Sitting of 15 November 1965

Preamble
The House met at half-past Two o'clock
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]
PRIVATE BUSINESS
  CLYDE PORT AUTHORITY ORDER CONFIRMATION
  Bill to confirm a Provisional Order under the Private Legislation Procedure (Scotland) Act 1936, relating to the Clyde Port Authority, presented by Mr. Ross (under Section 8 of the Act); read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time upon Tuesday 23rd November and to be printed. [Bill 14.]
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
  PUBLIC BUILDING AND WORKS

    Building Materials, Scotland
    Mr. G. Campbellasked the Minister of Public Building and Works to what extent there has been a shortage of bricks or other building materials in Scotland in the last six months.
    Mr. Edward M. Taylorasked the Minister of Public Building and Works whether there is now a shortage of building materials in Scotland.
    The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Public Building and Works (Mr, James Boyden): There has been no shortage of bricks in Scotland during the last six months. Cement supplies have been satisfactory since the beginning of August. Delivery periods for plasterboard, some ironmongery, and large diameter pipes continue to be longer than is customary.
    Mr. Campbell: Can the hon. Gentleman give an assessment for plasterboard for the coming six months as regards Scotland?
    Mr. Boyden: Plasterboard deliveries have improved. New production is coming into being at the beginning of 1966, and the situation will then improve rapidly.

    Ancient Monuments
    Miss Quennellasked the Minister of Public Building and Works in how many cases he has made recommendations for the preservation of ancient monuments situated under the proposed route of electricity cables, under Section 44 (3) of the Electricity Supply Act, 1926.
    Mr. Boyden: I regret that the information could not be provided without an expenditure of time and effort which would not be justified by the small number of cases involved.
    Miss Quennell: Is there not a danger that some of our archaeological remains will be irreparably lost or damaged in the course of transmission works, and will the hon. Gentleman consider ways by which a more efficient and flexible system could be adopted by the Departments so that we can protect these remains while it is still possible?
    Mr. Boyden: There is very close collaboration between my right hon. Friend the Minister of Power and my Department. If the hon. Lady knows of a specific case in which a monument is threatened in the way she suggests, perhaps she will let me know, and we will look into it.

    Building Materials
    Mr. William Hamiltonasked the Minister of Public Building and Works if he is satisfied that serious shortages of all building materials have now been overcome; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Boyden: Yes, Sir, except for plasterboard, but supplies of this should improve in 1966.
    Mr. Hamilton: Will my hon. Friend consider publishing in the OFFICIAL REPORT a list of the main building materials showing how many months' supply there was in October, 1964, and the current position?
    Mr. Boyden: Yes, Sir; my right hon. Friend will consider that.

    Palace of Westminster (Improvements)
    Mr. Robert Cookeasked the Minister of Public Building and Works why stage three of the roof scheme of improvements to the Palace of Westminster has been postponed, and for how long; and why the factors causing the postponement have not resulted in a change of completion date for the Star Chamber Court scheme.
    The Minister of Public Building and Works (Mr. Charles Pannell): The start on stage three would have meant my going to the Chancellor for £80,000 when there was a general retrenchment. Postponement is to April, 1966. The contract for the Star Chamber Court scheme had already been let prior to the Chancellor's measures.
    Mr. Cooke: Is not this just juggling with figures, and will not hon. Members be inconvenienced by the putting off of this vital stage three of the roof scheme?
    Mr. Pannell: No, Sir. The Answer to another Question will show that we have not been tardy in recognising the needs of Members.
    Mr. Robert Cookeasked the Minister of Public Building and Works if he will state the total sum expended upon improvements to the Commons part of the Palace of Westminster in the years 1952 to 1964; and how many square feet of accommodation have been made available to hon. Members, Ministers and the House of Commons Library by virtue of this expenditure.
    Mr. C. Pannell: Just over £300,000 to provide 3,750 sq. ft. of additional accommodation for Members, 2,100 sq. ft. for Ministers, and 4,150 sq. ft. for the House of Commons Library. That makes about 6,000 sq. ft. for Members.
    Mr. Cooke: Does the Minister agree that on the present rate of progress, if it is kept up, hon. Members will be pretty well off in about five years?
    Mr. Pannell: That sounds all right, but if the hon. Gentleman will look at what has been done since he will see that we have done very much better in the
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    last 12 months. Schemes in progress or planning will give 14,000 sq. ft. of usable office space at a cost of £460,000. Details of this are as follows: the south block of the roof space to be completed at the end of this month, which will provide an additional 3,400 sq. ft. of space for Members and possibly 1,700 sq. ft. for the Fees Office; and the new Star Chamber Court building, due to be completed in the early part of 1967, which will provide a further 9,000 sq. ft. of usable office space.

    National Federation of Clay Industries
    Mr. Allasonasked the Minister of Public Building and Works if he will make a statement on his official discussion with representatives of the National Federation of Clay Industries on 23rd September, 1965.
    Mr. C. Pannell: I would refer the hon. Member to the statement issued after the discussion. I am sending him a copy.
    Mr. Allason: Has the right hon. Gentleman seen a copy of today's Daily Mail in which, under the heading "The plan that dropped a brick", it is suggested that the National Federation of Clay Industries will be faced at the end of the year with a very disturbing—
    Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman cannot question the Minister on something for which the right hon. Gentleman is not responsible.
    Mr. Allason: May I therefore ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he is satisfied that the plans of the industry for a very substantial increase in production will go ahead or whether it is true that they will be postponed?
    Mr. Pannell: That is up to the industry. I consider that I have given it all the necessary assurances. In any case, I am not prepared to reduce the amount of house-building that is being carried out by industrialised building methods. That was one of the suggestions made. Industrialised building must be allowed to play its part alongside traditional building methods to enable the best possible use to be made of the labour available and to ensure maximum output.

    Construction Industry
    Mr. Chichester-Clarkasked the Minister of Public Building and Works whether he will give the figures for the value of orders of new work by contractors in the construction industry in August 1965 and the seasonally adjusted index figure for August 1965, taking 1958 as 100.
    Mr. Boyden: The provisional figure is £218 million. The adjusted index 148.
    Mr. Chichester-Clark: Are not those figures lamentable and is the Parliamentary Secretary not aware that if the Government's present policy in this matter continues—reinforced by building licences—the industry may find itself facing a quite serious situation?
    Mr. Boyden: The answer to the second part of the hon. Gentleman's supplementary is "No, Sir." The sharp fall in the figures in August must be taken to be the result of the July measures. These were intended to reduce the demands on the economy and to reduce the load on the construction industry, which had too much work in hand.
    Mr. Costainasked the Minister of Public Building and Works how many insured operatives aged 15 years and over, excluding administrative, technical and clerical workers and self-employed operatives, were employed by contractors in the construction industry in July 1964; and what was the equivalent figure for July 1965.
    Mr. Boyden: 1,151,000 in July 1964, and 1,121,000 in July 1965.
    Mr. Costain: Does this drop in numbers not indicate that there is something wrong in the industry, which we were assured would expand? How does the Parliamentary Secretary equate the industry's expansion with this drop in figures?
    Mr. Boyden: For a start, there are 4,000 fewer unemployed. There are also 10,000 more people in the categories which the hon. Gentleman excluded, which is making for very efficient production in the industry. There must be some men who transfer to factories producing industrialised building components.
    Mr. Costainasked the Minister of Public Building and Works if he will set out in the OFFICIAL REPORT the value of new orders obtained by contractors in the construction industry at current prices for each month of 1965; and what were the equivalent figures for 1964.
    Mr. Boyden: Yes, Sir.
    Mr. Costain: Could not the Parliamentary Secretary give an indication of what the figures show?
    Mr. Boyden: In the first eight months of this year the total value of new orders held by contractors was about £2,066 million, at current prices, compared with £1,979 million in the corresponding period of 1964.
    Following is the information:

    CONSTRUCTION VALUE OF CONTRACTORS' NEW ORDERS AT CURRENT PRICES

    Great Britain

    £ million

    Total New Work

    Date

    1964

    1965

    January

    258

    245

    February

    232

    252

    March.

    230

    319

    April

    266

    258

    May

    235

    254

    June

    257

    239

    July

    288

    281 (P)

    August

    243

    218 (P)

    September

    243

    October

    274

    November

    270

    December

    227

    Total

    2,993

    (P) = Provisional.

    Brick Stocks
    Mr. Carlisleasked the Minister of Public Building and Works (1) if he will give the figure for the number of bricks in stock at the end of September 1965;
    (2) what he anticipates will be the number of bricks in stock at the end of the year 1965.
    Mr. C. Pannell: Stocks of bricks at the end of September amounted to 233 million. I think they may rise to nearly 350 million by the end of the year.
    Mr. Carlisle: Would not the Minister agree that this tremendous increase in the stocks of bricks during September, and the further vast increase forecast for the end of the year, exposes a really scandalous situation in which the industry

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    has increased its output at the specific request of the Minister, only now to find that it has done it on a forecast which has been proved to be wholly wrong and incompetent?
    Mr. Pannell: To answer the last part of that supplementary first, when I met the brickmakers on assuming office they told me that it took about three years to step up production—that is, to get new plant going and so on—and we have been in office for only about 12 months. The figure of 8,400 million for this year's production includes a figure of about 300 million for normal reserves. This is about one and a half day's supply and there was a severe shortage in the industry when I assumed office.
    Mr. Chichester-Clark: In view of the Minister's hopeless failure to make a forecast even over a few months, how does he intend to restore the industry's confidence in relation to the five-year planning envisaged in the National Plan?
    Mr. Pannell: The hon. Gentleman has as yet not even a nodding acquaintance with the industry. He will find that when I met the industry it was not lacking in confidence.
    Mr. Manuel: To give an accurate picture of the position to the House, would my right hon. Friend state the number of days' supply of bricks held at the end of September and the number of days' supply the industry will be holding at the end of the year?
    Mr. Pannell: Stocks of.bricks at the end of September represented about 11 days' supply. By the end of the year they should represent about 16 days' supply. When I took office there were about two or three days' supply of bricks in stock.

    Historic Buildings
    Captain W. Elliotasked the Minister of Public Building and Works how many public events are planned for 1966 at historic buildings in his charge; and whether he will make a statement.
    Mr. Boyden: Twenty-one such events have been agreed, or are being considered.
    Captain Elliot: Is the Parliamentary Secretary really satisfied with this pro-
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    gramme? Would he not agree that this country is very well endowed with historic buildings of great beauty and that many of them are not being put to adequate use? Would he not also agree that if we increased this programme greatly it would very much assist the growing and important tourist industry?
    Mr. Boyden: We are indeed proud of our historic monuments and buildings and we consider sympathetically all cases that are put to us. However, the hon. and gallant Gentleman must bear in mind that in some historic monuments activities of this sort interfere with the residents who live in or near them.
    Sir J. Rodgersasked the Minister of Public Building and Works how many new publications relating to historic buildings in his charge are planned for 1966.
    Mr. Boyden: Twenty-six.
    Sir J. Rodgers: In view of the importance of tourism to help in our balance of payments, is the Parliamentary Secretary satisfied that his Department is doing enough to publicise the historic buildings under his care? Can he further state whether those pamphlets and guides will be published in other languages than English and, if so, which are these languages?
    Mr. Boyden: I shall gladly send the hon. Member the list, but, on the whole, productivity under this Government has been much better than under the previous Administration. At the end of 1965 we shall have produced 27 guides of the sort he has mentioned, while in 1964 only 14 were published. As the chairman of the committee dealing with the matter, I have this very much in mind.
    Mr. Allasonasked the Minister of Public Building and Works whether he will hold consultations with the Minister of Housing and Local Government on the improvement of the protection of the surroundings of historic buildings and ancient monuments.
    Mr. Boyden: My right hon. Friend is not aware of a need for any further special consultations with the Minister of Housing and Local Government but if the hon. Member has any particular

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    difficulty in mind perhaps he would let me know.
    Mr. Allason: Is the hon. Gentleman proposing to implement the resolution of the Council of Europe on this?
    Mr. Boyden: My right hon. Friend has power, under the Ancient Monuments Act, to protect the scheduled area of any ancient monument, and the protection of ancient buildings is the responsibility of the local authority and the Minister of Housing and Local Government.

    Industrialised Building
    Mr. Handingasked the Minister of Public Building and Works what further discussions his department has conducted with local authorities in the London area on the use of industrialised building.
    Mr. Boyden: None, Sir, because the National Building Agency for which my right. hon. Friend is responsible undertakes the detailed, technical discussions.

    New Buildings, Whitehall (Traffic)
    Mr. Grant-Ferrisasked the Minister of Public Building and Works why he has proposed two new blocks of buildings for Whitehall before Her Majesty's Government have produced definite proposals for the traffic in the area; and what steps he is taking to implement Professor Buchanan's scheme for removing through traffic from this area.
    Mr. C. Pannell: These buildings can be planned without prejudice to the traffic proposals. I am now awaiting the outcome of the Greater London Council's studies on these.
    Mr. Grant-Ferris: Is it not really putting the cart before the horse not to deal with the terrible traffic problems which we have outside this building as part of the general scheme for these plans? Would that not give confidence to the public, for does not the public want to see done what it can most easily see needs to be done?
    Mr. Pannell: What is now apparent to the hon. Gentleman was as clear as daylight to me a long time ago. If he considers the statement which I made in July he will see that I indicated then that these traffic studies were proceeding. They are still proceeding. As I have said, if
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    the consideration of this plan needed a traffic study beforehand then, of course, we would have undertaken one. However, the Martin-Buchanan proposals, including those of Professor Colin Buchanan, showed us that that was not so.
    Mr. Channon: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that he said last week that he hoped to make a further statement? When will he make that statement, for does he realise that this is a matter of great importance to all hon. Members?
    Mr. Pannell: I told those concerned that the hon. Gentleman, and all other hon. Members, are interested and I told them to hurry it up.

    Restrictions of Building (Inquiry)
    Mr. Grantasked the Minister of Public Building and Works (1) what representations he has received from the Royal Institute of British Architects regarding the findings of their inquiry into restrictions on building, details of which were received on 13th October 1965; and whether he will make a statement;
    (2) what representations he has received from the National Federation of Building Trades Employers regarding the findings of their inquiry into restrictions on building works, details of which he has received; and whether he will make a statement.
    Mr. C. Pannell: I met these bodies and a statement was sent to the Press. I am sending a copy to the hon. Member.
    Mr. Grant: I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for that reply and for sending me a copy. Nevertheless, is he aware that these reports reveal a serious state of affairs, with over £500 million worth of orders having been cancelled between July and September, a downtrend in output by the end of 1966, and that 7 per cent. unemployed in architects' offices is anticipated by the end of the year? What action is the right hon. Gentleman taking to halt this trend?
    Mr. Pannell: I did not accept all the assumptions. Nor did I accept the basis on which they were made. As a matter of fact, we have made a careful analysis of all these figures. For example, it is customary for a great deal of work, in normal times, to get on to the drawing

    663
    board but to get no further. This figure ran into many millions of pounds. It was included in the statistics when I met those concerned.
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: Are not the cancellations in this case on a much larger scale than in previous years and is it not a fact that, in the face of this anticipated falling-off of work in this industry, it is madness to impose building licensing on top of it?
    Mr. Pannell: It is difficult to answer these complicated matters in reply to a supplementary, but I will try to do so as shortly as possible. Broadly speaking. last year there was overheating in the industry to the tune of about £100 million. It would have been £140 million this year. To take up the slack which will become apparent next year, I have already announced that I am prepared to receive applications for building licences in advance of the Bill and that I will let the most urgent projects through the pipeline. [Interruption.] That is what we call planning.

    New Embassy, Rome
    Mr. Evelyn Kingasked the Minister of Public Building and Works what are the reasons for the delay in building the new embassy in Rome; and when he hopes to proceed with the project.
    Mr. C. Pannell: The same reasons which caused the postponement of many public projects in this country.
    Mr. King: Will the Minister bear in mind the desirability especially in Rome of adequate architecture in which to house the British Mission?
    Mr. Pannell: I am at one with the hon. Gentleman in this. I am sensible that in a city of great historic beauty this country's representatives should be housed in a fitting building. We have accepted this in principle, and I hope that the work will start next September.

    Government Offices, Bridge Street-Richmond Terrace Site
    Mr. A. Royleasked the Minister of Public Building and Works what considerations he took into account in arriving at his decision that the design of the Government offices on the Bridge
    664
    Street-Richmond Terrace site should be entrusted to his Department.
    Mr. Goodhewasked the Minister of Public Building and Works what steps he is taking to reconcile his proposal for a new building on the site at Parliament Street with the proposal in the Martin Report that the area should be developed in conjunction with the other side of Whitehall; and whether he intends to appoint a third architect to plan the building on the other side of Whitehall to replace the Great George Street Government offices.
    Mr. C. Pannell: My Department will have to analyse the users' needs for all these buildings and to work out with Sir Leslie Martin the planning principles that are to govern the development as a whole. This experience will be carried through into the design of the Bridge Street office building which will be the pilot project for the entire complex.
    It is too early to consider who should design the new offices on the Great George Street site, but the general planning principles will also be applied to them and to the new building on the Foreign Office site.
    Mr. Royle: Is the right hon. Gentleman sticking to the statement he made on 3rd November that the design of the Government offices on the Bridge Street-Richmond Terrace site will be done by his Department? If so, will be bear in mind the very poor effort which the architects in his Department have made of many buildings overseas in the past few years? Would it not be better to open the design to world competition rather than to have it done by architects in his own Department?
    Mr. Pannell: The hon. Gentleman is on very dangerous ground sometimes when he attempts adverse comment on the relationship between public and private architects. I may tell him that, in certain cases, I have some very valid objections to both.
    Mr. Goodhew: Is not the right hon. Gentleman aware that this area forms part of one side of Parliament Square and that it is vital for the Government to do a little more in the way of coordination?
    Mr. Pannell: My Department has designed many important buildings

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    throughout the world, which must have escaped the attention of the hon. Member for Richmond, Surrey (Mr. A. Royle). But, again, I would say that I am as sensitive as anybody here to what is required of any Minister of Works planning a site of that description.
    Mr. Strauss: Would not the Minister clarify the position? Is it the fact that the other three important parts of this project are to be done, one by a selected architect and one by an architect chosen by competition, but that this key position, of immense importance and with immense problems, is to be dealt with by the architects in his own Department? Is he satisfied that this is the right thing to do, and would he not consider it again before making a final decision?
    Mr. Pannell: I have made the decision and the Government have accepted the decision, and it is seemly that my Department should do this—[HON. MEMBERS: "Why?"] If I had put it out that an unspecified private architect was to do it, hon. Members opposite would probably have agreed without knowing who he was—[HON. MEMBERS: "Competition."] There is to be competition for a part of the total development. I think that there is a great deal of architectural talent concentrated in my Department.
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: While casting no aspersions whatever on the very able architects in the right hon. Gentleman's Department, surely, as has been pointed out, the crucial importance of this site to the whole of this part of London means that the right hon. Gentleman should have the widest possible field of choice in selecting the architect for the task. Will he not, whether he has made a decision or not, have the good sense to reconsider the matter?
    Mr. Pannell: I do not know that the right hon. Gentleman is an authority on good sense. As a matter of fact, I have had this under a great deal of review. I have had a good deal of professional advice of all sorts. A decision had to be taken by someone, and it has been taken.
    Mr. Royle: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. In view of the thoroughly unsatisfactory nature of the reply, I beg
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    to give notice that I shall seek to raise the matter on the Adjournment.
    Mr. Goodhewasked the Minister of Public Building and Works why he proposes to seek the services of two different architects to plan adjoining buildings for parliamentary and Government offices in the area bounded by Bridge Street, Parliament Street and Richmond Terrace.
    Mr. C. Pannell: As I said in my statement of 3rd November, we need to draw on a range of architectural talent both in my own Department and in private practice.
    Mr. Goodhew: But what efforts is the right hon. Gentleman making to be quite certain that this will form an integrated whole with Parliament Square when it is finished?
    Mr. Pannell: We are, of course, retaining Sir Leslie Martin as principal consultant. I answered the Question in part in the Answer I gave to a previous Question, that my Department has designed many important buildings throughout the world and we have unique experience in planning for the uses and needs of others. It seems to me that with the principal consultant we shall get the degree of unification, integration and harmony of design to which both the hon. Gentleman and I aspire.

    New Parliamentary Building (Architects)
    Mr. Channonasked the Minister of Public Building and Works what consultations with the Royal Institute of British Architects he held before arriving at his decision to limit the selection for the architect of the proposed new Parliamentary building to architects from the Commonwealth; and if he will now reconsider this decision.
    Mr. Chichester-Clarkasked the Minister of Public Building and Works what consultation he had with the authors of the Whitehall Plan before reaching his decision to limit the selection for the architect of the proposed new Parliamentary building to architects from the Commonwealth.
    Mr. C. Pannell: I held no formal consultations with either the Royal Institute of British Architects or Sir Leslie Martin,

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    but both have informed me that they support my proposal for a Commonwealth competition.
    Mr. Channon: Would not the Minister agree that this is probably the most important site ever to be planned in this way, and is it not absolutely vital that it should be planned by the best architect in the world, no matter from what country he comes? Would he not further agree that in his Answer to me last week he implied that he and I were liberal-minded and that others were not? Who are the others who are stopping him from taking the right decision in the matter, and will not he reconsider the decision?
    Mr. Pannell: I still hold the view that the hon. Gentleman and I are more liberal-minded than others. ' For instance, I could imagine quite a lot of people behind him who would not agree with his point of view—and a lot of people behind me. But it does seem to us, after all consideration, that it is appropriate that something within the centre of the Commonwealth should be left to a Commonwealth architect. The hon. Gentleman should not have grumbled. I have no doubt that if his hon. Friends had remained in office there would not have been any competition at all but merely selection.
    Mr. Chichester-Clark: The one thing certain is the Minister's ego, which has remained unchanged. Why is he so chauvinistic in this matter? Why does he not look at the subject again? Surely, the Commonwealth itself, which has a pride in this building and its precincts, would want the very best the world can offer.
    Mr. Pannell: That occurred to me, but it still seems to me, for a lot of reasons, that it is appropriate that the work should be left to a Commonwealth architect. The hon. Gentleman does not seem to understand that, at the end of the day, one does not quite know what architect one will get—or of what nationality. That is not the only reason, but it seems to us that if we throw it open to the whole of the Commonwealth we are going wide enough in this context.

    Private House Building, 1966
    Mr. Channonasked the Minister of Public Building and Works what esti-
    668
    mates his Department has received of the number of private houses likely to be started in 1966.
    Mr. Boyden: Amongst builders building on their own initiative, the last Ministry inquiry revealed that in 1966 they would start about the same number as in 1964. Assuming a similar pattern amongst builders building for clients, the number would be between 230,000 and 240,000.
    Mr. Channon: Would not the Parliamentary Secretary agree that after all the Government's boasting about the housing programme, it is rather sad that in 1966, after two years have gone by, they will be building no more private houses than in 1964? And what does he intend to do about it?
    Mr. Boyden: The whole matter is being very carefully discussed. I have no doubt at all that when the final results emerge they will be very satisfactory.
    Mr. Hector Hughes: Of the private houses mentioned in the Question, will the Minister say how many are likely to be built in 1966 in Scotland, and in which parts of Scotland? Will he issue a statement on that subject?
    Mr. Boyden: I hesitate to rush in on Scotland without adequate notice.
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: Can the hon. Gentleman say whether failure to increase the number of houses privately built is deliberate or inadvertent?
    Mr. Boyden: More houses will be built this year than were built under the previous Administration.

  MINISTRY OF PENSIONS AND NATIONAL INSURANCE

    Disabled and Sick Service Men (Pensions)
    Mr. Haleasked the Minister of Pensions and National Insurance whether she will introduce legislation to provide for disabled and sick discharged soldiers and sailors the right to rehearing of an application for a pension, on new medical evidence being available.
    The Minister of Pensions and National Insurance (Miss Margaret Herbison): As my hon. Friend knows legislation is

    669
    not needed to enable my Department to re-examine cases which have not been the subject of a decision by the Pensions Appeal Tribunal and we are always willing to do so. Even where a P.A.T. has found against a claimant, he has a statutory right of appeal to the High Court on a point of law and if, exceptionally, new medical evidence later becomes available which throws fresh light on a case, there is a well recognised procedure by which it can, by consent, be remitted for rehearing. I am satisfied that this procedure, which is well known to the British Legion, is in the best interests of the claimant; and before considering any changes in the adjudication arrangements for war pensions I should wish to consult them.
    Mr. Hale: Is the Minister aware that there is not one hon. Member on either side of the House who has not had cases of disabled soldiers who have lost their claims because they could not find medical evidence at the time, that this Question does not deal with points of law, that this procedure by way of appeal is exceedingly expensive and costly and that people cannot always take advantage of it, that a Measure to rectify this anomaly was introduced in the last Session and that no hon. Member on either side of the House raised his voice against it, and that it was defeated by her own implacable opposition? Would she explain why?
    Miss Herbison: I am sure that my hon. Friend must realise that, in getting justice for disabled ex-Service men, there is no conflict between him and me. What I want to ensure is that justice is done to every disabled ex-Service man. I understand that the British Legion value the flexibility of the present arrangements, whereby we have the "consent-remit" procedure. I can assure my hon. Friend that I shall have discussions with the British Legion and the other ex-Service men's organisations to find out their views, in order that, at the end of the day, there will be justice for every disabled man in this country.
    Mr. Wood: Will the right hon. Lady agree that various improvements have been made in this procedure over the years? Will she accept the assurance that any further improvements which she can make which would increase the justice
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    done to these men would have the full support of the House?
    Miss Herbison: Certainly.
    Mr. Gower: Would the Minister agree that the present arrangements to which she refers seem to give the benefit to the Ministry rather than to the claimant? Would she look at that?
    Miss Herbison: I am certain that the present arrangements do not give the benefit to the Ministry. Where there are questions of doubt, in almost every instance the disabled ex-Service man gets the benefit of the doubt.
    Mr. Hale: In view of the unsatisfactory nature of that Answer, I beg to give notice that I intend to raise the matter at the earliest possible opportunity on the Motion for the Adjournment.

    Byssinosis
    Mr. Haleasked the Minister of Pensions and National Insurance in view of the state of the existing law on the subject, what proposals she has for dealing with sufferers from byssinosis.
    The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance (Mr. Harold Davies): Industrial injuries cover for byssinosis was extended as recently as a fortnight ago to cover flax spinners in processes up to and including carding. My right hon. Friend has no further proposals at present.
    Mr. Hale: But is the Parliamentary Secretary aware that, once again, a Measure supported by the cotton textile unions in Oldham and elsewhere was introduced and defeated by the implacable hostility of the Minister during the last Session, that, out of a fund of £100 million in 1964, figures show that only one male person got 100 per cent. pension for byssinosis and that I constantly submitted evidence of tragic cases of people who had been defeated by this faulty medical definition? What does he intend to do about it?
    Mr. Davies: I do not agree with at least the middle part of my hon. Friend's argument. The position is that the Industrial Advisory Council made a comprehensive review of the position in 1955,

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    as a result of which the present Regulations were introduced. The Council subsequently, in 1960, considered whether occupational cover for cotton workers should be extended, but found no evidence then to support this view. The extension of cover to flax spinners in the agreed processes was again made following the Council's recommendation. There is no evidence at present that any of the Regulations has been defective so far as our present medical knowledge of byssinosis is concerned.

  MINISTRY OF HEALTH

    Corned Beef
    Mr. van Stranbenzeeasked the Minister of Health whether, in response to representations from the National Grocers' Federation and others, he will now order the small stocks of suspect corned beef remaining in private hands to be destroyed.
    The Minister of Health (Mr. Kenneth Robinson): This would not be justified on health grounds since the stocks could be rendered safe for human consumption.
    Mr. van Straubenzee: Will the right hon. Gentleman realise that this question refers back to an answer by the Parliamentary Secretary on 1st November, which appeared to indicate that there were stocks in private hands in respect of which he had not received assurances that they would not be released to the market?
    Mr. Robinson: I know that there is public concern about this matter but I am advised that, provided it is reprocessed by an approved method, this meat would be safe for human consumption. The representations of the hon. Gentleman's Question were made to my right hon. Friend the Minister of Agriculture and any Question about withholding of these stocks on commercial grounds should be addressed to him.
    Mr. Lipton: As the Government have taken care to ensure that by far the greater part of this consignment shall not come on to the market, why are they so reluctant to take drastic action in the case of this small section which is in private hands?
    Mr. Robinson: I can give my hon. Friend an assurance that no relevant cans from the canning establishment associated by the Committee of Inquiry with the Aberdeen typhoid outbreak will be disposed of in this country for any purpose.
    Lady Tweedsmuir: In view of the Parliamentary Secretary's statement the other day that there could be no guarantee that these stocks would not be released for human consumption, does the Minister's statement today mean that he can guarantee that none of this particular corned beef will be released for human consumption, whether processed or not, in this country and whether reexported or reimported?
    Mr. Robinson: It depends what the noble Lady means by "this particular corned beef". The reply I gave to my hon. Friend the Member for Brixton (Mr. Lipton) related to the relevant cans from the establishment associated by the Committee of Inquiry with the Aberdeen outbreak. The noble Lady will be aware that many more cans were voluntarily withheld from sale pending that inquiry.
    Mr. Hector Hughes: Is the Minister not aware that recent outbreaks of peculiar and unexpected diseases in various parts of Britain make this matter of great national concern? Will he take powers to see that such suspected beef or imported food is destroyed?
    Mr. Robinson: I am not sure to what peculiar diseases my hon. and learned Friend is referring, but I know that there has been no suggestion that any of the recent outbreaks of any disease have been associated with corned beef or typhoid.
    Mr. Wood: What consultations are going on between the Minister of Health and the Secretary of State for Scotland? Is this not the kind of decision which ought to be taken by the Government as a whole?
    Mr. Robinson: The decisions which I have announced are those of the Government as a whole. I am concerned only with the health aspects of this and, on health grounds, I am satisfied—as my original Answer made clear—that the stocks can be rendered quite fit for human consumption. But withholding on commercial grounds is a matter for my right

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    hon. Friend the Minister of Agriculture, with whom I have been in constant touch throughout this matter.

    Severely Disabled Patients (Mini-cars)
    Mr. Woodhouseasked the Minister of Health what priority he has assigned to the provisions of specially adapted mini-cars instead of three-wheeled one-seater vehicles for all severely disabled National Health Service patients in relation to other desirable improvements in National Health Service facilities.
    The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Health (Mr. Charles Loughlin): I would refer the hon. Member to my right hon. Friend's reply to his Question on 29th March last.
    Mr. Woodhouse: Will the Parliamentary Secretary ask his right hon. Friend if he recollects 18 months ago, when he was in:he position of Opposition spokesman on health matters, writing a letter to a disabled constituent of mine, Mr. Peter McBride, in which he was strongly critical of the present position and attacked the Conservative Government for maintaining it, and asked whether it was at that time the standard reply?
    Mr. Loughlin: I feel sure that my right hon. Friend will have heard what the hon. Member has said, but may I assure the hon. Member that this matter is to be reviewed early next year? It is continually under review and the review will continue next year and we shall do what we can when the time comes.
    Mr. Bagier: Will my hon. Friend look especially at this problem in view of the social implications? Will he look closely at the circumstances where a disabled individual is not allowed to have a partner in the car, or even a friend, in cases of breakdown? Will he especially look at this matter from that angle?
    Mr. Loughlin: I can assure my hon. Friend that I am very conscious of the social implications of the present position, but in the review we shall make we shall have to take into consideration not only those who are in receipt of these vehicles but also those who so far have not been able to receive a vehicle even though they have been disabled.
    Mr. Bessell: Will the hon. Gentleman take account of the fact that a four-wheeled vehicle is not only safer for the passenger and the driver but also for pedestrians and other road users? Will he give this matter urgent attention?
    Mr. Loughlin: I shall certainly give the matter urgent attention, but I ought to make quite clear to the House that we are satisfied that the present three-wheeled vehicle is safe both for the pedestrian and the user of the vehicle, provided it is reasonably used and maintained at maximum efficiency. I should not like anyone to be under the impression that it is unsafe.
    Sir A. V. Harvey: Will the hon. Gentleman take into account that even with a mini-car getting a wheel-chair on to the car poses a great problem, whereas with a Ford Anglia or Morris 1000 a chair can be put aboard?
    Mr. Loughlin: We take into account the problem of loading and unloading an invalid chair and so far as humanly possible we do whatever we can to assist pensioners and patients, and this will be taken into account in any review.

    Home Help Service, The Hartlepools
    Mr. Leadbitterasked the Minister of Health how many home helps are available in West Hartlepool and Hartlepool, respectively; what is the number of applicants for home help service, and the number receiving such service; and how many in-patients in the Hartlepools Group of Hospitals could be relieved of hospital care if home help service was available for them.
    Mr. Loughlin: Sixty-three and 15 (in whole-time equivalents); 504 and 101: 484 and 101, respectively. Information on the last part of the Question is not available.
    Mr. Leadbitter: Can my hon. Friend say that during the present general review of the services this service will be given special attention particularly in relation to the latter part of my Question? Will he agree that this matter is of importance and that it ought to be the policy of the Department he represents that people ought not to stay in hospitals for too long when the home help service could be made available to them?
    Mr. Loughlin: I should not like to try to answer the last part of my hon. Friend's Question in reply to a supplementary Question because in-patients may need more than home helps and it would be necessary to have a very searching inquiry before answering that point. My hon. Friend may like to know that the ratio of home helps per thousand of the population in both West Hartlepool and the Hartlepools is higher than the national average and it is predicted that in 1973 it will still be higher than the national average.

  HOSPITALS

    Broadmoor Hospital (Staff)
    Mr. van Straubenzeeasked the Minister of Health what hours of overtime at plain-time rates are being worked per week by the staff at Broadmoor Hospital; and whether he will make a statement on the staff shortage there in the light of the security considerations involved.
    Mr. K. Robinson: An average of 692. There are vacancies for 49 male and nine female nurses in a total complement of 370. Thanks to the skill and devotion of the staff, very high standards of security are maintained.
    Mr. van Straubenzee: While quite understanding the Minister's difficulty in recruitment, does his Answer not show that the imposition of the 42-hour week last July has been largely nullified by the shortage of staff to implement it?
    Mr. Robinson: No. The implementation of the 42-hour week has meant that the staff have been working one and a half hours a week less, in other words, the overtime has gone up by only half an hour following the reduction of hours by two hours.

    Hospital Beds, London and Middlesex
    Mr. Pavittasked the Minister of Health how many hospital beds there are in the area served by the former London and Middlesex County Councils; how many are governed by teaching hospitals and how many are under the administra-
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    tion of regional hospital boards; and what estimate he has made of the number which are likely to be transferred to teaching hospitals in the next year.
    Mr. K. Robinson: In National Health Service hospitals, 51,639; of these 15,654 are administered by boards of governors of teaching hospitals and 35,985 by regional hospital boards.
    I am considering further proposals for transfer of beds to teaching hospitals, but have not yet made any decisions.
    Mr. Pavitt: Whilst recognising the tremendous efforts my right hon. Friend is making to get more doctors in teaching hospitals, may I ask him to bear in mind the long-term cogent reasons for the integration of teaching hospitals with the regional hospital boards?
    Mr. Robinson: When the time comes to consider the long-term aspects of the administration in the London area I shall bear the views of my hon. Friend in mind.

  ROYAL PATRIOTIC FUND CORPORATION (PAYMASTER-GENERAL'S DUTIES)
  Mr. Maxwell-Hyslopasked the Paymaster-General what are his duties ex officio as treasurer of the Royal Patriotic Fund Corporation; and whether these include responsibility for the investment portfolio.
  The Paymaster-General (Mr. George Wigg): The Answer, Sir, to the first part of the Question is "Nil personally"; the answer to the second part is "No, Sir".
  Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop: While thanking the right hon. Gentleman for that reply, may I ask why his duties are nil when it is laid down by Act of Parliament that he has duties as treasurer of the Royal Patriotic Fund Corporation?
  Mr. Wigg: The Act of Parliament appoints the Paymaster-General ex officio. The hon. Member asked what my duties are in that connection and they are nil. The position is exactly the same as for my 35 predecessors since the Act was passed.

  MINISTRY OF LABOUR

    Discrimination in Employment (I.L.O. Recommendation)
    Mr. Parkasked the Minister of Labour why Her Majesty's Government has not stated its policy towards the International Labour Office Recommendation on Discrimination in Employment 1958; and if it will now do so.
    The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Labour (Mr. Ernest Thornton): The present Government fully accept the general principle of both the Convention and Recommendation on Discrimination in Employment and Occupation that there should be no unfair discrimination in the field of employment. We are, however, not able to ratify the Convention as industrial practice in the United Kingdom is not entirely in accordance with its provisions.
    Mr. Park: I thank my hon. Friend for that Answer. Will he agree that there is abundant evidence of racial discrimination in industry which is increasing and that only by extending the provisions of the Race Relations Act to apply to employment practices is this trend likely to be arrested?
    Mr. Thornton: My Department's employment exchange managers have full instructions not to condone discrimination on race or colour under any circumstances.
    Mr. Freeson: Perhaps, therefore, my hon. Friend will explain why certain managers of employment exchanges are initiating inquiries with employers as to whether they will take coloured people or not, and not waiting for employers to submit their own discriminatory recommendations to them?
    Mr. Thornton: I am not aware of that, but if my hon. Friend will give me details I shall certainly have them looked into.

  NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES
  Mr. G. Campbellasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what proposals he has put forward for nuclear-free zones in Africa, Latin America or Central Europe.
  The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. George Thomson): As a general principle we would welcome the creation of nuclear-free zones in certain areas and provided the appropriate conditions are fulfilled.
  We are therefore watching with interest the efforts being made by African and Latin American states in this direction, but this is a matter primarily for the states concerned. Before a nuclear-free zone could be established in central Europe, a number of preconditions would have to be met. These include progress towards a political settlement in the area and in particular of the German question.
  Mr. Campbell: The answer, therefore, appears to be "No". Have the Government taken any action on this proposal, which appeared on page 21 of the Labour Party's manifesto?
  Mr. Thomson: I have stated our general welcome in principle for the idea of nuclear-free zones. We are following closely the efforts being made by a number of States in this direction. In particular, our Ambassador in Mexico City attended as an observer the last meeting of Latin American States to consider this.
  Mr. Philip Noel-Baker: Would the Minister of State recommend to his right hon. Friend that he should lay a White Paper before the House on this important matter, on which many proposals have been made by Ministers in Governments of both parties over the last ten years?
  Mr. Thomson: I will consult my right hon. Friend about my right hon. Friend's suggestion.
  Lord Balniel: As the Labour Party manifesto states that the Labour Government will put forward constructive proposals for establishing nuclear-free zones in Africa, Central Europe and Latin America, and as in the many speeches he has made the British Minister at the Disarmament Conference has never once referred to this matter, are we to assume that it has been given a very low priority?
  Mr. Thomson: I have just told the House that we welcome in principle the idea of nuclear-free zones and I have explained the kind of conditions in which we think this idea can be advanced. We think that nuclear-free zones could make

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  a very useful contribution to bringing about non-proliferation, to which we attach the highest importance.

  EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
  Mr. Eldon Griffithsasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if, in view of increasing British commercial, technical and cultural links with the Common Market, he will approach the President of the European Community with a view to arranging more frequent visits by Members of Parliament to the offices of the European Community in Brussels.
  The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Walter Padley): It is primarily for hon. Members to make their own arrangements to visit the European Economic Community at Brussels. I believe that the European Economic Community Commission would welcome any Members who wish to visit the headquarters of the Community, and I shall consider whether anything could be done to encourage such visits.
  Mr. Griffiths: I thank the Minister of State for that reply. Will he do his utmost to ensure that as far as possible large numbers of Members of this House and of other legislatures in Western Europe are able to meet more frequently to discuss this important matter?
  Mr. Padley: The members of the European Parliament are members of their national legislatures, and through the I.P.U. and other organisations there is a good deal of interchange. There is also an overlap between the membership of the European Parliament, the Council of Europe and the Assembly of Western European Union. Therefore, I think I can give the hon. Gentleman the assurance he asks for.

  GENOCIDE CONVENTION (STATEMENT)
  Sir B. Jannerasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he will announce Her Majesty's Government's decision concerning the question of United Kingdom accession to the Genocide Convention; and if he will make a statement.
  Mr. George Thomson: I am glad to be able to inform my hon. Friend that Her Majesty's Government have now decided that the United Kingdom should accede to the United Nations Genocide Convention. Since this Question raises very complex issues I will, with permission, arrange for a full statement to be circulated in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
  Sir B. Janner: May I say how grateful I am to my hon. Friend for having now made this declaration, which is of considerable interest to the whole civilised world and in particular to the Jewish communities of the world? May I ask my hon. Friend whether he realises that this is an endorsement of lifelong steps which were taken by Professor Lemkin, the whole of whose family were exterminated in concentration camps? All of us are extremely grateful for the Answer my hon. Friend has given.
  Lady Tweedsmuir: I welcome the announcement made by the Minister of State and fully realise that he is to publish a statement on this matter. However, in view of the great technical problems involved in this matter, problems which exercised his Department over a considerable time, could he give us an assurance that these difficulties are now completely removed?
  Mr. Thomson: Yes. As the noble Lady has said, the difficulty here was, in effect, a conflict of principles between our tradition of granting asylum to political fugitives and our desire to accede to this Convention, which the former Government said that they had accepted in principle. We believe after a fresh examination of these difficulties that they are not overriding. I think that when the noble Lady has studied the statement she will feel reassured that the traditional right of asylum for the genuine political fugitive is not prejudiced.
  Following is the Statement:
  As the House is aware the principal difficulty faced by successive Governments in this matter has stemmed from Article VII of the Convention which provides that offences of genocide should not be considered as political crimes for the purpose of extradition. It was felt that this provision together with the wide definition of genocide in Article II, as extended by the list of related offences in Article III, might place unacceptable limits on the right to grant political asylum. Her Majesty's Government have, however, now reached the conclusion that this difficulty is not overriding.

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  Accession to the Convention need not involve depriving the Home Secretary of the power which he has under existing legislation to refuse to order surrender in any case where the charge has been clearly fabricated in order to secure the return of an offender who is in reality wanted for political offences for which extradition would not otherwise be granted. On the other hand, in cases where a person has in fact committed an offence of genocide of the kind which the Convention requires to be punished, even if he can be shown to have been inspired by political motives, it would in our view be wrong in principle that he should be able to claim asylum on these grounds. Her Majesty's Government desire to do all in their power to prevent the abominable crime of genocide, to ensure that those who commit this crime are brought to justice, and to co-operate with the United Nations in its struggle to secure universal respect for human rights. They therefore intend at a suitable opportunity to introduce legislation to bring our domestic law into line with the Convention, in particular by ensuring that all the offences described in the Convention are covered by our criminal law, and to ensure that accession to it takes place as soon thereafter as possible.

  BALTIC AND HUNGARIAN BONDHOLDERS (CLAIMS)
  Sir W. Teelingasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he will make a statement on the present position of the negotiations for the settlement of the Baltic Bondholders' claims, the Hungarian Bondholders' claims, and the policy of Her Majesty's Government towards Soviet bloc countries claims; and if he will receive a deputation to discuss these matters.
  Mr. Padley: Negotiations with the Soviet Government on outstanding post-1939 claims on both sides were resumed in Moscow on 13th October and continued until 1st November, when it was agreed to have an interval to enable both delegations to report to their respective Governments.
  On the Bonded Debt claims against Hungary, I have nothing to add to my Written Answer of 26th October.
  The policy of Her Majesty's Government towards financial claims against the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe, and towards any claims they have against us, is the same as our policy towards any other country, namely, to try to reach a satisfactory settlement as soon as possible.
  On the hon. Member's last point, there are many people who have an interest
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  in these various claims. I hope to get into touch with the hon. Member soon about the possibility of a deputation being received at the Foreign Office.
  Sir W. Teeling: I thank the hon. Gentleman for that reply. With regard to the Hungarians, I fully realise that the matter is still confidential, but will the hon. Gentleman bear in mind that, according to my information, the Hungarians are prepared fully to service the loans which they received after the First World War from us, and since we are not pressing the Russians at the moment on the pre-First World War Czarist Bond problems, will he deal similarly with the Hungarian post-1919-20 problem and clear that before going on to the pre-First War debts?
  Mr. Padley: Since the Hungarian discussions have been confidential, it would be much better if at present I said no more about the matter.

  ANGLO-ARGENTINE TRAMWAYS COMPANY (CLAIM)
  Sir W. Teelingasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in view of the recent decision of the Argentine Supreme Court confirming that of the Appeal Court concerning Argentina's indebtedness to the Anglo-Argentine Tramways Company, what steps he proposes to take to support the claims of the Company for a settlement out of court; and what is the present position.
  Mr. Padley: Discussions between the Argentine Government and the Anglo-Argentine Tramways Company for an out-of-court settlement are now in progress. The Argentine Government are well aware of the importance which Her Majesty's Government attach to a settlement of the Company's claim. Her Majesty's Government will continue to give the Company such support as may be appropriate.
  Sir W. Teeling: Does the hon. Gentleman know whether our Embassy in Buenos Aires is at present helping this company, because in the old days when these problems were raised the Foreign Office always said that, once the Supreme Court had agreed that we were in the right, it would do everything it could to press the claim?
  Mr. Padley: The hon. Gentleman may rest assured that the Embassy in Buenos Aires is carrying out the policy as enunciated from this Box.
  Mr. Speaker: Order. It is difficult to control Question hour against a background of chattering.

  MINISTRY OF LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES

    Land Commission (Staff and Accommodation)
    Mr. Arthur Jonesasked the Minister of Land and Natural Resources what steps have been taken to ensure the necessary staffs and accommodation in anticipation of the implementation of the Government's proposals set out in the White Paper on the Land Commission.
    The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Land and Natural Resources (Mr. Arthur Skeffington):
    Arrangements are well in hand for designating staff and earmarking accommodation.
    Mr. Jones: Why have not these duties been added to those of the district valuer's office?
    Mr. Skeffington: The Valuation Department will be carrying out such part of the Commission's work as deals with valuation.

  LOCAL GOVERNMENT

    Cesspools (Untreated Sewage)
    Mr. John Hallasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government what evidence he has of danger to health from the tipping of untreated sewage from cesspools on to lands adjoining residential property.
    he Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government (Mr. James MacColl): There is no specific evidence that the spreading of cesspool contents over land is a significant danger to health; but it is certainly undesirable, especially where there are houses nearby.
    Mr. Hall: Is the Joint Parliamentary Secretary aware that in certain rural areas,
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    notably in my own, it is the custom to spread untreated sewage on to fields which very often are in close proximity to residential areas and that in certain parts of my constituency there have been outbreaks of dysentery in places of this kind which the local population attribute to this custom? Can he convince the people that there is no danger to health from spreading untreated sewage in this way?
    Mr. MacColl: I do not think there is any danger to health, but my right hon. Friend would not hide the fact that he regards it as an undesirable practice.
    Dr. Bennett: If the official view is that the tipping of untreated sewage is not a danger and is not to be deprecated, does not that amount to saying that cesspools are in fact unnecessary?
    Mr. MacColI: I did not say that the practice was not to be deprecated. In fact I said that my right hon. Friend did deprecate it. I said that there was no convincing evidence that it was a danger to health.
    Sir R. Thompson: Would the Joint Parliamentary Secretary look at this matter again? Does he realise that a few years ago the discharge of untreated sewage into the sea caused a major scandal and gave rise to grave doubts as to whether this really was a safe practice? Might not the same considerations apply when it is spread over land?
    Mr. MacColI: The discharge of untreated sewage into the sea has not been found to be a danger to health. It has been found to be a very unpleasant practice which as far as possible should be avoided.

    NEW MEMBER SWORN
    Alfred James Wellbeloved, esquire, for Erith and Crayford.
BALLOT FOR NOTICES OF MOTIONS
  Central Africa
  Mr. Anthony Fell: I beg to give notice that on Wednesday, 1st December, I shall call attention to the situation in Central Africa, and move a Resolution.
  Areas of High Unemployment
  Mr. S. O. Davies: I beg to give notice that on Wednesday, 1st December, I shall call attention to the urgent need of redeploying industries to those areas with high unemployment, especially those mining areas where pit closures are threatened, and move a Resolution.
  Cervical Cancer (Cytology Services)
  Mr. Clifford Williams: I beg to give notice that on Wednesday, 1st December, I shall call attention to the need for the speedy provision of cytology services for the detection of cervical cancer, and move a Resolution.
BILLS PRESENTED
  COAL INDUSTRY
  Bill to make provision with respect to borrowing by, and loans by the Minister of Power to, the National Coal Board; with respect to the capital reconstruction, and the; application of certain funds, of that Board; for the making of grants with the object of accelerating the redeployment of the manpower resources of that Board and the elimination of uneconomic colliery capacity; with respect to pensions or compensation for certain persons who have been members of that Board; and for connected purposes; presented by Mr. Lee; supported by Mr. George Brown, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Ross, Mr. J. Griffiths, Mr. MacDermot, and Mr. John Morris; read the First time; to be read a Second time Tomorrow and to be printed. [Bill 11.]

  LOCAL GOVERNMENT (PECUNIARY INTERESTS) (SCOTLAND)
  Bill to amend section 73 and 102 of the Local Government (Scotland) Act 1947; presented by Mr. Ross; supported by Dr. Dickson Mabon; read the First time; to
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  be read a Second time Tomorrow and to be printed. [Bill 12.]

  POST OFFICE SAVINGS BANK
  Bill to enable deposits in a post office savings bank to be received for investment in securities, and at rates of interest, other than those authorised by the Post Office Savings Bank Act 1954; to amend the provisions of that Act as to the making and receipt of deposits; and for purposes connected with those matters; presented by Mr. Benn; supported by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Ross, and Mr. Joseph Slater; read the First time; to be read a Second time Tomorrow and to be printed. [Bill 13.]

  BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
  Ordered,
  That the Proceedings upon Government Business may be entered upon and proceeded with at this day's Sitting at any hour, though opposed; and that Mr. Speaker shall not adjourn the House until he shall have reported the Royal Assent to any Act which has been agreed upon by both Houses.—[Mr. Bowden.]

  BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE (SOUTHERN RHODESIA BILL)
  Motion made,
  That the requirements of Standing Orders Nos. 83 (Certain proceedings relating to public money to be initiated in committee) and 87 (Procedure on motion for charge on public revenue) and of the practice of this House relating to the imposition of charges upon the people shall be deemed to have been complied with in respect of any provisions of the Southern Rhodesia Bill or of any Amendment thereto moved by a Minister of the Crown which authorise expenditure or the imposition of any such charge; and that immediately after the Bill to which this Order applies has been read a Second time it shall be considered in Committee of the whole House.—[Mr. Bowden.]
  [Queen's Recommendation signified]
  Question put and agreed to.

SOUTHERN RHODESIA BILL
Order for Second Reading read.
3.35 p.m.
The Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations (Mr. Arthur Bottomley): I have it in Command from the Queen to acquaint the House that Her Majesty, having been informed of the purport of the Southern Rhodesia Bill, has consented to place her prerogative and interest, so far as they are affected by the Bill, at the disposal of Parliament for the purposes of the Bill.
3.36 p.m.
The Attorney-General (Sir Eiwyn Jones): I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
It may be helpful to the House if I begin by endeavouring to place the Bill in the context of the present legal situation in Rhodesia. I do not need to remind the House that the purported declaration of independence on Thursday last by the then Government of Rhodesia and the subsequent handing down of a new Constitution by Mr. Smith and his associates were illegal, ineffective, and in all respects invalid. The House will also bear in mind that Mr. Smith and the rest of the former Ministers have been dismissed from office. Accordingly, the present position, as I see it, is as follows.
The Government of Rhodesia is Her Majesty acting through the Governor who is appointed by Her Majesty. This is the broad position, and it corresponds to that which obtains in all British Colonies, of which Rhodesia is one. But the powers of the Governor of Rhodesia are much circumscribed by the Constitution under which he acts. In the first place, he has not himself legislative power. The power to enact laws rests with the Legislative Assembly, but, of course, the Governor must assent to any Bill before it can take effect as law.
The executive power in Southern Rhodesia is vested in Her Majesty and— I am quoting from the relevant Section of the Constitution, Section 42:
"may be exercised on Her Majesty's behalf by the Governor or such other persons as may be authorised in that behalf by the Governor or by any law of the Legislature."
688
The Governor's executive powers derive from the Constitution. For example, he appoints the Ministers and the judges; he summons or prorogues, or dissolves, the Legislative Assembly, he exercises the prerogative of mercy, and so forth.
Secondly, he exercises the executive power under a number of Southern Rhodesian laws. But the Constitution requires the Governor, broadly speaking, to exercise his powers in accordance with the advice of his Ministers. However, as I have said, there are now no lawful Ministers in Rhodesia.
I will add a word about the third function of government—the judicial function. The Constitution of Rhodesia gives the judges security of tenure. They cannot be removed from office, except for inability to discharge their functions or for misbehaviour.
The House will have read with pleasure the statement reported in today's Press and made by Rhodesian judges yesterday that the judges of the High Court will continue to perform their duties in accordance with the law. There can be no doubt whatsoever what the law means in this context. It means the law of Rhodesia as established by and under the Constitution of 1961, or, of course, any Act of this Parliament.
I now turn to the Bill. Its first purpose is expressed, as the House will see, in Clause 1, and it is purely declaratory. The Clause declares that Southern Rhodesia remains a part of Her Majesty's Dominions and that the Government and Parliament of the United Kingdom have the responsibility and jurisdiction hitherto existing in respect of it. I will say a word in a moment in explanation Of the expression "Government of the United Kingdom" which is contained in this Clause.
The second purpose of the Bill is to give Her Majesty's Government power to make any Orders in Council which may appear necessary or expedient as a result of the rebellion with which we are now faced. The Orders in Council which the Government have in mind, besides one relating to the Constitution, will deal with a number of matters about which I will say a word in a moment.
I will first deal with what the Government have in mind in regard to the Constitution. As I have said, the Governor has no legislative powers. It

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is therefore proposed to fill this gap by conferring on Her Majesty full legislative powers to be exercised by Order in Council. At the same time it is proposed to render invalid any action by the Legislative Assembly of Rhodesia since 11th November. In regard to executive power, it is proposed to do two things— first, to provide that the executive authority in Southern Rhodesia may be exercised on Her Majesty's behalf by the Secretary of State; and, secondly, it is proposed to free the Governor from the limitation imposed on him by the Constitution to which I have already referred —that is to say, that he is bound in general to act in accordance with the advice of his Ministers. This may not be strictly necessary as at present, as I have said, there are no lawful Ministers, but it may be as well to make the position transparently clear.
Looking at the Bill in greater detail, I think that I have already explained the purpose of Clause 1. I want to say only a few words about the phrase "Government of the United Kingdom". These words have been expressly chosen for a number of reasons. The House will have in mind the words which are customarily used by this Parliament when it passes an Act to give independence to a Colony. The recent Malta Independence Act is a good illustration. It provides that
"Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom shall have no responsibility for the government of Malta."
On this occasion we are are asserting exactly the contrary proposition. We therefore say that the Government of the United Kingdom maintains responsibility and jurisdiction in respect of Rhodesia.
Secondly, the phrase "the Government of the United Kingdom" in the case of Rhodesia has important implications. The first is that British Ministers do advise the Queen on a number of constitutional matters relating to Rhodesia, in particular the appointment of a Governor and amendment of the Constitution under Her reserved powers. The second is that the Government of the United Kingdom are responsible for Rhodesia's external affairs and has, for instance, been answerable in the United Nations for what has been going on in Rhodesia.
The right hon. and learned Member for Warwick and Leamington (Sir J. Hobson) indicated on Friday that he
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would prefer a reference to the Crown. This certainly, if I may say so, would be technically correct. But it would not establish the points which I have just made with the necessary clarity.
Clause 2 is the main Clause of the Bill. It confers powers to make the Orders in Council which have become necessary as a result of the illegal declaration. Under Clause 2(1), such Orders in Council may make such provision in relation to Southern Rhodesia as appears to Her Majesty in Council to be necessary or expedient. The particular purposes for which that general power is to be used are set out in subsection (2) of the Clause. First, the Bill gives power to make Orders in Council for suspending, amending, revoking or adding to any of the provisions of the 1961 Constitution. As a result of the illegal declaration, although the constitutional status of Rhodesia remains as it was before, it has become necessary for Her Majesty's Government to take power to operate some of the constitutional functions and to ensure that measures which the illegal regime may purport to effect under the Constitution have no validity. Given the situation with which the Bill deals, powers of this sort are necessary, in my submission, but it is impossible to see the precise use which may have to be made of them.
For example, it will be necessary to provide that no laws may be made by the legislators of Southern Rhodesia and no business may be transacted by its Legislative Assembly. Provision will be made for the Secretary of State, by order in writing under his hand, at any time to prorogue the Legislative Assembly. In addition, it is contemplated that power will be conferred upon him to exercise or control the exercise of such of the executive functions of the Government of Southern Rhodesia as he may consider expedient.
The House will know that, as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said in the debate on Friday, it is not the intention of Her Majesty's Government to suspend the 1961 Constitution at this stage. Indeed, the Bill does not give the power to do so. Clause 2(2,a), as the House will see, refers to suspending, etc.
" any of the provisions of the Constitution "
It does not permit the total suspending or revocation of that Constitution or the

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making of a new constitution. The House will also note—lest that contention may not be entirely acceptable—that Clause 3(3) states in terms that
"the expiration of Section 2 of this Act shall not affect (b) the Constitution of Southern Rhodesia 1961 as in force immediately before the expiration of that Section."
That subsection clearly implies that the Constitution will remain in force albeit with such modifications as this House and Orders in Council may have made, and a similar argument applies to revoking any of the provisions of the Constitution.
Clause 2(2,6) provides for modifying, extending or suspending the operation of existing United Kingdom legislation in relation to Southern Rhodesia or persons or things belonging to or connected therewith. The position arising from the illegal declaration has made it necessary, first, to remove Southern Rhodesia from the position of privilege which it enjoyed as a loyal Colony and, secondly, to make special provision for the protection of loyal Rhodesian citizens. The powers in this subsection will enable Her Majesty to remove Rhodesia from the Commonwealth Preference Area, by an amendment of the Import Duties Act, 1958, and to confer on loyal Rhodesians additional rights to obtain citizenship by an amendment of the British Nationality Act, 1948.
As I said the other day, it is also proposed to restrict the return of alleged fugitive offenders to Rhodesia by amending the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, so as to enlarge the discretion given to the Secretary of State and to give a similar discretion to Colonial Governors in respect of fugitive offenders whose return is claimed.
Orders in Council under Clause 2 (2,c), which is also admittedly in broad terms, may also impose restrictions on transactions relating to Southern Rhodesia. Under this power it will, for example, be possible to make the requisite Order relieving the Minister of Agriculture from his obligations under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement to take an annual quota of sugar from Southern Rhodesia. Such an Order would also cancel the current contract under which the Sugar Board has agreed to buy sugar from Rhodesia in pursuance of the Agreement. No other Orders in pursuance of this power are at present
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contemplated, but, as the House will understand, it may be necessary to impose further prohibitions or restrictions at a later stage. In the presence of rebellion, we can never be sure what course the rebellion may take or what steps may be necessary to deal with it.
Mr. Jeremy Thorpe: Is it intended that this power of varying enactments will relate to Section 3 of the British Nationality Act, 1948, which places very severe limitations upon criminal liability?
The Attorney-General: All I can say at the moment about that matter is that it is under active consideration. I do not think I can say any more at the moment.
I should point out that the Orders in Council which may be made under Clause 2 may apply extra-territorially. The House will see the relevant words in the last four lines of page 1 of the Bill. The Orders may apply extra-territorially in the sense that they may regulate or prohibit actions in foreign countries or on the high seas by persons who are amenable to our laws. This means that if, for instance, a United Kingdom citizen sought to evade the provisions of this Clause by entering into the transaction with the illegal Government in a foreign country, he would still be caught by the provisions of this Clause.
Clause 2(3) authorises Orders in Council under Clause 2 to include necessary consequential provisions, and it provides that such Orders may be made to take effect from 11th November, 1965, that is to say, the date on which the illegal declaration was made. The House will accordingly see that this permits a certain, though a limited, measure of retrospection. That is regretted on this as on all occasions, but the House may think that it is necessary in the circumstances in which we find ourselves, with the sudden pronouncement, in the very course of negotiations, of a declaration of independence. In my submission, this power is necessary to enable us to establish beyond doubt the invalidity of certain actions taken in Southern Rhodesia since the declaration of independence. An example is the new constitution which the illegal regime has pretended to give to the Southern Rhodesian people.

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Subsection (4) permits subsequent revocation or variation of Orders in Council. Subsection (5) requires that Orders in Council under Clause 2 shall be laid before Parliament after being made. Unless during the 28 days following the making of an Order it is approved by Resolution of each House of Parliament, the Order will expire. The intention of this subsection is to provide that each Order in Council shall be effective as soon as it is made and to ensure that as soon as practicable the House has a full opportunity to debate the provisions of the Order and to signify approval. If an Order were to continue in force for 28 days without being approved, it would, of course, lapse.
I am able to assure the House—and I suspect that the House will want this assurance—that it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to provide early opportunity for Parliament's consideration of all Orders which are made under the Clause, and, of course, in particular the all-important Order relating to the Constitution.
Clause 3 provides that this Measure will be of temporary duration. Clause 2, which, as I have explained, is the operative part of the Bill, will expire at the end of one year after the passing of the Bill, unless it is continued in force by an Order in Council, which must be laid in draft before Parliament and approved by Resolution of each House before it can become effective.
Orders in Council under Clause 2 will lapse when that Clause itself expires and laws that have been modified by such Orders in Council, such as the Fugitive Offenders Act and the British Nationality Act, will then revert to their previous form. But the Constitution of Southern Rhodesia will retain the form which it has immediately before the Clause expires—that is to say, it will remain as modified by any Order in Council under Clause 2.
As to the last Clause, the House will observe that, although the Bill gives power to extend Orders in Council to dependent territories as well as to the British Isles, this is only for the purpose of effecting an Act of the United Kingdom Parliament extending to those territories or for making provision relating to British ships and aircraft.
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I hope that I have set out sufficiently the reasons for the Bill and have explained its various provisions. I have sought to show—and I am confident that the House will accept—that the Bill is necessary and necessary now. It may be that some right hon. and hon. Gentlemen may think that the Bill gives the Government powers that are too wide. But I must say, with all the emphasis at my command, that Her Majesty's Government feel that it is imperative to ask Parliament now for adequate powers to enable them to deal with a dangerous situation, the future course of which it is not possible now to forecast with any degree of certainty.
Sir Harry Legge-Bourke: Before the right hon. and learned Gentleman sits down, could he give an assurance that no Order in Council will be introduced which the Government believe is not capable of being fully implemented?
The Attorney-General: The Government will introduce such Orders in Council as in their opinion they deem necessary to deal with the situation and will expect all loyal Britons to rally to the law, whether in this House or in Rhodesia.
Mr. Philip Noel-Baker: Before my right hon. and learned Friend sits down—
Mr. Speaker: Order. I think that the Attorney-General has sat down.
4.1 p.m.
Sir John Hobson: No one can deny the gravity of the situation which faces the country. I should like to acknowledge that the country has a difficult problem to deal with both in relation to Southern Rhodesia and the responsibility of the Crown, the Government and Parliament of the United Kingdom for Southern Rhodesia, and to the international situation which is developing in relation to this problem. Both these are matters of which every right hon. and hon. Member must be fully conscious.
Certainly the Opposition are fully conscious of them and, therefore, believe that in these circumstances Parliament should help the Government to take special powers for dealing with this emergency. We are anxious, in these

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difficult and dangerous days, to maintain the national unity which we have had heretofore, the national unity which my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition has spoken for up to now and which was emphasised from these benches on Friday in the debate which is a background to the Bill and the problem that confronts us.
We on this side recognise the Government's need for special powers in this situation, that they need them quickly and that they will need them during the period of the emergency. The Attorney-General made clear, as is obvious, that it is the intention of the Government to take these powers only for the purpose of dealing with the emergency and as an interim measure, and that any long-term solution, particularly a constitutional solution, for Southern Rhodesia must be found by further legislation in this Parliament and is not to be sought by the use of powers being given under the Bill.
We recognise, too, that no one can say exactly how the situation will develop. Anything may occur. For that reason it is obvious that the Bill must be drawn up in reasonably wide terms. It is for these reasons that we do not oppose the Bill in principle. We are very ready to help it on its way. We trust that the House can pass it expeditiously and soon, and we hope that the national unity can be maintained.
We as an Opposition are ready to give our support to this Measure. We hope that this will assist in re-establishing a constitutional and legal Government in Rhodesia, and also that it will show to the world and those who are anxious about the determination of Britain to deal with this problem, that this country, which is responsible for dealing with the problem, can be left to deal with it.
We are grateful to the Government also for advising us in advance of their intention to introduce the Bill and for giving some of us the opportunity to see it. We are particularly grateful that, after the discussions we had, they have acceded to some of the suggestions we made, and I am sure that this will assist the passage of the Bill. First, we are very grateful that they agreed that the Orders in Council should be subject to affirmative and not to negative Resolution. I am sure that
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this is important. Obviously, in a matter of this sort, Parliament should be in control of all these Orders and the affirmative procedure is the right way to deal with it.
We are also grateful for what the Attorney-General said today and the Prime Minister said the other day about the expedition with which important Orders will be brought forward for discussion in Parliament. As we understand it, the Government contend that any Orders which the Opposition regard as of particular importance or difficulty should be brought forward not only promptly but at a reasonable time of the day for discussion by the House. I am sure that this will assuage many doubts there may have been about the wisdom of having a 28 day period.
Of course, there may be many matters of a technical and abstruse nature, such as patents, for instance, which have to be dealt with by Orders in Council, and I do not suppose that anyone would insist that they should be dealt with in seven days, otherwise we should be spending the whole of our time in dealing with these matters in a constant stream. But I am sure that the Government and Opposition are in agreement that the really important matters are the matters which are likely to cause high questions of policy and difficulties and will, therefore, be brought before the House promptly and at a reasonable hour.
We are also grateful for what the Attorney-General has said about the suspension and revocation of the Constitution. There have been anxieties about whether it is right that the 1961 Rhodesian Constitution should be suspended for long periods or, indeed, should be revoked. We understand of course now that the Government are not intending either to rewrite the Constitution as a whole or to suspend it as a whole or to revoke it as a whole.
When the Solicitor-General replies, we should like to hear that the alterations that will be made in the Constitution will be only such as are immediately necessary to deal with the immediate situation and that there will not be an attempt, by these powers, to rewrite the whole Constitution and then, under provisions which the Attorney-General has explained, in Clause 3(3,6), leave Rhodesia

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lawfully under a Constitution which has been largely or wholly rewritten by use of emergency powers. We understand the Government not to intend that, but we should like the Solicitor-General to be good enough to clarify the point.
Clause 1 is declaratory, I suppose, for the purpose of international law, the law of the United Kingdom and the law of Rhodesia. How do the Government see the position upon a matter on which the Attorney-General has apparently been making some pronouncements in relation to whether or not these Ministers who have usurped power in Rhodesia are or are not guilty of treasonable activities? The question has already been indicated by the hon. Member for Devon, North (Mr. Thorpe) in his reference to Section 3 of British Nationality Act, 1948.
As I understand the position, of course primarily any of those who are acting illegally or who are usurping power in Rhodesia are subject to Rhodesian law. I am afraid that I am not an expert on Rhodesian law, but I understand that neither the Treason Act, 1351, nor the Treason Felony Act, 1848, apply in Rhodesia. The system of law there is Roman-Dutch, and how far the Attorney-General is an expert in Roman-Dutch law I know not. But are we to understand that under Rhodesian law those who usurp power are guilty of a particular offence there equivalent to treason? Perhaps the Solicitor-General can explain that.
There is, of course, the Rhodesian Act of Parliament, the Preservation of Constitutional Government Act, 1963, which the now illegal Ministers passed in order to prevent other people from subverting the Constitution which they themselves have now subverted. To that extent I understand that they would appear to be guilty of an offence under that Act.
I turn now to a matter of great interest to the House, the position under United Kingdom law. Are Mr. Smith and his Ministers in Rhodesia guilty of treason, or treason felony, or any other offence punishable under United Kingdom law? Does not that depend on whether they are Rhodesian citizens or citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies? As I understand the matter, if they are Rhodesian citizens and are not citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies, then
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they are not guilty, by virtue of Section 3 of the 1948 Act, of any offence against the laws of the United Kingdom.
The Attorney-General indicated assent.
Sir J. Hobson: I see the right hon. and learned Gentleman assenting. Perhaps his right hon. and learned Friend will deal with this important matter. It may have only the jurisdictional effect of determining whether such Ministers can be tried at the Old Bailey or must be tried in Rhodesia; but we should have this matter clear and the House and the country should know the extent to which any of these Ministers may be committing an offence against United Kingdom law.
The Attorney-General: Our understanding and information is that about half the members of the illegal Government are citizens of the United Kingdom.
Sir J. Hobson: I am grateful for that information. Perhaps the Solicitor-General will deal with the position as he sees it and will say whether I am right about the criminal liability in this country of those Ministers who are not citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies.
Mr. R. T. Paget (Northampton): This seems to be a matter of some importance. We have the example of Brigadier Skeen, whose treason was committed here, if it be treason, and who is a citizen of this country. If it be treason, then surely all who assisted and promoted his escape on Saturday are also guilty of treason. Can we have an assurance that they will be prosecuted and that no fear of favour will be shown, even if they should turn out to be members of Her Majesty's present Government?
Sir J. Hobson: I do not think I ought to be under an obligation to answer that question. I willingly hand it across the Table to the Solicitor-General who will no doubt be answering it. I am not the person to say whether anybody will be prosecuted for offences which occurred last Saturday, but that observation certainly raises a very interesting question. As I understand the position though, if any United Kingdom citizen has assisted in the unlawful seizure of power in Rhodesia, whether in Rhodesia or here, he will almost certainly be guilty of an offence against the 1848 Treason Felony

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Act and may possibly—although this is much more doubtful—be guilty of the more important treason under the 1351 Statute. Certainly there is a distinction between those who are Rhodesian citizens and those who are United Kingdom citizens. It is right that the House should understand the position, even though in the end it may come back only to the question of whether certain individuals should be prosecuted in Rhodesia or in London.
Last Friday I raised the issue of whether Clause 1 ought not to refer to the Crown instead of to the Government. I hope that its wording will not be a precedent for references to what are really the responsibilities and jurisdictions of the Crown. I regard this wording as a bad precedent. We do not wish to hold up the Bill, and this is far too important an occasion to indulge in an argument in Committee on the exact wording which should be used, and for that reason we shall not pursue it, but I would have been very much happier if the reference had been to the Crown and Parliament of the United Kingdom. The present wording may give some assistance to Mr. Smith who is now saying that the Governor of Rhodesia, who is Her Majesty's representative there, is really only the representative of the Prime Minister and his Government in this country. In this instance it is much better to refer to the Crown. All the difficulties which the Attorney-General mentioned would have been easily overcome by references to the Crown, or would not have arisen, because the Government in this country are in any event advisors to the Crown in all these matters.
This may be a technical matter, but I hope that this precedent will not be followed in future. Another difficulty arises. Who knows how wide a Government is? Anyone who has attended an eve of Session dinner given by the Government knows how wide "Government" goes. What on earth have junior Whips in the House of Lords to do with Rhodesia as members of the Government in the discharge of their ordinary duties?
I turn now to Clause 2. I do not think that it is right now to discuss the details of the constitutional Orders. The
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Attorney-General was good enough to indicate the form which they would take and we shall discuss all the Orders when they come up. Naturally we reserve our right and our position to examine each of them to see what it contains and to criticise it. It would not be right on this occasion to give any indication of what attitude we shall adopt, although, of course, we shall be willing to help all those Orders which are properly made and obviously necessary.
I have dealt with the question of the affirmative Resolution under Clause 2, and I am glad that undertakings have been given to bring forward important Orders promptly and at a reasonable time of the day. However, there is another matter on Clause 2 which causes anxiety. This arises in the last three lines of subsection (5).
Mr. Hector Hughes: On a point of order. Is not the right hon. and learned Gentleman addressing the House as though it were a Committee and dealing with Committee points rather than the matters of principle which should be raised on Second Reading?
Mr. Speaker: I am grateful to the hon. and learned Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Hector Hughes). When the right hon. and learned Gentleman is out of order, I will call him to order.
Sir J. Hobson: The Bill, as drafted, provides that in calculating the 28-day period no account shall be taken of any time during which Parliament is dissolved or prorogued, or during which both Houses are adjourned for more than four days. This is in very sharp distinction to our own Emergency Powers Act, 1920, which provides that an affirmative Resolution has to be passed within seven days and further provides that if Parliament is prorogued or adjourned for a period which will not have expired more than five days after Her Majesty makes a proclamation there is a duty to recall Parliament and Parliament must be recalled.
This may be of some importance as time goes on, for we may have a prolonged adjournment or prorogation, and, of course, when we get to next summer— when we hope that the whole of the emergency will be over, although it may not be—it would be possible for the Government to lay an Order at the end

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of July which Parliament would have no opportunity of affirming until November. To that extent these emergency powers would be being used over a prolonged period without any authority from Parliament.
I ask the Government to consider giving an undertaking in the same way as their undertaking about important Orders being brought forward promptly, so that if there were Orders of importance which the Opposition regarded as important and requiring discussion they would recall Parliament if it were prorogued or adjourned for any prolonged period which would otherwise prevent discussion. We can agree that there may be many small and technical Orders dealing with minor administrative matters when it would be absurd to recall Parliament, and we certainly do not suggest that Parliament should be recalled from a long adjournment for every Order made. But I would have thought that for important Orders of principle, particularly those which disturb the Opposition and which require discussion, the Government would undertake to terminate any prolonged adjournment or prorogation of Parliament.
I have only one other point, and that is on the use in Clause 2 of the word "revoke". If one thinks that there is a provision in the 1961 Constitution that is unnecessary during the emergency one can suspend it. As I understand the Bill, a part of the Constitution which is suspended only would, on the expiration of the Bill and by the operation of Clause 3, be revived. If one revoked a provision of the Constitution, on the other hand, the expiration of the Bill would not revive it because it would have been revoked permanently.
Why is it necessary to take powers to revoke parts of the Constitution permanently instead of merely suspending them, because if the whole object of the exercise is to provide only for the interim, surely we can deal with the interim period by a suspension? One can amend the Constitution for the interim period, and the amendments will continue. But what parts of the Constitution do the Government think they are going to revoke permanently so that even after the expiration of the Bill those sections will be revoked? Would not the powers of
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suspension be quite adequate, and why is it necessary under this interim Bill to take powers to do something permanently, when there is already power to amend and power to suspend?
Could the Government not give an undertaking not merely that they will not revoke the whole Constitution, but that they will not revoke permanently any major or important features of the Constitution, that they will only suspend it for the period of the emergency and then deal with the matter by legislation thereafter?
I appreciate that to some extent those are matters of detail, but if on Second Reading we could have assurances that are satisfactory, I am sure that it would greatly assist the passage of the Bill through the House and perhaps obviate the necessity for any Committee stage at all.
As I say, we certainly have no objection in principle to the Bill. We recognise its necessity, we recognise its urgency, and we recognise that this country has a long and creditable record for dealing with the problems of the Colonies. We hope that not only the House but everyone in Rhodesia and everyone outside this country and Rhodesia will recognise the unity of the House in the Opposition's supporting the Measure in trying to deal with the grave crisis that faces the nation.
4.22 p.m.
Mr. Sydney Silverman: The House recognises overwhelmingly the need for the Government to take wide powers, and most of us are ready to give them whatever powers they ask for in the matter.
All the same, when they come to specify the particular powers that they take, it would be for the House to consider the advisability of each one of the Orders on its merits. I think that we all understand that, because we are doing responsible and unusual things, and the fact that we give a general power to do them does not in any way enable us to abdicate our responsibilities for the precise things which they do.
All I am saying is that the House desires overwhelmingly, though there may be some exceptions, to give the Government in principle the power to do

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what they think necessary in these extremely difficult circumstances. If I intervene now, it is only to ask three questions of principle which seem to me to be important and difficult to raise on subsequent occasions when the actual Orders are brought before us.
The first is that I understand my right hon. and learned Friend to say that under the Bill they would have no power to suspend the whole of the 1961 Constitution. I cannot follow that. I speak with great diffidence, but, on the wording of the Bill, I should have thought that they had ample powers. If one looks first at subsection (2) of Clause 2, they make provision
"for suspending, amending, revoking or adding to any of the provisions of the Constitution of Southern Rhodesia 1961 ".
If one takes power to revoke or to suspend any of the provisions, for example, it must involve the power to revoke or suspend all of them. As far as I am concerned, I take no exception to that. Whether the Government would think it right to do so is a matter for them to consider and for us to consider when they come to us with the actual Orders which they ask the House to approve. But it seems to me that the Bill, if passed in its present form, would enable them to revoke or suspend all the provisions. That must be the inevitable outcome of taking power to suspend any of the provisions.
If there were any doubt about that, I would draw attention to the fact that subsection (2) of Clause 2 is expressed to be:
"Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1)",
and subsection (1) says:
"Her Majesty may, by Order in Council, make such provision in relation to Southern Rhodesia … as appears to Her to be necessary or expedient in consequence of any unconstitutional action taken therein."
Even if I were wrong on the subsidiary point arising under subsection (2), which is without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), as a direct consequence of subsection (1) there is power to revoke or suspend the whole of the 1961 Constitution if the Government wish to do so.
Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: If I may interrupt the hon. Gentleman, apart from the legal point which he is making,
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we would rely on what the Prime Minister himself said on Friday:
"We have no intention, as things are, of suspending the Constitution as a whole. Certainly, we should need very compelling reasons, which would first be put to the House."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 12th November, 1965; Vol. 720, c. 626.]
Mr. Silverman: The right hon. and learned Gentleman will see, if he recollects what I said, that I am not now dealing with the merits or demerits of suspending the whole of the Constitution. I am dealing with the point which my right hon. and learned Friend was making, that under the Bill the Government would have no power to do it. I am questioning that. I am saying that under the wording of the Bill, they would have ample power to do it if they saw fit. Whether we should think fit or not is a matter for discussion later on, but if I am right, I would not like the Bill to be accepted by the House under any mistaken notion that the Government would not have power to suspend the 1961 Constitution if they thought it necessary to do so within the terms of subsection (1) of Clause 2. That is my first point. I do not want to be too long about it, and I do not think that it is necessary to say any more about it.
The second question that it occurred to me as being worth while to ask was as to the generality of the power to amend the British Nationality Act in order to enable loyal citizens in Southern Rhodesia to become citizens of the United Kingdom instead of citizens of Rhodesia.
How far does that go? There are four million Africans in Southern Rhodesia, all of whom may be considered to be loyal for this purpose. Is it the Government's view that if any of them or all of them thought it necessary, for protection against intimidation, tyranny or oppression of any kind by the de facto illegal administration now operating in Southern Rhodesia, to claim British citizenship, they would be able to do so under the powers which the Government now take to amend the British Nationality Act, 1948, for that purpose.
That brings me to my third point, and that is the point about protecting loyal subjects in Southern Rhodesia against the disloyal and illegal exercise of power against them. This applies to a great many people, black and white. There are

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quite a number of white settlers in Southern Rhodesia who do not agree with Mr. Smith, and I quite understand that everybody will want to do everything in their power to protect them. Some of them are suffering restrictions already. What are we going to do about that?
I am talking about the white ones; I shall come to the others in a moment. What are we doing to protect them against restrictions merely because they oppose this illegal and usurping Administration's objections? I am thinking of Mr. Garfield Todd, and there are no doubt others. There is Mr. Baron, and others whom I do not need to list. We all know the sort of white settler in Rhodesia to whom this point might apply.
The principal point that I have in mind concerns the four million African citizens in Southern Rhodesia. By reason of illegal measures taken by Mr. Smith's Administration, all these people are subject at the moment to infringements of their liberty. They are not allowed to meet. They are not allowed to express opinions. They are not even allowed to know what is going on. It is an offence to tell them what is going on. It is an offence for them to listen to what is going on if anybody is courageous enough to try to tell them. A fortiori, if they do anything in pursuance of their duty and loyalty to this country, they are a long way off, and they are subject to powers which the illegal Administration would not hesitate to exercise. What do the Government have in mind for the protection of these four million coloured loyal subjects of this country in circumstances where it is only their loyalty that places them in danger? Many of us would like to have some idea of what the Government have in mind on this point, because one has to remember that the whole trouble arises out of the permanent denial to these four million subjects, these four million British citizens, or citizens of Southern Rhodesia, of ordinary, normal, equal citizenship and rights.
The whole trouble arises out of that, and if the state of emergency is going to inure to their disadvantage—and I am using very mild words—only because of their loyalty to the laws of this country, then it is incumbent on this House, which in this Bill is asserting its duty and its
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power to govern the whole of Southern Rhodesia, to do something to protect them.
Sir Arthur Vere Harvey: I understand the hon. Gentleman's argument, but can he suggest any method by which all these four million people can be given the facilities which he is suggesting, bearing in mind that they are six thousand miles away?
Mr. Silverman: I could answer that question. I could suggest quite a number of things that could be done, but I am not sure that I would be in order in doing so. One could think of much more stringent sanctions than the Government are imposing, even if one went no further than that.
If any of these four million people were to rise in revolt, not against this House, not against Great Britain, but against a gang of people whom by this Bill we are declaring to be traitors, to be pursuing treasonable activities, what would happen? Supposing they do their duty? It may well be their duty—certainly if it is in their power it will become their duty—to assert their own power against Mr. Smith and his colleagues. One would like to know whether, under this Bill, they will be committing any illegal act, or whether this country, or the Government of this country which by this Bill are asserting, and rightly asserting, their responsibility for their protection, would do anything against them?
More, would we do anything to assist them, or would we disclaim all responsibility in that connection? Would we wash our hands of them? Would we say,"This is nothing to do with us "? I ask that because it is no good granting a Government's claim to be the sole Government of a country unless they are prepared to do their duty as a Government with regard to all the inhabitants of the country of which they are claiming to be the rulers.
That is a point which the House of Commons has to bear in mind when it is facing this matter seriously and responsibly. It is all very well to say, as has been said on more than one occasion from both Front Benches, that we must preserve law and order. What does preserving law and order mean? Does it

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mean submitting to a treasonable Government, or does it mean resisting them? Or does it mean doing neither and being merely acquiescent? A great many people might prefer to acquiesce, and no doubt no one would blame them if they preferred to take no risks, but not all of them would adopt that attitude. Some of them may do what men and women of all ages and of all colours have done throughout the history of the world— defend themselves and their liberty against anyone who is determined to attack it, no matter what risks they may take.
One cannot say to them, "Do not do it because you cannot succeed ". We did not say that in June, 1940. We would have no right to say it to the Africans in Southern Rhodesia today. I have spent the whole of my political life saying that force is no remedy. I still say that force is no remedy, and I am not appealing to the Government to use force at this time. I think it would be wrong, and I think it would be injudicious. I think that it would be ineffective, and that it would add to the dangers of the situation. I am not blaming them for that. I am making a different point.
Suppose people who are subject, as we are not, to this illegal tyranny decided to defend themselves? My ideas about the use of force are not binding on them, and why should they be? They would be free to do it, and what I would like to know from the Government is whether they would take steps against those people, take steps for them, or wash their hands of the whole matter and say, "Fight for yourselves and we will come to your rescue if you win ". I do not think that many of us would be satisfied with that, and I am sure that that is not the Government's intention, but I should like to have some assurance on these points before we part with the Second Reading of the Bill.
4.40 p.m.
Sir Kenneth Pickthorn: It is extremely disagreeable, when a State is in external danger or difficulty—as ours now is—to put oneself in a posture which might seem grudging in support of one's Government. I have no such intention. What we are—I was going to say fighting for—struggling for, standing for, is said to be law and order. I agree with the
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hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Sydney Silverman) that—putting the matter in his words, as nearly as I remember them—it is all very well to say that what we are after is law and order, but what is law and order?
I suppose that in this place one may be forgiven for assuming that a great part of it, and a great factor for it, in the past and in the future has been, will be, and is the authority of this House. With respect to the learned Attorney-General, I do not take the view that his two statements—one the other day and one today—cover all the points about which the House ought to be better informed and more reassured than it yet can be. I am not for a moment being hostile when I say this, but I do not think that he can be said to have covered all the points.
There is therefore a duty—and a greater duty, because of my first sentence and because of the wide agreement between the two Front Benches—upon any one on the back benches who feels any doubt at all about any part of the Bill, to do his best to question the Government upon it. I make this statement with the more confidence because I have lived to see all this before. One of the few poor consolations of senility is that one has seen all the worst films round at least once before.
On the last great occasion there were very few people then and now still in the House who took any particular interest in this question. That occasion was the 1939 war and just after. One is the present Solicitor-General, who took an honourable and active part, and another, who took a less large if not less honourable part, is the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne. I also took some active part in these matters then. If three-quarters of the present Members of the House had been through all that, the enthusiastic acquiescence—if there can be enthusiastic acquiescence—of what has been said by the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne would not come so easily.
In the context of this kind of Bill— which is an adjectival procedural thing— none of the points which I shall raise can be called, save from the latitude of Aberdeen, mere Committee points: they add up to a Second Reading speech. I hope that if Amendments are put down I shall be the shorter in my references to those

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points in dealing with such Amendments, should any of the points that I am making prove to be Committee points as well as Second Reading points. I propose to put them now, or most of them—with your permission, Mr. Deputy Speaker—in the order in which they occur in the Bill.
My first point deals with the short notice that we have had, signalised by what I said just now about the fact that Amendments cannot be put down until after the Second Reading. It was not possible to read the Bill until lunch-time on Friday, and I had engagements from that moment almost to this. Although they were trifling or trivial, in a sense, partly small constituency engagements— and although bearing in mind the duty always to put Parliamentary business first —it was extremely difficult to cut them. I have no doubt that most of us—and I am sorry but not apologetic for this— come to this debate much less prepared than a man ought to be coming to a debate of this sort.
Those persons least partisan and best informed about this business of delegated legislation—those of such persons who have written about it—have almost all, so far as I can remember, said that the moment of any Parliament's retention of a proper relation between it and an enabling Bill is this moment—the Second Reading moment. If that is so, I do not complain, but I say to the Government and the Treasury Bench that they now owe us ever)' consideration because they, Heaven knows, have landed us in the position of having come to this debate so ill-prepared as I feel myself to be and I have no doubt that some of my hon. Friends are.
I am not a lawyer, but with regard to Clause 1—the declaratory Clause—it has always seemed to be dubious often, whether declaration strengthens or weakens. It is particularly dubious where the converse of what one is declaring is not reliable. Authority, responsibility, jurisdiction—all these things depend upon allegiance, and allegiance depends upon protection. The point about the situation in which we now are is that neither we nor any other Power has a normal capacity to protect subjects in Rhodesia.
I have hastily turned over most previous Bills of this sort, but I am relying mainly on my memory, defective—some of them were a long time ago, for instance of
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1939—when I say that they have all been limited mainly by their declaration of purpose. A simple example was the Defence of the Realm Act, passed in August, 1914. The purpose then was simply to win the war. Here, the operative subsection—Clause 2(1)—does not tell us what the purpose is. What it tells us is that anything to do with Rhodesia shall come within the ambit of action by the Government, just as other Bills might have told us that this was the case in regard to anything to do with Germany or Korea, or some colony where there had been a disastrous hurricane or fire. But the policy has not been made clear, only the territory and persons aimed at.
If it should be assumed that the policy is to restore law and order, I must remind the House—I am sorry that the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne has left, because I should like to have had a confirmatory nod from him—of what the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne said about law and order. In earlier cases this was the main limitation on the scope of such a Bill as this—it was known what the Bill was for. Here we do not know that at all, expressly. In all previous Bills of this nature the general purpose has been expressed, and generally we have had a series of examples—(a), (b), (c), (d) and (e)—in which detailed points of the general policy have been set out. Here, we have not got that.
Then, Ministers can give legislative authority to anything connected with Southern Rhodesia which "appears to Her Majesty" to be expedient. My recollection is not good but hon. and learned Gentlemen will remember the cases of Bayer and Liversedge and other such cases. My vague amateur memory of such things is that these words are designed to make it quite plain that from this matter courts are wholly excluded. I do not at all want to argue whether that is right or wrong. On the whole, I think, it is probably right. What I do want to argue is that it should be made quite plain by the Treasury Bench what these words are designed to do.
Incidentally, I may remind the Solicitor-General that he was on the anti-Government side on this on one occasion —in the 18b debate—when he was in favour of the Home Secretary being bound to accept the advice of his advisory committee. I thought at the time

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that he was wrong. Now, no doubt, he thinks he was wrong. Now he has jolly well got to.
There are one or two things which worry me about subsection (3). The Attorney-General said—he said it exactly like an uncle in a pious family muttering a prayer because he thinks it due to the presence of his sister and his niece that it should seem habitual—that retrospective legislation is always bad. I have heard many Attorneys say, "Retrospective legislation is always bad:" I have never heard one say so except when he was moving such legislation. It is an absolutely invariable rule that, on all other occasions, private and public, they find it extremely debatable. But when it comes to moving retrospective legislation, they always say that it is, in its nature, bad. So, by Heaven, it is. So are Attorneys, of course: so am I and all miserable sinners. But they ought to remember a little their better selves about this legislation.
Is it really necessary to make, not only in the interval between now and the time when the potential orders are initiated, orders in council retrospective on and on and on, continued retrospection? I cannot believe that it is really necessary. If it is necessary, we ought to be told how and I can produce very good quotations, from the hon. and I think not quite learned Member for Islington, East (Sir Eric Fletcher) about the law on retrospection. He was on the right side once and I hope that he will agree that this is an occasion when this should be remembered.
Then, the 28 days provision. In earlier Bills of this sort, it has been sometimes none, sometimes seven, sometimes fourteen, sometimes 28—differing periods for differing kinds of order. This 28 days is a very long time. Is it really necessary to provide for 28 days? On the face of it, it is not necessary, and, on the face of the logic of the matter, it cannot be necessary, because it is recommended from the two Front Benches on the ground that on any matters of the least importance, it will be something much shorter. If they know that they can do that now, it must be plain that the 28 days is a dangerously long period in this Bill and I would ask now for further consideration of that.
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Then there is the point about prorogation, which I think has been dealt with sufficiently. I think that those are all the separate points which I need to mention. They are none of them mere committee points. They are suitable no doubt in committee but are not committee points which would be unsuitable at this moment. I hope that no one will think that I mention any of them in any intention of opposition or obstruction. On the policy of Her Majesty's Government, though I believe that it could, with a little ingenuity, be brought into order on Second Reading of this Bill—I believe that we might all talk almost until this Rhodesia business is over—but, for the purposes of my argument now, I am not on the policy. I am not at all concerned to make things difficult either for the Government or for my own leaders, in respect to whom I yield to no one.
But I wish to make clear that it is difficult for Parliament to get back from these things once gone wrong. That reminds me of one other thing which I ought to mention—the "grandchildren" of delegated legislation. The Solicitor-General will remember that that expression became a technical term, because, under the delegated legislation of the last war—not under all of it, but certainly under most of it—the House had no right to see, still less to debate or move against, not the Order by the Regulations issued under the Order and these came to be called the grandchildren.
That was put right in 1947 or 1948, I have forgotten which, in one of the two Socialist Supplies and Services Bills which went very far towards strengthening the executive against the legislature—I think disgracefully far. That is not partisan: I think many hon. Members opposite thought so as well at that time. But they did one good thing in that Bill— they made it possible for the House to inspect and have some control over the Regulations issued under Orders.
It may not be vitally important now— it might never become important, although it did become extremely important in the past—and if this goes on for many weeks, it might become extremely important. Ministers ought to be clear what they should do about this and the House ought to be clear about what it wants them to do about this, before it parts with this Bill.
4.58 p.m.
Mr. Julian Amery: In the debate on Friday, the Government invited us to discuss the Rhodesian situation and we had a very good talk. Today, we are being asked to take action. This Bill marks the first stage of a journey and none of us knows where this journey will end. It is very important that we should examine this Measure, both its purposes and its consequences, very dispassionately—not in a mood of emotion, but as surgeons and doctors would examine a case.
The Bill confers immense powers on the Government. I hope that when the Solicitor-General winds up, he will be able to answer some of the points which were raised by the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Sydney Silverman). I am no lawyer, but I thought that his argument sounded overwhelming. I was impressed by the fact that, in opening the debate, the Attorney-General said that the Government had no intention of suspending the Constitution "at this stage ". In a quotation from the Prime Minister which my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Wirral (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd) read to the House when he sprang, with characteristic chivalry, to the Government's defence, there is also a qualifying phrase. "Not at present" were the words which the Prime Minister used. We should have an answer on this, because it is of vital importance both to the strategy on which the Government are embarked and to the hopes of bringing an end to the present rebellion.
I want to look at the Bill, first of all, in the context of the negotiations which failed and which led to U.D.I. in Salisbury and to this Bill in the House of Commons. I do not altogether share the admiration which some have for the Prime Minister as a negotiator. I do not think that he did any better in this negotiation than over Kashmir or Vietnam. There is a golden rule in negotiation. There is a time when, by giving an inch, one can save a mile, and, later on, there comes a time when, by giving a mile, one cannot even save an inch. It seems to me that the Prime Minister dribbled out his concessions under pressure and so—and this is what is relevant to the Bill—increased mistrust.
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The real reason for the breakdown was the inability to overcome the mistrust which existed on both sides in the negotiations. On the United Kingdom side, there was a mistrust that, if we gave independence on the basis of the 1961 Constitution, the Constitution which this Bill gives power to revoke, the Rhodesians would use it to introduce regressive measures which would injure the position of the Africans in Southern Rhodesia. Looking back on our experience in South Africa, no one can say that there was not some basis for that mistrust. On Mr. Smith's side, there was a mistrust that Britain, had the Rhodesians gone on without seeking independence, might at some time have gone back upon the conventions under which we undertook not to interfere in the internal legislation of Rhodesia or to amend the Constitution on our own initiative. Many speeches must have lent colour to that mistrust. None more than the speech of the Archbishop, which came, I think, at a very unfortunate time.
Yet there were some people in Rhodesia—Europeans—who did trust the British Government, who wanted to go on working with us. But on what basis? Not on a basis of independence bringing speedy majority rule. They wanted to go on on the basis of the 1961 Constitution without independence. It will come as a severe shock to them, to moderate men among the Europeans, that the Government are taking power to revoke, suspend or amend the Constitution, that they are putting themselves in a position from which they could impose a constitutional settlement if they were to prevail in their struggle with the rebel Government.
We must demand from the Government a clear assurance that there is no intention of imposing a constitutional settlement upon the Rhodesian people and that any ultimate settlement must come from agreement with a Rhodesian Government elected on the basis of the 1961 Constitution—unamended.
Mrs. Lena Jeger (Holborn and St. Pancras, South): Was it not the policy of the right hon. Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys), when he was in charge of negotiations, that the 1961 Constitution did not provide a sufficiently wide basis of franchise to justify the granting of independence?
Mr. Amery: The hon. Lady has misunderstood what I said. I said that I wanted an assurance from the Solicitor-General that we would not, under the powers conferred on the Government by the Bill, seek to impose a settlement on the Rhodesian people and that any settlement to be arrived at for independence must be negotiated between the Government of this country and a Rhodesian Government, when one can be formed legally on the basis of the 1961 Constitution not amended unilaterally under this Bill.
The Bill is the centrepiece of a series of measures—I do not call them punitive measures but coercive measures— designed, as the Prime Minister told us, to bring down the Smith regime. It is only reasonable, before we give our assent to it, to ask ourselves whether these measures are likely to succeed. I asked the Prime Minister this in the debate on Friday, and he said that he thought that they would succeed. If the measures so far introduced, including the ones to which reference is made under the Bill—that is, those relating to the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement and the Fugitive Offenders Act—are calculated to succeed, why are the Government taking such very wide powers? Why do they want to be able to bring in their Order at once and leave as long as 28 days thereafter, perhaps the whole of a Recess, before the House has an opportunity to pass judgment? Is this emergency procedure necessary for the Fugitive Offenders Act or for terminating Rhodesia's share in the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement?
Suppose that the Prime Minister is wrong and the measures so far announced are not enough and do not work, how far will the Government go? How do they mean to fill in this blank cheque which they are asking the House to give them? At the end of his speech the other day, the Prime Minister read an eloquent quotation from words used by Sir Winston Churchill at the time of the Abyssinian war. What Sir Winston Churchill was saying, in effect, was, "If you embark on sanctions, you must be prepared to go the whole hog" Are the Government prepared to go the whole hog? Is the Bill intended to provide them with the means of escalating sanctions, and how far would they go?
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Is their object to create economic chaos in Rhodesia? Is it their wish to create disorder as the means of restoring law? I should be sorry for any of the officers and judges in Rhodesia now asked to maintain order if they were to find themselves doing so against disorder deliberately brought about by the Government's policy. Therefore, I seek the further assurance from the Solicitor-General that he has no intention, and the Government have no intention, to use the powers under the Bill to enable them to undertake an escalation of sanctions against Rhodesia.
Mr. K. Zilliacus: Does the right hon. Gentleman agree with the Prime Minister's statement on Friday that the object of sanctions is to put an end to the rebellion, and is it not a matter for Mr. Smith and his friends to decide how far they are prepared to go in defying law and order and their constitutional duty? Do not we have to escalate sanctions until such point as the rebellion is defeated?
Hon. Members: Ah.
Mr. Amery: The point the hon. Gentleman makes is perfectly tenable from his point of view, but it is not the point I understood the Prime Minister to make. He said that he thought the present measures would do. He brushed aside any idea of oil sanctions the other day. How far does he want to fill in the blank cheque? The Bill confers enormous powers.
I gravely doubt that economic sanctions would achieve the result which the Government have in mind. Oil is an obvious case. We all know that it is difficult to deny oil to Southern Rhodesia without denying it to Zambia as well.
Those who have studied the economy of Southern Rhodesia are all convinced that it would take several months before the present sanctions even begin to bite, let alone to take effect. Those who know the psychology of the Rhodesians will agree with me, I think, that they are not very likely to be impressed by these measures. They are men very like ourselves with, perhaps, something of a Cromwellian readiness to accept some austerity and hardship in a cause which they believe, rightly or wrongly—I think wrongly—to be just.

