Sitting of 27 July 1965

Preamble
The House met at half-past Two o'clock
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]
PRIVATE BUSINESS
  BIRKENHEAD CORPORATION (MERSEY TUNNEL APPROACHES) BILL
    CITY OF LONDON (VARIOUS POWERS) BILL
      MERSEY TUNNEL (LIVERPOOL/WALLASEY), ETC., BILL
      Lords Amendments considered and agreed to.

  BRIGHTON SKYDECK BILL [Lords]
  [Queen's Consent, on behalf of the Crown, signified]
  Bill read the Third time and passed, with Amendments.

  CONWAY CORPORATION BILL [Lords]
  Read the Third time and passed, with Amendments.

  PEMBROKESHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL BILL [Lords]
  [Queen's Consent, on behalf of the Crown, signified]
  Bill read the Third time and passed, with Amendments.

  ROCHDALE CANAL BILL [Lords]
  A verbal Amendment made to the Bill; Bill read the Third time and passed, with Amendments.
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
  TECHNOLOGY

    Foreign Countries (Mutual Development Projects)
    Mr. Awdryasked the Minister of Technology what discussions he has held with foreign countries regarding the mutual development of advanced technological projects.
    The Minister of Technology (Mr. Frank Cousins): As my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary explained on 3rd May, the possibilities of practical collaboration in the fields of aircraft development and other advanced technologies are being considered with various European Governments. In my own field there have been a number of talks at the official level, but matters have not yet reached the stage where discussions between Ministers would be fruitful.
    Mr. Awdry: Does the Minister agree that really it is extremely important that we should get closer co-operation with Europe in the field of science, and has he carried out any detailed analysis to find out in which sectors of science and technology such co-operation would be fruitful?
    Mr. Cousins: It is, of course, highly desirable that there should be collaboration in civil technological subjects, but I repeat that it is in the best interests of all of us that we should not hurry into something of no commercial value to us. The hon. Gentleman will have heard of the steps taken in one field and we hope that there will be opportunities to develop others, but this is not primarily a Government responsibility.
    Mr. Woodburn: Is my right hon. Friend aware that, with the approval of his Ministry, a conference was held three weeks ago with all the European technicians with regard to computers and space research with a view to finding out how far the private enterprise computer and space research industry could collaborate in having an independent European production of these articles?
    Mr. Cousins: I am aware of that conference, of course, because we participated in it, but I remain convinced that

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    it is primarily a commercial job in the first instance.
    Sir H. Legge-Bourke: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that a number of analogue computers were being used in connection with the TSR2? Is he taking any steps to see whether these computers might be useful in the joint development, for example, of the swept-wing aircraft with the French?
    Mr. Cousins: No, Sir. I have not. This is primarily the responsibility of my right hon. Friend the Minister of Aviation.

    Computer Advisory Unit
    Mr. Awdryasked the Minister of Technology what is the number of civil servants currently employed in the Computer Advisory Unit.
    Mr. Cousins: The present strength of the computer advisory service is 32.
    Mr. Awdry: Does the right hon. Gentleman consider that this unit has an expanding rôle? Can he hazard a guess as to how many civil servants there might be in 12 months?
    Mr. Cousins: I believe that the unit has an expanding rôle. As I outlined in my speech in the recent debate, it is likely to grow. The extent to which it grows is dependent upon the rate at which we are able to recruit people, but certainly there will be growth.
    Dr. Bray: Is my right hon. Friend aware that this extension of the interests of the Computer Advisory Unit to cover those of the local authorities and the nationalised industries should have been made 10 years ago? Is he aware that a further extension might now be required to enable the Conservative Party to elect its new leader?
    Mr. Speaker: Order. I do not think that the Minister even of Technology can assume Ministerial responsibility for answering that. The first part was a matter of opinion, so the Minister cannot answer that either.
    Mr. Marples: Will the right hon. Gentleman consider giving more information about the number of cases that the unit has considered and which are currently under review? The difficulty faced by the House, as the right hon. Gentleman
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    realises, is how to measure all the efforts and information that the unit has to offer?
    Mr. Cousins: There have been a considerable number of cases, but there is a later Question on the subject and I hope to draw the House's attention to it then.
    Mr. Murrayasked the Minister of Technology when the Computer Advisory Unit will be making its report to him; and whether he will make a statement.
    The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Labour (Mr. Richard Marsh): The computer advisory service reports to my right hon. Friend continuously on technical aspects of computer policy and on proposals in the public sector to acquire computers as they arise.

    Fast Breeder Reactor (Site)
    Mr. Hector Hughesasked the Minister of Technology, in view of the fact that the most appropriate location for the forthcoming fast breeder new type reactor station is at or near Dounreay Atomic Station, with its relevant scientific equipment and staff, if he will now take steps to have it placed there; and when he will now take decisions on whether the project will proceed and on where it will be sited.
    Mr. William Hamiltonasked the Minister of Technology when he expects to make a statement on the siting of the prototype fast breeder reactor.
    Mr. Edward M. Taylorasked the Minister of Technology whether he will now announce the siting of the proposed prototype fast breeder reactor.
    Mr. Cousins: I expect the Atomic Energy Authority to submit to me its proposals for a prototype fast reactor some time in the next few months. As soon as possible thereafter the Government will announce their decision whether to proceed and, if so, where the reactor should be built. The claims of Dounreay will be taken fully into account along with those of other possible locations.
    Mr. Hughes: Does not my right hon. Friend realise that it would be in the national interest if the splendid but largely experimental work carried out at Dounreay were linked up with an adjacent factory of a productive character

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    producing scientific instruments, fine tools, machine tools and similar articles, which at present have to be imported from Germany and elsewhere, to the national loss? Will my right hon. Friend take steps to bring this about?
    Mr. Cousins: This is a difficult assessment to undertake. One has first to understand what the experimental reactor is doing and what a prototype fast reactor would do. It would be a producer of energy for transmission to industry. That would be the purpose and not to be used as an instrument to make fine tools. Wherever it is placed it will inevitably create energy that will require to be transmitted to an adjacent industrial area. But it would not be the corollary of putting it in an area that one should set up another establishment at the same time.
    Mr. Hamilton: Can my right hon. Friend indicate when the Atomic Energy Authority will be making its recommendations to him? Will it be this side of October or November? Can he further say what representations he has received, particularly from Scottish sources, on the siting of the fast reactor in the Highlands on social, economic, political and every other ground one can think of?
    Mr. Cousins: I cannot state precisely when the Atomic Energy Authority will report to me, but, as I have said before, I hope it will not be much longer before I can announce the date. Delay was caused by the fact that the Authority had to complete work on the design of the fuel elements before it could make suggestions as to the creation of the prototype reactor itself. Representations have been made to me from Scotland, and they have been very substantial. Indeed, many areas have made a point that it should be placed where it would be of the greatest value to Scottish development.
    Mr. Taylor: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the last Government intended to come to a decision on this matter in March or April this year because they were concerned about research work drying up at Dounreay and a consequent brain drain? Why is it taking so long to come to a decision?
    Mr. Cousins: The facts are not as the hon. Gentleman suggests. The last Government were not intending to come to a
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    decision by March or April. They could not have done so until they received the report from the Authority. Research work is not drying up. The Authority has a considerable amount of work to do at Dounreay. My understanding of the approach is that the facilities will be used for the creation of power for development of the Dounreay area in toto.
    Mr. George Y. Mackie: Nevertheless, is the right hon. Gentleman aware that considerable anxiety has been expressed by many bodies and by hon. Members on both sides about the delay in the decision? Is he further aware that Mr. Norman Elliott, Chairman of the South of Scotland Electricity Board, has come out in favour of the reactor being placed at Dounreay? Will the right hon. Gentleman confirm that the work on burn-up in the fuel elements is sufficiently advanced to make the prototype forecast compare favourably with the advanced gas-cooled reactors?
    Mr. Cousins: I would not be prepared to confirm that until I have received the report. As the hon. Gentleman is aware, I am conscious of the anxiety over where the prototype is to be placed. Indeed, he and I were together during a recent visit to examine the social and economic problems affecting Caithness. The decision will not be delayed any longer than is required to consider all the economic and social consequences.

    Marine Nuclear Reactors
    Mr. Wallasked the Minister of Technology if he will now make a statement on the progress of the development of marine nuclear reactors.
    Mr. J. H. Osbornasked the Minister of Technology whether he is satisfied with the rate of progress of development of atomic reactors for marine propulsion of surface vessels and that sufficient manpower and resources are now being devoted to this; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Cousins: The Joint Anglo-Belgian programme on the Vulcain reactor continues as planned and the experimental operation of a Vulcain-type core in the Belgian BR. 3 reactor is about to start. As my replies to the hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam (Mr. J. H. Osborn) on 7th July indicated, the effort on marine

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    reactor research and development has been diminishing for some time, pending a Government decision on a nuclear merchant ship. I am satisfied that the Authority was right to reduce its effort.
    Mr. Wall: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that a considerable volume of professional opinion believes that no further technical advance can be obtained until a prototype ship is afloat? As the matter has been under consideration by the Government for some months, when can we expect a final decision on a prototype nuclear-propelled ship?
    Mr. Cousins: I am aware that there are some views to the effect that there can be no further developments until they can be put into practical operation. But there are also views that it is useful to continue the programme envisaged for reactors in order to get information for purposes other than propulsion for nuclear ships. We are all conscious of the need for an early decision, and I hope that there will be an announcement before the Recess. I cannot go beyond that today.
    Mr. Osborn: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the fact that he has reduced the number of people working on the subject, together with the expenditure, almost forces him to reach a decision quickly, otherwise we shall ask him "Why"?
    Mr. Shinwell: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the United States Government are experiencing considerable difficulty in connection with their nuclear ship "Savannah", about which there was so much enthusiasm some time ago? Before the Government reach a decision, will they consider all the factors involved, including the cost, so as not to waste money?
    Mr. Cousins: I do not want to anticipate the statement which, as I have said, will be given before the Recess. One must recognise that there are considerable differences of opinion about the value of nuclear propulsion for commercial shipping at this time. There are no successful examples of it in the world now, and there is little enthusiasm amongst the maritime nations to develop nuclear ships.

