be one half of the Board's basic value as determined for the relevant year under that Schedule) shall have effect as if for the reference to one half there were substituted references to such other fractions as may be specified by the order in

    1511
    relation to the Board's generating activities and distribution activities respectively;

    (e) that, in any enactment relating to rating specified by the order, any reference to the manufacture of gas shall include a reference to such dealings with gas as may he specified by the order.

    (2) If the Minister is of opinion that payments by way of rates should be made by Gas Boards by virtue of this subsection by reference to any premises occupied and used by the Gas Council or a Gas Board for the reception or liquefaction of gas or the evaporation of gas in a liquid state, being in any case gas purchased by the Council or the Board, he may make an order designating the premises for the purposes of this subsection and providing for the determination, by such method as may be specified by the order, of a value for the premises for those purposes; and where such an order is in force the Minister may direct—

    (a) that the value determined as aforesaid shall be apportioned among such Gas Boards as may be specified by the direction in such proportions as may be so specified; and

    (b) that each Board specified by the direction shall, during such period as may be so specified, be treated for rating purposes as occupying, within the area of the rating authority in which the premises designated by the order are situated (and whether or not that Board occupies or is treated as occupying any other hereditament in that area), a hereditament of a rateable value equal to the proportion of the value aforesaid allocated by the direction to that Board; and

    (c) that sub-paragraph (3) of paragraph 4 of Schedule 3 to the Rating and Valuation (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1955 shall have effect during the period aforesaid, in relation to each Board specified by the direction, as if the Board's adjusted basic total of rateable values mentioned in that sub-paragraph were reduced by an amount equal to the said proportion.

    A direction under this subsection may be revoked or varied by a subsequent direction thereunder.
    (3) Before making any order under this section the Minister shall consult with such associations of local authorities as appear to him to be concerned, with any local authority with whom consultation appears to him to be desirable and—

    (a) in the case of an order in pursuance of paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section, with any Board mentioned in that paragraph which appears to the Minister to be concerned;

    (b) in the case of an order in pursuance of paragraph (b) or (e) of that subsection, with the Gas Council;

    (c) in the case of an order in pursuance of paragraph (c) or (d) of that subsection, with the Electricity Council;

    (d) in the case of an order under subsection (2) of this section, with the Gas Council.

    (4) An order under this section may contain such incidental, supplemental and consequential provisions, including provisions altering any enactment or instrument, as the Minister considers expedient for the purposes of the order.
    (5) In this section "Gas Board" means any Area Board constituted for an area in England and Wales under the Gas Act 1948, and "Electricity Board" means the Central Electricity Generating Board and any Area Board within the meaning of the Electricity Act 1947."
    Mr. MacColl: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
    When we were considering the Bill on Report, and particularly when we were discussing the main Clause on the rating of nationalised industries, I said that we hoped to be able, in another place, to introduce a Clause dealing with the distribution of the cumulo which had to be paid in rates by nationalised industries.
    At the moment there are a number of rather complex statutory formulae which fix this. Some of them go back quite a long way, and they vary in the case of the different industries. They are not really up to date in the light of modern technical developments in certain of the industries. A working party has been looking at this problem for some time, and we are now in a position to make suggestions for dealing with the anomalies.
    Perhaps I might tell the right hon. and learned Member for Hexham (Mr. Rippon) that we intend to consult the associations of local authorities about the precise formula which will be used, but, because of the desirability of dealing with this, and making it flexible so that it can be adapted from time to time to meet technical changes, we are proposing to do it by means of Orders.
    Subsection (1) enables my right hon. Friend to define the present formulae by giving due weight to processes such as the reception and evaporation of liquid gas. This was not thought of when the original Act was devised.
    Subsection (2) might almost be said to be designed for the hon. Member for Essex, South-East (Mr. Braine), because it deals particularly with the problems presented by methane, in which Canvey Island is the pioneer. The difficulty, as I understand it, is that methane may well be transported over a much wider area than the ordinary product of, say, the

    1513
    North Thames Gas Board. Therefore the share of the rate going to Canvey might bite unduly into the share going to the North Thames Gas Board, because this is a national and not a regional operation. The Clause enables these problems to be considered. I am afraid that these provisions are complicated. Although we are very anxious to push on as quickly as possible we shall not be able to bring the Regulations into force before April, 1968. That sounds a long time ahead, but already preparation has begun of the 1967–68 valuations, and calculations of these are already under way. It will take until 1968 to produce them.
    10.45 p.m.
    Mr. Bernard Braine: The House will be grateful to the Parliamentary Secretary for his explanation of this new Clause, but I should like a little further clarification. He will recall that I raised a point about gas rating during the proceedings on the Gas Bill. The point is a curious one. It might have general application, but it so happens that at the moment it applies only to my constituency, becauese the Gas Council chose to place there the first British methane gas plant. Tankers now bring 700,000 tons of liquid gas annually from North Africa. They discharge their cargoes at Canvey Island and the methane is stored and processed there and is then distributed by pipeline throughout the land. Through the medium of the plant in my constituency about 10 per cent. of the nation's gas is supplied and distributed.
    Unhappily, because of the way in which gas undertakings are rated, we have an industrial premises occupying about 70 acres of extremely valuable land but contributing practically nothing to the rate. The Canvey Council contemplated taking the matter to the courts, on the ground that what took place in the plant constituted a manufacturing process within the meaning of Section 11(1) of the Local Government Act, 1958, but the introduction of the Gas Bill frustrated that attempt.
    When I raised this matter I received promises from two Parliamentary Secretaries that it would be looked into, and I am glad to hear from the Parliamentary
    1514
    Secretary that that is the case. We now have the new Clause, which provides
    "Power to alter distribution of certain payments made by nationalised boards in lieu or by way of rates."
    This raises a question of crucial importance to the local authority in my constituency. As I understand it, subsection (1) would enable the Minister to revise the present formulae by giving due weight to processes, such as the reception and evaporation of liquid gas, which were not foreseen when the formulae were devised. If that is so I want to put two questions to the hon. Gentleman.
    First, does he envisage that subsection (1) will help my local authority? I am hoping for an encouraging reply from him. He has been very courteous, but I am expecting him to be not only courteous but forthcoming. If he does think it will help my local authority, can he say when the Order made by the Minister under the Clause would be effective? This is a matter of supreme importance to a small local authority which might be led, under the Clause, to expect a substantial increase in rate revenue.
    Mr. MacColl: I hope always to be courteous and sometimes I am forthcoming, but I cannot prophesy or give any categorical assurance about what form this will take. But the object of the exercise is to deal, inter alia, with precisely the point which the hon. Gentleman raised. We must get agreement between the ratepayers, the nationalised industries, and the competing rating authorities who want a share of the rates. This is a classic illustration of the value of delegated legislation, as it would be difficult to do this by continual re-enactment of legislation. By Statutory Instrument, it is possible to adapt it to a changing situation, as and when we get the necessary agreement. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will not have cause to reproach me.
    Mr. Braine: When might the council expect some decision on this? When will the Order be made?
    Mr. MacColl: I said that it could not come into effect before April, 1968. The laying of the Order would depend on when we had it prepared. It may be later than 1968, but that is what we are aiming for.
    Question put and agreed to. [Special Entry.]
    Lords Amendment, No. 21: In page 19, line 37, at the end to insert new Clause B—(Calculation of rate products.)
    "B. The Minister may, after consultation with any local authority or association of local authorities with whom consultation appears to him to be desirable, make rules as to the manner in which the product of a rate of one penny in the pound for any area is to be estimated or determined for such purposes of this Act and of any other Act, whether passed before or after this Act, as may be specified by the rules; and rules under this section may—

    (a) make different provision for different purposes;

    (b) repeal any provisions of, or of an instrument made under, an Act passed before this Act which the Minister considers will become unnecessary in consequence of the rules;

    (c) amend any provisions of an Act passed before this Act or of an instrument made under such an Act in such manner as the Minister considers appropriate in consequence of the rules;

    (d) provide that the provisions of any Instrument having effect by virtue of an enactment repealed or amended by the rules shall continue in force as if they were contained in the rules."

    Mr. MacColl: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
    This is a valuable proposal to bring under one roof the many different statutory powers for calculating rate products. It is not a fundamental change of the kind with which this Government are normally associated. It is a moderate one and not much more than a change of words. It means that consolidation will be easier under one definition. These Regulations could come into operation by April, 1967.
    Question put and agreed to. [Special Entry.]

    Clause 26.—(PROVISION OF LIGHTING BY HIGHWAY AUTHORITIES.)
    Lords Amendment No. 22: In page 21, line 16 at the end to insert:—
    "() Nothing in subsection (5) of this section shall affect the provisions of section 237 of the Highways Act 1959 (which relates to contributions by county councils to the cost of maintaining and improving claimed county roads); but for the purposes of that section—

    (a) the cost of the maintenance and operation of a road lighting system for a claimed county road in exercise of the powers conferred by this section shall be treated as part of the cost of the maintenance of the road; and

    1516

    (b) the cost of the provision and improvement of such a system for such a road in exercise of those powers shall be treated as expenses of an improvement of the road unconnected with its maintenance,

    and the cost of the provision, improvement, maintenance and operation of a footway lighting system for such a road in exercise of those powers shall not be included among the costs and expenses in respect of which payments and contributions are to be made under that section."
    The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport (Mr. Stephen Swingler): I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
    Perhaps we might discuss at the same time the related Amendments, Nos. 23 and 25.
    The Amendment would make it clear how Section 237 of the Highways Act will operate in regard to the exercise of lighting powers by highway authorities. The effect of the Amendment is that county councils will have to reimburse in full to claiming authorities the agreed cost of operating and maintaining road lighting installations and contribute to the cost of providing and improving them, although claiming authorities will, of course, continue to retain full financial responsibility for footway lighting.
    My right hon. Friend is advised that, as the Bill was drafted, there would not necessarily be full reimbursement of maintenance costs. County councils would have had to make an agreed contribution to any expenditure on lighting, whether on road lighting or footway lighting, which claiming authorities provided or maintained under the powers of the Clause. The Amendment removes any doubt about the application of the Highways Act, 1959, in this respect. This is why we wish to accept it and understand that it will help local authorities to make the change to new arrangements for lighting on 1st April, knowing their exact financial arrangements.
    Mr. Eric Lubbock: I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman's explanation. The Amendment seems to meet entirely the case of my hon. Friend the Member for Cheadle (Dr. Winstanley) when we discussed the matter on Report on 20th October. My hon. Friend—
    Hon. Members: Where is he?
    Mr. Lubbock: He has the Adjournment debate and is preparing for that. My hon. Friend has asked me to say that he is extremely grateful for the consideration that has been given by the Ministry to the representations which he has made over a period of months. However, may we be assured that the Amendment, introduced in another place, meets the case made by my hon. Friend?
    Without going into great detail on this matter, it seemed to us that there was a difference between the claiming authorities and authorities which exercise their powers by delegation from county councils, and my hon. Friend pointed out that this could not be justified logically. That point of view had been expressed to us by the district councils. It is thought that the Amendment will cover the case, but the Joint Parliamentary Secretary, obviously having discussed the matter with the local authority associations, will be in a position to assure us on this point.
    Mr. Swingler: We have consulted the local authority associations on this matter. The Amendment meets the case of the claiming authorities in full. It makes it clear that they will be reimbursed in full by highway authorities.
    Question put and agreed to. [Special Entry.]

    Clause 29.—(TRANSFER OF ROAD LIGHTING SYSTEMS.)
    Subsequent Lords Amendment agreed to. [Special Entry.]
    Lords Amendment No. 24: In page 23, line 22, to leave out from "date" to the end of line 24.
    Mr. Swingler: I beg to move, That this House doth disagree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
    The effect of the Amendment, which is similar to that which was discussed at considerable length in Standing Committee, would be to make it mandatory on the Minister of Transport to assume responsibility for outstanding loans and loan charges in respect of lighting installations on trunk roads which she takes over under the transfer provisions in the Clause. The Bill, as originally drafted, expressly debarred the transfer of loans and loan charges to the Minister. The
    1518
    Amendment therefore raises an important point of principle for us.
    The background to the provisions relating to loan charges is that when we first discussed this matter with the local authority associations we proposed that outstanding loan charges should remain the responsibility of the lighting authorities which had incurred them. In principle, we did not think there was a good case for highway authorities to assume the responsibility for any loan charges outstanding in respect of lighting systems which they took over. Highway authorities will not, of course, be taking over any sources of revenue from which the loan charges could be met, and this clearly distinguishes this state of affairs from, for example, undertakings like gas, electricity or other assets transferred together with rateable values as a result of a boundary change.
    Mr. Rippon: The hon. Gentleman mentioned that there had been discussions with the local authority associations. Did even one of them agree with the Government's view? Would he not agree that the action which they have taken is unprecedented, apart from one case in 1936?
    Mr. Swingler: The right hon. Gentleman is closely associated with precedent in this respect, in view of his membership of a former Administration. We will come to that in full, particularly in view of what the right hon. Gentleman did on a previous occasion.
    I am explaining that in our original discussions with the local authority associations we proposed no transfer of loan charges in respect of a service from which no revenue is gained because this provision, among other things, would not benefit those local authorities which pay for their lighting systems not out of loans but out of revenue. We would be landed in the further difficulty of naturally having to provide for some system of payments for those local authorities which had been prudent enough to cover their expenditure in that way.
    11.0 p.m.
    When our proposals were put to the local authority associations, they unanimously asked for mandatory provision for local highway authorities to assume responsibility for any loan charges in respect of lighting systems transferred to

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    them. That was the matter which was discussed. After negotiations, we did not think that we could refuse this request in respect of transfer between local authorities, since all the local authority associations, including the County Councils Association, were agreed upon it. That was why provision for that was made in the Bill.
    The desire of local authorities to provide for the transfer of loan charges between themselves does not constitute any reason why the Minister should do the same in regard to trunk road lighting. We have accepted that the transfer of loan charges in these circumstances is normal practice amongst local authorities, but it does not follow that the practice should automatically be extended to transfers of property between central and local government.
    There are a number of precedents, and I am coming to the important one. If precedents are to be held to be important here, the most relevant one is Section 228 of the Highways Act, 1959, which provides that there is no transfer of loan charges when a local authority road becomes a trunk road. This was based on a previous Act of Parliament, namely, the Trunk Roads Act, 1936, and in respect of all roads being trunked or detrunked that has been the position for several decades.
    Mr. Rippon: Does the Joint Parliamentary Secretary agree that the 1959 Act was not just based on the 1936 Act but was a consolidation Act? The real precedent, which is a dubious one, is the 1936 Act. There is no subsequent precedent.
    Mr. Swingler: The right hon. Gentleman will appreciate that in 1959 he and his right hon. and hon. Friends had a wide open opportunity, and they had many other opportunities, if this was the thing on which they wished to insist in the transfer of loan charges as between central and local Government, to take this action. The right hon. Gentleman should not be so stupid as to pretend HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] He knows quite well that, had the Government at that time wished to establish that position about the transfer of loan charges between central and local government, they had the power to do it. I am merely
    1520
    pointing out that they maintained the position that had existed ever since 1936, that there should be no transfer of loan charges in respect of highways in this fashion. I say that is the precedent which is most relevant to this situation and the principle that we are embodying in the Bill.
    Therefore, in respect of this, which is distinguished from revenue-producing services or things such as gas and electricity, there is a difference between local government practice in the treatment of loan charges and the practice established between central government and local government. It has been accepted by several Governments—there have been many Governments since 1936—that there should not be the acceptance of a transfer of loan charges in this way.
    It was on this basis that we commenced our discussions with the local authorities about this part of the Bill. It was because of their insistence that we accepted the insertion into the Bill of the provision for the transfer of loan charges as between local highway authorities. We hope that the House will uphold what was done previously in the Standing Committee, and disagree with this Amendment.
    Mr. Arthur Jones: Before the hon. Gentleman leaves the point of the difference in the position of the highway and lighting services, would he not accept that there is a complete difference in the point he is making? The highway, in the event of its becoming out of use, is owned by the owners and occupiers of the land which faces on to it, but we are here dealing with lighting equipment, where there is a transfer of assets. The same cannot be said of the highway, because it is impossible to transfer the assets of a highway which is only temporarily, as it were, in the public ownership.
    Mr. Swingler: We are transferring something from which no revenue is derived. It is a service, the cost of maintaining which will be taken over by another authority. One public authority has provided for it, and paid for it either out of revenue, as in some cases, or out of loans. It is transferred to another authority, which is now to shoulder the burden of maintaining it, renewing it and

    1521
    replacing it. There is no revenue to be earned from it.
    I think the hon. Gentleman will agree that in the case of the transfer of roads that is how the practice has been established over many years as between the central Government and local government. Since we are now accepting that the lighting system should be recognised as an integral part of the provision of roads, it is natural that we should apply the same principle to the transfer of the lighting system.
    Mr. Temple: This debate has now taken place three times—once in the Standing Committee and twice in another place—and if it had not been that Mr. Speaker did not select it for debate on Report this would have been the fourth debate on a subject which we regard as of very great importance. We agree with the Parliamentary Secretary when he says that a matter of principle is involved, but I have never seen a Government change position more in their arguments than this Government have on this subject.
    I am not now concerned with precedents, because I do not think that the precedent of the 1936 Act is important. Funnily enough, I think that the hon. Gentleman agreed with me in Standing Committee, because he did not at that stage lay much stress on the 1936 Act as a powerful precedent. He said that he regarded the question as one of principle. However, when the Minister without Portfolio spoke in another place on 21st November, he said that the best precedent he could find for such an Amendment as this was that the 1936 Act contained just this very thing!
    On that occasion, the Minister without Portfolio gave an undertaking that he would look at the matter again between the Committee stage and Report in another place, but when he spoke on it on Report the moment of truth came upon him. He said that the Government were dealing with the matter on an "ad hoc" basis. There was no precedent that weighed with the Minister without Portfolio; he was dealing with the question on an ad hoc basis. But the Government are not dealing with it on an ad hoc basis, and that is why we regard this as a matter of very great importance.
    1522
    I notified a Treasury Minister that tonight I would have something to say about the Treasury. A Treasury Minister should be moving this disagreement with the Amendment from another place. Here we are seeing Treasury sleight of hand. The local authorities were the gentlemen of the party; when they saw the first draft of the Bill they made representations to the Government that where a service was transferred from one local authority to another the loan charges that went with it should also be transferred. That is sanity, that is equity and what I would call common sense. That then is the position when a service is transferred from one local authority to another.
    But here we have the grasping hand of the Treasury showing through the negotiations. Where there is a transfer of those functions from a local authority to a Department of State the Department says that it will take over the assets but not the liabilities that go with them. That is the matter of principle on which we disagree entirely with the Government.
    My right hon. Friend was perfectly correct. All the local authorities associations are absolutely united in their opposition to what the Government propose. Very significantly, an erstwhile Member of the House, now the noble Lord, Lord Pargiter, speaking comparatively recently on this matter in another place, entirely supported the point of view which I am putting forward.
    Therefore, our point of view is very well supported in all places, except, apparently, on the Government Front Bench. I believe that this bodes extremely ill for negotiations going on at present between the central Government and the local authority associations on the rate support grant. That is why I said that I wanted a Treasury Minister here. There is no doubt that if the Treasury can insist on a trick of this nature being put across there will be very scant hope for ratepayers getting a satisfactory deal when the rate support grant is brought before the House.
    Therefore, I have no hesitation in advising my right hon. and hon. Friends that there is a principle involved here, that it is a principle with which we heartily disagree and I very much hope that they will follow me into the Lobby.
    Mr. J. J. Mendelson: Whatever my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary may have said a few minutes ago about his discussions with local authorities, he will be aware that many local authorities are bitterly opposed to the provision he is now defending. There can be no doubt about that. That is particularly true of rural district councils, like the Wortley Rural District Council in my constituency and others in many other parts of Yorkshire.
    The first point involved here is the principle of equity and good sense, and my hon. Friend has given no adequate reply on that. The people in my area and the members of the Wortley Rural District Council are not greatly impressed by references to precedents in 1936 and whether another Administration failed to change that precedent in 1959.
    Here we have an administrative function being transferred from local authorities to the Ministry of Transport, and while the Minister of Transport will have sole authority in these matters from now on, and the local authorities will have no further say, the Minister and the Department refuse to take over the loan charges. That is the core of the argument.
    I submit three points to my hon. Friend. First, this will be particularly unjust to local authorities which have been enterprising and energetic in this matter, and have therefore spent far more money than some other local authorities. They will be left with the charges where others will get new lighting development on trunk roads through their areas and make no financial contribution.
    My second point concerns a matter that should go a long way with my hon. Friend, and that is the question of precedents in other legislation. I wish to quote only one. There is the precedent of Section 6 of the National Health Service Act, 1946, under which there was a transfer of all local authority hospitals to the Minister of Health, and the Minister became responsible for all the outstanding loans and loan charges. Clearly, this is a precedent, coming from the year 1946 at the time of the administration of the party to which both he and I belong, which ought to go a long way with my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary.
    1524
    11.15 p.m.
    My third point, which is equally important, relates to the liability which has been undertaken by a local authority, say, a rural district council, which has provided not only an asset in the street, the light which can be seen with the naked eye, but also, in conjunction with the electricity authority, an asset beneath the ground. This will be a continuing asset of some importance, and, what is more, it will be used for further extensions which will be much cheaper because of the original investment undertaken partly with local authority finance. It is unfair in these circumstances that the Government should refuse to transfer the loan charges to the appropriate Ministry.
    The sums involved may in some cases be only small, but there is a principle involved here which very much concerns the local councillors in my area and in many others. It is not a matter to be made light of, although I am receiving the unaccustomed support of the right hon. and learned Member for Hexham (Mr. Rippon) in putting my argument. I beg my hon. Friend to discount that unaccustomed support from the benches opposite and have at the forefront of his mind the serious concern which many local authorities and councillors feel on this matter.
    We may be moving into a period when, either to ease the burden on local authority finances or to make improvements in central administration, functions will have to be transferred, and rightly so. But we shall be putting the cart before the horse and creating a very bad atmosphere among local authorities and councillors when such transfers come, quite properly, to be discussed if they feel that they do not receive fair treatment after a transfer has taken place.
    Sir D. Glover: I have had many representations from my local authorities on this matter. I would have made exactly the same speech which the hon. Member for Penistone (Mr. Mendelson) has made. As he has put all the points I had in mind to put, I shall do no more than endorse and reinforce what he said and beg the Government to think again.
    Mr. W. O. J. Robinson: At first glance, this Amendment looks extremely attractive and