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But, over and above that, there is a fact of power politics which the House must not overlook. No doubt, the South African and Portuguese Governments would be glad to see this matter resolved in a friendly way by reconciliation. They have no interest in a crisis breaking out in Southern Africa. But they could not easily allow Mr. Smith to be brought to his knees; and, unless we are prepared to extend the conflict to the whole of Southern Africa, whether by sanctions or other means, we shall find it impossible to bring the rebellion to its knees.
I know that there are some who would be glad to embark on a crusade to impose majority rule throughout Southern Africa. But this is a notion which does not commend itself to the House as a whole. Why should we undertake the damage which our own country would suffer and run the risks which could escalate beyond our control? Already, the sanctions proposed will add £30 million or £40 million to our dollar payments each year. It is not a big thing, but it is not a small thing either. I can well imagine the kind of comment we should hear from many quarters in the House, if it were proposed to do this as a gesture, in some other context. But why should we do it? Of course, we cannot condone rebellion. But the effort we make to suppress rebellion must correspond to some extent to the injury which we suffer from the rebellion. Certainly this is a rebellion, but it is a rebellion wrapped up in the Union Jack, and I cannot imagine a rebellion less directed against British interests.
Is there really any great principle at stake here? [HON. MEMBERS: "Yes."] There has been a lot of talk about one man, one vote. But the Prime Minister has mads clear that this is not the issue at stake. He was quite prepared to go on under the 1961 Constitution, and under that Constitution there would be no question of one man, one vote for at least 15 years and, some Rhodesians think, for 50.
The truth is that a new doctrine has been evolved recently. It is that Britain should not hand over independence except to a Government elected on a "one-man, one-vote" principle. This is a new doctrine. It did not always exist. It is being applied in Africa. No matter
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whether all of us know that the democratically elected Government to which we hand over will soon be replaced by a dictatorship. No matter whether a dictatorship would in truth give way to barbarism. That would not be our responsibility. That is the new doctrine. It is not a principle or, if it is, it is the principle of Pontius Pilate, who said: "Choose between the two, Barabbas or Christ. I wash my hands of the death of this just man ". I am convinced that there is no principle at stake. But I agree that there are great interests involved and that the Government have a right to take powers to try to defend these interests.
What, then, are these interests? It is on the basis of them that the two parties have the most in common. We have no great economic interests in Rhodesia. But we have great interests in South Africa and Zambia. We do not want to see a conflagration in a part of the world from which we draw so much of our raw materials, and where we have vital markets. And the Government must be prepared to guard these interests and to show themselves determined to guard them. But how is this to be done?
This must, of course, be a matter of judgment and the Executive must judge. It may be that the emotions of the United Nations are sham emotions. If they are, then sham measures like these may be justified, but it is unwise for a great country like ours to base its policy on shams.
I would advise the Government, in all humility, not to exaggerate the danger to our interests from international intervention; not to exaggerate the peril of Red troops in blue berets. We have had some experience of this. The United Nations force in the Congo would have been powerless without American transport support—given not by the United Nations but at the request of the Congolese Government. I do not think that the Americans would be likely to do that in this context.
Nor do I think that Soviet Union intervention is at all likely. It fell to me as Secretary of State for Air to advise the Government of the day on how far the Soviet Union could support the Gizenga r6gime established in Stanleyville in the North of the Congo. After considering the best information and intelligence reports, it became clear that, even with the

719
help of Egyptian bases, the Russians could not sustain a military effort of any size in Stanleyville.
We are today talking about a crisis 1,500 miles further south, where it would not be Tshombe's mercenaries that would face the Soviets but the second best army in the African continent. I do not think we need worry overmuch about Red troops in blue berets.
Of course, these are deep issues for the Commonwealth—and here again the Government are right to arm themselves with powers to try to minimise the stresses which might be imposed upon the Commonwealth. But let us be clear about this. The Commonwealth is not as united on this matter as it might appear. The Australians have already made it clear that they are not so sure about the sanctions. In Africa the pressure for violent action seems to increase the further from Rhodesia one gets. Zambia and Malawi are rather cautious. No wonder. They need to be realistic in view of their nearness to the scene. I urge the Government not to be frightened of too many of the stresses in the Commonwealth, nor of international intervention. Do not let them become "frightened little men ".
I appreciate that Her Majesty's Government have a difficult hand to play. They believe that sanctions will work and I hope that the sanctions which they have announced will be enough, but I doubt it.
I trust that Her Majesty's Government will not embark on or become committed to what one might call a policy of unconditional surrender. It would be easy to fill in this Bill to make it so unacceptable to European Rhodesian opinion that it would be imposing unconditional surrender on them.
I do not think that Her Majesty's Government will get a victory by sanctions, or by force, or by bringing about economic chaos. What, then, should we advise them to do? They are the Executive and must play the hand—[Interruption.]—but the important thing, I submit, will be to gain time to enable passions to cool here, in Salisbury and the rest of the world. Gain time for what?
There will be no return to colonial rule. This is a chapter from the past. One cannot put the clock back. But we must hope and work for the time when
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reconciliation will be possible. It may be that, if we are patient, wise and fair, an independent Rhodesian Government may judge it right to make some of the concessions to world opinion which as a Colony they were not prepared to do. Then will be our chance, perhaps, to take an independent Rhodesian Government by the hand and lead them into the comity of nations. Perhaps one day it may even be possible for us to lead that Government into Commonwealth membership. After all, no country per head of population has done so much by way of economic development and military sacrifice to serve the Commonwealth.
5.16 p.m.
Dr. Jeremy Bray: The right hon. Member for Preston, North (Mr. J. Amery) considers that no questions of principle are involved in the Bill or in this debate. I feel bound to rise to dispute that with him, for I am sure that he does not carry the whole House with him in that view.
Much of the difficulty of the whole Rhodesian situation is that there are great principles involved on both sides. It is the way we see the current course of history that makes the solution of the problem of Rhodesia such a desperately important one for us in the House of Commons to face. It is too grave a matter to approach on purely party lines. It raises principles on which we are agreed across the Floor of the House— for example, the principle of free government—and requires an understanding of human attitudes in Rhodesia to which we need to contribute from both sides of the House. I accept this, and the right hon. Member for Preston, North has his contribution to make, too.
I wish to speak particularly of the conscience of Rhodesia as expressed today by the Churches of Rhodesia and, at second hand, through the Churches in this country. The leaders and official representatives of the Churches of Britain meet in the British Council of Churches —and since I am the only member of that body in the House, I have been asked to put their point of view to the House.
All hon. Members, including my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition, will wish to

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think out, with the Churches, the implications of their beliefs for the action which, as the Government and as Parliament, we are called upon to take. The involvement of the Churches in Rhodesia in this situation is very deep and is widely acknowledged. They are responsible for 90 per cent. of the primary education of Africans there. They are also responsible for the greater part of the secondary and teacher-training education. Their efforts to increase the higher levels of education in Rhodesia, of Africans, have been positively opposed by the Smith regime; for example, by instructing the Churches to reduce by 25 per cent. the intake of Africans into teacher-training colleges next January.
The experience of the present and previous Governments in Britain when they have sought to increase the effort going into teacher training, further education and higher education has been that this has been opposed by the Smith regime. This is the daily experience of the Churches in their attempt to administer the machinery of education in Rhodesia up to the present.
Under such a regime it seems inescapable that the master-servant relationship with Africans will be maintained. It is this that the Churches of Rhodesia cannot accept. Hon. Members will have received a report of the consultation on human relations sponsored by the Christian Council of Rhodesia and held at the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland on 25th August of this year. We have just heard that this report has been suppressed by the censors in Salisbury, and cannot today be published in Rhodesia.
But this involvement of the Churches is not simply in education. It is the fact that the Churches are more closely bound up with the life of the Africans in the villages and towns of Rhodesia that has led them to protest at the grave injustice of the system of government which the illegal unilateral declaration of independence was intended to perpetuate. This involvement has brought to the Churches knowledge of the resentment—indeed, the hatred—nurtured by the system, and it is the African Christians in the villages and towns who know that, if Britain does not fulfil her obligations, Africans will take the law violently into their own hands.
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They fear far more the measures that they and their colleagues would take— their friends in Africa—than they fear any action that would be taken by Britain.
I think that the right hon. Member is displaying a lighthearted attitude to the lives of farmers—[HON. MEMBERS: "Nonsense."]—and whites in Rhodesia. These, I assure the House, are the reports from African Churches in the villages. These people are not agitators, but they live alongside the people there. It is these reports, collected directly from the people concerned by missionaries in Rhodesia, that have led the Churches to make their urgent representations to the Government.
The objective must certainly be to see that such changes as are made are brought about with the least possible suffering and loss of life. It was this background of information, of experience in Rhodesia today, that led the British Council of Churches at its meeting last month to resolve that in the event of a unilateral declaration of independence, rather than let the situation drift the British Government should be prepared to resume responsibility for government in Rhodesia. That is what we are doing in this Bill. As such, it has the support of the Churches: of their leaders meeting in the British Council of Churches.
The Prime Minister made the Government's position quite clear on Friday when, describing the objectives, he said:
"The question … is whether it is our policy to restore Rhodesia to the rule of law at the earliest possible moment, or whether we want to drag out the agony. This can be done, in our view, only by bringing the Rhodesia regime to an end, by making that regime unworkable and, indeed, creating a situation where at the earliest possible moment the people of Rhodesia, acting through the only legal Government there—the Governor —-themselves want to see and ask to see a lawful Government in its place."—[OFFICIAL REPORT. 12th November, 1965; Vol. 720, c. 633.]
But while these are the objectives of the Government, in their specific action the Government are conditioned, first, by the reactions of people in Rhodesia, secondly, by public opinion in this country and, thirdly, by world opinion, including opinion expressed in the United Nations. Since the Government have made their position clear, it is to the country and

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the Opposition—and the Leaders of the Opposition in particular—that the case for necessary action must be made.
There is no case for merely nominal sanctions leading after a short time to kiss-and-make-up with the Smith regime. This would show that Britain was abrogating her responsibilities, and would unleash violent reactions inside and outside Rhodesia which would quickly get out of control. To say that any other than formal sanctions would be punitive, merely to bring Rhodesia to its knees, is beside the point. When a driver is driving recklessly, dangerously, through a crowded shopping street heading, with his passengers, straight for disaster, we do not stop to talk about punishment and bringing the driver to his knees; we take the most effective possible means to stop the runaway car without risk, or with the minimum risk, to the people involved—
Mr. John Page: Hear, hear.
Dr. Bray: Yes—all right.
Therefore, we have to see whether the policy we have so far undertaken is the right one. If we go no further than the sanctions so far announced, those sanctions may produce—and it is devoutly to be hoped that they will produce—a speedy reaction, and an alternative regime in Rhodesia with which it is possible to negotiate.
Mr. John Page: The hon. Gentleman is talking about the passengers and trying to stop the runaway bus—which I do not think is a very good analogy, anyhow—and causing the minimum danger to the passengers and public. Surely, one does that as carefully as possible but, as far as I can see, the hon. Gentleman is saying that and starts by being careful but ultimately takes any means that one can to stop it, even with the maximum danger to the passengers and public.
Dr. Bray: I think that if the hon. Member will follow this argument, he will understand.
It is generally acknowledged that the economic sanctions will take time to work. This has been pointed out by hon. Members opposite. It will take a matter of months to show a serious effect. With
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the difficulties of credit for tobacco planters, the Treasury seem to think that it will take three or four months for inflation to get under way, unemployment having begun to increase meanwhile. But not only will the next tobacco crop not be available for sale before next Easter, but the British tobacco manufacturers seem to carry more than two years' stock of Rhodesian tobacco. The next year's crop could, presumably, be kept in warehouses in Rhodesia for a year or more on credit given to farmers by the Rhodesian Government, in the hope of later sale without interrupting the normal flow of business to Britain when affairs have settled down.
The Treasury, thank goodness, has no experience of Government under an authoritarian regime, and it would be a mistake to suppose that, with sufficiently repressive internal measures—price control, rationing, the lot—the Smith regime could not carry on, somehow, for many months, and possibly for years. In the deteriorating economic situation that Rhodesia would then face, with increasing unemployment, possibly with isolated acts of violence and retaliatory action between black and white, the danger is that within two years race relations there would have degenerated to the point where there was no future for white men in Rhodesia at all.
Mr. Paget: Hear, hear.
Dr. Bray: It is understandable that some hon. Members on both sides of the House shrink from this possibility, but the alternative is not weaker sanctions, but stronger sanctions, which can take effect more quickly. Indeed, the hon. Member for Antrim, North (Mr. Henry Clark), with whom I very seldom agree, said in Friday's debate that in many ways he would support strong sanctions in the hope that they would be taken off in a reasonably short period of time, rather than half-measures which might continue to eat out the economy of Rhodesia for a long time. What we, therefore, have to consider about sanctions is not their brutality or whether or not they are punitive, but their effectiveness in relation to the damage they do.
That means that we are driven directly to consider an oil embargo. Assuming

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that that is practicable, and with international reaction so far it would seem to be, I do not think that the Prime Minister needs persuading of its merits as a sanction—if one can talk of merits in this matter. But the Government cannot use this sanction, cannot lay on an oil embargo, until there has been time for reactions to show both in the world and in this country—until, indeed, there is some test possible of the measure of support that would be forthcoming. This has already begun to happen. We read in The Times today how Lord Malvern, with all his long experience of Rhodesia, pointed out that half-hearted sanctions would not have any effect on Rhodesia:
"They seem to be just playing at it, he said, but we shall know more after the debate in the House of Commons tomorrow. An oil sanction was the only one which would have a sudden effect on Rhodesia, ' but if they cannot find a way to fly in oil to Zambia they will kill that country too.'
It appeared that the best hope was for sanctions to work quickly to give the Government a rude awakening, otherwise Rhodesia would ' go down and down and down '".
Mr. John Farr: Will the hon. Member say how he thinks oil sanctions will be effective in view of the fact that both South Africa and Mozambique have good road and rail connections between their country and Rhodesia and could bring in all the oil needed?
Dr. Bray: If we were to have a debate on the practicability of oil sanctions I would take that up with the hon. Member for Harborough (Mr. Farr). That is for another time. But on the question of practicability, the oil requirements for South Africa are very well known. They are met largely from abroad. If those requirements were in any way increased for any reason they could be controlled by the suppliers. It is perfectly possible both in South Africa and Mozambique, provided there is world opinion behind an oil sanction, to make it effective. This is what needs time, to make it effective.
Mr. Paget: Has my hon. Friend considered the further point that neither Portugal nor South Africa could possibly allow oil sanctions to succeed because if the success of oil sanctions were given a precedent that precedent would immediately apply against them. Their survival depends on oil sanctions not being successful.
Dr. Bray: If my hon. and learned Friend assumes that we want to go about the world applying oil sanctions or any sanctions on anyone with whom we disagree on any minor, or indeed major, point, that may be so, but this is not so and it is to mistake the nature of our problems about Rhodesia today.
In the light of this need to minimise the suffering, the loss of life perhaps, in Rhodesia, I urge the leaders of the Opposition, in particular the Leader of the Opposition itself, to look very seriously at the attitude of his party to oil sanctions. Hard things have been said about the Leader of the Opposition, about his temporising on tobacco sanctions and giving way to sectional interests within his party—[HON. MEMBERS: "What sections?"]—but I feel that these things have not been justified. I admire the Leader of the Opposition in many ways but undoubtedly his attitude would be more understandable to the country as a whole if he were to show that his concern was genuinely to minimise the suffering in Rhodesia and to take the most effective means to that end. If he were prepared to support effective, decisive, immediate sanctions I am quite sure he would have the support of his party in the country and I am quite sure he would make it possible to exercise leadership in his party in future which it does not appear clear that he will be able to do as things now stand.
Most important of all is what we hold out to the people of Rhodesia in the long run. We have believed and still believe firmly in the possibility of a genuine multi-racial society in Rhodesia. We do not want to see the situation degenerating to a point where there is no future for white men there. We have spoken of a definite movement towards majority rule, not majority rule overnight. We are as anxious to assure the rights of the white Rhodesians as of coloured ones. We should go further and say that we are prepared to pay compensation for the property of those Rhodesians who after whatever settlement is reached decide that there is no future for them in Rhodesia and want to move to another part of the Commonwealth.
The principles of such a scheme were brought out in Kenya. The hon. Member for Haltemprice (Mr. Wall) has doubts

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about the efficacy with which that scheme worked, but we can make sure that it works in Rhodesia. The cost would be heavy but it need not be more heavy even than the continuation of the sanctions which we have undertaken.
Mr. Patrick Wall: Would the hon. Member agree that the example of Kenya is not a very good one, nor encouraging to Rhodesia?
Dr. Bray: There is some dispute about the details which the hon. Member gave to the House on Friday. I think he would be well advised to wait until he gets the details.
Mr. Wall: £0·2 million more.
Dr. Bray: Some hon. Members opposite have spoken of the danger of vindictiveness towards Rhodesia. I think that here they have misjudged the temper of the Government and the psychological reaction to the release of tension, the cessation of conflict. If the illegal declaration of independence began with a sad parody of the United States Declaration of Independence, let it end with an echo of the Gettysburg Address. Lincoln, speaking 74 years after the Declaration of Independence, said:
"We here highly resolve that this nation under God shall have a new birth of freedom and government of the people, by the people, for the people shall not perish from the earth."
5.37 p.m.
Mr. Stephen Hastings (Mid-Bedfordshire): The main point made by the hon. Member for Middlesbrough, West (Dr. Bray) about oil sanctions was effectively disposed of by his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget).
With respect to him, for a highly intelligent man, I think he suffers from wider delusions about Central Africa than anyone to whom we have listened on Friday and today. He spent some time condemning Rhodesia for the provisions made before U.D.I. for African education. This is one of the most unfair charges which have been brought. He should know that before U.D.I. Mr. Smith's Government, through its Department of Education, produced a ten-year scheme exclusively for African education costing £36 million, including 30 new
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secondary schools and bringing the total number of elementary schools to a figure over 200, I think. I have not the figure with me now, but I should be glad to give it to the hon. Member after the debate.
Dr. Bray: Can the hon. Member say why, if the Rhodesian Government are so keen to see an increase in education for Africans, they reduced the intake of Africans to training colleges?
Mr. Hastings: I think the best way in which the hon. Member could judge these questions properly would be to go there and to see for himself what is happening and he might begin with the multi-racial university. Unfortunately that would be a little difficult at the moment, but I hope he will take the first opportunity of doing so.
Before turning to the main objectives and the possible results of this Bill, I wish to raise a point of detail which I think hon. Members on both sides of the House will agree is substantial, extremely important and urgent. If my information is correct—it has only just been brought to my attention—the public servants of the Rhodesian High Commission who are still here are being required by the Commonwealth Relations Office to sign a declaration which I propose to read to the House. It says:
"You are required to declare that you dissociate yourself from the purported declaration of independence that has been made by Mr. Smith and his colleagues, that you do not accept the authority of any Government that Mr. Smith and his colleagues may purport to constitute in pursuance of this illegal declaration of independence and that you do accept the continuing responsibility and authority for Southern Rhodesia of the Government and Parliament of the United Kingdom.
If you decline to make a declaration in the above terms, you will be regarded as having chosen to adhere to Mr. Smith's illegal regime."
Hon. Members: Hear, hear.
Mr. Hastings: Hon. Members opposite seem to be quite happy about this. If they reread the speech the Prime Minister made on Friday, they will find that his speech was not at all in accord with the spirit of this brutal document. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] They will see that both the Prime Minister and my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition recognised that the choice facing all public servants in Rhodesia was extremely

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delicate and difficult. None of them, so far as I know, apart from the public servants of the Rhodesian High Commission in London, is being required to make that choice publicly.
What will happen to them? If they say, "No. We refuse to dissociate ourselves ", they are apparently branded as rebels. If they say, "Yes ", either they cannot return home—it would indeed be difficult—or, if they return home, they return having declared their open opposition to their own employer. It seems to me in all fairness that this is more than can reasonably be expected of public servants placed in this extremely delicate position. I am not quite sure whether there is any part of the Bill under which they are being required to sign this declaration. I truly believe that it is unfair and that it goes beyond the spirit of the speech the Prime Minister made on Friday. I hope that when the learned Law Officer of the Crown winds up the debate he will make very plain whether the Government propose to adhere to that, or whether they will not think again. Perhaps this is some oversight on the part of the Commonwealth Relations Office. These people should be enabled to go home without having to make this agonising, and I think totally unfair, public choice.
Mr. T. L. Iremonger: Would my hon. Friend add to his question to the Law Officer the point whether there is any time limit in signing and what the penalty is?
Mr. Hastings: I should be only too glad to add that question. I have no doubt that the learned Attorney-General will make a note of it, as perhaps he has made a note of the general point I have raised. This is not a party point. This is not a point on any of the principles which have been involved in this debate. It is a personal point for a few individuals who by pure chance happen to be in London, as opposed to being in Salisbury, at this hour. They are public servants in the employ of the Rhodesian Government.
Mr. Paget rose—
Mr. Sydney Silverman rose—
Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Samuel Storey): Mr. Silverman.
Mr. Sydney Silverman: Would the hon. Gentleman explain to the House—
Mr. Hastings: I gave way to the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget).
Mr, Paget Mr, Paget rose—
Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. I called Mr. Silverman.
Mr. Sydney Silverman: Would the hon. Gentleman explain to the House what difficulty an honest man would be in?
Sir K. Pickthorn: On a point of order. I am very likely wrong—I frequently am —but it had never occurred to me before that it was the business of the Chair to call interrupters. If one or more persons desire to interrupt, it surely is the decision of the hon. Member who has the Floor by whom, if anyone, he will be interrupted.
Mr. Deputy Speaker: The hon. Member for Mid-Bedfordshire (Mr. Hastings) gave way to two hon. Members. It seemed to me that I had to choose which should interrupt.
Mr. Hastings: Further to that point of order. I should make it clear, as I endeavoured to do, that I gave way to the hon. and learned Member for Northampton, not to the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Sydney Silverman).
Mr. Deputy Speaker: That was certainly not clear to the Chair. I think that we had better proceed.
Mr. Hastings: If we can leave that point, which seems to be one of substance.
Mr. Sydney Silverman Mr. Sydney Silverman rose—
Hon. Members: No.
Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order, order. The hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Sydney Silverman) must not persist.
Mr. Hastings: To come to the Bill— [Interruption.]
Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order, order. Mr. Hastings.
Mr. Archie Manuel: Be true to yourself.
Mr. Hastings: I have been connected with Rhodesia since my childhood, and through my family, for much longer than that. It is, for me, a bitter thing to see all the bright hopes with which I have been brought up brought to this present pass. Of course I, like all other hon. Members on both sides, deplore the U.D.I., but it is our duty, I conceive, if we cannot condone at least to try, and to try sincerely, to understand the reasons which have brought it about.
Therefore, I want to devote the first part of my remarks to the two main factors which have worked in the minds of Rhodesians and which have brought about the tragedy. I have no doubt that the Prime Minister did everything he could to avert the disaster, but unfortunately it is not a story of the negotiations of the last few weeks or days. It is a story of years of negotiations. The Prime? Minister was not negotiating, as some have tried to make out, with small and frightened men or with racist madmen, but with men perhaps made desperate by these years of negotiation with successive British Governments.
In Friday's debate more than one hon. Member pointed out that each Rhodesian Government appeared to have given way to another less moderate than the one before. I ask the House—why was this? Could it not be that, if some acceptable agreement had been made on independence with one of those more moderate Governments, we should never be in the pass we are today? They saw the Federation die gradually of negotiation. They had despaired of persuading British Governments of the true nature of their difficulties over this long period. Even the proposal for the Royal Commission at the last moment carried with it all the risks of a return to confusion and intimidation among the African people.
The Prime Minister—it seems so reasonable to people in this country—insisted that "normal political activity" should be permitted in the campaign leading up to a referendum, but that alone could lead to chaos and hatred in Central Africa at this time. These things sound incredible to many people in this country, but to anybody who knows Rhodesia they are not. They are true. This has been explained very many times in the House, in the Press and elsewhere, but it has
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seemed to the people of Rhodesia without any doubt at all that there was no hope of persuading people in this country of the facts or of the nature of their difficulties.
It is not a story, I repeat, of a few frantic days of negotiation. It is a story of years. It must be said that no party represented in this House is blameless in regard to this, least of all some hon. Members, principally on the other side of the House, who have lost no opportunity, certainly since I have been in the House, of sniping and sneering at the Rhodesian achievement whenever they had the chance.
The second factor which was borne upon the Rhodesians and which has brought that country to this tragedy has been the advancing disorder and chaos in independent Africa. In many areas—in vast areas—the values of civilisation have slowly ebbed away and with them all hope of practical aid for the peasant African people there. Practically everywhere the story has been the same—it is unpleasant but it has to be said—one-party government, ruthless suppression of minorities, extravagant and ostentatious living by the African ruling elite, complete indifference to the suffering of the majority, instability, and frequent bloodshed. On Friday the hon. Member for Kettering (Sir G. de Freitas) cited the case of Kenya. If this is an exception, indeed it makes me happy that it should be so, although the hon. Gentleman cannot be unaware of the views and suffering of the European farmers.
I should like to make two short quotations here which seem to me to bear upon the debates and our consideration of the Bill. They are both from people whose records as liberals and, indeed, as upholders of independence are beyond gainsaying. The first quotation I make is from a letter published in The Times of 6th November of this year from Dame Margery Perham, who has brought more to a knowledge of African affairs than most. She wrote this:
"May I make a plea through your columns to the leaders of independent Africa to show some restraint during the next few weeks when … the British and the Rhodesians wrestle with one part of the world's most difficult problem.….
… the state that most calls for African statesmanship at this moment is the Sudan.

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Here the army of the Muslim Arab north appear to have been let loose upon the dissident tribes, pagan and partly Christian, of the south. Refugees have been pouring over the frontiers and terrible stories have been told of massacre, torture, the burning of churches and schools, and the killing of those who wore clothes or spoke English in order to deprive these isolated tribes of leadership."
The Guardian of 14th October reports Dr. John Taylor, head of the Church Missionary Society, as saying of the Sudan:
"… even allowing for exaggerations and rumours, it was quite plain that terrible atrocities had been committed.' While the attention of the world is focused on the struggle to achieve justice in Southern Africa, the equally great struggle in the Sudan seems to arouse very little public concern'."
I did not notice any statement by the Archbishop of Canterbury about that. I did not: read anything from the Liberal Party. The Congo, Ruanda and Zanzibar all tell the same story, and now the Sudan.
It is a solemn fact that more Africans have been slaughtered by Africans since independence, in these few years, than died in all the colonial wars in Africa since the British first landed at Table Bay. As Mao Tse-Tung has said, this is a revolutionary situation, and what we are witnessing today is a second grab for Africa, more subtle than the first, but a reality nevertheless. The Prime Minister graphically described this on Friday. This is the reality of the situation. It is one thing to watch it from the security of London, S.W.I, it is another to watch it from the Zambesi valley.
I come to the question of the objectives of this Bill. The Prime Minister has said, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Preston, North (Mr. J. Amery) has made plain, that the objective was to reduce the illegal Government. With respect, I believe this to be unrealistic and dangerous. On Friday we listened to a speech from the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) which I believe was one of the bravest, the most realistic and the most important I have ever listened to in the House. He pointed the dilemma. He sketched the history and he implied the end.
If the objective of reducing the Smith Government is unobtainable except at grave risk of chaos preceded by a period of harsh excess, then the objective is unacceptable. This is what the hon.
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and learned Gentleman implied and I agree with him, and if this is so I have to make plain to the House that it is an objective which I do not share and cannot accept. The logic of the situation is that Mr. Smith and his colleagues appear to exercise real power. It has been our mistake over the years in connection with Rhodesia that we have attempted again and again to exercise authority without power. To imagine that we can reduce the Smith Government with economic sanctions is no more than an extension of that mistake.
Economic sanctions, as many hon. Members have said, simply do not work. They create the maximum bitterness and ill-will and all they achieve is the distortion of trade. Hon. Members must be aware that if one wishes to get rid of commodities on the markets of the world one can always do so—at a price. It makes things uncomfortable certainly for Rhodesia, and for the Africans themselves rather than the Europeans, but it can be done, and one does not need to be a clever operator on world markets to achieve it; and in spite of their speeches in the United Nations there are undoubtedly countries waiting to fill our shoes in Rhodesia. We must face the fact.
Much more dangerous is that by playing on the loyalties of Rhodesians or the personal courage of the Governor, the Prime Minister might produce a situation in which there could be division between Europeans in Rhodesia. Hideous consequences might follow. The Rhodesians are not frightened of tightening their belts, but their loyalties are deep. The Prime Minister said on Friday that mere "governessy admonitions" would not be adequate to meet the case. I think that he under-estimates the effect of consequential penalties, as I call them—the withdrawal of Imperial Preference, and the Sugar Agreement, the lack of access to the London Market and, above all, the agony of mind to which this situation has subjected many Rhodesians.
I know that it is argued that anything short of punitive sanctions would be totally unacceptable to the United Nations. I agree, but if, as the Prime Minister has wisely insisted, this is a matter solely for British responsibility, it is also a matter for British judgment, and if in our minds and hearts we should

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become convinced that a certain course was necessary and that course was right, then international disapproval should surely take its proper place in our calculations. Of course there would be uproar in many assemblies and in the United Nations, but, with respect, there has often been uproar at the United Nations. Our shoulders are broad and there is a difference between proper deference to international opinion and subjection to international pressure.
Mr. Hugh Jenkins: Is the hon. Member suggesting that the Government are afraid to take action which is internationally disapproved? Although I disagreed with that action, I would point out that the Government took action in Aden which was internationally disapproved. Cannot the Government this time take action which is internationally approved?
Mr. Hastings: I am not suggesting anything of the kind. The hon. Member is quite wrong. I am only hoping that if the Government come round to my view I hope that they will not be prevented from taking action by international disapproval.
I am taking exception to the objective behind the Bill. My objection would fit fairly closely the logic of the speech by the hon. and learned Member for Northampton on Friday. We should do nothing which might contribute unnecessarily to the breakdown of cohesive government in Rhodesia, even illegal cohesive government. We should seek to establish a period of calm, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Preston, North has said, and an atmosphere in which conciliation may begin again, perhaps through Mr. Smith or his colleagues or perhaps through some other personality commanding wide respect in Rhodesia and here. The Prime Minister will certainly have means of keeping in contact. There is no doubt at all about that.
The imposition of the consequential penalties which must follow the declaration of independence is, of course, inevitable but this is consistent, nevertheless, with the objective which I have outlined. On the other hand, I believe that the imposition of punitive measures,
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which I suggest could well be brought about under the Bill, is consistent only with an objective which I believe to be unobtainable except at a totally unacceptable risk. I have tried to speak without passion on a matter which concerns me deeply and personally, but I must make it plain to the House that for the reasons which I have outlined I see a distinct difference between the objective which I accept and this Bill, and therefore I cannot vote for it.
5.58 p.m.
Mr. Ivor Richard: The hon. Member for Mid-Bedfordshire (Mr. Hastings) has just delivered one of the most honest speeches that I have heard in the House. I shall disagree with him and I wish to tell him why. The hon. Gentleman's speech and that of the hon. Member for Preston, North (Mr. J. Amery) made me think of the days of the American Civil War. I do not want to quote Lincoln, but when that war broke out there was considerable movement within the ranks of government and opposition in America to do nothing about the rebellion in the Southern States. The phrase most often used to sum up the situation was, "Let the erring sisters depart ". If one were looking for a slogan to publicise the opposition to this Bill, I should have thought that those words would sum up the points thrown against it.
The right hon. Member for Preston, North said that there was no issue of principle involved here. He said that there may be a matter of interest but there is no issue of principle. I entirely disagree with him. There is a principle involved. It is a principle upon which we on this side of the House feel just as strongly as does the hon. Member for Mid-Bedfordshire. The principle is that it would be a bitter, bitter, irony if the last act of de-colonisation which Britain was undertaking in the twentieth century, in ridding itself of all its colonial possessions, was an act of acquiescence in handing over the Government of 3½million Africans to about 210,000 whites. This is an action in which we could not acquiesce.
The hon. Member said that we must try to understand why the Rhodesians feel this way. We may understand it, but, as he told us to make up our own

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minds in reference to the United Nations, so we must make up our own minds whether the Rhodesians are right. In my view, the 210,000 white Rhodesians are wrong because they are flying in the face of history and trying to halt a change which is inevitable. What we should try to do in this country is to make that change as easy as possible, to help to make the transition with as little upheaval as possible and to try to ease that transition from the present position of a semi-colonialist regime to a regime in which the principle of one man one vote becomes possible.
Mr. Paget: The trouble is that we did acquiesce in the principle of minority government. That is what the Prime Minister was explaining throughout these negotiations. He said all along that we are not objecting to that principle. The point we have reached is the formalisation of that to which we have already consented—and that does not seem to me to be a matter of principle.
Mr. Richard: I certainly do not agree with my hon. and learned Friend. I would emphasise to hon. Members who oppose the Government's policy that whether they are supporting the illegal regime in Rhodesia or supporting the regime of South Africa or attacking new regimes up and down the rest of Africa, they are flying in the face of a change which is inevitable. By attacking it and making things more difficult, they are not helping that transition but are making it harder.
Mr. Hastings: It is rather more than that. I was talking of the imposition of this chaos—that is the word which I used. There is a new grab for Africa taking place. That is something which not only the Rhodesians but we in this House have to take into account.
Mr. Richard: Of course there is a new grab going on for Africa—by the Africans. For the first time in the history of colonial Africa, the Africans are beginning to stand on their own feet. We cannot educate an African merely to the level of a mechanical skill. He will go on to want a vote and a say in how his country is run, and he should have that say. Our attack, if it is an attack, upon the present regime in Rhodesia is that this is precisely what they are not doing. We have been accused of distrusting the
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Rhodesian regime. Of course we distrust it, once we have looked at what these people have said and what they have done. I will be frank: the objective of the present Rhodesian regime, in my view, irrespective of U.D.I., is to entrench white minority rule in this part of Africa. I am being asked as a supporter of the Government to acquiesce in the rebellion of a Rhodesian regime the object of which, as I see it, is to entrench white minority rule over 3£ million of Her Majesty's subjects. With great respect, we cannot be asked to do that. It cannot be expected of us, and the Government are not prepared to do it.
Sir H. Legge-Bourke: I must challenge the hon. Member on that assertion. If he looks at page 75 of the documents he will find a statement by the Commonwealth Secretary at the meeting in 10, Downing Street on 7th October this year. The Commonwealth Secretary pointed out that the United Kingdom Government were prepared to contemplate a grant of independence before majority rule was actually achieved and that this was a major concession.
Mr. Richard: This does not answer my argument. If anything, it underlines it, and underlines the reasonableness of Her Majesty's Government's attitude in these negotiations. The right hon. Member for Preston, North said that a new principle had been introduced these days —that the British Government were not prepared to grant independence except on the basis of immediate majority rule. This is not so. The quotation which has just been read indicates that it is not so.
The Government's attitude throughout the negotiations was quite clear and distinct and, I should have thought, quite right. They were saying to the Rhodesian Government, "You say that the 1961 Constitution is acceptable to the majority of Africans. Prove it." Once hon. Members look at the Blue Book and go through the negotiations, even up to the last telephone conversation in the early hours of the morning between the Prime Minister and Mr. Smith, they will find no statement by the Government that as a prerequisite to the grant of independence, majority rule had to be conceded. What had to be conceded was a settlement on the basis of the five points—which were initially accepted by the then Rhodesian

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Government—and also that it should be proven to the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government and this House that those proposals were acceptable to the majority of the African people.
There are three points in the whole dispute. First, why did they demand, and take, their independence? Secondly, was it, in fact, negotiable? Could it have been prevented? Thirdly, what should be our attitude in the future? Those are the three questions which must be answered. The first question—why did they demand independence?—has been answered by the speech of the hon. Member for Mid-Bedfordshire. He said that there is a fear of what might happen and a fear of what has been happening north of Rhodesia. There was a fear on the part of the white minority of what would happen when majority rule came. This fear led them to take their independence.
But it is precisely that fear which was not negotiable by the Government. How can one negotiate if there is a fear which in itself is unreasonable? How can one negotiate on a reasonable basis with people who, from the start, are taking up an unreasonable position? The hon. Member for Mid-Bedfordshire shakes his head. Speaking for myself, I should have thought that a postulate which says that white minority rule must be entrenched into a future Rhodesian constitution was an unreasonable position. It seems to me that it is extremely difficult to negotiate reasonably with men who are themselves starting from an unreasonable position. That, surely, is the history of the negotiations.
Mr. Hastings: It is a legitimate question which I accept from the hon. Member. Seen from the other side of the argument, it might be put this way: as long as nebulous ties existed between them and a Government in London, which, rightly or wrongly, seemed not to comprehend the threat which faced them, they were in a position in which they felt safe when they were masters of their own destiny and not when they were not masters of it. There are no precedents for this situation. I grant that it is difficult to negotiate.
Mr. Richard: Of course there are no precedents. The fears which the hon.
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Member put merely prove how unreasonable their position was. What they are saying—or what he is saying for them, because at the moment he is acting as their unofficial spokesman—is that we should understand their position because they feared that the nebulous ties which tied them to us would make their position in relation to the Africans that much more difficult. But they have had internal autonomy since 1923. If the white minority so fear the black majority, they have had 35 years in which to do something about it. If the result of 35 years of internal autonomy is merely to create a situation in which the two races cannot live side by side in this area, then it says very little for the Administration over that period.
If one goes on from this point and asks, "Was it avoidable?", the answer must be, "No ". The British Government were saying, "We are not prepared to hand over except on the basis of a progression to majority rule". The Rhodesians were saying, "We are not prepared to accept independence unless it is on the basis of entrenched minority rule ". The positions were irreconcilable, and the break eventually became inevitable.
What do we do now? Speeches from the right hon. Member for Preston, North and the hon. Member for Mid-Bedfordshire say that we should do nothing. They say that we should pass a pious set of resolutions saying, "Tut, tut. You have been naughty boys. Go away and do not do it again." But as for trying to bring any influence to bear on the rebel Government, the answer of hon. Members opposite is, "Do nothing at all." As far as I can see, the hon. Members concerned think that the sanctions which have been imposed are too swingeing or, if they are not too swingeing, will be ineffective. When somebody says, "Why not make them effective?", they put up their hands in horror at the possibility of our trying to do that.
This is an absurd position to adopt. If the right hon. Member for Preston, North and the hon. Member for Mid-Bedfordshire believe that the Rhodesian Government are wrong to take independence, and if they believe that we ought to do something about it, it is no answer for them to turn to the Government and

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to say, "You are doing too much now in relation to sanctions, and we shall not support you if you try to do any more".
For the hon. Member to complain about how difficult it had been made for Rhodesian nationals in England when they had been asked to sign a form seems to me incredible. Does he suggest that a rebellion should take place without individuals having to make a choice whether they intend to be rebels or not? I should have thought that, rather than attack the Government for presenting them with a choice, he should have applauded the Government for at least giving potential rebels a chance to draw back from the brink of rebellion before they went back to Rhodesia. But not a bit of it. This indicates very clearly the divergence which exists between some Conservative back-bench Members and the Government's view.
A lot of nonsense is being talked about the difference between punitive and non-punitive sanctions. It is a distinction which I do not comprehend, a distinction without difference. If the Government are in the position that they have to do something, then for heaven's sake let them do it quickly and effectively. The important thing about sanctions is that they should work, they should work quickly, and they should produce the desired result. In this case that result is not merely to express British disapproval of the actions of a rebel regime; it is that we should try to overturn that regime and to re-establish a democratic system of government in Rhodesia.
May I pay a personal tribute to those people in Rhodesia who at least are having the courage openly to come out againgst this illegal act of rebellion? As the hon. Member for Mid-Bedfordshire said, it is easy for us in London to talk about this. It is not so easy if one is sitting in the Governor's mansion in Salisbury, and probably even more difficult if one is standing in the pulpit in Salisbury Cathedral surrounded by an Anglican congregation a large proportion of whom are probably in favour of the illegal act. We should therefore pay tribute to the actions of the Governor, the Lord Chief Justice, the Bishop of Mashonaland, Lord Malvern, the judiciary, and those editors and professional
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people in Rhodesia who seem to be coming out against this illegal action.
My view on the position is simple and fairly basic. If we are to adopt sanctions, let them be effective. If oil sanctions can be made to work, and if they are the most effective, then let us have oil sanctions and be done with it. There are two further points I would like to make.
First, it seems that the illegal regime have presented the judges and civil servants with an ultimatum, that if they are not prepared to swear allegience to the rebel regime, they will be dismissed without compensation. Surely it would be right for Her Majesty's Government, in these circumstances, to make it clear that any person who supported the Government's constitutional stand in this matter and came out openly against the rebellious regime would not be at a financial loss for having shown his loyalty to the Crown.
Mr. Iremonger Mr. Iremonger rose—
Mr. Richard: No. I cannot give way again. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will catch Mr. Speaker's eye.
Secondly, there is the question of censorship. It is vital that the true position somehow or other be put before the people of Rhodesia, but this cannot be done merely by the Rhodesia Herald appearing with blank spaces or putting its censors in the window so that the populace can see them hacking out the offending passages. It can only be done by the B.B.C. making rather more effective and stronger broadcasts to this area. Someone has suggested anchoring radio ships off the coast of Africa. Perhaps it could be done through Zambia or Malawi. I know not, but I trust that the Government are looking closely at the problem of getting the news to the people of Rhodesia.
The principles at stake here are enormous. It is not good enough for hon. Members opposite to say that there are no principles here. The greatest principle of all is at stake. The honour of the British Government is committed in this dispute. If Parliament and the country should fail on this issue, one thing will certainly be said—that whatever our power was in the past to influence the course of human events, it will be gone in the future.
6.17 p.m.
Sir Frederic Bennett: If it were not for the fact that I do not wish unreasonably to hold up Government business today, I would devote more time to the interesting but, in some respects, unfair speech of the hon. Member for Barons Court (Mr. Richard). He said that a lot of nonsense has been talked about drawing a distinction between punitive and consequential sanctions, but I remind him that this distinction was made by the Prime Minister himself last week. Is the hon. Gentleman now saying that the Prime Minister was guilty of talking nonsense?
Secondly, my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Bedfordshire (Mr. Hastings) made a very important point in saying that if we were to find a solution to the problem we must try to understand what motives drove 250,000 British people, or their representatives, to behave illegally in the way they have done. It is not in this context relevant to consider whether they are right or wrong. We all agree that they are wrong. But it is highly important to understand why they have done it. If we cannot, it will be almost impossible to find a solution.
The hon. Member for Barons Court made a cheap debating point about my hon. Friend's reference to the new grab for Africa. The hon. Member said that it was the Africans who were trying to grab it. He knew very well that my hon. Friend was referring to Communist intervention in Africa. If the hon. Gentleman will not accept my authority, he should read what Dr. Banda said recently—that the threat to Africa and the African Nationalists came from China. It was to that that my hon. Friend was referring, as the hon. Member knew.
Mr. Richard: Would the hon. Gentleman like to trace the connection between a possible Communist grab in Africa and the illegal action taken last week, having regard to the fact that, as far as I know, the potential Communists in Rhodesia, as the Rhodesian Government call them, have been in prison for 18 months?
Sir F. Bennett: It was the hon. Member himself who was trying to connect it with Rhodesia. My hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Bedfordshire was referring to other parts of Africa and the way
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in which the Rhodesians have taken the lesson to heart. In Zanzibar, for example, there was no white minority.
The hon. Member also alleged that we are in favour of doing nothing. That is unfair. We should not be giving support to the Bill if we were in favour of doing nothing. Every right hon. and hon. Member on these benches agreed with my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition when he made it clear that we accept the necessity and inevitability of severe consequential sanctions.
Mr. Richard indicated dissent.
Sir F. Bennett: The hon. Gentleman said there was an apparent desire in the Opposition to do nothing in this matter. It is, however, on record that the overwhelming majority of the Conservative Party accepts the inevitability of consequential penalties flowing from illegal action. We know that these are quite severe, and it is because we are supporting it that the Bill is going through tonight.
The question of Roman-Dutch law was raised earlier. Perhaps I can offer the Solicitor-General a little advice, being the only Roman-Dutch lawyer in the House. As far as I know, Roman-Dutch law no longer has any effect on criminal matters. I have thus saved him some research. I am still an advocate in the High Court of Southern Rhodesia, but I say to the hon. and learned Gentleman, in case he wants to send me one of these contentious little forms which have been referred to, that he need not bother. My loyalty is still firmly with the Crown in this country. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] I am grateful for once to receive some accordance from the benches opposite.
On Friday a whole series of charges were made that the Conservatives for one reason or another, led by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, were ratting on national unity and running away from it. This is wholly unfair, and I am glad that such charges have not been seriously repeated today. We are certainly all united on certain things.
First, everybody, despite what may have been said, thoroughly deplores the illegal action taken by Mr. Smith. Secondly, there is virtually unanimous if not complete support for the consequential penalties flowing from it. Thirdly,

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we all agree, I think, that the Prime Minister and the Commonwealth Relations Secretary did their best to avert the break at the last moment. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] I think they did their best. It may well not have been enough. There may well be points of criticism. I intend to make one serious point of criticism which could not be made on Friday because the documents were not then available.
It is a valid criticism that the Prime Minister did not make the concessions he made at the last moment over the telephone right at the beginning when the Royal Commission was set up. The result of holding back these concessions to the eleventh hour was that, by then, the wild men behind Mr. Smith were in charge and it was impossible to stop them. History will never know what might have happened if the concessions had been made at the beginning and not at the end.
Another thing on which we all agree is the desirability of restoring constitutional government in Southern Rhodesia. Here is where I am concerned about the absolute pledge to national unity from now. We are asked to give a blank cheque, and some doubts must be cast upon it. At this point, if we are to be asked to take further sanctions, we have the right and the duty to consider what objective we are trying to achieve and the likelihood of the steps proposed attaining it. For us to have doubts on that is not to be running away from national unity. It is right that we should have them. It has nothing to do with factions or sectional interests.
Every hon. Member has a duty to discuss any more serious steps that are taken beyond those already outlined and to decide for himself whether this will further the agreed objective of restoring national unity and legal government within Southern Rhodesia. Indeed, the Prime Minister has made it clear that he would expect every hon. Member to think of the situation in this light.
Mr. Sydney Silverman: For my part, I accept the duty of any hon. Member on either side to consider whether what the Government are proposing is wrong, either because it is inefficient or because it goes too far. But is it not an obligation on hon. Members who think that
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they are wrong to suggest to the Government what else they should be doing?
Sir F. Bennett: It is going much beyond the duty of any back bencher, who cannot have access to all the information at the disposal of the Government, to make detailed suggestions. That has never been suggested in any dispute on any subject. I do not want to go beyond what I have said. I have positive suggestions to make, but I cannot give them at this point. I urge merely that we should examine what we are doing and whether it will achieve our objective. We have not even got the Orders yet to be able to judge on them, so, in effect, we are being asked to give a blank cheque, with post-dated on it as far as some of us are concerned.
I want now to consider sanctions which may come at a later date and what should be our judgment. It seems to me that if they are not harsh enough a great deal of bitterness and misery will nevertheless be caused in trying to bring Rhodesia to its knees and that this will make ultimate agreement even more difficult to achieve than it is today, because ineffective sanctions will be useless. We would thus create great bitterness and resentment without achieving the objective.
At that point, the temptation would be great for hon. Members opposite and the Afro-Asian bloc at the United Nations to say, "Sanctions have failed. Let us get tougher". Inexorably, as the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) said, we would be driven to the point where the only logical consequence, once launched on forceful sanctions, was the use of military force. Every hon. Member knows in his heart that once set on the course of sanctions, if these do not work, unless we are very careful one day we shall be faced with the necessity of using force. Every hon. Member is shirking his conscience if he does not admit that fact.
Now let us suppose that the sanctions we propose eventually, without the use of force, bring Rhodesia to its knees. By then, these proud people will have suffered great hardship, together with the Africans of Rhodesia and people in neighbouring countries who get their livelihood through Rhodesia. We shirk our consciences if we do not admit that these are consequences which will flow from sanctions.

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It is worth pausing a few minutes, as was suggested by my right hon. Friend the Member for Preston, North (Mr. J. Amery), to make quite sure where we are really going in the long run as well as in the short run. We may not have many more opportunities open to us. The hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Sydney Silverman) asked me whether I would make practical suggestions. Although I do not think I have any duty to do so, I will try because, unlike many hon. Members, I have lived in that country as well as visited it and I know a great deal how the people there react.
Earlier, my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Bedfordshire stressed why Rhodesians had acted in this way. He was right. But I will add one other thing which has been in their minds and has helped to drive them to do such a desperately foolish thing. It was their fear that, as the years dragged on, and as the power in the United Nations of the Afro-Asian bloc grew, one day a British Government would be driven by their own Left-wing supporters and the United Nations to break the Convention and interfere with the internal self-government of Rhodesia.
This has been a very real fear, although the Government have said that they will not do it. I am not saying whether the Rhodesians were right or wrong in that fear, but I am saying that it has been their sentiment that public opinion in the outside world would build up to such an extent that the Constitution would be suspended and they would find themselves in a worse position than for many years past. With these thoughts in mind, they saw the horrors taking place in the Congo. One must try to understand the effect of these events on the Rhodesians, who were just across the frontier. I was out there when some of the worst events in the Congo happened. Hon. Members here find it very easy to talk about how British people should behave, but we should have a great deal of sympathy and understanding for how our people there do behave and how probably every hon. Member here would behave in a similar situation. Let me give only one instance. Do hon. Members opposite realise that morning after morning ordinary Rhodesian people, artisans and so on, opened their morning
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papers to see photographs of children disembowelled, nuns slaughtered and monks flogged? Did that have an effect on their way of thinking? Of course it did.
Hon. Members: What about Sharpeville?
Sir F. Bennett: I do not propose to reply to that. What on earth has Sharpe-ville to do with that? Do hon. Members opposite think that because something took place in Sharpeville something else ought to take place in Rhodesia or in the Congo? What is the point of mentioning Sharpeville? Do hon. Members opposite expect Rhodesians on seeing those photographs of little girls disembowelled in the Congo to say, "That does not matter, because someone else has been killed in Sharpeville "? That is too ridiculous to reply to.
I have no hesitation in supporting giving these powers to the Government, because I believe that they are necessary in the circumstances which have arisen and necessary because of the consequential penalties which Rhodesia must suffer. But as regards the future—and this is my constructive suggestion—having passed the Bill, we should have a breathing pause while we consider where the next steps may lead us.
In this context we should start thinking about offering a little carrot to the Rhodesians who may defect from Mr. Smith, as well as merely talking about the stick. We should be suggesting to the Rhodesians the sort of ideas which we in this country have in mind for the restoration of ordinary government and how it can go along. That is the way and the only way to get a proud people who want to belong to respond. Threats will not work. Threats have not worked before and they will not work this time. But if the Rhodesians are given some light at the end of the tunnel so that they can have some idea of the way we see the future of Rhodesia and all the people there, then and only then can we get the response from Rhodesia which we seek.
6.32 p.m.
Mr. Michael Foot: I came to the debate this afternoon expecting that it would be fairly brief, but a different complexion has been put upon it

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by the speeches of the right hon. Member for Preston, North (Mr. J. Amery) and the hon. Member for Mid-Bedfordshire (Mr. Hastings). In my judgment, their speeches went far beyond any mere comment on the Bill. The hon. Member for Mid-Bedfordshire said that he could not support the Bill. I am not sure whether he will vote against it. Certainly the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Preston, North was a speech against the Bill.
That alters the terms of the controversy in the House and in the country. It appears that there are many hon. Members opposite who wish to speak. Of course, they have every right to do so, but it seems that many of them will wish to speak in the same sense as the right hon. Member for Preston, North and the hon. Member for Mid-Bedfordshire. In other words, there is serious and substantial opposition to the Bill.
Hon. Members: How does the hon. Gentleman know?
Mr. Foot: From listening to the speeches I am giving my judgment of the speeches, and I have heard every word of the debate.
The hon. Member for Torquay (Sir F. Bennett) must have written his speech before he heard the speeches of his right hon. Friend and his hon. Friend, for it was in a very different tone. His speech was not so different in tone from that of the Leader of the Opposition and the right hon. and learned Member for Wirral (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd) on Friday. However, I do not believe that anybody who had listened to the whole debate could agree that the right hon. Member for Preston, North was advancing towards the Bill the same attitude and view of how to deal with the situation as his right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Wirral. In that case, a new situation is being created in the debate.
Mr. Hastings: Would not the hon. Gentleman agree that his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) on Friday made a speech totally inconsistent with the object of the Bill as a whole? Do not opinions differ on both sides of the House?
Mr. Foot: As far as I know, my hon. and learned Friend is the only Member
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on this side of the House who holds the views which he expressed in what even for him was an extraordinary outburst of perversity. I do not think that the hon. Member for Mid-Bedfordshire can escape from the situation on that basis.
We are having a very important debate. We are discussing the very wide powers for which the Government have asked and the House and the country have a right to know the attitude of the Opposition. I participate in the debate because I believe that the speech of the right hon. Member for Preston, North and the backing which he apparently has in his party, far from producing calmness and coolness throughout the world, can be most inflammatory.
I know that there is a tendency by some hon. Members opposite to sneer when the United Nations is mentioned, but it includes the representatives of most countries. Are we not concerned with the reputation of our country among those representatives? Of course we are. I do not believe that anyone who heard the speech of the right hon. Member for Preston, North could say that it was a speech likely to sustain the British Government's position in New York. If it were believed that his speech had strong support in this country and in the House, it would injure this country's position in New York and its ability to deal with the problem generally. Therefore, the best service which hon. Members opposite who agree with the right hon. Member for Preston, North can do to the House and their consciences is to vote against the Bill. Let us see how many hon. Members are opposed to it.
I am the very last person to question the right of hon. Members to come forward and examine a Bill and the powers which the Government wish to take. That was the basis on which the debate started. Two or three hon. Members, my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Sydney Silverman) among others, wanted to make inquiries about the powers under the Bill and how they
the measures to be taken. It is absolutely right that such inquiries should be made, even if doing so takes longer than was expected.
But that is very different: from opposing the Government's policy under the cover

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of making these inquiries. If that is what hon. Members opposite want to do, let them say so. Some of the statements which have been made, by the right hon. and hon. Gentlemen in particular, have been incitement to support the rebellion. The hon. Member for Mid-Bedfordshire said that there was a danger that some of the measures which the Government were taking might cause divisions among the white people in Rhodesia. That was an astonishing statement to have been made in the House.
We have it on the authority of the Government, absolutely supported by the Leader of the Opposition, that there are some people in Rhodesia who have engaged in an act of rebellion. Now some hon. Members are saying that it is shocking that the Government should take action which could cause divisions among those people. If some people in Southern Rhodesia are disloyal, surely it is the duty of everyone concerned to try to cause divisions among the white people there in order to ensure that they should return to their allegiance as swiftly as possible. Therefore, on that statement hon. Gentlemen opposite are playing with something very dangerous.
They have a right if they so think, I suppose, to say that they support the rebellion. It is a very dangerous game to play. But if they want to do so, let them say so. Let the right hon. Member for Preston, North say so. That was what his speech added up to. He did not even deplore the action which had been taken. Almost every sentence he uttered gave encouragement to those in Rhodesia who are in revolt against the Crown. I do not know which speeches here will be reported in Rhodesia, but the right hon. Gentleman's speech is very likely to be reported. I think that his speech will get through, and I think that that of the hon. Member for Mid-Bedfordshire will get through. Why? Because it helps them. The Rhodesian Government have a rigid Hitlerian censorship, and they can pick and choose.
The whole country should know that one of the reasons for the act of rebellion in Southern Rhodesia is that for years there have been people in this country encouraging them to go towards that brink and over it. I believe that there is a speech being delivered in another place
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this evening by a member of the right hon. Gentleman's party who for years has been encouraging the Government of Southern Rhodesia to defy the policy of Her Majesty's Government, both the present Administration and the previous one. I cannot quote the noble Lord, Lord Salisbury, but over the years, in association with some other members of the other place, he has been saying to the people of Southern Rhodesia that they have many friends here who would assist them and who favour their point of view. Although I strongly disagree with the incitements that they have given, I can understand their saying it before, but it is a very different thing to say it after 11th November than to say it before. So the right hon. Gentleman had better make up his mind.
Sir A. V. Harvey: The hon. Gentleman, speaking at 20 minutes to seven, has heard two speeches from this side of which he disapproves and one from his own side last Friday. Is it not too early in the evening to draw conclusions and build the situation up to the point of saying that the Opposition are against the Bill?
Mr. Foot: I have listened to every word that has been spoken in the debate, and I have a right to comment on the speeches that have so far been made, especially speeches by important Members of the House. The right hon. Gentleman for Preston, North is a very eminent Member who apparently speaks for quite a number. What the House and the country have to discover is how many hon. Members agree with him. I want to know whether the Leader of the Opposition agrees with him. I dare say there are some hon. Members on his side, like the hon. Gentleman for Torquay, who disagree with what has been said, and I pointed that out at the beginning of my speech. I emphasised that he disagreed, and that if he had only listened to what his right hon. and hon. Friends had said he would have had to alter what he said.
It is a fact that some hon. Members are giving what I should decribe as aid and comfort to those who have engaged in this act against the Crown, and the House has a right to have the facts known very plainly. It can be extremely dangerous,

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because, just as we ought to have the imaginative sympathy to understand how British people who have close associations with Southern Rhodesia over the years feel, so we ought to have the imaginative sympathy to understand how Africans feel about the situation. The hon. Gentleman for Torquay complained because an hon. Member on this side asked, "What about Sharpeville?", and he wanted to know what Sharpeville had to do with it. What Sharpeville has to do with it is that we were told about the fears of white people in Southern Rhodesia. The fear of even more subjects in Southern Rhodesia is that they will see what has happened in South Africa, and one of the things that have happened is Sharpeville. That is the relevance of Sharpeville to the present situation.
Before 11th November and even more since 11th November, a whole series of measures of a rigorous police state is taking place in Southern Rhodesia. Therefore, hon. Members of, the House have a responsibility to all the people there, and no one can say that our responsibility must be greater to the 200,000 white people than to the 4 million coloured people. That is what the right hon. Gentleman says, in effect.
What effect will it have in New York at the United Nations, throughout Africa and throughout the world if the House says that we are more concerned with the white population of Rhodesia than with the much larger coloured population? If we say that, we abandon any claim for this country being able to assert that we should have responsibility in the matter. It is an incitement to race war to say that.
Sir F. Benuett: The hon. Gentleman for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Foot) has made frequent reference to my remarks. I made the plea that I did for understanding of the way that the white population felt. They are the people who are in rebellion at the present time, but I did not forget the African feeling. That is not the matter under debate at the moment.
Mr. Foot: I was replying to the hon. Gentleman's repudiation of the mention of Sharpeville. I was trying to show the hon. Gentleman why many people in Southern Rhodesia and throughout the
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world think that what: happened at Sharpeville has a direct relevance to what is happening in Southern Rhodesia today. They have every right to think that, because we have a police state which every hour and every day is being more rigorously enforced in a country for which we are responsible.
I hope that the House will pass this Enabling Bill with the largest possible majority. I hope that anyone who sincerely opposes it will vote against it so that we know exactly where we are, and I hope that when the leaders of the Opposition support the Enabling Bill, as I understand they are to do, it will not merely be a vote in the letter but in the spirit as well to help sustain the Government in their policy.
We are told by the right hon. Gentleman for Preston, North that one of his complaints is that under the Bill the 1961 Constitution conceivably might be suspended. He wants an assurance that nothing like that will occur. If he is going to demand assurances of that nature, we will demand assurances on the other side, because it cannot be the situation that, following the revolt, we can revert to the 1961 Constitution exactly as before and say to the white people of Southern Rhodesia, "We are quite prepared to go back to the position as it was prior to 11th November". That is totally unrealistic. It may be said by some that we should make that offer to attract white people in Southern Rhodesia to assist us. What about the African people? If we said from the House that automatically the assurance was given that once the revolt was called off the 1961 Constitution would be re-established, it would be regarded as an outrage by the loyal subjects of the Crown in Southern Rhodesia, not the disloyal ones.
Moreover, the right hon. Gentleman says that he wants an assurance that there will be no escalation. That is a ridiculous request. The Government cannot be certain that the economic sanctions that they have proposed or the measures that they have taken are going to be effective. Some people have different views about them. Some people think that they may be effective, others think that possibly they will be effective, while others think that they will be extremely effective. But the Government cannot be sure.

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On Friday, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister quoted Sir Winston Churchill and used the phrase," all necessary lengths". I think that is right. It would be the only tolerable and honourable position for the Government to take. When I vote for the Bill, that is what I think I shall be voting for—all necessary lengths to ensure that the rebellion is put down. [An HON. MEMBER: "Including military force?"] An hon. Member opposite interrupts me and asks, "Including military force?" My answer to him would be, yes, partly for the right reasons that the Prime Minister has indicated and partly for the reasons that were raised and discussed by my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne a little earlier in the debate. He asked what is going to happen to those people in Southern Rhodesia who are loyal to the Crown and who stand by their allegiance, whether they are European or African? Supposing they are made the victims of persecution by the police state in Southern Rhodesia. Are we to leave them in the lurch?
I am not in favour of that. For a variety of reasons, I hope and believe that the situation can be dealt with short of military force. But we may come to it. I agree that it is extremely unpleasant, but we have to face it as we have faced it before. I do not know what other hon. Gentleman think about it, but I am not prepared to vote for a situation where we say that we can keep 50,000 troops in Malaya, I do not know how many troops in Aden and many thousands of troops in some other parts of the world, but that it is impossible for us to take military action in the most extreme situation in Southern Rhodesia.
I do not believe that that is a tenable position for Her Majesty's Government, so I believe that the policy for which this House will be voting tonight when it votes for this Bill is, in the words taken from Sir Winston Churchill's speech, in a different context admittedly, and which have a Cromwellian flavour, "all necessary steps". If in six months or a year the situation were to be that Mr. Smith and his illegal Government were still holding plenary power in Southern Rhodesia, still clamping their police state on the 4 million Africans, this country would have suffered one of
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the most humiliating defeats in its history. It would have suffered a defeat from which our reputation could never recover all over Africa. This country's position would be utterly denuded of moral authority throughout the world.
This is the situation, and therefore I believe that this debate is one of the utmost seriousness, and when we vote for this Measure I believe we should all be willing to vote for "all necessary steps ". But let those who are not prepared to support it leave us now. Let them tell us now that they are not prepared to do it. Let them tell us by their votes, and let the rest of us go on and sustain the honour of this country.
6.51 p.m.
Sir Lionel Heald: In this grave situation I believe that no hon. Member who speaks in this House should, if he can possibly avoid it, say anything which is going unnecessarily to raise the temperature—[Interrupton.]—or to introduce cross-currents into the House. I believe that there are few hon. Members who feel like the hon. Member who interrupted me just now. We are in a grave situation indeed, and I must say with the greatest respect to the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Michael Foot) that I think it a pity that he introduced the note that he did just now.
I believe that I have the right and the duty to say why I am supporting this Bill this evening, and I propose to do so. The Law Officers of the Crown, and the immediately preceding Attorney-General, have told us this afternoon that if we are not going to abdicate our responsibility in Rhodesia these measures are necessary as a matter of law, and as one of their predecessors I humbly agree with them. There has been no dispute about that.
What is our responsibility in Rhodesia? We annexed it in 1921, and the Crown today is responsible for peace. order and good government in that territory, and this House of Commons has to decide today whether it is prepared to maintain and reinforce that duty and responsibility, or not. That is the issue that we have to decide today.
Whether it is right or wrong that we should have arrived at the position where the decision has to be made is nothing to do with it. Nor is it very much to

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do with it what the consequences are going to be. We have a responsibility. It may be worth while remembering that Members of Parliament swear an oath of allegiance, as well as other people, and I have that in my mind. I do not believe, therefore, that we need discuss the legalities of this matter.
What I am concerned with more is the practical matter, and surely the most important thing is that if we are decided that we will maintain our position and perform our duties and responsibilities, then nobody in the world should have any doubt about it. There is at the moment doubt about it. There is doubt about it, first, in Rhodesia, and the reason for that, I grieve to see, according to the evidence—and there is plenty of it—is very largely repression and censorship. It is not possible for people there to get information as to what is going on, and, indeed, we do not know what they are being told, but we can gather some idea. I will turn to that in a moment: or two, but it is also clear, unfortunately, that people in this country do not understand either, and, with proper respect and restraint, I think that is a matter for strong complaint that both The Times and the B.B.C., and possibly other organs—but those are enough in all conscience—have not been as careful as they might have been in this matter.
I refer here particularly to the position of the judges. There are many right hon. and hon. Members in this House who have met Chief Justice Beadle. I may be prejudiced—I am—because he is a personal friend of mine, and a man for whom I have the greatest possible respect, but it was said in The Times today:
"The important meeting of judiciary yesterday ended with a statement saying that ' the judges of the High Court will continue to perform their duties in accordance with the law '—which "
adds The Times correspondent from Salisbury
"leaves unsettled the question of which law."
That clearly implies that the Chief Justice, either intentionally or unintentionally, was creating an ambiguity. That is an insult to him as a lawyer, because no competent lawyer today could say that there were two laws in Rhodesia. There is only one, and we have to understand
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that, whether we like it or not, and whatever the consequences may be.
It is an unfortunate fact that on the B.B.C. at 10 o'clock last night I heard the same thing said, and the language was almost literally identical, which suggests to me, with my possibly nasty legal mind, that it was something that was put out in Rhodesia, gobbled up by the correspondent there, and ladled out here. If people in this country think, as one of my constituents thought when he rang me up in the early hours of this morning, having read this and become very indignant, that the judges in Rhodesia are dithering, that is wrong. That is the practical reason why we have to pass this Bill today, and pass it with the largest possible majority—on this I agree with the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale—to show that, however much we dislike it, however difficult it is and whatever the consequences may be, we know what our responsibility is in this House of Commons, and we are prepared to discharge it.
6.59 p.m.
Mr. Emlyn Hooson: It was refreshing to hear the speech of the right hon. and learned Member for Chertsey (Sir L. Heald) after one or two of the speeches that we have heard from this side of the House today. May I say how much I agree with everything the right hon. and learned Gentleman said, save and except that I do not think he was justified in chiding the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Michael Foot) for his speech. Had he heard the speech of the right hon. Member for Preston, North (Mr. J. Amery) I think he would have understood—
Sir L. Heald: I heard it.
Mr. Hooson: —the reason for it.
It seems to me that the situation can be analysed quite simply. There are Members in this House this evening who are really saying that the rebel Government in Rhodesia should get away with it, that we should disapprove of what they have done and should say "Tut, tut", but, nevertheless, that they should get away with it. Fortunately, this idea is confined to a very small minority. It is only fair that we should make it clear, as the right hon. and learned Member for Warwick and Leamington (Sir J. Hobson)

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did, that this is not the view of the Opposition Front Bench.
Nevertheless, this other view exists. Surely, what the forum of world opinion is asking today is, "Is Britain really serious in her attitude towards Southern Rhodesia? Does she really intend to put down this rebellion?" Everybody agrees that it is a rebellion, but there is a great question mark against the seriousness of our intentions in the matter. In a moving and sincere speech the hon. Member for Mid-Bedfordshire (Mr. Hastings) submitted that we ought to understand the position of the people of Southern Rhodesia. Many people who entirely disapprove of the attitude of the Government of Southern Rhodesia nevertheless understand their position. It is possible to understand the position of the people in the Confederate States of America at the time of the Civil War, and to understand the attitude of the minority in Ireland who for years were afraid of the Catholic and Irish majority there. But it is not a question merely of understanding; we have been asked from certain quarters in this House not only to understand the attitude of these people but to approve of it.
The right hon. Member for Preston, North (Mr. Amery) asked what was the intention of the Government in regard to Rhodesia—was it to create economic chaos? Was it to bring Rhodesia to its knees? I would ask him what he intends to happen in Rhodesia: that treason shall prosper, that we should accept a coup d'etat and do nothing about it, save to say that we disapprove and that they should not have done it? As the right hon. and learned Member for Chertsey said, this is a matter about which there can be no issue on the question of principle. We have not only a legal but a moral responsibility as a trustee of Southern Rhodesia.
I now turn to some of the details of the Bill. It is important that sanctions should be applied and that these should be effective. I entirely agree with my right hon. Friend, the Leader of the Liberal Party, who said on Friday last that the only point of having sanctions is to make them effective, and that to be effective they must be as short and sharp as possible. If I have any criticism to
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offer of the Government it is that their sanctions are not severe enough. From the view both of this country and of Rhodesia—whether we speak of the white or the black population—it is far better that those sanctions shall be severe and short rather than half-hearted and long drawn out, and a cause of bitterness on both sides.
If the concept of sanctions is merely that we shall try to punish the Government of Rhodesia and then, eventually, accept the situation of their being the de facto Government, there is no point in applying sanctions at all. As I understand the Government's view, the objects of the exercise—and the only objects— are to crush the rebellion there and restore the rule of law, reminding loyal Rhodesians of their allegiance to the Crown. But although I agree that it is necessary for the Government to have very wide powers to do this—indeed, their attitude would not be credible unless they took very wide powers—we all know that many innocent people suffer in rebellions and in the counter-measures that are taken to deal with them.
It is the duty of this House to look at the Bill, and any Orders made under it, as closely as possible, in order to try to minimise the danger to innocent individuals who might be otherwise enmeshed. I therefore want to refer to one or two matters that strike me. Having read the Bill, and listened to the Attorney-General this afternoon and read his statement on Friday, it occurs to me that certain matters ought to be made clear.
The position of the Chief Justice and the six judges in Rhodesia has been referred to. We have heard that they have been threatened with dismissal unless they accept the de facto Government as the de jure Government in Rhodesia. It should be made clear that this country is 100 per cent. behind the judges, and that if they are dismissed they will be fully compensated. They should be directed as to their own position. It is a very difficult situation for judges with families. We know that what is a hot debating point today may in the course of time be forgotten, and that these may become forgotten men. It has happened before in history. The Government should make their position absolutely clear now.
If there are any whom we should reassure in this situation it is those people

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who are carrying out their day-to-day work in Rhodesia, trying to uphold the rule of law in very much more difficult circumstances than those in which we are discussing the matter in this Chamber. It is incumbent on the Government to give guidance as to the definition of treasonability in this context. I do not take exception to the statement made by the right hon. and learned Attorney-General on Friday, when he suggested that on the normal canons of interpretation when people are in the situation in which the rebel Government find themselves in Rhodesia the people who instigated and who are taking part in the rebellion are probably guilty of treason. But where does this end? The concept of treasonability in this context could be as wild a horse as any for public policy to control.
Many innocent people in Rhodesia will be required to do work against sanctions. Let us consider the case of an employee who, in the course of his employment, is asked by his employer to do an act which is intended by that employer, to contravene the sanctions imposed upon the illegal Government and who, without thinking very much about it, does this act. It might become a habit. Does he thereby commit treason? It is very important to give clearer guidance than has been given hitherto.
I know that the Law Officers have had a great deal on their plates and that it has been difficult to go into the details of this matter, but it is necessary that far greater guidance should be given than has hitherto been given on this matter. For example, what is the operative law now? We know that the criminal law of Rhodesia is the common law and the law of this country as amended or changed by Rhodesian laws, and that the Roman-Dutch law no longer applies, but there are considerable differences between the law of this country and the law of Rhodesia in the development of the criminal law. By what system is treasonability to be decided now that we are in the present situation of government by the Governor—de lure government by the Governor and the Secretary of State?
Should not we have dissolved the Rhodesian Parliament? As I understand it, although the Rhodesian Government have been dismissed the Legislative
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Assembly is still in being. Surely it should be incumbent on this Government to take steps to dismiss the Rhodesian Legislative Assembly. Further, would it not be right to suspend the 1961 Constitution? I agree with the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Sydney Silverman) that powers certainly exist within the Bill to suspend the Constitution, and I would have thought that this was the right step to take at the present time.
It is absolute nonsense to think that after a rebellion of this kind it is possible to go back to the 1961 Constitution as it was. Certainly now that these events have been put in train we do not know where they will end, and it must be possible for the Government to amend and, if necessary, suspend the Constitution completely. When we eventually have a settlement of this problem it will not be possible to go back to the 1961 Constitution.
I echo the words of the Leader of the Opposition, who said that it is necessary to retain national unity on this problem. There can be no doubt about the responsibility of any Government, whatever its complexion, in this situation. The Government have taken measures designed to restore lawful government to Rhodesia. I should have thought that anybody who owes allegiance as a Member of this House owes it to his constituency and to his conscience to support the Government in the measures which they are taking to deal with this situation.
7.10 p.m.
Mr. Anthony Fell: It would take the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Michael Foot) nearly to persuade me, against my better judgment, so far as voting is concerned. He nearly succeeded, by his taunting and his mischief-making speech, in persuading me not to vote against the Bill. It was just mischief, so he did not quite succeed.
However, the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale spelled out the reasons why I not only cannot support the Bill but shall oppose it. He spelled out these reasons very clearly, as they were spelled out by one of my hon. Friends, but he accepts a different view of what the result of his spelling out should be. What the hon. Member said, if I correctly interpreted it, the serious part of his speech amongst

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all the fun, was that the Bill will enable the Government to impose all sorts and manner of sanctions in order to bring about a desired end.
As I understand it from the Prime Minister, the desired end is that sufficient pressure should be put upon the illegal Government—or, as the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Sydney Silverman) so generously called them, "The gang of people whom we have declared by this Bill to be traitors"—so as to stop the illegal regime from operating at all, and we are attempting, by using sanctions of various sorts, to bring down the rebels and replace them with some other, unspecified, type of regime in Rhodesia.
In the first place, history does not support the view—and my hon. Friends who have had far more experience of Rhodesia than I have would, I think, support me in this—that one can bring down people of this sort of resolve and courage, who are misguided, perhaps, but courageous nevertheless, by hemming them in with closer and closer regulations and by trying to make them suffer more and more. The only result of that, normally, is to give them more loyal supporters. If this be so, then what the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale went on to say is, of course, true, that the Government having been caught up in their own theory that they can bring down the rebel Government by sanctions, if they fail to bring them down by sanctions, have no other course, if they are a Government at all, but to follow their policy to its logical conclusion.
Its logical conclusion, if sanctions fail and if we are not to allow U.N.O. to do the job for us, must be that the British Government are bound to go further than trade sanctions of that type. That means the use of force. I am not willing to give my support to that, though I fully realise that nothing I can say will stop the unanimity on the two Front Benches. Nothing I can say will alter the decision tonight, of the House of Commons at any rate, on the Bill.
Nevertheless, surely each one of us in the House—this is about the only point on which I agree with the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale—has a right to have a personal view. Surely every one of us—
Sir Godfrey Nicholson: No one is denying my hon. Friend that right.
Mr. Fell: My hon. Friend the Member for Farnham (Sir G. Nicholson) says that no one is denying me that right. With the greatest respect, I have been here only 15 years—I give some years to my hon. Friend—but, by heavens, people have tried on various occasions to deny me the right to express my own views. I merely say—
Sir G. Nicholson rose—
Mr. Fell: I am very sorry. I did not want in any way to have an argument with a very old friend of mine on my side of the House. I am merely saying that not only do we have that right, we also have a duty, if we believe that a Measure of this sort is wrong, and can do nothing but harm in a given situation, to vote against it.
Mr. Sydney Silverman: The hon. Member has known me long enough to know that I am in the most complete agreement with what he is claiming as the right of every private Member of the House. We all appreciate the hon. Gentleman's courage and sincerity in what he is saying. Of course he is entitled to his view: he is entitled to state it and to vote for it, but if he thinks that the Government's policy is wrong, what interests me is, what in his opinion would be right?
Mr. Fell: I wonder if the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne will forgive me. It so happens that I was lucky enough—or unlucky enough: I am not sure which—to win the Ballot and I have put down for discussion Central Africa. Therefore, I do not want to take up too much of the time of the House tonight.
I wanted to explain the reason why I intend to vote against the Bill, and I have almost done that. I also wanted to ask the Attorney-General one question.
On Friday, in talking about treason, he said:
"But it is right that I should point out in general terms that there is abundant authority for the conclusion that conduct of the kind that has taken place is treasonable."
He went on:
"So would be steps taken by anyone whether in Rhodesia or in this country, or by anyone else owing allegiance to the Crown, with

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the intention of furthering the objectives of the illegal regime or inciting others to take such steps."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 12th November, 1965: Vol. 720, c. 516.]
That was very clear. So it would be treasonable not only in Rhodesia but also in this country.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman was questioned on this and asked to explain it a little more. My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition said:
"The right hon. and learned Gentleman refers to discussion in the Press. Presumably he means that discussion of any kind or on radio or television would obviously be covered."
The Attorney-General answered:
"Clearly that is so. When I say ' permitted ' "—
he had said "permitted" earlier—
"I mean that which is legal under the law. We are not going to set up any kind of censorship in this situation."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 12th November, 1965; Vol. 720, c. 522.]
The question I put to the Attorney-General is this. Am I not right in my interpretation of what he said, that, by that very definition, he did set up a censorship in this country? I must not enter into a legal argument, for I am not qualified, but he said that such action would be treasonable both in Rhodesia and in this country. Before I refer again to what he said in reply to my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, perhaps I cught to read the passage which I left out in my first quotation. The Attorney-General said:
"Unlike the Rhodesian Government, it is not the intention of this Government to stifle the free expression of opinion "—
fine—we are all with him there—
"and clearly the free range of discussion about these matters conducted in the Press will be permitted."
Then came the question from my right hon. Friend to clear up the point as regards television, radio and so on— and, one hopes, individuals talking and arguing about these matters or even making speeches outside the House—to which the Attorney-General replied with the answer I have already quoted,
"Clearly that is so. When I say ' permitted ', I mean that which is legal under the law ".
If that means anything, it means that the law of treason can apply to anyone in this country who takes any part in
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the activities defined by the Attorney-General, that is, the activities to which he referred in the words reported in c. 516 of HANSARD, beginning
"But it is right that I should point out in general terms …"
I hope that we can have an answer on this point this evening for it is extremely important. In my view, the Government are not willing to take responsibility for their own actions in the eyes of the country, but they have left themselves a loophole should they think fit to bring an action against anyone at all who happened to disagree with their view of the Rhodesian situation.
I am grateful for having been called and the opportunity to make a short intervention to explain why I shall vote against the Bill.
7.22 p.m.
Colonel Sir Harwood Harrison: Like every other hon. Member, I am extremely troubled by the sad and grievous news of what has happened in Rhodesia, and those hon. and right hon. Members—and there are many on both sides of the House—who have visited Rhodesia and been the guests of the Rhodesian leaders as well as meeting them and their representatives here feel it, perhaps, even more. I was very interested in the wise speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for Carlton (Sir K. Pickthorn), in which he said that the object of the Bill was not stated in it. As I followed our debate last Friday, it became fairly clear that the object of the Government and, I am sure, of the whole House, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Chertsey (Sir L. Heald), a former Attorney-General, also said, was to restore law and order in Rhodesia. That is the main objective.
We must look at the Bill in that light. I have always been a great supporter of the 1961 Constitution, and I have spent many hours talking about it to Rhode sians of all colours, begging them to make that Constitution work. I thought it a very sad day when the African nationalists refused to take part. But in any enterprise, be it war, commerce or sport, it is wise, when weighing up a situation, to look at it sometimes through the eyes of the people on the other side of the hill. I feel that, with the possible exception

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of one or two speeches, we have not in this House been considering enough how some people in Rhodesia may be thinking at this time.
I was struck years ago by the attitude of those Rhodesians who did not vote for federation. They were the forerunners of the present National Front Party. They always felt, probably rightly, that if the vote had not gone for federation they would have got complete Dominion status and independence on their own. That thought has run through the minds of these Rhodesians ever since. In their view, and in ours too, the Smith Government was constitutionally elected. This has not been a rebellion or revolution with bloodshed.
I fully realise the many great difficulties facing this country and the Government today, and the few remarks which I have to make will be made in a helpful spirit. I can see that there could be a case, after what the Rhodesians have done, for letting them go their own way, regarding them as completely outside the Commonwealth and letting them take their own position in the world. But, of course, this is not the way we in this country behave or mean to behave. We regard them still as British, and the Government there is vested in the present Governor. It seems a little illogical, if we have dismissed the Smith Ministers and we still recognise the Governor, that Rhodesia should cease to have Preference on her goods coming here.
Is our objective under the Bill also to placate world opinion? If it is, we must be seen to be just and not vindictive. I have been sad to hear some speeches in the House, both today and on Friday, which have had an undercurrent of vindictiveness. I shall not allude directly to the hon. Member who made the remark, because I do not see him in the Chamber at the moment, but I could not help thinking that someone who refers already to the Rhodesians as the enemy does nothing but damage to what we all want to bring about. Moreover, he said it almost immediately after the Attorney-General had said that Rhodesians were still British subjects.
It is sad that the Prime Minister failed in what he tried to do, but some of my hon. Friends and I were surprised at the
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Government's action in immediately prohibiting the import of Rhodesian tobacco, without reference to the House of Commons. This took some of us who are without legal training rather by surprise, and, though I do not question the legality of that action under the 1939 Act, I cannot help thinking that, in such an explosive matter as this, it might have been wiser for the Government to have said, "We will at least discuss this before taking action and get the approval of the House of Commons". This is one reason why some of us are inclined to ask whether it is right to pass this Bill as it stands, giving a blank cheque to the Government. We want an assurance that what they intend to do will not be vindictive.
I beg the House for moderation and to face the realities of the situation, even if we do not like them. I do not mind any Government being stupid and afterwards having to withdraw from some position which they have taken up. What I do not like, because I love this place so much, is the Houses of Parliament being made to look ridiculous.
I may be wrong, but, from my knowledge of Rhodesia, the Government's hope, as I understand it, cannot succeed. I gather that what they are hoping is that they will be able to gather round the Governor and the Chief Justice the more liberal elements in Rhodesia who will be instrumental in forming a new Government independent of the Smith regime. This seems to be a thought underlying some of the speeches we have heard today, but, in my humble opinion, it is no more than a pipe-dream in cloud-cuckoo-land. These elements have long been dissipated. The last election in Rhodesia was entirely over U.D.I., and Smith won almost unanimous support. Even as great a figure as Sir Roy Welensky was defeated in a by-election. I cannot see that these people will desert Smith now that he has given them what they wanted.
Colonel Sir Tufton Beamish: My hon. and gallant Friend referred to the last election and said that it was held over U.D.I. I seem clearly to remember Mr. Smith saying that U.D.I. had been thrown out of the window, probably for good. As I understood the position, therefore, the election was not

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about U.D.I. After the election Mr. Smith made it clear that he would be consulting public opinion before such a declaration was made.
Sir H. Harrison: I think that it has been perfectly clear that Mr. Smith has had all his support on the basis that he was leading them to independence. Otherwise, I do not believe that he would have won the election.
Sir T. Beamish indicated dissent.
Sir H. Harrison: As I was saying, I do not believe that a great many people will desert Smith. The tougher the sanctions the more will those people remain united behind him. There will be hatred and bitterness, but sooner or later Her Majesty's Government, or the next Conservative Government, will have to deal with a de facto Government, probably that of Mr. Smith, existing in Rhodesia. Or is it Her Majesty's Government's intention, as has been suggested, to hope that disorder and rioting may take place?
We are appealing to people to keep law and order, yet they will probably have to take their orders from Smith's regime. Therefore, I am worried lest these sanctions, if applied, produce no immediate result. The hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) made a practical speech. How often in this House have we faced the situation of a de facto Government which we did not like and of which we did not approve but which we soon recognised? The most sad case in my memory occurred after independence being given to Zanzibar. A revolutionary Government took over and there was great massacre. However, within a few months this House recognised that de facto Government. If the sanctions are ineffective in, say, six months or a year, will the Prime Minister call them off or will he use greater sanctions and more force? When will these things come to a head? Do not we appear to be relying on the police there to maintain law and order?
It is fair to say that it always takes two to make a quarrel. It is also fair to say that people some distance from the scene are not always right. History has shown this. With great respect to hon. Gentlemen opposite, who talk so much about the brotherhood of man and who voted to abolish hanging and cor- 770
poral punishment, there is a section among them who seem to think that we are almost living in the gunboat era. From reading history, can. anyone really say that the British Government behaved impeccably at the time of American Independence? When history comes to be written of this period, I hope it will be said that Her Majesty's Government and all hon. Members bore in mind the realities of the situation—a few of which I have mentioned and others of which have been mentioned by other hon. Members. We must try to be sure that Her Majesty's Government act in the best interests of all concerned, in this country and in Rhodesia.
7.36 p.m.
Sir Knox Cunningham: In a short time Parliament will be asked to delegate certain powers to the Executive. That is what this Bill is about. We should, therefore, consider just what are the powers we are delegating. The Attorney-General gave a number of legal explanations, for which I was grateful, and I hope that the Solicitor-General will anwer one or two I wish to put.Clause 2(5) stated:
"An Order in Council under this section shall be laid before Parliament after being made and shall expire at the end of the period of twenty-eight days beginning with the day on which it was made unless during that period it is approved by resolution of each House of Parliament.
The expiration of an Order in pursuance of this subsection shall not affect the operation of the Order as respects things previously done or omitted to be done or the power to make a new Order …".
Am I right in thinking that the legal position is that an Order would expire, having run its 28 days, and that a new and identical Order could be introduced the next day so that that situation could be repeated on and on? In other words, is Parliament being asked to give that blank cheque? I am not suggesting that the Government will do this, but it shows that this is a badly drafted Bill. After all, it is a rushed Measure and I would like to be sure of the legal position that will result from it once it is passed.
Even if what I have suggested is not correct, what will be the result of this Clause? We will give powers to the Government by Order in Council and they will come into force at once. Within a certain period, perhaps at weeks, we

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shall be able to debate the matter. Even if we do, certain things will have occurred as a result of that Order in Council, so that such a debate may be completely stultified. These are serious matters, and I hope that whatever sanctions are to be imposed will be considered seriously on the basis of whether it is right and proper to impose them. I hope that we shall look at such sanctions on the basis of whether or not it is right to impose whatever sanctions flow naturally from the decision of Southern Rhodesia to leave the Commonwealth. I hope that it will not be considered right to impose "punitive" sanctions. As I see it, the only way for the House not to delegate all of these powers is to consider every Order in Council before it comes into force. In this connection, Clause 3(2) states:
"… no recommendation shall be made to Her Majesty in Council to make an Order under this subsection unless a draft of the Order has been laid before Parliament and approved by resolution of each House of Parliament."
Would this not be a good method, since it already appears in the Bill, to allow the House to consider these important and difficult matters as they arise. By passing this Bill we are starting on a road today, and where it may lead us no one here can say.
7.39 p.m.
Sir Harry Legge-Bourke: I had expected that this debate would be mainly confined to an interchange of legal opinions on the various aspects of what is primarily a lawyers' Bill, but I am glad that the House has decided that the occasion calls for something rather more than that. I would begin by asking the Attorney-General the same question that I asked when he sat down, which is concerned with the legal aspect. I may have so ineptly phrased my question that he misunderstood its purpose. Can we have an assurance from the Government that anything in an Order in Council introduced under this Bill—assuming that it becomes an Act of Parliament—will be such that it is capable of being enforced? If it is not capable of being enforced, it should not be introduced; still less ought it to be passed by Parliament.
This is a very grave occasion, indeed. If I may say so, I think that the House
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of Commons has risen to it as it should have done. This Bill is an awful Bill, in the true meaning of the word "awful ". We ought to stand in awe at the thought of what we are doing. What are we doing? We are giving powers to a Government to deal legislatively with former members of our Commonwealth as though they had become enemies threatening our State here. That is what this Bill does. That is the awful thing that U.D.I. has forced this country to do.
This is a very grave thing that we have to do, and if it comes to apportioning blame, let me say that none of us who has been in this House since 1945 is blameless—none of us. Many things have brought this situation upon us, and by no means the major part of bringing it upon us can be laid at the door of Mr. Smith and his colleagues. This is a very long story. It goes back to before the Second World War. It goes back, perhaps, to the concept of international Communism—the trading on the ignorance of backward people. This really lies at the root of this Bill, because this is what has run through Africa as it has run through other Continents. It is this that has made it impossible to provide stable Government as free as we should like to see it. It is these things that have brought us to this appalling pass.
After the Second World War, what did we do? We set up a world machinery based on what I believe to be the utter and complete fallacy that when one has an international dispute of some kind, one is the better likely to solve it by bringing in more people than would otherwise be automatically involved. That is what the United Nations invariably does. The contribution made to the present inflammatory position in Southern Rhodesia by those using the United Nations Organisation as it was never intended to be used, and abusing the power it gave them, is a very material factor in relation to this Bill, and the need for it." Hope springs eternal", they say. At the end of a war such as the Second World War it was natural that man should cling to any hope of preventing war he could possibly find.
However, if we look at what has happened since 1945 in relation to Southern Rhodesia, and which has made this Bill necessary, the first thing that stands out

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is that when the Central African Federation was first being thought of and mooted, the then Secretary of State for the Colonies, now the Secretary of State for Wales—the right hon. Member for Llanelly (Mr. James Griffiths)—gave instructions that district officers should not promote the idea of the Central African Federation in advance of its being passed by this Parliament. Then, perhaps, both Sir Roy Welensky and ourselves made a mistake over whether or not Dominion status should ever have been sought for the Federation, and whether, having been sought, it should have been granted.
This is all looking down the road. All those of us who have been in this House since 1945 are in this, so let us not now seek to apportion blame. Let me say to my right hon. Friend the Member for Preston, North (Mr. J. Amery) that none of us, least of all those who have served in previous Governments, ought now to seek to make one solitary party point against the present Administration on this issue. This is an inherited problem which the present Government have to handle. It is a sorry story, from the days of the Labour Government of 1945–51 down to the last Conservative Administration that ended in October, 1964.
It is a long story of collective responsibility. I know that my hon. Friends who were here then will recall occasions when, at one moment, our committees met and applauded Sir Roy Welensky to the roof for castigating our Government of the day, and the following week we had the Commonwealth Secretary or the Colonial Secretary and cheered him, too, for saying exactly the opposite. Month after month this went on. I remember protesting about it. There is a collective responsibility here that none of us can opt out of.
That being so, what have we to do today? In my view, we have to take the appropriate steps to ensure the maximum pause for consideration and reflection and the minimum of provocation, and as near to certainty as we can achieve to making sure that whatever we decide is capable of enforcement. If we approach the problem in that way we are entitled to ask the Government whether they are prepared to give us a solemn undertaking that they will introduce Orders only when they are absolutely
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satisfied that there are no means still open to them for further consultation.
When I speak of "further consultation" I do not restrict that consultation only to Mr. Smith and the illegal Government of Rhodesia. There are others—I named one on Friday, and I shall not name any more tonight—who may be able to help in this matter. I should like an assurance that before any of these Orders is introduced, the Government will have done everything they can to have consultation with whomsoever they find it possible to get in touch with on the subject of Rhodesia.
The second assurance I ask for, if I am to vote for the Bill, is that no Order will be introduced which the Government know when they introduce it is incapable of enforcement. In that connection, I would refer once again to what I said on Friday. The dilemma in which the Armed Forces in Rhodesia find themselves is bad enough, and I hope that steps are being taken, as I asked on Friday, to ensure that as many of them as possible of all ranks are made fully aware of the peril they put themselves in under military law unless they obey the Governor.
But there is also a great peril in which our own troops could all too easily find themselves. Some of us have recollections—for me they are recollections of boyhood; for others, recollections of adult life—of the Curragh incident. I do not want to see any member of the British Forces put in the position of having to take a sort of decision some men had to take then. It could happen all too easily.
I therefore once again ask the right hon. and learned Gentleman: can we have an assurance that no Order will be introduced under this Measure that is not capable of being enforced? If the Government were to introduce an Order which could be enforced only by military action, they themselves having made up their minds that no military action should ever be taken, it would mean, in fact, that they were bluffing those to be affected by the Order. This is one thing which must not be allowed to happen. No Order which will be found to be bluff ought to be tolerated. I wish to make quite clear to the Government that if I support the Bill I shall

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oppose any Order which I think contains the slightest bluff.
I hope that I have been fair in what I have said and I hope that I have not been unfair to previous Administrations now represented on this side of the House. Whatever else I say I want to make quite clear, should any of the remarks I have made tonight be quoted in Rhodesia, that U.D.I. was the end of a long road. It is folly and danger, not only to the future of Rhodesia but to world peace as a whole, or could become so all too easily. If we are to solve this problem we have to find a way of burying every hatchet which on both sides it is possible to bury. The Government themselves have to avoid being over-precipitate, but whatever they do, be it by sanctions or whatever form of action, let it be action which they know can be effective and enforced.
In the words of Matthew Arnold:
"I say, fear not; life still leaves human effort scope,
But, since life teems with ill, nurse no extravagant hope,
Because thou must not dream, thou need'st not then despair."
7.52 p.m.
Mr. John Biggs-Davison: Later this week we shall be attempting to censure Her Majesty's Government. In this debate today, however, there has been shown considerable understanding of the difficulties in which Her Majesty's present Government find themselves. Throughout these difficult weeks in which Her Majesty's Government have attempted to find a solution for Rhodesia they have had the full support of my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition and his colleagues. It is certainly no fault of the Conservative Party that the Government's Rhodesian policy has miscarried, but I must in justice say that my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Wirral (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd) was right when he said on Friday that this was an avoidable tragedy. It is a tragedy arising from the long years of mistrust between Rhodesian Governments and British Governments and arising from a failure of imagination, sympathy and understanding in London towards the difficulties of those people of various races 6,000 miles away.
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At the end of his broadcast and later in this House the Prime Minister said that in dealing with Mr. Smith he thought that at times he was dealing with someone who was living in another century, almost in another world. Those words were true words because indeed Rhodesia is another world and we cannot judge Rhodesia simply by the criteria and standards of public life and modern democracy here in Britain. I cannot for the life of me understand why the negotiations ended just as they did. I cannot understand why the Attorney-General or the Secretary of State for Commonwealth relations did not remain behind in Salisbury. I have said this before in this House; I cannot understand it. Here was a very difficult dealing to be done. Surely it was common prudence, common businesslike common sense for one member of Her Majesty's Government to stay on the spot to endeavour to clinch whatever deal might have been made.
I regret so much the lack of understanding shown by Her Majesty's Government in the sneering references to the chiefs. After all, in Rhodesia we are dealing with a society which is largely a tribal society. We should not sneer at these people because they are less advanced than we are. I thought it a great pity that the chiefs should be spoken of in that way. It was even more regrettable than the extraordinarily inept description of those who now, alas, are rebels as "frightened little men ".
We have heard again in this House of the state of emergency brought in before the unilateral declaration of independence. It is not altogether surprising that there should a state of emergency in Southern Rhodesia. At a time when the United States as well as the United Kingdom have stopped the export of arms to Rhodesia, arms are being smuggled into Rhodesia across the Zambesi for the purposes of a revolutionary overthrow of whatever regime there now is in that country. It is not surprising that there is a state of emergency in Rhodesia when leaders whom we are often asked to accept as responsible leaders of African Nationalist movements have been making statements which are tantamount to calling on the African population to slaughter their white fellow subjects in Rhodesia.