    Hovercraft
    Mr. Ennalsasked the Minister of Technology if he will now make a statement on the future of the Hovercraft industry.
    Mr. Cousins: As my hon. Friend will remember, I referred to Hovercraft in some detail during the debate on 14th July, 1965. The Hovercraft industry has got off to a good start, and I believe that Hovercraft will make a valuable contribution to transport and to our exports.
    Mr. Ennals: Is my right hon. Friend aware that there is great potential for the Hovercraft in a cross-Channel service, and particularly a cross-Channel ferry service? Will he and his right hon. Friend the Minister of Transport do whatever they can to encourage British operators to get into this field so that it will not be left to foreign operators?
    Mr. Cousins: Discussions are at present in train between us on the possibility of a Solent ferry service being operated by British Railways. It is necessary to remember when talking of the Hovercraft, as I made clear in the recent debate, they were not simply created for internal use. They were also designed to have export possibilities, and if people buy them they have to have somewhere to use them. There have to be some easy waterways in order for experiments to be carried out. We hope that the Hovercraft will be a commercial success, which is why we are asking British Railways to continue its experiments in this direction.
    Mr. Lubbock: Has the right hon. Gentleman had any discussions with the Secretary of State for Scotland about the use of the Hovercraft for communication between the islands of Scotland? Further, has he had any discussions with the Minister for Overseas Development about the possibility of using Hovercraft instead of helicopters on rescue operations in areas with poor communications, such as Pakistan, where the recent flood disaster could have provided a splendid opportunity to use them?
    Mr. Cousins: I have not had direct discussions with the two Ministers concerned on the specific subjects mentioned by the hon. Member. The subject is still

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    under consideration by the Interservices Hovercraft Working Party, which is considering where they can be used. There are some really valuable uses to which they can be put at the moment.
    Mr. Deedes: What advice, if any, has the right hon. Gentleman received on the potential of the Hovercraft in relation to the Channel Tunnel?
    Mr. Cousins: Have I got the question correctly? Did the right hon. Gentleman mention Hovercraft in relation to the Channel Tunnel?
    Mr. Deedes: I asked what technical advice has the right hon. Gentleman received, if any, on the potential of the Hovercraft in relation to the Channel Tunnel.
    Mr. Cousins: Unless someone has been misleading me, they are not constructing the tunnel for Hovercraft; they are constructing it for rail services. If there is any basis for an assumption that Hovercraft might be a useful creature to operate in the Tunnel, I suggest that a direct Question should be put down.

    Machine Tools
    Mr. Martenasked the Minister of Technology what action he has taken in the last two months about the cyclical difficulties in the pattern of machine tool ordering within that industry.
    Mr. Biffenasked the Minister of Technology when he expects to have the report of the working party set up to study the difficulties created by the cyclical pattern of machine tool ordering.
    Mr. Cousins: As I told the House on 14th July, the membership of the working party I have appointed to study these difficulties is now complete. The Working party has held its first meeting and I have asked it to report as soon as possible.
    Mr. Marten: Can the right hon. Gentleman say how long it took the working party before it held its first meeting after 14th June? Secondly, what is the present position in relation to the cycle in the pattern of machine tool ordering in the industry?
    Mr. Cousins: The working party has had its first meeting. I have not got the particular date. It is a substantial committee in its own right. I did not quite
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    understand the second part of the supplementary question. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman would put it down.
    Mr. Marten: There has been a cycle of ordering in the machine tool industry which that industry has found it difficult to carry. When he answered a similar Question last time he said that he was considering financing the stocks in this difficult cycle. What is the position of that cycle at the moment?
    Mr. Cousins: This machine tool committee has been asked to consider the problem of cyclical difficulties. We have placed in front of it a number of tasks upon which it can make its examination, one of which is the question of the ordering of stocks in slack periods and the ordering of prototype models. It has not yet reached its conclusions on this, but it will let me know as soon as it has. I suggest that we should not get into the position where we assume that the committee will resolve the problem of cyclical ordering of machine tools. It is not a function of the committee.
    Mr. Biffen: Does not the right hon. Gentleman agree that the latest published figures suggest that in the three months ending in April the new home orders for machine tools are 20 per cent. lower than for the preceding three months? In view of that trend, does he not agree that it would be highly desirable that this committee should report at the earliest possible moment?
    Mr. Cousins: I agree. The hon. Member will recall that in the debate on technology I mentioned that the Machine Tool Trades Association had not expressed such concern as I did about this problem, because I think it is a wrong position where we have a down-turn in our machine tool ordering at this time. But this machine tool committee is a committee of some substance, and the people on it know what it is all about. It consists of people like Sir William Carron, Mr. Harrison of Alfred Herbert Ltd., and Mr. Kearns, Chairman of the M.T.T.A. They know what the problems are. I mention those three people as an indication of that fact that this is a committee of substance.
    Mr. Hamlingasked the Minister of Technology to what extent his Department is consulting the machine tool industry with a view to extending public

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    participation in the manufacture of machine tools.
    Mr. Cousins: I am not at present planning an extension of public ownership into the manufacture of machine tools. No consultations are therefore taking place.
    Mr. Hamling: Is my right hon. Friend aware that we on these benches have been pressing for a consideration of this policy for a very long time in view of the inefficiency of the machine tool industry, as at present owned and controlled? Is my right hon. Friend looking at this again, because progress is going to be slow unless he carries out this consultation?
    Mr. Cousins: Of course, we are aware of the dissatisfaction that has existed in some quarters about the pace of growth in the machine tool industry and its inability, in some cases, to meet requirements of modern industry. The question specifically asked of me was whether I have plans at the moment, and the answer to that is certainly not.
    Mr. Gresham Cooke: Would the right hon. Gentleman be assured that, whatever his Left-wing friends want, public participation in the machine tool industry would not help it at present? What is really required at the present time is a new scheme of investment allowances to get over the cyclical trend.
    Mr. Cousins: I do not accept that that is a right conclusion. The question I was asked was whether I had had any discussion as to the possibility of public ownership at this time. The answer is still "No".
    Mr. Harold Walker: Will my right hon. Friend have a careful look at the very substantial imports of machine tools with a view to establishing Government manufacturing facilities in this field to which the machine tool industry has at present expressed a complete indifference?
    Sir H. Legge-Bourke: In view of the fact that the right hon. Gentleman was very anxious to deny that there was any risk of a sword of Damocles hanging over the industry, may I ask him what he is now going to do with the lesser swords being hung over it by his hon. Friends?
    Mr. Cousins: One of the things which I feel would be helpful to the machine tool industry would be for it to recognise that we have set up an appraisal team which has a responsible task in trying to determine the issues and problems confronting the machine tool industry. The House should address itself to serious questions so that we can help rather than hinder the industry.

    Women Scientists
    Mrs. Renée Shortasked the Minister of Technology what steps he is taking to encourage the recruitment of women scientists into the computer industry.
    Mr. Marsh: The Ministry of Technology is examining with the others concerned the need for further training courses to increase the supply of computer staff of all kinds. My right hon. Friend understands that the computer manufacturers would be glad to recruit more women scientists with the right talents and qualifications. If my hon. Friend has any evidence to the contrary, the Minister will be glad to consider it.
    Mrs. Short: I thank my hon. Friend for that reply. I am glad that he and the computer industry realise that there is a great deal of skill and ability among women—[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."]—and not only in matters of science and technology? May I remind him that a recent educational survey showed that girls in secondary and grammar schools—and, therefore, the heads of mixed and girls' secondary and grammar schools—are unaware of the opportunities that are available for girls and women in science and technology? Will my hon. Friend, therefore, take this matter up with his right hon. Friend the Minister of Education and Science and see that all the available information goes into all the secondary schools?
    Mr. Marsh: On the first part of my hon. Friend's supplementary question, I would say that she proved her point a long time ago, as far as the abilities of married women are concerned. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear"] Some hon. Members opposite have nasty looks on their faces. Currently, there are shortages of mathematicians and physicists in industry, so there is no difficulty in

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    married women who opt out of computer work for a period finding other employment. But in the next two or three years we shall need between 300 and 400 more people in this work, and it will be quite a job training them. I hope that my hon. Friend's Question will have some effect in obtaining publicity.
    Mr. Snow: Is my hon. Friend aware that it will be dangerous to rely wholly on the computer-producing industry to produce the necessary amount of staff for industries requiring computers? Is he further aware that last week I took a short course on computers, at the hands of a lady systems analyser, with, I think, beneficial results?
    Mr. Marsh: I was only going to add that currently there are about 200 courses with some element of computer knowledge at the technical colleges and universities in this country. My right hon. Friend, together with other Members of the Government, is examining the whole question of facilities.

    Computer Industry
    Mr. Ron Lewisasked the Minister of Technology what discussions he is having with the computer industry in Great Britain to expand production to meet foreign competition, with particular reference to modern design and price.
    Mr. Cousins: My Department keeps in close touch with computer manufacturers on all these matters.
    Mr. Lewis: Would my right hon. Friend not agree that it is not design or price but rapidity of introduction and new equipment by British manufacturers which matters?
    Mr. Cousins: This is the criticism that has been made against the British computer industry very frequently. It is not so much design or price. It can be argued whether a particular design is the most suitable one, but there have been considerable delays in the introduction of new equipment. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Wallasey (Mr. Marples), on the last occasion of a technology debate, drew attention to the fact that he had been giving particular attention to the question of software. We also have been giving some attention to this and hope that the British computer
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    industry will recognise that that is one of its failings and help us in that direction.
    Mr. Maxwell: Would my right hon. Friend consider inviting British computer manufacturers to put forward a design for a computer which could be used in schools, because the industry will not have sufficient people who know how to use computers unless we begin training them, as in the United States and the U.S.S.R., at school? Furthermore, will he bear in mind that the successful design and manufacture of cheap computers for schools would be of tremendous export value?
    Mr. Cousins: One of the British computer manufacturers is already tackling this. It forms part of our discussions with the Department of Education and Science, because we, too, believe that there needs to be training of young people in the use of computers.
    Sir Harmar Nicholls: In order to keep part of world trade looking towards this part of Europe, has the Minister any views on the suggested merger between an English computer firm and a French one?
    Mr. Cousins: This is a different question. It was raised a little earlier on another question, probably before the hon. Gentleman entered the Chamber. I have said that this is, in some cases, a matter for commercial interests in the first instance. They have drawn my attention, as the Minister responsible, to this, and we shall be dealing with it at some time.

    Holland and East German Research Stations (Co-operation)
    Mrs. Renée Shortasked the Minister of Technology what technical co-operation exists between the research stations of his Department and similar establishments in Holland and East Germany.
    Mr. Marsh: The Ministry's research stations exchange information as appropriate with the corresponding research institutes in Holland. There is rather less contact with East Germany.
    Mrs. Short: I am glad about the first part of the Answer, but not about the second. Can I ask my hon. Friend if

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    he is aware that, in the field of industrial building in particular, we have a great deal to learn from East Germany? Is he also aware that officers in his Department are not allowed to go on official vists to East Germany, and, if they do go in order to visit scientific establishments, they have to go at their own expense and take time out of their annual leave? We are the losers in this. Will my hon. Friend undertake to have a look at this so that it is put on a more sensible basis?
    Mr. Marsh: My hon. Friend will accept that this is a difficult question in view of the political atmosphere in relation to East Germany since the end of the war, which obviously creates some difficulties. It would be a mistake to believe that there are no contacts with East Germany. The Warren Spring Laboratory and an East German scientific institute are co-operating at present, and there is an exchange of research reports.

