Sitting of 27 April 1966

Preamble
The House met at half-past Two o'clock
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

MEMBERS SWORN
The following Members took and subscribed the Oath, or made and subscribed the Affirmation required by Law:
Austen Harry Albu, esquire, Edmonton.
Albert Evans, esquire, Islington, South-West.
John Meredith Temple, esquire, City of Chester.

PRIVATE BUSINESS
  BRIGHTON CORPORATION BILL
    GREATER LONDON COUNCIL (GENERAL POWERS) BILL
    To be read a Second time Tomorrow.
    GLASGOW CORPORATION (CARNOUSTIE STREET) BRIDGE ORDER CONFIRMATION
    Bill to confirm a Provisional Order under the Private Legislation Procedure (Scotland) Act 1936, relating to Glasgow Corporation (Carnoustie Street) Bridge, presented by Mr. William Ross (under Section 7 of the Act); and ordered to be considered upon Tuesday next and to be printed. [Bill 7.]
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
  MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

    Defence Policy (Recruiting)
    Mr. Kershawasked the Secretary of State for Defence what instructions he has caused to be issued to members of the forces on support for Government defence policy in order to assist recruiting.
    The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Denis Healey): None, Sir.
    Mr. Kershawasked the Secretary of State for Defence whether he will place in the Library a copy of the letter written by the First Sea Lord in his official capacity to retired naval officers on the subject of supporting Government defence policy and naval recruiting.
    Mr. Healey: No, Sir.
    Mr. Kershaw: Nevertheless, does not the right hon. Gentleman agree that the catastrophic policy of the Government has caused these bad recruiting figures? What does he propose to do about it?
    Mr. Healey: The hon. Gentleman is talking nonsense and he knows it. There has been no change in the trend of recruiting for a long time, but I will tell him what we are doing. As from the beginning of this month, there is a very substantial increase in pay to the Forces, because the Government have decided to honour the commitment under the Grigg Formula—unlike the Conservative Government in 1962. Secondly, we are introducing separation allowances for the Forces. Thirdly, we are reducing the overstretch of our Forces through the decisions we have taken in the Defence Review. All these measures were long overdue.
    Mr. Wall: Would not the Secretary of State agree that the Government's defence policy is responsible for virtually ending recruitment for the Fleet Air Arm?
    Mr. Healey: No, Sir.

    Service Men (Death Overseas)
    Mr. Grantasked the Secretary of State for Defence how many British Service men died overseas in each of the last five years; and what is the estimated cost to public funds of returning their bodies to the United Kingdom.
    The Minister of Defence for the Royal Navy (Mr. J. P. W. Mallalieu): As the Answer contains a table of figures, I will with permission circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Mr. Grant: Is the hon. Gentleman aware of the tragic circumstances of one of my constituents who had to spend his life savings to have the body of his son brought back from the West Indies?

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    Does not the hon. Gentleman recall that, on 10th February, the Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Army said that a review was taking place of this matter and that a statement would be made shortly? When is that review likely to be completed and the statement forthcoming? Will the hon. Gentleman consider this matter generously?
    Mr. Mallalieu: The report will be out shortly and I will, of course, look at it with the greatest sympathy.
    Following is the information:
    In North-West Europe, from where we already have a scheme for repatriating the bodies of dead Service men if the relatives so wish, the numbers are:

    1961

    74

    1962

    99

    1963

    108

    1964

    106

    1965

    95

    The total cost to public funds of bringing all these bodies home, at current rates, would be between £11,000 and £16,000 a year of which rather more than half is the cost of transport.
    Outside North-West Europe, the numbers are:

    1961

    136

    1962

    132

    1963

    145

    1964

    147

    1965

    191

    Assuming repatriation were feasible, the approximate cost for air transport alone, at current air freight rates, would be between £23,000 and £33,000 a year, and there would be other substantial costs, ranging up to £250 or more in each case.

    Privates Symington and Greig (Court Martial Sentences)
    Mr. Monroasked the Secretary of State for Defence if, following the refusal of the appeal to the Court Martial Appeal by Privates Symington and Greig of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, he will reconsider the sentences imposed.
    The Minister of Defence for the Army (Mr. G. W. Reynolds): The sentences of imprisonment were reduced from three years to 18 months during the processes of confirmation and petition to the Army Board. They are reconsidered at intervals as provided by the Army Act. A review in March of this year resulted in no further change. Another review will be made in June.
    Mr. Monro: Is the Minister aware that there are many aspects of the court martial in Singapore which have caused the gravest concern that there has been a serious miscarriage of justice? Will he say what reasons were given by the Army Council for turning down the petition?
    Mr. Reynolds: The sentence and the guilt were reviewed on three and four occasions respectively during the normal procedure of reviewing court martial decisions. I cannot accept the hon. Gentleman's statements about the way in which the court was conducted.
    Mr. Dalyell: if my hon. Friend is so certain that in this case, in which I have taken an interest, as he knows, the Army is right, why have there to be these frequent reviews?
    Mr. Reynolds: Because we take far more care in dealing with reviews of court martial cases than is the position in actions in the civil court. This is a good thing and makes sure that trials are properly conducted and properly looked into.
    Mr. Monro: In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the reply, I beg to give notice that I shall raise the matter of the Adjournment.

    Dockyards (Apprentice Instructors, Chargemen and Medical Assistants)
    Dame Joan Vickersasked the Secretary of State for Defence what action he is taking in regard to the status and pay of the apprentice instructors, charge-men and medical assistants in Her Majesty's Dockyards.
    Mr. J. P. W. Mallalieu: As I told the hon. Lady on 9th March, we are making progress, and hope to give detailed proposals to the trade union and staff sides before long.
    Dame Joan Vickers: This is an urgent matter and by now the hon. Gentleman will have received a petition from all the apprentice instructors from all the dockyards in the country. They would like to send a delegation to see him about the matter. Will he grant them an interview?
    Mr. Mallalieu: I know that this is urgent, but it is also very complicated and the matter must be handled through the trade unions.

    Junior Technician D. Burlin (Leave in Rhodesia)
    Mr. Evelyn Kingasked the Secretary of State for Defence why his Department did not carry out the undertaking given, prior to enlistment, to Junior Technician D. Burlin, K.1944089, in respect of the 61 days' leave in Rhodesia to which he was entitled.
    The Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Air Force (Mr. Merlyn Rees): All leave in Rhodesia for members of the British Armed Services, other than for compassionate reasons, was cancelled in view of the illegal declaration of independence by Mr. Smith. A number of individuals have been allowed to take leave in Rhodesia for compassionate reasons. We are considering whether we would be justified in applying a broader interpretation to the compassionate factor, and the particular case referred to by the hon. Gentleman will be looked at in the light of this.
    Mr. King: Is it not a fact that, whatever may have happened in Rhodesia, it is hardly the fault of Aircraftsman Burlin, or his ageing mother? I thank the hon. Gentleman for what he has said, but I add that if he were to deprive this aircraft-man, now that he is under military discipline, of an undertaking which was given to him prior to enlistment, the hon. Gentleman would be guilty of a very mean action.
    Mr. Rees: I assure the hon. Gentleman that we meant what was said in the Answer. This matter will be looked into again in the light of the review which is taking place.
    Mr. Powell: Why does permission in these cases have to be dependent on compassionate considerations?
    Mr. Rees: Because it is considered by my right hon. Friend that the rebellion in Rhodesia raises issues for members of the Armed Forces which make it desirable for them not to return there unless there are compassionate circumstances.

    Holywood, County Down (Site)
    Mr. Currieasked the Secretary of State for Defence whether he will give instructions for the demolition of unnecessary hutments at the Kinnegar, Holywood,
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    County Down, and for the tidying up of the site, which at present causes offence to residents whose houses overlook the site and to residents in Holywood.
    The Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Army (Mr. David Ennals): The hutments on this site are all in use. The site is, however, being tidied up as far as is practicable.
    Mr. Currie: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that that will give great satisfaction to the people of the Holywood area? We appreciate the employment given on this site and would be unwilling to suggest anything which could interfere with it. We are very grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his reply.

    British Forces, Germany (American Unit Trust)
    Mr. Randallasked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on the activities of sales representatives of the American Unit Trust in so far as concerns the official permission given to them to address meetings of British Forces in Germany.
    Mr. Ennals: Commanding officers of Army and Royal Air Force units have authority, at their discretion, to admit sales representatives to their units. I have no information of dealings with this particular organisation.
    Mr. Randall: Does not my hon. Friend agree that this raises the whole question of the propriety of the British Army authorities allowing this sort of pressurised salesmanship? If it is allowed for the sale of American unit trusts, why should it not be allowed for any other organisation? Would not my hon. Friend agree that there would be serious criticism if that were permitted?
    Mr. Ennals: As I have said, this is a matter for commanding officers to decide. Such permission where it is granted by commanding officers does not in any way give any official recognition to the organisation concerned and is valid only for the unit for which the permission is granted.
    Mr. Bellenger: What is the procedure under which entry can be made to military camps for this purpose? Is it done in the N.A.A.F.I. canteen? Can a request come from soldiers to see sales representatives?
    Mr. Ennals: No. The application has to be made to the commanding officer. Of course, where a sales representative wishes to visit people in their married quarters outside the unit area, that is a matter for individual decision and requires no approval.
    Sir G. Nabarro: Is it not a fact that, perfectly validly, British unit trusts' units are sold to members of the Armed Forces in Germany and elsewhere? Why should there be discrimination against American unit trusts?
    Mr. Ennals: There is no intention to discriminate. I made it perfectly clear that the matter was for decision by commanding officers. No instructions have been given that there should be any form of discrimination.
    Sir G. Nabarro: And a very good answer, too.

    Frigates
    Dame Joan Vickersasked the Secretary of State for Defence how many frigates he proposes to build in the next four years; and what is the total number contemplated under the present defence plan.
    Mr. Healey: One Leander Class frigate was ordered in March, a second is being ordered from Devonport Dockyard, and a third will be ordered from a shipyard shortly. Our precise needs for frigates and the rate of building to meet these in the longer term remain to be settled in the light of our defence review decisions.
    Dame Joan Vickers: When is the right hon. Gentleman likely to make a final decision? There is a need for these extra frigates and, as the dockyards are getting less and less work, will he see that they continue to have ships built in their yards?
    Mr. Healey: Of course, I will see that there is a steady flow of work to the dockyards and I think that we have assured this by the decisions already announced. Any further decisions will be announced as soon as possible.
    Mr. Powell: As the right hon. Gentleman apparently has a precise budget for the year 1969-70, why does he not know which ships will then be under construction and which in service?
    Mr. Healey: For the reasons which I gave last night and which the right hon. Gentleman patently failed to understand.

    Soldiers (Maintenance of Women and Children)
    Mr. Hector Hughesasked the Secretary of State for Defence what provision he makes for the maintenance of a woman and her child who finds that the soldier who bigamously married her has been sent away on foreign service.
    Mr. Ennals: None, Sir. My Department can only pay marriage allowance in respect of the legal wife.
    Mr. Hughes: Why was this man sent out of British jurisdiction, thereby depriving the woman of her rights, or delaying any rights, which she may have had in a civil or criminal action against him? Will my hon. Friend look into the injustice being done to this woman and child?
    Mr. Ennals: He was not sent out of jurisdiction. Civilians, of course, cannot be brought back for proceedings of this kind. It is very unfortunate for a bigamous wife. However, a soldier is a citizen and, although we do not give him special privileges, we must not abuse our powers by subjecting him to a liability in civil law which civilians can escape. However, my hon. and learned Friend has written to me about this subject and I shall certainly be writing to him.
    Mr. Hughes: In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the reply, I beg to give notice that I shall raise the matter on the Adjournment.

    Aircraft Requirements
    Mr. McMasterasked the Secretary of State for Defence what new transport and other military aircraft Her Majesty's Government now plans to procure either wholly or in part from the British aircraft industry; and what support Her Majesty's Government intends to give by way of defence purchases to British aircraft design and manufacturing teams.
    Mr. Healey: I would refer the hon. Member to paragraphs 17 and 18 of Chapter III of Part I of the Statement on the Defence Estimates 1966.
    Mr. McMaster: In view of the recent experience with the Boeing and the F111,

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    will the right hon. Gentleman now take a very friendly look at the British aircraft industry, before it packs up completely, with a view to injecting some hope for budding young aeronautical engineers that there is a future in the British aircraft industry?
    Mr. Healey: I am not quite sure what the hon. Gentleman means by talking about the F111. I hope that he was not misled by mistaken reports in the Press that the aircraft under discussion in the United States was that which Her Majesty's Government was planning to buy. Certainly we have taken steps, as I explained in the White Paper in the paragraphs to which I referred, to ensure that there is a suitable future for the British aircraft industry.
    Mr. R. Carr: Will the right hon. Gentleman confirm the promise given to the House by his right hon. Friend the Minister of Aviation on 16th February, that the need for a strategic jet transport would be considered after the defence review?
    Mr. Healey: Yes, Sir.
    Mr. Onslow: Would the right hon. Gentleman go further than that and undertake to make a further examination of the possibility of using the largest version of the VC10, which now seems likely to be required by B.E.A., for military purposes as well?
    Mr. Healey: We have all these possibilities under examination, but it is my duty to the country to ensure that the weapons which we order meet the country's need at a cost the country can afford.

    Bahrain (Married Quarters and Recreational Facilities)
    Mr. McMasterasked the Secretary of State for Defence what steps are being taken to improve the married quarters and recreational facilities available to members of the forces stationed in Bahrain.
    Mr. J. P. W. Mallalieu: We are building a second all-ranks swimming pool at Muharraq, improving the joint officers' club and we plan to build a third all-ranks pool at Jufair. Most of the Service families at Bahrain live in hirings; if the hon. Member has any particular com-
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    plaint to make about these or the married quarters, I will be glad to look into it.
    Mr. McMaster: In view of our imminent withdrawal from Aden, will the hon. Gentleman bear in mind the urgency of these measures, including particularly the need for proper air conditioning in married quarters, and will he see that the facilities are sufficient to meet the increased needs at Bahrain when we withdraw from Aden?
    Mr. Mallalieu: Most certainly.

    Land
    Mr. Dalyellasked the Secretary of State for Defence what overall plan he has for returning to civilian use tracts of land no longer required for military training.
    Mr. Ennals: Land that is used for military training is kept under continual review, and areas are released as soon as they are no longer required.
    Mr. Dalyell: Is the Minister satisfied that sufficient urgency is being given to this problem?
    Mr. Ennals: I am aware that there is a great deal of feeling about this. As I said, the matter is under continual review. However, my hon. Friend must remember that part of my duty is to ensure that the Services have the facilities which are necessary for operational efficiency. If my hon. Friend has a particular case in point, I will, of course, look into it.
    Sir A. V. Harvey: Will the hon. Gentleman see that the 240 acres at Nether Alderley, which the Ministry has had for a great number of years, are returned to agricultural use instead of being used for a proposed prison?
    Mr. Ennals: I would require notice of that question.
    Mr. Bob Brown: Would not my hon. Friend agree that the time taken in negotiations when a local authority requires land for redevelopment is interminable? Should not the period be shortened?
    Mr. Ennals: These negotiations are often extremely difficult, but certainly we think that they could be speeded up. We are seeing what can be done about this.

    Radar Station, Neatishead
    Mr. Hazellasked the Secretary of State for Defence whether the report of the inquiry into the fire at Neatishead radar station is completed; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Merlyn Rees: I have not yet received the report of the Board of Inquiry. I shall consider making a further statement in the light of the Board's findings.
    Mr. Hazell: Can my hon. Friend give any indication at all when this report is likely to be available, since this event caused a great deal of interest in the County of Norfolk?
    Mr. Rees: It is anticipated that the Board of Inquiry's Report will be received very shortly.
    Mr. Hazellasked the Secretary of State for Defence what arrangements he is making with the Norfolk Fire Services to enable regular exercises to take place at Neatishead radar station by Norfolk and Norwich firemen, thus reducing the element of risk in the event of any further fire occurring at this station.
    Mr. Merlyn Rees: Very close liaison is maintained between the Royal Air Force and local fire authorities, and facilities are afforded for fire officers and men to make themselves familiar with R.A.F. establishments, subject to the requirements of security.
    Facilities are now provided at Neatishead for members of the Norfolk Fire Brigade to receive breathing apparatus training under realistic conditions. Three training sessions have already taken place since the date of the fire.
    Mr. Hazell: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that information. Is he aware that the arrangements will give a great deal of satisfaction to the members of the Norfolk Fire Brigade?

    Arms Expenditure
    Mr. Frank Allaunasked the Secretary of State for Defence, in the light of the current balance of payments deficit, what further steps he is taking to prevent the increase in arms expenditure by approximately £100 millions a year.
    Mr. Healey: Even after absorbing pay and price increases of £124 million, defence estimates for 1966-67 are only £52 million more than those for last year, and indeed at constant prices are £72 million less.
    I explained in Part I of February's Statement on the Defence Estimates the steps which we are taking to control defence expenditure in future years.
    Mr. Allaun: Even if achieved, does not this ceiling of £2,000 million at 1964 prices mean at least £2,500 million by 1970? Are there not projects mentioned in the current defence review but not estimated for this year which will swell even this figure in the years ahead?
    Mr. Healey: The answer to both parts of that supplementary question is "No, Sir".
    Mr. Powell: Would it not have assisted the balance of payments if the right hon. Gentleman had made a better offset arrangement with the Americans in connection with the purchase of American aircraft?
    Mr. Healey: I have pointed out that the total value of the increase in dollar expenditure on all forms of equipment from the United States made by the last Government is less than the dollar expenditure by the previous Government, for which no offset agreement whatever was attempted to be negotiated.
    Hon. Members: Answer.

    H.M.S. "Dreadnought"
    Mr. Burdenasked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will give the reasons for the visit of H.M.S. "Dreadnought" to Rosyth for examination and repair.
    Mr. Liptonasked the Secretary of State for Defence what defects have been discovered in the "Dreadnought" nuclear submarine; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Ronald Bellasked the Secretary of State for Defence what constructional defects have recently been discovered in H.M.S. "Dreadnought".
    Mr. J. P. W. Mallalieu: As my predecessor told the House on 27th October, hairline cracks associated with some welds in the submarine have been discovered in the "Dreadnought" and we

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    are carrying out a series of sea trials to study the behaviour of the affected areas and are undertaking detailed metallographic surveys.
    The first of the series of sea trials has been completed and the submarine has returned to Rosyth to enable the affected areas to be studied and further surveys to be undertaken.
    Mr. Burden: Would not the Minister agree that it is a very serious matter that these cracks should have appeared after this submarine has been in service for such a short time? Would he not further agree that, from the point of view of future submarines, this really necessitates a very close look at the work which was carried out and at the place where that work was carried out?
    Mr. Mallalieu: It is serious, but no question at all arises of there being any risk to the ship's company. We are making a most detailed and careful survey.
    Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop: Can the hon. Gentleman say whether the metal-forming techniques employed in building H.M.S. "Dreadnought" were the same as those employed by the Americans, or were they different?
    Mr. Mallalieu: They were different in some particulars.
    Mr. Lipton: Can my hon. Friend tell me how much this submarine has cost to date, how much more it is going to cost to make it fully seaworthy and whether we are ever going to get value for money out of this expenditure?
    Mr. Mallalieu: We are getting enormous value from it already, finding out things we could not otherwise have found out.
    Mr. Ridley: Have these defects been noticed in the "Valiant" and "Warspite", which are her sister ships?
    Mr. Mallalieu: No, they have not yet.

    Chatham Dockyard (Hunter-Killer Submarines)
    Mr. Burdenasked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will use Chatham Dockyard for the construction of hunter-killer nuclear submarines.
    Mr. J. P. W. Mallalieu: I have nothing to add to the reply given by my predecessor on 27th October last.
    Mr. Burden: Would not the hon. Gentleman admit that there has never at any time been any fault in the hull welding of a submarine built at Chatham Dockyard? If this dockyard is to be used as a repair unit, only so much hot welding can be done and welders will be unemployed unless there is cold welding also. In view of the great record of Chathham Dockyard in this sort of construction, would it not be wise to give it the opportunity of construction?
    Mr. Mallalieu: Chatham indeed has a fine record. However, it would be a very expensive business to equip it for construction and we think that we have sufficient capacity already.

    Aden (Bomb Incident)
    Sir G. Nabarroasked the Secretary of State for Defence whether he will make a statement concerning the recent bomb incident in a cinema at Aden and the extent of British casualties incurred.
    Mr. Ennals: On 17th April a hand grenade was thrown into an open air film show at the camp at Beihan, near the Yemen border. British and Arabian Federation troops, as well as local employees, were watching the show, which was within the protected perimeter of the camp. The hand grenade exploded in front of the British troops. Thirty-three were injured; eight of them are still in hospital.
    Sir G. Nabarro: Does this incident mean that the Minister will be increasing the advance measures in Aden, particularly in places of troop recreation where the terrorists seem to concentrate their attacks?
    Mr. Ennals: There are already very adequate protective means. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] We must, of course, recognise that the situation creates dangers. We also recognise that the grenade which caused the damage was thrown from within the camp, presumably by someone already there. A thorough investigation is being conducted to find who was responsible.
    Mr. Biggs-Davison: Has there not been an increase in bloodshed, terrorism and danger for British subjects and their

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    families since the announcement that Her Majesty's Government are going to dishonour their obligations and run out of Aden in 1968?
    Mr. Ennals: This has been a problem, as the hon. Gentleman will know, for a considerable time and my right hon. Friend is very much aware of the gravity of the situation and is taking steps.
    Mr. Shinwell: Have we not suffered far too many casualities in the past few years in Aden, and would not the best security be for us to get out of Aden?
    Mr. Ennals: My right hon. Friend is fully aware of the decision taken to bring this about.

    Territorial and Army Volunteer Reserve
    Sir G. Nabarroasked the Secretary of State for Defence whether he will make a statement concerning the Territorial Army and the Volunteer Reserve.
    Mr. Reynolds: No, Sir. I would refer the hon. Gentleman to my written Answer of 22nd April to my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, Scotstoun (Mr. Small).
    Sir G. Nabarro: Is it the intention in the case of the future structure of the Territorial Army and Volunteer Reserve to allow these reserve troops to wear the regimental facings and cap badges of the units affiliated to the county regiments—as in the case of Worcestershire—which have formed such an important part of volunteer tradition during the last 400 years?
    Mr. Reynolds: Any hon. Member who has visited Territorial Army units in the past few years will have seen the multiplicity of badges. It would be a very brave man who tried to alter that situation.
    Mr. Younger: Would the Minister say something about the position of the civilian staff who work for Territorial Army Associations? Is he aware that for many months they have been extremely worried about the future of their jobs? Could he confirm how many of them are likely to be kept on?
    Mr. Reynolds: I cannot say how many are likely to be required. We still have
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    under consideration the disposition of the Home Defence Force. We are still having consultations with the associations and unions concerned in respect of compensation and other provisions for these employees.
    Mr. Powell: Does the Minister recognise that the House so far has had no opportunity to debate the Government's revised proposals, including those for the Home Defence Force, and that we shall wish to consider these on principle and on broad lines when we come to his Bill?
    Mr. Reynolds: I have no doubt that there will be ample opportunity in a few weeks' time on the Second Reading of the Bill and in subsequent Committee stages.
    Sir H. Legge-Bourke: Before we debate the Bill, would the right hon. Gentleman consider laying a White Paper to explain what the Government have in mind regarding the earmarking of reserve forces for purposes in the United Nations forces? Would he bear in mind that there are certain liabilities which people have undertaken which must not be betrayed by the Government?
    Mr. Reynolds: If British troops are used to give assistance to United Nations forces they go as formed units and come under whatever control they come under. I have been in considerable correspondence with the hon. Gentleman on this matter.

    Type 82 Destroyer
    Mr. Wallasked the Secretary of State for Defence what are the rôle and purpose of the new Type 82 destroyers.
    Mr. J. P. W. Mallalieu: The Type 82 destroyer has been designed as a successor to the County Class. She will be a dual-purpose ship, armed with the new surface-to-air missile system, Seadart, and with the latest anti-submarine attack weapon, Ikara. The primary rôle of the ship, which will also have the new three-dimensional radar and other advanced equipment, will be to defend a surface force against air and submarine attack.
    Mr. Wall: As this class of destroyer was designed to operate with aircraft

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    carriers, and as we are no longer to have aircraft carriers, is there a continuing reason for these destroyers? Is it not a case that the Government are to spend £120 million on building these destroyers, for which sum we could have built one and possibly two aircraft carriers?
    Mr. Mallalieu: We consider these destroyers to have enormous value to the Fleet.

    Defence Equipment (Sale to United States)
    Mr. Sheldonasked the Secretary of State for Defence what sales of British equipment are being made to offset the foreign exchange cost of the F111A.
    Mr. Goodhartasked the Secretary of State for Defence what is the value of purchases of British defence equipment which have been made by the United States Department of Defence since 1st January, 1966.
    Mr. Fisherasked the Secretary of State for Defence what orders for British defence equipment have been placed by the United States of America, or are in prospect, since the F111As were ordered from the United States of America; and what collaborative sales with the United States of America have been achieved.
    Mr. Healey: Details of a number of items of British defence equipment have been sent to the United States Department of Defence, some "invitations for bid" have been received and the first bids will be made tomorrow. No further proposals for collaborative sales have yet been made.
    Mr. Sheldon: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the economic burden of our east of Suez rôle is being increasingly questioned by hon. Members on this side of the House? The purchase of the F111A is entirely devoted to the east of Suez rôle. While the expenditure may be extremely large, many of us feel thankful that the foreign exchange part of it is to be met, but we shall be watching this point very closely.
    Mr. Healey: I do not know whether to be wholly grateful to my hon. Friend for what he said. I am grateful for what he said in the second part of his question. As for the first part, had he been present at the debate yesterday he would know
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    that there are very sound reasons, accepted by the vast majority on both sides of the House, for continuing a British military capability outside Europe.
    Mr. Goodhart: Can the right hon. Gentleman now deny the report that part of our defence contract with Saudi Arabia is included in the offset agreement on the F111A? Can he say what is the target for dollar sales in America on defence weapons for this first year?
    Mr. Healey: We fixed a target for the 10-year period during which we shall be paying for the F111A. No substantial dollar payments will be made for the F111A for at least four years, and for this reason we have made no fixed annual target.
    Mr. Speaker: Mr. Nigel Fisher.
    Several Hon. Members—
    Mr. Speaker: I called the hon. Member for Surbiton (Mr. Fisher).
    Mr. Fisher: Did not the right hon. Gentleman always justify the replacement of the TSR2 by the F111A on the ground that we should offset this very heavy dollar expenditure by selling a considerable amount of British defence equipment to the United States? Has he any comment on a report about a non-collaborative sale of 36 American aeroplanes to Jordan? Has he not wrecked the British aircraft industry without getting very much in exchange?
    Mr. Healey: We always justified the purchase of the F111A rather than the TSR2 on the ground that it would save this country about £600 million. In addition, unlike any previous Government, we have arranged to offset the cost of the F111A purchase by arrangements for the sale of British products to the United States or British products to third countries with assistance from the United States. This is a precedent unique in British history and I should have expected hon. Members opposite to welcome it if they had any interest in the future of the British economy.
    Mr. Powell: Will the right hon. Gentleman or his right hon. Friend the Minister of Aviation make a personal statement to the House explaining the circumstances in which they came to mislead the House by concealing the material fact that the

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    value of the Saudi Arabian deal was included in the offset arrangements on the F111A?
    Mr. Healey: There has been no attempt whatever to mislead the House on this—none at all. We agreed when we made the F111A deal that we should include the Saudi purchase arrangements, which had not then been concluded, in that part of the offset arrangements which related to sales to third countries. When the original negotiations were undertaken and the Americans originally undertook to stand aside, the F111A agreement had not been concluded, and the original American intention was not dependent on its conclusion.
    Sir J. Eden: The right hon. Gentleman's answer completely contradicts what was said earlier in the House by other Ministers. If that is not deception, what is? In any case, why was it necessary to bring into this matter the Saudi Arabian deal, negotiations for which had been begun many years ago, and which had nothing whatever to do with the purchase of the F111A? To bring it into part of the offset arrangements at this stage is a shameless piece of deception.
    Mr. Healey: I think that if the hon. Member takes the trouble to read what I said he will be less excited tomorrow than he was this afternoon. Negotiations for such sales were initiated under the previous Government. Like so many things which the previous Government initiated, they failed to bring them to a successful conclusion. We have done so—and that is the difference.
    Several Hon. Members—
    Mr. Speaker: Order. Questions must be questions and not statements.
    Sir J. Eden: I beg to give notice that we shall press this matter further at the earliest possible opportunity.

    M79 Light Mortar
    Mr. Goodhartasked the Secretary of State for Defence what plans he has for equipping British forces with the United States M79 light mortar.
    Mr. Reynolds: A decision on the use of this equipment will be taken in the light of trials now being held in this country and in the Far East.
    Mr. Goodhart: In view of the shortage of light mortar equipment in the Middle East and Far East and the fact that the trials so far held have proved to be most satisfactory, will the Minister press this forward as quickly as possible?
    Mr. Reynolds: It is not a mortar. It is a grenade thrower. I do not think that the rest of the Question therefore follows. But we are going as fast as we can.
    Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member for Gillingham (Mr. Burden) should not anticipate Mr. Speaker by standing when another hon. Member is speaking. Mr. Burden.
    Mr. Burden: Does not the Minister agree that if we go on buying American equipment at this rate we shall have to sell a lot of British equipment to make up for it?
    Mr. Reynolds: In fact, we are not buying in total sales as much as the amount to which the previous Government but one committed us. Answering about this particular piece of equipment, the hon. Member is probably aware that it takes many years to design a piece of equipment of this nature. We did not inherit any design studies about this from that Administration.

    Amphibious Warfare Squadron
    Mr. Wallasked the Secretary of State for Defence if the Amphibious Squadron is now to be reconstituted; and where it is to be stationed.
    Mr. J. P. W. Mallalieu: No, Sir. The present Amphibious Warfare Squadron will be paid off when the first of the new asault ships, H.M.S. "Fearless", is deployed east of Suez.
    Mr. Wall: Does not the hon. Gentleman propose to bring the new assault ships and commando carriers together in one squadron to work with the Army logistic ships? Would that not be following the successful precedent set by the original Amphibious Squadron?
    Mr. J. P. W. Mallalieu: One of these assault ships will do more than the Amphibious Squadron.

    Vehicles (Shipment to Dar-es-Salaam)
    Mr. Gresham Cookeasked the Secretary of State for Defence for what purpose Land Rovers and other vehicles

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    are now being specially prepared and overtime and weekend work being worked thereon at the Vehicle Recovery Depôt at Feltham in connection with the shipment of these vehicles to Dar-es-Salaam.
    Mr. Reynolds: The vehicles now being prepared for shipment to Dar-es-Salaam are a consignment that has been sold to the Tanzanian Government through the Crown Agents. Overtime being worked at the Central Vehicle Depôt is not directly connected with these vehicles.
    Mr. Gresham Cooke: If those 50 Land Rovers and military vehicles are going to be used in connection with any military operations in Rhodesia, should not the Government say so now and so put the public in a position to know what they are really intended for?
    Mr. Reynolds: The hon. Gentleman does not appear to have listened to my original reply. These vehicles have been sold to the Tanzanian Government as part of a general export drive, and we want to deliver them as quickly as we can.

    Leconfield Aerodrome
    Mr. James Johnsonasked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement about the future use of Leconfield Aerodrome, near Hull.
    Mr. Merlyn Rees: The Royal Air Force will require Leconfield for as far ahead as can be foreseen. Exactly what its future rôle will be has not yet been decided.
    Mr. James Johnson: In view of that Answer, which I did not expect, may I ask my hon. Friend, who is a Yorkshire Member like myself, to bear in mind the keen anxiety that the situation will change should the Hull City Council desire a modern municipal airport, in view of our movement towards the Common Market?
    Mr. Rees: I am aware of the interest that my hon. Friend has in the economic development of Yorkshire and Humberside. But, in terms of my right hon. Friend's responsibility for R.A.F., Leconfield, my reply is bald and clear. Under the defence review, we have not yet decided its future.
    Mr. Wall: Will the hon. Gentleman tell us when his right hon. Friend will make up his mind on the matter, because it is an important one? If the airfield is to be used by civil aviation as well as the R.A.F., the present arrangements can go ahead. If the R.A.F. are to quit the airfield, new arrangements must be made.
    Mr. Rees: We are fully aware of the importance of R.A.F., Leconfield, but it is not only its operational use which is important, because there are many other important issues there, namely, the flying zones in that part of Yorkshire. But it will be expedited, as I have promised my hon. Friend.

    Malta (Minister's Visit)
    Mr. Ridsdaleasked the Secretary of State for Defence when he intends to visit Malta.
    Mr. Healey: At an early opportunity.
    Mr. Ridsdale: Could the Secretary of State go as quickly as possible, as our cuts in defence spending will have a greater effect on the Maltese economy than possibly we may realise here? A visit by him will be welcomed by the Maltese people.
    Mr. Healey: I am aware of the problem, but it is not one for my Ministry, which is concerned with the security and influence of this country, and the savings which we make with the defence review are made in the interests of the people of this country. We have responsibilities to the people of Malta, of course, but those are for my right hon. Friend the Commonwealth Secretary.
    Sir A. V. Harvey: Will the right hon. Gentleman investigate the conditions of service of the Royal Malta Auxiliary, who get only two-thirds of the pay and allowances of Britsih troops? The matter needs straightening out, and it is about time that something was done to put them on a par.
    Mr. Healey: The hon. Member will be aware that that unit has recently had a pay increase, but I will look into the matter.

    Military Exercises
    Mr. Iremongerasked the Secretary of State for Defence what military exercises have been carried out in the United

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    Kingdom recently, and with what kind of operations in view.
    Mr. Healey: Six large military exercises have been carried out in the United Kingdom since the beginning of the year. Their object, whether they have been conducted on a single-Service or a three-Service basis or in collaboration with our allies, has been to prepare our forces to meet all probable eventualities. They have therefore been undertaken with a wide variety of possible operations in view.
    Mr. Iremonger: Can the right hon. Gentleman say which of our allies were not present at which of these operations, and whether Portugal was present at all?
    Mr. Healey: I cannot say that without notice. If the hon. Gentleman puts a Question down, I will answer it.
    Mr. Kershaw: In the past, facilities have been made available for hon. Members of this House to attend some of these exercises. Was that done, and will it be done in future?
    Mr. Healey: It was done in the case of one or two of them. If the hon. Member believes that we should make more facilities available for attendance at exercises, perhaps he will make his suggestion through the usual channels.

    F111 Aircraft (Bomb Load)
    Mr. Wingfield Digbyasked the Secretary for Defence what fresh assurances he has sought and received about the bomb load of the F111, as a result of the recent investigation in the United States of America.
    Mr. Healey: None, Sir.
    Mr. Digby: Is it not a fact that there seems to be some fresh information as a result of the work of the investigating committee of the House of Representatives and, in view of the importance of this aircraft to the Government's defence policy, would the right hon. Gentleman ask for further information?
    Mr. Healey: I think that the hon. Gentleman ought to do his homework. He should know that Congress has not been investigating the aircraft which we are
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    buying, the F111A: it has been investigating a totally different aircraft, the FB111. The hon. Gentleman should do his homework.
    Mr. McMaster: Has the right hon. Gentleman swallowed, hook line and sinker, the story of the American manufacturers that all the bad American planes have been sold to America and that all the good ones are coming to us?
    Mr. Healey: That is a good comic remark, but it is so irrelevant to the subject that I had better not comment on it.
    Mr. Paget: Would my right hon. Friend confirm or deny that the drag has turned out in our version to be about 20 or 25 per cent. greater than expected?
    Mr. Healey: I cannot remember whether my hon. and learned Friend asked me to confirm or deny. I deny it.
    Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop: Would the right hon. Gentleman agree that, for a given range, if the drag is up, the bomb load must be down? Since the President of General Dynamics informed hon. Members on both sides of the House that all was not well with the engineering, ought not the right hon. Gentleman to inform himself better?
    Mr. Healey: I can assure the House that I have taken the trouble to inform myself very well on this, and we are satisfied not only that the range is adequate but that it is still several hundred miles in excess of the radius of action of the TSR2.
    Mr. Rankin: Would my right hon. Friend say that it is the case that the F111A and the FB111 originate from the same model? Is it not possible that some of the faults in the FB111 might be transmitted to the F111A?
    Mr. Healey: To clear it up for my hon. Friend, the best analogy was trying to turn a Mirage into a totally different sort of aircraft by making it the Mirage IV. This is what the American Administration is trying to do in turning a tactical strike aircraft, the F111A, into a nuclear strategic bomber aircraft, the FB111. This presents serious problems but was not relevant to our purpose.

  PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS (SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SCOTLAND)
  Mr. Edward M. Taylorasked the Lord President of the Council whether he will make arrangements to extend the time available to hon. Members wishing to ask Questions to the Secretary of State for Scotland.
  The Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons (Mr. Herbert Bowden): No, Sir.
  Mr. Taylor: Is it not quite scandalous that the Secretary of State probably will not be in a position to answer Questions until June? He is responsible in Scotland for subjects covered by seven Ministries in England. Will the Lord President consider allowing a quarter of an hour once a week before the Scottish Grand Committee upstairs for Scottish Questions?
  Mr. Bowden: The idea of having Scottish Questions upstairs is attractive. I will look at that one. The Secretary of State for Scotland was at the top of the list immediately before the election. He is coming up the roster. He is likely to be reached before Whitsun, and will be at the top again afterwards.
  Mr. William Hamilton: Since the Prime Minister last week suggested that the question of morning sittings might be considered, would it not be advisable to give the House additional facilities for questioning Ministers and in particular Scottish Ministers on mornings during the week?
  Mr. Bowden: The Select Committee on Procedure is already looking at sittings of the House, and it might well look at that.
  Mr. Steele: Is my right hon. Friend aware that, because there are so few Scottish Tory Members, it now requires a very big proportion of English Conservative Members to constitute the Grand Committee and that English Members might object to the Scottish Grand Committee meeting so often?
  Mr. Bowden: That is another point that might be borne in mind. I have never known English Members keen to serve on the Scottish Grand Committee.
  Mr. Noble: Will not the Lord President admit that the number of Questions answered in the last Parliament by the Secretary of State for Scotland was enormously fewer than in the past and that not only the number but the content of the Answers was very poor?
  Sir G. Nabarro: And the quality.
  Mr. Bowden: I could not accept that for one moment. It is simply that there are other Departments which attract more Questions.

  HOUSE OF COMMONS PROCEDURE
  Mr. William Hamiltonasked the Lord President of the Council if he will state in detail his proposals for altering the procedure of the House to ensure that back-bench Members of the House shall have greater facilities and opportunities for challenging the Executive than they have had hitherto.
  Mr. Bowden: Not before the discussions through the usual channels with the two Opposition parties referred to by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister on Thursday last.
  Mr. Hamilton: Can my right hon. Friend give the House any indication when those discussions will begin, and can he say how soon he expects to recruit the staff required for such committees as the Prime Minister suggested? Does he stand by the evidence that he gave to the Select Committee on Procedure on these matters last May?
  Mr. Bowden: The proposals suggested by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister need to be examined in detail first, which will not take very long. The proposals will be put to the other side, as suggested by my right hon. Friend, and we shall ask for the approval of the House.
  Mr. Blaker: Can the right hon. Gentleman say why there is no proposal for a committee on foreign affairs? Would he undertake to look at the practice in Canada, where there is such a committee in the House of Commons and it works, I believe, to the general satisfaction?
  Mr. Bowden: I should have thought it advisable to start with one or two Departments first, and see how we go on.
  Mr. William Hamiltonasked the Lord President of the Council whether, in view of the need to modernise Parliament, he will take steps, by legislation or otherwise, to reduce, on future occasions, the time taken by the procedures in the House of Commons for the election of a Speaker and the swearing of Members.
  Mr. Bowden: Not in the immediate future.
  Mr. Hamilton: Does not my right hon. Friend agree that there was a colossal waste of time in this silly procedure last week? Would not it be much simpler for a Member, immediately on election, to be taken into a private office by the returning officer in his constituency and sworn in and take the Oath of Allegiance in that way and so save at least two days in this House?
  Mr. Bowden: There was not a colossal waste of time. We took two days, which is less than we have taken over a very long period. I do not—and I do not think that many hon. Members do, either—regard the taking of the Oath of Allegiance as a silly waste of time.
  Sir G. Nabarro: Is it not a fact that the last reply bears not at all on the subject which we are discussing? Is it not the fact that a great deal of time would be saved if hon. Members could take the Oath at prearranged times, but not necessarily in the Chamber, and not necessarily with Mr. Speaker present? Is it not a fact that the whole procedure could have been got through outside Parliamentary time without the loss of those two days?
  Mr. Bowden: I have not said that this will not be looked at. I have said that it cannot be looked at in the immediate future. After all, we are not likely to go through this exercise for another five years.

  OPENING OF PARLIAMENT (TELEVISION AND FILMING)
  Mr. Bellengerasked the Lord President of the Council by what authority the proceedings of this House were televised on the opening day of this Parliament; and whether he will make a statement.
  Mr. Rowlandasked the Lord President of the Council what consultations were held before permission was given for television cameras to be admitted to the Chamber of the House of Commons.
  Mr. Bowden: I would refer to the Answer which I gave to the Question by my hon. Friend the Member for West Ham, North (Mr. Arthur Lewis) on Tuesday, 26th April.
  Mr. Bellenger: Could my right hon. Friend say whether any permission was given for the introduction of ciné cameras into the Chamber, and by whom it was given, if it was given? Has his attention been called to a circular to all hon. Members this morning by a commercial undertaking offering pictures taken in the House, presumably by ciné cameras for which I understand no authority has been given by the House?
  Mr. Bowden: I answered Questions in some detail on Monday of this week on the subject of ciné cameras at the State Opening of Parliament.
  Mr. Rowland: Does my right hon. Friend accept that the only consultations acceptable to the House are consultations with the House? May I ask him also to give an assurance that the free vote which he has already promised on the principle of televising the House should be followed by further votes or discussion on the methods by which the House is televised; in other words, that the ground rules are as important as the principle in the matter?
  Mr. Bowden: The Select Committee on Broadcasting the Proceedings of the House of Commons has been discussing the question for some time, but its remit does not cover anything other than televising the House. I have been considering whether we ought not to consider the question of ciné cameras in the Chamber. When we receive a Report from the Select Committee, I hope that the House will discuss it and come to a decision.
  Sir C. Osborne: Will the right hon. Gentleman see that it never happens again?
  Mr. Bowden: I am not absolutely sure to what the hon. Gentleman is referring.
  Sir C. Osborne—
  Mr. Speaker: Order. Mr. William Hamilton, to ask Question No. 38.
  Sir Richard Glynasked the Lord President of the Council by what authority permission was given to a commercial film company to make a film of part of the proceedings in the Chamber of the House of Commons on Thursday, 21st April.
  Mr. Englishasked the Lord President of the Council by what authority the decision of the House of Commons Services Committee of 7th March upon the televising of the House of Commons proceedings at the State opening of Parliament was varied; and, in particular, by what authority colour filming and Press photography were permitted.
  Mr. Bowden: I would refer to the Answer which I gave to the Question by my hon. Friend the Member for Meriden (Mr. Rowland) on Monday, 25th April.
  Sir Richard Glyn: Would the right hon. Gentleman agree that the Select Committee on House of Commons (Services) under his chairmanship authorised the use of television cameras, or recommended the use of them, but made no such recommendation with regard to colour film and much brighter lights which were involved? Would he further agree that it was never authorised by Mr. Speaker or by a competent authority? Will the right hon. Gentleman admit that in his Ministerial capacity he had an office and staff in the House of Commons throughout the time when the House was not sitting? Why did not he intervene to stop the making of this ultra vires film?
  Mr. Bowden: A lot of admissions are required. I will admit that the House of Commons (Services) Committee recommended to Mr. Speaker that television cameras should be brought into this Chamber. I will further admit that the House of Commons (Services) Committee did not discuss the question of ciné cameras in the Chamber. I had no office in the House of Commons during the dissolution of Parliament. I have no such entitlement. I was not Leader of the House at the time, but was Lord President of the Council, and had no responsibility whatever for the televising of the House.
  Mr. English: Will my right hon. Friend, who has referred to the Answer which he
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  gave on Monday, withdraw the admission which he made at the bottom of column 360 that the Clerk of the House, for example, was one of the persons concerned in authorising whatever did happen?
  Mr. Bowden: I think that I had better stick to "the House of Commons authorities".
  Hon. Members: Who are they?
  Mr. Englishasked the Lord President of the Council what was the lighting level, in foot-candles, in the Chamber at 11.30 a.m. on 21st April, 1966; what it is normally; and what lighting is needed for television only.
  Mr. Bowden: At that time, the lighting level in the Chamber was 80-100 foot-candles. Normally it is about 10 foot-candles; television needs about 40 foot-candles.

  ADOPTION
  Mr. Abseasked the Attorney-General whether he is aware of public concern at the delay in the determination of adoption cases; whether the examination in the adoption law being conducted by the Law Commissioners is giving consideration to the creation of adoption courts to be composed not exclusively of lawyers untrained in child care but with paediatricians, psychiatrists and children's officers additionally appointed to determine disputed adoption orders; what steps are being taken by the Law Commissioners to obtain evidence from outside professional bodies; and when it is anticipated that the Law Commissioners will report on their conclusions relating to adoption law.
  The Attorney-General (Sir Elwyn Jones): I am aware of the concern at the delay which has occurred in determining certain adoption cases in the High Court, but recent changes in the practice of the Chancery Division should materially reduce the time which elapses before a case is heard. I have little doubt that the Law Commission, in the examination of the jurisdiction of the courts dealing with family matters for which its programme provides, will include a consideration of the constitution of the courts dealing with adoption cases,

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  and no doubt the Commission or whatever other body undertakes the detailed examination of this subject, will take evidence from professional bodies interested. It is too early to say when the Commission's preliminary examination is likely to be completed.
  Mr. Abse: While welcoming the directions which have been given to speed up such cases, may I ask my right hon. and learned Friend to take into account the considerable alarm which has arisen among the public over the blood tie case, as there is clearly a need for consideration to be given to people other than lawyers adjudicating on these delicate matters which require high skill and specialisation if right decisions are to be reached speedily?
  The Attorney-General: I have no doubt that all those matters will be taken into account.

  MARRIAGE BUREAUX
  Mr. Abseasked the Attorney-General whether he is aware that, although marriage brokage contracts are illegal, many marriage bureaux are in essence offering clients, in consideration of a fee, introductions to prospective partners; whether, in view of public concern that some of these bureaux are disreputable, he will require the Law Commissioners to include within their current review of family law a consideration of the desirability to make such contracts legal provided only that they are entered into by approved and registered marriage bureaux.
  The Attorney-General: I am not aware of public concern over these matters. Legislation requiring the registration of approved marriage bureaux would not be a matter for me; nor, since this would involve questions of social rather than legal policy, far removed from the topic of family law, would I expect my noble Friend the Lord Chancellor to invite the Law Commission to examine it. I will, however, readily consider any evidence of abuse that the hon. Member may care to submit to me.
  Mr. Abse: Will my right hon. and learned Friend note that, in view of what has been said by members of the Law Commission, that they do not feel them-
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  selves confined to deal with lawyers' law and that they should deal with social law, it will be a surprise that so rigid a rule as he is suggesting has been laid down? Will the Attorney-General note in this context that there are many abuses, such as retarded men being introduced to unmarried women, and there is clearly a need for scrutiny of many of these marriage bureaux?
  The Attorney-General: I do not think that there is any rigidity in what I suggested. Where the main emphasis is on social problems, rather than on legal policy, I should have thought that this was not really within the field of the Law Commission. However, what my hon. Friend has said will be borne in mind.

  B.M.C. EMPLOYEES, COWLEY (ALLEGED INTIMIDATION)
  Mr. O'Malleyasked the Attorney-General whether he will make a statement in relation to the decision of the Director of Public Prosecutions that no criminal proceedings should be instituted in respect of the events at the British Motor Corporation Works at Cowley on 4th March, 1966.
  Mr. Waldenasked the Attorney-General if he will make a statement on the decision of the Director of Public Prosecutions concerning the alleged intimidation of certain workers at the British Motor Corporation at Cowley on 4th March, 1966.
  The Attorney-General: The Director of Public Prosecutions consulted the Law Officers about his decision in this case. We all took the view that although the evidence obtained by the police did disclose a prima facie case that certain of the employees were intimidated by being, put in fear of personal violence, nevertheless there was insufficient evidence to justify proceedings against any identified individual. The preponderance of evidence showed that the shop stewards were not a party to that intimidation. Had there been sufficient evidence against any individual the Director would have instituted proceedings.
  Mr. O'Malley: Does not my right hon. and learned Friend agree that his Answer makes it quite clear that the shop stewards who held

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  the so-called workers' court were in no way acting contrary to the criminal law, and, secondly, that the manner in which this issue was raised by the Opposition was a dirty and unworthy smear against the whole of the trade union movement?
  The Attorney-General: As I have said, the preponderance of the evidence suggested that the shop stewards were in fact trying to pacify the workers at this meeting, and were not acting in any intimidatory fashion.
  Mr. Walden: Does the Attorney-General agree that if, in a similar incident, there were sufficient evidence against any individual, a prosecution could, and would, be instituted?
  The Attorney-General: If there is ever evidence of intimidation and threats leading to the putting of persons in fear of personal violence, of course proceedings will be taken.
  Sir J. Hobson: As the Attorney-General has admitted that there was intimidation in this case, and as it is the case that men who had refused to join an unofficial strike, and had refused to go on strike in breach of a procedure agreement which was binding on them and their union, had to pay money as a result of their intimidation, what do the Government intend to do about such situations for the future?
  The Attorney-General: A prima facie case of intimidation was disclosed by the evidence obtained by the police, but that is as far as the evidence went. In the view of the Director and of myself, there was insufficient evidence to justify the taking of proceedings against any identified individual. With respect, the other matters do not seem to arise from the Question.

ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE PENAL SYSTEM (DISSOLUTION)
The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Wilson): With permission, Mr. Speaker, I wish to make a statement.
I have to inform the House that the Queen, on my recommendation, has approved the dissolution of the Royal Commission on the Penal System in England and Wales. In its place my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary will appoint
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a Standing Advisory Council to make recommendations about such aspects of penal treatment as he may refer to it or as the Council itself, after consulting my right hon. Friend, feels it ought to consider.
The Royal Commission, whose terms of reference had been reported to the House on 16th April, 1964, columns 601-5, was appointed in August, 1964, with 16 members under the chairmanship of Lord Amory.
While no fundamental differences within the Commission on philosophy and principles have manifested themselves, six of the members have felt increasingly that the time is not opportune for a single review of the penal system, leading to a comprehensive report, which could set the direction for a generation. They are in favour of early experimental changes in the system, but they believe that such changes, combined with the relative lack of conclusive research results, will make it difficult in the near future to offer recommendations designed to last for a lengthy period. These members recently tendered their resignations; and two others felt that, in these circumstances, the Royal Commission could not usefully continue, and they also tendered their resignations.
The remaining eight members, including the Chairman, took the view that the task of carrying through a fundamental and searching reappraisal of the purposes of a modern penal system and the methods by which those purposes should be translated into practice, was entirely feasible for this Royal Commission. This being their view, they would have preferred to have completed the Commission's task, and, following the resignations, would have wished appropriate new appointments to be made to augment the remaining membership.
It appeared to the Government that the better course would be to dissolve the Commission and appoint a new standing body. The evidence obtained by the Commission will be published and made available to the new Council; and it will be kept informed of the results of research in the fields of criminology and penology, in the planning of which my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary now has the assistance of a strong research council.

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The new Advisory Council, unlike the Royal Commission, will be able to report from time to time on those aspects of the treatment of offenders on which advice is urgently required; and it can itself take up matters which, after consulting my right hon. Friend, it considers to be important.
While the Chairman and some of the members consider that a fundamental reappraisal by the Royal Commission should first have been completed, the Royal Commission as a whole are in agreement that the permanent machinery of government should now be strengthened by the establishment of a body exercising a continuous review of developments in the penal field.
A further announcement, giving the membership and terms of reference of the new body, will be made as soon as possible.
Mr. Heath: Is the Prime Minister aware that there will be widespread disappointment that, after 18 months' work, the Royal Commission should now be dissolved? Would it not have been possible to avoid quite such a serious situation developing if, after the resignation of the six members, the Prime Minister or the Home Secretary had said firmly that they would appoint others to take their places, thus enabling the Royal Commission to continue?
Is it not also true that the Standing Advisory Council cannot be a substitute for the Royal Commission in the long-term examination of the problems which were in its terms of reference? Therefore, although there will be a body to advise on certain specific items, there will be no substitute for the Royal Commission, which, in itself, is a matter for widespread regret. We all share the disappointment that the Commission should have been dissolved.
The Prime Minister: I think that all of us will share the disappointment expressed by the right hon. Gentleman about what has arisen. It would have been impossible to carry on after the resignation of the six. One of the fundamental questions here is whether, looking back on it, we were not all wrong—it was the previous Government who appointed the Royal Commission, but we all commented on the terms of reference—in
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thinking that, in this field, what was wanted was a once-for-all look, as is the manner of Royal Commissions, at something which is changing so rapidly and whether, perhaps, we were not wrong as well, all of us, in feeling that a Commission could do a job with such wide and far-ranging terms of reference.
This is why the Commission has broken down. Nevertheless, we feel that the publication of the evidence and making it available to the new Council will be the most realistic way of taking full advantage of the very hard work which has been done under Lord Amory's chairmanship during these 18 months.
Mr. S. C. Silkin: Would my right hon. Friend not agree that the words of his statement "…the task of carrying through a fundamental and searching reappraisal of the purposes of a modern penal system and the methods by which those purposes should be translated into practice", are matters which are long overdue? Would he not agree further that no better machinery has been devised for carrying out tasks of that kind than a Royal Commission? Would he assure the House that the standing body which is apparently to be introduced in its place will at least have the benefit of the chairmanship of a permanent officer, perhaps of the status of a Minister of State, who will be able to carry on the task which the Royal Commission has begun?
The Prime Minister: I can well understand the feelings of my hon. and learned Friend, who has put in a great deal of work as a member of the Royal Commission and was one of the 50 per cent. who wanted to carry on with its work. However, as he would be the first to recognise, the views which he has expressed were not universally shared on the Commission, and half his colleagues felt that this was not the way to deal with this particular problem, however strongly my hon. and learned Friend himself may have felt about it.
With regard to his suggestion about the new body, my right hon. Friend will, of course, consider this and other suggestions about the chairmanship, the membership and the organisation of the new body.
Mr. Sharples: Is the right hon. Gentleman not aware that one of the principal reasons for the abandonment of the Royal Commission is the fact that its main

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recommendations were probably anticipated by the publication of two Government White Papers? Does he not share the disappointment of many people, both within and without the House, at the abandonment of this study, the first for over 70 years?
The Prime Minister: I do not think that the hon. Gentleman is correctly informed about this. While it is true that, when the Royal Commission was set up, we on this side said that we would reserve the right, if we became the Government, to get on with urgent legislation without waiting for the Royal Commission to report, in fact this has not been one of the issues. Indeed, those who resigned—the six I mentioned—were, I think, foremost among those in the country who welcomed the White Papers and the proposals which we have made. This could have been a difficulty, I agree, but it was not.
Mr. Hogg: The Prime Minister has disclosed the view of the hon. and learned Member for Dulwich (Mr. S. C. Silkin), who is a member of the Royal Commission. Has there been any discussion between the Government and members of the Commission on whether the attitude of the other members of the Commission should be disclosed or not? If so, what was the result?
The Prime Minister: I would not have disclosed the view of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dulwich (Mr. S. C. Silkin) had he not himself made clear what it was in his question just now. It was well known that he was a member of the Royal Commission. Had he not made his own view known, I would not have felt free to do so.
My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary met all the members of the Royal Commission a few days ago and the statement issued afterwards represented the agreed view of all the members of the Commission. It would not be helpful if there were competitive statements coming out from those who took different points of view on the Royal Commission. I think that all of us and all the members of the Commission will try to avoid that.
Mr. Deedes: Is the Prime Minister aware that the future of the Royal Commission was discussed soon after the Government took office 18 months ago?
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What has occurred between the decision taken then and the decision reached now?
The Prime Minister: The answer lies in the wider experience gained by the Royal Commission in trying to carry out the very wide and searching terms of reference given to it by this House. A substantial number of members of the Royal Commission felt that, in the light of continuing experience, it would not be useful for the Royal Commission to carry on. That is why they resigned.
Several Hon Several Hon. Members rose—
Mr. Speaker: Order. We must move on.
Mr. W. T. Williams: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Although you have called three hon. Members opposite, for some reason you have omitted to call anyone from this side of the House.
Mr. Speaker: The hon. and learned Member for Warrington (Mr. W. T. Williams) must get his facts right if he protests against the Chair. I called an hon. Member from the side on which the hon. and learned Gentleman is sitting. There were reasons for calling those hon. Members I did call, and I hope that the House will have confidence in my choice.

RHODESIA
The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Wilson): With permission, Mr. Speaker, I wish to make a statement on Rhodesia.
As the Government have repeatedly made clear over the past five months, anyone in Rhodesia is free to approach the Governor or the British representatives in Salisbury with proposals as to the basis on which a solution of the problem can be reached. As the result of a recent report from the Governor, informal talks between officials have been arranged to examine whether such a basis exists.
Sir, the House will wish to know the sequence of events. I received a report from the Governor last week, at a time when, as it happened, my Private Secretary, Mr. Oliver Wright, had just left by air for Pretoria to assist H.M. Ambassador in his talks with the South African Government. He was instructed to leave the aircraft at Salisbury for discussions with the Governor before going on to Pretoria.

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As a result of his report to me on his talks with the Governor, he was instructed to return to Salisbury on Friday last, 22nd April. The Governor then arranged a meeting between Mr. Wright, Mr. Hennings, Her Majesty's Government's representative in Salisbury, and Mr. Smith.
A further talk has been held leading to agreed arrangements for the informal talks which will now proceed. They are informal, directed only to see whether a basis for negotiation genuinely exists; and they are without commitment on either side. In view of the importance of these talks the House will not expect me to say anything more which could in any way make them more difficult. The House will understand why, in view of the highly delicate situation, I could not say anything in last Thursday's debate.
In the debate due to take place this afternoon at the suggestion of the Opposition, hon. and right hon. Members, naturally, will say exactly what they wish to on the Rhodesian question, past, present and future. I have, however, in the new circumstances, asked my own Front Bench colleagues to keep their own remarks to the absolute minimum necessary to reply to points raised and to avoid anything which might prejudice the prospects of a settlement acceptable to this House.
Mr. Heath: Is the Prime Minister aware that we warmly welcome the announcement that talks are to be opened of an informal character between representatives of Her Majesty's Government and representatives of Mr. Smith and his colleagues and that these talks are to be devoted, not to the limited question of handing over the de facto power, but of finding a solution to the problems of Rhodesia? This, I believe, is a matter which will be warmly welcomed by the country, and, I hope, all right hon. and hon. Members.
Is the right hon. Gentleman further aware that it has long been urged from this side of the House that there should be talks without prior commitment between the two sides and that, therefore, we not only warmly welcome these talks but wish them every success?
As the Prime Minister has urged that these matters should be dealt with in points raised in the debate to follow, I suggest to my right hon. and hon. Friends
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that, in view of the delicate situation, we should not press the right hon. Gentleman on specific points now, but leave them to be raised in that debate.
The Prime Minister: I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his opening remarks. It is a fact, of course, that all of us wish to see a solution to this problem and all the measures that have had to be taken and which have been a matter of great controversy in this House were directed to creating a situation in which we could find a solution. That was the purpose of the sanctions introduced by the Government.
Both the right hon. Gentleman and I have expressed the view, which he expressed in this House in November, that:
"We recognise that it is an illegal Government and that the Government of this country can have no dealings with it."—[OFFICIAL, REPORT, 12th November, 1965; Vol. 720, c. 539.]
As recently as last February, the right hon. Gentleman made a very similar statement in an article in Punch.
I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will not press me to say too much about what has been done and, more particularly, the manner in which it has been done, for we are more concerned about results in the future than about the way these discussions have been brought about. But I can say that what is being done, and the manner in which it is being done, reflect the position that the Government have taken up on the question of legality and upon which the right hon. Gentleman himself has made a number of important pronouncements in the past.
One draws the wrong conclusion if one thinks that it has simply been a question, in the past five months, of willingness to have talks. We have always been willing to have talks, but the House, I am sure, will agree that what have been decisive in this matter have been the oil sanction, introduced in December, and the action we took recently at Beira with the authority of the United Nations. It is these things which have created the situation in which the talks that all of us have wanted to see could now take place.
Mr. Shinwell: Is it not true that the Government have always said that the prerequisite to exchanges between Her Majesty's Government and Mr. Smith

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should, in the first instance, be an approach to the Governor? Has Mr. Smith made such an approach at any time?
The Prime Minister: The House will have deduced from the words I used that the Governor has played a very leading part in this situation. Since I am more concerned with getting results for the future than with saying exactly how the approach by, to or with the Governor arose, I would prefer not to go into detail on this question, except to say that—because, as my right hon. Friend said, we have attached great importance to these matters—what has happened is in full accord with what everyone wanted to happen. As I have mentioned, the Governor played a leading part in promoting the meeting on Saturday which led to this situation.
I make it plain that these are not negotiations. Her Majesty's Government are not negotiating with the illegal régime. These are informal talks to see whether there is a basis on which proper negotiations could take place. Then, at that stage, one will have to raise all the big issues which were impediments, in some of my early statements and in the early statements of the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition, to the idea of direct negotiations.
Mr. Grimond: Is the Prime Minister aware that everyone will welcome the prospect that fruitful talks may result from these preliminary negotiations? Can he confirm three things: first, that the Commonwealth are in agreement with this course; secondly, that the principles agreed upon by all parties in the House remain in force and must be the basis of any talks; and, thirdly, that the most important point at issue is the safeguarding of our responsibilities towards the black Africans, and that these will figure largely in any discussions which take place?
The Prime Minister: First, my right hon. Friend has taken steps this morning to inform all those concerned in the Commonwealth with the latest developments. It would not have been possible, without endangering what was going on, to have too much prior disclosure. Indeed, it was not until this morning that I had the final confirmation that it would be possible to make a statement of this kind.
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Secondly, with regard to the principles that will be embodied in a final settlement, I said in the House on Thursday that, while there was quite a lot which we were prepared to forget and forgive, none of us in the House was prepared to accept a settlement which condoned an illegal act, or which failed to satisfy the principles which were laid down by my predecessor when he was Prime Minister and by the present Government and which were, as I said on Thursday, accepted by Mr. Smith in the negotiations last summer.
Those principles include the third point made by the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grimond), and I am sure that the House would only regard as an acceptable settlement one which gives effect to those principles.
Mr. Driberg: Can my right hon. Friend say whether there has been any reaction yet from the Commonwealth countries which were informed this morning of these talks and whether at any point during the talks representatives of the majority of the Rhodesian people will be invited to come in?
The Prime Minister: As far as I know, there has been no reaction from any Commonwealth country—there has hardly been time for that—although I think that the Commonwealth countries, particularly those which were represented at Lagos, will now recognise, as I said at Lagos, that the economic sanctions work. There was a lot of doubt expressed about that in Lagos at the time and in the past few days in this country. There will be that recognition.
What I have announced today are only preliminary and very informal talks to see whether a basis exists for negotiations. I would not want to prejudice these talks by saying how the negotiations will be conducted, or what kind of machinery might have to be established, perhaps on a bilateral basis between Her Majesty's Government and representatives of Rhodesia, possibly in the very widest sense, or whether other machinery such as some of the things discussed before the illegal declaration last year might have to be incorporated. These are matters which we should discuss in the informal talks which will be conducted, as far as this can be ensured—I think that it can—away from the glare of publicity and from pressures of all kinds.
Mr. Michael Foot Mr. Michael Foot rose—
Mr. Speaker: Order. We will debate Rhodesia in a few moments. I hope that we can move on.
Mr. Michael Foot: On a point of order. In a matter of this importance, is it not customary to have more than three or four questions, which is all we have had? This is a matter of very great importance. [HON. MEMBERS:" It is not not a point of order."] The question of whether you, Mr. Speaker, should continue the questions is perfectly a point of order, whether you accept my suggestion or not. I submit to you, Sir, that on a matter of this importance one or two more questions should be put.
Mr. Speaker: It is the duty of the Chair to sense the feeling of the House. I took notice of what the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition said and the fact that the hon. Gentleman was the only Member on his feet wishing to pursue this matter, and the simple fact that, as I understand from the usual channels, we are to debate the whole question of Rhodesia for the rest of the day. I hope that we can now proceed.
Mr. Michael Foot: I understand that it is your business, Mr. Speaker, and not mine or anybody else's, to sense the opinion of the House, but I should have thought that, in taking these matters into account, you would exercise your judgment on the importance of the matter. If it is suggested that the number of Members who rise to their feet to put supplementary questions determines the matter, then it might be that Members would have to take their own recourse in future in order to ensure that this happens.
I would seriously suggest that, in the light of the time which has been provided on statements of this importance in the past, you, Mr. Speaker, have curtailed the
714
number of questions which might have been put on this matter.
Mr. Speaker: With all respect to the hon. Gentleman, I fear that he is attempting to do what he said he was not attempting to do, and that is to act as Speaker of the House of Commons. If he thinks that the Chair has behaved in any way unreasonably, then he has his right—and I would fight for his right—to exercise that criticism in the way laid down. I have taken notice of what he has said, but I do not think that his comments were quite fair to the Chair.

BILL PRESENTED
  AGRICULTURE
  Bill to establish a Meat and Livestock Commission and make other provision for the livestock and livestock products industries, to amend the Agriculture (Calf Subsidies) Act 1952 and make new provision with respect to the supervision and enforcement of schemes under that Act, to auhtorise the payment of subsidies in respect of cows maintained for the purpose of breeding calves for beef, to authorise grants for improvements of agricultural land and in respect of expenditure on equipment, plant and machinery for use in agriculture, and on certain vehicles, and supplementary grants in respect of certain expenditure, and to make provision with respect to the shape and size of farms and related matters, agriculture and forestry on hill land, co-operative activities in agriculture, diseases of animals and other matters connected with agriculture, presented by Mr. Fred Peart; supported by Mr. George Brown, Mr. Roy Jenkins, Mr. William Ross, Mr. Cledwyn Hughes, Mr. Douglas Jay, Mr. Frederick Willey, and Mr. John Diamond; read the First time; to be read a Second time Tomorrow and to he printed. [Bill 8.]
ORDERS OF THE DAY

  DEBATE ON THE ADDRESS
  [FIFTH DAY]
  Order read for resuming adjourned debate on Question [2Ist April]:
  That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, as follows:
  Most Gracious Sovereign,
  We, Your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects, the Commons of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, in Parliament assembled, beg leave to offer our humble thanks to Your Majesty for the Gracious Speech which Your Majesty has addressed to both Houses of Parliament.
  Question again proposed.
  Mr. Speaker: Before I call the first speaker, may I mention that so far 36 hon. and right hon. Members have intimated that they wish to catch my eye in this debate, including 12 new Members. Because hon. Members were co-operative yesterday, I was able to call 15 back benchers. I hope that hon. and right hon. Members who are called today will be equally fair to others in the length of speeches that they make. I appreciate the keenness of new Members in wishing to take part in debates as early as possible, but I shall be unable to call more than three today.
  Mr. Sydney Silverman: On a point of order. Before the House resumes the debate on the Loyal Address, may I ask whether you, Mr. Speaker, have considered the representations which you were kind enough to receive about the Amendment to the Address in the names of my hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Michael Foot) and 60 or 70 other hon. Members, and if so, what conclusion you have reached?
  Mr. Speaker: The hon. Gentleman will know that it is not possible for the House to criticise the Chair in the selection of Amendments, which is a right that the House gives to the Chair. I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for raising this matter in the House. He and his colleagues came to see me and made very courteous representations this morning. I am afraid that a man convinced against his will is of the same opinion still, and that applies either to myself or to the
  716
  three hon. Members who came to see me this morning.
  The position is quite simple. If the hon. Gentleman will refer to Erskine May and Campion on Procedure he will find that the debate on the Gracious Speech normally falls into two parts: first, a general debate on the policy of the Government as outlined in the Gracious Speech; and, secondly, a debate on Amendments moved, for the most part, by the Opposition advocating alternative policies. When this debate opened, the Leader of the Opposition indicated the line which the Opposition thought that the debate should take and the kind of Amendment which they intended to propose towards the end of the debate.
  It has been the practice for at least the last 15 years that, in selecting the Amendments which are to be considered, Mr. Speaker should select those tabled by the official Opposition. If he were to select other Amendments, then he would be narrowing the debate on that day to subjects chosen, quite rightly in the opinion of the group which tabled the Amendment, by one or other of various groups in the House. I see no reason at present why I should vary the practice of the last 15 or 16 years, which is to choose the Amendments tabled by the official Opposition. This represents the historic right of Her Majesty's Opposition, on the one hand, and the negotiations between the usual channels to decide the course of the debate on the Gracious Speech, on the other.
  I believe that it would not have been right to do other than I have done. This I explained very carefully to the hon. Members who came to see me this morning. May I add that I am always very happy to meet hon. Members if they have any problems which they want to put to me privately.