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I am very glad that the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Michael Foot) showed no disposition tonight to want to limit this debate. He is very jealous for the rights of the House of Commons and of individual hon. Members. I am glad that there is no disposition in this House for us to proceed with undue and unworthy haste with this Measure, because this is a very serious Measure. I understand why the Government want it to go through quickly. This is reasonable, but if the emergency was so great it would have been quite possible for this House to have met yesterday. I have not long been a Member of this House, but I can remember an occasion on which we sat on a Sunday and we were not at war. That could have been done. It is right that this House should be able to discuss this matter, not in any spirit of obstruct tiveness but so that the different views in the House can be expressed.
I am perturbed at the powers which it is proposed to entrust to Her Majesty's Government under this Bill. It is always a difficulty in a democracy to find the right balance in times of trouble between Executive efficiency and Parliamentary rights. The extent to which this House of Commons is willing to entrust the Executive with extraordinary powers must depend to a great extent on the degree of trust there is between hon. Members and the right hon. Gentlemen who sit on the Treasury Bench. I am worried partly because already the Executive have behaved in this admittedly difficult situation in an arbitrary way. Mention has been made, particularly by my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Bedfordshire (Mr. Hastings), of the treatment of civil servants who happen to have had the misfortune of being posted to London— vindictive treatment at the hands of Her Majesty's Government.
Mr. Bottomley: Rubbish.
Mr. Biggs-Davison: The Secretary of State says that it is rubbish. I shall be extremely glad to hear that these very disturbing reports are untrue, when we have the final reply from the Treasury Bench. I hope there will be an adequate reply, because it seems that civil servants because they are here within the reach of the Secretary of State are to be treated in one way while civil servants
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in Rhodesia are to be treated in another way.
Mr. Manuel: Who is acting for these people?
Mr. Biggs-Davison: I am acting for my constituents as is my duty in this House.
Mr. Manuel: My interjection was to ask the hon. Gentleman who he thinks the civil servants he mentioned are acting for, unless they sign a declaration that they are breaking away from the illegal Government?
Mr. Biggs-Davison: As we have withdrawn our High Commissioner from Salisbury and as the Rhodesian High Commissioner has been asked to leave, I should have thought that his staff should be asked to leave with him. This seems to me to be perfectly reasonable, without their being asked to sign any statement which other public servants, who do not happen to be posted in London, will not be asked to sign.
`Mr. Bottomley: An explanation will be given. The hon. Gentleman has formed a harsh judgment on this action in relation to the home-based civil servants. He ought not to do that in trying to make an attack.
Mr. Biggs-Davison: I do not think that the Secretary of State was here when the serious allegations were made by my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Bedfordshire. I am very glad that I have been able to draw those allegations to the right hon. Gentleman's attention. I should be very glad, for the honour of this country, if our misgivings on this account could be set at rest.
The Government appear to be getting all kinds of arbitrary and quasi-dictatorial ideas into their heads. As the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) pointed out on Friday, there was never a word of this talk of treason and traitors at a time when we were at war with the American colonists in rebellion. When we were at war with them, there was never any talk whatever of treason and traitors because people happened to take a particular view. God forbid that we should ever be at war with Rhodesia. There was a certain gentleman—his name was

779
Horne; he was the leading spirit in the Constitutional Society—who sent Benjamin Franklin some money to succour the victims of the King's troops when we were at war. He was not prosecuted for treason. He was indicted for libel.
The Government have taken dictatorial action with regard to tobacco. They have acted under powers left over from a world war. We are not at war with Rhodesia, and God forbid that we ever should be.
Sir Richard Glyn: The Government's action on tobacco will affect only the coloured Rhodesians and not the whites and is in effect nothing more nor less than Oxfam in reverse.
Mr. Biggs-Davison: I thank my hon. Friend for pointing that out.
I come to the administrative decree by which Commonwealth preference has been withdrawn. Right hon. Gentlemen speak as though we were withdrawing something which is of unqualified benefit to the Rhodesians and of no particular importance to ourselves. I ask the right hon. and learned Gentleman when he replies to tell us whether the legal ground on which he stands is absolutely firm. I have studied the United Kingdom-Southern Rhodesian Agreement under the Ottawa Agreements of 1932. It has the historical interest that it is signed by a gentleman called Stanley Baldwin. Article 11 of the Agreement says this:
"In the event of circumstances arising which, in the judgment of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom or of the Government of Southern Rhodesia, as the case may be, necessitate a variation in the terms of the agreement, the proposal to vary those terms shall form the subject of consultation between the two Governments."
I suppose the answer will be that the Smith regime is no longer a Government, that the Government of Southern Rhodesia are Her Majesty's Government, and that they have had due consultation with each other or within their own ranks. I do not know, but I am not entirely convinced by the argument that the withdrawal of preference is consequential on the U.D.I. After all, Commonwealth preference is still accorded to certain countries which are no longer members of the Commonwealth, but no doubt we shall hear more about it when we hear the reply.
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More serious than this is the fact that the House is being asked to give carte blanche to the Government. It is true that the Orders under the Bill, if enacted, will be subject to the affirmative procedure. Am I wrong in thinking that what will happen will be that the Government will act under the very wide powers which will be conferred by this Measure, that they will do virtually what they like and we will be able to talk as much as we like, but that will have no effect whatever while the Government can command a majority in the House?
What do the Government expect to achieve by this Measure and by the administrative measures preceding it to which I have referred? Do they expect that the effect of all this and of the Orders which they have in mind will be that they will bring about a rebellion against the rebellion? Do they imagine, Rhodesians being what they are, that these measures will induce them to come to terms with Her Majesty's Government? Or do they perhaps not consider that they will make them more obdurate?
There will be an effect from the administrative measures and no doubt there will be an effect flowing from the Orders which may be brought forward under the Bill, but, as hon. Members, including my hon. Friend the Member for Dorset, North (Sir Richard Glyn), have pointed out, the effect is likely to be greatest upon the small, poor African people.
The hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Sydney Silverman), speaking of the four million people in Rhodesia, seemed to suppose they were all Rhodesian Africans. They are not. It is very difficult to get exact figures in the free intercourse that there is of labour between Rhodesia and the surrounding territories, but a very large proportion of them are not Rhodesian Africans at all. The freedom which they enjoy to enter Rhodesia, where there is so much prosperity, and work there is a mainstay of the national economies of Rhodesia's northern neighbours, Zambia and Malawi.
I think that we should keep Zambia and Malawi, these Commonwealth partners of ours, very much in mind. I should like to pay tribute to the statesmanlike approach to this very difficult problem adopted by President Kaunda of Zambia

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and also by Dr. Hastings Banda of Malawi. It was Dr. Hastings Banda who pointed out, quite correctly, that, if the ties between Malawi and Rhodesia were cut, Malawi would be lost.
What, in fact, do the Government hope to achieve? I rather think that certain words of Chatham, who expressed himself as
"an avowed enemy of the American independency,"
when moving an address in 1777, have some bearing on the likely effects of the sort of measures which the Government have in mind:
"You may ravage. You cannot conquer."
They may do damage to Rhodesia and they may do considerable damage to the United Kingdom. As I said when replying to an interruption by the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire (Mr. Manuel), I speak for my constituents. My constituents are entitled to be told about the effect on their interests and on the precarious British economy of these measures.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer has been in and out. His name appears on the Bill. Are we to hear from the right hon. Gentleman what effect measures already taken administratively and to be taken in the future under the Bill may have upon the British balance of payments? I think it is well known that between £25 million and £30 million could be added to the deficiency in our balance of payments if we have to turn elsewhere for supplies of tobacco. We can turn to India. India is a member of the sterling area. She can supply us with some tobacco. We can also turn to Canada and the United States, but, although Canada is a Commonwealth partner, neither is in the sterling area.
We are entitled to hear a little about the effect on the British balance of payments. Still more, we should know whether the Government have it in mind to go further, as they have been urged by the hon. Member for Barons Court (Mr. Richard) and the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale, and apply oil sanctions and a trade embargo. "Prohibitions" and "restrictions" were the words used by the Attorney-General. What further ones have the Government in mind? Is there to be a trade embargo?
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The Government are being exhorted from below the Gangway to be in earnest about sanctions and are being asked, "If they do not really hit Rhodesia what is the use of them?" Let us hear from the Government what they have in mind and let our constituents be told what we stand to lose ourselves from a trade embargo. Last year we supplied £35 million, equal to one-third of Rhodesia's imports. It may be said that this is not a big amount, but in the precarious state of our national economy can we afford such an embargo?
I deplore the U.D.I. [Laughter.]Perhaps the hon. Member for Dunbartonshire, East (Mr. Bence) thinks that it is a laughing matter. I think that it is very serious. Perhaps historians will recall that although it was a crime it was less a crime than a blunder. Here is a breach which we want to deal with. I want it mended and not widened. Nothing should be done to increase further the mistrust felt in Rhodesia for this country.
It is all very well for hon. and right hon. Members opposite to say that the 1961 Constitution was unacceptable and unsatisfactory. Rightly or wrongly, the electorate of Rhodesia understood that the 1961 Constitution was to be the last Constitution that they were to expect before independence was conferred upon them. It may not be easy to point to anything in black and white, but it is a fact that Sir Edgar Whitehead would never have obtained the consent of the Rhodesian electorate to the 1961 Constitution if it had not been put abroad in Rhodesia that it was a pre-independence constitution. If the House will not take this from Sir Edgar Whitehead, perhaps it will take it from Mr. Joshua Nkomo who, before the United Nations Committee on Colonialism in 1962, said that he feared that this Constitution, which he first of all accepted but from which he resiled subsequently, would bring independence to Rhodesia in 1963.
I think, therefore, that we should show the fullest understanding of the reasons for what has happened. We should understand the reluctance of these people who, but for an accident, might have been hon. Members now sitting here in the security of this Chamber. We

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should understand their reluctance to be cajoled or coerced down a dangerous path by a British Government—let us face it—less concerned for their welfare than for wider international considerations. Government after Government have been perhaps more concerned with the appeasement of the United States, of the United Nations and of the Afro-Asian bloc.
Perhaps the reason for this Bill is that we are confronted by government by gesture. False comparisons have been made between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. In 1923 the then British Government were of a mind that Southern Rhodesia should be incorporated in South Africa, but the electorate in Rhodesia, these Rhodesian Europeans, voted against incorporation in the Union of South Africa. Although it is true that many Rhodesian Europeans are of South African origin and a number of them are Afrikaners, it is also true that many of them came north because they wanted to live under a more liberal British system. [Laughter.]I cannot see that this is very funny. Is it surprising that people like ourselves, and perhaps South Africans, might want to move north and live under a British system of government and a British type of constitution? Is it so very funny? I should have thought that it was something to make us a little proud of our fellow-subjects in Rhodesia.
I greatly fear that if we act vindictively or rashly we shall not succeed in suppressing Rhodesian rebellion, but we shall succeed in finally incorporating Rhodesia within the South African system. This is why my plea is for conciliation, not coercion, for peace and not punishment.
8.16 p.m.
Mr. William Shepherd: I am sure the whole House will regard the Bill as being an extremely regrettable one and that few hon. Members will vote for it with any sense of satisfaction. They will feel no satisfaction, I hope, because conferring these powers upon any Executive virtually untrammelled by the powers of this House is in itself repugnant.
A large number of my hon. Friends have spoken today from a point of view which I cannot in all conscience endorse. I accept their views as being sincerely
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expressed and I hope that they will do me the same courtesy as I do them. I have only one exception to this comment, and that was the speech made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Preston, North (Mr. J. Amery). This saddened me immensely, and I want to say a few words about it.
When I heard it I recalled the comment made by my hon. Friend the Member for Carlton (Sir K. Pickthorn), that those of us who are somewhat senile had the advantage of having seen all the worst films twice through. When my right hon. Friend the Member for Preston, North was saying that we had no real difference with these people and there was no difference of principle and was extolling, albeit in guarded terms, the merits of these men, I compared that with similar phrases spoken in the years 1933 to 1939. I then heard friends of mine say, "Why should we really oppose Hitler? It is true, of course, that there are some excesses, but, after all, they are only against the Jews and what does that matter? It is true that we do not go all the way with this man. It is true that he is doing things of which we do not wholly approve, but he is much to be preferred to the Communists whom he opposes ". I am afraid that there is a danger here today on my own side that there is a muting of consciences because we have an affinity with many of those who are resident in Rhodesia. Instead of the Jews we have the black Africans.
I want to make it very clear that this is not a small issue. It is an immense issue of principle and, let us be frank with ourselves, it is not merely a question of whether the previous Government in Rhodesia proceeded at a certain pace towards majority rule. Let us be quite clear that Mr. Smith obtained his position and maintained it only because a great number of his supporters profoundly believed that he would bring to an end any possibility of self-determination. Equally convincing, and in defence of Smith, is the fact that if his own views had been contrary to this opinion, he could never have sustained his position as Prime Minister any more than did his predecessors.
We should make it quite clear to ourselves that there is a great issue of principle for which we have a profound

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responsibility. I was astonished that my right hon. Friend said that there was no issue of principle when three policemen, humble men, with no real responsibilities, no oath of allegiance to the Queen such as my right hon. Friend has, risked their position, no doubt with the chance of prosecution, because they believed that the conduct of the Rhodesian Government was inconsistent with their consciences.
I do not for one moment pretend that we could proceed to immediate self-government in the manner which is dictated and demanded by African extremists, but I think that any rational person looking at the situation will know that it was never the intention of the previous Administration to kill a proper measure of self-government. As my hon. Friend the Member for the Isle of Ely (Sir H. Legge-Bourke) said, we are responsible for this situation, because no Government in this country in the postwar has been firm enough with Rhodesia. We made a mistake in giving South Africa independence without making some provision for majority rule. We did the same thing with Rhodesia. The truth is that each successive Government has failed to be firm enough, putting off the evil day.
I do not wish to condemn any hon. Member who takes a view contrary to mine, but it is only sensible to say that if we tried to pursue the policy which is pursued by Mr. Smith, the inevitable result would be disaster for the white population of Rhodesia. Many hon. Members have said today that because the white Southern Rhodesians fought for us, because they have white skins, they are entitled to some special consideration. The coloured Rhodesians also fought for us, in larger numbers than did the whites. I cannot see that there is a basic merit in that argument.
I hope that the Government will do all they can to enforce the determination to bring to an end as quickly as possible the rebel regime in Southern Rhodesia. I say this in no vindictive spirit whatever. The Prime Minister was unfortunate in using the word "punitive" because all measures of this kind are somewhat punitive; if they were not punitive they would have no value in these circumstances. What we want to do is to apply those measures which are punitive but not vindictive. We should do those things which
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are calculated to bring this rebel Government as quickly as possible to an end and to give liberal opinion in Rhodesia a chance to express itself.
May I say a word or two about liberal opinion? It is very difficult to take a moral stand when those around you want to discount a moral stand. Many young men who find themselves in prison today are the victims of this. They go on a street corner with a gang of young boys of their own age, and a few of these young men do something and want to do something which is entirely wrong. It is very difficult for the other young men, who have not the same ideas, to resist going with them or to oppose them and say, "What you are doing is wrong ".
So it has been with liberal opinion in Southern Rhodesia. Of course there are men who oppose Mr. Smith and men who regard the deliberate dragging back of the Africans as being wholly repugnant to their feelings. But there are strong pressures which say, "Follow us and for all time you will be the boss, for all time you will have the advantages, for all time you will enjoy this high standard of living and low taxation". Against those pressures, liberal opinion cannot easily express itself, and when it does express itself, it is often put into detention where it cannot express itself. I urge the Government to do all they can to encourage liberal opinion in Southern Rhodesia by taking the strongest possible stand, short of any vindictive action, against the rebel Rhodesians.
May I say a further word about black living with white or white living with black. It has been said this afternoon that the coloured States of Africa present to us a ghastly picture and that all kinds of dire consequences have resulted from the measures of independence which have already been granted. We have had references to the Congo, which I consider to be wholly irrelevant to this discussion. Let us leave the Congo aside for a moment and look at one or two of the other countries. It is true that the democratic pattern which we have established in this country has not been very faithfully reproduced on the continent of Africa, and we are to some extent to blame for this failure because it was never likely to succeed. Once there was one man, one vote, its demise was almost

787
certain, because an uninitiated and irresponsible Opposition can soon kill the concept of democratic Government.
But these happenings have to some extent clouded the other fact which is coming out of Africa—that it is by no means so difficult for white people to live in African territories with black Governments as almost every hon. Member at one time believed. In almost every territory in Africa we are hearing from white people who return to this country for leave that they are finding it easy to live with their black Governments. Indeed, the measure of co-operation between white and black in those territories which have achieved independence is remarkable.
On Friday the hon. Member for Kettering (Sir G. de Freitas) read out a truly remarkable message sent by the whites of Kenya to the whites of Southern Rhodesia. This fortifies what I have said, that while there are problems of black and white living together, it has not proved to be difficult for whites to live in territories where there are black Governments. I should have thought that this example would be an important indication to us in this House that, if it can be done in Kenya, it certainly can be done in Southern Rhodesia.
I hope the House will support the Bill without a Division. I thought the plea by the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Michael Foot) was mischievous. I know that he likes to be mischievous and that it is part of his life. But on this occasion he ought really to have repressed his natural instinct because this is a somewhat serious matter. I hope that the House will pass this Bill without any Division because I believe that tonight we have to give a moral lead.
We have little left of the majesty of the last century. Indeed, I doubt whether we could now launch an airborne attack against the army of Southern Rhodesia even if we were foolish enough to try. But we have a position in the world which is of some worth. The moral purpose and standing of this nation is still of value to the rest of the world. I do not want to see this tarnished or diminished by any apparent failure on our part to do those things that our consciences should determine that we do.
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We must by our vote tonight make it clear, however distasteful it is to us to have to act against those whom we know well in Rhodesia—those who are our friends and, in my case, relatives—that we shall do it with determination because we conceive it to be our duty.
8.32 p.m.
Mr. Michael Clark Hutchison (Edin-bugh, South): Like every other hon. Member, I regret deeply the steps taken by the Rhodesian Cabinet. They were wrong and unwise and showed lack of patience. But, the step having been taken, we have to consider how we can restore or improve the position. The use of force has rightly been ruled out by the Government. It has also been said that the problem is between Rhodesia and Britain and that other nations should keep out.I agree with that also.
The next alternative suggested is to apply sanctions or other economic pressures with a view to imposing our will on Rhodesia or causing Rhodesians to exert pressure on their Government or causing a new Government to be installed. I take it that that is the purpose of the Bill.
On Friday the Attorney-General said the Government
"… propose to take a general power to make any Orders which appear necessary or expedient in consequence of the illegal declaration of independence."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 12th November, 1965; Vol. 720. c. 514.]
In particular he named four classes of Order and some of them are very sweeping. I dislike this Bill on two grounds. First, I am reluctant to grant these excessive powers to the Government. The Government are trying to take over the work of Parliament and to usurp its functions without justification. Secondly, some of the powers are quite unenforceable and to agree to powers which cannot be enforced is a nonsense and makes a mockery of the work of Parliament.
The Attorney-General said that we would make laws for the peace, order and good Government of Rhodesia. How is this to be brought about? I want to know. In the last resort, the final sanction is force, but that has been ruled out, so what do we do? It may be argued that financial pressures and economic sanctions will produce the

789
desired result. I doubt it. The history of sanctions is not impressive. They failed in the Italian-Abyssinian war. They failed in Cuba. There is endless scope for evasion. Other economic measures are very slow moving and often ineffectual. They hurt innocent people and can bring indiscriminate distress.
In the case of Rhodesia I believe that hostile financial measures will simply cause moderate men and women there to side with Mr. Smith and his Government. The coloured population will certainly suffer and Zambian and Malawi nationals who work in Rhodesia will be adversely affected immediately. Bitterness will be created and nobody can say what the end of the road will be.
I find the economic proposals and powers under the Bill distasteful. I cannot find it in my heart to support these measures against another Commonwealth country and against our own people overseas, however wrongheaded their Government may have been. Sooner or later we shall have to deal with Mr. Smith or the Rhodesian Government. That must be recognised. We would be very wise to keep the lines of communication with them open. I believe that it would be statesmanlike and wise to get in touch with them immediately and to see what accommodation can be arrived at for the benefit of black and white and of Rhodesia and Britain.
8.38 p.m.
Mr. Edward M. Taylor: I make this brief speech because I feel it is one I should make. I have no pretensions to be an expert on Rhodesia. However, I have taken every step I could to find out as much as I could about the subject, to hear all opinions and to read as thoroughly as I could the 1961 Constitution and the other papers leading up to it. Having done so, I feel that many of the speeches made tonight have been made on the wrong subjects.
We are not discussing the policy of the Government or of the previous Government, whether right or wrong. Nor are we discussing the rights and wrongs of U.D.I., whether it should have been taken or who was responsible. Nor are we discussing the assurances that the Government have given us today and on
790
Friday and at other times as to how this Bill will be applied.
Surely we are just discussing whether the Bill, with the measures outlined in it, is the right way to deal with the situation, and whether the indications of policy that the Government have given us are the right indications and ones we will agree with. This is a thing that should be considered very seriously indeed because Government policy could have an enormous effect on the future of the whole world.
That is why I particularly resented the speech made by the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Michael Foot). He pointed to three things which he said showed that our party was divided and that our policies were,wrong. In effect, he called in the ultimate for the sending of troops to sort out the problem and there were several "hear, hears" from the benches behind him from some hon. Members who have been doing their utmost to grind our national defences down to an all-time low and have thereby made it impossible for us in any case to make a contribution of that sort.
We then had a description of the police State. He said that Rhodesia was a police State and was becoming worse. We did not hear the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale and his supporters objecting when similar measures were introduced in other countries with results far more devastating than in Rhodesia.
Hon. Members should seriously ask themselves what they would do in such circumstances, if they lived in a small country with the world against them and what might be called the previous colonial Government against them and with the prospect of an insurrection in their own country while overseas leaders were talking about invasion. Would it not be necessary to take such measures as we thought necessary to preserve law and order in our own country? This is how we must regard the possible concept of a police State.
What I have said refers to measures only since U.D.I., because it is clear that under Rhodesia's Constitution before U.D.I., at least, since 1961, it has been impossible to bring forward any measure involving racial discrimination. This was the fundamental basis of the 1961 Constitution and there was a Commission whose

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approval for any such measure was required.
I am not happy about the Bill for several reasons. First, we are told that our support of the Bill is necessary so that Parliament can reassert its authority over Rhodesia. My understanding of the Bill is that it will effectively remove the ability of hon. Members to exercise timely control over a policy of sanctions or anything else. It might be argued that we have had an assurance that measures would have to be approved by the House. However, we can have all kinds of assurances about having a discussion of any measure within one or two days of a decision, but the psychological effect on Rhodesia and the world generally of any measure of sanctions, for instance, could be such that a revoking Order one or two days later would be largely ineffectual.
My second reason is that I do not know that the nature of the powers to be conferred on the Government is fully appreciated. I listened carefully when the Attorney-General explained the powers in Clause 2 and the details involved. However, I found myself largely in agreement with the suggestion that under that Clause it would be possible to suspend the 1961 Constitution and to do a wide range of things under the words
"an Order in Council.… may make such provision…in relation to Southern Rhodesia, or persons or things in any way …"
That demonstrates the full scope of the powers to make Orders.
My third reason is that if we pass the Bill, although we shall not be passing the Orders or conferring particular powers, we shall be accepting the principle of the policy of the imposition of sanctions. We must carefully consider the consequencies of such a policy and we must have serious doubts about it. If sanctions do not work —and it is more than likely that in the short or long term they will not work, because there are many countries, as is clear from the abstentions in the United" Nations and the two votes against the Resolution, which, openly or not, will not support such a policy—it will be impossible for the Government to achieve the results they want. If they do work and we get more co-operation than has ever been possible in any such previous operation, what is it we want to achieve and what would be achieved?
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It is clear that if sanctions were successful, they would bring a great deal of misery and distress to every person in Rhodesia, to those loyal to the Crown and to those not and even to those who do not know what the problem is about. It might be argued that the Bill is necessary to remove the principle of a police State and dictatorship from Rhodesia. Can it be such a terrible dictatorship in a country which, above all in Africa, has two-thirds of its present population under 21 years of age? Can it be so bad, when half a million people come into it voluntarily to work and do not find conditions so terrible or so objectionable that they voluntarily go away again, as quite clearly they can do if they so desire?
I believe that the sanctions in themselves will bring misery and distress, but, what is more dangerous, if we are successful in bringing ruin and misery to Southern Rhodesia, although Ian Smith has said that he will not, the inevitable consequence will be some retaliation from a desperate Southern Rhodesia that may result in the cutting off of electricity from Zambia, which could bring industry in Zambia to a stop and could have the consequence of flooding her mines. It could, in effect, put the clock back 50 or 100 years in Zambia, and perhaps other places, too.
I feel that we should think of the consequences of our policy before we vote for it. The Government have a duty to consider what will happen and what the end result will be. If we approve a policy of sanctions in general or in principle, we have to accept that the ultimate consequence will be armed intervention of some sort by someone. If our policy of sanctions creates a situation of distress in which law and order break down, it is quite clear that troops will have to be involved at some stage of the proceedings. If the Government are thinking in terms of armed intervention at the end of the day, they must also think of the consequences of that.
We are calling up the Ever-Readies to go to Aden, and there is considerable feeling against the use of them in such circumstances. But, even if we decide on the use of troops, how are we going to land them? Shall we send them via Zambia or Malawi, or do we send in paratroopers to Southern Rhodesia itself?

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It might be said that it is perhaps hypothetical and even silly to mention it, but I think it is vital, because we are today approving the basis of a policy, and it is our duty as individuals to consider what the consequences of that policy will be. I have looked at the Bill in every detail, and I cannot see it resulting in an acceptable or peaceful solution in any way. I think what other nations might do. I think of Southern Rhodesia itself. No matter how we look at it, there cannot be a peaceful and acceptable solution arising out of it. The one object of sanctions must be to create chaos and to create circum stances in which some new Government might arise or in which someone else can step in. Only if someone can show me that out of all the chaos and misery some acceptable solution will emerge will it be possible for me to support this policy. I cannot see it, and for that reason I certainly cannot support the Bill.
I apologise for intervening in the debate, because I feel that it has become the kind of debate to which only people with a wealth of experience and knowledge have been contributing. However, the situation is one that involves principles at which each Member of the House has to look. We must think of the consequences of the policy to which we are asked to give general approval. If we do that, we certainly cannot support the Bill.
8.49 p.m.
Sir Arthur Vere HarveyI am not one of those who have had the privilege of visiting Southern Rhodesia, but I, too, have studied the subject, and I feel very deeply about it. The last thing that I want to see is the situation in the territory getting out of hand, either for the whites or the blacks.
At the same time, I deplore the speech of the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Michael Foot), who made no real contribution to the debate but simply inflamed the situation. There were two speeches from this side and one from the Labour Benches last Friday with which he disagreed. To sum up the debate on the basis of those three speeches is very unfair, and, in response to a question, he replied eventually that he would support British troops going into Rhodesia. Surely the one thing that the House has
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to do today is to send a fairly united message out to the world.
It is unreasonable to expect every speech from both sides of the House to be identical. Nobody whom I have heard speaking today has said that U.D.I. was the right thing to do. Some hon. Members have made excuses as to why it happened, and have given the history leading up to it. Both parties have a responsibility in that direction, but those who have seen sanctions applied over the years have never seen them work, whether in Ethiopia or in Cuba. When the Americans applied sanctions against Cuba, they did not buy tobacco, but today we buy Havana tobacco in this country, and many Members enjoy it. I think that we have to turn these matters over very seriously in our minds.
It has been said that during the last war there was support for us, from both black and white, and that I endorse. I think that they have had a miserable deal over the years. Where there are second and third generation people growing up, it is the most frightful situation in which they now find themselves.
We all deplore U.D.I. It is very easy to say that in the comfort of an air-conditioned House of Commons, but what must it be like in Salisbury today? It is a desperate situation, and I ask hon. Members not to inflame it, to think seriously, and to think twice. Why do not those who recommend full sanctions recommend an oil embargo straight away? [HON. MEMBERS: "We do."] Not all do. The Prime Minister does not. Hon. Gentlemen opposite cannot have it both ways. It is either one thing or the other.
It is unthinkable that force would have to be used. We do not want one coloured or one white man killed. Our job as Members is to moderate the situation and to bring sense to it, if only for the next four or five weeks so that there is time to think, even by Mr. Smith, who might, by the immediate sanctions, have pressure put on him by his friends and colleagues who will say, "Smithy, you have made a mistake. You must think about this again." There are 4 million people involved, and that could happen. Do not drive him to desperation by bringing in extreme sanctions.

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I should have thought that at the moment the loss of Commonwealth preference would be sufficient. They have lost all financial status within the Commonwealth. One can see what has happened with the Peking Chinese in Zanzibar. I wonder how many Opposition Members in the Ghana Parliament are still in prison? Not long ago I heard that 60 were locked up. I heard Mr. Macmillan say that it was a convenient way of running the Government if the Opposition were in gaol, but let us think about it. People of the third generation living in Salisbury today are entitled to look to their Northern neighbours to see what has happened to them.
The point was made earlier that from the adjacent countries about 170,000 people come to work in Rhodesia, and they have a high standard of living. We have to take into account how events in Salisbury will affect those territories.
I deplore the broadcasts on television by African Nationalists in this country, who have been inflaming the situation rather more than the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale did. They have been saying "We have an underground movement at work. We are ready for sabotage. We are ready for their blood." It is disgraceful that the Government allow the B.B.C. to put that sort of thing out over the air and on television. It ought not to be allowed.
The Government felt, or Lord Normanbrook felt, that it was right to prohibit Mr. Smith from making his final television broadcast. I think that it was a wrong decision. The Government may have felt that Mr. Smith was becoming a little too popular in Britain. He had made quite an impression over here during that week or two, and in canvassing a number of people in my constituency I found that well over 90 per cent. of those people in Macclesfield were on the side of Mr. Smith. Rightly or wrongly, we should recognise that, but that is no reason why we, as Members of Parliament, should be guided by what our constituents say. We are here to express our views as we see them. I mention that in passing. We should take note of that situation.
I am sorry that Brigadier Skeen, who left this country on Saturday, had to move out in such an ignominious way. He was
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a man whose family, for seven generations, had served the Crown. He was serving his country up to the time when U.D.I. was declared, doing his duty. The Government could have been a little more human in giving him more reasonable time to get out. Then there are the six Rhodesian Sandhurst cadets who have been suspended—boys of 18 and 19. I hope that the Government will be more lenient with these youngsters who are here doing their best, and also with the young people who are employed at Rhodesia House.
I should like to hear from the Chancellor or some other Government spokesman what will be the effect on this country of these sanctions. It is all very well to say that tobacco will not be bought. The autumn crop has been bought and paid for, and there will not be another crop for 11 months. Even then I believe that tobacco is kept in Rhodesia for at least one year, and possibly two years, to mature. Why should not the Government put a ban on asbestos? I understand that about 50 per cent. of the output of Rhodesian asbestos is bought by this country. If we buy such large quantities, why should we not ban it? Is it because Britain needs it more than she needs tobacco? I want a clear explanation on this point.
If we are going to have sanctions we should impose them properly, and not bring in half-measures which will irritate the people and bring out the worst in them. This is a dangerous situation, and I am not convinced that what has been done by the Government will help at all. We shall bring the worst out of these 220,000 Rhodesians. They are not all loyal to Mr. Smith by any means, and I plead with the Government to do the minimum possible for a month or six weeks and then to see what we get.
We should allow the Governor to see what he can do, if he remains where he is, as seems likely. It may be that in a month, or five or six weeks, there will be a change of opinion and the Rhodesians will see that it is not going to work and that there is a possibility of avoiding bloodshed. To take these drastic measures over a period of time may be disastrous, and I hope that the Government will consider this matter sympathetically.
8.58 p.m.
Mr. Ian Lloyd (Portsmouth, Lang-stone): I have little claim to be listened to with any respect on this subject. I have lived in southern Africa for only 27 years. I also declare another interest in the subject. One of my forebears obtained the Rudd concession on which Rhodes built Rhodesia. My father-in-law was a Speaker in the Southern Rhodesian Parliament, and lives in Southern Rhodesia; my wife was born there, and my brother-in-law was born there and is now serving in the British Army. I therefore regard with some dismay the implication in the remarks made by the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Michael Foot) that the declaration of certain sentiments in this House was tantamount to incitement to rebellion.
I know that the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale has very little respect for the opinions of Lord North, but he might have some respect for the opinions of Edmund Burke who, 190 years ago, in this Chamber, said:
"I am charged with being an American. If warm affection towards those over whom I claim any share of authority be a crime. I am guilty of this charge."
None of us has a constitutional mandate to speaK here on behalf of the people of Southern Rhodesia. My hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Bedfordshire (Mr. Hastings) has earned it. For well over half a century 4 million Europeans, half of them British, have conducted their affairs under an uneasy condominium, effectively self-governing for 65 years in South Africa and 50 years in Rhodesia. They have exercised trusteeship over 10 million Africans—a trusteeship which, whatever its achievements, Europe has found increasingly unsatisfactory. The moral criteria have largely been determined, developed and defined in Europe, exported to Africa by the vocal organs of righteous political indignation. The practice and application of coexistence in multi-racial communities has been a local responsibility.
The divergence between refined precept and raw practice has created strains so severe that war broke out in 1899—we seem to have forgotten this—as it did in 1860 on another continent. A withdrawal from the Commonwealth took place in 1961 and a declaration of unilateral independence took place last week.
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Throughout this period, the voice of the European in southern Africa has been largely silent in this House. For once, it will be heard.
It will be heard because I am convinced that we are in grave danger of making asses of ourselves. The House's sense of history, which is one of the things on which it prides itself, is surely something which has not been very self-evident this evening. I think it was Santayana who said:
"Those who forget the lessons of history are condemned to repeat them."
I would add that those who learn the lessons of history are often condemned to repeat them with them.
Have those who have been negotiating with Mr. Smith forgotten, for example, the negotiations between Milner and Smuts as Attorney-General of the Transvaal? I would suggest that if they were to refresh their memories of the character and arguments of these negotiations, they would find a surprising parallel with those between Mr. Smith and the Prime Minister.
Have those who think that there have been developed new insights into and new solutions of the multi-racial community by any chance made themselves familiar with the correspondence between Smuts and John X. Merriman, the Prime Minister of the Cape? If they had, they would find very little developed in those arguments by either side which has not been deployed today and certainly very little which is new.
I came across the following phrase in the correspondence between Milner and Kruger:
"The existence of a rational franchise would remove the main causes of British intervention in the Transvaal."
That leaves very few arguments.
Are we incapable of recognising the repeated, terrifying and costly demonstrations in the deep South in the United States, in Southern Africa from 1899 to 1902, in Algeria more recently and now, possibly, in Rhodesia? Are we incapable of recognising that substantial numbers— I emphasise the word "substantial"—of Europeans are, rightly or wrongly, simply not prepared to hand over political power to indigenous peoples who, for whatever reasons, lack resources, lack responsibility, lack skill and lack enterprise?

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We should not concern ourselves, in my humble view, with the merits of this position—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] We should concern ourselves simply with the universality of this attitude as demonstrated on numberless occasions in the last century. Despite this bitter experience, let us admit that it is a failing of the Europeans, wherever they have involved themselves with indigenous peoples, that they are incapable of making this adjustment. Let us admit that this is a failure of the peoples of Europe.
Despite this, let us also realise that we have developed here in the United Kingdom—aided and abetted by all the major organs of opinion—an attitude of mind which suggests that, whatever contributions the Europeans in these parts of the world may make towards multi-racial ideals, they are not enough and they never will be enough. This is the basis of our attitude today.
We ditched the Federation—of that there is no doubt—because its multi-racialism fell short of our expectations. Now, our natural and inevitable dislike of all doctrines of racial superiority makes us unwilling to accept the necessity for interim solutions in interim situations, in which Europeans inevitably structure their social, political and economic systems to reflect real differences. Until these differences disappear, this necessity, as a real and practical political fact, must remain.
We have heard talk about insufficiency of means, particularly in relation to education. I wonder whether hon. Members seriously expected or can now expect a community which is not much larger in population than the town of Portsmouth or Plymouth or similar places in this country, and which in 1923 comprised only about 30,000 or 40,000 people, to create from nothing, without capital, the main educational substructure for 4 million people? Yet the burden of criticism today is that they did not do it.
I am not saying that there is any excuse for their not accepting the assistance which we in Europe have to offer now, but we must look at the whole record and consider what it is that this small community, without capital and without resources, has been expected to do, quite apart from educating their own children. Why should they not educate their own children by European standards? Why
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should they degrade the education of their own children in order to achieve this equality? Which hon. Member will will give me an answer to that question?
Mr. Norman Buchan: I will give the hon. Gentleman an answer. First, may I put in in the form of a question to him? He says that in 40 years a community of 30,000 people—
Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Member intervened to answer a question. He must answer it.
Mr. Buchan: What answer has the hon. Member got to this, Mr. Speaker—
Mr. Speaker: Order. If the hon. Gentleman intervenes to answer a question, he must answer it.
Mr. Lloyd: The very one who has an answer is high on the short list for the Chair of Higher Nonsense in Political Education yet to be set up in one of our universities.
Are we surprised that disillusioned people in Rhodesia have created a situation in which despair has followed automatically? There was idealism there in 1953. Let no hon. Member dispute that there was this idealism. Thousands of people whose dislike of the apartheid regime in South Africa was such that they felt impelled to emigrate went to Rhodesia. So let no hon. Member dispute that there was this idealism, and it is still there. But it is turning to dismay and to fear. It was once said that racial prejudice was false fears leading to real sorrows. Unfortunately, the real sorrows which many of us have seen in Africa lead ultimately to real fears.
The intimate experience which Rhodesians have had of the Congo and the other desperate affairs on their borders has bred a willingness to resort to measures which we all regard as discreditable. But have we any right to resent their attitude and expect them to bear the immediate personal consequences of what we preach? We talk as though the unilateral declaration of independence is Mr. Smith's sole responsibility. What a travesty of the truth. The responsibility rests firmly on the shoulders of those politicians, journalists, clerics, broadcasters and T.V. interviewers, the

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whole sorry legion of joyless Jeremiahs, who have forced Europeans in Africa to wear a straitjacket of guilt out of all proportion to their crime. Now, is the United Nations to be the final arbiter of man's inhumanity to man?
We have forced Rhodesians into a lie. Should we now be surprised that they turn against us? Should we be surprised that, as Dame Margery Perham said in her very fine letter to The Times, they do not accept with a shout of acclaim the flaming torch of African revolution, which we have helped to keep alive in the basements and slums of London, before the television screens and on the front pages of our newspapers? After the repeal of the Stamp Act, an Act of the United States Congress described how the colonies fell "into their ancient state of unsuspecting confidence in the Motherland ". It was Burke who seized upon this in his address to the electors of Bristol and who suggested that this unsuspecting confidence was the true centre of gravity among mankind, about which all the parts were at rest. It is this unsuspecting confidence, he said, which
"… removes all difficulties and reconciles all the contradictions which occur in the complexity of all ancient, puzzled, political establishments ".
He concluded:
"Happy are the rulers which have the secret of preserving it."
I hope that the Prime Minister does not ask us to accept that he enjoys this secret, because I am sure that not all hon. Members would accept that he does. The Rhodesians, like the Americans in 1776, despairing of us, have trusted in themselves. If their alienation is not yet complete, it will not long outlast the imposition of penal sanctions.
The House is debating a U.D.I., but what is the real declaration we are debating tonight, on which U.D.I. merely sets its seal? It is, in my view, M.D.I.— a multilateral declaration of ineptitude. It has been ineptitude, firstly, on the part of Europeans in Africa, who failed on a sufficient scale to encourage the emergent Africans, particularly in Southern Africa. If they had given that encouragement this situation would never have occurred. It has been ineptitude, secondly, on the part of Europeans in Europe, with their absolute determination to apply to non-homogeneous societies not merely the ideals,
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because this is right, but the concepts and institutions of homogeneous political societies to Europe. Indeed, the assumption by government in Europe that government by consent and free institutions are in all senses and under all conditions coterminus with and wholly dependent on universal suffrage has been a major cause of disaster. A minor ineptitude on the part of Europeans in Europe—I include not only this House but Europe as a whole—has been our failure to focus attention on this great area of Africa and the basic economic nature of the problem of advancing all these people.
The final ineptitude is of the Africans, particularly the African nationalists in Southern Rhodesia, whose impatience and conceit was encouraged by us to believe that they live in the modern equivalent of hell. They spurn whatever political advance is made available to them, act against civil order and thus augment the hell against which they have been encouraged to protest.
Treason is the revolt of reasonable people in Rhodesia against a multilateral declaration of ineptitude. There may be technical treason inherent in U.D.I., but we shall make the gravest misjudgment since 1776 if we assume that there is treason in the hearts of the Rhodesian people. At the height of the last war Field Marshal Smuts wrote a most poignant letter to his wife. It included the following phrase:
"Perhaps it is the fate of our little race to be sacrificed on the altar of the world's ideals. Perhaps we are destined to be the martyr race."
I am sure that if there is any sentiment in the hearts of the Rhodesian people tonight, that phrase is close to what it might be. It is not treason but the sentiment which they feel. It there not a place for a legitimate de facto authority in Rhodesia? Is it really possible for this House, this country—indeed, for Europe—to upset this? I remind the House that over the minarets in the heart of the Kremlin today there stands the Cross. It is not the Cross which is illuminated but the Red Star of Russia.
Sanctions, to be effective, require the co-operation of both Portugal and South Africa, and the chances that we could make these sanctions effective across the Limpopo are, in my opinion, absolutely nil. We have had a great deal of discussion this afternoon about oil, but I

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have not heard one hon. Member mention that South Africa has the largest oil-from-coal plant in the world, and is probably capable of supplying Rhodesian requirements from its own indigenous resources. If South Africa should choose to do this, what is our policy to be? Are we to destroy that plant? If so, how, and what will the consequences be of such an action if we take it?
If we press these sanctions to their logical conclusion, the result will be war —of this there is no doubt whatever. Are we prepared to accept these consequences? Have we thought this thing through? Have we asked ourselves what are the necessary conditions which, in our minds, will topple Mr. Smith's Government? How are we to create those conditions, and what will be the consequences throughout Southern Africa? I suggest that we have not thought these things through. We are not willing to face the logical consequences of our actions and, until we are, I cannot possibly support the Bill.
I believe that there are only two tests to be applied. The first is: do we or do we not want a major war in Southern Africa? If we do not want a major war in Southern Africa, we must be very careful how we handle this situation. The second is: do we want to restore British prestige in Southern Africa? I ask, because this is fundamental. I suggest that if we do want to restore British prestige there, the right approach to this problem, which is as formidable in its complexity as any that have come before the House of Commons, is one of humility in the face of what is a most enormous problem, with enormous complications.
We cannot stop the wind of change. It would be a fool who suggested that we could. The wind of change, a phrase that has been much maligned and criticised, nevertheless expressed a great truth in relation to Africa. The twentieth century is the century of change, not least in the balance and relationships between peoples, but I would suggest that the responsibility which this House faces this evening is not one of stopping the wind of change in Africa but, quite simply, whether we are to turn the wind of change into a monsoon of misery.
9.18 p.m.
Mr. Peter Thomas: We have had a very full, a very thoughtful and very serious debate on the Second Reading of this enabling Bill. One thing that has emerged quite clearly from the debate is that no one who has spoken welcomes this Bill. Those who have offered support to it have done so sadly. It is right to say that they do so for one reason and one reason only, which is that they think that it is necessary. Hon. and right hon. Members have delivered speeches with tremendous sincerity. No one has spoken other than wholly sincerely. In particular, it will be generally agreed, I think, that my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth, Langstone (Mr. Ian Lloyd) spoke from the bottom of his heart. He has associations with Southern Rhodesia —family and historical associations— which demonstrate the real problem we have to face when we are thinking about this matter.
It is true that we have ties of kinship with people in Rhodesia which cannot be severed by a Bill like this. They will remain, but I suggest that this Bill is not brought about because of anything which the last Southern Rhodesian Government did in the conduct of its affairs in Rhodesia. It is not brought about because of what happened in Southern Rhodesia in the many years when it had self-government. This is brought about because the last Government in Southern Rhodesia, or rather, Mr. Smith's Government, acted illegally.
I do not think that this has been in issue at all during this debate. There is no doubt at all, no issue in law, that they acted illegally last Friday when they declared independence. This was a grave step. It was a tragic step, and, as my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Ely (Sir H. Legge-Bourke) said, it was on their part folly. The repercussions, as he said, will be felt not only in Rhodesia, not only in Africa and Britain, but throughout the world, because what was done by this declaration of independence involved possibly the most important, certainly the most sensitive, problem in world relations —the problem of colour and the irritant, the major irritant, which goes with that problem, the question of white supremacy.
I think I can say from this debate that, with one or two exceptions, it is generally

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agreed that it would be impossible for Her Majesty's Government and Parliament to accept this rebellious challenge lightly. Southern Rhodesia is still part of Her Majesty's Dominions. Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and Parliament in the United Kingdom have the burden of carrying the Crown's responsibility and jurisdiction, which in law undoubtedly remain.
Therefore, we recognise that Her Majesty's Government need powers from Parliament to act. Clearly they must have the powers and they must be able to act quickly. It is also clear that when they come to Parliament and ask for an Enabling Bill they ask for powers which must be widely drawn.
As my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Sir J. Hobson) said at the beginning, we do not oppose the principle behind this enabling Bill. We have reservations and they have been expressed very strongly. We have reservations as to certain of its contents. There has been detailed criticism in the course of the debate, but, despite what has been said strongly and very forcibly against this Bill by certain hon. and right hon. Members, nevertheless it is the general wish of this House that the Bill should be given a Second Reading, provided that we can be satisfied on one or two important matters that were raised.
We have had certain assurances from the Attorney-General in his opening speech and we are grateful for what he said. We wish for some more assurances from the Solicitor-General when he winds up the debate. May I remind him of what was said in particular by my right hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington and my right hon. Friend the Member for Preston, North (Mr. J. Amery). We should like—I am sure this is the wish of a large number of hon. and right hon. Members—to have assurances from him that these emergency powers will not be used in an attempt to rewrite the 1961 Constitution so as to impose a constitutional settlement on the people of Rhodesia.
The Attorney-General said that there was no intention to suspend the Constitution. He prayed in aid words contained in Clause 2(2,a), that an Order in Council
"may make such provision—
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(a)for suspending, amending, revoking or adding to any of the provisions of the Constitution of Southern Rhodesia 1961."
The Attorney-General said that the words "any of the provisions" meant that it could only be part of the provisions and therefore did not mean an amendment to or an alteration of the Constitution as a whole.
I confess that I agree with the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Sydney Silverman) about this. The power is there in the Bill to revoke all the provisions. If the Attorney-General is right and they are restricted by the word "any", the power is nevertheless there to revoke so many of the provisions of the Constitution that it would become wholly emasculated.
My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington expressed his concern about the word "revoking" in the Clause. We believe that it is unnecessary, but we do not press this matter. We merely ask the Solicitor-General to give us an assurance that any revocations that may be made in this Constitution will be limited purely to consequential amendments. I can understand that if there is an amendment there may have to be consequential amendments in some form. I ask the Solicitor-General to say that they will be limited purely to those and that any amendment or addition to the Constitution will be interim only and is not intended to be permanent.
Concern has been expressed during the debate about the provision of Clause 3(3,b), which reads:
"The expiration of section 2 of this Act shall not affect—
(b)the Constitution of Southern Rhodesia 1961 as in force immediately before the expiration of that section."
What does this mean? Am I not right in saying that this means that, if an amendment is made of the Constitution in some way through an Order in Council, at the expiration of the 12 months from the date of the Bill, if it is not renewed, the Constitution remains as amended? This may well mean that there could be quite an alteration in the Constitution which, when the emergency has come to an end, would nevertheless have the effect that the Constitution has been amended in a considerable way.

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Therefore, we are entitled to know what the Government's intention is on this. If the Constitution has been amended, is it intended that that amendment shall be permanent, or is it intended that at the end of the period of emergency the main features of the Constitution shall remain, because I think that that is the general wish of the House? At the end of the emergency all the major features of the 1961 Constitution should still be effective.
The Attorney-General will agree with me that this is important, because the purpose of this Enabling Bill surely is to bring Rhodesia back to the lawful constitutional development. The purpose of it is not to impose a solution on Rhodesia. Therefore, any alteration of the Constitution which is intended to be permanent should be conducted, once there is a lawful Rhodesian Government again, by negotiation because only then will there be any hope of a final solution.
The first Clause of the Bill makes a declaration about the existing law. One thing which we should think about is the question of treasonable activities, which has been mentioned by many hon. and right hon. Members in the debate. Questions have been posed about the British Nationality Act, 1948. It is clear that there is a complicated problem here. If a person is a Rhodesian subject and is therefore a British subject under the 1948 Act but is not a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies, as so many Rhodesians are by reason of birth and other reasons, then the British subject who is a Rhodesian would not be acting in a treasonable way unless he was acting against Rhodesian law, whereas the British subject—like possibly Mr. Smith who is a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies because he was born before 1923 and because of his parentage— would be liable, even if he had not infringed Rhodesian law, if he infringed British law.
These are complicated matters. They are far from clear, and I was interested when the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Hooson) asked whether the Solicitor-General, in his reply, would try to clarify the subject. I do not think that it could possibly be clarified simply. I do not think that it would assist if an attempt were made, because the whole
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thing would be so confused that no one would be able to dare act in any way. I think that the Governor was right, as the legal Government in Rhodesia, to take a simple course. He enjoined all public servants in Rhodesia to continue normal working whilst refraining from all acts calculated to further the objects of the illegal authorities.
This is an eminently sensible approach, but I am sure that the House, which has concerned itself very much with the position of the police, the military and the Civil Service in Rhodesia, was very disturbed by the revelations made by my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Bedfordshire (Mr. Hastings) in his speech today. I confess that I had no idea that what he told the House had taken place, and I should like to refer to it.
My hon. Friend said that those members of the former Rhodesian High Commissioner's staff in London who remained here had been told by Her Majesty's Government that they must make a declaration of dissociation from the purported declaration of independence. My hon. Friend read out to the House what they were required to declare. What concerns me is, first of all, that at the end of the document is written:
"If you decline to make a declaration in the above terms you will be regarded as having chosen to adhere to Mr. Smith's illegal regime."
This is a new approach in British law. [HON. MEMBERS: "Disgraceful."] It means that these people are told that silence and neutrality shall be deemed to be an admission of guilt and possibly treason. I think that it would be agreed by the Attorney-General that this is a new and wrong departure from the ordinary law of this country. I hope that he will dissociate himself from it. I was surprised that the hon. Member for Barons Court (Mr. Richard), who is a member of my circuit and I think an extremely intelligent man, should have seen fit in his speech to try to support this action. It is wrong, and I am sure that the Government know that it is wrong if it means that those people who are in Britain, civil servants and officials of the old Rhodesian Government and possibly of the present Rhodesian Government under the Governor, are being treated in a different way from those who are in Rhodesia and who have just been

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told by the Governor to do the best they can.
I am told that there is one coloured gentleman among these people. What a dreadful position he is placed in; whichever way be chooses, he is placing himself in a difficult position. Is he to be placed in this position? Is he to be asked to choose here and now by a declaration? And if not, will he be treated differently from the white people who are civil servants of Rhodesia? In any way, it is wholly unsatisfactory. I did not know about this until the debate, but I am told that my right hon. and learned friend the Member for Wirral (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd) before the debate started communicated with the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, and I hope that we shall have an adequate reply on a subject which has concerned the House very much in the debate.
I have one or two more matters to raise. I appreciate that it is late and that the House wishes to hear the Solicitor-General's reply. But I should like to mention one or two other points on which we want some assurance. Clause 2(5) reads:
"The expiration of an Order in pursuance of this subsection shall not affect the operation of the Order as respects things previously done or omitted to be done or the power to make a new Order; and in calculating the period aforesaid no account shall be taken of any time during which Parliament is dissolved or prorogued or during which both Houses are adjourned for more than four days."
It is a departure from the normal procedure to have 28 days before which Parliament needs to pass these Orders. Normally it is seven days. But it is a point which one does not press because it is appreciated that there may be difficulties. We do, however, require an answer.
My right hon. and learned Friend asked about the effect of an Order which has been laid but at the end of 28 days has not been passed, and then another similar or identical Order is laid immediately thereafter. Is it possible to continue with these Orders, despite the fact that they are not passed by Parliament? From a practical point of view I agree that it could not be done, because Parliament would not tolerate it, but from the point of view of the drafting of the Bill
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it could be done, and it is a point to which the Solicitor-General should refer.
We are entitled to have an assurance from the Government that if an Order in Council is affected by the prorogration or the adjournment of Parliament or in some other way as envisaged in this subsection, then Parliament will be recalled and there will not be this very long delay, as there could be, particularly in an important Order. As my right hon. and learned Friend said, in small matters this clearly would not be necessary, but there may well be Orders which contain extremely contentious matters, as we have heard today, and it is only right that we should be given the assurance that in these circumstances Parliament would be recalled.
My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Macclesfield (Sir A. V. Harvey) said that it was important that we should send out from the debate a united message to the world. It is clear that in the debate there has not been unanimity. There has been agreement on certain matters. There is agreement that the act of U.D.I. was an act of grave concern to us, an act which is illegal and an act of folly. I suggest that we should appreciate that the Government are faced with a serious situation and that they deserve the powers for which they have asked. During the debates which will take place on the various Orders which will follow from the Bill, there will be opportunity for us to go in depth into the Orders. But tonight the Government ask for powers to act, and I commend to my right hon. and hon. Friends and to the whole House that it would be in the interests not only of Britain but also of all the people of Rhodesia if we were to act tonight in a united fashion.
9.41 p.m.
The Solicitor-General (Sir Dingle Foot): We have reached nearly the end of a sombre but memorable debate. As the right hon. Member for Conway (Mr. Peter Thomas) said, every Member who has taken part in the debate has addressed the House with great sincerity, and in nearly every case, I would say, with a high sense of the responsibility which rests upon us all. I particularly wish to acknowledge the tone and temper of the speech delivered by the right hon. and learned Member for Warwick and

811
Leamington (Sir J. Hobson) in opening the debate and the speech of the right hon. Member for Conway.
Before I come to the rather more substantial point about the Constitution and other matters which were raised, there is one particular matter with which I want to deal at once, because it has aroused the anxiety of hon. Members in different parts of the House. This concerns the declaration which was said to have been required from members of the staff at Rhodesia House. I think that I can set at rest the minds of right hon. and hon. Members on this matter.
It is necessary to distinguish between the official position of the staff at Rhodesia House and the treatment which is to be accorded to them as individuals. On the declaration of independence, the inter-Governmental relations previously conducted through the respective High Commissions in Salisbury and London of course came to an end. There is no legal Government for Rhodesia House to represent here, just as there is no legal regime in Salisbury with which our High Commission can have dealings.
We are, therefore, requiring the withdrawal of the former High Commission staff in London, the time of this withdrawal being comparable with that of the withdrawal of our staff from Salisbury. As individuals, the High Commission staff have simply been offered an opportunity to dissociate themselves from the illegal regime. They have been told that if they do so they will not be required to leave, that they will be regarded and treated by the British Government as loyal public servants of the Crown, that the objective will be to restore them to service under a legal regime in Rhodesia and that, in the meantime, financial assistance will be afforded to them and the possibilities of giving them alternative employment in this country will be immediately examined.
The document which has been mentioned was given to the former Deputy High Commissioner at his own request. It was given as a guide to the kind of declaration of loyalty that was needed and to the implications of the choice facing individuals. I want to make it clear that there has never been any question of requiring all members of the staff at
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Rhodesia House to make a declaration in one sense or the other or indeed to sign a declaration in any form unless they wished to do so.
I am told that there is no reason to think that any misunderstanding of the position remains in the minds of any member of the staff. The staff have also been told that, irrespective of any declaration that may be made, we will be prepared to consider sympathetically any individual compassionate case that may be put to us regarding the date of departure. I hope that this will set at rest the minds of right hon. and hon. Gentlemen.
Mr. Wall rose—
Hon. Members: Give way.
Mr. Speaker: Order. I do not know whether the hon. and learned Solicitor-General intends to give way.
Mr. Wall: I ask the Solicitor-General to explain the last sentence of the declaration. Why have these men been told that if they do not sign this declaration and then go home they will be regarded as rebels?
The Solicitor-General: They have not been so told and the position has been made perfectly clear.
Mr. R. H. Turton: Does the Solicitor-General deny that the actual document passed to these civil servants ended
"If you decline to make a declaration in the above terms you will be regarded as having chosen to adhere to Mr. Smith's illegal regime."?
The Solicitor-General: All that happened was that one civil servant asked another civil servant for an expression of opinion. That is all this document represents. The document was in no way presented on behalf of the Government to any member of the staff in Rhodesia House. Nobody has been asked to sign such a document. Nor has it been suggested that anyone should do so.
Mr. Hastings rose—
Hon. Members: Give way.
Mr. Speaker: Order. The Solicitor-General is obviously not giving way.
Mr. Edward Heath (Bexley): This is a very serious matter. I realise that the Solicitor-General is doing his best to help

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the House, but the copy we have of this document is headed "From the Commonwealth Relations Office, Downing Street", with the words "Declaration Required". It contains the sentence which has twice been read out to the House. Would it not be better for the Solicitor-General, in the presence of the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, to say quite frankly that he regrets that the document was sent out and that, in view of this statement, it is withdrawn?
The Solicitor-General: I thought I had already made it clear to the House that this document was not sent out. It in no way represents the policy of the Government and there is nothing for us to withdraw. The position as regards the staff at Rhodesia House is, as I have said, that nobody has been required to sign a declaration and I think that it will appear to the House, from what I have said, that every possible indulgence has been afforded to all members of the staff.
Mr. Heath: We accept that the Government wish to give every consideration to the members of the staff and if the Solicitor-General now says that this document in no way represents the policy of the Government then we are prepared to accept it.
The Solicitor-General: I thought I had said so, but certainly I give the right hon. Gentleman that assurance. This does not and never has represented the policy of the Government.
I come now to the speech of the right hon. and learned Member for Warwick and Leamington who asked for an assurance that we would not rewrite the whole of the 1961 Constitution under the powers conferred by this Bill. A similar assurance was asked for by the right hon. Member for Preston, North (Mr. J. Amery). I can give that assurance at once. I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Sydney Silverman) pointed out that it might be possible, by using the powers under Clause 2(2), gradually to erode the Constitution. But if we wanted to suspend the Constitution as a whole, these words would be entirely inapt.
If we wanted to do that, we would take powers to do so in the clearest terms, but it is not our purpose to destroy the 1961 Constitution. This is also the
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answer to the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Hooson). We want to preserve the 1961 Constitution, because it is under that Constitution that both the Governor and the judges derive their powers. Those powers would disappear if we were to suspend or revoke the 1961 Constitution. Therefore, we do not intend that the Constitution as a whole should be destroyed, or that it should be altered in any very considerable respect. But, of course, when we are taking powers, we have to take powers to deal with particular provisions in the Constitution should that become necessary.
Mr. Percy Grieve: Can the Solicitor-General say why in those circumstances it is necessary to have the word "revoking" in subsection (2,a)? Surely power to suspend or amend would be quite sufficient.
The Solicitor-General: It is necessary to cover every possible eventuality—suspend, amend, or revoke. It may be necessary—we cannot tell yet—to get rid of some particular provision in the Constitution, but I give the House the assurance that it is not our purpose to destroy the Constitution either at one blow, or by a series of erosions.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman went on—and this engaged the attention of various hon. Members—to deal with the question of treason. Last night, my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General and I were asked to advise on whether certain acts would constitute treason and we advised—and this advice was published in the Press this morning—that not only would any assault on the Governor constitute treason, but it would also constitute treason if there were an attempt to usurp the lawful authority of the Governor.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman pointed out, perfectly correctly, that there was a difference between the law of treason in this country and the law of treason in Rhodesia, and that the Treason Act. 1351. and the Act of 1848 did not apply in Rhodesia. That is perfectly true. The law in Rhodesia is based on Roman-Dutch law, but although the terms are different, the effect is very much the same and it remains true in Rhodesia, as it is here, that anyone who usurps the authority of the Governor, or anyone who

815
incites to rebellion, or anyone who gives aid and comfort to the rebel regime, is guilty of treason.
I do not ask the House to accept merely my opinion or that of my right hon. and learned Friend. I ask the House to recall what was said by Sir Robert Treadgold, a very considerable jurist, as the right hon. and learned Gentleman will agree. He resigned his position as Federal Chief Justice a few years ago because of the oppressive legislation which was being passed by the Federal Legislature and which is now mirrored in the legislation of Rhodesia. On 1st July, last year, Sir Robert Tread-gold said that a declaration, that is, a unilateral declaration of independence, would be treason, particularly if it were followed by action to give it effect. It is perfectly true, as the right hon. and learned Gentleman and the right hon. and learned Member for Conway pointed out, that the position is somewhat different as between citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies and Rhodesian citizens. There are both in Southern Rhodesia.
I believe that Mr. Smith and certain other members of his Cabinet are still citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies, whereas there are other persons there who are Rhodesian citizens. They are all of them subject to Rhodesian law while they are in Rhodesia. The difference is that those of them who are citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies are also subject to the English law of treason and, if they commit an act of treason, they are liable to be tried in this country. That, I agree, is perhaps an anomaly which is created by Section 3 of the British Nationality Act, 1948. But, as my right hon. and learned Friend informed the hon. Gentleman for Devon, North (Mr. Thorpe), the question of an amendment in the 1948 Act is a matter which we have under active consideration.
Reference to treason was also made by the hon. Gentleman for Yarmouth (Mr. Fell). He referred to the statement that was made by my right hon. and learned Friend on Friday last that, unlike Rhodesia, we were not going to impose any censorship in this country. But it is not just a matter of censorship. It is well
816
established that incitement to treason is in itself treason. If anyone in this country were to incite the rebels to persist in their rebellion or give them aid and comfort in any way, they might be exposed to prosecution. But that is not a matter of censorship. That is a matter of the law of the land.
Sir A. V. Harvey: Will the hon. and learned Gentleman say what the position will be of African Nationalists in this country who incite bloodshed over radio and television?
The Solicitor-General: I am dealing now with those who incite to rebellion. I say that that is an act of treason. It may be that other offences are committed by other persons, but the question that was put to me was about censorship, and I answered by saying that there is not and will be no censorship in this country. But, if persons break the law, they must be prepared to take the consequences.
Mr. Fell: Really, that does not answer the question satisfactorily. The Attorney-General, by his correction of himself on Friday, imposed a censorship on the Press and people of this country.
The Solicitor-General: He imposed no censorship. I do not want to take up the time of the House on the point, but he expressly excluded any question of censorship. I am saying that no question of censorship arises if people in this country choose to break the law by giving aid and comfort in any way to a rebel government.
Mr. Biggs-Davison rose—
The Solicitor-General: I shall try to cover all the points which were raised in the debate, if I might ask for the indulgence of the House.
The next point that was raised by the right hon. and learned Gentleman and by the right hon. and learned Member for Conway was in relation the expiration of the Order, in subsection (5) of Clause 2. He wanted an assurance that if during a Parliamentary Recess some important new order was passed, Parliament would be recalled. I cannot give him an assurance precisely in those terms. He will agree with me that we might have orders of differing degrees of importance, and no one would suggest that the House should be recalled because of some rather

817
trivial order. But if there was an Order which represented an important new departure, which may be very important indeed, then I suppose that as a matter of course there would be consultations between the usual channels, and I would think, though of course I cannot give an undertaking, that the recall of Parliament might very well follow.
Lord Balniel: Surely it is not unreasonable that the Solicitor-General should give the undertaking that if the Opposition request the recall of Parliament because in their view an Order in Council is controversial and important Parliament will be recalled? Surely he can give the undertaking that the Government will meet the Opposition's request.
The Solicitor-General: I cannot give an undertaking, and no Government can, that Parliament will be recalled whenever the Opposition wish to recall it. What I have said is that I would have thought that this was a matter which would almost certainly be considered through the usual channels, and that if a fresh Order made under this Bill represented some considerable new departure in policy Parliament would probably, indeed almost certainly, be recalled.
I come next to the speech of the right hon. Member for Carlton (Sir K. Pick-thorn). He made a somewhat nostalgic speech and reminded my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne and myself of the days, 25 years ago, when we passed the Regulations under the Emergency Powers Act, in 1939. He wanted to know whether it was really necessary to have a period of 28 days. Again I say that there may. be some Orders of great importance, and some of little importance, and it may be that if there is a fairly trivial Order the House will be content to allow it to pass for a certain number of days, up to 28 days, but the House has already received an assurance from my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister that it would be the wish of the Government, as I am sure it would be the wish of the Opposition and of hon. Members on both sides of the House, if we were dealing with an Order of any consequence, to bring it before the House in the shortest possible time. That is certainly the intention of the Government.
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The other point that was raised as regards this aspect of the Bill was raised by the hon. Member for Antrim, South (Sir Knox Cunningham). He said that there might be an Order which expired after 28 days and then a fresh Order in the same terms would be made a day later although the original Order had not been confirmed by the House. Theoretically that could happen. That could happen under any of the emergency powers legislation that we have ever had in this House, but in fact we know that it cannot happen because the House of Commons would not tolerate it. Therefore, I suggest that that is a perfectly imaginary difficulty. Moreover, if the Order were really of any consequence, the House would certainly insist on debating it before the expiration of the 28 days.
Now I come to the speech of the right hon. Member for Preston, North. He made the same point, and I say again to him that there has never been any question of this Government or, I would say, of the last Government either, imposing a constitution on Rhodesia. It has been the endeavour, both of the last Government, and of this one, to find some measure of agreement. That is to say, I come back to the fifth of the five principles. It is the aim of this Government, and, I think, of the whole House, finally to arrive at a constitution which will be reasonably acceptable to all races in Rhodesia, but there is no question simply of using these powers to impose a constitution from Whitehall.
The right hon. Gentleman—and also the hon. Member for Chigwell (Mr. Biggs-Davison)—went on to seek an assurance that it was not the intention of the Government to use these powers for what he called the escalation of sanctions. All I can say is that at the present time we think the measures now contemplated, and of which the House is well aware, will serve their purpose, but of course I cannot give an assurance that we will never use these powers for any further purposes, and no Government introducing a Measure of this kind could give an assurance of that sort.
The hon. Member for Middlesbrough, West (Dr. Bray) made a reference to the part played by the churches in Rhodesia, and I should like to join in the tribute

819
that he paid to them. My hon. Friend the Member for Barons Court (Mr. Richard) asked about broadcasting. I would refer him to the assurance given by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister last week. I understand that the B.B.C. is making every possible effort to see that the people of Rhodesia receive over the air the information which is denied to them by their own Government.
I turn now to the speech of the right hon. and learned Member for Chertsey (Sir L. Heald). His was a very welcome intervention in the debate. He referred in particular to the position of the Rhodesian judges, and I found myself entirely in agreement with what he said about their attitude. I had the opportunity of visiting Rhodesia in September last year. At that time the prospect of a unilateral declaration of independence was being canvassed; indeed, even then it was almost the only topic of conversation in Salisbury. I was then told that there was no question as to the attitude of the judges; they would all refuse to acknowledge an unlawful Constitution but would carry out their duties so long as they were able to do so. I was assured that the same attitude was shared by the great majority of the Rhodesian Bar. Therefore, as a member of the legal profession, I—and I am sure that the two right hon. and learned Gentlemen opposite will join with me—wish to pay my tribute to the Rhodesian Bench and Bar in these very difficult circumstances.
The hon. and gallant Member for Eye (Sir H. Harrison) was the first Member in the debate to refer to the embargo on tobacco imports. He asked why it was necessary to take action in advance of the Bill. My answer is simply that the Government have taken certain measures concerning tobacco, sugar, arms and exchange control under powers which already existed—that is to say, powers for which we do not need to seek Parliamentary authority. We took this action because, first, our objective was to act firmly against the illegal seizure of power by Mr. Smith and his colleagues and, secondly, because—as the right hon. and learned Gentleman has said—it was necessary to act swiftly. We stand by the decision to take those actions. We think it was right to do so in advance of the Bill.
820
The hon. Member for the Isle of Ely (Sir H. Legge-Bourke) asked whether we would introduce only those sanctions which could be made immediately effective. Of course we cannot do that, but we do not propose to introduce any sanctions for their own sake. We think that some sanctions will be immediately effective but others may take a little longer to make their effects felt. But under these emergency powers we do not intend to introduce any measures which we do not contemplate being effective in the end.
Sir H. Legge-Bourke: The Solicitor-General has not answered the point that I put. What I said was that the Government ought only to introduce Orders which they were determined to see enforced. The point that I was putting was not that they should necessarily only be effective, but that they should also be capable of being enforced.
The Solicitor-General: Yes. We intend all the measures that we introduce eventually to be capable of enforcement. But there must be some measures—for example, those relating to the constitutional position of the Governor—that we cannot enforce at present but which we intend to be enforceable at the end of the day.
I will come back in closing to the speech of the right hon. Member for Preston, North. He astonished me, because he said there was no issue of principle involved in the Bill. I should have thought that there was a tremendous principle here. After all, we are dealing with rebellion. Various references have been made to earlier rebellions, some of which succeeded and some of which deserved to succeed. Most of us would agree that the rebellion of the American colonists deserved to succeed. There are few hon. Members, even on the benches opposite, who would now rush to the defence of George III and Lord Bute.
There were rebellions of a different kind in the nineteenth century. There was the Risorgimento in Italy which led to the throwing off of Austrian rule. There was an unsuccessful rebellion, but one which deserved to succeed, in the streets of Budapest in 1956. But they all had one distinguishing feature. That they were all rebellions against tyranny and injustice. This is a rebellion

821
to maintain tyranny and injustice. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] It is a rebellion engineered by the spokesmen of a small racial minority who are prepared to go to any lengths and to break any law in order to maintain their privileged political and economic position.
We have heard about the measures which have been imposed in the last few days. Oppression did not begin with the unilateral declaration of independence. We have had over a very long period the African leaders imprisoned without trial. I arrived in Southern Rhodesia last summer on the day that they were suppressing the Daily News. I listened to the debate in their Parliament and it was apparent to me—as it was to anyone else who heard the debate—that the newspaper was being suppressed simply because it expressed views unpalatable to the Government and because it was a forum for African opinion.
822
We now see the stage reached of complete and absolute suppression. The right hon. and learned Member for Chertsey said, rightly, that we are responsible for the peace, order and good government of Southern Rhodesia. We have a responsibility for all people in Rhodesia, but, above all, I suggest, for that African majority who at present are denied all human rights and all means of political expression. It is to discharge that responsibility that we introduce this Bill today.
Question put, That the Bill be now read a Second time:—
The House proceeded to a Division—
Mr. GOURLAY and Mr. FITCH were appointed Tellers for the Ayes and Mr. EDWARD M. TAYLOR was appointed Teller for the Noes; but no Member being willing to act as second Teller for the Noes, Mr. SPEAKER declared that the Ayes had it.
Bill accordingly read a Second time.
Bill immediately considered in Committee [pursuant to Order].
[Sir SAMUEL STOREY in the Chair]
10.15 p.m.
The Chairman: Before I put the Question on Clause 1, I have to inform the Committee that two manuscript Amendments have been handed in, which I propose to select. The first is in Clause 2, page 2, line 1. leave out subsection (3).
The second is in Clause 2, page 2, line 11, leave out word "twenty-eight" and insert "seven".
Copies of these Amendments may be obtained at the Vote Office.

SOUTHERN RHODESIA BILL

  Clause 1.—(STATUS OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA.)
  Question proposed, That the Clause stand part of the Bill.
  Sir Charles Taylor: I did not have the opportunity to speak on the Second Reading of the Bill and, although I shall not detain the Committee unduly, I wish to say something about Clause 1. In the Army, young officers are told, when they write a precis or a paper about any situation, that they must start by saying "The object of the exercise is …" and then give the object of the exercise.
  The Chairman: Order. I hope that hon. Members will withdraw quietly and not carry on loud conversations.
  Sir C. Taylor: I have read and reread Clause 1, and I fail to see what the object of the exercise is. I do not know whether it is the Government's object under the Bill to create anarchy in Rhodesia. Do they want only to bring Mr. Smith to his knees? Do they want to deal with a successor? I do not know who the successor might be with whom they would want to deal.
  We should be told a little more in the Bill about what the object of the exercise is. Is it the Government's intention to ask the help of the United Nations? Is it their intention not to deal with Mr. Smith at all in the future, on any conditions? Is it their intention to deal with Mr. Smith's deputy? What is the intention? No one knows under the Bill at all.
  824
  Is it the intention to create an anarchy in Rhodesia?
  The Chairman: Order. This does not arise on the Clause.
  Question put and agreed to.
  Clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.