    Kipper Sausages
    Mr. Hector Hughesasked the Minister of Technology if he is aware that the new discovery by Aberdeen's Torry Research Station under the auspices of the Herring Industry Board, whereby kipper sausages can be produced with the herring bones eliminated, can be of commercial value to Scotland and of benefit to consumers; and when the process will be completed so that they can be put on sale.
    Mr. Marsh: The process referred to is being developed by staff of the British Food Manufacturing Industries Research Association, which is an independent organisation, grant-aided by the Ministry of Technology. The results are promising, but I cannot say when they will be ready for commercial application.
    Mr. Hughes: Does the Minister realise that it is the partnership of the herring with Aberdeen Angus that has made the British nation great? Will he give what assistance he can to this very desirable experiment with a view to maintaining the greatness of the British Commonwealth of Nations?
    Mr. Marsh: While not wanting to go too far into the possible effects of the British Commonwealth of Nations and
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    the consumption of kipper sausages, it is true that research is going on into this, but the commercial value to Scotland of smoked fish sausages is said to be uncertain.

    British Industry (Modernisation)
    Mr. Fisherasked the Minister of Technology what measures he is now taking to encourage the modernisation of British industry and to make it more competitive in world markets.
    Mr. Cousins: I would refer the hon. Member to the full account I gave of my Department's activities in the debate on 14th July.
    Mr. Fisher: Quite apart from the strictures of the Estimates Committee, which are very serious, would the right hon. Gentleman not agree that one of the most helpful steps that he personally could take to make British industry more competitive in world markets would be to support the incomes policy of the Cabinet of which he is a member? Does he support that policy or that of the Transport and General Workers' Union? If it is the latter, he ought, in decency, to resign from the Government.
    Mr. Speaker: There has been rather a lot of noise. The hon. Gentleman was asking about the modernising of British industry.
    Mr. Cousins: Could I deal with the relevant part of the question? I was reminded of the strictures of the the Estimates Committee. It would not be my wish at this time to make a comment about this. I shall do so at the appropriate time, but I would remind the hon. Gentleman that these great strictures which were made—and not the way they were reported in the Press—were that we had not put people from industry on the appraisal committees, a fact which I denied a few moments ago by giving the names of some members of one of the main committees. Another of the strictures was that there had been a delay in making appointments and that there was topheaviness of structure. I hope that this House will at some time get round to the idea that it is much more important to know whether we are going to put the British computer industry, or any other industry, on its feet,

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    rather than whether I have two deputy secretaries in my Department.
    Mr. John Page: Will the right hon. Gentlemen remember the advice of his hon. Friend the Member for Middlesbrough, West (Dr. Bray) and throw his weight about in Whitehall rather more? Will he try to persuade his hon. and right hon. Friends to use the purchasing power of Government and local government agencies to place orders only with companies and firms which are using modern equipment and techniques?
    Mr. Cousins: This is part of the approach which my Ministry is making to other Government Departments. When we get down to the question of bringing practical issues before the House, I wonder how many hon. Members opposite would support the idea that we should throw our weight about to place orders where we want.
    Mr. Woodburn: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that it is a sad reflection on the so-called attributes of private enterprise that they have to be so dependent on his Ministry encouraging them to do what they ought to have been doing long ago?

    BO.A.C. and B.E.A. (Computers)
    Mr. Kenneth Lewisasked the Minister of Technology what co-operation he has been able to achieve between the British Overseas Airways Corporation and British European Airways in the use and purchase of British computers.
    Mr. Eldon Griffithsasked the Minister of Technology what steps he is taking to ensure that the computer to be purchased by the British Overseas Airways Corporation will be compatible with that already in use by British European Airways.
    Mr. Cousins: Both Corporations have at different times from 1963 onwards satisfied the Government of the day that the computer systems of their choice were the best technical and commercial solutions to their requirements. The computer systems of the Corporations already intercommunicate, but the new equipment which B.O.A.C. are ordering will make this easier. It is important that each Corporation should have the
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    system which meets its requirements, and these are not necessarily identical.
    Mr. Lewis: If the right hon. Gentleman wants to put the British computer industry on its feet, surely he could use his influence with nationalised Corporations such as B.O.A.C. to buy a British computer system, because this is the one Corporation which could assist the British computer industry in its developments.
    Mr. Cousins: Yes, Sir, I agree that this should have been the position. However, I would remind the hon. Member of the point I made, namely, that since 1963 both Corporations have made it clear to the Government and had the Government's endorsement that they should purchase the computers which they require. They put forward the reasoning—it was put to me in the technological debate—that I ought not to interfere if the Corporations were satisfied that they were getting the best piece of equipment. I happen to hold different views about this, but the facts were as I stated.
    Mr. Griffiths: While accepting at once that it is in the interests of both Corporations that they should buy the computers best fitted to their own services, would the Minister not agree that it is wrong that B.O.A.C. and B.E.A. should not have reciprocity; that they are not able to programme one another's passenger information so as to pass it on to one another? Is this not the same as building one railway line with a 4 ft. 8in. gauge and another with a 5 ft. 2 in. gauge? They must be compatible.
    Mr. Cousins: It is not the same. The particular operations which these computers are doing are ticket and passenger checking and documentation. These were the aspects in which they were making themselves compatible with American lines which use the international airways. The B.E.A. machine is compatible, to a degree, with the new machine which is being ordered. Therefore, it is not worsening the situation. It is, if anything, easing it. The Corporations, although entitled to have advice and guidance from us—they had it from our Computer Advisory Unit—have been given a wide degree of freedom from Ministerial control in the past, and they exercise this—all the nationalised industries do.
    Dr. Bray: Is the Minister aware that this illustrates the need for continuity in such complex systems and that, if we are to avoid such quandaries arising in the future, all the work of his Programming Centre and Computer Advisory Unit is needed to lay the foundations of a healthy industry in future?
    Mr. Cousins: That is obviously correct, and we are hoping that the unit will be of value to people who want to purchase computers before they place orders.
    Mr. Marples: In view of the importance of compatibility in these computer systems, would the right hon. Gentleman tell the House what the advice of the unit was?
    Mr. Cousins: On the advice of the unit, we saw no justifiable reason at this stage for preventing B.O.A.C. putting the order where it went.

    Space Programme
    Mr. Albert Robertsasked the Minister of Technology if he will make a statement on the space programme prepared by his department.
    Mr. Marsh: My right hon. Friend has no direct responsibility for space research but following an invitation from the Secretary of State for Education and Science, he has directed the Atomic Energy Authority to undertake research on the design of the "payload" for the large astronomical satellite project of the European Space Research Organisation. At present, the Authority is carrying out a preliminary design study, which is expected to take about six months.
    Mr. Roberts: Has there been co-operation between my right hon Friend's Department and the Postmaster-General about satellite communications?
    Mr. Marsh: There is very considerable co-operation and constant discussion between the two Departments.
    Mr. Wainwright: Could my hon. Friend say when the satellite will be launched in Australia?
    Mr. Marsh: It is very difficult to give any precise date, but probably some time in 1967.

  PRIME MINISTER (OFFICIAL VISITS)
  Mr. Kenneth Lewisasked the Prime Minister what official visits he proposes to make abroad during the month of October.
  The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Wilson): I have, as yet, no official visits arranged.

  INDIA (NUCLEAR GUARANTEE)
  Mr. Martenasked the Prime Minister if he will now make a statement on the proposal that India should be given a nuclear guarantee.
  The Prime Minister: I have nothing to add to previous statements on this subject.
  Mr. Marten: Would the right hon. Gentleman recall that the last time he answered that question he said that he would deal with it in the debate which followed that Question Time, but in fact he did not deal with it? Some of us are getting anxious about what is happening here. Could he give us a little more information about whether there is any progress or not?
  The Prime Minister: It is not for me to express any comment on the anxiety which hon. Members opposite are suffering. We attach great importance, as I have said, to this. I am sure that the hon. Member realises the very great difficulties of securing anything in the nature of a nuclear guarantee. I have nothing to add to what I have said today, and I had nothing to add in the debate.
  Mr. Henderson: In view of the importance of this subject, would it be the policy of the Government to discuss with the United States Government and the Soviet Union the possibility of a guarantee of the nuclear security of nonnuclear Powers as part of a non-dissemination agreement?
  The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir. This is, of course, highly relevant to the 18 Nation Disarmament Conference which is to meet at Geneva in the near future, and the question of nuclear assurance of this kind is relevant to an anti-dissemination agreement.

  ARMS (OVERSEAS SALE)
  Mr. Blakerasked the Prime Minister what steps he is taking to co-ordinate the activities of Departments concerned with the sale of British arms overseas.
  The Prime Minister: If the hon. Member is concerned about co-ordination as it affects the positive selling of arms, I would refer him to the Answer given to him by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence on 21st July.
  Mr. Blaker: Is the Prime Minister aware that on that occasion his right hon. Friend said that Sir Donald Stokes and the "super arms salesman", when appointed, would be concerned with the sale of secondhand arms, as well as the sale of new arms? How does he reconcile that statement with his own call on 16th December for a ban on the bloody traffic in secondhand arms?
  The Prime Minister: I was referring to the extremely dangerous practice going on, which have been debated many times in the House, under which arms are transferred from Governments to private salesmen, who have been going all over the world selling arms to troublemakers and many of them have been used against British troops. My right hon. Friend's statement referred to Government-permitted sales to our allies and Commonwealth partners, whether they be new or secondhand arms. There is all the difference in the world between those two things.
  Mr. Ennals: Would my right hon. Friend agree that it is still the policy of the Government not to sell arms to South Africa?
  The Prime Minister: Certainly.
  Mr. Emrys Hughes: Could my right hon. Friend assure us that we will not speed up arms and slow down housing? Is he aware that there is a great danger that this might lead to an inflation of the arms industry at a time when we need all the skilled labour for the advanced factories?
  The Prime Minister: There is no question of speeding up arms production. We have had a number of historic debates in this Session when we have been voting
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  in respect of cutting down on aircraft and other arms programmes which have become irrelevant to our defence needs. Where there is an agreement to arm some of our allies in N.A.T.O., we feel that United Kingdom types of weapons should be used and not exclusively American weapons, some of which have been sold as a result of pretty high pressure salesmanship.
  Mr. Peter Thomas: Is the ban on the sale of secondhand arms still the policy of the Government, and do the Government intend to make any proposals in this field at the forthcoming disarmament conference?
  The Prime Minister: I should not like to say at the moment whether it is appropriate at the disarmament conference or for straight handling at the United Nations. It is, and has been under successive Governments, the policy to keep very strict control over the sale of secondhand arms from this country. In my statement last December and previous statements I was concerned with international arms traffic through international privateers.