    1525
    equitable, and, in normal circumstances, of course, one would accept that on a transfer of assets the loan charges also should be transferred. But I wonder whether it is right to say that a question of principle is necessarily involved on the transfer of all assets of whatever description. May I say that, as I live on an arterial road where the rate of destruction of lamposts is extremely high, I would describe these as very much wasting assets.
    Having gone into the situation and discussed it with my local authority, I wonder whether one ought to look at the practical effect to see whether local authorities are suffering or are likely to suffer hardship in this respect. The Minister will correct me if I am wrong, but I understand that, under the present financial arrangements, a local authority receives no reimbursement whatever of loan charges in respect of these lighting installations. If this be so, the fact that responsibility is transferred will make no difference whatever because, if the local authority maintained its ownership, it would continue to have to pay the loan
    charges without any reimbursement from the central or highway authority.
    I am informed also—again, I shall be corrected if I am wrong—that the lighting authority receives only reimbursement of one half of revenue expenditure in connection with these installations. If this be so, the local authority now bears the loan charges and half the revenue expenditure. Under the new arrangements, it will continue to bear the loan charges but will have complete reimbursement of the revenue expenditure. It seems to me that, under this arrangement, the local authority benefits and does not suffer from the previous arrangement.
    Mr. Swingler Mr. Swingler rose—
    Hon. Members: Divide.
    Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Eric Fletcher): Order. The hon. Gentleman cannot speak again except by leave of the House.
    Question put:—
    The House divided: Ayes 175, Noes 106.

    Division No. 224.]

    AYES

    [11.21 p.m.

    Alldritt, Walter

    Dobson, Ray

    Hughes, Emrys (Ayrshire, S.)

    Allen, Scholefield

    Doig Peter

    Hughes, Roy (Newport)

    Archer, Peter

    Driberg, Tom

    Hunter, Adam

    Armstrong, Ernest

    Dunn, James A.

    Hynd, John

    Ashley, Jack

    Dunwoody, Mrs. Gwyneth (Exeter)

    Jackson, Colin (B'h'se & Spenb'gh)

    Atkins, Ronald (Preston, N.)

    Dunwoody, Dr. John (F'th & C'b'e)

    Jackson, Peter M. (High Peak)

    Atkinson, Norman (Tottenham)

    Eadle, Alex

    Jones, Dan (Burnley)

    Baxter, William

    Edwards, Rt. Hn. Ness (Caerphilly)

    Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)

    Beaney, Alan

    Edwards, William (Merioneth)

    Judd, Frank

    Bence, Cyril

    Ellis, John

    Kelley, Richard

    Binns, John

    English, Michael

    Kenyon, Clifford

    Bishop, E. S.

    Faulds, Andrew

    Lawson, George

    Blackburn, F.

    Fernyhough, E.

    Leadbitter, Ted

    Boardman, H.

    Fitch, Alan (Wigan)

    Lestor, Miss Joan

    Booth, Albert

    Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)

    Lever, L. M. (Ardwick)

    Braddock, Mrs. E. M.

    Forrester, John

    Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)

    Bradley, Tom

    Fraser, Rt. Hn. Tom (Hamilton)

    Lomas, Kenneth

    Brooks, Edwin

    Galpern, Sir Myer

    Loughlin, Charles

    Brown, Bob (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, W)

    Garrett, W. E.

    Lyon, Alexander W. (York)

    Buchan, Norman

    Carrow, Alex

    Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.)

    Buchanan, Richard (G'gow, Sp'burn)

    Gordon Walker, Rt. Hn. P. C.

    McBride, Neil

    Cant, R. B.

    Gourlay, Harry

    McCann, John

    Carmichael, Neil

    Gray, Dr. Hugh (Yarmouth)

    MacCoN, James

    Carter-Jones, Lewis

    Greenwood, Rt. Hn. Anthony

    Macdonald, A. H.

    Coe, Denis

    Gregory, Arnold

    McGuire, Michael

    Concannon, J. D.

    Grey, Charles (Durham)

    Mackenzie, Gregor (Rutherglen)

    Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)

    Griffiths, Will (Exchange)

    Mackintosh, John P.

    Crawshaw, Richard

    Hale, Leslie (Oldham, W.)

    Maclennan, Robert

    Cullen, Mrs. Alice

    Hamilton, William (Fife, W.)

    McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.)

    Dalyell, Tam

    Hannan, William

    McNamara, J. Kevin

    Davidson, Arthur (Accrington)

    Haseldine, Norman

    Mahon, Peter (Preston, S.)

    Davies, Dr. Ernest (Stretford)

    Hattersley, Roy

    Manuel, Archie.

    Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)

    Hazell, Bert

    Mapp, Charles

    Davies, Edmyfed Hudson (Conway)

    Heffer, Eric S.

    Marsh, Rt. Hn. Richard

    Davies, Robert (Cambridge)

    Henig, Stanley

    Mendelson, J. J.

    de Freitas, Sir Geoffrey

    Hooley, Frank

    Millan, Bruce

    Delargy, Hugh

    Horner, John

    Milne, Edward (Blyth)

    Dell, Edmund

    Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas

    Mitchell, R. C. (S'th'pton, Test)

    Dempsey, James

    Howarth, Robert (Bolton, E.)

    Morgan, Elysan (Cardiganshire)

    Dewar, Donald

    Howie, W.

    Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)

    Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)

    Rhodes, Geoffrey

    Wallace, George

    Newens, Stan

    Richard, Ivor

    Watkins, Tudor (Brecon & Radnor)

    Oakes, Gordon

    Roberts, Albert (Normanton)

    Wellbeloved, James

    Ogden, Eric

    Robinson, W. O. J. (Waith'stow, E.)

    Wells, William (Walsall, N.)

    O'Malley, Brian

    Roebuck, Roy

    Wilkins, W. A.

    Orbach, Maurice

    Rose, Paul

    Willey, Rt. Hn. Frederick

    Orme, Stanley

    Ross, Rt. Hn. William

    Williams, Alan (Swansea, W.)

    Oswald, Thomas

    Shaw, Arnold (Ilford, S.)

    Williams, Alan Lee (Hornchurch)

    Owen, Dr. David (Plymouth, S'tn)

    Sheldon, Robert

    Williams, Clifford (Abertillery)

    Paget, R. T.

    Short, Mrs. Renée (W'hampton, N.E.)

    Williams, Mrs. Shirley (Hitchin)

    Palmer, Arthur

    Silkin, Rt. Hn. John (Deptford)

    Williams, W. T. (Warrington)

    Park, Trevor

    Silverman, Julius (Aston)

    Willis, George (Edinburgh, E.)

    Parker, John (Dagenham)

    Small, William

    Woodbum, Rt. Hn. A.

    Parkyn, Brian (Bedford)

    Spriggs, Leslie

    Woof, Robert

    Pearson, Arthur (Pontypridd)

    Swingler, Stephen

    Yates, Victor

    Perry, George H. (Nottingham, S.)

    Thomas, George (Cardiff, W.)

    Price, Thomas (Westhoughton)

    Thornton, Ernest

    TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

    Price, William (Rugby)

    Urwin, T. W.

    Mr. William Whitlock and

    Probert, Arthur

    Varley, Eric G.

    Mr. Ioan L. Evans.

    Redhead, Edward

    Walker, Harold (Doncaster)

    NOES

    Allason, James (Hemel Hempstead)

    Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)

    Onslow, Cranley

    Astor, John

    Hawkins, Paul

    Osborn, John (Hallam)

    Awdry, Daniel

    Heald, Rt. Hn. Sir Lionel

    Page, Graham (Crosby)

    Batsford, Brian

    Heseltine, Michael

    Peel, John

    Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torquay)

    Hill J. E. B.

    Percival, Ian

    Bessell, Peter

    Hobson, Rt. Hn. Sir John

    Pink, R. Bonner

    Biffen, John

    Holland, Philip

    Powell, Rt. Hn. J. Enoch

    Biggs-Davison, John

    Hooson, Emlyn

    Pym, Francis

    Bossom, Sir Clive

    Howell, David (Guildford)

    Rippon, Rt. Hn. Geoffrey

    Brewis, John

    Hunt, John

    Russell, Sir Ronald

    Brinton, Sir Tatton

    Hutchison, Michael Clark

    Sharples, Richard

    Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. Sir Walter

    Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)

    Shaw, Michael (Sc'b'gh & Whitby)

    Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)

    Johnston, Russell (Inverness)

    Sinclair, Sir George

    Buchanan-Smith, Alick (Angus, N&M)

    Jones, Arthur (Northants, S.)

    Smith, John

    Burden, F. A.

    Jopling, Michael

    Steel, David (Roxburgh)

    Chichester-Clark, R.

    Kimball, Marcus

    Stodart, Anthony

    Clark, Henry

    King, Evelyn (Dorset, S.)

    Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)

    Cooke, Robert

    Kirk, Peter

    Taylor, Edward M. (G'gow, Cathcart)

    Dalkeith, Earl of

    Kitson, Timothy

    Taylor, Frank (Moss Side)

    Davidson, James (Aberdeenshire, W.)

    Lambton, Viscount

    Temple, John M.

    Dean, Paul (Somerset, N.)

    Lancaster, Col. C. G.

    Thorpe, Jeremy

    Deedes, Rt. Hn. W. F. (Ashford)

    Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry

    Turton, Rt. Hn. R. H.

    Errington, Sir Eric

    Longden, Gilbert

    Vaughan-Morgan, Rt. Hn. Sir John

    Eyre, Reginald

    Lubbock, Eric

    Walker-Smith, Rt. Hn. Sir Derek

    Farr, John

    MacArthur, Ian

    Wall, Patrick

    Fletcher-Cooke, Charles

    Mackenzie, Alasdair (Ross&Cromarty)

    Weatherill, Bernard

    Fortescue, Tim

    Maginnis, John E.

    Whitelaw, William

    Foster, Sir John

    Maude, Angus

    Wills, Sir Gerald (Bridgwater)

    Giles, Rear-Adm. Morgan

    Miscampbell, Norman

    Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)

    Gilmour, Sir John (Fife, E.)

    Mitchell, David (Basingstoke)

    Winstanley, Dr. M. P.

    Glover, Sir Douglas

    Monro, Hector

    Wylie, N. R.

    Grant, Anthony

    More, Jasper

    Younger, Hn. George

    Gresham Cooke, R.

    Morrison, Charles (Devizes)

    Gurden, Harold

    Munro-Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh

    TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

    Hall, John (Wycombe)

    Murton, Oscar

    Mr. R. W. Elliott and

    Hall-Davis, A. G. F.

    Nabarro, Sir Gerald

    Mr. Peter Blaker.

    Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)

    Noble, Rt. Hn. Michael

    Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to. [Several with Special Entries.]
    Motion made, and Question proposed,
    That a Committee be appointed to draw up Reasons to be assigned to the Lords for disagreeing to certain of their Amendments to the Bill; that Mr. Greenwood, Mr. MacColl, Mr. Rippon, Mr. Swingler, and Mr. Temple be members of the Committee; that three be the quorum.—[Mr. Greenwood.]
    Mr. Robert Cooke: Mr. Deputy-Speaker, what would happen if we did not agree to this Motion?
    Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Eric Fletcher): Let us wait and see whether or not the House does agree.
    Question put and agreed to.
    To withdraw immediately.
    Reasons for disagreeing to certain of the Lords Amendments reported, and agreed to; to be communicated to the Lords.

  PRIMARY SCHOOLS (CHESHIRE)
  Motion made, and Question proposed,That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Fitch.]
  11.33 p.m.
  Dr. M. P. Winstanley: May I begin by apologising for having an appalling cold, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, which I mention merely to explain any inaudibility and also to make it clear that doctors are just as delighted to talk about their own ailments as anybody else.
  The opportunity of raising matters on the Adjournment is surely evidence, whatever some may say, that hon. Members still possess valuable powers which they can use on behalf of their constituents. I am grateful for this opportunity to draw attention to the educational problems in my area. I am sure that the Minister of State, Department of Education and Science, will agree with me—indeed, I doubt whether any hon. Members would disagree—when I say that the whole future of this country depends very much upon the knowledge and the skill of its people. I think we would also agree that this in its turn depends on the efficiency of our educational system.
  The Minister of State may care to know that I am in complete accord with him in believing that the future pattern of education in this country should be along the comprehensive lines and that that type of education will provide the widest possible opportunities to the maximum number of children to develop their varied potentialities to the full. I hope, further, that the Minister will also agree if I say that these fine plans would come to naught if there were serious deficiencies in the field of primary education. I am aware that there are primary school problems everywhere in the country, and I do not seek to belittle the problems in other places or to ask for special treatment in my own particular area. But I believe that there are special factors in the area of the Cheshire County education authority which require special consideration and which are not common to other areas.
  Of all county education authority areas, the Cheshire county area has had the largest percentage population growth since the war. This has been brought about largely by a massive influx of young
  1530
  couples, with the inevitable consequence that great pressure has been brought to bear on primary education. The figures make this clear. In 1947, the total primary school population in the county area of Cheshire was 63,518. By the beginning of this year it was 101,970, and it is expected by 1970 to reach 122,000, a growth of from 63,000 in 1947 to an expected 122,000 in 1970.
  If we look at the size of admission age groups to the county's primary schools, we see the same pattern repeated. These have risen from 8,376 in 1946 to 15,885 this year, and it is believed that they will approach 19,000 by 1970. This takes no account of those who are expected to attend private schools.
  It should not be assumed that parents who send their children to private primary schools would not necessarily prefer to send them to State schools if places were readily available. I can illustrate this by referring to the area in which I live, the village of Bowdon, in which there are two State primary schools holding approximately 500 children, and they are both full. In the same district there are three excellent private primary schools which accommodate approximately 600 children.
  My inquiries suggest that many parents would prefer State education for their children, but they are unwilling to use their own children as battering rams to push the authorities into providing a new school. I need not describe to the Minister what would happen if 600 additional children presented themselves at the two State schools, which are already full. No doubt a new school would ultimately appear, but not in time for the children concerned. I mention this merely to show that this problem, which is already great, is potentially even greater than it now appears.
  I am aware that many schools have been built to cope with the increase which has already occurred and that a major programme has been conducted. It is in many ways an admirable programme and I do not criticise it, but I think it is agreed that 66 further new primary schools will be required in the county's area by 1970 to accommodate the additional numbers and to deal with the backlog. I am aware that plans for these 66 new schools which are required by 1970

  1531
  are already well advanced, but experience has shown that there are inevitably delays in the completion of planned schools.
  Many delays have taken place throughout the county in general and in the area of my constituency of Cheadle in particular. These delays, which are not necessarily avoidable, produce an emergency situation which is extremely difficult to deal with. Indeed, the county has been forced to adopt what Dr. Kellett, the county's director of education, referred to recently as a series of undesirable expedients.
  These expedients, for coping with the additional numbers who cannot be accommodated in their own schools and when the new school has not yet arrived, are of a number of types: over-large classes, classes held in the school hall or dining room, sometimes in the hall with two classes divided merely by a row of coats and sometimes in the dining room, at the cost, as happened at one school in my constituency, of having to request parents to take their children home for school meals because of difficulties in reorganising the furniture which had been provided in connection with the meals, and finally an expedient which is equally undesirable, transporting a set of children, whatever is the number superfluous to the existing accommodation, by coach or bus to and from rented accommodation elsewhere.
  How undesirable these expedients have proved to be in my constituency has been amply demonstrated to me by the amount of correspondence which I have received. This huge file which I have here consists of letters from parents who are concerned about the problems in the primary schools. They are not the duplicated type of letter that one receives from pressure groups, but personal letters from parents, dealing with the personal problems of their children.
  At the moment, in my constituency there are four primary schools from which children have to be transported each day to and from rented accommodation—from High Lane they are taken to temporary classrooms in a laundry in Disley; from Peacefield School they are taken to the Grove Sunday School, from Thorne Grove, Cheadle Hulme, to Brunt-
  1532
  wood, and from Queens Road, Cheadle Hulme, they are taken to Bradshaw Hall. Other schools have had to adopt other expedients which are no less undesirable.
  I want to consider two of these schools as examples of the ill effects of the procedures. The High Lane problem started some time ago. The parents organised themselves and conducted a careful investigation into the whole problem. They made urgent approaches to the county to do something else, and they also protested direct to the Minister. They felt, from their head count of children coming along, that this was not merely a temporary problem for a matter of weeks, but was likely to be a continuing problem, and so it has proved, because the problem has continued for about two years.
  It is true that at High Lane we are in sight of having the new school, although whether when it finally arrives it will prove adequate for the additional numbers which will have arrived then is not clear, but it will clearly relieve the problem. The fact remains, however, that what was originally introduced as a temporary expedient has proved to be a lot more than temporary for the children involved.
  I do not think that I need underline the undesirability of these procedures. It is clearly damaging to a child's education for it, with others, to be separated from the parent school and the various activities going on there.
  Let me now come to the second example, which is the more recent one, Peacefield School. Once again the parents' action group organised rapidly, and it got this arrangement of the transfer of pupils by bus to temporary accommodation in the Grove Sunday School postponed, but it had to go ahead this term. The Sunday School is in a not unattractive building, but there is no outside play space, and therefore the children are confined indoors all the time. Secondly, it is un-gated, and opens directly on to a main road, and again it has this common undesirable factor of separating the children from the main body of the school.
  In both those cases the problem could have been overcome had the county been able to erect demountable classrooms or portable classrooms on the sites of the existing schools. This would preserve the integrity of the school as a whole,

  1533
  keep the children there, keep them in the same atmosphere, and avoid the whole problem, but the county, unfortunately, was not able to do this, mainly because of a lack of funds for minor capital building purposes.
  It has been made clear to me by the director of education that the county's grant, or at least what it asked for as a grant for minor building works, was cut by the Ministry by £190,000. I am aware that cuts have to be made, and I make no complaint about this because some cuts may be necessary, but I ask the Minister to look at the sort of things which have had to be foregone because of this cut. The Director of Education, writing to me, says that
  "this money"—
  that is, the amount of the cut—
  "would have been used this year to provide other essential accommodation, e.g. further demountable classrooms, and for a programme of the most urgent improvement projects. These would have included improvements to lavatories—their connection to water-borne sewage, and the building of inside lavatories"
  and so on. It is true that in the Cheshire County area there are still 28 primary schools which have pail closets. The fact remains that the county would have liked to obtain demountable classrooms, had it had the money. I was told only last week by the Director of Education that it had received an additional sum of £6.000 from the Ministry, and that this was being immediately used for demountable classrooms which would be used in my constituency. I am most grateful for that. It will solve the problem for one or two schools. But the important point is that this is a problem which, as sure as night follows day, will recur not once but over and over again, where we have the problem of a rapidly expanding authority.
  I ask the Minister of State to consider whether, in view of the special circumstances, he could give Cheshire County assistance to enable it to obtain a stock of portable or demountable classrooms, so that these can be rushed to whichever area has this problem at any time. It may be that it will sometimes be in my constituency, not infrequently it will be in others, but it is a general problem throughout Cheshire as a whole.
  Unfortunately, the effect of this recurring problem on the county authority has shown clearly that it cannot cope;
  1534
  it has not the resources to do anything about it. But the effect has been to poison relationships in education, so that parents have become resentful. They have been inclined to blame the education authority, and next the Ministry, and they have been unable to understand why these difficulties should occur not once but over and over again, when, as has been clearly explained to them by experts in their own parents' associations, that, at a very small cost, a stock of portable demountable classrooms could have solved the whole problem. It would be disastrous if relationships continued to be poisoned in this way, and might prejudice future desirable developments in education throughout the whole area. Only a small amount of money is involved, and I ask the Minister to consider what I have said very carefully in order to see whether or not he can give us some special assistance to meet what is a special problem.
  11.47 p.m.
  The Minister of State, Department of Education and Science (Mr. Edward Redhead): I welcome the fact that the hon. Member for Cheadle (Dr. Winstanley) has chosen as the subject for this debate the education situation in an area of Cheshire which, I agree, very neatly illustrates not only some of the most acute problems facing education authorities but also the enterprising way in which the authorities are tackling them.
  The County of Cheshire is one of the most rapidly growing regions in Britain. This is strikingly illustrated by the fact that the primary school population increased by nearly 12,000 between 1960 and 1965. This represents an increase of 14 per cent. compared with 1.7 per cent. for England and Wales over the same period. The vigour with which the Cheshire authority has tackled the problem created by this increase is shown by the fact that the provision of new primary school places in Cheshire has more than kept pace with the increase—from 1960 to 1965—almost 22,000 new places were provided, thus enabling very substantial improvements to be effected, as well as providing for the increased population. As a result, at the present time nearly half of all the primary school population in Cheshire is accommodated in post-war schools. That is a very good figure, comparatively.