  Clause 2.—(POWERS WITH RESPECT TO SOUTHERN RHODESIA.)
  Sir K. Pickthornm: I beg to move, in page 2, line 1, to leave out subsection (3).
  The Attorney-General told us this afternoon that retrospection is bad legislation. There can be no doubt that, so far as it is regrettable, it is more regrettable when it is delegated legislation than when it is direct and when it directly conveys the authority of Parliament.
  I can understand that there may be circumstances at the moment which would make it extremely inconvenient to the Government that legislation under subsection (3) should not be retrospective, and I do not wish to inflict on the Government in these circumstances any avoidable inconvenience. On the other hand. I do wish to make sure that the Government do not take power more than they foreseeably need, which is the practice of Governments and which I have resisted under Governments of all parties.
  I refer to the taking of power to make Orders in Council which are not only retrospective immediately—in other words, which need to be retrospective to 11th November—but which may be succeeded continuously by more retrospections for at least the rest of this year. Retrospection of that type is a matter which should be plainly justified by the Government before the Committee accepts it. It is not a matter of course. It does not follow just because it is in the draft of the Bill.
  We have not had long to table Amendments, and none of us has wished to put down more Amendments than might be necessary to ensure that certain points are on the record. The one I am making is one of them, and I hope that the Attorney-General—to whom I did make some attempt to teach history; though nothing would tempt me to teach

  825
  the Solicitor-General—I hope that the Attorney-General will persuade his colleague to look up the word "nostalgia" in the Oxford Dictionary.
  Mr. Thorpe: I wish briefly to oppose the Amendment on two counts. The first, to place the most favourable construction on the intervention of the right hon. Member for Carlton (Sir K. Pickthorn), is that he intervenes as a lawyer, as one who is opposed to retrospective legislation and as one who likes to see the House of Commons passing only legislation which has effect in the future. The right hon. Gentleman therefore raises this matter because he is opposed to any measure, even in the present circumstances, which smacks of retrospectivity.
  I say at once that I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman raises this matter with the best possible motives. Indeed, from the point of view of retrospection, I well remember leading the opposition to the War Damage Bill—on the grounds that it was retrospective— and greatly regretting the fact that the entire Conservative Front Bench abstained from voting on that occasion. My quarrel is not with the right hon. Gentleman, but I respectfully suggest that there are two objections.
  The first is that it is not as if we are changing the existing law retrospectively. We are dealing with a situation in which the established law has been violently trampled upon by the Rhodesian rebel Government as from 11th November. We are, therefore, compensating for the procedural inadequacies of this House to deal with a situation as at the very moment of 11th November when U.D.I. was declared. It is, therefore, a totally different situation from those in which arguments against retro-pective legislation are normally employed.
  We are dealing with an act of rebellion. It is arguable that it is an act of treason. There has been far too much of the suggestion from certain quarters in the last few days that this is something with which we might compromise. I would say to those who are prepared to appease and to mollify, and who say, "We cannot have retrospectivity, and perhaps we could modify this sanction or the other", that we are dealing with treason. I believe that we cannot compromise with treason, and that
  826
  the arguments against retrospection do not apply in this case.
  Secondly, it is presumably suggested that
  "…the supplemental, incidental and consequential provisions …"
  could go very much beyond the purpose originally outlined in the Order in Council, but if that were done there would always be Parliamentary redress. The matter could then be raised in this House, because we in this country, at least, maintain democracy, even if they do not in Southern Rhodesia. I would therefore say that this is not a case in which lawyers should talk about the great dangers of retrospectivity. We are dealing with a case of treason, and I should like to suggest to members of Her Majesty's loyal Opposition that they might do a little more against compromising with treason.
  Mr. Turton: The hon. Member for Devon, North (Mr. Thorpe) has clearly compromised with his principles. At one time he is in favour of retrospection and, at another, against it. I see the point in the subsection that for dealing with any matter regarding the Constitution of Southern Rhodesia it may well be necessary to have retrospective powers. In fact, the right hon. and learned Attorney-General, when justifying this retrospective power, said that it was necessary to establish the invalidity of the new Constitution. It is therefore quite right that, to that extent, we should have retrospective power.
  I submit, however, that when dealing with
  "…imposing prohibitions, restrictions or obligations in respect of transactions …"
  this power is really an abuse of constitutional practice. This is not a question of dealing with the acts of a rebel Government but of dealing with transactions that have been conducted in good faith by people of this nation with other people in Rhodesia. That is where I think the retrospection becomes an odious form of legislation.
  Let me give an example or two. I know that the Government have carefully chosen that the contentious ban on tobacco should be removed from Parliament by the device of using the 1939 Act, which was an emergency Act designed to last for the emergency. But suppose they

  827
  wanted to put a ban on a commodity— let us say, beef—and were using the power under Clause 2(3) to prohibit it, it would be monstrously unfair to say that all transactions in beef that had been entered into by the businessmen of England with Rhodesian farmers were invalid and illegal because, a year later, the Government had put a ban on beef. That is an abuse that can be allowed for under this Bill. Equally, in three months' time the Government might say that it is illegal for people to fly scheduled air services to Rhodesia. If one could backdate the illegality to 11th November of this year it would clearly be an abuse, and I am sure that the Government and the right hon. and learned Attorney-General would not want to do that.
  Therefore, if the Government cannot accept the deletion of the whole of the subsection they could limit the second part—line 4—by stating "…any provision made by or under subsection (2,a) or (2,b) of this section may have an effect from a date not earlier than 11th November, 1965." If they cannot do that here and now, they can do it in another place. We should be very careful not to break all constitutional principles when trying to deal with an illegal act by a rebel Government.
  10.30 p.m.
  Sir K. Pickthorn: May I ask a question which I put earlier in the day? I have been reminded of it by the hon. Member for Devon, North (Mr. Thorpe). He said that we need not worry because any regulations under the Orders in Council which purported to be retrospective would be magicked away by democracy. That does not necessarily follow. I inquired earlier this afternoon—
  Mr. Thorpe Mr. Thorpe rose—
  Sir K. Pickthorn: Perhaps the Attorney-General can tell me now. Is there to be provision to make sure that regulations—what he may remember were called "grandchildren" of Parliament not the Orders in Council but regulations under them—are we to understand that under this Bill those regulations will all come as a matter of course to our attention and all be open to control by this House?
  The Attorney-General: The Amendment which has been proposed is to leave
  828
  out subsection (3) of Clause 2. There are two limbs to subsection (3), but I understand from the speeches of those who have supported the Amendment that they are concerned with the second limb. dealing with retrospection.
  The Committee will have noticed that the retrospection is limited to the date of the rebellion. If the Government could not make Orders with retrospective effect to that date, the Government could be gravely hampered in dealing with the actions taken by the illegal regime in the meantime. The right hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton (Mr. Turton) was sensitive of this point and referred in particular to the constitution which the illegal regime has purported to issue to the Rhodesian people. We need this retrospective power, and this is an admirable illustration of the need for it. to deal with that kind of action.
  Orders in Council which will be issued under the authority of the enabling Bill when it becomes law will contain an express reference, if they include any element of retrospection, but without the general provision to make retrospective Orders in an enabling Bill, as the Committee knows, that power cannot be claimed for Orders in Council. These Orders will come before the House in due course and clearly they will not be exercised arbitrarily. This limited power of retrospection is necessary in the circumstances and I accordingly advise the Committee to reject the Amendment.
  Mr. R. J. Maxwell-Hyslop: Can the Attorney-General advise us on one point? Whereas, I think, the Budget comes into effect the moment it is read. at that time during the day, if I read this provision aright it would be possible by an Order made under the Council to be retrospective—not to the moment when the illegal declaration of independence was made, but to earlier in the day when there was still a legitimate Government. Is that correct? The provision merely gives the date of 11th November.
  The Attorney-General: No. It is clearly intended not to antedate any retrospective proposal to a date earlier than 11th November. The terms of the subsection make that quite clear. The retrospection takes effect only in the period from 11th

  829
  November to the date or the Order in Council when that in due course is issued.
  Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop: The Attorney-General has missed the point. A considerable part of the day had gone by before this happened. The reason why I press the point is that in making any Orders which refer back to this date I wish the Government to make sure that those Orders are operative only from the time when the illegal declaration was made and not before. This is a point of some substance. Will the Attorney-General give an assurance to the Commiltee that this will not refer just to the date but from the time of the illegal declaration and before then?
  The Attorney-General: I should have thought that I had made it clear that the retrospection will date from the moment when the illegal declaration of independence was made, namely, the date 11th November, 1965.
  Amendment negatived.
  Mr. Turton: I beg to move, in page 2. line 11, to leave out "twenty-eight" and to inser: "seven".
  This is, to me, the whole kernel of the objection to the Bill. Normally, when we have the affirmative procedure it is a seven-day period, because these are important matters and it is right for Parliament to debate these matters as early as possible. Most of the Orders which have been mentioned by the Government are ones which I think are necessary and approve of. The one I object to is the ban, because I think it is wrong and I think it will be ineffective.
  It is vital, if we are to preserve our Parliamentary democracy here, in the face of an unconstitutional act, that we should bring these matters to Parliament at once and discuss them, however inconvenient it may be to Parliament. In the old days it was always seven days for affirmative Resolutions. In 1939, when we had a war and there was the danger of bombing and the inconvenience of calling the House together quickly, that was extended under the Emergency Powers Act, 1939, to 28 days.
  I agree that there is the precedent of the 1939 Act for this, but this is not a war. I hope it is not. This is a time when we constitutionally want to get the Government to bring these matters early to Parliament. It is no good the Solicitor-
  830
  General saying, "It is all right. If the two Front Benches put their heads together, we will have this early". This is not the way to conduct matters in Parliament. The back benches, or even the Liberal Party, have occasionally to be consulted in these matters.
  Therefore, I beg the Government to think again, because these are matters of great constitutional importance. If it is a trivial Order, of course there is no difficulty about the Government bringing it in in one or two days, because it will not be challenged. The only time a question will arise is when a great number of Members want to voice their doubts about an Order. Therefore, let us try to deal with an unconstitutional act in a constitutional way. It is a great pity that the House of Commons has lately got into the habit of saying, "It is all right. We have put it in the Bill, but the ' usual channels' and the old boy principle will preserve democracy". We should not tolerate this in a 1965 Parliament.
  I beg the Government to think very carefully again about this. This is a matter to which many of us attach great importance. They will lose nothing by giving way on this point and making the 28 days 7 days. It may mean that the House has to sit a little late to get these Orders through, but these are important Orders. As these are matters which all of us, whatever varying views we hold on this, think are grievous matters which we want dispatched as quickly as possible, this change should be made.
  Sir Knox Cunningham: I support the Amendment. On Second Reading the Solicitor-General said that any important Order would be brought in early. It would not take 28 days. If that is the case, surely there is no reason why seven days should not be substituted. In the case of Orders which were not important there would be no discussion in the House and they could go through without loss of time. I ask the Government to accept the Amendment. I am sure that if they did so it would make a considerable difference to the feelings of the Committee on this matter.
  Sir C. Taylor: I contest the whole idea of the Order in Council procedure being used in a Bill of this kind. The Government would have been much wiser

  831
  if they had introduced one-Clause Bills. Orders in Council are—
  The Chairman: Order. All we are discussing now is whether the period should be 28 days or seven days.
  Sir C. Taylor: Very well, Sir Samuel, I will wait until we are on the Question, "That the Clause stand part of the Bill". I intended to deal with the 28 days but if I catch your eye I will speak, if I may, on the main Motion.
  Sir K. Pickthorn: I think that the point has been made clear enough. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] Hon. Members opposite are a little unreasonable. I have been kept up all night by them on a Bill very much like this one but not so bad. We on this side have been very good. We have kept ourselves as short as we could and have put down the absolute minimum of Amendments, but even now, with ingenuity, I can make the debate last a long time if I put my mind to it. A certain amount of decency in the exercise of excessive power on an occasion like this is the least we can expect, even from them.
  "It is very dangerous when a Government start to identify themselves completely with the national interest. What is the minimum of special regulations which will protect the country against its enemies? "
  What is the minimum here—28 days or seven? All the earlier words which I used after rebuking hon. Members opposite below the Gangway came from Sir Stafford Cripps.
  The Attorney-General: The proposal it the Amendment is to reduce to seven days the period within which the Government would need to seek the leave of both Houses for Orders in Council that are proposed. I assure the Committee that, of course, the Government are determined to proceed constitutionally to deal with rebellion. Indeed, it would be a very strange turn of fate if it were to do otherwise, but the proposal is that the Orders in Council shall require the affirmative approval of both Houses within 28 days.
  The right hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton (Mr. Turton) has referred to the precedent of the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939, which also had that period of 28 days, but perhaps I should
  832
  remind him that the Orders referred to in that case, being Orders imposing charges, needed the approval only of the House of Commons, not of another place, so that the Government had more time to get Parliamentary approval than they are allowing themselves in the present case.
  10.45 p.m.
  My advice to the Committee is that a period of seven days would be an impossibly short time in which to get the necessary Resolutions through both Houses. I have more than once given the Government's assurance that it is, in fact, intended to introduce, in particular, the Orders in Council of substance at the earliest possible time, which will be very soon, and having given that assurance to the House and referred to the precedent of 1939—there is, incidentally, in the Agriculture and Horticulture Act, 1964 a precedent where the period is 40 days— I ask the House to reject the Amendment. We are not asking for 40 days or, indeed, for 40 nights. We are asking for 28 days. My advice to the Committee is that that is a reasonable period.
  Amendment negatived.
  Question proposed, That the Clause stand part of the Bill.
  Sir C. Taylor: I deplore the principle of using Orders in Council in a Bill of this nature.
  The Chairman: Order. I hope that hon. Members will carry on their conversations more quietly.
  Sir C. Taylor: During the war, as a matter of emergency, the House accepted the principle of Orders in Council, but I should have thought that it would be more practical and far better on this occasion if the Government presented a series of one-Clause Bills which, if reasonable, the House would not hold up.
  I remind the Committee that an Order in Council cannot be amended. It must be either accepted or rejected. That is a great disadvantage. If we had a series of one-clause Bills it might save the Government time eventually because there might not be opposition to such a Bill but only in matters of detail.
  I should like an assurance on another point. I have had considerable experience of Orders in Council. As my right

  833
  hon. Friend the Member for Carlton (Sir K. Pickthorn) has said, they can have grandchildren. An Order in Council can state that further subsidiary Orders can be made by the Minister concerned and that these are not liable to be vetted by the House.
  I hope that the Attorney-General will assure us that, if there have to be Orders in Council, we shall not have such a ruse and that an Order in Council will not say that subsequent Orders to be brought in will not be subject to the vigilance of the House.
  Mr. Peter Emery: I have two purely Committee points with which I did not wish to bother the House at an earlier stage. The powers that are being granted under this Bill are as extensive as is possible and I ask for an assurance that the Government will use the Bill in all instances in the future for any action they intend to take in dealing with the Rhodesian problem.
  It is obvious that so far—and this matter has been skirted round—emergency powers have been used. I believe that no one would suggest that the Defence Regulations were intended to deal with this sort of situation. However, I can understand the Government's position in having to use them until this Bill becomes law. But a number of us on this side of the Committee would feel it wrong, once we had given the Government this Bill, if they were not to use it to deal with any matters concerned with Rhodesia in the future and were to resort to powers that exist at the moment.
  Secondly, in dealing with any Orders in Council as Statutory Instruments, I hope that the Government will fully consider that they should not use the power to revoke in certain agreements but shuld rather use suspension. I give a direct example. The powers under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement allow the Government immediately unilaterally to revoke the present quota with any country. It would, I believe, be wrong for the Government to wish to revoke when, under this Bill, they could suspend.
  If they revoke, they are taking away the direct carrot which might exist for the Government of the Governor in Southern Rhodesia to try to get people to
  834
  gather round some form of administration in opposition to Mr. Smith. If they merely suspend, the Government, if they wished, could immediately restore the position. If they revoke, that may not be possible. I hope that the Government will fully consider that when drafting Statutory Instruments in order to try to ensure that suspension rather than revocation is the action taken.
  My two points are quite simple: using the Bill rather than any previous powers and my direct question about revocation and suspension.
  Mr. J. Amery: The Attorney-General has been extremely inflexible in his remarks so far, and the same has been true of the comments of the Solicitor-General. If the Government are to appeal for national unity in this matter, they should try to make a slightly greater effort to meet the very reasonable criticisms which have been made from this side of the Committee.
  Having served in the Colonial Office and having had some experience of colonial emergencies, I fully appreciate that the Executive must have power to act swiftly where it has direct responsibility, but that is not yet the case with Her Majesty's Government. They do not have administrative responsibility inside Rhodesia, or, at any rate, the means to carry it out. It would help the Committee if the right hon. and learned Gentleman could give us some idea of the kind of circumstances in which he thinks that action would have to be taken very swiftly and yet the House of Commons need pass its judgment only 28 days later. This could not by any stretch of the imagination apply to the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement or the provisions of the Fugitive Offenders Act. Perhaps the right hon. and learned Gentleman will give us a hypothetical instance of the kind of circumstance in which the Government would have to act quickly and yet would not be able conveniently to come to the House for as long as 28 days.
  I want also to refer to the power to make a new Order. The Solicitor-General said that the words could be interpreted in a way which would allow the Government to repeat an Order if it had not been automatically approved by the House, but that this would never happen. In that case, why do the words

  835
  have to be there? Could the provision not be expressed differently? Having swallowed the 28-day period, if we are to swallow it, it is a little difficult on top of that to have to swallow this provision about a new Order.
  The Solicitor-General was extremely unreasonable in refusing to give an assurance that if the Official Opposition asked for a recall of Parliament to discuss any Order which might arise in the three or four months of the Summer Recess, their request would be granted. The Government have appealed for national unity in all this matter, but if they are to go on like this they cannot expect the full co-operation of the House of Commons when we debate any Orders which may come forward.
  11.0 p.m.
  Sir David Renton: I wish to refer to the position of the Rhodesian police, and it may be in order for me to do so in view of the words in Clause 2(1):
  "Her Majesty may by Order make such provision in relation to Southern Rhodesia, or persons or things in any way belonging to or connected with Southern Rhodesia …"
  The Rhodesian police may well find themselves in quite a dilemma now and in the few weeks which are to follow. They, like the police in this country, are officers of the Crown, responsible for the enforcement of the law. One would hope that they would take the same view of their duties as the judges have taken of their jurisdiction, but above all—and this has already been conceded by the Prime Minister in an earlier debate—it is in the interests of all concerned, especially in the interests of the people of Rhodesia at large, that law and order should be mantained.
  The police will find themselves in a somewhat unusual position. They may well find themselves attempting to enforce valid laws, but doing so at the behest of an illegal government. I think that the police are entitled to clarification of their position and they should have a good deal of indulgence from Her Majesty's Government. I hope that if any police officer in Rhodesia who has ties with the United Kingdom finds that he cannot conscientiously continue to do his duties, the United Kingdom Government will do something for him
  836
  if he loses his position in the Rhodesian police. I would be grateful for enlightenment from the Attorney-General as to what the attitude of the Government would be towards such a police officer.
  A further point I wish to raise arises from subsection (2,c) which gives power by Order in Council for
  "imposing prohibitions, restrictions or obligations in respect of transactions relating to Southern Rhodesia or any such persons or things …"
  I would be grateful if the Attorney-General would tell us quite clearly whether the proposed embargo on purchases of tobacco is on the basis of existing powers to restrict imports to this country or whether the Government propose to lay an Order in Council under this subsection. It is very important that we should know that. This is a very grave matter.
  I am not totally opposed to all sanctions proposed by the Government, and I think that some of them follow from the circumstances in which we find ourselves, but this tobacco sanction is one which the House should consider very carefully before supporting it. The last tobacco crop, as I understand it, has already been sold and, therefore, it does not enter into the picture, and harvesting of the next crop will not start until next April. A great deal could happen between now and then, and one hopes that many of these matters will be resolved to the satisfaction of the United Kingdom and the people of Rhodesia. If not Her Majesty's Government will find themselves—and I would like clarification on this point—having to ask the people of this country drastically to reduce their tobacco smoking, or finding large sums of dollars, something in excess of £25 million, in order to replace—
  The Chairman: Order. I think that the right hon. and learned Gentleman is getting very wide of the Clause which we are now discussing.
  Sir D. Renton: I am sorry, Sir Samuel. It was quite unintentional. I hope that I have said enough on this Clause. We are giving the Government very wide powers to impose a complete embargo. I was merely raising this issue in order that the Committee might be certain of the character of the powers

  837
  which it is giving to the Government, especially on this specific issue. Nothing affects the economy of Rhodesia more than the purchase of tobacco by this country from Rhodesia.
  I hope that I have said enough to alert hon. Members to the very drastic nature of this power. Exercise of this power could not be said to be directed specifically against the illegal government in Rhodesia, but it would hurt us and the whole population of Rhodesia if it were stringently enforced.
  Mr. Grieve: I hope that I shall not delay the passage of this very important matter too long if I take up again the point that I made when I intervened in the speech of the Solicitor-General in the debate on Second Reading. I refer to the inclusion of the power to revoke any provisions of the 1961 Constitution which is. contained in subsection (2,a) of Clause 2 of the Bill.
  I am bound to say that I do not recollect having heard from any Government spokesman in the course of the debates on the Bill any satisfactory explanation as to why this extremely wide power should be contained in the Bill.1have asked the learned AttorneyGeneral what conceivable contingency which may arise in the extremely serious situation in which we find ourselves could not be met either by the suspension or by the amendment of the 1961 Constitution.
  As it stands, subsection (2,a)of Clause 2 gives the Government power by executive act to review not only any part, but, since any part may include the whole if taken together, the whole of the 1961 Constitution, and to revoke it. When that is read with subsection (3,b)of Clause 3, which provides that
  "the Constitution of Southern Rhodesia 1961 as in force immediately before the expiration of that section"
  shall not be affected by the expiration of Section 2, the Government have power under that to revoke the 1961 Constitution entirely.
  Why should the Government take that power? What conceivable contingency would not be met by the suspension, if necessary, of the whole of the 1961 Constitution for as long as is deemed expedient?
  838
  What worries me and a number of my hon. Friends is the effect that the inclusion of this power in the Bill will have upon moderate opinion in Rhodesia. Will many people of moderate opinion who might rally to the legally constituted Government of Rhodesia and oppose the rebellion not in the last resort not be very worried by the inclusion in the Bill of the power—because such it is—to revoke the 1961 Constitution by Order in Council under the Bill?
  I ask the Attorney-General the direct question, would it not be better to sacrifice and strike out the revoking power, which I am boqnd to say seems to me to give the Government no further power than would be given to them by the power to suspend in any contingency that one might foresee?
  I ask the learned Attorney-General to deal specifically with that point, on which I, for one, think that we have had no satisfactory explanation.
  Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles: Before we leave the Clause, may I make a very short point about the terms in which it has been discussed in Committee?
  Hon. Members on both sides will perhaps agree with me in deploring the frequency with which we have heard such words as "treason", "illegal regime", "rebel Government", and so on used by several hon. Members.
  The Chairman: Order. It does not arise on the Clause.
  Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles: Then may I pass on and say that, before we leave the Clause, such provocative words as we have heard used are really a very poor way of describing people who, for better or for worse, have had to make a most agonising decision.
  The Chairman: Order. This really does not arise on the Clause.
  Mr. Hugh Fraser: I wish to raise the question of the removal from Rhodesia, and from those trading with Rhodesia, of the export guarantee arrangements. Will the removal of these guarantees be under existing powers or by Order in Council? This is a very important point, because throughout these debates, which doubtless are going to be of an extended sort over the next month or two, we have to

  839
  consider not merely the interests of the policy of this Government and of this House, but the effect that these sanctions may well have on the people of this country.
  To put forward the removal of export guarantees from our own exporters seems, without any explanation, to be a possible blow to the economy of this country. Do not let us delude ourselves that there are not others who will step into this breach. Do not let us delude ourselves that we are not at this moment giving export guarantees to countries which are frequently hostile to our 'so-called grand alliance. We are giving export guarantees to Cuba, to Red China, and to many other parts of the world whose policies are entirely in opposition to our own grand policies.
  To inflict on the exporters of this country this assault of sanctions, which will merely be against the interests of the British trader, without any effect on Rhodesia, needs the earnest consideration of this House, because there is no question but that the gap which we are creating by the removal of these guarantees will quickly be filled by others.
  The Chairman: Order. The right hon. Gentleman is going much wider than what we are discussing.
  Mr. Fraser: I am sorry, Sir Samuel, but I do not want to be put aside by a passing answer to this question. I am asking a vital question, namely, whether or not this is to be carried out under existing powers, or by a special Order in Council, and I am merely making it clear to the Attorney-General that what I am asking is not a trivial question, but one that is important to many people in this country, both workpeople and employers.
  Mr. John Hall: I rise to make one point. It relates to the problem of freedom of speech in this country. On Friday I raised this point in an intervention in the speech of the Attorney-General, when I said:
  "For the guidance of those outside the House and who cannot command the privileges of this House, can the Attorney-General say whether anyone who speaks outside or writes articles in support of the point of view of the present illegal Government could be impeached for treason?".
  840
  The answer the House received seemed to be satisfactory, because the right hon. and learned Gentleman said:
  "…it is not the intention of this Government to sufle the free expression of opinion, and clearly the free range of discussion about these matters conducted in the Press will be permitted."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 12th November, 1965; Vol. 720, c. 521.]
  Today some doubt seems to be thrown on this, and the interpretation of absence of censorship seems to be rather narrow. It is important from the point of view of people outside this House who may wish to comment on events to know whether or not, if they write an article or make a speech, at the end of which they may come down on the side of the present illegal Government—
  The Chairman: Order. I cannot see how this has anything to do with what we are discussing.
  Mr. Hall: With respect, Sir Samuel, I would refer you to Clause 2(2,c) which I would have thought had considerable reference to what I am saying, because it provides power
  "for imposing prohibitions, restrictions or obligations in respect of transactions relating to Southern Rhodesia or any such person or things,
  as appears to Her Majesty to be necessary or expedient as aforesaid",
  and so on. The Government may be prepared to impose a particular restriction on persons in this country who make certain speeches, or who write certain articles, outside the confines of this House. It is very important from the point of view of the Press and of authors of communications in this country that they should know exactly where they stand.
  If, rightly or wrongly, something is said outside the House which is designed to show to the general public that the writer or speaker supports what is being done in Rhodesia, will that person be guilty of treason? If so, could they be impeached and brought before a court in this country? I am asking only because it is important that the House should be quite clear and that people outside the House who may wish to write or comment upon the events of the last few days should be clear where they stand.
  11.15 p.m.
  Mr. John Biggs-Davison: I want to reinforce what has just been said

  841
  by my hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe (Mr. John Hall). It is necessary that Her Majesty's Government should make it much clearer than has been made already what are the rights and liberties of the subject on the question of comments on the Rhodesian situation. It seems that Her Majesty's Government are now pursuing a course of intimidation by ambiguity. All this talk of treason, treachery and traitors to which reference has been made in this debate is becoming rather immoderate and is getting a little out of hand. There was never any such talk at the time when another group of colonists were actually at war with this country. People who sent the rebels money and gave them comfort were never indicted for treason. I have referred to a certain gentleman who was indicted for libel for sending money to the rebels. We should be clearer about this and not have this vague reference made in the hope that some people may be intimidated.
  I want to say something about the question of revocation. The Committee is grateful to the learned Attorney-General for the courtesy with which he has met our points. This is in sharp distinction to the demagogic and irresponsible ranting with which his learned colleague wound up the Second Reading debate. It came ill from a Treasury Bench which was asking for national unity in these matters. We are grateful to the Attorney-General.
  I simply want to ask him—because he is learned in the law and I am not— how the Government would be in any way disadvantaged if the word "revoking" ere omitted. The words "suspending, amending or adding to any of provisions of the Constitution" would give the Government all the powers they desire.
  Reference has also been made to certain measures that the Government will take referring to further embargoes. I am alarmed on constitutional grounds at the wide extent of the prohibitions, restrictions or obligations, and the powers which the Government are proposing to take to themselves in respect of those prohibitions, restrictions or obligations. These, presumably, could include an oil embargo or a complete trade embargo. These are great questions, which should be brought to the House for legislation. I do not see any reason why they could not be.
  842
  The House is quite capable of passing legislation with the necessary speed in the national interest. I am keenly concerned at the wide scope of Clause 2(2,c).
  Mr. F. P. Crowder (Ruislip-North-wood): I should be most grateful if the Attorney-General would tell the House exactly what constitutes treason and where people stand, whether they be in the public service or in the judicial department. It seems to me that people are genuinely worried about this situation.
  Mr. W. T. Williams: On a point of order. So far as I know, there is nothing about treason in Clause 2. If there is, I shall be glad to be directed to it.
  The Chairman: If the hon. and learned Gentleman is out of order, I shall call his attention to the fact.
  Mr. Crowder: I appreciate that, Sir Samuel, and I am grateful. I do not wish to embarrass the Attorney-General, but the Committee should face this question. He was faced with this matter early last week. The House of Commons and the people of Rhodesia want to know what the Government's view and the Law Officers' view is of treason in law. I think that I know what it is, but I am not going to say so—
  The Chairman: Order. The hon. and learned Gentleman is getting a little wide of the Clause.
  Mr. Crowder: I am much obliged, Sir Samuel, but I have managed to put my point to the Attorney-General, that there is no reason, in my view—I say this subject to your Ruling—why he should not give that definition to the House tonight.
  Sir J. Hobson: I am sorry to add to the burdens of the Attorney-General, who has so many questions to answer, but there is just one point which I should like to put to him. Can he assure me that a view I have formed is wholly wrong— which is an unusual request from me to him. I have formed the view that, under Clause 2 as it stands, it would be possible for the Orders in Council to provide that Ministers should be able to make subsequent Regulations. This is the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Eastbourne (Sir C. Taylor) and by

  843
  my right hon. Friend the Member for Carlton (Sir K. Pickthorn).
  This is important, as it affects Parliamentary procedure, because it would mean, if I am right in my view, that it would be impossible for the Government to arrange, under Orders in Council, for what are called "grandchildren" Regulations. I should like, first of all, to get the view of the Attorney-General as to whether it is correct to say that Orders in Council could allow Ministers to make delegated Regulations without any Parliamentary supervision. If that is the position in law, will he say that the Government will, on every possible occasion, avoid that procedure, and not put in Regulation-making powers for Ministers unless it is absolutely vital and there is no other way of dealing with the matter?
  The Attorney-General: I have been asked a multiplicity of questions. Some of them raise matters which were debated at considerable length on Friday and again today. Accordingly, I must ask forgiveness if I do not go into those matters which have been traversed at some length already. But I will deal with two specific matters upon which my assistance has been sought by the Committee.
  In regard to the position of "grandchildren"—which is a term of art to which I have become accustomed in the course of the day—these, I am instructed —or I am informed—[Laughter.]—I must not revert to the happier days when I was in receipt of instructions—I am informed that "grandchildren" are not within Clause 2(5). In particular, "grandchildren" can be subjected to Parliamentary scrutiny by express provision of the parent Order in Council. An Order in Council which will do that does precisely this, as the Committee will see in due course when the Order in Council is presented to the House.
  I was asked by the hon. Member for Reading (Mr. Peter Emery) what the position was in regard to revocation. The broad position is that the only power of revocation which is provided for in the Bill relates to revocation of provisions of the Constitution. What will be done in regard to the sugar quotas will be suspension rather than revocation. So we are concerned, in this respect, entirely with
  844
  revocation of provisions of the 1961 Constitution.
  The necessity for the provision for revocation is that, when one amends one part of a Constitution, one may be left with residual "dead wood" which will call for revocation. I assure the Committee, as I have done before and as the Prime Minister has done, that it is not intended to engage upon any major revocation, or, in other words, to rewrite the 1961 Constitution, without the matter being brought before the House. I have said that several times, and I hope that the Committee will not think that there is any sinister purpose in the inclusion of the provision for revocation.
  I was asked by the right hon. Member for Preston, North (Mr. J. Amery) whether I could give some hypothetical instances in which the Government might be faced with a situation requiring them quickly to introduce an Order in Council in which it would not be practical for the matter to be dealt with by requiring the leave of the House before the Order in Council could take effect. I think that that was his point. All I can say about that is that we are dealing with a rebellion, with a dangerous situation which is liable to change from day to day. I do not think that it would be right for me, whether as Attorney-General or in any other position which I might hold, to conjure up tigers from the dark or to speak of catastrophes which may not arise.
  We hope that the strong position and firm stand being taken by the Government will still rally men of good will to the rule of law and proper, legal constitutional development. I feel that I should not be pressed by the Committee to describe the kind of hypothetical situation which the Government might find themselves in where these powers were necessary, and I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman, with his experience, will, on reflection, think that that is a reasonable position to take.
  Sir C. Taylor rose—
  The Attorney-General: Will the hon. Gentleman allow me to continue? I hope he will not think me discourteous. He has not honoured the Committee or the House by his attendance today—
  Sir C. Taylor: Yes, I have been here and I have spoken.
  The Attorney-General: If that is so, I immediately withdraw what has been discourteous on my part. But I have been asked a lot of questions, the hon. Gentleman has had his run, and perhaps he will let me proceed.
  Sir C. Taylor: I wanted only to clarify the point which the Attorney-General is making. If he thought it necessary to introduce an Order in Council, say, two days before the Easter Recess, the Whit-sun Recess or even the Summer Recess, what would be the position of the House at that time?
  The Attorney-General: If a sudden crisis were to arise—again, I do not think that I ought to outline a hypothetical situation which may not arise; one does not want to put ideas into the heads of rebels or, indeed, anyone else in Rhodesia—but if a situation arose in which urgent action of that kind took place involving a fundamental Order in Council taking massive new powers, I have little doubt that the Government would want to consult the Opposition in the ordinary way, and the matter would have to be dealt with, perhaps by recall of the House. I know not. Certainly, we cannot exclude that from the possibilities of the future. But, as I say, I hope that it will not arise. It is because we want to deal with probable situations which may arise that we are seeking the general powers under the Bill.
  The right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Huntingdonshire (Sir D. Renton) asked me questions about general matters regarding the agonising dilemmas of the police and public servants, and I can do no more than remind him of what my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said in this connection on Friday. But there is one matter on which I can, I think, give some assistance. The right hon. Gentleman asked whether the proposed tobacco embargo would be based on existing powers. The answer is "Yes". The tobacco embargo came into force today, 15th November, under the Government's powers under the Import of Goods (Control) Order, 1954.
  I make no party point in underlining the date 1954. The position is that the importation of goods into the United Kingdom generally is prohibited—and I confess that I found this a fascinating point, of which I was not aware until last night—except under the authority of
  846
  Board of Trade licence. That is under the authority of the Import of Goods (Control) Order, 1954, which is made, in turn, under the authority of the Import, Export and Customs Powers (Defence) Act, 1939. I have no doubt that the right hon. Gentleman was familiar with those legislative provisions. Thus, a ban on the import of tobacco and sugar was made under the power of that 1954 Order and, as I have said, that has come into force today.
  11.30 p.m.
  Mr. Turton: Would the Attorney-General explain how that Order and the powers under the 1939 Act were excepted from the general repeal of all emergency legislation, with certain exceptions, under the Emergency Laws (Repeal) Act, 1959?
  The Attorney-General: I do not have an immediate answer to that question. However, the position is that the Import of Goods (Control) Order, 1954, retained its validity and the ban on the import of tobacco has been operated under the terms of that Order. An instruction was issued taking effect today, 15th November, which was Amendment No. 4 to the open general licence dated 14th December, 1964, granted by the Board of Trade.
  As the Government have that power already, it is proper that the power should be used to achieve this purpose, which the Government regard as essential and as showing the seriousness of our intentions in regard to economic sanctions.
  It is true that it is not proposed to use the machinery of the Enabling Bill because, as I say, the Government have the legal power already. But, of course, this House has the means at its disposal, if it does not approve of the exercise of this power—by Motion, on a Supply Day or by various other means—to express its disapproval if it wishes to do so. Happily, the procedures of the House give abundant opportunity for disapproval to be expressed.
  Mr. Peter Emery: Is the right hon. and learned Gentleman aware that I put a specific question to him on this point? One can understand that the Government would use these powers when they did not have the Bill before the Committee I asked whether the Government would

  847
  give an assurance that, when dealing with Rhodesia in future, they would use the powers, extensive as they are, contained in the Bill and not use any powers contained under any other legislation.
  Hon. Members: Why?
  Mr. Peter Emery: Because the powers under the Bill are so wide and extensive and were, in any case, asked for by the Government specifically to deal with the Rhodesia problem.
  The Attorney-General: The Government will have to consider the nature of any future action they may have to take. All I wish to say is that they will, of course, take the House into their confidence in regard to the actions they take, but what precise legal powers they exercise the Government themselves will have to determine. I cannot give an omnibus undertaking as to what legal powers in regard to any critical situation the Government may need to use. The Government have to govern, and govern in a position of danger and rebellion, and I am quite sure that right hon. and hon. Members would not wish to tie the hands of Government: when the dogs of rebellion begin to run wild, one knows not what the end of the day may bring forth. I respectfully submit that the Government have indicated their wish to be frank with the House and for the House to have a full opportunity of debating the matters that arise.
  I have now received reinforcement of the information I tentatively expressed to the House, that the Import Etc. Act, 1939, was not repealed in 1959.
  The right hon. Member for Stafford and Stone (Mr. Hugh Fraser) asked me about export guarantees. The Government are not seeking further powers in respect of export guarantees; they are just not going to give any more in respect of Rhodesia.
  The hon. Member for Wycombe (Mr. John Hall) and the hon. and learned Member for Ruislip-Northwood (Mr. Crowder) asked me a question about the law of treason, but fascinating as I would find a dissertation on the subject I doubt whether the Committee stage of this Bill is an appropriate occasion for the Attorney-General to make it.
  A question was raised by several hon. Members about some observations I
  848
  made, with astonishing innocence, when I made my statement on Friday on certain legal aspects resulting from the illegal declaration of independence. The hon. Member for Wycombe asked
  "… can the Attorney-General say whether anyone who speaks outside or writes articles in support of the point of view of the present illegal Government could be impeached for treason?"
  I gave the answer:
  "Unlike the Rhodesian Government, it is not the intention of this Government to stifle the free expression of opinion, and clearly the free range of discussion about these matters conducted in the Press will be permitted"
  There was a great sigh from below the Gangway when I said that, as though I was very kindly permitting free discussion of opinion in the Press. The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition intervened, saying:
  "The right hon. and learned Gentleman refers to discussion in the Press. Presumably he means that discussion of any kind or on radio or television would obviously be covered."
  To that, I replied:
  "Clearly that is so."
  Then I thought that I would explain my use of the word "permitted", which suggested that I was engaged in an act of generosity to the members of the Press by permitting them free expression of opinion. I said:
  "When I say ' permitted ' I mean that which is legal under the law. We are not going to set up any kind of censorship in this situation."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 12th November, 1965; Vol. 720, c. 521.]
  Now I am pressed about the use of the words:
  "When I say ' permitted ' I mean that which is legal under the law."
  Of course, that is absolutely right. If, for instance, a newspaper in this country engaged in incitement to treason or sedition in relation to the Rhodesian rebellion, it might well be guilty of criminal acts and might well be liable to prosecution. That is the position under the law. It has always been the position under the law, and the position is unchanged by the circumstances of the rebellion. So one cannot give either as Attorney-General or in any way a free range to the Press either to engage in sedition or treason.
  This Government are determined to proceed legally and constitutionally in this

  849
  matter and to use legal and constitutional methods to meet illegal rebellious treason.
  Question put and agreed to.
  Clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.
  Clauses 3 and 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
  Bill reported, without Amendment.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
  11.42 p.m.
  Mr. Wall: I hope the Government realise that so far as I and, I believe, a number of my hon. Friends are concerned, they have been given the Bill reluctantly. They have been given it because it is established that penalties must flow from the illegal action of Mr. Smith in Rhodesia and that it is necessary to assist the Governor in maintaining constitutional government in Rhodesia.
  I believe that the choice before the Government in their dealing with Rhodesia will lead either to chaos or conciliation. I must say that after the speech of the Attorney-General it seemed likely that they would choose chaos rather than conciliation. I wish to make clear that I and many hon. Members on this side of the House are wholly opposed to punitive sanctions, and if the Prime Minister comes to the House in a week or so, as I believe he may, and ask for the imposition of oil sanctions on the excuse that the United Nations will intervene unless these are imposed, then I hope that the request will be fought tooth and nail in this House and in the country. I hope that the message has got through to the Government, thus far and no further.
  11.44 p.m.
  Sir Peter Roberts: I do not propose to detain the House for long. I was unfortunate in not being able to get in during the Second Reading, but that is not the reason for my intervening now.
  Having listened to arguments on both sides and arguments on the Amendments put forward in Committee, my experience leads me to believe that the sanctions which we are considering at the moment
  850
  will not be effective. If that is so, the ultimate result of what we are doing may lead us unwillingly into force. This I am opposed to. As a result, I propose to negative the Third Reading.
  11.45 p.m.
  Mr. Edward M. Taylor: Having failed to get a supporter to oppose the Second Reading, I have no wish to try again. But I think I am entitled at this stage to ask for one point of clarification. It relates to the operation of Clause 4. I am completely convinced that the Government have powers to contain or control the present illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia, the one led by Mr. Smith. However, I am not at all convinced that the Bill as it stands gives the Government power to control the activities of other illegal regimes which might be introduced and operated out-with Southern Rhodesia. We all must know that there is a possibility, albeit a slight one, that at least two Governments in exile will be set up illegally, rather in the same way as Mr. Smith's. Can we have an assurance from the Government that the Bill gives them power to control the activities of other such r6gimes, and if they have the powers do they intend to use them?
  11.46 p.m.
  Commander Sir Peter Agnew: Tonight we have enacted, or almost enacted, a solemn tragedy. We have given to the Government awful powers. We have done so deliberately and almost unanimously. So the Bill will shortly go forward to another place as being the expressed will and determination of this House to assert the power of the Crown in relation to Rhodesia. I believe that these powers have been given in a spirit in which they should not be used—vindictively. They may inflict a small amount of suffering on the whole Rhodesian people, which they will do indiscriminately; or they could inflict a great deal of suffering.
  I believe that in the end the restoration of a proper relation between Britain and Rhodesia will not come through the use and possession of these powers so rightly given. It will come, finally and eventually, through a reconciliation between reasonable people in Britain and reasonable political leaders in Rhodesia.
  11.47 p.m.
  Sir Charles Mott-Radclyfte: The House has accorded the Bill an unopposed Second Reading and Committee stage. We are now on the final stage—Third Reading.
  I want to make one suggestion to right hon. and hon. Members opposite. I very much doubt whether some of the intemperate language which we have heard from hon. Members opposite in the course of to-day's debate, particularly language used, unfortunately, by both Law Officers of the Crown—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."]—the Attorney-General and the Solicitor-General, phrases such as "dogs of rebellion"— is calculated to encourage the moderate elements that we hope to encourage in Rhodesia. Indeed, I believe that such language will deeply offend many moderates of passionate loyalty to this country and will drive them into the extreme position which we do not want to drive them into.
  The House should not be selective about the way in which we moralise in our advocacy of sanctions. There has been much loose talk of sanctions today. I suspect that there will be some even looser talk of sanctions in another place. There may be sanctions which automatically follow any declaration of independence; but the other type of sanctions, those of a punitive kind which the Prime Minister says he does not want to embark upon but which some of his colleagues do, are in a very different category.
  If these sanctions are going to be imposed on a moral basis, do not let there be any cant about this. If Rhodesia is a police State there are other police States within the Commonwealth in Africa. If the will of the majority is being thwarted in Rhodesia, I can think of other countries in the Commonwealth where both the wishes of the majority and the rights of the minority are being similarly thwarted. Therefore, we must not be selective in the way we moralise about these things. We must do so without cant.
  I hope that as a result of the passage of the Bill the Government will so conduct their affairs and phrase their statements as to narrow rather than widen, and mend rather than tear, otherwise we shall drive every single moderate into the
  852
  extremist camp, and the last stage of Rhodesia will be worse than the first.
  Question put and agreed to.
  Bill accordingly read the Third time and passed.

HOUSING (SLUM CLEARANCE COMPENSATION) BILL
Order for Second Reading read.
11.52 p.m.
The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government (Mr. Robert Mellish): I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
This is a short, four-Clause Bill to help owner-occupiers who lose their houses in slum clearance. It helps them in two ways. Clause 1 helps those who are entitled to what is known as the owner-occupiers' supplement. Clause 2 helps all owner-occupiers of condemned houses who still have debts to pay off on their property at the time they lose it. Clauses 3 and 4 contain financial and supplemental provisions.
The basic rule of compensation in slum clearance is that only site value is paid for houses which have been found unfit to live in. But Parliament decided in 1956 that special treatment was justified for owner-occupiers who bought their houses between the outbreak of war when slum clearance was suspended and the end of 1955 when its resumption was announced. They had to have somewhere to live, and with no slum clearance going on they could not be expected to consider that any risk of demolition was involved in buying property which, though it might not be up to standard, provided a home.
These owner-occupiers get a supplement equal to the difference between site value and market value. The provisions for that supplement expire on 12th December. There has been a feeling on both sides of the House that action is necessary to deal with the situation which will arise then. Some discussion of the matter took place during the debate on 21st May on the Land Compensation (Amendment) Bill, promoted by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak (Mr. Gurden). My hon. Friend the Joint Parliamentary Secretary said then that the

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Government recognised that there would be difficulties. The question was to find the best way of meeting them.
A simple extension of the supplement for another period of years would not do. It has to be recognised that the payment of the supplement already causes anomalies. An owner-occupier who is entitled to it gets market value. His neighbour, next door, who bought at a different time, may get only site value. The one could be a few hundred pounds better off than the other. A number of examples of this were quoted in the debate on 21st May, in particular by the hon. Member for Crosby (Mr. Graham Page). Just to carry on making provision for the payment of the supplement to those entitled to it could only lead to a widespread feeling of grievance.
It might be said that the answer is to give everyone market value, but we believe that that would be wrong. Slums were recognised as a problem long before an effective attack was made on them. All attempts to deal with them foundered on financial obstacles until the site value rule was introduced. It is fundamental to an effective slum clearance programme and has. been recognised to be so by successive Governments ever since it was introduced in 1919. Its basis is obviously correct. The public should not have to pay for houses which have been found, after a very careful process, with full safeguards for the owners, to be unfit for people to live in.
The supplement has always been seen as a purely temporary measure. It is due to end in December because Parliament thought that by then everyone entitled to it would have had at least ten years' possession of his property and that a return to basic compensation at site value would be justified. The easiest course would be to let the provisions expire in December as Parliament originally intended that they should. All owner-occupiers affected by slum clearance would then be treated in the same way. Invidious distinctions in the amount of compensation received would cease.
But the facts of the situation point to a middle way, which retains the essentially temporary character of the supplement but also recognises that the number of slums which remain to be cleared is so
854
large that there must be many owner-occupiers who expected to get the supplement whose houses are still waiting to be included in authorities' clearance programmes. The Government have decided that it would be fair to continue the supplement for owner-occupiers who bought between September, 1939 and December, 1955 who have not had more than 15 years' possession of their houses. Clause 1 does this.
The effect is to keep the scheme going for a further period during which all who continue to qualify will receive uniform treatment; and also to run it down gradually until it comes to an end in December, 1970. By that time we shall be a long way from the conditions which justified the introduction of the supplement in the first place and the scheme can properly be wound up.
Clause 1 also changes the stage in the slum clearance process on which entitlement depends. Under the present provisions a house must be purchased or— where it is subject to a clearance or demolition order—vacated before 13th December, 1965, for the owner to qualify. But purchase of houses included in the same Order can take place at quite different times and may not occur for more than a year after an order has been confirmed.
There has been considerable doubt amongst owners whose houses are included in orders which have already been confirmed whether their houses will be purchased or vacated before 13th December. Many authorities have been anxious to help them and have tried to push ahead with their procedures much faster than usual in cases where they know the owner might benefit. But, with the best will in the world, they could not have avoided situations in which purchase did not take place until the wrong side of the terminal date.
There is also some room for argument about what technically marks the date of "purchase" under a compulsory purchase order. In the last resort this is a point for the courts to decide. But there ought not to be any uncertainty about a matter on which entitlement to the supplement depends. Everyone affected should know exactly where he stands. That is why under Clause 1 the decisive date becomes the date on which an order is made by a local authority—

855
that is, the date on which the authority seal it.
All owner-occupiers for whom the Government are extending the supplement will know that if they have not had 15 years' possession of their houses on the date they are included in an order, they will keep their entitlement no matter how long a period passes before their houses are purchased or vacated. In practice this will mean that because of the lapse of time between making an order and the completion of purchase, some owners may enjoy as much as 16 years or more use of their houses and still get the supplement.
The change in the date on which entitlement depends applies also to orders made before the present provisions expire on 12th December. This will set at rest the anxieties of owner-occupiers and authorities, to which reference has already been made, about whether houses in orders already confirmed would be purchased or vacated by then. It will also benefit those owner-occupiers who bought their houses in the appropriate period and are affected by orders now going through the various stages of the procedure or made in the interval between now and 12th December. Far from purchase or vacation taking place, there is obviously no chance in these cases that the orders will be decided before the present provisions expire.
I repeat that owner-occupiers who bought between 1st September, 1939, and 12th December, 1955, who qualify for the supplement, and whose houses are included in orders made by 12th December this year, will continue to keep their right to it even if their houses are not purchased or vacated till after that date and even if they have had more than 15 years use. The 15 year condition begins to apply only with orders made after 12th December.
Mr. Graham Page: Is it the case that the five-year period in which the owner has to acquire his property means that if he acquired it between 1939 and 1950 he will in future not get the benefit of the supplementary payment?
Mr. Mellish: That is so, because he would have already had his 15 year period. I hope that is the answer. This Measure will really deal with the later
856
part of this period, in which the 15 year period will apply to 1970. It is the extra five years being added on which will resolve the anomalies the hon. Gentleman is referring to. Those who obtained houses in the period the hon. Gentleman has in mind are in the main not cases which are coming up now. The Bill will deal with those who bought much later.
The other main provision of the Bill is found in Clause 2, which helps all owner-occupiers of condemned houses with outstanding debts on their property. The site value rule must be maintained. Its merits are clear—and I think that I carry the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Kingston-upon-Thames (Mr. Boyd-Carpenter) and certainly the hon. Member for Gloucestershire, South (Mr. Corfield) with me on this. The hon. Member for Gloucestershire, South—my predecessor in office—agreed in the debate last May that site value was the right basis of compensation in most of these cases where slums are found to be generally unfit.
Mr. John Boyd-Carpenter (Kingston-upon-Thames): I think in that debate that I sought to establish a distinction between the general owner and the owner-occupier. I certainly did not accept site value, generally speaking, for the owner-occupier.
Mr. Mellish: Perhaps I misunderstood the debate. I read it carefully, however, and certainly the hon. Member for Gloucestershire, South re-emphasised that site value was a principle which should be maintained. As has been pointed out in previous debates, it has been maintained since 1919. I thought we were generally agreed on that.
As I was saying, the site value rule must be maintained. Its merits are clear. A slum clearance programme which has to deal with the 770,000 unfit houses shown in local authorities' returns earlier this year simply cannot be conducted on any other basis.
There can be no question of extending the supplement to owners who bought their houses after December, 1955, when slum clearance had begun again. Full publicity was given to its resumption and owners who have purchased since then must be assumed to have known what the effects would be. But there is a

857
problem where an owner-occupier who gets only site value has to carry on paying off a mortgage. He has lost his home, to which, whatever its structural condition, he was attached. He may have become a local authority tenant and have to pay rent. He may have bought another house of his own and taken out another mortgage to do so.
In either event, the existence of a debt which he has to continue to meet as well will be a burden on him. In some instances the local authority may consider that an owner-occupier is in this situation because of information it gave him. For example, an authority at the time of purchase may have told the owner, in all good faith, that there was no prospect of the house in which he expressed interest being included in its clearance programmes for some time ahead. On the strength of that assurance he may have entered into a mortgage. The authority itself may even have granted him one.
Since that date their programme may have accelerated or, for perfectly good reasons, they may have changed their minds about the order in which areas should be taken. In such circumstances, where an owner-occupier is suffering hardship, the Department will always consider sympathetically an application for an ex-gratia payment. But the general problem cannot be met by ex-gratia payments. Nor would it be right to devise a solution which provided for direct Government intervention. What is at issue is a matter of equity between a lender and a borrower and what their respective rights should be when slum clearance has wiped out the security on which the money was advanced. This is obviously a question for the courts to determine.
At the same time as Parliament in 1956 provided for the supplement it gave the courts jurisdiction to decide what should be done with the outstanding debt in those cases where the supplement was payable. But the owner-occupier who gets the supplement is for that very reason likely to be better able to meet his liabilities, whether arising from a mortgage or a rental purchase agreement, than an owner-occupier who gets only site value or, where a clearance order is made, nothing at all because the site remains in his possession. This is the type of owner-occupier who benefits under the
858
Bill. He, too, will now have the right to ask the courts to adjudicate on what should happen to any remaining debt. The right will not be limited to owner-occupiers affected by orders made in the future. Any owner-occupier whose house has been condemned at any time in the past, and who still has liabilities on it to discharge, will be able to take advantage of this provision.
The principles on which the courts already act will be preserved. They must have regard to all the circumstances of each application. In the case of purchase by instalments, they consider whether the money the vendor has had, together with any part of the compensation for the value of the site which falls to be paid him, is enough for the purchaser to have paid. In the case of mortgages, they consider whether the mortgagee knew or ought to have known that he was lending on insufficient security.
Clause 2 now specifically requires the courts to consider, in addition, whether the original purchase price for the house was excessive. A loan may not amount to the bulk of the purchase price, and yet by permitting a transaction to take place at all may have been the cause of a very bad bargain for the purchaser. The provision should help to keep down the price of sub-standard houses by deterring advances which enable poor property to change hands for more than it is worth.
People often lend money for perfectly proper business reasons on property which is later condemned. In other instances money is lent from a personal desire to help a relative or friend to find a home. Lenders in these categories have nothing to fear from the Bill. It is not a borrowers' charter designed to give people an easy way out of commitments they entered into with their eyes open. But it does offer the opportunity of equitable settlements in cases which have caused concern to hon. Members on both sides of the House.
The bulk of the expenditure under the Bill will fall on local authorities. Slum clearance costs normally do so. The continuation of the supplement will keep them higher than they otherwise would have been after the end of this year. It will add to the cost of acquiring slum property and, where houses are cleared but not purchased, it will extend for a

859
period a payment which authorities have to make only to owners who qualify for the supplement.
It is difficult to estimate what the cost will amount to. There cannot be any precise information about the proportion which owner-occupiers who bought between December, 1950, and December, 1955, form of all owner-occupiers now entitled to the supplement, or about how many houses belonging to them have not yet been included in orders but may be dealt with in time to qualify under the extension of the supplement for those with more than 15 years' possession. Nor is it known how many owners affected by current and confirmed orders will benefit from the change in the date of the entitlement. But samples of orders in different parts of the country have given some guidance on the annual average number of owner-occupiers affected by slum clearance orders in recent years, on what proportion of these owner-occupiers qualifies for the supplement, and on the average size of the supplement. On this basis and on abitrary assumptions about the number of owners who will benefit from the changes in the Bill, it is estimated that the total capital cost to local authorities will be about £3 million.
12.10 a.m.
Mr. Frank Allaun: I think this is a good Bill because it will bring relief to many owner-occupiers who need it badly, but you are now coming to what is a very serious disadvantage.
Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman must address the Chair.
Mr. Allaun: Forgive me, Mr. Speaker. The time of night is affecting me. My hon. Friend is now coming to the disadvantageous part of the Bill. That is the fact that it is the local authorities who have to bear the whole of the burden and, what is worse, the poorest local authorities, those with the greatest slum clearance to undertake, will have to pay most. When the Bill was first thought of, a year ago—
Mr. Speaker: Order. This is more a speech than an intervention. It must be brief.
Mr. Allaun: I am coming to my question immediately, Mr. Speaker. When
860
I inquired the cost, it was then estimated in some quarters to be about £9 million. My hon. Friend is now suggesting that the cost will be about £3 million. Is he sure that it will be £3 million and not £9 million?
Mr. Mellish: I said earlier that this was based on arbitrary assumptions which we were making and I tried hard to explain how difficult it was to calculate the figure. Certainly it will cost local authorities that much extra. The figure I have given is based on the best estimates available to our experts, and I am advised that it will be about £3 million. However, this is a balance of arguments. There are those hon. Members—and certainly my right hon. Friend is one of them—who believe that when a person loses his home because of slum clearance, we should do everything we can not only to be fair, but to be seen to be fair. I think that that is right. I hope that the Bill will be an indication of my right hon. Friend's determination to associate the Labour Party with those who are owner-occupiers or who are now trying to buy homes. We are anxious to be fair to them. Considering the number of years covered, this is not a high price to pay to remedy what all of us on this side of the House regard as sheer injustice.
As I said, we think that the sum will be about £3 million. This estimate covers both extensions of the supplement to those with not more than 15 years' possession and to those whose houses are included in orders made by 12th December, but not purchased or vacated then. It also relates to all expenditure under the Bill from the time it comes into force until the last payment is made some years ahead.
The cost to the Exchequer cannot be estimated, but it is unlikely to be large. If cleared land is redeveloped for housing, the extra cost involved in continuing the supplement could entitle an authority to a bigger basic subsidy under the arrangements still in force, or to an expensive site subsidy, or a bigger expensive site subsidy. The appropriation of land which has been bought at higher cost because of the extended supplement to a service where relevant expenditure ranks for general grant could result in an increase

861
in the total sum disbursed by the Exchequer by way of general grant. But these are marginal possibilities to which no figure can be put.
A supplement could become payable under the Bill to the owner-occupier of a house which the Ministry of Transport, or a development corporation, bought com-pulsorily in a new town and which was subject to an unfitness order made by the local authority. But a supplement has never had to be paid in those circumstances under the present provisions and is highly unlikely to occur under the extension.
Rate deficiency grant is the most probable source of increased Exchequer expenditure. However, it is impossible to tell how owner-occupiers who get the supplement under the Bill will be distributed among authorities who are entitled or not entitled to rate deficiency grant. This is the answer to what my hon. Friend was saying about the poorer authorities, because rate deficiency grant may well qualify them for an extra grant from Government sources. Nor can any forecast be made of whether authorities will choose to meet the supplement by outright payments or by borrowing. Their choice will affect the amount of rate deficiency grant to which they may be entitled in any year.
There is nothing in this uncertainty about the amount of Exchequer assistance to authorities which is peculiar to the extension of the supplement. It is the position which has obtained ever since the supplement became payable in 1956, and there is no cause to alter it. The situation is simply that whenever expenditure on the supplement entitles an authority to an increased Exchequer grant or subsidy it will be automatically forthcoming, although the total of these increases cannot be calculated.
Mr. Charles Mapp: I wonder if the Parliamentary Secretary would allow me to ask one question before he leaves the subject. In talking about the compensatory payments and telling the House how much they will amount to, is he aware that some authorities bring in this compensation under their housing revenue accounts? Others may include it in some other guise, and there should be some recognition of such
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an imposition on housing revenue accounts, where it is so applied, in the present legislation.
Mr. Mellish: My hon. Friend will know that, so far as we are concerned at the Ministry, he or any other hon. Member can come and talk to us about any difficulty that a local authority may be facing.
I was going to say in conclusion—and I think that these remarks are apt—that there will be those who will say that these supplementary allowances should not continue. There is the definite point of view that they should end on 12th December of this year. But my right hon. Friend was impressed with the remarks in the debate in May of this year, and he felt that a case had been made for the continuation of the grants for another five years.
I have said that that is the end of the story. But it is true that it will cost iocal authorities a good deal more money. However, it is money which will be spent in meeting what is, after all, a grave injustice to some of those who own their own houses. There can be no question of a departure from the general principle. Site value only is paid on those houses genuinely found to be unfit for human habitation if purchased after 1955. That still remains.
I hope that we shall get the co-operation of both sides of the House on the Bill. It is important that it should be on the Statute Book as quickly as possible. There is a great deal of good will in the House, and no one suggests that discussion should be restricted, but I hope that the remarks that I have made will receive the approbation of the House and that the Bill will get a Second Reading, so that it can pass quickly through its final stages and get on to the Statute Book within a week or so.
12.17 a.m.
Mr. Graham Page: It is unfortunate that the Government left the Bill until the eleventh hour before the legislation ran out, and that we had to have it at 11.52 tonight. It is an important Bill and, as the Joint Parliamentary Secretary has explained, it affects a number of people. Many people have been concerned with it over a period of time, wondering what the Government are going to do about it.

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In one major respect, I think that this is a despicably mean little Bill. The Explanatory Memorandum says:
"The objects of this Bill are (a) to prolong the rights of certain owner-occupiers to receive supplementary payments up to full market value…"
It is quite true that it prolongs those rights to some owner-occupiers, but for others it terminates those rights by not continuing the existing legislation. It terminates the rights of the very people who most deserve the relief given under the Conservative Act of 1956. They are the people who purchased during the war or within five years after the war. They are the people who are now going to be cut out of any right to this supplementary payment, and the people who the Government have singled out, apparently, as being unworthy of receiving fair treatment when their homes are taken from them. That is why I say that it is a despicably mean little Bill.
Is this part of the right hon. Gentleman's National Housing Plan? Let him sleep it off. Is it really part of that plan to whittle down the compensation payable to owner-occupiers who up to the present time have been entitled to market value for their property when it is taken away from them by compulsory purchase? Is it part of the local government review, which I understand is now being undertaken by the right hon. Gentleman, to reduce the rate burden by depriving the individual of certain rights to which he has been entitled? In this case the burden on the rates, if it is so, is being reduced by some of those who at present are entitled to market value for their property being deprived of it in future, and that was not what we understood from debates on the slum clearance law which this Bill seeks to amend.
This is rather an interesting point, because the Joint Parliamentary Secretary raised this question of finance and the expenditure falling on the local authorities. Previously his party, when in Opposition, said that this compensation should be paid out of taxes, and not out of rates, but we look at the Bill and we find that it seeks to amend a part of the Housing Act 1956 by partially extending and partially ending the provisions of that Act relating to slum clearance compensation.
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The Housing Act, 1957, was a consolidation Bill, and the part of it to which this Bill refers originated in the Slum Clearance (Compensation) Act, 1956. When the Conservative Government of that time introduced that Bill, which became the 1956 Act, the Labour Opposition tabled a reasoned Amendment to it,
"That this House declines to give a Second Reading to this Bill, because it does not provide for any direct Exchequer subsidies towards the payments proposed and so imposes an undue burden on the rates."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 28th March 1956; Vol. 550, c. 2186.]
It was very forcibly argued from these benches at that time that the compensation should be paid, not by the ratepayer, but by the taxpayer. This Bill in some respects extends the cases in which compensation is payable, and who is to pay it on this occasion? The answer is, the ratepayer again.
The Explanatory Memorandum says that there may be an increase in some rate deficiency grants, and that there may be a few payments by the Ministry of Transport and by new town development corporations, but where are the direct Exchequer subsidies for which the Labour Party pleaded on the previous occasion? We are told that £3 million will fall on the rates. The last sentence of the Explanatory and Financial Memorandum says:
"The total extra capital cost to local and other public authorities because of the provisions of the Bill is also difficult to estimate but seems likely to be of the order of £3 million."
The hon. Member for Salford, East (Mr. Frank Allaun) said he thought it was £9 million.
Here was a chance for the party opposite, in introducing this Bill, even in this small way, to keep one of its election pledges to transfer the burden on the rates to the Exchequer—only £3 million—but there is not a word about this in the Bill. There were many words about it during the Second Reading of the previous Bill which we are now extending. I have no doubt that the other Joint Parliamentary Secretary will be answering this debate, and perhaps he will answer this, and I quote from col. 2205 on 28th March:
"The Government now have a long record of having done everything they can to starve and squeeze money out of the local authorities, and of taking every step of stinginess they could to hold up, obstruct their work and to do everything at the expense of the ratepayers

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… Naturally, when it is said that this is to be paid out of the ratepayers' and not the taxpayers' money, no one will believe that it is because it is not administratively worth bothering about. The Government are doing this for their own good purpose and should pay for it."
Why does not the rule apply to the present Government? They are doing exactly the same thing—making this payable out of the rates. Perhaps the Parliamentary Secretary will explain this political somersault when he winds up. It is no good his saying that it is only £3 million, which is a small amount, because in the previous column he chided the then Parliamentary Secretary, saying,
"The Parliamentary Secretary should have thought of a better reason for trying to dispose of the Amendment than saying that there was only a little amount involved. We really cannot go back to the old argument that the size of the offspring is relevant to its legitimacy." —[OFFICIAL REPORT, 28th March, 1956; Vol. 550, c. 2204–5.]
That was a very good phrase—but what about this time? Will the hon. Gentleman explain why on this occasion he has not persuaded his right hon. Friend to produce a Bill which throws this expenditure on the taxpayer?
Now I turn to the main purpose of the Bill. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] I should have thought that the financial side of the Bill was important—and the Parliamentary Secretary spent a good deal of time on it himself, trying to explain away the reason why the Government have decided to keep the liability on the ratepayer.
The main purpose of the Bill is to fix a market value on certain owner-occupiers' houses which have to be cleared away to permit development. Since as long ago as 1919 it has always been recognised that if a house is so unfit that it has to be pulled down and acquired the acquiring authority pays nothing for the bricks and mortar, but only the land. This law is now embodied in Section 29 of the Housing Act, 1957. If the house is subject to a demolition order, or a closing order, each of which are followed by compulsory purchase order, or if it is in a clearance area and a compulsory order follows, the compensation for it is the value of the site cleared of buildings.
In 1919 it may have been that a house was truly a slum if it was so unfit as to be placed under a demolition order, a closing order, or a clearance order, but
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standards of fitness have risen since then. There is no denying that. We are not dealing with the sort of property which was a slum in 1919, and the standard of fitness is now statutorily defined under Section 4 of the Housing Act, 1957. That a house can be statutorily unfit and yet have a substantial value has been shown again and again in actual cases which have come before local authorities and the Lands Tribunal.
There can be a marked difference in compensation payable for identical houses, one owner-occupied and purchased during the 1939–55 period and the other not so qualified. In the debate on this subject in June I quoted a number of actual cases in which one could test the difference between site value and market value. There was a case in Smethwick of a house with a site value of £30 and a market value of £550; in Pontypool a case of a site value of £28 and a market value of £300, and in Royton a house with a site value of £88 had a market value of £250. There were some very substantial figures. I quoted cases of identical houses in Woolwich where the site value of £150 compared with the market value of £1,150, and a site value of £200 compared with a market value of £1,650. There was the indisputable case at Lewisham of a property site valued at £50, the owner of which managed to prove that he was entitled to market value because he had purchased it in the right period, and he therefore got market value of £975 for it.
I mention these figures again because I want the House to realise that this payment of supplement, both under the existing law and under the law as it will be under this Bill, is not always a question of money being given for bad or worthless property. The value is tested under Part 3 of Schedule 3 of the Housing Act, 1957, which has a specific direction about reduction of value for disrepair, for the house being in bad condition. So there is no question that this supplement is given for something in a bad condition: the house is valued properly on its market value in that condition.
The extent to which the Bill fails to provide market value for those entitled to it under the existing law is shown by the sort of figures which I have quoted. These are the means which the Government are mean enough, under this Bill, to take

867
away from those who are entitled to them —those people whom they recognised, when they were in Opposition, as deserving of Parliament's compassion in this respect.
May I press this a little further and compare the law as it is now, under the 1957 Act, and the law as it will be if the Government have their way and get the Bill through unamended. The person who is now entitled to compensation has to prove that he bought his house since August, 1939 and before 13th December, 1955. He has to show that the house was occupied on the latter date either by himself or his family. He has to show that he still has an interest in it when it is taken away from him by compulsory acquisition, and, as the law is at the moment, he has to show that it was purchased from him before 13th December next.
The Bill slightly improves his position because he will get the market value if the compulsory purchase order was made before 13th December next, no matter whether the property was actually purchased from him or not before that date. In that respect, his position is slightly improved—(An HON. MEMBER:"Slightly?"] I would not say that it was greatly improved, because there were many who construed the previous Act as having exactly that effect, and this Bill clears up a point of law, perhaps.
But, after 13th December, many will be deprived of their right to market value. A person entitled to market value in future will have to show, first, two similar qualifications to these which were necessary before—that he was the owner-occupier on 13th December, 1955, and that he still has an interest now, when the property is taken away from him— but he will now have to show that he purchased the house from 13th December, 1950, to 12th December, 1955, inclusive, and that the C.P.O. was made within 15 years of his purchase of the house.
To start with, that means that this Bill, if it becomes an Act, will run out in 1970. I am not so worried about that—my right hon. Friends who will be in Government then can look after that—but what is totally wrong about the Bill as it stands is that it cuts out those who purchased
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before 1950, those who purchased during the war, and those who purchased in a period of five years after the end of the war. Yet those were the people for whom the 1956 Act was passed.
In the Second Reading debate on the Slum Clearance (Compensation) Bill, 1956, the then Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government said:
"Thousands of people, not least ex-Service men, desperate somehow to get a home, have paid considerable sums for the freehold or the long lease of houses of this kind, either ignoring or else being ignorant of the prospect that they stood to be acquired in the course of time at site value only. It was all the easier for people so situated to overlook the risk or to take it because, for about 15 years after the outbreak of the war, there virtually was no slum clearance going on".—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 28th March, 1956; Vol. 550, c. 2162.]
In later speeches from the Opposition benches, it was recognised that it was both those who purchased during the war and those who purchased after the war who were to get the benefit of this supplementary payment.
So the Bill deprives the family who, perhaps, were bombed out during the war and were forced to find other accommodation in these twilight areas, perhaps just the most deserving and patriotic people who stuck it out in the cities and bought their houses there in order to carry on essential services during wartime. The Bill deprives the man who came back from the war and purchased one of these houses with his gratuity within the five years after the war when the Labour Government found it impossible to make much headway in reducing the housing shortage. Surely, a straight extension of the existing legislation would have avoided this attack on the very people whose hardship and suffering that legislation was intended to relieve.
It is true that, when the previous Bill became law, it was drafted to last only ten years. I think that that was right at the time. Legislation of this kind should come back for the House to consider it periodically. Parliament should have the opportunity of seeing how it has worked in practice. But there is no cause now to let this legislation lapse, and, if it does lapse, these people for whom the original law was passed will lose the benefit.

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I have no criticism of Clause 2 at this stage. I agree with the principle. I think it right that the county court should have power to adjust mortgage liabilities, roughly speaking, in all site value cases. I confess that I do not know why this was not in the original Bill. It seems the obvious case in which hardship will arise, when a man gets only site value and he does not receive the supplementary payment. There should be a power to put the mortgage liabilities right in such cases. But why spoil that improvement in a beneficial Clause with a cheeseparing provision about compensation in Clause 1?
I hope that we shall be able to put the Bill right. It is, at least, an extension of some beneficial legislation, and, if we can put it right to the point of still giving the benefit to those for whom the original legislation was intended, it will be a good Bill.
12.39 a.m.
Mr. Gordon Oakes: From these benches, I warmly welcome the Bill. It is not without significance that this is the first domestic Measure of this Session, and it deals with owner-occupiers. I want the House to note the number of hon. Members present on this side and the few on the benches opposite.
The Bill will be of great benefit to many thousands of people in my constituency of Bolton and elsewhere. It is designed to help those people who, in time of acute housing shortage, struggled—and I emphasise "struggled"—to buy their own homes. Often they had to give up luxuries to find the money. More often, particularly in Lancashire, the wives went to work and the whole of their earnings were banked to provide the deposit or help meet the mortgage repayments. They are the people we are endeavouring to help in this, the first domestic Measure of the new Session.
The houses about which I am speaking can be seen in any northern town. One can tell them at once by their new front doors, the way they have been improved inside, bathrooms and so on, new grates and other modern extras. These improvements show that to the people who bought or are buying these houses they are not just old houses but the cherished homes of their owner-occupiers. Nevertheless, many of these houses are 70, 80 and even
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more years old. Local authorities must have regard to urban renewal. The dilemma is that progressive families wish to buy their homes and make them into little palaces while progressive local authorities wish to undertake urban renewal, remembering that urban renewal is essential. A town cannot stand still. If it does, it dies. And most of these houses are to be found in the centres of such towns.
Although the owners of these houses do the best they can, many of the properties are damp. The houses are pushed up close together and, therefore, local authorities must do something about it. The Bill before us will help these people, many of them in Bolton and elsewhere in the north of England. In this connection, I again draw attention to the number of hon. Members present on this side of the Committee. Among them are hon. Members representing such places as Oldham, Salford, Manchester, Liverpool and other industrial constituencies.
Having welcomed the Bill, I come to the remarks of the hon. Member for Crosby (Mr. Graham Page), and I will agree with one of his statements and disagree with another. To disagree first; in 1955-56 it was anticipated by Parliament that very many of these slum houses would be cleared by 1965. We have reached 1965, but they have not been cleared. That is the situation because the previous Government prevented local authorities from building more council houses. When that Government introduced credit squeezes they applied them indiscriminately, regardless of region or need. When my right hon. Friends find it necessary to adjust the economy they arrange things so that the measures do not apply to everything which every progressive local authority is doing.
The hon. Member for Crosby spoke of rates. While I do not know what my hon. Friend the Joint Parliamentary Secretary will say in reply, it should be remembered that the present Government are inquiring into the whole question of rates, Exchequer subsidies and rating relief. Indeed, many of the fears expressed by the hon. Member for Crosby, and perhaps to some extent by my hon. Friend the Member for Salford, East (Mr. Frank Allaun) will be allayed when the Bill mentioned in the Gracious Speech comes forward.

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I agree with the hon. Member for Crosby that it would have been simpler for the Schedule to the 1957 Act to have been extended for a period of five years. This Measure can cause confusion in some people's minds. The hon. Member for Crosby has mentioned those people who bought before 1950. I have cases in mind of people who bought after 1950, but it is now known that the clearance will not affect them until, perhaps, 1968 or 1969. People who bought in 1951 or 1952 must feel a great grievance with this Measure, because although, in general, it allays the fears of those who own their own houses, it will not meet the case of the persons who bought after 1950 but whose houses are not to be cleared until some time late in the 'sixties.
The hon. Member did not deal at any length with Clause 2, except to agree with it. This Clause is very important. It means that when a house has to be cleared, if the owner-occupier has a mortgage on it he can leave the house without having a debt round his neck. People like that can apply to the county court and have a very substantial worry dealt with. I welcome the fact that the court will have regard to whether the price paid was excessive.
One practice that has gone on since 1955, in particular. It relates to the person who had a house that he often acquired after 1957, when he got the tenant out who was previously there— due to another Act passed by the previous Government. Having got the house, he found he could not sell it on the open market, because when the prospective purchaser went to the solicitor or surveyor he was told that it might be subject to a clearance scheme. As a result, the vendor could not get what was often an excessive price for the property.
He therefore found a prospective purchaser who badly needed a house who had little or no deposit and was willing verbally to agree that he would go into the house and pay so much a week over five, seven or ten years, and at the conclusion of such payments he would be handed the deeds.
The purchaser usually had no idea that the house was within the area of a clear-
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ance scheme. Very often he had no legal advice. I have known cases in which the handing over of the deeds was done quite literally. On completion, the vendor of the house merely handed over a bundle of deeds to the purchaser, who only learned when the house was to be acquired that there had been no conveyance to him. It may be said that it is a matter of caveat emptor, that it is the purchaser's duty to make sure about these things, but we are dealing with people who have never purchased a house before and do not know the legal formalities. Many who were cheated by unscrupulous vendors and still have a mortgage will be helped by this Bill, because the county court can take into account such factors as whether or not the price was excessive.
One other slight amendment should be made to this Clause. The Bill should also empower the court to inquire whether the mortgage interest rate was excessive. It should say so specifically. The Second Schedule to the 1957 Housing Act does not specifically mention mortgage interest rate; it incidentally mentions excessive price, but no mortgage interest rate. Another racket developed. Not the building societies, the banks or the local authorities who deal with scrupulous fairness with these matters, but the sharks came in on the fringe and lent money at very excessive interest rates to purchasers who were desperate, interest rates in the region of 9, 10, 12, even 15 per cent., over short periods on mortgages. Those interest rates should be looked into by the courts when the question arises of whether compensation should be paid to the mortgagor as well as the owner-occupier. As well as the mortgage interest rate they often had to pay an excessive survey fee, a procuration fee, an introduction fee and all sorts of rackets designed to extract the maximum amount of money from people most in need at that time.
I hold the view that if a back bencher cannot say what he wants to say in 15 minutes he is either not trying or is trying too hard. This is my last point. Will my right hon. Friend look into the question of the owner-occupier who benefits from the provisions of this Bill by a sum of compensation from the local authority and does not wish to be given a council house by the local authority

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but to acquire another small terraced house? I wonder whether a circular could be issued to local authorities asking them to give very favourable consideration to such purchasers. We are dealing in the main with people in their fifties who may find difficulty because of their age in getting a mortgage from a building society. Would the local authorities consider favourably advances under the Housing Acts or the Small Dwellings Acquisition Act because they know that such people have a large capital sum or are a good risk because they have already bought a house before the Act comes into operation?
I welcome the Bill and hope that it will be given a speedy passage. It is a very significant first domestic Bill for this House to pass in this Session and I therefore welcome it.
12.53 a.m.
Sir Anthony Meyer: I was particularly pleased when I saw this Bill laid before us—unheralded I think it was—but my pleasure rather drained away the more I studied it and, after my hon. Friend the Member for Crosby (Mr. Graham Page) had finished with it, I could find little in it for satisfaction.
I echo what the hon. Member for Bolton, West (Mr. Oakes) said about it being all very well to talk about caveat emptor, but the sort of people we are talking about are the sort of emptors who are less likely to be cave. This matter comprises many pitfalls. I have been very much concerned with a case which when I first looked at the Bill I hoped would fall within its scope, but it does not. It relates to people who bought just after the period for which the 1956 Slum Clearance Act provided special treatment. I am not concerned with what is really slum property. I can see very good arguments for not obliging local authorities to shell out vast sums by way of compensation for property which really is slum property. What I am concerned with are the type of houses which elderly people with very modest savings can afford to buy. These are precisely the sort of houses which it is only too easy and only too tempting for a local authority to have declared unfit.
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In a debate last Session on a Private Member's Bill introduced by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak (Mr. Gurden), my hon. Friend the Member for Crosby drew attention to the various ways in which it was possible for a local authority to have a house declared unfit. A large number of faults can be found with a house. It needs only one of them for the whole house to be declared unfit.
The case with which I have been concerned is a house which certainly is damp. To the couple who bought it, it was their idea of a haven in which to end their days. It had ninety feet of garden. It looked out over playing fields. It seemed in every way just the sort of place in which they could live for the rest of their lives. They made inquiries of the local authority. They were told that there was no question of the house being demolished for slum clearance and that the local authority had no immediate plans for redeveloping the area. They were told that in twenty years' time the thing might look very different, but after all they were over 60 at that time and they thought that if they had twenty years there they should be doing very well.
Less than five years later the local authority revised its plans and the house, bought three weeks after 13th December, 1955, which was the closing date under the 1956 Act, came into the local authority's next redevelopment scheme. My local authority—the Slough Borough Council, Labour-controlled—did its best to help this couple. It looked at the Act. It thought that under the Act it could have authority to make an ex gratia payment. The couple paid £600 for the house. They were offered £150 site value. Slough Borough Council thought it could put it up another £150, but this required the Minister's consent. The Minister considered the case. I am not criticising him. The Act did not allow him to authorise the ex gratia payment, because this quite clearly fell outside the period covered by the 1956 Act.
So I hoped when the Bill appeared that it would deal with the very specific cases of hardship which arise. I emphasise that these are not slum houses. These are decent terrace houses lacking in the latest amenities, lacking damp courses, as most

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houses of that date do, but very tolerable places for old people to end their days in.
I am not concerned just with the injustice which is done to people in this way, but also with the fact that this sort of thing discourages people from spending their money on housing themselves. One thing above all others which we should be doing is to encourage people to spend their money on housing themselves, because the more of the resources of individuals which go into the purchase of housing the better chance we have of coming to the end of our present interminable housing crisis.
Mr. Frank Allaun: We all sympathise with the couple mentioned by the hon. Gentleman. They lost £500 less £150, that is, £350, in 15 years. Is that an excessive loss when they would have had to pay a high rent in that area in any case?
Sir A. Meyer: They would have lost £450. They have not lost it yet. The house is still standing. It can be argued, as indeed the Minister said in a letter to me, that, after all, they had had 15 years' occupation of the house, but that is a difficult argument to put to somebody who is both losing his home, in which he wants to remain, and is faced with the prospect of not being able to afford to buy another one with the compensation he is getting and with having to live in a council house which is the last thing he wants to do. He would not have put money aside in the first place to purchase the house if he had wanted to live in a council house. I am not suggesting that he will be put out on the street in total misery but he had found a perfectly decent house and is now forced to turn out.
If he had been a wily chap he could have done what is done in certain cases. I was told of a Birmingham lady who was in this sort of situation. As a solicitor pointed out in a letter to me, if she could have spent £500 in doing up the house she could have claimed it was cheaper to have it declared fit for human habitation. The full market value would have been paid. She would have received £1,500 more. A sum of £500 would have been spent on repair and redecora-tion and the house would have been pulled down the next day.
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Anybody who can afford to spend money on making a house fit for human habitation gets full market value—and there is a vast difference between site value and market value—and the house is pulled down the next day. This does not seem to me to be a sensible way to go about it. I hope that we shall have the Bill sufficiently amended so that owner-occupiers can have full market value for houses which are not slum property in which they want to go on living. I hope at a later stage to produce an Amendment to that effect.
1.8 a.m.
Mr. Charles Mapp: We on this side of the House welcome the Bill. It has manifest advantages, but I was a little disappointed with the lack of flexibility in the Joint Parliamentary Secretary's introductory speech. I believe that more flexibility must be shown in Committee. I say this because I hope later to comment on a point made by the hon. Member for Crosby (Mr. Graham Page) which is worthy of consideration.
The local authority in my area is in the midst of this problem, with 14,000 to 15,000 houses to be tackled, which will take another 20 years. Against that background I and the local authority welcome the administrative tidying up which will be done by the Bill on the question of date of purchase. I am delighted that that has now been put beyond a per-adventure. I am glad also that the supplementary compensation is being continued in principle but I should like to address myself quickly and firmly to two outstanding points.
The first is the question of an easement in respect of the existing mortgages on some of these properties, and in the main those concerned are poor but thrifty people. If there is an application to the court and the court makes an easement, where will the financial easement fall? The easement will be in favour of the person paying the mortgage, but at whose expense? If it is at the expense of reputable building societies—not the type my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton, West (Mr. Oakes) talked about— then these people who, through their thrift, are trying to buy houses in these lower values will get little or no encouragement from orthodox building societies, who will have been caught by a fair

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decision by the court in such circumstances. If the effect is as I fear, the Bill will not have happy consequences for thousands of people in towns such as Oldham, many of whom want to buy what some people would call twilight houses. These are terraced houses in which the ordinary man or woman can see 15 to 25 years' life, given good husbandry. If, as an indirect result of this easement, building societies become more cautious in dealing with such people, the Bill will not have a happy effect. I want to be satisfied on this point.
The main reason that I felt that the Parliamentary Secretary was not flexible lies in the fact that I am not wedded to the date of 1955. In some northern towns honest, decent but humble people in the last few years have bought—or are still having to buy—small properties for sums such as £400 to £700. They have managed to make them habitable and comfortable, although by my standards they are likely to be pulled down in due course. Because of the date 1955, they will get nothing under the Bill.
The Bill seems to rest on the belief that we shall have solved our slum clearance problems in the next five years, but we shall certainly not have done so in many areas of Lancashire. A local authority may start the slum clearance process through its health inspector this month, but it may be three to five years before the stage of an order is reached. If an owner of one of these properties asks the town clerk officially for information about how his property will be affected by possible local authority action, he will find that there are three or four years of indecision ahead. People will suffer because of these years of indecision. I am not blaming the local authority or the Minister for this period of indecision, which is often due to a lack of sufficient health inspectors or to objections raised by people about the area in question. It may be due to a need to change priorities in the local authority programme. But the effect is a long period of uncertainty in the minds of people who in the last few years have bought, or who will have to buy, at relatively small figures houses in which they can see, with good husbandry, 15 to 20 years life.
In the absence so far of compelling information to the contrary—and I know that we can defer the issue for five years
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—I would like an Amendment to the Bill which would mean a continuity of policy, with some criterion of good husbandry. I am prepared to listen to arguments about those who bought their houses during the war. If the meaning of the Bill, which I had not appreciated, is what the hon. Member for Crosby says it is, some of us should reflect on what improvements can be made at a later stage.
1.10 a.m.
Mr. James Allason: I welcome the sudden conversion of the Labour Party to owner-occupation. I wish it had come in the last Session, when we on this side were fighting for concessions for owner-occupiers who were rigorously excluded from our discussions on the Rent Act.
Mr. Stan Newens: Would the hon. Gentleman give us details of how they were excluded?
Mr. Allason: We raised the question of owner-occupation for the retired. In Committee, on Report and on consideration of Lords Amendments the Government rejected concessions for owner-occupiers on retirement. It was only after considerable pressure that we were able to get special terms for them. The pressure always came from this side of the House.
I noticed that the Minister, replying to last Thursday's debate, said that most of the housing programme should be in favour of the local authorities and then suddenly remembered, at the end of his speech, the owner-occupier. I am delighted to hear that this represents the Labour Party's new policy.
I also welcome its concern about rates. But it is not new. Both sides have been worried about this aspect for years. After what we have heard tonight, I would like to know that a great deal of help will be given to local authorities and I hope that it will be effective in 1966-67 and not 1967-68, which is what I fear will be the case.
What is the philosophy behind the 15-year period? If a man has enjoyed possession of a house for 15 years, is that regarded as long enough for him to have enjoyed the value of the purchase price so that he should not receive any supplement over and above the site value? It means a considerable difference between

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site value and market value. If the 15-year period is up, the owner loses that difference. My hon. Friend the Member for Eton and Slough (Sir A. Meyer) made a substantial case for the final period up to December, 1955, being waived. It seems that anyone who buys a house after that time, having had a search and having found that the house has a clean bill of health from the local authority and then finding that the house comes under clearance order, should have something more than site value, even though the house may not be up to the full standard of fitness. Compensation could be the market value less the cost of bringing the house up to the necessary standard of fitness to qualify it for market value rather than, as in the example my hon. Friend gave, the owner having to pay £500 in order to get an additional £1,500 compensation.
I tried to follow the Parliamentary Secretary's explanation of Clause 2. He pursued the example of what would happen when a supplement was being paid. I would be grateful for an explanation of what would happen in the adjudication by the courts between the borrower and the lender where there was to be no supplement. Let us suppose that the lender is the local authority. If the judge decides that the mortgage shall be cancelled, then the local authority loses its 8 per cent. But let us suppose that the lender is a building society or an individual. Having entered into a transaction in good faith, is the individual to lose his money? We are agreed that cases of bad faith and excessive value are ruled out, but these are cases of good faith.
This is presumably retrospective legislation and it is intended to be an intervention in a transaction which took place some time previously. When the transaction comes to fruition, it is negatived by an order of the court. It seems to be a strange doctrine that there is such interference. I appreciate that there is a great need to do it, but I doubt whether the loss should fall on the perfectly innocent individual or building society who entered into a bona fide transaction quite honestly and who then found, because of the action of the local authority, that he was to be put at a loss. It may be that I misunderstood the explanation of the
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Parliamentary Secretary, but he did not address himself to the case where there was no supplement.
Mr. Oakes: That is the position at the moment and all the Bill does is to extend it to other categories of owner-occupiers. Under paragraph (5) of Schedule 2 of the Housing Act a person can go to the county court, and the Bill extends it further.
Mr. Allason: This is extending it very considerably and we are dealing with the whole principle. This will be a new Act to deal with the whole problem and not just an extension of what has been done in the past. It is something quite new and we should look at the principles afresh to see whether they are just. On the information I have had tonight, I doubt whether justice lies behind the Bill.
1.20 a.m.
Mr. Reginald Freeson: As the Member for a constituency where one of the largest slum clearance orders London has seen for a long time is now the subject of a public inquiry, I welcome the Bill very much. As perhaps the local leading light in initiating this current slum clearance order, it has been borne in on me for some time that genuine hardship was bound to be created by the introduction of very progressive and sound social policies in Kilburn, an area which for the most part should have been slum cleared 30 years ago instead of being left until this late date.
In recent years a growing number of people have been buying properties in which to live in an area recognised to be suffering from an acute housing shortage. This has been creating a situation which ten or fifteen years ago, certainly before the war, would have been unlikely to arise to any degree, a situation in which there is about 8 per cent. owner-occupation in the properties covered by the order now under inquiry. Over the past year or 18 months, I have contacted a number if not most of these people and I have been worried about those who while not in their 50's are probably in their 20's or 30's and who, but for the Bill, would be saddled with mortgages of between £1,500 and £2,500, some of them having purchased their houses perhaps only months before the local authority, following much discussion and consideration, decided to initiate the necessary procedures

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through its health department to establish a slum clearance order application.
We shall find this sort of situation increasingly in this and similar areas as over the years we proceed to embark on slum clearance and the redevelopment of areas, a process which, I hope, will be speeded up as it needs to be speeded up. Because of changing financial circumstances and the general economic background to incomes, as well as the pressures of acute housing shortages in most of London, worse in some areas like mine than in others, there will be growing numbers of people who have bought properties in rapidly deteriorating areas. We are not dealing with a static situation and we should have to deal with growing problems of hardship and anxiety and even suffering if it were not for the Bill.
However, in view of what is going on in my own area, I seek the general assurance that, however amended in detail, the Bill will benefit the owner-occupiers of properties now subject to slum clearance orders initiated before the Bill was introduced and which may be shortly implemented possibly, although not certainly, before the Bill becomes operative. This will be very important in the present situation in my area, as well as in what I hope will be schemes in the future.
Hon. Members have referred to the situation which arises in the twilight areas of our cities where slum clearance is being considered or, possibly, where there are town planning procedures for comprehensive redevelopment well ahead of the actual dates on which action will be formally declared by the local authority. It is expecting too much of the Bill to think that it should be able to deal with these important problems.
Since the point has been raised, I want to take the opportunity of expressing the hope that the kinds of studies and consideration that are being given to the problem by the Ministry will result in speedy action being taken. There is a special committee sitting at the moment on slum clearance definition, and recently we have had the report of the Housing Advisory Committee on the future of development plans, in which there was considerable discussion about the idea of establishing action areas. I hope that there will be speedy action at Ministerial and Parliamentary level in putting
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into effect some of the recommendations to speed up and tighten up the methods used for slum clearance. and redevelopment in our cities.
Tonight, we are discussing a Measure which is going to help considerably the small person evicted by large redevelopment schemes coming under slum clearance. But we must not overlook the fact that the main issue is getting the twilight areas of our cities pulled down and rebuilt as we would wish to see them rebuilt, and create better conditions generally.
One of the problems involved here is that which affects many people moving into these districts during the period of uncertainty—that period of time before slum clearance gets under way- -and the way that can be dealt with is by speeding up and tightening up the methods that local authorities use to establish slum clearance areas in our cities. It will improve the position for the local authority, because it will mean a better and more economic method of using its staff. It will improve the general housing conditions of people living in the twilight areas, because it will speed up the redevelopment of those areas. At the same time, it will clarify the position for many people moving into those areas who are tempted sometimes to go into house purchase in a twilight area because of the acute housing problems in our cities.
I believe that the kind of Bill that we have before us tonight is something to be welcomed. It may be that there are detailed points which we have to consider and tighten up in Committee, though some of the points about which we have heard tonight show a misreading of the Bill, with which, no doubt, the Minister will deal when he comes to reply. At the same time, it must be seen against the background of the urgeut need to speed up redevelopment. We must press ahead with it, as we are trying to do in my own area, but, at the same time, as the Government are trying to do in the Bill, we must help the little person who because of the housing shortage has saddled himself with a debt which will otherwise hang round his neck as a result of a slum clearance order.
Some parts of the speech that we heard from the hon. Member for Crosby (Mr. Graham Page) could only be described as rather petulant. We have here an attempt

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by the Government to do something to help the little man, but most of the comments that we have had from the hon. Member for Crosby—and the same can be said, to some extent, of other hon. Members on his side—have been petty criticisms to try and create an impression to the contrary, and that we are not helping people in need but making things worse for them.
What kind of debate on an important and valuable domestic Measure is that? As one of my hon. Friends said earlier, perhaps it is underlined by the fact that we have had quite a large number of hon. Members on this side sitting in on the debate, and one can see how many hon. Members we have had on the other side.
All welcome to the Bill, and let us get it through the House as quickly as possible.
1.30 a.m.
Mr. Stan Newens: Like my hon. Friends who have already spoken from this side, I rise to welcome the Bill.
In view of the fact that the previous Act expired this year, I find it somewhat hypocritical to refer to the Bill in the terms which were used by the hon. Member for Crosby (Mr. Graham Page). It seems almost as if hon. Gentlemen opposite are disappointed that the Bill has been introduced, since it deals with problems which are of very great importance to many people up and down the country.
My hon. Friend the Member for Bolton, West (Mr. Oakes) referred to the people who are troubled by this problem in the large industrial towns. I represent a county constituency which includes a new town, and I should like to point cut that this problem is one which also affects part of my constituency, in particular the town of Waltham Abbey. It might seem charming to those who pass through it, but in the back streets there are a number of slums which are likely to be cleared during the next few years, and during the course of the last few months a number of my constituents have approached me with precisely the sort of problem with which the Bill seeks to deal.
I think that the Bill shows how very much the Labour Government are concerned about the problems of the owner-
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occupier, and the fact that the Government have introduced this Bill so early in the Session should kill once and for all the myth which hon. Gentlemen opposite have sought to propagate, that we on this side of the House are not concerned about owner-occupiers. I have had discussions with people who are faced with problems of this sort, and I am delighted that the Government have introduced ihis Bill at this stage in the Session.
Having said that, I should like to make a plea for those owner-occupiers who bought their houses during the period 1939 to 1950. A number of hon. Members have referred to this. I understand that these people will not be entitled to the supplemental payment up to the full market value. I consider this aspect of the Bill to be unfair, because there may be two owners living next door to one another, one of whom purchased his house in 1949, before the effective date, and the other who purchased his house in 1950, subsequent to the effective date. Because of that they will be accorded different treatment, and this will leave the person who does not qualify for the supplemental payment with a considerable sense of injustice.
I hope that my hon. Friend will explain the reason for this arbitrary line. How does he justify this division which will subject people who bought their properties before 1950 to a considerable amount of what appears to be injustice? Many of these people are now old-age pensioners. Many of them are able to manage on a fixed income at the moment. They may have spent vast sums of money on improving their houses even though the houses adjoining their properties are not in such good condition.
If these people are rehoused in other property for which they have to pay a comparatively high rent, they may have to have recourse to National Assistance. I realise that National Assistance is a right to which we expect everyone in need to be entitled, but many old people are reluctant to have recourse to it, and therefore, with this in mind, I ask my right hon. Friend to consider the problem presented by those who purchased their property during the period 1939 to 1950.
I realise that they have had more than 15 years' use of their houses, and in that respect they may be said to have

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recovered what they originally laid out, but at the same time there will be a considerable sense of injustice in these cases. Therefore, while I welcome the Bill, I hope that my right hon. Friend will review this aspect of the problem and see whether anything can be done to help the people to whom I have referred.
1.35 a.m.
Mr. John Boyd-Carpenter (Kingston-upon-Thames): Despite the inconvenient hour at which the exigencies of the Government programme have compelled us to discuss a Measure dealing with important matters, which is something that hon. Members on both sides of the House, certainly those who have sat through this debate will regret, I think that we have had a very helpful discussion.
The Ministerial contingent on the Treasury Bench will agree that there has been a widely expressed feeling on both sides of the House that the Bill still plainly does not go far enough. I hope that that point has been noted by right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite, because at one moment during the debate, of the three Ministers so courteously representing their Department simultaneously on the Treasury Bench two were following the debate with their eyes closed. [AN HON. MEMBER: "They were concentrating."] That was the explanation that I was going to put forward to the House, in case some hon. Member present should draw some other and less flattering conclusion.
The hon. Member for Epping (Mr. Newens) suggested that some hon. Members on this side were disappointed by the introduction of this Bill. The hon. Member should study the history of the matter. It was my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak (Mr. Gurden) who introduced the subject into this Parliament when he introduced a Private Members' Bill towards the end of May. Hon. Members present during the debate on that Bill will recall that my hon. Friend the Member for Crosby (Mr. Graham Page) and myself both pressed the Parliamentary Secretary to take action in view of the fact that 13th December—the date when the present provisions cease to operate—was drawing near. And it was my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition who, at Bristol, two or three weeks ago—strongly
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pressed the Government to take action. So there is no question that my hon. Friends are extremely anxious for action to be taken on this matter.
That being so, I suppose that in criticising this Measure we shall be charged with looking a gift horse in the mouth.
Mr. Mellish: Hear, hear.
Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: I see that I have the Parliamentary Secretary with me. He has been awakened.
Mr. Mellish: I am not tired, but when the right hon. Gentleman is speaking it is impossible to go to sleep, anyway.
Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: Unfortunately, the hon. Gentleman has had the privilege of listening to me only for about three minutes. We are charged with looking a gift horse in the mouth, but when the animal's teeth are riddled with dental caries, which the Minister of Health is attempting to cure by introducing fluoride into the water system, it is necessary to draw attention to it.
The first and most obvious restriction is the limited number of people to whom the Bill will apply. The real human problem that lies behind this Bill is the fact that we are here concerned with people who, as a matter of definition, are losing their homes. They almost certainly are not very good or very nice homes, but they are these people's homes and they have been in them for many years. What a person to whom that happens really wants is compensation which will enable him to start again in another home and in many cases a home that he owns.
The people concerned are, as a matter of definition, owner-occupiers. They plainly want to be people who continue to live in their own homes, and it is therefore extremely important that the compensation which they receive should be on a basis and on a scale which will enable them, if they wish, to set up again as owner-occupiers. It is not sufficient, in many cases, for them simply to be able to take advantage of a local authority tenancy which, generally speaking, is a condition of the Minister's granting permission for the slum clearance scheme to proceed at all.
In those circumstances, it is very difficult to see what is the philosophy behind the 15-year limit. The hon. Member for

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Bolton, West (Mr. Oakes), in the course of an admirable speech, said that the purpose of the Bill was to help people who had bought their homes at a time of acute housing shortage. But, of course, the limitation, the fact that this gives benefit only to those who bought their homes between 1950 and 1955, and the fact that it excludes any help for those who bought their homes between 1939 and 1950, means that it gives no help at all to those who bought at the time of the most acute housing shortage.
That must be true, unless it is suggested that the first Labour Government not only failed, as they did, to make much contribution to the housing problem but actually left matters worse when they left office than when they came to office. Otherwise, it follows that it was those who bought their homes between, in particular, 1945 and 1950—who are excluded from the Bill—who bought their homes at the time of that most acute housing shortage, to which the hon. Member for Bolton, West has so properly referred.
Therefore, we must press the Joint Parliamentary Secretary to tell us why it is that the benefit of market value in the case of claims after 13th December this year is limited to the people who bought their homes only in the period 1950 to 1955.
On the face of it, this is an unfair discrimination. It has the effect of making the Bill very small in scope and it destroys the hopes of many people who bought their homes during the earlier period, which hopes were raised when it was announced that the Government were, at this almost thirteenth hour— indeed, at this thirteenth and a half hour —bringing forward a Bill to deal with this matter. Certainly, we shall have to press this matter very much further in Committee.
Those are the main comments which I wished to make about Clause 1. But there are other points—I may be interrupted in putting them to the House— in respect of Clause 2. I will say at once, and this is probably all I shall say for a few minutes—

ROYAL ASSENT
1.43 a.m.
Message to attend the Lords Commissioners;
The House went:—and, having returned;
Mr. SPEAKER reported the Royal Assent to:
Southern Rhodesia Act

HOUSING (SLUM CLEARANCE COMPENSATION) BILL
Question again proposed, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
1.54 a.m.
Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: When the House was summoned to attend the Lords Commissioners I had just concluded that part of my comments on the Bill relating to Clause 1. I come now, therefore, to Clause 2.
I am quite sure that the county court is the right tribunal for determining the issue in respect of these mortgages between individual citizens and I have no comment on that part of the effect of Clause 2. On the other hand, we should consider whether it is the right way to handle the matter when the mortgage in question was granted by the local authority which itself has brought forward the clearance order. In such circumstances, I imagine that the House would feel that the right, the inevitable, course is for the mortgage to be waived— and, indeed, with the right hon. Gentleman's permission, that is the current practice.
I am afraid, however, that the introduction of the provisions of Clause 2 will cause local authorities to take to the county court the question of mortgages in these cases. It may well be that with the fear that the district auditor may otherwise order a surcharge, local authorities will feel bound to avail themselves of this procedure. If so, the effect of these provisions in these cases will be to make somewhat less advantageous than at present the position of people who have in good faith taken a mortgage from a local authority and have then found the same local authority introduce a

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slum-clearance scheme affecting their property. This is not just an academic question. As the right hon. Gentleman knows, it is a question that arises in a number of cities today. There has been considerable trouble in that respect in the City of Cardiff.
We will therefore want to consider at the next stage of the Bill whether in such cases it is right that the matter should go to the county court; whether, indeed, it is right to carry a provision which will have the effect, inevitably, of the matter being taken to the county court, or whether we should not separate such cases where the mortgagor is the local authority promoting the scheme. As I say, I quite accept the fact that where we are dealing with the question of which of two citizens shall carry the loss, or how the loss should be divided between them, the county court is the right and sensible place to determine the matter.
The point I have made in respect of local authority mortgages ties up with what I thought was the very sensible point made by the hon. Member for Bolton, West, that in these cases the Minister should circularise local authorities and asked them to make advances, either under the Small Dwellings Acquisition Act or other powers, to people who have been turned out of their house as a result of a slum clearance scheme. That suggestion is well worth pursuing, but it would hardly be possible to do so if there were any question of the person concerned not being able to take on a mortgage for the new house because of having in addition to make payments in respect of the former house that had been demolished. Therefore, if the hon. Member's suggestion is to be followed up, we must press the right hon. Gentleman on the question of mortgages granted by the local authority which is also promoting the slum clearance scheme.
We shall want to examine this Bill further in Committee, but I must repeat that it is a disappointment for us. It only deals with a relatively small fraction of the problem, even of the immediate problem, which is created by the fact that 13th December of this year is the terminal date in respect of schemes under the 1957 Act. It seems to me that even the full extension of the 1957 scheme is not really enough.
890
It may well be that because of the timetable it is reasonable not to expect the right hon. Gentleman to deal with the whole problem in this Bill, but I very much hope that—if not tonight, at later stages of the Bill—we shall hear from him some indication of his intention to go a great deal further into the general question of compensation in respect in particular of owner-occupied houses. This is a problem which extends beyond slum clearance. Many owner-occupied houses are taken for other public purposes. Perfectly sound houses are taken for redevelopment schemes and for road schemes. In many cases very acute personal problems are created. Even in cases where full market price is paid there are very real problems for the person who has to leave a home which he may have occupied for many years.
Until, I think, 1919 an additional payment of 10 per cent. was made in such cases by way of helping with resettlement expenses. As none of us was in this House in 1919, I do not know why that was dropped. One of my hon. Friends found that that went through the House without any apparent explanation at that remote period. I hope that the fact that tonight we will give our agreement—I hope that we shall—to the Second Reading of this Measure and in Committee we shall seek to amend it within its scope and try to make it more effective for the purpose of carrying forward the purposes of the 1957 Act in full and not in a mutilated form, will not leave the impression that we have really dealt with the problem at a time when hon. Members opposite say—I am glad that they say it—that they favour owner-occupation and at a time when undoubtedly it is the deep belief of my hon. Friends and myself that it is desirable to extend that owner-occupation.
This is a good time for having a further look at the problems which arise in a complicated society such as ours and involve the taking of someone else's property. I am not satisfied that the general market price provisions are in this day and age necessarily right and accurate, but I do not want—indeed, I should incur your displeasure, Mr. Speaker, if I did —to take that matter further. I hope that the Parliamentary Secretary will answer the questions put to him, will seek

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to explain the consequences of rescinding the 15-year rule and will give such indication as he can of the answers to the points which my hon. Friends and hon. Members opposite have sought to make so that when he sits down we can give an unopposed Second Reading to the Bill.
2.3 a.m.
The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government (Mr. James MacColl): The right hon. Member for Kingston-upon-Thames (Mr. Boyd-Carpenter) said that he and his hon. friends were extremely anxious to see this Bill go through. Therefore, I think he will not—any more than I would—grudge the fact that in order to be sure that it goes through we are having the Second Reading at a rather early hour of the morning.
Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: I hope the hon. Gentleman will not take the fact that we did not object to the somewhat unusual procedure of having the Second Reading moved at 10 minutes to 12 as an indication that he and his right hon. Friend should be encouraged to treat this as a precedent.
Mr. MacColl: I do not think we shall be encouraged to do so, provided that we are able to get some of these Measures through, which we have to tackle and tackle fairly quickly.
Although the right hon. Member said quite a lot about the importance of this Bill and why we have taken so long about it—the hon. Member for Crosby (Mr. Graham Page) made the same point— the fact remains that the last Government showed no sign of getting such a Bill through or of doing anything about the former Act. When we were debating the Gurden Bill, the right hon. Member tried to find some reason why and even as late as the summer of 1964 there was no indication of what the fathers of the present Act intended to do about it.
I should like to make clear that we regard this as a stop-gap Bill. It is a Bill which we are basing largely on the 1956 Act and making some improvements on it, but basically we are accepting the approach to that Act at the moment. That does not mean that we are wedded to it or that we think that this is a final
892
solution. My hon. Friend the Member for Willesden, East (Mr. Freeson) referred to the Sub-committee of the Central Housing Advisory Committee under Mrs. Denington's chairmanship which is reviewing the standards of fitness to try to get some kind of uniformity on what we mean by unfit property. That is a very necessary part of the wide approach to the problem of dealing with unfit areas in the future. When that report is issued —I hops it will be issued before long— I hope it will be a starting point.
Hon. Members pointed out that there is nothing in the Bill about Exchequer subsidies and that this would be a burden on the rates. The review of housing subsidies which is likely to be an early piece of legislation and the more general review of local government grants will both have some relevance to this question. Therefore, this is not the final word about the apportionment of the financial burden between the ratepayer and the taxpayer. It is an interim Measure while the more fundamental changes are made.
There is a change in the slum problem. As slum clearance progresses, the standard of property coming under the attentions of the housing authority, although a complicated and long procedure has to be followed before demolition clearance orders are made, is less dramatic than it was in the very early days of slum clearance when there was such a big backlog. As more and more people buy their own houses, the owner-occupier's problems will play a greater part in this. My right hon. Friend is very aware of this and is by no means committed to accepting the present position. He is looking generally at the whole problem created in regard to standards of fitness by the quality of property coming into redevelopment and the special problems of the owner-occupier.
I have been asked throughout the debate what is the philosophy behind the 15-year period, why the Bill applies only to people coming in between 1950 and 1955. The philosophy of it is in the present Act. I cannot do better than quote what was said as recently as 11th November by the hon. Member for Gloucestershire, South (Mr. Corfield) referring to the Bill:
"As I understand the proposals, whereas the existing provisions resulting from the 1957 Act give a guaranteed period of 10 years, provided

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that the house was bought before the introduction of the Act, for either beneficial occupation or full compensation, the right hon. Gentleman has now made it a period of 15 years. I would not cavil at that, and, in fact, I think that I am probably the author of the idea."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 11th November, 1965; Vol. 720, c. 433.]
No doubt that is why the hon. Member for Gloucestershire, South has been hurriedly removed to the back benches, so that he may not compromise the cogency of the doctrine which is at present being expounded by the Opposition Front Bench. I do not want to be unfair to the hon. Gentleman. It is only fair to say that he went on in that speech to make precisely the point that we have been making, that we have got to look at the problem of owner-occupation and of the kind of property which will come up for demolition in the future. He was making the same point that my right hon. Friend is very conscious of. I have never found any evidence that the Act that we are now finishing was something intended to be renewed automatically every 10 years. As far as I can find out, nothing was said in debate to suggest that that was the case. All the evidence was that this was intended to be something once and for all.
If hon. Members look at the terminal dates they will find that the first one was 1939 when, with the war, the whole slum clearance programme finished. The other date was 1955 when the programme began again. The theory was that people in that period who bought property for owner-occupation could not reasonably be said to expect that they could be caught in a slum-clearance programme. After that date it was reasonable to expect that they should realise that this was a risk which they might have to meet. The effect of the Act was that if one bought property earlier in that period one might have 25 years' occupation of the property. If one bought at the end of the period one would not have more than 10 years' occupation, from 1955 to 1965. We have therefore made a substantial improvement inasmuch as we guarantee that people should have 15 years' occupation, whereas under the existing Act the people at the lower end of the scale were getting less than 15 years.
Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: Is not the hon. Gentleman overlooking the fact that under this Measure he is giving abso-
894
lutely nothing to anybody who bought a house before 1950?
Mr. MacColl: I have tried to explain the philosophy behind the right hon. Gentleman's own Act. It was, as I quoted the hon. Member for Gloucestershire, South, that one took 10 years as being a reasonable period of enjoyment of the house. If one had had the house before 1955 one had had it for over 10 years and therefore one came out of the provision. What we are now saying is that all these people should have at least 15 years and we are extending the law to ensure that everybody who comes under the legislation will get 15 years' occupation. We are therefore very much improving the service offered to those affected.
Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: Only for aminority.
Mr. MacColl: It is early in the morning and I do not want to spend too much time with the right hon. Gentleman, but he does not seem to have got the point yet. It is that everybody has at least 15 years' enjoyment of the house.
Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: Obviously if anyone has had 15 years' occupation, even the hon. Gentleman cannot take it from him. The point which I make is that the hon. Gentleman is giving something extra only to those who bought their houses after 1950.
Mr. MacColl: All the people who will be getting something under the new Measure will be people who have not had 15 years' enjoyment of their house. In other words, everybody will be brought up to the minimum standard of having 15 years.
Sir A. Meyer: The hon. Gentleman keeps on saying "everybody", but those who purchased after 13th December, 1955, will get very much less than 15 years.
Mr. MacColl: I have already dealt with them. They are the people who will come under the other test—that they acquired the property after the slum-clearance programme began again. It is open to the right hon. Gentleman or the hon. Member for Eton and Slough (Sir A. Meyer) to say that that is a silly

895
argument, but it was an argument advocated with great skill and clarity by no less a person than the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Powell). We know that he is not always sounding the keynote of the Conservative Party, but in this case he had the support in the Division Lobby and elsewhere of his party. No one who knows the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West, or the right hon. Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys) who was Minister at the time, will suggest that they blundered into this; they did some clear and careful thinking about it. The hon. Member for Gloucestershire, South who was in the Department recently, took very much the same view and claimed credit for the principle of 15 years. It is therefore a little out of place for the right hon. Member for Kingston-upon-Thames to blame us for it now.
I was asked whether it would be possible, under Clause 2—dealing with mortgages—for the court in looking at the mortgage to take into account the fact that there had been an extortionate rate of interest. I think that the court would be free to exercise discretion in the matter. One of the points which it can look at in reaching a decision about the mortgage is whether there has been a quite unreasonable rate of interest. The court would take that into account in what it decided. The value of the provision is that it gives discretion to the court. We have been in trouble lately about giving discretion to the court, but this is one of the cases in which we do it.
The hon. Member for Hemel Hempstead (Mr. Allason) asked how we had this extraordinary provision that it should be limited only to people who could have the supplement. If he is interested at this hour of the morning, I can tell him that this idea started as an Amendment put down by my noble and learned Friend Lord Mitchison in Committee, supported by my insignificant self. We could do no more than this because of the extraordinarily narrow and thoroughly stupid Money Resolution which the Government had put down. The Government had to alter that Resolution before Report because they could not even amend the Bill as they wanted; they had to take the time of the Committee in altering the Money Resolution. This was a
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Government Clause put down to meet the point made by my noble Friend and others in Committee. We can claim a good deal of credit for the Clause, but we had to limit it because of the limits of the Financial Resolution.
We have put into the Bill a mucli more sensible idea. It was pointed out that the people most likely to need this were those who could not get the market value. It raises a point which my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham, East (Mr. Mapp) made: will not it mean that building societies will fight shy of old property because they will be afraid of being caught by Clause 2? This is part of the problem which arises; we must balance the two points. The position formerly was that an owner-occupier might be quite happy to take a council house at a reasonable rent without minding about losing his old house, but then he suddenly found himself sued by the mortgagee for the money which had been advanced to him for buying the house.
We really had to say, "If you are so unwise as to lend money on such precarious security and that security is literally disappearing, the best thing to do is to call it a day and balance the loss to the mortgagee with the fact that the mortgagor is losing the house." It means that there will be reluctance to lend money on old property but one has to balance the two things. While my right hon. Friend acknowledges the value of owner occupation of old property provided it is good and can be preserved, it is not wise for this to be extended into property which runs the risk of being condemned as unfit.
There are cases—the hon. Member for Eton and Slough mentioned one—when local authorities have blown hot and cold. They have said first that they do not intend to make an unfitness order with the result that people have borrowed money, and have then, acting usually in good faith, changed their policy and have declared the houses unfit. In that sort of case, my right hon. Friend is willing to use his power to authorise ex gratia payments. They are difficult things to define but where there is a case for saying that people were misled in good faith by the local authority he is always sympathetic to an application for an ex gratia payment.