  RHODESIA
  4.1 p.m.
  Mr. Reginald Maudling: This debate on Rhodesia now begins in rather unusual circumstances, both for the Opposition as a whole, for the House as a whole, and, indeed, for the spokesmen for the Opposition. I am sure that the Prime Minister will recognise—as he did in the

  717
  last part of his statement—how difficult a situation is created for the House by announcing before a major debate a major change in Government policy. It is certainly a change in Government policy—of that there can be no doubt—but it is one which we wholeheartedly welcome on this side—[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."]—because it is one for which we have been pressing over a considerable time now.
  It was our purpose in this debate to emphasise precisely the need for talks, because we could see the danger of a situation already tragic developing into catastrophe. It was apparent to us that the course set in London and Salisbury, until this announcement, was a disaster course fraught with very serious consequences for us in this country and for the whole of Africa. We hoped, therefore, and we are glad that our hopes have been so swiftly realised, that this chance would be taken, possibly at the eleventh hour, to start talking, which is the only logical alternative to fighting.
  Thank heavens this chance has been taken. Indeed, it was with this in mind that we refrained from putting down an official Amendment to the Address on this subject. We did not want to do anything which, by forcing a Division, would make the Government's situation more rigid than it needed to be at a time when, quite clearly, flexibility, change and a willingness to take a new initiative were all important. Therefore, as I say, this debate takes place in a somewhat different situation from that which we had anticipated, but it is a change we wholeheartedly welcome.
  Our argument on Rhodesia is that for some time past Her Majesty's Government have been pursuing policies leading the way down an increasingly dangerous path. And the dangers facing this country now, especially after the United Nations resolution and the invoking of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter are very considerable. I say this to emphasise the background to the need for talks and, even more important, the background to the need for people both in London and in Salisbury to understand that this is the last chance. Unless they can agree, and can make progress,a
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  tragedy will befall this nation, and many others as well.
  We had, therefore, come to the conclusion that whether sanctions fail or succeed, whether the Rhodesian economy survives the impact of sanctions, or whether the Rhodesian economy is crushed by sanctions, sanctions alone are not a policy; they are half a policy. Sanctions merely designed to lead to the crushing of Rhodesia make no sense in the context of history. Sanctions designed as part of policy, with discussions going on hand in hand with the desire to reach agreement—this is the policy we wish to press on the Government.
  We felt increasingly that the developments since the unilateral declaration of independence—and the present menace now surely apparent to all men of sense in Africa, Britain and elsewhere—should have created a situation in which people were prepared to talk without commitment; to talk with the sole objective in mind of reaching a solution in the true interests of Britain and in the true interests of all the peoples of Rhodesia.
  Let us be clear on one thing: we on these benches have condemned the U.D.I. from the start. We thought that it was an act of great unwisdom, and we were convinced that it would bring serious consequences for Rhodesia, for Africa, for Britain, for the Commonwealth, and, tragically, up to now that assessment of the effects of U.D.I. has been borne out by events. On the other hand, we have been concerned at the growing way in which the Government have appeared to be pushed further and further, step by step, along a road that leads inevitably to the employment of force. That has been our great concern.
  Stopping points have been mentioned from time to time, but each time the Government have called a halt at one point they have very shortly afterwards been pushed even further. In November, when the first measures were announced of the stopping of aid, removal from the sterling area, the stopping of tobacco and sugar imports, those were said to be enough—in November. But in December a wider embargo was introduced. In December, again, the oil embargo was introduced, and in January there were a number of further measures designed together to add up to a total exercise of

  719
  economic power against Southern Rhodesia.
  I believe that it is increasingly clear that the Government misjudged the effects of those economic actions. If we look at the communiqué which was issued in Lagos in January, it is quite clear there that in the view of the Government these measures would bring what they called at the time the "rebellion" to an end within a matter of weeks rather than months.
  Clearly, this expectation has been falsified, and it is against this background of the falsification of the Government's beliefs in the economic field that we should examine what the Government have done in invoking Chapter VII and in asking authority for the use of force against ships trying to run oil into Rhodesia. It is very important, despite the announcement this afternoon, to look at the situation that has been reached, because the consequences for the future, and the consequences for the future of the United Nations, are very considerable indeed.
  There obviously was a change of policy in deciding to take an initiative in the United Nations under Chapter VII. The action which the Government took was not consistent with what the Prime Minister said on 21st December either about blockading Beira, or about the British Government not intending to take an initiative. The Government changed their mind, and I do not understand why they do not say so. It is perfectly open and proper for Governments to change their mind if they think that the national interest demands it, but I think that when they have changed their mind they should make clear that they have done so, and give the reasons for their doing so.
  I want to curtail my remarks this afternoon, in view of the new development, but I must make it clear that we on this side do not accept that the reasons put forward for invoking Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter are by any means convincing. We do not believe that this long train of tankers bringing supplies to Rhodesia would have materialised, in the light of what we know about the policies of the Governments both of the shipowning countries and the oil-producing countries, which are very important. We do not accept
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  that the limits of diplomacy had been exhausted.
  Nor do we accept that by moving a resolution in the Security Council, the Government prevented unfortunate initiatives being taken there. We think that they opened the door to precisely those initiatives. In our view, the consequences of this invoking of Chapter VII are so very serious that it should not have been done without overwhelming reasons, and no evidence of those overwhelming reasons has been produced to this House.
  I say, emphasising again the lateness of the hour and the seriousness of the situation we are facing, this action in the United Nations has led to doubt about our determination to treat this as a British problem. This is tremendously important. It must be made absolutely clear that in our eyes this is a British problem.
  I am delighted to think that this afternoon's statement by the Prime Minister will reinforce this point of view, which we have so often put forward from these benches. I believe that the action in the United Nations was an encouragement to those who believe in the use of force to settle this problem. There are many countries, as the House will be well aware, who believe quite genuinely that force is the right solution. This both sides of the House have consistently and totally rejected.
  I ask the Government spokesman this afternoon to make one thing quite clear, that not only do the Government themselves totally reject the use of force in any circumstances to impose a solution to the problem of Rhodesia, but that they are also totally opposed to the use of force by anyone whatsoever. Rhodesia remains part of Her Majesty's domains and I trust it will always be treated as such in negotiations and action taken by a British Government.
  The other danger in the present situation arises from the possible spread of mandatory sanctions to the whole of Southern Africa. The consequences of this upon South Africa, upon our relations with South Africa, upon our trade with South Africa, which has been so often emphasised, and rightly, by the Government, could be very serious indeed. It is true to say, as my right hon. Friend said

  721
  the other day, that the arguments applied in the case of Portugal could equally be applied in the case of South Africa. Then the effect of mandatory sanctions on the economy of Zambia would be very serious indeed.
  Another thing which troubles us very much is that there is no limit to the precedent of declaring this situation to be a threat to peace. There is no threat to peace whatever from Southern Rhodesia. There is no danger whatever of the people of Southern Rhodesia creating a threat to peace. Other people say that so offensive to them is this régime that fighting may break out. But it is a very new concept that nations can say that because they so dislike what is going on in another country they will declare that there is a threat to peace although it comes from themselves. I am glad that the Foreign Secretary is present. The consequences of this in many other countries on the future conduct of British foreign policy could be very serious indeed.
  Finally on United Nations action, I think that there are grave doubts about what may follow from the Security Council purporting to authorise actions which are illegal in international law.
  Then there are the very real economic dangers and the big charge already on our balance of payments. I hope that the Secretary of State will be able to give some estimate of what the present cost to our balance of payments is of the measures the Government are taking. Perhaps it is estimated at £50 million a year, including the copper situation. I do not know how much it is, but it is very serious.
  We must also recognise the loss of future goodwill and trade for us in Southern Rhodesia, which can be very serious. We must recognise that while our people are not trading plenty of other people are taking their place. That is part of the cost which Britain is bearing because we regard this as part of a British problem. We must not let the other people have it both ways. If we bear the burden on the balance of payments they must recognise that because we bear that burden it is our problem, which we intend to solve. If the sanctions spread further the damage to the South African economy and damage
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  to trade with South Africa and the trade of Zambia can be very serious.
  My conclusion on this situation, which I am heartened to feel that the Government now accept in substance, is that the present sanctions policy will not work because, as I said, it is only half a policy. The Prime Minister said that sanctions, to be meaningful, must be effective. That, in logic, is a strong argument. But to be meaningful they must also lead to a clear objective. Our objection to sanctions throughout has been based on this. We accept sanctions if they are designed to create a situation in which talks can take place, but we can never accept sanctions if they are designed merely to beat Rhodesia down into acceptance of unconditional surrender.
  That, I think, was clearly the attitude put forward in the Government statement this afternoon. It must fairly be said that in the Prime Minister's statement of 25th January the use of sanctions was designed not to start talks going with Mr. Smith and his colleagues, but to get them to abandon U.D.I. as a prerequisite to any discussions at all. We are all gratified to think that talks are now to start on a basis of no conditions on either side. I must say in fairness to the Opposition that it is an acceptance of our attitude on the argument put forward consistently over the whole period for many weeks previously.
  Sanctions alone will not be enough. If they failed as I think they probably would, over a period, the growing pressure of the United Nations and growing difficulties of the temptation and urge to use force would become very serious. On the other hand, if they succeeded in destroying the economy of Southern Rhodesia, if they brought economic chaos to that country—because people like the Rhodesians do not give in easily when they think they are right; and they think they are right—if the effect of sanctions was merely to bring chaos and destruction of the economy of Rhodesia, all there would suffer and no one, in the long run, would benefit.
  There has been a clear and overwhelming need for these talks to begin between Her Majesty's Government and the Smith régime. Whatever the mechanics of the talks, that is of little importance. The details, the way it is done, how it is done, the level of the talks, whether they are

  723
  official or Ministerial, private or public, we on this side of the House do not care what form they take so long as they take place, and take place as soon as possible without conditions, with the willingness to try to reach agreement properly understood and accepted on both sides.
  I make two points about these talks. First, in the meantime can there be a truce in the verbal war between Salisbury and London? It would surely be a good thing if, in both capitals, there were an end to the strong language used, strong language which is not surprising in a dramatic situation such as this. If there were an end to some of the things said by both sides about each other the chances of agreement would be all the greater.
  Mr. Michael Foot: When the right hon. Member says that he is in favour of these talks taking place without any precondition, does that mean that he has abandoned the condition which was laid down by his right hon. Friend the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) in the debate on 21st December, when he said that, in particular, he laid down two propositions which must precede any proposals for conciliation? The first was that majority rule for the Africans must be certain.
  That was the view expressed on 21st December by the right hon. Gentleman, and reaffirmed on 31st March as a precondition for conciliation. Will the right hon. Member for Barnet (Mr. Maudling) say whether he abides by that precondition for conciliation?
  Mr. Maudling: If the hon. Member will be a little less impatient he will find that I am precisely coming to the situation of with what the talks should be concerned. They surely must concentrate on the future rather than on the past.
  I believe that recent experience both in London and Rhodesia will have brought the gap between the two parties much closer than it was before. We must, on the one hand, disabuse people in Rhodesia of the belief that what a British Government are aiming at is immediate one-man, one-vote majority rule. On the other hand, we must dispel the idea that it is possible to accept the circumstances in which there can be a constitutional regression in which we would go backwards instead of moving forwards. [Interruption.] The hon. Member can
  724
  make a speech later if he catches Mr. Speaker's eye. The object—[Interruption.]
  Mr. Speaker: Order. So far the debates in this Parliament have proceeded in an orderly fashion. A disorderly fashion is for hon. Members on both sides to shout across the Floor at each other.
  Mr. Maudling: Mr. Speaker, I have been endeavouring to treat what I regard as a tragic problem with the proper seriousness it deserves. I shall continue to do so.
  Mr. Michael Foot Mr. Michael Foot rose—
  Mr. Maudling: No, I will not give way again.
  I think that the objective must be, without any doubt, uninterrupted progress towards majority rule as envisaged in the 1961 Constitution and as supported consistently by all my right hon. and hon. Friends. This is our responsibility and I do not believe it is in any way contrary to what Mr. Smith himself would accept and has, in fact, accepted in the past. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] It is inherent in the 1961 Constitution. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] Mr. Speaker, we shall not make any progress in an atmosphere of this kind. I was saying a little while ago that the purpose must be to reach agreement. We can reach agreement only by trying to reach agreement and not by trying to represent the views of other people in the most hostile way possible.
  There must be uninterrpted progress towards majority rule as envisaged by the 1961 Constitution; but this progress must be based on a capacity to rule responsibly. This, I believe, has also been accepted by the House throughout. Hence, there is the need, first, for time to make the transition, and, secondly, for efforts, particularly in education and training, to make the time of transition as short as it can practicably be made. On the one hand, people need to have an assurance that there will be no perversion of the Constitution, that there will be no going back on it, and that this uninterrupted progress will continue. On the other, people seek an assurance, I believe justifiably, that there will be no imposition of immediate majority rule.
  This, it seems to me, is the kernel of the problem we must face. The difficulty

  725
  is to establish this sort of certainty in the case of an independent country. Our object clearly, on both sides of the House I am sure, is to achieve the independence of Rhodesia in acceptable conditions. Anyone who has had, as I had for a short time, responsibility for the Colonial Office, knows how difficult it is to write into a constitution safeguards for minorities, safeguards indeed for majorities, that cannot be overruled by the action of those who hold power. One sees what happens so often in so many countries where we tried, and tried desperately as a British Government, to secure the constitution so that it could not be overthrown. One has seen time and time again how, in practice, this cannot be done.
  Therefore, we have a new and unique problem in this case, because we must all recognise that here in Rhodesia we must finally solve the problem of how this can be done, how these guarantees can be given in an independent country. There have been many suggestions—for example, a treaty of guarantee, the supervision of the Privy Council, and so on. I hope that the Government will examine and re-examine all these possibilities, because they seem to be the kernel of our whole problem.
  It will need the utmost of good will and flexibility all round if this is to be so, but the solution is a task of a noble nature which reasonably calls for all the efforts that any of us can make in the House.
  I conclude in this way. I said at the beginning that this situation is a tragic one. It has the two great elements of tragedy. First, there is a conflict, not so much of right and wrong as of right and right—two parties believing that they are right and sincerely believing that they are right. This must be recognised if we are to get an answer. Secondly, it has the nature of a tragedy in moving inexorably down the road step by step to catastrophe. All this we have seen. All this we hope can now be resolved.
  I visited Salisbury once as Colonial Secretary. I had been in Kenya and in Zambia. The problems there were difficult, but the problems of Southern Rhodesia were the most difficult of all for Britain. Perhaps that is why they were our last problems: they were the hardest of all to solve. I could see clearly
  726
  on my first visit there that here in this lovely country, built up by people in a relatively short time, might well lie Britain's Algeria. This is a thought which has haunted all of us who have been concerned with this problem for so long.
  We greatly welcome the fact that the Government now intend to embark upon these talks. We welcome the fact that they will take place without condition. We ask for a cessation of controversy, of strong language, of accusation, of distrust. We ask that a genuine attempt be made to put aside considerations of face, artificial pride or smaller considerations. We ask that a real attempt be made to solve, in the traditions of this House and of our constitution, the last and the greatest of Britain's African problems.
  4.25 p.m.
  The Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations (Mr. Arthur Bottomley): The right hon. Member for Barnet (Mr. Maudling) will not expect me to agree with everything he has said. For example, he suggested that there had been a change of Government policy. I hope to show in the course of my speech that that is not so. I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for the restraint and moderation with which he has handled this subject, the most difficult of the problems which confront us in the world today.
  I intend to follow the right hon. Gentleman's example and speak with equal restraint, because I would remind hon. Members on both sides that we are dealing with an extraordinarily tense and complex situation. Words spoken in heat in this Chamber very often are carried into Salisbury and throughout Africa where they are given the wrong emphasis and perhaps undue significance which they might not otherwise deserve. I am sure that no one in the House wishes to make more difficult an already very difficult situation.
  This is not to deny the Oposition's right to criticise. The right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues before him have certainly done this. I hope that I can rebut every one of the criticisms. I hope and believe that all of us on both sides of the House are agreed on certain fundamentals and that what separates us are differences of opinion on tactics and not on strategy. Indeed, I think that the right

  727
  hon. Gentleman himself has shown that this is so.
  Let me, without taking up too much of the time of the House, reflect for a moment on the essential issues between us and the Rhodesian régime which led to their illegal action last November. To do this, it is necessary to look back beyond October, 1964, when this Government assumed responsibility for the problem. Our predecessors, those who now sit on the benches opposite, were faced with the same basic difficulties. They were and still are, insisting on the recognition in any solution of the same principles which we on this side have consistently put forward. All of the principles which we have laid down in the course of our negotiations with Mr. Smith were elements in the policy of hon. Members opposite when they carried the responsibility. Likewise, right hon. and hon. Members opposite encountered essentially the same obstacles in their efforts, which we commend, to reach agreement.
  We should not lose sight of the fact that the issues are the same today, although obscured by the drama and passions of the I.D.I. and world reaction to it. In the short term our policy must be to secure a return to constitutional rule and to avoid a disastrous conflagration or a collapse of authority or the economy in Central Africa. Fundamentally, our policies are directed towards a solution which would be compatible with the standards and principles on which we wish to see a democratic society develop in Rhodesia.
  During the hopeful meetings which the Lord Chancellor and I had with Mr. Smith in Salisbury in February of last year, these fundamental considerations were constantly in our minds. We believed then that we had found a basis on which we could negotiate a solution which we could commend to Parliament as satisfying the aspirations and fundamental rights of all races in Rhodesia. I recall a personal meeting with the then Prime Minister of Rhodesia, Mr. Smith, and this was followed by a meeting between Mr. Smith, my noble Friend the Lord Chancellor and myself at which a basis for a settlement of the Rhodesia problem seemed likely to emerge. This approach was subsequently expressed in the terms
  728
  of the five principles. The House is familiar with those five principles, to which has been added a sixth to give some safeguards for the European Rhodesians. Mr. Smith accepted these as a framework within which discussion could proceed. Mr. Smith, the Lord Chancellor and I acknowledged that we could not commit our colleagues. For my part, I promised to put the proposals to my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, which I subsequently did.
  I can only guess what happened in the case of Mr. Smith. I believe that he reported to his colleagues and that they considered he had gone too far in agreeing to a possible set of conditions for a settlement. It is my feeling—I can only use my personal judgment—that there was a split in the Rhodesian Cabinet and that it was decided to take the differing opinions to the party caucus. At the party caucus meeting these differences could not be settled, and it was then resolved to have a general election. I think that in going for this general election the Prime Minister himself hoped to win more liberal support for his views and the rather more extreme members of the Administration hoped to push Mr. Smith forward in support of more reactionary policies.
  In the event, as the House knows, Mr. Smith won the election handsomely, and I am bound to say that I was encouraged and hopeful that a realistic policy would then be followed. A leading Minister, a supporter of the reactionary element in the Rhodesian Government, was dismissed and sent as the Rhodesian representative in South Africa. A leading liberal supporter, who had left the earlier Government with the then Prime Minister, Mr. Winston Field, was brought back into the Cabinet. But I am very sorry to say that, in the event, my hopes were not fulfilled.
  In retrospect, it is clear to me that I.D.I. was virtually inevitable. The almost complete elimination of moderate European opinion from the Rhodesian Parliament at that election created political pressures for the seizure of independence which proved irresistible. Everyone would, I think, agree that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister did everything possible to avert what we knew would be a damaging, even a disastrous, event for Rhodesia and her neighbours. The end of

  729
  this, we then said, we could not possibly foresee if that development continued.
  The House will recall the sincere and strenuous efforts made by my right hon. Friend during his visit to Salisbury last October. At his request, the Attorney—General and I stayed on in Salisbury for a further day or two in a final effort to bridge the gap. We have had plenty of evidence since then that the Rhodesian Government of the day had in fact decided upon I.D.I.—[HON. MEMBERS: "U.D.I."]—and it was only the Prime Minister's visit which had delayed I.D.I.
  Sir Gerald Nabarro: U.D.I.
  Mr. Bottomley: No, not U.D.I., not "unilateral". It is an illegal declaration of independence, and that is why I say "I.D.I.". If the hon. Gentleman had been in the House earlier, he would have known that "I.D.I." has been said not only today but on other occasions too.
  Sir G. Nabarro: Is the right hon. Gentleman trying to coin a new phrase this afternoon by saying "I.D.I."? We have always understood it to be U.D.I.
  Mr. Bottomley: The hon. Gentleman is showing that he is evidently behind the times, but perhaps we ought to excuse him. He was out of the House for a time. I should like to have coined the expression, but I can assure the hon. Gentleman that it was used by hon. Members on his own side of the House in earlier debates. Perhaps he will accept that from me.
  So far as the Prime Minister's visit was concerned, it did hold up I.D.I., but, as I have said already, it was virtually inevitable from then onwards. The almost complete elimination of moderate European opinion created political pressures which led to this pressure for illegal independence. I think everybody, those who have been told the story, will agree that what the Attorney—General and I tried to do was to get a set of conditions which we could adopt and present to our Government and to Parliament which would form the basis of an agreement.
  But I regret to say that Mr. Smith and his colleagues could not come forward and meet us. The Rhodesian Government wanted the power to stop African advancement. They wanted the power to reside in the hands of the Europeans for as long as they could see so that they
  730
  could control the destiny of the country. I do not think any responsible opinion could support that. In the same way, no responsible opinion would demand the imposition of majority rule in Rhodesia without adequate preparation. We have certainly never said that from this side, and I have no evidence that the other side would want to press us on this matter.
  I believe that Mr. Smith misjudged our position on this point. Although we made it clear continually to him, I think he thought that he could get away with it without the consequences that inevitably developed not only in Britain but in the world as a whole. I think he and his colleagues convinced themselves, in effect, that there was no room for compromise with the evolution of a democratic society. In doing so, they abandoned, temporarily, I hope, the political philosophy which has always distinguished the Rhodesian approach to their problems from that of South Africa. I believe, equally, that this philosophy is more deeply ingrained in Rhodesian thinking than they may realise. Those who would pull Rhodesia towards a racial solution to their problems may yet be confounded.
  We have been accused of mishandling the situation. But those who accuse us conveniently ignore the fact that we inherited this problem from right hon. Gentlemen opposite. We inherited a tense situation overshadowed by the threat of an imminent U.D.I. as it was called at that time. The right hon. Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys), when I was shadow Commonwealth Secretary, kept me fully informed. I am, therefore, in a position to understand how closely the policy pursued by the then Conservative Government conformed with our own. Let me pay tribute to the right hon. Member for Streatham. Right up till polling day itself, with the approval of the then Prime Minister, he stuck to his guns and they refused to be pushed by demands from those who were acting irresponsibly in Rhodesia at that time. In fact, it was not an issue of semantics or a constitutional quibble. It was something that affected the liberty and the right of individuals, and this is something upon which the whole House, certainly in a Parliamentary democracy, can unite. The principles on which the policy

  731
  of the Opposition and our own policy have been based would provide a platform, I believe, on which the whole House could unite, and this was my belief when I became Secretary of State. I thought we should act in this way.
  Whatever may be the views about sanctions and negotiations as expressed by the right hon. Gentleman and some of his colleagues, I still believe there is no significant difference between us as to the nature of the solution that we seek. I hope that the House will bear this in mind and will accept that this is why we cannot and will not abdicate from our purposes or, as seems to be desired by some hon. Members opposite, quietly draw a curtain over the whole affair.
  Sir Harry Legge-Bourke: Could the right hon. Gentleman say whether the basis upon which eventual negotiations will start, or would start, if the initial informal talks succeed, will be the basis that was last put forward by the Prime Minister just before U.D.I.? I think the right hon. Gentleman agrees that that offer went further, so far as immediate self-government was concerned, than any previous offer had ever gone.
  Mr. Bottomley: The hon. Gentleman always endeavours to be helpful on this question of Rhodesia. I hope that he will not press me on that. The informal talks are beginning and I think it will be much better to see how they develop before we see the next step forward.
  I have tried to fill in the background of events up till last November. The point I emphasise in this connection is that, right up to the very last moment, we tried in every possible way to reach a settlement and, as has been said, we went to the very limit of what we could reasonably commend to Parliament as a fair and just solution. Our proposals for a Royal Commission, for example, were a final effort to achieve a compromise with Mr. Smith's point of view. No one can justly accuse us of not trying our utmost to settle this matter by peaceful negotiation.
  I emphasise again that the troubles which have confronted us since November were caused solely by the illegal declaration of independence and the rejection of our constant and patient efforts to
  732
  find a solution round the conference table. The Rhodesians broke off the negotiations when they could have led to a solution, and this act was a revolt against the Queen and a rejection of the authority of this Parliament. This was the situation which faced us on 11th November last. We could not accept this illegal action, and both sides of the House agreed that the rebellion must be brought to an end and a way must be found to induce the Rhodesians to return to the conference table.
  We were faced with the choice of methods by which we could bring this about. Many urged us to use military force to bring the rebellion to an end, and pressure for this has remained heavy since last November. The right hon. Gentleman asked me to give an answer to a specific question. If he will look at column 531 of HANSARD yesterday, he will see that the Prime Minister himself gave the complete answer. I will just add a reference to one part having regard to the point which the right hon. Gentleman made. The Prime Minister said,
  "or anybody else's armed forces …"
  So that this covers not only British forces but other armed forces, too.
  We were, as I have said, faced with the choice of method. We rejected force. There were many reasons why we did so, but the basic reason was the one to which the right hon. Gentleman referred, that we wanted to avoid bloodshed, chaos and the consequences which could follow from the use of force. Instead, we chose sanctions, a more lengthy but a bloodless method. We knew that sanctions would take some time. It is not true to say that we over-estimated their effectiveness. The length of time depended on the stocks which the Rhodesians built up in preparation for I.D.I., that build-up of stocks having been done with great secrecy. It depended also on how quickly we could shut off Rhodesia's sources of supply. It was bound to take time. For instance, we had to organise the air-lift to Zambia and to persuade all the many countries concerned to take the necessary steps.
  But we knew that, in the end, sanctions would prove effective. This is where I disagree with the right hon. Gentleman. We hoped that, as their effect was increasingly felt, sensible

  733
  Rhodesians would begin to realise that, perhaps, it was better, after all, to return to the conference table. Indeed, the sanctions policy is proving successful. This is why we are able to talk more hopefully today. The steadily increasing economic pressure is being felt in Rhodesia. There can be no doubt that the level of economic activity in Rhodesia is decreasing and that the added effect of this is continuing to weaken the Rhodesian economy. The combined effect of British and international embargoes on Rhodesian exports denies to the illegal régime about 50 per cent. of their normal supplies. It can be expected that this process will gather force. The full impact has by no means yet been exhausted.
  The effect of reduced earnings and the financial controls which we have imposed upon Rhodesia has been to compel the régime to institute a rigorous system of licensing and exchange control. They are undoubtedly in difficulty as regards the import of oil, credit, the sale of the tobacco crop, unemployment, and the general run-down of business and commercial activity. An economy based on the necessity of buying at a premium and selling at a loss is a poor risk. Their credit problems are likely to increase and, as the extent of their failure to dispose of the tobacco crop at a reasonable price becomes apparent, they are bound to find themselves in most serious financial difficulty. Unemployment cannot be disguised by expedients for ever. [Interruption.]
  Mr. Patrick Wall: Optimist.
  Mr. Bottomley: The hon. Gentleman speaks for himself, fortunately.
  Sir G. Nabarro: No, he does not.
  Mr. Bottomley: And one other.
  The migration of workers, manpower orders and National Service tend to obscure the full extent of this problem. It cannot be contained for long, and there can be no doubt that, as the weeks pass, Rhodesia will be running deeper and deeper into financial and economic crisis. [Interruption.] This is so.
  The right hon. Gentleman raised with me a question about oil sanctions. The question of the oil embargo is a separate
  734
  matter, and there was a very full exchange between my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition last week. I do not intend to go over this matter again. The right hon. Gentleman was answered by the Prime Minister fully on all these points, and, in particular, on the accusation that our decision to go to the United Nations represented a change in policy.
  It might be helpful to hon. Members speaking later in the debate if I summarised again briefly the situation which faced us and which led to the United Nations action.
  Mr. Maudling: The right hon. Gentleman spoke of an accusation of change of policy. This is not an accusation. A change of policy is very often welcome. Certainly, the change of policy today we fully welcome.
  Mr. Bottomley: I was showing the right hon. Gentleman, and I shall continue the process of showing, that it is not a change of policy. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] I shall continue to show that that is so, and I think that any fair-minded observer will, at the end of the debate, be able to see that that is so.
  Let we now go over the background for the benefit of right hon. and hon. Members who will take part later in the debate. The right hon. Gentleman has asked me some questions about the "Joanna V".
  Mr. Hugh Fraser: The right hon. Gentleman is making an extremely interesting speech on the background. I think that he said something about the Lagos Conference. It is most important that he explains whether he still stands by the statements made by the Prime Minister at Lagos.
  Mr. Bottomley: I intend to make my own speech. If the right hon. Gentleman can get in later and make his own contribution, it is open to him to do so.
  The right hon. Member for Barnet asked me some questions about the "Joanna V." [HON. MEMBERS: "He did not."] Indeed, he did. He referred to the fact that the ships were breaking the embargo, and I said that I would answer his question. If he did not specifically name the "Joanna V," I am referring to it as

  735
  such because it is the only one which actually got into the port.
  Mr. Maudling: I did give the Secretary of State notice of some questions I intended to ask him, but I shortened my speech after this afternoon's announcement and left out that part.
  Mr. Bottomley: With respect, the right hon. Gentleman raised this matter, and I am dealing with it in the way I think best to answer it satisfactorily. If he does not want me to pursue it, all I can tell him is that I shall nevertheless do so because I think it is necessary in order to show that the action taken by Her Majesty's Government was the only way in which we could be sure that the oil embargo would continue. What the right hon. Gentleman and his hon. Friends have failed to do is to say what they would have done in the circumstances. Would they have allowed the oil to go through? If this had happened, we would not have been in the position we find ourselves in now when, as the right hon. Gentleman acknowledged, talks look likely and more profitable than was the case before an attempt was made to breach the embargo. I shall if I may, leave my right hon. Friend the Attorney-General to pursue it further, if anyone else wants it pursued on the basis of the United Nations decision, because he was present at the time and he is much more competent to do it for that reason. That point which the right hon. Gentleman had in his note I have no intention of answering, but if it is necessary to do so my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General, who took part in the United Nations proceedings on that matter, will be able to do it very efficiently and effectively.
  Let me turn to the negotiations about which the right hon. Gentleman is anxious to hear. The Prime Minister this afternoon indicated the road which we were travelling and showed that it was one which has been reached because of this Government's policy and not because of the behaviour of the Opposition, who had no policy at all and who at one time were split in three ways. I do not want to go further into that, but I will leave it as a fact.
  So much for the policy which dealt with the illegal action. I am sure that this part of the policy is proving successful
  736
  and has proved successful in improving the prospects for the talks which have been mentioned this afternoon. Since November, we have applied a double policy of bringing increasing pressure to bear by imposing sanctions while at the same time making it clear that we were always ready to discuss a return to constitutional rule. We have always made it clear that anyone is free to talk to the Governor or to our representatives.
  Throughout the months since November we have constantly watched for signs that the Rhodesians were willing to return to the conference table and to embark on fruitful discussions. We have had no lack of information on what was going on in the minds of the Rhodesian leaders and the state of thinking in Salisbury. Since 11th November many channels of communication have been open to Salisbury. Many Rhodesians, some of them Rhodesians of prominence, have visited this country, and many of them have produced ideas on which a settlement might be based. Many of them have reported the views or what they believed to be the views of the Smith régime. Many hon. Members, some from the other side of the House, and business men have gone from this country to Rhodesia and have reported to me on their return what they discovered about the prospects of negotiations.
  In addition, the Governor was in constant touch with the thinking of Mr. Smith and his followers. I am sure the whole House will agree that we should pay a further tribute to the part which the Governor has played and is playing. He has remained at his post as the representative of the British Crown and a symbol of loyalty. More than that, as a distinguished Rhodesian himself, he stands for the interests and future of the Rhodesia in which he firmly believes. His robust and honourable advocacy of Rhodesian interests has been the cause of encouragement and enlightenment to us all.
  I cannot, emphasise enough that we are and have been in the closest touch with the Governor. It would not be right for me to reveal the advice which the Governor, as a servant of the Crown, has given to Her Majesty's Government from time to time any more than it would be right for me to reveal the information which I get from my professional advisers.

  737
  But I can assure the House that we do know the Governor's views and he knows ours. [Laughter.] I do not see what there is to laugh about in that. It is quite offensive to the Governor, and if that is the intention of some hon. Members opposite I do not see why they joined so wholeheartedly in the tributes which I have paid to him as a very worthy servant of the Crown.
  All these many contacts with Salisbury have shown until recently one thing—that the régime was prepared to negotiate only on the basis, the precondition, that they retained their illegal independence. This came out time and time again both in public statements from members of the régime and in private remarks to visitors. It was clear that they saw negotiations merely as concerned with the confirmation and ratification of their illegal independence, and this we could not accept.
  My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister made it clear on 21st April that we could not legalise an act of rebellion against the Crown or compromise on principles laid down by two successive Governments. We could not embark on negotiations on this restrictive basis—negotiations which would have conceded all that we have worked for over the last two or three years. But we continued to watch anxiously, as I have said, for signs of a change in the Rhodesian attitude, and those signs have been evident over this last week. The House has heard my right hon. Friend's statement before the debate. It would not be right for me to go any further into that matter now. Public comments cannot do good to this delicate exploration at this moment now that the talks are due to start.
  Let me conclude by saying that I think that a new phase may now have opened. I submit to the House that all that has happened demonstrates the success, within the inevitable exigencies and pitfalls of a developing situation, of the policy which this Government have pursued since last November. We have remained throughout entirely flexible and reasonable. We have always been willing to listen to any proposition which held out any opportunity of fruitful and meaningful discussions. We have always wanted to return to the conference table, and we have repeatedly made this clear to the
  738
  Rhodesians through every available channel. At the same time, we have remained inflexibly resolved to stick to our chosen course of sanctions rather than the use of force, and to pursue this course despite all the criticisms and pressures to which we have been subjected. I believe that that policy has paid off.
  Sir G. Nabarro Sir G. Nabarro rose—
  Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Eric Fletcher): Order. If the Minister does not give way, the hon. Member must resume his seat.
  Mr. Bottomley: I believe that that policy has paid off and that it was the right policy to pursue. Critics of this policy, aimed to hold out in one hand the widening of sanctions and in the other hand the olive branch of talks, have been mainly disruptive. They have accused us of not using enough of the olive branch or not using enough of the weapons. None of them has been able to produce an alternative policy except the two extremes of the use of force or the complete acceptance of the illegal declaration of independence. I believe that the majority of thinking people would not accept either of those two extremes and that the middle course which the Government have pursued commands general acceptance in this country and the world.
  It is not a very good moment to look into the future. A final settlement of the Rhodesian problem is still a long way off, but I will emphasise again that we shall work for this settlement with the same policy of moderation and flexibility. We stand by the six principles.
  At the same time, we are not pressing for immediate majority rule. Our objective is a steady advancement through achievement in a way and over a period which will secure for Rhodesia orderly government and the essential conditions of stability for the future economic and social development of a non-racial society. We are seeking to promote the evolution of a non-racial society where all, black and white, can play their part. There is much for the Europeans and Africans in Rhodesia to do before this kind of society can be evolved, but Europeans must recognise that 4 million Africans cannot be treated as though they did not exist and must be given a majority say in the development of their country. The

  739
  African leaders, too, must realise that they cannot discharge their responsibility to the African people by opting out of the constitutional sphere. Without their co-operation progress by evolution would be impossible. When constitutional government is restored to Rhodesia, the situation will make heavy demands on the statesmanship and good will of both the African and European political leadership. It is that statesmanship which we hope will be forthcoming. If it is not, there cannot be a peaceful and just solution to the Rhodesian problem.
  But this is looking far ahead. In the meantime, I will ask the House to support the policy of Her Majesty's Government, which I think has been responsible for bringing about the present situation and is the only hope of leading to a peaceful solution of the Rhodesia problem.
  Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Eric Fletcher): Mr. Selwyn Lloyd.
  5.0 p.m.
  Mr. Selwyn Lloyd Mr. Selwyn Lloyd (Wirral) rose—
  Sir G. Nabarro: Before the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations sits down—
  Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. I have called Mr. Selwyn Lloyd.
  Mr. Lloyd Mr. Lloyd rose—
  Sir G. Nabarro: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Is it not a perfectly legitimate and well ordered device for the Chair to allow a question at the end of a long Ministerial speech before the right hon. Gentleman sits down?
  Mr. Deputy Speaker: Not after another hon. Member has been called by the Chair.
  Sir G. Nabarro: But I rose before you called my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Wirral (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd), Mr. Deputy Speaker, and I said, "Before the right hon. Gentleman sits down". Further to the point of order, I have, in perfectly legitimate and well-ordered fashion, four times asked the Secretary of State during his speech to give way, but each time he has refused. Am I not, therefore, perfectly entitled, before you call the next speaker, Mr. Deputy Speaker, to ask for a question
  740
  to be taken before the Secretary of State sits down?
  Mr. Deputy Speaker: The hon. Gentleman is not in order. I have called Mr. Selwyn Lloyd.
  Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: I think that many of us listened with great interest to the final sentences in the Prime Minister's statement this afternoon when he gave his instructions to his colleagues as to how they should handle the debate. I think that the Secretary of State has honoured those instructions rather in the breach than in the observance.
  I welcome very much the Prime Minister's statement and his belated decision. I also welcome the language in which he couched it, which is very different from that which he used before, in that he has spoken about "a solution of the problem" rather than "the ending of the rebellion" and "making it the basis for negotiations" rather than "accepting these representations". I welcome the statement, and the fact that the statement has been made will shorten my speech, although I do not think that it will alter its content.
  On 22nd February I saw the Commonwealth Secretary after my return from Rhodesia and urged him to do exactly what the Prime Minister has announced this afternoon. The Prime Minister said in his speech last Thursday that there was nothing in the report which I brought back which suggested any basis upon which a settlement could be reached, nor did my report:
  "raise any new points on which Mr. Smith was prepared to move forward from the issues rejected before last November."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 21st April, 1966; Vol. 727, c. 95.]
  I want to deal with that contention not just for the record, but because what I said to the right hon. Gentleman then is, I think, directly relevant now. I told him of the people that I had met in Rhodesia—327 of them, of whom more than 60 were Africans, and that I had spent more time with the Governor than with any other individual. I told him that I had stressed three points to everybody, the Rhodesian Front as well as the others. I said that U.D.I. had been illegal and wrong, that the European minority could not for ever rule a majority very much larger in size than itself, and, also, that if European and African Rhodesians

  741
  were to live happily together they had to begin to end racial discrimination. That is still my position. I also defended the responsibility of this House for all Rhodesians.
  I gave the right hon. Gentleman my conclusions, and nothing that has happened since has caused me to change them. I think that they are just as relevant in this new phase. First of all, I said that Mr. Ian Smith was in control. There was no doubt about that. I said that the action of Her Majesty's Government here had consolidated white Rhodesian opinion behind Mr. Smith and his colleagues, and there is no doubt about that. I can give an example of that to the House. When I was in Bulawayo I met about 25 businessmen, many of whom were concerned with British companies. Tbey said that there was not a man in the room who had been a political supporter of Mr. Smith and that they opposed him politically, but that now they would do everything they could to co-operate with him to ensure that sanctions did not succeed, and that when they had beaten the sanctions they would go back to opposing Mr. Smith politically.
  That showed that there had been a complete misjudgment of the effect of sanctions. It had not been realised that all European Rhodesians, or the great majority of them, would look on this as a battle for Rhodesia and rally behind Mr. Smith.
  Mr. Sydney Silverman: Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman believe that the present hope of negotiations would ever have arisen either if sanctions had not been imposed, or if the sanctions had been ineffective?
  Mr. Lloyd: I will deal with that point; it is obviously a relevant one. I will deal with what I told the right hon. Gentleman on that matter.
  I told the right hon. Gentleman that white opinion had been consolidated behind Mr. Smith and that there was no chance of a change in that opinion until an alternative to U.D.I. was put forward which Rhodesians would think reasonable. The offer of 25th January had been quite disastrous. I was told that by representatives of Mr. Smith's opponents. I think that that is true today—
  742
  that if the approach to the new talks is to be the approach of 25th January there is not a chance of success.
  Secondly, I told the right hon. Gentleman, dealing with the point that the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Sydney Silverman) has just raised, about what I thought was the effect of sanctions, that they were likely to damage the Rhodesian economy. I was talking then towards the end of February, but I did not think that they would cause a collapse. I did not think that they would cause the Rhodesians to throw their hands in and accept unconditional surrender.
  I thought, however, that they would be a powerful influence towards a settlement. I have always said that in the House. I have always advanced the view over sanctions that they should be a means of bringing pressure to bear so that we could have a settlement and agreement, but not unconditional surrender. I believe that that also is true today. However, I think that we make a mistake, according to my most recent information from Rhodesia, in exaggerating the present effect of sanctions upon ordinary people in Rhodesia. I think that the people who are looking ahead, realise the dangers.
  The third point that I made to the right hon. Gentleman was that neither side could win this contest. If Rhodesia succeeded in sticking it out, as it was probable that they would stick it out in some fashion, there would be a very bleak future before the people with whom I discussed the matter and their children. If, on the other hand, Rhodesia were to be forced to capitulate after a struggle lasting years, there would be a great bitterness towards us in South Africa—not only in Rhodesia, but in South Africa as a whole. That would cause us grave economic damage. So I thought that it was a conflict that neither side could win. I advised the right hon. Gentleman that, in my view, there should be talks at once without prior conditions.
  I told the right hon. Gentleman, also, that I had made it quite clear to Mr. Smith that I had not gone out to Rhodesia to negotiate. I did not think it right for an Opposition spokesman to negotiate; he would be accused of undermining the position of Her Majesty's

  743
  Government. Nor did I think that Mr. Smith would be likely to give me terms that he would accept when negotiating with Her Majesty's Government. If he gave me certain terms, he would expect the Government to want him to go further. So I did not try to negotiate with him.
  But I told the right hon. Gentleman that I had three discussions with Mr. Smith and that my advice was that talks should be held as quickly as possible. I should not have given that advice unless I had thought that a settlement was possible. I have never said that it was easy, and I do not think that it is easy today, but it is possible. The clearest possible implication was that, in my view, there had been some movement in the position of Mr. Smith and his colleagues.
  There had been a great deal of information on that, although I agree that some of it had been conflicting. I agree that what had been said privately was not always repeated publicly. That is not peculiar to the Rhodesian situation. But there was movement and I think that the Government knew that there was a movement of opinion on this, and I think that they are to be blamed for not starting the process of talking earlier. However, at long last my advice has been taken and they are starting talks.
  In my view, the purpose of the talks should be a constitutional settlement as a result of which Rhodesia can have its lawful independence. I think that the reason why the offer of 25th January was hopeless was that it involved direct rule from Whitehall thinly camouflaged, and I found no one among European Rhodesians who really accepted that. It also involved a constitutional conference the outcome of which was completely uncertain.
  As to the nature of the settlement that can be reached, it is very important that we in this House should not be too specific at the present time. If I had responsibility for these matters, I would put certain matters on the agenda. The first matter would be educational development and educational advance, with the United Kingdom playing a substantial financial part in it, and having also, I think, therefore, some measure of say in the programme. I agree with what Mr. Smith told me when he said that he did not think
  744
  it right to educate African Rhodesians just to be voters. They must have a place to go to in the Rhodesian society. Therefore, it is not just a question of an educational programme. It is also necessary to have a placing organisation so that people can be put in worthwhile jobs.
  Secondly, I am absolutely certain that there must be movement against racial discrimination. I have told some of my hon. Friends before, and I hope that they will not mind if I repeat it, that while I was in Rhodesia I met an African doctor who told me, "While I am in the hospital, I am treated as an equal and I get the same pay as my white colleagues who are perfectly good colleagues, but when I leave the hospital gates I cannot come to speak to you in your hotel". This was a special occasion and he had been allowed to do so. He went on to say, "I could not go and live anywhere near my white colleagues".
  I told the Rhodesians that on that basis they could not have a happy community. He told me that he was not an extremist, but felt that he was a second-class citizen. The white Rhodesians must realise that they cannot get a united, multi-racial Rhodesia unless they start to change that. But it cannot all be swept away overnight. The same thing applies to the business quarters in the big cities which are white areas. It is unreasonable to expect progress unless that situation is altered.
  In addition, for the agenda for the talks one must consider a blocking mechanism. I know that some people doubt whether any blocking mechanism would be effective, but it is important to have some specific measure so that there cannot be retrogression. There must be more African seats and phasing out arrangements for the B roll seats and one must also include on the agenda a widening of the franchise. There is the matter of entrenching clauses on these topics in the new constitution and the question of the collateral treaty should come up again.
  Most important, at least as important as the other things, there must be independent procedures for establishing breaches of any undertakings given. I agree with my right hon. Friend that there can never be absolute certainty that an agreement in a constitution will be kept, but we can arrange procedures

  745
  for making it perfectly clear if there has been a flagrant breach. I say quite frankly that I do not think that there will be agreement on all these things, but I hope that there will be agreement on sufficient of them to make a bargain possible.
  The atmosphere for the discussions is extremely important. If the Government continue with their approach—"we shall be graciously pleased to listen to any representations which you choose to make"—or if they talk about the régime beginning to weaken, or the oil sanctions having been successful, they will only make it more difficult to get agreement. Getting agreement will be a difficult enough operation. Those of us who have been to Rhodesia have seen the bitterness and even the hatred which has been engendered. The extremists on both sides are stronger than they were and great diplomatic skill is needed, of the type shown, for example, by the Foreign Office during the Trieste negotiations.
  There is a need to try to improve the atmosphere. With respect, I doubt whether the right hon. Gentleman's speech this afternoon will improve the atmosphere. Some things have been done which have been very silly, for example, the stopping of the Nuffield gift for the medical school at the multi-racial university. That looks like vindictive action and I hope that the Government will think it wise to try to improve the atmosphere.
  If, by mischance, agreement is not reached, I hope that the Government's final offer will be clearly stated. I believe that it would get through to the Rhodesians and they could then form a judgment upon it. I beg the Government to adopt this approach. I have deliberately suppressed criticisms which I could have made of the conduct of certain aspects. I have not become involved with Chapter VII, and so on.
  Finally, I do not think that anybody who has been to Rhodesia recently could have failed to be impressed by the sadness of it all—a beautiful country where great economic progress has been made, by Africans as well as Europeans, with great potential wealth and with especially close ties with Britain and with a better chance, as it had, of multi-racial society than almost any other country, with few
  746
  extremists on both sides. That was the situation.
  Now that country, with its proud and tough people of European origin, is engaged in a conflict which neither side can win. Extremism has been strengthened all the time and there has been a great strain on race relationships in Rhodesia and elsewhere in Africa. I do not think that it is a threat to peace, but it is certainly a threat to progress. A new effort is needed and I am delighted with the statement by the Prime Minister today.
  The Commonwealth Secretary ended his speech with a reference to the need for statesmanship. I entirely agree that statesmanship is needed. It is late in the day and it will be very difficult and we have to be very careful not to be drawn into day-to-day comments on the discussions or negotiations taking place, but I pray that statesmanship will be shown by both sides in these discussions.
  5.15 p.m.
  Mr. Stanley Henig: I claim the indulgence of the House on the occasion of this my maiden speech. I believe that I am the first representative of the ancient and honourable City of Lancaster ever to speak from the Labour benches.
  I believe that in accordance with the traditions of the House I am entitled, before referring to the subject under discussion, briefly to mention just one of my constituency's problems. I hope that my right hon. Friend the Minister of Transport will pay due heed to the fact that we in Lancaster are still awaiting adequate transport facilities between the two sides of our city. In particular, I hope that now that the railway link between Lancaster and Morecambe has, unfortunately, been ended, the railway bridge will be made available as a second road bridge over the River Lune.
  At the same time, may I pay tribute to my predecessor who was from the other side of the House, especially as this is a debate about Rhodesia. I assure right hon. Gentlemen opposite that they will find my views on Rhodesia even less palatable than they occasionally found those of my distinguished predecessor. However, I believe that on my side of the House there was some admiration for the courage with which

  747
  Mr. Berkeley always put his views on all kinds of subjects.
  I hoped to catch your eye in the debate yesterday, Mr. Speaker. I was unfortunate then; I am fortunate now. Had I spoken yesterday, I would have wanted to refer to Britain's entry into the Common Market and to say—and this is not irrelevant now—that I and many of my hon. Friends are against Gaulleism of all kinds wherever it may be found, Gaulleism of the gunboat mentality, Gaulleism of the nationalistic variety. I must confess that I find it odd that some hon. Members opposite who wish, they say, without reserve to enter a supranational community, none the less seize every opportunity they can find to ridicule the United Nations.
  The Rhodesian problem is not a British problem alone. The danger of Southern Rhodesia is that many African countries in the long run would never tolerate a situation in which the wealth and power of Rhodesia were in the hands of a small cliqué differentiated from the bulk of the population by virtue of the colour of their skins. Had the British Government allowed Rhodesia to get away with its illegal declaration of independence last year, there would have been a potentially explosive situation in the middle of Africa, a situation which could have been resolved ultimately only by conflict. Britain, therefore, had to act.
  However, this problem also involved Britain herself, because we had had some historic responsibilities in the area, responsibilities which had been ill carried out. It ought to be a matter of profound regret to many people in this country that only now are we concerned with the fact that Rhodesia is a thoroughly anti-British police State, after Rhodesia has illegally declared its independence, when it seemed for 40 years that we were very little concerned with what was going on in that country.
  I turn to what, in my view, is the basic principle for settlement. It is difficult for any hon. Member this afternoon to say too much on this subject because obviously, of necessity, we are in the dark about some of the things that have been happening in the last few days. However, in any settlement the needs, aspirations and desires of the bulk of the population
  748
  must not be overlooked and I hope that in the talks which presumably will shortly be going on in Southern Rhodesia between the forces representing all political groups the coloured population will not be overlooked.
  I am not one of those who says that we must have democracy as on the British pattern in Southern Rhodesia. It does not behove us to go around the world trying to create little Britains. The phrase "free elections" is much overdone. The real danger about Rhodesia is not so much that one has a tyranny. One has a tyranny, and a rather nasty one, but there are tyrannies in many other parts of the world. In Southern Rhodesia, as in South Africa, one has a tyranny based on the colour of a man's skin.
  This is a world in which the majority of citizens do not have a white pigmentation in their skin. If the future of our planet is to be a clash based on racialism, on colour, there is the danger that we might lose it. But, apart from this consideration—and I believe at this point it is relatively minor—there is the disaster which it would mean to us all. This has been the point at stake in Southern Rhodesia.
  Had this country allowed Mr. Smith to get away with his illegal declaration of independence we would have said once for all that whenever there was a clash between the interests of whites and coloured people, then regardless of moral principles we would support the interests of the whites. But we did not. We stuck to our moral principles and, in doing so, we left a reasonable probability that if the future of the world is not to continue in conflict between East and West—and I sincerely hope that it will not—it will not be replaced by a far worse conflict between North and South.
  5.23 p.m.
  Mr. Duncan Sandys: It is my pleasure to congratulate the hon. Member for Lancaster (Mr. Henig) on his maiden speech. He did not hesitate to express views, which he obviously holds strongly, with vigour and conviction. He will not expect me to say that I agree with all that he said, but I am sure that the House will look forward to further contributions from him on this and other topics.

  749
  I warmly welcome the decision which was announced by the Prime Minister today. It is a belated decision, but none the less an exceedingly welcome one; the decision to have talks with the Smith Administration in Salisbury. It is obviously the only sensible way out of the present dangerous deadlock.
  This welcome decision does not alter the fact that since we last discussed Rhodesia in this House a very grave new development has taken place. The Government have effectively lost control of the situation in the United Nations, and that is a very serious development. By asking the Security Council to issue mandatory orders to Britain, the Government have abdicated their responsibility. They are now no longer free to exercise their own judgment or of their own discretion. They have in this matter become agents of the Security Council, acting under instructions from New York.
  When my hon. Friends and I criticise the Government's recent action, we are asked "What would you have done?" It is a fair question, and I propose to answer it. To begin with, we would not have allowed ourselves to get into this position. It is all very well for the Secretary of State to smile, but as far back as the debate last December we clearly foresaw that attempts might be made to break the oil embargo and that this would raise the dangerous and awkward question of blockade. That is one of the reasons why we pressed so hard for early talks with Mr. Smith so as to try to settle this matter before the country was faced with this perilous dilemma.
  Having ignored our advice, and having allowed the situation to drift into this position, the Government should have persevered longer in their efforts to secure the voluntary co-operation of the other countries concerned. The possibilities of persuasion had quite obviously not been exhausted, since a British Foreign Office Minister was actually talking to the Portuguese Government in Lisbon at the very moment when the Foreign Secretary took this matter before the Security Council in New York. While these further diplomatic approaches were proceeding, no doubt—and I will be frank about this—a tanker or two would have slipped into Beira and Mr. Smith's Administration would have received some
  750
  small additional quantities of oil. On the other hand, this must be weighed against the grave dangers which will now result from having placed Britain under the orders of the Security Council.
  The British Resolution, for that is what it is, approved by the Security Council, declares that the continuance of the Smith régime constitutes a threat to international peace. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Barnet (Mr. Maudling) said, this is palpably untrue, but I will not go into that because it is so obvious. Apart from the question of truth, this declaration has presented to other nations the most powerful justification for demanding more and more new measures of increasing severity, including, if necessary, the use of force.
  Having themselves asked the United Nations to order Britain to blockade Portuguese territory, Her Majesty's Government should not be surprised if, quite soon, they are ordered to extend the blockade to South Africa. South Africa would not docilely accept being blockaded. It would, no doubt, hesitate to start a shooting war. But quite certainly the South African Government would turn the Royal Navy out of the Simonstown base and revoke the Defence Agreement to which the present Government have said, like their predecessors, that they attach importance.
  Even if we managed to prevent South Africa from obtaining additional supplies of oil over and above its normal requirements, it would not be at all difficult for that country, by dipping into its large reserves, to provide Rhodesia with enough oil to carry on for quite a while. Then, no doubt, we should be urged by the United Nations to put further pressure on South Africa by imposing economic sanctions. That, of course, would be ruinous. As Lord Caradon told the Security Council the other day, the suspension of trade with South Africa might damage our balance of payments to the tune of £300 million a year. That is something which we obviously could not afford and we would have to refuse.
  In that event I have no doubt that the United Nations would turn to us and say, "If you are not prepared to take economic action against South Africa, having stated that the continuance of the Smith Administration is a threat to international peace, it is your bounden duty to take

  751
  military action to overthrow it inside Rhodesia." That is something which would be totally repugnant to the British people. That is the perilous tangle into which the Government's action has got us. It is therefore, more than ever fortunate that they have now decided to try to resolve the problem by negotiation before the siuation gets completely out of hand.
  If, however, the talks are to have any chance of success, the Government—and this was referred to by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Wirral (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd)—must make it clear that they have dropped their insistence upon a period of direct rule by the Government, since, no matter what the Government say to the contrary, this amounts to a demand for unconditional surrender. It amounts to a demand for a blank cheque, which would make any negotiations a complete farce. I hope, therefore, that the Minister who winds up the debate will take the opportunity quickly to remove any doubts on this important point.
  As the interesting survey broadcast by the B.B.C. the other day shows, sanctions are not as yet cutting very deeply. The Europeans continue to be firmly united behind Mr. Smith, and they are not likely to surrender until their whole economy is in ruins and the machinery of government has collapsed. There is no certainty that sanctions, however long pursued, could necessarily be sufficiently effective to produce that result. Even if they were, surely that is not what anybody in any part of this House wishes to achieve. That, however, is now largely academic, because in any event the process of slow strangulation would certainly take very much longer than the Security Council, which now possesses the initiative, would be willing to wait.
  Therefore, unless a settlement can be arrived at fairly soon, the Government, to use the phrase of the Secretary of State, will find that more and more they are being pushed around by other countries which have no love for Britain and which are more interested in satisfying their racialist emotions than in doing what is best for the people of Rhodesia.
  752
  It has been said that we on this side are in favour of sanctions only as long as they are not effective.
  Mr. Philip Noel-Baker: Hear, hear.
  Mr. Sandys: That is totally unfair and untrue. Most of us on this side have accepted sanctions as a sad but unavoidable necessity. We have accepted the purpose of sanctions, which is to help to create a mood in Rhodesia which will be conducive to bringing Rhodesia back to constitutional rule, and we wish that objective to be achieved.
  We must, however, keep things in perspective. Rhodesia is not our only problem. There are other objectives of British policy at home and abroad which are just as important. We have to consider how our action over Rhodesia is likely to affect the achievement of those other aims. We have to weigh one with the other. To resolve the Rhodesian problem, we must be prepared to take appreciable risks and to pay an appreciable price, but not unlimited risks and not an unlimited price.
  We have to consider how far it is right to alienate our old and trusted allies—[An HON. MEMBER: "Portugal."]—how far it is wise to risk military embroilment how far we can afford to lose important and valuable export markets and how far it is fair to ask the British taxpayer to foot the bill. The sky is not the limit. Somewhere, there must come a point beyond which we could not go. The task of the Government is to negotiate a reasonable settlement before that point is reached.
  The Prime Minister has said that he is not asking for immediate African majority rule as a precondition for independence, nor is he insisting upon a fixed timetable for the advance of Africans thereafter. That means that, subject to safeguards for the future advance of the Africans, the Government envisage independence for Rhodesia under a government which, at least initially, will be under European control. Since Mr. Smith is the only person who is in a position to speak with authority for the Europeans, it has been clear all along, at least to us on this side of the House—
  Mr. William Molloy Mr. William Molloy (Ealing, North) rose—
  Mr. Sandys:—that sooner or later the Government would have to make up their minds to talk to him. The Prime Minister has now announced informal talks to explore the possibility of more formal negotiations. I hope very much that the question of legal status, to which the Prime Minister referred in passing in reply to a supplementary question this afternoon—
  Mr. James Johnson Mr. James Johnson (Kingston upon Hull, West) rose—
  Mr. Sandys: If the hon. Member will forgive my not giving way, I do not want to make a long speech. I hope that the question of legal status and protocol will not be allowed to stand in the way.
  Mr. R. T. Paget: Hear, hear.
  Mr. Sandys: The holding of talks should not imply any recognition of the legality of the Smith Administration. Equally, it should not imply any renunciation by Mr. Smith of U.D.I.
  I do not underrate the difficulties which caused the breakdown last autumn, but I am optimistic that this time they will be overcome. The reason for my confidence is that in the interval both sides have learned a lot. The bitter experience of these last months and the dangers which are looming ahead for both sides provide a powerful inducement to agreement. Each will, no doubt, have to make concessions to the other. But, with so much at stake, with so great a prize, and with the hopes of so many centred upon them, I cannot believe that once negotiations have been re-started either could allow them to fail.
  5.40 p.m.
  Mr. Eric Moonman: The choice that every Member faces in a maiden speech is one related to the question whether he refers to his own specialist knowledge or whether he should deal strictly with the subject under discussion.
  I was unfortunate on previous occasions in catching Mr. Speaker's eye, and, therefore, I have chosen to deal with the effective running and organisation of the nation's resources rather than with Southern Rhodesia, the subject under debate. That is not to say that I am disinterested in the problem surrounding
  754
  our relationship with Southern Rhodesia, but there are many hon. Members who will wish to pursue the subject further, and, no doubt, make the points that have caused me some anxiety.
  I should like to say a word about my own constituency of Billericay, which has the largest electorate in the country. I am not making any special plea for the size of the constituency. It reflects the extraordinary development which has taken place in Essex in recent years.
  There are two particular problems which are relevant to Billericay. One is the fact that the social services have not developed as they have done in other parts of the country, and certainly one contrasts that with my own home area in the North-West. There are not in existence the many institutions like hospitals and schools built in previous decades. I know that those who live in Brentwood and the nearby towns will recognise that there is a great case for a regional development plan which will help to co-ordinate transport and the social services.
  The other matter which is relevant to my constituency is the dramatic growth in the new town of Basildon. I regretted that there was no reference in the Gracious Speech to the independence of the new towns in the country, and it may be that the town of Basildon, like other new towns, will cause just as much concern in future as Southern Rhodesia does at present. In my view, a U.D.I. is likely to happen in our new towns, and I would give them my support. The danger is that a new town will become an old town not only without in any way achieving its potentiality, but without even going through the processes of self-discovery. The lack of a hospital, for instance, in the new town of Basildon is a disgrace.
  I want now to deal with the effective running of the nation's resources and, in a way, I am not too apologetic about introducing this subject into the debate today because many of the speeches on Monday under the heading of technology and education were probably as relevant to the forms of debate on that occasion as mine is today.
  Many of my colleagues in the technological universities and colleges have probably become depressed, if they have read HANSARD or the newspapers, by the general tone in the debates on the Gracious Speech on the two important

  755
  areas of our national resources—on the one hand, technology, and on the other, education.
  The theory behind technology is the utilisation of new ideas into action. In other words, we have some knowledge arising from research studies to take appropriate action in industry so that the nation as a whole can benefit. That is a tremendous challenge to the universities and industry.
  There is obviously a great need for a co-ordinating agency to translate the findings of the research establishments into a practical form. It is extremely doubtful whether there are many industrialists in the country who are fully aware of the enormous advances made in human relations research here, in the United States and in India. The names of the late Professor MacGregor, Tom Burns and some of my colleagues at Manchester University would be strange to them.
  The important question is whether industry is fully aware of the real value of research. What particularly concerned me the other day was the fact that much of our discussion ignored the myths which prevent both managements and the trade unions from thinking clearly. There is, on the one hand, the myth of management, which is that of the manager or employer who does not want to modernise. He is the autocrat who feels that the work problems can best be tackled by using methods that were adequate many years ago. I have had a number of conversations with managements who are content to run their businesses as they have done for the last 40 years. There are also those managers who are willing to accept the challenge of new ideas but who are not aware of the price that it involves. The bill for good human relationships is something that they may not meet but one which will have to be met probably by another generation of managers and trade unionists.
  There are myths on the part of the traditional trade unionist who is concerned with terms like "worker control". A more correct interpretation of what is relevant to modern industry is "industrial democracy". There can be little opportunity for workers to share in the control of a business in the way that we have seen in Yugoslavia, because there were
  756
  special circumstances which surrounded the setting up of worker control in that country as in Israel.
  The problems that we face in British industry today are problems that are quite deep rooted. Unless we can understand fully the myths which surround the problems, we are not likely to bring about the sort of effectiveness for which we are all searching.
  A major problem in industry is that the "rights" claimed by many employers and trade unionists are mutually exclusive. If employers' rights were met in full, it would mean that there would be no place for the trade unions, and the greater uses of technology would suffer. Similarly, if the trade unions' rights were met in full in the existing social and political climate, management would become possible.
  I want now to turn briefly to the subject of the running of Parliament. I can only add my voice to the speeches and comments already made about the way in which our business is conducted. In the language of the estate agents, there is no doubt that this building is well sited, has all sorts of modern conveniences, and is in a desirable position in our city. But there are many practical difficulties facing both the new Member and even perhaps a Member who has been here for some time. I hope that in this Parliament there will be great opportunities for Members from all parts of the House to consider very seriously the sort of organisation that we want to have, which will not only reflect what is right for the conduct of business, but the sort of organisation which the nation expects.
  Mr. Deputy Speaker: Mr. Turton.
  Mr. Charles Fletcher-Cooke: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Without any reflection on my right hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton (Mr. Turton), may I point out that he is the fourth Privy Councillor in succession to be called from this side of the House? How long is the line to spread out? Is it till the crack of doom?
  Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. That is not a point of order. Mr. Turton.
  5.49 p.m.
  Mr. R. H. Turton: I should like to congratulate

  757
  the hon. Member for Billericay (Mr. Moonman) on going through the ordeal of making a maiden speech in the House. I hope that we shall hear him on many occasions when the subject of debate is technology and education or the reform of procedure in the House. He has a great command of his subject, and I shall be glad to hear him another time.
  I think it is without precedent, when an Amendment is placed on the Order Paper regretting the exclusion from the Gracious Speech of an item of policy and Mr. Speaker does not select that Amendment, for the Government to come down on the day when the debate on the subject is taken to repair the omission in the Gracious Speech by adding that policy. Mr. Deputy Speaker, if you require any protection from my hon. Friends, may I say that as some of my hon. Friends and I have put down an Amendment regretting that talks were not being opened, I have a certain right to speak.
  The Government's action means that everything that I was going to say in my speech has had to be altered. I thought that the right hon. Gentleman made a mistake in trying to justify his policy in his speech. I had prepared a speech criticising condemning his policy, but I do not believe that my speech of condemnation, or his speech of justification would be helpful today.
  What I want to try to do in a short time is to define the issues of what I believe the Minister has announced as the talks about talks. We are not promised talks, but talks about talks, and the confusion into which the House and the country often gets in this Rhodesian problem is the confusion of trying to make as one two distinct but inter-related aspects of the situation. There is, first, the break by Mr. Ian Smith with Whitehall, and, secondly, the fact that the present state of the electoral system in Rhodesia is such that she cannot be accepted as an independent member of the Commonwealth. In my view these are two distinct problems requiring distinct treatment.
  Taking the first one first, the illegal seizure of independence, I think that what the House does not realise is that the idea of direct rule from Whitehall is offensive to Rhodesians of every colour and race. They have never been under direct rule from Whitehall. At one
  758
  time they were under the rule of a Chartered Company. When that ended, they were offered union with South Africa, or a relationship with the British Government. They chose to be under the British Government for foreign affairs and defence, but to have internal self-government, and I think that a great deal of the bitterness which has been aroused since 11th November has been due to the failure of the British Government to recognise that fact. No one wants to have direct rule from Whitehall, and therefore Mr. Smith has had rallying to him those who disagree with his policy merely because he is at last getting away from Whitehall.
  Where I think the Government have made a mistake—and here I want, if not to criticise, to elucidate—is in appearing to attach all the importance to what they call the illegal régime. I believe that this policy at the United Nations under Chapter VII is thronged with disaster. The Resolution which was moved on 9th April says:
  "Considering that such supplies of oil will afford great assistance and encouragement to the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia thereby enabling it to remain in being, determined that the resulting situation constitutes a threat to peace."
  That is clearly saying that to enable the illegal régime to remain in being constitutes a threat to peace.
  As I understand it, the threat to peace is a tanker going into the port of Beira, or, alternatively, a tanker which had discharged oil leaving Beira, and Britain was given the right to use armed force against those two tankers. If that is a threat to peace—and I hope that when the learned Attorney-General replies he will deal with this point—are the Government arguing equally that bringing oil over Beit Bridge, or across the Limpopo, or the action of the Germans, the French, the Japanese, and the Americans, in buying tobacco at tobacco auctions, and in selling their goods to Rhodesia, thereby enabling the illegal régime to continue, are also threats to peace? As my right hon. Friend the Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys) said, I think that this is the dangerous step which has developed by the Resolution of 9th April, and Parliament should be told. Whatever views we may have, and however much we differ in our views as to the treatment of