  1535
  This is not to imply that the Cheshire authority is in any way complacent—I say this in fairness to the authority—about the progress it has made in tackling its problems. The authority would be the first to point out that it has sought to do even more. As the hon. Member rightly said, it has not on any occasion secured all that it has sought in the way of approvals. That is a common experience. Successive Governments have been unable, because of the pressure on limited, although rising, resources fully to meet authorities' requests for capital programmes. The figures show the progress which the authority has made with the resources available.
  The hon. Member referred to "cuts" in the minor works allocations. This term leads to a misconception. He means, I think, that the authority has not received all that it has asked for, but it would be wrong to think that there has been a steady reduction, year by year, in the allocations to the authority. In fact, the initial allocations for county minor works in Cheshire have risen each year since 1963–64. The 1965–66 figure of £350.000 was augmented by £225,000, a substantial addition in recognition of the special problems.
  A further demonstration of my Department's recognition of these problems can be seen in two additional allocations—not only the £6,000 to which the hon. Member referred, but also £65,000 agreed since the 1966–67 allocation of £370,000—
  Dr. Winstanley: The right hon. Gentleman must accept that I included that in my calculation, that the reduction from what the authority had asked for was £190,000.
  Mr. Redhead: There has not been a reduction in the allocation, but a steady and substantial increase. Although it has not been possible in recent years to allocate minor works resources as large as Cheshire and other authorities would have wished, Cheshire's special difficulties have been recognised in the rising allocation. The rapid growth in Cheshire is not uniformly distributed. In some areas, the increase in population greatly exceeds the county average. There are new towns and overspill areas where the speed of
  1536
  housing development has created acute problems in the supply of new school places.
  In areas of rapid private development, there is even greater difficulty in phasing the provision of new schools with the increase in housing. Although local authorities watch closely plans for new private estates to obtain reliable information about the rates of house construction, it is not always possible to arrange for the building of new schools, which take longer than houses, to coincide with the completions of houses. Private developers are bound to relate the pace of their building to the state of the market, the supply of labour and the availability of capital. When the families will move into the new houses is difficult to forecast.
  Generally, the new dormitory areas of the large cities present some of the greatest difficulties in providing adequate educational facilities at the right time, and we ought not to minimise those difficulties. When an education authority knows that a new housing development is going ahead faster than expected and that the families will move in before the provision of permanent school places, it has several choices. It can make the maximum use of space in existing schools, including those not accessible except by transport, or extend their accommodation by hiring buildings like church halls as annexes or by putting up quickly-erected new classrooms.
  All these methods have their drawbacks, but, properly used, they enable authorities to provide reasonable educational facilities for the interim period, or until the local "bulge" in the school population, which can be of short duration in an area of new housing, has passed through the primary schools.
  The Cheshire division is an example of an area in which these problems arise particularly acutely. New houses have gone up all over the division and are still going up. The most extensive developments are at Marple and Bramhall and in Cheadle itself.
  The methods used by the Cheshire authority to meet the situation are on the general lines which I have mentioned. The hon. Member referred to some of them and, without denying that the solutions adopted have some drawbacks, I

  1537
  think that the L.E.A. has been able to ensure that the temporary arrangements are educationally acceptable and cause the minimum inconvenience to children, parents and the teaching staff.
  The most appropriate method of meeting temporary accommodation problems naturally varies with the circumstances. The temporary shortage of places at Marple High Lane County Primary School was met by the use of spare classrooms at Disley, about two miles away. Bus transport was provided by the authority in this instance. I emphasise that that was a temporary expedient, pending the completion of a new primary school which will be ready for use from the first day of the new term in January, 1967.
  At another school in Marple, Peace-field, a Sunday School hall has had to be used, as an annexe, but it is worth emphasising that this is the only instance where premises not specifically adapted for secular educational purposes are in use in the Cheadle Parliamentary division. Her Majesty's inspectors have reported favourably on the conditions in the hall and I acknowledge that this has been a temporary expedient pending the completion of another new school, which I hope will be completed by December, 1967.
  The hon. Gentleman referred to other cases where similar temporary expedients have been adopted. In many cases the authority has met the situation by the use of demountable classrooms. Modern demountable classrooms are of a high standard. Indeed, in many older schools where such classrooms have been added they provide the best teaching spaces in the school. Nevertheless, authorities, rightly in my view, do not use them indiscriminately. Apart from the physical obstacles sometimes encountered, such as lack of space or of the necessary services, authorities may have to allow for the cost of erection and subsequently of dismantling and transporting to a new site, and this may not be justified for the short time that the temporary accommodation is required.
  Although the Cheshire L.E.A. already makes extensive use of demountable, prefabricated classroom units, in some cases other solutions are more appropriate and economic. The authority is now proposing to carry out extensive trials with
  1538
  mobile temporary classrooms. These classrooms, of which a number of satisfactory models are now on the market, differ from the demountables in being transportable as a whole unit or a small number of units from one site to another. They are, therefore, much more quickly available than the most rapidly assembled demountable classrooms and cost a good deal less to install. The first of these are already in use in Cheshire and their application will be extended. In particular, the authority decided some weeks ago to install mobile classrooms at Bramhall, Pownall Green School, to augment the existing accommodation for infants.
  It would be wrong of me to give the impression that, even in the rapidly growing dormitory areas such as Cheadle, there has to be extensive recourse to temporary expedients which, as I have said, no matter how well thought out, must be inferior to new schools of longer lasting construction.
  In the Cheadle constituency, 30 new primary major projects, providing a total of 7,800 places, have been programmed since 1959–60. I doubt whether many other areas comparable in size in the country can match this. As a result, of the 43 primary schools in the constituency at present, 27—that is, nearly two-thirds—are of post-war construction. What is more, 11 more are either under construction or will shortly start building.
  Dr. Winstanley: Although we can expect some delay in the building of these schools, is the hon. Gentleman aware that in respect of the two examples he gave, of High Lane and Peacefield, the county would have used demountable classrooms if they had had them? It was because the authority did not have any that they were not used. Is he aware, therefore, that it would be helpful if these methods were available in case the situation demands their use?
  Mr. Redhead: I hope that the local education authority will use its enhanced minor works provision to try to meet the situation in this case in the manner it has adopted. I do not want to be unresponsive to the hon. Gentleman's appeal and certainly I shall consider most sympathetically the references he has made. But, in fairness, I must say that Cheshire and Cheadle in particular have

  1539
  not been treated unfairly by reference to the general experience, given the limitation of resources, although rapidly rising resources, in this regard which has confronted us with the problem of backlog and the explosion of the school population that is occurring throughout the country.
  A massive programme of construction has been undertaken which has led to the provision of a first class educational environment for the large majority of the children and projects now in process of execution will enable improved conditions to be made available to many more.
  As in Cheshire as a whole, so also in Cheadle, the major and minor building programmes have not only kept pace with increased demand, but also enabled many improvements to be made. In Cheadle primary schools, 63 per cent. of the children are now accommodated in post-war schools, a higher proportion than in the country as a whole. This compares with a national average for England and Wales of only 45 per cent. In the light of these figures it is difficult to substantiate any suggestion that the children in the Cheadle constituency or, for that matter, in
  1540
  Cheshire as a whole have been unfairly treated.
  I add that neither the local education authority, to which I pay tribute for its energetic efforts to meet a bitterly difficult situation, nor my right hon. Friend nor I are complacent about the situation, which is by no means peculiar to Cheshire or to Cheadle. But the facts speak for themselves. They speak of an area of new houses, good homes and new schools —a rapidly increasing number of new schools—in which children have better educational opportunities than in many other parts of the country.
  In saying that, I beg the hon. Member not to imagine that I am being complacent about this. I am not. I recognise the difficulties and I hope that, in the not too distant future, we shall be able to tackle the difficulties not only in Cheshire but in many other parts of the country which represent even worse situations as a result of the backlog of neglect which is the inheritance of the Government in education.
  Question put and agreed to.
  Adjourned accordingly at two minutes past Twelve o'clock.

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Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Wakefield
The Lord Gisborough—Took the Oath.

HOUSE BUILDING
2.36 p.m.
LORD ST. HELENS: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what estimate they have made of the number of permanent dwellings likely to be completed in Great Britain in 1966.]
THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF HOUSING AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (LORD KENNET): My Lords, my right honourable friend the Minister of Housing and Local Government has said in the House of Commons that he expects about 380,000 houses to be completed in Great Britain in 1966.
LORD ST. HELENS: My Lords, while thanking the noble Lord for his Answer, may I ask what explanation the Government have for what was very aptly referred to by the political correspondent of The Times the other day as the
"dismal failure to reach the vaunted plans to build 400,000 houses a year"?
Furthermore, since the pledges of successive Ministers of Housing and Local Government have come to nothing, may I ask what changes in policy the Government envisage in order to complete their programme of 500,000 houses in 1970?
LORD KENNET: My Lords, I should be reluctant to accept the terminology of this or that political correspondent, whether about vaunted plans or dismal failures. The target, as the House well knows, is to reach 400,000 houses a year. As to changes in plans, I think it
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is common knowledge that all initiatives are affected to a certain extent by our present economic difficulties, and my right honourable friend's plans for increasing the output of houses must reflect those difficulties in their formulation.
LORD NEWTON: Yes, my Lords, but is not the estimate which the noble Lord has just given for 1966 particularly disappointing if one casts one's mind back to the much more optimistic view that he took when we debated the housing situation on the Motion by my noble friend Lord Hawke at the end of July?
LORD KENNET: My Lords, it is disappointing. But I should remind the House that the figure is about the same as last year's, which was a record figure, and was, in any case, considerably higher than the highest achieved by the Party opposite when they were in office.
LORD LINDGREN: My Lords, can my noble friend say what proportion of these houses is provided by local authorities and what proportion by New Towns or other organisations?
LORD KENNET: My Lords, I can give my noble friend the breakdown between public and private, but not, without further notice, the breakdown between local authorities and New Towns as such. The breakdown between public and private forecast for 1966 is 185,000 public starts and 200,000 public* starts. I would draw your Lordships' attention to the fact that the figures are starts and not completions.
LORD AUCKLAND: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord whether he has any figures relating to development areas where there is a great need for housing for those in the new industries going into them? Can he say what proportion of these figures relates to those areas?
LORD KENNET: My Lords, not without further notice. But, of course, the Government share the noble Lord's preoccupation with housing needs in development areas.
LORD COOPER OF STOCKTON HEATH: My Lords, would my noble friend agree that if we are to achieve these ambitious objectives, not only of 400,000 houses but of 500,000 houses,
*See col. 1149.

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priority at the moment should be given to industrial investment rather than to social investment?
LORD KENNET: My Lords, perhaps that ranges rather far from the Question on the Order Paper.
THE LORD BISHOP OF LEICESTER: My Lords, I believe that the Minister, in answering the question on public and private allocation, by a slip of the tongue used the word "public" in regard to both figures. Would he kindly repeat the answer?
LORD KENNET: I apologise to your Lordships. The figures are: forecast for 1966, 185,000 public starts and 200,000 private starts.
LORD HAWKE: My Lords, have the Government had any consultation with the brickmaking industry with a view to giving them guidance in planning their output for the spring?
LORD KENNET: My Lords, there are continuous consultations. The most recent took place at a meeting, on November 30, of a Working Party at which the housebuilders, the producers of building materials and the building societies were represented on all these matters.

NAVAL HOUSE PURCHASING SCHEME
2.40 p.m.
LORD BLYTON: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the first Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what progress has been made with the Naval House Purchasing Scheme.]
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE ROYAL NAVY (LORD WINTERBOTTOM): My Lords, this scheme, which gives advances of pay to help ratings to buy their own houses, has proved to be very useful and popular, not least because it has helped to reduce the demand for married quarters. Since it started in September, 1965, nearly 3,000 ratings who have re-engaged to serve for pension (that is, to complete a total of 22 years from the age of 18) have received advances.
LORD BLYTON: My Lords, I thank the Minister for his Answer. Can he tell me whether under this scheme ratings can let their houses if their families join them, either abroad or at home?
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: Yes, my Lords. If they are near to a naval port or establishment they can let them to the Royal Navy through naval hirings; or, if they are suitably situated elsewhere they can let them to either of the other Services.

ROYAL NAVY MARRIED QUARTERS
LORD BLYTON: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the second Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will make a statement on the provision of married quarters for the Royal Navy.]
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, good progress has been made with the provision of married quarters in the United Kingdom and we believe that, with the quarters now existing and those in the current building programme, supplemented by a reasonable number of hired quarters to provide flexibility, we shall be within sight of eliminating long waiting lists for official accommodation at most naval ports and establishments. There are over 8,000 married quarters and 3,300 hirings in the United Kingdom occupied by naval families now. Approximately 5,500 more quarters are being built in the current programme. Included in these is a new housing estate at Gosport on which 1,500 houses and flats together with community facilities are being built by an industrialised system. The first of these quarters have already been occupied and are very popular.
Already we have been able to ease certain restrictive rules on the occupation of naval married quarters in the United Kingdom, which had been necessary earlier because of the shortage of quarters. We shall relax restrictions as soon as possible at the few places where they have had to be retained. If there are signs of increasing demand, extra quarters will be added to the building programme.
LORD BLYTON: My Lords, while thanking my noble friend for that Answer, and recognising that this scheme is an advance on the previous scheme as I know it, I would ask him if he can tell me whether the abolition of the three-year rule would mean that a naval family may now settle permanently on a married quarters estate of their own choice?
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: No, my Lords. The basic qualification for a married quarter is still linked with the husband's service at a particular establishment or port, or in a ship based at, or operating from, that port. The abolition of the three-year rule means that a family may continue to live in the same married quarters during successive drafts or appointments for the husband, if he is still based on the same port. It also means that a family will never be faced with having to move from a married quarter while the husband is away, as sometimes happened under the old rules.
LORD CARRINGTON: My Lords, without wishing to disturb the harmony of an obviously "planted" Question, may I ask whether the noble Lord can tell us anything about married quarters in either Gibraltar or Singapore?
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: That is another question, my Lords.
LORD CARRINGTON: With great respect, my Lords, it is not. It is asked in the original Question.
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, I am afraid that I cannot give exact details about the provision of married quarters, although I know that in Singapore hirings are easily available and there is no heavy housing problem there.

LAUNDRY AND DRY-CLEANING CHARGES
2.46 p.m.
LORD REDESDALE: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether, in view of recent statements made by them, the statistics produced for the Prices and Incomes Board on the laundry and dry-cleaning industries will be continued on a running basis.]
THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, BOARD OF TRADE (LORD RHODES): No, my Lords. These statistics were produced by the National Board for Prices and Incomes for their report on laundry and dry-cleaning charges. Her Majesty's Government are satisfied that the statistics normally available to them are sufficient for the discharge of their continuing responsibilities in relation to these industries. The Board of Trade will require more detailed information from individual laundries for the exercise of their responsibilities under the Prices and Incomes Act 1966, but this need not involve statistics about the industry in general.
LORD REDESDALE: My Lords, while I am grateful to the noble Lord for the information given in his reply, I should like to ask him whether the information given in the original Prices and Incomes Board report is not relevant to future inquiries and investigations which presumably the Government will have to make if they are to relax Order No. 1?
LORD RHODES: My Lords, may I help the noble Lord? A small sample of 600 firms is taken by the Ministry of Labour to make a rough index for the Retail Price Index. The Board of Trade get monthly returns for the purpose of turnover, and then every few years, I think about every five years, there is a Census of Distribution which also collates the figures. We have a dual role in this respect, and I should like to explain it to the noble Lord. On the one hand, we are following up with firms concerned complaints about increases and are considering whether directions under Section

1153
27 of the Act should be applied to any of these. On the other hand, we are considering applications from laundries for consent to increase prices. In the former, we have received from the public about 1,135 complaints, and from the laundry industry as a whole about 44 applications for increases.

POLICE PENSIONS REGULATIONS 1966
2.48 p.m.
LORD BOWLES: My Lords, in the regrettable absence of my noble friend Lord Stonham, I beg to move that the Police Pensions Regulations 1966, a draft of which was laid before the House on November 15, be approved. I hope that the House will welcome these consolidated Regulations because they bring together in one instrument the provisions of the Police Pensions Regulations 1962 and the eight subsequent sets of amending Regulations. They apply in England and Wales, and in Scotland, in the same way as the former Regulations and, in revoking and restating those Regulations, this consolidation provides a badly needed comprehensive code in relation to the past as well as for the future. I would emphasise that the Regulations in no way affect entitlements of existing pensioners whose rights are fully safeguarded.
Some changes have been introduced into the pensions code, to which I should draw attention. Two of them are largely administrative, and I will refer to these later. The others are either minor or clarify Regulations where the present wording is not sufficiently clear. An example of a minor change is one relating to the calculation of the pension payable to an officer who is injured on duty. In calculating, or reviewing, such a pension the officer's degree of disablement is taken into account; but under the existing provisions only the degree of disablement arising from the injury which occasioned the grant of the pension may be so considered, even though the degree of disablement is increased as a result of some other injury on duty coming to light later on. The new Regulation 107 provides that in cases of future retirements the degree of disablement attributable to any injury on duty shall be taken into account.
1154
An example of clarification is Regulation 12A(4) of the 1962 Regulations, which provides that the gratuity payable to a widow whose husband's death resulted from an attack or injury received in effecting an arrest shall be calculated by reference to the pay of a constable in a police force. At that time police pay rates were uniform throughout the country. Earlier this year constables in the City of London and Metropolitan Police forces were granted supplementary pay of £50 a year. The new Regulation makes it clear that the gratuity shall be calculated by reference to the pay of a constable in the police force of which the husband was a member.
I will now explain briefly the two administrative changes to which I referred earlier. The first relates to the financial arrangements for a police authority to discharge its liability in respect of the accrued pension entitlement of an officer who has transferred to another force. The present arrangements are that the authority pays an apportioned contribution towards the eventual pension which is payable by the police authority of the force in which the officer last serves. The Regulations provide instead that the liability known as the transfer value shall be discharged at the time of transfer by an immediate lump sum payment "to the authority to which the officer has been transferred". This is a common method of discharging pension liabilities in cases of transfer between public employments and is familiar to the local authorities who will operate it. The main provisions giving effect to this change are contained in Regulations 62 and 64 and Schedule 7.
The other change concerns the aggregation of service for pension purposes in the case of officers who have served in the police and in the civil service or in civilian employment which is in effect superannuable on Civil Service terms by reason of the Metropolitan Police Staff (Superannuation) Acts. The existing authority for the aggregation of such service is contained in Section 10 of the Police Pensions Act 1921, which was preserved by the Police Pensions Act 1948 pending the introduction of new transfer arrangements on the lines of those applying generally in the public

1155
service. So far as they concern persons leaving or entering police service, these new transfer arrangements are contained in Regulations 38 and 65 and Schedules 4 and 7 to the Regulations. But in relation to persons leaving or entering the other employment involved in the transfer, it is necessary for those provisions to be complemented by further rules to be made by the Treasury and the Home Secretary under the Superannuation (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1948, which is the general Statute concerned with transfer provisions for the public service. If these Police Regulations are approved, the related transfer rules, which are subject to Negative Resolution procedure, will come into operation on the same date, that is to say, January 1, 1967.
The new arrangements will govern transfers which are completed on or after the date when the provisions come into operation, but the provisions of Section 10 of the Police Pensions Act 1921 will still govern the entitlement to aggregate service in the case of officers who have completed their transfers before January 1, 1967. These two administrative changes will facilitate the integration of the Police Service into the public sector superannuation network.
Finally, the House should know that these Regulations, including the changes made in them, have been drawn up by the Departments in full consultation with the local authority and police associations concerned, and have been agreed by the Police Council for Great Britain. My Lords, I beg to move.
Moved, That the Draft Police Pensions Regulations 1966, laid before the House on November 15, 1966, be approved.—(Lord Bowles.)
LORD SANDFORD: My Lords, I am sure we are all grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Bowles for that full and detailed explanation of these Regulations. In view of his explanation, and in the light of the Report from the Special Orders Committee, I think there is nothing further which need detain us from giving approval to the Regulations. It is gratifying that, for once, the rules to which the noble Lord referred are not to come into force until after the Regulations have been approved by Parliament.
1156
I think that all noble Lords will feel that this is a suitable opportunity for us to ask that a message be conveyed to the noble Lord who was to have moved this Motion, conveying to him our prayers and best wishes for a thorough recovery.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Hear, hear!
LORD BOWLES: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his kindly suggestion, and I will see that it is put into operation.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

ARMED FORCES BILL
2.56 p.m.
Order of the Day for the Third Reading read.
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill, standing in the name of my noble friend Lord Shackle ton, be now read a third time. Though somewhat complex, the Bill does three main things. It renews the Army Act and the Air Force Act; it brings broadly into line the laws governing enlistment in all three Services, and it revises and consolidates the Statutes governing discipline in all three Services. I am sure that this Bill will be of benefit to all three Services, in whose welfare your Lordships take so much interest. This, if I may say so, was indicated by the constructive criticism of noble Lords opposite during the early stages of this Bill, for which we are grateful. The Bill represents a substantial step forward in bringing the Statutes affecting the Services closer together, and as such I commend it to your Lordships. I beg to move.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 3a.—(Lord Winter bottom.)
LORD THURLOW: My Lords, as the noble Lord said, there have been very slight differences between us in regard to this Bill, and my noble friends and I welcome the continuance of the Army Act and the Air Force Act for another year. We also welcome anything that simplifies and brings the laws for the three Services into line, and we shall welcome from time to time other Bills which the Government may well bring before us that will continue this work, so that eventually, perhaps, these complicated and different laws of the three Services can be embodied in one much simpler

1157
manual. So I welcome the Bill and wish all members of the Armed Services all success until we look at their conditions in a year's time.
On Question, Bill read 3a, with the Amendments; and passed, and returned to the Commons.