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The change which the hon. Member for Crosby dismissed as comparatively trivial is rather important. It concerns the date on which the purchase order was made. It will mean that everyone within the order will have a uniform starting date—the date when the order is made. Although the date of purchase may vary with different houses within the same order, the clause makes it clear that everyone within the order will be treated the same whenever the process of purchase is completed.
It also means that, where there has been an order made before this Bill becomes law, even if the finalising of purchase proceedings is not completed until after the present Act has expired and those concerned do not come under this Bill, they will still get the advantage of the present Act. The hon. Member for Crosby, in an adjournment debate recently, complained bitterly that we would not come to the rescue of local authorities which were, he said, bewildered by legal difficulties, but now he has pooh-poohed the whole thing as a triviality.
Mr. Graham Page: The local authorities were confused because of the circular sent out by the Minister saying what this date should be.
Mr. MacColl: The hon. Gentleman was complaining that it created unfairness because there were various interpretations of the word "purchase". That was in the original Act, but by changing it to the date of the making of the order, we made it quite clear.
I hope that the House will give the Bill a Second Reading. It will help a number of people who need help. It is not a final solution. It is not intended to be. But at any rate it goes further than the Act it succeeds.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly read a Second time.
Bill committed to a Committee of the whole House.—[Mr. Fitch.]
Committee Tomorrow.

HOUSING (SLUM CLEARANCE COMPENSATION) [MONEY]
[Queen's Recommendation signified]
Considered in Committee under Standing Order No. 88 {Money Committees).
[Sir SAMUEL STOREY in the Chair]
Motion made, and Question proposed,
That, for the purposes of any Act of the present Session to amend Part II of Schedule 2 to the Housing Act 1957 it is expedient to authorise the payment out of moneys provided by Parliament of any increase in the amounts so payable under any other Act which is attributable to amendments of the provisions of Part II of Schedule 2 to the Housing Act 1957 relating to private dwellings.—[Mr. MacColI.]
2.25 a.m.
Mr. John Boyd-Carpenter (Kingston-upon Thames): The Joint Parliamentary Secretary, in his reply to the Second Reading debate, referred to the Money Resolution of a previous measure as "narrow and stupid". I rise to ask whether that definition is apt for this one. I appreciate that what will be in order in Committee is not for me or the Parliamentary Secretary but for you, Sir Samuel, but, none the less, I ask for an indication from the Government whether, in drafting this Money Resolution, it was intended to exclude the possibility of the Committee discussing Amendments to widen the scope of the benefits given under this Measure, in particular to deal with the limitation of the 15-years period which we discussed on Second Reading. In other words, is it the judgment of the Government that this Financial Resolution is drafted so as to exclude Amendments which would extend the scope of the Bill to cover all houses which were covered by the 1957 Measure and not merely those purchased between 1950 and 1955. My own reading of the Resolution, without professional advice, is that it is fairly wide and would not have that effect. Although my name has appeared on as many Money Resolutions as that of most hon. Members, I realise my limitations on this highly technical matter and I would appreciate an assurance from the Government.
The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government (Mr. James MacColI): I will come to the rescue of the reputation of

899
the right hon. Gentleman. He was not Financial Secretary when that notorious Money Resolution, which was so shocking, was passed. It was the right hon. Member for Hampstead (Mr. Brooke).
I do not want to put ideas into the right hon. Gentleman's head, but I think that it would be surprising if he found that the sort of Amendments which he has in mind to widen the scope of the Bill were out of order.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolution to be reported.
Report to be received Tomorrow.

HOUSING (SLUM CLEARANCE COMPENSATION) [MONEY]

  CONSOLIDATION, &c, BILLS
  Lords Message [11th November] communicating the Resolution, That it is desirable that, in the present Session, all Consolidation Bills (whether public or private), Statute Law Revision Bills and Bills prepared pursuant to the Consolidation of Enactments (Procedure) Act 1949, be referred to a Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament, to be considered forthwith.—[Mr. Fitch.]
  Lords Message considered accordingly.
  Resolved,
  That this House doth concur with the Lords in the said Resolution.—[Mr. Filch.]
  Message to the Lords to acquaint them therewith.

DECEASED SERVICE MEN (REPATRIATION OF BODIES)
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Fitch.]
2.31 a.m.
Mr. John Tilney (Liverpool, Waver-tree): From matters of major moment to many, may I turn to one of import to but a few? I only pray that those few may not become many because of what has been debated earlier both in this House and in another place.
In September, a constituent of mine, Sapper David Adams, was killed in Aden. The family wished to bring the body home, but found that it could do so only after much difficulty and at what I believe to be unduly high cost. Because
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similar difficulties and costs may be met by other families, I am grateful for my luck in the Ballot and to the Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Navy who has answered Questions of mine and said that repatriation is under review.
My own belief is that it does not matter what happens to my body when I die, but there are many who wish to bring back home the body of a loved one who has been killed or who has died on active service. Too often a bereaved family has to make up its mind in a hurry and at present it finds great difficulty, not only in discovering what the cost will be, but, through a sudden decision taken largely on emotion rather than reason, it may incur an unnecessarily high financial burden for years to come.
The Armed Services until recently have had a policy whereby in whatever theatre of operations a man was killed or died there should he be buried in a military cemetery. On 5th March last year my hon. Friend the Member for Saffron Walden (Mr. Kirk) pointed out the difficulties of any change in this rule. I believe that we all admire the work of the Imperial War Graves Commission. In many areas of the world its cemeteries are perhaps the only things of beauty.
But some families wish above all for a son or brother or husband to be buried at home. The Adams family had such a wish. It was helped when it appealed to the Ford Motor Company by that company, which at that time was employing another son. To make the proper arrangements with the Ministry of Defence, the company's personnel and welfare department spent no less than 50 man-hours and £100 in telephone and postal charges and general administrative expenses. I believe that to be quite impossible for the average family. But the main cost fell on the Adams family, even though the funeral directors, also constituents of mine, advanced £259 to pay B.O.A.C.'s bill. Incidentally, it costs only £102 for a live person to come from Aden.
There were also various out of pocket expenses. There was the cleaning up of the coffin, which arrived in a bad condition, so that the total undertaker's bill was as much as £358 13s. 9d. But on top of that comes a letter from the Ministry

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of Defence F.8 Effects (A.D.), Worcester Road, Droitwich which, after commiserating, demands a further £66 14s. Od. There is an item of £17 10s. for the provision of a coffin. Would that not have been free had Sapper Adams been buried in Aden? Then there are items for the provision of a zinc liner, £9 4s., and associated labour charges, £11 5s. Perhaps the Under-Secretary would be good enough to say what those charges are and whether they could not have been provided by the Armed Services. There is an embalment fee of £26 5s. Why is that so high, when it only costs 12 guineas in Liverpool, and could it not have been done by the R.A.M.C? Finally, there is an item for a health certificate, £2 10s. That, indeed, seems to be an odd name for a certificate to do with death. The total cost was over £425, which is an almost impossible debt for most families, coming on top of the shock of the bereavement.
I understand the problem which arises about what could be done should we be involved in a major war, and I know that many people think that the bringing back of bodies ought to be discouraged. But surely there ought to be some standard charge and a standard procedure that is easily discoverable, especially at a time like the present, in a sort of twilight war.
Times change. In decades gone by we could have been sure that no British cemetery would be altered, be it in Europe or elsewhere, without our permission. Can we now be so sure should we leave territories in Africa or Asia? Are we certain that our Service cemeteries will never be desecrated because of racial hostility, or, even without desecration, that the land will not be put to other use?
Some change of policy has already been undertaken by Her Majesty's Government. In the case of North-West Europe, the next of kin have a choice: firstly, that the body can be flown home at public expense; and, secondly, that two relatives can be flown out for the funeral service, also at public expense. Perhaps the Under-Secretary would be good enough to give the House particulars of the cost of each choice.
Is it not possible to do the same in Aden and in Malaysia? One is told that in a hot climate action has to be agreed on quickly, but is it not possible to have
902
an embalmer on the war establishment in each theatre? If a body is embalmed for flight to another country, I am told that an incision can be made under the armpit of the deceased and, as with a blood transfusion, a chemical with a formaldehyde base is pumped into the whole arterial system. There is no cutting out of any part of the body, as in times gone by, and, if that is done, discoloration vanishes and the body will keep for many weeks in great heat.
It is placed in a metal casket which is hermetically sealed, and, in turn, that is placed in an ordinary packing case which is padded with a chemically-treated sawdust.
I am told that there are 1,000 em-balmers in this country who can deal with three or four bodies a day, and therefore, although I understand that in a major war immediate repatriation is impossible, in this kind of minor conflict surely something could be done? Freight is considerable at commercial rates, but do not Service aircraft in most weeks fly back from the area of operations, when they are not full, and when they could take coffins at public expense or at much reduced cost?
Other countries do this. The United States of America sends back tens of thousands of bodies, and no doubt the hon. Gentleman has seen the United States Air Force Manual on Mortuary Affairs. The United States is a rich country, but the United Nations send back the Irish in their service. The Australian Army and Air Force send back the bodies of those killed. The Dutch and the Belgians do, too, when there is no general way. and they do so at public expense, yet they have a lower income per head than does Great Britain.
I am not asking for no payment to be made by the family concerned. I am asking that there should be a low standard charge, that it should be easy to find out what this is and what the procedure is, and that the information should be given to the family without any request by that family. At the same time, guidance should be given on choice, and this should be given as soon as possible after the notice of death. Above all, I believe that the procedure should be as simple as possible. This would be no comfort to the bereaved family, but it

903
could reduce distress and avoid some harrowing letters, and perhaps the Minister will look carefully at this problem.
2.42 a.m.
Mr. Ronald Buxton: I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Wavertree (Mr. Tilney) for giving me a little of his time to bring a similar case to the attention of the Under Secretary of State for Defence for the Navy.
This case concerns Private Wallace, a young soldier of 17 in the East Anglia Regiment who was drowned only four days after he arrived in Aden. His parents, who are constituents of mine, were informed by telegram of his death. It happened to be a Sunday morning, and they got on to the welfare services with two requests; first, could they bring their son back to England; secondly, if that was impossible, could they fly out to Aden to attend the military funeral? The answer came back that it was impracticable to bring the body back to England because of climatic conditions, and they were told that it was impossible to fly them out in time to be present at the funeral.
Mr. Wallace, an ex-warrant officer, is a very determined man. He was determined that he would not take "No" for an answer. He arranged passages for himself and his wife, and they arrived in Aden in time to be present for their son's funeral, but he was never told of any embalming service which would have made it possible for his son to be repatriated for burial in this country. Now he is looking into the possibility of re-burying his son in this country if that can be done at a reasonable cost.
I think that there is a strong case for revising Service procedure in this matter. My hon. Friend has mentioned that many other nations do this. Why should not we repatriate those who lose their lives in peacetime in the service of their country? If this service is available for North-West Europe, why cannot it be extended to other theatres? After all, many of the costs would be the same. It is only a question of additional freight. Surely in a case like this, where aeroplanes are going to and fro regularly from most operational theatres, it would be possible, with the help of the embalming ser-
904
vice so that the body did not have to be despatched immediately, and to avoid the high cost of civil aircraft, to bring them back in Service aircraft?
If a Service man is flown overseas alive, have not his parents or his loved ones the right to ask that his body should be flown back if he should meet with a tragic death in this way? In many cases relatives might be satisfied with burial overseas, in some war cemetery, but where they wish otherwise I do not see that this service should be denied them even if they are willing to pay some of the costs.
Times have changed in the Army since my hon. Friend and I served in it. Twenty years ago life was different. There were many harsh things in the Service, and there was a lot of "bull". There were bare and uncomfortable barrack rooms, and many similar things. But in the modern Army this service should be available to relatives when the most heartrending thing of all takes place— the funeral of a loved one after a fatal casualty.
I am glad that, due to Mr. Wallace's letter to the Queen, the wording of telegrams notifying relatives of fatal casualties may be altered. I ask the Under-Secretary to review the whole procedure. The cost would be negligible considering the fact that few of these casualties occur in peacetime. The Services provide for loved ones to visit the graves at a later date. The cost of this would be saved if the body were repatriated. Let us remember that yesterday was Remembrance Sunday—the time when we commemorate the casualties of two world wars.
In peacetime fatal casualties are fortunately very rare occurrences, and in those circumstances is it not reasonable to ask that when they do occur the best possible treatment should be accorded to those who have been bereaved?
2.47 a.m.
The Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Navy (Mr. J. P. W. Mallalieu): This is a distressing, delicate and extremely difficult subject, but I am none the less very grateful to the hon. Member for Liverpool, Wavertree (Mr. Tilney) and the hon. Member for Leyton (Mr. Buxton) who has supported him, because they have both highlighted some aspects of what has been

905
Government policy for some years and is clearly unsatisfactory and distressing to a number of people.
I was disturbed to hear that the hon. Member for Leyton and, to a lesser extent, the hon. Member for Wavertree felt that their constituents had been in some way neglected or churlishly treated by the Ministry of Defence. I have looked at the details of the case which the hon. Member for Leyton has mentioned and I find that what happened was that on Sunday, 4th July, the father of the boy rang up, not unnaturally in very great distress, and asked whether the body of his son could be flown back at public expense. He was told that according to existing rules this could not be done. Subsequently, the father asked whether the parents could be flown to the funeral at public expense, and again he was told that under existing rules this could not be done.
Having stated what the rules were— and I shall refer to them shortly—the duty officers there then did everything possible to find a way to help the hon. Member's constituent—I must not say to find a way round the rules—and quite early on the following morning they managed. to find two places for the father and the mother on a flight that was going out to Aden.
When the father rang through again at 10.20 on the Monday morning, the following day, he was told that this flight was available. He had, using his own initiative, already booked a civilian flight, and in this respect too, the duty officers did everything they could to help him over passports and inoculation, informing Aden that they were arriving and seeing that they were met and looked after at Aden, and, subsequently that they were given a concessionary flight home. Within the rules, I assure the hon. Gentleman, the duty officers concerned did everything they possibly could.
The hon. Member for Wavertree, seemed to have some complaint about the treatment his constituent had had. He mentioned that the Ford Motor Company, who acted very decently and altruistically in this matter and spent a great deal of time and money in making arrangements. I am sad that they should have found it necessary to do so,
906
but that was not through any fault of the Ministry of Defence. They were told what the procedure was—just one telephone call served to tell them—if the family wanted to bring the body home.
The hon. Member mentioned some of the expenses which were to be charged to his constituent by the Ministry of Defence. He mentioned the coffin, and asked whether the coffin would not have been free if the boy had been buried in Aden. That is exactly the question which I asked myself. He asked about the zinc liner and the embalming fee. If a coffin is coming home with a dead body in it, it has to have a zinc liner. The associated charges which were put in the bill are to do with the hermetic sealing and the extra welding and packing which the airlines insist on.
The health certificate, incidentally, does not refer to the health of the body. It is a question of the health of people who might be in contact with the body and certifies that there is no danger to the health of other people because of the body.
We have had a good look at these charges, some of which puzzled me. We have decided, in this case only—which is exceptional because of the hardship involved—to waive all of them except the health certificate, over which we have no authority. Furthermore—I would stress that this is an exceptional case—the hon. Member knows that there is an interdepartmental committee looking at the whole policy on this subject, and I shall make certain that these points are brought immediately to their notice.
I move now from the details of the case which has been put to more general issues. Both hon. Gentlemen have suggested, hopefully and reasonably, that we should provide an embalming service. This is incredibly difficult. There is virtually no civilian embalming in Aden; only one man does it. There are, of course, doctors, but it is not a doctor's duty to carry out embalming. It is not a doctor's job. They cannot be compelled to do so: some will, some will not.
There is a great deal of danger in embalming in tropical countries if a man has died from a tropical disease. There is no mortician's rate in the Services. There is no embalming service in the

907
Services and we could not possibly provide one. Supposing we did so in Aden, which is the area with which we are concerned. The two men who were detailed out there would be on continuous overseas service because there is no call for their services at home, and for much of the time they would be completely unemployed. Thank goodness this sort of case does not happen often. So not only in Aden but elsewhere there would be extreme difficulty in providing an official Services' embalming service.
Both hon. Members rightly pointed out that other countries provide an embalming service. The Americans do it, but America has burial customs which are different from ours. Embalming before burial is fairly normal there; it is not here. It is abnormal with us. The Americans have a large civilian service, and it is common practice to embalm, so that it is possible for them to have a Services' embalming service, the men concerned doing some of their work at home and some abroad. But that would not apply to us.
There are the other countries mentioned, Holland, Belgium and Australia, and the United Nations also as regards the Irish troops who, unhappily, were killed on United Nations service. I am not absolutely sure as regards all, but I believe that it is, in fact, the American service which copes with this. I think that that is so, and it might conceivably be possible for us in some theatres, though not in Aden because they are not there, to come to an arrangement with the Americans.
Both hon. Members raised a major point regarding the very high cost of transporting the bodies home. I must say that, on looking at the figures, I am surprised at the cost. But, as things are at present, it is not possible to do it more cheaply. The airlines state what the charge is, and if we bring a body
908
home in Service transport we have to stick to their charges because it is not an entitlement at the present time and we must not undercut them, if that is the right phrase. This is something I knew nothing whatever about, and that is why I said that I was extremely grateful to the hon. Gentlemen for raising the subject.
The hon. Member for Wavertree spoke of a fear that cemeteries overseas might be desecrated. Of course, there is no guarantee that they will not be, but I found encouraging some words in the 46th Annual Report of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission which has only just been published. The Report states that the newly independent Governments have shown "ready understanding" of this problem and have not hindered the work. So one can hope, without any absolute guarantee, of course, that the same respect will be given to our graves in the future as in the past.
The hon. Gentleman said, and I feel very much with him, that he did not mind what happened to his own body. Neither do I. But it is what some people feel, often very deeply, that matters. I should like to do everything I possibly can to meet the wishes of those other people. In this short outline of the position, I have mentioned the great difficulties I see in regard to embalming. I have mentioned what seemed to me to be some surprising facts about transport. I shall put all the points which have been raised—they are all being considered—to the Inter-Services Committee which is studying the matter now, and I shall make sure that my Ministerial colleagues are very well aware of them. I can make no promises about it, but I assure the House that the whole subject will receive a long and hard look.
Question put and agreed to.
Adjourned accordingly at Three o'clock a.m.

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Preamble
The House met at two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Bristol

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, in anticipation of a long night, perhaps the House would like to know that hot meals will be available between 7 and 9 p.m., and that from 10 p.m. sandwiches and coffee will be available in the Guest Room.
My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend the Leader of the House, I beg to move the Motion that stands in his name on the Order Paper.
Moved, That, in the event of the Southern Rhodesia Bill being received from the Commons this day, Standing Order No. 41 (No two Stages of a Bill to be taken on one day) be dispensed with for the purpose of taking the Bill through all its stages this day.—(Lord Shepherd.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

SPECIAL ORDERS COMMITTEE
THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (LORD MERTHYR): My Lords, on behalf of the Lord Chairman, I beg to move the Motion standing in his name on the Order Paper.
Moved, That a Select Committee be appointed to consider all Special Orders of the present Session; and that the Lords following, with the Chairman of Committees, be named of the Committee:

D. Atholl,

M. Willingdon,

D. Munster.

V. Soulbury,

L. Airedale,

L. Archibald,

L. Cawley,

L. Coutanche,

L. Crawshaw,

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L. Faringdon,

L. Jessel,

L. MacAndrew,

L. Meston,

L. Morton of Henryton,

L. Peddie,

B. Plummer,

L. Royle,

L. Strang,

L. Terrington.

—(Lord Merthyr.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

SOUTHERN RHODESIA
2.7 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD GARDINER): My Lords, I beg to move, That this House takes note of the situation in Southern Rhodesia. The situation in Southern Rhodesia is one in which there is an illegal Government; a state of emergency has been declared, and regulations have been made under it which provide powers, inter alia, to control the movement of persons, to detain persons, to place cordons around designated areas, to prohibit the possession, sale or distribution of newspapers; to control or prohibit printing or publishing of any designated book, newspaper, pamphlet, et cetera; to prohibit the possession of arms within designated areas; to prohibit gatherings or classes of gatherings; to designate protected places or areas and to control access to them; to impose curfews; to deny access to restrictees and detainees or any communication with them; to arrest persons on suspicion without warrant and to detain them for up to thirty days, and to detain a person in any place, including a dwelling, flat or room; that is to say, a power of house arrest. In addition, there is provision for detention camps.
It is an offence punishable by imprisonment or fine to publish or distribute information, statements, et cetera, likely to cause alarm or despondency. By further regulations nearly all civilian employees, including judges, can be directed to stay at their posts indefinitely on conditions fixed by the Minister, and can be directed to perform any act deemed necessary by the Minister. Employees can be suspended indefinitely, and other persons drafted into public service.

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Failure to comply with, or hindrance of, regulations incurs penalty of fines up to £500 or imprisonment up to two years. Censorship operates through the Director of Information or censorship officers, to whom any article must be submitted before publication. The Government have powers to take over, intercept or suspend telegraph, telephone or Telex services, and to take over or control any radio station, service or apparatus. Employees of printing and publishing firms or communications services can be directed to stay at their posts and must obey directions given. There are wide powers also as to goods and services, as well as financial provisions.
In addition, a new Constitution, which is of course quite invalid, has been promulgated, and under that Constitution if the Queen does not appoint a Governor General on the advice of the illegal Ministers of Rhodesia within fourteen days a Regent will be appointed. Section 128 of the illegal Constitution provides that the Chief Justice and other judges may be required to accept the illegal Constitution on pain of automatic dismissal without compensation. The Governor has been ordered to leave Government House, and regulations provide that civil servants and judges can be directed to stay at their posts indefinitely. The entrenched clauses of the Constitution are now safeguarded merely by a two-thirds vote of Parliament.
My Lords, in these circumstances it is the view of Her Majesty's Government that it is extremely urgent that an enabling Bill should be passed by Parliament to enable them to deal with this situation. The liberties and even the lives of people are in question, and it is quite impossible to know at what hour of what day it may be necessary, at once, either to amend some part of the Constitution or to give the lawful Government, in the person of the Governor, powers which it has not got. It was for that reason that the Government wished to introduce this Bill on Thursday, or, if not on Thursday, on Friday; and it was at the wish of the Opposition that it was delayed over the week-end so that a full debate could take place in another place on Friday. In the course of that debate the right honourable gentleman the Leader of the Opposition said:
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"It would be right for the Government to be able to get the enabling Bill through all stages on Monday."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 720 (No. 4), col. 540; November 12, 1965.]
That it why I have moved this Motion: so that, before this Bill arrives from another place, the Bill having been published, your Lordships' House will have every opportunity of discussing the situation in Rhodesia, and then the Bill.
I am not an expert on Rhodesia. There are, I know, many Members of your Lordships' House who know a lot more about Rhodesia than I do. The noble Lord, Lord Alport, for example, I suspect knows more about Rhodesia than perhaps any other Member of your Lordships' House. But it may be that there are in your Lordships' House Members who know even less about Rhodesia than I do, and your Lordships will perhaps forgive me if I therefore direct myself primarily to them. One should perhaps state some basic facts first. There are approaching four million Africans in Rhodesia, and something approaching a quarter of a million Europeans. They have had full internal self-government for forty years; and, since 1961, on the 1961 Constitution. This is a somewhat complex Constitution. It provides for a Governor General and a Legislative Assembly, to which 65 members are to be elected—50 on an A Roll and 15 on a B Roll. The qualifications for the A Roll are higher, and it was not thought (as is, of course, the fact) that many Africans would be qualified for the A Roll. Qualifications for the B Roll are less; so in general one may say (as has in fact happened) that the A Roll seats are at the moment in effect European seats and the B Roll seats are African seats. The voting qualifications are extremely complicated on both Rolls, because there is a series of alternatives. They depend, in the main, either on what your income or the value of your property is or on your educational qualifications: and the mixture is such that the more money or property you have the less education you need have, and the higher education you have the less your income or property need be.
There is a Declaration of Rights covering a very wide field of human rights. It covers, in fact, the right to life, the

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right to personal liberty, freedom from slavery and forced labour, protection from inhuman treatment, protection from deprivation of property, protection of privacy of home and other property; provisions to secure the protection of the law; freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and association; and protection from discrimination by written laws.
The implementation of the Declaration of Rights is in the hands of a Constitutional Council, which includes representatives of all races; but their powers are extremely limited. All Bills are submitted to them. If they take the view that a Bill is racially discriminatory, they so report to Parliament, and that has the effect of delaying the passage of the Bill for some time. But their powers are set at naught if there is a State of Emergency or if the Prime Minister certifies that the particular Bill is one of urgency. In any case, they have no similar powers concerning legislation which was passed before 1961: and, of course, the main Act of a discriminatory character, the Land Apportionment Act, was passed before 1961.
The main clauses of importance—those dealing with the Governor General, the Legislative Assembly, and so on; and, of course, those referring to the Constitutional Council—are entrenched, and the form which the entrenchment takes is that before any of those clauses can be amended either there must be four racial referenda—that is to say, a referendum of the European, African, Asian and coloured races—and they must all be in favour of it, or the British Government must agree. For some reason which I do not pretend to understand, the clauses which provide for the 50 A seats and the 15 B seats are not entrenched clauses.
My Lords, if I may (and I am afraid that I shall exceed my usual twelve minutes, but as this is a complex subject I am sure that the House will understand), I should like to say quite a bit on a subject which was not really discussed in another place on Friday at all. It seems to me that, in the main, we are here really dealing with human beings—white men and women and children, and black men and women and children, in Rhodesia; and that, if we wish to arrive at a right conclusion as to what ought to be done
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in the tragic events which have occurred, it is our duty to try to understand (whether we agree with them or not) what are the views of the different people, white and black, in Rhodesia.
When I went to Rhodesia, I went to learn. I listened to what Mr. Smith's Cabinet said; I listened to what Mr. Smith said, both in the Cabinet and privately, and to what Mrs. Smith said. I listened to what Mr. Nkomo and the other leaders of ZAPU said. I listened to what the leaders of ZANU, Mr. Sithole's Party, said; I listened to the individual Members of Parliament who were supporters of the Smith Government; I listened to other members of the Rhodesian Front, including a large number of individual tobacco farmers; I listened to what representatives of the Church said; I listened to what representatives of the universities said. I listened to the heads of the Tobacco Trade Federation; I listened to the Chambers of Commerce. Of course, I listened to the then Opposition headed by that fine Olympic yachtsman, Mr. Butler. I listened to what his Members of Parliament said. I listened to what African Members of Parliament said. I listened to what Mr. Parry said and to what the Independent European Members of Parliament said. I listened to the trade unions, to white trade unions and to the black trade unions. I listened to African traders; I listened to all the heads of the Civil Service departments—all Europeans of course. I listened to what very junior African civil servants said. I listened to what Lord Malvern said and to what Sir Roy Welensky said. I listened to what Mr. Winston Field said; I listened to what Mr. Garfield Todd said; I listened to what Sir Edgar White-head said; and I listened to a good many others. So, while I have no doubt that many Members of your Lordships' House are much more familiar with the different views in Rhodesia than I am, I did spend my time there doing nothing but listening to what they all said.
I think the following is a fair account of the different views. Perhaps I might start with the Rhodesian Front, the Government Party. They say: "When the Europeans came here there were nothing but a lot of savages here and disease was rampant. The different tribes spent most of their time fighting one another.

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As a result of our coming here, disease is now wiped out to the extent it ever is. We have brought peace. We have established the rule of law and we have developed the country. We have developed it more successfully than any of our forbears could have imagined. Our economic state is now high. This has not happened without a tremendous amount of work on our part. Those of us not born here have all come out here, and by dint of hard work we have created the country's present economic state. It is not only a State in which the European's living standard is high; it is a State in which the African's living standard is high, so much so that we have over 100,000 Africans, who are not Rhodesians, but who have come in from the African-run countries around us; because the African-run countries around us have not the skills to create the amount of employment or the economic standards which we can provide for them here. In the field of education—nearly all of which is, of course, provided out of taxation on the Europeans—you will find in Rhodesia a higher proportion of Africans going to school than you will find in any of the countries around us and it is, to our view, ridiculous that, when Britain has given independence to all these countries around us in the last few years, we who have been internally independent for forty years and have made the enormous success which we have in the development of the country, should be the one country in this part of the world which is refused independence."
If one says: "Do you think that some might think it was a reflection on Rhodesia if, having been fully self-governing for forty years, it is only in Rhodesia that the Africans are not sufficiently advanced to get to majority rule?" then they say: "But no African is fit for majority rule. They were not fit for majority rule in any of these countries around us. Look at what is happening in all these places. Look at Ghana, where President Nkrumah goes and locks up his enemies without any sort of charge being made against them or without any sort of trial. Look at the case of Dr. Danquah, a member of the Bar and a leader of the Opposition, who had done just as much as Nkrumah to obtain independence for Ghana. He dies in detention having never been charged with anything.
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If President Nkumah's judges refuse to convict somebody on a capital charge because they do not think he is guilty, then he removes the judges. Look at Nigeria where they have just had elections and where they are all busy killing one another because they cannot agree on what was the result of the elections. Look at Kenya. We have seen a lot of English farmers, who were there; but who have been driven out. We see them as they come through Salisbury. Look at Malawi and the sort of statements that Dr. Banda makes, saying at the moment that somebody ought to be publicly hanged before he has even been tried. Look at Zambia in the North. We know what is going on there because we have a very efficient security service."
They say—and Mr. Smith told me this himself, and obviously he felt about it strongly: "Do you know that quite recently one of the Ministers in Zambia locked the door and tried to rape or seduce his European secretary? None of these countries were really fit for democracy. They would all have done a lot better if they had stayed under British rule; and we are not going to allow the same sort of thing to happen here. This is our birthright. We have settled here. Some of us are second generation Rhodesians. Having worked as we have, and having made the success that we have in Rhodesia, we see no reason why we should move out before the Africans are anything like fit for majority rule. We are not anti-British. It is the British who seem to us since the war not to be the people they used to be. There are no more loyal supporters of the Queen than we. We fought for Britain in the war, and the fact is that we have merely decided to maintain Christian standards of civilisation in this part of the world and the rule of law."
My Lords, if Mr. Smith were here, I think he would say that this is a fair account of the views honestly held by the Rhodesian Front and explained by them. Of course I like Mr. Smith. He is, I think, a very sincere man, and the sort of man who, if he made you a promise, would carry it out. But I think he has a power of self-deception which is much greater than most of us have, though no doubt we all have a bit. For example, in the time of the last Government he strongly affirmed that at the time of the

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negotiations and consultations, when the Federation was breaking-up, the Government had given him an undertaking that Rhodesia could have independence on the terms of the 1961 Constitution. He was taken by that Government very carefully through the documents; it was shown to him that there was no document that suggested anything of the kind. Then he said that it must have been an oral promise. Of course, the negotiations had been conducted for Rhodesia by Sir Edgar Whitehead. Sir Edgar Whitehead issued a public statement to say that he had never asked for any such promise and had never been given any such promise.
Sir Alec Douglas-Home ultimately wrote, in September, 1964, to Mr. Smith saying:
"I am writing to confirm what I said to you; namely, that no undertaking explicit or implicit, was given about the British Government's intentions regarding Southern Rhodesia's independence in the event of the dissolution of the Federation, which we were not at that time contemplating, nor was any such undertaking asked for. Sir Edgar Whitehead confirmed this in a speech in your Legislative Assembly on August 25 in which he said. 'No agreement was made with Her Majesty's Government to the effect that after the Federal break-up, if such happened, we would necessarily be granted sovereign independence without any further change.'"
And Mr. Smith then accepted that that must obviously be right and that he had been wrong.
Almost as soon as this Government took Office, Mr. Smith was saying, "You must remember that in the discussions which took place about federation we were promised that we should have our independence on the 1961 Constitution, and we were misled." Our High Commissioner in Salisbury then took him very carefully through all the documents again; reminded him again of what Sir Edgar Whitehead had said, and Mr. Smith accepted again that he must be wrong about that. Yet later, when he was over here discussing matters with us at No. 10, in the middle of a speech he suddenly said, "Of course, you must remember we were grossly deceived, because there is no doubt that at the time of the negotiations about federation we were promised that if the Federation broke up we should get independence on the 1961 Constitution." I am quite sure
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that each time he said these things he sincerely believed them to be true. We sometimes find that with witnesses. A witness says something, and you think, "He must know that is untrue". Then it turns out that, however unreasonable it may be, the witness does in fact believe it.
My Lords, before I leave the Rhodesian Front, there are two other points of their view which I should mention. The first is this. They always said to us, or did when I was out there: "Of course we accept majority rule, because we accept the 1961 Constitution; and under the 1961 Constitution, as African educational and financial status improves there is, of course, bound to be African majority rule. Therefore we accept it." But when Mr. Smith was over here, we asked him whether, if there was United Kingdom help, he would increase the amount of African education. And he said, "No. We believe in education for its own sake, because the African who is to some extent educated is more use to us economically than one who is completely uneducated. But we do not believe in bringing African majority rule nearer, and we certainly should not agree to African education being expedited for that purpose. The Rhodesian Government would think it wrong to accelerate the educational advance of the Africans simply in order to improve their political status in the community." Mr. Smith said he must make it clear that the Government Party in Rhodesia did not believe in majority rule.
The matter was carried a stage further when my right honourable friend the Prime Minister was in Salisbury. Even when I was out there we had discussed the fact, that, because the clauses of the Constitution which provided for 50 A seats and 15 B seats had not been entrenched, if there was independence, there would have to be some sort of guarantee against a retrogressive amendment of the Constitution. Mr. Smith indicated that he did not agree, and the reason why he did not agree really appeared only in discussions with the Prime Minister in Salisbury, when he said he could not agree because, if the time ever came when it looked as if the Africans would get a majority in the Legislative Assembly, and the Rhodesian Front did not think that they were fit for

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majority rule, they would decrease the B Roll seats to one or increase the A seats in order to stop it. It became, perhaps for the first time, crystal clear that they do not really believe in majority rule, at all events in their lifetime, as Mr. Smith has sometimes put it himself. I asked Mr. Harper, when he was over here, "When do you think the Africans will be fit for a majority rule?". He said and I have no reason to suppose that it was not his honest opinion, that he thought two hundred years.
There is one further point as to their views which I shall be less good at explaining, because I have always found it difficult to understand it myself; but that is not for lack of asking either Mr. Smith or his colleagues for information about it. It is; why do they want independence now to the extent even of having a rebellion and taking power illegally? In other words, what is wrong with continuing on the existing Constitution? What is the crisis about? They have got all the powers in their own hands except in matters of foreign policy. What is the need for independence now?
To that question, Mr. Smith has, again, two reasons, mainly this first. When you ask him about this, what he always says, is, "We cannot stand this awful uncertainty any longer. We cannot go on in this uncertain way. Although the economy is strong, we should be in a better financial position still if we had more investment capital. We cannot get investment capital because we are not independent. Financier after financier has said, "If you are independent, there is any amount of money you like". It is this lack of investment capital that is holding us up." I said, "Well, I do not know much about financiers, but I should have thought that what a financier primarily wants is stability. Do you not think it is, perhaps, your threat of a which has naturally made financiers hesitant to put a lot of money in Rhodesia until they see whether or not there is going to be a rebellious Government?" The answer was, "No, No, it is not that at all; it is this dreadful uncertainty. We must end this dreadful uncertainty."
The second reason, which he also gave on television when he was here, is: "This will enable us to have better control of
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the Africans, because so long as the Africans feel they can get to London, and there is somebody over our heads to appeal to, we shall have a certain amount of trouble with them. Once they realise that we are in the saddle, and are staying in the saddle, and that we are the people who decide things, we shall have much less trouble with the Africans."
That brings me to the African Nationalists, whose case, I am glad to say, is very much shorter. They say, "Nothing less than ' one man, one vote', to-morrow. We are not interested in anything else and our great remedy for all the problems of Rhodesia is violence." Last year there was a good deal of violence in the townships, not by Africans against Europeans, but by gangs of young men employed by Mr. Nkomo, who beat up those who did not join the Party, and gangs of young men employed by Mr. Sithole who beat up those who did not support his Party. Their great remedy for everything is violence. If asked to defend this, they would, I think, say, "We know the Rhodesian Front. We have boycotted the Constitution and the Elections because this would be a farce. It would look well if we were in Parliament, but the real truth, whatever they say, is that the Rhodesian Front do not believe in majority rule, and they have no intention that there shall be majority rule, at least in their lifetime. If we address meetings or try to spread our views, we are arrested and sent into a restriction area, and our wives and children are left to starve. What on earth remedy have we except the remedy of violence?"
The Council of Chiefs—I do not think I have mentioned them, but we spent a whole day at the Indaba and half a day talking to them—are all in favour of independence. They do not call it independence, they call it cutting the strings with Britain. They say, "We have a simple choice. Either we cut the strings with Britain, or it is Nkomo to-morrow. We do not want Nkomo to-morrow. We support the Government."
Then there are the rest. By "the rest" I do not mean that they are all unanimous, but they all say substantially the same thing. The leading industrialists, traders, white and black, Opposition Members of Parliament, African Members of Parliament, businessmen, the

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Churches and the universities all say, "There is no need for any crisis of any kind at all. After all, we have under the existing Constitution all the powers. We are fully self-governing internally. It is not like an ordinary Colony. We have our own Army, Air Force and Police and our own Civil Service. There is no reason why we should not go on with this Constitution which will provide majority rule in time. Nobody can say how long. Estimates vary between five years and fifty years. Most people think probably somewhere about fifteen and twenty years. But it will be a Constitution which will allow in due course for African majority rule. Why on earth cannot we go on as we are? There is nothing really wrong with the 1961 Constitution. If Britain were to grant independence to a minority like the European minority here, obviously there would have to be safeguards for the Africans and there would have to be some changes in the Constitution. But this terrific crisis atmosphere is a thing which has been worked up entirely by the Rhodesian Front for electoral purposes and there is no need at all for any atmosphere of that kind."
If I may, I will now comment on one or two of those different views. In the first place, I think that the Europeans have done a magnificent job in the development of Rhodesia. They have done it by hard work and by skill. I am not a farmer, but I have no doubt at all from what I saw that they are magnificent farmers. Down in the Hippo Valley, where there was land on which nothing would grow and everybody said that it would never grow anything, damming projects and irrigation have made the land grow almost everything. For example, Rhodesia used to be an importer of sugar and now is quite a big exporter. There is no doubt that in the agricultural field they have done a splendid job.
In the field of African education they have not done at all badly. It would perhaps be unfair to countries around them to contrast a country which has been internally self-governing for forty years and has a high living standard with those countries which have only just started. But they have done well in primary education. It is perhaps second-
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dary education which is somewhat lacking.
In relation to what they say about the countries around them, no doubt we shall all have our own views. I think that here there is really a basic philosophic difference. We of the Commonwealth and all Parties in this country have long subscribed to the view that we are trustees in the case of Colonies while we bring them to a stage of development when they can run their own country. This view is not shared by members of the Rhodesian Front—no doubt quite honestly. They say that all these countries would have been much better off if they had stayed under British rule. If by much better off", they mean economically, I have no doubt myself that that is true. But what do we do when the African whose country it is says, "Well, thank you very much; on the whole I would rather be free and run my own country, even if I do not do it so well as a white minority." How do we equate the scales: economic standard with being free?
Some of your Lordships may have read an account the other day in a newspaper of a Salisbury barman with the average living standard in Rhodesia of about £1,250 a year—the African standard being about £200 a year—who said, "All these niggers are no good. They never will be any good." The thing that struck me was that he said it in front of his assistant, who was an African. People have feelings, and whether this desire for freedom and for running your own show is rational or not, we in the Commonwealth have recognised its strength and have adopted the view which I have set out. It is true that these Rhodesians are the most loyal subjects of the Queen, and that 9,000 fought for us in the war. What they did not mention and what one could not guess from the advertisements in this country, on which they spent so much money, is that so did 15,000 black Rhodesians.
So far as the countries around them are concerned, I should have thought on the whole that we should be gratified rather than disappointed. The general situation in Nigeria is a matter for self-congratulation on our part. I have seen a very large proportion of the Bench and Bar in Nigeria—some 1,500 African lawyers: 750 of them, all trained in

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London at the English Bar—and a better Bench and Bar one would not want to see.
So far as Kenya is concerned, I think that we probably all should say that we were surprised at the way in which Mr. Kenyatta, from the moment he got into power, without a word of recrimination, has done his best to see that Kenya is a truly interracial country. It is interesting, I think, that at this time leading farmers and others in Kenya should have sent to Rhodesia this message, while the Prime Minister was over there on the 2nd:
"We, the undersigned are either Kenya citizens of British origin or British residents of Kenya. Most of us have held, or still hold, positions of some responsibility in the public, commercial or agricultural life of the country. We wish to express publicly our feeling of deep shock and dismay at the declared intention of the Rhodesian Government to seize independence in the name of a white minority and in defiance of the British Government's persistent efforts to secure legally enforceable safeguards leading by stages to African majority rule.
"These efforts have been supported by all political Parties in Britain. We feel we can speak for the overwhelming majority of British people in Kenya when we say that they are most certainly supported here.
"Some of us have known in the past what it is to stand up for our rights as settlers against an interfering British colonial office. Most of us had perfectly sincere reservations about the speed with which independence was granted to Kenya.
"To-day, however, we must readily admit that a great many of our fears have proved totally unfounded. Like any other new country, Kenya has its fair share of difficult problems. The disruptive forces of tribalism are not yet stilled. The cold war exerts its malign influence, in East Africa as it does in most other parts of the world.
"Stock thefts continue to harass the European and the African farmers. Drought and famine have added to the difficulties of the settlement schemes in the Highlands. We desperately need more overseas investment to fight chronic unemployment. Sudden and apparently arbitrary deportation orders have sometimes upset morale among the minority races.
"Kenya in fact is no Shangri-La. But what country is? To weigh in the balance against the shortcomings just described, we can honestly say that President Kenyatta's Government has kept its pledge to respect the rights of all races and that the bitterness of the past has been largely forgotten in the spirit of Harambee.
"Racial prejudice is minimal, the rule of law has been preserved. Freedom of religion,
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speech and of the Press has generally been respected. Law and order has been maintained by a first-class police force under African command.
"Above all, the Kenya Government has succeeded in the face of enormous difficulties in creating a genuine feeling of stability, an atmosphere in which every man, whatever the colour of his skin, feels free to get on with his job, to earn his living and bring up his family in peace. The European and the Asian are united, in fact, with the African in the urgent task of building a new nation. This is not a political platitude. It is a fact which any visitor to Kenya can see for himself.
"Indeed, it is a pity that more of Rhodesia's (and South Africa's) leaders do not take the trouble to visit East Africa to learn at first hand what independence has achieved. At all events, we hope it is not too late, even now, to add our voices to the British Prime Minister's and say to Mr. Smith, 'Prime Minister, think again'."
This letter was signed by Wilfrid Barger, Jack Block, Sir Michael Blundell, Kenneth Bolton, Michael Curtis, Lord Delamere, Sir Derek Erskine. Sir Wilfred Havelock, E. H. Howard Williams. Sir William O'Brien Lidsay, Charles Markham, Monty Ruben, Humphrey Slade and Leslie Thornton.
It does not seem, so far as I can make out, that any of the Rhodesian Front leaders have ever been to the countries around. None of them seem to have met President Nkrumah, President Kenyatta, President Nyerere or even Mr. Kaunda. They were deeply shocked, of course, by what happened in the Congo. The Congo has had a great effect, naturally enough, on the white settlers in Rhodesia. They have also been affected by the views of some Kenya settlers who came from South Africa and who left Kenya on independence and went back home to South Africa through Salisbury; and these are really the only settlers in Kenya whose views they have heard.
As to the African Nationalists, first of all they expected us to send an army at once to hand them power on a plate, and the only alternative was to call a Constitutional Conference. They seemed shocked when we made it quite plain to them that there was no question of this country sending an army, and it was useless to call a Constitutional Conference if nobody attended it. The Rhodesian Cabinet had made it quite clear from the outset that the last thing they would think of doing was to attend a Constitutional Conference. The

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African Nationalists could not attend, because they were restricted. So no Constitutional Conference was in prospect.
We strongly urged on the African Nationalists how mistaken they had been in not working the Constitution. As I said to Mr. Nkomo "If only you had worked the Constitution, you would now be in Parliament and would be seen to be what you are, the leader of the African people. You would have had political experience and Parliamentary experience". But they still feel that working a Constitution is something of a trap, and they still talk of nothing but majority rule to-morrow. This is partly because when you have two Parties it is like having two trade unions. As long as one says, "Nothing less than one man, one vote, to-morrow", the other is obliged to say, "Nothing less than one man, one vote, to-morrow," and it is difficult to get any sense out of either of them. This is not a difference of ideas. It is a personal difference between Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole. The Organisation of African Unity and everybody else have tried, but have not succeeded in bringing them together.
As to the Chiefs, they are really hopeless. We spent a day at the Indaba. There are, I think, about 700 of them and one cannot deal with them there. We thought that if we saw the Council of Chiefs around a table we could find out what they thought. Their position being hereditary—once a Chief, always a Chief—a number of them are very old and obviously completely senile and "gaga". Most of them are completely illiterate. It may be that in some cases they really represent their tribes; but in other cases they obviously do not represent anybody. They are highly respected in many quarters as civilian judges, which is what they are, in tribal matters, and some resent that the Government should have brought them into politics. When you ask them, "Why do you think the only choice is between cutting the strings tomorrow and having Nkomo to-morrow?", they say, "That is what the Government tell us; and that is what the African Nationalists tell us, and obviously it must be so". They do not understand the Constitution.
They have been promised by the Government that if they support the Govern-
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ment the Government will give them back their old criminal jurisdiction, so that they will have more power over their people. I do not think that they support the Government merely because they are paid by the Government and can be dismissed by the Government; I think they support the Government for the very good reason that it pays them to do so. They do not like the African Nationalists, but they like to have more powers in the tribal areas. We tried to go into this further at what we thought was going to be a round-table discussion with the Council Chiefs. But Mr. Harper had been very much in charge of the Indaba and had made arrangements for all members of the Press to be there when we were talking to the Council—Mr. Harper was very much there—and discussion really became impossible, because whatever we asked for, Mr. Harper, in effect, told them what the answer was.
I have no comment to make on what I have called "the rest". I saw no reason to disbelieve them when they said that there was no real need for a crisis atmosphere at all. After all, the Smith Government itself has all the powers in its own hands. But the one and only thing that my right honourable friend the Commonwealth Secretary and I said to everybody when we went there, including particularly the Government and their supporters, was, "We have not come here to try to establish African majority rule to-day or African majority rule tomorrow. Nobody is threatening you with anything. There is no reason why you should not go on as long as you like under the existing Constitution." We did, I hope, get this across: that there never has been, as I think, any real reason why by desperate means independence should he seized now, except that this is the call on which they had won the Election—in fact, on which they had won two Elections—namely, that they would obtain independence, and, if necessary, take it.
I feel rather sorry for Mr. Smith. There is no doubt that in the last fortnight Mr. Smith has been fighting, and I should think knowing him, fighting pretty hard, against an illegal declaration of independence. I know he feels that he has nailed the flag of to his mast to such an extent that if he gave it up he would probably have to retire from

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public life. But I know he feels that it is really a mistake, and that if it had been done at all, it should have been done before. But he has a lot of extremists in his Cabinet, and I am afraid that they have carried the day.
I found that there was a difference between Rhodesians and non-Rhodesians—and by "Rhodesians" I mean men born in Rhodesia. It splits into three. About one-third of the people there were born in Rhodesia; about another one-third come from England, and the other one-third come from South Africa. The Rhodesian Front themselves differ a bit. I talked to a number of tobacco farmers who had come from South Africa, not because they disagreed with anything that was going on in South Africa, but because the land in Rhodesia is better for growing tobacco than in South Africa. But Mr. Smith is a Rhodesian, Sir Humphrey Gibbs is a Rhodesian and the Chief Justice is Rhodesian. Most of the extremists in the Cabinet, I think, are not Rhodesians in that sense. Mr. Harper came from India. Mr. Dupont, Mr. Lardner Burke and Mr. Wrathall—in fact most of them—have come out from here since the war, and in many cases fairly recently. But it was because we knew throughout what appalling problems would arise if there was an illegal declaration of independence that, although we could see no need for this crisis atmosphere, we have done every single thing we can to avoid it. I am glad to see that Mr. Maudling takes that view. Some, I think, may say that we went too far to appease them. But I can assure the House that there is nothing which the Government could have done to avoid this which they did not do.
At this hour I am not going to start on the question of sanctions, or to argue about what is punitive and what is not punitive. But I would suggest for your Lordships' consideration that, first, the least we can do is what we said we would do, including not taking their tobacco, which is a step we said we would take. The public statements we have made were not disagreed to by the Opposition Party here. If we did not mean what we said, we were bluffing; and we had no right to make such statements if we were bluffing. That, I should have thought, is the least we can do. How far we should
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go is a matter of opinion. There are those who cry "Forward!" and those who cry "Back!". Some would like to do nothing, so long as it is not effective. That does not seem to be a very sensible point of view. Others would go further, and use force. But it does not seem to the Government that, whatever the problems of Rhodesia are—and they are great—they could usefully be solved by force.
I should hope that some at least of your Lordships may have heard what my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary said about that at the United Nations yesterday. I know that some noble Lords (the noble Lord, Lord Milverton, for example) do not think that the United Nations can ever do anything at all. There are extremist members in Mr. Smith's Cabinet who think that, too. I should not have thought, if a war started between two countries like India and Pakistan, that the United Nations could stop it. I should not have thought they would have the effect they had at the time of Suez But when you get, as you did the other day in this matter, the vote of 101 to 2, it is no good saying: "This is an African bloc." This is really world opinion, and it is very difficult to stand out against it.
Not the least of the difficulties of Her Majesty's Government is seeking to retain control at the United Nations in limiting the steps to be taken to those which Her Majesty's Government think ought to be taken. Of course this is a point on which the appearance or non-appearance of the unity of this country is going to have a considerable effect. If they see that this country appears to be divided on what they regard as far too limited measures to be taken, it will, of course, make the task of my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary an even more difficult task than it is now.
At the bottom of this there really is a basic difference. Mr. Smith was right in one sense when he said that the differences are irreconcilable, because the real difference at the heart of this problem is that we in the Commonwealth believe that it is our duty in respect of all Colonies—and this is a Colony—to develop the inhabitants of the country so that they get to a position in which they can rule their own country. This is not the view of the Rhodesian Front: they do not believe in majority rule. The

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situation which we have to face is that we have to consider what is necessarily involved in the whole of the relationship between white people and black people in Africa. In conclusion, I would venture to hope that, for some of the reasons which I have mentioned, we in this country shall be able to approach these difficult problems with as great a degree of unity as possible.
3.2 p.m.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, it is, I think, useful that we should have a general discussion on Rhodesia before we turn our attention to the Bill, which I understand is likely to reach us early this evening. I am sure the whole House is grateful for the exposition given by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor of what he learned, and the information which was given to him, on his visit to Rhodesia. That, of course, is now some time ago. I was sorry myself that the noble and learned Lord did not at this moment say more in explanation and justification of the action which the Government have taken and propose to take at the present juncture. We shall be discussing that inevitably and rightly in the course of this debate, and I do not propose to refer to the Bill in any detail now.
The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor began his speech by telling us of the wide powers that exist under the State of Emergency—powers that, of course, can be legally exercised only by the Ministers of the Rhodesian Government and those acting under them. He also told us about the new Constitution which has been—he used the word "promulgated", but I think "announced by" Mr. Smith would probably be a better description, with its power apparently (I have not seen it myself) to require the Chief Justice and others to accept directions given to them by the Executive. The noble and learned Lord went on to say that it was, in the view of Her Majesty's Government, extremely urgent to pass the enabling Bill. I should like to say just this about the Bill. Were it not for the urgency, I should myself have seriously considered tabling some Amendments to improve its language in the course of our debate. I feel some doubts as to the way in which certain things are expressed in it. But we recognise that
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it is urgent and desirable that that Bill should, if possible, receive the Royal Assent to-night. While I will raise certain points when we come to the Bill in the hope that I shall get satisfactory assurances, undertakings and explanations from the Lord Chancellor, I hope that he will not think that in doing so I am in any way seeking to impede the passage of the measure.
Now may I turn to the present situation or, indeed, perhaps look-back, and look back a little longer than the noble and learned Lord? For weeks, months and, indeed, years, we have all hoped that what has happened would not come to pass, and successive Governments have striven hard to find a satisfactory end agreed solution; and our present Government have done so, too. But I am sure that all your Lordships were surprised and shocked when the news came last Thursday that the Prime Minister's efforts had failed and that Mr. Smith had embarked on this illegal course. My mind went back to the talks we had with Mr. Smith in 1964. They were not easy. Then, too, there was a threat, a very real threat, of U.D.I. Then Mr. Smith maintained, as he did in the recent talks, that the people of Rhodesia, African and European, wanted independence to be granted on the 1961 Constitution. Mr. Smith accepted, and I quote the words of the Joint Communiqué published on September 12 1964:
"Independence must be based on general consent."
He also said:
"He was convinced that the majority of the population supported his request for independence on the basis of the present Constitution and franchise."
We said, in effect. "Prove it to us". And Mr. Smith undertook to do so. The threat of U.D.I. then was averted, and to that extent those talks succeeded. Mr. Smith was told that it would not satisfy us, or the world, just for him to call an Indaba and to get the support there for his claim. In fact, Mr. Smith has not, I am sorry to say, fulfilled the undertaking he gave then to prove his statements.
The Communiqué—it was a joint Communiqué—went on to say that he recognised that we, Great Britain, were entitled to be satisfied about this and, as The Times said on that day:
"He abandoned recourse to U.D.I. until the test of public opinion in Rhodesia had been made."

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That test has never been made. The purpose of the Royal Commission was, if I understand it correctly, to make it, but it would seem that it was only after the London talks were ended, only after the Prime Minister's visit to Rhodesia, that a Royal Commission for this purpose was suggested. It was on November 3 that the Prime Minister told us that the Government—and I ask your Lordships to note his words—were
"prepared to agree"
to the Rhodesian's Government's proposals being
"put to the test of acceptability to the people of Rhodesia as a whole".—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 718 (No. 670), col. 1027, November 3, 1965.]
That was on November 3 of this year. So it was only then that our present Government were prepared to agree that that which Mr. Smith had undertaken in 1964, namely, his assertion, which few can credit, should be put to the test.
Then the Prime Minister, having said that the British Government were prepared to agree to this, told Mr. Smith—and again I quote:
"The British Government cannot, of course, be expected to commit themselves in advance to accept that report "—
that was the Report of the Royal Commission—
"particularly as, in any case, the eventual decision rests with Parliament alone."
A week later, on the very eve of U.D.I., the Prime Minister told us that he put this question to Mr. Smith, and, if I may, I will remind your Lordships of its terms. He said:
"We asked them the following question. ' If the United Kingdom Government undertook to commend to Parliament, whose sovereign rights must be reserved, a unanimous report by the Royal Commission to the effect that the 1961 Constitution was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole as a basis for independence, would the Rhodesian Government give a corresponding undertaking that if the Royal Commission submitted a unanimous report to the effect that the 1961 Constitution was not acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole as a basis for independence, they would abandon their claim in this respect.'"
It goes on, of course, but for my purpose I need not quote any more; it is not really relevant to this discussion.
I must say that it seems to me a pity that this was not said earlier—that the British Government were prepared to
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agree that Mr. Smith's assertions should be tested—because I feel that if it had been done then, there might at least have been a chance that the Declaration of U.D.I. would have been postponed, and the Prime Minister has frequently emphasised the need for time in connection with this problem. U.D.I. would at least have been postponed, and perhaps avoided. There is at least a chance that Mr. Smith would have accepted this proposal. After all, Mr. Smith recognised in 1964 that we were entitled to be satisfied about this. Now we have to recognise, sad though it is—and I accept, as we all do, that the Prime Minister and his colleagues have tried very hard in this matter—that those efforts have failed.
Now we have to decide what coupe this country should take. I was disappointed, I must admit, that the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, did not make some observations on this subject, or more observations than a reference to force. My Lords, before turn to that matter there is one correction I should like to make. I see that in the course of the recent talks in Rhodesia, according to Command Paper 2807, on page 122, this is recorded as having been said:
"Mr. Smith said that the Conservative Administration had virtually conceded this point; in particular, the then Lord Chancellor, Lord Dilhorne, had agreed, during the discussions in September, 1964, that, if the Rhodesian Government could satisfy the United Kingdom Government that their Constitutional proposals were acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole, the United Kingdom Government would no longer have any grounds for intervening."
My Lords, the first I saw of that was when it was published in the Press last Saturday morning. I was quite certain then that I had said nothing of the kind; that Mr. Smith was entirely mistaken. The record of the talks at which I was present is also published in this volume, and if your Lordships care to look you will see that there is not a single word in that record which supports Mr. Smith's statement. I am quite sure that I said nothing of the kind, and although, naturally, people do make mistakes, I cannot understand how this mistake came to be made by him. My Lords, I thought it was desirable to make that public correction of something which appears to have been said and to which importance might have been attached in the

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course of the Prime Minister's talks in Rhodesia.
The noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, began his speech by saying that there was an illegal Government in Rhodesia. What Mr. Smith and his colleagues have done has been described by the Government as an act of rebellion—of rebellion against the Crown—and it is quite clear, beyond any shadow of doubt, that such authority as they exercise has no vestige of legal right behind it, neither under the law of this country nor, I venture to say, under the law of Rhodesia. My Lords, faced with this, what action should we take now? One possible course would be just to say, "This is an act of rebellion, but there it is; we will not do anything about it". No doubt a number of arguments could be advanced for that, but in my view it would be utterly wrong for us to take that course. Indeed, if I might take a leaf out of the book of the Leader of the House, who so often talks to us about moral questions, I would say it was morally wrong as well.
The noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, referred to world opinion in this context. Of course we should have regard to world opinion, and not least, I should have thought, to the opinion of Australia, Canada and New Zealand. There is no doubt at all that they would think it wrong and would consider that we were failing in our duty if we did not take steps now; if we just treated this as an unfortunate event and took no action about it. I would also say that no one who has any regard for the rule of Law and the sanctity of obligations under it could aquiesce in the illegality of this usurpation of authority.
Another course would be to use all the means at our disposal, including force, to restore constitutional Government under the law. There are, we know, some who think the use of force for this purpose would be morally justified. The Government have, and I think rightly, rejected this course, and what they propose is to apply economic sanctions. Sanctions are a blunt instrument. They will, if effective, hit not only those acting illegally and the supporters of the illegal régime, but also loyal Europeans and Africans. It is better, the Prime Minister said, for the action to be effected quickly
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than for it to be lingering and to involve prolonged hardship, and I am sure that your Lordships will agree with that.
So, my Lords, we have to consider whether the proposed sanctions are likely to be effective quickly. I should be grateful if the Government could tell us more about them. I have heard it said, for instance, that the ban on Rhodesian tobacco will begin to be effective in only about nine months' time. I should like to know from the Government whether that is really the case, and how they think that ban will be effective now. I think the case for that ought to be made to your Lordships, and I am sorry that the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, apart from a reference to tobacco, did not make it. He asserted that a public statement had been made about this matter which had not been disagreed to, as if that established the approval of Parliament. I should like to know, and I press the Government on this, whether it really is the case that that sanction will not begin to bite for some nine months, and if it is not the case I press that that should be made clear.
All sanctions, if they are to achieve any purpose, are bound to hurt, to be punitive in a greater or lesser degree. It is all very well to say, as the Prime Minister did, that the Government's purpose is not punitive; and I agree that the intention behind the imposition of sanctions is not just to punish Rhodesia and all its peoples for what Mr. Smith and his colleagues have done, but to secure, if possible and as soon as possible, the rejection of this illegal régime by the people of Rhodesia. And the hope is, as I understand it, that as the economic pressures begin to be felt pressure will be applied in Rhodesia on this régime and that this may bring about a change of heart. I hope that that hope may be realised. But I think we must recognise that we are dealing with very determined men. Their actions have already shown them to be that. Before U.D.I. they declared a State of Emergency, and no doubt they propose to use, and use illegally, the emergency powers there created. They have already put under restraint one of their political opponents, and so it is not inconceivable that they may seek to do the same to any in Rhodesia who oppose their actions and policies.

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It has often been said, in this House and elsewhere, that we have a duty to both European and Africans in Rhodesia. That, of course, is true. At this time I think we have a very clear duty to give all help, support and guidance to those in Rhodesia, and I am sure there are a great number of them, who remain loyal to the Crown and who, although their voices may be silent at present, would like to reject this illegal régime. I hope that clearer guidance can be given to them than has been given from this country so far.
The Government have said that it is the duty of public servants in Rhodesia to sustain law and order and at the same time they must do nothing to further this illegal régime. Does this mean that if one of the ex-Ministers now exercising illegal authority signs an order depriving a political opponent of his liberty, an order which would be valid if made by a Minister under the emergency powers, it is the view of Her Majesty's Government that the police should give effect to it in the preservation of law and order? If the police do, they will certainly be assisting the illegal régime, and if they do it will make it much more difficult for opponents of this régime to make their voices heard and to play their part in securing a return of lawful and constitutional government. If it is the Government's view that the police should not enforce any such order made by the illegal régime, I hope very much that that will be stated.
I have read very carefully, as I daresay many of your Lordships have, the Attorney General's statement of the legal position, and there are some observations that I should like to make with regard to it. He said:
"I should point out in general terms that there is abundant authority for the conclusion that conduct of the kind that has taken place is treasonable. So would he steps taken by anyone, whether in Rhodesia or this country, or by anyone else owing allegiance to the Crown, with the intention of furthering the objectives of the illegal régime or inciting others to take such steps."—[OFFICIAL REPORT. Commons. Vol. 720 (No. 4), col. 516, November 12, 19651.]
As a general proposition stating the law of this country as applied to British subjects before 1948, I certainly should not quarrel with that. But the learned Attorney General did not refer to the
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British Nationality Act, 1948 passed by the previous Labour Government. Section 3 of that Act provides that a British subject who is not a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies should not be guilty of an offence against the law of the United Kingdom by reason of anything done in a country mentioned in subsection (3) of Section 1 of the Act—and one of the countries mentioned is Rhodesia—unless the act would he an offence if he were an alien and if the act done in Rhodesia would be an offence if done in a foreign country.
That, if I understand it correctly, means that a Rhodesian citizen would not be guilty of an offence or a treason against the laws of the United Kingdom in respect of anything done in Rhodesia unless it would be an offence if he were an alien and had done it in a foreign country. And if I understand that section correctly—and I shall be grateful for the Lord Chancellor's views upon it—it would appear wrong to say or to suggest that any Rhodesian citizen guilty of conduct of the character described by the Attorney General, guilty of that conduct in Rhodesia, could be convicted in this country of treason. I ask and hope that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor will say whether he agrees with what I have said. The Attorney General is, of course, responsible only in connection with the law of England, but I am sure that he does not claim, any more than I should, to know and to be an authority on the law of Rhodesia, which is not the same as that of England.
I have drawn attention to this matter not because I wish in any way to weaken the effect of anything that the Attorney General has said, but because Section 3 of the British Nationality Act is certain not to escape attention, and it is, I think, important that if, notwithstanding that section, what the Attorney General has said is right in law, that should be made clear beyond any shadow of doubt. It may be the case, and I trust it is, that in this respect—that is to say, in relation to treason—the law of Rhodesia is similar in all material respects to the law of England. If it is, what the Attorney General has said is clearly right. Of course, what he has said is clearly right in relation to those who, though in Rhodesia, are still citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies, and if the law

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of Rhodesia is similar to that in this country, Rhodesian citizens, though not triable in this country, would, if guilty of such conduct, be triable and punishable in Rhodesia. Nothing that Mr. Smith has done or can do can alter that law, and I ask the Lord Chancellor to take an opportunity of dealing with this point fairly fully, because I think it is not unimportant.
I should not like to conclude my observations without paying a tribute to the Governor of Rhodesia for his fortitude, his courage and, not least, the propriety of his conduct. It seems to me that he has already set a fine example to the loyal Rhodesians of Rhodesia in the course he has pursued; and the same, of course, applies also in relation to the Chief Justice. To sum up, I join in deploring and condemning the action taken by Mr. Smith and his colleagues. I cannot believe that it was in the true or long-term interests of Rhodesia. For years they have enjoyed internal self-government. The only practical legal significance of independence validly granted would be the right to conduct their own foreign relations. Now, by their actions, they have, it seems to me, put the whole future of the territory in jeopardy.
I think it impossible that this country should continue in its dealings with Southern Rhodesia as if nothing had happened. I agree that we should seek to restore the rule of law and the end of this illegal régime as soon as possible; and in considering the sanctions now proposed, and others, if there are any others, proposed by the Government in the future, we must, it seems to me, apply the test suggested by the Prime Minister: Are they likely to be effective, and effective quickly? I am sure we are all united in hoping that the day will soon come when this illegal rule will be ended, and that it will be followed by Rhodesia taking her place as an independent member of the Commonwealth, with not just a Constitution acceptable to a minority, but a Constitution broadly based, clearly fair and just, and giving adequate representation to a multiracial society.
3.32 p.m.
LORD REA: My Lords, there are, I think your Lordships will agree, times when public official discussion about particularly delicate matters of diplomacy has
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indeed its drawbacks. I do not concede or suggest that this is an occasion when publicity is a disadvantage, for it is most necessary that the people of this country should know the views of their representatives in both Houses of Parliament—and I personally consider that the House of Lords is in a broad sense very representative and certainly very responsible. It is essential, too, that the people of Rhodesia as well as of the whole of Africa, and indeed all foreign countries, should know clearly how we are handling this tragic situation brought about so unwillingly by irreconcilable views. At the same time, it may be only too easy to exacerbate resentments and deep antagonisms unless' we handle our discussion here to-day with sobriety and as much moderation as we can command.
I propose, therefore, merely to summarise quite shortly what I believe to be the views of my colleagues on these Benches; and not to try to recapitulate moves which have proved to be abortive, nor yet to suggest decisive future action which can only be decided upon by Her Majesty's Government, who alone can assess the immediacies and the quickly changing values in a most unstable scene. Since the Party for which I speak is fundamentally based upon the principles of liberty of the subject and of human rights, we are of course much concerned that this country and the Commonwealth shall not lag behind world opinion in these fields, and indeed shall lead it.
It has been our criticism of recent British Governments (and I am not going into Party politics now) that they are too insensitive to the impetus of progress which has been such a phenomenon all around us, particularly since the end of the last war. We were rightly reminded last week by several speakers, of the most prominent and leading and responsible position which we held for so many decades; and we were rightly exhorted to pursue at least the high ideals of that pre-eminence, even though (as the noble Duke, the Duke of Devonshire pointed out) we were no longer the hub and the focal point of prosperity and progress. In the case of the Labour Party, our criticism is, in general—and I am not going into detailed criticism—that we are hanging back in our great responsibility towards internationalism and in taking our place as a partner in the forefront of

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world progress and co-operation; whereas, on the other hand, in the case of the Conservative Party we rather feel that too much pride is held in our past glories, and therefore is retarding us in almost the same way. In the matter of emergent nations, of which Rhodesia, with her preponderant coloured majority, is obviously one, we cannot afford to be reactionary or static; and I consider that both the present Government and their immediate predecessor are to be admired and praised in the attitude and action which they have taken.
The fault—which is no fault of ill-will or bad faith—lies in the reluctance of the late Rhodesian Government to accept the speed of world development which in some cases, as in Rhodesia, outstrips the ability and the competence of those in power to control it or to guide it. This backwardness in Rhodesia, this failure to keep up with world opinion, may well be in part our own responsibility in this country for having failed somehow to educate people like Mr. Smith and his colleagues in the inevitability of progress from racialism to human co-operation, quite irrespective of all old traditional barriers, which I need not name.
Therefore in this tragic situation I can only say that the progress in political development which has the support of Her Majesty's Government was inevitable: and that it is pitiful to see so many of our own kith and kin in Rhodesia as misled as was King Canute himself. Our affection and our regard for them remains. We understand with deep sympathy their difficult and often tragic position, of seeing so much labour and devotion and dedication over so many years being apparently cast aside. That indeed is tragic. That is why I devoutly hope that some sort of reparation and compensation can be fully taken into account when this matter is solved. But the change to the new world—the new world in politics and democracy—cannot be put off; and if it can be achieved only by the bitter discipline of sanctions and commercial pressure, then I fear that these harsh measures must regrettably be employed. It is my wish, as I know it is the wish of all of us in this country, that the solution, even accompanied by grievous disappointment,
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may be achieved without physical force, without violence, and without bloodshed.
3.37 p.m.
LORD BUTLER OF SAFFRON WALDEN: My Lords, I should like first of all to crave the indulgence of your Lordships in rising to address this House for the first time. I can only say that I hope, in view of the length of the list of speakers, to be short, and that I shall be able to bring some of my own experience in this matter before your Lordships on this occasion. I have been singularly well trained in Parliamentary manners and etiquette, having been for some considerable time a Member of another place and for six years its Leader. I should apologise to your Lordships' House that, unfortunately, I have to leave before the end of the debate. This is due to an engagement in Cambridge which was made three months ago, and which I did not feel it possible to break, particularly as this was an emergency sitting of the House for a special debate. I hope, therefore, that your Lordships will understand if I am not here for some rather critical moments at the end of the debate, but I shall hope to make my point of view perfectly clear.
I think the first thing we have to get clear in our minds—I certainly learned this during the period when I was Foreign Secretary—is that the background to this question is one of most intense international feeling, quite apart from the feeling we may have within our own country: and that there is most intense feeling in the Commonwealth, which I learned about when I was First Secretary in charge of Central Africa. In view of this intensity of feeling, in my opinion, unless there is a high degree of national and international unity exhibited at this moment inflammatory tendencies may develop which may put in question peace itself, and certainly will put in question the existence of the modern Commonwealth as we know it. Therefore, I can say with absolute certainty that the eyes of the world and of the Commonwealth—and I would support what the noble and learned Viscount says about Australia, New Zealand and Canada, as well as the other members of the Commonwealth—are upon us to see how we are going to act.
On the other hand, I should like to say this at the opening of my remarks.