  BATTLE OF PETERLOO (COMMEMORATION)
  Mr. Hamlingasked the Prime Minister what official preparations are being made to commemorate the Battle of Peterloo.
  The Prime Minister: None, Sir.
  Mr. Hamling: Is my right hon. Friend aware that, inasmuch as recently we have been celebrating the Battle of Waterloo, in the opinion of many hon. Members on these benches the Battle of Peterloo is just as important, in view of the fact that this was the first Chartist demonstration?
  The Prime Minister: I would not say that it was a Chartist demonstration. The Charter had not then been signed. In the Waterloo celebration we were celebrating a great victory by British and allied troops. I am not certain that it could be said that the actions of the 15th Hussars and the Cheshire Yeomanry in the Battle of Peterloo were quite such a glorious achievement.
  Mr. Hastings: Would the Prime Minister consider appointing the hon. Member for Woolwich, West (Mr. Hamling) Minister for Technology, as this would assist a forward-look generally?
  The Prime Minister: I think that the last word was said in the Peterloo Medal when quoting Verse 14 of Psalm 37. The medal said that
  "The wicked have drawn out the sword, and have bent their bow, to cast down the poor and needy, and to slay such as be of upright conversation."
  For my part, while I am prepared to receive any representations from the Manchester City Council about any proposed celebration, I should prefer to leave it to Psalm 37.

  NUCLEAR WEAPONS
  Mr. Hugh Jenkinsasked the Prime Minister on what date he received the letter and banner of the Hiroshima Mothers' Group for the Prevention of Nuclear War; if these are now available for inspection at No. 10 Downing Street; and if he will make a statement on the policy of the British Government towards the prohibition use, testing and stockpiling of nuclear weapons.
  The Prime Minister: On 11th June, Sir, and the banner was later returned as requested to the sender. As for the Government's policy on nuclear weapons, I would refer my hon. Friend to my speech in the debate of 19th July and to the numerous Answers I have given to Questions on this subject.
  Mr. Jenkins: With reference to that speech and subsequent references, will the Prime Minister confirm that it is still the policy and view of the Government on this question of the nuclear deterrent, in particular of the British independent nuclear deterrent, that, as was said in the Labour Party manifesto, it will not deter anyone and its possession will impress neither friend nor potential foe?
  The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir. I think that what I said on 17th December showed that what was claimed to be an independent deterrent in fact was not. I think that our analysis has been confirmed by all the facts which we have learned since. I confirm, as I stated
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  in the debate last December, that it is our policy to internationalise the so-called national deterrent.
  Mr. Marten: Will the Prime Minister confirm that he will keep the British nuclear deterrent for use as a nuclear guarantee to India?
  The Prime Minister: I have said that what we intend to do as far as India is concerned is to discuss the provision of an effective international deterrent for the purpose of any guarantee which may be worked out for India to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in Asia.
  Mrs. Anne Kerr: Does my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister appreciate that it is not only the women of Japan who are concerned about the existence of nuclear weapons but women throughout the world, and the women of Great Britain in particular; and that they at least, as a majority group of world women, would appreciate this country's surrender of the right to test nuclear weapons and to have nuclear bases on British soil and the right to take part in nuclear alliances which are contrary to the United Nations Charter?
  The Prime Minister: I accept that women all over the world want to see the end of nuclear weapons. This view is not, of course, confined to women. We all do. This is why the Government have taken the initative at Geneva—or will be doing so—in tabling proposals to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Our own national policies were fully explained on 16th and 17th December and subsequently. But I cannot accept that alliances of which we are members are contrary to the United Nations Charter.
  Mr. Speaker: Mr. Philip Noel-Baker.
  Hon. Members: Oh.
  Mr. Philip Noel-Baker: Does the Prime Minister recall that the Muncipality of Hiroshima and the people of Hiroshima have made constant efforts to warn the nations of the world about the dangers of nuclear war? Will he ensure that if any Members of the present Government visit Japan they will go to Hiroshima and not avoid doing so as Tory Ministers did?
  The Prime Minister: I will certainly consider my right hon. Friend's proposal.

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  It is a fact that Japan has had a very real interest in warning the world about nuclear weapons. So, if I may say so, has my right hon. Friend the Member for Derby, South (Mr. Philip Noel-Baker), and the chorus of groans from right hon. and hon. Members opposite every time a Nobel Peace Prizewinner gets to his feet is a further addition to our views about their international policies.
  Mr. Braine: In order to get this into perspective, may I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he is aware that everyone on these benches—and, I feel, everyone on the Government benches—has been a member of the campaign for multilateral nuclear disarmament?
  The Prime Minister: We have always supported a comprehensive multilateral agreement to ban nuclear weapons everywhere in the world—
  Mr. Braine: All of us.
  The Prime Minister:—although I think that some of the policies of the last Government stood in the way of that multilateral convention—[HON. MEMBERS: "Nonsense."]—with their harping on the so-called independent deterrent for purely domestic purposes. This is why my noble Friend is taking an initiative in the matter at Geneva.
  Mr. Speaker: Mr. Gresham Cooke.
  Mr. Ridsdale: On a point of order. As an ex-Tory Minister who visited Japan, may I be called to ask a supplementary question?
  Mr. Speaker: I am sorry. Hon. Members often have special claims to be called, but I have to ignore them in order to make progress.

  BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
  Mr. Gresham Cookeasked the Prime Minister, in view of possible balance of payment difficulties arising during the Recess, what arrangements he is making for dealing with such difficulties; and if he will give an assurance that he will seek to recall Parliament if such a situation develops.
  The Prime Minister: The balance of payments is much better than it was a year ago, and my right hon. Friend the
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  Chancellor of the Exchequer hopes to make a Statement reinforcing previous Government measures later this afternoon. As for the second part of his Question, I would refer the hon. Member to the provisions of Standing Order No. 117.
  Mr. Gresham Cooke: Is the Prime Minister aware that many well-informed people think that the balance of payments crisis may develop more severely in September and that further measures may be necessary beyond those to be announced this afternoon? Will he give an assurance that Parliament would be recalled in such circumstances?
  The Prime Minister: I am not sure that the hon. Member is aware of the text of the statement to be made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer this afternoon. As for the views of certain well-informed people, I am anxious to know who is informing these well-informed people because, as I stated in the original Answer, compared with a balance-of-payments deficit of £800 million last year, all the signs are that the balance-of-payments deficit this year will be considerably less than half that figure, which is quite a good interim report.
  Mr. Shinwell: Would not my right hon. Friend agree that the time has come when hon. Members of all parties, irrespective of their political views, should divest themselves of political prejudice and stop indulging in gloom and despondency? Does he recall that during the past years we have frequently had balance-of-payments problems but that on no occasion has the House been recalled to deal with them?
  The Prime Minister: I particularly remember that in the very grave balance of payments crisis which followed Suez, when we were fully opposed to the Suez operation but when it was a question of strengthening sterling, we from the Opposition Box expressed our full support for any measures to save sterling, despite the fact that we were completely opposed to the policy which had led to the crisis in the case of Suez.
  Sir E. Boyle: The right hon. Gentleman has said that three times in this Session. Will he take it from me that it is quite incorrect and that in fact the

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  Finance Bill and the policy of imposing temporary increases in taxation were opposed through all their stages by the Labour Party.
  The Prime Minister: In fact the right hon. Gentleman is a year out. The Finance Bill was in the previous year. Perhaps he is referring to the Autumn Budget, and the following Finance Bill. If the right hon. Gentleman is saying that if an Opposition opposes a Finance Bill it is acting against sterling, I will take his point, whatever the motives for the protracted debate on the Finance Bill. But in that case we supported the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Macmillan, in his demand that action be taken to save sterling. But we reserved our right to oppose, for example, petrol rationing and the increased supplementary taxation on petrol, which was not done in the Finance Bill but on a Ways and Means Resolution—and the right hon. Gentleman himself said that it was not a Budget.
  Mr. Rankin: Is my right hon. Friend aware that all the well-informed views of which we have been told were not so well informed about the outcome of the first ballot for the Tory leadership?
  The Prime Minister: I do not think that that arises out of this Question in any way at all. All I would say is that if, with a balance-of-payments deficit of £800 million last year, there was a feeling that that was a tolerable figure to be accepted—which we were told repeatedly by right hon. Gentlemen opposite, although we did not agree with it—then I think that, with a balance-of-payments deficit this year of much less than half that figure, there is no possible justification for any financial crisis when the economic position is improving rapidly and when we require more time to get it completely right.
  Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: I am not going to ask the right hon. Gentleman about the degree of support which he gave to the measures which I took to defend sterling in 1961. However, are the measures which the Chancellor of the Exchequer will announce today well thought out, because we have not yet received a copy of the statement which the right hon. Gentleman is to make? [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."]
  The Prime Minister: On the question of my right hon. Friend's statement, the right hon. Member for Wirral (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd) did not convey a copy of his statement to me on 26th July, 1961, because it was regarded as having budgetary significance; and it is not usual to transfer any statement from the Chancellor of the Exchequer dealing with policies of that kind. So the right hon. Gentleman did not give me a copy of his statement. I hope that he is not trying to suggest that at any time I or any of my hon. Friends supported his policy on Suez. But I now know a great deal more about what he was doing at Villacoublay and Sèvres on that occasion, and I hope that one day he will come clean with the House because of the effect he then had on sterling.

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS (GOVERNMENT MEASURES)
The Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. James Callaghan): The measures taken in the Budget to correct the balance of payments deficit are beginning to take effect. This year's balance of payments deficit is likely to be well below half last year's figure. To ensure that we reach our aim of eliminating the deficit in the course of next year and of maintaining the strength of sterling, the Government have decided to adopt the following measures.
First, expenditure at home. The Government intend to slow down the rate of expenditure on capital projects and to defer as far as possible purchases of equipment and stores by Government Departments, local authorities and nationalised industries.
Housing, schools and hospitals will be contained within their existing programmes. For other non-industrial capital projects for which contracts have not yet been signed, the starting dates will be postponed for six months. Exemptions will be made for projects in development districts and areas of high unemployment. Similarly, purchases of goods will be deferred to the maximum possible extent.
All Government Departments have been instructed to carry out this policy and to arrange for other bodies for which