LAND COMMISSION BILL
3.0 p.m.
Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee read.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Kennet.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[The EARL OF LISTOWEL in the Chair.]
Clause 61 [Exemption for single family dwelling-house built on land acquired before 23rd September 1965]:
LORD WADEmoved, in subsection (1)(a), after "dwelling house" to insert:
"or not more than two dwelling-houses which, or (as the case may be) each of which, is".
The noble Lord said: We are now dealing with the subject of exemption from levy for a single family dwelling-house built on land acquired before September 23, 1965. May I repeat that I am in favour of collecting for the community value created by the community. The only question is how best to do it. I do not think this Bill sets about the task in the right way. I believe that the levy procedure will be extremely complicated. I think it therefore reasonable to reduce the number of cases where liability may arise, especially where the amount involved is comparatively small. Furthermore, I think we should endeavour to reduce the number of anomalies. Of course, one must draw the line somewhere, and the question is simply where the line should be drawn.
Under Clause 61 a person who owns a plot of land may build a house for the only or the main residence of himself or his son or daughter or father or mother or parents in law. That, I think, is a fair summary of subsection (5).Under subsection (6) the expression "dwelling-house" includes garage, outhouse or other appurtenances. But if on
1158
this one plot of land which the owner possesses two small houses are built instead of one, then, if I understand this clause correctly, the exemption does not apply to the second house. For example, the would-be owner-occupier may think it desirable to build one house for himself and his wife and another separate one on the same plot of land for his in-laws. In that case the exemption will not apply to the second house for the in-laws. There is much to be said in some circumstances for a separate house for the mother-in-law or mother and father in law to live.
The more one examines this problem the more one sees the kind of anomalies likely to arise under this Bill. The exemption applies to a single dwelling-house, but, if I understand the clause correctly, it does not apply to a pair of semi-detached houses. If the owner, perfectly properly, decides that he would like to build a pair of semi-detached houses and that he and his family should live in one and the mother-in-law in the other there would be a liability to the levy so far as one half of the pair of "semis" is concerned. My Amendment is simply designed to permit two units of occupation, two houses, on this plot of land instead of one.
I am assuming that my interpretation of a single dwelling-house is correct. I have studied the Bill, but I have not been able to find in the interpretation clauses anything that throws any light on this point. I have, however, gone to the trouble of looking up Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, and on page 903 I find this:
"Dwelling house: A dwelling house is obviously a house, with the super added requirement that it is dwelt in."
That seems to me to be incontrovertible, but it does not help me very much. As I say, one must draw the line somewhere, but it seems strange that one should draw the line through the middle of a semidetached dwelling-house. Of course, if one put one's in-laws into the outhouse, that would be all right: it would be a different matter.
It is not for me to suggest ways around this Bill. Once it becomes law my view is that the law must be observed. But I think it is proper to point out potential anomalies. For example, if the in-laws live in the other half of the semi-detached dwelling-house and there is a connecting

1159
door or passage, I imagine that liability would not arise. If that is so, it seems to me this will bring legislation of this sort into disrepute. I am not suggesting that there should be exemption for an unlimited number of houses on the plot of land which we are now discussing. This was considered in another place in Committee and a wider Amendment than mine was debated, and Mr. Skeffington said:
"We have the suggestion, which is in Amendment 202, which would mean that a landowner with a large family could, in addition to building a house for his wife or his daughter and her husband, go on giving plots of land for as many dependants as they have—children, grandchildren, illegitimate children, and step-children. Really there would be no end until one ran out of land or children or dependants."
I am not suggesting there would be anything of that sort. My Amendment would simply extend the exemption to two dwelling-houses and no more than that. It would cover the case of the two separate houses, it would cover the case of the pair of "semis", and I think it would cover the case of a house divided into two separate units. There is no ideal solution, but I think the proposal I am putting forward would be a fairer one than that in this clause, and I think it would tend to lessen the anomalies. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 62, line 35, after ("dwelling house") insert ("or not more than two dwelling-houses which, or (as the case may be) each of which, is").—(Lord Wade.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD GARDINER): As the noble Lord, Lord Wade, who so persuasively moved this Amendment, knows, levy is payable on the happening of a chargeable act or event, and speaking generally quite irrespective of the financial means of the company or person concerned. Apart from Clause 61, there are only two exemptions from levy; one is cases in which, as with certain types of charitable land, it has been thought impracticable to ascertain the value; the second is those cases in which in effect the Exchequer would be paying itself. Clause 61 is therefore a complete exception to anything else in the Bill and is an exception to meet a case of hardship. It is simply to meet the case where, before the White Paper had been published, a man had bought a plot of
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land intending to build a bungalow on it to retire to, or for his wife, or something of that sort, and then because he has to pay the levy the whole plan is frustrated and he cannot afford to build the bungalow.
Of course, I can appreciate the argument which has been advanced, that a couple are going to retire and need two houses to accommodate the mother-in-law. I think the noble Lord has forgotten that couples have two mothers-in-law, so if we are going to make it two houses we ought to make it three. As the noble Lord said, one has to draw the line somewhere. This is really a very special case for the reasons I have given and the Government do not propose to extend it. It is not, I think, accurate to say that they are drawing the line through the middle of a semi-detached house, because I am hopeful the noble Lord will agree that one cannot have a semi-detached house standing by itself. There must be a second semi-detached house.
LORD WADE: I am sorry if I did not state the position quite accurately. I intended to say through the middle of a pair of semi-detached houses.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I should respectfully accept that. But in the Government's view it would be wrong to extend what is intended as an act of generosity to help people of small means, in a way outside these narrow limits in circumstances in which it would be difficult to police it or to administer it, and which could result in a substantial profit being made. This is quite different from trying to avoid the frustration of the purpose for which a particular plot had been purchased.
LORD WADE: I thank the noble and learned Lord for his reply. I must say that I am not entirely satisfied, though I do not feel that this is an issue which should be presed to a Division. Therefore, while reserving my position for a later stage of the Bill, I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNORmoved, in subsection (1), to leave out paragraph (b). The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 38. As the noble and learned Lord has just said, Clause 61

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springs from paragraph 31 of the White Paper, and it may simplify my exposition of the Amendment if I read to your Lordships that short paragraph. It says:
"A person owning land at the date of the publication of this Paper who satisfies the Commission that he is building a single house on the land for occupation by his family will he able to do so without having to pay levy. This exemption will relate to only one dwelling-house however much land the person may own."
I entirely accept that the exemption should apply to only one dwelling I do not agree with the noble Lord, Lord Wade, who moved the last Amendment. But what I am questioning is why this concession should be made only to a person owning land at the date of the publication of the White Paper. It seems to me reasonable to consider whether it would not be equally fair to extend it to purchases made after September 23, 1965.
One must appreciate that as time goes on children grow up, and the owner of some land may wish to have his son and daughter-in-law, on their marriage, living near him on land that he owns. Whether it is a good thing for children to live near their parents or parents-in-law is an interesting moral and social question, but I do not think it should influence our consideration of these Amendments.
In my view, it will be regarded as extremely hard if, when something perfectly normal of that character arises at some date in the future, the owner of the land finds that, in order to help his son by erecting an extra house for him on the land that he has owned, though he did not own it in 1965, he will be charged betterment levy. I cannot follow the argument that he would be making a profit out of this land, because all this is within the family; and if one member of the family is making a profit, the other member of the family must be suffering thereby by having to pay more. I am not suggesting for one moment that this concession should go outside the area of the family. I believe, privately, that the solution in years to come will be a simple one. I do not think that the Land Commission will last, any more than the development charge lasted; and I think that in years to come, when this man's children have grown up, there will not be
1162
a Land Commission. But we have to legislate here on the basis that a Land Commission are coming into existence, and I want to ask the Government most seriously why paragraph (b) is needed.
This Amendment was discussed in another place along with a number of other Amendments and it is therefore not entirely clear what the reply of the Government was to this specific Amendment. Part of the reply was that the Amendment could not be accepted because it is not in the White Paper. I submit that we cannot legislate by White Paper. When Parliament considers the White Paper it considers the principles of that White Paper; it considers the White Paper in general. But it cannot be out of order in either House of Parliament to suggest afterwards that, in the detailed implementation of the policy, improvements could be made in regard to what was said in the White Paper, so I think that that argument falls to the ground. The other argument which was used was that the Amendment could give rise to evasion. If that argument was intended to apply to this particular Amendment, when it was discussed in Committee in another place, all I would say is that I do not think that it is applicable. But it may be that the Parliamentary Secretary, when he was referring to evasion, had in mind one of the several other Amendments that were discussed at the same time.
That would leave as the only argument against this Amendment that it would somewhat widen the special concession that is being made. When one considers whether or not it is right to widen a concession, one must apply common sense. One cannot reel off the answer on any a priori principles, and I submit to your Lordships that it would be regarded as common sense that if, at some future date, when a man's children have grown up and he wishes to build a house on his land for one of them on getting married, he should not have to pay a betterment levy. I think it would be regarded as contrary to common sense if he were required to pay betterment levy under Case C. It is for these reasons that I commend this Amendment to the House.
Amendment moved—
Page 62, line 39, leave out paragraph (b).—(Lord Brooke of Cumnor.)
3.17 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: As I have explained, the sole object of the Government in Clause 61 is to provide for a particular case where somebody would otherwise suffer hardship because the whole object for which he had bought a plot of land before the date of the White Paper, and therefore, before he knew what was happening, was to build a house for himself or his near family. If we were to extend the exemption beyond that—for instance, to the second house mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Wade—it must be remembered that after six months of occupation there would be nothing to stop him from selling it, and thereby making a substantial profit.
I entirely agree that the fact that it is not in the White Paper is not a good reason for opposing the Amendment; but if the clause applied to land bought at any time it would become virtually impossible to collect levy on the development of houses, because developers would make sure that, before they started developing, the land was, at any rate nominally, in the hands of the person who would buy the house when it was completed. What is more, the developer would make sure that when he sold the land to the householder the consideration was taken outside the conveyance, as, for example, by the simple expedient of ensuring a large profit on the construction of the house so that no levy would be taken on the conveyance.
The degree of evasion to which this Amendment would give rise would mean, in the Government's view, driving a coach-and-four through the Bill. I am quite sure that that is not the object with which the Amendment is put forward—I am not suggesting that it is intended to be a wrecking Amendment. But for the reasons I have given it would, in the Government's view, amount in practice to a wrecking Amendment because of the extreme facility of evasion to which it would give rise. The reason for limiting the sole concession made by this clause to somebody who bought a plot of land at the date of the White Paper is that anybody buying a plot of land after the date of the White Paper would know about the levy and ought accordingly to have provided for it, whereas the man who bought his plot before the White
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Paper would not. On those grounds, I am afraid that I am unable to accept the Amendment.
LORD AIREDALE: The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, having for the moment, at any rate, held at bay my noble friend Lord Wade on the last Amendment, was not content with that, and in his answer to this Amendment launched another attack on my noble friend by pointing out, quite correctly of course, that in the case of the second house it might be sold after six months and a considerable profit made. But is it not fair comment that the man who had bought the land before September 23, 1965, could also after six months sell the land at a considerable profit? But that consideration did not prevent Her Majesty's Government from introducing paragraph (b) and allowing the gentleman who bought the land before September 23, 1965, from having this concession. So, with great respect, was it not rather unfair to launch a second attack on my noble friend Lord Wade?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I certainly did not mean to launch a second attack, or indeed any attack, on the noble Lord, Lord Wade, who, as I said, put his case with his usual persuasion. Of course, a line has to be drawn somewhere, but the point is that after a White Paper has been issued people know where they are about the levy. That is why there is this special arrangement in relation to the man who bought his plot before the date of the White Paper and who is then frustrated in the whole object of his buying the plot as a place to which to retire. It was a special case to meet that situation.
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR: I listened with great care to the noble and learned Lord, and I am in entire agreement with him about the necessity of preventing evasion of this or any other clause. From what I know about the economics of building development, it seems to me that it would be extremely difficult for any ordinary builder engaged on a big development not to do anything at all about proceeding with the building until he had already managed to sell each plot of land to a purchaser. I very much doubt whether this evading expedient, which the noble and learned Lord

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described, would be practicable for the developer. However, I accept that we must not leave loopholes for evasion.
But the noble and learned Lord, in his argument, did not seem to me to meet the main point which I was making. Suppose that somebody to-day were to buy a house with a piece of garden or meadow attached. In years to come, when one of his children had grown up, he might, quite sensibly, wish to build a small house on part of the garden or meadow for one of his children. It would seem to be against common sense if that person at that stage had to pay levy on the building of a house for a member of his family; nor, so far as I can judge, could there be any possibility of evasion in that case.
I should be grateful if the noble and learned Lord could consider this matter further with the Minister, because this is in no sense intended as a wrecking Amendment, as I think the noble and learned Lord accepts. It would have been possible for the Opposition to try to make the task of the Land Commission as difficult as possible and to try to amend the Bill in ways that would harm the Land Commission's reputation. This Amendment is rather designed to save the Land Commission from a certain degree of unpopularity which may in certain future cases attach to them, and it is in that spirit that I should be grateful if it could be considered further. I will not press the Amendment now. I feel sure that the Minister will bear in mind what I have said. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
3.26 p.m.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSSmoved, in subsection (3)(a), after "not" to insert:
"and that other project of material development has begun to be carried out,".
The noble Viscount said: This Amendment is not one in whose drafting I take any tremendous pleasure; and indeed I think that I might have done it rather better. Nevertheless, it is intended to raise a point which does not bring to the fore either the coach-and-pair which the noble and learned Lord Chancellor had so much fear of yesterday, or indeed the coach-and-four which is to-day's conveyance. It is a simple point. As I
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understand it, entirely within the concept of the White Paper in regard to the single dwelling-house one may change one's mind as to the occupant, but may not change one's mind as to the siting of it within the plot. I may be wrong about this, but the reasoning is as follows.
In subsection (2) of Clause 2 it is quite clear that you can serve an amended notice changing the would-be occupation of the dwelling-house from yourself to your son or daughter, but it is quite clear that under this subsection you may not change where you put the house upon the site. I believe that you would be bound by the original notice of the project as to where you put your house on the site, because if your Lordships look at Clause 38, subsection (5), it will be seen in the notice of the project to which you attach the claim for exemption under Clause 61 you have to give details of the planning permission under which you propose to build. The planning permission in the case of a single house would almost invariably have been a detailed planning permission for a house in a certain site.
I cannot believe that it would in any infringe the principle of this exemption from levy if, before the work on the house was begun—and this is absolutely essential—the person who wished to build it were to change his mind for some quite innocent and good reason and decide that he wished to put the house in a slightly different position on the site for which he also had planning permission. Unless I am wrong, this cannot be done. I should be grateful if the Government would say why, if one can change the occupant before work on the house starts, one cannot change the site or the part of the site on which it is built. It seems to me to be a restriction which I cannot understand. I do not believe anybody else can understand it, and if it can be explained whether in the first place it is the case, and secondly, if it is the case, why, I believe that the country will be most grateful. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 63, line 14, after ("not") insert the said words.—(Viscount Colville of Culross.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This is intended, as I have said, to apply in very limited circumstances. When a man buys a plot, he presumably knows where he intends to put a bungalow. Furthermore,

1167
so far as individuals are concerned there may be deaths, and one must allow for changes in that respect. The effect of the Amendment is to allow the owner of land to serve more than one notice claiming exemption under Clause 61, if the development in respect of which the earlier notice or notices would be served had not yet been started at the time when the latter or last notice was served. The exemption in Clause 61 was intended to deal with these very limited circumstances of the man of small means who buys a plot of land on which to put a house for himself or his family. The Amendment presupposes that two or more different projects of development might take place—for that is what it would amount to; the exemption really is not apt.
The noble Viscount might not have appreciated this, but there is no provision for withdrawing the first notice that had been served, and it would appear that if the owner served one notice but did not start work in pursuance of it until after he had served the second, he would still be exempt in respect of the house to which the first notice related and could then build as well the second house without liability to levy. That I think would be the effect of the Amendment as drafted.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: I was fully aware of this difficulty. I should have said that I was speaking to my second Amendment on this clause as well, which was, of course, expressly designed to enable the Land Commission to avoid that happening. The way I, at any rate, intended it was that if the second notice was served, they would under the powers that they have under subsection (4) be able to cancel the first one. It may be that I did not get it right, but I specifically tried to provide against that.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I think the noble Viscount would agree that this is all highly technical. I do not know from my own knowledge whether my right honourable friend the Minister reads Hansard, but I should suspect that might well be so. I can only leave it there.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord. It may be, again, that this is a matter which can be dealt with by
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way of administration. But may I just draw his attention to this? Under subsection (4) you are at liberty to serve two or more notices claiming exemption at the same time. It may be that what you would wish to do is to serve two notices in respect of the same house but with alternative occupants. I cannot think why, but you might want to. What, you could do is to serve two notices at the same time in respect of two slightly differently sited houses on the same plot. If you did that, then the Land Commission could choose which one they gave exemption on. It is a truly extraordinary thing but, as I understand it, if you have planning permission for both they can say, "Yes, you can build that one with exemption. But, no, you cannot build that one, and if you do you will pay the levy. "It seems to me that there is a very odd discretion here, unless I have not understood the subsection.
But if there was the case which I had envisaged, that the notice had been put in some time before the project was going to be begun—and indeed that can be done up to twelve months before—and a road proposal came along which would, in fact, chop off the front part of the site so you wished to site your house a little further back, then, as I understand the Bill as at present drafted, you would pay the levy if you did so. Only if you built the house in the original place, which might be straight on the back of the footpath, can you be exempt. I believe that this is a little inflexible.
The suggestion which I am making is entirely within the terms of the White Paper, as I think the noble and learned Lord accepted, and it may be that there is some administrative answer. But I believe this should not be so inflexible that this sort of minor change is prohibited. I should be grateful, therefore, to study this further, and perhaps I may take this up if necessary at a later stage if I can improve the matter. Therefore, I beg leave at the moment to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
3.33 p.m.
LORD WADEmoved, in subsection (3)(b), after "project" to insert:
"and stated in the notice to be intended as his residence (or that of the person for which he is so substituted)"
The noble Lord said: If it is the intention of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor not to accept any further Amendments, there may not be very much point in moving an Amendment of this nature. But it has been suggested to me that this very complicated paragraph (b) would be a little clearer if, after the word "project" in line 19, there were added:
"and stated in the notice to be intended as his residence (or that of the person for which he is so substituted)".
I am therefore moving this Amendment in order that the noble and learned Lord may have an opportunity of stating whether he considers these words would, in fact, improve this paragraph. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 63, line 19, after "project" insert the said words.—(Lord Wade.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: With great respect, we do not see that this Amendment would really have any effect. This is always subject to argument, which does not do any harm, but it does not appear to us to achieve any actual object. Therefore, in any case, we would be reluctant to accept it on that ground, apart from the fact that we are dealing with Part III.
LORD WADE: I do not propose to press this. I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave withdrawn.
Clause 61 agreed to.
Clause 62:
Limited exemption for builders and developers of residential property
(5) Regulations made for the purposes of this section may provide that subsection (1) of this section shall not have effect unless, before the end of such period (not being less than six months) from the first appointed day as may be prescribed, the builder or developer serves on the Commission a notice containing such particulars as may he prescribed for the purpose of indicating to the Commission that a question of exemption under this section is likely to arise.
3.35 p.m.
THE EARL OF KINNOULLmoved to add to subsection (5):
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"Provided always that where the Commission is satisfied that the failure to serve such notice within the prescribed period is due to inadvertence or is otherwise accidental subsection (1) of this section may if the Commission thinks fit have effect notwithstanding that such notice is not served within the prescribed period."
The noble Earl said: Clause 62 concerns the special provisions for limited exemption for builders and developers of residential property. In order that they may benefit from this exemption, they must within six months from the first appointed day serve notice on the Commission that they wish to claim relief under this clause. The Amendment which I am now moving seeks to prevent hardship arising, where a builder or developer for some perfectly genuine reason—such as, for instance, mislaying a letter—serves notice of claim on the Commission after the six months period.
As I understand the clause as it stands, the Commission would not have any power of discretion to allow the claim, even if they agreed with the cause of the late application. It may be argued that this discretion will be included in one of the many regulations to be made by the Minister, and that the Amendment is therefore unnecessary. If that is the case, I would earnestly suggest that it would be far safer to give the Commission this discretionary power now, in this Bill, than risk its becoming lost in the regulations still to be made, for after all it may take some time for the Minister to make all the regulations. I very much hope that the Government will see fit to accept this Amendment, which does nothing to alter the effect of the clause but simply allows the Commission a little more human understanding when dealing with a late application of claim. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 65, line 19, at end insert the said proviso.—(The Earl of Kinnoull.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: In the Government's view this Amendment is redundant. It is, in fact, intended that the regulations which will be made under Clause 62(5) will provide that notice must be served on the Commission in respect of the land which may become liable to this exemption within six months or such longer period as the Commission may allow. The Commission will act reasonably, and obviously if there are good and genuine reasons for the