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  the Rhodesian Government, we were told that the British Government were not in favour of using force, but by using Chapter VII and Articles 39 and 42 they are in fact empowering the United Nations to order them to use force in those contingencies.
  Perhaps I might now leave the first problem and go to the far more difficult one, namely, the fact that the present state of the electoral system will not enable the Commonwealth to accept Rhodesia as a constituent member. We have to remember that the present state of the electoral system is one agreed by the British Government. The 1961 Constitution lays that down, and unless we can get the economy of Rhodesia developing, and education proceeding fast enough, there is no hope for many years of getting that electoral system changed so that we get a Parliament reasonably representative of the whole country.
  Every action which the British Government have taken against Rhodesia since 11th November has postponed and delayed the possibility of getting more Africans educated and of Africans being able to qualify through having the qualificatory level of income under the Constitution. This seems to me to be the most difficult problem.
  Mr. Brian O'Malley: Would not it be true to say that, even if a large number of Africans received the vote because of new qualifications, there would be no more African representation within the Constitution?
  Mr. Turton: No. If they were to qualify on the "A" roll, they could get a majority in Parliament. What I think the hon. Gentleman is talking about are "B" roll qualifications. What we have to think of is how we can accelerate the development of Rhodesia so that the electoral system is such that she can be accepted by the Commonwealth as an independent member.
  That brings me to what I think is the most important aspect of this problem today. What are the talks going to be about? How will they be conducted, and who will play a part in them? I have defined the issue under two separate heads. I think that the two main aspects of the talks must be, first, to clarify the terms under which the British Govern-
  760
  ment can accept Rhodesia as an independent country, and, secondly, the conditions under which the Commonwealth can accept Rhodesia as an independent member. They are two separate issues, but both must be considered during this process of talks, either in the early informal talks or in the later ones.
  I was delighted, when the Prime Minister made his announcement, that he said that the talks would be without the glare of publicity. I believe that the talks about talks should be without the glare of publicity, and so should the consequent talks. That is of great importance—
  Mr. James Johnson Mr. James Johnson rose—
  Mr. Turton: I will give way a little later.
  This is of great importance, because the action during the last five months has so heated the passions of many people in various parts of the world that publicity will not help if we are sincerely anxious to get an honourable settlement of these problems.
  Mr. James Johnson: Would the right hon. Gentleman accept that an honourable settlement could only be on the basis of satisfying 4 million black men and their families who live in the territory and not simply satisfying the 200,000 white men? Is that not the only honourable basis for any agreement between Her Majesty's Government and Salisbury?
  Mr. Turton: The hon. Gentleman must not think that all the electors will ever be satisfied. The last election here proved that they were not all satisfied. The hon. Member is simplifying the problem. He is moving on to the next section of my speech.
  I believe, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for the Wirral (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd) rightly said, that the lines of the agreement to secure both the first objective and the second are the six terms which have been announced. I do not want to repeat them, because I want to make a short speech, but I should like to add to one.
  I do not believe that a crash programme of education is of the slightest use in Rhodesia unless it is accompanied by a crash programme of development. Every action which the British Government have taken in imposing sanctions has retarded

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  that possibility for the Africans. Therefore, Britain and the Commonwealth must make their contribution to a crash programme of education and of development.
  We should bear in mind that, only last week, the Minister of Education in Mr. Smith's Government announced a crash programme of primary education. I do not believe that that is sufficient, but at least it shows a certain amount of willingness. They have not the financial resources today to promote a crash programme of secondary education. That should be our aim and one of the offers which we make in the talks which are now to be held.
  Who are to conduct the talks? If I am right, and this is not merely a matter between us and Rhodesia, as to the assumption of the illegal régime, but is also a question of Rhodesia's place in the Commonwealth, it is very important that, in the second stage or in subsequent stages of the talks, Commonwealth statesmen should be asked to take part. As I see the position, in all these talks, we should talk not merely to the Government in power but also to those who are not in power.
  Therefore, not only should the Prime Minister of Britain take part in the talks, but also the Leader of the Opposition. Equally, in Rhodesia, not only should the Prime Minister of Rhodesia take part, but also the Leader of the Opposition—
  Mr. Molloy: He is in gaol.
  Mr. Turton: The Leader of the Opposition is Mr. Chad Chipunza, and he should be at the talks. It would be valuable if he were—
  An Hon. Member: Nkomo?
  Mr. Turton: I believe that representatives of Commonwealth countries should be at the talks. It would be of immense help if Sir Robert Menzies could be persuaded to take part, or, if he were not available, Mr. Harold Holt, the present Prime Minister of Australia, representing the Commonwealth countries outside Africa. I believe that the Commonwealth countries in Africa should also be represented at the talks. It might be of value if someone like General Ironsi of Nigeria could be asked to take part.
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  That is the kind of picture which I suggest to the House today—a body of seven men, representing this country, Rhodesia and the Commonwealth, to hammer out what is probably one of the most difficult problems with which any statesman has ever been faced in any part of the world. I believe that if that could be achieved, then the prayers of the whole world would be for the success of the deliberations of that body of men.
  6.6 p.m.
  Mr. F. J. Bellenger: After the statement by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, this debate has become something of an anti-climax. It is obvious that many of the things which many hon. Members wanted to say—as hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite have said, probably by way of criticism—and other remarks which I had wanted to make to the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State especially must fall by the wayside. I think that Mr. Speaker was right in reminding the House that, in those circumstances, speeches should be short. I will follow that advice.
  There were one or two points which might have been put by way of questions if we had had a longer opportunity. They were what one might call committee points, but they are relevant today. As the Prime Minister said, it is no good crying over spilt milk. Enough milk has been spilled already to cause considerable apprehension, not only in Rhodesia but in this country, where substantial interests are at stake in the policy being followed.
  I have not intervened in any debate on this subject before today since U.D.I. took place, because I thought that Mr. Ian Smith made a very grievous mistake in declaring U.D.I. However, that is in the past—at least we hope so—in view of what the Prime Minister has said. Therefore our thoughts should be directed to the future.
  The Prime Minister has said that informal talks will take place. What does that mean, precisely? The Prime Minister's Private Secretary has been to Rhodesia, as has an official of the Commonwealth Relations Office, and Mr. Smith has told the world—or his Parliament, which is the same thing—that that individual, a State servant, a civil servant, who has gone out there especially to explore the ground, said nothing to him,

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  or at least to those civil servants of the Rhodesian Government who saw him. He said that there were three.
  I submit that it is no use having informal discussions unless they are specific. In that respect, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, and the Prime Minister himself—we know that it is the Prime Minister who takes the initiatives in these things—must instruct those who enter into these informal discussions to discuss matters which will bring the present impossible situation to a successful conclusion. I will not ask my right Friend what these discussions should be about. I agree with him that they should be on a diplomatic basis and not in the glare of publicity, but obviously as the discussions proceed Questions will be asked in the House about the progress which the Prime Minister has made in the informal discussions, whoever he sends there.
  I suggest that our man in Rhodesia is there—the Governor. Although Mr. Smith has treated him somewhat discourteously, partly through the frustration that he felt through having Her Majesty's representative still there, I think that the Governor might be accorded a little more status by Mr. Smith and might possibly be used by the Prime Minister to conduct discussions, perhaps in an informal manner, because he is not now recognised by the Smith Government although we consider him to be the legal representative of the Crown in Rhodesia.
  If that is accepted by the Prime Minister, what comes next? One hopes that these informal discussions would soon be lifted off that basis on to the basis of formal discussions. Everybody now knows what is at stake and what are the differences between the Smith Government and ourselves. I have said that Mr. Smith acted very irresponsibly, but he was pushed into that position by many people in Rhodesia—good people on the whole, many of whom were met by the right hon. and learned Member for Wirral (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd) and many of whom I have met when I have been out there. They were afraid that they would be completely dispossessed and ignored, as has happened in African countries north of them, as we know only too well. It is small wonder that they were apprehensive and that, al-
  764
  though there are only 200,000 whites compared with 4 million blacks, the whites felt that they had done a good job there which should be recognised. Those who have seen Salisbury and other towns and who have seen the farms know what they have done in the 70 years since they took it from the jungle and created a modern industrial and agricultural State. Is there any wonder they they say, "We want to be as much masters of our fate as the blacks want to be masters of theirs"?
  How are we to bring these two conflicting interests together? That is the test of diplomacy. I urge the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State to study history and, in particular, recent history. I lived through the Irish rebellion when murder was abroad and when members of the Government of the day were under great difficulties and fear of assassination. Never let us forget that the I.R.A. came over here and assassinated a British field-marshal on his doorstep. It might have happened to Ministers, as it did to the Ministers in Ireland. But there had to be a time when these inflammatory circumstances were discussed round the table and there had to be give and take.
  A lot of give and take will have to take place between Britain and Rhodesia before a mutually acceptable settlement is reached. I think that at some time the House is entitled to know what the Prime Minister has in mind for a settlement without, as it were, putting all his cards on the table. It is remarkable how all politicians always keep their cards close to their chests, Mr. Smith in Rhodesia and the Prime Minister here. But the issues do not concern just those two gentlemen. They concern people who might slide into war, as has happened before, because all the big shots have kept their cards close to their chests as if they were playing a game of poker.
  The issue is as vital to the country as it is to Rhodesia. Look at the trouble which is being caused to considerable British interests at stake in Rhodesia, with Lloyds having to deny their own policies and not being permitted to conduct their business in a peaceful way. The two Governments have to get rid of that, for if it goes on for a long time it will not only be the future of Rhodesia which is at stake; as others have said, there will

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  be considerable difficulties for this country.
  Following a point made by the right hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton (Mr. Turton), I read two very illuminating responsible and statesmanlike articles in the Sunday Telegraph last Sunday, one from the former Australian Prime Minister, Sir Robert Menzies, and the other from Sir Roy Welensky. I have met and had long discussions with both these gentlemen, with Sir Robert Menzies as recently as last October. I should like to set the tone for the debate by reading quite shortly two extracts from these articles. Sir Robert Menzies, by no means entirely takes the British point of view, but he is in favour of sanctions. He refers to the older members of the Commonwealth, and one must make this distinction in debates on Africa because there are older members of the Commonwealth with far more experience, far more erudition and far more responsibility than is to be found in some of these coloured races to whom this country, not the United Nations, has given liberty.
  Sir Robert Menzies wrote:
  "The older members of the Commonwealth would, I am sure, welcome efforts towards creating a state of affairs in which the ultimate recognition of Rhodesia as a member of the Commonwealth, on a basis acceptable to the wisest African leaders and in conformity with the principles stated by the British Government could be made possible. But Mr. Smith and his followers must play their part."
  I will suggest one or two little things which Mr. Smith might do now to show his good will.
  We should never forget that Sir Roy Welensky was the Prime Minister of the Federation of the three constituent parts of the country until recently. He wrote in his article:
  "I am an opponent of U.D.I. but I love my country."
  That is simple language. I wonder how many of the coloured races whom we have liberated and who will have to look for their prosperity and their future to the white man, with all his powers for developing the country, could say it as simply as that. From what I have seen of them on television and in other ways, they are much more emotional. They want immediate power, and when they get it they do not know what to do with it. That means that for millions of people
  766
  their future is at stake because of the irresponsibility and naivety of their leaders.
  Sir Roy Welensky is out there, and if any man knows about that part of Africa, he does. He wrote:
  "We cannot be starved into submission."
  Let us put that together with the sentence, "I love my country." He adds,
  "Even if oil were cut off we could still limp along, but the long-term effects would be most damaging."
  They would, with the tobacco crop, which is the backbone of the Rhodesian economy, cut off at the behest of the British Government and the tobacco growers not being allowed to trade with anybody they liked.
  I do not know all the facts. It may be that the policy employed by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State was to avoid a bigger danger. We all know from where that danger comes. But the pursuance of these policies will bring Rhodesia into a state of confusion in which she will be ripe for real rebellion. What then will happen to British interests in Rhodesia? Certain other nations could not care a snap of the fingers about that.
  There is one suggestion which I want to make. I hope that it will be reported in Rhodesia; I suspect that Mr. Smith takes some interest in our debates in this House. He might let up a little on the conditions of austerity of the Governor. This would show good will. It would not bring about a further rebellion against his Government, but it would make life tolerable, as life should be made tolerable for civilised people even though they are in a country which is at odds with Britain. It would not matter much to Mr. Smith, but it would make the Governor more amenable to talks and possibly would lead to a better spirit in the so-called unofficial negotiations.
  Meantime, sanctions are being continued. Britain probably will not lose much if oil is stopped altogether, although I would remind those hon. Members who have experience of another occasion when oil sanctions were imposed on Italy at the behest of the League of Nations that they did not work. [HON. MEMBERS: "Why not?"] I am not concerned with that, The oil sanctions are not complete at present; never mind why. Industry in Rhodesia can be brought almost to a stop

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  only if the sanctions are made effective. But if they are made effective, if we stop all trade, this will lead to a situation in which it will not be possible for unofficial or official negotiations to take place. I am merely referring to another incident about which I know only too well and which eventually, with other reasons, precipitated us into war.
  Hon. Members may scoff at that suggestion as being extravagant. Let them read history and recent history. When a statement is made like that which I have just quoted from Sir Roy Welensky, 200,000 white people are not going down completely without asserting their rights, such as they are, even though they may be in conflict with 4 million black people. I do not want to introduce—[Interruption.]—perhaps hon. Members will wait. They anticipate quite a lot. Some hon. Members do not have much experience of this House. I do not want to make any statement which may exacerbate feelings. My right hon. Friend is quite right. But I must state the facts as I see them; and let my hon. Friends state the facts as they see them. This is a subject for debate. I have heard enough debates in this House to be able to draw many conclusions from them.
  We must hope that the Prime Minister will be successful. But we must also hope that British interests, which are suffering severely, will not be put to the test much longer. If they are, it will react on this country's balance of trade and we shall suffer. Then hon. Members can perhaps explain to their constituents what it is all about.
  I hope that when this debate concludes and negotiations start the House will be kept informed, as far as possible, about where we are going. At present we are in an impossible situation—not only Rhodesia but ourselves. Who will state with assurance that the United Nations will endorse a policy of sanctions or pass resolutions as they have just done and then leave it to Britain to carry them out at no expense to themselves? I am not so sure.
  For these and other reasons I welcome the Prime Minister's initiative, although he gave a reason for it with which I would not agree, namely, the efficacy of sanctions. Let us get the two sides together for talks. As Sir Winston Churchill said,
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  talk is better than war. I do not mean war in the physical sense, but a state of war exists between the two countries. I hope that we will urge the Prime Minister forward to a successful conclusion of formal as well as informal negotiations.
  6.27 p.m.
  Mr. Bernard Braine: It is, I think, true to say that until the Prime Minister's statement this afternoon the feeling was universal in this country that the Rhodesian problem was not merely eluding a solution but was proceeding step by step to a catastrophe which none of us on either side of the House wished to see. Suddenly there seems to be a light at the end of the tunnel. It is a very good thing that there are to be talks and that these talks are to be without commitment. I hope that there will be a readiness on both sides from the beginning to try to understand the point of view of the other. U.D.I. was technically an act of rebellion. It was an illegal act. It was an act carried out, I have no doubt, without the approval of the majority of the Rhodesian people. In my view, no British Government worth their salt could have done anything other than to condemn Mr. Smith's action. It was also an act of folly, because it precipitated a course of events which predictably would damage the interests of all the parties concerned.
  Then the great question arose as to what to do about it. Down the ages there has been only one way in which to deal with rebellion, and that is to put it down by force of arms. But one cannot put down a rebellion by staying many thousands of miles away and hurling invective at the rebels. I recall that Winston Churchill said in the 1930s, when the pacifist Left was talking about stopping Germany, that this could not be done by a card vote of the T.U.C. In this case the Prime Minister decided not to use force. He has protested all along that he has no intention of using force. In principle, he was quite right, because this was—and let us recognise it—a rebellion with a difference.
  First of all, British public opinion would never have supported military action. It is uneasy enough as it is about economic sanctions. The right hon. Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. Bellenger) rightly referred to what

  769
  happened in Ireland nearly 50 years ago. Memories of what happened there have been revived in recent weeks, and they are not happy memories; they underline the old saying that the grass never grows over the battlefields of civil war.
  Moreover, at the back of the Prime Minister's mind there must have been the knowledge that this rebellion was taking place, not in a dependency governed closely by the Colonial Office hut in a country which had enjoyed over 40 years of full responsible self-government. I would hope, therefore, that this fact, which must have been in the back of the Prime Minister's mind throughout, is in the forefront of our minds now we are approaching the question of talks. Rhodesian leaders had attended successive conferences of Commonwealth Prime Ministers for many years before a great many of the present Commonwealth countries had received their independence. Indeed, but for the Rhodesians' readiness to pool their material resources—and, I would add, their hopes and aspirations, too—in the ill-fated idea of the Central African Federation in 1953, they might have attained their political independence long ago.
  I do not wish to be misunderstood. In my heart, I do not believe that there is any future for the white man in Southern Africa unless he is prepared to move very much faster in offering a genuine partnership to the black man. Here I echo every word uttered by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Wirral (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd). On the other hand, as one who had some hand in the piloting of the 1961 Constitution through this House, I know that the majority of white Rhodesians at that time genuinely wanted a liberal solution. A good many of them accepted the inevitability of majority rule, although they thought then, as no doubt they think now, that the process would necessarily take a long time. But the fact that under the new Constitution virtually all Members of their new Legislature would owe their seats to the votes of both races would mean that in time the fact of race would matter less and less. That is the answer to the hon. Member who asked a question a moment ago about the 1961 Constitution. In the end, given time and
  770
  good will, it would have been possible to arrive at a multi-racial solution and majority rule.
  That was the belief then. If it changed subsequently, it is important for the House to understand why. I beg hon. Members who think—and a good many genuinely think—that all white Rhodesians are illiberal, to recall what happened in the years immediately following the introduction of the 1961 Constitution. Two developments conspired to inject fear into the situation and to destroy that confidence without which it was quite impossible for that Constitution to work.
  There was, first, the refusal—the ill-advised refusal—of the African Nationalists in Southern Rhodesia to work the 1961 Constitution; and their use of open intimidation, of arson and physical violence to prevent Africans from registering as voters in the first place, or once they had registered from casting their votes. The second development was on their borders—not in Hampshire or the Isle of Wight or Canvey Island—but the mounting chaos, mutilation and murder which became a daily occurrence in the Congo.
  If then the Prime Minister excluded the use of military action, as he was right to do, was there any hope of economic sanctions succeeding? The Prime Minister clearly and genuinely thought that those sanctions would succeed, and when it was plain that they were not bringing down the Smith régime quickly, which was the object of the exercise, he turned to oil sanctions. He told the Lagos Conference that this would do the trick in a matter of weeks. We now know that it did not do so.
  It is very easy to be wise after the event, and I am not casting myself in that rôle. When U.D.I. was declared I was on my way to the Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference in New Zealand. I returned in time for the debate on oil sanctions and abstained from the vote that followed. But had I caught your eye on that occasion, Mr. Speaker, I should have said that all who know Southern Africa, who have been there or who have friends and business acquaintances there, could have predicted the failure of economic sanctions to act quickly. That they would succeed in the long run in pulling Rhodesia down

  771
  there is no doubt, but they would not act quickly.
  The hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) was absolutely right when he said that sanctions had not rallied the moderates to us but had rallied them to Mr. Smith. Sanctions have had the effect of evoking something of the Dunkirk spirit in Rhodesia, and I would not sneer at that—there were many Rhodesians with us at Dunkirk. They have also had the effect of developing a pathological hatred—and I say it with great sorrow—for the Prime Minister. The one thing they have not done is to bring down the Smith régime quickly.
  On the other hand, sanctions have failed in their primary object of bringing down the régime quickly, they are likely to succeed in doing what could hardly have been in the mind of the Prime Minister at any time—in slowly eroding the Rhodesian economy, and paving the way for ultimate collapse which would make it quite impossible for the 250,000 whites to remain there except under the umbrella of South Africa. What a tragic irony that the people who, just over 40 years ago, had the opportunity of becoming the fifth province of the Union of South Africa but instead chose—proudly chose—self-government under the British Crown, should be faced with this agonising dilemma.
  This slow erosion simply could not have been in the Prime Minister's mind, because he must know, his advisers must have told him, that the first sufferers would not be the Europeans but the Africans. Every one of us who understands how the Rhodesian economy works, who knows how dependent it is on labour drawn from neighbouring territories, knows that long-drawn-out sanctions would hurt the Africans more than the Europeans. Prime Minister Banda really hit the nail on the head when he said:
  "I will not boycott Rhodesia, South Africa or Mozambique. If I boycott Rhodesia, am I boycotting Smith? No, I am boycotting my own people."
  The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bassetlaw referred to powerful articles in the Sunday Press. There was an equally powerful article in this week's Spectator, written by Sir Edgar Whitehead, who was responsible for intro-
  772
  ducing the 1961 Constitution. This is what he says on the subject:
  "The black are likely to suffer more than the white because the white are relatively so few that they can be helped by job-sharing and other devices, while the black are so numerous that it is probably beyond the resources of the régime to do much to assist them other than by returning as many non-Rhodesians as possible to Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia, thereby adding to the difficulties of those countries."
  He goes on to say that in London last November
  "…many people were talking as though sanctions would quickly bring Rhodesia to ruin. Today the wheel has swung full circle and many people are talking as though sanctions are doing no damage to Rhodesia at all. Both views are absurd. Of course damage is being done, but I doubt whether more than a third of the financial loss is falling on Mr. Smith's supporters."
  Where do we go from here? It is an impossible situation in which to find ourselves. My right hon. Friend the Member for Barnet (Mr. Maudling) was absolutely right when he spoke of the futility of raking up the past. In this context I remember Edmund Gosse's apt words:
  "The past is like a funeral gone by."
  Every raking up of the past serves only to exacerbate the position. What is needed now is fresh thinking, and I am delighted there is evidence that the Prime Minister is prepared to indulge in fresh thinking on how this unhappy business can be resolved.
  Until today I must confess it looked very much as if both the Prime Minister and Mr. Smith were too involved personally to resume the dialogue with any chance of success. Both have been protesting for some time that they wanted talks. Now there are to be talks, and that is good, but how do we take the statement by the Secretary of State this afternoon that this does not represent any change in policy? It is imperative that this should be clarified by the Attorney-General when he replies tonight, because one of the most alarming features of the Government's policy until this afternoon has been their belief that at the end of the day it would be necessary for Britain to impose a period of direct rule on Rhodesia. On that basis, there could be no talks. I hope, therefore, that the Attorney-General will spell out exactly what the Secretary of State meant, because it does not fit in with what the Prime Minister was saying earlier.

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  On the other hand, I hope that a great deal of attention will be attached to the wise words of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Wirral. Clearly Rhodesia is not in a position to bring about a rapid improvement in the economic and educational standards of her people if we are to see the 1961 Constitution, which I take it will be the basis of any settlement, being treated as something which Africans as well as Europeans can accept. It may be that, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys) said, we in this country will have to pay an appreciable price. I hope that after all the moralising we have indulged in we shall be prepared for that. There is need to get rid of racial discrimination. There is need for give and take on both sides.
  I do not believe that the going will be easy. I hope that nothing will be allowed to break off these talks once they have started. My right hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton (Mr. Turton) suggested that Commonwealth statesmen might be brought in to assist. I understand that Sir Roy Welensky, who of course was an opponent of U.D.I. but is a passionate Rhodesian patriot, has been suggesting that an outside mediator should be called in and suggested an American of the stature of Dean Acheson. That is an idea, but there is no need to go outside the Commonwealth. There is no more respected or experienced figure than Sir Robert Menzies. I hope that the Prime Minister will consider this.
  I was reading the other day what was said of Disraeli:
  "that he educated the Tories and dished the Whigs to pass Reform, but to have become what he is from what he was, is the greatest reform of all."
  I say this in a genuine spirit of friendliness to the Prime Minister. He will lose nothing at all but will gain a great deal in reputation and stature if he is prepared now to break fresh ground. That would be a reform which the whole nation would welcome. Somewhere, someone has got to make a start in bringing about a settlement, in securing justice—perhaps rough justice at this stage—for both black and white. Otherwise, if the situation is allowed to drift, the interests of black and white in Rhodesia will suffer, conflict will spread, chaos will ensue and one of
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  the most hopeful parts of Africa will slip back into darkness.
  The responsibility resting on the shoulders of the Prime Minister and Mr. Smith is enormous. Neither of them can afford now to let the situation drift. It would be tragically ironic if this final chapter of Britain's mission in Africa was concerned with bringing ruin to what many of us know has been a prosperous and civilised country. Equally, what could be said of obstinate men who control the levers of power in Rhodesia persisting on a course which makes it impossible for their children and their children's children to enjoy their inheritance? I therefore beg the Prime Minister and Mr. Smith, when considering their duty in this matter, to remember Thomas Jefferson's warning, uttered soon after another U.D.I. He was thinking of the contradiction between a state of slavery in the new United States and the high principles enshrined in the Declaration of Independence, when he said:
  "I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just."
  6.45 p.m.
  Mr. Ben Whitaker: As this is my first speech in this House, I should like to start by paying tribute, as the new Member for Hampstead, to my predecessor, Mr. Henry Brooke, both for his integrity in taking unpopular decisions and for his courage in changing his mind on the issue of capital punishment. Both these are not easily found qualities inside politics or out. He and I have successively had the honour to represent a constituency which it would be presumptuous of me to say is an intelligent one, but which is one I believe concerned less with party than with principle. I believe I was elected despite rather than because of my own party's record on immigration and Vietnam.
  It has been said in some quarters that the issue of Rhodesia was shielded from the electorate at the last election, but certainly at my meetings Rhodesia was the issue most frequently discussed. Some of the most memorable moments of the campaign were when people who had voted Conservative all their lives—this meant for some 10 or 15 times—told me that this time they would vote Labour, although some of them found difficulty in bringing that word to their mouths because they were unaccustomed to it,

  775
  because, to use their words, of their view of some Conservatives' appeasement of an illegal racialist police State. Hon. Members might also be interested to know that I received letters from Service men of high and low rank who were unable to write to the Press to express their disgust that they had been slandered by the accusations that they would not fight against racists because they were white racists.
  I shall speak briefly tonight on behalf of another very large body of men who are supremely and vitally concerned in this debate but who have no voice here. I mean the people of Rhodesia of all races who have been loyal to Britain and democratic principles in the last few months. We here are purporting to be their legal Government, yet for the last five months we have been unable to prevent them being imprisoned and restricted without trial. We have seen their families made destitute, both European and African, because of their belief in the rule of law. They have been intimidated by measures of Mr. Ian Smith, such as the one which makes it an imprisonable offence to bring a Minister into disrepute or to spread alarm and despondency. I think that hon. Members will agree that those are the bases of a free Press.
  While I was in Rhodesia I saw even school children arrested and punished for peacefully declaring their loyalty to Britain. Conditions in Rhodesia have been accurately described by a courageous bishop who has been living there during the last few months as being no different from those obtaining in Nazi Germany or occupied France. Let us never forget that it was on the 1961 Constitution that these discriminatory laws were based, and it is under that Constitution that the apartheid principles of the Land Apportionment Act are still existing in Rhodesia.
  I found it a very unpleasant experience to be a Briton in Rhodesia since U.D.I., because one was impotent to help those people who have the courage to speak their minds by actions and words to what we were only saying in this country by words. I ask the Government tonight to give a pledge that we shall not forget these people and will compensate them fully for their courage and suffering because they have been bearing the brunt of our own responsibilities during the last few months.
  776
  I found the really shaming thing about being a Briton in Rhodesia since U.D.I. to be this. If U.D.I. had been seized in Aden, who can doubt that honourable and gallant Members opposite would have been loud in their demands for immediate force to arrest the rebel leaders? Supposing the same thing had happened in Belfast, would hon. Members opposite who represent Ulster seats have suggested that we negotiate with those people for five months? Some Americans have rightly commented in the past few weeks that even President Eisenhower was prepared to take stronger measures against his own countrymen at Little Rock, Arkansas.
  I suggest that the difficulty of talks with Mr. Ian Smith became apparent before U.D.I. and has been exactly the same ever since. It is simply that, if Mr. Smith ever makes the slightest concession, he knows full well that he will be replaced by a more extreme politician. It is in this light that I would like respectfully to congratulate Her Majesty's Government on taking the action they did through the United Nations. I think that moment was an historic landmark in the evolution of civilisation in the world. It is, I think, in eloquent contrast not only with this country's previous action at Suez but also with the American activities in Vietnam at present. Unless we can solve the problem of Rhodesia in a fully democratic and speedy way, we shall rightly be asked to cease pretending to a responsibility which we appear to be incapable of discharging.
  In those circumstances let us not hesitate to ask the United Nations to take the fullest multilateral rôle here. Meanwhile, let us never be afraid of advocating a full democracy in Rhodesia. We have seen the fears of European settlers about an African government dispelled in Zambia and in Kenya. Africans, fortunately, seem to differ from Europeans in their freedom from colour prejudice, despite the fact that they have so much more logical reason for feeling it.
  Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles: On a point of order. I am very reluctant indeed to interrupt an hon. Member who is making his maiden speech, because I remember, from having undergone it not so long ago, the ordeal which a maiden speech involves. However, is it not a convention in the House

  777
  that Members during their maiden speeches do not raise controversial matters?
  Mr. Speaker: I am really distressed that the hon. and gallant Gentleman, who himself made a maiden speech so recently should have raised a point of order which is not a point of order during a maiden speech.
  Mr. Tom Driberg: Disgraceful!
  Mr. Whitaker: I am grateful to you, Mr. Speaker. What Africans in Rhodesia cannot stomach, and rightly so, is the fact that over 90 per cent. of them are at present denied any democratic representation.
  I am sure, from having talked to people of all races in Rhodesia, that there are enough people of all races there who are free from colour prejudice and who will be willing to form a non-racial coalition. Government along the lines of the plan recently suggested by the distinguished Rhodesian lawyer, Mr. Hardwick Holderness. There are in fact more graduates amongst the Africans in exile and in concentration camps in Rhodesia tonight than there are amongst the Rhodesian Front Cabinet, so the replacement of the latter will be to the benefit of the advancement of civilisation in Rhodesia.
  To conclude, every moral and practical consideration for both Britain and Rhodesia unite to demand that we lose no further time in taking any effective step as long as that results in the reconstruction of a democratic Rhodesia as soon as possible. I know that many hon. Members will watch very carefully to see that we do not in the negotiations ahead compromise with essential moral principles, so that we never again have any repetition of the succession of Rhodesian crises we have had in past years. Let us insist that these talks are with all Rhodesians and not with the tiny minority of them for whom Mr. Smith purports to speak. Time and time again this afternoon we heard hon. Members opposite reveal their minds by talking of Rhodesians when they quite clearly meant only white Rhodesians. Let Her Majesty's Government never fall into the same error in the negotiations ahead.
  6.55 p.m.
  Mr. Patrick Wall: This is the first time that I have had the good fortune to be able to congratulate an hon. Member after making his maiden speech. I am delighted to be able to congratulate the hon. Member for Hampstead (Mr. Whitaker). I think all hon. Members will have particularly appreciated the generous tribute he paid to his predecessor in that seat. We welcome the views the hon. Gentleman expressed on Rhodesia, even though they may have been rather controversial. I also welcome his belief in freedom—freedom, I am sure he will agree, for both black and white. I hope that we shall meet the hon. Gentleman frequently in controversial debates, on Rhodesia and on other subjects, in the future, and I look forward to having the opportunity of crossing swords with him on a later occasion.
  I visited Rhodesia in January and have recently returned from a visit to Singapore, Australia and the United States. These visits convinced me, both from the point of view of Britain and from the point of view of Rhodesia, and indeed of the outside world, that the final settlement of this dispute between Britain and Rhodesia must be made within the next few weeks. That is how I intended to open my speech, Mr. Speaker. I think that the statement the Prime Minister made this afternoon, of which of course I did not know when I wrote down my notes, underlines the fact that this really is the last chance of settling this unfortunate dispute before it spreads into a conflagration of war.
  In view of this, I think that it is right to examine both the economic and political background as it is at present. I think that the Secretary of State's apologia for the Government's action was more than a little biased and one-sided. I want very briefly to discuss the present economic situation. I believe, as do many other hon. Members, that sanctions have failed if their design was to bring the Rhodesian Government to their knees. It is quite clear that sanctions may have induced a belief that it would be wise to negotiate. It is equally clear, I think, that sanctions have failed to bring the Rhodesian Government down or to make them disposed to surrender unconditionally.

  779
  Obviously, the nub of the whole policy of sanctions was the petrol and oil blockade. It is quite clear that sufficient petrol and oil for some time to come are still getting into Rhodesia. When I visited Salisbury and Bulawayo, I saw a very large number of foreigners who were prepared to buy or sell Rhodesian goods under the counter—at a price, of course, but, above all, on the understanding that, when sanctions were finally lifted, their country would have a share of the market which up to that time had been almost exclusively British.
  Again, I have been reliably informed in the last few days that over 50 per cent. of this year's tobacco crop has been sold to foreign buyers. I also understand that both chrome and asbestos are getting through the blockade. I am told that there may be a coal shortage in Rhodesia because so much coal is going to export.
  Again, we have been told that one of the main dangers facing the present Rhodesian de facto Government is a shortage of foreign exchange. Yet the allocation of foreign exchange to industry in the second quarter of this year is 20 per cent. higher than the allocation in the first quarter of this year. So it does not look as if foreign exchange will knock the Rhodesian de facto Government out in a short period of time. Indeed, they are saving something like £13 million a year in foreign exchange by not servicing the loans taken over by Britain when she took over the Rhodesian Reserve Bank.
  Against this background, it is fair to say that a number of foreigners are beginning to think that the blockade is breaking down and are therefore preparing to get into the Rhodesian market on a rather larger scale than they have done during the past few months. Some very prominent foreigners—I will not name any, but hon. Members may know who I have in mind—have been visiting Rhodesia recently. I believe that there will be considerable developments in trade following these visits.
  There is, of course, the other side of the picture. Small textile firms in Rhodesia have closed down. Some major firms have been prohibited from discharging their employees and, therefore, are obviously suffering because they
  780
  have to pay their employees although they have not any work for them. I understand that Standard Telephones has been closed and that this business has been taken over by foreigners. It is clear that shop employees and building operatives have been affected quite seriously, but there are many jobs for this type of worker in South Africa and many of them will go to South Africa and get other employment while continuing to send money to their families in Rhodesia.
  Therefore, I think it is clear that those who claim that the policy of sanctions was intended to soften up Rhodesia to persuade her to negotiate have made a case, but those who claim that the object of sanctions was to bring about the unconditional surrender of the Rhodesian Government have not made their case, and it is unlikely that they will ever do so. In other words, the short-term effect of sanctions may have been reasonably satisfactory from the point of view of Her Majesty's Government, but the long-term effect of sanctions is unlikely ever to be satisfactory from the point of view of the Government in this country. It may, indeed, lead to a slowing down of Rhodesian industry, but it has clearly created a strong anti-British feeling and a consumer boycott not only in Rhodesia but in other territories of Southern Africa. This means, whatever happens in the talks, a serious and inevitable long-term loss of markets and invisibles in both Rhodesia and South Africa. This could be very disastrous for the economic future of this country when our balance of payments exists on such a narrow margin as it does today.
  While considering the economic background, one must bear in mind the cost of economic sanctions to this country. The trade loss has been estimated at £33 million a year and the loss in invisibles at £26 million a year. The cost of the economic war—the additional cost of copper and similar matters—is estimated at £6 million; exchange control guarantees £10 million; the airlift to Zambia £7 million; economic assistance to Zambia £7 million; extra service costs £2 million; the maintenance of a Javelin squadron in Zambia £3 million; improvements to Zambian roads £3½ million; the Francistown Radio £½ million. That totals £98 million in a year. In addition to that, the guarantees to the World Bank

  781
  on Kariba, if they are called in, amount to £65 million, and British assets in Rhodesia, which could be taken over by the Rhodesian Government, total £108 million. The bill to the British economy, if these proposed talks do not succeed and if the situation deteriorates, could be well over £200 million and probably nearer £300 million in a full year. This leaves out of account the effect on invisibles, banking and trade in South Africa, Mozambique and Angola.
  I wish to follow the example of other hon. Members who have spoken in the debate and to keep my speech fairly short. May I, therefore, deal briefly with the political background. The most important change is the use of Chapter VII which sanctions the use of force, and the use that tie British Government have made of this sanction—in other words, the fact that Britain has used force on the high seas. The Prime Minister only yesterday distinguished between the use of force to prevent oil from getting into Rhodesia and the use of force in Rhodesia itself. I appreciate that distinction, but I do not believe that any representative of the Afro-Asian bloc in the United Nations will make that same distinction.
  I believe, therefore, that these talks must succeed and that the alternative to talks succeeding may well be mandatory sanctions imposed by the United Nations. This means—and the House must consider the possibility—a naval blockade of the whole of Southern Africa. It means that the British would be the first to be hit. British investment in South Africa totals over £1,000 million. Last year South Africa was our third largest customer. Exports last year to South Africa were £261 million and imports from South Africa were £181 million. This means that we had a balance of trade in our favour of £80 million. This is no mean achievement in these days when our balance of payments is balanced on a knife-edge, quite apart from the fact that 70 per cent. of the gold backing of the free world's currency comes from South Africa, and Southern Africa contains 4 million white people, which some hon. Members opposite seem to forget.
  In describing the political background, I have mentioned the use of Chapter VII and mandatory sanctions, and I now want to refer briefly the effect of the use of force or the threat to use force on British
  782
  Services. I recently visited the Middle East and the Far East, and I believe that the effect on morale of the possibility of hostilities with Rhodesia has been very severe indeed. The Prime Minister will know what inquiries have been made and I understand that the older men, the officers and senior N.C.O.s, have made their views fairly plain. In Australia there is official support for the British Government's policy of sanctions. But there is strong unofficial opposition, and I think this was manifest in the Australian Government's recent refusal of the British Government's request to increase economic sanctions. They know that they will be the next to be subject to Afro-Asian pressures.
  In the United States the prevailing view was summed up in an article in this week's edition of the United States News and World Report. I should like to quote two paragraphs which are indicative of the views of many people to whom I spoke in the United States last week:
  "The U.N. which voted to authorise armed force against peaceful Rhodesia has failed to act against Communist war-makers in Vietnam. Britain which sought and got co-operation on a naval blockade and trade with Rhodesia insists on trading with war-making North Vietnam whose troops are killing Americans. The British also continue to trade with Communist China and Communist Cuba. American urgings to halt such trade are rejected."
  That is a very strong feeling of the Americans. They have been asked to follow the British Government's policy as far as Rhodesia is concerned but there has not been much reciprocal action.
  Now I turn to the talks themselves, and I should like to say how delighted I am, as I am sure every hon. Member is, at the Prime Minister's statement today. The Rhodesian Prime Minister said only yesterday that he would be prepared to talk without any preconditions. Our Prime Minister has now accepted this offer. I would say that when I discussed possible negotiations with various members of the Rhodesian Government and with friends in all walks of life, both black and white, in Rhodesia I found the general view that in order for the talks to succeed there must be an agreement to put the operation of U.D.I. on one side. A leading Rhodesian said, "You cannot expect us to give up U.D.I. Equally we cannot expect your Prime

  783
  Minister to recognise U.D.I. Let us therefore put U.D.I. on one side. Let us put aside the 1961 Constitution and the 1965 Constitution. Let us concentrate on talks for a new constitution which will give legal effect to independences". I believe that is good advice and that talks along those lines could succeed. If we really are endeavouring to find a constitution which can be agreed between Her Majesty's Government in Britain and Her Majesty's Government in Rhodesia to give legal independence to that country, we could succeed. If we make clear that that is our aim the Rhodesians will co-operate.
  I believe that we can get agreement on a blocking operator and that it is also important to come to an agreement for the gradual repeal of the Land Apportionment Act. In talks with Africans, I have found that this affected them more than any one other issue. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Wirral (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd) referred to the views of an African doctor working in a hospital. It is the same with African Members of Parliament. There must be a gradual repeal of the Land Apportionment Act, but one cannot expect it to be thrown out of the window altogether, because it prohibits for example, European traders going to the African tribal areas and taking over the trade. Only Africans can at present trade in these areas, so that the Act affords a great deal of protection to the Africans. Therefore, it cannot be repealed overnight; it can, however, be modified.
  I should like to emphasise the advice given by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Wirral and my right hon. Friend the Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys) who said that economic assistance from Britain to speed up educational advance must be accompanied by healthy economic development. It is no good producing high-grade students from secondary schools or universities unless we can also produce jobs for them. There is nothing worse than an educated and frustrated man. He turns to politics, and we all know the unfortunate result in many parts of Africa. Therefore, I think that any educational programme must be accompanied by a programme of economic development and economic help must be provided for both.
  784
  These talks can succeed and, what is as important, is that for the first time a British Prime Minister could sell an agreement made with a Rhodesian Government to the Commonwealth and to the United Nations. He could do this because he can now say, "I have thrown the book at Mr. Smith and in so doing I have really damaged the economy of my own country and now I have reached an agreement which I believe to be fair to all races in Rhodesia which Mr. Smith can accept. Therefore you must accept it, or you can go and jump in the lake." This is a very important matter, as I believe that the factor inhibiting all previous British Prime Ministers has been that any agreement they might have reached with the Rhodesian Government would never have been accepted either by the Commonwealth or by the United Nations. I am sure that that is now out of the way and that both the Commonwealth and the United Nations would accept an agreement which both our Prime Minister here and Mr. Smith accepted.
  The House must not be too optimistic. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton (Mr. Turton) said, we are going to start talks to start talks. The House and the country must consider the alternatives. What could happen if talks failed? It is by looking at the terrible alternatives that we shall create the right approach to the talks. It must be fully understood on both sides that these talks have to succeed.
  But, if they fail, what are the alternatives? First, a continuation of the economic blockade. I do not think that this will satisfy the Commonwealth, and I gather that the Commonwealth Ministers are coming together to discuss the question in July. Not much can be done further to strengthen the economic blockade, and, as I have said several times in this House I do not believe that South Africa will ever stop supplying oil and petrol to Rhodesia. She knows that, if she does so, the same sanctions will be applied to her within six months. As I have said, there are signs that the economic blockade is now breaking down and that other countries are beginning to take advantage of the British position.
  The next alternative is the direct use of force by British troops. There was talk during the election campaign, rather wild talk, I thought, of the use of two British

  785
  brigade groups. It has been estimated that two divisions would be required. Whether it be two brigades or two divisions, where are they to come from today, and if we could find anything like that number of troops, what would their morale be like? We must face the fact that, if a British force were used in this way, say, moving over the Zambian border to invade Rhodesia, immediately South African volunteers in plain clothes, would come north to help the Rhodesians. When I was in South Africa, someone remarked to me, "If there was any invasion either by the United Nations or by Britain into Rhodesia, there would be only generals left in South Africa because everyone else would be gone over the border iii plain clothes". This may not be palatable, but we must face these facts. Any such idea could well lead to defeat and, in any case, such action would be disastrous for both Britain and Rhodesia. Therefore, we should put the use of British troops out of our minds.
  But we cannot put out of our minds the use of United Nations forces. If these talks fail, the United Nations, whether we like it or not, may impose mandatory sanctions. [Interruption.] The majority can ask for mandatory sanctions and this can be put to the Security Council. Would it be vetoed by Britain? All the remarks of the Prime Minister over the last three or four months have led me to believe that we should not veto such a suggestion because, as he said on one occasion, if I remember aright, such action would lose us the Commonwealth. He had an exchange with my right hon. Friend the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) some months ago on this very issue. It may well be that the French would exercise the veto, and that might save our skins. But then, of course, there is the procedure of the "Uniting for Peace" resolution which gets round a veto in the Security Council. Although it might not be enforeable, such a move could produce great international pressure.
  If these talks fail, there will be very heavy pressure from the United Nations for mandatory sanctions, which could mean either a naval blockade or the putting of troops into Rhodesia, presumably via Zambia. This would be absolutely fatal to all concerned. However, such action could get off the ground only
  786
  if someone were ready to pay for it. The United Nations could not, of course, pay for such operations. Here we come again to the Americans. I understand that a report was recently prepared for the President on this very matter. No doubt, the decision there would be wrapped up more as a matter of internal politics than anything else, as to how much such action could help to gain the negro vote in any future election. I am certain that the Americans would not wish to involve themselves in another Vietnam. They have more than enough on their plate at the moment.
  What is clear is that any such action as an oil blockade of the whole of Southern Africa would be regarded by the four nations affected as an act of war, and the first to suffer would be Britain through her investment and her trade.
  I conclude in this way. The real danger we face is United Nations intervention, which would be as ineffective but far more destructive than in the Congo. It would be destructive not only to Africa but to the West as a whole. I quote here a paragraph from a report by three Congressmen who were sent to Rhodesia recently by the American African Affairs Association:
  "It would be comforting to assume that sanity will prevail, that the ideologised fury of Britain's Prime Minister Wilson will be recognised for what it is and not for the principled assault on racism that it claims to be".
  These three Congressmen conclude that,
  "Rhodesia as now constituted will not be crushed by Mr. Wilson and the Labour Government of England. There is a firm determination to stand up to whatever the British, the neighbouring African States and the United States of America can throw at them …".
  The House must realise that the only sane alternative to war is talks. I am convinced that the vast majority of the British people are in favour of negotiations. Negotiations have now been announced in the House by the Prime Minister. In the referendum recently carried out by the Anglo-Rhodesian Society, 74 per cent. of those approached wanted negotiations. In a similar referendum by the Sunday Post of Glasgow the number in favour was, I understand, 92 per cent. In the Daily Express questionnaire during the election period a total of 71 per

  787
  cent. opposed the use of force. I understand also that the Daily Express also ran a questionnaire among Labour Party candidates during the election campaign, asking them, "Would you approve the use of forcre against Rhodesia in any circumstances?". The newspaper told us that only seven gave an unqualified "Yes", and 117 gave an unqualified "No", with many others giving specified answers either way.
  The point I am trying to make is clear. We have been saved today, by the action of the British Prime Minister and the Prime Minister of Rhodesia in agreeing to talks, from the grave risk of war. The choice, I am quite sure, is still between peace and war. This choice lies wholly in the hands of our Prime Minister, and he will go down in history and be remembered by history for the decision he makes. It looks now as though the Prime Minister will come down on the side of peace. I devoutly hope that he will, but I hope also that he will remember that time is running out.
  7.18 p.m.
  Mr. R. T. Paget: If I may, in this new Parliament, I shall say a word to introduce myself. I know Rhodesia. I have taken a great interest in Rhodesian politics for 20 years. I have been a forward critic of the native policy and its unfairnesses under both the Federal Government and the Rhodesian Government. Indeed, I received the accolade, if that be the right word, on one occasion, of being described by Sir Roy Welensky as "the worst b… of the lot". My hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull, West (Mr. James Johnson)—who, I think, is the other Member on this side who knows Rhodesia—and I achieved by our combined agitation some reforms which were very beneficial to the black Africans.
  But, when it came to this issue, I took the view from the start—not because I wanted it to be so but because I knew it to be so—that independence was inevitable and would have to be accepted, that penal sanctions would only have the effect of uniting the Rhodesians behind Smith, and that we should have to negotiate with Smith. In all this, I committed the political crime of being right too soon.
  788
  None the less, I welcome the present decision and, in particular, that "toppling Smith" has ceased to be numbered among our objectives. I do not think that hon. Members who talked about toppling Smith had any idea what it meant. Toppling Smith meant breaking the spirit of white Rhodesia. A country lives, above all, on its spirit, not only material things. What is important is the will, the belief and the confidence in itself. If one destroys that, one has destroyed the future. In doing that, one would utterly destroy the prospect of racial co-operation. That is what happened in the southern states of America; they destroyed the spirit of the South, and the resulting racial bitterness endured for 100 years, a wretched decadent society. That is what we should have landed ourselves with, because all white Rhodesians identified themselves with Mr. Smith once this decision was taken.
  Let us remember that if we had toppled Smith we should not have had a Civil Service there because the Civil Service would have been defeated, bitter and hating. We should not have had a police force there, because it would have been defeated, bitter and hating. We should have had no co-operation from the whites. The Africans of Rhodesia—this may be our fault, or it may be nobody's fault—are not capable of governing, not capable of forming a Civil Service and not capable of forming a police force—yet. Time has to be given. If we had toppled Smith Rhodesian civilisation would have toppled too. It would have been a tragedy for Rhodesia, for Africa and for us. So I am thankful that that is out of the way. Now we have an opportunity to get a sensible agreement. This agreement must be our responsibility. We must not be diverted by other considerations or by outside interests.
  I should, therefore, like to look for a moment at the Organisation for African Unity, the creation of Dr. Nkrumah, to see to what extent it is responsible, to what extent it is representative and to what extent it has power. As to its responsibility, I think it will be judged by two of its efforts. There was the conference at Addis Ababa which unanimously agreed to withdraw recognition from Britain. In that conference there seemed to be no distinction between members of the Commonwealth and those who were

  789
  not members of the Commonwealth, and members of the Commonwealth who withdrew recognition decided to remain members of the Commonwealth. That is a measure of its responsibility. Also, half of them were repudiated by their own Governments before they got back home.
  The other measure of responsibility is shown by those on the Committee of 24, the anti-colonial committee of the United Nations. Just consider its latest effort in Aden—full support for the terrorists in Aden, with a refusal to hear what we had to say because what the colonial Powers said should not be considered. I think that this, too, is a measure of its responsibility.
  Let us for a moment see how representative they are. What is not realised in this House is how astonishingly narrow-bottomed these African Governments are. Consider for a moment Mr. Smith in Rhodesia. He has the conscious support of the Europeans, perhaps 7 per cent. of the population. He probably has the opposition of the Nationalists, which may be 200,000-300,000—another 7 per cent. of the population. Apart from that, there is the passive acquiescence of the great tribal minority. This passive acquiescence is an African phenomenon—acquiescence to the Government. It is similar to the acquiescence to the blind movement of the fates, the elements, the weather, and the tribal gods. This acquiescence dernands no more than a minimum interference with the tribal habits and customs.
  I say that Mr. Smith, with his 7 per cent support, has probably far more popular support than nine-tenths of the Governments in Africa. Let us look at them for a moment. They are both narrow-bottomed and unstable. Not 5 per cent. of Africans north of the Zambesi know or care whether Rhodesia is black, white or piebald. Let us first look at Francophone Africa. In all that part the language of Government is French and participation in Government is confined to the very small numbers who speak French anyway. That is how we start.
  It is expressed by five military dictatorships and seven one-party presidencies. It is probably misleading to call them Fascist, because they do not enjoy anything like the popular backing which Fascist régimes had.
  790
  Then let us look at some of the others. Let us take Nigeria. What do the Nigerian Government represent today? They represent a group of Ibo officers who have seized power by murdering the Government. We seem to have recognised them a week after they had murdered the Prime Minister of Nigeria, a colleague of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister of this country and his recent host.
  In Ghana we have another Government which represents a military dictatorship. In the Congo we have a Government which represents a military dictatorship. In the Sudan we have not only a military dictatorship but a savagely racial one. This is an Arab military dictatorship which is engaged in what is very near to genocide of the negroes in the south, with the refugees going across the frontier into Kenya and into Ethiopia. Terrible things are happening there. In Ethiopia we have a medieval monarchic autocracy fully engaged in an undeclared war with Somalia.
  Look at Tanzania. Mr. Nyerere has not recovered, I very much regret to say, from having to be rescued by our troops from his own mutineers. Tanzania is in a sorry state. The writ of Government is not running. Let us take Zambia. The Zambians are the real victims of these sanctions. They are in a terrible mess. A quick settlement is necessary if Kaunda is to be saved. He is the man who is in real peril.
  Finally, there is Dr. Banda, the one man who can talk sense because he is sufficiently secure to do so. Let there be no doubt at all that in their hearts Nyerere and Kaunda are longing to see this settled, because it is an appalling peril to them, but only Banda is sufficiently secure to come out and say so.
  So much, then, for the representativeness of O.A.U. What about its military capacity? It is simply non-existent. Dr. Banda has said that two platoons of the Rhodesian army could dispose of all the forces that black Africa could place on the Zambesi. This is the truth and the reality.
  So what have we there? There is no responsibility, and there is no real representativeness. There is impotence. There is sound and fury signifying nothing. I urge my right hon. Friend not to let the

  791
  O.A.U., in or out of the Commonwealth, stand in the way of a just solution on Rhodesia.
  I come to the point on which I disagree with the hon. Member for Haltemprice (Mr. Wall)—the position at the United Nations. This matter has been assigned to the Security Council, and under Chapter VII, Article 12, the General Assembly is excluded while the Security Council is seized of it. On the Security Council we have a veto. Our consent is necessary. But hon. Members should not imagine that it is only our consent which stands in the way of Chapter VII mandatory sanctions. We had the utmost difficulty in persuading both the French and the Americans to go as far as they did this time.
  The French we persuaded, but only for concessions to General de Gaulle's policy in Europe, not to exercise their veto this time. The Americans were most anxious to help us in Rhodesia. They regard it as our business and they were anxious to help because, as they put it, we had been "good guys" in Vietnam. But they drew the line, and told my right hon. Friend so, "Rhodesia is your business but we cannot recognise that as far as South Africa is concerned. We do not want to become involved in South Africa over it." If it is a question of using the Security Council it is not a matter that they will go ahead of us; it will need the utmost persuasion and effort on our part to persuade and drive them along.
  Mr. Wall: I hope that the hon. Member is right about the United States. Would he not agree that there is a fairly strong body of opinion, at any rate in the State Department, which feels that strong action against the whites in Africa consolidates votes behind the President of the United States?
  Mr. Paget: There may be a section holding that view but it certainly is not dominant, that certainly is not American policy and that certainly is not the reaction which we have had. On this matter we can possibly push the Security Council to further sanctions with great difficulty and great pressure, but if we want to stop and agree, let us look at some of the members of the Security Council: America, France, Taiwan, Japan, Holland, New Zealand, We only
  792
  have to persuade Jordan or one South American and we have a majority there for any settlement. We need not be inhibited by U.N.O.
  Let us realise that the alternative here is war—there is no question about it—because sanctions are not going to work. Portugal and South Africa cannot allow sanctions to work. It is a matter of self-preservation. Edgar Whitehead has pointed out the facts in the current Spectator. I do not like Dr. Verwoerd and I do not approve of his policy, but he is not a Chamberlain or a Daladier, and he can recognise his Czechoslovakia as well as anybody else. Mr. Kapwepwe, the Foreign Minister of Zambia, said only two nights ago on television that if Rhodesia were broken, then of course South Africa's spine would also be broken. Dr. Verwoerd can see that as well as Mr. Kapwepwe, and to imagine that he can allow Rhodesia to fall is simply wishful thinking. If this goes on it can only escalate into war, and it would be a terrible and costly war. Those who were responsible for it would be as guilty of a crime against humanity as any who are buried at Nuremberg. This would be a dreadful thing to allow to happen.
  What can we do? I should like to do a balance sheet of what the mere continuation of the present situation would cost us. I was astonished at the figure given by the right hon. Member for Barnet (Mr. Maudling). Look at the costs. The cost of the airlift to Zambia and various other services is £19½ million a year. I have not the cost of a naval blockade of the Mozambique channel, but it is an expensive operation keeping ships at sea and aircraft constantly on patrol—a very expensive operation.
  There is trade with Rhodesia. We lose £30 million in exports. We earned, and probably have lost permanently, in insurance and services and interest, another £18 million. Apart from that we have to get our raw materials at far higher prices from non-sterling sources.
  Then consider copper. It is very expensive to get copper, and it takes a long time to sink a mine—and copper happens to be obtained in areas of bad political stability. As a result there is a very close margin between the supply and demand for copper. One of the factors which has caused prices to go wild is a strike in Chile, but another factor is what is

  793
  happening in Rhodesia. People have been stocking up for fear of what might happen to supplies. There has also been a strike in Zambia.
  The present price rise alone is costing us upwards of £60 million on our balance of payments. If we were to extend the sanctions to Zambian trade then, on the Board of Trade's most optimistic estimate, it might be possible to get 60 per cent. of the copper out of Zambia but not more. The copper trade tell me that it would be nearer 45 per cent. The loss of even 40 per cent. of Zambian copper means that we go shopping for an additional 100,000 tons of copper in a world which has not got it, and that means that copper prices—again I am told this by my friends in the industry—will rise to over £1,000 a ton. This will be another £200 million on our balance of payments.
  Look at the problem of South Africa. South Africa is about our biggest customer. She takes £265 million a year in our goods. But we have created in South Africa such a hatred as has to be experienced to be believed, and particularly among South Africans of British descent. It is Natal which is particularly infuriated and outraged by our behaviour and which already has an unofficial boycott of British goods. In a period when Japan increased her exports to South Africa by 46 per cent. and Germany by over 20 per cent., our exports are falling, and will fall catastrophically if we do not settle this matter. If we take sanctions to South Africa, three-quarters of the free world's gold, which comes to London, is involved—and what happens to that, and what happens to the £, I ask those who regard that as the ultimate disaster?
  We cannot afford to allow these things to drift on as they are. We have got to negotiate. We have got to get an agreement and we have got to negotiate it in a spirit that what we are looking for is getting together to make a success of Rhodesia for all the people of Rhodesia. We have got to get together with good will and to forget about protocol.
  From the talks I had with Mr. Smith, with the Governor and with others in Rhodesia, I should like to state what is not negotiable. Let us start off with all this stuff about a return to the Constitution, a return to the rule of law, the
  794
  Governor's authority and not legalising rebellion. Whatever that may sound like here, in Rhodesia it is regarded as a mere euphemism for "You lick my boots for a start". That is not acceptable. No nation, however it achieves its independence, surrenders that independence until it is defeated. Whatever form it takes, the reality is that we must negotiate with independence.
  The second thing which is very important and which is not really understood—and this is one of the five points and I think that it was a mistake that it was put forward—is the suggested need to hold some form of plebiscite. "Securing the agreement of all the people" just does not fit. It is contrary to African custom and is offensive to African custom. This is a difficult thing to explain, but to the African it is the ruler's job to decide and if the ruler asks the African to decide, to the African that is passing the buck. At the indaba which is the traditional council of the African, the chief must decide, and if he does not decide, he has abdicated and loses all respect. There is the deepest inhibition about decision in the African. To him to ask him to decide is asking him to do somethinig unlucky, something impious. That is precisely what wrecked Federation. We asked the Africans to decide and from then on Federation never had a chance. In their view it was an unlucky thing.
  The decision must be taken and the decision must be imposed. This is the only point on which I found myself in disagreement with the right hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton (Mr. Turton). I would not bring in anybody from the Commonwealth or anywhere else. This must be decided between us and them. It must be a firm decision and it must be imposed. If that firm decision is imposed, it will be accepted in Rhodesia and gratefully accepted in the countries just north of the Zambesi.
  What are the points which are negotiable? The first is education, and this is the essential thing to majority rule in Rhodesia. At present, the Rhodesians are relatively paying as much for African education as we are paying for our army in terms of national product. It is the biggest single item in their budget, but it is nothing like enough and that is where we have to go in and help them. I talked about this with Mr. Smith. The

  795
  Rhodesians provide £6,500,000 and we should provide a similar sum. That having been done, an agency should be put in charge of that education programme, reporting to the two Governments who provide the money.
  But that education scheme—and the Rhodesians regard this as of the first importance—must be geared to an economic expansion plan so that the Africans produced as educated men can pass into an economy which has jobs for educated men. What Rhodesia fears and rightly fears is the creation of a babu class, as it was called, of educated unemployed. That is not good for the stability of any country. Thus, the second thing which we must negotiate is a Rhodesian expansion plan as to which we would help them to get the capital—which would not be difficult because there are great prospects there if there is political security—which would absorb the educated African as he came forward. If that were done there would be a majority of African voters within 12 to 15 years.
  Another matter which must be negotiated is protection of the qualifications so that they are not stepped up so that the Africans do not get the vote. So must the constituencies be protected. They must not be gerrymandered on a racial basis. I am not an enthusiast for blocking powers or anything like them. I have never found anywhere in constitutional history that minority blocking powers work. I believe that the administration of the electoral roll, the actual registration of voters and the actual establishment of constituencies, should be handed over to the courts and should become a matter for the courts to decide in a judicial and not a political manner. I believe that that would be acceptable.
  As to non-discrimination; if we are to create an economy to take the Africans, we want to be assured that it does and we therefore want an undertaking about non-discriminatory legislation requiring the employment of an appropriate proportion of Africans as they come forward; and also requiring what Rhodesia already has—an appointments board working on a non-racial system in public employment. I believe that it is essential that the Land Apportionment Act should be turned into a control of user Act and not a control
  796
  of race Act. It is perfectly reasonable that there should be areas of big farms and areas of small farms, that there should be areas of high population per plot of land in housing areas and areas of low population. But that does not mean that one does not keep back the tribal areas and it does not mean that one does not have certain protection for the African townships. It means that one has it on a user basis and not a racialist basis.
  All this is negotiable and on this basis it is perfectly possible to negotiate a future for Rhodesia which has the consent of the people who presently rule Rhodesia, the consent of the Civil Service which has to work it, the consent of the police force which has to administer it, and which will move forward to the first genuinely non-racial society which we have seen, because both races would have time to come forward to the forging of a joint establishment. We should get this kind of agreement concentrated on the right things, make it and impose it. Third parties should not be allowed in and we should not consider the necessity to appease the outsider. This is a matter between us and Rhodesia. We are the trustees of the black Rhodesians. We have to do what is the best for them, and the best for them is to provide a society in which they can develop, not to wreck the society in which they live.
  7.47 p.m.
  Sir Frederic Bennett: I am truly delighted to be succeeding the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget), because very modestly at the beginning he said, perfectly fairly, that from the very start of the crisis he had taken a precisely similar line, and I think that he will concede a little compliment to me in return and agree that I have been bracketed with him, even starting from last November, in adopting a precisely similar attitude. If I might break a lance on behalf of both of us; the fact that we have tried throughout these months to be realistic should no longer lay us open to attacks on the basis of being pro-Smith or pro-white Rhodesia. That is absolute nonsense. To be realistic does not mean that one has to be pro a particular contender in a dispute. It is merely a matter of accepting the facts of the situation. That

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  the hon. and learned Gentleman has done extremely well and extremely concisely while addressing the House tonight.
  A number of hon. Members have now been to Rhodesia over the years, especially in recent months as this crisis has arisen, as the hon. and learned Gentleman and I have. However, I think that I can claim to have been there more recently than anyone else, because I came back to take the Oath barely 48 hours ago from an African tour when there were taking place the events which have culminated in today's statement, a tour which included particularly Zambia and Rhodesia itself. I was very glad to hear the hon. and learned Gentleman mention Zambia, and I propose to do so again.
  There is not nearly enough appreciation or realisation in this House, certainly by hon. Gentlemen opposite who clamour most loudly for sanctions, of just how much we have done to damage Zambia and undermine its political and economic stability. If we wanted to topple anyone, we have done a good deal more to topple our friend Mr. Kenneth Kaunda than we have Mr. Smith in Salisbury. No amount of trying to hide the facts will make them any less true.
  For many years, almost since its inception, Zambia has developed a trading pattern to the south and to Rhodesia. By our actions and by persuading the Zambians to go along with us on entirely false premises, to which I shall come later in my speech, we have distorted these traditional patterns of trade. Although we have come to their help in a first-aid way, we have not by any means ameliorated the damage that Her Majesty's Government have done in the last few months.
  One cannot find anywhere in Zambia a Zambian who does not feel deeply embittered because the Zambians were persuaded to break their pattern of trade and upset their economic progress—certainly the progress made since the days of Uhuru—all on the basis that the sanctions would succeed in a matter of weeks; that they would be quick and effective, as the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister wrongly said, and that everything would soon return to normal.
  One of the real tragedies of the situation—and I hope that these words reach Zambia—is that the sanctions have not
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  been quick and effective. Apart from all the other reasons that have been given today, one reason why I hope that sanity will be restored in Central Africa is that Zambia will be spared any further totally undeserved suffering. I say that because whoever may be blamed in this matter, the Zambians certainly cannot be blamed. They have been the unfortunate instruments of the unsuccessful policies of this country.
  In his opening remarks, the Secretary of State claimed that the sanctions were responsible for bringing about the situation which the Prime Minister described today. Whatever views we hold on this subject, I am prepared to admit that there may have to be some face saving. If he or anyone else likes to think something different from what I think, let them think it. I used precisely the same reply to Mr. Smith only a few days ago when he said that, from his point of view, he had suffered no rebuff over the oil embargo because he had enlisted so much extra sympathy in the Portuguese territories and Africa—so much so that he was expecting more, rather than less, support from those areas in future. He felt that in any negotiations he was now in a stronger position. I said the same to him as I said a moment ago, that if that is what he would like to think, then it was all right with me—as long as the talks got started. That, I pointed out, was the most important item.
  To show the real state of affairs in Rhodesia I will describe what I saw when I was there just a day or so ago, for it would be wrong for us to think—indeed, it would be dangerous if we allowed ourselves to think it—that we have browbeaten Rhodesia to a point when it is ready to talk. To think that would be wrong and to state it would give a completely false psychological impression which might be damaging.
  I will describe, without any party political undertones, the situation which I found there a day or two ago. It is absolute nonsense to talk about that country being beleagured. The streets of Salisbury are more crowded with motor cars than many towns in this country, and that is saying a lot. One can go by taxi virtually anywhere and buy an aeroplane ticket to any destination. If one goes into any hotel, good or bad, one finds every form of food on the menu in addition to

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  drink. In the food shops one can buy almost anything one requires at reasonable prices.
  These facts may be unpalatable, but they are true. The shopping centres and shops generally are still extremely well stocked. The people are well dressed. If one says to people, "You are a beleagured economy", one receives a rude horse-laugh, because that is not the view of the average Rhodesian. It would be absolutely wrong if we tried to mislead ourselves into having false impressions which might lead us into believing what is not true about the position there.
  It was suggested earlier that a great deal of unemployment has been caused among the European population in Rhodesia and that many of them had had to go to South Africa to seek employment. I understand that the figures are admittedly considerable and I gather that between 3,000 and 4,000 Europeans have gone to South Africa to work. People do not understand, however, that these people have not necessarily left Rhodesia for good. In many cases their families remain where they have been living all along. There is an immense number of vacancies for white workers in Johannesburg. This is not a matter of poor whites leaving Salisbury to seek work in Johannesburg. They have merely gone to South Africa to work—remembering that, with air travel, it is only a stone's throw from Salisbury and Bulawayo to Johannesburg—and there they earn more wages and take or send that money home in hard currency which Rhodesia wants.
  All this is not breaking the economy of Rhodesia and it would be a misconception to think that it is. Indeed, when I left Salisbury I took with me a copy of the Rhodesia Herald and I have with me a cutting in which there appear 150 advertisements of vacancies in Rhodesia covering every grade of technical, administrative, farming and other work. If what has happened has represented a disaster for Rhodesia, the position should be the other way round. Quite the reverse is the position, with plenty of vacancies for jobs to be filled.
  I am saying these things not to encourage the Rhodesians to a point when
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  they will not talk but because it would be absolutely foolish for us in this country to imagine that Rhodesia has been browbeaten by sanctions. The opposite is the truth.
  Instead I pay tribute to the people of Rhodesia and to Her Majesty's Government for realising where the collision course on which we were engaged was leading us. More and more sensible people in Rhodesia, in and out of the régime, and people in this country, in and out of Government, in addition to people throughout the world, have been realising that had we kept our collision course, the only end would have been total economic disaster and the creation of an African industrial slum in Salisbury, the alternative being a form of civil war which would go outside Rhodesia's borders. The Government may have been tardy in bringing the situation back to sanity, but at least more people are now agreed that the time to talk has arrived.
  It is depressing for someone from this country to visit Rhodesia just now. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Wirral (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd) explained this in his remarkable summary of what he accomplished in Rhodesia. There is an almost shimmering haze of hatred for a British visitor. I cannot remember a mission which I have enjoyed less than being in Salisbury during the last few days. It is no good saying that the Rhodesians should not feel that way. What should they say? "You are good chaps for trying to browbeat us." Is that what they should say? Instead, they are saying and feeling utterly betrayed by Britain.
  The remarks I am making are factual and I am not talking about the régime or the Rhodesian front but about the air stewardess, the waitress in the café and the taxi driver. They all feel a sense of resentment against this country and we should not mislead ourselves into thinking that such feelings are limited to the white population. There are many Africans who, while they would, of course, like to see greater advances for Africans in their country, do not see much fun in Britain conducting sanctions which have not brought them political advancement but have lowered their already too low economic standards. This is the view of many Africans. If we delay much