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they are responsible to do likewise. The nationalised industries will be called on to follow a similar course of action. Local authorities will be asked to follow suit.
Loan sanction and grants will only be given to local authority projects which are urgently required. In particular, sanction will not be given except in special circumstances to loans for expenditure on land purchases in advance of requirements, on civic buildings, offices and a variety of miscellaneous projects which, though desirable in themselves, are not essential at this time. The expenditure in these categories is now running at £150 million a year.
Lending by local authorities on mortgage for house purchase has trebled in England and Wales in the last five years, and in 1964–65 reached £180 million. With the co-operation of the local authorities this will be restricted to the average of the three years ended 31st March, 1965, namely, £130 million.
Since the beginning of the financial year drawings by local authorities on the Public Works Loans Board have been exceptionally heavy. In present circumstances a more regular phasing of issues is necessary, and I have asked the Public Works Loans Commissioners to arrange this forthwith.
The Government, in addition to reviewing their own establishments, are asking the local authorities to review their present establishments; and in the light of this to confine net increases in their staffs to very urgent services, where essential professional workers, for example, teachers, are required.
The House will recall that last spring I undertook to review the swollen programmes of public expenditure left behind by our predecessors. This review is now complete. As I forecast before the election, the examination revealed that it would not be possible to carry out all the programmes we inherited within the limits of our resources until the necessary rate of growth of production has been achieved. We have, accordingly, reshaped the total programme and I can inform the House that from now on expenditure will be kept to the level that we as a nation can afford. I am giving instructions to Departments that the 1966–67 Estimates shall be drawn up within a limit which has been determined
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for each Department within the agreed total.
As regards defence, good progress is being made with the review designed to reduce the forward defence programme by some £400 million by 1969–70 and to achieve a large cut in that part which falls on the balance of payments. Next year's programme is being reduced by about £100 million. As to other overseas expenditure, all Departments and public authorities are to observe the most stringent economy in overseas expenditure and do all they can to increase overseas receipts.
So much for cuts in existing expenditure. We shall also have to defer some of the desirable social reforms we had hoped to do in the immediate future. While priority must go to wage-related unemployment and sickness benefits, the Government have decided that it will not be possible to introduce an income guarantee scheme or remove the remaining National Health Service charges in the next Session. We have also decided to postpone the introduction of the scheme of specially favourable interest rates for owner-occupiers.
In regard to private investment, the Government will introduce legislation instituting a licensing procedure to govern the starting dates of privately sponsored construction projects of the value of £100,000 or more with the exception only of housing projects and industrial building. The control will be made retrospective to all such projects for which no contracts have been entered into before the time of this announcement. Provision will be made for exempting projects in development districts and areas with high unemployment.
It is further proposed to introduce control over office development in the Birmingham conurbation. An Order giving effect to this will be laid before Parliament as soon as possible after the Control of Office and Industrial Development Bill receives the Royal Assent. As my right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade has already announced, closer control over industrial building will also be introduced when this Bill becomes law. It will become necessary in the London and South Eastern, Midlands and Eastern Regions to obtain an industrial development certificate for industrial development exceeding 1,000 sq. ft.

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I have decided to reinforce the hire-purchase measures. As from tomorrow, the maximum repayment period of hire-purchase contracts will be reduced from three years to 30 months. This will apply to all goods which are now subject to H.P. controls other than furniture, bedding, cookers and water heaters, for which the period will not be altered. The Government will consult immediately with the gas and electricity industries to secure a reduction in promotional expenditure.
I propose to introduce some further changes in exchange control. The first concerns direct investment outside the sterling area. Hitherto, official exchange has been allowed in certain cases regarded as specially favourable for the balance of payments. For the time being no further approvals will be given for the use of official exchange in such cases. All approved projects will have to be financed with investment currency or by borrowing abroad.
Another change concerns investment currency. I announced in the Budget that certain receipts of foreign currencies by residents of the United Kingdom which had hitherto been allowed to be sold as investment currency would in future be exchanged at the official rate. The same change will now be made in respect of certain other receipts, including the proceeds of life policies and the assets of immigrants redesignated as residents of the United Kingdom.
Finally, I am asking the Bank of England to exercise more uniform control over borrowing in this country by companies registered here but controlled by non-residents of the sterling area.
It is the Government's policy to limit to the greatest possible extent facilities for financing imports of manufactured goods for home consumption and imports of all kinds for stockbuilding. With the Government's approval, the Governor of the Bank of England has now written a further letter to the banks. It asks them to scrutinise with even greater care than they do already all requests for credit when there is prima facie evidence that to provide the finance would facilitate payment for imports.
As regards prepayment for imports, at present payment for imports into this country may be made at any time between
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the date of contract and the date of arrival of the goods. In future, payments will not normally be allowed before the goods have been shipped. This should produce a useful once-for-all saving and help to check excessive purchases.
If the exchange control measures I mentioned earlier are continued for a full year, these, together with this once-for-all saving, should produce a total saving in official exchange of at least £45 million over the next year.
My right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade is introducing from Monday next a further improvement in the Export Credit Guarantee Department bank guarantee facility, by reducing the qualifying contract value from £50,000 to £25,000.
Arrangements are also being made to reduce the cost of shorter-term credit. This will affect a much larger volume of exports, and help many more companies. For shorter-term credits of at least 30 days and less than two years, guaranteed unconditionally by the E.C.G.D., the banks have agreed in principle to make finance available at Bank Rate. This compares with rates of around 1 per cent. above Bank Rate at present. The scheme will involve a large extension of the E.C.G.D.'s unconditional bank guarantee facility.
Details will be announced as soon as possible.
Also in this field of exports, urgent action will also be taken to increase efficiency in the docks and to improve access to them.
Together with the other measures the Government have taken previously, these further steps will reinforce our position and enable us to continue with the tasks of balancing our payments and reconstructing the economy.
Sir Harmar Nicholls: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. May I have your guidance? In view of the unfortunate decision not to provide the Opposition with a copy of this statement—for reasons which may or may not be well based—and in view of its importance, and bearing in mind that it cannot be debated now because the Order Paper is fixed, is there any way of having a short Adjournment so that a considered probe can be made in the interests of understanding the statement?
Mr. Speaker: Not within my control.
Mr. Barber: Having listened to the statement made by the right hon. Gentleman, I must say that I can see no reason why he should not have delivered a copy of the statement to the Opposition, in accordance with the normal courtesies of the House. Both sides will agree that we have listened to a very grave statement indeed, which will have the most serious repercussions throughout the whole of the country. We shall have the opportunity on Monday of debating the whole economic situation, including this statement, but as the statement was handed to my right hon. Friend only when it was actually being made by the Chancellor, I will now only make one or two brief observations.
First of all, I would say to the Chancellor that we on these benches—
Mr. Speaker: Order. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will contrive to put the observations in an interrogatory form.
Mr. Barber: I apologise, Mr. Speaker.
I hope that the Chancellor will appreciate that we will not shirk from giving our full support to measures that are genuinely in the interests of the nation. The statement raises a number of questions, and the first is: will the right hon. Gentleman tell the House what is the total financial effect of all the measures he has announced? Secondly, is it not the case that the primary purpose of these further measures is to reassure foreign opinion? Does he realise that the lack of confidence that exists abroad is the direct consequence—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] Oh, yes—of the inept and incompetent handling of our economic affairs?
Lastly, does he not agree that the announcements he has just made to the House make a mockery of the Labour Party's election manifesto, and show the Labour Party's promises for what they were—a hollow fraud on the electorate?
Mr. Callaghan: I would certainly want to give the Opposition every proper facility in regard to this statement, as is always done, but there is, as the right hon. Gentleman will notice, a sentence in it which talks about licensing controls which are retrospective from the time of this announcement and that, I think, is
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an important reason for not previously giving the Opposition a copy. In any case, as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has said—and I do not want to make a major point of it—apparently when a similar statement was made in 1961 a copy was not supplied.
It is difficult to quantify the total financial effect, because in some cases we are talking about reduction of pressure of demand and, in others, about reduction in Government expenditure. I have said that on defence there will be an immediate reduction of £100 million, and the hire-purchase measures should, on the other hand, reduce demand by about £65 million. There will be other consequences arising from the deferment of capital projects for six months which I cannot at this stage quantify, although figures will become available in due course.
As to whether this action is necessary to reassure foreign opinion which is disturbed by the consequences of the handling of the situation by the Government, it really is a little too much for hon. Members opposite to try to slide out in this way. I need only refer them to the O.E.C.D. Report which speaks of the persistent and deep-seated weaknesses in the economy which have grown up over a number of years. It is with these that we are grappling. It is these that we are attempting to overcome in the reconstruction of the economy.
It is, of course, necessary to reassure foreign opinion that the events of the last 13 years are not now continuing. What foreign opinion wants to be clear about is that this country is reconstructing its industries; that it is in a position to earn is keep; and that it is in a position to pay its way. Every measure we take to achieve that is a real reassurance of foreign opinion.
As to the election manifesto, a number of things were said, I would remind the right hon. Gentleman, of the way in which he and his colleagues contradicted me in November, 1963. I said to the country:
"The Tories are embarked upon a spending spree. It is like taking on hire-purchase commitments when we do not know how much they will be and whether we shall be able to afford them."
This was hotly denied by all Conservative spokesmen at that time.

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There were other matters, too. The plain truth is that the Government of the day concealed the truth because they were throwing away the money of the people at that time.
Mr. Grimond: This is, of course, a grave and will probably be an unpopular statement—probably it was not worth making unless it was grave and unpopular. Will the Chancellor assure us that the Government are not speaking with two voices? Will they tell the people that they have to accept unpopular things? Is he satisfied that he has taken enough out of consumption goods, for there has been a feeling that a soft home market, whatever is done for exports, may end in more consumption at home?
Will the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind the question of investment allowances? Is he satisfied that private investment will go on at the required level? Did I hear him say that overseas defence expenditure will not be cut this year, but next year, by £100 million? If so, is he satisfied that that will be enough?
Mr. Callaghan: I shall try to remember all those questions. The right hon. Member may remind me if I forget some of them.
First, as to whether this will be unpopular, I have no doubt, but believe and trust, that the people will accept what is necessary so that we should balance our external payments and live within our means. To say anything less, or to believe anything less than that, would be unworthy of the people of Britain.
As to whether enough has been taken out of home consumption, I think that one of the effects of these measures will be to ensure the speeding up of a number of projects which, at the moment, are lagging because of the great strain to which the economy is subjected. It may well be that we shall get more out of the economy even in the short run as a result of greater concentration of effort of this sort.
Thirdly, on the question of overseas military expenditure, with the rest of my colleagues I have worked on this ever since we came into office. We have
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made substantial changes, for instance the cancellation of TSR2 was a very early decision.
The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Wilson): Hon. Members opposite voted against it.
Mr. Callaghan: I do not know who voted which way; but we made that change. I think that everyone realises that in this field we can make changes of this sort only over a very long period. I assure the right hon. Member that to cut £100 million on military expenditure next year is a very considerable achievement. I assure the House that I shall go on doing my best to make certain that we get this cut of £400 million in the period we have set ourselves. I believe that it can be done, but we need the support of all in the House and of the whole country if we are to do it.
Mr. John Hynd: Are copies of this statement now available for hon. Members? Will the Chancellor explain how the cut in local authority mortgages will achieve any saving whatever, because, if people are unable to get money from local authorities, they presumably will get it from somewhere else, or will be unable to purchase houses? Would my right hon. Friend care to explain how this is an effective way of saving?
Mr. Callaghan: I think it true to say that there has been an explosion in the field of local authority borrowing for which they pay only interest, while the greater part of the capital has to be found by the Exchequer. The fact that that has gone up so substantially to £180 million is at least evidence that we could not maintain such a rate of expansion. Of course, this will mean—I do not deny it and it would be foolish to deny it—that it will be more difficult to get money from this source to purchase housing; but we have to choose between that and other consequences which would be much more unpleasant
Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: We will, of course, support proper measures to defend sterling—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."]—unlike what happened in 1961, when I recall some of the speeches made by hon. and right hon. Members opposite. In view of what the Chancellor has said in one of his answers about speeding up, is this stop or is it go?
Mr. Callaghan: I saw in the Press that what we were suffering from was too much go-stop and not too much stop-go. The theoreticians can work out what the difference is. What I think will be the effect is to ensure that at the end of the production pipeline we shall be getting a faster rate of production than we were getting before because of the very great strains which were placed on the economy. It is within the experience of every industrialist that the fulfilment of orders—including many important export orders—has been held up because of failure to get sufficient labour or through shortages of components. This will have the effect of making the economy much more balanced than it has been over the last two years.
Mr. Sydney Silverman: While we fully appreciate the prime necessity for the Government to pursue a policy to make certain that the country can stand on its own feet in the world, and pay its own way, before we can do the things we want to do, may I ask my right hon. Friend to answer two specific questions? First, can he estimate whether his proposals will have an effect, and if so what effect, on the level of employment in this country?
Second, since the proposals that he is making are meant to deal with an immediate emergency, does he not consider that to postpone the proposed cut of £400 million in defence expenditure for four years will not help him to achieve the objects that he has in mind?
Mr. Callaghan: There is no doubt that the election programme on which we stood, and about which many of us made many speeches, said that we put the economic recovery of the country first; and until we get the economic recovery of the country we cannot fulfil the social programmes and aspirations we have in mind. I and others made speeches on television and in the country, but, of course, we were not helped by hon. Members opposite telling the electorate that everything was all right.
The effect on employment is a matter about which the whole Government, including, of course, myself, are very deeply concerned. We have not been in the Labour movement for many years to create a substantial measure of unemployment. Let there be no doubt about
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that. [HON. MEMBERS: "Or on this side."] I do not except hon. Members opposite from that desire, but there is strong feeling about this matter. Our intention is, as we have endeavoured to do and, to a certain extent, have succeeded so far, to secure a redeployment of labour. There are now important export industries which cannot get the labour they require to fulfil orders. Everyone knows that there is a shortage of exports today. It is the basic weakness from which we are suffering. Therefore, the Government's policy is directed to positive redeployment of labour towards those fields.
As regards postponement of defence cuts, I promise the House that it is not my or the Government's intention to postpone any defence cuts which are reasonable and feasible. This is a very tough field in which we are operating, but I give the House the assurance that we shall make the maximum cuts at the earliest possible moment.
Mr. Brooke: What does the Chancellor judge has worsened between April and July to make these serious restrictions and postponements necessary now? If they are necessary now, as they may be, why did he not foresee that at the time of his Budget?
Mr. Callaghan: There are two reasons. First, demand has continued to rise despite what I did in the Budget, although hon. Members opposite voted against it on the Second Reading of the Finance Bill. It would have been even worse if they had carried some of their Amendments to the Bill. The other major point is that exports have not been rising to the degree on which I was relying. The relationship between imports and exports is not satisfactory yet and that is a relationship that must be satisfactory. This is the other major reason why I felt it necessary to introduce these steps at this time.
Mr. Atkinson: Would not my right hon. Friend agree that there is something basically wrong with our priorities if we are now saying that we cannot next year improve on our housing record for this year? Would he give some assurance to the housing industry, particularly to those who are involved in industrial building, about the future so that they do not at this critical stage start to cut back on