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failure to notify they will extend the time. Publicity will be directed to all builders about this clause, so there will not be any good reason or excuse for a builder not to know about the conditions contained in it. But I agree with the noble Earl that there are always exceptional cases which ought to be provided for, and I will undertake that when the regulations are made that discretion will remain. I hope, in view of that undertaking, that the noble Earl will withdraw the Amendment.
THE EARL OF KINNOULL: I am much obliged to the noble and learned Lord, and I willingly withdraw the Amendment on that understanding. I beg leave to withdraw it.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
On Question, Whether Clause 62 shall stand part of the Bill?
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR: I do not wish at this stage to take exception to anything that is in the clause, certainly not at this stage of the Bill, but I want to ask the Government whether they would be good enough, on the Question, That the clause stand part of the Bill, to give your Lordships a brief explanation of the meaning of the clause as it stands. I have some reason for asking that. I have no wish to waste your Lordships' time, but this is a clause which is going to be of considerable importance to house-builders, and we all have a common interest in ensuring that house-building goes on steadily. Thanks to the fact that the clause was amended in several places at a late stage in another place at the end of October, I think I am right in saying that there is no convenient summary on record anywhere of the meaning and implications of the clause as it now stands. I should be grateful, therefore, if the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, would give this Committee a brief summary of the clause. Then we could all consider it in Hansard and see whether we understood and agreed with it.
LORD KENNET: I should be most happy to do so. Speaking for myself, I find it a great relief that we are not at this moment debating an Amendment to a Part of the Bill which would have been a Ways and Means Bill if it had been separate, but are discussing the meaning
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of provisions which have come to us from the House of Commons—and in this I think this House is more properly and more happily employed than it has been employed in the last day-and-a-half.
At the date of the White Paper builders were known to hold stocks of land ripe for development by housing which in many cases represented several years' output. If they all rushed to start development on this land before the appointed day, instead of completing houses already started, the orderly progress of the housing programme would be disrupted. The purpose of this clause is therefore to enable such land to be developed at the time when it would have been developed had there been no Bill. The clause therefore exempts the development of such land by the builder, no matter when it is developed.
The exemption is granted to firms which were in business as builders or developers before September 23, 1965, and whose business included the building of houses, flats or other dwellings. It includes both those who build the houses and those who, employing another firm to do the actual building, assemble the land and dispose of the houses. A builder or developer must have held, on September 23, 1965, either the freehold or a lease of the land, or have been under a binding contract to take such an interest—not a building agreement. These are the qualifications of the developing owner as defined in Clause 32. For a project to be exempt, the principal purpose of it must be housing, but it does not need to be exclusively housing; it can include other forms of development, such as the small group of shops which might well form part of a typical housing estate. The Commission must be satisfied that the other development is subsidiary.
The exemption is limited to land which had a planning permission on September 23, 1965, or for which planning permission was granted later on an appeal from a decision of the local planning authority before that date. The planning permission can be one granted on an outline application even though, by September 23, 1965, no detailed approvals had been obtained. In practice, it is not uncommon for a project to be varied, and there is therefore no obligation on the builder to follow slavishly the terms of the original permission. Indeed, provided the ultimate

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project consists of houses, an exemption will be available even if the planning permission was not for houses. There is one final condition. Within a time prescribed by regulations (expected to be six months) or such extended period as the Commission exceptionally allow, the builder or developer must register with the Commission his claim to have been in business at the appropriate date and the land for which they expect to claim exemption.
THE EARL OF KINNOULL: Can the noble Lord answer one point arising out of this matter? Where land had been zoned for residential development before the White Paper was published, would that be classed as "with planning consent"? Because this has been an issue among local authorities.
LORD KENNET: We are here going into the tricky business of putting a gloss on legislation before it is even through. I must be very cautious what I say, but the condition here is the existence of a planning consent.
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR: I am much obliged, and I am sure all your Lordships are, to the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, for giving us that summary of the clause and for putting it on the record. I cannot for one moment accept that your Lordships' House should be confined to considering Bills in the manner suggested when they concern finance; but it is of great value, as opportunity occurs, to obtain on the record a summary of a complex clause, especially when a great many people outside Parliament will wish to know precisely what it means.
I should just like to ask the noble Lord why it is necessary to include paragraph (a) of subsection (3) of this clause; that is to say, that
"planning permission"—
at least, outline planning permission—
"for the carrying out of material development was in fore immediately before 23rd September, 1965"—
the date of the White Paper. The land referred to in this clause must be owned by a builder or developer; otherwise, it would not qualify for the exemption. It does not seem to me that it is very material 'whether or not outline planning
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permission had been given by that date. We seem to be getting into a mixture of dates (and this will come up again on Schedule 5)—September 23, 1965, August 1, 1966, and the first appointed day, whenever that may be. I do not for one moment wish to derogate from the importance and value of this clause, which I think is a very sensible one; but why would the clause not equally well serve its purpose if that particular paragraph were left out? Because once the land has been acquired by the builder or developer it must be rather a matter of chance whether outline planning permission had or had not been given on that particular date.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: Before the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, answers that question, may I say that I think my noble friend Lord Brooke of Cumnor has put his finger upon a technical matter of some importance. Of course, what is intended to be exempted under this clause is a project of material development which, as described in subsection (2), deals with housing. The planning permission which, as it were, triggers off the whole of the clause and which must have been in existence before the day the White Paper was published, need not be a permission which allows housing. It can be a planning permission for anything. Therefore, if you were a builder who owned land for a builders' yard, with planning permission, you would be exempted under this clause.
If that is the effect of the wording of the clause, as I believe it to be, it seems a very strange way to legislate. I do not know whether this is intentional—perhaps it is—but it seems to me that the logical way to do it in this clause would be to require the planning permission to be planning permission for housing development, and not for something else. But this does not appear to be the way in which the clause is drafted. Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, can clear up this point.
VISCOUNT GAGE: I wonder whether the noble Lord would also clear up one other point. If builders' land is going to be exempted from levy under this Part of the Bill, will it also be exempted from the possibility of compulsory purchase by the Land Commission under Part II of the Bill?
LORD KENNET: The whole purpose of this clause is, as it were, to dovetail the Land Commission into the operation and to prevent the approach of the Bill which is at present before the Committee disrupting building and development progress before it came into effect. To achieve this was no easy task and a good deal of thought was given to how it should be done. If this clause had not been there we feared, as I have explained, that there would have been a rush in the direction of new development and elsewhere houses would have remained half-built; while, if one had drafted the clause differently, one might have produced a reverse effect. The Government were rather treading a tightrope in making the provision in this clause.
In answer to the question of the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Cumnor, the date was put there because in the pursuit of a non-disruption policy in this drafting the Government decided that the provision should be limited to land which was ripe for development, and an acceptable way of judging the rightness seemed to be the existence of planning permission. If planning permission was not in force on that date then we held this to be an acceptable indication of unripe ness for the practical purposes of this Bill. In regard to the point raised by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, I am not sure that I entirely grasped it and I should be grateful if he will allow me to read his remarks to-morrow and to communicate with him privately or to bring the matter up on Report.
The questions came in such quick succession that I regret I have entirely forgotten the point raised by the noble Viscount, Lord Gage. I wonder if he would be good enough to repeat it.
VISCOUNT GAGE: There have been many suggestions that land has been withheld from development. In my experience, the land that enjoys planning consent and which has not yet been developed is, to a large extent, owned by builders. I wonder whether builders who have exemption under this Part of the Bill because it is not desired to stop house development will also be free from the threat of any of their land being required by the Land Commission under Part II.
LORD KENNET: No, not under this clause. Of course, it is in no way the purpose of the Land Commission Bill to enable the Land Commission compulsorily to purchase land which has been developed It is intended to permit the compulsory purchase of land not developed in order that it should be developed.
Clause 62 agreed to.
Clause 63 agreed to.
Clause 64 [Meaning of "project of material development" and provisions relating thereto]:
THE EARL OF KINNOULL: I beg leave to move this Amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Jessel. This clause deals with the factors that will constitute the start of a project. Subsection (3) of this clause lists five specified operations which, started before the first appointed day, will not attract levy for material development under Case E. This Amendment seeks to add to that list of specified operations the operation of land reclamation. I am sure the Committee will appreciate that it is an operation fundamental in making the best use of our limited natural resources. The sort of cases I have in mind are those such as land reclamation from either the sea or marsh or waste land. I would commend this Amendment to the Committee. It gives little away in lost levy; but it could help in the short period left to encourage the urgent need for land reclamation. We are losing over 50,000 acres of good agricultural land a year to building; and there is a great deal of waste land still in need of reclaiming.
Amendment moved—
Page 66, line 37, at end insert ("or reclaiming land").—(The Earl of Kinnoull.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I venture to think there are a great many difficulties about this Amendment. Its object is to make reclaiming land one of the specified operations provided for in Clause 64(3). It is very easy to talk about reclaiming land, but the noble Earl has not suggested any sort of definition. Presumably it would cover things like reclaiming marshes, scrub or woodland for agriculture, and reclaiming land from the sea-bed or a river bed. But under the regulations which are to be made under Clause 99(2)(c) none of these things

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would, in themselves, be material development. Moreover, the essential character of the specified operations, as noble Lords can see by looking at Clause 64(3), is that they are precise operations clearly forming part of a project of material development. At the time they are carried out the project must be known and one can see from the nature of them that, in the ordinary course of events, there would generally have been a notification to the local authority building inspector before the project began.
It is very necessary that the specified operation should be precise because, under Clause 80, it is a criminal offence to fail to notify the Commission before the start of a project. It must, therefore, be quite clear what the starting date is because, as I think the noble Viscount, most Members of the Committee and certainly all lawyers would agree, if we are going to make something a criminal offence there must be a reasonable degree of precision about it. How is anybody to know whether, if some scrub or a few trees were removed from land, this is going to amount to reclaiming it or not? Reclaiming land would not normally form part of a project of material development. Once land has been reclaimed it may be developer or it may not be. But in the ordinary way a good many years would pass because, while reclaimed land can be used fairly soon for agriculture, if it is required to support building ordinarily, but not always, it has to be allowed a considerable number of years to consolidate.
At the time that reclamation starts it would, I should think, be unusual for anyone to be able to be sure and precise about the development which might eventually take place on the land. So this is clearly an inappropriate time at which to assess a liability for levy in respect of the development. Apart from that, the addition of these words would, I think, make the provision of Clause 64 so vague as to be unworkable and might expose the citizen to the danger of unwittingly committing an offence. The absence of the words from this clause do no harm. If an owner of land has incurred expenditure in reclaiming land, and this has increased the value of the land, he can then claim an allowance for the expenditure under Schedule 4, Part V, if and when he may become liable for levy on a
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chargeable act or event. It is for those reasons that the Government feel that they cannot accept this Amendment, and I hope that with that explanation the noble Earl will be prepared to withdraw it.
THE EARL OF KINNOULL: I am obliged to the noble and learned Lord for his reply. I wonder if he would be prepared to consider this Amendment again if we can produce a precise definition of what "reclamation of land" really involves under this Bill.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: It is always open to the noble Earl or the noble Lord, Lord Jessel, to put down an Amendment at some further stage or to write to the Minister. I have no doubt that if anybody writes to the Minister he will receive a courteous reply.
THE EARL OF KINNOULL: On that understanding, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 64 agreed to.
Clause 65 [What is comprised in a project of material development]:
4.1 p.m.
On Question, Whether the clause shall stand part of the Bill?
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR: There is nothing in this clause to which I wish to take exception and, greatly presuming, I believe I can understand it, but I am not absolutely certain. This, as the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, will appreciate, is another clause which will be of importance to a great many people outside Parliament. Again, as we are getting on at a fair speed this afternoon, it would be of value were the noble Lord willing to give a few minutes to putting before the Committee a summary of the clause.
LORD KENNET: When a project of development is notified there must be some precision about the boundaries of the land which form part of that project. Once the start of a project has been notified the whole of it can be completed without any further liability for levy. But base value, when levy is assessed, is 11/10ths of the current use value of the land comprised in the project. This means that no levy is charged on development

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value equal to 10 per cent. of the current use value. For example, consider a project of development involving the erection of ten houses on one acre of a 100-acre farm which has a current use value of £300 an acre. If the land comprised in the project is the one acre on which the houses are built £30 of development value will not be charged. But if the whole farm were taken as the unit,£3,000 of development value would be excluded from levy. The purpose of Clause 65 is therefore to ensure that the land comprised in the project is realistically defined.
The relevant land for a project includes all the land on which any actual development—works or buildings or clearing—which forms part of the project which has been notified, takes place. However, unless the land defined in the notice of the project does not include the proper curtilage of any building, the relevant land cannot include any land not included in the notice. Thus, if a project when notified includes land which is not to be directly involved in the development, the extra land would be excluded. But if the notice did not include all the curtilage, the relevant land would be extended to include it. Sometimes the project of development may be a change of use, for example, of a single room of a house. If the relevant land in such a case were limited to the single room the valuations could be odd. In these circumstances, therefore, the unit is taken as the whole house. It is the hereditament which appears as a single entry on the rating list. These are complicated provisions, and I am afraid that any attempt at a further explanation of them could not fail also to be complicated, but I hope that what I have said may stand the Committee and those interested in these matters in good stead.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: I should like to ask the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, to look at a point about which I am afraid I have not given him notice and therefore I can expect no answer this afternoon. It refers to a point which the noble Lord mentioned arising under subsection (4). The noble Lord will see that where there is a material development which does not include anything but a change of use—in other words, there is no project of building anything—
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the hereditament is the area of land comprised in that material development. This is simply splendid, provided you have a definable hereditament; but there are areas of waste land and areas of farming land which do not appear in the valuation list at all. Alternatively, there may be a house or a shop, or something else, with a large area of land behind it which has not been previously used and which may, or may not, form part of the hereditament in the valuation list. Until that moment no one has cared, because there has been no value to put in the valuation list in respect of that waste land.
I have met this problem under Part VIII of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1962, dealing with planning blight, where again the matter is tied to the hereditament which appears in the valuation list. Under that particular section, or collection of sections, it is extremely difficult sometimes to interpret what is, or is not, the area concerned. In this case I think it will be even more difficult. Suppose you have a house with an area of waste land behind it, and the area of waste land is turned into the same example which I used before, a builder's yard, it may well be that you will have to deal with the whole thing, with complicated valuations and everything else, on the basis of the house also being used as a builder's yard. There will be no hereditament which you can use. The waste land will not appear in the valuation list as a separate hereditament and the only thing that will appear is the house itself. This, I believe, will result in some ridiculous situations, and I should be grateful if the noble Lord would look at it again. I am not trying to be unhelpful in any way. I believe that this is a technical matter which, while the measure is still a Bill, might usefully be cleared up.
LORD KENNET: I am conscious of the indeterminate status of exemplifications or explanations by members of the Government of Bills which are before Parliament. Ideally, one would like to see a Bill perfectly framed to take account of everything and then leave it to the courts to get on with. This Bill is already long enough, so I am anxious not to go into too much detail about what effect this or that provision may have, because of

1181
the indeterminate status, which I mentioned, of what I am saying at the moment. But it seemed to me, listening to the noble Viscount, that he has raised an interesting point and one on which it might be expedient to have some expression of opinion or guidance from the Government at this stage. I will look into it and if possible I will write to the noble Viscount or make a further statement at a later stage.
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR: I hope the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, will not take it as any reflection on the clarity of his reading if I say that I should like the opportunity to read over in Hansard the summary that he gave us just now. As he said, we are getting into complex matters here, and though I thought I understood the clause as printed in the Bill, having listened to the explanation of the noble Lord I am not quite so certain now. But I repeat that undoubtedly it will be of value to have that collective summary of it on the record, and I am pleased to know that he has no objection to my asking him to give these summaries. I seriously believe that it will be of great value to have them on the record in Hansard for this Part of the Bill.
Clause 65 agreed to.
Clause 66 [Variation of project]:
On Question, Whether Clause 66 shall stand part of the Bill?
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR: I wonder whether I may be forgiven if I repeat the same technique and ask the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, to give a short summary of this decidedly complex clause.
LORD KENNET: When levy is assessed at the start of a project of development it will be assessed on the precise project notified, and that project can then be completed without any further liability for levy. It may happen, however, that before it is finished the project may be changed. There can be many reasons for this. Unforeseen difficulties may dictate a different pattern of development, or there may be changes in demand for the particular type of development, or a differing planning permission may be obtained. This clause is concerned with such variations. If the variation involves additional land it must be notified as a new project.
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The new project includes so much of the land of the original project as is involved in the variation. For example, if a twenty-acre estate is being developed with houses at ten to an acre, and after the first twelve acres are developed planning permission is obtained for development of the remaining eight acres, together with a further two acres, with flats, the new project would be the erection of flats on the ten acres. But the current use value of the eight acres of the original project would include the value of the right to develop at ten houses to the acre.
There may be a variation not involving additional land. In that case there is a new project if either the developer notifies the change or the Commission serve a notice that the variation seems to them substantial enough to constitute a new project.
What "substantial" means is a matter for the Commission, but clearly they are interested only in variations which realise more development value, and it would need to be a significant amount to justify the Commission in taking any action. If a developer is in doubt he can serve a notice on the Commission without prejudice to his right, if the Commission then serve a notice of assessment for additional levy, to argue, before the Lands Tribunal if necessary, that the variation is not substantial.
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR: I am much obliged to the noble Lord once again. On this occasion I hope that I have followed his summary with as much understanding as I was able to achieve when reading the Bill beforehand. Again I have no criticism to offer of the clause. I think it is of value that we should have this summary on the record.
Clause 66 agreed to.
Clause 67:
Project of material development begun but not completed before first appointed day
67.—(1) The provisions of this section shall have effect in relation to any project of material development (in this section referred to as "the larger project") where—
(b) one or more specified operations comprised in the project (in this section referred to as "the existing operations") began before the first appointed day to be carried out on part of the land comprised in the project, but no specified operation has before