  801
  longer trying to come to a sensible settlement, the psychological climate for doing so will worsen from day to day. In that context, it is folly to imagine that time is on our side.
  Every speaker today has tried to be brief, and I intend to follow that precept. I had prepared a long and, I thought, very good speech to make today after my return from Rhodesia, but it is now wholly inapplicable in view of the statement which has been made today. If that is the only sacrifice which has to be made to accomplish success in the talks, I shall regard it as being well made.
  Without going into the details of the sort of constitution which should emerge, I should like to make two or three general points about what, in the most general terms, we should aim at in coming to a settlement. First, I plead that we do not get misled, particularly those of us who are lawyers, into thinking that we can create a stable society in Rhodesia by a whole series of built-in constitutional safeguards. I have grown increasingly cynical about the effect of constitutional safeguards, and Africa is littered with countries whose constitutions, with which we so proudly set them independent, are now totally in ruins.
  I have been honorary constitutional adviser in one or two countries and I have been proud of myself in managing to get acceptance of, for instance, provision for an appeal to the Privy Council, before a constitution could be changed. If there are ruthless men after independence who are determined not to live under that constitution, they will not do so and nothing that we can do in this House will alter that. We have seen this only too recently in several African countries, which it might be invidious to mention, but which, incidentally, are among the most stringent criticis of Rhodesia. Therefore, let us think instead not quite so much of the form of all the safeguards, but of producing the sort of constitution which will receive general agreement and which, therefore, there will be no driving urge to change. This is much more important than dwelling upon those paper safeguards which, we know well, can be swept away.
  This sort of progress will require a great deal of far-sightedness by the Europeans as well as by the Africans.
  802
  If, however, we merely concentrate on thinking that all we now need to do is to fiddle about with "blocking" this or that in the 1961 Constitution and we then impose it, and it is still not satisfactory to the effective power in that country, which for some years to come will be the whites, once they have got their independence they will tear up that constitution exactly the same as other countries in Africa have done. The mere fact that the power there is white will not stop them tearing up the constitution if they believe that it strikes at their basic security.
  Mr. Molloy: Would not the hon. Member acknowledge that that by itself does not mean that they have power for ever, because there will be the power of Asia and the power of the remaining African countries, which might take objection to it and might take power forcibly? That is the whole danger of the situation.
  Sir F. Bennett: Without going into the details of the speech by the hon. and learned Member for Northampton, I would have thought that by now we had learned not to take too seriously the power of the rest of Africa to use force to change the Rhodesian Constitution. I cannot believe that that power will be that much greater after independence than it is beforehand. If the hon. Member reads his hon. and learned Friend's speech tomorrow, he may see that for the foreseeable future at least, one of Rhodesia's least worries is the thought of a Mali-Guinea army setting out from 7,000 miles away to occupy Salisbury. That is one of the more unlikely contingencies to be faced.
  I was trying, however, to make some serious points and I hope that I will not be drawn into matters of a purely hypothetical nature which are not realistic. Another point which I wish to make is that in the new constitution we should not make too much of a fetish of voting procedures and the question of how many people vote, what sort of vote they have, A and B rolls and the rest. We have to find a constitution which is generally acceptable within an African society, including the aspirations of the Africans themselves.
  I wish that I could count the number of occasions when I have sat through debates when we have sent African

  803
  countries into independence and have given them our blessing. We have got the principle of one man, one vote, for them. We have sent a deputation and given them their Mace, and we have sent them autographed copies of Erskine May. Within a few months, however, the only purpose of the Mace has been to hit Mr. Speaker or Mr. Deputy Speaker over the head, that being regarded as its most logical use, and within a few weeks, or within a few months at most, it has no longer been one man, one vote, but has become one man, one vote, and one election. This could happen again if we concentrate too much simply on the fetish of voting procedures as opposed to getting a constitution which will command general acceptance right across the races.
  My third and penultimate point concerning the constitution is that I whole-heartedly share the views of those who have said that it is totally unrealistic to think that we could ever get the Rhodesians to go back to a period of colonial status or direct rule, merely saying to them that if they are good boys, within a certain length of time they will get their independence. This one simply is not on and there is no one among the effective white society in Rhodesia at present who would wear it for one moment.
  However hard it may be for us to accept this, one of the reasons why they will not do it is that they do not trust us thereafter to give them their independence. That may be an uncomfortable thought for us in the House of Commons, but we have sometimes changed our minds, and whatever the Secretary of State may say, we have even occasionally changed our policies. Some of the people out there think this one up for themselves, too. Therefore, whatever constitution they get, next time must be the last one, a generally accepted one and an independence one. I hope that this will be in the forefront of all our minds.
  I now make a small practical suggestion about how we could get the talks going with a greater prospect of success even than we expect today—and we must obviously be cautious in our hopes today. I seriously wonder whether it would not be worth the while of both sides to make one or two gestures to try to get
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  some of the hatred and distrust out of the air. I cannot expect Mr. Smith to express regret, but I should like him openly at least to say that he will withdraw his demand that the British diplomatic representatives in Salisbury should leave. I wish that he would reconnect the Governor's telephone and stop behaving childishly in that context. There are one or two other things that I wish he would do.
  I wish also—and it cannot easily be calculated what a good effect this would have upon the prospect of negotiation between reasonable men—that Her Majesty's Government could now make some concession, however small, as a gesture. I do not suggest that the whole panoply of sanctions should be withdrawn, but can we not relax some small item of the kind that causes more irritation than damage out there? I shall not enumerate them, because I do not want to spoil the atmosphere tonight. We are doing a number of things to the Rhodesians which do not help to achieve settlement but cause widespread irritation.
  If, within the next day or two, the Secretary of State could say that to try to get the new climate established, that we here, too, will play our part and will do this, that and the other, I believe that there will be a chance, and it may be the last chance, for us to get this appalling problem out of our way and to ensure the future prosperity and happiness for all the people of Rhodesia irrespective of race.
  8.8 p.m.
  Mr. Christopher Rowland: I welcome the hon. Member for Torquay (Sir F. Bennett) to the small club of those of us who have been to Rhodesia since the illegal declaration of independence. We were in need of another member, because the former hon. Members for Lancaster and Preston, North are no longer with us and we have gained my hon. Friend the Member for Hampstead (Mr. Whitaker). We were, therefore, one short.
  As a number of hon. Members may know, I went to Rhodesia early this year with two of my Parliamentary colleagues, now the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Power and the Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Army. I

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  should like to think that some of the things we said when we were there have borne fruit and might be contributory factors towards the announcement made today by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister.
  When we were there, we said that the British Government were not and had not been insisting on immediate majority rule. We pointed out that in our opinion the sanctions which the Rhodesians were then enduring and are still enduring were not a hump over which they would get but a slide down which they would go, and, though there have been doubts about the effectiveness of sanctions, there is no doubt that there has been a gradual slide in the Rhodesian economy.
  I said in particular that in my view Britain was interposing herself between Rhodesia and the rest of the world, that in some ways we were shielding and protecting the white Rhodesians from the consequences of their own folly, but that we were getting remarkably little credit for it. That was my analysis of the situation. I like to think that, as the last three or four months have rolled by and the world consequences of the situation have been brought home to the Rhodesians, what I said then has been accepted with a little more credibility than it was at the time. I said that if one was a white Rhodesian it was probably better to be coerced by one's one-time friends than attacked by enemies.
  I pointed out that there was a world interest in Rhodesia. It may be that it lacks at present a military presence, as my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) has been at pains to point out. But I said that it could not be doubted that there was a world interest which was capable of sparking off some form of military action, possibly by the United Nations.
  When I was in Rhodesia I also said that there was broad, all-party agreement in general about post-war policy towards Africa and that, despite the divisions about the application of sanctions or a particular sanction, there was a great measure of unity in the House about the commitments of the British Government towards ensuring that the peoples of Africa enjoy majority rule, if not today at least eventually. I found myself quite frequently having to defend
  806
  the records of Lord Butler, the present right hon. Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys), and the right hon. Member for Enfield, West (Mr. Iain Macleod). I tried to point out that what the British Government of today were doing was but a continuation of the policies of the last two decades. Some of that may perhaps have been perceived in Rhodesia as the months have gone by, but there were many sad impressions that I formed then, and I expect that I would be sad today as well.
  I found that the European Rhodesians were remarkably insulated in their awareness of the world. They really thought that they had had to seize independence because, otherwise, they would have been attacked on the initiative of the Commonwealth after the next Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference. They thought that it was a pre-emptive strike against such an eventuality, with little awareness that the British Government would not be coerced by the Commonwealth in the matter. They felt last November that they had to take that action before next June came. I found that many people, not among the leaders but with what might be called grass root opinions, genuinely believed that the British Government were part of a worldwide Communist conspiracy, and that the visits by the Prime Minister to Moscow were part of it.
  I suppose that I am reasonably well known for supporting the Government over matters like Vietnam. I found myself at a famous meeting in Rhodesia about which there has been some publicity, and the only question that I answered was from someone who assured us that we were supporting the North Vietnamese Government against the United States, and to be attacked a few minutes after denying that was rather ironic. That kind of complete fallacy about Britain is one of the sad impressions that any visitor going to Rhodesia today would form.
  There was contempt not only for the authority but for the possible power of the United Nations. And I suppose that in some ways one was saddened, if one was trying to assess the chances of an eventual settlement, by the very strong and high morale of the European population. I saw there a mirror image of the cussedness and perversity of my own

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  people, and I recognised it for what it was.
  That is not to say that all white Rhodesians support the Smith régime. To say that would be a slur on many people, some of whom have now had to come to this country, and it would be a slur on all those of liberal persuasions who either openly or privately speak out against the régime. In some ways, it would be a slur on the great number of people in the middle, particularly in the business community, who, in a state of controlled schizophrenia, deplore what has been done but try to make the best of a bad job in the interests of their businesses and their country.
  Like all visitors to Rhodesia from this House, I was saddened by these various impressions, because one wondered how it would all end. Yet, at the same time, one found certain positive features. First of all, the sanctions had been more comprehensive than had been expected. That is not to say that the British Government did not warn Mr. Smith frequently and in detail of what would happen, but there is no doubt that to his people it was more than they had expected. Perhaps things are changing a little, but I must say that at that time the impact was still to be felt by the man in the street. There was a great division of opinion between the better-informed persons and their worries and the less well-informed persons. The less well-informed person, in many ways, was more likely to be a strong Smith supporter. I felt then that the long-term political effect of sanctions, in terms of influencing the leadership of Rhodesia as well as the man in the street, had still to be determined.
  If I may say so to my colleagues on the Front Bench, four months ago I felt that more time was necessary for sanctions to have effect, either economically or politically, than at that time was felt to be the case. It is precisely because of that that I believe that the Opposition of this country have been ill-advised to press so strongly so quickly for talks with Mr. Smith. In other words, the essence of the whole policy of the British Government has been one of time—to decide not only how much pressure to apply but at what point it should be decided that enough pressure
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  has been exerted to influence the situation.
  Today's statement by the Prime Minister is an indication that the British Government are trying to get the timing right. If one thinks back only a few weeks, it is quite clear that no suggestion of talks could be made by the British Government until we knew how the tobacco sales, or non-sales, fared. In taking the line throughout the campaign that we must talk now, the Opposition were omitting to look at the date of 29th March when the tobacco sales started. There might have been a good deal of popular sympathy and support in the country for the British Government last month, to say, "Yes, we will talk to Mr. Smith." That might have struck an unthinking chord in the country, but it would have been quite a wrong policy, given that our key sanction had still not had a chance to operate before the end of last month; and the fact that it was two days before the General Election was pure coincidence.
  Another reason why time has had to elapse has been because, as time has gone by, the threat of United Nations involvement has become more real. There are limits to how long Britain can say to the world, to ourselves, or to Mr. Smith, that the Rhodesian situation is solely our responsibility. In particular, I believe that Dr. Verwoerd has had to weigh that very carefully indeed. I would stick to what I said when I was in Rhodesia, that in the final analysis it would not pay Dr. Verwoerd to bail out Rhodesia if it embroiled him in a confrontation with the United Nations. I know that hon. Members who have great experience of Southern Africa may disagree with that view, but on the other hand there are other people who would accept it.
  I also said that in my judgment the success of sanctions against Rhodesia, assuming that they are successful, does not mean that sanctions will then automatically be applied to South Africa; but the risk which South Africa runs is if it is thought that sanctions can succeed against Rhodesia only by coercing South Africa. She then puts herself in a much more dangerous position. But the argument which some hon. Members have used that Dr. Verwoerd must come to the rescue of Rhodesia because if he does

  809
  not and sanctions succeed against Rhodesia the world will say, "We have done it against Rhodesia, we can do it against South Arica", is a false line of argument, and I hope very much that Dr. Verwoerd sees the wisdom of what I am saying. In fact, I hope this is one of the ingredients in the present situation which has led to today's announcement.
  But if I am wrong, and if Dr. Verwoerd sustains Rhodesia and does not influence Mr. Smith in the direction of making concessions, or if Mr. Smith refuses to take notice of Dr. Verwoerd even if Dr. Verwoerd does not sustain him, if any of those eventualities occur, there will be a limit to how long Britain can claim, or the world agree, that Rhodesia is Britain's exclusive responsibility. I think that it is for Mr. Smith, and nobody else, to decide whether that is a risk worth taking.
  I think that tonight, in the continuing Rhodesian crisis, we may be at a turning point. If that corner is not turned, it will be Mr. Smith's responsibility, and when my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton, talks in apocalyptic terms—as he did about what would happen if talks did not succeed, if the United Nations took up the matter, not through our own volition perhaps, but because we cannot stop it—I trust that he realises that the one man who can avoid all this happening is still Mr. Smith.
  Finally, I should like to say a word about some people whom I do not think have been mentioned, or at any rate not very much, in the debate today. I am thinking of the Governor, and of the Chief Justice. As one of the many Members who has visited Government House and met Sir Humphrey Gibbs and Sir Hugh Beadle, I hope that they will think that today's move, in which clearly the Governor has played a part, and I hope a considerable part, is some tangible reward for their long vigil in Government House. They, together with their officials, notably Mr. Pestell and Captain Owen, the Governor's A.D.C., have endured a peculiar form of incarceration during the last few months, and I believe that the people of Rhodesia, white and black, as well as the people of this country, owe them a debt of gratitude. I think they have combined good sense with honour throughout the last five agonising months since 11th November.
  8.24 p.m.
  Mr. Stephen Hastings: I think that the hon. Member for Meriden (Mr. Rowland) has given what I would describe as a rather idealised picture of the position. I understand the motives for his apologia, but he will understand if I disagree with him. He spoke of the critical nature of the timing, but the Prime Minister—if he said it once he must have said it half a dozen times in statements to the House—said that the purpose of the sanctions was that they must be effective and quick. This is what he intended, and I do not think that the description to which we listened from my hon. Friend the Member for Torquay (Sir F. Bennett) accords with the picture which the hon. Gentleman gave us. The hon. Gentleman told us that when he was out in Salisbury he believed the sanctions were comprehensive. Perhaps they have become a little less comprehensive since. He said that he felt that the Rhodesian Europeans were insulated from the world. This may be so, but if it is, I think it is also true that there are far too many people in this country and beyond the shores of Africa who are equally insulated against the reality of Africa, and certainly I have not heard a more realistic picture of the situation than that contained in the speech of the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) this afternoon.
  As one who has had a life-long connection with Rhodesia, naturally I welcome without reservation what the Prime Minister said this afternoon, and like everybody else in this debate I shall have to readapt a speech which would have been different if the right hon. Gentleman had not been able to say what he did. I accept the Prime Minister's recommendation that we would be wrong today to go into detail about how these talks were started, or indeed to go too much into the precise terms of the discussions, because the first thing that we have to do is to create the atmosphere in which they can succeed, and we are far from that at the moment.
  I regret the tone of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. I think it was wrong to suggest that sanctions had brought about this situation. It is plain that the Prime Minister believed that they would be short and

  811
  effective—he said so on many occasions—and they were not. This is true even of oil. In spite of the Joanna V incident, adequate supplies are still reaching Rhodesia over Beit Bridge and from Mozambique, certainly enough to maintain the present level of rationing for the foreseeable future.
  It is interesting to note what the Prime Minister said in the first instance when he mentioned oil sanctions. On 10th December he said:
  "… we are examining with others concerned the question of oil sanctions, provided this is multilateral in application, for only multilateral action is, in our view, likely to be effective."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 10th December, 1965; Vol. 722, c. 769.]
  I do not think that anybody on either side could claim that oil sanctions today are multilateral. What the Joanna V incident led to was the invocation of Chapter VII of the Unted Nations Charter. I regard this as a grave development. I believe that the Prime Minister did internationalise the crisis by doing this, and I think that it is fair to make one more short quotation from one of the right hon. Gentleman's statements on 20th December, when he referred to the same Chapter VII in these terms in reply to a question from the hon. and learned Member for Lincoln (Mr. Taverne):
  "… I was well aware during my visit to the United Nations last week that Chapter VII Resolutions on any aspect of the Rhodesian question might have a habit of escalating."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 20th December, 1965; Vol. 722, c. 1694.]
  It was the Prime Minister who invoked Chapter VII, and in my view it is precisely this drift from apparent stopping points towards further escalation which has so deeply disturbed many of us on this side of the House, and I think more than one on the other side as well.
  What has in fact happened is that the Prime Minister has, mercifully, recognised the facts of the situation, and has had the courage—and I say that without reservation—to change his policy. If he had continued, he would have been faced with three alternatives, and here I shall repeat what my hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice (Mr. Wall) said earlier. He mentioned the same three alternatives. The first would have been to extend the oil blockade to cover South Africa—in order to make it multilateral, as he said it had to be in order
  812
  to succeed. The second would have been to try to use armed force against Rhodesia by some means or other across the Zambesi. The third would have been to turn the whole matter over to the United Nations by some device.
  In any one of these three courses, had we gone that far, he would have been met by force. The blockade would have led almost inevitably to an armed commitment by this country against all the entrenched Europeans of Southern Africa. An attack on Rhodesia would have resulted in overwelming pressure on Dr. Verwoerd for support for Rhodesia, because support for Rhodesia among South Africans, both Dutch and British, is now at fever-heat. Who knows what an appalling muddle might have resulted from armed action by the United Nations? The Congo was bad enough, against practically no serious opposition at all. I had the chance to see the United Nations force in action on more than one occasion there and I would not want to witness the same thing again.
  We came perilously near the edge of the cliff and I think it right that the House should consider in a little more detail what this would have meant. An interesting report was made by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in New York, in March, 1965. I understand that this organisation commands the resources to make a serious inquiry of this nature. It was entitled, "Apartheid and the United Nations: Collective Measures, An Analysis." My contention is that any one of these three courses with which the Prime Minister would have been faced, if he had not decided or felt able to say what he did today and launch unofficial talks, would have led to escalation to a use of force involved in this situation.
  The Carnegie Endowment worked it out like this. For a blockade of 120 days, 50 warships of all kinds would have been necessary, plus 300 aircraft at a cost of 111 million dollars. To maintain it for six months would have cost 165 million dollars. This, in their view, would have led almost inevitably to a military operation and, based upon the logistics of the Congo, 93,000 men would have been necessary in the initial assault. Four months of operations would have cost 223 million dollars and additional naval and air strike necessary would have

  813
  added 50 million dollars. Therefore, a six months' blockade followed by an assault of this nature would, in their view, has cost about £300 million.
  The casualties for which they budgeted in the assault period alone were 7,200 on the United Nations side killed. Moreover it is salutary for us to remember and reflect at this time that the Rhodesians could and would maintain in the field something like 30,000 to 40,000 men; the South Africans, counting commandos and everyone else, 250,000.
  I go even further and ask the House to remember one other fact, that the last time we, as a country, engaged in military operations in that part of the world, 448,000 men were in action on our side to hold down about 60,000 Boers. The British South Africans were on our side on that occasion—about 50,000 of them—but they would not be the next time. We were helped by 50,000 Empire troops as well, and there were 97,000 casualties.
  The conclusion from this, surely, is that the operation simply is not on, militarily, without the active assistance of a major Power. There are, I suppose, two such Powers—the United States and Soviet Russia. 1 cannot believe that the Prime Minister would ever seriously consider inviting Soviet Russia to assist. As for the United States, does anybody seriously think that they would accept a commitment of that size on top of what they are suffering in Vietnam at present? Of course they would not.
  However, even if it were on and even if it succeeded, I believe that the pain and destruction involved would be no less massive than the direct colonial commitment which this country would have taken on or would have forced on the United Nations for the foreseeable future in Southern Africa. The British Empire and all we have achieved overseas would be seen finally to dissolve in a welter of death, destruction, and anarchy.
  This course of events seems unthinkable to us, but it was perilously close—
  Mr. James Johnson: Is not the logic of this argument that we should simply let Mr. Smith fix his own terms as he thinks fit in Central Africa for four million Africans?
  Mr. Hastings: I have mentioned no terms for Mr. Smith or for the British Government. I am trying to show what, in my view, would have happened inevitably if the Prime Minister had not decided—how this exactly happened, he asked us not to inquire and I am prepared to accede to that request—to make the statement which he has made. What terms will be possible is another matter altogether, and obviously there must be give and take on both sides: I would be the first to admit that.
  We should realise, as the hon. and learned Member for Northampton said, that, whatever solution the Government may succeed in reaching—and I hope, as I can call myself a Rhodesian or at least more Rhodesian than anything else that they will succeed—there will be protests and reproaches galore. There is no doubt of that. I hope that the Government are facing up to this consciously already and have no intention of giving way to international or external pressure in the way in which some of us on this side have felt, with good cause, that they have done more than once in the last six unhappy months. If the Attorney-General felt able to give reassurance on this matter it would reassure not only me but many others in the House.
  I should not detain the House much longer. Others wish to speak and, happily, the tenor of the debate has been altered by what has happened. I want to support the proposition put forward that, whatever contribution we may make finally to a settlement in Rhodesia, let us remember that education by itself will only turn sour unless we create the jobs and economic conditions to absorb those educated.
  The plea here is also a fair one that Mr. Smith and his colleagues have, even since U.D.I., introduced a new education programme involving 18,000 new places in secondary schools and primary education for every African child in the foreseeable future. That was a bold thing to do and I do not believe that such a plan could have been advanced simply as a propaganda manoeuvre. Indeed, it was in preparation long before U.D.I. The will is there and we can do something positive to assist agreement and help them with this sort of problem.

  815
  Another form of activity well worthy of support and which I hope the Secretary of State might turn his mind to is the African Farmers' Development Corporation, a body started by the European farmers to help their African neighbours in the reserves. It started with a small group of European farmers in the Umvukwes district getting together with their African neighbours and helping them to improve their crops, using their own machinery and money. The scheme now includes hundreds of Europeans and thousands of African farmers and the results have been stunning. But funds have been short. In this way we could help not only towards agreement but towards the future of Rhodesia.
  Those who have been fearful about these matters all along will be filled with relief and hope as a result of what has been said and, like my right hon. Friend the Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys), I believe that far too much is at stake on either side for the talks to be allowed to fail. I repeat that on both sides there must be concessions, of course, but I hope for more.
  I must say this hope has grown as the debate has continued. I hope that perhaps as a result of success—and we cannot yet count on success—this may be a new starting point for our dealings with Southern Africa as a whole. There has been deep thought in the debate not only about economic and political conditions but about the African personality. It is through understanding of this particularly difficult problem for Europeans—and I make no apology for referring to the speech of the hon. and learned Member for Northampton again in this connection—that we can make success out of this intractable tragedy. I look forward to the day when help for the poor and, indeed, unstable regimes of Central Africa comes, if not completely, at least in large measure, from the richer countries of the south. It is in this way that fear may be repelled—and fear lies at the heart of the danger and difficulty.
  8.40 p.m.
  Mr. Brian O'Malley: The hon. Member for Mid-Bedfordshire (Mr. Hastings) has welcomed, as I think every hon. Member welcomes, the statement which the Prime Minister made today. I believe that had it not been for the
  816
  policy of sanctions which this Government have pursued in the last five or six months the hon. Gentleman would not have been able to welcome the statement because it would not have been forthcoming.
  I do not have the advantage, or perhaps disadvantage, of the intimate connections which the hon. Gentleman apparently has in Rhodesia, but I believe that his assessment of the effect of sanctions is optimistic from the Rhodesians' point of view. He said that petrol rationing would not be taken any further. That reminded me of the statement which my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) made some months ago, when he said that petrol rationing would not be necessary at all. The hon. Gentleman's assessment that there would not be a further cut in the petrol ration is not shared by a number of informed political commentators in the Press of this country.
  In recent weeks we have been faced by a dangerous, escalating situation arising from the Rhodesian crisis. I therefore welcome the Prime Minister's statement today as something which can hold up that escalation. I hope that my right hon. Friend the Commonwealth Secretary will understand it when I say that, although we welcome the statement, we must regard it with caution. No one who has read the detailed report of the negotiations which took place between the Rhodesian Government and the Governments of this country, both Conservative and Labour, can underestimate the difficulties or problems which still have to be dealt with. Although we must try to lay aside our memories, none of us finds it easy to forget some of the things which have taken place in Rhodesia in the last six months. I welcome the statement with caution because the alternative could well have been catastrophe.
  The right hon. Member for Barnet (Mr. Maudling) said that when the British Government took action under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter we were going along a road fraught with danger. I agree with him. But I do not believe that there are any safe roads in a situation like this.
  Before I come to the main burden of my speech, which will be to argue that the present situation has been reached

  817
  directly as a result of Government policy, I should clear up one thing which happened when the Commonwealth Secretary spoke today. He suggested that the present Administration had inherited a dangerous situation from the Conservative Administration. This was greeted with jeers by a number of hon. Members opposite, suggesting that that was not true.
  The Blue Book shows quite clearly that as early as February, 1964, in a message sent by the right hon. Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys) to Rhodesia, and later at a meeting in September, 1964, the Conservative Administration felt it necessary to spell out in some little detail the consequences of an illegal declaration of independence.
  They talked of what would happen at the United Nations; of the possible reaction in the Commonwealth; of the possibility of non-recognition of or relations with an illegal régime; of Southern Rhodesia in such circumstances being a target for subversion, trade boycotts, and so on.
  It came to the point when, in June, 1964, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Streatham felt obliged to write to Mr. Smith saying that talk of U.D.I. in recent speeches in Rhodesia might well oblige the British Government to tell Parliament the attitude of the Conservative Administration on the lines of the communication that had been sent to the Rhodesian Government as early as February, 1964.
  We must continue to evaluate and judge the present situation in the light of international repercussions and in its international context. I have felt that when many hon. Members opposite have applied themselves to the international repercussions arising from the situation in Rhodesia, their thinking—even on the Front Bench—has been affected by the views of that section of the Conservative Party which tends to minimise the significance of African nationalist attitudes, the pressures and views expressed at the United Nations and the future implications for both the Commonwealth and the United Nations.
  A Government spokesman was right to say in a recent debate on this subject that what was at stake was the whole future rôle and influence of this country in world affairs. We should view
  818
  Rhodesian policy and the situation in Rhodesia in the light of these external factors. They may be external, but they are intimately bound up with the Rhodesian situation, and in this international context one should judge British Government policy and the propositions of the Opposition.
  I think that in making an assessment of the situation, it is necessary to take seriously into account the ingrained attitudes and fears, the hopes and aspirations, of the Europeans in Rhodesia and the rest of Africa, and those also of the African populations in Southern Rhodesia and in other parts of Africa. I am sure that Sir Edgar Whitehead was right when he said in the Spectator on 22nd April that both sides must be assured that their legitimate interests are protected, and that a solution must be found that is acceptable to both sides.
  In this debate, over-shadowed as it is by this afternoon's statement, it is perhaps as well to balance and consider and try to understand the attitudes of the Europeans as well as of the Africans. The attitude one certainly gets is that the time spirit in Southern Rhodesia is very much that of another century—and I think that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister used such a phrase last year when we debated the subject here. Sir Roy Welensky speaks of the
  "… almost pathological antagonism which our electorate felt towards the imposition of an African majority."
  Where this kind of attitude exists, it arises partly from the kind of environment and views current in that part of the world but which are no longer acceptable in this country and in other parts of the world.
  The second thing which we should bear in mind is the apparent distrust of many white Southern Rhodesians of intentions of British Governments, but I do not think this is the responsibility of this Government. On any reading of the situation, it has been quite clear that throughout the Prime Minister has at all times been frank with the Rhodesian Government on his attitudes. Sir Roy Welensky made a number of interesting comments about the negotiations and contacts which took place with our Conservative predecessors. I have not the time tonight, nor do I want to get involved in

  819
  an argument about good faith and methods of negotiations pursued by the previous Conservative Government, but on the Monckton Comission and its terms of reference Sir Roy Welensky leaves one in no doubt that he had very little faith in what he was told by Mr. Macmillan and the right hon. Member for Enfield, West (Mr. Iain Macleod). We have to live with this distrust; it is a distrust which we inherited.
  Certainly one would be wrong to overlook and to ignore the attitudes and the fears of the Europeans because of what happened on their borders in the Congo. We would be wrong also to overlook the attitudes in Southern Rhodesia of a section of the population which has natural inclinations towards South Africa. We must remember that many of the white Southern Rhodesians have genuinely believed that there is no alternative to the 1961 Constitution but immediate black majority rule. I believe this Government have done everything they could to get rid of this illusion, and certainly it has not been our responsibility that it exists. Although one would not wish to push the matter too far tonight because of the delicacy of the situation, Mr. Smith, in his statements, suggested that he could put to the electorate only the question of the 1961 Constitution or black majority rule. He holds some responsibility in this matter.
  If we are to bear in mind the attitude of the Europeans, as we must to get out of the impasse, we have also to pay regard to the legitimate aspirations of the black majority. Some hon. Members opposite have not done so. Once the ideas of democracy begin to run through a people and a continent, there is little that can stop them. It is almost like a field of corn before a strong wind. Ideas of democracy sometimes go wrong, and there are difficulties, but we should pay regard to the legitimate ideas of the Africans in Southern Rhodesia and in the rest of Africa. We should understand their bitterness after the long history of racial discrimination in Southern Rhodesia. We should understand the legacy of bitterness left by the Federation and the bitterness arising from the events of the last six months.
  If we try to examine the situation in its international context and look at the
  820
  attitudes and aspirations both of the European and Africans in Southern Rhodesia, it is obvious that if an agreed and moral solution is to be found it has to be a compromise solution. During the long negotiations between the British Government and Mr. Smith, there is no sign that Mr. Smith ever realised just how far the Prime Minister and the British Labour Government had moved towards a compromise with him and just how difficult it would have been on the kind of terms we were talking about to justify this to African national opinion. Even at the end of the negotiations, before the illegal declaration was announced, the Prime Minister was still flexible and willing to compromise. He was going further than any previous Administration in his terms of reference for the Royal Commission and the attitude of the British Government towards it.
  I turn to the proposition propounded by a number of hon. Members opposite, that severe sanctions have hardened the attitude of many people in Rhodesia who were not basically sympathetic to Smith and that they have increased the bitterness. I believe that in the short term this has been so. There has probably been some rallying towards the Smith Government because of this. It should also be appreciated that, if no sanctions, or if ineffective sanctions, had been applied against Southern Rhodesia, there would still have been a movement of opinion to Smith, because it would have been widely believed that he had got away with it. We have been able to have the statement that we had today from the Prime Minister only because of the policy of economic measures and sanctions which the British Government have taken.
  I want to look in a little more detail at the Opposition's attitude that the British Government have lost control of the situation and that we should not have gone to the United Nations—this was the clear message of the right hon. Member for Barnet (Mr. Maudling)—but should have tried other methods first, presumably legal and diplomatic methods. I want to consider the other possibilities. I want, first, to comment on one statement made by the right hon. Member for Sreatham. He suggested or implied that it might have been preferable to have allowed the odd oil tanker to have gone through to Beira rather than invoke

  821
  Chapter VII sanctions at the United Nations. I disagree strongly with the right hon. Gentleman on this.
  Mr. Sandys: I said that I thought that we ought to have exhausted all the possibilities of persuasion before taking that very serious step.
  Mr. O'Malley: This is one proposition that I intend to examine very briefly. I was also under the impression that the right hon. Gentleman implied that it might have been preferable to mandatory sanctions that the oil tanker should have gone to Beira. The Leader of the Opposition certainly implied this the other day. This is a fundamentally wrong appraisal of the situation, because if this had happened not only would there have been a whole pile of tankers going there, but other foreign business men in all parts of the world would have decided that sanctions had failed and they would have moved in increasingly. It would have meant that Great Britain would have lost the initiative and the pressure for force at the United Nations would have been ever stronger than it has been in recent weeks.
  The diplomatic situation again belies the attitude of the right hon. Member for Streatham. When the oil tankers were on their way to Beira the attitude of the Greek Government was helpful. They sent wireless messages asking the vessels to turn back. They made some threats of the possibilities of fines and the revocation of licences, but when the Ioanna V was first intercepted, as I understand the position, we had no specific permission from the Greek Government to do that. It had been left to Great Britain, acting, I would assume, in conformity with the United Nations resolution of 20th November. Therefore, we were left with no legal right to stop these oil tankers going through. The Greek Government had at no period in the negotiations, which had been going on over a number of weeks, given us any permission forcibly to stop those vessels.
  A formal statement on 5th April announced. Portugal's non-participation in sanctions. There was no statement from the pipeline company meeting on 6th April. As I understand it, my hon. Friend and Lord Walston returned to this country on 9th April with no promise that the
  822
  Portuguese Government would prevent a link between the pipeline and the vessel.
  I cannot continue with the rest of my speech. All I have been able to do is to look at the diplomatic situation which existed between Greece, Portugal and this country and to note very briefly what had been happening and the constant pressure at the United Nations in the weeks previously for action by the 36 African member States. I believe that this statement of the Prime Minister's probably gives us, for the first time, a little light at the end of the tunnel. If we are seeing that light at the end of the tunnel tonight, as I hope we are, I believe that it is directly the responsibility and the result of the policy which the British Government have pursued in the last six months.
  9.0 p.m.
  Mr. Anthony Barber: In the House of Commons unique situations are not infrequent. Certainly the circumstances of this debate today have been somewhat unusual. The debate was preceded by a statement given by the Prime Minister which, I think it is fair to say, has altered the whole basis of our discussions this afternoon and this evening. Whatever else I have to say later on, I certainly join with all those who have welcomed this change of policy on behalf of the Government. Indeed, the rousing cheers which the Prime Minister received from the Opposition benches should leave him in no doubt at all that, at long last, he is now doing the right thing. As my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Wirral (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd) said, as long ago as February he urged the Commonwealth Secretary to do just what he is now doing.
  I should like to join in the congratulations which have been heaped upon those hon. Members who have made maiden speeches today. Because of the course of events—the making of the Prime Minister's statement immediately before the debate—the task of those hon. Members speaking for the first time in this House was not an easy one, but certainly those whose speeches I had the privilege of hearing acquitted themselves well, and I know we all look forward to hearing them again.

  823
  With every week that has passed since U.D.I.—if the Commonwealth Secretary will pardon the expression—the issues associated with the developing problems of Rhodesia have become more complex and more tangled. I think all will agree that they have also become very much more serious. The Prime Minister, when he spoke in the House last Thursday, said that the Rhodesian problem was one of the most difficult with which the Government had to deal. Of course, he was absolutely right. The dangers inherent in the present situation as it has developed are equally obvious to the Opposition as to the Government. It is perfectly true that we on these benches do not shoulder the executive responsibility, but we have, nevertheless, to reach our conclusions on the basis of such information as is available to us. One of the purposes of a debate such as this, even after the important announcement made by the Prime Minister, is to do just that—to impart information to back benchers and to the Opposition.
  Whether the Prime Minister likes it or not, it is a fact that throughout the whole country the question of Rhodesia is considered to be a political matter of paramount importance. I mention this because, frankly, I did not understand the line taken by the Prime Minister last Thursday when he told us that he had hoped that it would have been possible to have kept Rhodesia out of the General Election. I can only give my own experience. Certainly, whenever I spoke at meetings during the General Election and did not mention Rhodesia, on every such occasion I was closely questioned about it at the end of the meeting. After all, this is a matter not only of supreme importance, but also of immense danger. It is also a matter of universal interest in Britain, and it is no discredit either to the British electorate or to hon. Members of this House that their views do not always follow party lines. Certainly at least one or two speeches today have shown that to be the case.
  My home is not far from one of the largest coalfields in the country, and I can assure the House that there are many people who voted Labour on 31st March and who, at any rate until the statement which was made today, had hitherto been extremely dubious about the Government's Rhodesia policy. This is, of
  824
  course, quite natural and inevitable when there are great moral issues at stake, as there are in this case. It is very natural that there should have been these differences. I am told that hon. Members opposite are not entirely united on the Government's policy of wholehearted support of the bombing of North Vietnam, another issue of worldwide significance.
  I mention these facts because the views and feelings which have been expressed by my right hon. and hon. Friends in the House as well as at private party meetings have been both a recognition of the gravity of the situation which we have reached and a reflection of the deep and sincere convictions held by individual Members. I have had occasion to speak on Rhodesia twice in the past from this Dispatch Box, on comparatively minor matters, and I have never sought to minimise the immense difficulties with which right hon. and hon. Members opposite are faced. But I hope that right hon. Gentlemen in their turn will recognise that, despite the differences we have had, throughout the whole of this period the sole criterion of my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition has been the national interest. It was precisely because we believed it to be in the national interest that, before ever we knew that the Prime Minister was to make a statement today, we decided that we would not put down an Amendment to the Address and so call a division.
  It is now more than five months since the folly of U.D.I., and, until the Prime Minister made his statement today, we were all agreed on two matters. We were all agreed that the U.D.I. was illegal, and we were all agreed that the object of all we did should be to ensure the return to constitutional government in Rhodesia. Now, after the statement this afternoon, we are all agreed on a third aspect of policy, that there must be, and will be, talks.
  The Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations went out of his way today, at considerable length, to defend the Government's handling of the situation as between Rhodesia and this country. Indeed, I think it fair to say—the right hon. Gentleman will not deny it—that he spent most of his time, naturally, perhaps, in view of the statement made earlier, in dwelling on the past history

  825
  of the matter. I shall, therefore, explain to the House, in as moderate language as I can, why we on these benches believe that the Government's handling of the situation has, to say the least, been somewhat inept.
  In the period which preceded U.D.I., my right hon. Friends did all they possibly could both in private conversations with Mr. Smith and by means of public statements to dissuade the Rhodesian Government from seizing independence illegally, and, when Mr. Smith did seize independence illegally, we immediately condemned it. In response to the important point raised by the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Michael Foot)—he is not here now, but it will be within the memory of those who heard the intervention—I want to say that it has always been our view that the white minority in Rhodesia could not and should not permanently rule that country. But it is equally clear—I am sure that the Secretary of State will be the first to agree with me now—that, whatever settlement is ultimately reached, the progress to majority rule must take time.
  Mr. Bottomley: I said so.
  Mr. Barber: The right hon. Gentleman said so this afternoon, but it is important to emphasise it. This brings me to a point which, I believe, raises one of the most unfortunate aspects of the discussions which led eventually to the U.D.I., the fact that many intelligent, moderate and normally well-informed people in Rhodesia genuinely thought that the alternatives which the Labour Government were forcing upon them were illegal independence or almost immediate majority rule.
  Within a few weeks of the U.D.I., I spoke to a leading businessman who had visited Rhodesia and who, I may say, was of sufficient importance to be seen by the Prime Minister on his return to London. He told me that, in the conversations he had had in Salisbury and elsewhere in Rhodesia, again and again otherwise perfectly reasonable people had told him that they thought that the alternative to U.D.I. with which they were faced was majority rule either immediately or within a ridiculously short period.
  The Government may say that this was never their policy. They may say
  826
  that they made this absolutely clear to Mr. Smith. But the fact is that they were not able to get it across to the white Rhodesians. I believe from what I have heard that this was one of the prime causes of the support which Mr. Smith received.
  The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Wilson): I do not disagree that this has been one of the big misunderstandings in Rhodesia. But it was certainly not our fault. As I have reported a number of times to the House—indeed, on my return; and I said this very plainly in Rhodesia, on their television and on their radio, and in my public statement at the airport on arrival and when I left—we did not control the system of propaganda and what was put out in Rhodesia. I think that the dilemma or choice that the right hon. Gentleman has mentioned was rather assiduously spread at that time. But we did everything in our power, not having control of the media of propaganda, to make it quite plain that we thought it was going to be a matter of a very long time.
  Mr. Barber: I accept what the right hon. Member says. Indeed, I think he will agree that I was trying to put the matter fairly. I said that he might well say that he and his colleagues had done everything that they possibly could, but the fact was, as it turned out, that many of the white Rhodesians simply did not believe the statement which the right hon. Gentleman was making. This may well be—if I may put it this way; I want to try to be as moderate as I can—because of some of the statements made by senior members of the Labour Party when they were in opposition.
  At any rate I raise this question now not because I want to hark back to the past but because I believe that if the talks are to succeed, as we all hope and believe they will do, the path of the right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues will be made considerably easier if they go out of their way, with the new means of communication now at their disposal, to make it abundantly clear to the white Rhodesians that there is not before them the simple choice which some of them genuinely believe existed before. To do this would certainly make the chances of success in the talks more likely.

  827
  In his speech this afternoon, the Commonwealth Secretry spent a great deal of his time on the history of sanctions. He said "We knew that in the end sanctions would be effective." He then went on to dwell at length on what the Government had done. I should like to make a few remarks on the points that he made.
  First, on the day after U.D.I. the Prime Minister was asked about the likely effectiveness of the first batch of sanctions which were announced either on the day of U.D.I. or on the following day. He was asked whether, if they did not prove effective, he intended to do something further. The Prime Minister replied—I want to be perfectly fair about this—that the Government would certainly have to review the situation in the light of discussions at the United Nations and elsewhere. But he said this about the first batch of sanctions, which we supported:
  "It is our view that these measures will be effective, not least because of the financial considerations … we have no other measure in contemplation so far as we are concerned."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 12th November, 1965; Vol. 720, c. 635.]
  I am not saying that at that stage there was anything whatever reprehensible about this statement, but I am saying that either the advice which the right hon. Gentleman was receiving was wholly wrong or he made a very great error of Judgment, because, as we all know now, those measures were not nearly enough.
  Then there was the right hon. Gentleman's speech on 21st December on the question of the blockade of Beira. I do not intend to go over the ground again, because the Prime Minister gave his explanation on Thursday, but the Commonwealth Secretary went out of his way to mention this again today. I would only remind the House that, whatever else the Prime Minister may have said on 21st December in referring to a possible resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter, he said in terms:
  "We do not ourselves propose to seek such a resolution."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 21st December, 1965; Vol. 722. c. 1919.]
  Again without going into the merits, the hard fact is that the Government have done precisely that which they said they would not do. There may or may not have been good reasons why the right hon. Gentleman concluded that it was right to go back on the assurance he had
  828
  given to the House of Commons but go back on that assurance he most certainly did.
  This afternoon the Prime Minister, in answer to a supplementary question, referred to the Lagos Conference. It is as well, when one is reviewing the history of sanctions in the light of what the Commonwealth Secretary told us, to be reminded of one of the most important passages in the Lagos communiqué which was issued three and a half months ago. It said:
  "… the Prime Ministers noted that the statement by the British Prime Minister that on the expert advice available to him the cumulative effects of the economic and financial sanctions might well bring the rebellion to an end within a matter of weeks rather than months."
  That was three and a half months ago. I wonder what the time scale for sanctions is now for the Government.
  From all the information I have received, I entirely agree with my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Wirral that it would be a great mistake if the Government were to exaggerate either publicly or, much more important perhaps, in their own minds, the effect of sanctions. I am only sorry I was not here to listen to the speech from my hon. Friend the Member for Torquay (Sir F. Bennett) who, I believe, is the last hon. Member of this House to have been in Rhodesia, because I understand that he made very much the same point.
  My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Wirral and my hon. Friend the Member for Torquay and others are not alone in the doubts they have about sanctions. I mentioned the Lagos communiqué of three and a half months ago and want to quote a short passage from the Financial Times two months after the conference. The report said:
  "Rhodesia's economic performance since independence is much better than most economists and businessmen had expected. The air of great optimism in Salisbury has been dampened a little, no doubt, by the nonappearance of an oil tanker this week. But there is a growing belief that sanctions have already failed to achieve their purpose.
  "In official circles here"—
  the report came from Salisbury—
  "Whitehall claims that sanctions are taking their toll are greeted with amusement. Even anti-Smith Rhodesians have become extremely cynical about what they consider to be unrealistically exaggerated British claims of the success of sanctions."

  829
  Those were the views of a correspondent of the Financial Times who was out there.
  If we on these benches over the last weeks and months have been restive about the Rhodesian policy of the Government—which the Commonwealth Secretary, judging by his speech today, seems to think has been an unqualified success—if we have been unhappy about some of the things that have happened, I can only say that the Government have themselves to blame. I can see that, while these informal talks are going on there is obviously a limit to what the Prime Minister can tell us about them. But we only regret that it has taken him so long to accept the clear advice which has been given both by the Governor and by Sir Hugh Beadle.
  Long before the Prime Minister got involved in the last few days with the talks to which he referred in his statement, he had every opportunity of telling the House why he did not accept the advice given for several weeks past by these two eminent and respectable gentlemen. These are the two men who only a few months ago were held in high esteem by the Prime Minister and I assume that they still are. I well remember that, on the first day of the debate on the Gracious Speech last November, the Prime Minister praised Sir Hugh Beadle
  '…for his sagacity, judgment and humanity …"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 9th November, 1965; Vol. 720, c. 29.]
  I hope that the Commonwealth Secretary will listen to this, because we on these benches, as did the whole country, knew the advice of Sir Hugh Beadle as long ago as January of this year. Sir Hugh Beadle then conveyed his advice to the British people through the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget), who this afternoon, everybody will agree, made a fine and courageous speech. Considering that this is what was said in January of this year, I should like to quote from the article—not an interview but a considered article—which the hon. and learned Gentleman wrote on his return to the United Kingdom in the middle of January. I quote only the first two paragraphs:
  "My last two hours in Rhodesia were spent at Government House with Sir Humphrey Gibbs, the Queen's representative,
  830
  Sir Hugh Beadle, the Chief Justice, and Sir Godfrey Nicholson, M.P.
  "A very full discussion ended with Sir Humphrey saying 'We seem to be in entire agreement', and Sir Hugh turning to me and saying: 'When you get back, for heaven's sake convince them that they have got to negotiate with Smith. There is no one else. The alternative is disaster'. I asked: 'May I quote you?' And he answered 'Yes'."
  This afternoon, the Commonwealth Secretary said that words uttered in this Chamber are often carried to Salisbury. How right he was! I wonder whether he still remembers the words which he uttered in the House on 7th December and which were carried to Salisbury. He then said:
  "… we cannot deal with Smith in any way—because he is not a man to be trusted."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 7th December, 1965; Vol. 722, c. 385.]
  I must say that there is no need to ask the right hon. Gentleman this evening where he stands on those words now. The Prime Minister, thank goodness, has at long last had the good sense totally to reject them and to accept the policy which was proclaimed weeks ago by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition; in other words, to open talks without prior commitment.
  Then there was the clear and unequivocal advice of the Governor. The Prime Minister knew weeks ago that his advice was precisely the same as the suggestion made by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition—to get round the table and to talk. But at that time, for reasons which were never given to us, the Prime Minister rejected it, and so the only way which was left open to the Governor to make the British Government see sense was to publish his views to the world. This he did, as we know, in a talk which he had with Lord Bolton when Lord Bolton was authorised to make his views known on his return to this country.
  The message which Lord Bolton conveyed to the British people was, of course, true, and I was somewhat surprised this afternoon that both the Prime Minister and the Commonwealth Secretary went out of their way to say that there had been no change in policy. I would have thought that it would have actually helped the talks at this stage if they had admitted what, after all, is the obvious truth to those of us who have listened to the previous debates—that there has been a complete change of policy, because this is

  831
  what it is. If anyone doubts that, I will explain why.
  These informal talks are taking place, as the Prime Minister told us, as the result of a meeting between his Principal Private Secretary and Mr. Smith, and these talks, to use the Prime Minister's own word, are directed to seeing whether a basis for negotiations genuinely exists. This was welcome news, and I ask the House to note the words "to see whether a basis for negotiation exists", because previously the Prime Minister's policy was quite contrary, for he said:
  "We cannot negotiate with these men …"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 10th December, 1965; Vol. 722, c. 771.]
  When we on these benches took exception to what we believed to be a rigid and uncomprising approach by the right hon. Gentleman, we were criticised and treated almost as traitors ourselves. Yet this is now what the right hon. Gentleman is doing. Of course there has been a change, and a very welcome change indeed.
  Then this afternoon the Commonwealth Secretary, in his valiant defence of Government policy, said that nobody had produced a better policy. That is precisely what my right hon. Friend did—the policy of talks without prior commitment—and we are delighted that this is now also the policy of Her Majesty's Government.
  I have already mentioned the fact that three and a half months ago the Prime Minister told our friends that he expected the rebellion to be brought to an end within a matter of weeks. I had a considerable amount more to say on the question of sanctions and I had hoped to be able to deal with some of the specific points that have been raised—
  Mr. Bottomley: Before the right hon. Gentleman leaves that point, is he aware that the difference today is that before we had to recognise the illegal régime before talks could take place? Is that what the right hon. Gentleman is suggesting we should do?
  Mr. Barber: I am saying that three and a half months ago the Prime Minister announced to the world in a communiqué that he thought there was a fair chance that the rebellion would be brought to an end within a matter of weeks. If the Commonwealth Secretary wants me to pursue this, I will read it.
  Mr. Bottomley: No.
  Mr. Barber: Good. I will pass on to my next subject.
  Mr. Bottomley: Answer my question.
  Mr. Barber: I was dealing with that very point. I am making the point that the right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues have consistently misjudged the effect of their sanctions on the Rhodesian economy. If the right hon. Gentleman will look, for example, at the independent report—not an anonymous report—of Nicholas Carol, diplomatic correspondent of the Sunday Times, last Sunday, he will see that this is borne out. It was borne out today in every speech by hon. Members who have been to Rhodesia.
  The Prime Minister: It is a fact that at the time about which the right hon. Gentleman is talking, in January, the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition and I both insisted, I think rightly, that there could be no negotiations if those negotiations meant validating or accepting the illegal régime and if there was no forswearing of that illegality. That was the position which both Front Benches took up at that time. There has been a change now. Is the right hon. Gentleman now saying, contrary to what his right hon. Friend wrote in Punch and said in a number of places and in the House, that we should have negotiations if negotiating meant accepting the illegal régime of that time?
  Mr. Barber: No. What my right hon. Friend has said is that there should be negotiations without prior commitment. This is what the right hon. Gentleman has now proposed, and this we welcome. There is nothing to quarrel about over this. It is acceptable to the whole House and we are delighted that he has done it.
  I had something to say about the grave consequences for the relationship between ourselves and South Africa in connection with Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, but obviously I must bring my remarks to a conclusion. I will just say that I hope—indeed, I expect—that Her Majesty's Government are taking into account the very serious economic consequences for Britain if a policy of blockade of Beira were ever to be applied to South Africa.

  833
  South Africa, after all, is Britain's third largest customer. Last year we sent it £265 million worth of exports, and those hon. Gentlemen opposite, and some Cabinet Ministers, who used to parade in favour of a trade boycott of South Africa may like to know that last year, under a Labour Government, whereas the overall increase in exports was 7 per cent., the increase in exports to South Africa was 11 per cent.—and this is a measure of the importance of this trade to us. On top of this, it has been estimated that our investment in South Africa amounts to about £1,000 million. None of these economic factors is paramount, but in our present balance of payments position the Government are, I am sure, certainly weighing them seriously in the balance.
  I hope it is now agreed on all sides of the House that sanctions are not an end in themselves. They are a means to an end, and that end, as my right hon. Friend has repeatedly said, is to persuade the people of Rhodesia to turn back to moderation and constitutional rule. As the Prime Minister now realises, the tragic situation in Rhodesia at the end of the day can be solved only by conciliation.
  On 25th January the Prime Minister made a statement in the House in which he set out the Government's aims and purposes. He reaffirmed that policy when he spoke last Thursday in the debate. I shall not go over that ground again. Suffice it to say that we on these benches have real reservations, and I hope that they will be respected as sincere reservations, as to the likelihood of this plan, which was reaffirmed last Thursday, succeeding.
  I say that because to those in Rhodesia to whom that plan was aimed, and whom it is necessary to influence if the object of all of us is to be attained, that plan must seem very like a call for unconditional surrender. Certainly, as my right hon. Friends the Members for Thirsk and Malton (Mr. Turton) and Streatham Mr. Sandys) said this afternoon, Rhodesia is unlikely to accept a period of direct rule.
  In his statement today, the Prime Minister asked the House to understand why he could not say anything in last Thursday's debate, but he went out of his way to reaffirm his statement of
  834
  25th January, and I am bound to say that that was unfortunate. Unless a policy of economic sanctions and a genuine and realistic attempt at reconciliation go hand in hand, there is a real danger that the actions of the Government will drive the Rhodesians to extremes rather than bring them to moderation. This is surely an anxiety which must be shared by all of us, in all parts of the House.
  Time and again my right hon. Friends have said that at the end of the day there would have to be talks. This is the only way to reach a constitutional settlement that is fair to all Her Majesty's subjects in Rhodesia. That should surely be the aim of the United Nations. It is certainly in the interests of South Africa and Portugal that a settlement should be reached. It is certainly in the interests of Zambia, as the hon. and learned Member for Northampton pointed out. If the Government are right and sanctions are really biting, it is obviously in the interests of the Smith régime to reach a settlement. Who can doubt that a just solution would bring joy and relief to all of us here in the United Kingdom?
  Over the past few months, we have had deep and serious differences with the policy of Her Majesty's Government. Those differences were genuine and they were sincere. Whether, on the question of the timing of the talks, the Prime Minister is right or my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition was right in putting forward the suggestion earlier, we all welcome the decision which was announced today to get talks going and we all pray that they will be successful.
  9.33 p.m.
  The Attorney-General (Sir Elwyn Jones): I am glad that the right hon. Member for Altrincham and Sale (Mr. Barber) began and ended his speech by supporting the important statement made today by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister. The fact that that statement of the Prime Minister could be made and came to be made is a measure of the success of the Government's policy in what the right hon. Gentleman has conceded to be a highly difficult situation.
  I doubt whether the right hon. Gentleman's speech has been helpful to what should be the common cause. It seems to have been more concerned with making party points than in working towards

  835
  unity in this House and settlement in the interesting development that has arisen. If I may refresh the right hon. Gentleman's memory about recent history and the alleged failure of my right hon. Friends to take advantage of opportunities for negotiation, he will not, I am sure, forget that as recently as January of this year, when my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations sought to go to Salisbury for talks, the condition was that there should be preacceptance of the illegal régime by Her Majesty's Government.
  Happily, there are signs of a change of outlook. I certainly do not want in my observations tonight to widen any differences, because I am quite sure that all men of good will cannot fail to applaud the Prime Minister's statement.
  A number of suggestions have been made in the course of the debate as to how the negotiations that are about to begin should be conducted, what the agenda should be, who should take part in them, and where they should take place. It would not be helpful for me at this delicate stage in the preliminary exchanges to comment upon those matters. As my right hon. Friend has said, the informal talks are being entered into without commitment on either side but we realise that there is much at stake, and the overall message that has come from the House of Commons in the course of the debate has been to wish success to what is now being undertaken.
  Before I deal with some matters to which, nevertheless, an answer is called for from me, I should like to congratulate three of my hon. Friends on their admirable maiden speeches. I refer to the speeches of the hon. Members for Lancaster (Mr. Henig), Billericay (Mr. Moonman) and Hampstead (Mr. Whitaker). They maintained the tradition of the House of paying tribute to their eminent predecessors, which is the kind of tradition that oils the wheels of Parliamentary progress.
  I should like particularly to commend the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Hampstead, and may I say one word about a specific matter which he raised? We shall honour fully the undertakings announced in the House by my right hon. Friend the Commonwealth
  836
  Secretary on 22nd December, 1965, to give financial and other help to members of the Rhodesian public service and of the police and armed forces who lose their jobs or suffer in certain other ways as a result of their loyalty to the Crown.
  Mr. Paget: Would the right hon. Gentleman tell us, are there any?
  The Attorney-General: My hon. and learned Friend's eternal unhelpfulness in the situation is once more indicated. There are some, and we shall stand by them.
  Mr. Paget: One, or two?
  The Attorney-General: The major matter to which I desire to address myself, and which has been the subject of criticism by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Barnet (Mr. Maudling) and other right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite in the course of the debate, is that the Government should not have gone to the Security Council. In my submission, the taking of the problem to the Security Council and the obtaining of a Chapter VII resolution was not only unavoidable; it was wholly justifiable in the situation in which the Government found themselves on 5th April.
  May I commend to the House the observations that were made by the American delegate, Mr. Goldberg, at the Security Council meeting which I had the honour to attend? He said:
  "The world has quite properly looked to Britain, the constitutional authority, to solve this very difficult question. Britain has never hesitated to acknowledge its responsibility publicly and to the members of this Council, and in coming here when it did originally and when it does so today, it seems to me, as a believer in this world Organisation, that Great Britain should be congratulated and not condemned for manifesting its recognition of its obligations under the Charter and its respect for the decent opinions of mankind."
  The fact is that, had we not obtained the powers given to the Government by the terms of the Security Council resolution, three things would have happened. First, oil sanctions which the House approved, and to which effect had been given in the law of the United Kingdom and Rhodesia, would have been in danger of total collapse. Of course there are some hon. Gentlemen opposite who think that that might have been a

  837
  good thing, but it was the view of the House that they should be enforced. Secondly, a major victory would have been won by the illegal régime in Rhodesia. Thirdly, more far-reaching action would undoubtedly immediately have been demanded at the United Nations.
  The position on 5th April was that the "Joanna V" had arrived at Beira that day, and it was possible that the pumping of oil through the pipeline to the Rhodesian refinery might start at any moment. What was more grave perhaps was that one tanker was actually approaching Beira, and other tankers were undoubtedly on the way. Of that we had a considerable body of evidence at our disposal.
  The position was that the Security Council resolution of November calling for an oil embargo was not a mandatory resolution under Chapter VII, and it could not, in the view of the Government, give legal authority for the use of force to prevent tankers with oil for Rhodesia from entering Beira. The Committee of 24 had met on 4th and 6th April, and was clearly determined on action. It was clear that in the very near future there was likely to be a call for a Security Council meeting at which a mandatory resolution in the most far-reaching terms would be proposed.
  It was in those circumstances that Her Majesty's Government, therefore, called for a meeting of the Security Council on 7th April to secure the adoption of a resolution which would avert the immediate threat, that is to say, a major breach of the oil embargo through the unloading of oil at Beira and its pumping through the pipeline, and the arrival of further tankers and supplies.
  That resolution was adopted on 9th April, and the House will recollect that by its terms the Security Council determined under Chapter VII that the situation resulting from the arrival of a tanker, and the approach of another, and the consequences which would flow from that, constituted a threat to peace. The Security Council went on to call on the Portuguese Government not to permit the pumping of oil from Beira, and not to receive at Beira oil for Rhodesia. It called on all States to ensure the diversion of any vessels reasonably be-
  838
  lieved to be carrying oil destined for Rhodesia, and on the United Kingdom to prevent, by force if necessary, the arrival at Beira of vessels reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined for Rhodesia. The Government therefore sought and secured from the Security Council the action necessary to deal with the urgent situation resulting from an apparently imminent and major breach of the oil embargo, including authority for the use of the necessary minimum of force.
  Mr. Barber: One part of the resolution
  "Calls upon the Portuguese Government not to receive at Beira oil destined for Rhodesia."
  Will the Attorney-General explain to the House why, on the same day, Britain abstained from voting on an Amendment which
  "called on South Africa to take all measures necessary to prevent a supply of oil to Rhodesia."?
  Why the discrimination?
  The Attorney-General: Another resolution in far more extreme terms was proposed by the Security Council that day. I am making the point that the very limited, and immediately necessary, terms of the United Kingdom resolution were of great importance in limiting the action at that stage, and were the limit of what the immediate situation required. On the South African situation, of course, diplomatic negotiations were taking place and have been taking place throughout the whole of this period. I will certainly not be drawn into describing the nature either of those which have been taking place in the immediate past or of those which are taking place at the present time.
  However, right hon. Gentlemen opposite must really ask themselves, not merely what they would have done themselves—we have failed to get an answer to that—but, objectively, what the alternatives were in the situation in which we found ourselves. Some, of course, are obvious. The Government could, in the absence of authority, under a Chapter VII resolution, either have allowed these foreign flag tankers to go into Beira unimpeded or have intercepted them unilaterally—unless they had obtained the authority of the flag State to intercept the tankers on

  839
  the high seas and diverted them, if necessary by force, to other destinations.
  To have allowed tankers to go into Beira in that situation without taking any action to prevent them would, of course, have been to acquiesce in a serious breach of the oil embargo which this House approved and which is obviously critical in the Rhodesian situation. That would have removed, in the view of the Government, a most powerful element in the pressure on the illegal régime in Rhodesia.
  In this connection, I can do no better than quote from an article written by the right hon. and learned Member for Wirral (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd) in the News of the World on 27th February. In it, he suggested that sanctions:
  "… are a powerful influence towards a settlement."
  Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: I said that today as well.
  The Attorney-General: The right hon. and learned Gentleman said that today, as well.
  However, one cannot help noting on the other side of the House still the view of sanctions, "Sanctions are fine so long as they are not effective." That has been continually the effect of the speeches which we have heard from many hon. and right hon. Members on the other side of the House—
  Mr. Edward Heath Mr. Edward Heath (Bexley) rose—
  The Attorney-General: I will give way in a moment.
  I will say this, in regard to what we have heard this evening about the effect of sanctions. I could not help detecting a certain satisfaction reflected on the other side of the House that sanctions apparently were not biting so effectively as the Government are claiming they are. Whatever the position was last month or six months ago, the information at the Government's disposal is that our economic measures and the economic measures which other countries have taken—let us take note of the remarkable international co-operation which has gone into this effort of dealing with the rebellion in Rhodesia—are biting more and more and that the economic difficulties of the régime are increasing.
  840
  I do not know whether I have departed from the point which the right hon. Member for Bexley (Mr. Heath) wanted to raise, but I will now give way.
  Mr. Heath: The right hon. and learned Gentleman has in fact completed the circuit. I wanted to ask him this. He has just emphasised the remarkable co-operation between countries and he said that the Navy was unable to intercept unilaterally unless the consent of the flag State had been obtained. I would ask him this direct question. Was the consent of the Greek Government asked for and was it refused? This is very important. Secondly, how can he stand at that Box and make accusations against this side of the House of wanting sanctions to be ineffective when his Government abstained on a resolution which called for effective sanctions to prevent South Africa from sending oil?
  The Attorney-General: It is generally conceded that, potentially, perhaps the most effective sanction is oil. If what the right hon. Gentleman has just said is true, why did he not vote for the oil sanctions? Why was the House treated to that dismal experience that night when the Opposition divided into three? The men who are really supporting us went into the Lobby with us. What did the Leader of the Opposition do? He sat on the fence.
  I have answered the question about the South African position; that was not the immediate challenge and threat to international authority which was faced at that time, and in spite of the right hon. Gentleman's efforts to create difficulties with South Africa, I will say no more than that diplomatic discussions are continuing. As for the position of the flag State, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has already answered this question quite clearly; express permission to the Royal Navy to intervene had not at that material time been obtained.
  Mr. Heath: Had it been asked for?
  The Attorney-General: I refuse to be drawn further into the matter of the diplomatic exchanges with an ally.
  Mr. Heath: That is dishonest.
  The Attorney-General: There is no dishonesty and it is outrageous that the

  841
  right hon. Gentleman should have the impertinence to address that observation to me.
  Mr. Speaker: Order. If the Front Bench wishes to intervene, it must intervene in a Parliamentary way.
  The Attorney-General: The position therefore was that on 7th April we were faced with the very destruction of the sanctions policy and the reinforcement of the position of the illegal régime. What else would have resulted? What would have resulted is that other States would have insisted on taking the handling of the Rhodesian situation out of our control. The right hon. Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys) said that our decision to take the matter to the United Nations resulted in our losing effective control. The opposite is the case. We regained it. Anyone listening to those proceedings in the Security Council would have been under no illusion at all that if the British Government had not acted immediately and effectively on 7th April as we did, we should have been faced with the introduction of measures of a far more stringent and potentially far-seeing nature.
  Mr. Sandys Mr. Sandys rose—
  The Attorney-General: I cannot give way, particularly in the light of the recent exchange with the Leader of the Opposition.
  Mr. Sandys: The Attorney-General referred to my speech.
  The Attorney-General: I have very few minutes left and I am trying to deal with some of the matters raised in the debate.
  As I have said, we could as a Government have intercepted vessels on the high seas unilaterally. The Royal Navy had the power to stop the "Joanna" and to stop the "Manuella" from going in, and it may well be that if another Administration had been the Government of our country this is what they would have done. But the Labour Government believe in the rule of law.
  Mr. Heath Mr. Heath rose—
  The Attorney-General: Having had the rare experience of being accused of dishonesty by anybody, I will certainly not give way.
  842
  The position which we took is that we required the legal sanction of the Security Council for the necessary action which needed to be taken. By taking the step which we took we prevented from arising a situation in which a mandatory resolution of a more far-reaching character would undoubtedly have been proposed.
  The sort of resolution likely to have been proposed can be seen by examining that which was in fact adopted by the Committee of 24 on 21st April by 19 votes to nil with five abstentions. That resolution condemns the failure of South Africa and Portugal to implement the resolution of the Security Council and condemns their alleged support and assistance for the illegal régime in Rhodesia. It calls on the United Kingdom to use force to bring the rebellion to an end. It considers that the situation in Southern Rhodesia is a threat to international peace and urges the Security Council to call on all states to impose mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII.
  Her Majesty's Government could either have allowed the Security Council to adopt such a resolution, with incalculable consequences for Britain, for the whole of Southern and Central Africa and for the United Nations; or, as the right hon. Gentleman keeps repeating quite unnecessarily, it would have been open to the United Kingdom to veto such a resolution, despite the apparent illogicality of vetoing a resolution which in part confirms or appears, on the face of it, to confirm our own policy of applying an embargo on the supply of oil and oil products to Rhodesia. What is perhaps more important, the use of the veto in these circumstances would have had profound and incalculable results for our relations and the relations of the West as a whole with Africa in general.
  Clearly, therefore, an objective consideration of these alternatives which faced us at the beginning of April dictated unavoidably and inescapably the course which the Government took in the Security Council. Now, with the Security Council backing, we have plugged one of the most important breaches of the oil embargo. It is quite true, as has been said more than once in this debate, that there are other leaks, but such supplies as reach Rhodesia by these other means are less

  843
  satisfactory and are considerably more expensive to Rhodesia than the supply of crude oil to their own refineries.
  In our view, it is preferable to allow time for the implications of the Security Council decision to sink in while the action which we are taking through diplomatic channels continues. I am sure that the House will not expect me to make any comment on the various diplomatic exchanges which are taking place, particularly in the light of the Prime Minister's statement today. They have been taking place before and after the recourse to the Security Council.
  There is still time to comment on one matter, namely, the suggestion that there were no grounds for saying that the situation in Rhodesia constituted a threat to peace. In my view, the resolution of the Security Council on that matter and to that effect was entirely justifiable and reasonable in the circumstances. The Security Council had already declared in the resolution of 20th November that a continuance in time of the situation resulting from U.D.I.
  844
  "constitutes a threat to international peace and security."
  The loss of control of the situation which would have resulted from a major breach of the oil embargo, the assistance which it would have afforded to the illegal régime, the diminution of the prospect of an outcome acceptable to world opinion, might well have led others, in this highly explosive situation, to despair of peaceful solutions and to demand resort to action which would have had grave and incalculable consequences for the peace of Africa. The determination by the Council represented a reasonable assessment of the situation.
  In my submission, no Government could have done more than this Government have done to achieve a peaceful solution to this grave and difficult problem. But the Government are determined to continue in their efforts to achieve a just settlement peacefully which will do justice to all Rhodesians.
  It being Ten o'clock, the debate stood adjourned.
  Debate to be resumed Tomorrow.

  BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
  Ordered,
  That the Proceedings on the Motions relating to Business of the House, Procedure (Motions for leave to bring in Bills and Nomination of Select Committees at Commencement of Public Business), and Procedure (Select Committees) may be entered upon and proceeded
  That—

  (1) save as provided in this Order, Government business shall have precedence at every Sitting until the Summer Adjournment and no bills other than Government bills shall be introduced;

  (2) private members' notices of motions shall have precedence over Government business on 17th June, 24th June, 8th July, and 22nd July, and ballots for these notices shall be held after Questions on 25th May, 15th June, 22nd June, and 6th July, respectively;

  (3) no notices of motions shall be handed in for any of the days on which private members' notices have precedence under this Order in anticipation of those ballots;

  (4) Standing Order No. 5 (Precedence of Government Business) shall have effect after the Summer Adjournment as if the session had been opened at the first meeting of the House after the said Adjournment.

  It is usual at the beginning of a Parliamentary Session to move a Motion covering the time allotted to private Members for Private Members' Bills and Motions during that current Session. It has been the custom during the last several years to allocate 20 Fridays—10 for Private Members' Motions and 10 for Private Members' Bills. However, this year, with an extended Session and in accordance with what my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said in the debate on the Address on Thursday of last week, the proposal in front of the House now is to allocate not 20 Fridays for private Members' time but 24. We propose that the time should be divided as to 14 days for Private Members' Motions and 10 days for Private Members' Bills.
  This is rather more than would normally be given under similar circumstances, but there are precedents, and perhaps the nearest precedent is when there was a General Election in the spring of 1955, when the Administration at that time allowed no private Members' time whatsoever until the autumn of that year—
  Mr. R. Gresham-Cooke: Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will allow me to correct him there. He speaks of the spring of 1955, but the General Election was on 26th May, 1955, and Parliament did not reassemble until 7th June. There were only six weeks left of that Session.
  with at this day's Sitting at any hour, though opposed.—[The Prime Minister.]

  BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
  10.1 p.m.
  The Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons (Mr. Herbert Bowden): I beg to move,
  Mr. Bowden: I am, of course, prepared to accept the hon. Gentleman's figures.
  The position is that, with the interruption of a General Election, the result of which has been most pleasing—[Interruption.]—a certain amount of time is lost for everyone. If one thinks in terms of time lost as a result of that event—although the time was well spent—12 days of legislation were lost to any Government that might have been in power at the time, the Opposition lost six days, and it is not unreasonable to ask Private Members to lose some time. In fact, Fridays were already taken up in the last Session before the Dissolution of Parliament, and this proposal gives an additional 24 in the current Session. That, plus half days, meant a net loss to back benchers of 5 Fridays which, as I say, is not, in the view of the Government, unreasonable having regard to the fact of the Opposition losing 6 days and the Government losing 12 days of legislation.
  Since the Motion was put down, I have looked at it again, because I think there could be some injustice to private Members. That is as the result of the procedure of the House which means that no Ten Minute Rule Bill can be raised until such time as a Ballot for Private Members' Bills has taken place. The reason for that is that Members who are successful in the Ballot take precedence over everyone else, and other hon. Members who come in for Ten Minute Bills do not jump the queue.

  847
  What I would therefore propose, with the approval of the House, is that in order to enable Ten Minute Rule Bills to be moved after the Ballot, the Ballot should be taken reasonably quickly—perhaps within a week or ten days from now—that will require a new Motion on the Order Paper—and that immediately after the Ballot, with the new Motion, of course, stating clearly the dates on which debates will take place, there should instead of four Fridays between now and the end of July being allotted for Private Members' Motions, be two on Private Members' Bills and two on Private Members' Motions.
  Hon. and right hon. Members in all parts of the House will appreciate, if they look at the calendar and consider the Whitsuntide Recess, that this is a much better arrangement. It will enable hon. Members who wish to use Standing Order No. 13 and to seek the leave of the House to bring in Ten Minute Rule Bills to do so. They will know their place in the queue and there will be no difficulty. I am proposing that the Motion as it stands should be approved. If it should be defeated on a Division, or if it were withdrawn, I am afraid that according to Standing Orders a Ballot would have to take place tomorrow, which would be quite unfair to hon. Members who have no warning whatever. If the Motion is approved, I propose within a week or 10 days to put down another Motion taking two Fridays for Private Members Bills and two Fridays for Private Members Motions before the end of July, thus allowing hon. Members to introduce Ten Minute Rule Bills if they wish in the normal way. This is a reasonable thing to do and the allocation of time is reasonable.
  Mr. Leo Abse Mr. Leo Abse (Pontypool) rose—
  Mr. T. L. Iremonger Mr. T. L. Iremonger (Ilford, North) rose—
  Mr. Speaker: Order. We cannot have two hon. Members on their feet at the same moment.
  Mr. Abse: Before my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House sits down, will he explain to the House whether when he says that this will facilitate the possibility of the introduction of Ten Minute Rule Bills "in the normal way"
  848
  we are to understand that he means the normal way—that is, the way before the present unfortunate experiment was adopted? The normal way, as he will know, is that it should be taken at a time when the whole House is sitting and not when its business has been despatched—
  Mr. Speaker: Order. We have a Motion on that issue on the Order Paper to be considered later. Mr. Iremonger.
  Mr. Iremonger: Before the right hon. Gentleman sat down, I wished to ask him to elucidate a little further what this means in terms of hon. Members wanting to introduce Ten Minute Rule Bills. Does it mean that those Bills may be introduced as from now but will take precedence after the Bills which have taken their place in the Ballot, or does it mean that they may not be introduced at all until the Ballot has been drawn?
  Mr. Bowden: The latter is the position because, after an hon. Member has been given leave to bring in a Bill, he has to give a date. Until we have passed such a Motion we cannot do anything.
  Mr. Speaker: I have selected for discussion the first Amendment on the Order Paper in the name of the hon. Member for Wandsworth, Central (Dr. David Kerr): in line 2, to leave out paragraph (1). With that Amendment we may take the hon. Member's other Amendment: to leave out lines 13 and 14 and add
  "for the remainder of this session as if for the word 'ten' in paragraph (2) thereof there were substituted the word 'fifteen', and as if for the words 'in each session to be appointed by the House' there were substituted the words '1st July, 15th July, 18th November, 2nd December, 16th December 1966, and 27th January, 10th February, 24th February, 10th March, 14th April, 28th April, 2nd June, 16th June, 30th June and 14th July 1967'; and as if in paragraph (3) thereof, for the word 'seventh' there were substituted the word 'tenth'.
  (4) Paragraph 4 of Standing Order No. 5 shall have effect with the substitution of the word 'third' for the word 'second'".
  10.9 p.m.
  Dr. David Kerr: I beg to move, in line 2, to leave out paragraph (1).
  It is either a very rash and foolish man or a man holding a very deep conviction about his case who dares to cross swords

  849
  with my right hon. Friend the Lord President of the Council. I hope that when I sit down the House will feel more inclined to judge me the latter than the former.
  In the 18 months which it has been my pride and pleasure to spend here, I have learned to think of the House as a corporate being, in that in matters such as this it takes it upon itself to decide as a corporate being, forgetting the conflicts of party interests. We are grateful for the very sober and helpful way in which my right hon. Friend made his case. I want to put it plainly to the House that this is first and foremost a matter for the House. If I may refer to the words which were used by a previous Member for Ebbw Vale when talking about a previous Leader of the House, he reminded that Leader of the House that the Leader serves the whole House and not just his colleagues on the Front Bench. It is in this spirit that I hope I may be heard and my arguments judged.
  We are offered four days for Private Members' Motions. This is a welcome offer and one which my second Amendment does not in any way seek to reduce. However, my right hon. Friend's Motion denies to the House the opportunity to have its full meed of Private Members' Time. I accept precisely what my right hon. Friend said about a Ballot being held tomorrow. It was precisely with this in mind that I tabled what looks like a rather complex and forbidding Amendment. I must tell the House bluntly and happily that, had I not had it tabled for me with the excellent assistance of the neutral Officers of the House, I doubt if I would understand it myself. I cannot forbear to pay tribute to the very helpful way in which they are always approachable. My Amendment takes into account the fact that we should not defeat the Government's Motion tonight, because to do so would be to deprive many of my back-bench colleagues of precisely that right to take part in the Ballot which I am trying to defend here tonight.
  It appears to me, to put it no more critically than this, a great pity that we could not have had the Ballot Book available to us until the Standing Order has been rescinded by Motion of the House. I hope that, if occasion arises in the future when a Standing Order is subject to Government amendment in
  850
  this way, we shall at least proceed, until the House has decided to rescind that Standing Order, to act upon it.
  I deprecate the way in which the Motion was put to the House last night, a matter of only 36 or 48 hours before the Ballot should have been taken. We were given only an opportunity to object, without the right to discuss, which in terms of our own Private Business is one of the most precious rights which we back benchers still retain in the House.
  If my right hon. Friend's Motion is successful tonight, the amount of time available for private Members will be reduced. My right hon. Friend has acknowledged this fact. Let me make it quite clear that this is the Member for Wandsworth, Central behaving like a hoary old reactionary. I want to keep things as they are. I do not want to lose private Members' time. It is the Government's Motion which is taking us away from the existing state of affairs and moving against the rights of the back bencher.
  We are offered extra time for Motions. I do not under-rate the value of Motions. Many of us remember with a certain amount of grief that it was a Private Members' Motion which nearly confounded the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Bill by bringing the debate away from Standing Committee and back to the Floor of the House. I shall return to this in a moment. I certainly do not under-estimate the value of Private Members' Motions. But the fact remains that there are certain Bills, certain enactments, which are always judged most suitable for private members to take up. Although the Government never deny themselves the right to participate in the discussions, it is left to the private member to table the Bills which are matters of conscience and of personal concern.
  The House need only recall that if this Motion is agreed tonight, some men will go to prison having committed homosexual offences, the other place in detail and this House in principle having already determined that they should be spared that punishment. I am not going to suggest that if we had Private Members' Bills this would guarantee the reintroduction of a Measure of homosexual or abortion law reform. What I am saying is that

  851
  if the Government Motion stands, it will guarantee that we will not have such a measure of reform. This is what I find so unacceptable.
  I recognise that the Government need all the time which this House can grant them for the successful passage of urgently necessary legislation, to which I in common with all my colleagues on these benches are committed enthusiastically and to which we are looking forward. As a very junior Parliamentarian—and I assure the House that I speak with the utmost humility after only 18 months' service in this House—I am not prepared to accept that this is the only way in which the Government can find the time. The extra length of time which my Amendment proposes will permit more Private Members' Bills to reach the Statute Book. I am asking for these five days in my Amendment which my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House has suggested it would be equitable for back benchers to surrender.
  If I may quote again from the debate in 1959, my hon. Friend the Member for Dagenham (Mr. Parker) said:
  "If we are to give more time for Private Members' Bills, we should also take greater care to assist private Members in getting their Bills through the House."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 28th October, 1959; Vol. 612, c. 221.]
  It is these extra few months which are so precious. To suggest that we should start having Private Members' Bills in October or November means that we surrender these extra months during which the passage of Private Members' Bills through the very complex machinery of Parliament could be materially assisted.
  I emphasise that I am not asking for extra time. I am resisting the Government's attempt to restrict Private Members' Time. If I may once again quote from a fellow back bencher, the hon. Member for Surbiton (Mr. Fisher), in the same debate, he said:
  "The restriction on Private Members' Time is rather like the imposition of a new tax. It is always said to be temporary to meet some particular difficulty but tends to become permanent."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 28th October, 1959; Vol. 612, c. 216.]
  Mr. Speaker, I hope I shall be forgiven for quoting from a very recent but very relevant debate. If I may once again quote the words of Aneurin Bevan, he said in the debate in 1959:
  852
  "… if we do not carry the Motion today, nothing very calamitous will happen to the Government. All that will really happen will be that Standing Order No. 4 will be at once put into operation. So the right hon. Gentleman must not pretend that in resisting it we are attempting at all to frustrate the activities or intentions of the Government."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 28th October, 1959; Vol. 612, c. 212.]
  The words strike me as most happily apt. The Government are always in a difficulty over legislative time. So far as I can foresee they always will be in difficulty over legislative time, because my information is that the Government's own Departments can provide enough Bills of their own making, without the Government's policy-making Bills to fill Parliamentary time. There is always pressure of legislative time. Therefore, if there is really an argument for increasing the time available for Government Bills let us have morning sittings. We had them last Session. I thought they were a great success. I discovered no particular difficulty among Ministers, among businessmen, or even, if I may say so with humility, among doctors in coming to the House in the morning and playing a full part in the proceedings taking place at that time.
  If we are asked to surrender only five days of time, let us have five mornings or ten mornings to make up for it. If it is really a question of only five days of time to be surrendered, let us have five days less on the Recess. When we subject ourselves, as some of us have, to criticisms about Members' pay, it might be a little easier to resist those criticisms if the number of sitting days which the House occupied in the year amounted to even a little more than 160. Let us have 165 sitting days. This would not shorten hon. Members' Continental holidays very much. I urge on the House the conception that, with all this business awaiting us and much more which my right hon. Friend could discover for us to do, never mind the hectic time-table which he has set himself, we could well have an amendment of this rather outworn machinery. Let us have a look at it.
  I do not share the rather naive views which exist outside the House and in the Press about it, but let us have a look at the possibility of reintroducing by Resolution Bills which have reached a certain stage in the last Parliament without having to go through all the lot again. It

  853
  is the same general party structure in the House. Such Bills need not occupy so much discussion time. I think of the Road Safety Bill, which, as far as one car, see, will come back virtually unaltered, and of other Bills which had already reached an advanced stage.
  If we could do it for Government Bills, might we not at least consider the possibility of doing it for Private Members' Bills? There were half a dozen lost when the election came upon us, some of them very valuable Bills. I stress this because it is essentially a non-party point. Some of the most valuable were tabled not by Members on this side but by Members opposite.
  If I have learned nothing else in my time in the House, I have learned that this place essentially belongs to the private Member. [Laughter.] I acknowledge that that possession sometimes is a shadow of the substance we would all like it to be. But hon. Members who care to examine the whole development of Parliamentary procedure will, I am sure, share my view that the anchor chain of all that has ever been decided has been the anchor chain of private Members' privileges and private Members' Time. True, it is sometimes stolen away. We are all happy to think that you will stand guard over our privileges, Mr. Speaker, but only we, the back benchers, can, in fact, preserve them.
  In conclusion, I dare to quote once more from that debate in 1959:
  "Let us make a good start. Let us decide that the Government cannot have their own way… Let us have a free vote on this issue. It is a House of Commons matter, and… if we decide to extend our privileges by the retention of the Standing Order, it will be to the advantage of the House and the country."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 28th October, 1959; Vol. 612, c. 227.]
  Those words were spoken by my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell).
  10.24 p.m.
  Mr. Peter Kirk: This is an important debate, as the speech of the hon. Member for Wandsworth, Central (Dr. David Kerr) has underlined. The reputation of the House among those outside it does not, perhaps, stand as high as many of us here would like to think it did. One of the reasons why it does not stand so high is simply that the business of the House appears
  854
  to be so much in the hands of one or other of the Front Benches. There is a feeling that there is a kind of cosy arrangement between the two, they discuss what interests them, and what interests the ordinary back bencher is not discussed at all. Certainly, in the ten or eleven years that I have been in the House, I have seen this going on. The tentacles of the Front Benches have reached out for private Members' time. The hon. Member for Wandsworth, Central has done the House a very great service by tabling the Amendment.
  The Leader of the House, as he always does, charmed us all with the suggestion that a compromise might be available. I noted the terms of his compromise. He appeared to justify his original Motion on the ground that everybody else had given up a great deal of time and so private Members could give up five Fridays. But whereas the Government have given up 17 days and the Opposition 7 days, private Members have given up five days from a very much smaller total. The amount of time of which private Members have been deprived is a very large part of the total amount of Private Members' Time at the moment. I do not think that we can accept a situation in which we are not allowed to introduce Private Members' Bills until the autumn.
  The Leader of the House has, very rightly, said that he will alter this matter in the near future, but has also pointed out that if the Motion is not passed tonight we shall be faced with an impossible situation tomorrow, something with which none of us would like to be faced. The fact is, however, that he justifies it solely on the ground that if we do not do this hon. Members' rights under the Ten Minutes Rule Order will be breached. I suggest that hon. Members' rights under the normal Private Members' legislation rules will be breached as well if we pass the Motion in its present form.
  We had very little time to discuss Private Members' Bills in the last Session. Indeed, as the hon. Member said, a very large number of very worth-while Bills, some introduced from this side of the House, fell because of the Dissolution—though I doubt whether any hon. Member opposite would complain about that because of the result of the General Election. Nevertheless, they fell, and some

  855
  were Bills that I should have liked to see on the Statute Book, and I believe that this applies to hon. Members opposite.
  This problem is not solved simply by giving us two more Fridays before we adjourn for the summer. Nor is the precedent which the Leader of the House cited from 1955 a very good one. The House came back in 1955 very much later than it did this year, and for that reason more time is taken. I should like the Leader of the House to look at the matter again. I do not think that any hon. Member wants a Division on the matter tonight, but it is an important matter, one which affects private Members on both sides. Therefore, I would press the Leader of the House, if we give him the Motion tonight—as I suppose we have to, otherwise a situation will arise that we cannot get out of—[An HON. MEMBER: "Nonsense."] As has been said, we cannot have a Ballot without anybody knowing what is going to be introduced. I trust that if we give the Leader of the House the Motion tonight he will be a little more generous. There are a very large number of matters of principle which a great many private Members wish to raise.
  Sir Charles Taylor: Perhaps my hon. Friend would pursue this point. Why have we no Ballot tomorrow under Standing Order No. 5? Was it a direction from the Government Front Bench? Was it assumed that the House would pass the Motion tonight? Why were arrangements not made for the Ballot?
  Mr. Kirk: I hope that my hon. Friend will not expect me to answer that point.
  Mr. Robert Maxwell: Why give up the fight before it is lost?
  Mr. Kirk: If the hon. Gentleman wants a Ballot tomorrow, I would happily join with him about it. I can speak with total impartiality on this matter. I have gone in for every Ballot in the eleven years that I have been in the House but have never yet won a place. So I reckon I have a right to speak on this matter which other hon. Members have not got. Unless the Leader of the House can give us some pretty firm assurances that he is prepared to go a little further, perhaps we
  856
  ought to vote against the Motion. Nevertheless, I can see the problems which will arise. The basic point is that if the reputation of the House is falling, as I believe it is, that is because people believe that we have become the fools of our respective Front Benches. I have had the advantage of sitting on the Government Front Bench for a short time and I know the temptations that come to those who do. No doubt the same temptations come to those sitting on the Opposition Front Bench.
  But it is nevertheless not good enough to say that the Government insist on having this time. What are they going to do with it? We know that Government business on a Friday is nearly always over by one o'clock, if it lasts that long, and then we all just go home. Thus, half a day is wasted. The Government can get the sort of business it wants on a Friday by putting it down for any normal sitting day.
  We want firm commitments from the Government as to what they intend to do with the Fridays they propose to take. The hon. Member quoted extensively from the debate in 1959. I hope the House will not mind if I quote from it also, for it was a good debate and I have a particular interest in it because my predecessor at Saffron Walden, Lord Butler, was then Leader of the House. It will surely interest the Lord President that Lord Butler at the end of that debate gave way almost entirely. He gave way, I think, because of the speech made by Aneurin Bevan. In addition to the quotations given by the hon. Member, Mr. Bevan also said—and these words are important—
  "… I suggest to hon. Members that they ought to look twice at the Motion before they pass it. Now that we have a House of Commons with a large Government majority—we do not know yet how calamitous that is going to be for the country—it seems to us, and it must seem to people outside the House of Commons, that if we proceed with this Parliament for another four or five years after the conventional fashion of the last ten to fifteen years, it may be that a very considerable lessening of interest in our Parliamentary proceedings may take place, especially—I am sure hon. Members in every part of the House will not be angry if I say this—when it is true that in the course of the last half century, in particular, the growing rigidity of the party machines has expunged originality in the House of Commons itself.
  Therefore, I would suggest, in an entirely non-party spirit"—

  857
  You will not be surprised, Mr. Deputy Speaker, to hear that at that point of his speech hon. Members said "Oh"—
  "I say 'in an entirely non-party spirit' because I am an established Parliamentarian and I am very anxious for the reputation of this House—that hon. Members opposite. especially new Members, must realise that there stretches out before them endless hours of infinite boredom, almost limitless stretches of arid desert, that will be almost unendurable unless we can put a few oases ourselves here and there"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 28th October, 1959; Vol. 612, c. 214-5.]
  I did not often agree with Mr. Bevan, although I enjoyed the privilege of a slight acquaintance with him, but on that occasion I agreed with him more wholly than ever before. I believe that this is a matter that the House itself must decide. We cannot be dictated to by either Front Bench on this. It is a matter of very great importance. Mr. Bevan was right. We have to place these oases here and there because, unless we do, neither Front Bench is prepared to do it. For that reason I hope that the House will pass the Amendment, and I shall vote for it.
  10.35 p.m.
  Mr. Leo Abse: The Government's proposition is an astonishing one. It is that we should postpone any question of Private Members' Bills until the autumn. I find it astonishing, because it is being made at a time when we have heard so much of the persuasion of individual Members and when we have had rehearsed to us again and again the inadequacies of the facilities for those who sit on the back benches.
  Indeed, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister explained last Thursday in his first speech of this Parliament that he was seeking to devise ways and means of being able to overcome the difficulties that were spelt out by Mr. Bevan in the debate in October 1959.
  At a time when the rigidity of the party machines and the urgency always declared by the Executive to the passing through of legislation are well known, to come to the House in this cavalier manner and pre-empt our rights in the way suggested is to ask the House a great deal. It has been asked on the score that everybody must give up a little, that that is fair arid equitable.
  But what is taking place here is part of a long historical process, the process
  858
  of erosion of the rights of individual Members which has been going on for a whole century. Looking back at 100 years ago, one realises how then the individual Member could come to the House genuinely free to defy his own Whips, genuinely able to answer only to his constituents, genuinely compelled to answer only to his conscience, and one sees how over the years, through the centralisation of the Civil Service and the growth of the party systems, to what an intensity of the oligarchic system we have reduced ourselves almost to an anonymity which apparently causes some hon. Members to regard it as frivolous when an hon. Member points out that the House belongs to private Members.
  I would say from my own experience that to postpone Private Members' Bills to the autumn raises a number of practical technical difficulties. No aid is extended to private Members by the Government when they attempt to put through legislation dealing with controversial issues and ofttimes the Bills are bandied backwards and forwards from Lords to Commons with a series of Amendments, so that the private Member seeking to steer his Bill through finds again and again that he is watching the timetable and wondering whether all his work will simply be a complete waste of time.
  I can recall, when steering through divorce legislation, that after it had shuttled backwards and forwards from the other place to here it was clear to me that there was an ambiguity in the Bill which was almost vital and which had not been raised in any stage of the proceedings. I remained concerned but quiet while Amendments from the Lords at the very last moment went through this Chamber, not daring to mention the ambiguity, which was afterwards settled only after considerable litigation in the courts, because I knew that if one in any way impeded the Bill all would fall.
  There are many reasons why postponing Private Members' Bills until the autumn can jeopardise much effective private Members' legislation. But, more than that, the Executive is taking the view that it must eschew a whole range of social legislation of great importance. Rightly or wrongly, it is saying that many issues which impinge on human relationships are such that the Government must

  859
  contract out of them. They are not small issues. They affect millions of people. They are issues, such as those raised in the last Parliament dealing with abortion or illegitimacy or homosexuality, within the social life of the country. It is because they are large and important issues and because they are often neglected that there are compelling reasons why private Members should have the maximum time available to them to deal with such matters.
  The private Member fights these issues with his hands tied behind his back. He fights them without draftsmen, without Government aid. It is unfair to suggest that we can lop off the time of Private Members because the private Member is supposed to be on equal terms with the Government. It just is not true, and we all know it is not true. It is leading to a serious situation.
  One hon. Member referred to the Homosexual Reform Bill. It is a serious matter that we now have the situation in the country where the police are being required to enforce a law which says that men who conduct themselves in private in the way delineated in legislation may receive a sentence of life imprisonment. Yet both Chambers have passed a Resolution to the contrary. This is a serious matter, for here is what I regard as a vicious piece of criminal law which is being enforced and which the police have the duty to enforce despite the expressed will of both Chambers of Parliament. To suggest that an issue of this kind must be postponed because some drainage Bill or other must be hurried through is not good enough.
  It is not good enough to suggest that there is some compelling legislation which must be got through. I do not know what particular legislation the Leader of the House has in mind. He has not indicated to us which Measures he so urgently requires. Some hon. Members would, had we heard that the Steel Bill was being introduced tomorrow, probably have been a little quieter. Others may have been angrier. But the fact remains that there is this wide area of legislation clamorously needed but being dodged and neglected by the Executive.
  860
  If we tonight just acquiesce in what the Leader of the House is asking, we shall be abandoning the whole of our rights. We shall be confirming the process that has gone on without check for a century. We shall be saying that we are content to be Lobby fodder, and that is not what we really want to be.
  My right hon. Friend was a most able and distinguished Whip. He is a man with great understanding, and I understand that as a Whip his efforts to deal with Parliamentary business were commendable. But he is now Leader of the House. He now has obligations that are above those of a party manager. He has obligations to us all, and when I see that even on matters like the Ten Minutes Rule he has already indicated that what he asked for temporarily in the last Session he now wants to make permanent, I fundamentally distrust this suggestion that we should forfeit a sacred right—our right to have a Ballot and get on with the work of private Members.
  10.43 p.m.
  Mr. T. L. Iremonger: My hon. Friend the Member for Saffron Walden (Mr. Kirk) was right when he said that we should let the Leader of the House have this Motion—[HON. MEMBERS: "Why? "]—if he will give a firm undertaking that this is merely to save embarrassment with the Ballot tomorrow, that he will reconsider his whole attitude and that he will restore to private Members their full time for discussion.
  Mr. R. J. Maxwell-Hyslop: Why should it cause the right hon. Gentleman embarrassment when hon. Members will be able to read in the newspapers tomorrow and hear on the wireless that any hon. Member who wishes to do so many enter the Ballot?
  Mr. Iremonger: I am obliged to my hon. Friend for that question. The answer is that it would be preferable for us to get from the Leader of the House what I am asking for; an understanding that he will restore to us in this Session enough private Members' days to give us all the Bills we missed in the last Session and the Bills to which we are entitled in this Session. In this way the right hon. Gentleman would be saved any embarrassment tomorrow. If he does not take this course, I hope that my hon. Friends and hon. Gentlemen opposite who have courageously contributed

  861
  to this discussion will combine to defeat the Motion.
  We are indebted to the hon. Member for Wandsworth, Central (Dr. David Kerr). I was not absolutely sure that the examples of the Bills which had lapsed were quite the best calculated to elicit the support and sympathy of some of my hon. Friends. But never mind. I am in favour of Private Members' Bills in principle even if I may be against individual ones in practice. I suggest that we do not mourn too specifically Bills which some hon. Members may be glad to have seen lapse.
  I was sorry to hear the hon. Member for Wandsworth, Central say that somehow it was bold of him to cross swords with his right hon. Friend the Lord President of the Council. The right hon. Gentleman is here in his capacity as Leader of the House. If the hon. Member felt that it was bold of him to cross swords on this issue with the Leader of the House, I am sorry. It would have been more becoming to say that it was the Leader of the House who was bold in crossing swords with the House on an issue like this.
  I am glad that we have had support from the other side of the House. I hope that the Leader of the House will take to heart the words spoken by his two hon. Friends who have spoken, who have reminded him that he is the servant of the House in guarding the rights of the House and that he should not be party to a process of steady erosion of private Member's rights. If the right hon. Gentleman wants to make his tenure of office memorable in any worth-while way, it will he as a Leader of the House who has played a part in restoring private Members' rights.
  If the Government have had to give up some time because of the General Election, and so on, the priority in restoring time should be given to Private Members' Bills. All the time should come out of Government time. It is only by grace of private Members that right hon. and hon. Members on the two Front Benches are able to monopolise the time. I do not see why we should be such worms as perpetually to pander to the desires of right hon. Gentlemen in arranging the business of the House.
  The first priority is that the private Member should have his rights respected
  862
  by the Leader of the House and upheld by hon. Members in all quarters of the House. I am sorry to see that the Leader of the House is bearing so plainly on his forehead the mark of Cain, which has been put there by his long service in the Whips' Office. I hope that he will not set a precedent by playing fast and loose with the time of the House. This is a very poor augury for what may be a long Parliament.
  I should not at all look forward to the prospect of Bills, which hon. Members in all quarters of the House might want to bring forward, being held up because the Leader of the House has the idea that Government business is all-important and that only Government business is important. There can be no measures which the Government have in view that are so important that they justify sacrificing the time of Private Members which they have lost through the General Election.
  My hon. Friend the Member for Abingdon (Mr. Neave) was thwarted by the right hon. Gentleman in introducing a Bill. Owing to the delay that has elapsed since then, 50,000 old people have died without having the benefit of the Bill that my hon. Friend would have introduced. How many more will die similarly if Private Members' Bills are held up by the Motion which is being debated tonight?
  I hope that hon. Gentlemen opposite who have given support to their hon. Friends who have spoken to this Amendment will not hesitate to go into the Lobby and vote against the Motion, unless we have an assurance that every Friday which we lost in the last Parliament will be restored, and we shall have every one to which we are entitled in this Session.
  10.50 p.m.
  Mr. Sydney Silverman: I must confess at the outset that I make a short contribution to this discussion with a good deal of diffidence. I do not know whether my right hon. Friend realises what a great strain his Motion puts not merely on my loyalty but on my gratitude. I cannot take part in the diatribe against the Government for their tyranny and their oppressiveness or their desire to elevate into a dominant position their legislation as

  863
  against anybody else's ideas of what legislation is appropriate or important or urgent.
  I have the greatest possible personal reasons for not taking part in any such accusation. A year or more ago I did not take part in a Ballot for Private Members' Time. The Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Bill, which I am glad to remember became an Act of Parliament, did not arise out of a Private Members' Ballot. It was moved, it went through all its stages, and it passed the House of Commons and another place only because the Government sacrificed their own right to take up the whole of the time of the House in order to afford facilities for a Private Member's Bill.
  I shall always remain grateful to the Government for having done that. I can see no other way in which that Bill, to which I gave a certain proportion of my energies throughout my public career, would ever have reached the Statute Book, and I therefore do not feel inclined to participate in a general attack on the tyranny or the oppressiveness of the Government. In my case, it certainly is not true. Not merely did they afford facilities for the Second Reading and for all subsequent stages, but when difficulties were created for it after it had done two-thirds of its work in a Committee upstairs because the House decided that it would begin the Committee stage all over again on the Floor of the House, the Government provided the time to enable that to be done. They proposed and carried through the House a Motion to enable it to be done by having, for the first time in the history of this assembly, morning sittings. I must remember all this.
  Mr. Iremonger Mr. Iremonger rose—
  Mr. Silverman: I should like to go on for a moment, and then I shall give way.
  I must also remember that when the House exercised its right—and I am not complaining that it did—to submit that Bill to the closest and longest possible scrutiny in Committee and on Report, there came a time when it was very doubtful whether the time factor alone would enable it to pass this House in time to be dealt with in another place. If time had not been found to enable that to be done, all the work which the
  864
  House had done on it over the whole year would have been lost, and we would have had to begin again in this Session. I therefore recognise that I am not entitled to complain that the Government are oppressive or tyrannical about their claim on the time of the House of Commons.
  Having said that, I must recognise also that I cannot put myself in the position of even seeming to say that, having got my own Bill through, I do not care two pins for what happens to anybody else's Private Member's Bill.
  Mr. Iremonger: What the hon. Gentleman is saying is very important, in this sense. It has been disputed in the country from time to time that the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Bill was a Bill for which the previous Labour Government must take responsibility. Would I be right in thinking, in view of what he has said, that the Labour Government do deserve a high degree of credit or otherwise for that Bill?
  Mr. Silverman: I hope that the hon. Gentleman will forgive me if I do not follow him into a rather pettifogging and bad-tempered intervention. All I am saying is that I am the last Member of this House to join in a complaint against the Government on the grounds that they are too tyrranical in their claims on the time of the House at the expense of private Members. Other hon. Members may be entitled to say that, but I am not so entitled and I do not say it.
  I do say, however—and I hope that my right hon. Friend will understand why I say it—that it is just because I recognise a sense of loyalty and gratitude to the Government for the facilities which they afforded to my own Private Member's Bill that I feel very dubious about supporting them in a move to which no longer affects me, because the Bill in which I was interested is now a part of the Statute Law of the country, to prevent other hon. Members without the Government facilities but merely in the ordinary course from exercising their own rights in that way. It is this that places me in so great a difficulty in my approach to my right hon. Friend's Motion.
  I hope that hon. Members will recognise that I am trying to take a fair-minded and honest approach to what is undoubtedly a very difficult problem—[Interruption.] I do not know whether

  865
  hon. Members would like to make an audible intervention. It so, I will readily give way and try to deal with any intervention. Otherwise, it would be more helpful if interventions by hon. Members were made audibly and standing up, rather than by a series of mutterings on the back benches.
  In that situation, I should like to appeal to my right hon. Friend to look at this matter again. He has made a valuable concession. The situation with which the House is now faced is not quite the situation with which it looked like being faced yesterday or the day before. A serious concession has been made. I am not saying that the House ought to be content with it: I would not be content with it, and if the House is not content with it, it is within the rights of the House, in a matter which is plainly one for the House, to decide for itself whether it wishes to accept the Motion and accept the offer made, or whether it wishes to reject it and go on with the position as it at present is.
  I see no reason why a Ballot should not be taken tomorrow, just because a great many hon. Members are interested in preserving their rights on a Friday. It is no hardship to ask them to make a sufficient sacrifice to attend on a Thursday to enter their names in a book, which would enable that a Ballot to take place. I see some difficulties in the way, but no insuperable difficulties. The concession which my right hon. Friend has made reduces the difference between the Government's original proposals and their present proposals to a very narrow margin. Surely it is worth while for the Government to consider whether they really need the extra two or three days which the amended proposal would give them. It is not unprecedented for Governments to say, "We have so much to do that we need all the time". They could have said it last year. They did not say it. The Government between 1945 and 1948 did not say it.
  What I am suggesting to my right hon. Friend is that there is still room to reconsider the matter and to see whether the importance of their retaining the whole of the time which they propose to retain is worth the dissatisfaction and anxiety which it occasions in so many quarters of the House. If the Motion is persisted in, I shall certainly not vote
  866
  against it. I would not vote against the Government's advice in favour of my hon. Friend's Amendment.
  Sir C. Taylor: The hon. Member would have done so in the old days.
  Mr. Silverman: There is an old Army saying about "ifs" and conditional events which the hon. Member no doubt recollects but which it would be out of order for me to repeat. I remind him of it.
  All I am saying is that I would not think it worth while or right to support my hon. Friend's Amendment if the Government on reflection think that it is worth their while to retain the whole of this time against so much articulate opposition shown in the debate. I appeal to my right hon. Friend to have another look at it to see whether he needs to have this Motion passed tonight and whether he needs to deprive private Members of the very, very limited opportunities which, in the development of Parliament, have remained to private Members to get legislation of their own choice passed on their own initiative on a free vote of the House.
  11.2 p.m.
  Mr. Graham Page: I am sure that the House is very grateful to the Leader of the House for the fact that by the concession which he is prepared to make he has shown that he realises the feeling of the House in the matter. The concession does not go far enough, but it shows that he realises that there is a very strong feeling that private Members are being deprived of time quite unnecessarily.
  He would have had to give far more than the two days he is now suggesting had there not been a General Election. More than that would have been spent on private Members' legislation in the next few months. It is not just a question of time lost; it is a question of Bills lost. This means that a whole year of Private Members' Bills have gone. I expect that this is the first and last time in our political lives that the hon. Member for Wandsworth, Central (Dr. David Kerr) and I will agree. I support his amendment. He said that about half-a-dozen Bills would be lost. I took the precaution of getting the list of the Public Bills for the last Session, and I find that

  867
  there were 36 Private Members' Bills lost by the election, five of which had reached Committee stage. As for the Bill in which I was interested, my National Sweepstake Bill, the Government were apparently so frightened that a Conservative Member would get such a wise Bill through the House that they dissolved Parliament the day before it was to come up for Second Reading.
  It is ironical that if one is a local councillor one has far more chance of getting a Bill through the House than if one is a private Member, because both Houses passed a Resolution keeping alive Private Bills from local authorities. I picked one up in the Vote Office just now—a small Bill of about one page: for the Huyton-with-Robey Urban District Council. [Laughter.] I am not suggesting that there is any favouritism about this, but here is a piffling little Bill to turn a piece of parkland into a football ground—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."]—perhaps to commemorate the days when the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister played there without his boots. Here is this little Bill which Parliament has solemnly said shall remain alive from one Parliament to the next, yet other important Bills, Private Members' Bills, which had reached the Committee stage—the Estate Agents Bill, the Protection of Birds Bill, the Sexual Offences Bill, the Doorstep Selling Bill and the Justices of the Peace Bill—all were well on the way to getting on the Statute Book had it not been for the General Election, are lost. The fact now is that all Private Members' Bills of this year, 1965–66, are lost. I am not frightened about the precedent of 1955. If the right hon. Gentleman has looked it up, he will know that that Motion was not debated at all, but tonight we are debating the Motion, and the Leader of the House can now appreciate the feeling of the House about it.
  There is no difficulty about the Ballot tomorrow. If I read it correctly, the Amendment of the hon. Member for Wandsworth, Central, would, if accepted, merely postpone the Ballot from the second Thursday to the third Thursday of the Session. We could therefore hold the Ballot a week tomorrow and have a further five days of private Members' legislative time before the autumn. Surely
  868
  the Government do not need just three more days so urgently. The Leader of the House is prepared to go to 12 days for Private Members' Bills—he shakes his head—
  Mr. Bowden: Perhaps I may correct that statement. I said that I would adhere to 14 days for Motions and 10 days for Bills, but that, contrary to what is said in my Motion on the Order Paper in my name, two days for Bills would be taken before the end of July.
  Mr. Page: I understood from the right hon. Gentleman's speech that there would be the normal 10 days plus 2 days, but now it appears that there will be only the 10 days for Private Members' Bills. This is even worse than I had thought. I thought that we were to get another two days for Private Members' Bills, but even if it is 10 days against the 15 days in the amendment, is it so vitally necessary that the Government should have those five Fridays which could be put to very good purpose by private Members—one only has to look at the list of 36 Bills which died because of the General Election. I ask the right hon. Gentleman to go a little further with his concession, and please the whole House in so doing.
  11.9 p.m.
  Mr. Stanley Orme: What concerns those of us on this side who want to see Parliamentary reform and the reform of this Chamber is to find that whenever during the last 18 months any alterations have been made we have had to defend the status quo in order to protect our rights. First, there was the transfer of Ten Minute Bills from 3.30 p.m. to 10 p.m., and now there is the reduction in private Members' time. I am convinced that all of us on this side want to see Government legislation go through and are all prepared to provide the time for it, but in the present case we could meet on Wednesday mornings when other Committees were not meeting. We did that for the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Bill—and I am very sorry that we are not carrying my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Sydney Silverman) all the way with us on this present issue.
  It is a little ironical that this debate comes after we have gone through a week of pantomime when four days were

  869
  wasted in archaic procedures and ceremony taken up by swearing-in and all the flummery which goes with it, which could easily have been done outside this Chamber. There is no need for this. If we are to have any Parliamentary reform, hon. Members will have to fight for it in this Chamber. We have to fight against the tendencies of the Executive to say that they need time, possibly before they have examined how much detailed time they actually need.
  In the type of society in which we live, a highly industrialised society with tremendous stresses and strains, which have an effect on the individual as well as on society as a whole, there is greater need than ever for social reform, not necessarily introduced by political parties, but by individual hon. Members to be brought to this House and put on the Statute Book as the law of the land. As a very new hon. Member, I find that we are often told, "You make the laws", but we do not get enough opportunity to make social legislation. I took great pleasure in voting for the Bill introduced by my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne. There was the Bill dealing with homosexuals for which I and a large number of hon. Members on both sides of the House voted, but which has now fallen. There were Bills like that dealing with reform of the law in relation to abortion. There are Bills of a less contentious nature. They are of great importance to sections of the community. If we cannot protect the rights of such people, we are failing in our duty as Members of Parliament.
  I find it very contradictory to read statements in the Press to the effect that the Government would like to find fruitful and useful work for back-benchers and then to find that the Government wish to take away possibilities of using those opportunities fruitfully. I suggest to the Government and to my right hon. Friend that it is not good enough to take away the opportunity to introduce Bills in time for them to go through the complication of being, rightly, discussed in detail in this House and another place and finally passed. It takes a long time to get legislation on to the Statute Book. I had thought, and I still hope, that this will be a memorable Parliament. It will not be if rights of private Members are taken away.
  Sir C. Taylor: I am trying to help the hon. Member's argument. In the "bad days" before the war, this House debated Private Members' Motions every Wednesday and Private Members' Bills every Friday—two days of Private Members' Time every week. In those days Parliament was a much more lively place than it is today.
  Mr. Orme: I thank the hon. Member for his intervention, but we are hoping for far more social legislation to be introduced by the Government now. I suggest to hon. Members opposite that we should not worry about what divides us on this issue. What unites us as back-bench Members is far more important. My right hon. Friend the Leader of the House does not represent just the Government or the two Front Benches who, on issues like this, tend to get much closer together than they do with the back benchers of their own parties. The Leader of the House should have another look at this question under the pressure that is being put on him tonight. He should concede the point, allow the matter to go forward and let us have a Ballot tomorrow. Like most hon. Members, I attend this House every day. I cannot see the difficulty in having a Ballot tomorrow.
  I ask my right hon. Friend to do as I suggest, and if he experiences difficulty in finding time for Government legislation let him come to the House and we will give him the time. But I ask him not to undercut and reduce private Members' time, which I believe is more valuable today than it has ever been in the history of the House.
  11.17 p.m.
  Mr. R. Gresham Cooke: The Amendment of the hon. Member for Wandsworth, Central (Dr. David Keer) is very sensible indeed. As my hon. Friend the Member for Crosby (Mr. Graham Page) pointed out, that would advance the Ballot by a week and would give plenty of time for the advertising of the Ballot.
  The offer made by the Leader of the House, although better than his original Motion, is not at all generous. There are no fewer than 12 Fridays left between now and the end of July, omitting those in Whitsun, and I should have thought that to have only two Fridays out of those

  871
  12 for Private Members' Bills was very bad indeed, particularly having regard to the fact that no Private Bills have been advanced since November. In addition, even with these two Fridays that have been offered, it does not seem that any Private Members' Bills will get through by the end of the summer. Therefore, we shall have one whole year in which no Private Members' Bills will have been passed at all. They perform a very valuable service, as has already been said.
  The Times stated the situation very well this morning when it said that Private Members' Bills include
  "small measures of general insignificance which matter a lot to special interests or the supporters of special causes. It also includes moral-legal-social fields where Governments have shown themselves reluctant to take the initiative …"
  They fill a very valuable gap. It goes on to say:
  "It is questionable whether an attitude of cold or benevolent neutrality towards legislation in some of these matters is the right attitude for Governments to adopt."
  Of coures, the original Motion of the Leader of the House is very bad indeed. I do not know how he had the face to bring it forward. I had three Private Members' Bills. Two were on the Order Paper before the Dissolution and both were non-controversial. One has been on the Order Paper for 18 months and was accepted in principle by the Home Office. That was designed to give local authorities some control over the teen-age clubs. The Home Office said that it intended to bring forward its own Bill. Another of my Bills was designed to adapt the law relating to taking away motor cars to the taking away of vessels and yachts, the sort of Measure of which everybody approves. Again the Home Office considers it to be non-controversial, and said that it would accept the Bill. Those Bills have "gone for a burton".
  I have another Bill which is a little controversial, relating to the restriction of polls during General Elections. But, as the hon. Member for Crosby has said, there are a large number of non-controsial and excellent Bills which have been lost.
  I ask the Leader of the House to tell us now that he will be more generous and give us more than those two out of
  872
  the 12 Fridays which are left. Unless he does so, we must accept the Amendment moved by the hon. Member for Wandsworth, Central and vote for it as a very sensible proposal.
  11.20 p.m.
  Mr. Michael Foot: Every Member of the House who has listened to the debate will agree that it was quite right that my hon. Friend the Member for Wandsworth, Central (Dr. David Kerr) should have moved the Amendment, and we are extremely grateful to him for having done so. He has performed a service to the whole House. It is right to remember also that, if the matter were to be pressed to a Division, it would be as a House of Commons matter, not a matter affecting the parties in any sense at all.
  My hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Sydney Silverman) underlined the point, which he stated perfectly fairly, that it is a false charge against the Government to say that they have been contemptuous of Private Members' Time. My hon. Friend gave instances, of which he better than any other hon. Member can speak, of how this Government, in the last Parliament, went further than, probably, any other Government we can remember in order to cherish Private Members' Time. I assure the Leader of the House and the Chief Whip that all of us who were associated with my hon. Friend's Bill and who supported it appreciate what the Government did, not only because of the merits of the Measure itself but because of their recognition of the rights of private Members in this House.
  It would be quite wrong, therefore, if the House were to debate this proposition on the basis of saying that this is a tyrannical Government who have no care for private Members' rights, who are not interested in them, who brush them aside in a contemptuous manner. It would be quite false for anybody either inside or outside the House to say that. Many of the newspapers never report properly what happens in the House, and, if they were to examine and apply their minds to what happens here, they would discover the fact that, over the past eighteen months, despite all the difficulties which they had then, the Government showed the greatest consideration for private Members' time.

  873
  Therefore, when we criticise what the Government are proposing now, we are not criticising them on the basis of saying that they are a tyrranical Government not interested in these matters. They have paid very great consideration to them, as is proved by the facts. We on this side of the House—this is certainly my view—are not prepared to accept from any hon. Members opposite, particularly from those who hardly attended the place during the past eighteen months, the suggestion that this is a Government who brush aside any consideration of private Members' interests [Interruption.] Some hon. Members have spoken in that sense, or have indicated it, but we are not prepared to accept it. It is simply not so. For as long as I have been a Member, there has been no Government who have paid more consideration to private Members' time than the Government over the past eighteen months.
  Mr. Graham Page: Surely, the hon. Member recollects the time when a Private Member's Bill introduced by my hon. Friend the Member for Abingdon (Mr. Neave) was crowded out of its proper time.
  Mr. Foot: Individual Private Members' Motions that may have been moved may have been subject to the normal processes of the House.
  Hon. Members: Oh.
  Mr. Robert Cooke Mr. Robert Cooke (Bristol, West) rose—
  Mr. Foot: I will answer the hon. Member for Crosby (Mr. Graham Page) first, and then I will give way to the hon. Member for Bristol, West (Mr. Robert Cooke).
  That is not a ground for denying what I have said, that, despite all the pressures en Government time during the past 18 months, the Government have behaved with great generosity to Bills introduced by my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne and by hon. Members opposite—and, I think, very properly. That was what I was acknowledging in the first place. I do not think that anybody could deny it. I do not think that the instance that the hon. Gentleman cites in any way overthrows the proposition that I am making.
  Mr. Cooke: I wonder whether the hon. Gentleman would regard the activities of the Paymaster-General on that famous evening as being the normal process of the House.
  Mr. Foot: What the hon. Gentleman may claim to have been the activities of the Paymaster-General on that occasion is not generally acknowledged. There are many arguments about it. If the Bill in which the hon. Gentleman is so interested was so passionately supported by that side of the House, it could have been introduced as a Government Measure during the previous 13 years. When they had a Government in power which was in charge of private Members' time, they could have provided all the facilities.
  The hon. Member for Abingdon (Mr. Neave), who is so avid and eager in his support for private Members' time, is not here tonight. I do not know where he is. Apparently, he is so eager to support the proposition that he is not here at all. He is not here tonight, and was not here for 13 years. He was here only for an intricate moment when he wanted to put a proposition before the House when he thought that it would embarrass the Government. So we are not concerned with that.
  Mr. Graham Page: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
  Mr. Foot: No. I have given way already. [HON. MEMBERS: "Withdraw."] If the hon. Member for Abingdon was so eager to press the matter, he might have been here tonight. [HON. MEMBERS: "He is."] Those of us who are here tonight are here because we are interested in protecting private Members' time. The hon. Member for Abingdon, who pressed this matter so strongly, has not turned up at all.
  Hon. Members: He has.
  Sir John Rodgers: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Is it in order for the hon. Gentleman to suggest that my hon. Friend the Member for Abingdon has not been here this evening when he was here only five minutes ago and is probably in the House somewhere quite close to this Chamber?
  Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Eric Fletcher): There is nothing that has been out of order so far.
  Hon. Members: Withdraw.
  Hon. Members: Nonsense.
  Mr. Foot: There is nothing at all to withdraw. What I said was that those of us who are here tonight to engage in this debate are interested in protecting private Members' time, and when I said it I said that the hon. Member for Abingdon was not here, as he was not.
  Hon. Members: He is now.
  Mr. Airey Neave Mr. Airey Neave (Abingdon) rose—
  Mr. Foot: I will give way to the hon. Member in a moment.
  Hon. Members: Give way.
  Mr. Foot: I will give way in a moment.
  Mr. Neave Mr. Neave rose—
  Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order.
  Mr. Neave: On a point of Order—
  Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. I am on my feet. The hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Michael Foot) has intimated that he will give way to the hon. Member for Abingdon in a moment.
  Hon. Members: Give way now.
  Mr. Foot: I will give way when I want to. I have said that I will give way to the hon. Member. I am very glad to see him here. [Interruption.]
  Mr. Neave Mr. Neave rose—
  Hon. Members: Sit down.
  Mr. Foot: I will give way to the hon. Member for Abingdon in a moment. It has always been my custom in this House that, if I want to engage in a debate, to come in at the beginning, to listen to what is said and to take part if I happen to think I am entitled to. On that basis, if the hon. Member for Abingdon has been here from the beginning to protect private Members' time, as some of his hon. Friends were saying in his absence, then I have never known him before to be so lacking in vocal capacities.
  Mr. Neave: Will the hon. Member now withdraw what he appears to have said—that I was not here during this debate? I was here all the time.
  Mr. Foot: If the hon. Gentleman had been here when the original matter arose, this difficulty would never have occurred. He should stick to the truth.
  Mr. Robert Cooke: Perhaps I can refresh the memory of the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Michael Foot). He said that my hon. Friend the Member for Abingdon had not been here for thirteen years, but in fact during that time my hon. Friend served with great distinction as a Minister of the Crown and was often seen in the House.
  Mr. Foot: I did not say that the hon. Member for Abingdon was not here for thirteen years. I said, and it was perfectly well understood by every other hon. Member, that if the hon. Member for Abingdon had wished to raise the subject of his Bill during the previous thirteen years he could have done so.
  I assure the hon. Member for Abingdon that in his absence I did not raise any question of his presence or absence. It was raised by other hon. Members who referred to his Bill. All I said in reply, as I was entitled to, was that if he had wanted to raise the subejct of his Bill during the many precious years he was in the House he could have done so.
  The question of private Members' time is not only one that affects the rights of private Members. There are many occasions on which a Government can say, "We are entitled to claim all the time that is available to the House of Commons". If the Government told us that they have such a pressure of public business that they must have all the time, or almost all the time, of the House, and if, having looked at their Measures, I agreed with them, I would consider that they had a powerful claim. This was the claim made by the Labour Government in 1945.
  Mr. Sydney Silverman: It was also claimed by the Coalition Government during all the years of the war.
  Mr. Foot: It has, therefore, been claimed by both sides, and it is a perfectly respectable claim. Private Members have an absolute right that we must protect, but we must never get into the situation of saying that private Members' rights are absolutely opposed to Government claims. We are here because we support

  877
  many of the Measures proposed by the Government; we would not be here otherwise.
  The Government have every right to say, "We have claims upon the time of Parliament and these are the claims we make because we wish to see our business proceed." I do not quarrel with the Government on that score. If they were to say that this was the only way in which they could get their business through, it would be very difficult for those of us who support the Government and who have worked for it and tried to see it returned to power and who have been successful in so doing to oppose such a proposition.
  But there are some factors to be taken into account by the Government which they have not sufficiently taken into account. First, there is the proposition advanced by my hon. Friend the Member for Pontypool (Mr. Abse) which was reinforced by the views stated by the Home Secretary in an interview which he gave to the Sunday Times last week. He was asked what were his views about abortion and homosexual reform and many other matters with which many of us are concerned, and he said that they were matters better introduced into the House by private Members. That is a view with which most hon. Members would agree. Some of us might prefer that the reform of the law on abortion, for which many of us think that the case is overwhelming, should be introduced by the Government, and I would strongly support the Government if they did that. But I can understand the Government saying, although I would disagree with them, that they would prefer a reform of this kind to be introduced in much the same manner as that introduced by my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne. The matters to which the Home Secretary referred are matters in which he is particularly concerned, although other Members are also concerned. His answer is that these things are best done by private Members.
  If the Government say that and if that is their considered view of the proper procedure, they have all the more responsibility for providing time to do it and to provide that time not merely next autumn, but now. Many things can turn sour in a few months. If the Government
  878
  are elected in March and many Measures which people want to be introduced are not introduced until the autumn, things can turn sour in the meantime. Why do we have to wait so long? Why cannot we proceed? Why can we not have these matters introduced and discussed and have more time for them, as my hon. Friend the Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme) says?
  Why do we have to be bound by previous restrictions on time? The Leader of the House may disagree with me about some of these matters of procedure, but I think that he is strongly in favour of altering the times of sitting and I think that he would support such a change. He has been urging it in many quarters. He would probably like the House to sit in the mornings. I am not saying that I am committing him, but I think that that is his general attitude towards it. It is not fair to say that he is opposed to the House reforming itself, but this is one of the ways in which that could be done.
  Why should we not have many more of these measures? What could excite Parliament better? We have the many major Bills coming forward which were mentioned in the Queen's Speech, but alongside them we could have the major measures of liberal reform, instead of holding back until the autumn with everyone wondering how long they will take. Why not proceed with them now and say that we will do it a little faster? Would it not have been an exciting thing for the country if the Leader of the House, instead of moving this Motion, which is orthodox, had said that the Government were not content with that and wanted also to find time for the House to deal with these matters, which are not novel but which have been piling up for years? Many of these Measures have already been passed by the House of Lords and we are trailing along behind.
  I plead, I urge, the Government with what little power I have at my command not to think in the old terms. Think in the new terms. Think, "Why cannot we do it swifty? Let us excite the House of Commons. Before this summer we will be discussing all these matters which young people throughout the country want discussed".

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  We all have different ideas about what should be discussed. That is what the House of Commons is for. That being so, let us have all these ideas, these Measures, piled in. Many of us would prefer to sit longer hours if only we could do that. It is April. By the end of July we will have the Finance Bill. The country can be bored to tears by a Finance Bill, even a good one. Why not have some of these other matters brought in as well? Why do not the Government think in these terms?
  I am not asking my right hon. Friend to withdraw the Motion, although I hope he will decide that the whole thing should be taken away and looked at afresh. My complaint is that the new Government have not torn up all their old briefs and started afresh. This is a new Parliament. Let us start afresh and work on this differently.
  I do not agree with some of the reforms proposed by some of my hon. Friends, although they have every right to propose them. Indeed, I do not agree with all of those proposed by the Prime Minister. Some of his are most reactionary. Do we want to stuff the House of Commons into a pigeon-hole again? The House of Commons is a most flexible place. This Motion could he withdrawn tonight and another introduced tomorrow or the day after. It was said by somebody that the House of Commons was like the trunk of an elephant; it could pick up a pea or fell an oak.
  Mr. Gresham Cooke: It never forgets.
  Mr. Foot: That is what the House of Commons can do. Why does not the Cabinet say tomorrow that it will put at the top of its next agenda what I am saying? This could all be done because one of the virtues of this place is its flexibility. If the Government want to change something they can do it overnight. Within 24 hours certain matters affecting Rhodesia were passed through all the procedures. That could be done for Private Members' Bills. The Government could say, "We have listened to what has been said. We believe that the overwhelming majority of hon. Members in this new Parliament think differently from the old ones. They want us to deal differently with these matters. The item will be placed at the head of the Cabinet's
  880
  agenda next week and then we will make different propositions to the House." Who says that that is bad? Would it do the House any harm or cause injury? Who thinks it would?
  Mr. Nicholas Ridley: The Chief Whip.
  Mr. Foot: I do not think he does. He is a very sensible chap. He has always dealt with me fairly, and that is a considerable proposition.
  Dr. David Kerr: I am not saying it is bad, but I think that there is a little difficulty because the House of Commons procedure is not quite as flexible as all that. If the Motion were withdrawn tonight, a Ballot would take place tomorrow. Thus, what my hon. Friend is suggesting, and which I fully support. would just not be possible.
  Mr. Foot: Many hon. Members are extremely grateful to my hon. Friend for tabling the Amendment. He has done a great service to the House. I assure him that the House is much more flexible than he thinks. I am inclined to vote against the Motion. I am not urging, exciting, any other hon. Members, but that is my inclination, although I appreciate that a lot of people do not take my advice. I do not complain about that. But whether or not we vote the Motion down, the Government could deal with the matter differently.
  It is all very well for the Leader of the House to shake his head and say that this is flexible. If we defeat the Government today, the Ballot would go ahead. That would not be the end of the world either. It would be a quite amusing situation.
  Mr. Bowden: My hon. Friend does not seem to appreciate that if the Ballot were to go forward tomorrow, he would land the House with less time for Private Members' Bills and Motions than I am offering.
  Mr. Foot: I am not quite sure whether that is the case. If it is, I am interested to hear the proposition; my right hon. Friend might persuade me not to vote against it. I presume that he will have a chance of putting his case again. But I do not think that that is really the case.
  What the Government could do, if they wanted, whatever happens to the Motion

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  tonight, is to come to the House next week and say that we will have more time for Government business between now and the end of July and more time for private Members as well. If the Government cannot decide that, they are not fit to govern the country. They could decide that perfectly well. They could decide it by shaking up some of the old customs, by changing the times when we meet and by saying that they will alter immediately the kind of ways in which the Government operate their business. That is the kind of way in which it could be done.
  My right hon. Friend could find time within a matter of hours to get through this House Measures for dealing with Rhodesia. He could do it within a few hours through this House and another place, even though a lot of people did not like it. If he says to me that a Government which can do that cannot find much more time to provide all the available facilities for private Members to do what they want, I do not believe it.
  The whole thing must be shaken up. The whole perspective must be altered. A lot of people say to me that I am an old reactionary because I am not in favour of transferring the affairs of this House to a lot of committees elsewhere. I am not in favour of doing it because it is one way of destroying effective business in the House of Commons. Of course, I am in favour of altering the business of the House of Commons so that we can get things through much more efficiently and effectively. Of course it could be done.
  I therefore plead with the Government not to go on in this old stodgy fashion, which is what they have been doing since the beginning of this Parliament, coming back as if everything is the same. Things are not the same. We have a 97 majority for one thing. We have a different Parliament. It is not a laughing matter. That is what people voted and campaigned for. A lot of people who voted for this party voted principally because of its major measures about international and economic affairs, but they also voted for it because they say, with every justice, that it is a Liberal Party in the proper sense of the term.
  For ten years, hon. Members opposite voted against any reform of racial discrimination laws—not the Liberal
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  Party; they voted on our side. The rest of them, however, voted against the Measure introduced by my former hon. Friend the Member for Eton and Slough, the then Mr. Fenner Brockway, year after year. But we have had an abortive measure for dealing with that. Let us have a proper measure for dealing with it, the Measure introduced originally by my hon. Friend the Member for Pontypool for protecting the rights of people in private, preventing them being subjected to intolerable tyrannies. Why should this go on?
  Why should we have to wait for people to be subjected to tyranny because we say that we have not got time in the House? Of course we have time. Why do not the Government make time? Change the procedures to get the time. We are not content that the Government should say that they are going to proceed with all the Measures which they produced before, and they will give only a slight concession so that half the time will be given to Private Members' Bills.
  It is ridiculous even to suggest that half the time should be given to Private Members' Motions as compared with Private Members' Bills. Bills are better than Motions. Let us get the Bills through. Let us not merely get them through, but let us have an assurance from the Government that they will reexamine the whole method of private Members' time. Let us have proper guarantees that when Measures are passed by the considered opinion of this House on a Second Reading—Measures such as we have had to liberate individual people in this country from tyrannies and from police action against them—they will become law. According to this House it is just that people should be liberated from those actions, but the procedures of the House of Commons say "No". We are not prepared to tolerate people being denied their rights, so change the procedure.
  We are now merely asking in moderate terms, but as the weeks go by we shall demand, that the Government change the procedures so that the things which are agreed by this House shall be translated into law, so that the liberties of the people of this country shall be properly protected, so that the opinions of the majority of the elected representatives of this country shall be translated into

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  law. That is what we want to see, and we want an assurance from the Leader of the House that he will go back to the Cabinet and tell them that this is what the House of Commons wants. In my opinion, that is the way we should vote tonight, and I hope that my right hon. Friend will get up and respond to what I have said.
  I am a supporter of the Government, but I want to see this great Government proceeding much faster. I want to see them change the procedures. I am not content with the old methods. I want to see them putting things into law day after day and week after week to show the people of this country that something is happening in this House of Commons. I say that, above all, because I believe in this House of Commons. I believe that that is the right way to govern people.
  If we are to be told that the old procedures say, "Oh no, you cannot do it that way, you have to wait until the autumn", that is the way to destroy what I believe we have here, which is democratic government. This is what we want to protect. I am prepared to fight for my political rights, and therefore I trust that the Government will get some sense of urgency into the way in which they deal with these things, and will have some sense of responsibility for the people who are injured by the kind of laws which we still maintain, and the old methods which we maintain. Let us clear them up. That is what we voted for. That is what the country voted for. That is why my right hon. Friend is there, so let us see that we do it.
  11.53 p.m.
  Mr. J. Grimond: The hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Michael Foot) began, I thought, as the fugleman of the Executive, but later in his speech he turned to become the tribune of the plebs, and I found him much more agreeable in this rôle. I cannot help thinking that when the hon. Gentleman commenced his speech he was at least accusing the hon. Member for Abingdon (Mr. Neave) of not being present, but later he said that this was not the case. I doubt very much whether he can reconcile that with his remarks.
  884
  In so far as the later part of the hon. Gentleman's speech was devoted to an attack on his Government for their failure to move with the times and for their failure to respond to the mood of the House, I wholly agree with him.
  I believe that the hon. Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme) was right in saying that there are many matters of personal and social importance which can best be dealt with by individual Members. But I go further than either of the hon. Gentleman. I believe that the House has to think again fundamentally about its whole rôle, which is to take part in the decision-making process of government before decisions are made, and I wholly support this attempt tonight to stand up for the rights of individual back-bench Members. Looking at the Front Benches, it is very notable that, on the Government Front Bench, there is a preponderance of people who are engaged, either as Leader of the House or as Chief Whip, in maintaining a certain discipline in their party.
  On the Opposition Front Bench, there is a notable gap, if I may point to it, between the Chief Whip, who is a most admirable man, with a certain duty to perform—though that duty does not embrace encouraging back benchers to be particularly resilient or independent—and the far end of the bench. Half of the Conservative Party is missing, because there is a conspiracy, an agreement, nowadays between the Front Benches against the rest of the House. It is convenient, as everyone knows, for the Front Benches to maintain the view that we are the patient oxen, that our duty is to troop through the Lobbies voting with our feet but not with our heads.
  Perhaps this is convenient, but it is certainly the death of Parliament. I am not certain whether tonight is a suitable occasion for deploying the whole case for a fundamental reappraisal of the rôle of the House of Commons in the 20th century, but it is certainly a suitable occasion for standing up for the view that Parliament at least has the duty to maintain its position against that of the Executive, that it should be better informed, that it should have more opportunities for raising matters which are inconvenient to the Executive.