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If we go too far and indulge in physical action, in particular, I feel certain that we shall push Southern Rhodesia into even more negative courses than those upon which they have embarked, and we shall then—there has been little reference to South Africa, either in the public Press, or hitherto in debate in either House—see a danger of the Zambesi River being for a long time ahead the frontier of white supremacy from South Africa upwards. There never was less case for spite, or more case for firm statesmanship, than we see at the present time.
I do not find it surprising that this issue should come to a head. I was deeply involved with this matter when I was in charge of Central Africa. Indeed, perhaps the only criticism or comment I should like to make on the Prime Minister's conscientious stewardship in this matter was when he said that nobody before him had had so many talks with the personalities engaged in Central Africa. I could not help thinking, when listening to the speech of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, that he certainly appears to have had a good many talks. I must add myself to the catalogue, and I will undertake not to give an account of all the talks I myself had. During the Prime Minister's recent visit to Central Africa I received a message from the Southern Rhodesian side—because I have many friends among the Southern Rhodesians—saying, "We have had all this before."
There may be some slight value in my taking part in this debate, because I may be able to indicate that both parties, and the last Government as well as this, have in fact been through this and put the case in the last Government almost as much as the case has recently been put by the Prime Minister. I seem to remember long hours of conversation with Mr. Winston Field, Mr. Dupont, and also Mr. Smith, and I am not sure the toughest is not Mr. Dupont. I remember hours of conversation with Mr. Nkomo, which very often consisted of addresses by himself of a singularly eloquent character to which it was difficult to make any reply. I remember equally long conversations with Mr. Sithole. As the Lord Chancellor has said, the difference between the two gives a sort of contrapuntal
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value to their remarks which seems to make progress almost impossible. At the time when I was discussing this issue with Mr. Field, the Southern Rhodesians were making it a condition that they should be granted independence on terms suitable to themselves before they agreed to attend the Victoria Falls Conference which wound up the Federation. In the end, wiser counsels prevailed, they attended the Conference, and I think that we wound up the Confederation in a dignified manner. But, later on, Mr. Field was dismissed by the junta which controls Mr. Smith, and the issue of independence remained wide open, only to be brought to a head now.
I should like in this connection to repeat what was said by the Lord Chancellor in relation to this story about an understanding between the British Government and the Government of Southern Rhodesia that if the Federation were to break up Southern Rhodesia would have complete independence. My name has been associated with this alleged promise, and I should like to support what Sir Alec Douglas-Home said on May 10, 1964, which is in the Command Paper which we have before us in this debate. Sir Alec then said:
"I must make it clear that there is no substance whatsoever in this claim, and that no such assurance was ever at any time asked for by the Government of Southern Rhodesia or given by the British Government."
That is my experience and those are the facts of the situation. I say that nobody should be surprised that this matter should come to a head, since it has been clear to me, at any rate, for some time that the points of view of the British Government and the Southern Rhodesian Government are, and were, irreconcilable. To say this would seem to mean that I am critical of attempts to bring the two sides together. This is not so. I think it was the duty of the British Prime Minister to exert every effort, personal and corporate, to avert the disastrous rift, which, from now on, is bound to be a source of ever-increasing grief and anxiety to us all.
I studied with care the five principles which have been discussed and which I need not elaborate to the House: namely, unimpeded progress to majority rule guarantees against any retrogressive amendment of the Constitution an immediate improvement in the political

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status of the African population; and progress towards ending racial discrimination. Those were the first four. I believe that it was the fifth principle, namely, that the British Government would need to be satisfied that any basis for independence should be acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole, which was always likely to be the breaking point. Indeed, I believe Mr. Smith felt this to be the irreconcilable point. Looking back, what a thousand pities it is that Mr. Smith and his Cabinet did not realise the strength of their hand! They were given a trump card when the Prime Minister stated that he did not expect majority rule to be established immediately. This was realistic and sensible on the part of the Prime Minister and it deserved a response, namely, that an effort should be made to proceed with the other four principles on which Mr. Smith himself said he found less difficulty in proceeding: that is, that there would be an advance towards African self-government and that some steps would definitely be taken in this direction.
I notice in The Times to-day that there is an extract from the witty and wise Lord Malvern—and how much we regret he cannot be here to-day, as he says in his interview, to take part in our debates! Then he goes on to say:
"What a mess they have made of things! if we had got together with an African middle-class within fifteen years the thing would have been quite different, but they had not the intelligence to see that."
Whether one agrees with Lord Malvern or not, one realises that he is probably the greatest statesman in the whole of Southern Rhodesia. Most of us realise what a tribute we should pay to him for what he did to build up that country.
I went into a long negotiation with Mr. Winston Field about the possible basis for an independence grant. It would have necessitated, in the first place, a great improvement in secondary education in Southern Rhodesia. Their primary education is already about the best in Africa, and that is forgotten in the general criticism of the country and of its leaders and statesmen. If I had been Mr. Smith I should have tried for a loan from this country to assist even more than we do in their secondary education. Another step would have been an improvement in the number of B Roll seats,
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as well as a widening of the A Roll register, and then, finally, an ending of racial discrimination by the repeal of the Land Apportionment Acts. I approached Sir Robert Menzies and got his preliminary blessing that this was a possible line of approach. We were nearing the possibility of some understanding that there would be a definite prospect of Africanisation and of the Africans taking part in the Government. Then it all broke down.
It was, to me, a great source of sorrow. I helped to grant independence to Malawi, I helped to grant independence to Zambia, and I knew what these proud peoples would feel in Southern Rhodesia and how they would be feeling that they must have some form of independence themselves. However, we must register the fact that Mr. Smith did none of the things; that he never showed any convincing sign of moving along the road to African participation. We must realise that he is supported by a caucus and a Party more ruthless than himself; that he was fully warned of the consequences of breaking with the Commonwealth and with the Crown. He was shown the strength of feeling in what is called the White Commonwealth; he knew the strength of the feeling in the United States of America. I cannot but come to the conclusion that, in the circumstances, the logical results which flow from leaving the Commonwealth and breaking with us must follow.
I should like now to go over, quite shortly, with your Lordships what the possibilities are. The first is the use of physical force. Here I should like to support the language, the demeanour, and the action of the Foreign Secretary at the United Nations. I think the British Government have been absolutely right to oppose the use of force. Here I should like to take a leaf out of the book of my friend Dr. Banda—one of life's great realists—in which he reminded us not to underestimate the forces at the disposal of Southern Rhodesia. We are fortunately not in a position to-day to define what are the loyalties of these forces.
I should like just to remind your Lordships how this was all decided. We sat in a small room at the Victoria Falls Conference—we did not do this in the main Conference—and there the Northern Rhodesians, as they were then called,

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and the Malawi representatives agreed to the Federal Air Force being passed over to Southern Rhodesia. That always seemed to me to be the turning point in the history of the Southern African continent. I would beseech your Lordships to realise that any attempt to impose a solution by force, either by the United Nations or by neighbouring States, or, most unlikely, by the British Government, would be likely to rally these powerful forces to what we now call the "rebel Government"; to lead to a disaster—a disaster in which the assailants would be as badly mauled as the Southern Rhodesians themselves. Again, we must remember the danger of a possible link-up with South Africa. I therefore trust that all the Government's efforts at the United Nations and elsewhere will be directed against imposing a solution by force.
I see that the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury is to follow me, and therefore I must be somewhat careful about this portion of my speech because he has an unfair advantage over me. I would say only this: that I have attempted to study what he said on this subject of force, and with the aid of The Times I now have a clearer indication of what he had in mind. But any reference to force seems to me to need to take into account the terrible physical and logistical difficulties of using force in this area. I would quote the words of Burke, used in his famous speech on conciliation with America, which is rather apt to our great debate to-day:
"The use of force",
he said
"is but temporary. It does not reduce the necessity of subduing again. A nation is not governed which is perpetually to be conquered."
So much for the use of force.
I now turn to the various economic sanctions which have been mentioned by the Government and by other people. I have read the Prime Minister's Statement in another place on Thursday last. For the most part, the very strict measures which he proposes should follow on the enabling Bill are the logical outcome of Mr. Smith's breaking with the Commonwealth. Where the plan goes further than
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what we had in mind when we were in Government is in relation to the tobacco imports and to sugar. Up till now, I have heard no proposals for Britain's supporting oil sanctions, or the extreme view of policing with warships the Portuguese and other coasts. I am glad of that, since total economic sanctions have seldom been successful in world history, and we must remember that 4 million of tile inhabitants of Southern Rhodesia who will suffer are Africans, and only some 220,000 are Europeans.
On the understanding that wider sanctions and the use of physical force are out, the question that then arises is whether one should support the enabling Bill and the accompanying list of measures, or whether one should oppose the Bill, or amend it and resile on some of the more important measures. As I have said, when I was a Minister I was prepared for all measures resulting from breaking with the Commonwealth; that is, controlling remittances, blocking balances, taking away the Preference, applying exchange control, and so forth. But when I am asked now whether I am going to support the Bill or oppose it, taking with it the extra and stricter measures proposed by the Government, I have the following considerations in mind.
It is, in my view, vitally important that we in this House should not put ourselves athwart the deeply felt feeling in the country, in the United States of America, in the Commonwealth and in the world. In view, further, of the magnificent stand of the Governor, to which the noble and learned Viscount referred—and knowing him as I do I feel most deeply for him in the circumstances—and of the Chief Justice, whom I also know, in view of all these considerations, we should support the Bill and what flows from it. We should not allow any feeling of hesitation in our resolve to be felt, either in this country or abroad. What we are doing is very strict, and may be strict enough to bring more sense and order into the situation. Of course, we must all watch with deep anxiety and care the developing situation, and be guided by the information given us by those in authority.
Before I conclude, I should like to refer to the ethics of the situation. It may be said that it has for long been a

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principle of British policy not to use external pressure to coerce another Government to adopt internal policies to suit our own ideas. Certainly, we live with the Government of Spain, we live with the Government of Russia, we have normal diplomatic relations, and we took no special steps when South Africa left the Commonwealth. But here there was, and is, a question of Her Majesty's Government's deciding on the terms on which independence can or should be granted to a dependent Power.
I have explained that in my time I went to all possible limits to try to encourage the Southern Rhodesian Government to take the first and vital steps along the lines of possible self-government for the Colony. Her Majesty's Government to-day have had their own negotiations, and now, in return for that, we have all been faced with a resolute and illegal act of defiance. If we ignore that, we lose our own influence in the councils of the world and in the Commonwealth. What is more important—and this is the most important argument of all—we lose our own influence to control events and prevent them from being carried to unwise and bloody extremes. We must therefore move forward with firmness but with the utmost self-control, so that our own control of the situation may result in a happier future than at present seems possible for the peoples of Southern Rhodesia. I will quote Burke once more. He said:
"A State without the means of some change is without the means of its own conservation."
It should be our aim, my Lords, to show the people of Southern Rhodesia that to face the need of change is the only way to ensure their own conservation.
3.58 p.m.
THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTER-BURY: My Lords, it falls to me to be the first to welcome to our debates the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Saffron Walden, and as he and I are old friends it is a special privilege to do this. I know that we all hope that the noble Lord will frequently give us, as he has given us to-day, the great value of his counsel, coming, as it does, from such knowledge, experience and wisdom.
It is indeed a tragedy which we are facing, and, I would mention, not only a tragedy for countries but a personal
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tragedy for many persons. The Rhodesian crisis has brought to many people grief between friends, and grief between relatives, too; and we cannot forget that among those on the other side in Rhodesia are people who, however mistaken we may think them, are God-fearing people who care for Christian values. We are very lacking in imagination if we do not have some understanding of the fears felt by some of the white people, who know about the violence, and even the chaos, which has occurred in some parts of Africa. But it is a tragedy in which there are clear moral issues, as the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Saffron Walden, has been telling us so clearly. I believe that the people of this country, after some inevitable bewilderment, are grasping what these moral issues are.
First, there has already been the issue of the wrongness of allowing independence to Rhodesia except on the basis of all the conditions which the Prime Minister has described in the five points. I think it is important for us to be clear that the issue is not just one of democracy: it was not, and it is not, an issue of, "One man, one vote". There are things which matter more than votes. The issue has not been that of immediate rule by the majority, but of a safeguarding for the members of that majority of real progress in education, in civil rights and in freedom from racial discrimination. It is in these matters that the obligation of this countries lies.
Next, now that U.D.I. has happened, the issue for our country in the sight of the world, and not least in the sight of all the countries of Africa, is that our country should be seen to uphold law, order and justice with the same resolution everywhere, whatever be the race and colour of those in relation to whom law has to be upheld. Nothing could damage us more in the eyes of African countries—and, I would add, in the eyes of the God of justice and righteousness—than that we should even seem to falter in this duty and obligation.
Now the matter of sanctions. What are they for? What are they designed to achieve? Many people in the country have been rather confused about the aim and ethics of sanctions. I do not believe that sanctions have very much signify-

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cance as a kind of gesture of protest. Gestures of protest may be right, but a mere gesture could damage people whom we least want to damage and could leave the final situation no better. Again, I do not believe in sanctions as a sort of punishment; and, in any case, they could, if prolonged, bring punishment to innocent people, Africans as well as white. But sanctions have, I believe, both moral validity and reason behind them if their aim is, as the Prime Minister has told us, to bring about the end of the illegal régime in Rhodesia. I would thus call sanctions not a moral gesture, nor a punishment, but an effective moral instrument to achieve a result. That is perhaps their sole justification.
Presumably sanctions can be effective partly by causing such difficulties for the Rhodesian régime as to disable it from carrying on, and partly by causing more people in Rhodesia to see that this régime offers just no way forward. But, my Lords, if sanctions are to do that, they must be really effective and as quick as possible in their effect. Only thus can they be the effective moral instrument. Otherwise, sanctions can drag on in embittering ineffectiveness. Perhaps, very soon, the question of oil may arise. It has been suggested that an oil embargo, if practicable and effective, might be the strongest form of pressure. The report in The Times to-day of what the noble Viscount, Lord Malvern, has said is most significant.
As to possible action beyond economic sanctions, my own view is known as to what I believe Christian conscience should say if the lamentable necessity arose. It is good now to hear from the Government that any intervention to uphold order would be on request of the Governor and not on request of any Party on either side. I believe, therefore, that the actions already taken and now being prepared by Her Majesty's Government have behind them sound moral principle. I do not believe that the Government could, without dishonour, be acting differently. But it is a course with dangers on either side.
On the one side there is the danger that any vacillation or watering-down of sanctions would mean slow, ineffectual sanctions, leading to much prolonged
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bitterness and no firm result. There is the danger that other countries, either within the United Nations or on African soil, should lose patience and go to extremes—and nothing might more easily excite other countries to extremes than if they saw Britain, in contrast with some of her own actions in the past, in Africa and elsewhere, being unable to uphold law in a territory where there is, after all, a British Governor and judges whom we recognise.
My Lords, no Government could have a harder task than ours at this time: the task of steering between these two dangers and of being resolutely firm, yet looking for a law and order which must, in the end, go with reconciliation and with changes in outlook. In following this course I believe that the Government at this moment and on this issue deserve the support of all our citizens, if there are differences as to what particular sanctions are likely to achieve, no doubt these differences must be debated, but we can all surely hope—and, certainly so far, today's debate has encouraged us to hope—that these differences will not prevent all our leaders from being at one in stating clearly, and upholding, the moral duty of our country. There are at stake not only the future of Rhodesia and the future of much else beside, but also the honour of this country.
4.8 p.m.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, anyone, I suppose, who takes part in this debate—one of the gravest, I imagine, in the political experience of any of us—must clearly weigh his words with care, so as not to inflame further an already sufficiently tragic situation. I will try to do this, strongly though I feel that it is, in part at any rate, our own past and present treatment of the Rhodesians that has brought them to their present pass.
But first, I think, in accordance with the traditions of this House, I should make it clear that I have a personal interest. I have myself a long family connection with Rhodesia. The capital of the country, Salisbury, was named after my grandfather, who was Prime Minister at the time it was founded at the end of the last century; and I am a Freeman of that city—an honour of which I am very proud. I have also a territorial connection, in the form of a share in two

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farms, but I hope the House will agree that that should not inhibit me from speaking on the affairs of Rhodesia any more than having a share in a farm in England would debar one from speaking on the affairs of our own country. It may, indeed, be said that it gives me an additional qualification, in that I have a personal experience of the country and its peoples which is riot, unhappily, open to all of us.
Now, my Lords, I would turn directly to the events of the last week which have led up to the final break in the negotiations between the two countries, and to last week's decision by Mr. Smith and his colleagues to make a unilateral declaration of independence. In doing so I would say that I do not intend, except indirectly, to deal with some of the points raised by the most reverend Primate in the speech he has just delivered to us. That does not mean that I agree with him. I could not disagree more strongly with some of the things that he has said; but time does not permit me to stray from the main theme of our discussion. I hope he will forgive me if I leave it at that this afternoon and turn directly to the discussions between the United Kingdom and the Rhodesian Governments.
We have had two accounts of those discussions, one from Mr. Wilson and one from Mr. Smith; and, as so often on occasions like this, they differ widely. Mr. Wilson said, in effect, that there was no difference of substance between the two Governments and that this was merely the action of a little clique of "small frightened men". Mr. Smith, on the other hand, said—and I will quote his words:
"on the main issue that is at stake, the Governments have moved further apart."
Now, whatever may be their views of his latest action, all who know Mr. Smith will, I think, agree that he is a man of outstanding rectitude and honesty. I think that emerged from the account which the Lord Chancellor has given us this afternoon. He would not say what he did not think. I therefore cannot personally accept, sans phrase, the Prime Minister's account of what emerged from the discussions.
We have had the White Paper and that, no doubt, gives the truth as the Prime Minister sees it; and I am not suggest-
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ing anything to the contrary. But it is not, I suggest, the whole truth: there is something missing. I believe that that element, which is not mentioned at all in the Prime Minister's account (nor even in the very frank and moderate account which the Lord Chancellor gave us this afternoon), is the deep feeling of distrust and suspicion of all British Governments which exists to-day and has grown steadily in the minds of Rhodesians as a result of their own and their neighbours' experience in recent years.
I am not going to suggest for one moment that that is all the fault of the present Prime Minister. He has come on the scene very late in the day when mistrust was already created. I recognise to the full that the blame must attach far more to the leaders of my own Party over that period. I am pretty certain, too, that Lord Malvern, whom the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Saffron Walden, quoted, would also agree with this—in fact, I am not certain that it does not emerge from the interview to which the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Saffron Walden, referred. In saying that, I do not detract in any way from the very warm welcome which I am sure we all give the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Saffron Walden, for the very thoughtful and important contribution which he made this afternoon.
Mr. Maudling, in a speech over the week-end, said, with commendable candour, that he could not think of any major thing the Prime Minister had done wrongly or had not done. He had, after all, only been following the same lines as Mr. Macmillan and Sir Alec Douglas-Home would have done. And the same line of argument was pretty well followed, I thought, this afternoon by my noble and learned friend Lord Dilhorne. Whether it was tactful of Mr. Maudling to say what he did at a moment when the policy of the late Government was crashing in ruin and disaster, I really do not know. But what Mr. Maudling saw so clearly, the Rhodesian leaders saw, too. To them (and as the long and tortuous discussions proceeded, it became more and more clear to them), this was the same old policy. As the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Saffron Walden, himself said, a friend of his in Rhodesia had written to him, "We have heard all this before".

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They remembered how again and again Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom had put forward proposals for Constitutions for British dependencies in Central Africa; how, again and again, those Constitutions had been accepted by the local Government and then, with the ink hardly dry on them, those Constitutions one after another, had been scrapped under African pressure; and new ones put forward.
LORD CHORLEY: That is complete nonsense.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: The noble Lord will have his opportunity of saying that later. At any rate, as a result of previous experience, the Africans in Central Africa—that is the view, at any rate, of the white Rhodesians: their convinced and sincere view—had no incentive to co-operate with the local Europeans: they were always looking over their shoulders hoping to squeeze something more out of the United Kingdom Government: and they nearly always got it. The Rhodesian Government saw this process beginning all over again.
There was a proposal for a Royal Commission whose recommendations they felt were designed to bind them but not the home Government. That, as I understand it, is the inner meaning of the sentence in Mr. Smith's broadcast:—
"The bitter lesson of the Federation"—
which means, as I understand it in this context of the Monckton Commission—
"is constantly in my mind"
That is the meaning, too, of that other sentence:
"I would he failing in my duty to all of you who live in Rhodesia if I was to permit this country to continue to drift in the present paralysing state of uncertainty."
There was, I repeat, in the Rhodesian view—and it is a view I think noble Lords must take into account, whether they agree with it or not—no possibility of any enduring settlement between the Europeans and the Africans so long as the Africans were encouraged to continue to look over their shoulders to London.
Then there was that obscure phrase to which the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Saffron Waldon, rightly referred, about any settlement having to be acceptable
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to the Rhodesian people as a whole. Mr. Wilson had used that phrase again and again. But what did it mean? Did it mean what it appeared to mean? Were the United Kingdom Government, in effect, suggesting something that we do not in fact practise in our own country, with an infinitely more advanced population—a plebiscite, or referendum, to the whole population? How should the Rhodesians know? I do not know myself what that phrase means. I do not suppose that many, if any, of your Lordships do. All I know is that we should not accept such an idea as a referendum to the people as a whole here.
Only the other day we passed through this House the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Bill. In my speech on the Second Reading debate, as some of your Lordships may remember, one of the main points I made was that the proposal had never been submitted, in this case through a General Election, to the British people as a whole, who, infinitely more advanced than the Africans, should surely have been able to give a view worth having on a comparatively straightforward point like that. Yet, although it was not disputed in the debate, I think, from any quarter, that the large majority of the British people were strongly opposed to abolition, what reaction did I get? A shocked raising of hands; a united shout from the supporters of the Bill: "It is not our job here to follow public opinion. Our job in Parliament is to do what we, the Government and Parliament, think right; not to follow but to lead public opinion." The noble Baroness, Lady Wootton of Abinger, on the Third Reading of the Bill even went so far as to urge my noble friend Lord Colyton not to pay too much attention to what she called "ill-informed public opinion"; and, comforted by this reflection, the majority of your Lordships trooped into the Lobby in support of the Bill.
I wonder what these noble Lords think now of a proposal that the recommendations of a Royal Commission touching the future of Rhodesia, which were bound to be of a most complicated kind, should be submitted to the arbitrament of the people of Rhodesia as a whole and not merely of the Rhodesian Parliament, although they must know that the vast proportion of the voters in such a

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plebiscite could have no real understanding of the complexity of the issues involved and have in fact only just learned enough to repeat endlessly, "One man, one vote", as if it were some kind of magic incantation. At any rate, I hope the House will appreciate with what sceptisim such a proposal may well have been received, not only by Mr. Smith and his colleagues but by the body of white Rhodesians as a whole, and how it could only tend to increase their suspicions that they were going to be sold down the river once again.
Then what about that other argument so frequently used to-day, that the white people of Rhodesia are not concerned with the rule of law? I think the most reverend Primate referred to that. I do not believe, if he will forgive me for saying so, that there is a word of truth in such a suggestion, at any rate so far as by far the greater part of the white population are concerned. There is, indeed, one aspect of the law with which Rhodesians, perhaps more than us, are very much concerned and which may be said to colour their whole life: it is to ensure—the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor put the case far better than I can this afternoon—that that measure of law and order should be maintained on which all civilised life depends, that measure of law and order that we enjoy here.
They have seen what has happened in the Congo, which is, after all, not so far off from them as it is from us—things so horrible that the British Press has been reluctant to print them—and they do not want those things to happen to their wives and children. That is one of their main preoccupations at the present time. And who shall say that it is an entirely unworthy one? Should anyone say, "If it is, indeed, their object to maintain free institutions, why do they themselves keep certain people under restraint?", it would surely be fair to remind this House that it is not for us here in this country to throw stones at them. For, in our own emergency, in the days of the last war, not so very long ago, we ourselves found it necessary to keep quite a number of people in confinement under Regulation 18B, for six years without trial, not because we had no regard for liberty but for the opposite reason—that we regarded them as a danger to our
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very existence as a free nation. Can we, looking at Africa to-day, looking at the Congo and looking at Southern Sudan, regard the present attitude of the Rhodesians, who, after all, are our own stock and who value just those things that we value in this country—can we regard their attitude as so indefensible? Have we forgotten so soon what we did in a similar case?
I have said these things to-day because I believe that this is, in a sense, a moment of truth, in which we must all search our consciences. We live here in England, 5,000 miles away from Rhodesia. Most of us have probably never been there. Most of us probably will never go there. In such circumstances, while I suppose that all of us regard majority rule as the ultimate goal of British policy—it always has been—are we so very certain that we are right about the pace of constitutional advance for Africans that is safe for Rhodesia to-day? These Rhodesians, we must remember, are the only people at this time who are keeping the British way of life alive in Central Africa. Are we so sure that this is the right way to treat them, to stigmatise them as traitors, to do our utmost, by every means in our power, to beat them to their knees and call in the rest of the world to help us?
That is no doubt the easy course for us, but are we so sure that in the long run it is the wise and courageous course? We are told that Mr. Smith and his people—and, I suppose, a large section of the population of Rhodesia—are rebels. That, indeed, may quite rightly be the technical word, but I cannot believe that they are rebels in any disgraceful sense, any more than George Washington was or those Irish leaders of the past, who I am sure the noble Earl, Lord Longford, holds in high esteem.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, there, of course, we had a small country fighting for its freedom—not 200,000 people trying to oppress 4 million.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I do not propose to argue with the noble Earl. The point I was trying to make—and I did not make it as a debating point—is that there are nominal rebels who are not disgraceful rebels but fighting for a high ideal. Their action, it may be said, has been wrong, and a

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great many noble Lords would argue that that is true. I personally have always opposed a unilateral declaration of independence and I regret as bitterly as anyone that things should have come to this pass. Their action may be said to have been unconstitutional. Certainly it has been, and those of us who believe in constitutional action must regret deeply that, for that reason alone, it has been regarded as necessary to take this action. But there are occasions, as Burke, who has been so often quoted this afternoon, once said at the time of the American War of Independence, when men driven to a certain point say to themselves—and I would recommend this classic dictum by one of our great political thinkers to the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne:
"It is not what a lawyer tells me I may do; but what humanity, reason and justice tell me I must do."
Personally, placed as the Rhodesian Government were and bearing in mind their past experiences of British Governments, I cannot regard what they have done as wicked; and our supine repudiation of our own kith and kin, who alone have made Rhodesia what it is, under pressure mainly from a hostile junta of semi-civilised States, whose motives are wholly political, this stigmatising of them as rebels, when in fact they were, as I think most of us realise, the loyalest of the loyal subjects of the Queen, seems to me—and I am not ashamed to say it—about the lowest point our country has ever reached, and I am pretty sure that countless people in this country feel the same. These letters in my hand are the sort of thing that reach me by every post, from people of every section of the population who hold the views which I have made bold to express this afternoon. Do not, therefore, my Lords, I beg of you, with all the force at my command, do not, by any action that we now take, let us sink lower still and give any impression, in this country or outside, that we are persecuting, for reasons of mere expediency, those who have proved themselves in our own extremity our truest friends in the world.
Feeling as I do, quite frankly, my first instinct was to vote against the Second Reading of this Bill, but I believe that that would not be a proper course. For
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once this unhappy situation has been reached, everybody must realise that there well may be certain steps which have to be taken, some which may even be regarded as uncontroversial but which, in any case, are inevitable. But it is my intention, when the Bill itself comes to your Lordships' House at a later hour to-day, to move an Amendment to ensure that, before any action is taken by Order in Council under this Bill of a nature which touches the imposition of sanctions, it must first be approved by both Houses of Parliament. That is not only, I think, clearly desirable in a matter of this importance, but also, I submit, in the highest degree constitutional. As such, I shall move it, and I hone that it will receive the support of the Government and the House.
4.31 p.m.
LORD VERNON: My Lords, as this is the first occasion on which I have had the honour to address your Lordships, I should like to crave the indulgence of the House. In spite of the pitfalls of the subject of this debate, I shall try to be as brief and non-controversial as possible. The dilemma which now faces this country regarding Rhodesia is indeed agonising, and to those who, like myself, have personal ties with Southern Africa, I think it is especially agonising. I say this because the problems in Rhodesia are, to my way of thinking, but a microcosm of the problems further South—problems which in the case of South Africa have much more dreadful and much more serious implications, implications which will have to be faced one day; and, possibly, the sooner they are faced, the better. But that is a point to which I shall be returning a little later in my speech.
We must all admire the prodigious efforts made by the Prime Minister during his visit recently to Salisbury, and subsequently, to reach agreement with Mr. Smith on the basis of an advance towards majority rule. But I cannot see how negotiations on these lines can ever have had a real chance of success. The trouble is that the so-called five principles from which we cannot depart are not what Mr. Smith and his colleagues either want or can accept. There is so much at stake for Mr. Smith and his fellow Europeans. They see threatened, not only their homes—in many cases the

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only homes they have ever known—but also their livelihood and their whole way of life: a way of life closely modelled on that in South Africa and, let us be frank about this, a way of life which has been connived at by successive British Governments over a period of forty years, during which time Rhodesia has been independent in all but name. Indeed, it is only by chance that Rhodesia is still the responsibility of the British Crown. If the referendum in 1922 had been marginally different and Rhodesia had voted to join South Africa, Rhodesia would now be part of the Independent Republic of South Africa.
I think we have to be quite clear what we are trying to achieve. At present there is great injustice in Rhodesia for the African majority. But we do not want to replace injustice for the many by injustice for the few. We must arrive at a solution where there is justice for all. The use of force to quash the rebellion has been ruled out, quite rightly, by the Prime Minister. There are many arguments against the use of force, but to my mind one of the most cogent is the effect it would have on the Armed Forces who might be asked to carry it out. Speaking personally, if I were still in the Armed Forces, and much as I dislike the mentality and racial attitude of the Europeans in Rhodesia, I should find it difficult, if not impossible, to obey orders to shoot down people some of whom were my comrades in arms in the last war. I sincerely hope that no British Government, whatever the provocation, and whatever the pressure brought to bear on them, both in the United Nations and from certain quarters in this country, will ever put British troops in such an invidious position.
We must all hope that the present measures will bring about a change of régime in Salisbury. But if they do not, and if the sanctions at present being applied do not work—and there is considerable doubt whether they will work, in view of the loopholes which exist through South Africa and through Mozambique—and if in the last resort Mr. Smith knows that we are not going to use force, then it seems to me that this country will be placed in a very weak and humiliating position before the world, because although we might continue to maintain that Rhodesia is our sole
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responsibility, we should be unable to show that we were achieving results. If the circumstances should arise, I should have thought that there was a strong case for admitting quite frankly and openly that we have been unable to resolve this problem, and for placing it fairly and squarely before the United Nations, in which we could play a most constructive rôle.
But I think there is another reason why the United Nations may be a more appropriate body to handle this. In my view, strong coercion against Rhodesia alone—and I emphasise "alone"—is not desirable either by force or by sanctions. The problem should be looked at not in isolation, but in the framework of Southern Africa as a whole—and by that I mean Africa South of the Zambesi River. By reason of history, geography, education and race, it is often forgotten that so many of the white minority of Rhodesia are Afrikaners. For all these reasons, Rhodesia is closely affiliated to South Africa, where the root of the trouble lies. Too often in the past we have been buffeted from one African crisis to another as the pressures have mounted against us. This time I suggest that we should give a lead. But if the Rhodesian problem is to be looked at in this wider context, we must be realistic. The parrot cry of "One man, one vote", becomes completely senseless when applied to a population of 8 million Africans, 3 million Europeans and upwards of 2 million coloured people. It cannot conceivably be fair.
I want to suggest to your Lordships this afternoon a rather different approach. I believe that the only answer which is fair to all—and we must be fair to all—is to partition Southern Africa, including Rhodesia, between the races. We should aim to settle, as the result of a single package deal, the problem not only of Rhodesia, but of South Africa, South-West Africa and the Portuguese territories as well. I envisage a genuine partition of that country and its wealth, not the bogus form practised by Dr. Verwoerd in his Bantustan. I shall not attempt to go into the details of such a settlement—it could take various forms—but I certainly foresee the white people giving up the whole of Natal, including Durban, part of the Transvaal, and a large part, if not the whole, of Rhodesia.

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It will involve very heavy sacrifices by the white people, but when they had made those sacrifices they would at least be left with a country which was entirely theirs, where their children could grow up and which would, I hope, he internationally guaranteed. I am, of course, well aware that what I suggest this afternoon would not be readily acceptable to Dr. Verwoerd, any more than it would be to Mr. Smith. It is then that I suggest that coercion should be used. If the United Nations were able and were willing to offer Rhodesia a wise, reasonable and practicable alternative, which would not he the case with majority rule, then I think they should not hesitate to enforce compliance by economic sanctions against South Africa and Rhodesia. If these were thoroughly applied, I am sure there is little doubt that they would prove effective.
What I am advocating would be very difficult to effect. It would cost a lot of money, it would cause hardship to many, and there would have to be movements of population. I realise that I shall be told that what I suggest is, therefore, impracticable. But I myself believe that all these obstacles can be overcome if there is a will to overcome them. This problem must be faced sooner or later, and let us face it now, while the opportunity occurs. To look beyond the frontiers of Rhodesia to these wider horizons at the present crucial time will require great courage, but we shall achieve much more, and we shall achieve it more fairly, and by doing so I believe we shall gain the gratitude of future generations, not only in this country, but in Southern Africa as well.
4.42 p.m.
EARL ATTLEE: My Lords, it falls to me to congratulate the noble Lord who has just sat down on a very interesting and constructive speech. I do not want to detain your Lordships long. I have no long experience of Rhodesia. Thirteen years ago I visited both Northern and Southern Rhodesia. At that time these problems had not arisen acutely. We had the wise leadership of the noble Viscount, Lord Malvern, who made such an impressive contribution to-day in the Press.
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I can recall talking, both in Northern and in Southern Rhodesia, with Africans, and their great opposition at that moment was to the Central African Federation, on the ground that they could not trust Southern Rhodesians. They said that there were Southern Rhodesians who would not accord the African his place which he demanded as a civilised, or potentially civilised, human being. They were right. But, of course, if one wants to job back, one can see how these troubles arose long ago. I recall how we all applauded the action of Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman in giving back self-government to the Transvaal—a very generous act. There were only two Members in the House of Commons who saw the danger and raised the matter. They were Sir Charles Dilke, and Mr. Keir Hardie, who pointed out the danger of handing over to a white minority a very large black population who were not only different in race, but their servants and their employees.
Then we had the same problem again in 1933, and we made the same mistake. We did not allow for the potential development of the African. Perhaps it was very short-sighted; perhaps we could not see. It seems to me to-day that we have this situation, where the present ruling clique in Southern Rhodesia consists of people who do not know educated Africans, whose relations with the African is that of master to servant, whose mentality is rather that of an American in the Southern States before the Civil War, and whose descendants survive to-day in the Ku Klux Klan. It is no good jobbing back. What we have to look at to-day is the position, both now and in the future.
I think that the Prime Minister went to all lengths to try to reach a settlement. He was following in the steps of Conservative Prime Ministers. I recall Mr. Harold Macmillan's words in South Africa about the "wind of change". Many people did not like that phrase. But he was right: there is that "wind of change". This trouble in Southern Rhodesia is only part of a world-wide change, the relationship between peoples of different colours and different stages of civilisation. In my day it was in Asia; to-day it is in Africa.

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That is the problem that must be solved by the younger generation to-day—how to effect a proper relationship between these great races. It is not just a case of treating them well, and that kind of thing. This is a case of status. The African to-day, like the Asian yesterday, claims status. He wants to be in a position in which he has self-respect, and you cannot give him that so long as you deny him human rights. To-day we have this very difficult position. It is rather suggested that it has been brought on by this country, but I do not think so. This present situation has been provoked by the fact that there are in power in Southern Rhodesia a comparatively small group of people who are actuated by fear. It should be realised that it is a fear one might well have of people exposed to a much larger population with wives and families at stake. It is a real fear. But fear is not a good counsellor. It is a pity that these people who are in the grip of fear should be those who were formally in command in Rhodesia, people mostly of mercenary descent, whose attitude towards the African was far different.
Now to-day we have this problem, and I think it is inevitable that we should take strong action, but no stronger than is necessary—decisive action, but endeavouring to do as little harm as possible. That is our duty. We must look beyond the immediate trouble. We must not act out of vindictiveness. We act only because we have to try to establish equal justice. I think we are quite right to try to bring this matter to the United Nations. It may be that it will have to be settled in some way by the United Nations, but perhaps, in the very interesting suggestion of Lord Vernon, we may have to be prepared to take generous action where people find they can no longer stay in Southern Rhodesia. I am quite sure we must realise the full demands of the Africans.
I thought that the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, gave an expression of a view so often taken by ruing classes. They are afraid of other people in subjection. It is the kind of attitude taken by Lord Addington in regard to Peterloo and the Tolpuddle Martyrs. That kind of action, that kind of statement, is so plausible. Such people are afraid of the
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ordinary working people in this country, whom they call "the mob". We very nearly came to a bloody revolution at that time, and but for wiser counsels over the ages we might have had a revolution. We got away from that, but we have to realise that the Africans to-day are in just the same position as the uneducated people in this country were then. We are their rulers and we are also their economic exploiters; and I say that, when we apply these sanctions, they should be short, sharp and strong. The sooner they can stop, the better; and the sooner we are prepared to treat with these frightened people—Mr. Smith and his friends—generously, the better.
Perhaps we might get a guarantee for their safety from the United Nations, which includes the African States as well as the European and Asian States. Something of that kind may be needed in order to restore confidence. To-day we are suffering from the fact that power in Rhodesia has fallen into the hands of frightened people, and one cannot get frightened people to hear reason. It may be that some degree of coercion by economic sanctions is necessary. If those sanctions are to be applied, let it be done thoroughly. We have examples of sanctions which did not work. If only we had applied sanctions properly, we should have stopped Mussolini in his tracks. Whatever action is taken, let it be decisive and forceful, but not vindictive, and with a realisation of the feelings behind this con test.
4.55 p.m.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: My Lords, I am sure that anyone who speaks in this, debate to-day must speak with a deep sense of responsibility. I think many would not wish to speak, and I myself would much rather not have taken part in this debate, but if one has borne responsibility in this area for Rhodesia and the Federation then I think it is one's duty to try to make as constructive suggestions as one can. In this tragedy—and it is a tragedy—which has come upon Rhodesia there is one thing on which, I think, all your Lordships will be agreed, and that is a feeling of profound regret that the Rhodesian Ministers were not prepared to carry on under the 1961 Constitution until the Royal Commission had a chance to function or some other solution could be reached.

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For my part, I am convinced that throughout these negotiations the Prime Minister has been sincerely desirous of getting a settlement, and I believe also that Mr. Smith has been sincerely desirous of getting such a settlement. There is one thing in the course of the Prime Minister's negotiations which I regret. At one stage, and it may have been an important stage, in the discussions I think it was unfortunate that the Prime Minister, perhaps not intentionally, gave the impression, while accepting that there should be a Royal Commission—which I think was a valuable suggestion and was one which, after all, Mr. Smith was just as prepared to accept as the British Government were—that the two Governments would he in a different position: that the Rhodesian Government would be bound by the unanimous findings of the Royal Commission but that the British Government would not be so bound.
It is quite true that later on the Prime Minister said that what he had meant was that Parliament would have the last word. Of course that is quite true. Parliament is paramount. But what the Prime Minister could, and I think should, have said at the critical stage, as indeed he said afterwards, was that if the Royal Commission made a unanimous report, then just as he expected Mr. Smith's Government to accept that, so his Government would recommend such a solution to Parliament. That was done in the end and in spite of that the break took place, but I cannot doubt that the hesitation, as it appeared, in regard to the acceptance of a unanimous report must have been used by some of the people in Rhodesia, including some of the Ministers, to oppose a settlement. It is common ground that there are certain Ministers in Rhodesia who were really quite determined throughout not to come to a settlement, and they may have used that to oppose it.
I think there are three things that we should remember about the 1961 Constitution. I agree with the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, that this Constitution really has given to the Government of Rhodesia practically complete self-government. It is true it has not done so in regard to foreign affairs, but I should have thought the great issue is
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not whether they should spend a great deal of money in appointing Ambassadors here and there. In everything that concerns the internal affairs of Rhodesia under that Constitution they have been completely masters of their own house. As Mr. Smith himself pointed out with regard to that Constitution, at the Conference at which it was established nearly everybody accepted it: the British Government, of course, accepted it; so did Sir Edgar Whitehead's Government, which was then in power, and so also did the Africans. That is very important.
Remember, the Africans, both Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole and the Africans they represented, accepted it; so did the Central African Party, and the coloured community and the Asians, and the representatives of the Chiefs. What is more, it is again recorded in the record of that Conference that all the Africans agreed that the provision for the Constitutional Council which was enshrined in the Constitution afforded to the Africans quite as good a safeguard as the reserved powers of the Secretary of State. I think it is worth quoting:
"The Conference agreed that the decision to enshrine a Declaration of Rights in the new Constitution, to establish the Constitutional Council and to permit appeals in this connection to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, would provide safeguards against discriminatory legislation as fully effective as those at present afforded by the powers reserved to the United Kingdom Government."
Under that Constitution Southern Rhodesia prospered; under that Constitution it developed; under that Constitution it borrowed money; and under it the Africans also prospered exceedingly. As a matter of fact, the Africans in Southern Rhodesia were certainly a good deal better off materially than the Africans in Northern Rhodesia. And it was that Constitution that Mr. Smith claimed was acceptable to the majority of the population and should be the basis of the grant of independence, and it was that issue that he was prepared to leave to the Royal Commission.
I do not agree with my noble friend Lord Salisbury on one point, when he says it is quite impossible to say that something should be acceptable to the population as a whole, and, What does it mean?—we do not go by it here. In fact, so far as I could follow him, the greatest test of merit was that you should

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disregard public opinion. But in fact what Mr. Smith himself said was that he interpreted the population as a whole, and the British Government accepted that interpretation as meaning that it was acceptable to the majority of the people, and that was the test that would have been put to the Royal Commission. Surely, in the face of all that it is a disaster that Mr. Smith and his colleagues have rushed into U.D.I. Without a doubt, it will prove a disaster to Southern Rhodesia. But, let us make no mistake, it will be damaging for this country, too—damaging economically at a time when our economy needs all the trade and all the opportunity that it can possibly get; damaging also to less material but not less real and valued interests, to ties of long friendship, often with kith and kin.
To-day, as it seems to me, the important consideration for all of us is, Where do we go from here? In this tragic situation, of course the Government and Parliament here must take action. But let that action be calm, wise and well-considered. Hot heads are quite as dangerous as cold feet. Let us remember that there are not a few in Rhodesia who did not want illegal action; and, what is more, I feel sure that there are many more who really had never considered what it meant, who had never thought of the consequences at all, and who will profoundly regret, if they see the consequences, that this action should have been taken, and many more certainly who when they see the results will wish to retrace their steps. These people, naturally and rightly, have friends here. They are not friends who condone illegal action, but they are friends who want to save Rhodesians from themselves. So, whatever we do, let us avoid making it unnecessarily difficult for a future Rhodesian Government to retrace their steps. That, surely, ought to be the supreme aim of all of us and all action should subserve that purpose. Doors can open as well as shut, and doors which have been shut, even slammed, can be reopened.
I was anxious, as we all were, to see the form the Government's proposals would take. I thought one thing to be absolutely essential, and I think it is largely met under the Bill. The thing that I thought was vital was that all action should be under the constant
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supervision and control of Parliament, and that, as I say, is largely met by the provision for Affirmative rather than Negative Resolution. But, subject to this, there are a number of measures, such as exchange control and day-to-day matters, which have to be dealt with immediately and must be done continuously. On the other hand, there are other sanctions, larger economic sanctions, about which there cannot be all that hurry. An Order can be made and it can be brought at once before Parliament; it can be debated in both Houses within a day or two of being made; both Houses can express opinions. If there is agreement, then it goes through, but if there is not agreement and if second thoughts are needed—and very often the Government feel such second thoughts are wise—then the Order can be taken away and a new Order made within twenty-four hours and brought forward.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Earl on a point of clarification? Of course, in this House under the Special Orders procedure it does take more than twenty-four hours; it is bound to.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: I am sure that we could all agree. Anything can be done by legislation or indeed by Resolution of this House, and I am quite sure we could pass whatever was necessary, either by Bill or Resolution or amendment to our Standing Orders here, to bring any Order requiring an Affirmative Resolution before this House with quite as much speed as it could be brought before the other House. I am sure that, if the Government agreed, the whole House would readily assent to any amendment of our procedure to make that effective. I say that for another reason. I think there is a very large measure of agreement to-day. It seems to me that it is so enormously important that that measure of agreement should he maintained. It is important for this country; it is important for the effect in Rhodesia, too; it is important for the effect in the world. With doubtful Resolutions, on which on merits there may well be two opinions, the more we discuss the proposal fully and frankly the more we are likely to maintain that agreement which is so desirable. That would apply to all the Affirmative Resolutions.

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I would venture to suggest to my noble friend Lord Salisbury that if the Government met him on that and said they would bring any contentious Resolution before both Houses as rapidly as possible, he might be willing not to amend the Bill in the way that he is tentatively proposing to do. But perhaps the most important of all the sanctions that we have heard about stands outside this, because it comes under a different procedure—I refer to tobacco. As I understand it, that comes under some Act of 1939 and is subject only to a Negative Resolution.
LORD COLYTON: No. I am sorry to interrupt my noble friend. It is not subject to Negative Resolution either.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: I am much obliged to my noble friend. If it is not subject to any Resolution at all, then as there cannot be need for any hurry about this matter, as the existing crop has been bought, some procedure, perhaps merely a Motion of Government intention, ought certainly to be brought before both Houses so that the matter can be debated on its merits and action taken after full consideration. I am not committing myself at the moment on whether this is right or wrong. There is this to be said about it: that if this sanction were imposed it might he a most effective sanction, because money has to be borrowed for the crop, to finance the planting of the crop and so on, and that makes it something which comes home to a large number of people.
On the other hand, may this not fall on the just and on the unjust? There are a large number of people in Rhodesia who grow tobacco. There may be many farmers who are interested in growing tobacco but who are not active supporters of Mr. Smith. Many of them no doubt are; I do not know. But surely there should be an opportunity for considering what the results will be before this sanction is imposed. And, what is perhaps most important of all, although certainly it will hit the tobacco farmers it will hit surely the natives far harder. I had a great deal to do with getting started the growing of the right kind of tobacco in Rhodesia and elsewhere, away back in the ' thirties when I was Colonial Secretary. There are probably tens
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of thousands of Africans in Rhodesia who are employed in growing that crop to-day.
LORD COLERAINE: My Lords, will my noble friend allow me to interrupt? I understood him to say that he thought it desirable that this Order banning the import of tobacco should appear before Parliament so that it could be debated. I think he said that, did he not?
THE EARL OF SWINTON: Yes.
LORD COLERAINE: Would my noble friend allow me to tell him that I propose to move an Amendment in Committee on the Bill which would have exactly that effect? I will show my noble friend that Amendment, and I hope I may count on his support when he has seen it.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: That is most interesting. So long as we get this issue brought before Parliament, whether it is brought under an Amendment, to bring it actually within the scope of this Bill, or whether it is brought by a Resolution of the Government ad hoc, I do not particularly mind. But I am glad that we are at one that this is a matter which, before action is taken, ought to come before both Houses of Parliament.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, this is a matter in which the noble Earl is considerably interested. Would he permit me to remind him that there are opportunities for this matter to be debated in another place on Supply Day and on a Resolution? As the noble Earl also knows, it would always be within the right of any Member of this House to raise the matter on our own Order Paper so that it can be discussed. Therefore it would be quite wrong to say that this matter could not be discussed in either House.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: Well, it was not I who said that it could not be discussed in either House. I was asking that it should be discussed. The noble Lords who interrupted me said that it could not be discussed here. But my point is that it is a matter of urgency. We cannot wait for a Supply Day in another place. I do not know how long it takes to get a Private Member's Motion nut down here. As I understand

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it, the Order is now in effect. That, I think, is most serious. My plea is all the stronger if the Order is in effect. And if at present everybody is forbidden to finance the new tobacco crop, then the sooner this matter is brought before both Houses the better, and it certainly ought to come before the House on the initiative of the Government.
I do not want to make a Party point of this issue. I have not myself made up my mind about its merits. But if the noble and learned Lord wants to carry the whole House and the whole country with him and as far as possible keen us together on this question, then let us have every opportunity for debate and unbiased consideration. I am sure it need not mean delay to make it subject to Parliamentary control. This Parliament can, and I am sure will, act with expedition and firmness, but with a deep sense of responsibility. But in all the actions that the Government propose—certainly in all the action that we in Parliament take—always let us have is mind the aim that Rhodesia will come back into the Commonwealth.
5.17 p.m.
LORD GLADWYN: My Lords, no doubt your Lordships will be wondering why I am taking part in this debate at all since it is clear that I have no special knowledge of Rhodesia, but I must say that I feel I know enough at least to suspect that comparing the Rhodesian revolt of a few settlers in one of the African lands to the great historical revolt of the American colonists in the 18th century, as I rather think the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, who has just left his seat has tried to do to-day, is flying in the face of all history; and indeed, worse than that, endeavouring to confer a sort of moral justification on this Rhodesian revolt which I am sure the great majority of people in this country would not admit that it possessed.
LORD HASTINGS: My Lords, would the noble Lord say why it is flying in the face of all history to compare this with what happened in the American revolt?
LORD GLADWYN: My Lords, it is a totally different thing. The American colonists were a large and flourishing community, and they had been there a
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long time. They were not surrounded by millions of local inhabitants as the Rhodesian settlers are surrounded by 4 million Negroes. The situation is totally different in every way. The American colonists were inspired by the great doctrines of Locke and the French philosophers. I do not think that Mr. Smith is inspired by any particular philosophy.
LORD HASTINGS: My Lords, I really think that the noble Lord should go back and read his history again, because his facts are entirely inaccurate. In trying to make an analogy between the American and Rhodesian revolts I feel that the noble Lord should not make statements like that which are wholly historically untrue.
LORD GLADWYN: I was not attacking the noble Lord. I was merely commenting on something which I thought the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, said. But, of course, if I am wrong I shall be the first to apologise.
But, my Lords, what, greatly daring in view of the long list of speakers, I wanted to do when I put down my name, was to draw attention to what I think is quite an important aspect of this situation—namely, that of the United Nations, an organisation with which I have had a great deal to do in the past, and with which I have, to the best of my ability, tried to keep up since I retired from the Foreign Service.
I do not think that, under the stress of any present emotion, we should regard the United Nations only as an intolerable, if happily rather powerless, governess, or that action by it, or under its auspices, would necessarily result in transforming Rhodesia into a sort of Congo; though I must say that if it had not been for the United Nations I believe the horrible situation in the Congo a few years ago would probably have been even worse. There is no doubt at all that, United Nations or no United Nations, Mr. Smith's lunatic gesture would have given rise to a dangerous situation in which the great Powers of this world would probably all have been involved. But the United Nations is supposed to be, and to some extent already is, a machine for dealing with just such dangerous situations as this. It is possible that in the long run it may even be of considerable use.

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What is the intention of the United Nations in the present crisis? The Security Council, of course, is rightfully obliged under the Charter to decide how any situation—and this, of course, is "a situation"—which might threaten international peace and security (that is the phrase used in the Charter) should most suitably be dealt with. That is what it has to decide. Equally, under Article 2(7) of the Charter it is not entitled to concern itself with such situations as are within the domestic jurisdiction of any member. But we have ourselves so often in the past winked at the non-application of this rule that it would be difficult to invoke it over Rhodesia; though it is true that the French are doing precisely that at present, if I understand the position aright. Morever, since the Rhodesian Government is in a state of flagrant rebellion, it is difficult to see how we could effectively maintain that the effect of its actions was solely the concern of Her Majesty's Government. Thus, there is no reason why the Security Council should not concern itself with Rhodesia, and indeed every reason, I think, under the Charter why it should. In any case, this is the position, as I understand it, which has now been taken up by Her Majesty's Government. So the object of our admirable Foreign Secretary is, presumably, to have this situation examined, if possible, under Chapter VI of the Charter, which is, broadly speaking, that relating to "peaceful settlement."
But, with the best will in the world, it is difficult to see what a peaceful settlement of this situation can possibly be, other than the peaceful surrender of Mr. Smith to Her Majesty's Government and the instalment by Her Majesty's Government of another, and presumably more co-operative, Government in his place, willing and able to proceed with the development of the 1961 Constitution. If this is not the objective, what is? What it is hoped to achieve therefore, one imagines, is some discussion in the Council as a result of which the Council will approve such action as Her Majesty's Government have already taken to attain their end and keep the item on its agenda in case such action does not have the required result. Unfortunately, there is little reason to suppose that it will have
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such a result in the short run, beyond, I am afraid, severely straining the economy of Rhodesia and, to a slighter extent, that of other nations, including our own.
Few people really expect economic sanctions of any kind, even those relating to oil, to have the desired result, except perhaps over a period of years. I remember very well being a sanctioneer, as they called it, in the League of Nations in 1935. My experiences then certainly led me to believe that it was wrong to adopt sanctions at all unless one was prepared to go as far as the use of force if sanctions did not work. Anyhow, if nothing further happens beyond the sanctions we are now proposing, I am afraid that Mr. Smith will probably stay in power for a considerable time, and the rebellion as such will be seen to have succeeded, at any rate temporarily. That is what will probably happen. Mr. Smith may he increasingly "punished" for his rebellious gestures—though we are assured that the action to be taken is in no way punitive—but the only immediate result of the whole operation will be that we shall have been punished too.
Noting this fact, the Security Council will either have to recognise its own powerlessness to deal with the situation or have solemnly to declare that this is a situation which threatens international peace and security within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter. Needless to say, such a decision can be taken only if it has the concurrent votes of the five Permanent Members and two others. If a Permanent Member actually abstains, the practical effect is exactly the same as if he voted for.
Once this crucial decision has been taken (this is the point), one thing leads to another. Under the Charter a chain of events is set afoot which must lead either to a severe loss of prestige and influence for the United Nations as a whole or to the progressive and successful application of force of one kind or another, including, in the last resort, military force. Each progressive measure of force will, of course, have to have the concurrent votes of the five Permanent Members, or the equivalent abstention, otherwise it will not be valid. Permanent Members would also be well

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advised to get agreement between themselves before doing anything of the kind as to the financial implications.
Since, in the case of Mr. Smith's rebellion, we must count on the desire of the Russians, and one or two other members of the Council, to adopt what they no doubt would call forward policy, everything depends on the nature of the votes cast by the United States, France and Britain on this crucial issue of whether the rebellion is or is not a threat to international peace and security under the terms of Chapter VII, Article 39, of the Charter. If, and only if, it is so judged to be, it does not make any sense to say, in advance, that only measures of compulsion stopping short of military force will be employed to bring Mr. Smith to heel. Having decided that the rebellion is in fact a threat, the Security Council would be bound legally to do its best to eliminate it. The final measure laid down in the Charter for doing this is precisely military force.
It may well be that the Security Council will decide that no such threat exists, in the sense that, pending observation of the effect of the means already taken, it will still lie within Chapter VI of the Charter relating to peaceful settlement. If they do that, it will probably be because of the contrary votes of the three Western Permanent Members, or of one of them. But I must say that doubt whether we should be well advised to veto a positive resolution in this sense if it were known to be going to receive the concurrent votes of our two Allies, America and France, and more particularly the former. That really would expose us to the obloquy of the world and most certainly would sound the knell of the Commonwealth. There is no doubt about that.
So what I think we might very well do, if the United States decides to vote "For" on this crucial issue—which is no doubt rather improbable—would be to say that if the chain of events which is then initiated by the Security Council's decision were to end up in the application of force, it would have to be left to the United Kingdom, to us, to apply such force, and that our concurring vote on this issue would be given only on that clear condition. In other words, by "showing willing", as it were, to apply
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force if absolutely necessary and in the last resort, and provided, presumably, that we had all possible logistic and financial support also, we should be acting at once as the agent of a legally formulated world public opinion and would maintain our own control of the situation.
If we vetoed a resolution concurred in by the other great Powers concerned, this would hardly be the case. We should not have control of the situation then. Why not?—because then, under the resolution United For Peace—which, incidentally, was negotiated by the noble Lord, Lord Shawcross, and myself way back at the end of 1950—the matter would pass to the General Assembly, and if that majority of the General Assembly included America and Russia (which it obviously would in the circumstances for we should have vetoed the thing with our sole vote in the Security Council) then undoubtedly the Assembly could take effective military action and no doubt it would. Whereas if the Assembly majority did not have such support owing to the Security Council having failed to arrive at any decision, then any action by it would be ineffective, doubtfully legal and could of course, if necessary, be disregarded.
The present position, as I understand it, is that Her Majesty's Government have firmly stated that, in their view, force is no remedy for the present situation and should not therefore be employed, except, apparently, in the rather curious event of its being requested by somebody in Rhodesia or even by the Governor, if indeed he remains at liberty. If the United States shares this view, and there is some reason to suppose it does, then there is no prospect of any effective action to alter the existing situation in Rhodesia, I am afraid, since the economic sanctions which the Security Council might approve would most likely not result in the collapse of Smith, at any rate for some time, while, as I have said, the General Assembly in the absence of American support would be physically and indeed financially quite unable to organise any military action; unless indeed the Russians were deputed by a two-thirds majority of members of the Assembly to undertake an expedition—an invitation which I myself believe, however, they would undoubtedly decline. Even if they gave logistic support to a Ghanaian or

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Ethiopian army, or any other army, which is theoretically possible but I should have thought not very likely, there is no present willingness on the part of Rhodesia's neighbours to admit any such forces to their territories. Moreover, what measures other countries would take in those circumstance, is just anybody's guess. In other words, a kind of Congo situation really does seem to me to be a bit of a nightmare. So perhaps is the idea that perfectly innocent whites would be massacred elsewhere in Africa if Mr. Smith appeared in any way to be getting away with it.
We have even heard lately that there is a possibility of a race war starting shortly in Africa and involving the world. I must say that I very much doubt this possibility. Exactly who will fight whom in this African race war? Will the Russians, who after all are white, be drawn into the war against the blacks, or is it supposed that the Americans and the European armies will take the field against the embattled Negro race? I must say, my Lords, I rather doubt whether the general cause of peace is advanced by exaggerating the horrors of the present situation.
It must be admitted that if in the long run economic sanctions are seen to be pretty useless from the point of view of achieving our ultimate end, it is conceivable, though even then unlikely, that Zambia and other neighbouring States might, as a result of some resolution by the General Assembly, call in Soviet or even, I suppose, Chinese military forces. But if they did this, which I repeat is unlikely, it would mean upsetting the whole world balance, and I suspect that this would be rectified by other means before the Russians or the Chinese even got near the Zambesi, just as it was rectified when the Russian ships turned back from Cuba.
What is certainly deplorable is the extent to which co-operation between blacks and whites in Africa north of the Zambesi River may be prejudiced by the Rhodesian attempt to put the clock back south of it, which cannot of course in the nature of things last for very long. But there really is no reason why such co-operation should be imperilled if Her Majesty's Government not only vigorously oppose Mr. Smith, but even go so far as
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to say at some stage—not now necessarily—that while themselves objecting to the use of military force except in the last resort, they would nevertheless co-operate in any action decided on by the Security Council acting within the strict limits of its legal competence.
My Lords, I have attempted to set forth in a few minutes as best I can the legal and political position so far as the United Nations is concerned, as I understand it. But there is only one golden thread to lead us safely through what The Times has properly described as a political minefield, and that is absolute Anglo-American unity. No British decision should if humanly possible be taken without American approval and vice versa. We are unfortunately not yet in the European Economic Community; otherwise, the same might well have applied o our European neighbours also. Still, a united Western view, if it is achievable, would also be of the greatest assistance in enabling this country to emerge with untarnished honour from one of the greatest moral crises in its long history, and it is to that end that we should all work, irrespective of any Party feeling.
5.38 p.m.
LORD MACPHERSON OF DRUMOCHTER: My Lords, I apologise for addressing your Lordships for the first time on such a controversial subject. Unfortunately, it is one on which I cannot remain silent. Rhodesia is a country which I know from many visits, a country in which I have many acquaintances both black and white. Naturally, I do not agree with or condone the illegal action taken by Mr. Smith, but I do not altogether agree with the way is which this serious situation has been handled. It is my opinion that the majority of people in this country do not know the position, and I find it distressing that the bulk of the British Press has not more fully explained the facts which have led to the critical situation of to-day.
The Rhodesian Constitution accords the vote regardless of race or colour. The voting system is designed not to maintain privileges for any one race, but to protect and maintain standards for all. In the United Kingdom we give the vote only to those of us over the age of 21. In fact, I assume that below this age we consider that the individual is not sufficiently intellectually mature. But

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Rhodesia has very different conditions to contend with. The average adult of 21 is not ready to control the destiny of his country.
As the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has advised your Lordships, the Legislative Assembly consists of 65 members, 50 of whom are elected by the more highly qualified A Roll and 15 by the lower qualified B Roll. Without boring your Lordships with all the alternative qualifications under the different Rolls, I think the minimum qualifications are worth mentioning: for the A Roll an income of £330 per annum or ownership of property to the value of £550 and four years' secondary education; for the B Roll, over 30 years of age and an income of £198 or ownership of property to the value of £385. The system may not be ideal, but it is designed to entrust the control of the country to the educated, to the people with a stake in the country and to those people earning a basic wage. It is reported in the Press that this system could give an African majority in as little as 15 years, but, as somebody else has said, what Africa needs most of all is time.
As education plays such an important part in their voting system, I should like to give your Lordships some further facts. The 1957 share of the revenue for African education was 11·9 per cent. of the total; in 1962–63 it had risen to 20 per cent., amounting to £5¼ millions; and in 1964 the amount voted was £6·2 millions. It must be borne in mind that taxation falls mainly on the shoulders of the 220,000 Europeans. This, surely, shows what a tremendous effort Rhodesia is making to educate her people. Of the African population of school-going age, 95 per cent. now receive a minimum of five years' education. Lastly on this subject, I think it is interesting to compare Rhodesia's ratio of children at school to total population with those of some other African countries. Rhodesia, 1 in 6; Ghana, 1 in 8; Algeria, 1 in 21; Mali, 1 in 61; Ethiopia, 1 in 108. I hope that what I have said will show your Lordships that Rhodesia is striving to obtain a multiracial community far sooner and on far surer lines than most other African countries.
One of the most important causes of Rhodesia's illegal action is that the Afri-
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can nationalists will not participate in any constitutional discussions but would rather run to London. It is hoped, it may be vainly, that once it is realised that the power of London to veto legislation and to interfere in the internal government of Rhodesia has been stopped, the African nationalists will then sit down with their own Government and work out their domestic problems.
How are we to break this present critical position? By economic sanctions, thus penalising the very people this House is so anxious to protect? To bring, as some reports say, Mr. Smith to his knees? Yes; no doubt we, backed by the rest of the world, will bring Mr. Smith and Rhodesia finally to their knees; but at what cost? And then what? The Prime Minister has reiterated that he is always willing to negotiate. Surely we cannot sit back satisfied with the disastrous position we have to-day whilst our enemies work away and exploit this breach and our embarrassment. This whole question has become too vital and too important for Party politics, with each side striving to win political gain from the other.
I should like to suggest a delegation, not from the Government (as our Government and the illegal Government of Rhodesia cannot be on speaking terms) but from the British Parliament—if you like, a fact-finding mission. What we want to know, and what should be put to this country, is: what are the terms the Rhodesian people consider they can possibly accept, and what exactly are the clauses the British Government wish to insert into the 1961 Constitution? It is also just possible that such a mission could find a solution, now that Rhodesia has had a taste of the world's reaction to U.D.I. In the present circumstances, I cannot think of anyone more suitable to lead such a mission than Sir Alec Douglas-Home, one of the most respected Members of both Houses and someone whom I am sure would obtain the maximum co-operation in Rhodesia; and he could be supported by such other capable brains as Lord Shawcross and others. This whole position, irrespective of who caused it, must be resolved as soon as possible, before we do unthinkable damage to Rhodesia, this country and the Commonwealth.
5.47 p.m.
LORD COLYTON: My Lords, my first duty—and a great pleasure it is—is to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Macpherson of Drumochter, on a clear, simple and constructive speech, delivered in a most effective way. We all remember his father, who sat on the Labour Benches, with great affection; and we remember, too, the great interest that he always had in the Commonwealth. It is, therefore, a real pleasure to all of us to welcome his son here to-day, and to say that we hope to hear from him often in the future.
My Lords, this is a day of deep sorrow for us all, and especially, I think, to those of us who know and love Rhodesia. It is a tragic break after 75 years of a close family relationship between our two countries in peace and in war. Before I proceed further, I must declare an interest in Rhodesia, as a director of a company with timber and some city property there. I would first wish to endorse what my noble friend Lord Salisbury said about the terrible disillusion in Rhodesia in regard to Britain, which has affected members of all Parties there, over the last five years. For over forty years Rhodesia has had full internal self-government. She has never been a Crown Colony, as the Prime Minister suggested in his broadcast on Thursday night. She has never been governed from Whitehall. The only British legislation which has ever been specifically passed in regard to Rhodesia is the enabling Acts which brought into force the two Constitutions of 1923 and 1961. Now we have U.D.I. and this enabling Bill.
I suppose it is true that history has shown that in certain circumstances illegal declarations of independence have, in the long run, justified themselves. I am referring particularly, of course, to the American Declaration of Independence and to the Declarations of Independence of Spanish-American countries throughout the nineteenth century, often carried through with our help.
I did think that the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, was a little ill-advised—I am sorry that he is not in his place—to rebuke my noble friend Lord Salisbury about his reference to the American Declaration of Independence. He said that one could make no comparison. In some ways that is not true. There was
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certainly no consultation with the American Indians on that occasion, certainly no "one man, one vote" there. But all you have to do is to look at the television on any Saturday night to see what happened to them. I think perhaps that the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, and the noble Lords who sit on those Benches must have forgotten that the yellow colours they sport at Election time were taken straight from the buff facings of the uniform of the American rebel militia.
I am not suggesting—do not let it be thought—that I am condoning U.D.I.; nor am I suggesting in any way that the Prime Minister has behaved as a modern Lord North. On the contrary, except for his rather hectoring message to Rhodesia in October 1964, I would submit with all respect that both he and the Commonwealth Secretary have shown a rare understanding of the feelings of Rhodesians, white and black, and of all the other aspects of this most intractable problem. I felt the same thing when listening to the noble and learned Lord who sits on the Woolsack this afternoon. If I may, I will venture to correct him on two points. One is that Sir Humphrey Gibbs is not a Rhodesian: he was born in this country. The other is that, when he referred to the one-third South Africans in Rhodesia, he perhaps overlooked the fact that very many of them moved up to Rhodesia to get away from apartheid.
As I say, I felt up to a fortnight ago when the Prime Minister returned from Salisbury that he and his colleagues had handled the Rhodesian question with conspicious tact and skill. When he first put forward his proposal for a Royal Commission, I felt there was still hope. In his Statement to the House of Commons to which I listened on November 1 he made it clear that, although the matter was ultimately one for Parliament, if there was a unanimous report by the Royal Commission it would in practice mean that both sides would accept it. Then, unfortunately, as my noble friend Lord Swinton said, he changed his position in his Statement to the House of Commons on November 3. I thought he put forward conditions which it was impossible for Mr. Smith to accept. The first was that it must be made known that the British Government themselves

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disagreed with the Rhodesian Government's Constitutional proposals. The second was that, even when the final and unanimous report was submitted, the British Government could not be expected to commit themselves in advance. It was what one newspaper called, "Heads I win, tails you lose". It meant that if the Rhodesian people rejected the proposals, Mr. Smith's cause fell to the ground; but if they accepted them the British Government still reserved their position as to what course of action to take. The third was a suggestion for a national referendum in Rhodesia which, once "one man one vote" was excluded, was clearly contradictory and unacceptable.
Although at the last minute I think the Prime Minister modified his attitude on the second point, I had little doubt after November 3 that U.D.I. was only a question of time. That is not to say that I approved it. I am bound to tell the House that I have given this question of U.D.I. much thought over the past two years. I have come to the conclusion, rightly or wrongly, that U.D.I. could only be justified under extreme provocation either by some act of the British Government, such as an attempt to impose a new Constitution on Rhodesia, or by some act by the United Nations in which they sought to coerce the Rhodesian Government through sanctions or by force. I could not feel that the impasse reached last week in those negotiations really fell within that category.
So we are hound to ask ourselves why Mr. Smith decided on this course of action. At first sight, as other noble Lords have said, it might seem that it would have been so easy for him to carry on indefinitely under the present Constitution. But to understand his reasons, we must try to look into the minds of the European population of Southern Rhodesia over the past twenty years. There is no doubt, although there is no written document to support this, that Southern Rhodesia could have had its independence for the asking during the war, or immediately after. At that time it was not considered to be particularly urgent, and Rhodesians doubted whether the trappings of sovereignty were really worth the additional burden on their limited exchequer.
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Then, in 1953, came federation, and all the hopes and dreams of a great multiracial State headed for independence within the Commonwealth to which that gave rise. It was not until after successive tragic events led to the break-up of the Federation that Southern Rhodesia turned to the only practicable alternative; namely, independence for themselves. They saw Malawi and Zambia, their former partners in the Federation—countries far more backward than they were—going forward to independence. They saw the great stream of British immigrants drying up and the falling away of overseas capital investment in Rhodesia to a mere trickle. They felt that only by a permanent solution to this issue of independence could they succeed in retrieving their fortunes and ensuring the full development of the natural resources, brains and manpower of Southern Rhodesia to the benefit of all its inhabitants alike.
So it was that the Government of Mr. Winston Field and his successor, Mr. Ian Smith, entered into negotiations for independence based on the 1961 Constitution. I will not attempt to go into all the matters which the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Saffron Walden, has touched upon this afternoon; but I felt at the time that this was fully justified. The resistance shown by successive British Governments to this plea has only hardened European opinion in Rhodesia and slowed up African advance to political equality of status.
The correspondence and the interchanges dragged on, first under one Government and then another; more and more wild statements were made, and resolutions passed at the United Nations. To the North, in newly-independent States, there were mutinies, Communist infiltration and modification of the Constitutions within a few months of adoption. Political rights of the Europeans throughout those territories have been virtually extinguished. Even to-day there are 1,300 European mixed farmers in Kenya, who, after 20, 40 or 60 years of hard work are quite unable to carry on their farming—and that in spite of the fact that they have a friendly and helpful African Government. Yet they cannot sell their farms and get out. In oilier territories there were uprisings, followed by massacres on such a scale and so

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bestial as to be beyond description. Zanzibar first, then Ruanda, and more recently the Congo.
So the Rhodesians, in their uncertainty as to their future, saw the possibility of all those things happening to them. I am convinced that, as other noble Lords have said, in their final attempt to achieve independence by negotiation they were entirely sincere. But time was slipping away. There were, of course, in my judgment some unnecessary pinpricks on the part of the British Government; like the attempt to block the appointment of a Rhodesian diplomatic agent in Lisbon which had been conceded to the Federal Government of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1957 and transferred to the Southern Rhodesian Government in a letter from Mr. Duncan Sandys to Mr. Winston Field on December 10, 1963. There were, in my opinion, injudicious statements, like that of the noble Lord, Lord Caradon, who in the midst of these negotiations told an audience in New York:
"The confrontation between black nations in Africa and the former colonial Powers is not far ahead. The fuses are already lit, ready to blow the whole world sky high."
I do not think that that was the height of diplomatic tact.
There was also the encouragement given, most unwisely—and here I do blame the Government—to Sir Hugh Beadle, the Chief Justice of Rhodesia, whom we all know and admire, to come to London without the authority of his Government. That, I feel, must have been almost the last straw. Incidentally, I was amazed to learn from the Prime Minister's speech on Friday that he had been discussing with Sir Hugh Beadle the implications of, and counter-measures to, U.D.I. while he (the Prime Minister) was still in Salisbury and before U.D.I. had happened at all. After all, Sir Hugh is a high functionary of self-governing Rhodesia and not of the United Kingdom.
However, whatever may have been the final calculation which influenced Mr. Smith and his Government, the thing is now done and an illegal declaration of independence has been made. What should our actions be? I believe that in these conditions our aim should be to minimise the damage and mitigate the ill-effects flowing from the present situa-
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tion on all concerned, on Rhodesians, black and white, on Zambia, on Malawi and, finally, on Britain herself. It is in this light that I feel bound to view the Prime Minister's Statement on Thursday and the Bill which we are shortly to consider.
Of the long list of harsh measures which the Prime Minister read out and which it is proposed to take, some are constitutionally consequential on Mr. Smith's illegal action. Others are, in my judgment, merely punitive. What are our reasons, for example, for banning purchases of tobacco and Rhodesian sugar? Are the Government not aware that the effect of this will fall, to begin with, only upon thousands of African workers in the field, who at the moment are engaged in putting in seedlings? Is it the Government's aim to stimulate unemployment and starvation and, ultimately, chaos and bloodshed, in an attempt to bring Mr. Smith's de facto Government to its knees? I cannot believe that this is their purpose, nor do I think that they will succeed in doing so; but by their proposals they will undoubtedly cause untold suffering to hundreds of thousands of Africans and their families, both in the country and in the towns.
I was glad to see that the Prime Minister repeated his undertaking that there should be no use of force. At least, there is to be no second Boer War. But if that is conceded, what can be the justification for using these other cruel and punitive measures? I understand from the Bill that we are to have an opportunity of discussing and approving some, at any rate, of the measures which it is intended to impose. I hope that when these measures come before both Houses of Parliament we shall address ourselves to them in a spirit of humanity and Christianity and in an effort to limit the damage to what is constitutionally absolutely necessary and inevitable.
There are certain aspects of the sanctions which the Government are seeking to impose on which I should like to ask one or two questions. Can the noble Earl who is to reply for the Government say how it is possible to argue that Rhodesia can remain part of Her Majesty's Dominions but at the same time is no longer to be entitled to the privileges appertaining to that status? I am

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referring to Imperial Preference and, for example, the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement. Can the noble Earl tell me under what section of the Rhodesian Constitution of 1961, the Commonwealth Secretary, acting through the Governor, had the right to dismiss Mr. Smith and his Cabinet last Thursday? Or is this one of the things which are to be regularised retrospectively by the Bill? If so, I think that we should be told accordingly.
What will be the effect of these measures on our own balance of payments? What is it going to cost us? Are we, in fact, going to have to spend at least £35 million a year in order to buy American stockpiled tobacco, which no doubt they will be only too glad to get rid of? It seems to me that these and many other matters need to be cleared up. No doubt they will frequently be coming before us in debates over the next weeks and months.
I submit again to your Lordships that the way to preserve law and order in Rhodesia, and perhaps, let us hope, one day bring about a return to legality and to the Commonwealth, is not by penal and punitive measures, subject to the inevitable constitutional steps to which reference has been made. For 37 years, from 1923 to 1960, Rhodesia advanced, entirely under its own Government, to high standards of education, health and housing, to become one of the most progressive territories in the whole of Africa. Since 1960, political advancement has been rapid. Rhodesia is one of the few countries in Africa where a genuine non-racial democracy has been emerging in peace and in order. My belief, despite what the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has said, is that had independence been freely conceded in 1963, when the Federation broke up, we should have had majority rule in Rhodesia within fifteen or twenty years. I still believe that even to-day the majority of Rhodesians would accept this. Those who voted for Todd and Whitehead, Welensky and Malvern, would accept this, once they were sure that their own future as an independent country was in their own hands. Whatever we may feel about Mr. Smith's action, do not let us now, by our actions here, throw Rhodesia into chaos, racial strife and bloodshed which could destroy all.
6.6 p.m.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, may I first refer to the speech which has been delivered by my noble friend Lord Macpherson of Drumochter? I heard his proposal that a fact-finding commission should go to Rhodesia. That was exactly the objective of the Royal Commission, which has been rejected by Mr. Smith and his colleagues, even after all the concessions which were made by the Prime Minister in his telephone conversation, which has been reported this morning. Nevertheless, I should welcome a fact-finding commission going to Rhodesia. My only criticism of my noble friend's proposal is of the personnel which he proposed. I am not sure that they would be acceptable to all sections of the public in this country.
The noble Lord, Lord Colyton, and I have frequently clashed in another place. I want to say to him that I recognise the deep sincerity with which he has spoken, as I recognise the sincerity with which the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, spoke earlier in the debate. One of the difficulties about this controversy is that there is this sincerity on both sides and I know that both the noble Lords will extend that recongition to me, as I extend it to them. I would only put to them' this point. If this had been an African Government, instead of a European Government, in a British Colony which had not reached the stage of independence, and if that African Government had seized independence illegally, if that African Government had suppressed every political Party of Europeans in its territory, if that African Government had imprisoned or exiled the leaders of those European Parties, if that African Government had been responsible for an action like the Land Apportionment Act, which so unfairly divided the ownership of land between African and European populations, if that African Government had practised the kind of racial discrimination which is practised by the minority White Government in Rhodesia, would they not immediately have said that the British Government were justified in declaring the declaration of independence illegal? Would they not immediately have said that the British Government would he justified in declaring that that was a rebellion?

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Indeed, in those circumstances, I think they might well have urged much further action than the British Government have taken in the case of Rhodesia, where a Government representing a minority of 220,000, with an African population of 4 million, has illegally claimed its independence in that way. I am saying this because I think your Lordships will understand the reaction of Africans to this situation when they compare the stern steps which would have been taken against any African Government in a British Colony which illegally claimed independence, and the steps which have been taken in the case of the Rhodesian Government.
I want to make one further reference to what the noble Lord, Lord Colyton, said. He stated that the reference to a referendum in the declarations of our Prime Minister was a contradiction of his Statement that he was not immediately asking for one man one vote. In fact, the Prime Minister did not propose the referendum as the only means by which the opinion of the Rhodesian people as a whole could be taken; that was a matter for the Royal Commission. But I would point out to the noble Lord that the first reference to a referendum as a possible method of taking the opinion of the people of Rhodesia was not made by Mr. Harold Wilson; it was made by Sir Alec Douglas-Home. I have here an extract from the record of a meeting held at 10 Downing Street on September 7, 1964, between Sir Alec Douglas-Home and Mr. Ian Smith, the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, which was published in the Blue Book (Cmnd. 2807) which was issued on Friday night. This is the quotation:
"The Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, repeated that Mr. Smith must try to go further than a mere indaba"—
that is, a Conference of the Chiefs—
"(to show that there was African support for independence) and must move towards something in the nature of a referendum."
The Prime Minister, in suggesting that that might be one method, was only repeating what Sir Alec Douglas-Home had said before.
May I say how much I appreciated from the noble Lord, Lord Colyton, and, indeed, from the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, and others, tributes to the manner in which the Prime
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Minister handled this question. The noble Lord, Lord Colyton, made certain reservations about later developments. But the Prime Minister was in this position of extraordinary difficulty. He had to appeal to the opinion of four different and conflicting spheres. He had first to carry with him public opinion in this country, because he is the Prime Minister of this country, and must have the support not merely of Parliament but of the people of this country in this grave crisis. I think that the Prime Minister's extra, ordinary reasonableness and extraordinary moderation in the conduct of these negotiations has gone far in carrying British public opinion. Secondly, the Prime Minister had to exert influence upon opinion in Rhodesia itself. Again, I would say that by his conduct during his visit to Salisbury, and by the discussions which he had with representatives of every section of the Rhodesian people, he went a long way in causing misgivings among those who have now taken the course of a unilateral Declaration of Independence. It may be a little time before we see the total effect of the influence which he exerted while he was in Rhodesia.
However, the Prime Minister had not only to think of opinion in this country, nor of opinion in Rhodesia: he had to think of opinion among the African people of that Continent, and not only its peoples, but its Governments—and there we must acknowledge this evening that, so far, the Prime Minister has not succeeded in gaining the conviction of the African peoples about the depth of his determination in handling this rebellion in Southern Rhodesia. I find it most significant that even the more moderate Governments of Africa, like those of Ethiopia and Senegal, equally with the more radical Governments, like Guinea and Ghana, are dissatisfied with the action which the British Government have taken. This is of enormous importance to us, not only in our relationship with the African people, but particularly with the independent African countries which are a part of our Commonwealth.
The fourth group of public opinion which the Prime Minister has had to influence during these difficult negotiations is the member States of the United Nations. Here again, it is evident, from the resolutions which have been carried

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by the overwhelming majorities to which the Lord Chancellor has referred, that in the United Nations there is not criticism of the British Government for what they have done: there is criticism of the British Government because they have not gone far enough.
I agree, to an extent which I did not expect, with the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne—I expected it more in the case of the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Saffron Walden—who said that if economic sanctions are to be imposed those economic sanctions must be effective and rapid. The noble Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, referred particularly to the sanction which is to be placed upon the export of tobacco. He is quite right in saying that the maximum effect of that sanction will not take place until the harvest next spring. But I think perhaps he overlooked the fact that, as the noble Lord, Lord Colyton, said, the seedlings are now being sown, and therefore the farmers, who are among the greatest supporters of the illegal Declaration of Independence, must already be now looking forward to the effect of the sanction, and perhaps may be having second thoughts. But I agree entirely that, if economic sanctions are to be effective, they must be extended from what they are at the present time. There was the quite extraordinary interview, to which reference has already been made, with Lord Malvern in The Times this morning, in which he suggested that the sanctions which have been imposed will not be effective. He said:
"'They'"—
that is, the British Government
"'seem to be just playing at it, but we shall know more after the debate in the House of Commons to-morrow.' An oil sanction was the only one which would have a sudden effect on Rhodesia, ' but if they cannot find a way to fly in oil to Zambia they will kill that country too'."
Southern Rhodesia will receive help from the Republic of South Africa and from Portugal, and I think they will be probably the only two Governments in the world that will give help to the illegal Government of Rhodesia. Neither Portugal nor South Africa are oil-producing countries. South Africa may have a Southern Rhodesia comes from the Middle East, and we may expect that
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the Arab Governments of the Middle East will take action to stop that oil from going to Southern Rhodesia. The companies who transport the oil are American and British, and in view of the support which the American Government are giving to the British Government in the policy they are now pursuing, one could hope that the American and the British Governments will exert some influence upon those American and British companies.
If economic sanctions are to be effective, they must extend beyond the sanctions which are at present put into operation, and the extension of sanctions to oil would be the most effective way in which to do it. I do not believe, personally, that economic sanctions alone will bring about the results which we want. Governments are extraordinarily resilient in meeting economic pressures of that kind. I am one of those—and I think perhaps my record may have shown it—who are deeply opposed to the use of force. I rejected absolute pacificism only in the Spanish war, which was a rehearsal of the Great War. One of my reasons for rejecting absolute pacificism then, strangely enough, was exactly the situation which has now arisen in Southern Rhodesia: that a position might come where the white minority might seek to assert its right to govern the vast majority of the African people.
I understand the reasons which the Prime Minister has urged for not resorting to force, but he has indicated that there are circumstances in Southern Rhodesia where force might be necessary. Up to this moment, there has been little force in Southern Rhodesia following the declaration of independence. Only in this afternoon's newspapers do we read of the beginning of a resistance. But I think we shall be very unaware of what is likely to develop if we do not expect resistance to occur in Southern Rhodesia, because Southern Rhodesia at the moment is mentally a slave State. There is a censorship which does not permit the people of Rhodesia even to know that the British Governor there has dismissed Mr. Smith and his colleagues.
Arising from that, I should like to ask whether the Ministers, when they reply, can indicate what steps are being taken by the B.B.C. to supplement its present

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service, so that the people of Rhodesia may learn the facts and may learn the truth. But it is not only the censorship. Under the emergency which is now in operation in Southern Rhodesia, anyone who expresses verbally, even in private conversation, criticism of the Government may be arrested and imprisoned. I am beginning to wonder whether the Bishop—or was it the Archbishop?—who very courageously preached his sermon yesterday, may become a victim of that decree under the emergency laws. The matter goes even further than that. Any African who wears the headgear which Joshua Nkomo wears in Southern Rhodesia may be arrested and imprisoned. I have one of those hats in my hand. It seems to me to be a mark of the establishment rather than of subversive propaganda. But if I were to put that on my head in Southern Rhodesia to-day, I could be immediately arrested and imprisoned. That is a repetition of what happened in India in similar circumstances, when any Indian wearing a Gandhi cap could similarly be arrested and imprisoned.
When we see conditions of that kind in Southern Rhodesia, I think it would be over-optimistic to expect that resistance will not take place, and that resistance will not be suppressed. I believe that we have to look forward to a situation in Southern Rhodesia in which there will be not only resistance within Southern Rhodesia but also, perhaps, in the present mood of African Governments, assistance from those Governments for those whom they regard as their brothers in Southern Rhodesia. Many of these Governments have already declared that they are involved in a race war with the white minority illegal Government in Rhodesia. The race war is mounting, and we must have that terrible picture in our mind as we are thinking of the future. It may be necessary for the British Government, not only because of the situation in Southern Rhodesia itself, but because of the intervention of African Governments, to think in terms of a peace-keeping force going to Southern Rhodesia.
There is a third danger, to which the Prime Minister referred in his speech in another place last Friday: that China and Russia are now competing for
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influence in the whole continent of Africa. China and Russia may intervene, and in the present depth of determination which there is in the minds of Africans and African Governments, despite all their non-alignment, they are likely to welcome any intervention which is on the side of the African population in Southern Rhodesia. In all these circumstances, I say seriously to your Lordships that, bearing in mind the probability of resistance and repression in Southern Rhodesia itself, the probability of intervention from African Governments outside, and the possibility of some intervention by the Communist Powers, it may prove necessary for the British Government also to intervene. I ask, if it is so, that such intervention should secure the endorsement of the Commonwealth and of the United Nations. Indeed, I think there is a good deal to be said for the view that, if there is to be an intervention, it should be an intervention by a mixed force which would not give the impression of just a white force invading that country.
My Lords, I think the greatest hope of finding any solution to this grave issue, which may not only spread to other parts of Africa but even develop, if outside Governments are individually involved, on the world scene, will be that Mr. Ian Smith and his Government will crumble, not only from the effects of action taken by the Government here but from the action taken by the courageous whites in the independent Judiciary and, it may be, in the Army and the Air Force, who may bring down their Government.
We must realise that this issue of Southern Rhodesia represents the deepest issue which the generation of to-day has to solve. It is the issue of the relationships of races in the world. If I ever despair of our present time it is on account of the degree to which racial feeling still exists and is reflected in so many parts of the world. Southern Rhodesia is the test. Is a minority representing 220,000 Europeans to have the right to become an independent Government over 4 million Africans? If for a moment we contemplate that, we are surrendering the whole principle that peoples, whatever their colour and their race, belong to the same human family. We are I surrendering that principle not only in

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Southern Rhodesia but for the whole of Southern Africa, and particularly in the Republic of South Africa, where that principle is most humiliatingly denied. Therefore I would say to your Lordships this is a crisis much greater even than Southern Rhodesia; it is a crisis which reflects the most fundamental principle facing all mankind to-day. It is the crisis as to whether those of one colour have the right to govern another, or whether we are going to move forward into a world in which all races and all colours may co-operate in an ordered democracy.
6.35 p.m.
LORD CACCIA: My Lords, unlike many of your Lordships, I have no direct knowledge of Rhodesia. I shall therefore be brief and restrict myself to two points on which I have some small experience, negotiation and organisation. The first is a point of negotiating method. On this I should like to start by adding my small tribute to the Prime Minister for the way in which he continuously strove to keep the channel open for further discussion with the Rhodesian Government. Once he had decided, and again I think rightly, that force should not he used, this was the classic canon of diplomacy, methodically carried out. In the end Her Majesty's Government were frustrated last Thursday by the unilateral declaration of independence and were forced, however reluctantly, on the course—and let us not mince matters—of economic and psychological warfare.
What now? I assume that the object of these sanctions is not to extract an unconditional surrender but rather to reopen the channel of communication, which the Smith group closed, on certain conditions and with certain objects. One of these conditions has been made clear: that the illegal and unilateral declaration of independence must be repudiated. But is that all? Is the position still as stated by the Prime Minister in his last telephone conversation with Mr. Smith, when he said, "As far as we are concerned we have never ruled out the status quo"? Does that still stand? And would a repudiation of the unilateral declaration of independence lead automatically and at once to the withdrawal of sanctions, and would nothing more be demanded? Or is this a case of the Sibylline books? It would surely be a point of essential
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importance for the Rhodesian people and any possible successors to Mr. Smith's present group. In supporting the action of the Government may I therefore urge that they should make it plain what alternative to Mr. Smith and his policy is now open to them. If unconditional surrender is not our aim, would not clarity about these things be the most hopeful way of getting back to the negotiating method which the Prime Minister followed with such persistence and vigour before U.D.I.?
My second point concerns our own Governmental and administrative organisation. In this crisis the present set-up still provides that one Secretary of State and one great Department of State, the Commonwealth Relations Office, deals with the relations between this country and Rhodesia while another Secretary of State and another Department, the Foreign Office, handles the foreign aspects, and this includes the United Nations. Such a pattern of organisation is, I submit, bound to be time-consuming, wasteful in men and money, and a blunt and imprecise instrument of government.
I do not say this out of any spirit of criticism of the Secretaries of State concerned. Indeed, if I may, I should like to pay my tribute to the splendid manner in which the Foreign Secretary defended our case in the United Nations yesterday. In doing so he was triumphing over the organisation rather than being supported by it. Nor do I say this out of any desire as an ex-member of the Foreign Office to promote some form of take-over bid. From this point of view of organisation it does not matter who takes over whom. They are loyal and sensible officials in both Departments, who now in any case belong to the same Service, Her Majesty's Diplomatic Service, and can be relied upon to make any system work after a fashion. I admit that sometimes you can get good decisions from a bad system, just as you can obtain bad decisions from a good organisation. It is human to err. But I also agree with the first Lord Hankey, that a good organisation is far less likely to lead to misunderstandings, muddle and misjudgment than a bad organisation.
It may perhaps he argued that any change would be unpopular in the Commonwealth. I doubt it; and, in any case, Canada has already gone that way. It

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may also be said that the middle of a crisis is no time for change. But when is this moment of calm likely to come? And is it not time enough to look again at this after the Indonesian confrontation, with one Secretary of State and one Department dealing with Malaysia and another Secretary of State dealing with Indonesia, the United Nations and the United States; the Cyprus incident, with the Commonwealth Secretary dealing with the Cypriot Government and the Foreign Secretary responsible for relations with Greece, Turkey and the United Nations; and now this Rhodesia crisis?
There is another aspect. Her Majesty's Governments, of whatever Party, nowadays consider it their duty in the national interest to exhort industry to reorganise in order to achieve greater productivity, to save technically trained manpower and to reduce costs so as to be more competitive in world markets. They also exhort trade unions to get rid of restrictive practices and outdated lines of demarcation. Does this not make it all the more incumbent on Her Majesty's Government to make sure that they themselves have no beam in their own eye?
It is an ill wind that blows no one any good. If from this Rhodesian crisis we could achieve some streamlining in the Government machine, in short a Department of External Affairs and a Secretary of State for External Affairs, we should, in my submission, have got rid of a system which I do not think could have been dreamed up by anyone unless it had developed out of quite other circumstances of pre-war times.
6.42 p.m.
LORD MOLSON: My Lords, for the last few years I have watched affairs in Central Africa, and I have had the feeling that I was watching the denouement of some Greek tragedy. And although this U.D.I. is one of the steps towards the end, it is, I fear, by no means the end of the tragedies that we shall witness. The Monckton Report said that it was most desirable for economic and social and political reasons that the Federation of Central Africa should be maintained but that it would inevitably break up unless the Southern Rhodesian policy and social attitude was fundamentally changed. Neither Sir Roy Welensky nor Sir Edgar Whitehead, the two Prime Ministers in
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power at that time, was willing to take any step of that kind and the Federation of Central Africa has come to an end.
Southern Rhodesia is to-day facing the same kind of disaster because of the unwillingness of the Southern Rhodesian electorate to make the sort of changes in a liberal direction which we said were a condition of survival. First of all, Sir Edgar Whitehead went and was replaced by Mr. Winston Field as Leader of the Dominion Party or Rhodesian Front, which repudiated even the principles for which Sir Edgar Whitehead had stood. Then because Mr. Winston Field was not sufficiently extreme, he was got rid of and replaced by Mr. Smith. There is only one of the members of the present Southern Rhodesian Government of whom I have any experience; that is Mr. Harper, the present Minister of Industry, who gave evidence before us when he was the Leader of the Dominion Party of Southern Rhodesia. When he had completed his evidence, which was at cross purposes with that of the Federal Leader because it was so much more extreme, I said to one of my colleagues, "If that man ever obtains power or influence in Southern Rhodesia the outlook is very bad indeed."
I have studied the Blue Book containing the recent exchanges and I admire the patience and courtesy which the present Prime Minister has shown in carrying on these negotiations. But however courteous, persistent and optimistic he may have been, I do not think anyone who really studies these transactions can believe that they ever could have been successful. At page 72, Mr. Smith said this to the Prime Minister:
"He must make it clear that the Government Party in Rhodesia did not believe in majority rule. They accepted that the 1961 Constitution would eventually bring it about; but they would not take any action to hasten this process. The criterion of fitness for majority rule must be a criterion of merit, i.e., a criterion in terms of those standards of civilised behaviour which other independent African countries were not succeeding in observing."
In order to understand the full significance of Mr. Smith's statement, it is necessary to turn to a later conversation, at page 105, when the British Prime Minister was trying to ensure that the franchise clauses, which as the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said

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are unentrenched, should be safeguarded in the event of independence. Mr. Smith bad estimated that anything from fifteen to fifty years would be required for an African majority—
"But 5 years ago Sir Edgar Whitehead had predicted a period as short as 12 years. The Rhodesian Government must therefore"—
and I emphasise the word "therefore"—
"retain their powers in this field, since, if it appeared at a future election that an African Government was probable and the Rhodesian Government felt, in the light of developments in the countries to the North of Rhodesia, that this would still be premature, they must have the power to delay such a majority by, for example, a reduction in the "B" Roll seats. In the last resort, this would he their only means of preserving their civilisation."
Those two quotations in juxtaposition mean this, that not only was the present Rhodesian Government unwilling to do anything to expedite an African Government coming into power, but if under the Constitution of 1961 it appeared that this was going to happen sooner than Mr. Smith expected, as soon as Sir Edgar Whitehead had calculated, in that case it would be necessary for them to alter the franchise in order to postpone the advent of an African majority in power until the Rhodesian Front in its wisdom decided, having regard to other countries north of Rhodesia, that the Africans were likely to be suitable recipients of political power.
LORD HASTINGS: I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord. I am sure he would not like to mislead the House. It is not a question of altering the franchise, which is one of the entrenched clauses—the franchise qualification. It would be a question of altering the representation of reserved seats. That is rather a different matter. I thought the noble Lord would like to be quite clear about that.
LORD MOLSON: Yes, but the effect would still be, as the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia indicated, to postpone the advent of an African Government to power. That is exactly what he said:
"The Rhodesian Government must therefore retain their powers in this field, since, if it appeared at a future election that an African Government was probable and the Rhodesian Government felt… that this would still be premature, they must have the power to delay such a majority by, for example, a reduction in the "B" Roll seats."
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That seems to me to make it quite plain that, short of a change in the attitude of the Southern Rhodesian Government, it was impossible for these conversations to succeed. It is the fact, of course, that each hoped that the other would retreat. We are therefore now confronted with a unilateral declaration of independence.
When Mr. Macmillan as Prime Minister asked me to serve on the Monckton Commission, with great prescience he told me what he feared for the future. As many of your Lordships know, Mr. Macmillan has a love of slightly abstruse historical analogies. He said, "We are facing in the future in Southern Rhodesia the alternative dangers of a Boston Tea Party or a Servile war." The reality is for worse. We already have the Boston Tea Party, but I greatly fear a Servile war in the future. It is essential that this Parliament, and this Government, should take measures against this rebel Government. Some of them are automatic, because they have chosen to go out of the Commonwealth, and therefore it follows logically and of their own choice that Imperial preference and other concessions and advantages enjoyed by members of our family of nations should come to an end. There are other measures, partaking of the character of economic sanctions, which I am sure it is essential that we should introduce—and tobacco is, I think, one of those. Sanctions are really only of two kinds. There are ineffective sanctions and effective sanctions. Ineffective sanctions are not only useless; they are worse than useless. They exasperate and exacerbate, they cause ill will and achieve nothing.
LORD BOOTHBY: My Lords, may I interrupt my noble friend for one moment? Exclusion from the sterling area is the greatest sanction of all.
LORD MOLSON: Yes, I do not doubt that, and I entirely agree. I take it that that is not actually one of the automatic results that follow, because Canada is a member of the Commonwealth of Nations and yet is not in the sterling area. But, if I may resume, not only must the sanctions be effective, they must be effective as speedily as possible. I think it is most interesting that Lord Malvern, who has such great knowledge of this matter, said that the best hope was for sanctions to work quickly, to give the

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Government, by which he meant the men illegally holding power at the present time, a rude awakening, otherwise Rhodesia will go down and down.
What objective have we in mind when we apply these sanctions? It is, first, to bring about the fall of the Smith régime. Secondly, I am sure it must be to restore in some form effective British rule in Rhodesia. I disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Caccia, who has just spoken, in suggesting that it is necessary for us at this stage to indicate with whom we should be prepared to do business. It is quite impossible to look into the future.
LORD CACCIA: My Lords, if the noble Lord would permit me to interrupt, may I say that I did not suggest that we should say with whom. I merely said that if there were other groups who were contemplating trying to remove the illegal Government, they might be urged to or dissuaded from such action by knowing in advance what sort of conditions they would have to face if they took such a step.
LORD MOLSON: I think it difficult for us at this time to foresee exactly what the conditions would be. But I entirely agree with the noble Lord that the Government would be wise to hold out the prospect that if a more responsible and a moderate Government could he formed in Rhodesia, we should be prepared to do business with them. That would involve their coming back into the comity of the British Commonwealth. It would mean the restoration of some form of British authority in that territory.
We have had great experience throughout the centuries, but especially after the last war, of establishing a form of Administration in territories which for some time have not been under our control. I am sure that that is essential. I say that for this reason: that our main object must be to ensure that our intervention and our policy shall be the policy that will prevail. We must retain the confidence and support of the United Nations, of other members of the Commonwealth and, as far as possible, of African States in the vicinity of Rhodesia, that our steps are intended, and are likely, to be effective in restoring our authority in Rhodesia.
If that is not done, then there will be intervention by others. That is quite certain.
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There might be intervention by the United Nations. After the experience of the Congo, I do not desire to see that. There might be intervention by the Communists—possibly by Russia, possibly by China, possibly by both of them, either in co-operation or in opposition to each other. I do not know which would be the more harmful. There might be intervention by African States on the frontiers of Rhodesia. All that is most undesirable. I believe it is essential that, when law and a Constitution is restored in Rhodesia, it should be done as the result of the initiative and persistence of this country, and I believe that it well may be that Britain's most valuable services to Rhodesia will lie ahead.
6.59 p.m.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, we have reached the stage of being one-third through the debate with which we are threatened this evening—there are still two-thirds of the speeches to come—but already it looks as if there is a certain consensus of opinion in this House. I do not mean by that that we are all in agreement. I do mean, however, that we are in agreement on some of the courses and some of the facts which have emerged. For instance, not one single speaker—and the majority have been from the Opposition—has suggested that U.D.I. is justified. Everybody has condemned it more or less—some much more strongly than others. Nobody has suggested that the Bill which we hope to receive some time to-night or early to-morrow morning should be opposed. The only comment that has been made on the Bill by a number of noble Lords is that certain parts of it might be amended; in other words, that sanctions are too strong.
The noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, has put down an Amendment which I can hardly believe he himself takes really seriously, because if we really are to impose sanctions we must impose them quickly. We cannot afford to indicate a sanction which we propose to operate subject to the approval of the House: it must operate from the time when the Order in Council is propounded and published. There may be something to be said for reducing the period of 28 days, but to suggest that it is not to be operative until both Houses of Parliament have approved it, is, I think, to render

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the sanction wholly ineffective. That is a point which we can discuss in Committee; it does not go to the root of the whole matter.
A number of speakers in this debate have clearly shown they appreciate that this is a very difficult problem. I myself find it extremely difficult because, like the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, I think I understand the situation and the feelings of the settlers in Southern Rhodesia. Probably, if I were in their position, I should feel the same—a fear that something which one has built up over the years, some of them for twenty or thirty years, something in which their forbears have been involved, a situation which has come about by hard work, is being imperilled by the overwhelming mass of people who, they feel, are unsympathetic to them and will endanger their whole way of life. All that is understandable, but we also have to understand the other side, too.
The noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, asked whether we thought that in the long run we were embarking on a wise course. I do not know what is wise; nor does he. I do know what is right, and it seems to me that it cannot be right that the situation which the noble Lord, Lord Molson, so accurately described should be allowed to continue indefinitely. It cannot be right, that a small minority, one in twenty, should be in a position to say, "For all time we will oppose the other 19 out of 20 having equal rights in this country with us." It is quite true that the white people have built up the country and in the course of so doing have benefited the Africans. The Africans did not ask the white people to go there, but they have incidentally benefited; and I am prepared to concede that, if by some action on the part of the Africans the white people were forced to leave, economically the Africans would for a long time to come be worse off. That one must concede, but is it not a matter for them? After all, we fought a war and suffered severely in the interests of freedom and the right to manage our own affairs in our own way. Is it not understandable that African people should feel in exactly the same way?
The issue is much wider even than merely the question of the Africans in Southern Rhodesia. In my judgment, the future of the whole Commonwealth is at
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stake, if we did not take the action which we are taking on the unilateral declaration of independence then it seems to me that the whole Commonwealth would disintegrate. After all, the vast majority of the members of the Commonwealth are not white people: they are coloured of one kind or another. All of them, without exception, are sympathetic to the course we are taking. If we fail to take this course, it seems to me almost certain that the majority of the countries which constitute the Commonwealth would desire to leave and it would break up.
There is to-day, of course, a school of thought which would prefer that we should be left merely with a white Commonwealth—Canada, Australia, New Zealand. I do not know whether or not the noble Marquess takes that view, or whether the noble Lord, Lord Colyton, agrees with it. I should be very interested to hear. If we do want to preserve the Commonwealth—and I feel passionately that it is worth doing; it is something which we have contributed to the world, which is for the benefit of the peoples of the world and which will be increasingly for their benefit—if that is felt to be worth while, I feel that in this case we really must take the strongest possible line in support of the African population.
To come back to the matter whether this course is wise or not, the noble Marquess's view is, of course, as good as mine—possibly better, because he knows the country and knows the people while I do not. But I should have thought that at least there is one thing one can say, and that is that if we are embarking on sanctions we should try to make them effective and speedy. There is no point in weakening the effect of sanctions by eliminating certain items where we can exercise the maximum pressure. Of course, I quite realise that if it were possible to prevent oil from going into Rhodesia that perhaps would be the strongest sanction of all, but we have no direct control over oil and we are not in a position to impose those sanctions. However, in regard to sugar and tobacco it seems to me that those are effective sanctions which we ought to use and which are readily available. I do not understand the distinction between one kind of sanction and another. One flows naturally and legally from the course

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which the Southern Rhodesians have taken, and the other is merely punitive. If, of course, it had no other object than to be punitive I could understand, but the object of all these sanctions is to put pressure upon the Rhodesians so as to induce them to realise that they have got to come to an understanding with this country as to their future course. In my view, the more effective we make the sanctions, the sooner will this realisation on their part come about.
I feel that almost everything that can be said in this debate has been said, but I think, with the most reverend Primate, that this is a moral issue. It is not a question of expediency. In the last resort it is a moral issue, as to whether we are to stand by and see 4 million people allowed to remain indefinitely in an inferior position, not to be given the opportunities of advancement, of better education, but remaining almost literally hewers of wood and drawers of water; or whether we should take the step of recognising that these are human beings, our brothers and sisters even though their skins may be different, and give them the opportunity of living as full a life as we should like for ourselves.
7.11 p.m.
THE LORD BISHOP OF WINCHESTER: My Lords, a fortnight ago a letter appeared in The Times under the heading "Ministry of Reconciliation", signed by eleven signatories including myself. Those of us who signed the letter felt that we could not at that stage support a resolution before the British Council of Churches which suggested a course of action which might involve the use of force, as the most reverend Primate the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury was quick to point out quite correctly in words which have been frequently, if I may say so, taken out of their context. I was one of those who believed that at that particular juncture, when delicate negotiations were in progress, such a resolution was inopportune and that it was vitally important that the Church's essential ministry—that of reconciliation—should not be prejudiced.
But now, as a result of the breakdown of negotiations and the unilaterial declaration of independence which we all so deeply deplore, a new situation has
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arisen; a situation fraught with so many problems to which there are no easy, no immediate, and no wholly right solutions. In this agonising situation, whilst the primary task of the Church qua Church remains unchanged—namely, to fulfil this ministry of reconciliation in Rhodesia and indeed throughout Africa, come what may—Her Majesty's Government have a clear, inalienable, moral obligation placed upon them: the responsibility for fulfilling their trusteeship for the welfare of all the peoples of Rhodesia, of the 4 million Africans as well as of the 200,000 to 250,000 Europeans.
I welcome the assurance of Her Majesty's Government's Prime Minister, that force will not be used to achieve constitutional ends. I interpret "force" in that context to mean physical or military force, and I know it is a sincere hope shared by us all that law and order may he restored without the necessity of any form of police action to preserve human life. The one thing that matters supremely, as I see it, is that whatever measures of an economic character are put into operation by Her Majesty's Government, with the support of the United Nations, whilst they should not in any sense be punitive, at least in intention, should be rapidly effective in achieving their sole purpose—namely, the establishment of a new Government with which negotiations can be resumed until a basis of independence can be agreed which will secure full justice for all the peoples of Rhodesia, black and white, white and black, and which will promote the true interests of that country. As Her Majesty's Government pursue their onerous task and endeavour to fulfil their unenviable responsibility, they will have the full moral support of a great body of Christian opinion in this country and in Rhodesia, and I trust they will receive from this House the full, unhesitating support which they need and deserve.
7.15 p.m.
LORD HASTINGS: My Lords, I am very happy to follow the right reverend Prelate who has just resumed his seat, because he has referred to the moral issues and I intend to devote part of my speech, in an indirect manner albeit, to the moral questions lying behind the problems which face us now. This U.D.I. descended upon the people of this country with suddenness and as a great

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shock, and I feel sure that they feel, in the majority, utterly bewildered and confused and would like to have some guidance. The Prime Minister has said that he considers U.D.I. an avoidable and unnecessary action, and added that a form of madness had seemed to descend upon the Rhodesian people, because it is the people who are backing the Smith Government. I agree that this was an unnecessary action and that there has been some madness, but I do not agree in precisely the same way that the Prime Minister has meant to indicate.
Before I go further I must declare my interest. It is well known to many of your Lordships, but as I have not been able for a period of five years to speak on Commonwealth affairs in general and on African affairs in particular, as I used to do, there are many noble Lords who have joined this Chamber since who will not be aware of my interests in Southern Rhodesia. The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor referred to my noble friend Lord Alport, who spent two—or was it three?—years there as Her Majesty's High Commissioner. I was resident, and a permanent resident, in Southern Rhodesia from 1951 to 1957 when I was farming. I still have my farm and I visit it every year. During that period of residence I belonged to all the local organisations, like the Farmers' Union, and I had the privilege of being chairman of the local country club, which forms a very important centre in a rather far-flung community of that nature. I was also interested in politics, and at the time when Mr. Garfield Todd was Prime Minister and leader of the United Rhodesia Party I was chairman of what was described as one of the most active branches of Mr. Todd's Party.
Perhaps it is worth telling your Lordships that in 1956, soon after I had become a Member of your Lordships' House, I was the only Member of either House of Parliament who took the trouble to go to the now famous conference at Salima on Lake Nyasa organised by the Capricorn Africa Society, at which people of all races were present. It was an inspiring occasion, and it is with an added sense of tragedy that I have to inform your Lordships that practically all those Africans, Asians and coloured people who were at that con-
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ference of a multiracial nature now belong to one or other of the nationalist African organisations. One wonders why and how that could happen.
We are asked tonight to bring a moral judgment to bear and to take a very serious decision on the Bill which will shortly come before us, and perhaps even more serious ones in the forthcoming weeks and months. Therefore, with your Lordships' permission, I should like to hark back a bit farther even than did the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Saffron Walden.
The real reason why this tragedy has happened—and it should never have been allowed to happen—lies further back. The noble Lord, Lord Colyton, has mentioned the fact that the Government of Rhodesia was never a Colonial Government, in the true sense; and in 1923, of course, it could have chosen to join the Union of South Africa and thus obtained its independence. However, it looked forward to better things, because, of course, the majority of the people were purely British and not Afrikaners, and they wished to remain British with British institutions. They chose as they thought a better future.
In the war, for the great services rendered by Rhodesia, that country was in fact—verbally, certainly, if not in writing—offered its independence (I know this is true), but Lord Malvern turned it down because he considered that his country had not a viable economy. It was as recently as 1958 or 1959, I think, that I heard Sir Alec Douglas-Home, when he was a Member of this House and Commonwealth Relations Secretary, say that a viable economy was still considered one of the cardinal principles before the granting of independence. Of course, that has all changed now. Then, at the time of the setting up of the Central African Federation in 1953, Southern Rhodesia, very reluctantly, agreed to join the Federation—reluctantly because she did not want the inclusion of Nyasaland; which, in the outcome, proved to be a grave error. At that time, I think, it is almost certain that Southern Rhodesia could have had her independence if the Federation had not been set up. You must remember, my Lords, that we are talking of 1953, and not of 1963.