1183
that day begun to be carried out on the remainder of that land; and
(2) If the existing operations, or some of those operations, are authorised by one or more planning permissions in force on the first appointed day, then for the purposes of this Part of this Act—
(a) so much of the larger project as relates to land comprised in that planning permission or those planning permissions, together with so much (if any) of that project as relates to any other land on which any of the existing operations began to be carried out before that day, shall be taken to constitute a separate project of material development which began to be carried out before that day, and
4.14 p.m.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSSmoved, in subsection (2)(a), to leave out "relates" and insert "is confined". The noble Viscount said: These two apparently innocuous Amendments are concerned with a provision which, to me at any rate, is one of unparalleled complexity. It is also one which I believe is liable to be subject to a great deal of litigation unless it is absolutely certain that the provisions of this Bill are right.
Levy under case C is chargeable when a project of material development is begun on or after the first appointed day, and the beginning of that project is signified by the carrying out of one or other of the specified operations set out in Clause 64. It immediately occurs to one that some projects of material development will have been begun before the first appointed day but will not have been completed by that day. Then one has to decide what part, if any, of that project is to bear the levy. Builders and other people concerned with a project which in this way straddles the first appointed day are concerned to know how much of the project is going to be subject to levy and how much is not. Understandably, they will wish to know beforehand what they can do to avoid the levy legitimately and what they cannot do.
I understand that the principle of this matter is set out in two short paragraphs. The first is one which was given by the Parliamentary Secretary in another place, where he said this:
"Clause 67 deals with projects of material development begun but not completed before the first apointed day. That is where some
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part of the project has not been started. In that case it has always been accepted in the principle of the Bill that there is no reason why that type of development should not bear levy. It was absolutely right that definite development where approved or started before the first appointed day should be exempt."
In that statement I believe that he is not accurate, because that is not what the clause says. The other paragraph was a Written Answer by the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, to my noble friend Lord Kinnoull on June 29 last. I will not read it all out, but he said this:
"Thus if outline permission was given for a housing estate but that permission included a detailed permission for the road lay-out (but not the houses)—
Let me interpolate here that I think that if there were outline permission which did not give any detailed approval for the road and not the houses, the position would be the same—
"then if a start on the roadworks had been made before the appointed day the whole project would be taken to have started before the appointed day because the houses were to be built on land comprised within the planning permission which authorised the road works"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 275 (No. 28) Col. 772: 29/6/66.]
That is a very significant statement, to which a great deal of attention should be paid. I think the intention is fairly clear. I am concerned to see whether Clause 67 implements it.
The other difficulty is this. The clause must now be read with Clause 99(3), which was put in on Report stage in another place. Again I am raising a point which I do not think has ever been explained comprehensively in terms of Clause 67 as we now have it plus Clause 99(3). Clause 99(3) makes it clear that where permission is granted on an outline application (I believe that is an unfortunate way of expressing it, because although there is a precedent in the Control of Offices and Industrial Development Act and The Land Commission Act, here it is not the application but the consent with which we are dealing), then only that development which was authorised by the outline permission, either without any need for further consent or where further consent was needed, where it had received that consent, is—in the term of art used in Clause 67—authorised by the planning permission.
I should like to take an example which is very much the same as that used by the

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Parliamentary Secretary in another place, but I am afraid that the way he did it is not altogether apt for explaining the problem I am trying to set out. Take a piece of land which is going to be developed in four phases—A. B, C and D. On A, there is outline consent for the houses, also a detailed consent for the road and for the houses. On B, the same applies: there is both outline and detailed consent for the road and for the houses. On C, there is outline consent for the houses and for the road, but there is detailed consent for the road only; and on D there is no consent at all.
On the first appointed day all the roads have been put in, including the roads on D, even although there was no consent, and then the houses were started on A. I understand that the intention is that on A the whole project should be considered to have been started before the first appointed day, because both the road and the houses had been begun before that day and there is detailed permission for them. On B, where the road has been begun with detailed permission and there is also detailed permission for the houses, though they have not been begun, similarly that whole part of the project is to be taken to have been begun before the first appointed day, because it is part of the larger project which relates to the land comprised in the planning permission (in the words of Clause 67(2)(a))—that is to say, detailed permission for the road. I believe that the intention, according to what the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, said in his Written Answer, is that on C also, where there is a detailed permission for the road, but not for the houses, all of the project, including both road and houses, is intended to be comprised within the project started before the first appointed day, because again the houses would be built on land comprised within the planning permission which authorised the road works, to quote the noble Lord, Lord Kennet.
What of D? It is, I think, perfectly clear that the intention is that only that amount of the project on D which actually consists of the land on which the road is to be built is, despite the lack of definition, to be comprised in the project which is deemed to have been started. But no houses on D for which there is no consent of any sort are considered to be within that project started before the first
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appointed day. They are to form part of a separate project subject to levy later.
On area C, about which I was talking, I can bring in the houses for which there was detailed consent but only outline consent, only because, being without detailed permission themselves, they still constitute part of the project which—and this is the crucial word—relates to land comprised in the planning permission. I believe that the word "relates" is the crucial one in that context, if that is the intention of the Bill. Therefore, the word "relates", as it were, expands the scope of the detailed consent which was granted for the levy; so that it also comprises the houses which would in due course come on to that road and would be served by it. But then, if that is what "relates" means the first time it appears in Clause 67(2)(a), why does it not mean the same thing the second time it appears? If the analogy I have given is correct, where Clause 67(2)(a) says,
"together with so much (if any) of that project as relates to any other land on which of the existing operations began to be carried out"—
and those are the road on D without planning permission—I should have thought that "relates" ought to have the same meaning as it had earlier in the paragraph, and again be expansive, so that it also includes the house which will front on to that road.
The same thing applies where the word "relates" is used in subsection (3)(a). I believe that in the second two cases where the word "relates" is used it is intended not to be expansive, but restrictive. I believe it is the intention that it is only the actual land on which the specified project is taken to be carried out, and not land related to it, which is intended to be considered as taken before the appointed day.
I am particularly anxious that this clause should be as clear and understandable as possible. I have therefore put down two Amendments, which I hope, by differentiating between the meaning of "relates" where it first occurs and the two second occasions where it is used, will, as it were, point the distinction that is intended. I have therefore put in what I hope is an acceptable phraseology—"is confined". I appreciate that this is extremely difficult. I hope that I have

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explained my point with some degree of clarity, but if I have failed to do so I shall not be in the least surprised. However, I should be grateful for any help that can be given. I beg to move.
Amedment moved—
Page 70, line 6, leave out (relates) and insert (is confined).—(Viscount Colville of Culross.)
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR: The compelling speech of my noble friend Lord Colville of Culross will have convinced your Lordships, if that was necessary, that this is a difficult clause. I had been intending to ask the Government if they would, as in the case of these few previous clauses, at some stage give the Committee the benefit of a summary of the clause. Let me hasten to add that I have no intention of repeating that request in respect of the remaining 35 clauses of the Bill, whether I understand them or not. But I think these fall into a group, and it is particularly important that people outside should appreciate what is involved in them. I hope that in the discussion on this Amendment, or on the Question that the clause stand part, the Government will, in particular, address themselves to one of the questions which my noble friend raised, and that is the dove-tailing (if I may "lift" that word which has just been used) of the answer of the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, to my noble friend Lord Kinnoull on June 29 with the wording of this clause, because views have been expressed by people more professionally qualified than I am that this clause, in conjunction with Clause 65, does not seem to bear out everything that the noble Lord said on June 29.
I am quite sure that on June 29 the noble Lord did not think to mislead the House in any way: there must be a fault on our side or on the side of the professional students of this clause. If there had been any change in Government intention since June 29, I am sure it would have been made known to your Lordships' House. But this is one of the particular difficulties that was raised in my noble friend's speech just now, and I hope that before we leave this Amendment and this clause entirely we shall be enabled to have a consecutive explanation of the clause, in addition to a reply to my noble friend's Amendment.
LORD KENNET: When the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, is
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moving his Amendments and making his points, I often have the impression that he is pretending to be counsel called upon for an opinion in view of future litigation under this Bill, and that he is sometimes inviting the Government to pretend to be a judge presiding over the litigation in question. It is, of course, much easier for the noble Viscount than it is for me, because he is a barrister and I am not a judge. It is difficult for Ministers, even for the Lord Chancellor, to pretend in this House to be a judge in the hypothetical cases which the noble Viscount raises.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: May I just say this? I am not doing anything of the kind. I am moving a specific Amendment which I consider and hope is an improvement to the wording of the Bill. It is certainly not intended to be a muddling Amendment or anything of the kind. I hope I have given sufficient notice for its merits or demerits to have become clear to those advising the noble Lord. I hope the noble Lord will not consider that I have been wasting the time of the Committee by giving an example. If one were to try and make a speech on this subject in pure abstract, without giving an example, I believe that it would be totally incomprehensible, and I have given the example in order to try to make the subject clearer.
LORD KENNET: I meant no offence; I meant a harmless witticism at nobody's expense. The effect of the noble Viscount's Amendment would be to give a very narrow meaning to the part of a larger project which is exempt. I believe that the Bill as drafted leaves some flexibility for a generous interpretation by the Commission, and that this flexibility might be removed by the passing of the noble Viscount's Amendment. I shall not ask the noble Viscount to accept that as it stands, but what I will do, as I have been doing in former cases, is to seek to give a fuller explanation of what the Government think the clause will do, and in view of that he can judge whether or not to go forward with his Amendment.
Just on the point of the possible conflict of what was said by the Parliamentary Secretary in the House of Commons and what I said myself in a Written Answer to the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull,

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earlier, and what I am about to say now, I have looked at this carefully, and I cannot myself see any conflict. But in all cases it is better to look to the future than to the past, and I shall try to get this situation as clear as I can immediately.
Under Clause 27 levy is chargeable on a project of material development started after the first appointed day. Therefore no levy is chargeable on the completion of a project started before the first appointed day. After the appointed day there is a notice of a project and the extent of the project is defined by the notice. But there is no notice of a project started before the appointed day, and it is therefore necessary to define its limits otherwise. This is the purpose of Clause 67, and it sets out to define the project, so far as possible, as it might have been expected to be if it was one started after the appointed day, and to recognise as started, projects which would have started in the normal course of events before the first appointed day.
The normal project is one for which there is a detailed planning permission in existence before it is started. Such a project causes no difficulty and there is therefore no need for special provisions. It does not fall with Clause 67. It can be left to the general provisions of Clause 22. Clause 67 is concerned with cases where there is not detailed approval for the whole of a project at the time that it is started.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: With great respect, it cannot be Clause 22. It is Clause 27.
LORD KENNET: As the noble Viscount will be aware, I am reading from a prepared statement. It may be that there is a misprint.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: Clause 22 is Owner's right to require Commission to elect, which I do not think is the right clause.
LORD KENNET: I accept the noble Lord's correction, subject to further correction, and I am sure he will be content if it comes out right in Hansard in the morning.
Clause 67 is concerned with cases where there is not detailed approval for the whole of a project at the time that it is started. The clause provides, as might
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be expected, that the limits of the project are set by the limits of the planning permission—development of the whole of the land comprised in a planning permission forms part of the project which is started. However, a project following an outline planning permission would not normally be started in contravention of conditions to which the permission is subject. Generally an outline permission contains conditions that development will not be started until detailed approval is obtained. A project is started when any of the "specified operations" of Clause 64 are begun.
Clause 67 provides, therefore, that a project under a planning permission can be taken to be started only where the specified operations which constitute the start are "authorised" by the permission. Clause 99(3) has put beyond any doubt what "authorised" means, although in the Government's view there should not have been any real doubt even before that subsection was inserted on Report in the House of Commons. "Authorised" means that any detailed approvals necessary under the permission before the specified operations can be carried out have been obtained. The possibility of variation in a project is allowed for. The rules of Clause 67 are based on reality. They will have to be interpreted in the light of an actual project of development in progress after the appointed day when it may be necessary to determine whether or not it was started before. The specified operations which were carried out before the appointed day must form part of the project and they must have been authorised by a planning permission, but the project does not otherwise have to pursue the details of the permission—it must, however, be contained within the land comprised in the permission.
Clause 67 recognises one other possibility. A developer may start work without a planning permission. This is not to be encouraged, but it does happen. If works are done without permission before the appointed day they can constitute the start of a project, but this is limited narrowly to the land on which the works are done. An illustration may help to illuminate this clause. I apologise to the noble Viscount that it does not follow exactly his plots "A", "B", "C" and "D", but I think it will cover the same ground. Imagine a builder with 55 acres of land. He has an outline

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permission for 30 acres and detailed approvals for 10 of them. If he starts work by laying out roads or digging foundations on the 10 acres in accordance with the detailed approval, the project started will be the development of the 30 acres. The development of the remaining 25 acres will be a separate project started after the appointed day.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: That has been a most helpful answer, for which I thank the noble Lord greatly. It is now quite clear that the intention of the Government in this clause is precisely to the contrary of that which my Amendment was seeking to achieve. I put the Amendment down because I believed it to be the intention of the Government which they were not achieving. But since they wished there to be a liberal interpretation of the more complicated details of outline and detailed planning permissions, I think a great deal of relief will result from what the noble Lord has said. I quarrel with the noble Lord in only one respect. I do not believe that Clause 99(3) has put anything beyond doubt. In my view it has added at least five further difficult points of complication to this matter; but perhaps we may deal with them later on. I thank the noble Lord very much for what he has said, and I have no hesitation in asking leave to withdraw my Amendment.
LORD KENNET: I am grateful to the noble Viscount for admitting that what is concealed by complication is sometimes liberality.
THE EARL OF KINNOULL: I wonder whether I could ask one question arising out of the noble Lord's answer? Suppose a developer owns, say, 2,000 acres of land for which he has outline planning consent. What did the noble Lord mean when he said that if the development is started without detailed planning consent on these 2,000 acres before the first appointed day he will escape the levy? Is that what he means?
LORD KENNET: The field is so full of pitfalls that I would ask the noble Lord to look at my more detailed explanation tomorrow morning, to see whether he can deduce from it an answer to his question.
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR: To save raising any point on the subsequent
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Motion that the clause stand part, may I join in thanking the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, for his comprehensive reply and ask him whether he would do one further kindness? So many people have inquired of me how the purport of the second paragraph of his Written Answer on June 29 (which was quoted by my noble friend Lord Colville of Culross) is implemented in Clause 67 of the Bill or elsewhere, that I should be most grateful if he could find time within the next few days to write me a short note on that. That will enable me to clear away doubts that exist in other people's minds, and I am quite sure that I should do it more successfully if I could copy to those people an authoritative statement by the noble Lord than if I attempted a new paraphrase or explanation of my own.
LORD KENNET: I will gladly do so, but the noble Lord must he careful of deterring the Government from making successive explanatory statements on the same clause. I emphasis that what I have just said is now the authorised version.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 67 agreed to.
Clauses 68 to 73 agreed to.
Clause 74 [Application of Part III to minerals]:
4.40 p.m.
LORD NUGENT or GUILDFORDmoved, after subsection (1), to insert:
"( ) For the purposes of the provisions of this Part of this Act and for the avoidance of doubt Case A and Case B disposals of major minerals only shall not be regarded as chargeable acts or events."
The noble Lord said: This Amendment has the purpose of exempting from levy Case A and Case B dispositions of all the major minerals. Let me say immediately—I hope to the relief of noble Lords opposite—that this will not strain their intellect, if strain their intellect the last Amendments, moved by my noble friend with such dialectical brilliance, did. They can relax their intellect now, and I hope alert their sympathy for what I believe is a good point. This Amendment should be read in conjunction with No. 43, standing in the name of my noble friend the Duke of Buccleuch and

1193
Queensberry, which is an Amendment to the definition clause, Clause 99. The two are obviously related. In the light of our earlier debates on Clause 7, it may be too widely drawn, and if necessary I shall redraft both these Amendments and move them again at Report stage.
When moving the Amendments to Clause 7 I said that the Country Landowners' Association were particularly concerned about the whole class of minerals and the effect of this Bill on them, and what I am doing now concerns only a part of the subject in which the Country Landowners' Association is interested. They still hope to see the effect of the Bill removed from all minerals, but I expect the noble Lords opposite will have noticed that the noble Lord, Lord Henley, and my noble friends and I have removed from the Order Paper our next Amendment, which was to omit Clause 74. The reason is that I now wish to direct this Amendment to class 1 minerals only, because I believe that a case has been made out that they are in a somewhat different category from minerals as a whole. Therefore I am directing this Amendment to that class, and, in particular, I am concerned with ironstone workings.
I recollect that the noble Lord, Lord Champion, informed the Committee during the discussion on the Amendments to Clause 7 that it is unlikely that the Land Commission would buy land for the working of minerals in this preferred class, and I apprehended that he saw some distinction between this class of minerals and minerals generally. It seems to me that class 1 minerals are, in fact, in a different class, in terms both of the philosophy of the Bill and of the practice of the Bill. The philosophy of the Bill is that where there is development that has value as a consequence of the action of the community as a whole, there should be a levy for the benefit of public funds. But that does not seem to apply to class 1 minerals. It obviously makes no difference whether there is housing or industrial development near mineral ironstone workings, because they do not change in value, and therefore I should have thought they were outside the general philosophy of the Bill.
Speaking again of ironstone workings, in practice the royalty received by the owner of ironstone-bearing land is al-
1194
ready subject to the mineral rights duty for the restoration fund, which may be 50 per cent., or sometimes even more, of the total royalty. I noticed that my honourable friend Mr. Farr, in another place. referred to the case of the Northampton-shire mineral owner who is receiving a royalty of 2½d. per ton and is paying a duty of 1½d a ton, which goes straight into the restoration fund. The balance of the royalty receivable by the owner of the land is then, of course, subject to income tax and surtax.
Finally, the period of extraction is short: the ironstone is extracted, and then the land is refilled and restored, and that is the end of it. I think I have made the point that this mineral development is already making a substantial contribution to public funds—and, I suggest, in the best possible way, because it is ensuring that the land is fully and properly restored. In those circumstances I submit to the Committee that there is a sound case for exempting this class of mineral working from the levy in Cases A and B. It may be that Ministers intend to make such limited exemptions in the regulations, which Clause 74 will enable them to do, but in any event I should prefer to see them in the Bill. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 76, line 22, at end insert the said subsection.—(Lord Nugent of Guildford.)
4.46 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: As the noble Lord has said, the effect of the Amendments would mean that no levy would be collected in Cases A and B on the disposal of any minerals, except sand and gravel. As the noble Lord knows, this is exactly the same as Amendment No. 107 in the other place:
" 'Major minerals' means all minerals other than sand, gravel and clay",
and also Amendment 96:
"except that Case A and Case B disposals of major mineral only shall not be regarded as chargeable acts or events".
So that we are only going over familiar ground which the House that deals with Supply has already covered.
The Amendments are unacceptable in principle and, I submit, would be anomalous and unjust in practice. While there is a case for exempting mineral operators from levy in Case C, because of the wasting nature of mineral development

1195
(and the regulations will provide for such an exemption), there is none, I suggest, for exempting landowners, when they dispose of land for mineral development. Any value they realise in such a transaction is development value, as in any other case, and should be subject to levy. Nor is there any reason for demarcation between major minerals and sand and gravel. It was partly on the last ground that my right honourable friend, in dealing with the Amendment below, said that the demarcation was impossible; and the point was not further pressed. The Government's view is that the Bill is right in leaving minerals to be dealt with by regulations.
Special provisions should be made about minerals because of the special nature of mineral development—for instance, the fact that it is wasting development, and the special arrangements under which the mineral operators work the minerals; that is to say, the mineral licence, under which no interest in the land passes to the operator. Because of the special nature of the mineral development there should be, and the Minister has announced that there will be, special exemption from levy for mineral operators when they start developing. Because of the mineral licence system there should be special provisions to ensure that a licence is treated as a lease; hence the operator will be treated at the start of the development as holding an interest in the land, with the landowner holding the reversion. As the landowner will have paid levy on granting the licence, any other treatment would be unfair to him.
I have referred to the statement made by the Minister—I am sorry; it was the Parliamentary Secretary. It was at the Committee stage, at column 739, and it was in reply to a question. I will read it slowly because I know some of these things are rather complicated. I was comforted by the remark of the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Cumnor, that he had read a clause and thought he had understood it, but later came to the conclusion that he did not, because I have been in exactly the same position. Indeed, yesterday, I see, in a moment of mental aberration, I started talking about an
1196
arterial road—why, I cannot think. The question was:
"Is it suggested that the very removing of the minerals lying under one's land forms betterment? Could the Parliamentary Secretary help me?'
The Parliamentary Secretary replied—
"Yes. Minerals do constitute a particular case and a particular difficulty. They were dealt with separately in the earlier legislation. I expect that the hon. Gentleman probably knows that discussions will be taking place with the industry. There are likely to be widespread exemptions in Case C because the philosophy is different. Provided that one can make certain that one can stop evasions, there will be very considerable exemptions from levy in Case C. It is being discussed with the industry now and, of course, it will be incorporated in such regulations as are made. To that extent it is true that the Bill will be modified, and I think rightly modified, in respect of minerals."
Then, in column 741, he was asked:
"Is it the case that any fresh discovery and fresh start on any development of this kind would clearly he leviable beyond dispute? Is that the position?"
He answered:
"No, I do not think that it would. I think that this depends upon the general project, the nature of the operations and so on, and what the developing owner could have done before the appointed day. This is, of course, an entirely different kind of transaction from that dealing with betterment levy, and the regulations will make the exemptions as wide as is practical and fair in the light of the general principle that I have enunciated."
I do not think that to-day I can carry it any further. In general, my right honourable friend has preferred to put a great many matters of detail into the Schedules to the Bill in order to reduce the number of regulations. But in this particular case, where discussions are still going on with the industry, the regulations have not been made, and further than I have already stated I cannot take it because, as they say in the profession, "It will be all right on the night".
When the regulations are made we shall see, but of course under subsection (2) the regulations have no effect until approval. What I have been waiting to see is whether any noble Lord would move an Amendment, either here or under Clause 98(2)(a), to provide that the regulations must be approved by your Lordships' House as well as, as in all cases under this Part of the Bill, the Commons House of Parliament. Of course, that has not