  885
  Many of these matters, which have been mentioned earlier—abortion, homosexuality and the whole question of capital punishment—are matters which were rightly raised by back benchers. If we had waited for an official pronouncement on these matters we should have waited a very long time.
  Therefore, whatever may be said about whether we are now being presented with only a minimal diminution in our traditional amount of time in this House is irrelevant. I agree with the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale that it is not a question of harking back to what happened in the past 10 or 15 years. It is a question of looking forward to what we ought to be doing in the next 5, 10 or 15 years. In this period we should be reasserting the view of this House that it has a much bigger part to play in the general government of this country than it has been allowed to do up to date and, in particular, that it has a right to an increased amount of time in which back benchers may draw attention to these matters which, if they do not deal with them, will not be dealt with at all.
  I am afraid that we are deluding ourselves if we suppose that, if we give up our time or accept the minimal amount now allowed, the Government will deal with these matters. They will not, because they are unpopular matters: they are matters on which it is difficult to get agreement between the individual parties in the House and are therefore matters which cut across parties and on which we can get a consensus only by having a coalition not among the parties but among the individual Members.
  Therefore, I hope that we shall, tonight, maintain the view that the House of Commons has a much more important rôle to play in government than it has been allowed to play up to now. Tonight we are arguing in theory about a very narrow issue, but, although on this issue our rights are not being greatly infringed, they are not being extended and it is extension of our rights which we want.
  What we want tonight is to affirm the view that the individual Members of the House—elected by constituencies and not by parties—are here to raise issues of importance not only, possibly, to the great majority of people but to big minorities in this country who recognise that they should be raised and debated in the
  886
  House. Therefore, I am very glad to be here tonight. I am very glad to be here as a back-bench Member of the House, maintaining the rights of the House as against the Front Benches. At the end of the day I hope to vote for the point of view that we should not simply accept what was good enough for the last 10 or 15 years but should look forward to the next 5, 10 or 15 years.
  In that relationship we have to think of an entirely new rôle for the House. If we go on as at present, not only shall we lose the respect of the country but we shall be defeating the whole purpose of electing a House of Commons. The whole purpose is that the House shall raise matters of all sorts of importance to our constituents and shall not simply be a rubber stamp for whatever Government are in power. We shall be expected to bring informed criticism to bear on the Government and to take into our own hands to a greater extent than has been possible in the last 15 years the atmosphere and the general outlook of politics in this country. That can be done only by allotting more time than is now possible to the rights of private Members.
  12.2 a.m.
  Mr. Bowden: It may be convenient if I reply to the debate at this point. One or two things which I say may be of some help. In the first place, may I take the point made by the Leader of the Liberal Party about the usual channels. I should not like it to be thought for one moment that the usual channels do anything other than a service to Parliament, while at the same time serving their parties. It comes rather amiss from the right hon. Gentleman because he knows as well as I do that he is very anxious that his party should get into the discussions through the usual channels.
  May I make a general point on hours of sittings, which is not perhaps concerned with this Motion. The Prime Minister said in speaking in the debate on the Gracious Speech, and it has been said on another occasion, that it is our intention to ask the Select Committee on Procedure to continue their discussions in this matter. They made some researches to see what could be done about hours of sittings. I am not suggesting that this means morning sittings, or late finishing. It simply means hours of sittings. I hope that they will undertake this research pretty

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  quickly and report to the House so that we may see what can be done—and for debate in the House. I hope as a result not only to provide rather better hours for hon. Members generally but additional time.
  We have heard a great deal during the debate about the curtailment of the rights of back-bench Members and about taking away the rights of back-bench Members. Without seeking for one moment to be controversial about this I remind the House—and this applies to hon. Members on both sides of the House—that the rights of hon. Members, whether Government or Opposition, whether back-bench or Front-Bench Members, are contained within our Standing Orders. Private Members' time is governed by Standing Order No. 5, which makes it clear that the amount of time available in a Session is 20 days, 10 for Private Members' Bills and 10 for Motions. It is wrong to talk about curtailment when in fact the Government have offered—I have offered this on their behalf—an increase in that amount of four days. It may be argued, as does my hon. Friend the Member for Wandsworth, Central (Dr. David Kerr) in his Amendment, that this is not sufficient time, but it is not accurate to say that there has been a curtailment.
  The point was made that between now and the end of July there are 12 Fridays available. There are not, because if the Ballot took place tomorrow, under the Standing Order Bills could not be presented for about four or five weeks. This is to give hon. Members who are successful in the Ballot an opportunity of choosing their subjects. Further than that, there is contingency and essential legislation—not necessarily party legislation but the sort of Bills that any Government have to get through. They have to be through the House by 31st July, and certain Fridays will be used for this purpose.
  Let me make it absolutely clear what I have offered to the House. I said—I hope frankly and clearly—that although the Motion on the Order Paper does not do it, I have had second thoughts, and what I am offering to the House, as I said at the beginning, is not an additional overall number of days—the Government must adhere to that figure—but, to help hon. Members—and I hope, to help the Government, because some
  888
  Private Members' Bills are of great help to the Government, too—some emanate from Government Departments, as has been said—two Bill days and two Motion days shall be taken before 31st July. This is the maximum we could possibly get in.
  That does not mean that one would then have to wait—as my Motion says—until the autumn for the Ballot. It means that the Ballot could take place within 7 to 10 days. Within the prescribed time, the Bills could be presented, and there would then be two Bill days before the end of July, and two Motion days. In addition, hon. Members could, after the presentation of the Bills, begin in the normal way to introduce their Ten Minute Bills. This, in my view, is the best we can possibly do at the present time.
  On the question of the overall position of the Government, perhaps I may be allowed to say this. It may not give much help or pleasure to the Opposition, though I am sure that it will to the Government benches, but I have more than enough legislation for five years, not one Session of Parliament—
  Mr. Tom Driberg: If there are four days available, and since I think that most hon. Members would prefer Bill days to Motion days, would my right hon. Friend make it four Bill days instead of two and two?
  Mr. Bowden: I am prepared to look at that suggestion, if the House wishes, but I would remind the House when we got towards the end and there were a number of Fridays on Motions, it might then be felt that more time should be devoted to Bills, but we should already have taken a decision on 10 Bill days. If therefore, we take four days before the end of July—and, as I say, I am quite prepared to look at that idea—it will leave only six—
  Mr. Kirk: May we have this quite clear? Is the right hon. Gentleman saying that he will take four days from after the Summer Recess and put them before the Recess, but that the amount of net gain to the private Member is precisely nothing?
  Mr. Bowden: The amount of net gain to the private Member is precisely what

  889
  the Prime Minister said it would be—four Fridays in addition to the 20 days within Standing Order No. 5. That is certainly less than would be provided by the Amendment in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Wandsworth, Central, but it is four Fridays additional to the normal allocation of private Members' time in the normal Session.
  Mr. Michael English: I am not quite sure that my right hon. Friend has grasped the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Barking (Mr. Driberg) a moment ago. The point is that many of us on this side—and, I believe, on the other side—would be prepared to do quite a lot to assist my right hon. Friend with regard to losing Private Members' Motion days if we could have them replaced by legislation days. What we want is a difference in the proportion—not merely four days brought forward and replaced by four Private Members' Motion days after the Summer Recess, as my right hon. Friend says, but the four legislation days instead of the four Motion days.
  Mr. Angus Maude: Perhaps I could, in addition, put a question to the right hon. Gentleman, because we would like to get this matter clear. He says that he is offering the House four extra days, but this, surely, means four extra days in a Session which is one and a half times as long as usual, and we have lost a whole Session's Private Members' Bills already. Therefore, on balance, the private Member is worse off.
  Mr. Bowden: There are occasions, of course, when private Members are much worse off than this, as I indicated when I moved the Motion. One occasion was in 1955 and another was for three years, from 1945 to 1948 in the first Labour Government after the war when, as my hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Michael Foot) pointed out, there was no private Members' time at all.
  I am quite prepared to look at the question of the allocation of Bills and Motions within the figure of 24. I think I would be in some difficulty if we went too far with Bills because many hon. Members also regard Motions as important. I am prepared to look at that as I am prepared to look at the question of how many Bills we can take within the
  890
  four days before the end of July. I cannot go further than that, and I hope that we can now come to a decision.
  12.11 a.m.
  Mr. Airey Neave: I do not think the right hon. Gentleman's concessions are at all good enough. I do not think that he has gone far enough. It has been pointed out that 36 Bills were pending in the last Parliament and five had reached Committee stage.
  I hope that all in favour of private Members' time and rights being safeguarded, including the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Michael Foot) who made a startling speech against the Government tonight, will vote against the Government on this issue. This is a very important occasion. I hope in particular that the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale will vote against the Government in support of his own speech. I did not intend to intervene in this debate except for two points raised by the hon. Member when I was temporarily out of the Chamber. During the course of his speech he appeared to suggest that I had not attended this debate. That is quite untrue. He is usually a very courteous hon. Member. As he was completely incorrect, will he withdraw the suggestion?
  Mr. Michael Foot: If the hon. Member was here when I said that he was not here, of course I will withdraw. If I suggested that he was not attending the debate when he should have been, I am prepared to withdraw, but I did not raise the Question. It was raised by someone else and I looked to see if the hon. Member was in his place. I did not see him there and made the comments which I thought at the time were perfectly justified.
  Mr. Neave: The hon. Member admits that he was incorrect and I accept what he said.
  I attempted to introduce a Private Member's Bill in March, 1965. It might have been introduced 13 years ago. I quite accept that and I wish it had been introduced before, but no hon. Member opposite attempted to introduce a Bill on the subject of non-pensioners. The Government deliberately blocked that Bill on 26th March by a frustration of private Members' rights on the blackest

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  of Fridays we are ever likely to talk about. It was very dangerous indeed that the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale should have referred to my Private Member's Bill of all Bills. It was the only Bill deliberately filibustered by a Government for a very long time.
  There may be others who wish to introduce Private Members' Bills in future. For that reason, the sooner we have the Ballot for Private Members' Bills, the better, so that a Private Member's Bill on the subject of non-pensioners can be introduced again.
  12.14 a.m.
  Mr. Michael English: It seems that a deal of hypocrisy is sometimes talked about Private Members' Motions and Bills. It is legitimate to say that over the years Governments of all parties have been cutting down private Members' time, but it is not fair solely to blame Governments for the erosion of private Members' time. Not least responsible are back benchers who put their names in the Ballot without having any idea of the Motion or Bill they would put forward if successful. Not least responsible are back benchers who put forward Bills they have obtained from the Whips on this or the other side of the House.
  I heard many cheers for the admittedly admirable speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Wandsworth, Central (Dr. David Kerr), but those cheers often came at a point when he was criticising an item in the Motion which exactly followed precedents set by previous Governments, many of them from the party opposite. The reasons for the suspicion, if one may put it that way, that has been aroused by the original terms of the Motion are simple. As my hon. Friend the Member for Wandsworth, Central said, without the guidance of the neutral Officers of the House, he would never have been able to find his way through the tangle of procedure. However, I cannot follow my hon. Friend all the way when he said that he hoped my right hon. Friend would take the Whips off. The Whips were never put on. If they had been, there would have been far more notice given. This Motion has had the shortest possible period of notice that could be given. This is not fair
  892
  on back benchers, irrespective of who puts the Motion down.
  The second point about this original Motion is that it gives additional time. My right hon. Friend is quite right and, with respect to my hon. Friend the Member for Wandsworth, Central, I think he is incorrect. If there was not a Motion there would not be any extra time. My right hon. Friend the Leader of the House is right in that. But what excites our suspicions about the original Motion is that the whole of the period before the Summer Recess related to private Members' Motions. Even if one wholly accepts, as most hon. Members on this side of the House would accept, the proportions of time that should be devoted to Government business and to private Members' business, I have to ask: why should the whole of the proportion devoted to private Members' business before the Summer Recess be devoted to Motions and not to legislation? Could it possibly be because legislation is, as it is rightly described, an Act of this Parliament that affects somebody, whereas a Motion is merely a piece of publicity and propaganda?
  I am glad to see that the Leader of the House has offered some concession on the point that I have just mentioned. But if the proportions of private Members' time as between Motions and legislation were to be as they have been suggested originally, why put all the Motions at the commencement of the Session? The important point is that some Bills should get their Second Reading so that they can go into Committee and not be blocked for shortage of time. Why put all the Motions at the beginning of the period? Why not put the legislation at the beginning and at the end for the final passage of Bills, and put the Private Members' Motions in the middle?
  This Motion as originally constructed was designed to ensure that this House passed as little private Members' legislation as possible and to use such private Members' time as there was for idle discussion of issues which would not result in an Act of Parliament. This has excited a little suspicion amongst many of us.
  I am glad that the Leader of the House, with his usual adaptability, has said that he will take these points into consideration. If he does, I think the House will

  893
  be willing to give him the amount of time he requires. The question of the 24 days is not so much the issue here. The real point is that we should be able to do something useful with those 24 days so that, as hon. Members have said, we should be enabled to assist our constituents by passing legislation that affects their lives.
  12.18 a.m.
  Mr. Angus Maude: I am not anxious to detain the House for very long at this hour, but I confess that the second speech of the Leader of the House did not seem to me to go so far as back benchers on both sides of the House would have liked it to go. The hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Michael Foot) was clearly right when he said that if the Government really wanted to do this thing, if they really care as much for private Members' legislation as they do for the least measure of their own legislation, they would get this matter organised like a shot. They never have any difficulty about arranging things to get their own business through, and they could arrange it for the convenience of private Members if they really wanted to do so.
  It is always a little discouraging having to be beastly to the Leader of the House because he always manages to give us the impression that, though he is an ex-Chief Whip, his heart is in the right place, and we do know that he is anxious to help us. But if he would be a little more anxious and a little less despondent about the prospects of doing it, I feel sure, as did the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale, that he could do it.
  I agree with the hon. Member for Nottingham, West (Mr. English) that the most alarming feature of the Government's proposals is that we are being given no chance whatever to get Bills through Second Reading and into the pipeline at an early enough stage to avoid a very long postponement of any effective private Members' legislation.
  The hon. Member for Ebbw Vale and the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Sydney Silverman) both tried to provide alibis for the Government in this respect by talking about the amount of time given to the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Bill in the last Parliament. But this is not a relevant argument
  894
  today. That was, incidentally, a Bill which the party opposite was committed to, it was forecast in the Queen's Speech, and it was to all intents and purposes a Government Bill. I supported it myself, and I am making no party point here. But the fact that the Government gave their own time to a particular Private Member's Bill and they found it more convenient to let a private Member pilot a controversial Measure through in their own time does not absolve them now from giving private Members their rights in legislation during this Session.
  Various hon. Members have spoken of great measures of social reform which only private Members can carry through. Some of these are extremely controversial, for instance, on capital punishment, homosexuality and abortion, which in some of its aspects can be a pretty controversial subject. But what I urge on the House and the Government is that there are many measures which do not arouse any of the passions which some of those arouse but which are of enormous importance to very small minority groups and to individuals in this country. There are measures for the protection of consumers. There are small measures which will never get into Government business, which may be in a Department's pigeonhole for five or ten years, but which the private Member can get through and, sometimes, get through quite quickly.
  We are not talking here only of Bills which have a controversial Second Reading debate and a long Committee stage, perhaps being voted on at both Second Reading and Third Reading. There are many Bills which can be got through with virtually no Amendment, except on quite small technical points in Committee, but which make minor reforms for which small minorities or voluntary organisations have been campaigning for years. We are now discussing our only opportunity for doing these things. The Government, naturally, cannot and will not find time for these very small things. But they should not take away from us the chance to do it. Whatever they may have done for the Bill to abolish capital punishment in the last Session affords no excuse for trying to whittle away our rights today.
  In a Session as long as the Government are promising us this time, 24 days for private Members is not enough. We

  895
  lost all our Bills in the last Parliament. We are to have an enormously long Session, and we are being given only four more days in this time. It is not adequate compensation. One can understand the Leader of the House saying that it is all very embarrassing for the Government. But we must reply, as private Members, that we are not responsible for the Government's embarrassment in this respect. They chose the date of the General Election. It was they who decided not to have a Ballot tomorrow. None of this is our fault, and it is up to them to arrange matters to give us our rights and to enable us to get our Bills under way in proper time. As the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale said, they could do it if they really wanted to enough. I hope that they will show that they do want to enough. If they do not, I hope that the House will show them in the Division Lobby that they ought to.
  12.25 a.m.
  Mr. Robert Maxwell: Along with other hon. Members, I profoundly regret that my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House found it necessary to introduce his Motion. I am not so much concerned as to whether we are given two extra days for Bills or four for Motions or Bills of private Members. I oppose the Motion on the ground that it attacks some of the fundamental rights of back benchers.
  Not so many days ago the Prime Minister, in opening the debate on the Address, recognised that back benchers are not being made use of, that they ought to be given greater and better opportunities. Within a few days of that recognition, something for which right hon. and hon. Members had fought for years, the Leader of the House comes along with a proposition treating private Members' time with utter contempt, his attitude being "If something has to go, let private Members' time go, almost first, for a burton".
  As a new Member of Parliament in the 1964 Parliament, I remember being immensely shocked to discover how little influence a private Member has upon Supply—the amount of money that we vote for the Government. I was shattered to discover that a Supplementary Vote for £60 million was going to be
  896
  passed by the House on the nod. When I made inquiries about how this was, I was told that that, too, was arranged through the usual channels. Unfortunately, I have not had time to make inquiries as to when it was that private Members—who were elected in the first instance to make sure that the Supply for which the Government ask is really needed—gave up that right. Was it also on this kind of procedural Motion one day that private Members lost that right of controlling Government Supply?
  At a time when reform of Parliament is seriously in the air, and at a time when the Leader of the House is anxious to help back benchers play a bigger and better rôle in national affairs, can he not be big enough to admit that it was utterly wrong to introduce a Motion of this kind which takes some of the few rights and prerogatives that private Members have? If my right hon. Friend is unwilling or unable to withdraw the Motion, and should he cause my hon. Friends on this side to divide the House on it, then I shall, with the deepest regret, have to vote against it.
  12.28 a.m.
  Mr. Robert Cooke: I would briefly offer to the Leader of the House one or two new thoughts at this late stage. I feel that he started off in the wrong frame of mind when he tried almost to mislead the House in suggesting that we are in a comparable position with 1955. He talked about the election taking place in the spring. It was high summer—24th May—when we fought our campaigns and the country went to the polls.
  I want to put to the Leader of the House some figures about the number of days that have been offered. What he is offering, even at his most generous, is 24 instead of 40. With regard to the Bills which were lost in the last Session, I put it to him also that he could find the extra days for which we have all been asking by being a little more helpful about some of the Bills which reached an advanced stage—Government Bills, contentious Measures—in the last Parliament. If he were prepared to be a little graceful and open to some of the Amendments that have been tabled, those Measures need not take so long passing through the new Parliament, even though

  897
  the Government have what they are pleased to call a steam-roller majority.
  If we are to have the present Session messed up, as the last Session of this Parliament will probably be messed up, there will only be three decent Sessions for private Members' legislation and that is a poor state of affairs. We have heard from the Prime Minister that various Parliamentary reforms are mooted, including such things as morning sittings and push-button voting. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] Hon. Members say "hear, hear", but who will benefit from this streamlining? It will be the Government—not private Members. In making our proceedings more expeditious it will be the Government's business that will go through more quickly. It will help the Government and not private Members. It will make it easier for the Government to proliferate legislation.
  I want to put a thought to hon. Members who care as much as I do about private Members' rights. Perhaps it is not procedure that needs modernising or altering. Perhaps it is rather the case that private Members are not skilful enough in using the existing procedure. One has only to look round to see some hon. Members who are very skilful. Whenever they wish to raise a matter they nearly always find a way.
  For example, there are the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Michael Foot) and the hon. Member for Fife, West (Mr. William Hamilton). One recalls how the hon. Member for Buckingham (Mr. Maxwell) on a Supply day got in before the Front Benches and made his point. The hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Sydney Silverman) is also skilled in using our procedure, as are some of my hon. Friends—and I am too modest to mention so many on this side of the House. It is hon. Members who are often at fault. Let us move cautiously on suggestions that we should tinker with our procedures. Let us, rather, look more clearly at what we have.
  12.33 a.m.
  Mr. Hector Hughes: This debate has taken place on the assumption that the Government are seeking to take private Members' time for ever. The Motion does not say so. It asks that the Government may take private Members' time up to the Recess.
  898
  I echo what was said by my hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Michael Foot)—that this is a great Government.
  I invite my hon. Friends to recall that the Government have a great plan and that the object of the Motion is to give the Government time to implement it as far as possible before the Recess. For that reason I ask my hon. Friends to realise that the National Plan is a great plan and that the Government desire to implement as much of it as possible before the recess. I ask them to support the Motion.
  Mr. Graham Page: Does the hon. and learned Member recollect what he said in 1955 on a similar Motion?
  "Today the Prime Minister made the shocking announcement that private Members' time is to be taken by the Government from now until the Summer Recess."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 9th June, 1955; Vol. 542, c. 138.]
  Mr. Hughes: It is all very well for the hon. Member to refer to what has been said in the past. I have made it clear that this Motion is designed for a special purpose. The Government are asking to take private Members' time only up to the coming Recess. I draw the attention of the House to the first paragraph of the Motion and—
  Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. and learned Gentleman had completed his speech and is now replying to a question. But he cannot make a second speech.
  12.35 a.m.
  Mr. W. F. Deedes: The exchanges which have just occurred between my hon. Friend the Member for Crosby (Mr. Graham Page) and the hon. and learned Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Hector Hughes) illustrate that there is an inexorable routine about this Motion to which I would be the first to subscribe. I would willingly agree that it is a Motion liable to come from any Government and to be opposed in a certain way by any Opposition. None the less, despite the very courteous speech from the Lord President of the Council in answer to the debate, I still remain in sympathy with the Amendment moved by the hon. Member for Wandsworth, Central (Dr. David Kerr).
  The single point which I want to make to the Leader of the House is that on the whole there are reasons why this Amendment is more in his favour than

  899
  he thinks. But, before I illustrate that, I must take up a matter raised by the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Michael Foot) and the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Sydney Silverman) who implied that the record of the Government in the last Parliament had in some way indicated some indulgence towards private Members and the use of their time. My hon. Friend the Member for Stratford-on-Avon (Mr. Maude) has made it quite clear that the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Bill is the worst example which hon. Members could use to illustrate their point. On the other hand, it is probably the best illustration which I can bring forward for mine.
  That Bill was mentioned in the Gracious Speech of the time and the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne had made it part of his own policy, but it was given to the hon. Gentleman very conveniently for very good reasons, and it could not possibly be said to fall into the category of Private Members' Bills within the terms in which we are discussing them tonight. On the other hand, it indicated—and this is the point I want to make to the Leader of the House—the great value to the Government of the day of private Members' legislation.
  On that account, there is no doubt from all the statistics that the private Member is the loser from what the Leader of the House is proposing, and I know that the right hon. Gentleman accepts that. He will be the loser if not in time then in terms of Bills, because those Bills which were running up to the time of the election are now lost, including a Bill which will be memorable to all hon. Members and which I opposed, which we may not see again for a considerable period, but which many will regard as a loss. There is no way of arguing round this. The fact is that in terms of Bills, private Members have suffered a deprivation.
  What hon. Members on the back benches have resented most in the course of the debate is the feeling that legislation which they may propose is expendable and that what they have to offer the House is something which the Leader of the House and the Government of the day may treat with a certain indulgence if they feel so inclined, but which is expendable if the Government's commitments are such and such. This is something
  900
  which private Members feel is to be not only resented but unjustified by fact.
  I do not want to enter the argument about whether we do better with more days on Bills and fewer days on Motions. My own inclination is that Private Members' Bills are more valuable than Private Members' Motions. I would say that Motions were more embarassing to the Government and that Private Members' Bills more often were helpful. I would therefore have thought that the Government would plump for the Bills. But without altering the balance, and we must be careful not to alter precedent for future occasions, I would have said that this was a finely balanced argument.
  In the end, the Government will be the loser by this Motion, because the Government have a great use to make of private Members' legislation. Every hon. Member knows what happens when he is fortunate in the Ballot. He may have a good idea of his own or may have one offered to him. But, failing anything else, he can have recourse to a Government Department which has a wide variety of miscellaneous Measures, some very useful, some very small, which would wait for years unless a private Member took them up, sometimes doing something of great value not only for the Department but for society at large.
  This has been the history of many Private Members' Bills in recent years. But beyond that the Government are often able to use private Members for Measures which the Government are not themselves anxious to introduce. I will not illustrate this because it might show prejudice against certain Measures which have more recently been introduced. However, illustrations have been given where both Governments have thought it advisable for private Members to advance a cause to see what would happen. In respect of both miscellaneous Measures which lay dormant in Government Departments year after year until private Members take them up and Measures which the Government funk, to put it crudely, the private Member has an invaluable function to fulfil and a function closely identified with the interests of the Government.
  I beg the Leader of the House not to allow us to think that we are, in a sense, an expendable factor in the use of Government time but to acknowledge that if there is to be a loss incurred, it will be

  901
  shared with private Members by the Government. I believe that before the next 18 months are out the right hon. Gentleman will have cause to regret the Motion.
  12.42 a.m.
  Mr. Tom Driberg: Unusual though it may be, I ask my right hon. Friend to consider speaking briefly for a third time to clarify the undertaking which he gave. When I interrupted him during his second speech he said that he would look at the proposal of rearranging the four Fridays so that instead of having two Bills and two Motions we could perhaps have four Bills.
  Since then, what appeared to be an extremely valid point was made by my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, West (Mr. English) when he pointed out that it is much more important to get Bills started early in the Session because of the process of legislation. We could then perfectly well have Motions later in the Session. Would my right hon. Friend comment on that suggestion?
  Mr. Bowden: With the leave of the House, I will make the position clear. I
  said that I was prepared to look at the suggestion that we take the four days before 31st July for Bills—all of them for Bills. At the same time, I remind the House that if we do that we will have six days left after the Summer Recess for Bills and hon. Members will be in a difficulty which must be faced. It is that when one has taken those six days, there will be no opportunity for Bills. That comes under Standing Order No. 13—Ten Minute Rule Bills getting into Committee. This is one difficulty of taking all Bills together, but the House may be prepared to face that.
  Dr. David Kerr: In view of the reassurances offered by the Leader of the House, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
  Hon. Members: No.
  Question put, That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question:—
  Question put:—
  The House divided: Ayes 191, Noes 35.

  Division No. 1.]

  AYES

  [12.44 a.m.

  Abse, Leo

  Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)

  Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)

  Albu, Austen

  Davies, Ednyfed Hudson (Conway)

  Hughes, Roy (Newport)

  Anderson, Donald

  Davies, Harold (Leek)

  Hynd, John

  Archer, Peter

  Davies, Ifor (Gower)

  Janner, Sir Barnett

  Armstrong, Ernest

  Dewar, D. C.

  Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)

  Ashley, Jack

  Dobson, Ray

  Johnson, Carol (Lewisham, S.)

  Atkins, Ronald (Preston, N.)

  Doig, Peter

  Johnson, James (K'ston-on-Hull, W.)

  Bacon, Rt. Hn. Alice

  Dunnett, Jack

  Jones, Dan (Burnley)

  Bagier, Gordon A. T.

  Dunwoody, Mrs. Gwyneth (Exeter)

  Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)

  Barnes, Michael

  Dunwoody, Dr. John (F'th & C'b'e)

  Judd, Frank

  Baxter, William

  Eadie, Alex

  Kelley, Richard

  Beaney, Alan

  Edwards, William (Merioneth)

  Kenyon, Clifford

  Bence, Cyril

  Ellis, John

  Kerr, Dr. David (W'worth, Central)

  Benn, Rt. Hn. Anthony Wedgwood

  Ensor, David

  Kimball, Marcus

  Bennett, James (G'gow, Bridgeton)

  Fernyhough, E.

  Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)

  Bidwell, Sydney

  Finch, Harold

  Lipton, Marcus

  Binns, John

  Fletcher, Raymond (Ilkeston)

  Lomas, Kenneth

  Bishop, E. S.

  Foot, Sir Dingle (Ipswich)

  Loughlln, Charles

  Blackburn, F.

  Ford, Ben

  Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.)

  Blenkinsop, Arthur

  Forrester, John

  Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson

  Boardman, H.

  Fraser, J. D. (Norwood)

  McBride, Neil

  Booth, Albert

  Gardner, A. J.

  McCann, John

  Bowden, Rt. Hn. Herbert

  Garrett, W. E.

  MacColl, James

  Boyden, James

  Garrow, Alex

  MacDermot, Niall

  Braddock, Mrs. E. M.

  Gordon Walker, Rt. Hn. P. C.

  Macdonald, A. H.

  Bray, Dr. Jeremy

  Gourlay, Harry

  McGuire, Michael

  Brooks, Edwin

  Gregory, Arnold

  McKay, Mrs. Margaret

  Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, Provan)

  Grey, Charles

  Mackenzie, Gregor (Rutherglen)

  Brown, Bob(N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, W.)

  Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)

  Mackintosh, John P.

  Brown, R. W. (Shoreditch & F'bury)

  Hannan, William

  McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.)

  Buchan, Norman

  Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)

  McNamara, J. K.

  Buchanan, Richard (G'gow, Sp'bum)

  Hart, Mrs. Judith

  MacPherson, Malcolm

  Cant, R. B.

  Haseldine, Norman

  Mahon, Peter (Preston, S.)

  Carmichael, Neil

  Hattersley, Roy

  Mahon, Simon (Bootle)

  Carter-Jones, Lewis

  Hazell, Bert

  Mallalieu, J.P.W. (Huddersfield, E.)

  Coe, Denis

  Henig, Stanley

  Manuel, Archie

  Concannon, J. D.

  Hilton, W. S.

  Marquand, David

  Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)

  Hooley, Frank

  Mason, Roy

  Crawshaw, Richard

  Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas

  Miller, Dr. M. S.

  Cullen, Mrs. Alice

  Howie, W.

  Mitchell, R. C. (S'th'pton, Test)

  Dalyell, Tam

  Hoy, James

  More, Jasper

  Davidson, A. (Accrington)

  Morgan, Elystan (Cardiganshire)

  Roberts, Gwilym (Bedfordshire, S.)

  Wainwright, Edwin (Dearne Valley)

  Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)

  Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvon)

  Walden, Brian (All Saints)

  Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)

  Robertson, John (Paisley)

  Walker, Harold (Doncaster)

  Murray, Albert

  Robinson, W. 0. J. (Walth'stow, E.)

  Wallace, George

  Norwood, Christopher

  Rose, Paul

  Watkins, David (Consett)

  Oakes, Gordon

  Ross, Rt. Hn. William

  Watkins, Tudor (Brecon & Radnor)

  O'Malley, Brian

  Rowlands, E. (Cardiff, N.)

  Whitaker, Ben

  Oram, Albert E.

  Ryan, John

  Whitlock, William

  Owen, Dr. David (Plymouth, S'tn)

  Sheldon, Robert

  Wigg, Rt. Hn. George

  Page, Derek (King's Lynn)

  Shore, Peter (Stepney)

  Williams, Alan Lee (Hornchurch)

  Palmer, Arthur

  Short, Rt. Hn. Edward(N'c'tle-u-Tyne)

  Williams, Clifford (Abertillery)

  Parkyn, Brian (Bedford)

  Silkin, John (Deptford)

  Williams, Mrs. Shirley (Hitchin)

  Pavitt, Laurence

  Silkin, S. C. (Dulwich)

  Williams, W. T. (Warrington)

  Pentland, Norman

  Silverman, Julius (Aston)

  Willis, George (Edinburgh, E.)

  Perry, Ernest G. (Battersea, S.)

  Slater, Joseph

  Winnick, David

  Perry, George H. (Nottingham, S.)

  Small, William

  Winterbottom, R. E.

  Price, Christopher (Perry Barr)

  Snow, Julian

  Woodburn, Rt. Hn. A.

  Price, Thomas (Westhoughton)

  Spriggs, Leslie

  Woof, Robert

  Probert, Arthur

  Swingler, Stephen

  Yates, Victor

  Randall, Harry

  Symonds, J. B.

  Redhead, Edward

  Thomas, George (Cardiff, W.)

  TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

  Reynolds, C. W.

  Tinn, James

  Mr. George Lawson and

  Rhodes, Geoffrey

  Urwin, T. W.

  Mr. Alan Fitch

  Richard, Ivor

  Varley, Eric G.

  NOES

  Alison, Michael (Barkston Ash)

  Gresham Cooke, R.

  Neave, Airey

  Awdry, Daniel

  Grimond, Rt. Hn. J.

  Ramsden, Rt. Hn. James

  Bessell, Peter

  Hunt, John

  Ridley, Hn. Nicholas

  Braine, Bernard

  Iremonger, T. L.

  Rossi, Hugh (Hornsey)

  Carlisle, Mark

  Jenkin, Patrick (Woodford)

  Taylor, Edward M. (G'Gow, Cathcart)

  Cooke, Robert

  Jopling, Michael

  Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)

  Crouch, D. L.

  Kerby, Capt. Henry

  Winstanley, Dr. M. P.

  Davidson, James (Aberdeenshire, W.)

  Kirk, Peter

  Worsley, W. M.

  Deedes, Rt. Hn. W. F. (Ashford)

  Langford-Holt, Sir John

  Younger, Hn. George

  Errington, Sir Eric

  Mackenzie, Alasdair (Ross&Crom'ty)

  Eyre, Reginald

  Macmillan, Malcolm (Farnham)

  TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

  Fortescue, Tim

  Maude, Angus

  Sir Charles Taylor and

  Foster, Sir John

  Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J.

  Mr. Graham Page

  Main Question again proposed.
  12.54 a.m.
  Mr. Nicholas Ridley: This, surely, is the most extraordinary display of pusillanimity that we have ever seen in this House. We heard the hon. Member for Wandsworth, Central (Dr. David Kerr) move his Amendment with great eloquence, and receive support from both sides of the House, only to find that he not only did not support it in the Lobby, but, I believe, voted against it. He has apparently suffered a change of opinion on account of the noises made by the Leader of the House in his speech. But those noises simply consisted in advancing two days for Private Members' Motions from the part of the Session after the Recess to that before the Recess. There will be no total increase in time, and those two days will give the chance for only one or two Bills to get through during the whole of the calendar year 1966.
  When one considers the eloquence with which the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Michael Foot) amused the House, his passion for Parliamentary reform, his
  904
  impassioned plea to his right hon. Friend to adopt the Amendment, to accelerate the progress of this vital legislation through the House, and then we see the whole of the party opposite trooping through the Lobbies like some great stage army—
  Mr. Speaker: Order. The debate on the Amendment is over. The hon. Gentleman must now address himself to the Motion.
  Mr. Ridley: I would not wish to delay the House at this stage except perhaps to remind the Leader of the House, on this question of the Motion, of some of his own words. I have here the election address of the right hon. Gentleman at the last election. He said in it:
  "It has been impossible to govern with such a small Parliamentary lead."
  It goes on:
  "… but the small Parliamentary majority is a great handicap to our work."
  Now he has his large Parliamentary majority. Now he has the chance to give the House the opportunity to have the reforms which all his supporters want and he puts before the House tonight a Motion which virtually squeezes out any

  905
  chance of one single Private Member's Bill of any dimension becoming law in the calendar year 1966.
  I believe that the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale was right on the principle. I do not agree with all his selection of the various Bills, but it is extraordinary that, having been given this opportunity for which the right hon. Gentleman appealed in his election address, he can do no better than this.
  In large red letters at the end of that address, he said:
  "It is people who matter."
  Yet what are these Bills about? They are about people, about people who might be affected, about non-pensioners, about people who might be guilty of homosexuality unless such Bills were put forward. If the Leader of the House really believes that it is people who matter, he would do well to withdraw the Motion and bring forward some other Motion tomorrow which would still be in time and which would have general consent—
  Mr. Bowden: Does the hon. Gentleman want me to withdraw the Motion tonight? Does he really want that, with the result of a Ballot tomorrow, the presentation of Bills in five weeks—full stop, with no allocation of time for Bills or Motions unless the Government take subsequent action?
  Hon. Members: Another Motion.
  Mr. Ridley: If I may ask a question of the Leader of the House, why did he not support the Amendment of his hon. Friend?
  Mr. Speaker: Order. We cannot debate the Amendment again.
  Mr. Ridley: It seems to me that, the right hon. Gentleman having voted against that Amendment, which I do not want to debate, this puts the House in an extremely difficult position, because we cannot now express our wish to have more time for private Members. The Leader of the House has put us in a position where we virtually have to accept his Motion, which has been condemned by no fewer than 20 hon. Members. Only one spoke in favour of it—the hon. and learned Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Hector Hughes), who has proved to have
  906
  changed his opinion from that quotation of his views in an earlier debate, given by my hon. Friend the Member for Crosby (Mr. Graham Page).
  The Leader of the House has led us into an impasse. It is up to the right hon. Gentleman to get us out of it. It is not for me. I cannot tell him whether to put down a Motion tomorrow. But he is well aware of the feeling of hon. Members on both sides of the House, for 19 out of 20 who have been fortunate enough to catch your eye, Mr. Speaker, have condemned the Motion, half on this side of the House and half on the other side of the House. The Leader of the Liberal Party, who has left us, was of the same opinion.
  I hope that before we leave the subject the Leader of the House will bring forward some suggestion which will appease the very just and proper desires of hon. Members on both sides of the House, and I leave with him the final words of his own election address, that it is "people who matter".
  1.1 a.m.
  Mr. R. J. Maxwell-Hyslop: I believe that the Leader of the House may have left out of the Motion one word, the omission of which would mean that no Private Bill could be introduced into the House—including local authority Bills—until after the Summer Adjournment. The Motion reads,
  "save as provided in this Order, Government business shall have precedence at every Sitting until the Summer Adjournment and no bills other than Government bills shall be introduced."
  I think that he meant to say "no Public Bills other than Government Bills," but the wording of the Motion is that no Bills of any kind may be introduced. Is it his wish that no Private Bills shall be introduced until after the Summer Adjournment? I should be delighted to listen to his reply.
  Mr. Bowden: My advice is that Private Bills, such as local authority Bills, are covered by a special Standing Order.
  Question put and agreed to.
  Resolved,
  (1) save as provided in this Order, Government business shall have precedence at every Sitting until the Summer Adjournment and no bills other than Government bills shall be introduced;
  (2) private members' notices of motions shall have precedence over Government business on 17th June, 24th June. 8th July, and 22nd July, and ballots for these notices shall be held after Questions on 25th May, 15th June, 22nd June, and 6th July, respectively;
  (3) no notices of motions shall be handed in for any of the days on which private members' notices have precedence under this Order in anticipation of those ballots;
  (4) Standing Order No. 5 (Precedence of Government Business) shall have effect after the Summer Adjournment as if the session had been opened at the first meeting of the House after the said Adjournment.
  Mr. Speaker: Does the right hon. Gentleman desire to move the other Motions on the Order Paper in his name?
  Mr. Bowden: No, Sir.

  HOUSES (DAMPNESS AND CONDENSATION)
  Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Lawson.]
  Mr. Speaker: Order. Would hon. Members leaving the Chamber please do so quietly? They may have an Adjournment debate themselves some day. Mr. Tam Dalyell.
  1.3 a.m.
  Mr. Tam Dalyell: This Adjournment debate, which is symbolic of much that we have been talking about, has its origin in the desperation of housewives—the desperation of housewives whose curtains are ruined, the desperation of housewives whose newly-bought furniture is in various stages of decay, the desperation of housewives whose youngsters' clothes are rotting away with mildew in cupboards, the desperation of housewives who pay rent for a four or five-apartment house and find that one or two apartments are unusable on health grounds, the desperation, too, of families, who may have waited for years for a house and who find that they are cheated by damp of enjoying the benefits of their new house.
  My purpose in raising the subject tonight is not to castigate this or that local authority or to pour abuse on certain builders. My purpose is to ask the Government to look again at a nationwide problem which has become all the graver this winter, characterised, as it has been, by the absence of a span of low humidity. Though reasons for condensation are many, in the interests of coherence I ought to be specific about some of the causes of distress and then end by asking for an action programme.
  First, some changes in ways of living tend to increase the humidity of the air in a house or flat. In particular, clothes are commonly washed in the kitchen or bathrooms, and probably dried indoors as well. Trends in design are largely responsible for this; sculleries and outhouses that would keep steam away from the rest of the house are seldom provided nowadays.
  Secondly, there has been a trend to increase the number of rooms without

  909
  flues, and permanent ventilation of flueless rooms by other means is not commonly provided. Flueless oil- and gas-burning appliances are in more widespread use, and the main product of combustion is water vapour, which is emitted into the air within the building. This can be extremely confusing for those who have been used to the natural draughts of a coal fire to dry the atmosphere.
  Thirdly, solid floors without an insulating floor finish suffer from condensation because they are slow to warm up, and "cold bridges" such as thick concrete lintels can also be a source of trouble. This, in part, could account for one's observation that the worst affected flats are often those in the block next to the major staircase.
  Fourthly, and finally in my examples, it is nowadays more common for dwellings to remain unoccupied during the day, often without background heating, with a sudden rise in temperature and humidity during the evening. It is a familiar and understandable family situation that the mother and father are out working, with the children at school taking their mid-day meal either at school or at their granny's. Mother has to do the washing at night, air temperature drops in the morning and creates significant moisture.
  These are basically ordinary problems of simple physics. I could put forward concisely a programme for action. It strikes me that the Government could help the local authorities even further by publishing an easily understood booklet of what to do and what not to do—the Parliamentary Secretary might well tell me to distribute rather further some of his Ministry's existing admirable literature—for the benefit of the housewife and the layman who are probably not any great shakes at physics and who are moving out of a house with two or three chimneys to a modern all-electric or centrally-heated house or flatlet. A simple pamphlet should not go into too great detail about, for instance, the physics of gaseous states. It should be simple and easily comprehensive.
  But, in my view, a booklet is not sufficient. Local authorities could make no better human investment than in a sensible soul on their staff. She need not
  910
  be an Einstein or a Cockcroft, but could go round in a chatty way and explain the do's and don't to young housewives as they move into for what, for them, is in most cases a new kind of house. She should be some sort of sympathetic character who realises that the generation of water vapour is difficult to control when one has a young family; and that women must be warned of the dire consequences of spreading nappies to dry on the floors of under-floor-heated houses.
  For example, it should be explained to housewives that condensation does not always occur in the room where the moisture vapour is produced; much of the moisture vapour in a home is produced in the kitchen, and it drifts from there to the colder parts of the house, such as the stair well and bedrooms, and causes condensation on the cold surfaces there. At times it may cause dampness in bedding and other soft furnishings. A local authority employee who could explain this in a simple and friendly manner could surely persuade most families of the importance of keeping a reasonable temperature in bedrooms.
  I suggest that school domestic science classes have a part to play. I hope that the Parliamentary Secretary will raise this matter with the Secretary of State for Scotland and the Secretary of State for Education and Science. A simple course on the heating and ventilation of the home, describing the ordinary physics of damp and condensation, should be part of the curriculum for any pupil before he or she leaves school. Architects should be prevented from designing unnecessarily large windows. Perhaps the Parliamentary Secretary will agree that the Scandinavians have proved that too much glass makes heat loss rather difficult to counter. If houses are left empty during the day there should be some kind of heat input, either council background heating or tenant-controlled.
  I am also concerned about insulation. Here, as the Under-Secretary of State for Scotland will recognise, our Scottish standards are rather higher than those of England. Even so, it is not sufficient to have lining in walls. We should look at the experiments conducted in the north-east of England, which the Parliamentary Secretary knows well, as to the matter of double glazing. If the Government could do something to lower the

  911
  number of varieties of double glazing, it is my information that they would reap the benefits of economies of scale and in the next year or two the double glazing of windows could go out in the form of a Government recommendation to local authorities.
  In Scotland it seems that there is a case for altering some of the ventilation regulations. Many families may find it too cold to open a whole window at night, but if there were a regulation hopper window at the top, many families would open it. This fact assumes significance when one recalls that a sedentary person breathes out roughly one pint of water every 10 hours. This makes the introduction of easier ventilation all the more important.
  I am conscious that my concern so far has been less with the dwelling itself than with the use of the dwelling. For this I make no apology. While in no way blaming tenants, it is probably true that 70 per cent. of the difficulty arises from the use of the dwelling. However, I do not doubt that constructional matters are also important. Here I have three questions. Is not water penetration often due to inadequate design? Would the Minister agree that the Building Research Station standards of four years ago are not altogether satisfactory? Should not more time and money be spent on details of the job, particularly on the lead work?
  I must be very brief because the hon. Member for Aldershot (Sir E. Errington) wishes also to take part in this debate. I am against penalties because it seems that they superimpose relatively complicated clauses on legal contracts. Nor am I in favour of incentives, because all they do is to get builders to do what they are already under contract to do. This is not a very satisfactory system.
  I end on one desperate and urgent problem. It is the problem which is faced by the existing tenant in a house with a dose of damp or condensation or mildew or fungus already in it. There is a case for the Government considering what help they can give to those local authorities which desire to rehouse temporarily tenants who are in these existing appalling conditions. Here is a very grave problem. Certainly from many houses I have seen, not only in West Lothian but elsewhere, I rather doubt if a meaningful remedy can be found for
  912
  these problems unless a month or two is taken for the reconstruction of the house or flat at a time when the tenants are out of it and have been temporarily housed elsewhere. I realise that this costs money and that some local authorities may find it very difficult, but there is an argument for the Government to look at this nationwide problem.
  1.15 a.m.
  Sir Eric Errington: I am grateful to you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, for calling me. I want to speak for a few minutes on the question of condensation. The hon. Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell) has suggested that instructions ought to be given about these houses which we are discussing. I do not think that that is the correct way to deal with the problem. I believe that there must be much further investigation. Our experience in Aldershot of the building of married quarters, about which the Minister knows something, has not been satisfactory. I admit that there have been slight improvements as a result of reducing the window space—there is little doubt about that—but generally speaking there is a return of this mould which is due to damp, and nobody seems to know how to stop it. If anybody does know, he certainly has not conveyed the information to the tenants.
  I had an opportunity during the election of going round a number of houses and, as I say, there was some improvement, but it was very small. I should like to know whether anybody at the Ministry really knows the answer to these problems. It may be said that if a house is left during the daytime this condition may get worse. But, after all, a house has got to be left sometimes. People go out and leave their houses empty. The question whether there is condensation should not depend on that.
  My plea is that we should be told what is the cause of this condition. We should be told whether it is possible to do anything more to prevent this continuing as badly as it does, and the onus should not be put on the tenant, or the soldier and his wife. The problem should be considered and an answer should be found which is satisfactory and clear to everybody. If this is not done there will be continued dissatisfaction with these buildings. I hope the Minister can give us a satisfactory answer.
  1.18 a.m.
  The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Public Building and Works (Mr. James Boyden): I am grateful for the way in which my hon. Friend the Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell) and the hon. Member for Aldershot (Sir E. Errington) have stated this case. If I cannot cover all the details that were raised I shall certainly write to them and explain what I can.
  The basic trouble in many forms of construction is the old-fashioned one that wet construction needs time to dry out, and people do not often appreciate that it takes as long as a year. In a year like the one we have just had, the extra dampness in the air makes it even more difficult than is the case in normal circumstances. However, mould growth is a very irritating and unpleasant thing for the householders and the Ministry of Public Building and Works is very conscious, as is the Building Research Station, of the troubles that it gives rise to.
  The incidence in recent years has probably had more publicity than in previous times because of the rising standard of householders in what they expect, and certainly in the experience of the Building Research Station this last winter has been one of the worst for condensation because of the atmospheric humidity which has been consistently higher than the average. I know that does not explain the case raised by the hon. Member for Aldershot, which was well before that, but this has been one of the particular difficulties in the current year.
  There are three main causes of humidity in building. One, to which my hon. Friend the Member for West Lothian referred, is faulty design. This is not always the fault of the architect. Sometimes it is the fault of the client in having too strict a cost limit or in having an inadequate specification. But this sort of cause due to faulty design or poor specification can be seen in, for example, bad detailing of joints which allows water to penetrate from the outside, in inadequate damp-proofing membranes, or in the use of unsuitable materials such as tile-hung walls where there is the danger of damage caused by children playing. My hon. Friend referred to awkward windows as another cause, and in that I include large
  914
  windows without ventilators or small pieces which can be opened. Householders are unlikely to open a large window all the time or in bad weather. Equally, a small fault like an awkward catch which the housewife cannot reach or even an awkward catch which does not open easily may often result in a window not being opened and, therefore, not providing adequate ventilation.
  Another serious cause is inadequate heating, especially when there has been a change from ordinary coal fires to some form of central heating. Quite often in these cases, the central heating is not used properly, and flueless oil heating, paraffin oil heating, is used as a supplement or as an economy One pint of oil burned produces one pint of water. It is 10 times more water-making than the breath of the human occupants to which my hon. Friend referred.
  Another set of causes is the old-fashioned one of bad workmanship, very often associated with inadequate site control. Components are damaged on the site and are put up damaged, or they are damaged as they are being put up and then not put right. Misalignment of joints is another cause. Woodwork is left out in the weather until it is soaked and then not properly dried off before being put into the building. A very common source of trouble is caused by workmen filling cavities in cavity walls above the damp-proof course with rubbish and mortar.
  I emphasise how important site management is throughout the building industry. It is matter of more general concern than this particular problem, though it affects it. I hope that more attention will be paid to site management.
  Mr. T. W. Urwin Mr. T. W. Urwin (Houghton-le-Spring) rose—
  Mr. Boyden: I must press on. I have a great deal to answer.
  Misuse by the occupants is quite a common cause. I have spoken of problems created by heating methods and the failure to ventilate rooms which are not in use. My hon. Friend spoke of the need for housing managers and builders to let occupants know what they should do about central heating, condensation and so on. Progressive local authorities usually have a booklet which they issue

  915
  to new tenants, and some have enough staff in the housing manager's department to be able to visit homes and explain to people coming into new houses, particularly new system houses, what they should do. The N.F.B.T.E. issues excellent pamphlets in encouraging good relationships between builders and clients in the private sector. Sometimes the damage is caused by inadequate reporting from the tenants of council houses.
  All these three groups of causes give rise to dampness and condensation which is not easily cured but which can be put right if the cause is ascertained early enough.
  It has been suggested that the Building Regulations are not adequate. The Regulations, of course, provide only a minimum standard. I will now refer briefly to the parts of the Building Regulations which deal with dampness. I can do no more than give the references, but I hope that that will be helpful to my hon. Friend. Rain penetration is covered in Part B of the Regulations, particularly Regulation B3, and Part C, particularly Regulations C8 and C10. Rising ground moisture is dealt with in Part C, particularly Regulations C2, C3 and C6. Condensation is dealt with in Part F, Regulations F3, F4 and F5. Regulation K3 specifies the sizes and positions of ventilation openings. I mention these because these are the essential parts of the Building Regulations which prescribe these minimum requirements.
  I agree with my hon. Friend that the penalties in contracts, which can be specified by the client and the architect, are not a very effective way of doing any of the progressive things that we want in the building field. Good supervision and good application to the basic principles is what is required. There always is, of course, the question of retention money and the maintenance period which enables the client to exercise some compulsion.
  Sir E. Errington: Would it be possible to have the booklet setting this out? The ordinary tenant does not know where he stands.
  Mr. Boyden: As I say, some local authorities do this.
  Sir E. Errington: What about the military authorities?
  Mr. Boyden: Yes, indeed. This is something to which I shall come in a moment so far as publicity is concerned. I am rushing it a bit, but I want to come to that. I have taken notice of what has been said on both sides of the House.
  I want to make the basic point that it would be wrong to blame any particular system of construction for these difficulties. Obviously, industrialised systems and lightweight systems have some particular features, but it would be quite wrong to blame system-built houses as having qualities that are less satisfactory than traditional houses.
  I was asked whether there was a need for more research. The basic physical ideas of condensation and generation of mould are well known, and the problem is more of getting over the information that is known rather than research into new fields. If I may give some examples of where there is a good deal of publicity, the Building Research Station has a series of leaflets, which are intended more for the builder than for the tenant. I have sent a set of copies to my hon. Friend. My Department is publishing a series of advisory leaflets, two of which are on dampness in buildings and condensation, and a new one is about to be produced on condensation.
  I think that it is very much for consideration—I hope that this will shortly come about—that the Building and Civil Engineering Research and Information Association, which we hope is about to be formed, will take on board this kind of topic. We badly need in the building and construction industry a regionally based advisory service which will do the sort of thing that my hon. Friend has spoken about. It will advise the builder—not so much the tenant—who, in his turn, will have all the information about it. We hope that it will not be very long before this Association is set up.
  I undertake to look at whether it is desirable—and whether it can be done; I think it can be done—to make some case studies of particular condensation failures which one could classify into certain groups. My hon. Friend referred to the Tipton conference in conversation with me. That conference could not find any one cause of dampness in buildings,

  917
  and each individual council was going to look at its particular problems. But it will probably arise from our own experience in the Ministry and from local authority experience that we can put together some useful studies which will be of use largely to the housing owners—that is, the local authorities—and to the Service Ministries, and so on, as a result of which they will be able to avoid this trouble in the future. These two activities I undertake to look into. I cannot, of course, promise straight off, because these affect other Ministries—the Scottish Office and the Ministry of Housing and Local Government—as well.
  All these things are really only a series of attacks on the particular problem that we have. I just have time, I think, to refer to the question of Aldershot, where a very thorough investigation has taken place. I was not as active as the hon. Member for Aldershot in this matter but I have taken an interest. The Department has gone into the problem thoroughly. One set of maisonettes has been improved; they have gone through the winter and have been found satisfactory. Another series is in the process of being done and is likely also to prove satisfactory. One patio house has been done as a test of whether the remedies the Department is applying are right. It, too, has gone through the winter satisfactorily.
  918
  Work on the patio houses is about to take place and it looks as if the problem has been solved technically. It remains now to complete the work on the maisonettes and patio houses on the basis of past experience. I hope that, in the course of the next 12 months, the hon. Member for Aldershot will be able to give a clean bill of health to Aldershot in this respect. If there are any further points I have missed, I will write to my hon. Friend and to the hon. Gentleman.
  The basic problem is really to do well what is known. Nearly all the problems of design, workmanship and site control are well known and can be dealt with satisfactorily. Then there is the education of tenants in using new materials and central heating and ventilation. This problem is known to progressive housing managers but it is a matter of getting the information across.
  I certainly undertake to look at the literature we have from the Building Research Station and from my Department, to see what other literature we can produce and to consider whether we can make improvements. The sort of conference held at Tipton is very useful and this, too, is a matter that I shall look at.
  Question put and agreed to.
  Adjourned accordingly at twenty-eight minutes to Two o'clock.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
  F111 Aircraft
  F111 Aircraft
  H.M.S. "Ark Royal" and H.M.S. "Eagle" (Operations)
  H.M.S. "Ark Royal" and H.M.S. "Eagle" (Operations)
  Copper (Increased Price)
  Copper (Increased Price)
  Service Voters (Proxies)
  Service Voters (Proxies)
  Parliamentary Candidates (Canvassing Facilities)
  Parliamentary Candidates (Canvassing Facilities)
  Aircraft Flights (Nuclear Weapons)
  Aircraft Flights (Nuclear Weapons)
  Military Facilities (Australia)
  Military Facilities (Australia)
  Brigade of Guards (Polo Ponies)
  Brigade of Guards (Polo Ponies)
  Vietnam (British Forces)
  Vietnam (British Forces)
  H.M.S. "Sheba", Aden (Sewerage)
  H.M.S. "Sheba", Aden (Sewerage)
  Army Administration (Scotland)
  Army Administration (Scotland)
PORTS
  Parkeston Quay and Navy Yard Port, Harwich (Traffic)
  Parkeston Quay and Navy Yard Port, Harwich (Traffic)
ROADS
  A5 and A49 (Junction at Meole Brace)
  A5 and A49 (Junction at Meole Brace)
  Channel Tunnel
  Channel Tunnel
  Trunk Roads (Overloading)
  Trunk Roads (Overloading)
  Advance Warning Triangle
  Advance Warning Triangle
  East-West Flyover, Croydon
  East-West Flyover, Croydon
MINISTRY OF AVIATION
  Aircraft Noise (International Conference)
  Aircraft Noise (International Conference)
  Jet Aircraft, Heath Row (Noise)
  Jet Aircraft, Heath Row (Noise)
TELEPHONE SERVICE
  Addiscombe Exchange
  Addiscombe Exchange
SCOTLAND
  North East
  North East
  Murders (Glasgow)
  Murders (Glasgow)
  Sprat Fisheries (Research)
  Sprat Fisheries (Research)
  Farm Business Recording Scheme
  Farm Business Recording Scheme
  Price Review Award
  Price Review Award
  Agricultural Industry
  Agricultural Industry
  A7
  A7
  University Students (Teaching Profession)
  University Students (Teaching Profession)
  Feudal System (Reform)
  Feudal System (Reform)
  Prescriptions (Increase)
  Prescriptions (Increase)
  General Practitioners
  General Practitioners
  Hill Cattle and Hill Sheep Subsidy Schemes (Eligible Land)
  Hill Cattle and Hill Sheep Subsidy Schemes (Eligible Land)
  Cadco
  Cadco
  A8 (Accidents)
  A8 (Accidents)
PUBLIC BUILDING AND WORKS
  Overseas Establishments (Army Works Services Staff)
  Overseas Establishments (Army Works Services Staff)
  COUNCIL OF EUROPE (PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION)
  COUNCIL OF EUROPE (PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION)
  LEGAL PROCEEDINGS (LAW OF CONTEMPT)
  LEGAL PROCEEDINGS (LAW OF CONTEMPT)
AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD
  Hill Cattle and Hill Sheep Subsidy Schemes (Eligible Land)
  Hill Cattle and Hill Sheep Subsidy Schemes (Eligible Land)
AUSTRALIA
  Emigrants
  Emigrants
EDUCATION AND SCIENCE
  Teachers (West Ham, North)
  Teachers (West Ham, North)
NATIONAL FINANCE
  Purchase Tax (Repayment)
  Purchase Tax (Repayment)
  Corporation Tax and Capital Gains Tax
  Corporation Tax and Capital Gains Tax
  British Forces, Germany (Cost)
  British Forces, Germany (Cost)
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
  Green Belt, Colne Valley
  Green Belt, Colne Valley
MINISTRY OF LABOUR
  Development Districts, Northern Region (Training Assistance)
  Development Districts, Northern Region (Training Assistance)
  PALACE OF WESTMINSTER (TELEVISION)
  PALACE OF WESTMINSTER (TELEVISION)
OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT
  India and Pakistan
  India and Pakistan
  British Guiana
  British Guiana

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Lincoln
Several Lords—Took the Oath.

STATEMENTS
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, at a suitable moment after 3.30 two Statements will be made. The first will be made by my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor, and concerns the Royal Commission on the Penal System in England and Wales. The second will be made by my noble friend the Leader of the House, and is on the situation in Rhodesia.
BRADFORD CATHEDRAL AND CHURCHYARD BILL [H.L.]
Read 3a, and passed, and sent to the Commons.
LOUGHBOROUGH UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY BILL [H.L.]
Read 3a, and passed, and sent to the Commons.
UNIVERSITY OF SURREY BILL [H.L.]
Read 3a, and passed, and sent to the Commons.

CRIMINAL APPEAL BILL [H.L.]
2.40 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD GARDINER): My Lords, I beg leave to introduce a Bill to transfer the Court of Criminal Appeal's jurisdiction to hear appeals in criminal cases to the Court
128
of Appeal; to amend the law relating to such appeals in England and Northern Ireland and appeals to the Courts-Martial Appeal Court; to amend the provisions of the Army Act 1955 and the Air Force Act 1955 relating to the powers of confirming officers; and for connected purposes. I beg to move that this Bill be now read a first time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 1a.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Bill read 1a, and to be printed.

VETERINARY SURGEONS BILL [H.L.]
THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO (LORD CHAMPION): My Lords, I beg leave to introduce a Bill to make fresh provision for the management of the veterinary profession, for the registration of veterinary surgeons and veterinary practitioners, for regulating their professional education and professional conduct and for cancelling or suspending registration in cases of misconduct, and for connnected purposes. I beg to move that this Bill be now read a first time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 1a.—(Lord Champ
On Question, Bill read 1a, and to be printed.

PERSONAL BILLS COMMITTEE
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (THE EARL OF LISTOWEL): My Lords, I beg to move the first Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper.
Moved, That a Personal Bills Committee be appointed, to whom all Petitions for Personal Bills shall stand referred; and that the Lords following, with the Chairman of Committees, be named of the Committee:

V. Gage,

V. Simonds,

L. Cohen,

L. Grantchester,

L. Morton of Henryton,

L. Silkin.—(The Chairman of Committees.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

STANDING ORDERS COMMITTEE (PRIVATE BILLS)
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES: My Lords, I beg to move the second Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper.
Moved, That a Standing Orders Committee be appointed, and that the Lords following, with the Lord Chancellor and the Chairman of Committees, be named of the Committee:

M. Salisbury,

M. Willingdon,

L. Ailwyn,

L. Airedale,

L. Archibald,

L. Cawley,

L. Crook,

L. Douglas of Barloch,

L. Faringdon,

L. Terrington,

L. Tweedsmuir.—(The Chairman of Committees.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

ADDRESS IN REPLY TO HER MAJESTY'S MOST GRACIOUS SPEECH
2.43 p.m.
Debate resumed (according to Order) on the Motion moved on Thursday last by Lord Cohen of Brighton—namely, That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty as follows:—
"Most Gracious Sovereign—We, Your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in Parliament assembled, beg leave to thank Your Majesty for the most gracious Speech which Your Majesty has addressed to both Houses of Parliament."
LORD CARRINGTON: My Lords, before I start on the main theme of my speech this afternoon I should be grateful if your Lordships would allow me to say a brief word on one other topic. When we were exchanging civilities last week I expressly did not mention my noble and learned friend Lord Dilhorne since he was not in the House at that time and I particularly wanted him to be here when I spoke of him. I must, of course, be very careful about what I say in case it should sound like an obituary. As your
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Lordships will observe, my noble and learned friend is far from dead. I will therefore confine myself to saying how much I personally owe to him in the period when he was Deputy Leader of the Opposition and also when he was Lord Chancellor and I was the Leader of the House. Certainly nobody could have worked harder and nobody could have given me greater support. I very much hope that in his new geographical position my noble and learned friend will not be too silent and that the House will still hear him sailing into action, sometimes bristling with indignation, and at other times cooing like a dove. But, my Lords, wherever he chooses to sit he will certainly remain the noble and learned friend of all of us.
There is always the danger, in a speech on foreign affairs, of trying to cover too much ground, and since it is now some time since we had a foreign affairs debate there is a great temptation to discuss many of the issues which have arisen in different parts of the world in that intervening period. I shall, however, confine myself this afternoon to two issues: first of all, Europe—the Common Market, and the situation which has been brought about by General de Gaulle's declared intention to stand aside from NATO—and, secondly, the situation in the Far East, and in particular Vietnam and Indonesia. These two areas highlight the question I which has been in the minds of a great many of us in the last few years—namely, what is Britain's rôle in the changed world and in her changed circumstances.
Your Lordships will recollect that some years ago Mr. Dean Acheson made a speech in which he suggested that Britain had not found a rôle for the years since the change of Empire into Commonwealth. He made perhaps some rather unkind observations about this. At the time, that speech gave a certain amount of offence to certain people, and no doubt, to some extent at any rate, it was exaggerated, although there was obviously a basic element of truth in what Mr. Acheson, who could not by any standard be called an enemy of this country, had to say.
It is as foolish for Britain to pretend that her position has not altered, that her military powers and responsibilities have not diminished, and that the emergence of the independent States of Africa and

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Asia, together with the rise of the new Commonwealth, has not greatly changed her position, as it is small-minded and selfish to say that, because of these facts, Britain ought to retreat into her own island to live, if possible fat and comfortably, without regard to events in Europe or in the world and without trying to influence them. Though the Government, a little unexpectedly, in the light of certain speeches they made when in Opposition, have shown a robust determination to retain a British presence East of Suez, they have not, at any rate until very recently, given the appearance of being ready to accept that British membership of the E.E.C. is the key to our national future. And I believe that it is the key, and in part the answer to Mr. Dean Acheson's question.
I am, and always have been, and always shall be, an unrepentant advocate of Britain's joining the Common Market. Even in those days when it was considered that our membership would gravely undermine the Commonwealth, not only did I not share that view, but I thought that it was largely due to a misconception of the new rôle and form of the Commonwealth, and also an excuse for timid thinking and lack of imagination. We on these Benches have made our position clear, as indeed have noble Lords on the Liberal Benches. I do not intend to repeat this afternoon the reasons why I consider it vital that Britain should go into Europe. We have heard them—both the political and the economic reasons—over and over again; and the more I hear them, the more convinced I am that they are unanswerable. But, alas! neither the Conservative Party nor, of course, the Liberal Party are in a position to put into the practice the policy which they advocate. It is only the Labour Government who can do this, and this afternoon I wish for a moment to question the noble Earl the Leader of the House on where the Labour Party really do stand on this issue.
Your Lordships will remember that, as a result of the Western European Union meeting in London, the matter of entry into the Common Market was widely discussed during the Election campaign. At the W.E.U. meeting, the Foreign Secretary thought (though it has since tran
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spired that he was mistaken) that the French delegate had made a new and forthcoming statement about British membership of the Common Market. As a result, he himself made a rather more encouraging comment than was usual among Foreign Office Ministers in the last Parliament. Subsequently, no doubt as a result of what was said during the Election campaign by Mr. Heath, and others, the Prime Minister made a speech in Bristol on Friday, March 18, in which he set out the Labour Party's attitude towards membership. To say that that speech was disappointing is to put it very mildly. I do not know what the Prime Minister had in mind. It is perhaps conceivable that he intended his speech to be regarded as a great deal more forthcoming than in reality it was. But anybody who has even a fairly elementary knowledge of the problems of Europe must have realised that the theme of his speech, and the conditions he set, made British membership absolutely impossible.
At a Press conference a week or so earlier he had also said that it was impossible for the Labour Party to accept the agricultural policy of the E.E.C. This statement, combined with the Bristol speech, undoubtedly disheartened those of our friends in Europe who had hoped that if a Labour Government were reelected there would be a change of policy. It is perhaps a mistake during an Election campaign, when the pressure on the Leader of any Party must be great and when the temptation to make Party points is irresistible, to pay too close attention to the actual words used. Let us, therefore, if we may, forget that speech.
Some of what has happened since has been a good deal more encouraging; some, I think, a little more doubtful. Let us examine what is said in the gracious Speech. The actual words are that
"They"—
that is the Government—
"would be ready to enter the European Economic Community provided essential British and Commonwealth interests were safeguarded."
That statement can mean a great deal, or it can mean absolutely nothing. Those words could be an excuse for inaction or a springboard for a further effort at joining. I may be quite wrong, but I think

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it is the latter. I very much hope so, and I trust that the noble Earl, Lord Longford, will tell us so later this afternoon. Certainly Mr. Brown, the day before yesterday, told us that the political will was there. And this is an important factor, for one of the most vital things the Government have to do is to convince the people of Europe that they, the Labour Party, really are serious about joining the Common Market; and, in particular, they must convince the French of this. For I do not believe that the French, or indeed many others, yet believe that the Government are in earnest, or that the political will is there.
I would judge that the words that I have read out from the gracious Speech will not be construed in Europe as being very encouraging: the formula is too familiar. They may well be taken merely as a reiteration of the five basic conditions upon which the Labour Party have frequently insisted, and which, of course, make our membership impossible. My Lords, the Six are not going to change their agricultural policy because we do not like it. Nor are they going to make special terms for Britain which they were not prepared to make for themselves. Why should they?
We must remember that since 1962 there has been a good deal of thought given to, and a good deal of experience of, the working of the Treaty. There will thus be less likelihood of a change just to suit our convenience; though change to ease our real difficulties is a different matter. It may be, too, that the very fact that the Treaty has been working for three or four years may iron out some of the difficulties which we envisaged during the negotiations in 1962. But one thing I hope the Government will recognise, and that is that we are not going to be treated specially and uniquely. They should not expect it. Though, naturally, there must be negotiation.
Therefore, it comes down to this: what exactly do the Government mean when they say that they will join the E.E.C. subject to essential interests being safeguarded? What would they consider (this is in general terms) to be adequate safeguards? We agreed very largely in 1962 what we thought those safeguards were. How do the Government differ from us? What are the essential interests which they think must be safeguarded?
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What would they consider to be adequate now, in 1966? I have a suspicion that it is a forlorn hope to ask the noble Earl the Leader of the House to answer these questions, because the Foreign Secretary declined to answer them yesterday in another place; but surely it is upon the answers to those questions that the test of our intentions will be judged. I thought it very disappointing that in an otherwise encouraging speech the Foreign Secretary declined to be drawn further. It is easy enough to say that you want to join the Community, but it is the provisos with which you surround your intention which cause the misgivings among our European friends. I hope (it is not a very strong hope) that the noble Earl will be able to go a little further this afternoon, for the misgivings of our friends in Europe are still shared by a good many of us. The answers to these questions will show us whether or not the Government mean business.
Allied to the problem of the Common Market is the problem of NATO. I think there are some—and some in this House —who seem rather lightly to discount the importance of NATO. They say that they cannot conceive of any situation in which force could be used in the European area, and that it is so unlikely that we should remove a large proportion of our forces from Europe and consequently dismantle some of the complicated framework and infrastructure of the Treaty Organisation. My Lords, I do not share that view; at least, I do not share the view that you can dismantle NATO. It has always seemed to me that one of the chief reasons why there is so little likelihood of war in Europe is precisely because NATO exists. Surely the break-up of the Treaty, the disappearance of American troops from Europe, the re-emergence of individual armies, navies and air forces and the end of integrated command would be much more likely to lead to a recurrence of the dangers of the 1946–49 period than to a continuance of the comparative stability that we have enjoyed in the last seventeen years.
But, my Lords, that is not to say that the organisation of NATO is perfect: indeed, it would be very odd if it were. The Treaty was formed in 1949, and circumstances have greatly altered since that date. In 1949 Europe was poor, war-weary, not at all well armed or equipped, and the spirit of some of its

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countries was pretty low. To-day all that has changed. The prosperity in Western Europe rivals the prosperity in the United States, and the morale and spirit of its peoples are high. They are, therefore, much less likely to accept without demur the dominance of the United States in the Alliance. All these things are well known, as indeed is the attitude of General de Gaulle. He has not, so far as I know, changed his views about NATO for a long time, and his action of a month ago could hardly be called unexpected.
I cannot pretend that I do not regret his action. I also cannot pretend that I believe that, in this age of complication and sophistication in warfare and in weapons, it really is possible for an alliance to be convincing and to be a deterrent to a potential aggressor unless there is integration on a large scale, and particularly integration in command. The absence of the French from that integration must seriously weaken the Alliance. Nevertheless, I think it would be wrong to dismiss General de Gaulle's criticisms of NATO out of hand. We should be equally wrong to criticise the Americans for the lead they have taken in NATO over these past years. On the contrary, we should be very grateful to them.
Account must be taken, however, of the importance, and growing importance, of the individual members of the Alliance, and whatever the rights or wrongs of General de Gaulle's case or of the Americans' case, this difference of opinion surely offers a splendid opportunity of having a new look at the organisation, of reviewing the whole Alliance, and working out a system more in keeping with the situation in the late 'sixties and 'seventies. I know that this is what the Foreign Office have been wanting to do for some time; and, having read the speech of the Foreign Secretary in another place yesterday, I do not think the Government or the Foreign Secretary would dissent from that. It may be that General de Gaulle's action will make a review easier. I hope that we shall hear from the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, this afternoon what steps the Government propose to take in this matter, because there is urgency. I do not share the view that NATO has out-
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lived its usefulness, and I am sure that its weakening fills most of us with grave misgivings.
Lastly, my Lords, I turn to the Far East. I am glad to think that we are to hear this afternoon a maiden speech from my noble friend Lord Head, who has a very wide knowledge of this area. I know that there are many, on all sides of the House, who are gravely perturbed about the situation in South Vietnam, and they are worried about the United States getting more and more deeply involved in a situation which is becoming more and more serious, and looks less and less capable of solution. It is, of course, very easy for people to criticise the United States, to forget what they are doing, to criticise and say that they should have done this or should not have done that; or to go hack to the days of President Diem and to say that the original mistake was to let him be overthrown. All these things are, I suppose, to a greater or lesser degree open to argument. But the fact remains that the United States is in South Vietnam, and deeply committed.
I am at a loss to understand those who advocate that the United States should abandon South Vietnam. How can they possibly extricate themselves from that country at this moment without a loss of face—and a loss of face which would have incalculable effects on the remaining independent States in that area? The effect, for example, on Thailand and the Philippines, not to mention Cambodia and Laos, would very likely be catastrophic—no less tragic, perhaps, than the effect on China, which could interpret the American withdrawal only as a total victory for Communism. Our friends would be gravely disheartened, our enemies triumphantly encouraged. This is not an action, surely, which any American Government could contemplate, nor do I think that the United States would be morally justified in abandoning the South Vietnamese. It is, of course, perfectly true that the South Vietnamese are heartily sick of the war, and heartily sick of their military Government. This is not surprising when one considers that they have been fighting for over twenty years in one form or another, and against one enemy or another. Nevertheless, I do not believe