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their capital investment and thus affect the tremendous programme, which we should all like to see next year, to give first-class homes to our people?
Mr. Callaghan: What I said in my statement was that the housing programme will be contained within the present programme. This will mean that, as a result of lessening demand in certain other fields, it will be possible to achieve that programme. I doubt whether it could have been achieved at the level which the whole construction industry was trying to maintain at present. Therefore, we can assume that there will be a continuation of the housing programme but I do not think that it is possible at this moment to expand it over this year's level, which has been increased over previous years.
Mr. Soames: Would the right hon. Gentleman reconsider the answer which he gave to the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grimond) about the effect on the balance-of-payments problem of the cancellation of aircraft orders? He said that this had reduced it. In fact, the cancellation of the fighter and transport aircraft manufactured at home and ordering the aircraft from America has already increased the load on the balance of payments by some £230 million.
Secondly, would the right hon. Gentleman tell us how much of the reduction of £100 million which has been decided upon in the defence programme for next year is to fall on overseas expenditure? When can we expect details of these cuts to be announced in the House?
Mr. Callaghan: The right hon. Gentleman will know from his past experience that we are at this moment engaged in settling next year's Estimates between the Departments. It is this decision on next year's Estimates within which the Ministry of Defence will be working from now. It knows that it has to work within that total. So there will be no question of announcing the cuts. The Estimates will come along in the normal course of events and there will then be announced the policy which the Estimates carry out, as well as the equipment which is required.
As regards the effect on the balance of payments of ordering aircraft from
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overseas, the right hon. Gentleman will know that no orders for the F111 have yet been placed. As regards other aircraft, this was part of a major operation to secure a redeployment of the labour force into fields where we believed that it would be more productive for the national economy. That was the reason that it was undertaken.
Mr. Bagier: While appreciating my right hon. Friend's dilemma, and also noting in his statement the several measures which he mentioned to help the development districts, may I ask him whether he will keep a very close watch on unemployment in these areas? He will recall that in the past each measure led to a rise in unemployment in the North-East and in Scotland. Will he ensure that whatever actions he takes will not stem the gradual move towards recovery brought about by the last nine months of Labour Government?
Mr. Callaghan: We do not believe that it is either humanitarian or a proper use of our resources in skill and manpower to allow the development districts and the rather wider areas where there is high unemployment to remain in that state. We therefore believe that it is proper on all counts not to apply the full rigour of these measures in those particular areas. I believe that this marks a very great difference between what is being done now and what has been done on some other occasions.
Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: When the right hon. Gentleman says that the housing programme will be continued within its present level, does he include the private sector? If so, how does he propose to enforce that? Does this also mean that the increase in local authority building which the Minister of Housing and Local Government announced only a very short time ago is being scrapped? Can he say how many houses it is his object to take out of the programme which otherwise would have been built this year? How does he reconcile that with the Prime Minister's statement on 12th September last that it was intended by a Labour Government to apply to housing the methods of an operation of war?
Mr. Callaghan: I think that the last part is certainly true, with the new systems of house building being

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developed. It is a great pity that they were left unused here for so long after other countries had developed them. May I say to the right hon. Gentleman that we shall have plenty of opportunities over the new few days to debate the detailed questions which he has put to me. I am sure that answers will be given to him then. [HON. MEMBERS: "Wriggling".] We are not debating the matter now. The right hon. Gentleman asked me a number of questions. Do not get impatient. The hon. Member for Shipley (Mr. Hirst) never stands up to intervene. He merely sits there and squeals.
The number of housing starts next year will be the same as the number of starts this year. My right hon. Friend is having discussions with the building societies now to see whether a floor and a ceiling can be put on the level of private sector house building. If this can be done, we shall have a well-balanced housing programme which will match our needs, or, at any rate, the productive possibilities of the construction industry.
Several Hon. Members rose—
Mr. Speaker: We cannot carry this matter further.

CHATTEL MORTGAGES
4.6 p.m.
Dr. Reginald Bennett: I beg to move,
That leave be given to bring in a Bill to make provision for the granting of mortgages upon personnal chattels; and for purposes connected therewith
I realise that after what has just been said by the Chancellor of Exchequer this may seem a remarkably bad time to suggest a new practice in the production of credit within the country. At the same time, after what has been said, it looks as if there will be more people needing it. Anyway, my proposed Bill has, and has long had substantial support on both sides of the House. I must declare an interest. It is an interest which I have had throughout the debates on hire purchase. I hope that right hon. and hon. Members will acquit me of any charge that it has swayed my judgment in any improper way.
What I seek to do is to try to make good a defect, as I see it, in the present law on credit. At present, it is possible to obtain a mortgage on what is called fixed property—house property and the like—but one cannot raise loans of money against movable goods. The only alternative is hire purchase, for which we legislated in the last Parliament, or the new and increasing practice of the unsecured loan, which seems a mere evasion, and not a very satisfactory one.
One thing which is not possible is for a purchaser to raise a loan against goods which he has newly acquired. The reason is that the present law dates from way back in the last century when, owing to harsh dealings, no doubt, the Bills of Sale Acts were passed—that of 1878 which acted to protect creditors, and that of 1882 which acted to protect debtors. Raising money at that time was seen as a way, so to speak, of pawning the furniture, and restrictions were placed upon this. It was not then foreseen that people who were credit-worthy and in possession of good incomes would be considering acquiring chattels on credit.
The limitations are also due to the Moneylenders Acts, which prevent the lending of money except under very stringent conditions. It was the rigours of these Acts which led to the introduction

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by a private Member 30 years ago of the concept of hire purchase.
The Bill which I seek leave to introduce would, first, permit mortgages on newly-acquired chattels only, thus making it quite different from the ordinary raising of personal loans. Secondly, it would authorise the advances of money on such mortgages by persons and businesses carrying on banking, insurance or other activities such as the Board of Trade may in future regard as proper for the issuing of loans on chattel mortgage. Thirdly, it would lay down a standard form of chattel mortgage which Parliament would approve as being fair to customers. Such a form would be suggested in the Schedule to the Bill.
If such a concept as I have mentioned is acceptable, the purchaser in the future would own the chattels that he has bought. They would no longer be the property of a finance company. He would, therefore, be able to dispose of them or to deal with them as he saw fit and he would be able to retain the proceeds of sale and any benefits that he was able to get for them in place of the difficult processes of repossession and other things which obtain under hire purchase.
Furthermore, the Bill would do away with an increasingly elaborate subterfuge, which, we must admit, is a legal fiction, of hire purchase, which is now being found increasingly cumbersome, especially after the recent additions to the law on the subject. The most worthy objective of all is that the costs to all the parties, especially the purchaser, would come down. For those reasons, I beg to ask leave to introduce the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill ordered to be brought in by Dr. Bennett, Sir E. Errington, Mr. W. T. Williams, Sir H. Butcher, and Sir E. Bullus.