1197
happened. But your Lordships will have the satisfaction of knowing that the House which historically has the responsibility for Supply matters will be able to pass judgment on the regulations themselves before they have any effect.
This is probably the last Amendment to which I shall be replying, so perhaps I might just add this. In a sense, of course, that brings us back where we started. Again, if I may make it quite plain, I am not challenging the technique of the hole in the Bill provision, which is well established. The point is that, as your Lordships know, in the last 99 years it has been used only twice in a Supply matter, in 1930 and 1931, because of course there was a Labour Government, and this, I am afraid, is the point on which I started. It is a device not being used in very modern times, only twice in 99 years, both times employing the built-in Conservative majority here because there happened to be a Labour Government in office and it was desired to embarrass them on a question of Supply, which historically for hundreds of years has been the sole prerogative of the other place.
LORD MITCHISON: I have been sitting here not lifting my eyebrows because I promised the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Cumnor, I would try not to lift them again. I intervene, not to say anything on the last question that my noble friend was discussing, but only to say a word or two about ironstone mining in the hope that I may reassure the Opposition Front Bench about this. I have had some experience of various kinds of mining. I sat for a constituency which I should think contained more ironstone mining than any other place in England, and the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, will probably remember I did my best to get him to pass what proved finally to be the levy on ironstone, and it was passed.
All I want to say about it is this. Naturally, one would like to see these things in a Bill, but this is quite unsuitable for putting into a Bill because of the immense variety of circumstances. It is a question of what the land is to start with, it is a question of what you do then, and it is a question of what is left at the end, and these are all really rather difficult matters, because the processes of ironstone mining themselves
1198
vary considerably with the nature of the soil, and also because the operators themselves have had to learn a good deal as they went along. I have stood on a hill not very far from Corby and heard Messrs. Stewarts & Lloyds explain to the Minister of the day that they could not possibly do what they finally did, and what was being done at the moment in another part of England. I am sure the statement was made in all good faith, but there has been a good deal of probing and experiment in this very difficult business, a business which is a matter of experience and a business which operates in circumstances so constantly different in different cases that you really must be guided, I should have thought, by the more flexible method of regulations. Not raising my eyebrows, I sit down again.
LORD NUGENT OF GUILDFORD: May I thank the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor for the reply that he has given to the Committee on the point I raised, and may I say that, while of course we welcome his reassurance, which I had already gathered from reading proceedings in another place, that operators would be in many cases exempt on Case C, I must say I am disappointed that he still feels that he cannot in any way meet the point I have made for Cases A and B exemption for landowners. I feel that the case I made out is a good one on its merits and therefore it was worth putting to the Committee again, and I think it is none the weaker for the fact that it has been put before. It is a good case and I think it is quite widely recognised outside as being one worthy of attention.
Of course, I recognise the point made by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor with regard to subsection (2) of this clause, that the regulation power is reserved to the Commons only, and in no circumstances would I consider suggesting it should be amended. We have indeed, I think, already explained why we think it is worth while raising these points here on Amendment and debating them, and, if the points seem to be of sufficient importance, dividing on them. Considering the intrinsic merits of the points we have raised, and indeed, I should have thought, the restrained way in which we have raised them on Part III—after all, Part III is the "guts" of the

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Bill and if we did not discuss that it would be hardly worth discussing the Bill at all; it is of great public interest—I thought it was a little unfair of the noble and learned Lord to suggest that we were solely moved by a desire to embarrass a Labour Government. I am quite sure if noble Lords opposite were sitting on this side in Opposition and they had a similar Bill before the House, they would feel it was their duty in those circumstances to put down Amendments and debate them. It may be that because of the composition of this House they could not successfully win Divisions, but I do not doubt they would divide on any point they thought of sufficient importance; and whether or no the matter is finally recorded in Hansard as an Amendment secured, it still has the benefit that a matter of considerable public importance has been debated in public and the spoken word has been heard to the benefit of the whole community. With the procedure that the noble and learned Lord has most graciously advised the Committee we can properly follow, of moving the whole of Part III out of the Bill before we send it back to the Commons, we then entirely preserve the position of privilege in the other place; and if the other place does not wish to look at the two or three Amendments that may remain in the Bill by the time we have finished with Part III then of course it will not do so; it will look at it entirely unamended and no harm is done to anyone.
But, returning to the merits of this Amendment, I do feel that it is a good point. I realise that it is not perhaps in its most felicitous form, but I should like to consider putting it down again with other Amendments that I am preparing to put down on Clause 7, which also affect mineral workings for Class 1 minerals. Therefore, in those terms, I would ask the leave of the Committee to withdraw the Amendment, with the probable intention of putting down something similar on Report.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 74 agreed to.
Clauses 75 to 98 agreed to.
Clause 99:
Interpretation
"disposition" includes the grant of a tenancy, the renewal, extension or other variation of a tenancy, and any other conveyance, assignment, transfer or grant of an interest in or right over land, whether made by an instrument or otherwise;
5.2 p.m.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSSmoved, in subsection (1), to add to the interpretation of "disposition":
"but does not include any mortgage effected by a demise or subdemise for a term of years absolute;".
The noble Viscount said: I have no doubt that there is no intention whatever that under Case B, Part III of the Bill, mortgages should be notifiable or subject to levy. This is indeed so if one carefully construes the Bill. But it is a most careful construction indeed that is required before one discovers this to be so. I believe the technical answer is that if you look at Clause 99(8) you find that definitions in the interpretation section of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1962, apply for the purposes of this Bill as they apply for the purposes of that Act. And if you look at Section 221 of the Town and Country Planning Act you see that "tenancy" is there described by reference to the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1954, in Section 69(1) of which you find a definition which excludes mortgages.
This may be thoroughly satisfactory as a piece of immense ingenuity on the part of the draftsman, but for those who wish to find out what is the law it is perhaps not the easiest way of expressing it. I therefore thought that there would be some merit, at any rate, in putting it in clear terms in the Bill. I think in the interpretation clause "disposition" does not include a mortgage. I do not believe that it matters that "disposition" is used equally in Part II of the Bill, because if my interpretation is right it does not include a mortgage there either, and is not intended to. So whether the wording which I have taken from Sections 85 and 86 of the Law of Property Act, 1925, is the right wording or not, or whether we ought to go back and express again the much more complicated language of Section 69 of the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1954, I do not much mind. But I should

1201
have thought that the Government might have considered, even at this stage of the Bill, telling everybody that mortgages are not intended to be dealt with. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 91, line 5, at end insert the said words.—(Viscount Colville of Culross.)
LORD KENNET: The noble Viscount is perfectly right in his assessment of the Government's intention in this matter. It is not the idea that a mortgage should attract levy. A mortgage would attract levy only if it could be a disposition granting a tenancy under Clause 30. But a mortgage is excluded from the definition of "tenancy" contained in Section 221 of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1962 which is applied by Clause 99(8) of this Bill. As the noble Viscount pointed out, the 1962 Act imports the definition of tenancy from the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1954, which specifically excludes a mortgage.
The noble Viscount said that this was an ingenious way of defining the matter. I agree with him; it is. I do not think I should be telling tales out of school if I revealed to the Committee that this part of the clause was put in on the initiative of Parliamentary draftsmen who feared that as it stood before it was not sufficiently clear, and their hope was that this would clear it up. Then the noble Viscount protests at their ingenuity. Draftsmen will be draftsmen! The noble Viscount said that he did not much mind whether this was changed or not, and I should like to assure him that the Government also do not much mind whether it is changed or not. I will look at it again and consider how much rope should be given to the ingenuity of draftsmen, and if the noble Viscount would agree to withdraw this Amendment perhaps we could have another word about it on Report.
LORD MITCHISON: I am sorry again to interrupt, but before that is done there are two matters I should like to mention to my noble friend who is going to reply in a moment. The first one is that it perfectly true that you can go through these hoops and get the definition that way. There is another and even simpler way of doing it, and that is to look and see on what transactions the levy is chargeable. Nowhere will you find any-
1202
thing in the Bill—and I have been through it for the purpose—where you can reasonably say that it is intended to include a mortgage. In my submission there is no ambiguity about it. I see the noble Viscount looking at some point where he thinks there is an ambiguity. Perhaps he will tell us what it is.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: It is, of course, the same point that was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Kennet. It is levy under Case B, under Clause 30(1). It may be that the noble Lord has not refreshed his memory about the contents of Sections 85 and 86 of the Law of Property Act 1925. What it says is that you may create a mortgage by either a demise or, in the case of Section 86, a sub-demise for a term of years absolute, or alternatively you may do it by way of legal charge. I should have thought that it was quite clear that unless you put in some exclusion of mortgages, that would be covered by a disposition granting a tenancy for a term of years certain, and no less than seven years.
LORD MITCHISON: I will look at it if the noble Viscount wishes me to. But I have looked at this clause and I looked at it again while he was speaking. I cannot find in it anything that an ordinary, reasonable man would consider to include a mortgage or anything like it. That is my first point. The second one is that I hope that we shall remember the Scots. They have entirely different methods. I do not think they have anything that is called a mortgage. They have some things that are rather like it, and it might be advisable to see that any Amendment made here was in line with the views of the Scottish Office on the matter.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, for his remarks on the Scottish point, and I am sure that if I may have a word with the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, before the Report stage the matter can be covered. But I suggest to the noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, that he must be wrong in this matter, because if there were no ambiguity about it I cannot see why the definition in the Landlord and Tenant Act has to be imported. I imagine that it was imported to avoid any difficulty, supposing that a mortgage was brought in. It is clear that there is

1203
no intention to bring in a mortgage, and I think I can agree with the Government that we can improve this Bill in this respect.
LORD MITCHISON: May I say to the noble Viscount that I have not his youthful confidence. I am not so sure that I am right, but I do not think there is anything in this Bill which would lead an ordinary, sensible man, reading it through, to suppose that a mortgage or anything of the sort was intended to be covered.
LORD NEWTON: Before my noble friend seeks to withdraw his Amendment, if that is his intention, may I say that we on this side are delighted that the noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, once again feels able to raise his eyelids.
LORD MITCHISON: I thank the noble Lord.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: I think on the last occasion the noble Lord was raising his eyelids before he started and his eyebrows at the end. I am much obliged to the noble Lord, Lord Kennet. I shall be glad to converse with him about this matter, and, if necessary, we can return to it on Report stage. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD KENNETmoved in the proviso to subsection (3) after the first "of" to insert "section 6 or". The noble Lord said: At the Report stage in the House of Commons the present Clause 99(3) was inserted because it was evident at that time from comment in the legal Press and elsewhere that there was confusion in the minds of the public about the meaning of the words "authorised by planning permission" which were used in Part III of the Bill. Clause 99(3) made it clear that these words meant that any detailed planning consents necessary under an outline planning permission must have been obtained before any work done was authorised by that planning permission. Clause 99(3) was drafted to apply to the whole of the Bill because otherwise there would be room for confusion.
We have now realised, however, that this Amendment has had more severe repercussions on Clause 6(3)(a) than expected and has made it clear that the
1204
Commission would not even be able to buy land where the planning permission was in outline and the necessary detailed planning consents had not yet been obtained. The Amendments put this right by ensuring that, in this paragraph, a planning permission without such detailed consents having been obtained is sufficient.
Amendment moved—
Page 92, line 20, after first ("of") insert ("section 6 or").—(Lord Kennet.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 99, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 100 to 102 agreed to.
Schedule 1 agreed to.
Schedule 2 [Special Procedure for Compulsory Purchase Orders]:
5.16 p.m.
LORD KENNET: This Amendment is one which I undertook to introduce during our discussion earlier on, on Clause 8. We had a very full discussion on that clause, and there is nothing more to say about it. However, there is one preliminary matter. The next Amendment on the Order Paper seeks to leave out the whole of Schedule 2, and before I introduce this Amendment I wonder whether the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Cumnor, could give us some indication whether he intends to move the subsequent one.
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR: With respect, I do not think that that is the next Amendment, because it is not numbered; but I think I can help the noble Lord by saying that I am not proposing to press that Schedule 2 should be omitted from the Bill.
LORD NEWTON: May I say that I was relieved that the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, made precisely the same mistake I made when attempting to leave out Clause 8? I was advised that I could not do it.
LORD KENNET: Great minds make the same mistakes. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 98, line 19, at beginning insert ("Except in so far as sub-paragraphs (3) to (5) of this paragraph otherwise provide").—(Lord Kennet.)
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR: My noble friends and I are very much obliged to the Government for what they have done in this respect. They have gone along way, though not the whole way, to meet criticisms which we expressed when discussing Clause 8 of the Bill, a clause which is closely linked with Schedule 2. It is now clear that, if your Lordships accept this Amendment, no occupier can suddenly find himself or herself deprived of his or her home through the special quick-acting procedure of compulsory purchase. If I understand the Amendment aright, it means that if an occupier raises an objection to a compulsory purchase order where it is proposed that this special procedure shall apply, then the Minister must grant a public inquiry or, if the objector prefers, a private hearing, or, alternatively, exclude the house in question from the compulsory purchase order. That seems to be satisfactory. As I have indicated, we are not, in the circumstances, proposing to move that Schedule 2 should be omitted from the Bill. Indeed, it would not make sense to do that, so long as Clause 8 remained in the Bill, As I gave notice when discussing Clause 8, we may have to return to that at a later stage.
Speaking for myself, my view is that there might conceivably be certain narrow cases where a special procedure of this character was justified, but there could be no justification for applying the special procedure to acquisitions generally throughout the country. Clause 8 in its present form would permit that. If I may help the noble Lord by giving him advance notice of what may occur on the Report stage, I think that he may find that Amendments on the Order Paper will be designed, not to destroy the specially rapid procedure, but to limit its application to those narrow categories of case where there is a special justification for it. Having said that, I have no desire to detain your Lordships any longer on this matter. I welcome the Amendment so far as it goes, and I, for my part, do not wish to discuss Schedule 2 further in advance of the discussion we may be able to have on Clause 8 at a later stage.
LORD KENNET: I am grateful to the noble Lord for advance warning of his
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intentions. Our future debates will be the better for it.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD KENNET: This Amendment is part of the same situation I have outlined. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 98, line 25, at end insert—
("( ) Where the land comprised in such a compulsory purchase order as prepared in draft by the Commission consists of a dwelling-house, and the occupier of the dwelling-house duly objects to the order and that objection is not withdrawn, the last preceding sub-paragraph shall not have effect in relation to that objection.
( ) Where the land comprised in such a compulsory purchase order as so prepared includes a dwelling-house together with other land, and the occupier of the dwelling-house duly objects to the order and that objection is not withdrawn, then if the Minister referred to in sub-paragraph (2) of this paragraph—

(a) does not either cause a public local inquiry to be held or afford to the occupier of the dwelling-house an opportunity of appearing before and being heard by a person appointed by that Minister for the purpose, and

(b) authorises the Commission to make the order, that Minister shall require the Commission to make the order with a modification so as to exclude the dwelling-house from the order.

( ) In this paragraph 'dwelling-house' means any building or part of a building in which a person is residing, and includes any other building or part of a building in which a person normally resides but from which he is temporarily absent.").—(Lord Kennet.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Schedule 2, as amended, agreed to.
Schedule 3 [Supplementary provisions as to general vesting declarations]:
5.20 p.m.
LORD KENNET: The provisions in this Amendment were rather fully discussed on Clause 10. I hope the Committee will agree with me that there is no need to open the matter further. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 100, line 48, at end insert—
("11A. As respects Scotland, where by virtue of paragraph 9 or 11 of this Schedule a general vesting declaration is to have effect in relation to a larger area of land than that originally comprised in the declaration, the

1207
Commission shall alter accordingly the description of the land affected by the description."—(Lord Kennet.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Schedule 3, as amended, agreed to.
Schedule 4 [General provisions for ascertaining factors relevant to assessment of levy]:
5.21 p.m.
THE EARL OF KINNOULL: I hope that this Amendment will not reopen the constitutional issue. But I believe there is a misprint in the Bill, as page 113, line 34, does not tie up with page 115, line 1, which reads "after 29th December 1965". Also it does not tie up with Clause 83. I am advised—
LORD KENNET: Did I hear the noble Earl aright? Page 115, line 1, does read "29th December 1965."
THE EARL OF KINNOULL: The noble Lord is absolutely right. What I am trying to amend is page 113, line 34, so that it will tie up with page 115. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 113, line 34, leave out ("before 21st December 1965") and insert ("after 29th December 1965").—(The Earl of Kinnoull.)
LORD KENNET: I must confess that, when I saw this Amendment, I was not clear that the noble Earl was going to move it simply on the ground of a misprint. Now that he has made that clear, may I ask him whether he will withdraw it and I will examine whether there has been a misprint? Of course, if there has been a misprint it will be put right. But if there has not been a misprint, I should point out that we are back in the Schedules which depend on Part III of the Bill, and all that my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor has said applies here.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: I understand that what happened was this. On December 21, 1965, the Bill was published or printed, and it was just before Christmas. I believe it was at a weekend, or very close to it. What then happened was that the Bill was not available to members of the public until some time after the Christmas holiday, and the first occasion upon which an ordinary member of the public could get
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hold of it was on December 29. Therefore, I believe it was generally considered right that the time for which the public ought to have known what was in the Bill, and dealt with matters accordingly, should not be the date when the Bill was technically first published, but the date when it was, in fact, available to them. I do not believe that there can be anything but a misprint here, because, as I understand it, where we are dealing with December, 1965, anywhere else in the Bill, the date has universally been put as the 29th though for some reason it has been printed here as the 21st. I believe there is nothing more than a misprint here—I hope that is the case—and I am sure that if the noble Lord looks at it that will be a very satisfactory solution.
THE EARL OF KINNOULL: I am quite prepared to withdraw the Amendment on that understanding. All I would say is that I have heard of cases where contracts would be affected by this (as I call it) misprint. So if the noble Lord cannot accept the Amendment, perhaps I could raise it on another occasion. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Schedule 4 agreed to.
Schedule 5 [Base value derived from previous transaction.]:
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSSmoved, in paragraph 2(2)(a), to leave out "within the period beginning on 1st July, 1948, and ending with" and to substitute "before". The noble Viscount said: This is in the nature of a probing Amendment, and I hope that this matter has not been raised by anybody anywhere else before. Certainly, I have not become aware of the answer. There are various examples in this Bill, and I thought I had chosen the first of them, but, in fact, there is another one in Part V of Schedule 4, where the beginning of the period during which one may take account of, for instance, expenditure or other such matters has been set as July 1, 1948. As it happened, that was the appointed day for the coming into operation of the Town and Country Planning Act 1947.
It is perfectly true that under that Act there were certain financial provisions, which affected development value and claims on the £300 million fund set up in