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for one moment that if the bulk of the people of South Vietnam wanted a North Vietnamese or Viet Cong victory the Americans would be able to bolster up, as they are doing, the military régime and continue to fight the Viet Cong.
It surely follows that there is still a considerable resistance in South Vietnam to the Viet Cong and, although war-weary, they are still determined not to give in. I, for one, do not therefore see that the Americans have any choice other than to continue, as they are continuing, to fight for a military victory but, at the same time, to make it abundantly clear that they are prepared to negotiate without prior conditions. I was glad to see in the gracious Speech that the Government will continue
"to use all available means to achieve a negotiated settlement".
It is, I think, rather doubtful whether at this moment we are in a position to be of much use in this direction, but if the opportunity arises we should certainly take it, for in negotiated settlement must surely lie the solution to this problem for the United Slates.
I have noticed that there has been some comment, both in the United States and in Australia, that we have not been doing our fair share in the Vietnamese war. It was, of course, agreed, both by this Government and by its predecessor, that we should concentrate in containing the Indonesian confrontation while the Americans were occupied in Vietnam; and there has been a very large British effort to that end. All of us must have been encouraged to read of the change of régime, or perhaps more accurately the change of executive authority, in Indonesia. While President Soekarno was in charge, there was not much hope for the end of confrontation. I think it is too early to say what the new Indonesian Government proposes to do, though Government spokesmen may perhaps may be able to tell us later on what their assessment of Indonesian intention is. But I think we should remember this. Ostensibly, the excuse for confrontation was the retention of the British base in Singapore, together with the incorporation of Sabah in the Federation. It was really nothing of the kind. President Soekarno had made such an appalling mess of the economy of Indonesia that some diversion was necessary, and a diversion which had patriotic over-
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tones, colonial overtones, European overtones, was, of course, highly popular and suited him down to the ground. We should be making a mistake to suppose that the "crush Malaysia" campaign was not popular with the people of Indonesia and, in particular, with the army. It may well take some time for a change of policy to be brought about, if indeed the new rulers of Indonesia wish that to happen.
The overtures which Indonesia has made to Singapore seem to be not so much a slackening of hostility towards Malaysia, as another means of embarrassing her, so I think we must be careful in assuming that confrontation will automatically cease, until we see an expression of good faith on the part of the Indonesians. But one thing we can certainly be pleased with is the total defeat which the Chinese have suffered in Indonesia. The breach with China must surely be wholly good, and a great encouragement to hopes of peace in that area.
My Lords, I know that there are some in the Party opposite, and all in the Party on my right, who would like to see Britain withdraw from her role East of Suez and, in particular, in South-East Asia. Most of them, as I understand it, do so on the grounds of expense, for which I do not have much sympathy. It seems to me that we are spending a great deal of money on all sorts of things which are basically much less important than the commitments which we have in that area. There are others who feel that our presence in South-East Asia is unnecessary for a totally different reason. They feel that the Chinese are not themselves expansionists, and that talk of domination of South-East Asia by the Chinese is unrealistic. They go on to argue that the presence of Europeans on the South-East Asian mainland is more likely to lead to difficulties than to act as a deterrent to aggression. Nobody yet knows whether this theory about the Chinese is right or wrong. We certainly have no evidence to support it; and such evidence as there is seems, if anything, to contradict it. I should therefore be disinclined to base the whole of the foreign policy of this country in that area on the assumption that the Chinese were going to behave themselves. There is far too much at

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risk, and the prospect of a South-East Asia together inevitably, I should have thought, with India and Pakistan as a solid Communist bloc, is not one that we can contemplate lightly. It is, of course, a perfectly fair speculation, but I sometimes wonder whether speculations of this kind do not have some undesirable effects.
I noticed in both The Times during the week and the Observer last Sunday a report that the Australians had declined to allow discussions of alternative bases on the mainland of Australia, since they believed that we should at all costs remain in Singapore. I do not know whether that report is true, but to anybody who knows the Australians there will be an immediate recognition of the vital importance of Singapore to that country. It would be difficult to overemphasise the effect on Australians of the surrender of Singapore in 1942, and it would be equally true to stress the continuing mistrust of British intentions to stay in the Far East, a mistrust fanned by the kind of speculation to which I have been referring.
I can well imagine—though perhaps it is untrue—
that Australian reasoning is on these lines: "We believe that Singapore is vital to the defence of our country. We are not going to make it easier for the British to get out by offering them alternative accommodation, because it is in our interest for them to stay there for as long as possible." I must say that I think it is in the interests of the Western World that we should stay there as long as possible—with, of course, the proviso, with which we all agree, that we cannot stay there if we are not wanted. I shall be very interested to hear what the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, can tell us about the progress of the negotiations which the Government have had with Mr. Lee Kuan Yew over the past week.
Whatever speculations there may be about the future let us make one thing abundantly clear. No British Government—not even a Liberal Government—could possibly abandon its solemn obligations and commitments in South-East Asia. Nevertheless, we must obviously look to the future, and we all look forward to the day when there is no need for British or American troops on the soil of South-East Asia, and when each
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individual country in that area can defend itself by itself, or in conjunction with its neighbours, or underwritten by the West.
My Lords, I started off my speech by recalling Mr. Dean Acheson's words about Britain's rôle in the world. As I say, on the whole I am encouraged by the speeches made by leading members of the Government in the last few days. I think that as a nation we are beginning to realise that our rôle in the world must be in conjunction with our European neighbours: not, of course, exclusively so, because, as I believe I made clear, we still have an important rôle to play East of Suez. I do not think that those two roles are contradictory, for Europe, with Britain playing a major part, must of course concern itself with Asia and Africa and not exclusively with its own problems. I believe that we are moving in the right direction, but I also think that we must go faster than we have been doing in the last two years or so. I very much hope that the noble Earl the Leader of the House, who has a splendid opportunity this afternoon, will be able to say that the Government will press on with their Common Market negotiations with real urgency, and with a real will to succeed, for time is getting short.
3.13 p.m.
LORD GLADWYN: My Lords, when we discuss foreign affairs in general, and not any particular specific subject, I think that we ought to try to concentrate on the wood rather than on the trees and, as I think the noble Lord who has just spoken indicated, try to look at the subject as a whole. So I will endeavour to follow his example. But before doing so I think I should comment to some extent on what he said about specific subjects, and notably about NATO and Vietnam and our policy East of Suez from the point of view of those who sit on these Benches.
With regard to NATO, I do not think that we here would criticise at all what the noble Lord said. We would agree with his comments. With regard to Vietnam, I have, of course, considerable sympathy with what he said about the desperate predicament in which the Americans find themselves. But what he did not say, and is obvious, is that it is not so much a question of the undesirability of, and the catastrophic

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results which would follow, the Americans' abandonment of the South Vietnamese, as of what would happen if the South Vietnamese refused to continue to stand by the Americans. This is a dilemma which is becoming increasingly apparent in the United States of America itself, and I do not think that we should seek to minimise the importance of that possibility.
With regard to our rôle East of Suez generally, I need not say very much, as I think the attitude of our Party is quite well known. It is not entirely on the grounds of expense that we recommend cutting down as much as possible on our obligations East of Suez, although it is very largely so, because the amount we spend there is very nearly equivalent to the foreign exchange deficit on our balance of payments in this country; and when we have to borrow that from international bankers it seems rather absurd to go and spend it East of Suez. At least it seems rather paradoxical to me.
What we on these Benches have suggested is that we should try to do fairly soon in the Persian Gulf what the Government have already done with regard to Aden. No doubt we shall have to go on for some time with our obligations in Malaysia. As regards Malaysia, and Singapore in particular, we have in fact never said that we should get out immediately, or even in the near future. But we have said that we should try to assist every possibility that exists for ending the confrontation between Malaysia and Indonesia; and there now seems quite a reasonable prospect of doing so. Perhaps the noble Viscount who is to speak later will elaborate on that. But if there is such a prospect then I think undoubtedly we should have to decide what to do with the 50,000 men we now have in the island of Borneo. If we took them out we could not put them all into the base at Singapore we should have to bring them back here.
As to Singapore, nobody would suggest that we should stay there longer than we are wanted, and I should therefore have thought it imperative that we should discuss with the Australians what would happen supposing the local inhabitants do not want us to stay on in Singapore any longer. So I think it is short-sighted (of the Australians rot to discuss with us
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the possibility of building up some kind of base facilities in North Australia.
Also we have suggested from these Benches that we should try to work out with the Americans and the Australians some general scheme for the defence of the area as a whole. It may well be that that would be after the Vietnamese war had ended, and when in fact we had had to abandon Singapore, and that would possibly involve also a discussion on the communications going West-about and not East-about, as they do now over very doubtful Middle East and islands in the Indian Ocean.
Having said that, my Lords, I should like to say a few words on the general issue. I think there is now general agreement in this country that we have three broad options open to us during the next decade before, as Mr. Acheson said, and as we always quote, we eventually "find our rôle". These three options, if we forget for a moment our self-appointed rôle as leader of the Commonwealth (because, although the Commonwealth will undoubtedly go on, "leading it" is not one of the options for us for the future), are, as I believe the noble Lord, Lord Carrington hinted, neutralism, presumably connoting a highly directed economy in this country; drifting ever closer to the United States of America, or, in some way joining Europe. I think it is the last which is now, happily, the most favoured in this country. But there is no doubt that it is still vigorously opposed by a large and quite influential group in the Labour Party. I think they hold, broadly speaking, that joining the European Economic Community might prevent the accomplishment of what they always refer to as "Socialism in our time". Perhaps even more important, as they think, it might ruin our relations with the Soviet Union and the Communist East.
I think also there are certain Tories who are not at all happy about the European solution although they may accept it. They are certainly not happy about our signing the Treaty of Rome, and that for quite different reasons from the anti-European group in the Labour Party. They are concerned with our ancient traditions and our relationship with the Commonwealth countries, which they think has a greater future than I believe

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is the case. But broadly speaking, I think the chances of our going for the first option—that is to say, shrinking into ourselves, despite the fact that a certain number of people would like this country to do just that—are not very great. On analogy, it would be equivalent to a star which I believe the astronomers say after a period of intense activity suddenly becomes what is called a "yellow dwarf". I must say, I do hope we shall not become a yellow dwarf.
Yet indeed after four hundred years of nationalist expansion, during which we founded an Empire on which the sun never set and spread the new ideas of our Western civilisation, of Christendom, if you like, with great success throughout the world, we might follow Spain and Portugal and indeed most of the Empires since time began into a period of political eclipse, concentrating on our own affairs, sensibly directing our economy on clever Schachtian, or perhaps one should now say Baloghian, lines, not attempting to play any great or decisive role, in fact a hedgehog reflex, not inconsonant with trying to play one super Power off against the other, but entirely consistent with the desire of a considerable section of our people who want to get on with what, as I say, they call the achievement of Socialism in our time. It is possible, in spite of Gaullist insistence on what the General calls her "rang", her position in the world, that this may also be the eventual fate of France. There may not be very many people who favour this solution, but, as I say, the tendency certainly exists.
There are many more, I am sure, who feel that we may well end up as part of some Anglo-Saxon federation, the logical centre of which could hardly be anywhere else than Washington, although I believe there is a school of thought, which I think is wrong, that it could now be situated, along with NATO or the remains of NATO in London. The present moves against NATO by General de Gaulle, and indeed against the European Economic Community, will undoubtedly help this tendency towards an Anglo-Saxon bloc, and it might be reasonably acceptable to many people here, perhaps even the majority of our countrymen. For it would be, after all, quite compatible with the maintenance of our peculiar forms of Government and ancient traditions. It is
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even possible that such a federation might include some other European States, though not I think those of the Latin culture, while the future of Germany would be quite obscure. In the end she would probably be absorbed in the famous "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals", that is to say, I suppose, a congeries of States in which the dominant Power would be the Soviet Union.
All this appears to be implicit in the serious proposals recently put forward in the United States of America about what they call Atlantic Union. These seem to be making some headway, chiefly owing to American impatience with Europe and desire to find some justification for their Western policy other than President Kennedy's famous partnership, which many of them seem to think is entering into a sort of decline, thanks to the determination of de Gaulle that the European partner should not be a genuine community but only what he calls a Europe of States, under, of course, French leadership. So it is possible if Europe really cannot be formed, that is to say if the Brussels machine really does break down and all the members of the Community recover their complete freedom of action, that the General's nightmare of an Anglo-Saxon bloc dominated by America, with France in a weak position between the two super-Powers, might come about after all. At all events, the present French policy seems, for reasons it is really very difficult to understand, to be working towards this end, whether in Europe or in the sphere of the North Atlantic Treaty.
Happily, of course, the third or European option for Britain is still open. Like the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, I do not propose to elaborate on the reasons why it still seems to be the best solution. But the sad truth is that it cannot be taken up with success for so long as the French pursue their present policy. This option lies, of course, in our joining the European Economic Community, in building it up into a real community, and not a mere Europe of States, and thus forming on this side of the Atlantic a union of a novel type more suited to our ancient nations than any form of Atlantic union, which in default of the creation of Europe could only be an association between an elephant and a

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number of much smaller beasts, that would of course in practice have to be run by the elephant—there would be no other possibility. There is no doubt that in a genuine European community Britain would have a leading r ôle, as indeed would France. By the time we reached the point where German reunification might be possible we might, hopefully, have arrived at the stage where the self-contained and totally independent European nation state, the bane of Europe since the Reformation, had in fact disappeared, though the individuality or "personality" of the existing European countries, including our own, might in no way be affected.
The chances of German reunification, "in peace and freedom", of course are slender indeed if there is a continued Soviet-American confrontation, and slenderer still if the intention is to achieve the reunification solely or largely on the basis of some deal between France and the Soviet Union. So for those reasons those who believe in the necessity, and it is a necessity, of ending dangerous tension in a nuclear world should firmly contemplate the desired European goal and not fall for any second best solution unless and until it is absolutely certain that old-fashioned nationalism has finally triumphed and that therefore we must adapt ourselves unfortunately to the resultant anarchy.
In these circumstances what we Liberals would above all else desire is some definite announcement by the Government that, by and large, it accepts these premises which I have outlined and wants not only to join the European Economic Community but also to build up a European political community, using the same techniques as those so admirably embodied in the present famous Treaty of Rome. We were therefore encouraged, as I think was the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, by the increasingly European sentiments expressed by our excellent Foreign Secretary and, indeed, many other members of the Labour Government during their first term of office, and even by what they said, or some of them said, during the Election.
Then we were absolutely shattered by the Bristol speech of the Prime Minister, which appeared to be conclusive evidence that he favoured the Europe of States as formulated by General de Gaulle, not a
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European Community as conceived by the great architects of European unity from The Hague Congress to the present time. Again, we were moderately encouraged—or, rather, we recovered partially from our discouragement—not only by the expression in the gracious Speech of at any rate a definite desire by the Government to enter the E.E.C. without at least any insistence on the famous five conditions of Mr. Gaitskell (this is the first time so far as I know the Government have ever officially and expressly said any such thing), but also by the appointment of two Cabinet Ministers of known European tendencies and great abilities to conduct operations in the event of our being able to resume negotiations. We were, in addition, encouraged, on the whole, by the remarks of the Prime Minister when he embroidered the other day on the relevant passage in the gracious Speech in another place, and again by the general tenor of the speech read out on Monday last to Mr. Cecil King's editors' conference (over which I had the honour to preside) by Mr. George Thomson, acting for Mr. George Brown.
Finally, we were especially encouraged by what the Foreign Secretary said only yesterday in another place; namely, that the Government did not question the institutions set up by the Treaty of Rome, but only felt that provision should be made for the safeguarding of our essential interests "within the framework of those institutions". That is what he said. He added that it was true that
"there would also have to be adjustments in some of the working rules of the Community."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 727 (No. 7), col. 562.]
Perhaps the noble Lord, when he comes to reply, will tell us what that means. I am afraid that I have no idea what it actually implies. Later in his speech, replying to a question asking whether he subscribed to the ideal of European political unity—a question coming, incidentally, from his own side—the Foreign Secretary said that in his view membership would involve acceptance of the objectives and ideals that were in the mind of the framers of the Treaty. Well, politically speaking, there is, of course, no doubt what those objectives and ideals were.
In view of these recent statements, it is obvious, I think, that the Government have now come close to making that

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Declaration of Intent which I suggested should be made nearly two years ago; and that of course is very good—at least we think so. But—and this is the point—they have still not said explicitly what their objective is; that is to say, whether it really is to work for a genuine European Political Community. The essential object of my intervention to-day is to ask them, if they can, to take this little further step.
After all, if as they now announce, they want to join the European Economic Community, they should quite clearly say that they do not favour a Europe of States, and that if they sign the Treaty of Rome it will be, as I hope, with the firm intention of allowing the Commission to carry out the important and independent role assigned to it under the Treaty, and of accepting the verdict of a qualified majority vote in the Council of Ministers whenever the Treaty so decrees. In any case, we should have a legal obligation to do that if we signed the Treaty. Naturally, if we go in we should, as it were, fight our corner, as indeed, of course, all present members do, and no doubt with our great influence and our admirable civil servants we should have quite considerable success.
Naturally, too, there are some things which must be settled before we go in. Nobody doubts that; certainly we do not. One such thing is the length of the transitional periods which we and, of course, New Zealand should have before we pass over fully to the Common Tariff and apply the main principles of the Community's agricultural policy, subject of course to any derogations that may be jointly agreed upon in advance. Indeed, the recently expressed intentions of the Government on the broad nature of the concessions that they should seek seem to be reasonable. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, that they might be specified a little more, but I feel, perhaps contrary to what he thinks, that the Government cannot go too far in that direction before they begin negotiations.
In other words, I think that the concessions which they now seem to be seeking would be reasonable, though, naturally enough, they cannot at the moment make them absolutely clear. But to say that we must insist on always importing our foodstuffs free of duty, and on conducting a completely independent
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foreign and domestic policy just does not, with great respect, make any sense, on the assumption, that is, that we want to sign the Treaty, as the Government say they do, and to enter the Community as a full member, as the Government say they want to do.
What we suspect—it is only a suspicion —is that the Government are now suffering from schizophrenia, a kind of split mind, so far as Europe is concerned. We therefore greatly hope that the Government will rid themselves, or try to rid themselves, of this unfortunate psychological complaint and make it quite clear that what they want to join is a real Community, and not a mere alliance of the old-fashioned sort with strong anti-American overtones; in other words that their objective is an autonomous Western Europe firmly within the Western Alliance, and that they are in no way attracted by the Third Force and nationalist theories and principles of the present Government of France. If they do this, they may, it is true, delay our entry into the Community for a year or two; but if they go in on the other tack and join, or even if they profess to favour, a Gaullist Europe, there is small hope for this country of ours, and less for an enduring Western Alliance and the possible wider Atlantic Association of the future.
The blunt fact is that there is little prospect of de Gaulle allowing us to join the Community unless, if he can—and it is a large "if"—he has reduced it to a sort of French-led Confederation, largely outside NATO, and perhaps in some special relationship with the Soviet Union. If he does achieve this end, I suggest there would be small inducement for us to join. Indeed, I should imagine that, among other things, we should find it quite impossible to subscribe to the prospective foreign policy of such a group. I hope that I am wrong in these gloomy forebodings, but I feel I may not be.
To resume (this is my last word), as we see it, all the Government should do is to say, quite simply, that they do not want to join a Europe of States and, subject to the broad conditions to which I have referred, that they do want to sign the Treaty of Rome and faithfully abide by its terms while remaining true to the Western Alliance. If only they could give such a lead, if only they could say

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just those few words, I assure them that they would change the whole foreign political situation for the better and also, I feel, be able to rally the nation behind them in the pursuit of a noble aim and a genuinely common cause which, I believe, would have the enthusiastic support of a large majority in all political Parties in this country.
3.38 p.m.
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (THE EARL OF LONGFORD): My Lords, it is a privilege to follow two statesmanlike speeches such as those of the noble Lords, Lord Carrington and Lord Gladwyn, even if the latter could not divest himself of some, as he himself called them, "gloomy forebodings ", to which I shall return later on. It is also a pleasure to speak in front of the noble Viscount, Lord Head, who is to make a maiden speech which I believe he has pondered now for six years since he was raised to the Peerage, and which we are awaiting with exceptional interest. In the meantime, he has rendered outstanding service to this country in various parts of the globe. I should like once more to join in the tributes paid by the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, to the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne. The noble Viscount is not here, but I am sure that we on these Benches would regard him as a Member of the House who will always command our deep respect, even when we disagree with him, as is bound to happen from time to time; but the House would not be the same place without him.
The noble Lords, Lord Carrington and Lord Gladwyn, have raised the whole question of our attitude to the European Economic Community. I will try to say quite a few words on that subject, leaving some at least of the other topics, particularly NATO, to my noble friend Lord Shackleton, and some of the other issues to my noble friend Lord Walston, who will reply at the end of the debate. Lord Carrington was trying to interpret the recent utterances of Ministers in an encouraging sense. I hope he will continue to do that. I feel that he is fully justified in doing that, according to lights which, in this matter at least, I share with him.
Last year the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, opened a debate on the whole question of Europe, to which I made a
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long reply on behalf of the Government, and which I myself thought would please him, would mollify him, would generally increase his sense of wellbeing; but he found it most discouraging at that time. I am not quite sure that anything that could be said on the subject of Europe would ever satisfy Lord Gladwyn.
LORD GLADWYN: My Lords, I was grateful for small mercies generally.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: Last year the noble Lord was not grateful for anything. On this occasion, if one follows his words closely, he takes a pessimistic view of the situation, as if in some way it would all be transformed by a few magical words delivered by some humble figure like myself this afternoon. I feel that that is not quite realistic, but I will reply to his line of argument later on. I hope that when I have finished and when other Ministers this afternoon have made their contributions, both the noble Lords, Lord Carrington and Lord Gladwyn, will feel encouraged by what the late Cardinal Newman would have called our development of doctrine. I hope that both noble Lords will feel that things are moving on in a way which they would applaud.
Let us put our attitude clearly and concisely. We in the Government agree entirely that it would be to our political and economic advantage to join the Community. We are all aware that in a modern industrial world there are many leading industries, particularly the more modern ones, which need a wide economic base if they are to be developed to their full potential. In the rest of the world there are three major economic complexes which have emerged and which command large home markets. The addition of the United Kingdom and EFTA countries would provide a combined market in Europe with a total population approaching three hundred million, which would be more than five times our own market at present. The benefits which would accrue, in our view, would accrue not only to Britain. We believe our world-wide trading connections and our large domestic market would be of great value to an enlarged Community. It is not a question of our asking a favour of somebody and offering nothing in return. Such an outcome would help to heal the present division in Western Europe into two economic

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groupings, quite apart from Eastern Europe. Unless something is done, and done rapidly, this division will tend to grow very much as time goes on. There are many imponderable political and cultural advantages which I would not seek to discuss, but I think I have said enough to indicate that the Government yield to nobody in their appreciation of the possible benefits.
The noble Lord, Lord Carrington, wants to be quite sure that we are serious and genuine in our desire to join. I can give him that assurance solemnly and unequivocally. There is no doubt a consensus of opinion in this country, and certainly in the Government, that we ought to join. The decision of principle has been taken. The question now is not one of ends, but of means. The issue is not whether we ought to go in, but how we can get in on the right terms. I hope that those statements will satisfy the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, and also the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, at, this stage. If words mean anything, this starting point should satisfy anybody who wants to go in, though anybody who does not will find this sort of proclamation a good deal less exhilarating. This is a free country and those who do not want to join the Common Market have as much right to express their opinion as those who do. I hope that what I have just said represents the statement of intent for which Lord Gladwyn has pleaded so eloquently; though I myself have never known why he attaches such world-shattering importance to that particular phraseology. Surely nobody, even Lord Gladwyn—indeed he made this plain in his speech—will argue that we must make no effort to secure the right conditions. Surely everyone, including Lord Gladwyn, would agree that some safeguards must obtain, again as he in fact said in his speech. I do not suppose that noble Lords opposite if they were again in office would in practice commit themselves unconditionally to negotiate for British entry into the European Economic Community. I do not want to argue about the conditions which they made before, but although this is a rather uncontroversial occasion, at least so far, I would point out that they failed to get in. So I am afraid that we cannot turn to them for information as to how entry should be secured, but I quite agree
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About the genuineness of their desire to enter.
Let us all agree that no Government in this country would contemplate some move of this kind designed to alter our whole future economic and commercial problems without a profound examination of all the implications, without using every possible endeavour to see that the necessary safeguards were secured. So far, that must be common ground among those who want to go in. That, then, is our initial approach. I would remind the House that this approach—this approach of being anxious to go in but also being determined that the minimum safeguards should be secured—was an approach of the six present members of the Common Market when they were negotiating among themselves what has now become the Treaty of Rome. They fought very hard for their own essential interests. They took good care to see that all those interests were properly safeguarded, and very long and hard were the negotiations involved. Therefore, I am quite sure that nobody would seriously argue that we should not bargain and argue as strenuously as they did. If we failed to take these precautions, it would not only be a great wrong to the British people but a grave injustice to our friends and allies in the Commonwealth and in EFTA.
I hope that this afteroon I lay proper stress on our moral commitments both to the Commonwealth and to EFTA. Just as we need to make a considerable adjustment in our own arrangements, so we should regard it as fair that the members of the Community should, where necessary, make adjustments in theirs. Again, in so far as we use words in public which I am sure express genuine attitudes, I repeat that I cannot believe that in principle what I am now saying should be different from the attitude of any responsible British Government.
The noble Lord, Lord Carrington, asked me what we mean by "adequate safeguards". The noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, paid a generous tribute to the speech of the Foreign Secretary yesterday, but found him a little disappointing on this particular point. Lord Carrington is too experienced and skilful a negotiator to be unaware of the difficulty of answering that type of question in any detail in public. If I set out the full list of conditions which ideally we should

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like to see satisfied, as has occurred before, we might be accused of discouraging our European friends at the outset. On the other hand, there is hound to be a good deal of amicable bargaining on the most optimistic assumptions, and the noble Lord would not expect me, in advance, to throw away any cards which we hold. Therefore, I must, I say with great respect—risking some slight loss of his esteem, but not, I hope, a permanent loss—be forgiven for not going into more detail than the Foreign Secretary went into yesterday. But I would say straight away that there can be no question of taking lightly our commitments to EFTA. This, particularly at present, is something that one must say with a great deal of emphasis, though I myself do not believe that the problem there is likely to be anything like as difficult as seemed possible at one time. I would not expect grave difficulties to arise there.
Of course, agriculture must be examined with particular caution. It may not be so difficult, though it is obviously essential to safeguard our own farmers. The effect on the cost of living, however, cannot be brushed aside at all lightly, and the same is true in the expert view nowadays—and perhaps ever truer—about the effect on our balance of payments, which is bound to arise at every point of the discussions and particularly here. Again, it would be grossly irresponsible to ignore the impact on the Commonwealth. It seems almost certain that New Zealand, which the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, mentioned, must be treated as a special case. I am not trying to give a comprehensive list but am singling out the kind of points which any Government here would be hound to place in the forefront. But, in our view, the difficulties have diminished since 1962.
I am very pleased, indeed, that the noble Baroness, Lady Gaitskell, is speaking this afternoon, think I that sometimes Mr. Hugh Gaitskell's name is used here in a somewhat misleading fashion. Mr. Hugh Gaitskell, as a man and as a statesman, has left an immortal legacy to our people and to many peoples outside this country. I would suggest that, as the years pass, his stature will grow ever larger, but the facts upon which he based his five points have changed a good deal since 1962. If he were with us to-day
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he would be the last to claim that these conditions, formulated in that particular way in 1962, were a sacred and unalterable text which could never be reinterpreted in the light of changing conditions. It would be tremendously unlike Mr. Gaitskell to take that attitude.
Perhaps what is more relevant is to point out that it would be quite wrong to embark once again on formal negotiations to join the Community in such a way as to risk a second rebuff. It seems certain, therefore, that we shall need a period of intensive preparation and of consultation with our Commonwealth and EFTA friends. Some of the problems—I have mentioned agriculture, in particular, but other problems, also—seem formidable at first sight; but that is no reason for being downcast. We must make sure in advance, after careful soundings, that there will be a sympathetic and welcoming response from all our future partners before we embark on formal negotiations. But, given such preparation, given the goodwill, I am personally very hopeful that our efforts will be crowned with success. I want to leave no doubt in any mind—I am sorry if I am being repetitive, and perhaps the noble Lord will forgive me for that—that success in entering the Common Market is the firm objective of the Government.
The noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, may feel that he has not been altogether answered on one or two of his main points. He raised the very delicate question of supranationality, but, with proper respect, I beg him not to defeat his own purposes. I think that when progress is taking place along lines which he clearly welcomes, he might not in fact be serving the purposes which he had in mind if he kept asking always for a little more; above all, if he tried to insist on recantations at critical moments. I was not sure that that part of his argument was going to further the cause which he and so many of us have at heart. I would return rather to that fine book which he himself has written about Europe It is a small classic, if I may be allowed so to describe it, in which he says that, first, there must be the will, then the concept and then the act. I think he is convinced now that there is the will and also the concept, and I hope he will feel that the act is in a fair way to being performed.
LORD GLADWYN: My Lords, I thank the noble Earl very much for what he said about my book. But the concept does seem to me to be extremely important and the main thing which you want to get right. What I fear is that if you go on with one concept you may encourage the triumph of nationalism, which will defeat everything you are now trying to achieve.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, the noble Lord made that point just as clearly a little earlier. But I would remind him of something which was said by the Foreign Secretary yesterday—and, really, it could not have been said more plainly—which the noble Lord himself quoted. The Foreign Secretary said yesterday that membership would involve acceptance of the objects and ideals that were in the minds of the framers. The noble Lord asks: Can he really mean that? Frankly, I think the noble Lord has gained so much reassurance in the last few days that he might be content—if I may respectfully say so—for another 48 hours.
I yield to no one in the warmth of my good will towards the Common Market, but the Common Market is not Europe. Europe is something a great deal bigger than the Common Market, as was so wisely said in another place by Mr. Gordon Walker. I hope that there is no rule in this House which prevents us from congratulating another House on the return of one of its Members. I am sure all of us here rejoice at the thought that so admired a public figure as Mr. Gordon Walker is once more in full play. I have already insisted on the need for working in the closest harmony with our EFTA partners, and we must never lose sight of the aim of reunifying the whole of Europe, even if that seems a long way off at the moment. The E.E.C. countries have sometimes been criticised for being inward-looking, for being a divisive, rather than a unifying, force in Europe and the world. Certainly, I am not denying that there have sometimes been dangers of that kind, but at the moment one can point to strong and beneficent tendencies of a different sort. The West German note of March 25 this year is a striking example of one E.E.C. country's efforts in the search for a wider unity. There is a readiness there to make sacrifices for the sake of
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reunification, and there are a number of other constructive proposals. I think we can see in that Note, if we were not so sure of it before, that the concept of Western European Union, as interpreted by the Germans and other countries, is in no way incompatible with the concept of full European unity. The one leads naturally to the other.
Indeed, I would go a little further. Later I shall say just a few words, when I am finishing my speech, about the ideal of World Government and the necessity of working towards that through the United Nations at all times. Here, again, there is nothing incompatible between a European approach to a World Government, and a United Nations approach to a World Government. The great difficulty in the world to-day is to get any group of nations to agree to anything important for more than about five minutes at a time. That is the world problem in a nutshell. Whatever temporary difficulties the E.E.C. countries may be experiencing, we must recognise that the European Common Market has represented a large increase in the amount of agreement in the world, and if we can now expand that measure of agreement to our own presence and that of our other friends, we shall not be undermining the ultimate world aspiration; we shall be rendering it an indispensable service.
I do not wish to speak too long, so I must leave Vietnam to the noble Lord, Lord Walston, but I should just like to take this opportunity of expressing my appreciation of the way in which the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, spoke about the problems of our American friends, to whom we owe so much, in the world scene as a whole.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: £900 million.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: I was really moving on a higher plane of thought.
We shall all want to hear from the noble Viscount, Lord Head, about the Far East, and I will not seek to reply on that subject at any length now. I should just like to repudiate (I think that is the right word) any suggestion, in any paper, however reputable, that there is something going on between us and the Australians which can be called a dispute. There is no disagreement, I am assured, between Australia

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and Britain over the need to examine the possibility of alternative facilities in Australia in case the Malaysia-Singapore base becomes untenable. The examination is continuing at the present time in, I am informed, an amicable atmosphere. The Australian Government, and we ourselves, want Commonwealth forces to stay in Malaysia and Singapore as long as they are welcome there. May I add that the Australian Government are, I believe, very pleased at the results of our Defence Review as outlined in the Defence White Paper? So I hope that this word "dispute" will not be brought in to cast a shadow over discussions which are proceeding in a very friendly way. I do not think the noble Lord used the word "dispute", but the article to which he referred was headed with a rather glaring reference to an alleged dispute.
My Lords, I will try now to look at matters a little more widely without repeating too obviously what has been said in another place in the last 24 hours, and, as old hands at this particular task will discern, that is not the easiest of problems. When we stand back and take a broad view of British foreign policy we must surely distinguish between our longterm goals and our interim programme. I say that, but we realise that it is on the latter, on our interim programme, that we have to depend for many years for our self-preservation and for the maintenance of peace. I was reading again in the last few days that splendid History of British Foreign Policy by the noble Lord, Lord Strang, which I hope is compulsory reading, or very happy voluntary reading, for all Members of the House.
On page 343 the noble Lord reminds us:
"After the war it was clear to Mr. Bevin"—
whom he served so faithfully—
"that past policies would no longer serve. It was no good talking about naval predominance or the balance of power. Britain could not stand alone, and the Commonwealth could not be self-sufficient. The United Nations could not guarantee security at that stage"—
and, of course, that is still the position at the moment. In the words of Lord Strang, writing about that post-war period:
"Security must be sought by supplementing the United Nations, but in a manner in
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harmony with the United Nations principles, and"—
bearing all that in mind, under the leadership of Lord Attlee and Mr. Bevin, supported by a highly patriotic Opposi-tion—
"Great Britain departed from previous policies and took the decision to join a regional community, recognising the fact of beneficent American power".
All that is summarised in Lord Strang's book when describing the policies which inspired us just after the war and which have inspired us, with one or two aberrations, ever since. I do not intend to dwell on those.
But, with all its virtues, this policy has been, after all, a policy of the second best. It has been a palliative rather than a cure for the prime disease from which the world has been and still is suffering. I am referring to the threat of a catastrophic, annihilating war which has hung, and still hangs, over us all. If the threat seems slightly less urgent at the present time, we should not think only of ourselves but of our children —and there one cannot pretend that in the long run, with the growth of nuclear Powers, the danger is any less now than it was a few years ago. All of us on these Benches—and, I am sure, far outside them—are convinced there can be only one long-term remedy which can make peace secure, not only for this generation, which may struggle through somehow, but for generations to come. Certainly we on these Benches are convinced that the one aim which must override all others in the defence field is the establishment of an international police force in a disarmed world as the precursor to the final establishment of World Government. That is the longterm aim.
But, in the meanwhile, of course, we have to defend ourselves by ordinary military and diplomatic methods in conjunction with other peace-loving States. In the long view of history, our success or failure in these next few years, the years immediately ahead, must be judged by our progress, or the lack of it, towards the establishment of the United Nations, far more effectively than hitherto, as a peace-keeping system and one which mobilises much more effectively than hitherto the resources of the rich to help the poor. That is our aim, and it underlies, or should underlie,

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everything we seek to accomplish in the years we are passing through.
However, we are obliged to recognise that certain fundamental prerequisites for such far-reaching developments are in present circumstances beyond our grasp. We cannot just insist on the establishment of an effective international police force. We can take a lead, as we have been trying to do, but in the last resort we cannot control international affairs as we can temporarily control matters within this country. It is to this long-term work, and yet to turn to the more limited objectives which lie on the way to it, that we are directing our earnest efforts, in the hope that we shall be able eventually to strengthen the United Nations to the point where it can take over the defence of peace.
I will not dwell at any length on our achievements. I am not saying that it is a Party matter. We take special pride in what we have done, but we are not the first to embark on this course. I need only remind the House of the burden in men and funds which we in this country are willingly shouldering in a common effort to create a favourable atmosphere; of our contributions to the United Nations development programmes; of our standing offer of logistic support for military operations; and, not least, of the substantial additional voluntary contribution of ten million dollars we made towards the elimination of the Organisation's financial deficit. In addition, this Government is, I suppose, unique in having within its ranks two Ministers who are giving their undivided attention to the work of the Organisation in one case, and of disarmament in the other. I know Lord Caradon and Lord Chalfont, who have already achieved a high measure of world-wide fame for their services for peace, would wish to be present this afternoon except that they are engaged in urgent discussions elsewhere.
My Lords, before I close I should like to say a word on one very wide question linked with what I have just said but going a little outside it. This question contains a strong moral element—although, as always in politics, the moral and technical factors are inextricably intertwined. The question I have in mind is the whole issue of the nature and extent of the sacrifices which we are prepared
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to make as our contribution to world peace. This issue is being represented—confusingly, as I should think, though not with any deliberate intent to confuse; but certainly far too crudely—as the question of whether or not we ought to remain East of Suez. That practical question of whether we do or do not play a particular part East of Suez arises, but as I see it there is a wide principle at stake. A week or two ago there appeared a powerful article in the Observer by an author for whom I have as much respect as I have for anyone in public life, though I disagree strongly with that particular article. He is a member of my own Party, but I do not think that concerns us very much here, because leading men of other Parties have shown themselves equally critical of what is called the East of Suez role. But, at any rate, the author of this article argued passionately against what he called "the decision to stay East of Suez in the 'seventies".
LORD BOOTHBY: What is his name?
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: I will ask the noble Lord, who is a man of preternatural intelligence, to guess. But it is not a question of personalities: I am taking the theme. He wrote:
"The world has changed. Our old role as peacekeeper is no longer appropriate or within our power. In the 1970s we can and should lay down the white man's burden with a clear conscience having made during this century sacrifices for peace and sanity far beyond the call of duty."
That point of view, while held by a relatively small minority, perhaps, in both Houses of Parliament, is expressed by some of its exponents, with knowledge and vehemence and certainly with immense sincerity. It deserves an answer if only to clarify the fundamentals of the Government's policies. I am not at this moment concerned to argue for or against any particular defence commitment, whether East of Suez or anywhere else. We dealt with some of those particular problems in the last Defence debates and I have no doubt we shall return to them often again. In a particular case many points of defence policy may be involved, and of course the whole question of what we can or cannot afford to spend overseas is wrapped up with our economic success or lack of
it.
But there is one general aspect of this article and this thesis which I must resist

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as passionately as its authors propound it. I refer to the suggestion I have just quoted that,
"… having made during this century sacrifices for peace and sanity far beyond the call of duty",
we should now withdraw—and these last are my own words—to an easier way of life and then go on to recognise, as the author suggests, that our role as peace-keeper is no longer appropriate or within our power.
Let us see what element of truth is here contained among much which seems to me quite mistaken. It may well be that we can no longer aspire to the role of individual peace-keeper. I believe that our function in that direction in the past has been somewhat exaggerated. But let us agree that we ourselves cannot aspire to be an individual peace-keeper over wide areas of the world. This is, indeed, beyond the capacity of any single Power to-day. But surely our contribution to collective peace-keeping is more urgently required now than at any time during our history, and within our economic limits, which can never be ignored, this is a role which must be played where the need is greatest, whether East or North or South of Suez. This is what is meant by a world-wide policy—and it is a world-wide policy, on behalf of the Government, that I am defending this afternoon.
Speaking for myself—and this is a personal reflection—I would suggest that if we were considering our national interests in isolation, in so far as that is possible in the modem world, if we were actuated by purely selfish considerations, by rather Machiavellian considerations, it would be highly advantageous to pull in our horns and spend as litter as possible overseas on helping others militarily or economic ally. Certainly it would make a wonderful difference to our balance of payments when we reflect that there has been this colossal increase in our Government overseas expenditure in the last ten years. But if we did that we should be blatantly shirking our duty, to the world. Of course, in the first place (and we discussed this an, earlier debate) there are particular legal and moral commitments, promises we have entered into; but that-is far from all. I am patriotic and nationalistic enough to believe that whether or not the United Nations ulti-
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mately realises our hopes depends on our country more than any other country except the United States, and possibly in some respects, in view of our Commonwealth leadership, on us even more than on her. In physical terms, the United States, with a population four times ours, is quite indispensable to all these purposes. When we judge any particular programme of peace-keeping in this phase of history we must judge it not ultimately by whether it enhances British or American prestige, but by whether it keeps the peace for the moment and leads on to the day when the United Nations itself will be strong enough to bear the load.
After no little heart-searching, because the force of the other argument has appealed to me on more than one occasion in the past, I am utterly convinced that the present world-wide policy of the Government—supported, as I believe it to be, by leaders of the other Parties and by the nation as a whole—is not only a necessary element in peace-keeping today; I am sure that it is the only policy which will enable us to lead the world to a system of world government in law and to a system of human brotherhood in spirit. That is what we have always stood for in one way or another, in spite of many differences in my own Party, and that is what I believe the House as a whole will stand for increasingly as time goes on.

THE PENAL SYSTEM
4.15 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, with your Lordships' permission, I should like to repeat a Statement which has just been made by my right honourable friend the Prime Minister in another place. His words were:
"I have to inform the House that the Queen, on my recommendation, has approved the dissolution of the Royal Commission on the Penal System in England and Wales. In its place my right honourable friend the Home Secretary will a point a standing Advisory Council to make recommendations about such aspects of penal treatment as he may refer to it or as the Council itself, after consulting my right honourable, friend, feels it ought to consider.

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"The Royal Commission, whose terms of reference had been reported to the House on the 16th of April, 1964 (columns 601–5), was appointed in August, 1964 with sixteen members under the Chairmanship of Lord Amory.
"While no fundamental differences within the Commission on philosophy and principles have manifested themselves, six of the members have felt increasingly that the time is not opportune for a single review of the penal system, leading to a comprehensive report, which could set the direction for a generation. They are in favour of early experimental changes in the system, but they believe that such changes, combined with the relative lack of conclusive research results, will make it difficult in the near future to offer recommendations designed to last for a lengthy period. These members recently tendered their resignations; and two others felt that, in these circumstances, the Royal Commission could not usefully continue, and they also tendered their resignations.
"The remaining eight members, including the Chairman, took the view that the task of carrying through a fundamental and searching re-appraisal of the purposes of a modern penal system and the methods by which those purposes should be translated into practice, was entirely feasible for this Royal Commission. This being their view, they would have preferred to have completed the Commission's task, and, following the resignations, would have wished appropriate new appointments to be made to augment the remaining membership.
"It appeared to the Government that the better course would be to dissolve the Commission and appoint a new standing body. The evidence obtained by the Commission will be published and made available to the new Council; and it will be kept informed of the results of research in the fields of criminology and penology, in the planning of which my right honourable friend the Home, secretary now has the assistance of a strong Research Council.
"The new Advisory Council, unlike the Royal Commission, will be able to report from time to time on those
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aspects of the treatment of offenders on which advice is urgently required; and it can itself take up matters which, after consulting my right honourable friend, it considers to be important.
"While the Chairman and some of the members consider that a fundamental re-appraisal by the Royal Commission should first have been completed, the Royal Commission as a whole are in agreement that the permanent machinery of Government should now be strengthened by the establishment of a body exercising a continuous review of developments in the penal field.
"A further announcement giving the membership and terms of reference of the new body will be made as soon as possible."
That, my Lords, is the conclusion of the Statement made by my right honourable friend the Prime Minister.
4.19 p.m.
LORD DERWENT: My Lords, I am sure that the whole House is grateful to the noble and learned Lord who sits on the Woolsack for repeating the Prime Minister's Statement. Speaking for my-self—and the noble and learned Lord will appreciate that I have not yet had time to consult some of my colleagues, in both Houses, who are very interested in this matter—I have the feeling that this is probably the right decision. I think it is the right decision, certainly from my point of view, who may have to criticise certain home affairs matters which the Government carry out, because there are among certain members of the Party opposite some ideas as regards penal reform to which I do not think I can agree.
As I see it, the effect of having this Advisory Council will be that if these ideas, which I personally do not much like, are put into force and are found not to work, the Home Secretary of the day will have comparatively instant advice as to why the Advisory Council think they are not working. And as some of these are very new-ideas, which I know are held by noble Lords opposite, I do not think that the Royal Commission could really act in reasonable time on new experiments. For that reason I think that this Advisory Council is probably a good idea.
There are two matters that I would put to the noble and learned Lord. On

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first listening to this Statement, one imagines that the Advisory Council will have a good deal of independence, but twice there occurs the phrase (referring more or less to its independence on matters it can bring forward itself), "after consulting with my right honourable friend". I would ask the noble and learned Lord if he can say at this stage whether in fact the leading strings will not be too tight. The other matter about which I should like to ask is this. This, of course, is to be—at least, I take it to be such—an Advisory Council to the Home Secretary. Is it envisaged that the Advisory Council will publish reports which will be available to the general public? I think that if that could be arranged it would be of enormous benefit in the whole question of penal reform, because everyone would then understand what people are trying to do.
LORD REA: My Lords, before the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor replies, may I also thank him for repeating the Statement from the other House. Although we have had very little time to consider this matter, it must strike most of us as in some ways a confession of failure. The Royal Commission was a very important Commission, of very eminent people, and it is sad that for some reason they have not been able to come to a constructive solution on the things before them. Nevertheless, it is, as I say, too early to judge this, and we put our trust in what has been advised. I would endorse the hope expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Derwent, that, in default of a decision having been made for all time by the Royal Commission, this Advisory Council will be reporting publicly and frequently.
LORD BOOTHBY: My Lords, before the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor replies, I should like to put just one question. Will the advice of this Advisory Council be available to the Secretary of State for Scotland, as well as to the Secretary of State for the Home Department?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, in answer to the first question raised both by the noble Lord, Lord Derwent, and by the noble Lord, Lord Rea, I have no reason at all to think that the leading strings will be too tight. The
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second question, as to whether the Advisory Committee's reports will be published, I am afraid I cannot answer without notice. It was, I think, the practice with the old Advisory Committee on the Treatment of Offenders, that their reports were published, but we shall be discussing these questions to-morrow, and perhaps the noble Lord would be good enough to repeat the question then, and I shall be happy to answer it to-morrow. With regard to Scotland, while I have no precise information, I cannot think that any information which my right honourable friend the Home Secretary has and which might be useful to my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Scotland would be withheld from him.

RHODESIA
4.25 p.m.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, with your Lordships' permission, I should like to make a Statement on Rhodesia which has just been made by my right honourable friend the Prime Minister in another place. I am following the words of the Prime Minister:
"As the Government have repeatedly made clear over the past five months, anyone in Rhodesia is free to approach the Governor or the British representatives in Salisbury with proposals as to the basis on which a solution of the problem can be reached. As the result of a recent report from the Governor, informal talks between officials have been arranged to examine whether such a basis exists.
"Sir, the House will wish to know the sequence of events. I received a report from the Governor last week, at a time when, as it happened, my Private Secretary, Mr. Oliver Wright, had just left by air for Pretoria to assist Her Majesty's Ambassador in his talks with the South African Government. He was instructed to leave the aircraft at Salisbury for discussions with the Governor before going on to Pretoria.
"As a result of his report to me on his talks with the Governor, he was instructed to return to Salisbury on Friday last, April 22. The Governor then arranged a meeting between Mr. Wright, Mr. Hennings,

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Her Majesty's Government's representative in Salisbury, and Mr. Smith.
"A further talk has been held leading to agreed arrangements for the informal talks which will now proceed. They are informal, directed to see whether a basis for negotiation genuinely exists; and they are without commitment on either side. In view of the importance of these talks the House will not expect me to say anything more which could in any way make them more difficult. The House will understand why, in view of the highly delicate situation, I could not say anything in last Thursday's debate."
The Prime Minister then goes on to refer to a debate taking place in another place.
"With regard to the debate due to take place this afternoon at the suggestion of the Opposition, honourable and right honourable Members, naturally, will say exactly what they wish to say on the Rhodesian question past, present and future. However, I have in the circumstances asked my Front Bench colleagues to keep their own remarks to the absolute minimum necessary to reply to points raised and to avoid anything which might prejudice the prospects of a settlement acceptable to this House."
My Lords, that concludes the Statement of the Prime Minister.
LORD CARRINGTON: My Lords, nobody in the House would, of course, wish to say anything which would make the Government's task any more difficult in the negotiations that lie ahead, least of all noble Lords who sit on these Benches, since we have been pressing for some little time for something of the sort which has been announced this afternoon. I think everybody in the House will greatly welcome the announcement that exploratory talks will take place. May I ask the Leader of the House—though I do not press this, and if he does not wish to answer the question I have no wish to embarrass him—whether he can tell me who is to be in charge of the talks? Is it Mr. Oliver Wright? And if the exploratory talks prove successful, are the talks which then follow to be conducted on the same basis and in Salisbury?
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, I appreciate the whole attitude of the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, which of course is what I entirely expected of him. I am afraid I cannot say more than I have said on the topics which he has just raised.
LORD REA: My Lords, may I say from these Benches that we propose to take the advice offered by the Prime Minister, at least for a short time, and not open our mouths.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I wish only to welcome the Statement which has been made and which is what many of us have been hoping for for a long time. I fully recognise that these talks are informal and without commitment. We can only hope that they will lead to fruitful results.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, I am very much obliged to the noble Marquess also.

ADDRESS IN REPLY TO HER MAJESTY'S MOST GRACIOUS SPEECH
4.29 p.m.
Debate resumed.
VISCOUNT HEAD: My Lords, I must at the outset thank the noble Earl, the Leader of the House, for his welcoming remarks. I can assure him that when a few days ago I was introduced to your Lordships' House I was very conscious of the fact that I was nearly six years late, and, as he said, that was due to no discourtesy but to the fact that for almost all of that time I was abroad. That is why I stand before your Lordships to-day as a somewhat elderly "maiden" giving a somewhat overdue delivery, and I hope that your Lordships will afford to me the consideration usually afforded to people in that condition.
The subject to which I should like to direct my remarks is that of South-East Asia, and I am well aware it is one which is controversial, volatile and complex. I would say at the start, in view of my recent Government service, that these remarks constitute my own views and not Governmental views. At the same time, I would add that, of course, they are not necessarily in direct conflict with or against the Government's views. After

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which rather ambivalent disclaimer, your Lordships may think that I have picked up a trick or two from the Foreign Service with which I had the honour of serving during the last six years. But it would be quite wrong, if it were thought that I spoke with any Governmental authority whatever.
I do not wish to direct my remarks so much to the present situation as to something which I believe to be of immense importance in South-East Asia—namely, some definition of what our aim is, of what we are trying to achieve in South-East Asia and what our long-term policy should be to bring about that aim. When I say "we", I refer to the United States, Britain, Australia and New Zealand, because in my opinion there is no such thing as a purely independent British policy. And when I mention these four countries, I hope that before long Japan, too, will share in some of these responsibilities.
When I say that we should have a long-term policy, I think that it is very difficult to go further than, say, the next decade. I think it is a fact that we are fairly vague about what our long-term policy is and what exactly we are doing and trying to do in South-East Asia. It may be said that in the middle of two wars in that area it is difficult to evolve a long-term policy, but I would reply that the British are by nature empirical and like pursuing ad hoc policies, and I believe that the United States do, too. The effects of wars, terrible though they are, are transitory compared to the effects of the decisions and policies pursued after them. My fear, frankly, is that in the Far East, without any coherent long-term policy agreed between the United States and ourselves, we shall be led to a series of empirical decisions, brought about by the political and military situation, which will end us up in a position far from that which we should have aimed at if we had to-day a coherent policy that we could follow. I fear that because I found that in America when I talked to some people I felt rather as though I were a man who had gone to Paris in 1917 to talk about the Versailles Treaty; and, as was the case with the Versailles Treaty, unless we are aware of what we are trying to do, we may get into serious trouble. Furthermore, I consider that a long-term policy of the
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kind which I believe we ought to have could do much to reassure the people of South-East Asia and also China; it would do much to disarm our critics at home and the critics of America in America; it would give us something to aim at and it might well ensure that through empirical decisions we do not get entangled in further difficulties in that area.
Your Lordships may well be saying: What should such a policy be? But before I suggest what it might be, I think it is necessary briefly to examine the problem which confronts us in South-East Asia and also touch on the attitude of the people who live there and the attitude of China. Although it may seem obvious, I would suggest that the present problem has been brought about by the coincidence of two sets of circumstances. The first is the end of colonialism in an area where practically every country was colonised; the second is the growing military and economic power of mainland Communist China. These two circumstances, coming together, have brought about a highly volatile and potentially dangerous situation.
There are those people who say, "Let the people of South-East Asia sort out their own affairs or stew in their own juice. We have given them independence. What more do they want?" We must realise that a great many of the difficulties of the people of South-East Asia are a direct consequence of colonialism. I do not want here to give judgment on colonialism, which did much good, but it has left consequences behind it. We deplore, for instance, the economic mess and bad Government in Indonesia, but when the Dutch ruled Indonesia they had no intention of departing. They made no preparations, they trained no bureaucracy, they had no administration of the locals and nobody had any practice in the art of government. The Dutch thought that they would be there for ever, and when they departed suddenly, through no fault of their own, Indonesia was left with nothing. Another example is the border of Borneo, which has given us trouble and will, I fear, give us more trouble. It is a purely arbitrary line, drawn without reference to ethnic or geographical considerations, between us and the Dutch for convenience of colonial administration in the island of Borneo.

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In Malaya, what is to-day the main trouble?—racial tension, strain and difficulties between the Malays and the Chinese. Why?—because of the massive immigration of Chinese, sponsored by the British, not unnaturally, with the growth of the tin and rubber industries. The departure of the colonial Powers recently has left in South-East Asia a vacuum of power which is dangerous, though it has been filled to some extent. Therefore, I would say that a part of the troubles of South-East Asia, so far as we are concerned, is unfinished business. I think that with our record in the past and our traditions, at the end of colonialism to fold our tents and depart and leave a mess to look after itself is not a very honourable rôle.
What do the people who live in South-East Asia think about the present situation? It is very misleading to talk about the man in the street in South-East Asia, because the vast majority of people want only peace, some reasonable standard of Governmental stability and the ability to cultivate their paddy and their fields. But there is a minority of thinking Asians, some of whom are highly intelligent—the more long-headed politicians, some journalists, intellectuals, university professors, doctors, lawyers, men of property and so forth. They are watching the present situation closely and keenly. If any noble Lords have the opinion that we should clear out, I can assure them that the very last thing which those whom I would term leaders of opinion and thought in South-East Asia want is that the United States and Britain should depart.
They are watching carefully, because they wish to know where the future is. They know on which side their bread is buttered, in so far as that in Asia it is a had thing to be on bad terms with the side who is obviously going to become the boss. If the West disappear, I suggest that there will be a dramatic change. They will not go Communist overnight, but, squatting on the fence, as they do, the Left leg will go down six inches, and insurance policies with Peking will be taken out all over Asia. That will brim about a dramatic chance. Almost all these people want the West to stay.
Their idea of their own best future is that some balance, some equilibrium, of military and other power between China
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and the West should be established, and that inside that balance, they can govern themselves, not as we want them to, not as China wants them to, but exactly as they themselves want. The establishment of such a balance is their best hope. That is what they hope for, and in my humble opinion that is what we should aim for. Nobody can think to-day that we can coerce an independent country to govern itself in the way we want it to by the long-term deployment of military force on its soil. I believe that that is a hopeless and doomed approach.
What do the people of China think? I hope that I am not being discourteous in any way to the Foreign Office, or to the noble Lord who represents it in your Lordships' House, if I say that we know remarkably little about what China thinks; and, unfortunately, I am afraid that China knows remarkably little of what we think. The more we get to know China, the more China gets to know us; the more people go to China and the more Chinese come here, the better for all of us—because any policy should gradually aim towards a situation in which we can live in the world with China without wars or rows. The sooner China can cone to the United Nations, and the United States can find a way of recognising China the better. Only then, I feel, shall we be able to make a real start.
But that apart, China is very xenophobic and I think that she has some justification for being xenophobic. There are a great many arguments for the good that colonialism did, but it would need a first-rate apologist to make a case for the exploitation of China by the European Powers at the time of the concessions, when the Russians, Americans, British, Belgians and French gave them loans, "bagged" their railways and carried out some of the hottest transactions that have ever been practised in any so-called independent country in the world. I suggest that if similar treatment had been afforded to ourselves we should have said: "Watch out for those sharks." There is much uphill work to be done before, leaving out ideologies, we can overcome the feelings and fears on the part of China to the Powers which behaved in that way.
But what is the attitude of China? It seems to me (I think this has been

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said already by a noble Lord) that there are, broadly speaking, two schools of thought. There are those who say that China has enormous problems on her hands and great difficulties. She has the whole of this vast agricultural problem, and she is attempting to industrialise herself. The Chinese are a patient people. China will concentrate on her own affairs, and provided that the situation is reasonably stable she will let things gradually develop; and at the moment she feels that they are, on the whole, developing satisfactorily. Therefore she will not adopt an aggressive attitude and will not risk war. There are others who say that China views South-East Asia as part of her legitimate sphere of influence and wishes to dominate it; that she will not stop even at conventional war if necessary, and that China must be regarded as a really tough, aggressive nation. I would say, in parenthesis, to those who are of this latter opinion that, purely from the point of view of her own self-interest, China is now in a state of incubation, in that she wants to have an atomic capability. This project will for some years be vulnerable to attack by conventional high explosive from the air, and that seems to me, to put it at the lowest, to be a good reason for China's avoiding, out of self-interest, a conventional war in the next few years. However, I leave it at that.
There are two possible attitudes to take about China and although one must take precautions and be prepared for the worst, I suggest to your Lordships, and particularly to the United States, that the best policy to assume in your attitude and dealings with China is the most hopeful one that she will not be aggressive. But if you treat her and expect her to behave like a ravening beast, surely your chances of attaining the long-term object of living with China must be greatly reduced. The situation in Vietnam will not go on for ever. The trees do not grow up to the sky. I was Secretary of State for War when the Mau Mau troubles, and the troubles in Malaya and Cyprus, were going on, and there were periods when people said, "This will go on for ever; it will never stop. Something must be done". But these things do stop. I believe that confrontation will stop; and I hope that it will stop fairly soon.
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When it stops what do we do? What is our aim? Again, there are various schools of thought about this, but so far as I know there are no agreed ones. As the noble Earl, the Leader of the House has said, there are those who say, "Get out and go. It is none of our business. Let the situation sort itself out." Some noble Lords have already produced strong arguments about this, but I would add this one. If we and the Americans went, there would be a general reorientation towards Peking. There would be a lack of desire right throughout South-East Asia to resist what I would call the impulses of power from Peking.
But another and, as I think, the most serious of all consequences of this would be the reaction in India and Russia, which I feel would be extremely frightening, in the sense that you would create great tension. And I should not be surprised if, a few years after we and the United States had left South-East Asia we were not deploying in India just as large forces as we should have deployed to create a balance in South-East Asia, but a long way further back. I believe that it would be a disastrous course, and I therefore reject it.
There is another school of thought—and there are many in Australia and in America, and some here, who think this way. They say: "We must contain China. We must have strategic forces deployed strategically in the area. We must stay in Singapore, whether we are wanted or not. We must protect the Straits of Malacca and it is rubbish to talk about going. These people cannot kick us out and we will and must stay." There are people in the Pentagon who say, "We have now nearly constructed the biggest base in Asia at Cam Ran Bay which has grown up like a vast mushroom. To go is strategic nonsense. Why should we go? These people cannot kick us out."
That is what I would call the tough, "dig-in" policy. I do not think that at a time twenty years since the last war it makes sense to say that, willy-nilly, you are going by force to remain on the soil of an independent Asian country that does not want you. I think that such a policy would end in tears. Furthermore, the longer you stay when you are not welcome, the greater the prospect of

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getting involved in local revolutions and so on, and of finding yourselves being called on, possibly by an existing but rather out-of-date and autocratic régime, to put down a rather more liberal progressive régime; and once again you find yourselves killing one lot of Asians on behalf of another lot of Asians. This is about as undesirable a position to be in as one could conceive. Therefore I do not really see any future in the tough, "dig-in" policy.
By now, my Lords, I dare say you are saying: "What does the fellow want? He first of all says that we must not go, and then he says that we cannot stay". Well, my Lords, I do say that as long as we are wanted, and wanted in the right way, we should stay. But it is quite easy to think of circumstances arising, and sooner than we anticipate, in which we should not be wanted. What are we going to do in anticipation of that situation? As I said before, the people of South-East Asia want to exist between a balance of power, and I believe that a credible deployment of military power which would reassure those who wish to remain genuinely independent and unaligned in South-East Asia could be created without any troops on Asian soil except one.
I believe that if there were a deployment of power based on Okinawa, North or Western Australia and Diego Garcia, such a force would act as a credible military reassurance to the people of South-East Asia, in that Western power was there and fully balanced mainland China. With the sea-keeping qualities of modern Fleets, the Seventh Fleet (perhaps I should not say how long it can stay at sea) can stay at sea for a very long time. With the range and lift of modern aircraft, and with the mobility of soldiers, I believe that we could create a credible deterrent, with the United States in Okinawa, with Australia, us and New Zealand in an Australian base, and with us and perhaps some Americans in Diego Garcia. One cannot foretell when one might have to go there. But it takes time to prepare these things.
Suppose that the Joint Staffs of the countries concerned—Australia, New Zealand, America, us, and, I should hope, Japan (though I am afraid that this is some way off)—examined that and said, "So far as we are concerned, we
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think this is a credible, practicable project which would work, and which strategically makes sense and will be a convincing deterrent against overt aggression". And also suppose that the United States of America, ourselves, Australia and New Zealand met at top level and said, "We agree. This, if we are not wanted, if we are asked to go, is our long-term policy, to deploy this credible deterrent off Asian soil". I suggest to your Lordships that if that were done it would have a very good effect, and the sooner it is said, the better —for these reasons.
First, the Chinese would be genuinely relieved that it was not the intention, in the long term, to retain powerful bases on their doorstep. Secondly, the people of South-East Asia would say, "The West are not going to get fed up, fold their tents and leave us in the lurch", and those who have stood against Communism would be much fortified. Thirdly, we should have an aim to go for, instead of a series of empirical decisions, for which there is always a fondness but in which there are great dangers. Also, having got a scheme of that kind, I believe that our own critics, and the critics in the United States, and the critics among the Communists and others of Western policy, would be greatly disarmed, because of an unequivocal statement that it is not our policy to remain in the long-term in South-East Asia when we are not wanted —and there are a great many people who suspect that we and the Americans are going to do exactly that.
To make such a declaration would also, I believe, improve the chances of getting a settlement, both in Indonesia and in Vietnam. And I cannot see any real reason why this cannot be done—except, of course, that we are apt to say, "Don't bother the Americans while Vietnam is on", and the Americans are apt to say, "Let us win the war and think afterwards". I maintain that that is a most dangerous policy. It may be that, before the war in Vietnam is over, something else will flare up. If we knew our aim, we should know what to do. If we are aimless and empirical, we may go and get dangerously involved again. Therefore I commend to your Lordships this suggestion that we should be quite clear where we are going in South-East Asia, and we should

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evolve a long-term policy. By doing so we might do a great deal to disarm the dangers of what is now an exceedingly unsettled and explosive part of the world.
4.53 p.m.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, it is a great privilege indeed for me to be able to congratulate the noble Viscount, Lord Head, on his first, very much delayed, speech in this House. He is by now an old Member, but we have not heard him here before, for reasons which I think we all understand. I understand that he has been cogitating over this speech for some six years, and it is indeed a welcome speech to-day. I admired greatly the breadth and understanding of what the noble Viscount said to us. It is something which we shall deliberate upon for some time to come, and everything he said was well worth saying.
The noble Viscount is so experienced and practised a speaker that it is almost impossible to congratulate him upon his speech, but I realise that every maiden speech in this House must be an ordeal to the person who makes it, even though the noble Viscount gave no sign of any ordeal in his speech. One would have thought he had been speaking in this House for years. Nevertheless, in spite of his guise I think it must have been an ordeal to him to address your Lordships for the first time; and he has certainly acquitted himself with the greatest possible credit. It is to me a special pleasure, because we were colleagues in another place, and I welcome every new face from the other place in this House. Indeed, it is becoming a very familiar place for me, because I am seeing so many old friends from another place, and I welcome an additional one. This is not the time to make any comments, other than laudatory, on the noble Viscount's speech, but we look forward to hearing him again, speaking from his vast experience; and then we may be able to say what we think. Frankly, I can find nothing wrong with what he said this afternoon.
In his opening remarks, the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, commented, quite rightly, on the fact that in the time we each thought it right to take up the attention of the House it was quite impossible to deal with more than a limited number of subjects. He selected
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a number, and by some coincidence the particular matters selected by him were exactly those that I had myself chosen to discuss. He spoke so reasonably on each of those that I do not find much to disagree with in what he said. Indeed, I wonder whether, having heard the speeches this afternoon, there is not the beginning of a bipartisan policy on foreign affairs. Certainly there ought to be, and from what we heard about Rhodesia this afternoon, and from the various speeches from different parts of the House, there can be no serious difference of opinion. Certainly I am not going to exacerbate one.
I wish to say a few words about the Common Market. I am glad to find that, generally speaking, the aims are now accepted. I think most people would wish to join the Common Market if it were possible, and the speeches of the Foreign Secretary yesterday and of my noble friend this afternoon will be most encouraging. However, there are one or two things which they were not able to make clear to us, and I think it is only right that we should say quite plainly where we have some doubts. Neither the Foreign Secretary nor my noble friend dealt with the particular difficulty which they themselves foresaw in earlier weeks, certainly during the Election and before, in connection with joining the Common Market. This was the question of a common foreign policy and the abandonment of sovereignty.
In speeches made from time to time by members of the Government it has been made clear that if we join the Common Market we must retain our sovereignty and also our independence in foreign policy. I am not arguing whether those matters are desirable or not. It may be most desirable that we should retain our independence in that way, but that is inconsistent with the Treaty of Rome, and it is inconsistent with joining the Common Market. If we really want to insist upon our independence and to repudiate supranationality, then it is hypocritical to pretend that we really want to join the Common Market. I should have been glad to hear from my noble friend, or from the Foreign Secretary yesterday, what were the true intentions of the Government in that respect. This is not a bargaining point; it is not a debating point at all; it is a fundamental question of