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As the years went on the Federation failed and came to an end, and I think it must have been a great shock to Southern Rhodesia, which had turned down the chance of independence at least twice, and probably a third time, to find that she could not have it at the dissolution of the Federation. And why, my Lords, could she not have it? It was because we had moved forward ten years and the policy of Her Majesty's Government had changed. I think we must acknowledge that fact. It demonstrably changed after 1959, in response to the advance in world political opinion and the demand of the African nations, some of whom had already obtained their independence. But the fact is that Her Majesty's Government had changed their policy, and the Southern Rhodesians and the Federal Government felt let down—and I do not think one can be surprised at that.
Now, my Lords, may I go back a little further and deal purely with Southern Rhodesia? In 1958, after I had returned to this country and had given up my residence in Rhodesia, Mr. Garfield Todd was removed unceremoniously as leader of the United Rhodesia Party and as Prime Minister. I broadcast on the B.B.C. current affairs programme on the same day, saying that I felt more harm would be done to the political career of those who had turned him out than to that of Mr. Todd himself. It looks as though I may have been wrong about Mr. Todd, but who knows what the future holds? I was certainly right about the people who turned him out, who have long since receded into political obscurity. I believe that that was the first great mistake made by the Europeans in Rhodesia. Then Sir Edgar Whitehead came along, and he had trouble with the Africans, largely, I think, because the Federation was not going too well; and he had to pass certain restrictive laws.
We come next to the 1961 Constitutional Conference. By that time it was fairly clear that the Federation was going to fail. The Monckton Commission had already taken place, and it was obvious that the two Northern Territories would break away. The Southern Rhodesians were getting very worried, and my friends in Sir Edgar Whitehead's Cabinet and among his Members of Parliament—
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almost every one of whom I knew personally—asked me what I thought should be done in order that they could obtain their independence. I said: "When this Conference comes along, you must give at least 25 per cent. representation, and preferably more—perhaps even one-third representation—to the Africans, and slightly widen the franchise." My Lords, that was not done. If it had been done, I think that would have been accepted by the Africans and we should not have been in this mess now. So I think that that was the second mistake that the European Rhodesians made.
But let us remember that there is another side to this coin. That Conference was attended by Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole. They had agreed to accept the best they could get, which was the fifteen seats in Parliament, and they put their signatures to the document which Mr. Duncan Sandys brought home. But they were not strong enough to stand up against the pressure of some of their more extreme elements, and in particular to the pressure of outside African influence—and some of that influence was not anxious to see the success of a multiracial community in Southern Rhodesia; it wished only to see African domination. As a result, Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole backed down from their signatures and boycotted the election and actually began agitating throughout the country. One has to face that fact.
I believe that, of all the mistakes that have been made during the course of this tragedy, that was probably the greatest folly of all, because if the Africans had stuck to their signatures, and had worked this Constitution, not only would they have been the official Opposition now, but the Right-Wing Government of Mr. Winston Field would never have come to power. Why do I say that? Because the Africans boycotted that election and indulged in agitations, and there had to be repressive laws; and because, hardly before the ink was dry upon the Constitution, there was agitation outside, among the Afro-Asian Nations, in the United Nations, to advance upon the Constitution, which had not yet been given even a chance to work, simply because the Africans would not work it.
It was because of that, coupled with Sir Edgar Whitehead's bold gesture to

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put in his election manifesto the proposed repeal of the Land Apportionment Act, that the Europeans were induced to believe they could not trust the Africans, and that they must get their independence. That is why they put in a Right-Wing Government at that time. Whatever the negotiations have been since, and whoever has done whatever they have done, and however hard they have tried, from the day Sir Edgar Whitehead lost the election the day we are now facing has, in my opinion, been inevitable. There was perhaps a chance under Mr. Winston Field, who is a great gentleman and a very reasonable and wise leader. Under him, we might have been able to come to terms.
Now we come to the part played by our own Governments and the Opposition. I still believe that we might have been able to manage it under Mr. Winston Field; but here again we were not offering enough guarantees for the minority of the population in the long run, the Europeans. My Lords, the offers which have been made by Mr. Wilson in these last days and weeks, I think I am right in saying, have been at least equal to, and I believe more generous than, any offers which were made by the Conservative leaders in the previous five years. But let us remember this: why were these offers not made by the Conservative Party earlier? Because, if they had been made before the 1962 election, we should not be in this mess to-day.
I am bound to say that one of the reasons, at any rate, why they were not made is because, in order to make them and to be able to carry the Commonwealth, the United States and the United Nations with us, we should have needed a united national attitude towards it, and we had not got that. Let us remember that if, in those years, we had made such offers as have now been made by the Labour Government, we should have been most strongly criticised by the Labour Opposition, who were at that time wedded to giving independence solely on the basis of majority rule and on the principle of "One man, one vote".
Therefore I am bound to point out to your Lordships that we all have made our share of mistakes. In looking at this question one can only say that almost at every step the wrong movement has
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been made at the wrong time or, perhaps more important, the right move has not been made at the right time. That refers to the Europeans in Rhodesia; it refers to the Africans in Rhodesia; it refers to the African nations outside Rhodesia; it refers to the United Nations and to the whole of Parliament in this country, both Government and Opposition, at whatever period we are discussing.
I am bound to agree with my noble friend Lord Molson that this has been the unfolding, with horrible inevitability, of an ancient Greek tragedy; and it is my humble opinion that all of us, all the participants who have taken part in this tragedy, will stand judged at the bar of history as morally guilty. I wish to make this quite clear to your Lordships, and I hope it will be quite clear to the people of this country, because we are called upon to make serious decisions. Since there are moral issues involved let us remember the prayer given us by the most reverend Primate on television on Thursday night. I think I can remember it fairly accurately. It was this:
"God give guidance to all the Rhodesians and to each one of us in the ways of justice, reason and love."
And when we use that prayer, let it, above all, apply to ourselves, and do not let us imagine that it is to be applied to the people of Rhodesia alone.
It is in that spirit that I should wish to turn to the Bill which is before us. There is no doubt that there has been an illegal action. We are faced with a technical act of rebellion, in any case; and that is something, whatever one's personal feelings and interests may be, that we cannot approve of and cannot condone. Therefore, I shall vote for this enabling Bill, knowing that I shall be offending some of my friends in Rhodesia; but I can do no other because certainly it is legally and morally right to vote for this Bill. But when it comes to certain other details, there I think we shall need further explanations; because we do not know what is going to be done under this Bill. It is clear that under the Bill certain actions of a constitutional kind may be necessary in the field of the maintenance of law and order, should that eventually break down.
But when it comes to sanctions, this Bill does not really seem to apply to that matter at all. We are going to be faced

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with the application of sanctions not by Orders in Council but under administrative Regulations which have been made under other legislation; and we may not have the opportunity to discuss it. Therefore I would seek explanations on these matters, because when it comes to discussing such things as that, if we discuss them, in the future, I should have much greater difficulty in voting for specific sanctions and I should certainly not do so on moral grounds.
I was glad to hear the most reverend Primate, I think it was, say that sanctions are not a moral issue at all. From what I said previously in my speech I hope I shall have carried the House with me at least as far as that. We must regard them from the standpoint of practical, conciliatory, positive politics, both national and international. I do not think I shall detain the House any longer on the details of tobacco sanctions. Perhaps to-morrow I can help the House on that, because, after all, I am a tobacco grower myself.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Lord? None of us knows when we shall have the opportunity of discussing some of these details; but I think if the noble Lord is meaning to absent himself until tomorrow he might find the issue had been settled in his absence. I cannot give a promise of when we shall be talking about these matters.
LORD HASTINGS: I am sorry. I do not intend to absent myself except for a temporary period. I shall be here certainly later this evening. I did not realise that one would have the opportunity of discussing in greater detail such a matter.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: I do not knew whether one will have that opportunity or not.
LORD HASTINGS: My Lords, I will say briefly as regards tobacco that although the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, said rightly that the seedlings have been put in, of course they have to be transplanted; and they have not been transplanted yet in great numbers. Therefore the costs incurred by farmers so far in this season are negligible and can be cut
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altogether. They will grow such tobacco as they think they will be able to sell. Therefore it is my opinion that the tobacco farmer, if he has been wise enough to build his farm also into a mixed farm, as I have, will be able to carry on on a lower ebb. Tobacco sanctions, therefore, not only will not begin to work until the sales get under full swing next April, but are not likely to have the effect it is believed they will have. For that reason, if I were given the choice I should vote against it; but I shall not vote against it in fact, because I have a personal interest and it might be for ever afterwards said that that was the reason for my taking that line. But this is of a practical and technical nature.
My Lords, I have said all I need to say. I have said it to make sure that everybody in this House, and so far as possible in this country, should approach this subject with real humility, in the knowledge that we must bear our share of the guilt, and therefore adapt all our methods to bringing about conciliation in Rhodesia on a basis which the European people of that country, quite apart from the Africans, can accept. If only it had been said before (and not merely last week by the Prime Minister; and I mean said before even by my own Party) that there was no question of an African majority to-day or to-morrow, if that had been made perfectly clear a long time ago, then I think we should have been able to reach agreement long before now.
7.39 p.m.
LORD ALPORT: My Lords, we have just listened to a very moving speech, and one which represents the dilemma which many people in Rhodesia are facing at the present time. I shall, I hope, in the remarks that I have to make, perhaps supplement something that the noble Lord, Lord Hastings, has said by making two personal references. I never thought in the last thirty years that it would fall to me to congratulate as a maiden speaker in this House the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Saffron Walden. Many improbable things have happened, but that, so far as I am concerned, is the most improbable of all. I am very glad to have the opportunity to say that now, after over thirty years of comradeship, and sometimes of conflict, I, like others of your Lordships, have learned of his integrity

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and wisdom, and I am very glad that we are to have the opportunity of having it at the disposal of your Lordships in the future.
The other thing I would say is how much I appreciated the speech of the right reverend Prelate the Lord Bishop of Winchester. Those who listened to him will find strength from his advice in the difficult decisions we are called upon to make. I should also like to explain that, although I speak from these Benches, in matters relating to this problem of Rhodesia I regard myself as speaking—as I am entitled to do—as an independent. So long as I possess any opinion—and I do not overestimate it—I can say that it will continue to be exercised to prevent divisions created by Party allegiance from confusing our judgments and affecting the manner in which this matter is handled.
This does not mean that I do not have a passionate interest in the situation which confronts us in that country. The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor was kind enough earlier to-day to say that I had had some experience of affairs in that part of the world. I should not like to make too great a claim on that score, but it is a fact that my family has been associated with Southern Africa over two centuries, before the British came there. As a result I have no doubt that one's outlook is confused, but I hope that in other ways one's judgment is clarified. There is no precedent of which I can think in British history for the situation which confronts us at present in Rhodesia: not the American War of Independence; not Ulster, and nothing I know of this side of the sixteenth century.
We have to remember that the history of Rhodesia and Southern Africa does not start in 1953, or 1945, or 1923, or before the First World War. The problem of the relations between two attitudes to advancement in that part of the world has been true right back at any rate to the beginning of the nineteenth century. It has been the conflicting views of the Dutch, on the one side, and of the British, on the other. The decision made by the Rhodesian people in December, 1962, when Sir Edgar White-head's Government was defeated and replaced by that of Mr. Winston Field, was consciously, or in the case of many of them unconsciously, to opt for the
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Dutch solution for the future of race relations in Southern Africa, which is opposed to the British tradition. There has been a struggle for the soul of Rhodesia over a very long period; from the days of the first settlement. It was decided very narrowly in favour of the British point of view in the referendum of 1922, and from then on there was a gradual development of liberal attitudes in relation to race relations throughout the territory.
In the referendum of 1961 it seemed certain that the majority of Europeans in Rhodesia would wish to continue in close relationship with British policy in this matter. After all, they were watching very closely the developments outside their own territory. They were frightened by what they saw when the refugees from the Congo came through, and they were concerned with what they thought were unwise decisions from the British Government in relation to other parts of Africa; and they were astonished to find, when South Africa left the Commonwealth and proceeded as an independent Republic, that, so far from South Africa suffering as a result, she enjoyed almost immediately substantial economic advantages and relative internal security.
The whole trend in Rhodesian ideas has been drawn over all these years since the first settlers went North to Southern Africa, in general, and British South Africa, in particular, rather than to the United Kingdom. When the British point of view in the Republic of South Africa was clearly unable to withstand the expansion of Dutch ideals and ideas, and was threatened with the acceptance of those things, those in Rhodesia took it as a lesson. Much of this may well have been unconscious, but the results were absolutely clear. In 1962, after the election of that December, there was never any chance under the Government elected at that time, whether under Mr. Winston Field or under his successors, of an agreement being reached between any British Government—I repeat, any British Government—and the Rhodesian Front Government.
My Lords, this is no new view, so far as I am concerned. My Secretary of State, Lord Butler of Saffron Walden, will remember that I gave that advice when I served him, and I think that the noble and learned Lord the Lord

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Chancellor will bear me out when I say I gave that advice some many months ago. Nothing that any Government could do, whether under Sir Alec Douglas-Home or the present Prime Minister, could have reached an accommodation with the Rhodesian Front Government. Of all the parties that took part in the Constitutional Conference before the Constitution of 1961 was accepted, only one refused to accept and acknowledge the conclusions of this Conference. The United Federal Party and the United Federal Government, under Sir Edgar Whitehead, accepted that Constitution; the Central African Party accepted that Constitution; the representatives of the Chiefs of the coloured communities and the Asian community all accepted that Constitution. Mr. Nkomo, as Lord Hastings has said, and Mr. Sithole, accepted it, although I know that they subsequently resigned. The point is that one party refused, and that was the Dominion Party, which formed the framework and the basis for the present leadership in Rhodesia. I find it extraordinary, after knowing the whole of that background, and knowing that the Government never accepted the constitutional settlement of 1961, that they should use it as a basis for their future independence.
I know that suspicions are wrong and that good faith is the essential element in political progress, but although they may remember the mistakes—and there were mistakes—of British Governments of all Parties in the past, though they may attribute to us lack of good faith, we on our side have a right to historical memory as well. We remember the good faith which brought about the South Africa Act of 1910 and the safeguards that were writen into that Act to ensure at any rate a basic freedom for the peoples of all races in South Africa. And we have seen over the years the gradual emasculation of the rights of so many who live in the present Republic of South Africa.
When the moment came for us to realise, whether they understood it or not, whether they are conscious of it or not, that the people of Southern Rhodesia had opted for a South African solution—not in detail, not doctrinaire, not as part of the full panoply of apartheid, no doubt, but fundamentally an orientation to South
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Africa rather than to Britain—then we in this country, whatever Government were in power, had a duty to make certain that the safeguards which were written into the Constitution, before independence was granted to any Government in Southern Rhodesia, were sufficient to ensure reasonable prospects of freedom and progress for the people of all races in that territory.
I have listened in Rhodesia, at second-hand so to speak, to the debates in your Lordships' House and since I have returned I have listened to every one that has taken place. There have been many accusations of bad faith levelled at successive British Governments. I have seen how these have been used and exploited in Southern Rhodesia by people who are fundamentally anti-British, to denigrate everything this country has stood for, everything which this country could accept as a possible future for the people of all races in Southern Rhodesia. If good faith is the issue here, we also have a right to be certain of the good faith of any Southern Rhodesian Government to whom we hand over full and independent power over the future of every man and woman in that territory, regardless of race, creed or colour. This is not a Party point of view. This, I believe, is a British point of view.
At this present moment, His Excellency the Governor, the Chief Justice, the heads of the religious communities and many other honourable people are seeking, even after the twelfth hour, to restore Southern Rhodesia to the British orientation. I should not speak too passionately, I suppose, but I have found it incredible to hear in this House, the Upper House of the British Parliament, speeches made in support of a rebel Government without any mention made whatever, without even any tribute of a personal nature, to the Governor, who represents alone constitutional authority in Rhodesia at this moment and who is facing a dilemma your Lordships and I should pray to God we shall ourselves never have to face. The only thing that we can do is to ensure that whatever we say, whatever action we take during the long controversy that lies ahead of us, is designed to restore the British position in Southern Rhodesia, to help the Governor, the Chief Justice and the large number of men and women there,

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who look not southward but back to this country for their moral values and their political processes and their hopes for a decent future for themselves.
How can we help His Excellency the Governor? I would say that the Government have got to make clear the conditions which we in our British Parliament will accord to the Government that succeeds the Smith régime. There must not be an attitude of unconditional surrender by the Rhodesian people. We must try to ensure not only that the people of Rhodesia and the people in the Civil Service, the Army, the Air Force and the police, if they take the right decision in the terrible dilemma with which they are faced and if they turn to the Governor and the constitutional authorities there, will receive reasonable and proper support, but also that their country and what they stand for will not, as a consequence, be suddenly thrown into the melting pot of some new policy about which they know nothing. We have to be definite with them now. We have to tell them the constitutional settlement which will be come to by a British Government with the successor Government to the Smith régime as soon as Rhodesia returns to its allegiance. We should be specific on the conditions that are going to be available to those who remain loyal in the Civil Service and Forces and to those who are going to support, may be at great cost to themselves, the British point of view in Southern Rhodesia.
I should like to see the Prime Minister making an immediate statement. But that is not sufficient. In Southern Rhodesia, they know the vicissitudes of British politics—one Party in power to-day and perhaps another Party tomorrow. They have seen their interests become the football (as they always refer to it) of Party politics. Therefore, any decision about the constitutional settlement at the end of this rebellion must, in my view, be one that is underwritten not only by the present Government but by the leaders of the Conservative Opposition as well. Then we shall have a definite and decisive offer to make to the Rhodesian people so that they will know what their future is. They will know, if they decide to make the right decision, the decision that is demanded by duty and loyalty, the decision that is
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demanded by us here, which we are calling upon them to make, though luckily enough we do not have to make it ourselves, that they are doing something for the future of their country which they can be assured is in its best interests. In that sort of spirit, I think that we in this Parliament and in this country may gradually find a return to support for the constitutional authorities in Rhodesia. If we fail, we face—and they face—a tragedy. But if we succeed in that way, we shall have been doing a service not only to the peoples of Rhodesia, not only to ourselves and to the Commonwealth, but to the whole desperate and fervent problem of race relations throughout the world.
8.0 p.m.
LORD SOPER: My Lords, I shall count it a prize to be able to follow in the spirit of the last two speeches to which it has been our privilege to listen. I should like to begin by paying a tribute, as a non-Anglican cleric, to a Bishop of the Anglican Church, Dr. Alderson, who is Bishop of Mashonaland, who yesterday in Salisbury Cathedral spoke with great courage on the moral issue which has occupied your Lordships' House in this debate all to-day. It was he who said, with a splendid determination and a carelessness of his own personal safety, what has been said in this House with equal fervour, but with very different prospects of danger.
There has been among all the vicissitudes of this debate a complete unanimity that we are confronted with a moral issue. It is as to the way in which that moral issue has to be effectively demonstrated and exercised that I would invite your Lordships to listen for a few moments to one who is a professed pacifist, and makes no apology for it. I do not intend to embark upon an evangelical effort, but any conversions, of course, will be happily received. What I want to do, if I may, is to assert a position which, though held by a few, is necessarily, even in the opinion of many who have opposed themselves to it, a reasonable and intelligible interpretation of the Christian faith.
I believe that in all circumstances the application of armed force for the solution of moral problems defeats the ends to which that armed force may be dedicated, because it uses inappropriate means

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to secure those ends. This, of course, presents a host of difficulties, and they are difficulties of which I am not unaware. What I believe, however, is that at least the pacifist position is worthy to be stated; and though I do not attempt to prove that all those who refuse the arbitrament of armed force for a solution of the problem of Rhodesia are animated at this moment by a pacifist faith, yet I most cordially recognise the absolute right of the attitude which Her Majesty's Government are taking in refusing to embark upon armed violence as a method of solving this difficult problem. I find that if the moral issue is the one with which we are to be concerned—and your Lordships have given ample assent to that proposition—then it follows inexorably that moral agencies must be employed to secure the moral end.
I find myself in, not so much disagreement, but a certain amount of bewilderment from time to time when I listen to ecclesiastical pronouncements; and in order that I may not be offensive to fellow clerics, to whom I owe so much, let me put this in the first person plural. We parsons are adept at generalisations. We are not nearly so good at reducing our generalisations to precise terms. It is always, it seems to me, a worthless thing when you are dealing with a particularly precise problem to talk of force. It is possible to pour buckets of holy water over the word "force", which if it were defined in more precise terms would immediately appear to be a very different thing from the kind of benison which attaches to it when sometimes it is used.
Similarly, when to-day we hear that sanctions are not a moral issue, I frankly do not understand what those words mean. If we are concerned with a moral principle, then it seems to me that it follows as the day the night that any attempt we make to deal with that moral issue must be in moral terms. I confess my utter and complete rejection of the use of armed violence to secure a moral end to the present dilemma, which has afflicted South Africa as well as Southern Rhodesia, and which has afflicted the world as well as this country. When something is wrong I believe that it is better in all circumstances to refuse it, though I am well aware of the fact that in this sinful world some element of compromise is inevitable. I be-
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lieve that the exercise of armed violence under any conditions will be fatal, and, therefore, I support the Government wholeheartedly in their refusal to countenance it. I am not thereby relieved of the responsibility of trying to face an issue—though I would in interpolation make the comment that there are a number of people who seem to me to be concerned with activity, as if anything done is better than doing nothing. This seems to me an elemental and courageous fallacy. If the only bottle by the bedside of the patient contains strychnine or arsenic, it is better to leave the patient alone than fill him up with it.
Believing as I do that what is morally wrong cannot turn out to be politically right, I am the more concerned to think and spell out what seems to me to be the probable consequences of any resort to violence. I hesitate to criticise my noble friend Lord Brockway, especially as he is not here at the moment, but I did intimate to him that, though I agreed with a good deal of what he said, I must join issue with him on the question of the result of armed force. Your Lordships noticed with what judicious care my noble friend spoke this afternoon. I am bound to point out that had you been at Speakers' Corner in Hyde Park yesterday afternoon, you would not have heard from the sponsors of the Movement for Colonial Freedom references to the possibilities that may prove exercise of forces necessary. What you would have had handed to you, and would have read and probably heard, over my noble friend's signature, was the following injunction:
"The further action we call for is British intervention to remove the Smith régime and to impose direct British rule, backed by all the necessary armed forces."
That is a very different kettle of fish, and to many of the adolescent cowboys in Hyde Park, of various coloured skins, it is an incitement to violence that has no moral basis at all. And though I do not necessarily agree with the noble Lord, Lord Caradon, that we are facing the imminent prospect of a conflagration that will reach to the uttermost shores of Africa, I do believe, and I make my testimony to it as clearly as I can, that those who would operate force at the beginning must calculate the escalation of that force; and if they will the end, they must will the means, and all the means, to that end.

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I hope that we shall execrate the use of armed violence as any possible solution to this terrible problem with which we are confronted.
But, as I said, that does not exonerate us or relieve us from responsibility. What shall we do if we are by moral principles Withheld from using armed violence? Shall we use sanctions? Must they be punitive? I am personally a little bothered about the word "punitive". So far as I understand my dictionary, the noun is "punishment" and the adjective is "punitive". What is wrong with punitive actions when people have committed sins or crimes? What is wrong with punitive sanctions if those sanctions are intended to punish? Of course, punitive sanctions would be entirely wrong if no crime had been committed. When I see all the sickening apparatus, as the Prime Minister does, of apartheid and of a totalitarian régime in Southern Rhodesia, I hate it. I am confirmed in my hatred of it by the advices that come to me from the missionary societies and the various churches in Southern Rhodesia who are not nourished and supported by theologies that have polluted the churches of South Africa in the past. I am content to believe that we are facing something that is evil.
And, quite apart from the moral evil which is involved, there is the constitutional evil to which reference has so frequently been made this afternoon. Are then sanctions wrong if they involve penalties not only upon those for whom those penalties are intended but also upon others who are innocent? In the world in which we live there is no possibility, it seems to me, of isolating the criminal and isolating the penalties which are attached to his delinquency. We must seek to minimise that application of punishment where it is not deserved, but we cannot guarantee that anything we do of a punitive nature can be exactly and precisely levelled upon the unworthy head and life of the one who has committed the offence.
On the other hand, there is a moral objection to the use of any punishment which is not reformative but is in fact recriminatory. In many cases it could be argued, and I for one would want to argue, that it is morally just as bad to starve a South African or a Southern
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Rhodesian child as it is to shoot that child in the head. If sanctions are calculated to produce conditions in which you apply a different kind of violence which in fact has the same lethal effect, then it suffers from the same basic objection.
What then can we do? I believe the Government were entirely right in selecting, in the realm of sanctions, such sanctions as they believe can quickly be applied and can be effective to the maximum degree upon those upon whom those sanctions should rest, and to a minimum degree upon others who will necessarily be in some way disadvantaged by them. In that regard, I have no doubt that sanctions must be effective, and I would not prejudge the effectiveness or otherwise of the sanctions which have already been instituted. I heartily approve them, not as a matter of absolute equity but as the best that can he done in the circumstances and which may, indeed, if they are protracted, create a situation where, to quote a number of noble Lords, Mr. Smith is brought to his knees. Professionally that is a "consummation devoutly to be wished" I should heartily like to see Mr. Smith brought to his knees.
I believe that we have underrated, as yet, if our own hands are clean and if we do not threaten violence, the moral capacity we have to sustain and encourage those forces in Southern Rhodesia which are already in opposition and can, I think, be sustained and have their opposition increased. I view with some horror the reflection that, in the days when there was a large and growing opposition to Hitler, it was largely the threats of violence which bound the German people to him in the unholy bonds of the Third Reich. I want to liberate the people of Southern Rhodesia to carry on the constitutional fight and to support them in that fight, so that this evil régime may be overthrown and that a better one may come.
I would add one last word, and it may sound almost Cloud-cuckoo-land after what I hope has been a more or less considered evaluation of the situation. If, by the application of severe economic sanctions, the evil effects of those sanctions are passed on in terms of starvation to the poor and innocent 4 million people of other coloured skins from our own,

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then if, in the past, we have felt it appropriate to load up aeroplanes with bombs and to drop them, if we thought it appropriate at the time of the Berlin airlift to endeavour to feed 2 million people, is it fantastic to believe that the same expertise and the same adventure in good relations could not in fact do much to alleviate the evil which might be the accompaniment of the imposition of severe sanctions? I, for one, would humbly invite this House to believe that when once you have put away the threat of violence, when once you have taken the gun out of your pocket, then, for the first time, you will be free to examine other methods of social change which hitherto have been hidden from us precisely because we have been obfuscated by the power, so-called, of might rather than of right.
I support the Government most heartily in their repudiation of armed violence. I support them equally heartily in their moral concern to do something which will be effective in bringing this evil Administration in Southern Rhodesia to an end. For the time being, therefore, I am thoroughly in favour, for what it is worth, and I lend my support equally heartily to the fulfilment of their programme of sanctions.
8.16 p.m.
LORD CLITHEROE: My Lords, first of all I should like to apologise for the fact that I was late in my place to-day, but unfortunately I was held up by fog in the North of England. Secondly, I should like to say with what interest I have listened to the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Soper, and I will try to deal with some of the points which he made, especially with reference to the question of sanctions.
I myself have some knowledge of and interest in Central Africa, and I know something of the feelings of people in various countries in Central Africa. I feel very deeply the sad situation in which we are, and particularly the conflict of duty which it brings in its train for many of my friends, not excluding His Excellency the Governor. I do not propose to criticise anyone this afternoon, or comment on what has gone before. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hastings, that we are all to blame. I want to make it absolutely clear that I am totally opposed
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to economic sanctions, and I will try to explain to the noble Lord, Lord Soper, why. In my judgment, economic sanctions will either fail or they will lead to war. Lord Soper has already told us that he will be opposed to any military intervention and, therefore, he would obviously accept my argument, if it were the case that it would lead to war. But I believe they will fail because I think they will be ineffective.
I remember very well thirty years ago, when I was in the House of Commons and we entered upon a programme of sanctions against Italy. Noble Lords who are as old as I am will remember that, too. These sanctions against Italy failed in their object and, what is more, they played a part in leading to an infinitely more terrible war. What will the effect of these sanctions be? This is the point I should like to put to Lord Soper. He talked about punitive sanctions to punish someone. I want to consider who is going to be punished when he considers whether he can support conscientiously punitive sanctions. First of all, the effect of sanctions will be this. Our trade in this country will be damaged and our balance of payments will be upset to a substantial degree. That, of course, will have, as one of its consequences, a certain amount of unemployment, and it will also reduce the ability of this country to continue its social programmes.
Secondly, we shall have to buy our tobacco from America at a cost of very many tens of millions of pounds, and though that is something which the United States of America will not mind, none the less I want to think of the effect it is going to have in Rhodesia. In Rhodesia I think there are roughly 200,000 acres, or something of that sort, under tobacco and there must be more than 100,000 workers engaged in working in tobacco, all of whom have wives and many of them have very many children. All of these, if they lose their jobs, will suffer. They are the people upon whom the punitive sanctions will fall first and hardest. There will be suffering and unemployment and hardship in Rhodesia, and the poorest people will suffer the most.
Who else will be punished? There are many working in Rhodesia to-day who are immigrants from other neighbouring black countries, such as Zambia

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and Malawi. These will be sent home and they will add to the problems and the poverty in the countries to which they are sent. Who will be punished by that action? Southern Rhodesia has no wish to damage her neighbour, Zambia—none whatever—but if sufficient provocation is given, what may happen to the relations between those two countries? I have no doubt noble Lords know the difficulty of Zambia, a land-locked country. Zambia depends almost entirely on the Rhodesia railway system which passes through Southern Rhodesia to Zambia. If the frontier between those two countries were to be cut, Zambia would be cut off from supplies which reach her at present, including oil and petrol. Who would suffer then and on whom would the punishment fall? Supposing the power were to be cut off from the Kariba Dam, which is the last thing the Government of Southern Rhodesia would want to do. This would bring to a standstill the copper mines in the copperbelt of Zambia and put out of work tens of thousands of people there. Who would suffer then and on whom would the punishment fall? The people of Zambia depend also on the coal which comes up from the Wankie Collieries to Zambia. They are entirely dependent on that.
All these things mean that it would be a terrible tragedy if strife were to take place between Southern Rhodesia and Zambia. Let us pray that it will not do so! But, for goodness sake! my Lords, do not let us provoke it, and that is what we are on the verge of doing. In my judgment these sanctions will lead either to failure or to war. Pray let us think again and let us return to the path of conciliation. Above all, we want to avoid bloodshed and disorder and bitterness which may last for many generations.
8.25 p.m.
VISCOUNT DE L'ISLE: My Lords, it is more than four years since I last addressed your Lordships' House. I do so to-day, as have many other noble Lords, with a deep sense of the tragedy of the situation with which we are confronted. I have listened with great attention to many notable speeches to-day. I must confess that I am a little confused, and not least by the great emphasis on the moral issue which confronts us. So
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many noble Lords have seen it plain and clear. It is not so distinguished in my sight. I believe that we have a very practical issue before us. How can we best return Southern Rhodesia to the allegiance of Her Majesty?
We have had two remarkable speeches, one from the noble Lord, Lord Caccia, and one from the noble Lord, Lord Alport. I think the noble Lord, Lord Caccia, was entirely right in recommending to Her Majesty's Government that they should at the earliest possible opportunity make plain to the people of Rhodesia the terms upon which Her Majesty's Government would treat with a new Government in Rhodesia and the opportunities and advantages which would accrue therefrom. I am sure, too, that the noble Lord, Lord Alport, was right in emphasising his concern that Southern Rhodesia should return to what we may term the British tradition of politics.
I believe that we shall achieve neither of these objects if we allow ourselves to be provoked, whether by moral fervour or by political irritation, into taunting the people of Rhodesia and the people of South and Central Africa. After all, morals, like many other things, go in fashion: what was fashionable some years ago in the moral field is less fashionable to-day, and vice versa. It is better that we should not arrogate ourselves a position of self-righteousness, which very often declines into cant. We should see, so far as we can, the difficulties and the tragedies which confront all those peoples in Africa, black and white, who dwell together, sometimes alas! in strife. We should concentrate on those points of reconciliation which will, I hope, result not in a conflagration but in a continuation of the progress towards a multi-racial society.
I share the view of noble Lords who have expressed doubts whether sanctions will, in fact, achieve the objective which they are designed to achieve. I think they are much more likely to exacerbate feeling and to drive into the arms of the extremists those elements in Rhodesia who really feel the weight of the imputation of their guilt of rebellion. External pressure almost invariably hardens opinion and with pressure comes a feeling that, "If need be, we can endure all." In

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this terrible situation we need to reconcile and not to exacerbate. I think the message should go out from this House that the wisest counsel is to use good temper and good manners.
8.29 p.m.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, I wish to deal almost entirely with two topics, the question of sanctions and the question of the United Nations. Before I come to them perhaps your Lordships will allow me to make clear, what will not surprise you, that I deplore the unilateral declaration of independence at least as much as Her Majesty's Government. I think that I see the dangers and difficulties of illegality at least as much as they do. But, my Lords. I have sufficient knowledge of history, I hope, to remember that when nations struggle for independence the question of legality is not the only one, and is not always that which is considered the most important. After all, it will be generally conceded, I think, that most people, and nearly all historians, think that Mr. Burke was at least as intelligent and morally right as Lord North.
With a great deal of what the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack said at the outset of this debate I found myself in agreement. I thought he made the most unnecessary apology that had ever been made to this House when he apologised for taking more than twelve minutes over his speech, because I thought his masterly account of the different attitudes of various parties in Rhodesia was not only of fascinating interest but very useful indeed to all of us, and particularly to those like myself who have no knowledge or experience of life in the area. With one or two things that he said towards the end of his speech, as I shall indicate, I am not in complete agreement. As my noble and learned friend, Lord Dilhorne pointed out, the Lord Chancellor did not deal at all with many of the subjects which so much interest us and with which we are concerned. I do not blame him for that, because I expect that part of the Government's case probably awaits the introduction of the Bill. I may say, incidentally, that I have no particular objection to the Bill.
Before I come to the two topics that I mentioned, I must make one thing clear
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about my view of the Prime Minister's negotiations in this matter. Whatever my differences with the Prime Minister and his Government on all other subjects, I watched with sympathy the efforts he made to reach a solution of this problem and hoped that his visit to the country would be crowned with success. As I say, I do not think I had anything other than a desire that he should succeed. But, having said that, I must make equally clear that I cannot myself share the view that he did everything that any man could and that his negotiations are not open to criticism. I sat in your Lordships' Gallery of the House of Commons on November 3, less than a fortnight ago, and heard the Prime Minister making a proposal which was designed to avert, and which he hoped would avert, the tragedy that has since taken place.
I listened with great hope to a great deal of what he said, but there was one paragraph in his speech which so much depressed me that it removed all hope from my mind that he would succeed in his object. I do not wish to trouble the House with it again—it has been mentioned by more than one noble Lord this afternoon; but it was the paragraph that has been described as "Heads I win, tails you lose": the proposal that a unanimous Royal Commission which came to a conclusion adverse to the Government of Rhodesia would have great consequences, but that a unanimous conclusion in their favour would have no result whatever; the British Government would remain entirely unbound. Of course it is true that Parliament would have the last word, but that does not mean that a Government cannot give an indication of what its own attitude would be.
I came back to this House in time to hear the Statement repeated here. I thought rapidly whether I should make any comment on what seemed to me this disastrous paragraph. I had no hesitation in thinking it wise to remain silent, because if one had pointed out this defect it might have been thought that it would have prejudiced what chances there were. And I also had one final hope: I thought that in this matter the Prime Minister had made so obvious a mistake that Mr. Smith might consider it worth while to put some questions to our Prime Minister. What I have said in criticism of the

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Prime Minister I think he himself subsequently thought a just criticism, because, as we know, in his final efforts he made a statement which, had it been made at that earlier stage, would perhaps have given some hope. But I do not put it higher than that. I do not question the Prime Minister's good faith in these long efforts. I only think that in that matter he made a great mistake.
Now I come to the question of sanctions. What is their object? Their object is not, of course, to ruin Rhodesia economically; it is not to produce the breakdown of law and order, though they may do both those things. The object, of course, is to induce in the people of Rhodesia a desire to change their Government. Perhaps I should give it in the Prime Minister's own words. This is what he said on November 12, in his speech in another place. He was talking about the object of restoring Rhodesia to the rule of law, and he went on in these words:
"This can be done, in our view, only by bringing the rebel régime to an end, by making that régime unworkable, and indeed, creating a situation where at the earliest possible moment the people of Rhodesia, acting through the only legal Government there—the Governor—themselves want to see and ask to see a lawful Government in its place."—[OFFICIAL REPORT (Commons), Vol. 720 (No. 4), col. 633, 12th November, 1965.]
I can appreciate that that is a worthy and proper object. What astonishes me is that nobody seems to have asked himself the question: are the sanctions proposed calculated to bring about that result? That is the most vital question of all. If they are not calculated to bring about that result, but may bring about those other undesirable results, they will not achieve their object.
I am not so certain as my noble friend who has just spoken that these sanctions must be bad, but I implore the Government to ask the right question: are they calculated to bring about the result they desire? Everybody assumes that the only thing that could be wrong with them is that they are not severe enough. They say, "Nothing could be worse than ineffective sanctions". Perfectly true. But it is assumed, without any evidence, that to make them more severe must make them more effective. There is no certainty whatsoever about that. If these sanctions do subject Rhodesia to great economic
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injury, and possibly to the breakdown of law and order, then they may not induce the people of Rhodesia to seek a new Government. They may unite them behind their present Government, struggling, as they think, against great injustice and vindictiveness. But that will not induce them to seek a new Government. Such a desire will certainly not be the automatic result of action thought to be vindictive. Here I should like to say that I am sure my noble friend Lord Salisbury was right on one thing. Though I do not agree with him in everything he said, I am sure that he is right when he says that the late Government of Rhodesia—this de facto illegal Government of Rhodesia—believe they are right. That does not make them right; it does not make their attitude lawful. But it has great relevance on what are likely to be the consequences of sanctions if they are thought to be vindictive.
The two speeches which gripped the House as much as any in the debate to which we have listened were the speeches of Lord Caccia and my noble friend Lord Alport. A most interesting thing about them is that both speeches mentioned what they wished the Government to do on the political plane, and neither expressed a great confidence in the sanctions now proposed. I do not want to weary the House by saying that all these sanctions are necessarily wrong: some of them may be right. But I should be much happier if I felt entirely convinced that the Government asked themselves, about these sanctions, this single all-important question: will their tendency be to bring about the result that the Prime Minister has described as their object? If not, there is no sense in them. I confess that I have great doubts whether sanctions obviously intended to be coercive will even tend to induce the people concerned to seek new leaders. I may be quite wrong, but I thought it right to express those doubts.
Those doubts are increased by the fact that two false arguments are being used, in my opinion, by those who support these sanctions, and support them without question. One of the arguments used by the Prime Minister and by the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack, in his opening speech this afternoon, was that the Government must impose all these sanctions because they

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said in advance that they were going to do so. I agree that, of course, it would be wholly improper for Her Majesty's Government to bluff, and I entirely accept that they were not bluffing. Nevertheless, the fact that you have said you were going to do something is not a justification for doing it, if in fact it will not bring about the legitimate object that you have in mind. I hope that the Government will not be too proud, if they find that there is something in these doubts, and that these sanctions are not calculated to bring about the result they desire, at least to look at them, or at some of them, again. I do not doubt that some of these sanctions must result from the illegality that has been committed, but I do not think it follows that nearly all of them must.
The second matter that troubles me is this. There are many supporters of extreme sanctions in Parliament, and there are many writers in the Press, who ought to know better, who say that the Government must impose these sanctions even if they are foolish, because otherwise somebody else will so something more foolish still. I have purposely slightly exaggerated the terms, but I have not falsified the argument. The argument is this: whatever these sanctions do, unless we do the most sensational things, the United Nations may do something worse. I say that that would not, in any event, be a good argument. It is not an argument for doing something in which you do not believe—that otherwise somebody else may commit an even greater folly.
Actually what is feared about the United Nations, as I shall endeavour to show, is based upon a misconception. The Security Council cannot lawfully authorise any action whatsoever of which our Government do not approve. Let that not be forgotten. I was not myself in favour of, and I should not myself have advised, taking the initiative in summoning the Security Council at all, although, of course, had any organ of the United Nations asked us for some information, I think we could, in accordance with precedent, have given it.
Nevertheless, I concede at once that there are respectable arguments on the other side, and some leaders of my own
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Party have expressed the view that the Government were right themselves to take the matter to the Security Council. Anyhow, I am not going to criticise that. But what I am going to criticise is the idea that, having brought it to the Security Council, they would be justified in allowing the Security Council to take some action by way of sanctions of which they disapprove.
There is so much misunderstanding about what the Charter provides, that perhaps I may do again what I did in this House just over nine years ago, when I reminded the House of what was the position about the so-called veto. Most of the population of this country is genuinely under the impression that the Charter (which they have not read) contains some mention of a veto which, for some strange reason, it is improper to use. The Charter of the United Nations does not, from beginning to end, mention the word "veto". What is generally referred to as "a veto" arises under Article 27(3) of the Charter, under which most decision of the Security Council are made by an affirmative vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members—and we, of course, are a permanent member. If a permanent member votes against a proposed resolution, there can be no decision of the Security Council. What does that mean? That is called using the veto; when the permanent member votes against a resolution of which he disapproves.
The merit or demerit of such action must depend on the demerit or the merit of the proposal before the Security Council. That is quite obvious. I do not suppose that even the Liberal Party would say that it is never right to vote for a minority view, but the idea that it is always improper to use the veto means just that. So when the Prime Minister expressed his fear of "a Red Army with blue berets", with "an aura of legitimacy" from a resolution of the United Nations, it could get no such aura of legality from the Security Council except with our connivance.
But it may be said: if we vote against the Security Council resolution, it could then go to the General Assembly under the uniting-for-peace procedure adopted in 1950, that is to say, that the Assembly might pass a resolution by a two-thirds

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majority. Of course, if the Assembly did, that resolution would have no such legal effect as anything done by the Security Council, and no country has been more emphatic than Russia in saying that it is illegal to take action on such a resolution of the Assembly where there has been no resolution of the Security Council. I do not, of course, deny the power of the Communist countries and others to make mischief if they are so determined, but I do say that their aura of authority from the United Nations is not one of the risks, if we play our hand correctly. If Russia, itself in default on many resolutions of the United Nations dealing with Hungary and other matters, wishes to intervene in Central Africa with the aura of the United Nations, I dare say that the attempt would not collapse from its inherent hypocrisy, but that is not really a matter with which we have to deal. I want to make it absolutely clear that, if the Government proceed with sanctions, it should be on their own conviction that the sanctions on which they proceed will bring about the result they intend; and let them not hesitate to use the veto against sanctions which they themselves regard as disastrous.
8.54 p.m.
THE LORD BISHOP OF SOUTHWARK: My Lords, as we have already heard, there are so many in your Lordships' House for whom the sadness of this occasion is heightened by personal associations. It is comparatively easy to generalise and to take sides when one thinks of the dissidents as nameless, anonymous groups—white, black, settlers, natives. It is more difficult to generalise when one thinks of the dissidents not like that but in personal terms, perhaps even by Christian names. This is how I am trying to think this evening. Although I have never been to Africa, it has been my privilege, especially when I was vicar of the University Church in Cambridge, to know and to minister to a great many Rhodesians, both white and coloured. White and coloured met at the Communion Table in the University Church and together we shared the sacraments. Again, a fortnight ago, when I was asked to meet in the Guest Room in your Lordships' House the leader of a delegation of Rhodesian businessmen, I found that here was the boy whom twenty years ago
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I used to teach in the school where I was a master and he was a pupil.
It is such poignant associations that compel us to strive for a solution which will reconcile those who are estranged and prevent further estrangement. It is the possibility of this further estrangement that troubles me most—the prospect of what may happen if either side in Rhodesia takes to shooting or to extreme measures. Passions will be raised, bitter things said in the Commonwealth; and, let us face it, murder of Europeans, in revenge for harsh measures, could stretch from Sierra Leone to Somaliland and everywhere from the Sahara southwards.
I understand the mood of the white Rhodesians. What the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, has said, with sincerity I am sure, is appreciated by so many of us in this House who do nut agree with his conclusions but who admire his sincerity and appreciate his point of view. We understand the mood of the white Rhodesians. They have worked hard in their country which country gives them their living, and they fear that if white minority rule comes to an end a one-Party State will take its place which could be destructive both of wealth and of life. But I also understand, as do your Lordships, the mood of the African. The mood is a feverish one, but you do not make him any better by rebuking him. You have to diagnose its cause, and fundamentally that cause lies in the way in which the African for generations has been made to serve ends not his own. When we have paid the last tribute to the integrity and self-sacrifice of the best of our race who have governed Africa, developed its commerce and sought its people's welfare, we cannot forget that we did it even at our best as trustees, as being in loco parentis. The African to-day is in revolt against being a ward, against being treated as a child. This is very hard for us in Britain to understand. I know it is very hard for myself to understand, especially when we have been conscientious trustees and devoted parents. But not all our contacts with the Africans have by any means been at this exalted level.
If we are to understand the prevailing mood of Africa's hostility to the West—and there are few things more important than understanding this mood; we who

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are in the Church are being constantly reminded of the need of this by our missionary—we cannot do better than listen to the words of an oppressed people of antiquity as expressed in Psalm CXXIII:
"Have mercy upon us, O Lord, have mercy upon us: for we have had more than enough of contempt. Too long our soul has been sated with the scorn of those who are at ease, the contempt of the proud."
Yes, it is with a deep understanding of those words of the psalmist of long ago, as precisely expressing the mind of Africans to-day, that we must judge both the present moment and the possible future events. That is why if we fail we may have to prepare ourselves for very ugly happenings, not only, and not necessarily, in Rhodesia. Now this is not being an alarmist. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, takes a different view. I respect his judgement greatly, but I have to admit that it is almost opposite to the expressions of opinion that we get in the Church from those who are working at the grass roots in these countries. It is not being an alarmist; it is a cautious estimate of what may occur in the present mood of African exasperation.
With this as a background, I make very briefly three points. First, the extremists on both sides must be saved from themselves, and I emphasise "on both sides"; and we must seek to save Africa from the consequences of the stupidity of the extremists. Above all, we must remember that there are wise, sober-minded people on both sides, and it is to these that we should direct our appeal.
Secondly, to date it is the white Rhodesians who have taken the step that might lead to the dreaded catastrophe. Their revolt could be the trigger for a different sort of revolt of quite terrible proportions. It is for this reason that the British Government must remove the finger of the white Rhodesians from the trigger, and thus save Rhodesia and the rest of Africa from the consequences of their folly.
Then, thirdly, it is no part of the Church's duty, speaking as I am now from the Episcopal Bench, in a situation as complicated as this, to prescribe particular political or economic actions; that is the business of Government and
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of Parliament. What the Church can properly say is that the saving of people from the consequences of their folly is often very painful. Such pain is not necessarily punitive; it may be redemptive—I emphasise that word "redemptive". I cannot believe that the Prime Minister, or any member of the Government, or any member of the Opposition, wishes to punish Mr. Smith just for the sake of punishing him, and I think it is a great pity that such a loaded word as "punitive" is being so carelessly used. What the Prime Minister wishes to do, I hope and I am sure, is to redeem the situation before it is too late, and in that process of redemption he deserves our full support.
I conclude as I began. We are faced with a quarrel within the family, among people whom we know. This is not unusual; the members of a family often fall out and it is the task of the family to regain its unity. Let us therefore avoid emotive words like "treason" and "rebel", while not hesitating to take whatever harsh measures may be necessary; and, again, harsh measures are necessary in nearly every family. Yet let both sides, setting aside hurt pride, make another effort and another effort and yet another effort, to reopen negotiations in the hope that our divisions shall be healed.
9.5 p.m.
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, it is not easy to follow a speech like that which we have just listened to from the right reverend Prelate. I thought it was a speech of exceptional charity and one which has given a further perspective to this debate. I was also interested in what the right reverend Prelate had to say about thinking in personal terms, and that is a point I should like to return to in just a few moments. I shall support this Bill when it arrives from another place, and I shall do so wholeheartedly and without any reservation. I support the action of the Government and of the Prime Minister in the last few days and over the period of the negotiations before the declaration of independence on Thursday, and I shall therefore vote for the Bill and against both of the Amendments. I say that at this stage because I shall not speak again in the debate, and I wanted to make my position quite clear.

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However, I have two questions about some of the things which have been said in the last few days. The first concerns the political rights involved. I am not talking now of the illegality of the unilateral declaration of independence—that is beyond doubt—but of the other arguments that are used. There is the argument in the interests of the African majority of "One man—one vote"—an argument of democracy. Then there are the arguments in the interests of the white minority—the arguments of property; again, something which has a place in democratic theory and democratic practice. These rights are difficult to disentangle and extremely difficult to evaluate in the situation in Rhodesia as it is. I think, also, that they are likely to look rather different in Salisbury from how they look in London.
The second point on which I want to touch, following the right reverend Prelate, is the Rhodesian leadership. I would not join in any denigration of Mr. Smith. I had an opportunity to meet him and to talk with him briefly when he was in London for the last round of negotiations, and I found him, in that brief acquaintance—and there are others who have known him over a much longer period—a thoughtful and direct man of apparent sincerity and integrity. Here was a man in an impossible situation. It is true that it was a situation to which he and his Government had contributed, but its origins go back to that day in 1889 when Cecil Rhodes's emissaries first arrived in the territory; to the form of quasi-independent administration, the Chartered Company, which they were later authorised to set up; to other events in 1923; and to the sad experiment of Federation in Central Africa. All these factors built up to last week's climax.
To Mr. Smith, in the position in which he found himself, and subject to the pressures from his own supporters in Rhodesia, there must have seemed practically no alternative. It is difficult in these circumstances not to feel some sympathy for Mr. Smith. If we think in personal terms, I do not know what some of your Lordships would have done if they had been in precisely that same position. But the whole point, my Lords, is that we are not in that position. The crux is that we are not in the same position as Mr. Smith, and we cannot afford to think and behave as
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though we were. We are in London; we are in Parliament, and we have a wider responsibility. This is the other side to what the right reverend Prelate was saying about thinking in personal terms.
What we are observing and what we have to recognise is one of the oldest and most familiar conflicts in international politics—indeed in any politics for that matter—which is where a particular interest, which may be legitimate or illegitimate, diverges from the general interest. There is an analogy here with a trade union leader who seeks wage increases above that which an industry or perhaps the country can afford. He seeks to obtain an additional advantage which he believes to be in the interests of his members. Yet those interests may conflict with the wider interests of society as a whole. He can still do so believing it to be the correct and right thing for the group he is elected to represent.
The action taken by Mr. Smith to protect the particular interests of the white minority is bad, not only because traditional law has been set on one side but because the whole future of Rhodesia has been jeopardised. I object to U.D.I. fundamentally because it is a threat to the future peaceful development of Rhodesia and of Africa. It is a threat, also—and a very serious one—to world order, in which we as well as the Rhodesians have a stake. There is a text in this week's Economist, in the leading article, which Rhodesians might take note of. In a very good phrase, the Economist says: "History will not allow it"
The southern part of Africa, it has been said, is now like a time-bomb, and a time-bomb, even when buried under an orderly surface, will go off once the fuse has been lit. We do not need to look to Russia in 1917 to see that. It is also a shameful place in which things are done of which nobody can be very proud. Rhodesians now join South Africans as people who cannot go out of their own country, out of their own enclosed and shuttered world, without explaining and justifying what is done in their country. The only way forward in Rhodesia, as elsewhere, is for a vital, educating and advancing society in which all the citizens of the country can feel that they have a part and in which they have a future. I believe, my Lords, that

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the events of last week have now made this harder to achieve in Rhodesia, perhaps even impossible to achieve, and I very much fear that we, as well as they, will live to grieve over the results.
9.14 p.m.
LORD FRASER OF LONSDALE: My Lords, I do not want to enter into an irrelevant argument with the last speaker. I want to affirm that neither South Africa nor Rhodesia are shameful places; the former is my country and the latter my neighbour. I went on record, some six or seven weeks ago, in a letter in The Times newspaper, when I urged upon the parties to this dispute that Rhodesia should inch its way towards independence de facto, rather than throw down the gauntlet of independence de jure. I wrote to Mr. Smith, to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor and to Mr. Heath. I mention these matters for the record and to show that I did the best that I could to avoid the issue now upon us.
I have not, of course, had the opportunity of reading all the papers, and I do not know where this matter stuck or whether that particular aspect was thoroughly tested, tried and found to be unassimilable. But I much regret that that advice—no invention of mine—was not taken, because it would seem to me to have been the way to approach this matter. And this links up with my view that neither South Africa nor Rhodesia is shameful. Nor is the last speaker, the noble Lord behind me, right to say of Mr. Smith that he was just a representative of the white man, as if he were nothing else. He and his fellows, and previous Governments in Rhodesia for thirty years, have brought forward in a most remarkable way, educationally and materially, the people committed to their care, and they are to be praised, not to be blamed, for all they have done for their country.
Now, here we are; and at the end of this enormously long debate I have very little to say. I want to try to avoid repeating what has been said so much better by others, but I have something to say which I am not sure has been said. It is my guess that Mr. Smith and Rhodesia will sweat this out. It has to be remembered that in this cold war
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upon which we are embarking—and how right the noble Lord, Lord Caccia, was to mention psychological warfare—the Rhodesians will be fighting on interior lines. They are a tough people; they have much in common with the Afrikaners whom, sixty or seventy years ago, it took the greatest country in the world four or five years to bring to terms. And it would not surprise me in the least if, notwithstanding the sanctions that have been proposed, the present, the de facto, Rhodesian Government (and we must admit that is what it is) is there for quite a long time. It would not surprise me if some change of opinion in Britain, perhaps even a change of Government, or the replacement of this Government by another one of the same Party but of a different view, might not make terms.
The American colonists who broke away were eventually recognised—nearly everyone is recognised some day—and the offences or crimes or actions of one generation become ships that have passed in the night. Who would now recommend that we should go to war with Russia to free the Baltic countries or the Balkan countries? Who would recommend that we try to undo the partition of Ireland, or that we solve the problem in Cyprus by some other method than the one we are now pursuing?
These things tend to become fixed as the pattern of time goes on; and it is my guess that the Rhodesians will sweat it out and that Her Majesty's Government will fail. But at what cost! We shall have impaired the viability for a generation of two countries: Southern Rhodesia, for one, and what was Northern Rhodesia, for the other. We may have brought ourselves to hot war, because cold wars sometimes develop into hot wars, and we shall have exacerbated the situation between the Europeans and Africans to a degree that is almost unthinkable.
We shall not even succeed in helping the Africans, because, having impaired our trade more than we have already done in Southern Africa, having perhaps lost the stability of the pound and the favourable balance of payments which we were promised for the next year or two, we shall be less able to help the emerging countries in Africa than we are now. There are few countries in the

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whole of Africa that make a living—only three or four, and two of them are those most concerned with us in this matter. Even those that do make a living North of the Zambesi, though still getting loans and help from us, will do so only to the degree to which we do not impair our capacity to help them.
I say this because otherwise it might be thought that I am talking for a white interest, as the noble Lord behind me suggested Mr. Smith was doing. I have no interest in Rhodesia. But I know this: that it is the strength and financial solvency of the European countries that are able to finance development in these coming territories. I know also that the only thing we give—and this may be important—to African peoples when we give them independence is the vote, but for a very short time, because their leaders abolish the vote after the first round, and so "One man, one vote" becomes "One man, one vote once". The other thing we give them is the satisfaction of the ambitions of the very few who are capable of leading and are, in fact, the leaders. I should like to see a way in which they can be brought into things but how disappointing when Southern Rhodesia tried to operate the 1961 Constitution and the leaders of the Africans refused even to try!
Nevertheless, I am not wholly unhopeful about Southern and Central Africa. There are three or four territories, be they small ones, where something like a democratic system is operating, well. There are notably the three High Commission Territories, particularly Lesotho and in another setting, the Transkei. In all these territories they have, mainly, "One man, one vote" and, in Lesotho. "One man, one vote twice". That is an improvement.
As I have suggested, it can work, but it cannot work if we impoverish these countries. I believe that in Rhodesia if Mr. Smith and the Chiefs could be brought to talk together, ignoring for the time being the politicians, something sensible could be done; and I recommend this course. How much better that this cold war which we are now indulging in, instead of being one that may last for nine years or nine months, should be a nine weeks' wonder! The initiative is
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with us to make it so. Looking into the crystal ball, I see a Federation or confederation of all the States South of the Zambesi in which all men, of whatever colour, have equal status in the Federal Parliament. It would be much better if this idea could be worked for and attained by countries that are solvent and strong, and helped by a Britain that is solvent and strong, than by countries that have been impaired by a long enduring cold war.
My last observation is this. I read with pleasure that on the day before he left, the ex-High Commissioner for Southern Rhodesia placed his poppy and little white cross in the Garden of Remembrance at Westminster. That touched me rather deeply, because I have often presided at and organised that garden, and it reminded me that these men were our comrades, my comrades.
Now I have a question to ask of the Lord Chancellor, and if he cannot answer me to-day, perhaps he will write to me. May I send a copy of Hansard to that Brigadier? I do not happen to know him, but that is immaterial. I should like him to know that there is at any rate one ex-Serviceman here who appreciated his gesture. The point of my question is not entirely drama, or to please him: it is to ask a wider question. Can any of us here write to our friends and relations in Rhodesia, or shall we be committing treason'?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: There is no reason why any noble Lord should not write to any friends in Rhodesia. There may be some limit as to what may be said. It has already been stated by the Government that we have no intention of interfering with free speech. If the noble Lord were to write to a friend in Rhodesia urging him to go and arrest the Governor, a different situation would arise.
LORD FRASER OF LONSDALE: I should have in mind to send him the Lord Chancellor's speech, as well as my own.
9.23 p.m.
LORD GLENDEVON: My Lords, after that trenchant question by the noble Lord, and the formidable, and I am sure absolutely correct, answer given by the Lord Chancellor, I shall be brief. I am

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sure, in any case, that your Lordships will agree that at this hour we all ought to be as short as we can, and I certainly will. At least two speakers in this debate today, the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, and the noble Lord, Lord Hastings, have said that previous Governments must take much of the blame for present events in Rhodesia. History, and only history, will show that. If it is right, then sympathy for all Rhodesians must follow to that extent. But even if it is right, there was, in my view, no excuse for Mr. Smith and his Government to lead their people blindly, as I believe, into this avoidable impasse.
I see the noble Lord the Leader of the Liberal Party in his place. He compared Mr. Smitth to King Canute. I realise that this debate is about Rhodesia and not about soil erosion, but I should like, in passing, to set the record straight. King Canute always gets blamed for what he never said. What happened was that King Canute was told by the men around him that he was all-powerful and could stop the tide, and he said: "Don't be silly; I can't". I hope the noble Lord will get it the right way round.
LORD REA: I am obliged to the noble Lord.
LORD GLENDEVON: I always like to help the noble Lord, even if it is not about the present crisis. What I was saying was that there was no need for this crisis, and no excuse for this illegal and unconstitutional act. I hope that the whole country will unite behind the Government in condemning this act, just as the whole Commonwealth has done. To do so will be to stand upon the rule of law—nothing less and nothing more than that. To do so will be, in my submission, the greatest single service that we can render at this time.
I do not want, and none of your Lordships has wanted, to say anything unduly harsh or avoidably unkind, and this is not meant to be, either. But I wanted to say something in my speech to your Lordships that ought to be said. Nothing has hurt me more, or offended me more, in the whole of this terribly sad crisis than what is to me the complete conflict between the loyalty to the Sovereign as it has been so forcibly expressed by Mr. Smith and his friends,
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and the way in which that loyalty has been shown. Loyalty to the Sovereign is inconsistent with disloyalty to the Crown; and it is inconsistent with the treating of Her Majesty's representative with the contempt with which he has been treated in Salisbury, and I regret it deeply. One says that quite genuinely, and much more in sorrow than in anger.
I do not suppose the ramifications of what I have said were thought out by men in great difficulty and who were in a great dilemma, but nevertheless if one is big enough to lead a people, or to run a show, one ought to be clear enough in one's mind about where loyalty begins and where it ends. In this context I should like to ask the Government a question about servants of the Crown who are serving Rhodesia. I may be wrong about this, but I believe I am right, and I should be very much obliged for information about it. There was something about this in the Press to-day, but I did not get my information from the Press. I am told that the Commonwealth Relations Office has sent a document to Rhodesian civil servants outside Rhodesia in the last few days, and that in that document these servants of the Crown have been given, I am told it is, 24 hours—I do not know whether that is right. The Lord Chancellor shakes his head, and I am glad that that is not so. But I am told that they have been given a very short time—and I hope this is not correct either—to sign a declaration of support for Her Majesty's Government, in the absence of which they have been told we can do nothing for them in the future. They have not, however, been told that if they will declare allegiance to the Crown, then they will be looked after. This is what I am told, and I am ready to be corrected if I am wrong. Clearly I have the time wrong, but if they have been given a very short time to sign a declaration of this sort in this crisis, I think it is too quick and too abrupt a way to treat them.
LORD REA: My Lords, could the noble Lord explain what he means by "Rhodesian civil servants"?
LORD GLENDEVON: Those who are serving Rhodesia here in London, and also in other posts. I heard of one in Tokyo, and one in Washington. I am simply repeating what I have been told,

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and I do not know whether I am accurate. If people think this has happened and it has not, then it will be for the good of everybody for the record to be set straight.
I have only one further subject to mention, and that is the subject of sanctions. This, of course, is going to be the rub. I realise that many of your Lordships feel differently from others of your Lordships about it. I take my stand upon what I believe to be the right view and it is, as has been said, to persuade the people of Rhodesia to have a Government which will revert to constitutional action. There is nothing vindictive at all in setting that objective. Strength of purpose is obviously the intention of the Government, and they are right to intend it; and strength of purpose must not be confused with vindictiveness nor, on the other hand, is it in the least inconsistent with compassion. It is going to be our duty. I am afraid, to cause a good deal of pain and a good deal of discomfort, but, my Lords, let us then be ready to heal.
LADY EMMET OF AMBERLEY: My Lords, before my noble friend sits down, could he enlarge on the question which he has put to the Government about Rhodesian civil servants abroad? Surely the loyalty of civil servants in Rhodesia also should come into the picture and they should have some assurance from the Government as to how they stand if they remain loyal to the Crown.
LORD GLENDEVON: My Lords, I did not mention them because I understood that civil servants actually in Rhodesia have not been sent this document. Certainly on the general question, one hopes very much that the Government will be able to say to these people, wherever they may be, whether in London. Salisbury, Washington, or wherever they are, "If you feel you can give your loyalty to the Crown, come what may, we will look after you afterwards".
9.37 p.m.
LORD REAY: My Lords, speaking late in the evening, and yet far from last, I will add only a few comments to this grave debate. The Government are committed by the moral logic of recent history to the application of sanctions against Rhodesia. The purpose of these, by their effect of discomfort and in-
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security on the supports of Mr. Smith, must be the collapse, or the retreat, of the rebellious Government. At the same time, this effect must occur before the application of these sanctions over a long period causes serious damage to the economy and a serious decline in investment. The longer the rebel Government remains in power during the application of severe sanctions—and the sanctions are already severe—the less recoverable will be the damage done to the economy the harsher and more embittering will be the repressions of the State police; the graver will be the threat to the structure of the country from a hungry and unemployed African majority, and the greater will be the dangers, on the one hand, of physical intervention by African parties or their agents, either more or less lawless, and, on the other hand, of repercussive effects on the European minorities of, in particular, Zambia and Kenya.
It is probably correct to say that time was on the side of the British Government during the negotiations which preceded the declaration of independence, but that does not seem to be so any longer. Time to-day looks an enemy, rather than a friend. It seems likely that the sanctions already imposed are severe enough to cause a serious decline in investment in Rhodesia if they are continued over a length of time. In that case the need for their early success in changing the orientation of the rebels becomes the more urgent. And it is worth noting, in this context, that Lord Malvern is reported to-day as holding the opinion that only a sanction on oil would be likely to produce this effect. In that case we are in danger of being in the most unsatisfactory of all positions, where our adopted sanctions are insufficient to impinge on the intransigence of the Government and its supporters, and yet sufficient over a long time to impair the strength of the economy.
It seems to me that only those who decline to forswear some sympathy with the rebellious Government can object to sanctions on tobacco, and that it is only with sanctions on oil that there is a real prospect of securing the effect we want. But if, on the one hand, in this difficult psychological exercise we are to try to reduce the rebel Government by the discomfort of sanctions, we must, on the

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other hand, be assiduous in extending to the Rhodesians the promise of a more comfortable alternative, by making it clear that progress to majority rule will still be phased gradually, by indicating the conditions on which negotiations will be resumed, by offering, perhaps, compensation for those who would wish to emigrate, above all by making it physically possible for Rhodesian inhabitants to receive Governmental directions and assurances and factual news on the medium wave wireless.
On the question of force, I doubt if the desirability of the use of British troops is going to be as remote a likelihood as has generally been allowed. What successive indignities of treatment of the Governor are going to be unresisted? What disobediences to his command are going to be tolerated? What if the Governor requests physical assistance? What if the rebel Government violates an international agreement in respect of, say, Zambia, which it would be doing if it cut off the power from Kariba to Zambia? These are not necessarily unlikely contingencies and I suggest that any current feeling that the question of the use of force has been finally decided in the negative may prove to be illusory.
I mention these considerations because this is perhaps the last of England's great imperial tests. If we are to be true to all our principles of imperial legacy, we must be determined to the limit of our intelligence and strength to prevent the passage of this Colony to our heirs under a Government whose accumulating characteristic, in my submission, is a defiance of the only principles of government that we can practise or preach or tolerate. That is why, in the circumstances, he only debate that is relevant is a debate about the means of restoring correspondence with this penalised country, and why no possible form of Government reaction is, in its proper circumstances, beyond consideration.
9.43 p.m.
EARL DE LA WARR: My Lords. I think perhaps the most outstanding point of this controversy has been its lack of bitterness; the relations between Mr. Wilson and Mr. Smith, the debates in this House, and so far as I know in another place, show almost complete unity
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on a subject in which immensely deep feelings are rampant. I think it was the Bishop of Suffolk who said the same thing in other words, and I join with him in saying, "Do, for heaven's sake, let us hang on to it." The only minor criticism should feel myself about this debate is that, although it has been mentioned, we have not paid sufficiently high tribute to Sir Humphrey Gibbs, the Governor. With his lady he has shown a common sense, a courage and in integrity, and I think we ought all to be very proud, because although he has become a Rhodesian he is a Britisher by birth. He is the best that England can produce, and I would almost venture to say, if it were not going to seem to be denigrating him, the best that Osbert Lancaster's small grammar school near Slough can produce.
In a debate like this, where so many are speaking, I felt it was right to limit my remarks to just one isue: and indeed, in this discussion we really are faced with only one issue, namely, whether we pursue the policy that we heard over the wireless from Mr. Heath—I think the words were "what flows inevitably from Rhodesian action"—or whether (I know the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Southwark rather objected to the term) we set out to punish.
Before we settle that question we have to be quite clear on our objective. What we all of us want is a lasting, just and, above all, unembittered solution to the tragic problem with which we are faced to-day. How are we to obtain it? The arguments for punitive or really drastic action—use what words you like—are quite simple and clear. One can say that half-baked measures must give us the worst of both worlds. The problem is how to bring home to the Rhodesians as soon, and as drastically, as possible the realities of what they have done.
But we must surely obtain our ends by methods that do the least damage to black and white alike, whether it be in Rhodesia itself or in neighbouring territories. I do not know that much has been said this evening of the danger of the spread of this prairie fire that we may be lighting, but I do not really want to make my argument on the need to limit ourselves to moderate measures. It is quite clear that we must achieve our end,

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and if something more severe is necessary we must undertake it. But do we know—I do not think we do, and I do not think we can except by experience—exactly where the line can be drawn between action that will be sufficient to make Rhodesians realise the extent to which they have been misled—because I am quite convinced that they have been misled; they have been told again and again that this was not going to be a serious matter for them—and, on the other hand, action that in fact rallies them? Hitler's bombs certainly did not demoralise us; they rallied us. And there comes a point in attack upon a people when you get this situation; that some of my own friends in Rhodesia, who were strongly against U.D.I., have said to me, "We are fighting U.D.I. up to the last, but if we are really attacked we are Rhodesians". That is a reaction that many of us would have.
I think we all know that there are a great number of loyal, moderate and liberal-minded Rhodesians. Many of them have always been against what we call U.D.I. It may be wishful thinking, but I believe that, even to-day, there are many others beginning to realise the extent to which they have been misled. Therefore. I would ask Her Majesty's Government—and I do not feel that I am pushing up against a brick wall, because, as has been said again and again in this debate, Her Majesty's Government have behaved with great moderation and statesmanship throughout their handling of this problem—to bear in mind this possibility. Now what really comes out of it? I would venture to suggest that we should start with what many of your Lordships would consider comparatively moderate measures, bearing in mind that they may prove to be insufficient, but also that there are a number of responsible people in Rhodesia who, once the seriousness of their position is brought to their consciousness, may in fact be influenced by even that moderate action.
I realise to the full that I shall be told that this will not satisfy the United Nations or Afro-Asia, but I think that is something we have to face. Her Majesty's Government have asserted that they consider this problem to be our responsibility. The Leader of the House
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is not here, but I do not think we have yet been told whether the Government are prepared to carry that attitude to the point of exercising the veto in the Security Council. Whether we shall be informed of this in the debate or not, I do not know, but it is certainly a matter of very great importance. We have a right to claim that this is our responsibility—not only a right under the Charter of the United Nations, but, because of the fact that there is no empire in the world, and there has not been such an empire throughout the history of the world, that has given freedom and independence to so many hundreds of millions of people in the space of a very few years.
After all, who are likely to be our critics? Has not the time come—and I believe the situation with which we are faced to-day gives us an opportunity of mentioning this problem—when we are entitled to ask for judgment of all nations by a single standard? Do we always have to accept criticism from the United States, with their problems in the South, and their having during the last month declared innocent a man who murdered not only a Negro but a white woman for driving in a car with a Negro? Do we have to shrink before the criticisms of Russia, tyrannising, as she does, over millions of her own and other races? India and Pakistan at the moment are tearing each other's eyes out over who is to dominate another race. Has not the time come when a nation with a record such as ours has the right to speak out and be proud of what it has done, and to refuse to accept criticism from those who are themselves in no position to sit in judgment on others?
No one else has mentioned this point, and it may be that I am wrong in thinking that it is relevant to this debate, but it is something which is very strong in my heart. It certainly strengthens my conviction that it is right for us to follow our own consciences and not to be over-influenced by criticism from outside. This Government have shown great statesmanship hitherto. I would say: let them continue to do so and consider carefully whether they should not proceed step by step, testing out and seeing what is the minimum damage they can do before achieving the object that we all hope to achieve.

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In conclusion, I should like to support the noble Lord, Lord Caccia, and the noble Lord, Lord Alport, in their request to the Government to tell the Rhodesian people exactly what we would settle on. I think the noble Lord, Lord Alport, went further and said: "Let there be an all-Party declaration". The one cry I heard from the then Opposition when I was in
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Rhodesia just before the last election was: "Do for Heaven's sake give us something on which to fight! We have nothing to tell the people of Rhodesia about what terms are available to them." I believe that Her Majesty's Government and the Opposition would do a great thing for Rhodesia and for the ultimate solution of this terrible problem if only they could do that.
9.58 p.m.
LORD COLERAINE: My Lords, we have heard on every side today, and in the past few days, of the paramount need for national unity. For my own part, I am not sure that that is now really the most important thing. When we are at war national unity is essential, and indeed has to be enforced, but we are not at war with Rhodesia. We may hold that they are in rebellion, though for my own part I must say that I regard it as a technical rebellion, but we are not at war with them. Of course, while the negotiations were going on one could argue that national unity was paramount, and indeed at that time national unity was real. I do not believe that there is any one of us in this House who did not pray that a unilateral declaration of independence might be averted. But now we are faced with a new situation, and we must decide upon the best means of meeting it. That, surely, is simply a matter of judgment, and I believe—I hold most firmly—that it is not only our right but our duty to exercise our judgment in the light of that reason which God has given us, and that experience which we have had.
My Lords, I do not believe in the argument that if there is any wavering in support of Government policy it will strengthen Mr. Smith's hand, will unite the White Rhodesians behind him. In fact, I think exactly the reverse will happen. If we pursue the role which the Prime Minister and the Government have indicated, of savage sanctions designed to bring a change of heart in the shortest possible time, I am afraid that we shall bring a change of heart all right, but it will not be the kind of change that we want. I was in communication this evening with a friend of mine who has just returned from Salisbury. I say "I was in communication" deliberately, for I did not in fact speak to her except through an intermediary, because she was in bed with a fever. She arrived in this country from Salisbury on Saturday, and had been in transit through Salisbury over the two or three days covering the U.D.I. and its immediate consequences.
She told me that she was staying with friends who were entirely opposed to U.D.I. but they told her that, now that it had come, and in the light of the re-
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action of the Government, they would support Rhodesia's independence to the death. She told me, too, that that was the experience of all the friends that she met in Salisbury during that couple of days—and, as I have indicated, her circle of friends was entirely among those white Rhodesians who, until then, had been opposed to U.D.I. I would implore your Lordships and the Government to consider whether, the more extreme the pressure becomes on Mr. Smith and his Government, the more it will in fact consolidate opinion behind Mr. Smith rather than cause a division. For my own part, I think there is a very real danger of this policy, which we are all invited to support unanimously, producing that effect of consolidating Mr. Smith's position rather than weakening it.
Like others of your Lordships, I have studied this Command Paper on the documents relating to the negotiations between the United Kingdom and the Southern Rhodesian Governments. I find it extremely good reading. Something is made clear to me by this document that I have never understood before. Before I develop this point, I should like to tell the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, if he would allow me to do so, that I listened to his speech this afternoon with the greatest admiration for its objectivity and its absolute fairness. As he was speaking, I felt that if the noble and learned Lord had been in charge of these negotiations, not only for the last three or four weeks but over the last three or four years, the Rhodesian Government would have formed a different opinion from that which unfortunately they did form about the reliability and the integrity of British Ministers. I hope the noble and learned Lord will forgive me for paying him that compliment.
But as I was about to say, the noble and learned Lord is puzzled, I was puzzled, and I think we have all been puzzled by the fact that the Rhodesian Government, which had the reality of independence, still insisted on the formality. Why, when they had the substance were they so desperately keen to get the shadow as well? I believe the answer is partly to be found in this record. I think that if your Lordships will read this record you will come to

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the conclusion that there was a gulf which was quite unbridgeable between the British Ministers of any Party and the Rhodesian Government. It was not a question of argument; it was not a question of logic; it was simply that the two sides were not playing the same game and they were not playing it on the same ground. The Rhodesians, I think, were there as patriots. We may think their patriotism misguided; but they were there as patriots and were thinking only of the future of their country. The British Ministers. I think, were entangled in a labyrinth of constitutional law; and they never seemed to get out of it except for occasional excursions into the effect of all this upon our relationships with the Commonwealth or with the United Nations or on world opinion. The Rhodesians were thinking of Rhodesia; we were thinking of matters entirely different.
The crux of the whole matter is to be found in particular in one passage in this report on the negotiations. It is on page 124; and if your Lordships will bear with me I will read out the passage which seems to me to be so important in this connection. Lord Graham, that is the noble Lord whom we know and respect as the Duke of Montrose, who has so often intervened in our debates on these subjects and who now, I suppose, we have to regard as a traitor, said
"that many Africans preferred good government to majority government, especially in the light of the experience of their fellow Africans in, e.g., Tanzania and Malawi.
"MR. WILSON said that the issues raised by a statement of this kind involved fundamental questions of political philosophy which it would take a very long time to explore in detail. It might be better that the two Governments should try to abstract from their respective political philosophies and to confine themselves to the more specifically constitutional problems which confronted them.
"MR. SMITH said that what confronted them was precisely a question of political philosophy, not merely one of constitutional law."
I believe that that passage and, in particular, the sentence which I have just read out by Mr. Smith, defines the real difference between the two parties and does much to explain whey they are so insistent upon getting the formality as well as the reality of independence.
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The Prime Minister and others have denied that any true analogy may be drawn between the American War of Independence two hundred years ago and what is happening in Rhodesia today. In his final news conference before he left, the Prime Minister emphasised that that Declaration of Independence showed a decent regard for the common opinion of mankind, whereas the Rhodesian declaration, if it came, would fly in the face of world opinion. The quarrel with the United States started not with the fine words of the Declaration of Independence, but with a squalid squabble over taxation. But the nub of the argument was the same two hundred years ago as it is today. It is simply this: that a people of British stock who had grown into nationhood were not prepared to submit any longer to the control of a Parliament 3,000 miles away in which they had no representation.
I believe that that is really the issue to-day so far as Rhodesia is concerned. If that is so, can we really imagine that sanctions and pressure, which, as the noble Lord, Lord Reay, said, may carry us farther than we expect to go, are going to bring people of British stock to heel? I myself cannot believe it. Others have tried this. We ought to know this, because white Rhodesian behaviour in this is very much our own behaviour, as a number of people, from Philip of Spain to Hider, have found out. They have had to find it out the hard way. I very much hope that we shall not have to find it out the hard way. When everything has been said, the fact remains, as more than one noble Lord has pointed out to-night, that our real job now is to try to pick up the pieces. I think that in anything we do, in anything that the Government do, we have to be sure that there are some pieces left to be picked up and that, through Mr. Smith and Mr. Wilson, we have not wrecked this unhappy people and this unhappy State beyond recovery.
10.16 p.m.
LORD GRIMSTON OF WESTBURY: My Lords, I am sure your Lordships have all been impressed with the speech to which we have just listened. At this time of night I hope not to detain your Lordships for too long, and I have cut out parts of what I was going to say. However, there are one or two things which I think should be said in this debate. We can all agree that what has happened is

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tragic, but I think what we all ought to agree, as well, is that the fault is not entirely on the Rhodesian side; and the realisation of this should influence out future actions.
The build-up of the climate of opinion in Rhodesia which has brought the Smith Government to power and made the U.D.I. declaration possible has been going on for years. No political Party in this country can disclaim their share of responsibility over those years. I suppose that in legal phraseology the Smith Government may be rebels. But can any of your Lordships who heard his broadcast the other day believe that in his heart he is a rebel? I found it a very moving broadcast. The Union Jack is to continue to fly; the National Anthem is to continue to be sung: and I could not help feeling how favourably that compares with other places, where on the grant of independence a republic is immediately proclaimed, allegiance to the Crown is severed, the Union Jack is pulled down and they proceed to "gang up" against us in the United Nations. Cynics may say that this is pure sentiment. But sentiment is a very potent thing in the world, and I am not ashamed of it.
The Rhodesians have certainly flouted the rule of law. But is it for us in this House to stand in a white sheet over that matter, when we remember that only a few short months ago we in this House retrospectively reversed a judicial decision of the highest court in the land? I think we should remember this.
I referred to the build-up of the climate of opinion in Rhodesia, and I think it is best exemplified in remarks which were made to me when I was last in that country. I may say that I do not claim a great knowledge of Rhodesia, but I have paid several visits there over the last few years. This was the gist of the remarks that were made to me, not by one person, but in different parts of the country: "We know you are going to treat us as expendable. You are much more interested in your image at the United Nations than in doing justice to those who have built this country and to whom you have been content to give virtual independence for years". That was a very general view, and I am sorry
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to say that it is certainly, to quite a large extent, justified.
Let me remind your Lordships, first of all, of the United Nations Congo operations. I make no excuse for doing this. Your Lordships will remember that the United Nations was originally called in to maintain order after the mutiny of the Force Publique. At that time in Katanga there was in power President Tshombe, a friend of the Belgians, who was running a viable Katanga in law and order when the rest of the Congo was a shambles, and doing it with the help of the former colonial power and with white mercenaries. He was indeed sowing the seeds of multiracial development. But that was anathema to the Afro-Asian group and their friends in the United Nations. What would have been a peace operation was turned by that interference into a campaign to oust Tshombe from Katanga. They succeeded, with the help of the United States and ourselves, in achieving that object, and after much bloodshed Tshombe was ejected. The Rhodesians saw all this happening at close quarters.
Let me remind your Lordships—perhaps you have forgotten—that during that time at one moment the United Nations asked for 1,000 lb. bombs to be delivered to them for a police operation. This was stopped by the indignation which was aroused in the British House of Commons. This episode, I think, has a bearing on the powers we are shortly proposing to give to the Government, but I shall come back to that later. Anyway, after a year or two Tshombe was back again with his white mercenaries, and it is thanks to that fact that quite a number of missionaries and others were saved from a massacre. It will be seen in to-day's paper that Tshombe has now won a vote in the Congo Parliament.
What I want your Lordships to remember is that that man, who wanted to work with the white colonial power, was driven out by the United Nations with the support of ourselves and the United States, and the lesson of that was not lost upon Rhodesia. Then there came the break-up of the Federation and the handing of independence straight away to Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The impression which has been created on the minds of many in Rhodesia by these events is that Britain

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has been in far too much of a hurry to hand over to black majorities, with precious little regard for the feelings or the fate of those who have built up the country, and when this process reached a point where there was a white population large enough and powerful enough to revolt, it has done so, and it is not surprising. That is the tragic position we have reached, and we must, if honest, admit that we have a heavy portion of the blame. When I say "we", I mean all political Parties in this country.
Now I come to the question of sanctions. According to the Government, they are designed to bring home to the Rhodesians what they have done, but not to punish. The Government have explicitly stated that this is a British matter and not one for any outsider. I think most of us would agree with this view. But then why, oh why, my Lords, run off to the United Nations at once and drag them in, particularly after the Congo story? Why not have adopted the attitude taken by the French Government who, refusing to recognise the illegal Smith régime, nevertheless said, "We will take no part in the United Nations over this, as we regard it as wholly a British matter."
I understand that the Prime Minister thinks that by getting in first he will steady the United Nations' demands for drastic action. My Lords, I have been to the United Nations myself. I spent three months there on our delegation, and I do not believe that our going there to try to get in first will do any such thing as restrain the United Nations from making extragavant demands. In fact, I think it may well prejudice our future position. I have seen it suggested in the Press that the Government have up their sleeve oil sanctions as a sop, if necessary, to restrain United Nations' demands for force. I only hope that is not true. I hope this is not the idea, because if it is it will be disastrous, so far as any build-up of moderate opinion to bring pressure to bear on the Smith régime is concerned, and it will make nonsense of what the Prime Minister said in the House of Commons last Friday, which in a moment I will quote.
However, the Government have gone to the United Nations and I trust that they
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will be ruthless in the use of the veto against action which goes against the Government's declared policy as stated by the Prime Minister. This is what the Prime Minister said:
"we are not going to indulge in any measures purely for the sake of recrimination, purely for the sake of inflicting punishment, purely for inflicting pain or hardship for their own sake. We are not out to punish…"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 720 (No. 4), col. 632; 12th November, 1965.]
One may be quite sure—in fact it has already happened—that the United Nations will be out to do all those things which the Prime Minister has set his face against, and what line are the Government then going to take, having invited the United Nations to help? The Prime Minister talked about the prospects of the Red Army in blue berets arriving in Africa unless the United Nations was appeased. I cannot imagine that this is a logistical possibility except with the aid of the United States and ourselves, as in the Congo operation, and I must Fay it seems scarcely credible that the U.S.A., at the present moment pouring out blood and treasure to resist Communist infiltration in Vietnam, would support it in the guise of backing the United Nations in Africa. I believe that the greatest chance of bringing the Rhodesians back is to confine sanctions to what they have brought upon themselves by their own actions and to show them that we stand against the excesses which will no doubt be called for by the United Nations and by other African States.
Finally, I, too, was greatly impressed by the fair way in which the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor put the case for the Rhodesian Front, and I should like to echo the words which were spoken by my noble friend Lord Coleraine. But the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor referred to one answer of Mr. Smith which he could not understand. It was an answer to one of the Lord Chancellor's questions, which was:
"Why do you agitate for independence when you can govern yourselves as long as you like under the 1961 Constitution?"
I am afraid, my Lords, that the underlying and really terrible answer to that question is that, after what has passed during these last years, they do not trust us. It is a terrible thing to say, but I

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believe it is true. They have brought matters to a head and we are faced with this tragic situation. I believe that it is vital now to see that the words of the British Prime Minister, which I have quoted, are adhered to and can he seen to be trustworthy. For that reason, when the time comes I shall support the Amendments to the forthcoming Bill, which I understand are to be introduced with that object in view.
LORD FORESTER: My Lords, I must first say that I spend half my life in Rhodesia, so I might be considered an interested party or even—what is it?—a self-confessed rebel. However, having just come from that country a week or so ago, I felt I should intervene in this debate and I might give your Lordships some relevant factors that you had not already heard. First, consider the state of Salisbury today, which is the same as when I left it: absolute tranquillity, people of all colours walking down the streets politely—buxom Umtazi, skinny Englishwomen, all looking in the shops to see how best to spend their husbands' money. Surely we do not want to alter this now by savage sanctions. Leave those savage sanctions until the Rhodesian Government has passed amending legislation not to the benefit of the Africans.
Tobacco takes a lot more labour than any other crop. I grow about 350 acres. With that I feed, house and pay some 200 African families; I also provide a school for their children. This is a typical set-up of the Rhodesian tobacco farmer. If we put an embargo on Rhodesian tobacco, naturally it will not be grown, and many thousands, perhaps even 100,000, Africans will be put out of work and near to starvation level. What then? Idle hands and empty stomachs are no good to a country. They cause trouble, unrest and probably bloodshed, that word which has been so glibly used by many in this country, even the Church. Perhaps that is what the Government want; but if it is, let this House not be a party to it.
Also, is it wise to destroy an industry that has been so laboriously worked up? The British palate for smoking has been carefully watched, and now more than half the tobacco you smoke in all your cigarettes is Rhodesian. If you lose all
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that you will have to get it from America. That suits America very well; I believe there is four years' supply waiting in their docks, and very bad tobacco it is, too. I hope it will not give you lung cancer but it may well do so. Should you have to cultivate the taste for American tobacco it will cost us, I believe, about 35 million dollars a year, and that may go on till the end of time. Is that going to help our balance of payments?
The African is the most hospitable person, and no doubt those in the tribal areas will share their last mealy with their brothers who come back from the farming area. But that merely spreads the famine. The unfortunate British taxpayer, I believe, pays some £200 million to the other African States. Does he wish to have to spend even more on subsidising starving Rhodesian Africans whom we have put out of employment?
As regards the effect of sanctions on tobacco, the first planting of tobacco is about now, on the first rains; if this embargo comes into force the second planting in December the tobacco growers would obviously not plant. They will plant groundnuts or cotton or some flowers, or some other crop which does not take one-tenth of the labour that tobacco does. Their fertiliser they can keep for another year. So the immediate effect of the sanctions is on the African labourer. Later on, the effect will of course be on the tobacco grower when, next May, at the tobacco sales, he cannot sell the crop.
It seems to me utterly incongrous to apply punitive sanctions to Rhodesia, a State that is pledged to multiracialism and eventual African rule—certainly a much more liberal régime than that carried out by our friends to the South or to the North. Surely it is better to use the reasonable velvet glove rather than the punitive mailed fist which, as other noble Lords have said, will most certainly drive all Rhodesians into a corner together and invite them to endure any sacrifices. I have many friends in Rhodesia who are members of the old U.S.V. Party. A week or so ago they were all stolidly behind Mr. Smith. They said that Rhodesia speaks with one voice in her desire for independence. Now, possibly they may think differently. So

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let us give them very opportunity for second thoughts, perhaps an alternative or a coalition Government. I will most certainly support the Amendment of the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, so that every facet of the Government's punitive measures may be looked carefully in the mouth by your Lordships before they are carried out.
10.39 p.m.
LORD MILVERTON: My Lords, I rise to offer a few comments on the Rhodesian situation, and I do not propose to detain your Lordships for any length of time. But I ought first of all to say that, like everybody else in this House, I deplore the fact of U.D.I. Or perhaps I ought to say that I deplore the necessity for it. I think that men like Mr. Smith were driven in despair to take this unwise step. We are all familiar now with the negotiations which took place between the Prime Minister and Mr. Smith, and the divergent interpretations which have been placed on the spirit of those negotiations. My own feeling is that reasonableness and willingness to make some concessions were almost entirely on Mr. Smith's side, and that the British Government's demands, however patiently and plausibly set forth, rested on an inflexible foundation and left no real freedom for accommodation.
My reading of the Prime Minister's position is that he dared not appear to be otherwise than inflexible, because he was all the time apprehensive of the United Nations. All this talk about "Red troops in blue berets" seems to me nothing short of the admission of blackmail by the militant members of the United Nations—shall we say Soviet Russia trading on the hysteria of certain members of the Afro-Asian group? I am very mindful of the Veto rights which this country possesses in the Security Council and which can be, and surely should be, immediately used when any such suggestion is ever made. I believed, and still believe, that an acceptable agreement could have been reached between the Rhodesian Government and the British Government on the basis of the 1961 Constitution. Granted certain assistance in educational facilities which would have accelerated African potentialities to qualify for registration as group A voters
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as well as opportunities for training in the spheres of responsible government positions, I simply do not believe that it would not have been possible for the right sort of negotiator, who understood the atmosphere of Africa, to arrive at an agreement of that sort with Mr. Smith.
I cannot forget, and I do not think anybody should forget, that the 1961 Constitution opened the door wide to the black African citizens of Rhodesia to qualify themselves within a reasonable period of years for a dominant participation in the government of a great and prosperous country. But they were intimidated by self-appointed leaders into refusing to co-operate in any such constitutional advance towards partnership and eventual predominance in a civilised Government. The chance lay with the African community, and they were misled by their so-called leaders into refusing what was a golden opportunity. It is also clear that the militants of the United Nations will go on pressing to the end for the immediate surrender of Government powers to the unqualified numerical majority of black Africans. The Prime Minister has himself said that universal suffrage, "One man, one vote," makes no sense to-day or to-morrow. But that is the danger which looms large on the horizon now. The imposition of various penal sanctions is an act of war and is extremely likely to produce a situation in which the use of military force will be loudly demanded to control the chaos these measures seem likely—or even, some may think, designed—to create.
Let us consider some of these moral considerations. Is not failure to stand up for civilised government, is not failure in obedience to the traditions and sacred beliefs of one's own race, is not substitution of expediency for courageous faith, far greater disloyalty than a technical breach which can legally be called rebellion? The Rhodesian Government, in my view, was driven into this unwise course. Throughout the British world there has always, for many generations, as I have known it, been a passionate loyalty to the Crown, because the person of the Monarch is, surely, a symbol of the traditions and high principles of the British race. It is mentally quite separate from the feeling towards

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the British Government which may sometimes be, and in my experience has been, a good deal less than cordial.
Amid all this talk about rebels and traitors, if one analyses the facts, on which side is the failure in faith and loyalty? Is it not with us? It is a sorry day when we are ordered by irresponsible foreign representatives to abandon the high principles by which we once stood. We are told that we must swim with the tide, even if it be a torrent of barbarism. Mr. Smith has only asked, after all, that ample time be given to his African fellow citizens to take advantage of the opportunities provided for them, so that they can, if they will—and they have up to date refused—make a constructive contribution to the prosperity of so potentially great a country. They have not been willing to do so.
I can only say that to me it seems that the "frightened men" are on this side of the picture, not on the Rhodesian side. Are not the British Government looking over their shoulder all the time to the United Nations? The United States, Canada and Australia are in strange association with Soviet Russia and Afro-Asians in this insistence that civilisation has no right to survive if it is numerically outnumbered. Incidentally, on this basis I can never understand why our American friends bar the entry of China to the so ineptly called United Nations. How can you on this principle, when you are founding a Government of the world, deny a share of one vote to one-fifth of the world's population?
LORD BOOTHBY: My Lords, may I interrupt my noble friend for a moment? He has referred to the traditional position of the Monarchy. Has he any authoritative information about the attitude of the Queen herself on this question?
LORD MILVERTON: No, my Lords. Of course I have no such authority. I was merely giving the views of my own experience. But to return to what I was saying, I have never understood why the United States have taken this attitude. It may he that they are so pre-occupied with painting the Statue of Liberty black that they have overlooked these other incidents.
If one thinks of the problems which are going to arise as a result of the
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tragedy which we have been discussing today, it is indeed appalling for anybody to envisage what this Government will do. I was much impressed by the appeal which the noble Lord, Lord Alport, made to us, that at least we should know exactly what we want to do, in the end, with Rhodesia; what are the terms and conditions which we should be ready to offer to them. It is no use waiting and drifting with time. We should know exactly what we are trying to do in this appallingly difficult situation.
My Lords, I am utterly opposed to the imposition of penal sanctions—at least, viciously penal sanctions—because they are morally unjustifiable; because they are likely to be unsuccessful practically—indeed, if they were successful they would probably lead to actual war—and because they will harm most those people whom they are nominally designed to assist. In conclusion, may I say that it seems to me that now the sun is setting blood-red on the high principles which once governed our relationship to the timing of betterment, both material and spiritual, of hitherto backward countries, but I, for one, refuse to salute this withdrawal from responsibility as the dawn of a brighter day.
10.52 p.m.
THE EARL OF LYTTON: My Lords, I suppose I should start by saying that I had regarded the transfer of political authority from white to black in Rhodesia as something which was only a matter of time, and not of a very long time at that. I had thought until today that everyone had that view, including everyone in this House. Moreover, in my discussions with the High Commissioner, Mr. Campbell, which brought me into this matter, I had the impression that that was also the view of most responsible Rhodesians. I had thought that we were not divided on a matter of principle, but on a matter of time. I am not one enthusiastic about instant independence as prescribed by, for example, the United Nations, but I came up today for the purpose of voting in support of Her Majesty's Government for one reason more than any other—namely, that the machinery they are devising seems intended, in spite of references to the United Nations, to keep the problem of Rhodesia a British problem.