1209
order to deal with that and other very difficult matters, some of which in a very vestigial way are still going on. Nevertheless, I believe that, so far as the context of this Bill is concerned, the appointed day for the 1947 Act now has very little relevance, and it seems a curious thing that this has been chosen as an arbitrary beginning for the period when these different matters in the Schedules are to start.
I think it would be useful if the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, could explain the philosophy which governs this, because if there is none I believe that we should take out this arbitrary starting date, and allow any transactions which occurred before September 22 (which of course has great relevance for the purposes of this Bill) to be taken into account. So if the noble Lord would be kind enough to explain why we have to use this date as the beginning for all these matters, I should be very grateful; and so, I think, would other people. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 117, line 10, leave out from ("made") to ("22nd") in line 11 and insert ("before").—(Viscount Colville of Culross.)
LORD KENNET: We are still within the shadow of Part III, and so I welcome the noble Viscount's assurance that this is a probing Amendment. There is a philosophy behind this. The effect of the noble Viscount's Amendment, as he said, would be that the person liable to levy would be able to claim as his base value the price at which property was bought at any time before September 22, 1965, and not merely between July 1, 1948, and September 22, 1965. July 1, 1948, is the date, as the noble Viscount said, when the Town and Country Planning Act 1947, came into force and development values existing on that date were vested in the State. In recompense, claims could be made against the £300 million fund. Valid claims are now transmuted into a right to obtain a payment for unexpended development value and, as such, are included within current use value. Development value existing on July 1, 1948, is therefore fully recognised and allowed for in the levy scheme in the way I have explained. I hope that this is a sufficient statement of the underlying philosophy.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: I suppose that it conceivably is the philosophy in Schedule 5, but this is not the only place where that date occurs. Is the noble Lord saying that this is the philosophy all through? The Rules of Order in this House might just allow me to refer back to Schedule 4, where, of course, the subject is expenditure on property. And that, I should have thought, has nothing whatever to do with even the unexpended balance of development value which may still be hanging around in a few cases as a result of Part VI of the 1947 Act.
The noble Lord does not seem to have dealt with the general point wherever this occurs. He has, it is true, given me a reason here. Nevertheless, I believe there is some cause to look at this point again. As the noble Lord knows, constitutional point or not, there may be an opportunity for another place to reconsider it if, after all, there turns out to be a mistake. Can the noble Lord confirm whether this is a general philosophy which underlies all the references to July 1? If so I shall state them again, and see whether we agree.
LORD KENNET: No. I hoped that the noble Viscount was probing only Schedule 5. I should not be too happy at the moment to say that, on every occasion this date appears in the Bill, this is the underlying philosophy. It seems to me that there has already been a body of complaint about there being too many dates in the Bill, and there is a great deal to be said for limiting the number.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: That is exactly why I wish to take it out. I shall study what the noble Lord has said, and perhaps he will look at the other places in the Bill where that date occurs; for instance, in paragraph 10 of Schedule 5, in paragraph 42 of Schedule 4, and, for all I know, in a great number of other places. Meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
5.30 p.m.
LORD NUGENT OF GUILDFORDmoved, in paragraph 11(2)(a), to leave out "1st August 1966" and insert "23rd September 1965". The noble Lord said: This is, of course, as the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, will recognise, entirely in

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the spirit of his last remark about removing one superfluous date, as I regard it, from the Bill and to that extent improving it. The effect of it, of course, would be to extend the exemption from levy provided by Clause 62 to purchases of land made between the publication of the White Paper on September 23, 1965, and August, 1966.
I have, of course, studied the proceedings in another place, and from that I have learnt that on August 1, 1966, in the Committee stage in another place, the Minister announced his intention to allow such exemption from levy in respect of purchases of land for building after August 1 provided development had started within six months of the first appointed day; and he moved Amendments accordingly. I understand that the Minister's purpose was to ensure that the flow of land for development for house-building was not interfered with or handicapped during the interim period, and that, as such, it was a gesture of some value to the building industry. Nevertheless, the building industry have made very strong representations to us that it does not go far enough; and, if I may go a little wide, they contend, in particular, that the Minister's Amendment to Clause 99, which defines that detailed planning consent as well as outline planning consent is required for the purpose of Clause 62 exemption, is too restrictive.
The Master Builders' Federation would like to see a substantial widening of the Minister's concession, and they strongly contend that the flow of house-building will be handicapped if it is not granted. I should state immediately that my Amendment is drawn a good deal more narrowly than they would have liked to see it, but I think it would go some way towards meeting the practical problem which I understand the Minister intended to meet by the concession he made in Committee. It is in that sense that I beg to move the Amendment.
Amendment moved—
Page 120, line 6, leave out ("1st August 1966") and insert ("23rd September 1965").—(Lord Nugent of Guildford.)
LORD KENNET: If for a moment I may go back over the history of this, the Bill in its original form provided that the price paid for land between Septem-
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ber 23, 1965, the date of publication of the White Paper, and the appointed day should not be taken into account for levy because it was feared that otherwise fictitious transactions would be entered into for the sole purpose of producing high base values. The White Paper explained that this would be the position. There was, therefore, no excuse for anybody to buy land for development after September 23, 1965, on which they did not think they could start development before the appointed day. All the same, it became clear during the summer that smaller builders were not buying land because they feared they would not be able to start work before the appointed day.
In order to ensure that the housing programme should not suffer in the slightest from any provision in the Bill, the Government inserted what is now paragraph 11 in the Schedule into the Bill as an Amendment. The Amendment would, they felt, encourage small builders to buy and to continue to build to the best of their resources; but, naturally, the concession related only to the period starting from the date on which it was introduced. I must say it would seem wrong to the Government to extend this period backwards to the date of the White Paper, because this would ignore the whole genesis and history of the concession. It was intended then, and is still intended now, that those who buy land should get on and develop it. If they bought land before August 1 in the expectation of developing it quickly, they will have had at least seven months' time in which to start, and generally much more.
I do not know whether there is in the noble Lord's mind any thought that these provisos may give rise to a rush of applications for detailed planning permission immediately before the first appointed day. If there is, I would say that this is a danger which we feel we must run. We shall just have to "lump it"; it does not seem to be a sufficient danger to warrant changing the provisions of this Schedule—which, I would remind the Committee, are in any case still dependent on Part III.
THE EARL OF KINNOULL: If a developer can prove that he made a perfectly genuine purchase of development land, in say, June, 1965, and that his

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friend, another developer, made a perfectly genuine purchase on August 2, 1965, why, in fact, in equity, should they be treated differently?
LORD KENNET: The noble Earl is intending to give both dates in 1966?
THE EARL OF KINNOULL: Yes; I am sorry.
LORD KENNET: This is going deep into the background of the matter. I do not know whether the noble Earl would consider that the inequity in this paragraph which he appears to find is a reason for supporting this Amendment.
THE EARL OF KINNOULL: I certainly support the Amendment on the grounds that the White Paper set out the reasons why it wished to defeat what it called "inflated prices". What I am suggesting is that, with this knowledge of the White Paper, a developer could perfectly well have purchased land in June, 1966, and his friend on August 2, 1966, and yet they are to be treated differently. That is my point.
LORD KENNET: Whenever you put a date into any sort of financial provision you risk giving rise to small marginal inequities. We are back at the dove-tailing problem, which we discussed before.
THE EARL OF KINNOULL: But what would it in fact cost the Government to go back?
LORD KENNET: I am sorry; I have no figures available.
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR: I hope the Government will consider this again. I am not saying that my noble friend's Amendment is necessarily the ideal way of simplifying the position, though it seems to me an excellent way; but otherwise the Bill is going to produce a pretty complicated plan over a short period of years. If a house-builder owned the land and had outline planning permission by the date of the publication of the White Paper in September, 1965, he is likely to be exempt from levy under Clause 62. If a developer purchased the land after August 1, 1966, and starts development within six months after the first appointed day, he is likely to be, in effect, exempt from levy, because it is unlikely that the development
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value of the land will have been increased substantially over that short period.
But if he happens to have bought land some time between September, 1965, and the end of July, 1966, he gets advantage of neither of these concessions. The reason for that, as the noble Lord has explained, is that it was thought that if, from the beginning, concessions were offered for purchases after September, 1965, there might be purchases at artificially inflated values in order to avoid levy. But, as things were, nobody had any incentive to purchase at an artificially inflated value, because he would have read the White Paper, and there could not now be risk of evasion, because this period is past. It is all over and done with. I should have thought, quite seriously, that there would be an improvement in the Bill if the period between the White Paper and August 1, 1966, could now be brought into one or other of these categories—the earlier category, pre-White Paper, or the later category, post-August 1, 1966.
It seems to me that we are now left, in fact, with an unnecessary complication in the Bill, and a complication that is going to have some evil effects. The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, himself mentioned a possibility; that is to say, that there is bound to be a great rush among the people who purchased land between September, 1965, and the end of July, 1966, to obtain sufficient planning permission before the appointed day to enable them to make a start on the project. That will not be very good for building, and it will certainly throw an extra burden on the planning authorities Indeed, it may mean that there is a substantial difference in the financial position due entirely to whether the grant of planning permission takes two months, three months, four months or five months in any particular case.
I would ask the Government to examine this afresh to see whether it would be possible, without any loss to the principles of the Bill, to seek to have only two separate periods in the operation of the Bill, and not three separate periods. As it stands, there is a period before September 23, 1965, where one thing happens; a period from September 23, 1965, to July 31, 1966, when another thing

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happens; and a period August 1, 1966, to the appointed day, when a third thing happens. In the first period people can obtain some concession from the Bill; in the third period people can obtain some concession from the Bill; but in the second period they can obtain none. I submit that not only will there be a complication but there will be intense pressure on the planning authorities from the effort to secure sufficient planning permission before the appointed day to enable some development to start.
LORD NUGENT OF GUILDFORD: I think that enough has been said from this side of the Committee to make it clear that there is a problem here. It is not a vast one; it is a transitional and limited one; but I think it should be enough to persuade Ministers opposite that there is some worth in looking at it. Perhaps the noble Lord will consider it again on Report stage. In the light of that, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Schedule 5 agreed to.
Schedule 6 [Supplementary provisions gelatin, to Schedules 4 and 5]:
5.43 p.m.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSSmoved to add to paragraph (4)(1):
"Provided that, where for the purposes of paragraph 4, paragraph 14 or paragraph 32 of the 4th Schedule to this Act, any depreciation in the value of an interest in any other land held with the relevant land, or as the case may be, part thereof in the circumstances set out in those paragraphs respectively, falls to be calculated, there shall be ascertained in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this sub-paragraph—

(a) the value of the interest in both the relevant land and the other land, together, and

(b) the value of the interest in the other land,

and the amount of the depreciation in the value of the interest in the other land shall be the amount (if any) by which the value of the interest mentioned in head (a) of this sub-paragraph exceeds the aggregate of the value mentioned in head (b) of this sub-paragraph and the current use value of the relevant interest referred to respectively in paragraph 3, paragraph 11 or paragraph 31 of that Schedule."
The noble Viscount said: I am afraid this Amendment looks a little alarming;
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but, within the limits of my power to draft anything, I have tried to set out what I hope is the point I was seeking to make. The question that I am concerned with arises under paragraph 4 of Schedule 6, which gives a general direction on how one is to calculate depreciation of the value of an interest. One does this
"by reference to the price, or…depreciation of the price which that interest might reasonably be or have been expected to fetch on a sale in the open market"—
and I stress this—
"at the time by reference to which the value or depreciation falls to be calculated".
There are two sets of circumstances under this Bill, so far as I can see, where one is going to be dealing with depreciation. First, it occurs under Case D, and there it seems to me that paragraph 4 of Schedule 6 is entirely satisfactory and there can be no difficulty about it. But it also occurs under Cases A, D and E, if I am right—though it matters not—where, for instance, in paragraph 4 of Schedule 4 it is necessary to ascertain "whether the value of an interest in any other land" held with the land that is being sold at the same time is depreciated by the same.
It is in this respect that I should like no more than an assurance from the Government on how the valuers acting on behalf of the Land Commission are going to deal with the matter. It is almost an absurd point; but there is in my view the possibility of too strict an interpretation of the words of paragraph 4. The simple situation that would arise would be where someone has a house and a large garden. He wishes to sell the garden for development but to keep the house. It is perfectly possible, in fact, likely, that by selling the garden the value of the house itself will thereby be slightly decreased. It is that depreciation of the value of the house which he retains, which is dealt with in the paragraphs of Schedule 4, which I have set out, and which he is allowed to take into account to reduce the amount of the levy.
The problem arises whether it is possible to value the house in the way that is intended at the "time by reference to which the depreciation falls to be calculated". That time is, of course, the time when he sells the garden. It could be argued, on a strict interpretation

1217
of those words, that if you have to value it at the very time when the garden is being sold then there is no possibility of putting on the market at that time the house and the garden together so that you could see what the higher value would be. The only thing you could do would be to put on the market the house and the garden separately, because that is the transaction which is going on at that time.
If that were to happen, it would be impossible to get the larger value for the two together. In that event the provisions which allow the depreciation of the house to be taken into account will become migratory. I am certain that this is not intended to happen. I am sure that the valuers would not take this point which is open to them on a strict interpretation of the wording of paragraph 4 of Schedule 6. I have put down an Amendment which I hope would have the effect of doing what I believe would be the intention of the Government. I should not insist on this if I could have an assurance that what I have attempted to describe as being the generous interpretation of these words would always be applied by the valuers in any case concerned. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 127, line 4, at end insert the said proviso.—(Viscount Colville of Culross.)
LORD KENNET: The same point was the subject of a different and less elaborate approach in an Amendment put down by the Opposition in the House of Commons Standing Committee "E". The Amendment was put down by Mr. Allason, who advanced the very same arguments about houses and gardens as the noble Viscount advanced. It was withdrawn on the strength of an assurance by my right honourable friend the Minister of Land and Natural Resources that it was unnecessary. There was a subsequent exchange of letters before Report stage between Mr. Allason and the Minister and the matter was not pursued. It is apparent that the House of Commons were contented about these worries.
These provisions were inserted in the Bill on the advice of the Valuation Office of the Inland Revenue whose valuers will be concerned in valuations for the purposes of assessment of levy in order to
1218
ensure that the amount which the noble Viscount's Amendment purports to add to base value would be added to base value. I hope, in view of the fact that we are still depending from Part III and the case that has been argued in the Standing Committee of the House of Commons, and of the assurance I have just given, that the noble Viscount will be willing to withdraw his Amendment.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: I appreciate that this has been argued before; but, as the noble Lord said, there was a subsequent exchange of letters and the matter was not returned to. For that reason I thought it might be possible that the noble Lord would like to say something on this to-day. So long as he has now made it clear that what the Valuation Office are proposing to do is what, at any rate, I hope I have set out in my Amendment, there can be no further trouble about it. As understand it, that is what the noble Lord is saying. Is the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, saying that the broad interpretation will always be used?
LORD KENNET: I am saying only that the House of Commons has been over this matter and is content. The wording was put in on the advice of the Valuation Office to achieve a certain effect, which I have just told the noble Viscount. I can repeat it if he wishes.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: Would the noble Lord repeat it?
LORD KENNET: The wording as it stands was put in in order to ensure that the amount that the noble Viscount's Amendment seeks to add to the base value would, in fact, be added to the base value. In other words it is looked after.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: I am much obliged to the noble Lord. I should like to say, with the greatest respect to him, that the mere fact that it has been dealt with in another place does not necessarily mean that your Lordships are not entitled to another explanation. I am nevertheless grateful to the noble Lord for his reading that again. It is a little complicated and I was anxious to ensure that I had heard him correctly the first time. I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Schedules 6 to 11 agreed to.
Schedule 12:
Death, Bankruptcy, Winding up and Floating Charges
(2) The preceding sub-paragraph shall have effect subject to subsections (3) and (4) of section 44 of this Act; and, without prejudice to those subsections, a notice of assessment of levy served by virtue of this paragraph shall not have effect if it is served more than three years after the death of the deceased.
LORD WADEmoved, in paragraph 5(2), to leave out "three" and insert "two" [years]. The noble Lord said: We are now dealing with Schedule 12, Part II, concerned with "Death on or after relevant date". I referred briefly to this subject when I was advocating a clearance letter procedure on an earlier Amendment. The object of my Amendment is to insert "two years" instead of "three years". The noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, courteously told me that it was intended that the Land Commission should follow somewhat similar procedure to the Inland Revenue where persons potentially liable were concerned about their liability and wished to have it determined. I am obliged to the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, for what he said in that earlier debate.
Personal representatives may, nevertheless, be faced with a serious problem, since they may have to wait three years. May I just summarise the first three subsections of paragraph 5? Under the first sub-paragraph, where a charge or act or event occurs and the person prospectively liable for levy dies on or after the relevant date but before the notice of assessment of levy has been served on him, the notice of assessment of levy may be served on his personal representatives. I am not reading in full; I am giving what I hope is a fair summary. In sub-paragraph (2) a notice of assessment of levy shall not have effect if it is served more than three years after the date of the death of the deceased. To put it another way round, the personal representative may have to wait three years. Under the third sub-paragraph even though an estate has been wound up and everything done except for this possible liability for levy, even though the estate has been wound up and the personal representative has, to all intents and purposes,
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ceased to be a personal representative, he will neverthelss be liable for this levy up to a period of three years.
I should have thought two years was adequate. I do not know why the period of three years was chosen. Some would say that two years is too long, but there are grounds for suggesting two years. The present provision may well create some hardship for beneficiaries, and certainly embarrassment to personal representatives, and I hope that some way may be found for shortening this period at any rate to two years. With that in mind I beg to move the Amendment.
Amendment moved—
Page 174, line 15, leave out "three" and insert "two"—(Lord Wade.)
5.55 p.m.
THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO (LORD CHAMPION): Having sat throughout all this Bill, having been given some 38 clauses with Schedules to look after for the purpose of answering questions on the Motion that the clause stand part, and having found teat on only one of them was a question raised, I am almost happy at this late stage to hear my own voice, especially as I spent three week-ends, plus many late hours, studying this Bill. I think I can satisfy the noble Lord, Lord Wade, to some extent, without accepting the Amendment. In the first place, I must point out that the three-year period is taken from the income tax precedent which requires a tax assessment to be served within three years of death. There seems to us to be no reason for substituting a lesser period.
It is, I think, the next point which will to a large extent satisfy the noble Lord, Lord Wade. The Commission will normally serve a notice of assessment within a few months of the chargeable act or event, and hence the event of death, assuming it to occur immediately after the chargeable Act, but there will be cases when a good deal of negotiation and discussion will need to go on between the parties before the assessment is served. It would not be for the interest or the advantage of either party to require the Commission to serve a notice before such discussion was completed, and a period of two years, I am told, might not be sufficient in complex cases. We think the three-year period is, and

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may be, an advantage to the Commission on the one side, and (this is extremely important in connection with the Amendment) an advantage to those handling the affairs of the deceased. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Wade, will regard this as a reasonable answer to the point which he raised.
LORD WADE: The noble Lord, Lord Champion, is always reasonable in the way he presents his case. I am not entirely satisfied, but we keep hearing this reference to the shadow of Part III—
LORD CHAMPION: I never referred to that.
LORD WADE: No, it was the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, who referred to the shadow of Part III. I hope that the time will come when the shadow will be lifted, but in the meantime I will consider it further, and I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Schedule 12 agreed to.
Schedule 13 [Special provisions as to levy in certain cases]:
5.57 p.m.
THE EARL OF KINNOULL: I beg to move this Amendment, which stands in the name of my noble friend Lord Jessel. Part I of Schedule 13 appears to give certain exemptions of levy to companies limited by shares or by guarantees but does not include any company constituted under Royal Charter. If this is the correct interpretation, it would appear grossly unfair, and the purpose of this Amendment and the one which follows is to correct the situation. Companies constituted under Royal Charter would then be placed on the same footing as companies within the meaning of the definition of the Companies Act 1948, so that where there are transactions between members of a group no levy will be payable. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 180, line 17, leave out ("either").—(The Earl of Kinnoull.)
LORD MITCHISON: I rise because I hope to go away quite soon, and this time I am lifting my eyebrows. I do
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not think that this Amendment is necessary. The word "company" has the same meaning as in the Companies Act 1948, and in that Act the word includes "existing companies", and "existing companies" comprise among many other kinds, charter companies.
LORD KENNET: I do not think this Amendment is necessary, but perhaps I must just tell the noble Earl how the situation which he seeks to amend arose. The provisions as they stand are largely taken from Schedule 13 to the Finance Act 1965 which was amended by paragraph 15 of Schedule 5 to the Finance Act 1966, which included companies under Royal Charter. When this happened we considered whether or not to amend this Bill so as to bring it into line with the 1966 Finance Act, but since we thought it most unlikely that the companies in question would be involved in landholding transactions between members of a group, we decided that it simply was not worth the trouble. But I have no objection at all to the noble Earl's Amendment; and were there evidence of cases of companies having this status who would be involved in this sort of transaction, I would willingly accept it, except for the fact that we are dealing with a Schedule depending on Part III. However much I may regret it, I advise the Committee not to accept this Amendment.
LORD MITCHISON: With great respect, the Amendment is still unnecessary, for the reason I gave.
LORD KENNET: I agree with my noble friend.
THE EARL OF KINNOULL: I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, as I am always grateful, for his observations. I am not certain that we are right in accepting everything that has been said, but I am grateful to the noble Lord for his assurance, and with that I beg leave to withdraw this Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Schedule 13 agreed to.
Remaining Schedules agreed to.
House resumed: Bill reported with Amendments.

BUS FUEL GRANTS BILL
Brought from the Commons; read 1a, and to be printed.
LEE VALLEY REGIONAL PARK BILL
The CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES informed the House that the opposition to the Bill was withdrawn: the Order made on 1st November last discharged, and Bill committed to the Committee on Unopposed Bills.
  HAVANT LINK ROAD
  HAVANT LINK ROAD