CHATTEL MORTGAGES
  CHATTEL MORTGAGES
  Bill to make provision for the granting of mortgages upon personal chattels; and for purposes connected therewith, presented accordingly and read the First time; to be read a Second time upon Friday, 29th October, and to be printed. [Bill 201.]
ORDERS OF THE DAY
  TRADE DISPUTES BILL
  Lords Amendments considered.
  TRADE DISPUTES BILL

    Clause 1.—(CERTAIN ACTS NOT ACTIONABLE IN TORT OR AS DELICTS.)
    Lords Amendment No. 1: In page 1, line 5, at beginning insert:
    "( ) This Act shall not apply if it is shown that a threat of the character specified in the next following subsection was made to secure the termination of the employment of any person."
    4.14 p.m.
    The Minister of Labour (Mr. R. J. Gunter): I beg to move, That this House doth disagree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
    If it is convenient, Mr. Speaker, I suggest that we might discuss, at the same time, the remaining two Lords Amendments: in page 1, line 5, after the preceding Amendment, insert "Save as aforesaid", and in line 15, at beginning, insert "Where this Act applies".
    Mr. Speaker: That will be entirely acceptable if it is agreeable to the House.
    Mr. Gunter: Hon. Members will remember that our purpose in introducing the Bill was to clear up the confusion concerning trade union law which had arisen from the Rookes v. Barnard case. The Bill does this by providing that it shall no longer be actionable to threaten to break a contract of employment or to threaten to induce another person to do so in the circumstances of a trade dispute.
    Like the rest of trade union legislation, the Bill does not distinguish between threats with different kinds of purpose. It applies to all threats where there is a trade dispute. This is not because we wish to settle in the Bill once and for all the question of whether all such threats should be protected. It is because we wish simply to restore the position which for 60 years before Rookes v. Barnard was generally believed to exist and to leave the policy decisions in this matter until the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations has reported.
    The Bill was amended in another place to remove from its protection threats to

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    secure the termination of the employment of any person. The Amendment is mainly directed against strikes to enforce a closed shop, although, as I shall argue presently, it does not stop there.
    Our position has been made clear in the debates on Second Reading and in Committee. Although Rookes v. Barnard was itself a closed-shop case, its effects are not limited to cases of that kind. They extend to other kinds of strikes as well. Equally, the Bill extends over the whole field of trade disputes. It is, therefore, wrong to think that this is a Bill to legalise the closed shop. We recognise that the closed shop issue is an important one in this context, and we do not by any means have a closed mind on this subject.
    There are, however, arguments on both sides. It may well be that change is needed in the law in this matter, and we shall all await the outcome of the Royal Commission's deliberations with great interest. It may well be that further protection of the individual is necessary.
    Having said that, however, this House cannot escape the arguments on the other side. It is all very well for people to talk about the rights of the individual—every hon. Member is entitled to lay the greatest emphasis upon the rights of the individual—but we have to remember that there are rights of the majority as well. We do not hear so much about the rights of the majority. There is, for instance, the right of workers to say that for a reason which they regard as important they do not wish to work with a certain individual. There is also the question whether it is reasonable that a man should be allowed to take all the benefits that a union obtains through negotiation without paying his dues and accepting the responsibilities of membership.
    It does not seem right to us to come down on one side or the other of this very important matter in the Bill. I again urge the House to agree that the sensible thing is to wait until the Royal Commission has reported. The best course is simply to restore the previous position, which was well understood, until we have the report of that Commission, so that all the issues arising in the sphere of industrial relations can be dealt with together with due regard to their relationship to
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    one another. A piecemeal approach would only raise more problems than it solved.
    The difference between the right hon. Member for Grantham (Mr. Godber) and myself in this matter is that the right hon. Gentleman believes that these major problems within industrial relations can be dealt with one by one and separately. I cannot accept that view. There is a relationship between the closed shop and the unofficial strike and restrictive practices. It is my firm conviction that we must see this as a whole and then introduce the necessary legislation if that is required.
    However strong the reasons for full protection for the individual may be, the Amendment to the Bill that is proposed does not achieve that. All that it does is to remove from the scope of the Bill threats of a breach of contract aimed against an individual. It would not affect threats of something which is not a breach of contract.
    One of the major problems of industry today is that men take industrial action without breaking their contract. One of the problems of the present unofficial action is that men are not in breach of contract; they are working according to the rule book. Therefore, the protection which the Lords Amendment would give to the individual would only be partial and inadequate.
    That is one reason for criticising the Lords Amendment, but a more important reason is that it would detract seriously from the main purpose of the Bill. The Bill is intended to clear up confusion about the legal position which may hamper trade unionists in their work, but the Lords Amendment introduces fresh uncertainties. As I have said, it removes the protection of the Bill in closed shop cases; but it goes wider than that. It might apply, for instance, in the circumstances of a dispute over discipline—for example, if workers objected to working for some particular reason for some particular supervisor or manager. I am not defending such conduct any more than I am defending the closed shop, but it may reasonably be asked if it is right for the law to be brought into these matters.
    We must remember that this would be a complete departure from our traditional methods of dealing with industrial disputes, and it might be argued that it would

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    have the effect of making industrial relations worse instead of better, but whether it is right or wrong to bring the law in, it will certainly be confusing to bring it in for some trade disputes and not for others. Where precisely will the boundary rest? Trade union officials are not lawyers; they cannot deal in the fine distinctions between different strikes which lawyers draw—very different distinctions from those which are used in the actual field of industry. It is unreasonable to expect them to carry in their heads a number of complicated provisos about the rights which the Bill confers.
    The practical result of retaining the Lords Amendment would be that trade unionists would be unable to mention the possibility of a strike to an employer in many cases without the fear that they were exposing themselves to action for intimidation. As amended, therefore, the Bill will not prevent the worsening in industrial relations which is always likely to take place if this legal problem is not cleared up.
    I suggest to the House that it would be particularly unfortunate for trade unions to be affected by uncertainty of this kind at present. The Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations is just getting into the main part of its work. It has recently sent out to interested organisations a survey of the questions on which it would like to have evidence. One glance at that will show how dependent the Royal Commission will be on information and any evidence from the trade union movement. I hope that the House will agree with me in this matter, that we should do all we can to help towards better industrial relations by passing the Bill in the form in which it will do most good, and that we should, therefore, await the findings of the Royal Commission, the guiding lights which I hope will be given to this House as to future relationships and terms of contract and of employment relations between employer and workman, and, indeed, between workman and the State.
    I therefore suggest that we send the Bill back to another place, expressing disagreement with the Lords Amendment.
    Mr. J. B. Godber: I never get any particular pleasure out of
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    attacking the Minister, for he and I think in the same way on a number of issues. I remember that when I was Minister he helped me on various issues, and I have tried to do the same thing for him; but I am bound to tell him that in this case, as he knows, our approach is fundamentally different. I must say to him things which he may think somewhat harsh in this context, but I should be failing in my duty if I did not, because we on this side of the House feel very strongly about this matter.
    The Minister said that the main difference between him and me is that I want to deal with the matter piecemeal and he wants to deal with it comprehensively. I suggest to him that that is not correct. Really, the difference is that he has brought in a piece of piecemeal legislation. Perhaps "a piece of piecemeal legislation" is an unfortunate phrase, but he gets what I mean. He has brought in this element of piecemeal legislation. He has done so, as he may say, in response to undertakings he had given, but he has brought it in and we have sought to show him that, even accepting the liabilities he may feel he had undertaken in regard to this he need not have stuck on this particular point. This is the real issue between us on this.
    This is the issue we argued in this House before. This is the issue which has come back to us from another place. We believed that there had never been shown that degree of urgency which the Government claimed in regard to any need for action arising out of the Rookes v. Barnard case. We accepted that undoubtedly a degree of confusion had arisen in regard to this. I have never denied that. I have always said that there was something to be said for having this looked at and, if it was shown to be necessary, to do so, to take some action, but we have not accepted that it need cover a case similar to Rookes v. Barnard.
    In the Rookes v. Barnard case the actual issue was resolved, and the anxieties of trade unionists arose not because of that, but because, as the right hon. Gentleman has said himself this afternoon, genuine fears, whether right or not, arose in the minds of many trade unionists as to whether there were wider implications of the judgment which

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    would seriously affect trade union officials in carrying out their normal duties.
    This was the issue which was always put to me when I was Minister. On this matter, this was the issued posed, and this was the issue which, I understood, was the issue the Government wanted to deal with.
    When the Bill first came before us, and we discussed it in the House on 16th February, I genuinely thought, in my Second Reading speech that there was a case which I put to the Minister for an Amendment in line with the one now before us, although not in exactly the same words. Indeed, we moved a similar one which we debated when we were in Committee on the Bill. I was then quite expecting that I would have a soft answer from the Minister in reply. I thought that the Minister might have responded saying he would agree to such an Amendment.
    This is what I said on Second Reading, and I should like to remind the House of my words:
    "I should like to ask a specific question of the Minister. If the Bill secures its Second Reading, will he be willing in Committee to accept an Amendment designed to exclude from the Bill's protection intimidation intended to injure individual workers?"—[OFFICIAL REPORT. 16th February, 1965; Vol. 706, c. 1039.]
    That was a specific question which I put then, and I was hopeful—it shows how wrong I was, and how I misjudged the Minister's character—that he would accept such an Amendment, because it seemed to me it in no way impeded trade unionists in what they were seeking to achieve, and there was no need for the Minister to have stuck on this particular point.
    Others, of course, have said that the party opposite had a mandate for doing this and that it should not be impeded from carrying out its legislation. Well, in seeking to see whether this point is established I studied with the very greatest care a booklet which, as the right hon. Gentleman probably knows, was produced at the last election. The only reference to anything of this kind is on page 10, being a reference to a charter of rights. It says:
    "The right of trade union representation and proper safeguards against arbitrary dismissal would be included"—
    in the charter. That is the only reference I found, and as I read that it would seem
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    to me to be supporting our line of argument in regard to this, because this is arbitrary dismissal at the behest of a trade union, and I should have thought that that ought to be covered as much as any other sort of arbitrary dismissal. So I say to the Minister that if his party has a mandate for anything it has a mandate for accepting our Amendment. I therefore hope that this will encourage the Minister, even at this very late hour, to go back on this rather unfortunate attitude which he has taken to it.
    4.30 p.m.
    To go on from that point, it is true that in the Queen's Speech at the beginning of this Session it was said that a Bill would be introduced
    "to give workers and their representatives the protection necessary for freedom of industrial negotiation."
    That is exactly the point that is covered by the Bill with the Amendment. If they demand, in addition, that in their industrial negotiations they should always be in a position to insist on a man being dismissed, I do not think that that is a reasonable requirement, and I do not believe that the Minister thinks that it is, either. The Government have given effect to this pledge in the Queen's Speech, even with the Amendment, and, while we shall be discussing their failure on certain other items in this House later this week, the right hon Gentleman can hold his head high even if he accepts the Amendment and say that he has honoured this pledge.
    There is also the point in the Queen's Speech about which I reminded the right hon. Gentleman on an earlier occasion. In the last paragraph it said:
    "In all their policies My Government will be concerned to safeguard the liberties of My subjects."
    The point of the Amendment is to safeguard the liberties of individual subjects. This is the point which I put to the Minister, and with which he did not deal. He has never dealt with it, nor has his right hon. Friend the Prime Minister. This is a point of some substance, and the liberty of the subject matters in regard to their policies as stated in the Queen's Speech. It matters to Members on this side of the House who feel strongly about it, and it arose in regard to questions asked of the Prime Minister in respect of the Declaration of Human Rights.