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I wonder if I am right in inferring that the Government of the 50 million people or so of this country are the Government of Rhodesia today, and that we govern as, in a sense, a majority Government of 4¼ million Rhodesians. If so, it is comparable with the situation in Kashmir, where 4 million or so Kashmirians are governed by 400 million Indians. India says that this is an integral part of India and that it is nobody else's business, and in that view they were fully supported on October 13 by the Emperor of Ethiopia in Addis Ababa, who not only took the view that it was entirely their business but that there was no sort of case for ever applying the principle of self-determination to Kashmir. It seems to me that if these two authorities in Africa and Asia take this view, we can at least argue with them that the position is legally the same with regard to Rhodesia. The practical difference is that their purpose is to thwart self-determination for ever, whereas ours is to facilitate it without bloodshed.
I wonder, if that is the case, whether I have made a correct inference about these two comparisons. To continue briefly, I wondered whether the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor gave all the weight that was properly due to the position of people like Mr. Nkomo. He referred to Mr. Nkomo saying, "One man, one vote, tomorrow." And he answered it simply by saying, "We have said not today and not tomorrow." But surely behind Mr. Nkomo is Resolution No. 1514 of the General Assembly of the United Nations which prescribes immediate independence, regardless of lack of preparation. Similar views are embodied in the Charter of Addis Ababa, the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity, and in many resolutions of that organisation, which has now 36 members, many of them of our own Commonwealth. Similar resolutions, much more violently expressed, were embodied in the Conference of the Non-Aligned Nations in October, 1964. Representatives of 47 member nations and 10 observers were present—getting on for half the States of the whole world. All of them were afraid of giving one single word of credit to the freedoms that Britain has bestowed, and all of them
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were condemning us for what we had not done here and there.
In addition to these matters, there are in Tanzania the headquarters of the Liberation Committee and physical forces of the Organisation of African Unity with the Foreign Minister of Tanzania as its chairman, and it is dedicated to violence and subversion in neighbouring countries. Surely that is known to Mr. Smith's Government and to all Rhodesians. If any more were needed, there is the book, published in Britain, written by Mr. Tom Mboya who describes in absolute detail the procedure followed by the nationalists in order to get the white man out. He is represented, as soon as they reach a certain stage, as the enemy, the one enemy, the only enemy; and anything denigrating and mendacious that can be said about him is said. I should have thought the Rhodesians have a genuine crisis which they see plainly; although I must concede that in all Mr. Smith's appearances on television (which usually tells us most nowadays) there was very little of anything I could think of to carry conviction of the genuineness of the crisis.
It seems to me that the Rhodesians must feel that the pressure of the Commonwealth and the non-aligned nations is such that a British Government will not be able to resist it for long. I wonder whether when the phrase "Not to-day nor to-morrow" was used in the course of these negotiations, anybody mentioned the period which has been mentioned to-day (for the first time, to the best of my knowledge, from a high authority) of possibly fifteen to twenty years. If this period is contemplated and considered possible, surely it would be better to start in a different way altogether. Constitutional progress in Kenya and Tanzania was carried out in a virtual vacuum. The poor in pence were elevated to the seats of the mighty and there was nothing in the way of a substantial middle class community of Africans with all sorts of trades, professions and activities. There were only the poor Africans, the African politicians in power, and the rich whites.
Would it not be possible to approach the matter from the absolutely opposite end, to decide, after calculating the cost and the methods of carrying out a plan, to create an African middle class community in twenty or thirty years and give

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that date as the date after which there would be more Africans with the vote than whites? They could then do what they liked. It seems to me that if that were done, if we did hold the fort, we could bring the Rhodesians—at any rate, the ones I am in contact with—to believe by degrees in the possibility. Those who would not tolerate it would filter away and would not need to be compensated. They would take their opportunities. The noble Earl, Lord Swinton, in his eloquent speech, said, "Keep the door open". This is my contribution to keeping the door open. There is more I could say, but we have been waiting for nine hours, so I will sit down.
11.2 p.m.
LORD MOWBRAY AND STOURTON: My Lords, after nine hours, as the noble Earl has just said, your Lordships have heard much wisdom, expressed with tremendous eloquence and sincerity, from all Parties and it leaves little for anybody else to say. But there is one point, which I feel may be stressed, which struck me during the extremely lucid and very fair account which the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor gave us at the beginning of the debate. He told us that Mr. Smith had said to him that if education appeared to be going too well, they would have to think about changing the qualifications. I think I have it roughly right. Obviously, I cannot answer for Mr. Smith, but from what a lot of Rhodesian friends have told me, and from what I have read in the Rhodesian papers, there is one point which ought to be made. Rhodesia, which is a small country in population, stands very high in the educational stakes. They are a people who are dedicated to giving multiracialism eventually. They are not like those living to the South of them, dedicated to not doing so. They are doing it, as the noble and learned Lord said, on the basis of various permutations and one of them is education.
If I may bore your Lordships with details, twelve years ago there were only 263,000 children in their schools. Last year, UNESCO reported that there were 628,000 black children and 36,000 white children between 5 and 14 in their schools. By any standard, this is a remarkable achievement. We all know that buildings are hard to get, and how
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hard it is to find teachers. This is even more so in a country like Rhodesia. Furthermore, these figures represent 91·5 per cent. of all children of that age in Rhodesia. To compare this with the so-called conservative, enlightened countries, I would just mention one, Ethiopia, which has only 5 per cent. of its children at school. Secondary education has not been progressing so fast, but even here, last year 8,500 children were attending secondary schools, and this year this was expected to be up to 11,500. It is a significant jump. In due course, by these figures multiplying themselves, this would have the effect of giving the vote to more people, not only on the B Roll, but also on the A Roll, which we know is the important one.
There is another point which I think should be made. If sanctions are going to be effective, over a period of time this is obviously going to affect the finances of Southern Rhodesia. At the moment, they are spending on education 9 per cent. of their Budget. This is a large figure, and it is even higher, in a way, than we probably realise. Here in Britain, to educate one child we have three adults to pay taxes towards that child's education. In Rhodesia you have the extraordinary situation of what is really a young country in more ways than one. There, 50 per cent. of the population is under seventeen. This means that one adult has to pay for one child's education.
All this is going to be in jeopardy if sanctions become punitive and disruption takes place. This will put back for a decade, perhaps, some of the advancing youth of that country. This is exactly the opposite of what all Parties and all people of good will want. My only plea to your Lordships is: please do not let us put our necks too much in the noose and, as an honourable Member of another place on the Government Benches said the other day, regret that for the next ten years we shall be trying to undo what we do to-day.
11.7 p.m.
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: My Lords, I assure your Lordships that I shall be brief. I felt that I had to speak briefly in this debate, because I have quite a few friends in

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Rhodesia, though I have no interests there. Every Member of this House has deplored the declaration of U.D.I., because we have to uphold the rule of law. Though I think that sometimes the law can be "an ass," perhaps that is not so on this occasion. What I am really worried about is the question of sanctions, and I should like to say a few words about that.
As I see it, sanctions will either be entirely ineffective, in which case they will make the British Government look foolish, or they will lead to chaos through unemployment and, therefore, unrest and a breakdown of law and order. If sanctions are imposed and they are effective, I think that what might perhaps happen is that we shall find a great common market created in the South of Africa. You will find that Rhodesia will be forced, much against her will, to join up with the Portuguese territories and South Africa. Presumably we do not want that to happen, though perhaps there might be worse solutions. I beg the Government to be careful over the question of sanctions. I agree that we must show displeasure to the illegal Rhodesian Government, but surely the withdrawing of Imperial Preference and such matters is sufficient.
With regard to the ineffectiveness of sanctions, I would point out that if, for instance, we try to put an embargo on oil, we do not control the world's oil supplies. What is to stop South Africa from buying oil from the world and selling it to Rhodesia? In order to make sanctions effective, we should presumably have to apply them to South Africa and to Portuguese territories, which would he quite impracticable. Another point, of course, as some noble Lords have said, is that if we do not buy Rhodesian tobacco it is also going to hurt us. I understand that we should have to purchase, presumably from America, about 100 million dollars worth of tobacco. Owing to our extremely unfavourable external balance of payments and our dollar shortage, I should have thought that this would be the last thing we should want to do, though no doubt it would be extremely gratifying for American tobacco growers.
On the subject of America, it really does irk me that we have them preaching
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to us regarding the colour problem when their record is deplorable. If you take the State of Washington, I understand that over 60 per cent. of the population are coloured, and no coloured man is even allowed on a local council. In Rhodesia every African, if he has merit, can attain any office in public life. Therefore. I do object to our being taught our business in this matter by America.
The other thing which upset me is that I think it is most undignified that our Foreign Secretary has gone scurrying to the United Nations. By all means send him there, but he ought to say to the United Nations that Rhodesia is a colony, that it is completely our affair, and we propose to do (a), (b), (c) or (d). But to go to the United Nations and to ask for all their support to try to force Rhodesia to her knees through sanctions is extremely undignified and completely immoral. Who are the majority of the members of the United Nations? The majority of them are, as we know, tyrannical dictators. Some of them do not even pay their subscriptions to the United Nations: the British taxpayer subsidises quite a few of them. These are the people whom we are asking to advise us. Honestly, it is most hypocritical.
A number of noble Lords have praised the Prime Minister very highly for his handling of this crisis, but I cannot really agree with them. In my opinion, he has built up this crisis too much into a great world crisis. It appears that he was trying to find a Cuba to justify himself. But perhaps I am wrong here; it is only my opinion. However, I feel that if only we had played this matter down it would have been far better. Surely, by building it up into a great crisis we are only inflaming world opinion.
I agree there is no real parallel, but when South Africa went out of the Commonwealth, it was hardly mentioned. I agree that the parallel is not the same. If you take the India—Pakistan war, there you had the most appalling crisis that the Commonwealth has ever had to endure. But I cannot remember the Prime Minister appearing on television several times, or all this great activity, with everybody flying about the world. I should have thought that that was a far greater crisis than the Rhodesian crisis.
THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (LORD CHALFONT): Will the noble Viscount allow me to intervene? I have listened to him with interest and growing astonishment, and I should like to ask him three questions. The first is on the question of Washington. Does the noble Viscount realise that Washington has, in fact, no Council but comes directly under the Central Legislature; and does he know how many Negroes are represented there? Does he know how many of the 117 countries of the United Nations are, in fact, tyrannical dictatorships; and will be agree that in fact the fighting in Pakistan and India was stopped by the sole intervention of the United Nations?
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: I can tell the noble Lord quite a few of the United Nations which are, in fact, dictatorships, and he knows as well as I do that great numbers of them are members of our Commonwealth. Does the noble Lord want me to enumerate them? There are Ghana, Tanzania, the Sudan, Pakistan and so on—one can remember dozens. Regarding the India—Pakistan war I agree that on the face of it the United Nations stopped it. But they stopped it only because the Great Powers were behind them. Rhodesia is a completely different matter, because it is entirely our affair.
The other thing on which I cannot agree with the Prime Minister was in his broadcast of 12th November, when he said that since the war the British Government had given freedom and independence to 700 million people. I would say that that is the mis-statement of the century. On the average, these 700 million people certainly have not got anything like the individual freedom they had in the former British Empire. They certainly do not have the impartial justice that they had then.
I think it is a pity that the Prime Minister has apparently tried to work up public opinion in this country against the Rhodesian Government. It is quite true that they have done an illegal act, but they do not embark on slippery politics, and they are, on the whole, a simple people of pure British stock. A large number of them are farmers—indeed, I know quite a few. We should not be hard on them. They may have erred,
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but I thought the Prime Minister's statement on Thursday was really very cruel. I feel that nothing can be gained by absolutely crushing and browbeating them. By all means let them see that they have been foolish and have broken the law, but do let us try to keep the door open. I see no reason why we cannot reopen negotiations in a short time, after everything has simmered down. Time always has the effect of simmering down affairs like this.
I am sorry to keep returning to this subject of the Prime Minister, but the other thing he said—and I think it was also said by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor—was that we were trustees for the people of the Commonwealth; we were trustees for the minorities, as well as for the majorities. Of course, that is quite true. But then how about the Turkish minority in Cyprus? They are in the Commonwealth, but the whole time their position is being eroded. There are other instances of minorities who are having their position eroded in the Commonwealth. You cannot blame the Rhodesian Government for being frightened of the British Government's intentions.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, could the noble Viscount explain why you cannot blame them for being frightened of the British Government's intentions? We made it perfectly clear to them throughout the whole of the negotiations at every stage that nobody was trying to push them into anything at all. Nobody was trying to make an alteration; as long as they behaved constitutionally, we should behave constitutionally. They might pass laws under which an African throwing a stone would be subject to an automatic death penalty; we might disagree but we should not interfere. If Her Majesty exercised the power of reprieve, whatever we thought, she would do so not on the advice of her United Kingdom Ministers but on the advice of her Rhodesian Ministers. We should continue to observe this convention as long as they behaved constitutionally. There was nothing to stop them from going on as long as they liked under the 1961 Constitution, under which they had all the power. Will the noble Viscount explain how, in those circumstances, he now says they were naturally frightened by the British Government?
VISCOUNT MASERREENE AND FERRARD: I am not saying they were right to be naturally frightened. The British Government has obviously acted in perfectly good faith. The Rhodesian Government over the last few years have been let down; they have had so many changes with various British Governments that they probably now do not take British Governments at their 100 per cent. face value. I am not blaming the present Government. I am just saying that they probably did not believe that everything that was said was true. I am saying they cannot have had 100 per cent. trust, because if they had had 100 per cent. trust they would be quite crazy to declare U.D.I. I personally think they were crazy anyway. But I cannot believe even a madman would have declared U.D.I. if he had had 100 per cent trust.
I would make a last appeal. According to law, the present Government in Rhodesia is illegal, but it is apparently at the moment maintaining law and order and it also is an elected Government. I feel we have to be very careful before we destroy that Government, because if we destroy it then we shall probably destroy law and order, and Heaven knows where it is going to end. So I beg that we shall be very careful in our general dealings with this question.
11.25 p.m.
LORD BADEN-POWELL: My Lords, one of the penalties of being the thirty-sixth speaker in a debate is the fact that most of the other people have said what you wish to say yourself. I therefore will not keep your Lordships long tonight. I must, however, before going any further, declare a form of interest in the matter, as many other noble Lords have done this evening, in that my family on my mother's side go back for four generations as Rhodesians—indeed, they came to that country in 1890 with the original settlers. My wife is also a second generation Rhodesian. She and I were both born in that country, and were at school there for the first few years of our lives.
I personally regret very much indeed the fact that Mr. Smith has declared independence. But I feel, as many noble Lords have felt today, that he, and indeed the whole population, both black and white, realised that they were in an
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invidious position since the break-up of the Federation. We cannot deny that the prosperity of Rhodesia has been brought about by the white Rhodesians' expertise coupled with the black Rhodesians' hard work, and this has been achieved in a relatively harmonious atmosphere so far, just as we cannot deny—and this has already been stated many times to-day by many noble Lords—that this has resulted in one of the most prosperous and go-ahead countries on the African Continent, and one that must surely come under majority rule one day in the future. But as my noble friend Lord Hastings said earlier, with the rising feelings of active hostility, before U.D.I. was declared, among the other African States, in a blind and misguided attempt to stir up hot tempers and unrest in Rhodesia, and all this done with no regard to the 1961 Constitution—the 1961 Constitution did at least pave the way to some form of responsible majority rule—I feel that the Rhodesians of all denominations realised that some form of stand had eventually to be taken.
Unfortunately, this has taken the form, to date, of a tightening of controls and a restriction of freedom, which has transformed the country for the moment, at any rate, into the beginnings of a Police State. The dilemma, as has been mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Saffron Walden, has been heightened by the abysmal lack of leadership or coherence so far shown by the African nationalist leaders in that country, and by an apparent lack of willingness on the part of Whitehall to make up its mind. Here again, my noble friend Lord Hastings hit the nail firmly on the head in this matter.
Surely this is one of the roots of the problem, our failure to solve it at a much earlier stage, for we have known that Rhodesia must take the notional step from self-government to independence in the very near future; and the fact that Britain has been so tardy in even attempting to find a permanent solution has been one of the main reasons for bringing about the thought of U.D.I. The blame must rest, to a great degree, on us here in Britain. After all, we have known about the threat of U.D.I. for over a year. It seems to me that the laws of basic justice demand of us in this country that we cannot, with a clear conscience, extract

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reparation or wreak vengeance—call it what you like—on people in another country who have decided to take these drastic steps in an attempt to resolve a situation in regard to which we, in this country, have been so tardy and have not tried to resolve ourselves.
LORD GLADWYN: My Lords, what would the noble Lord have wanted us to do instead?
LORD BADEN-POWELL: If we had perhaps gone into this question more thoroughly at the end of the Federation—perhaps, as one noble Lord said earlier, if the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor had been in charge of the negotiations at the end of the Federation—I am sure we might have found a quite different situation from that obtaining to-day.
I now come to the possible consequences of the imposition of sanctions. Surely the imposition of sanctions of any description will serve only to make people more determined to see the thing out. When the severity of the sanctions increases, then the determination increases proportionately, and so the circle becomes tighter and tighter till we find no way out except chaos. I also believe that the Rhodesians will try to sweat it out. Supposing the régime of Mr. Smith were brought to its knees by this method and a more moderate Government could be formed, how would they be able to continue the policy of integration? For now that the tempers of black Africa are roused and crying for blood, we must be very naive to assume that they would allow any form of orderly integration to take place from now on. I fear that a more moderate Government in that unhappy country within the next few months, or even the next couple of years, will not be possible because it will be the signal for some one of Rhodesia's neighbours to the north to start a conflict which may have the most far-reaching results.
All I ask today is that we, as a nation, will consider very deeply and with much heart-searching before taking any step whatsoever that might jeopardise the situation of both white and black Rhodesians, or indeed our own position and commitments on the African Continent. The furore that will ensue on that Continent alone will be heavy
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enough to bear, especially at the moment, with all the sabre-rattling and cries for blood emanating from the lips of the leaders of the so-called newly emergent countries. Should one of them, or a combination of a number of them, take the law into their own hands and start to flex their muscles, probably with Chinese and possibly Russian backing, they will be attempting to perpetrate another Congo bloodbath and will asuredly tip even further the fine balance which is already under severe strain between black and white Rhodesians.
Rhodesia will not be able to stop this, without the additional burden of economic sanctions and the stabbing in the back that would mean. Both Napoleon and Hitler learned that it was impossible to fight on two fronts, and should Rhodesia, as we know it today, have to fight on two fronts, one economic and one military, she will certainly be brought, albeit bloodily and chaotically, to her knees. Where do we go from there? The rift will have gone too far ever to be healed, and a once prosperous country will be an economic and political backwater. All the good work of the last few years will have been undone and it will all have been to no avail.
There have been many speakers to-day and we have still a great deal of work before us. I have therefore not spoken as fully as I should have liked. All we can hope is that Her Majesty's Government, and indeed the country as a whole, will temper its reasoning, not with thoughts of our losing face in the sight of the world, but rather of putting ourselves into the shoes of Rhodesians and first weighing the consequences of what may issue from the remainder of the African Continent and the United Nations before we ourselves take any action. After all, the thing is now done, it is an established fact at the moment, and there is not a great deal that we can do about it without doing it by force. We cannot allow a recurrence of the Algerian or Congo situation to take place. If this is so and if Rhodesia's neighbours to the North do attack, our rôle here in Britain may have to be extremely different from what it now is. We may find ourselves back-pedalling on decisions which we might have to take now. I therefore ask the House to consider very deeply

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the sanctions which are now to be imposed before making those sanctions greater or harder to bear for the Rhodesian race.
11.35 p.m.
LORD STRANGE: My Lords, I nave come to the conclusion that to say, "I promise to be brief" is unlucky; it does not seem to come off. So I shall say merely that I am on your side. As your Lordships have heard me say pretty often, I live in the Isle of Man, and to that lovely island comes a constant stream of colonists from all of our departing Colonies. Many of them are friends of mine, and they have asked me whether I would try to express their views in your Lordships' House. I think their views are sound, and to a great extent they differ from anything which I have heard in this debate. I think I should say about these people, that I always had the idea that the Empire-builders were alcoholic public schoolboys lying on divans, clapping their hands for chota pegs, or village maidens suddenly overnight growing into haughty queens. But since I have known them I have found them really hard-working, not always very well off—struggling like oneself—rather charming, and rather interested in the future of the country which they have been in for so long.
The first thing they told me, before the present terrible situation developed—and if it had been a racing tip it would have been rather a good one—was that they were afraid that Mr. Smith would win. My friends also said—and, peculiarly enough, it is exactly what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Fraser of Lonsdale, in a brilliant speech—that they thought there would be many leaks if sanctions were employed, and that it would be a great pity if sanctions were ever employed because it would leave a permanent scar that would take a lot of healing. They thought that Mr. Smith would win, and they were sad that the British Government had been brought to this state, because they thought that they would lose face. This is not what I am saying; it is what I have been told.
The point which these people wanted to make was that when Europeans went to Africa their culture did not always fit in with the Africans, who, after all, are a different race, and that that caused a
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certain amount of trouble. They told me something which I had never thought of before: that for centuries and centuries the Africans have been nomads, free-ranging people, and the European civilisation, which has shut them up in towns and kept them close together, has a deep psychological effect which they do not notice. This comes out, one might say, in the form of claustrophobia, which is inclined to involve them in riots, as happened in California this year. But my friends also said that the Africans in what they called purely African States were quite able to run their own countries, and to run them quite well.
I have to put brackets in here. What I have been saying is what I have been told. Now I come to what I have to say myself. Somebody told me that somebody else told him that he saw on television last night a document from Kenya, which was signed by prominent ex-British citizens of Kenya. These people live in an African State and they said that they were perfectly happy there under African rule. One of the signatures, I was told, was that of the noble Lord, Lord Delamere, who is one of my oldest friends, and I thought to myself "If Tom Delamere signed it, it will not be far wrong." The brackets are now closed, and I go on to say what I have been told.
As regards the Cape, which has a climate in which British and European people can live comfortably, I am told that when the Europeans first went to it there was nobody there at all; and when they went to Rhodesia the population was so thin on the ground that it could not be counted. They say the Europeans have built up these colonies and that they have made them progress, that they have put up their own buildings and that they are primarily European from beginning to end. They think that morally they really do belong to Europeans, while morally many of the other countries belong to Africans. That is their point of view.
They put it this way. They say that nobody seems to realise how big Africa is. They tell me that there are more live able acres to a human being in Africa than anywhere else in the world; that the countries are enormous and that there is room for all. They say that we in Europe think nothing odd of having

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France, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Holland and all these places; we in England think nothing odd of having these different countries. If we go and work in Belgium, we naturally obey the Belgian laws and the Belgian customs, and we try to speak the Belgian language. If the French come over here, they try to obey our laws. They probably do not speak our language, but they do come over here and they are citizens while they are here. They think that is the aim of the development of Africa, that that is the future of it: certain purely European-ruled States which Africans can go into under European rule, and certain African-ruled States that anybody can go into and be under African rule. That is the view, as I have told you, that has been given to me by these friends of mine.
I think I should clear myself by saying that I have been to Africa, and that I enjoyed it very much—but then I enjoy going anywhere very much. Through the Victoria League I have had Africans to stay with me, and I thought them very charming. Anybody who laughs at my jokes I think charming. Really, I have no opinion about it. As on previous occasions, I have gone to the Gallup Poll and the National Opinion Poll—as I have told your Lordships before, I have very good access to them. This time I drew a blank. There seemed to be complete apathy. Nobody seemed to be interested in the question at all. But I trust, my Lords, that the British Government have better authority than one person I talked to. It was an old soldier, who said to me, "The Malawis were a wonderful race. They were great warriors, and they had all sorts of lovely ideas". I asked him what ideas they had, and he said he had forgotten. I asked him what his authority was, and he said King Solomon's Mines.
11.43 p.m.
LORD RUSSELL OF LIVERPOOL: My Lords, I know that you are all waiting impatiently to hear the last two speeches, but it is not my fault that I am last in the queue. Having regard to what has been said by the noble Lord who has just sat down, I do not propose to say that I shall be brief, but I hope that I shall not speak for too long, and that your Lordships will bear with me
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for a few minutes. I must say I am a little apprehensive as to whether I shall last as long as that, because a few moments ago, when the last noble Lord was speaking, I heard the noble Lady sitting just below me saying that she was in favour of euthanasia. I hope that she will refrain from using me as a guinea-pig at least until after I have finished my speech.
However much we may deplore the Unilateral Declaration of Independence made by Mr. Smith, I am sure that no one who has visited these countries which during the last few years have obtained their independence, and who has not had his eyes closed to what has been going on there, can fail to understand that many Rhodesians are discouraged, dismayed and somewhat apprehensive at what has happened in some of them since they obtained their independence. Furthermore, anyone who visited the Congo when the United Nations force was there and who did so again this year, as I have done, must fervently hope that there will be no direct intervention by the United Nations in Rhodesia. And if a resolution is put forward in the Security Council—and, so far as I know, that could be happening at the moment—which is asking for force to be used, I hope the Foreign Secretary will oppose it strongly and even, if necessary, use the veto.
Further, although it cannot be denied that Mr. Smith's Government have led the country into rebellion, I hope that the words "treason" and "traitor" will not be used any more in this country. They are words which should be reserved for more suitable occasions. To call the average Rhodesian a "traitor" is only going to make eventual reconciliation with Rhodesia (and I should have thought this was the aim of any British Government) more difficult to achieve. For the same reason, I would ask Her Majesty's Government to think hard before imposing punitive sanctions, by which I mean sanctions which are not purely consequential upon a state of rebellion, because to impose such punitive sanctions is, in my opinion, bound to disrupt the national unity in this country which it is essential that Her Majesty's Government should have behind them while this crisis lasts.

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My Lords, there are three questions which I hope the noble Earl who is to speak for Her Majesty's Government at the end of this debate may be able to find time to answer. The first springs from the fact that some extremely irresponsible statements have been made recently by a number of African leaders, with one notable exception. Will Her Majesty's Government make it abundantly clear that neither they nor the majority of the people of this country approve of such statements and that such a bellicose attitude can only make the present situation worse? The second question is: Will Her Majesty's Government also inform those who have already been told that the recognition of the rebel Government in Rhodesia is an act of treason, that to recognise an African Government-in-exile will amount to the same thing? Thirdly, if the noble Earl can find the time to do so, will be tell the House what will be the position of a large number of residents in Rhodesia who served in the Forces and who are now in receipt of Service pensions?
There is only one other matter with which I wish to detain your Lordships. It is a matter which was dealt with by the noble Lord, Lord Glendevon. I should like to deal with it for a few moments in greater detail. He was talking about the position of Rhodesian civil servants in this country. They have been asked to sign this declaration. With your Lordships' permission, I should like to read it to the House.
"From the Commonwealth Relations Office. Declaration required. You are required to declare that you dissociate yourself from the purported declaration of independence made by Mr. Smith and his colleagues, that you do not accept the authority of any Government Mr. Smith and his colleagues may purport to constitute in pursuance of this illegal declaration of independence and you accept the continuing responsibility and authority for Southern Rhodesia of the Government and Parliament of the United Kingdom. If you decline to make a declaration in the above terms you will be regarded as having chosen to adhere to Mr. Smith's illegal régime."
I have always believed that the sanctity of the political beliefs of permanently established officials has always been respected. These Rhodesian officials are now required publicly to dissociate themselves from their employers, the de facto Government of Rhodesia. If they refuse
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to do so they will be deemed to have thrown in their lot with the illegal régime.
I would ask your Lordships to consider the dreadful position in which an African holding such a position finds himself in. There are Africans in this country holding such positions. If he elects to sign the declaration, then in the event of the Smith Government lasting, he will have cut himself off from his own country. If he refuses to sign, then in the event at some date of constitutional Government being re-established in Rhodesia, he would be a marked man as soon as African majority rule came about. I hope that Her Majesty's Government may have second thoughts about this. I agree with noble Lords who have said that this is no time to listen to extremists. The Prime Minister said that any one in favour of ought to have his head examined. It is to be hoped that good sense and sanity will get Her Majesty's Government through the trying times ahead.
11.51 p.m.
LORD CARRINGTON: My Lords, I do not think that anybody could say that we have not had a full debate. We have discussed this issue for ten hours and I think that I am the 42nd speaker. This has been a remarkable debate, and we have heard some notable speeches. In particular, I think that all noble Lords would like me to mention the speeches of my noble friend Lord Butler of Saffron Walden, and the noble Lords, Lord Macpherson of Drumochter and Lord Vernon, who made their maiden speeches in this debate. They all made splendid contributions.
Of all the other speeches, I hope that your Lordships will not think it invidious if I mention only one, but it was one which struck me very much—that was the speech of my noble friend Lord Hastings. He speaks with great knowledge of Southern Rhodesia, but his exposition was, if I may say so, most dispassionate and well instructed, and it added greatly not only to the credit of this House but also to the reputation of my noble friend.
This is, of course, a debate which we all hoped would never take place, of a situation which we all hoped would never arise. I do not think that there is anyone in this House, and very few outside it,

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who can be anything but dismayed, and profoundly shocked, at Mr. Smith's decision unilaterally to declare indedependence. Everyone, in every Party, has advised Mr. Smith and his colleagues against it, and no one knows what the consequences of his decision will be. No doubt historians in future, when looking through the events which led up to this climax, will say that a Conservative Government should have done this or a Labour Government might have done that. But of one thing I am quite sure. However Governments may emerge, whether with credit or blame, the Governor, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, will universally he held to have done his duty, and done it nobly. It cannot have been easy for him. He is a Rhodesian resident of long standing, and comes of an old and distinguished English family. The decisions he has had to take in the last few months must have been heartbreaking, yet everything he has done has been absolutely right and absolutely consistent with his position as Her Majesty's representative. I know that it will be the unanimous view of this House that he has behaved with dignity and courage and has well served the Crown.
It would be foolish to deny that over past years there have been many different views about the situation in Rhodesia. A great many people, and certainly I myself, have felt sympathy with the position of the white Rhodesian. As my noble friend Lord Salisbury said, we have felt on many occasions that here were a people who come from the same stock as ourselves; who have worked hard in their country; who are responsible for the high standard of living which they enjoy, and the high standard of living of all their people, African, Indian and European. Some of us have thought it natural, having regard to some of the things that have happened in other parts of Africa, that there has been a feeling by successive Rhodesian Governments that to plunge Rhodesia too quickly into a state of majority rule might for everyone, both black and white, be the worst thing that could happen. Indeed, I do not think there has been anybody—certainly not the Prime Minister, because he has said so—who thinks that at this particular moment it would be right that there should be a Rhodesian Constitution which would ensure a large African majority.
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All of us feel that there should be majority rule. The dispute between us has largely been one of timing. Those who sit on the Benches opposite think, perhaps, that majority rule should come sooner, for example, than those who take the view of my noble friend Lord Salisbury. But the fact remains that the difference, in essence, has been one of timing. Certainly I felt, and I think that others like me felt, that if we could ensure that the 1961 Constitution was, at any rate for the time being, properly applied, so that African advancement could be assured, then in the course of time—and we should have to see how long it would be—everyone of good will would agree to another step forward towards complete independence and majority rule.
Here I associate myself very much with what the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack said. I have not been able to see why the Rhodesians have found that attitude so difficult to accept. They have, after all, had control over their internal affairs for a great many years. The substance of independence was already theirs. Almost everybody was agreed on the ultimate aim—or, at any rate, they said they were agreed on the ultimate aim. It would have been up to the British Government, whether Conservative or Labour, to support them as they moved steadily forward; and not only to support them, but to hold back the more extreme forms of African and other opinion which were asking for much too much, much too soon. But the fact of the matter is, as everyone knows, that Mr. Smith was not content with this, and was not prepared to accept some of the very conciliatory suggestions put forward to him by the Prime Minister. He has decided to take the plunge, and we are now faced with a situation which all of us have tried to avoid and which all of us have headed. We have in front of us the terrible examples of the Congo and of Algeria, the suffering and the misery, the racialism and hate which have grown out of those two tragic events. At all costs, we have to avoid that.
What we are debating here this evening are the measures which Her Majesty's Government are proposing to take as a result of Mr. Smith's action. Where do we co from here? What are we to do to put right the situation which all of

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us deplore? There are some who feel (I think the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, is one) that since Mr. Smith and his Government have rebelled against the Crown, force should be used to restore the situation. But I do not think there are many who feel that; or, indeed, that those who have advocated that solution have fully considered the consequences of that action, not only the consequences in Rhodesia itself, but the consequences in the neighbouring countries, and, perhaps more important still, in this country. I am glad that the Prime Minister has set his face against that.
We are then left with two other alternatives. One is to do nothing, and to hope that public opinion, both in Rhodesia and in the world, will force the Rhodesian people to reconsider the action they have taken; that the moderates in Rhodesia will be able to make their view felt and that another Government will emerge which can restore the situation to its pre-U.D.I. position. I am bound to say that I think that outcome would be most unlikely. We have to consider the effect of doing nothing on our friends and potential enemies around the world. We have to consider the effect of inaction on the United Nations and on other people more extreme than some in the United Nations, and some who would wish to use force for purposes not necessarily connected with Rhodesia. We have to consider whether, if we do nothing, it may not appear that the British Government are abdicating power and responsibility and appearing to condone the actions of Mr. Smith, which both major Parties have declared to be illegal.
Or, thirdly, we can take some such action as the Prime Minister in another place has described, for which purpose the Government are seeking wide powers under a Bill which we hope shortly to receive from the House of Commons. Let me make it perfectly clear that we on this side of the House, as I believe it is true of noble Lords opposite, believe that this is a matter purely for the British Government. Rhodesia is a British responsibility. The declaration of independence was directed at Britain and the Crown. The United Nations and other countries do not enter into it, except in so far as we invite them to do so. Now if that is right, are the
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Government then asking unreasonably for powers to impose some penalties and sanctions on Rhodesia as a result of her action? Anyone who has read this Bill will see that it in fact gives very wide powers indeed to the Government. Under it, the Government can suspend, amend, revoke or add to the provisions of the Constitution of 1961, and they can impose prohibitions, restrictions or obligations relating to Southern Rhodesia or any such persons or things.
When my colleagues and I first saw this Bill, we were concerned to ensure that Her Majesty's Government should justify the introduction of a Bill with such wide powers. I have followed, as I am sure all your Lordships have followed, the assurances which have been given in another place, and will, I hope, be given here this evening, as to how the Government will operate the Bill. They have told us—and I hope the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack, or the noble Earl the Leader of the House will repeat this—that they will propose the suspension of the Constitution only in the gravest of emergencies, and that before they do so they will first come to Parliament. They have told us that on other Orders that are laid under this Bill they will give facilities for an immediate debate. It is. I think, fairly well known that, because of the anxiety of those who sit on this side of the House here and in another place, the Negative Resolution procedure which was orginally in the Bill was altered to an Affirmative Resolution procedure.
The Prime Minister and Ministers in this House have also described what steps they intend to take under this Bill. Broadly speaking, they seem to follow automatically from the consequences of what Mr. Smith has done. If any other steps are proposed by the Government, the House has an opportunity of debating them and of making up its mind about them under the Affirmative Resolution procedure and with the guarantee that time will be made available for that debate. Should this state of affairs arise, I do not doubt that the House will judge each individual Order on its merits. It will inquire as to its purpose, and weigh up the likelihood of its success in achieving that purpose. I think myself that the Government have gone a long way

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towards meeting the initial objections which were aroused by the wide scope of this Bill. I think any Government, faced with a situation so grave, is entitled to ask Parliament for powers of this kind, provided assurances like those I have outlined have been given.
My Lords, it may be that some of your Lordships think that the measures the Government have outlined go too far. Some may think that they do not go far enough. For myself I believe that the Government could have done no less than to make it abundantly clear to the Rhodesian Government that certain consequences must inevitably follow from U.D.I. Sanctions, whether they are consequential or not, hurt. Some of the measures which the Government take will hurt. It is a matter of judgment as to how much further, if at all, one should go in this direction, but, my Lords, I think it is a matter of judgment and not one of principle.
All your Lordships will realise that the proceedings of Parliament will be watched closely by our friends abroad and by the Rhodesian people themselves. The Governor has made his stand plain. The Chief Justice has made his position abundantly clear. We should do nothing this evening which would be construed in the smallest degree as giving comfort to Mr. Smith and his Government. By no action we take this evening must we ever be accused of condoning what he has done. I hope that this evening all of us, whatever Party we belong to, will be agreed that however distasteful it may be to us, and for however short a time we hope these powers will operate, the Government should have the powers they ask for and we should allow them to have the Second Reading of this Bill.
12.7 a.m.
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (THE EARL OF LONGFORD): My Lords, we have often heard the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition to great advantage in this House, but I do not think it is only because we agree with him so entirely tonight that many of us will feel we have never heard him make a more notable contribution. Certainly he has played a further part in building that national unity which has been such a feature of these difficult days in both Houses, and we would echo many things
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he said, including his heartfelt tribute to the Governor of Rhodesia. We would also join him in congratulating all three maiden speakers, led, if I may put it that way, by the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Saffron Walden. He singled out the noble Lord, Lord Hastings, who did indeed make a moving speech, and perhaps I may be allowed to mention two other speakers, at the risk of a great deal of unpopularity elsewhere. I think most of us must have felt that the noble Lord, Lord Alport, lived up to the expectations that we have formed of him, and the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, gave us the benefit of many years enduring self-sacrifice on behalf of the African peoples.
My Lords, we all want to get on to the Bill, and that means very few remarks from me. I imagine that there are few speakers who will be so querulous as to ask, after my observations, why their questions were not answered in detail. Therefore, I am afraid I shall have to break our ordinary rules and reply to hardly any questions at all. The noble Lord, Lord Colyton, asked a number of highly pertinent questions, and to show that I have made a note of them may I refer to one at least: "Under what powers were the Rhodesian Ministers dismissed?" They were dismissed by the Governor acting on behalf of Her Majesty the Queen and on her instructions, under Section 43 of the Constitution, which provides that the Ministers hold office during Her Majesty's pleasure.
Perhaps I should at least refer, although I am not in a position to answer it at all explicitly, to the very important question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Caccia, and echoed—although I am afraid I was out of the Chamber at the time—by the noble Lord, Lord Glendevon. The noble Lord, Lord Caccia, asked what would be the position when this emergency passed in Rhodesia: what could we expect then and what could the Rhodesians expect then? The short answer is that any Government in that situation would be appointed by the Governor, and could be appointed only by him. One would hope that a normal situation of that kind would be restored as soon as possible, but I realise that the noble Lord's question went rather wider than that and perhaps I could answer it on another occasion, after full consultation.
LORD GLENDEVON: My Lords, will the noble Earl permit me to intervene? The noble Earl referred to me but in fact I did not ask that question. I asked about compensation to those servants of the Crown in Rhodesia and elsewhere who opted for loyalty to the Crown. I quite understand that the noble Earl cannot answer this question now.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: I am sorry; it arose from my temporary absence; I have heard most of the ten hours' debate, but I missed the noble Lord's speech. The short answer to the noble Lord's question is that the Prime Minister said in another place that we think there would be general agreement that we should accept responsibility for public servants in Rhodesia who out of conscience feel they cannot serve the régime, and proposals will come before Parliament in due course.
There was one issue which came up in various forms during the debate; that is, the question of whether the positions of the two Governments were irreconcilable. In one sense, of course, there has been a fundamental clash ever since the elections at the end of 1962. If anyone wants that developed more fully, I recommend him to read the noble Lord's remarkably fine book where it will all be set out most cogently. But, of course, there is a fundamental clash between anyone who believes in democracy as we understand it in this country and the forces in Rhodesia, those particular forces in Rhodesia, which, as mentioned by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor at the beginning, do not believe in majority rule. May I say to the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, that this official record of documents relating to the negotiations is, I understand, broadly agreed; it is not a question of one man's opinion against another. In the official record on page 72 Mr. Smith is quoted to this effect:
"He must make it clear that the Government Party in Rhodesia did not believe in majority rule."
When one talks of a clash of philosophies, of course one finds it expressed there. I do not think one could say more about that tonight, except that no one who understands democracy as we understand it here could accept that point of view for a moment.
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However, if one asks whether a rebellion of this kind was inevitable—whether in that sense the positions were irreconcilable, may I say that the Prime Minister (and all will be happy at the tributes paid to him today) has made it plain, and it comes out clearly from the record, there was nothing irreconcilable about setting up the Royal Commission; there was no difference at all when it came to the point. When it came to the point Mr. Smith could not point to any reason why this Royal Commission should not be set up. One is forced to the conclusion that he did not want it set up, or rather the dominant elements in his Government did not want this Royal Commission set up. They were determined to make a break, and all the efforts of the Prime Minister and everybody else foundered on that intransigence, and in that sense the positions were irreconcilable. The Rhodesian leaders refused to allow them to be reconciled; they insisted on a showdown and break. Sir Winston Churchill once called the last world war "the unnecessary war", and I think we can fairly call this the most unnecessary rebellion of all time, because, by the time the position had been clarified and cleared up, there was nothing irreconcilable about the establishment of the Royal Commission.
Now we have come to sanctions. I do not want to cross-examine noble Lords opposite on what some of them have said about sanctions. I think the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, made a superb speech on that aspect, but again I perhaps say that because I agree with him and, of course, the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor. One does not need their juristic or forensic skill and knowledge in order to put one or two extremely awkward questions to anyone who shrinks from the kind of sanctions which we recommend. We ask, "Do we want these sanctions to be effective?", and that is the vital point. Of course, it would be ludicrous if we went through all this just as a means of expressing disapproval. They are meant to bite, to hurt; but let me say at once that we do not like hurting or being punitive. Having written a small hook on punishment, which my noble friend Lord Stonham has been kind enough to put in the Library of the House, I do not want to

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be semantic about it, but these sanctions are intended to bring about a change of heart in Rhodesia.
That is the reason, and I agree with the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, and the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor on what they have said elsewhere. If one is asked whether one knows that they will hurt, then one must admit it. Unhappily, it would be impossible to select one gentleman in Rhodesia and say, "You are the guilty party and these sanctions are to hurt you, and you only." If we are imposing sanctions on a country, then they will hurt that country as a whole; but we hope that there will be a change of heart quickly, and the sooner then we shall be able to make friends again.
We are all agreed that this is an illegal act on the part of the present régime in Rhodesia. It cannot be condoned in any way, as Lord Carrington has said. Then we come to what might effectively be done. We eschew military force, but we embark on the sanctions with no kind of avidity whatsoever. On the contrary, we look forward to the next period with extreme reluctance and regret. Yet we cannot hesitate when we think of the world issues; and, when thinking of this, I am thinking not only of world pressures. The Government of this country cannot neglect this international course—for that is what it is. I am thinking here of some of the speeches we have heard. Lord Brockway spoke most eloquently on this aspect. We cannot say that the 200,000 are all Rhodesia. They are as much a part of Rhodesia as any other part, but we have all to recognise our ultimate and undying responsibility for the whole 4¼ million people, which is the total if the African and white populations are added together. If we simply shrug our shoulders and allow those who embark on such illegal action to get away with it, then we shall be dishonouring the name of Britain; and that, I believe, would not be, and would not deserve to be, forgiven by history.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

SOUTHERN RHODESIA BILL
12.20 a.m.
Brought from the Commons.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, before moving the First Reading of this Bill, may I say that a number of questions have been asked in the course of the evening as to what is the intention of the Government in regard to this Bill. One has tried to take the sense of the House, and it seems to me that it is unanimous that we should proceed with this Bill through all its stages. I beg to move that this Bill be now read a first time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 1a.—(Lord Shepherd.)
On Question, Bill read 1a.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I have it in command from Her Majesty the Queen to acquaint the House that Her Majesty, having been informed of the purport of the Southern Rhodesia Bill, has consented to place her Prerogative and interest, so far as they are affected by the Bill, at the disposal of Parliament for the purposes of the Bill.
Then, Standing Order No. 41 having been dispensed with (pursuant to Resolution):
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I beg leave to move that this Bill be now read a second time. It may be helpful to the House if I begin by endeavouring to place the Bill in the context of the present legal situation in Rhodesia. I need not remind the House that the purported declaration of independence on Thursday last by the then Government of Rhodesia, and the subsequent handing down of the new Constitution by Mr. Smith and his associates, were illegal, ineffective and in all respects invalid. The House will also bear in mind that Mr. Smith and the rest of the former Ministers have been dismissed from office. The present position is therefore as follows.
The Government of Rhodesia is Her Majesty, acting through the Governor, who is appointed by Her Majesty. This is the broad position, and it corresponds to that which obtains in all British Colonies, of which Rhodesia is one. But the powers of the Governor of Rhodesia

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are, of course, much circumscribed by the Constitution under which he acts. In the first place, he has not himself legislative power: the power to enact laws rests with the Legislative Assembly. But, of course, the Governor must assent to any Bill before it can take effect as law.
The executive power in Southern Rhodesia is vested in Her Majesty, and I quote from the relevant section, Section 42, which has already been referred to:
"The executive power in Southern Rhodesia is vested in Her Majesty, may be exercised on Her Majesty's behalf by the Governor, or such other persons as may be authorised in that behalf by the Governor, or by any law of the Legislature".
The Governor's executive powers derive from the Constitution. For example, he appoints the Ministers and the judges; he summons, prorogues or dissolves the Legislative Assembly; he exercises the prerogative of mercy, and so on. Secondly, he exercises the executive power under a number of Southern Rhodesian laws. But the Constitution requires the Governor, broadly speaking, to exercise his powers in accordance with the advice of his Ministers. However, as I have said, there are no Ministers in Rhodesia now.
I would add a word about the third function of Government, the judicial function. The Constitution of Rhodesia gives the judges security of tenure; they cannot be removed from office except for inability to discharge their functions, or for misbehaviour. The House will, I think, have read with pleasure the statement reported in the Press and made by the judges, that the judges of the High Court will continue to perform their duties in accordance with the law. There can be no doubt what the law means in this context. It means the law of Rhodesia as established by and under the Constitution of 1961, or of course any Act of this Parliament.
The noble Lord, Lord Alport, hoped that Her Majesty's Government would make it clear on what terms the rebellion might be ended; and there seems in some quarters to a misapprehension that, if and when the rebellion comes to an end, there will be a vacuum because there will be no Constitution. This of course is not so, because the 1961 Constitution is fully operative as the Constitution of Southern Rhodesia; and, except
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to the extent that it may be amended by legislation or under an enabling Act, it will continue as the Constitution, and the only lawful Constitution, of Southern Rhodesia.
I now turn to the Bill. Its first purpose is expressed in Clause 1, and is purely declaratory. This clause declares that Southern Rhodesia remains a part of Her Majesty's Dominions, and that the Government and Parliament of the United Kingdom have responsibility and jurisdiction hitherto existing in respect of it. I will say another word later in explanation of the expression "Government of the United Kingdom" contained in this clause. The second purpose of the Bill is to give the Government power to make any Orders in Council which may appear to be necessary or expedient as a result of the situation with which we are faced. The Orders in Council we have in mind, besides one relating to the Constitution, will deal with a number of other matters to which I will refer in a moment.
I will deal now with what we have in mind in regard to the Constitution. First, the Governor has no legislative powers. Therefore, we propose to fill this gap by conferring legislative powers to be exercised by Order in Council. At the same time we propose to render any action by the Legislative Assembly of Rhodesia since November 11 invalid. In regard to executive power, we propose to do two things. First, we propose to provide that the executive authority in Southern Rhodesia may be exercised in Her Majesty's behalf by the Secretary of State. Circumstances might arise in which powers could not be exercised by the Governor. Secondly, we propose to free the Governor from the limitation imposed on him by the Constitution to which I have already referred—namely, that he is bound in general to act in accordance with the advice of his Ministers. This may not be strictly necessary as at present there are no Ministers, but it seems wise to make the position clear.
Turning now to an examination of the Bill in greater detail, I have already explained the purpose of Clause 1, and I merely wish to say a word about the phrase "Government of the United Kingdom". We have deliberately chosen this expression for a number of reasons. The House may have in mind that this

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is the phrase customarily used by Parliament when it passes an Act to give independence to a colony. The recent Malta Independence Act, for example, provides that Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom shall have no responsibility for the Government of Malta. On this occasion we are asserting exactly the contrary of that. We therefore say that the Government of the United Kingdom maintains responsibility and jurisdiction in respect of Rhodesia.
Secondly, the phrase "Government of the United Kingdom" in the case of Rhodesia has important implications. The first is that British Ministers advise the Queen on a number of constitutional matters relating to Rhodesia, in particular the appointment of a Governor and amendment of the Constitution under her reserve powers. The second is that the Government of the United Kingdom are responsible for Rhodesia's external affairs. It is for those reasons that the phrase Government of the United Kingdom" has been used. Clause 1 therefore changes nothing; it is purely declaratory.
Clause 2 is the main clause of the Bill. It concerns powers to make the Orders in Council which have become necessary as a result of the illegal declaration. Under subsection (I) such Orders in Council may make such provision in relation to Southern Rhodesia as appears to Her Majesty to be necessary or expedient. The particular purposes for which the general powers conferred by subsection (1) are to be used are set out in subsection (2). First, the Bill gives power to make Orders in Council for suspending, amending, revoking or adding to any of the provisions of the 1961 Constitution. As a result of the illegal declaration, although the constitutional status of Rhodesia remains as it was before, it has become necessary for Her Majesty's Government to take power to operate some of the constitutional functions and to ensure that measures which the illegal régime may purport to effect under the Constitution have no validity. Given the situation with which the Bill deals, powers of this sort are clearly necessary, but it is impossible to see the precise use which may have to be made of them.
It will, for example, be necessary to provide that no laws may be made by the legislature of Southern Rhodesia, and
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no business may be transacted by its Legislative Assembly. Provision will be made for the Secretary of State by order in writing under his hand at any time to prorogue the Legislative Assembly. In addition, it is proposed to confer upon the Secretary of State the power to exercise or to control the exercise of such of the executive functions of the Government of Southern Rhodesia as he may consider expedient. Your Lordships will know that, as my right honourable friend the Prime Minister said in another place in the debate on Friday, it is not the intention of Her Majesty's Government to suspend the Constitution at this stage. This is the point to which the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, referred. Indeed, the Bill does not give the requisite power to do so.
Clause 2(2)(a) refers to
"any of the provisions of the Constitution".
It does not permit the total revocation of the Constitution or the making of a new Constitution. The House will also note that Clause 3(3) states in terms, that
"The expiration of section 2 of this Act shall not affect…
(b) the Constitution of Southern Rhodesia 1961 as in force immediately before the expiration of that section."
This implies that the Constitution will remain in force, albeit in a modified form. The same argument applies to revoking any of the provisions of the Constitution. Clause 2(2)(b) provides powers for modifying, suspending or extending the operation of existing United Kingdom legislation in relation to Southern Rhodesia, or persons or things belonging to or connected therewith.
The position arising from the illegal Declaration has made it necessary, first, to remove Southern Rhodesia from the position of privilege which it enjoyed as a loyal Colony; and, secondly, to make special provision for the protection of loyal Rhodesian citizens. The powers in this subsection will enable Her Majesty to remove Rhodesia from the Commonwealth Preference area by an amendment of the Import Duties Act 1958, and to confer on loyal Rhodesians additional rights to obtain citizenship by an amendment of the British Nationality Act 1948. It is also proposed to restrict the return of alleged fugitive offenders to Rhodesia by amending the Fugitive Offenders Act

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1881, so as to enjoy the discretion of the Secretary of State.
Orders in Council under Clause 2(2)(c) may also impose restrictions on transactions relating to Southern Rhodesia. Under this power it will, for example, be possible to make the requisite orders relieving the Minister of Agriculture from his obligations under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement to take an annual quota of sugar from Southern Rhodesia. Such an order will also cancel the current contract under which the Sugar Board has agreed to buy sugar in pursuance of the Agreement. No other orders in pursuance of this power are at present contemplated, but, of course, as the House will understand, it may be necessary to impose further prohibitions or restrictions at a later stage. In the presence of rebellion we can never be certain as to what will happen next.
The Orders in Council which may be made under this clause may apply extra-territorially, in the sense that they may regulate or prohibit actions in foreign countries or on the high seas by persons who are amenable to our laws. This means that if, for instance, a United Kingdom citizen sought to evade the provisions of this clause by entering into the transaction in question with the illegal Government in a foreign country, he would still be caught by the provisions of the clause.
Subsection (3) authorises Orders in Council under Clause 2 to include necessary consequential provisions, and provides that such Orders may be made to take effect from November 11, 1965—that is, the date on which the illegal declaration was made. The House will of course observe that this permits a certain measure of retrospection. This is necessary to enable us to establish beyond doubt the invalidity of certain actions taken in Southern Rhodesia since the declaration of independence. An example is the new Constitution which the Smith régime has pretended to give to the Southern Rhodesian people.
Then, my Lords, subsection (4) permits subsequent revocation or variation of Orders in Council. Subsection (5) requires that Orders in Council under Clause 3 should be laid before Parliament after being made; and unless during the 28
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days following the making of an Order it is approved by Resolution of each House of Parliament, the Order will expire. Your Lordships have already been told by the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, that the Government's original intention had been to provide for a Negative Resolution, but that an Affirmative Resolution in this form was considered proper because it will come into force at once; while, on the other hand, the rights of your Lordships' House and of another place are safeguarded by the provision that it will expire unless approved within the 28 days.
In answer to another question raised by the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, and also by the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, I can tell your Lordships that it is the intention of the Government to provide early opportunity for consideration by the House of all Orders which are made under this clause; and, as far as this House is concerned, an approach through the usual channels will meet with a ready response. I understand it is the view in all parts of the House that, whatever may he the group of Orders at any particular time, they should be taken together so that there should not be six or seven different debates but, as far as possible, one debate on a number of Orders.
Clause 3 provides that the Bill shall be of temporary duration. Clause 2 (which, as I have explained, is the operative part of the Bill) will expire at the end of one year after the passing of the Bill unless it is continued in force by an Order in Council, which must be laid in draft before Parliament and approved by Resolution of each House before it can become effective. Orders in Council under Clause 2 will lapse when that clause itself expires, and laws which have been modified by Orders in Council—such as the Fugitive Offenders Act and the British Nationality Act—will then revert to their previous form; but the Constitution of Southern Rhodesia will retain the form which it has immediately before the clause expires; that is to say, it will remain as modified by any Order in Council made under Clause 2.
As to Clause 4, the House will observe that although the Bill gives power to extend Orders in Council to dependent territories as well as the British Islands, this is for the purpose only of effecting an

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Act of the United Kingdom Parliament extending to those territories, or for making provision relating to British ships and aircraft.
My Lords, I hope that I have set out sufficiently the reasons for moving the Bill, and that I have explained its various provisions. I have sought to show, and hope the House will accept, that the Bill is necessary. I am aware that some questions of a legal character raised by the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, in the course of the preceding debate have not been answered. But if I may, if it is not inconvenient to the House, I will deal with them now.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I should be content if the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor would like to take the right of replying to them on another occasion. I think it would be asking a lot of the noble and learned Lord to detain the House by dealing in detail with the points, which I consider important, at this stage when considering the Second Reading of this Bill. I think that if the noble and learned Lord could say that in the course of the next few days those matters would be dealt with, and dealt with publicly so that the matter could be put beyond doubt, that would suffice.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I think it would be in accordance with the wishes of the House, and in view of the lateness of the hour, that I should accept the offer which the noble and learned Viscount has made to me. I move accordingly that the Bill be now read a second time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
12.42 a.m.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I am sure that the House is grateful to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor for the clear and detailed exposition of this Bill that he has given, even at this late hour. I also feel (I do not know if I am right) that the House does not want, after the long debate today, to take up time on debating the Second Reading of this measure. We have already had intimation of Amendments that are about to be moved, and I am sure that your Lordships wish to get on with those.
There are, however, just two points that I want to raise, quite shortly; and
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I referred to this possibility during my earlier speech. The powers taken in Clause 2 of the Bill are extremely wide and indefinite—though I make no complaint of that. They can vary in character from constitutional provisions to economic provisions, and provisions affecting transport and every kind of thing. So far as the constitutional provisions are concerned, I take it from what the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said that what is envisaged is the making of such alterations to the 1961 Constitution as are rendered necessary by the present position and because of the illegal régime and of its acts. I would certainly support any changes which are made with a view to preventing the illegal régime cloaking itself and its actions with any appearance of legality. That, I take it, is the object, and the primary object, of those constitutional powers. But the wording is very wide. I was glad to hear that there will be no question of suspending the Constitution without the matter first being considered by Parliament. I was under the impression—it may be wrong—that power to revoke any of the provisions would include the power to revoke all of them. But if that ever arose, that no doubt would be considered by Parliament first.
When one comes to consider Clause 2(5) there is a point there with which I hope the noble and learned Lord can deal, and which has not so far been dealt with. I welcome his statement, his assurance—I do not think it was in quite as positive terms as in another place—that if an Order regarded as of great importance is proposed by the Government, Parliament will have a very early opportunity of giving consideration to it. But when one looks at the last four lines of Clause 2(5) one sees that a period during which both Houses are adjourned for more than four days is not to be counted towards the 28 days. That might mean that at the end of, say, July, if the Government, because of the necessities of the situation, thought it right to bring in a major proposal, or a proposal for a particular sanction, Parliament might not in those circumstances have an opportunity of considering that proposal until, possibly, October or November. I should like the assurance of the Lord Chancellor that, should that sort of situation arise, there would he immediate consultation with the other

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Parties, with a view to ensuring that Parliament would have an early opportunity of considering the proposal and would not have to wait until Parliament met again, perhaps after a somewhat lengthy Recess. If the noble and learned Lord could deal with that point, I think it would possibly help.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, if it is convenient that I should deal with that at once, I can certainly say that in the event to which the noble Viscount referred, there would be immediate consultation between the Parties for the purpose which he has indicated.
LORD CLITHEROE: My Lords, could the noble and learned Lord answer one further question? Could an order be made under this Bill, if it becomes an Act, which would authorise the Bank of England to withhold the balances of any of its customers?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, the powers are very wide, and that may be so. I should prefer to have an opportunity to consider that point, because these financial matters are so complicated.
LORD CLITHEROE: My Lords, I am much obliged to the noble and learned Lord.
On Question, Bill read 2a.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I beg to move that this House do now resolve itself into a Committee on the Bill.
Moved, That this House do resolve itself into a Committee on the Bill.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Motion agreed to; House in Committee accordingly.
[The LORD MERTHYR in the Chair.]
Clause 1 agreed to.
Clause 2 [Powers with respect to Southern Rhodesia]:
LORD MERTHYR: Before I call the first Amendment, may I inform the Committee, in order to make it clear, that we are dealing with a second edition of this Amendment, which is typed on foolscap paper and not on quarto-sized paper. The only difference, I understand, is that after the word "accordingly" there is a proviso.
LORD COLERAINE LORD COLERAINE moved, after subsection (2), to insert as a new subsection:
"( ) Any power to make Orders in Council, rules, regulations or orders, or the like, conferred upon Her Majesty or Her Government in the United Kingdom by any Act passed before the commencement of this Act shall, as respects any exercise of that power which occurred—

(a) on or after 11th November, 1965, and

(b) in relation to Southern Rhodesia, or persons or things in any way belonging to or connected with Southern Rhodesia.

be deemed to have been exercised under this section, and this section shall apply thereto accordingly:
Provided that notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (5) of this section any exercise of such a power which imposes a charge on the people or on public funds, or which varies the amount or incidence of or otherwise alters any such charge in any manner or which affects the assessment, levying administration or application of any money raised by such charge shall be subject only to the approval of the Commons House of Parliament."
The noble Lord said: I beg to move the Amendment in my name. I must first apologise to your Lordships for having to move a long Amendment without having it circulated in the normal way, but of course it was impossible to adopt the normal procedure, because this House had no cognisance of this Bill until an hour or so ago. Although the Amendment which I have just read is a long one, I do not think it is in any way complicated. I will try to explain, quite briefly, just what it is intended to do.
Perhaps I can do that best by referring to some comments that were made by my noble friend the Leader of the Opposition in his speech a short time ago. My noble friend said that this Bill gave the Government extremely wide powers, almost infinitely wide powers. I think he said that when he first saw the Bill he was a little alarmed by this, but that his alarm was allayed by Clause 2 (5), which ensured strict Parliamentary control over the operation of the Bill. In particular, he was mollified (if that is the right word) by the fact that the Government themselves had volunteered to change the Negative Resolution procedure to procedure by an Affirmative Resolution.
If what my noble friend says is right, that this Bill gives the Government such wide powers that it is right that there should be these safeguards, that it is right that there should be this direct Parliamentary control by both Houses of Parliament, then surely it is right that

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some very important matters affecting Rhodesia which are outside the ambit of this Bill should equally come under Parliamentary control. The fact is that two of the most important sanctions which the Government have already imposed on Southern Rhodesia do not come within the ambit of the Bill, and there is nothing, as I understand it, that Parliament can do about them. They are laid on the Table, I think, but we cannot debate them, and certainly we cannot vote on them.
We have heard a lot in the debate this afternoon about tobacco, and I think I am not exaggerating if I say that I feel that on this side of the Committee, at any rate, there is great uneasiness about how that particular sanction is going to operate. I think, again, it was my noble friend Lord Carrington who said that sanctions must hurt. We all admit that. But the question is: whom are they going to hurt? I think we are all agreed that, so far as the tobacco sanction is concerned, the people it is going to hurt are the Africans. It is not going to hurt the white Rhodesians. The same thing applies to the sugar sanction. Both these sanctions are imposed, not by the Bill which we are discussing now, but curiously enough, by the Import, Export and Customs Powers (Defence) Act 1939. In other words, these sanctions are being imposed against Rhodesia under a Bill which passed through Parliament, not to deal with Rhodesia, but to deal with Hitler. I cannot help feeling that that is not a very satisfactory position.
But, apart from that, I would suggest that it is desirable that both these sanctions should be debated by Parliament and should be subject to the same procedure as any sanction would be if it happened to come under the Bill which we are discussing now. I think we are agreed that we cannot condone this act of rebellion. None of us welcomed it; all of us hoped that it would not take place, and we all of us condemned it. By giving this Bill a Second Reading, as we have done, unanimously, all three Parties agreeing, we show that we do not condone the rebellion. It can be argued—and I think some noble Lords feel this—that if we press this Amendment, if we have a vote on it, whichever way the vote goes, that would amount to condoning the rebellion. I
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do not believe that is so, because we have already given our opinion on that on Second Reading. But I think it would ensure strict Parliamentary control over these weapons which it may be necessary to use, but which are going to have a devastating effect on the Rhodesian people as a whole, and particularly a devastating effect on the African people.
I hope, therefore, that the Government may be moved to accept this Amendment. It is not a wrecking Amendment in any form, as I am sure the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor will admit. It is intended simply to ensure that, where far-reaching economic measures are taken outside the scope of this Bill by Orders made under Acts of Parliament, in many cases passed during the last war, they should be brought into line with the same procedure as the Bill's and brought under the same Parliamentary control as is provided in the Bill. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 31, at end insert the said subsection.—(Lord Coleraine.)
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I rise to support my noble friend Lord Coleraine. He has explained his Amendment so fully and so clearly that there is very little that I can add to it. I agree with him, and hope that the Committee will agree, that there is no question of this Amendment softening the attitude of this House or of the Government towards the Rhodesian Government. It is really a matter of Parliamentary control which might apply in any circumstances. There are already far-reaching measures taken under this procedure over which Parliament has no control at all, and that would, I feel, in any case be wrong. Such experience as I have of your Lordships' House leads me to suppose that Parliament ought always to keep control wherever it can. Of course, Parliament can do what it likes if this Amendment is passed. They can look at these measures which are taken under these regulations; they can approve them, reject them, or they can do anything they like. They ought to be allowed to look at them and discuss them. I submit that it is, as it were, a question of the proper conduct of this House and Parliament in general, and it is for that reason that I support the Amendment.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I am afraid that the Government are unable to accept this Amendment. I appreciate that the object of the Amendment is to submit to Government review the instruments which were made by the Board of Trade on November 11, revoking individual licences to export arms, and so on, to Southern Rhodesia, and modifying the current open general import licence so as to ban the import of tobacco and sugar from Southern Rhodesia. The Board of Trade are empowered by the 1939 Act, to which the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, has referred, to regulate the export of goods from and the import of goods into the United Kingdom. The export of goods from the United Kingdom is controlled by the Export of Goods (Control) Order, which prohibits, except under the authority of a licence of the Board of Trade, the export from the United Kingdom of, inter alia, the goods mentioned in Group 1 of Schedule I of the Order; that is to say, arms and military stores and appliances.
An instrument made by the Board of Trade on November 11 revoked all existing licences for the export of these goods. The Import of Goods (Control) Order prohibited the import into the United Kingdom of virtually all goods except under the authority of a licence of the Board of Trade. An open general import licence dated December 14, 1964, had the effect of authorising, inter alia, the import of tobacco and sugar and related products originating in, or consigned from, Southern Rhodesia. The amendment to the open general licence made on November 11 excluded those goods from the benefit of the open general licence. In other words, tobacco, sugar and related products originating in or consigned from Southern Rhodesia cannot be imported into the United Kingdom except upon new licences.
Orders which are made under Section 1 of the 1939 Act are not subject to Parliamentary control and never have been subject to Parliamentary control, nor are licences made under those Orders, nor instruments revoking or modifying any such licences. This is very old legislation—good Conservative legislation. It has never been suggested before that those Orders ought to be submitted to Parliamentary control.
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The new provision suggested is extremely wide in its terminology. If the Amendment were passed it would bring within its net a large number of instruments for which the degree of control contemplated in subsection (5) of the clause as proposed to be amended would appear to be unnecessary. It is difficult, however, going through the Statute Book, to estimate how many instruments would require the affirmation of both Houses of Parliament if this Amendment were carried, but if I may take two examples from the powers of the Board of Trade alone, to show how very sweeping it is, the revocation of a single individual licence to export arms to Southern Rhodesia would require Affirmative Resolutions of both Houses; or to take another example, to deal with an Order in Council declaring Southern Rhodesia to be a Convention country for the purposes of the Patents Act, thereby conferring certain privileges on her, would also require an Affirmative Resolution of both Houses. In fact, of course, in many of the cases the object of the Amendment in its present form would not be achieved, because, as I understand it, it relates only to rules, regulations and orders, and in most of these cases it is a mere revocation of a licence. So that the terminology of the Amendment would not in fact, if accepted, achieve the purposes for which it is designed.
LORD COLERAINE: Would the noble and learned Lord allow me to intervene? The Amendment refers to "rules, regulations or orders", and the Lord Chancellor says that would not in fact cover what I am trying to do; but it also includes the expression "or the like". Would that not in fact cover the point?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I should not, with respect, have thought so, when what the Board of Trade has in fact done is merely to revoke part of the licence; I should not have thought the words of the Amendment were really apt to fit what the Board of Trade has in fact done. But the real point is that the Government took action on these matters immediately in order that the world might know the gravity with which it regarded that which the then Rhodesian Government had done; and they are not prepared, and it is not, it is submitted,

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reasonable at this stage, to ask the Government to consider forgoing the powers which they already have. This does not apply to any other Order under similar legislation. After all, Parliament is never without powers to express dissent, if it desires to do so, from any action which a Government has taken. For the reasons which I have ventured to give the House, I am afraid I am unable to accept this Amendment.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: I think the Committee is in rather a dilemma here. The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor opened our long debate today with one of the most reasonable and constructive speeches I have heard in this House, if I may say so, and it showed a great understanding of the Rhodesian position. Anyone who heard the debate which took place here must have been struck by the consensus of opinion that we condemned unilateral action but at the same time we were extremely anxious to watch over sanctions to see how they impinged, to what extent they were really necessary and whom they would hurt. We readily accepted such sanctions as on the export of arms; everybody agrees that that should be stopped at once. But the matter which caused most anxiety in all the speeches, including that of my noble friend Lord Hastings and others, was this question of sugar. The Government readily conceded that this clause dealing with sanctions under the Bill gives us the Affirmative Resolution procedure, and, as I understand it, on the undertakings given by the Government during the debate here, and still more in another place, the debate on an Affirmative Resolution should take place as rapidly as possible.
I think there is unanimous desire in the House that the sanction on sugar should come up before the House and that it should go through a procedure which at any rate is equivalent to the Affirmative Resolution procedure. With great respect to the Lord Chancellor, what he has said is really not relevant to the unique situation with which we are here dealing. It is not the least like dealing with a Power with whom we are at war. God forbid we should ever be at war with Rhodesia! We are dealing with an absolutely unique situation here. In this case surely there should be a provision.
I appreciate that my noble friend's Amendment may not be very happily con
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ceived; it would extend to cover a great mass of things which no one wants to bring forward or have debated. But surely the Government can meet us in discussing tobacco and possibly also sugar, and surely that could be met by the Government's undertaking at a very early date to put down a Resolution, just as the Lord Chancellor moved his Motion to-day to take note of the situation in Rhodesia. Let the Lord Chancellor or the Leader of the House put down a Motion at the earliest possible date to say that this House approves the action of the Government in relation to sugar in regard to Rhodesia. If the Lord Chancellor would do that, I believe that he would carry the whole House with him and we could all accept it.
LORD CARRINGTON: I would support what the noble Earl has said. I think there is great force in what my noble friend Lord Coleraine has said in moving his Amendment. When we pass this Bill we shall give the Government very wide powers, and during the course of the debate the Government have assured us that when using these powers they will act under the Affirmative Resolution procedure, that we shall get time for debates, and they have gone a long way to meet us.
However, it so happens that these two particular issues which worry my noble friend, sugar and tobacco, are outside the scope of this Bill and have been already made the subject of Orders under a totally different Act. In my view, it is rather a pity that that has happened. Of course I absolutely understand why any Government would do it. If the legislative power is there and available, it would be perhaps asking too much of any Government not to use it. Nevertheless, I think that there is a distinction between the powers which are available under this Bill and the powers which have been used under existing legislation.
I greatly hope that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor will be able to accept the position which my noble friend has raised. If we want to discuss these matters, then surely we can put down a Resolution and the noble and learned Lord, I hope, would afford time to debate it. But if my noble friend is not satisfied with the situation in which the Government afford time to

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discuss an issue of this kind, then I think I must revert to what I said earlier. In normal circumstances I should find no difficulty at all in supporting my noble friend on this Amendment—I think probably he is right; but I do not think that the circumstances to-day are normal.
I ventured to suggest earlier on that unity in the House and unity in the country was important. I do not suppose a Division makes all that much differance, though I think it would be much better if we did not have one. But I am quite certain that if we had a Division in this House and the Government were beaten, and the Bill went back to the Commons and there was an issue of dispute between the two Houses, there would be an impression, whether mistaken or not, that all of us were not behind the Government in their attitude towards U.D.I.
It is generally supposed, and it has been said in the newspapers and in broadcasting, that this Bill is likely to receive its Royal Assent early this morning. I believe that if at this stage we passed an Amendment in which the Government were defeated, and the Bill went back to the Commons, the situation would he greatly misunderstood, both in the country and throughout the Commonwealth and the rest of the world; and so, if my noble friend insists upon pressing this Amendment, I must say that the advice I would give to those behind me is not to support him.
1.13 a.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: In law, of course, we are the only people who are responsible, and we cannot get out of being responsible, for all the people of Rhodesia. But it is idle to pretend at this date that what has happened is not of real concern to most of the countries of the world which will be seeing what is being done in England to-day. Of course the Government took the steps at the time, nearly a week ago, which they thought right. They are not prepared now to say to the world, "We are now inviting Parliament to reconsider everything which we have done from a week ago." But Parliament is not without remedy, and I would certainly accede to the suggestion made by the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, and if the Opposition
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would like to put down a Motion deprecating what the Government have done, I will undertake that every facility will be given to see that it is heard at an early date.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I wish, even now, that the Government could find a way of meeting us on this difficult point. I realise the difficulty of the point, and I realise the strength of the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, about the importance of our not showing any division in this House on this issue. But what my noble friend Lord Swinton has done is to provide the Government with a way out of the difficulty. They can do this without in any way impairing the unity of the House. Even if they cannot say anything definite tonight, I would ask whether they would consider the possibility of a Resolution being put down—not themselves putting down a Resolution, but allowing a Resolution to be put down.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: I think the noble Marquess is under a misapprehension. As I understood the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, he was accepting the proposal put forward by my noble friend Lord Swinton and was saying that, if a Resolution were put down, time would be found for discussing it.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: What I proposed was that the Government themselves should put down the Resolution. That seemed to me to be a reasonable thing.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: No.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: The Lord Chancellor said they were not prepared, in the eyes of the world, to go back on all they had done and ask Parliament to reconsider. But we are not asking Parliament to reconsider. Parliament has never had the opportunity of considering this sugar sanction. I have an absolutely open mind on this matter; I want to hear the arguments. I should have thought it was more in the interests of the Government and of unity that the Government should put down a Motion asking the House to approve what they have done. But if the Lord Chancellor will not do that, then it is, of course, open to my noble friend Lord Coleraine to put down a Resolution to say that the House does

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not approve of the action. As I understand it, if my noble friend Lord Coleraine does that, the Government will provide the earliest possible facilities for a debate. That is right, is it not?
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Yes.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: Then I understand that correctly. As the suggestion came from me, I would respectfully suggest to my noble friend that he should accept that, although, frankly, I would infinitely prefer the matter to be dealt with by a Government Motion. However, if it has to be done by way of a Motion put down by my noble friend Lord Coleraine, that meets the substance of my proposal.
LORD MOLSON: Would it not be more satisfactory from the Government's own point of view that they should put down a Motion that this House approves of what the Government have done, rather than that it should take the form of being put down by an independent Member in the form that this House approves?
LORD SHEPHERD: I think it would be very strange if the Government were asked to put down a Motion to approve an action which they have taken quite lawfully under existing legislation. I should have thought it was a very dangerous precedent for the Government to be called on to do it. I have had conversations with a number of noble Lords on this matter, because they have been most concerned. As Chief Whip, I would repeat that we are very willing to provide time for the convenience of noble Lords who are interested, so that the matter may be adequately debated. If noble Lords are anxious they can consult this side through the usual channels, and I am quite sure that we shall be able to meet them and to satisfy them in discussions on the matter.
LORD COLERAINE: The difficulty about this—and it is a genuine difficulty—is that what I wanted to ensure through my Amendment was that there should be a Parliamentary discussion and a Parliamentary decision upon this matter. I did not want to prejudge that discussion or that decision by putting down a critical Motion, but, as I understand the position, there will be no discussion on this matter unless some noble
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Lord puts down a Motion critical of what the Government have already done.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: I think there is a slight misapprehension here. There is no need for the Motion to be critical. It can be a Motion just calling attention to what the Government have done.
LORD COLERAINE: Would a Motion to take note be sufficient?
LORD SHEPHERD: Yes.
LORD COLERAINE: I should like to get this clear. If a noble Lord put down a Motion on the lines of the Motion of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor this afternoon, asking the House to take note of the Order of so-and-so made under the Act of so-and-so, then that could be debated and the Government would not willingly obstruct such a debate?
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: No. I think the only reservation which one would have to put in there is that one cannot give a blank cheque, so to speak, to endless discussion on all the Orders. But in the case of sugar and tobacco we should certainly feel it our duty to provide time.
LORD COLERAINE: On that assurance, I would ask your Lordships' permission to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
1.22 a.m.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY moved, in subsection (5), to leave out all words after "section shall" and to insert:
"not come into force unless a draft of the Order has been laid before Parliament and approved by Resolution of each House of Parliament."
The noble Marquess said: I rise to move the Amendment standing in my name. This Amendment is quite short and simple and of a much more limited scope than that which we have just been discussing, and its purpose is, I think, wholly respectable. It seeks merely to ensure that any measures to be taken by the Government under the enabling Act shall, before they come into force, receive the prior approval of both Houses of Parliament. It may be said that it should not be necessary to move any Amendment to achieve this and that in a Parliamentary democracy such as ours every action

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of the Executive should need the prior approval of Parliament. But that, in fact, as we all know, is not always the case.
It has become a practice under our Constitution, a practice which seems, I think, steadily to grow under every Government, for Governments to introduce something in the nature of blanket Bills of the widest character, giving them powers to take action under Orders in Council to be submitted to Parliament under the Negative or, as in this case, Affirmative Resolution procedure, and then, without more ado, to take whatever action they think proper and come to Parliament later to get Parliamentary approval. We all know that that is very frequently done, and I should have thought it was generally agreed that it was never in itself desirable, for it weakens the position of Parliament in relation to the Executive. In Bills dealing with comparatively minor matters it does not perhaps very greatly matter, and the practice may have been regarded as merely, if I may say so, oiling the machinery of administration. In cases like the present, however, where great issues are at stake, I should have thought that Parliament should surely give prior approval before far-reaching action was taken.
This Bill, as the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor himself has said, is very widely drawn indeed, and unless Parliament retains a firm control over what is done under it Parliament will, in effect, be giving the Executive a blank cheque, and a blank cheque for a very large amount. Action of a most far-reaching character might be taken without any prior approval by Parliament, and even if at a later date Parliament rejected an Order in Council, which of course it could do, it might be impossible to reverse the engine and the harm would already have been done.
I would emphasise that there is nothing sinister about this Amendment. It is not, as I saw suggested in one newspaper, obstructive in character. I do not mean it in that way. It is merely to retain proper Parliamentary control over action taken under this most important Bill. I hope, in view of this explanation, that it will be acceptable both to the Government and to the House, or that in any case the Government will be able to give such assurances that the purposes of the
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Amendment will have been achieved. The Lord Chancellor, in his speech moving the Second Reading, spoke sympathetically of the Government's intentions, and if I could be assured that the delay would really be very short indeed, I should be prepared to withdraw the Amendment—but I do want that assurance.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 9, leave out from ("shall") to end of line 13 and insert the said new words.—(The Marquess of Salisbury.)
LORD COLYTON: I should like to support my noble friend in the Amendment which he has just moved. The procedure which he is advocating in his Amendment is, of course, far more normal than that which is laid down at present in subsection (5). This, I am advised, is normally required only for Orders to be passed in the Recess, and it seems to me that the Government must show very strong reasons why this very exceptional procedure should be required in this case, when it is most essential that Parliamentary approval should be given beforehand to these Orders.
There is a further aspect of this matter which I should like to raise in connection with Clause 2, subsection (5). The second paragraph states:
"The expiration of an Order in pursuance of this subsection shall not affect the operation of the Order as respects things previously done or omitted to be done or the power to make a new Order;…"
This, of course, is common form, and has been used countless times in Acts authorising subordinate legislation since the passing of the Statutory Instruments Act 1946, which, by Section 5, subsection (1), expressly allows this. The question I should like to ask the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor is: has this provision ever been used in relation to subordinate legislation of this particular kind; that is to say, Orders which are in force from the time at which they are made?
The power which the Government are taking in fact means that they can make a new effective Order at once, even though the original Order has been defeated in Parliament. Thus, a defeat in Parliament would not necessarily defeat the powers taken by the Government, or prevent their continued use by virtue of a new Order. It seems to me that

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this is one more reason for supporting my noble friend's Amendment, which would get rid of this difficulty.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I am happy to give the undertaking for which the noble Marquess has asked. I am afraid that I cannot answer offhand the question put by the noble Lord, Lord Colyton. The real point here, of course, is that we are dealing with very serious things. We do not very often have a rebellion and it is not possible to foresee what the extremists in the rebellious régime may do. The powers are wide—as, under an Enabling Bill they must be—precisely because one cannot foresee what may happen. Under the sweeping emergency powers which they have assumed for themselves, men's liberties and even their lives may be at stake. It is a case in which a man's life—possibly the safety of the Governor—might depend on an Order made. In the Government's view, the suggestion that we should sit about for a fortnight is one which is quite impossible in the circumstances of the case. It was for that reason that the Government had thought that a Negative Resolution would have been appropriate but it was after discussion with the Opposition that this reasonable compromise of this form of Affirmative Resolution, as I understand it, was agreed upon and the Government accepted it so long as the actual Order comes into force at once. As I understand it, these Orders would in this House have to go to the Special Orders Committee, and that would probably take a week in itself. I think the noble Marquess is a little doubtful about this and his experience is much greater than mine; but I was advised that the Special Orders Committee might take about a week to get the Order through this House.
It is for those reasons that I should be unable to accept any Amendment which had the effect that the Order did
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not come into force at all until it had been approved by both Houses of Parliament. But I appreciate the noble Marquess's concern that an Order should be brought before the House at an early date and, as I said in moving the Second Reading, I should be glad to give that assurance; and if an approach is made through the usual channels there will be no difficulty in coming to agreement.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his assurance, and in view of what he has said I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 2 agreed to.
Remaining Clauses agreed to.
House resumed: Bill reported without amendment; Report received.
Bill read 3a, and passed.
1.34 a.m.
THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO (LORD CHAMPION): My Lords, I beg to move that the House be now adjourned during pleasure for the purpose of a Royal Commission.
Moved accordingly and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
House adjourned during pleasure. House resumed.

ROYAL COMMISSION
1.45 a.m.
The following Bill received the Royal Assent:
Southern Rhodesia.
House adjourned at six minutes before two o'clock.