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principle. And while I quite realise that when you are about to enter into negotiations you do not disclose your full hand, there are certain principles upon which you have to make up your mind; and we, and those with whom we are to negotiate, are entitled to know what those principles are.
I hope that we shall not embark on negotiations unless we know that we shall be welcome; we cannot afford a second humiliation. As matters stand at present, it is still open to France, or any other member of the Common Market, to impose a veto on our entry. Therefore, I should welcome a cautious approach, feeling our way and making quite sure that, when we do make a formal application, it will be acceptable. But even before we make this application we must get the position clear as regards the Commonwealth and fellow members of the European Free Trade Association.
As regards the Commonwealth, we must make up our minds whether we want to sacrifice the Commonwealth for the sake of entry into the Common Market, or whether we are going to make every possible effort to maintain the Commonwealth and make it consistent with our membership of the European Economic Community. I do not think we are in a position to say to the members of the Community that they must take steps to accommodate the Commonwealth. I believe that is our own responsibility, and that before we actually make our application we must make our own arrangements with the Commonwealth and satisfy them that our entry into the Community will not be damaging to their interests. It is conceivable that we may have to make a choice between the retention of the idea of the Commonwealth and entry into the Common Market, and that would be a very difficult choice indeed. I feel that the existence of the British Commonwealth is of such great importance to the world that if I had to choose between retention of the Commonwealth and entry into the Common Market I should vote for the retention of the Commonwealth. But at least we must face up to the possibility that we may have to make such a choice. Best of all would be to make every possible attempt to reconcile the continuance of the Commonwealth with membership of the Community.
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The same applies, to a lesser extent, perhaps, to the European Free Trade Association, except, of course, that we are pledged to membership of EFTA. We joined them in times when we found it difficult to become members of the Community, and I think our good name is involved in playing the game with them and not letting them down by joining the Community without first making satisfactory arrangements with them. I believe that can be done, and I have no doubt that it can be reconciled.
There are other difficulties that I see in joining the Community. There is the question of agricultural policy. But I should say that these difficulties are of a minor character, and although certain problems might be created here in raising the cost of agricultural products there would, of course, be a saving, though not necessarily a corresponding saving, in the subsidies that we are at present handing out. This may well be the price that we shall have to pay for the much greater opportunities that the Community will offer to us in the way of increased trade and improvement in our competitiveness.
I want to say a word about NATO, which was one of the matters with which the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, dealt. I was for a time a member—I am not sure whether I still am—of the British Parliamentary delegation to NATO. I was a member for two periods, and I had the opportunity then of judging the value of NATO, and particularly the attitude of various of its members to it. I am bound to say, and to say quite frankly, that I was never happy about the attitude of the French. They were always courteous, but they made very little contribution to the deliberations. The noble Lord, Lord Crathorne, has just entered the Chamber. I was talking about NATO, and nobody knows more of the NATO Parliamentarians than does the noble Lord. I was always under the impression that the French were not particularly interested in the whole thing. They came and they were courteous, friendly and hospitable, but they showed no particular interest, and it certainly came as no surprise to me that they decided to take their forces out of NATO. I suppose the logic of it is that they really do not feel that NATO to-day is serving a useful purpose. I do not think that anything can be gained by

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further approaches to France on this matter, except to see that the arrangements are tidily ended, and without bitterness or recrimination.
A number of things flow from this. The first is that it gives us an opportunity of reviewing our attitude to NATO and what we are seeking from it. It has been pointed out that NATO was first created as a defensive force against Soviet aggression. I think it is to-day recognised that that idea no longer exists, or, at any rate, that the danger of Soviet military aggression is so slight that we need not take NATO as seriously as we did before. But there are other roles for NATO than merely military defence, and I should like us seriously to initiate, if necessary, consideration of what the new rôle of NATO should be. I think it is still possible that the Soviet Union may wish to permeate countries, to instil in them the doctrines of Communism, and, by providing assistance, military, financial and technical, and in other ways, to create an influence over them; and we must combat that. But that is a very different rôle for NATO than the one which has existed up to now. I am not prepared to say at this stage what would be the result of such further consideration; but that we ought to give serious consideration to it I have no doubt.
There is another matter which perhaps it might be indelicate to talk about at this moment, but I am going to do so because I understand that discussions are taking place behind the scenes—I refer to the new headquarters of NATO. At present they are in Paris. They are housed not in the kind of building that I should have chosen if I had a voice in the matter. The building is inconvenient, out of the way and not really satisfactory. But I think it is fairly obvious that it would be quite unsuitable for the headquarters of NATO to continue in France after the French have left it, and new headquarters will have to be sought. I think that there is a strong case for these headquarters to be in London, and I should greatly welcome that.
As against any other large city, London seems a most appropriate place for the headquarters of NATO. We have a great deal to offer in the way of the important facilities that will be required, and I hope that the Government will stake out a strong claim,
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if it does become necessary to move the headquarters, for those headquarters to be in London. Perhaps I might even put forward a suggestion as to where they should be. I will not mention a particular site, but there are quite a number in the Royal Borough of Kensington which I think would be admirable. I will not go beyond that, but I hope that, if it becomes necessary to move, we shall find ourselves moving to London, and in a more convenient location than the existing NATO building is in relation to Paris.
Finally, I want to say just one word about Vietnam. The Government promised in the gracious Speech that they will persevere in efforts to secure peace in Vietnam and to promote the stability of South-East Asia. I fully concede that the Foreign Secretary has done everything possible to initiate discussions between the United States and the Vietnam nations concerned in the war which is taking place. I believe that recently, but perhaps not earlier, they have made no pre-conditions as to whom they are going to talk to. What can we do? Certainly, it is desirable—I think it is vital—to end this war. I would regard the war in Vietnam as probably the least popular of any war that we have ever been interested in or concerned with. It is even becoming increasingly unpopular in the United States itself, as we can see from the various movements that are taking place there. Your Lordships may have seen on television the discussion at the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States, when not one member spoke in favour of the continuance of the war. The United States is getting more and more involved. I think that to-day there are some quarter of a million men involved in the war there, and the number is growing; and the amount of money spent is vast.
I think that, to some extent, our influence has been greatly weakened by the fact that it is believed by those whom the Foreign Secretary has approached that we are partners in this war. It is true that we are not actually participating, but Australia is, to a limited extent, and so is Canada. We are certainly supporting it, and it is felt that we are partisans in making an approach for negotiations. I do not know how we can disengage ourselves from this position. But if one is coming forward as one who is seeking

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peace, one's hand is not much strengthened by being recognised as almost a party to the dispute that is going on. If, somehow, we could become less favourable to the war that is taking place, and take a more objective view, I think our views would be much more heard and listened to, with the possibility of negotiations taking place.
I do not want to say more than this at this stage, because, with the noble Viscount, Lord Head, I believe that this will not go on indefinitely—nothing ever does. Somehow, the common sense of the world—of the United States, of the Chinese and of others—will find a solution. Our objective should be to find the solution as quickly as possible. I want once more to repeat that I feel happy about the tone of the debate here on foreign affairs. It appears that the opinions expressed on different sides are not seriously apart, and that we are gradually moving towards a bipartisan policy or—should I say?—a tripartisan policy. If we can achieve that, I think it will be of benefit not only to this country but to the people of the world as a whole, and it will certainly add to the influence which we can exercise in various parts of the world.
5.18 p.m.
VISCOUNT HALL: My Lords, after listening to the standard set by the most recent maiden speech, I rise for the first time in your Lordships' House with some considerable call on my reserves of courage, and am now passing through the ordeal phase mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Silkin. However, I appear here with a sense of humility, too, in introducing this voice of mine in the place of another not only overwhelmingly more deserving of being heard in this House but also many leagues more able in making a worthwhile contribution to your deliberations. I therefore lean heavily on your Lordships' courtesy in absolving me from attaining, in this first speech, the high standard set for me by my father, or indeed the splendid example set to-day by the noble Viscount, Lord Head. I find myself in a practical difficulty, too, in that from past maiden speeches, except the one to which I listened recently, I presume that custom behoves me to observe the best traditions of your Lordships' House. Furthermore, I have in my short apprentice
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ship here already come to understand that your Lordships, in general, subscribe to the view that words should be for the transmission of thought. These criteria, by custom, leave me with little indeed to say of a pertinent and detailed nature; hut, at the risk of encroaching upon your Lordships' patience, I should like briefly to expound some views of mine gleaned from a passing experience of some years in foreign fields and, latterly, from the stance of a senior staff member of an inter-governmental financial organisation primarily concerned with investment policies in whole ranges of industries in just over a hundred countries in the Western World, some of which I believe will be in your minds throughout this debate.
Wherever and in whatever context we range throughout the foreign field, logic and reason will inevitably bring us face to face with the two fundamentals of modern national survival—the drain upon our resources, on the one hand, which invariably means money in terms of spending whether in defence manpower programming abroad, or official or governmental activity abroad, or either short or long term programmes of private endeavour. Clearly, whatever is decided to be done abroad by Britain will have to be interpreted by us here as the degree of eventual draw-down upon the Exchequer and is, at first sight, I venture to suggest, often seen to be only distantly related to the second unequivalocal fundamental, which is this country's balance of payments.
Although some years ago "balance of payments" was a term only in the usage of financial and economic experts, today it seems to be a term used very often, frequently and popularly, so that all of us have become aware of it, some of us rather painfully. So perhaps your Lordships will forgive me for emphasising that the balance of payments or the degree of profit margin of this country is built upon the activities of residents of this country, and, what is even more important, by residents of all nationalities living and working in this country, even if the enterprises for which they work are owned by foreigners—that is, provided that those enterprises or those foreign nationals are subject to the control and the direction of our Government. It may be an oversimplification to define the draw-down on our resources, no matter how distant that

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draw-down may seem to be, as money spending, and our present-day productive effort as money-spinning; but it will serve to define the gap with which I am concerned, and with which all our foreign friends within or outside this country are equally as concerned if they are in economic relation with us.
The gracious Speech drew attention to the very great effect that the quality of true foresight in foreign affairs plays in the narrowing of this gap both by control of the drain on resources, on the one hand, and by its great leverage potential for contributing handsomely to the balance-of-payments position, on the other hand, and especially the latter by means of our goodwill positioning abroad. True foresight recognises as basic that the widely variable degree of goodwill we possess from place to place abroad is stimulated by anything from whimsy, at one end of the spectrum of international reaction, to acceptance of hard fact at the other end, but hard fact often coloured locally by either oblique interpretation or expression more related to parochial inducement and ambition—or may I say perhaps a convenient bending of the truth? Furthermore, benders of the truth have more reason to proclaim loudly and long their theses and themes to those about them than those who stick rigidly to fact, and wherever they may be, in local capitals, in inter-governmental assembly, or in private discussion; but it is much more difficult to do so in the face of an authenticated fact in black and white.
My first plea, therefore, is for a much more rapid, more pertinent, and more decisively regular distribution of hard and pointed fact from a Government source, authenticated by the Government and despatched to whatever part of the world that fact is related, even to whatever inter-governmental agency that factual action or decision may be relevant. Briefly, I urge a rapid crescendo in our public-relations programme in the foreign field in our money relationships all over the world, including gold, our development aid programmes, our contributions to inter-governmental and group government proposals, by cash, credits, or by the wisdom of our technical engineers, and the stand which this country has taken, and will increasingly take, in the furtherance of practical British achievement abroad. My experiences, few as
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they are, persuade me to feel quite convinced that a practical furtherance of the distribution of authentic fact into foreign capitals—among the lay people of foreign capitals, as well as the specialists—will greatly contribute to our international liquidity and the beneficial effect of that liquidity upon Britain's trading.
Since 1950 the value of world trade has just about tripled, and since 1959 it has increased by something over 40 per cent. It has been almost wholly dependent, in terms of international liquidity, upon sterling and U.S. dollars, if international liquidity can be defined as the term given to the world's supply of reserves of gold, or of currencies which are freely usable internationally. While it is my belief that this form of liquidity is adequate, and although I understand that inquiries are still being pursued on whether that is in fact so, in this context we have heard in the gracious Speech that efforts are to be made on negotiated terms to conjoin Britain with a wider community. That is a situation which cannot be other than welcomed wholeheartedly, but which will also call for very close practical and continuing advanced study of European liquidity in relation to sterling, and the placing as a business entity of its liquidity in relation to that of the surrounding world; probably in relation to U.S. dollars.
Consequently, my second and final plea in this instance is for caution in any negotiation for conjoining until this is done, and until it is established unequivocally that there is a welcome for us; that a place exists for us on a base of participation, which cannot be equally fulfilled by any other member; and that the long-term outlook holds specific and bold promise for us in this country first, and later for our traditional trading friends. I thank your Lordships for your courtesy in listening to me.
5.33 p.m.
THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE FOR THE ROYAL AIR FORCE (LORD SHACKLETON): My Lords, there has been such a degree of interest, and, indeed, agreement in this debate, that my own intervention will be of a fairly short nature, aided, I may add, by the fact that I have severe toothache. I would first of all, on your Lordships' behalf,

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wish to congratulate my noble friend Lord Hall. His father was a much loved figure in this House, and a man, as we know, of the very greatest distinction. I sympathise very much with the noble Viscount finding himself in the position in which he does, but I can assure him that from now on his anxieties can be at rest. He chose to discuss a rather difficult and interesting aspect, which bears directly on foreign affairs, and which we would do well not to forget.
There has been no detailed discussion —partly because on other occasions we have been debating economic questions —on the economic aspects of foreign policy. I found myself in agreement with much of what the noble Viscount said. First of all, there was the great importance of getting across to the world, through the various media at our disposal, the facts of our policies and of our achievements. It may well be that we ought to be doing more but here, of course, we are, as always, limited by available funds. However, there are many in the Government who are deeply interested in this aspect of the matter, and certainly the noble Viscount's plea will be noted.
When the noble Viscount came to the question of international liquidity, I was sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, was not here with his loud "Hear, hear" to support his remarks. But, of course, in the context of the Common Market, the future position of sterling, and the solution of this chronic problem of imbalance of payment as it affects this country, will be one of the most important subjects. These are aspects on which co-operation with Europe and other countries is so necessary. I will not attempt to go further into this, because there are those who would say that it would be too damaging to sterling. But it is my view, if I may speak personally on this particular point—and I have always hoped for this—that any advance into a wider community would relieve sterling and, therefore, this country, of the tremendous burdens which we carry and the penalties which we pay as a result. Therefore, I think that the noble Viscount can be gratified by the importance of the subject which he raised.
I had intended to speak to your Lordships mainly about certain aspects of
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foreign policy seen, as it were, "through defence eyes". But, of course, it is worth remembering that we had a debate last March, only a month ago, before the General Election—it seems about two years ago—on the subject of Defence. We then had that notable speech from the noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Montgomery of Alamein, which was so helpful—at least to some of us—as well as being a very accurate and valuable speech in itself. I would start by making one point which I think we must always bear in mind, which is that our military forces exist in, and need to be adapted to the needs of, a very unstable world. All the speeches we have heard have emphasised that instability. This points to an even greater degree of flexibility, to a need for mobility and quick reaction in our military forces.
This afternoon I propose to deal primarily with the question of confrontation in the Far East and with NATO. By "NATO", I mean NATO in all its aspects, although I think my noble friend Lord Walston may be dealing also with some of the political questions of NATO—at least, I hope he will do so, and I hope equally, in case he does not, that he will forgive me for dealing with it a little myself. In the gracious Speech your Lordships will have heard that Her Majesty's Government
"will continue to give full support to the maintenance of the North Atlantic Treaty and its Organisation, which they regard as a necessary basis from which to promote greater stability in East-West relations".
I am sure that this commands the support of the great majority of the Members of your Lordships' House.
The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, in an interesting speech, also lent support to NATO, but I disagreed with him on one point in which he implied that it was just possible—and he may not have meant this that NATO need pay less attention to the military aspects of its role, and that the risks having diminished therefore we need to devote less effort to it. It is precisely because NATO has been so successful that the risk has been diminished, and our intention is to continue to support NATO. This is also the intention of others of our allies, as exemplified in the declaration by the Heads of the fourteen Governments on March 18. This reaffirmed that NATO and its Organisation were essential to the

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security of the countries concerned. It is worth noting that the declaration acknowledged the efficacy of the alliance as a deterrent, not only in purely military terms, but also as a practical symbol of the readiness and determination of member countries to consult and act together whenever possible.
There is no doubt in my mind and, I know, in the minds of a great many others, that NATO has worked; that it has been a success. Since 1949 the westward advance of Communism has been contained, despite the potential pressure that still exists, as exemplified by the Berlin crisis of a few years ago, and, indeed, by the recurrent troubles over access to Berlin. No one who has been to Berlin and seen the Wall—and, my Lords, I feel that every legislator ought to go to Berlin and see the Wall for himself—and has looked over the Wall, as I did recently on a very snowy afternoon, can he in any doubt about the existence and the reality of the pressure from the East. It is one of the most depressing and most shameful symbols of division that have ever been created.
My Lords, as I say, granted the success of NATO, there is no argument for bringing it to an end; and the Declaration of the Fourteen refers to the continuing need for an integrated and interdependent military organisation in peacetime. This has to be credible, and it means having credible land forces, air forces and, indeed, naval forces as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. I will not take up your Lordships' time by describing (because we have dealt with it at such length) the size and nature of the British contribution to NATO and its organisation. As noble Lords know, there has been an interesting development through the creation of a mobile force, the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force, to which this country contributes. The effectiveness of this Force is maintained by annual exercises, and its existence is designed to illustrate the ability and willingness of the Alliance collectively to respond quickly to a threat to any member.
Having said that, my Lords, I still agree that the military threat to Europe is a great deal less; and, of course, NATO is very much larger than the military force alone. Indeed, it is very much larger—and some people may think regrettably—than the teeth arms employed.
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We have a large complex of headquarters, covering Allied Land Forces Europe, SHAPE—one could go through the list almost interminably—and, of course, they contribute effectively to the success of NATO. But, my Lords, seeing NATO at work makes one think that there is scope for some measure of streamlining and some measure of reorganisation. I think it is likely that the entirely to be regretted occasion of the proposed French withdrawal from NATO will at least provide an occasion for some measure of streamlining and reorganisation.
The noble Lord, Lord Carrington, asked me to say something on the steps that the Government were taking towards meeting this situation. I am afraid there is not much I can say to-day, for the simple reason that the work is in fact going on—and I do assure the noble Lord that I am not evading this issue. A number of working groups have been set up to study the consequences of the French attitude and the reorganisation of the higher structure of NATO. This is clearly a matter of urgency, and will be dealt with both at official and at Ministerial level; and, as the noble Lord knows, in June there will be a Ministerial meeting at which the matter will be reviewed.
LORD CARRINGTON: My Lords, might I interrupt the noble Lord? I must apologise for only just having returned, but I wrote to the noble Lord and told him that I should be a little late. Are any of these discussions taking place with the French, or are they only by committees in NATO from which the French are debarred?
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, I would rather not be pressed further on this. There are discussions going on with the French, but I think it is worth noting that French officers and officials find themselves in an exceedingly difficult position at the moment. I think I would rather leave that. Let me say that we are, however, determined to carry these discussions through to a successful conclusion.
My Lords, of course, the basic difference between the French and the remainder of the Allies is that the French hold the view that the existence of the North Atlantic Alliance is itself a sufficient guarantee of protection; that the Allies will get together in due course;

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that our new attitude, which is induced by our experience in the last War, when we found the preparations at staff level inadequate, is in fact based on an old concept—this is what they would argue —and that it is not necessary to have the degree of organisation that we consider essential. I am sure that all your Lordships will agree (as, indeed, do all the other NATO countries) that it is quite vital that one should have a proper NATO organisation.
My Lords, there are some very interesting by-products from the existence of the NATO organisation. Seeing NATO at work recently made me think that it is really rather a tragedy that sociologists have never taken a look at the NATO organisation. The capacity of officers and men of different nations to work together in the utmost harmony, and with a degree of what might be called almost international esprit, is one of the exciting sides of NATO. This was notable from the very early days, and the noble and gallant Field Marshal will remember the extent to which this spirit was engendered. It is still, I am glad to say, very strong in NATO; and, despite the difficulties that may exist organisationally and politically, I still believe there is a valuable social experiment going on in NATO to-day.
My Lords, before I leave the subject of NATO I should just mention one of the great issues that concern members of the Alliance—the question of controlling nuclear weapons. Last year the Council set up a Special Committee of Defence Ministers to study ways and means of improving consultation and extending Allied participation in nuclear planning. The United Kingdom is playing a big part in these deliberations, and to-morrow and on Friday my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Defence, together with the Defence Ministers of Germany, Italy and Turkey and the Secretary General of NATO, are meeting in London, under Mr. McNamara's chairmanship, to discuss some of the problems involved. This concern of the Alliance with the control of nuclear weapons is just another aspect of the continuing and vital interest of Her Majesty's Government in disarmament.
I think the most one can say with regard to NATO and the attitude of the
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French is that one hopes that this will be a passing phase. I think this is one of those cases where it is probably better that one does not indulge in recrimination, however deeply we may regret events. I am sure it is the view of everybody in this country, and of every Party, that the closest friendship and cooperation with the French people should be maintained, preferably in the North Atlantic Alliance but, if it is impossible to achieve it within that Alliance, in some other form of organisation, but ultimately coming together in a much wider measure of co-operation in Europe of a kind about which my noble friend Lord Longford and others have spoken.
Now, my Lords, I should like to turn, very briefly, to the Far East, and to do this against the background of the very remarkable speech of the noble Viscount, Lord Head. I remember that Lord Head was one of the nine Ministers of Defence of the previous Government. Regrettably, his tenure of office was one of the shortest of them all, because I can assure him that he was highly regarded by the Opposition. But, of course, the loss to this country in the field of defence led to a gain in other fields; and his work, both in Nigeria and in Singapore, has been of the greatest value. Not the least of the value of this has been the distillation of knowledge and experience which came out of his speech to-day. He provided a most interesting and valuable analysis. So much of what he said was, I think, agreed with by practically everybody in this House.
I will not attempt to deal with all the points made by the noble Viscount, beyond pointing to one difficulty. What he said in relation to the policy we should follow in the Far East, and in other areas of the world, is very much in line with the policy of Her Majesty's Government: the policy that we do not stay in a country unless we are wanted. But, of course, there is room for argument as to whether one is wanted or not; and this difficulty still remains. It is certainly true that, if we are wanted in Singapore, we shall remain in Singapore. I myself hope for a continuation of the excellent and friendly relations which have been so much a part of the British position in the Far East. This is one area of the world where least of all has there been any desire on any

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large scale on the part of the local inhabitants for the British to depart. It is clear that our presence there is still desired.
I was asked, I think by the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, about the talks with Lee Kuan Yew. I would say that we welcomed the opportunity to exchange views when he was here. The talks, needless to say, were of a confidential character; but it is certainly true that there is the closest accord in our thinking—the thinking of my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Defence, and that of Lee Kuan Yew—as to the problems which have to be faced in the area; and there is a great measure of mutual understanding about the factors which are likely to influence the future of our base at Singapore. The immediate problem, of course, is still whether Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore can live together in harmony. Here again I do not dissent from anything that the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, said. It is now eighteen months since he spoke as a member of the Government; and I remember that we used to tease the Opposition that they found it difficult to adapt themselves to their position in Opposition. But the noble Lord's speech to-day was, I thought, a most admirable statement of the position and very much represents the views of the Government.
My Lords, I have really nothing more to say on the prospects of peace with Indonesia. I thought that the noble Lord summed up the situation exactly. It is more hopeful. It is too early to anticipate that confrontation will come to an end: obviously, the situation is more fluid—but at the most terrible price for Indonesia. Although we may be gratified at the change in the policy that may result, the penalty paid in the number of Indonesian lives that have been lost is a very high one. We must all hope that we shall see an end of confrontation, and that we shall return to the friendlier relations that existed in the past.
Here again, the analysis of the noble Viscount, Lord Head, in relation to the history of colonial rule in that part of the world was very skilled indeed. I will not add to what he said, except to suggest that we must always bear this history in mind when dealing with coun-
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tries like China. One remembers the "Opium wars" and other less attractive aspects of British colonial policy. I do not know whether to call it British colonial policy; but it was certainly British policy and British action. Some of the feelings that may exist to-day are rather more explicable if we bear that in mind.
The organisation of military operations in that area in the future is something to which the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, also referred. Discussions have been held with the Australian Government, conducted both in Canberra by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Defence earlier this year and, more recently, in London with the Australian Minister for External Affairs. These have led to agreement to examine the practical possibilities of stationing troops in Australia. I must say that this examination is without final commitment on either side, and final commitment cannot be entered into without final agreement as to the need. But we must wait until we see some of the major political and military uncertainties in South-East Asia beginning to crystallise, as some of them, we hope, may.
I would reiterate what my noble friend Lord Longford said: that there is, in fact, no disagreement. There may conceivably have been on the part of the Australians a natural suspicion that our desire to get out of Singapore was primarily actuated by the need to meet the £2,000 million target. I should like to emphasise that this is quite untrue. It was a realistic recognition of the case that the noble Viscount, Lord Head, gave us: that it might not be possible for us to remain in Singapore, and that it was therefore sensible to take the necessary precautions and to think about the consequences if that eventuality should come about.
I shall not detain your Lordships any further. I hope that I have answered the particular points about which the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, asked. I do not doubt that we shall have further opportunities—and, I think, fairly soon— to discuss some of these questions; but I must say that I was greatly encouraged by the degree of agreement between noble Lords in all parts of the House as to what the policy should be. Even the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, I found, was in not quite

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such an extreme position with regard to our East of Suez policy as I had thought.
LORD GLADWYN: My Lords, I was not conscious of having said anything contrary to what I have said before.
LORD SHACKLETON: I thought the noble Lord's speech suggested that even the Liberals have begun to approach the common ground which exists with regard to the East of Suez policy; and this was to be welcomed also. I was a little surprised by one remark made by the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn. I thought he called us the "self-appointed head of the Commonwealth"—I think he used some phrase like that. It seemed to me a rather odd phrase. We might, of course, be the hereditary head of the Commonwealth; but I really do not know what he meant by that phrase.
LORD GLADWYN: My Lords, what I meant, although perhaps I expressed myself badly, was that there was no longer any possibility of the Commonwealth being run from London as a great many people think it ought still to be.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, that is very different. That is rather a gloss on what he said. But I will not pursue this further, beyond saying that I am gratified that the views of the more moderate members of his Party have begun to influence him also in regard to this matter.
6.0 p.m.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, may I first express my admiration and sympathy with my noble friend Lord Shackle-ton who has delivered his speech under circumstances of some physical disability, and may I express the hope that the treatment he received will make him happier personally, though it could not make him happier in the efficiency with which he has stated his case. I wish especially to apologise to the Leader of the Opposition, to the spokesman for the Liberal Party and to the Leader of my own Party the noble Earl, Lord Longford, for the fact that I was absent when they spoke. It was due to physical circumstances which I have not yet been quite able to discipline.
I was present during the debate to listen to the quite remarkable speech of the noble Viscount, Lord Head. I sat in a humble position in another place when he
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was Minister for War and I then greatly admired the ability with which he spoke, though very often I differed from the conclusions which he reached. I have since debated with him at the Oxford Union, and I should like to say that I was deeply impressed by the contribution which he made to-day. With a great deal of what he said I find myself in agreement. Other matters which were raised by the noble Viscount were so fundamental and thought-provoking that I should like to give greater consideration to them before making a comment upon them. It would be an impertinence for me, a comparatively new Member of this House, to congratulate him upon his maiden speech, but if he is able to contribute to our debates the independent and stimulating view he expressed in that speech the whole House will welcome the fact that he is now to be present in our midst.
Perhaps I should say a word about my noble friend Lord Hall and his maiden speech. I acknowledge at once that I am not an expert on economics, and still less of an expert in the realms of finance, but I appreciate that what this country is able to establish in its economy and in its financial relations with other countries will be a determining factor in its foreign policy. I am quite sure that the whole House will welcome the contributions which the noble Viscount is able to make in this regard.
My Lords, I regret that I was not present during the earlier part of this debate. During the part to which I have listened I have been a little startled by one fact. It is the disregard paid to the most essential feature in all foreign relations to-day. That feature is that there is now in the world a development of scientific arms which could destroy all human life upon this planet. My noble friend Lord Shackleton made some reference to nuclear control, but I do not believe that any of us can begin to discuss foreign affairs without appreciating the fact that there are stocks of nuclear weapons both in Soviet Russia and in the United States of America which might destroy all human life on this planet. I appreciate the development, to which I shall be referring later, that there are now better relations between the United States of America and the Soviet Union, which makes the cold

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war of less importance, and therefore the danger of a world nuclear conflict perhaps less urgent. But I submit to your Lordships that when it is in fact a reality at this moment that there are stocks of nuclear weapons which could destroy human life all over the earth, we have to pay regard to that fact and we have to pay regard to the dangers.
Those dangers are, first, that there may be an escalation of present conflicts, illustrated by what is happening in Vietnam; the danger of accidental war which, despite all the scientific controls, may still run berserk; and, thirdly, the danger, of which we have become more recently aware, of internal accidents to the aeroplanes which carry these destructive weapons. Unless the Governments of the world will take control of this new scientific means of destruction of all human life, that danger to us all must remain.
My Lords, I wish to pay my sincere tribute to our present Minister for Disarmament. I do not think that any of us who have heard him speak publicly, or who have met him privately, can doubt that he has a real dedication to the task of seeking to end the extension of nuclear weapons in the world. Not only has he that dedication: he has a quite exceptional ability, and what I particularly welcome—because it is exceptional in the sphere of foreign affairs—is that he has the courage in these respects to be independent of pressures from the United States. He will be back in this House next week, when I shall be putting a Question to him on these matters, but I could not speak on foreign affairs to-day without paying my tribute to him. I think that the success of the courageous efforts which the Minister for Disarmament is making is dependent on three factors. It is dependent, first, upon an increasing accord between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Secondly, it is dependent on the policy of the Government of the Republic of France, which at the moment is unilaterally developing its nuclear arms. It is dependent, thirdly, upon the future of the policy of the peoples of the People's Republic of China, which also has established nuclear weapons and is proceeding over the years to the creation of a missile force.
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I want to look at these three factors in turn. First, in regard to the improved relations between the United States of America and the U.S.S.R., which all of us welcome, I would say that there is one factor which is seriously prejudicing them to-day—the war in Vietnam. I do not propose to discuss that this afternoon; I shall be opening a debate on Vietnam next Tuesday. But I met representatives of the Russian Foreign Office in Moscow last year, and I have no doubt at all that the war in Vietnam and the support the British Government has given to America in Vietnam is very seriously prejudicing, not merely the spirit of the accord between the U.S.A. and this country, but also the practical proposals towards disarmament and the control of nuclear weapons which are being considered at Geneva. Despite this, I think that there has been an extraordinary change in opinion in Soviet Russia on all matters relating to the cold war.
I was tremendously impressed by the annual May Day message which the Communist Party of Soviet Russia issued this year. Usually it placed China at the head of the nations to which it issued its greetings. This year it places France at the head, for reasons which I will describe later, Britain comes second, and the U.S.A. third. And there was this remarkable paragraph in the May Day message:
"May the co-operation between the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union widen in the interests of preventing a new world war and in the name of the preservation of peace."
Such a declaration would have been impossible even three years ago, and it indicates the new hope that some approximation of opinion between the Soviet Republic and the U.S.A. may lead to a decrease of the tension of the cold war, in spite of what is happening in Vietnam.
I turn to the second difficulty, which is that France is independently developing its own nuclear weapons. I find President de Gaulle of France not only one of the most fascinating of modern statesmen in the different aspects of his policies, but also a statesman who has this great contradiction: that apparently in home affairs he is authoritarian, dictatorial, limiting the expression of democracy, whilst in international affairs he is more "with" the dynamic tendencies of our time than any other Western statesman

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I know. One remembers how, even during the war, in his speech at Brazzaville he high-lighted the end of the French Empire in Africa and the coming of colonial freedoms. One remembers how, in the most extraordinary way, although he was brought to power by the O.A.S. in Algeria, he recognised the independence of the Algerian people. To-day he is standing for two tendencies in international affairs, which I have no doubt the future will endorse. The first is the view that, because of the decreased danger of war in Europe between the West and the Soviet Republic, co-operation between West and East in Europe is possible in a way that was never realisable before. This is one of the reasons why Soviet Russia has now placed France at the head of the nations in its May Day message.
Some agreement between East and West Europe is also a condition of the solution of German reunification. I do not pretend that that is near. A difficult road with many obstacles has still to be trodden. But I am glad to welcome the initiative which the German Social Democratic Party has taken in proposing that there should be joint gatherings between the Socialists of West Germany and the Communists of East Germany, on the condition that publicity shall be given to their respective views so that the peoples of both West and East Germany may begin to understand their opposing views, and perhaps, with understanding, come nearer to a solution.
General de Gaulle wisely takes the view—and I may remind my own Front Bench it was the view of Hugh Gaitskell and Aneurin Bevan—that the solution of the German problem is a neutralised and disengaged Germany; indeed, not only a Germany neutralised and disengaged but an area in central Europe which would be wide open. I would suggest to the members of our own Government, as they begin their new course with a majority behind them, that if we are to expect Germany to accept denuclearisation, this Government, as well as France, must give a precedent in ending dependence on nuclear arms.
I had not intended to make a reference to the European Community, but after what has been said in the House to-day. I think I must do so. I believe that
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realistically we must face the fact that, if we can bring together EFTA and the six nations of the Common Market, it would be a progressive step. But I should say that, in addition to the difficulties about our own agriculture, and particularly about the trade of New Zealand, which is so dependent on this country, there are three warnings which should be sounded in the probings which are taking place. The first is this: the bringing together of the European Governments of the West would not be ultimately beneficial to the peace of the world if it became an alliance of the West against the East, and, therefore, that in any movement towards a European Community of the West there must proceed the kind of proposals that I have already indicated for coming to some conciliation and peace.
Secondly, I would say that British entry into the European Community must not be at the expense of the developing territories of the earth—and I do not refer only to the Commonwealth countries, which have preferential Customs arrangements with Britain. One of the tragic facts of the last six years in all the developing countries has been that, with all the aid which has been given by Britain, by America and by the United Nations, the standard of life of the people has not risen. It has sometimes remained level, but it has not risen because the industrial nations of the world have taken their products at reduced prices, which has meant that the incomes of the peasant population has been falling. There is a great danger, which I beg our own Government to face, that in establishing a community of Western European Powers, thinking of their own development, they may become a stronger bastion of industrial nations which require foodstuffs and raw materials from the developing nations, and a greater power to keep their standards down rather than lift them up.
Thirdly, I want to say this. The Treaty of Rome spoke not only in terms of economic co-operation; it really established political union. I am one of those who want to see wider federations and wider federations will come in Europe. But I give this warning. It would be absolutely disastrous for this country, as indeed for other European countries, to

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move towards a political union which necessitated not only similar home policies, but similar foreign policies, until there is much more approximation in the ideologies of European Governments and peoples, and much more basis for a common social pattern. France, Western Germany, the social democratic countries of Scandinavia, Britain, with its mixed economy, which we hope will become more socialised—where is the political unity there? I would therefore say to the Government that, when they approach the problem of bringing EFTA into association with the six nations of the Common Market, they have to appreciate that the evolution of any political union must depend on an approximation, not only of its economic, but of its political, ideologies.
Then there is, finally, the difficulty of China. I think that if we are to look at the problem of China from an historical standpoint, rather than under the immediate pressures, we must see that her ideology at this moment is very similar to the ideology of Soviet Russia in the early days of the Russian Revolution, and that this ideology is a reflection of exactly similar circumstances. Soviet Russia was isolated, boycotted. Soviet Russia, in the beginning, was expressing its revolution in rather crude forms. China to-day is isolated and boycotted, and beginning her revolution in rather unsophisticated forms. I take the view that as the Chinese People's Republic becomes concentrated upon its own construction, and as a new generation arises in China, her ideology will change in the same way that the ideology of the Soviet Union has changed. But if that change is to take place, it must be as a reaction to more rational and liberal policies followed by the West, and particularly the United Nations.
I make a strong appeal to our own Government—which was the first to recognise the People's Republic of China, and which has, rather belatedly, voted, independently of America, for the acceptance of China into the United Nations—to make this a real, dynamic issue within the United Nations. For how long can we go on recognising the population of the Island of Formosa as representative of China? I believe that a changed attitude by the West and the United Nations on that issue would
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encourage elements which are in China, and which, reflecting past changes in Soviet Russia, will change the ideologies which are now expressed at Peking.
I did not intend to speak for so long, but I must make one other reference to the situation in South-East Asia, and it is to Indonesia. There was the fear in Asia of Communist China in the North and the great archipelago of Indonesia, with its 100 million people, in the South, with its Communist tendencies. The situation in Indonesia has changed and the significance of that fact will be tremendous in Asia. It is going to be significant upon China. It must be significant in relation to the confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia. Mr. Malik, the Foreign Secretary of Indonesia, in his Press conference on April 4, said that the policy of confrontation would continue but Indonesia would always be open to negotiations for a peaceful settlement; and Nicholas Turner, the well-informed correspondent of the Guardian, stated on April 25 that Mr. Malik
"let it be known privately that his intention is to end the confrontation as quickly as possible".
Members of the Government may be aware that in this House I have pleaded more than once for a reconsideration of the whole problem of Indonesia and Malaysia. I have pleaded for it because I believe that there must be a reconstitution of the frontiers there. I was delighted to hear the noble Viscount, Lord Head, speak of the fact that in the vast island of Borneo—the fifth largest island in the world—the old colonial frontiers are absolutely out of date, dividing peoples and tribes which are one, and families which are one. The time is coming when in that whole region we should begin to look at this problem again, and go back to the very hopeful proposal, made at Manila before Malaysia was established, for a wider confederation which would include all the peoples in that area.
My Lords, I want to conclude by saying this. I have spoken of the dangers of nuclear weapons. Perhaps the most ironic fact of our period in history is that the same scientific instruments which create nuclear weapons can so largely contribute to ending the hunger and poverty which are in the world to-day. It has been four months since I have been able to address

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your Lordships. I first went to India. I flew from Bangalore to Bombay, across the great famine area, and there, instead of the green fields, there was the red and the grey and the yellow earth, with no cultivation. By accident I have since spent two months in Algeria, where again I saw drought, with sheep dying and the people denied, in the destruction of the harvest, the one sustenance of their whole year.
Yet these same weapons—which are now concentrated, not only in the Soviet Union and in America, but also partially in our own country, in France, in China, for the destruction of life—these weapons could so bring the deserts of the earth to fertility that the problem of hunger and of poverty in the world would be ended. I am asking my friends in the Labour Party, of which I am a loyal supporter despite some disagreements about policy, and whose victory I so much acclaimed at the last Election as the hope of this country and of the world—I beg of them to think of foreign affairs not only in the terms of military groupings and military alliances, of threats from here and threats from there, but in terms of the great and constructive possibility of using those instruments, which are at present desecrated in the armaments of destruction, in the consecrated task of ending poverty and hunger in the world.
6.37 p.m.
THE MARQUESS OF ABERDEEN AND TEMAIR: My Lords, I wish to address your Lordships about one paragraph in Her Majesty's gracious Speech from the Throne. It is the paragraph which states:
"My Government will continue to promote the economic unity of Europe and to strengthen the links between the European Free Trade Association and the European Economic Community."
The noble Earl the Leader of the House mentioned the necessity for a close relationship with EFTA, and that point was also referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Silkin. I do not think it seems to be generally realised what a terribly difficult position we are in at the present moment.
The noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, in addressing the House yesterday, referred to the amount of work for the export drive that has been encouraged by the
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Government, through the Board of Trade, by the British exhibitions which have been taking place, for some years now, in every part of the world. Reading that comment, one might think that all this work had been done from Government sources. I should like to mention my interest, at least in any matter worth speaking about. I wish to declare that I was a director of British Overseas Fairs. I was one of the first directors when it was formed in 1954 and I remained, taking part in all the exhibitions which took place from then until I retired from that board, not wishing to become an octogenarian passenger, and so I was not present at the last three exhibitions. All those have been supported by the Board of Trade.
The noble Lord, Lord Shepherd then went on to speak about the great work done by the City of London. The City of London has had some stands in a great many of those exhibitions, but there then came out, almost in conversation, the fact that there had been a fire in the exhibition which is about to open on Friday in Oslo. The noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, said it was a terrible thought that it should be suggested that there had been arson in such an occurrence. I can explain that in this exhibition the City of London have not, in this case, had a pavilion within the periphery of British Overseas Fairs. It was a separate pavilion some little way off. I hesitate to doubt the figures given by a Minister of the Crown, but I think Lord Shepherd said it cost £40,000. My own figure was £4,000. However, we will leave it at that.
Why should that take place? Why was there a fear that it might be arson? The reason is that there is very severe regret—I put it at more than regret—in Norway because of what has happened recently. I refer to the temporary charge on imports which was established on November 20, 1959, and became effective on July 1 the following year. That was intended as a temporary charge, but as with so many Government charges and measures, temporary charges are apt to continue. Actually the dates I have given were the dates of the establishment of EFTA. This T.C.I. (temporary charge on imports) came into force in October. 1964, and it was then reduced to 10 per cent. But the complaint is that that

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was a flagrant breach of the Stockholm Convention, which came into force in 1960. Because it applies to manufactured goods, the T.C.I. affects only 30 per cent. of Norway's exports, but the effect on Norway is disproportionately high because it is so large a share of her total exports. So there has been a great deal of bad feeling in Norway. It was even suggested at one time that the exhibition would have to be cancelled. That will not be the case. The exhibition will be opened next Friday by the President of the Board of Trade, in the presence of the King.
But the position is such that the Norwegian police have strengthened the force to look after any trouble that might occur in the exhibition. Further, there has been a great deal of investigation by the Norwegian police as to how the fire was started. I have here a telegram saying that they are quite convinced that it was not an accident, and that in fact they have discovered some material, I think a can, which was not there when the work was completed. They consider that the senior member of EFTA, by breaking the rules unilaterally, without consultation, has caused a very severe position.
One of the first exhibitions with which I was concerned, more than thirty years ago, was a British exhibition in Buenos Aires. When I was there I was impressed by the fact that when Argentinian people made any agreement between one another they would shake hands and say palabra inglesi; that meant to say that you could always depend on the word of an Englishman. It meant something that was going to last and which you could trust. Here is a terrible thought: that this agreement has been broken without notice and without any discussion. The President of the Confederation of British Industry wrote a letter, which was published, to the President of the Board of Trade saying what a terrible thing this was and urging that this charge should be abolished as soon as possible. It is not possible for that to happen during the exhibition because the meeting of EFTA will take place at Bergen at almost the closing time of the exhibition.
That exhibition will go on in spite of the knowledge that several orders have been cancelled because of this state of affairs. I have a telegram here from
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the managing director of British Overseas Fairs saying that the feeling is that overwhelming success for Britain will come from Norwegian industries. They say that their quarrel is with the British Government and not with British industry. However, it makes one feel that that palabra inglesi does not apply now. Possibly you think a term quite often used in France applies:perfide anglais—incidentally, that did not apply to Scotland because the Scottish and French nations have for centuries been such friends. That is the kind of thing that is brought up on any question as to the reliability and dependability of those who have entered into an agreement. I do not wish to detain your Lordships any further. There is a great deal that could be said about this trouble at some time. The exhibition will take place in the presence of the King, and His Royal Highness Prince Philip Duke of Edinburgh will spend two or three days at the exhibition.
Finally, I would remind your Lordships of what is said in two publications. I think of the Fifteenth Psalm, which sets out how a person should behave if he is to be trustworthy. One of the sentences in the Psalm is:
"He that sweareth to his own hurt, and changeth not."
Finally it says that
"He that doeth these things shall never be moved."
There was another version:
"He shall never fall".
To come to more recent times, I think of the well-known poem of Rudyard Kipling, If. In it he describes very much the same sort of thing as the Fifteenth Psalm does, and it ends:
"And what is more, you will be a man, my son."
6.50 p.m.
BARONESS GAITSKELL: My Lords, before I begin to speak on Her Majesty's gracious Speech, may I add my congratulations on the two remarkable maiden speeches of great wisdom from the noble Viscount, Lord Head, and my noble friend Lord Hall. I hope Lord Head will make up for his six years' absence from this House by making more speeches of the kind he made to-day.

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I wish to-day to speak briefly on only one aspect of the gracious Speech, Britain's entry into the Common Market provided essential British interests are safeguarded. The words in the gracious Speech are very carefully chosen. It is with some trepidation that I venture to speak on this subject. It is, after all, a hazard for anyone who is not an economist to speak on this very complicated legalistic subject. Economics has become the white magic of the Western world. A new foreign language has been evolved, and words and phrases are incanted which are meaningless to the ordinary man and woman. My Lords, now that the propaganda for entry into the Common Market has been gathering momentum since the Election, it has been accompanied by a massive publicity campaign in some newspapers. All the high pressure advertising techniques have been employed, and there have been many sermons from the Mount of High Holborn preaching salvation by joining the Common Market.
But the British public have but little idea still of how such a momentous step would affect them in practical ways. It is conceded that the cost of living would rise, but sometimes I long for a homely detail for example, just what effect going into the Common Market would have on the price of cheese. It would be salutary if those who press so hard for joining would be more explicit on the immediate effects of such an important step, and would not dazzle us with the promise of the big market on our doorstep. Too often when anyone raises an anxious query about the terms of entry, he is brushed aside by a vague phrase about sticking to the rules of the Rome Treaty, as if we were about to take part in some European sports contest.
If my approach to the Common Market is neither evangelistic nor crusading, I believe with many people that the time has now come for us to start seriously negotiating the terms of entry. I believe that, in our present economic situation, nothing short of this exposure to the blast of greater competition from Europe will make us face up to the economic facts of life. This will be strong medicine for our economy and, like any drastic treatment, may have painful side effects; and the cure may be long and painful, too. But there are no miracle cures for our economy. All the competition in the
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world will not produce the goods unless we all work harder.
Most people to-day would wish to work towards the greater integration of Europe. I do not believe that economic obstacles are insurmountable now; but I believe that the political difficulties are great, and that there are dangers in taking precipitous political steps. This is where I am not so starry-eyed as the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn. We witnessed the painful disillusionment when Mr. Heath tried so hard to arrange a hasty marriage by proxy between Britain and the Common Market. Though many of us believe in promoting the greater integration of Europe, we also believe in the Atlantic Community, and eventually in World Government. These should not conflict with one another. The political situation in the world and in Europe keeps on changing. So I cannot understand the mystique of the number "Six" in Europe. General de Gaulle believes in no such superstition. He has managed to split the European Community by attacking the Rome Treaty and NATO, thus killing two birds with one stone—one economic and one political.
Why not a Greater European Community which would include EFTA? These are the questions which baffle the non-experts and non-economists like myself. But I believe that the Greater European Community is the only genuine integration of Europe for which we must work in years to come. I believe that the economic hurdles are not impassable for us, but I think the political ones will not be so easy to clear. Our greatest problem to-day in the world is not the Common Market; it is the gap between the rich and the poor nations. We should never lose sight of that. By helping the developing nations with trade and aid, we are not only helping to keep the peace in the world but helping to build up the markets of the future.
For all these reasons, I believe that the Government's cautious approach to joining Europe is responsible and also far-sighted. I hope I shall not be accused of being partisan when I say that I am glad that it will be a Labour Government which will tackle the transition of our economy when we join the Common Market, for, though we hope that Britain will be more prosperous as

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a result, we also know that some people may weather the harsh winds of competition, but for others it may be just stormy weather. Finally, the Government will have both a tough and a delicate task, throughout the negotiations and after. But what remains as true today as it was in 1962 is that unconditional entry means unconditional surrender of many things which we believe in and hold dear.
6.56 p.m.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, I should like to congratulate the two noble Lords to whose maiden speeches we have listened with so much pleasure and interest in this debate. When my noble friend Lord Head, announced what he was going to describe to us, I thought it was going to be a strange and exciting hybrid animal. He called it a "longterm ad hoc policy for South-East Asia and China". The policy which he did describe was, I think, an eminently sensible one, which, with but few exceptions, nearly everybody in this country would wholeheartedly support.
Although it may take a long time, it must be our long-term objective to arrive at a permanent understanding with China. Our country has always been in favour of the admission of the Peking Government to the United Nations, although it was only about three or four years ago that we summoned up enough courage to vote against the Americans on this issue in the United Nations. That, of course, does not mean friendship for, or approval of, China. In fact, one of the reasons often advanced in favour of China's entry into the United Nations is that the horrible atrocities of which the Chinese have been guilty, in Tibet and elsewhere, could be so much better, and perhaps more effectively, dealt with if the delinquent was a member of the United Nations and could there be brought to book. But if we are to be secure against destruction, it must be our long-term objective to bring into a system of world security and disarmament this country of, we do not know how many people—sometimes it is said to be 600 million, and sometimes 800 million; but certainly about one-fifth or one-sixth of the world population.
At the same time, as my noble friend said, the small countries of South-East Asia who do not want to lose their free
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dom and independence, must be protected against the aggression of stronger counttries than themselves who may endeavour to deprive them of their liberty. Although it may be a great sacrifice in many ways to us, it is a moral obligation upon us to do what we can to help them, and to help the Americans to defend their liberty.
LORD BROCKWAY: Does that mean that the Opposition support the sending of British soldiers to Vietnam?
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: That is an entirely irrelevant question, if I may say so. The reason we do not send British troops to Vietnam, although the Australians do, is that we are one of the co-Chairmen of the 1954 Geneva Committee. The Americans understand perfectly well that it would weaken the possibilities of peace by negotiation if one of the Chairmen of that Committee were to send troops to support the Americans in the field of battle. We have agreed with the Americans that our part on the military side is to defend Malaysia, which is one of those countries that need protection against aggression by stronger neighbours.
I hope that the noble Viscount, Lord Hall, will allow me to mention the very great affection which I had for his late father, as Member for Aberdare in another place, where I was his colleague for fourteen years, and later on in your Lordships' House. He was a man who was very highly regarded by all Parties, both as a British statesman and also as a Welsh patriot who loved his country. I hope that the very great ability and distinction with which the noble Viscount has spoken this afternoon will be regarded by the Party opposite as at least some practical vindication of the hereditary principle.
I should like also to congratulate the Government on their wonderful enterprise in putting up no fewer than three Front Bench speakers to take part in this debate. We are very grateful for the attention they have paid to this debate, and look forward to hearing what is still left. But from this Bench we do not intend to compete in this respect with the Government, either in time or in content. We do not intend in any way to enter into an oratorical contest. All

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that I intend to do is to pursue, for a very short distance indeed, one or two of the points which were contained in the full and courteous reply which was given by the noble Earl the Leader of the House to my noble friend Lord Carrington and the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, who questioned him about the highly important subject of the Common Market.
The noble Earl rightly said that this is a free country and all are free to express their opinion. That is very true, and we are trying to persuade the Government to do just that—to express their opinion freely. I sympathise very much with the difficulty of the noble Earl when we press him to do that, because I think we all know that he agrees with us on the question of the Common Market. We can sympathise with the difficulty in which he finds himself, and I think he tackled it in a praiseworthy manner; that is, in trying to interpret the utterances of the Prime Minister in the most encouraging sense that is possible.
The noble Earl talked about recantations. We know from past experience what happens. If we cross-examine and catechise and probe the noble Earl on this question, the only result we can achieve is to compel him, with utmost pain, reluctantly to confirm one or other of the more nullifying conditions which the Prime Minister insists on expressing from time to time. I ask your Lordships: can that do any good? I doubt if it can. I think that the undertones of the noble Earl's speech were intended to suggest that it might even do harm. That came into my mind when he spoke of recantations.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, may I take the noble Earl up on one point? As he knows, I have to leave in a few moments and may not hear the end of his reply to my submissions. I would think it a very great mistake if the noble Earl were under the impression that the Prime Minister took one point of view and other Ministers took another. We have had three statements this week from Cabinet Ministers, one on behalf of Mr. Brown who is ill, one by the Foreign Secretary, and one by me this afternoon. I should be much surprised if those views expressed were not those of the Prime Minister.
LORD GLADWYN: My Lords, may I—
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, as the noble Earl has to leave, we ought not to delay him long. What the noble Earl has said recalls to my mind that he compared the movement of Government opinion on this matter to Cardinal New-man's dissertation on the development of doctrine in the Church of Rome. The development of ecclesiastical doctrine very seldom proceeds at what one would call a breakneck speed: it more emulates the iceberg in the pace of its movement.
At the time Cardinal Newman wrote his book on the development of doctrine it so happened, as the noble Earl will remember, that one rather significant landmark in the development had been reached. Pope Pius IX had lately made a proclamation in which he stated that Protestants and other Christians who did not belong to the Church of Rome would not necessarily be condemned to everlasting punishment in a future life if on the Day of Judgment it could be satisfactorily shown that their separation from the Church of Rome was due to invincible ignorance. This, I believe, put some British Catholics in a slight dilemma, because, they felt it possible that if they instructed their Protestant friends so efficiently and carefully that they removed their ignorance but did not succeed in persuading them to join the Church of Rome, they might unintentionally inflict irreparable damage on their future prospects. I thought the noble Earl had similar feelings about some of his colleagues in the Cabinet on this issue.
I entirely agree with what the noble Earl and the noble Baroness, Lady Gaitskell, said about negotiations. Of course, no country in the Common Market has ever entered it without negotiation. Negotiation is an essential preliminary for entry into the Common Market, and we all know what our negotiations will be about. I do not think the antithesis between the Commonwealth and the Common Market is a true one; I think that it is more or less fictitious. The two are almost entirely irrelevant to each other. As we still believe, in the long run all Commonwealth countries would benefit enormously in their trade from our membership of the Common Market. In our negotiations in 1962 we

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got the most wonderful terms for all the African members and most of the Asiatic members of the Commonwealth. They were to be admitted on the same terms as the French.
LORD BROCKWAY: New Zealand?
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: New Zealand is not in Africa. The longest part of the negotiations were concerned with Canadian and Australian wheat, and with New Zealand butter. On that we had got to the point of obtaining agreement in principle that special arrangements would be made for these commodities. It was when we got that arrangement and agreement in principle that General de Gaulle broke up the negotiations—in my view, as I have said in this House before, because he thought that the negotiations were going to succeed, not because he thought they were going to fail. He had always hoped that they were going to break down on these points. When he saw that they did not break down he decided to break off negotiations.
As for EFTA, no one has ever had any doubts about that. Any doubts on that score are purely fictitious. It was always understood that we would not enter until our EFTA partners could be admitted at the same time, either as members or as associates. Those who were not members of NATO for political reasons might have had to be associate members. As for having an independent foreign policy, I do not know whether any of your Lordships think that Britain would be likely to want to pursue a more independent foreign policy than is now being pursued by General de Gaulle and one more antagonistic to the views of the rest of the Community, which I should have thought was contrary to the terms of the Treaty of Rome.
As for economic policy, there is nothing in the Treaty of Rome to prevent nationalisation and there is a certain amount of nationalisation in France and Italy. But it seems to me that if we go shouting about the place, that we will not join unless we are allowed to have a separate economic policy, whatever our intentions may be, the only effect of repeating that over and over again will be to prevent negotiations from ever being allowed to start.
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On agriculture, which is perhaps the most difficult of the problems, it is not a question, as one of your Lordships, I think, said, of protecting our own farmers, but of not giving them too much protection. Under present Common Market rules the price of wheat would be so enormous that farmers like myself and some of my noble friends would all get so much money as to be tempted to grow perhaps too much wheat. I have heard it said that our wheat acreage might go up to four million, which would be economically undesirable, and possibly some arrangement will have to be made about agriculture.
But what I should like to impress on the Government is that the E.E.C. had not decided their agricultural policy in 1962. Had we joined in 1963, as we hoped, we should have been able to take part in the final settlement of the E.E.C.'s agricultural policy. As it is now, I think one must say that, whatever our views about modification might be, it will not be any use trying to have negotiations about the Common Market if we insist on having an agricultural policy which is based on deficiency payments rather than on a levy. I think that, in principle, we must accept the agricultural policy which they have; and that is why it seems to me that if we are sincere about our desire to join the Common Market we ought now to start changing our agricultural policy along these lines.
In view of the lateness of the hour I shall not try to stand between the noble Lord, Lord Walston, and your Lordships. I will only express again the hope that the noble Earl, Lord Longford, and his colleagues who think with him will not relax their efforts to promote the development of doctrine, with as many recantations among their colleagues as may be necessary, to achieve our early entry into the Common Market for the benefit not only of Europe but of the whole Free World.
7.15 p.m.
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (LORD WALSTON): My Lords, we will, of course, never relax our attempts to promote our doctrines, wherever they may be. We even have hopes that one day we shall be so successful that some noble Lords opposite may

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realise the true worth of the doctrines which we preach from this side of the House.
But without developing that theme I should, at the outset, like to pay my tributes to the two maiden speeches that we have heard. It is hard, when one is the third or fourth speaker to do so, to find a new form of words to express the sincerity of the appreciation that we have for my noble friend Lord Hall and the noble Viscount, Lord Head. They were both, in different ways, admirable speeches to which we had been looking forward, and in the case of the noble Viscount, Lord Head, for a very long time indeed. His speech was worth waiting for and we are grateful to him. I am also delighted to see that my noble friend Lord Brockway is back again, and not only to see but to hear from his speech that he has fully recovered his normal vigour. We have missed him in the past, and although we have had some good debates on subjects that are close to his heart, they would have been even better had he been with us.
I think the best way of winding-up this interesting debate is to re-state again, in general terms, what our long-term political aims are. The noble Viscount, Lord Head, rightly remarked that in South-East Asia we must have a long-term policy. I am sure he would agree that that policy should not be confined only to South-East Asia, but that our whole foreign policy must be based on long-term objectives. Those are, to put them briefly and perhaps in an over-simplified fashion, the achievement eventually—and these are very long-term aims—of world peace, World Government and an international peace-keeping force to ensure the peace throughout the world; and, on the more positive side, not simply the prevention of war but the actual creation of a richer and a better society.
We cannot sit back, when eventually we have achieved peace, and say, "Now carry on with it". We must still do all that is in our power— and at that time it will be very much more than it is at present—to destroy poverty, to destroy the starvation of which my noble friend Lord Brockway so rightly reminded us, and in its place to give the opportunity for everybody throughout the world to
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develop the potentials which are in them, and not allow the development of those potentials to be confined to just a small number of relatively rich people living in relatively prosperous parts of the world. As I said, those are long-term aims and we cannot expect to achieve them in our lifetime. But we are making progress towards them, and we are doing it primarily through international organisations of one kind and another.
It is extraordinary, if one looks back over the years, to see how these international organisations have proliferated. Of course, the United Nations is the main one among them and we are—there is no need for me to repeat it here — wholehearted supporters and adherents of the United Nations in all its activities. We disagree with some of its members at times. We may disagree with some of its majority decisions at times, just as all of us, in our individual capacities, disagree with the majority decisions—I think even noble Lords opposite occasionally disagree with the majority decisions—of the electorate in this country. But that does not make them any less ardent supporters of our system and our country and our Parliament, and that is our attitude towards the United Nations.
We also support the various other more regional organisations which are designed to these ends—the maintenance of peace, the prevention of war and the abolition of poverty. I should like to emphasise that the most constructive and effective rôle of the United Nations has not been the maintenance of peace (although it has achieved remarkable successes in that sphere) but in its economic and cultural activities, and in the spread of techniques through the Food and Agriculture Organisation, the World Health Organisation, the I.L.O. and so on, spreading benefits throughout the world. In addition, of course, there are, as I say, the various regional organizations—SEATO, CENTO and NATO; and ours is the only country that is a full member of all those three organisations. To all of them, in different ways, we give our support and contribute leadership.
I will only briefly mention NATO, as it has been referred to very adequately. My noble friend Lord Shackleton—fully recovered, I hope, from his recent operation,

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which seems to have taken place with the utmost speed—dealt with this subject very fully, but he indicated that he was leaving something for me to say, although I am not quite sure what it was. I think that all I need do with regard to NATO is to re-emphasise its rôle. NATO was first set up because the member countries realised that modern warfare and the threat of modern warfare required more than simply alliances. The days were past, it was felt then—and they are still more past to-day—when all you needed to do was to sign a treaty of friendship or alliance, wait for the war to break out, and have so many divisions or so many ships of the line to put at the disposal of your allies. Modern warfare requires intensive planning and collective developments of weapons, techniques and logistic support of all kinds. NATO was set up in order to achieve that; and the need for it is just as great to-day as ever it was, even though, by its very success, the threat of the particular form of attack that NATO originally envisaged has now receded.
We accept fully that NATO in its present form may well be in need of various alterations, improvements and modernisations, and we are always prepared to carry on the process of consultation with our NATO partners in order to achieve this aim. It would be unfortunate if the impression got about that, because of our reaction to the unfortunate initiative of the French at the present time, we were opposed to any change. That is very far from the case. But we do believe that it is essential, for the peace and the welfare of the Western world, and of the world as a whole, that NATO should continue, and that it should be strong. No matter what the future holds, we shall adhere to its principles with all our allies who are associated with us in it.
My Lords, another of these organisations of international character which has been mentioned, and properly mentioned, at considerable length by many speakers is, of course, the European Economic Community. Here, again, I think my two noble friends—and I hope that in his remarks the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, in speaking of the plethora of Front Bench speakers on this side was not in any way regretting it—have already covered most, if not all, of the relevant points and
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answered most of the questions. Certainly I think they have answered, if not entirely to his satisfaction, the queries raised by the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn. But I should like to take up the three points which were made by my noble friend Lord Brockway. He first of all said that, whatever benefits might come from a closer integration of Europe through the Six and ourselves, it would be of no benefit at all if it was carried out at the expense of the other countries of Europe. With that, I am in entire agreement, and I think that my noble friend Lady Gaitskell also made the same point. The Six is only a stepping stone. There is nothing mystical about the Six, and I hope never will be about the Seven, because I hope it will not be joined solely by us but by most, if not all, of our EFTA partners. From there it can progress on into a still wider European Economic Community, embracing all the countries of Europe, East and West.
LORD GLADWYN: Including the Soviet Union?
LORD WALSTON: If they so wish.
LORD GLADWYN: As far as Vladivostok?
LORD WALSTON: So far as the Urals, or even further, if some people wish it. There is no limit, so far as I am concerned, to the size of the European Community.
The second point my noble friend made —and, again, I am in complete agreement with him—was that this should not be at the expense of the developing countries of the world; it must not be a rich man's club. We must ensure that European wealth, experience and industrialisation, whether they are made use of by individual countries or by a collective group of countries, are used not only for the benefit of those people who live in Europe but for the benefit of the whole world—and, in particular, for the benefit of those areas of the world which need it most. He further pointed out the dangers or difficulties of Britain integrating with Europe so long as there were dissimilar foreign and domestic policies within the countries of Europe. On that, I cannot agree with him. The fact that there are differences of political opinion and economic opinion in this country does not mean

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that we cannot be an integrated country, and the fact that there are differences of opinion among people living in other countries in no way presents an impediment to a proper democratic association between us.
My Lords, carrying on with the practical proposals and actions which we are taking to achieve these long-term aims, I should like to touch very briefly on disarmament, again raised by my noble friend Lord Brockway. As he said, he will shortly be pursuing this matter further with my noble friend Lord Chalfont, and that is the proper occasion for a debate on it. But I would emphasise once more the progress which we have made and the attempts that we are making for still further progress in this very vital field. In the past, there has already been achieved—and we give full credit to noble Lords opposite and their friends for this —the partial Test Ban Treaty, which was a step towards disarmament. We are now working—and my noble friend Lord Chalfont in particular is working with the greatest energy and skill—to bring about a non-proliferation treaty. That is the second step towards it: first of all, to prevent the testing of new weapons; and, secondly, to prevent existing weapons from getting into any more hands than those which already have them. Thirdly, we hope to go on from there to an agreement for a reduction of present stocks of weapons; and finally, of course, the abolition of all nuclear weapons. That is going rather further ahead than we can look clearly at the present time, but those are our realistic aims.
Now to the positive side: aid, and what we can do for foreign countries, for the poorer countries—and I agree wholeheartedly with all those speakers who have underlined this as being one of the main objectives of Her Majesty's Government's policies in overseas countries. I have already mentioned the United Nations, what it is attempting and what it is achieving. I will only reiterate that we give our wholehearted support both in good will, in our talk and with our money in order to promote its activities and also through such other organisations as the Colombo Plan, the Asian Development Bank, the various other regional organisations all designed to this end and, of course, through our own Ministry of
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Overseas Development, which is working within the confines of a stringent budget to ensure that all the money we can afford is wisely and profitably spent in a way that will bring maximum benefit to those people whose need is greatest. There is no doubt that, so long as the gap between the rich countries and the poor countries continues to grow, as it does at present, we shall have to wait a long time before world tension is released and world peace is assured. One of the best methods by which this can be achieved—and I hope that within the next years we may be able to make some progress along these lines in company with our richer friends from the richer countries—is in agreements on commodity prices and particularly those commodities produced in the developing countries.
My Lords, I have kept the subject of South-East Asia until the penultimate part of my speech. I am in some difficulty here because we shall be discussing—it or, at least, Vietnam—at a later time. Therefore, as no noble Lord has specifically raised this matter I propose to ignore it tonight. That does not mean to say in any way that we do not consider it one of the most important aspects of the whole picture of South-East Asia. The speech of the noble Viscount, Lord Head, was, as I said at the beginning, a magnificent example not only of clear expression but of clear thinking behind that expression. I would say that the policy he adumbrated was in no basic respect different from that of Her Majesty's Government. The question is, of course, how to arrive at that ultimate policy. The difficulty, as my noble friend, Lord Shackleton, pointed out, is to decide who it is that really represents countries and who it is that wants you to stay. Some people want us to stay and others want us to go. So long as there are no free elections —and in few of these countries is there a likelihood of any genuine free elections—how can we decide to whom we shall listen?
But we must always be on our guard —and I thank the noble Viscount for making this clear—against (and I wrote down his words) "unwittingly helping existing reactionary régimes against more liberal régimes". I think that was the phrase the noble Viscount used. It is a danger which we all see happening and against which we must always be

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on our guard; for even a régime which appears at one time to be an admirable one can unfortunately, after achieving power threaten to become a repressive and authoritarian regime. Our policy must always be directed towards supporting, in so far as we can, the will of the majority, towards supporting those régimes which are going to give the maximum freedom to people to make their own choice and to lead their own lives.
We do not wish to impose our own particular dogmas on the people of South-East Asia. They are different from us they are many miles away from us; they have their own civilisation, their own traditions stemming from different origins. It would be foolish as well as wrong for us to try to say that such a method worked in the West and must work also with them. We have no desire to do that. We want to give them the opportunity of choosing their own way of life and at the same time improving their own economic standards.
With regard to China (and the noble Viscount was right to point to China as being the key country in this great complex of South-East Asia), I am sorry that he was not here when we had a debate on February 10 on this subject. Perhaps he would allow me to read from the OFFICIAL REPORT my won closing remarks on that occasion:
"To sum up, our intentions against China are in no way aggressive. We will resist their imperialistic ambitions wherever they may appear. But on the internal side, so far as their own country is concerned, as long as they stand within their own boundaries we shall do all we can to help them in their economic and cultural progress. The more contact we can have in that way, and the more we can work together, the greater, I hope, will be the chances of our avoiding future catastrophe."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 272 (No. 34), col. 960; 10.2.66.]
I recommend to the noble Viscount that he may read some of the other speeches of noble Lords on that subject.
Finally, my Lords, let me once more reiterate, and perhaps amplify a little, those ultimate objectives of which I spoke at the beginning and try to suggest that there is some progress that has been made. We have our visions, and occasionally those visions come rather close to reality. With your Lordships' per
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mission I should like to read a somewhat lengthy quotation:
"I can see the day when there will be a great confederation of the independent and self-governing English-speaking nations, made clearly recognisable and effective to the outer world by some new form of international corporation … Step by step this power will advance, binding the nations together, not severing them. For it will be based upon ideas, which unite, and not upon race, which severs. And all those who share these ideas are ipso facto a part of this union … Then we shall be prepared to make an end of war; because behind the great humanitarian idea there will be the power to safeguard these ideas …"
"Let us allow our 'dream' to materialise still further. I can see this great Confederacy of the future established permanently … And here will be sitting the great Court of Arbitration … Here will be assembled, always ready to carry into effect the laws enacted, an international army, and an international fleet—the police of the world's highways. No recalcitrant nation (then and only then, will the nations he able to disarm) could venture to oppose its will to that of this supreme representative of justice … The function of this capital to the great Confederacy will not only concern war; but peace as well … Science and art, which are ever the most effective bonds between civilised peoples, will there find their international habitation, and here will be established the great international universities, and libraries and museums … Thus will the World's Peace be insured, the nations be brought together, and the ancient inherited prejudices and hatreds he stamped out from the face of the earth."
My Lords, that was written by my father in 1898 and I think we can now look—nearly 70 years later—to some progress from that idea then put forward. Another thing which should also give some cause for optimism and take our eyes away from the failures which are so often concentrated upon when we talk of these matters, is to look back to 1939, 21 years after the end of the First World War. To-day is 21 years after the Second World War, and I think that however pessimistic we may be, however much we see the clouds threatening, we must all agree that not only is the peace of the world more likely at the present time than it was 21 years after 1918, but that the methods of settling disputes, the forms of co-operation and the aid given by one country to another, all give us very great cause, if not for complacency, at least for optimism for the future of the world. My Lords, those are the objectives which we have and which Her Majesty's

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Government will try to pursue in the years ahead.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, I beg to move that this debate be now adjourned.
Moved, that the debate be now adjourned—(Earl Jellicoe.)
On Question, Motion agreed to, and debate adjourned accordingly.

ROYAL ALBERT HALL BILL [H.L.]
Reported, with Amendments.
House adjourned at nineteen minutes before eight o'clock.