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    Article 20 of the Declaration of Human Rights says, in its second paragraph, that no one may be compelled to belong to an association. The Prime Minister was asked about this earlier this year in the House, and he stood by the answer that was given by Lord Lindgren in another place. He said that the Government stood by the Declaration of Human Rights, and, when he was pressed on this matter, he added, in regard to this legislation which had not then been produced, so we did not know what would be in it,
    "… we did not intend to raise any fundamental question of human rights in dealing with it."—[OFFICIAL RFPORT, 17th November, 1964; Vol. 702, c. 192.]
    Before the election, at the T.U.C. Conference in September, he said:
    "… we will legislate to put the matter of legal interpretation beyond all doubt. I am advised that this can be done clearly, briefly and crisply without raising the issues of human rights or public policy."
    That seems to be the basis on which the Prime Minister gave his answer in the House. In fact the Bill, without this Amendment infringes on this principle of the Declaration of Human Rights.
    Mr. Gunter: I am puzzled about this. Of course, I would not defend intimidation, and I believe that the whole law on this matter ought to be reviewed. During the last few weeks my attention has been drawn to a letter sent out by a firm near Grantham to its workers. The letter said that the National Union of General and Municipal Workers had recruited workers to the union from the firm. It went on to say that if any worker joined this union he would either have to resign or, if not, he would be given his cards and dismissed. Only if a worker refused to join the union would he be retained. The employer added that he hoped that this would be taken in the spirit in which it was intended. A very strange remark indeed! I think that that was a deplorable letter to issue to the workers in that firm.
    If we are to review the law of the closed shop, I want to look at the law with regard to the inalienable right of a person in a free society to earn his living as a member of a trade union.
    Mr. Godber: I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his intervention, because it helps me to make my point
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    clear. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that it is deplorable that a firm should take that action, and I agree, too, that the Royal Commission should look at all these issues, but it is the right hon. Gentleman who has brought in this legislation. We have not brought it in, and the point that I am making concerns this Bill.
    The Minister cannot avoid that issue. That is the difficulty. Had legislation been brought in with regard to employers which would be affected in this way I would support the point that the Minister has just made, but he has brought in this legislation in this form and I am trying to get the right hon. Gentleman to accept the Amendment which leaves the position clear until the Royal Commission has reported on these issues.
    What we seek to do by the Amendment is to leave it so that the position in regard to an individual case, as in Rookes v. Barnard, is left as it is according to the law now, before the Bill is passed, but that the wider issues which really worry trade unionists are dealt with by the Bill. This is the difference between the Minister and myself, so it is right to remind him and the House about the conflict between Article 20 of the Declaration of Human Rights and the legislation which the Minister is bringing forward. I do not think that it is invalidated by what he said, but I am glad that he brought this out so that we can clarify the position between us on this matter.
    The Bill raises an issue on fundamental human rights, and we have tried to eliminate this point. We tried to do it in this House, but we failed. Their Lordships, by another form of words, have put the matter right. The Government are seeking to enforce what I believe to be an unnecessary and damaging factor in the Bill, and that is why we must resist what the Minister is urging upon us.
    As everybody knows, the Bill was brought forward specifically with the idea of preventing a recurrence of anything similar to the Rookes v. Barnard judgment going forward. I have never conceded the need for urgent action, but I have always accepted that this was a feeling in the minds of many trade unionists. They came to see me about it on many occasions, but nobody ever

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    put this issue to me. It was never said to me, "We must have this right to enforce the closed shop". Those who came to see me were concerned about the wider issues, and I am saying that as this was never put forward as a major issue I do not see why the Minister cannot accept this Amendment.
    This is the feeling that I have had all along in regard to it. This is the point with which the House has to concern itself now, and I cannot see why the Bill as amended in the other place, should not go forward, because it gives unions all the protection for which they ever asked me. I do not know whether they have asked the Minister for additional protection, but it certainly gives security to trade union officials in its amended form.
    Mr. Gunter: Do I understand that at no point in his conversations with the trade unions was the right hon. Gentleman asked to restore the law to what it was thought to be before the Rookes v. Barnard case?
    Mr. Godber: They asked me to restore the law, but they never specified this particular reason for so doing. Their reason for wanting the law restored was that ordinary trade union officials carrying out their everyday duties would be impeded by that decision. I am speaking about their reasons, rather than about what they asked for. We never discussed the form of words. We always discussed the reasons, and that was always the wider reason that was given for their request. That was the position when I was Minister, but, of course, I do not know what reasons they have given the right hon. Gentleman.
    That was the position when I was Minister, and that is the position in which we are now that this Amendment, or a similar one, has been discussed at length in this House and accepted in another place, and we must, therefore, press for its retention.
    I do not understand why people in responsible trade union positions reacted as they did when this Amendment was passed by another place. According to The Guardian of 26th June, Mr. Woodcock said:
    "If this Amendment simply makes illegal the threat to strike without making illegal the strike itself, then we might be driven to
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    advise unions not to get in contact with the employers at all and simply to advise their people to walk out without informing anyone of their intention to do so, and without giving any opportunity for negotiations. This is why I call it distorting industrial relations. But if we are driven to it by the vindictiveness and stupidity of the legislators—in this case the House of Lords—we will have to do it."
    Shortly afterwards another trade union spokesman, Mr. Jack Jones, the Acting Assistant General Secretary of the Transport and General Workers' Union, at his union's annual conference, complained that the Lords' Amendment had stopped the Government from carrying out their election pledge about Rookes v. Barnard. He went on to say that the Lords were saying that the workers should not have the right to strike and should not threaten to strike.
    The Minister knows as I do that those statements are wildly inaccurate, but, as far as I know, he has not corrected them. Perhaps he would like to do so before this debate ends. I have already dealt with the reference to the election pledge and I need not say more about that, but I do not understand why the comments of trade union leaders have so distorted this matter. The Amendment has effect only if there is an attempt to force the dismissal of another worker.
    I grant that that can happen for various reasons. I have heard it argued that workers might refuse to work with another man because his method of working was dangerous. The Minister gave other examples today. But if that were so, there must be plenty of other ways in which to put the matter right without resorting to this form. It must be an extraordinary situation in which one has to rely on the provisions of the Bill to protect people who are trying to have some alteration made on this basis, and I cannot believe that it is necessary.
    The most obvious case—there are not many of them and I do not want to overstate my argument—arises when a man refuses to join or, like Rookes, rejoin a union. This is the issue of the closed shop, or the union shop, as some hon. Members like us to say when they want us to be precise. On this the Minister has always been frank with the House and has repeatedly stated that he is opposed to the closed shop—and he repeated it this afternoon—that it should be considered by the Royal Commission.

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    When the Bill was on Report in this House, the Minister said:
    "… I am convinced that the closed shop, with all the complications which surround it, is precisely the sort of problem which needs to be studied by the Royal Commission. To try to legislate about it without the benefit of such a study is, in my view, like trying to read without learning the alphabet … all that we have tried to do is to bring some measure of order out of the chaos created by the House of Lords decision in Rookes v. Barnard. …"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 18th May, 1965, Vol. 712, c. 1262.]
    I have tried to show that although I accept that that is the general intention of the Bill, there is no possible justification for the Minister's stand on this Amendment. That is where we differ. The right hon. Gentleman has all he wants and I do not know why he is trying to bring in this other little bit. He would get a ready response from the House if even now he said, "I accept that I have been wrong and blind in all this and will now accept the wise advice of another place and the other side of the House". He has the chance to be big hearted and big minded and I invite him at some stage to be so.
    The right hon. Gentleman is not facing up to the issue and did not face up to it when the Bill was before us earlier. The Bill gives the unions what they have asked for and I repeat that no trade union ever asked me for this assurance and I do not believe that the right hon. Gentleman has been pressed for it. Why is the trade union movement insisting on this issue now? Why is the Minister insisting on it?
    I suggest that the answer is probably to be found in the emotional reaction of many trade union leaders to this whole question, and I realise that this is something which one has to bear in mind. I believe that the speech of Lord Citrine, in another place, repays study in this context. I have always regarded him as a pillar of the trade union movement and as one who did not normally take an extreme view. But I must admit that I was very much taken aback by his line on this Amendment in another place. He referred to it as a "blacklegs' charter". This is a very highly emotive phrase, but it does not help calm analysis of the problem. However, it typifies the intolerant attitude in many areas to
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    anybody who attempts to defy union militancy.
    If a dispute arises and a man—or men—refuse to go on strike with his fellows, we all know the way in which such a man is sometimes treated. He is abused, or sent to Coventry, and sometimes there are demands for his dismissal. We all know that this happens, and yet in most cases the fact that he does not strike has little effect on the effectiveness of the strike. Usually, only one or two men are involved in not striking.
    I appreciate as well as hon. Members opposite the violent emotions which are aroused when any dispute breaks out, but we ought not from this House to appear to condone or encourage those who take hostile action against their fellows. Although we accept that it happens in fact, we should not be seen to encourage it and I hope that at least in this House we can continue to attempt to safeguard the minority, or the individual, even if we do not agree with the minority's actions.
    4.45 p.m.
    The House has always cared passionately about the individual and I can remember cases when there have been scenes about an individual who was in danger, for instance, from some arbitrary authority in some foreign land and for whom asylum in this country was sought. I have always thought that the House was at its best on such occasions.
    But have we not an equal responsibility about those who seek to exercise an arbitrary authority against an individual in our own country and about action which can cost him his livelihood in this country? I do not suppose that we have all agreed with the views of some of those others whom I have mentioned, but we have nevertheless given them protection. The House has an equal duty to protect any man or woman in this country who has not contravened the law and who wishes to continue in his chosen employment.
    Hon. Members opposite say, and the Minister said this afternoon, that majorities have rights, too. The right hon. Gentleman said that further protection of the individual might be necessary, but that the majority had rights. He was

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    then speaking about the Royal Commission. My answer is that of course the majority has rights, but it is in a position to protect itself and to take advantage of its rights. But the rights of a majority carry clear and inescapable responsibilities with them. One of those responsibilities is to see that the power of its position is not abused. That is what we have to face with trade unions, as with others in this country.
    It is the basis on which discussion takes place in this House. If we base our political system on the rights of minorities and majorities, at least we should see that it applies in other sections of our national life, including the unions.
    Mr. Hugh Jenkins rose—
    Mr. Godber: The hon. Gentleman will have a later opportunity and I am now coming to the end of my remarks.
    Mr. Jenkins rose—
    Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Dr. Horace King): Order. If the right hon. Gentleman does not give way, the hon. Member for Putney (Mr. Hugh Jenkins) must resume his seat.
    Mr. Godber: The hon. Gentleman will have plenty of opportunity to intervene. I was drawing my remarks to a close. I have tried to state the case fairly and that is why I do not propose to give way.
    In this House we base ourselves on minorities having absolute rights which we are proud to defend and it is right that we should apply that same principle to minorities in industry. That is why we on this side of the House attach such tremendous importance to this issue.
    I am not suggesting that a great many people will be saved and protected by the Amendment. The Minister rightly said that the issue was narrow. However, the principle is very important. It is a principle in which we believe. We believe that the Minister is failing in his duty by resisting the Amendment. I say that to do so can do great harm and give the wrong impression, and for that reason I ask my right hon. and hon. Friends, when the time comes, to show their feelings on this matter in the Division Lobby.
    Mr. Ness Edwards: I am surprised that an ex-Minister of Labour
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    can deliver a speech of that type. I am not complaining about the tone or the manner of the right hon. Gentleman's speech, but I am amazed that one who has had experience of the Ministry of Labour should treat the matter so academically. One would have thought that the right hon. Gentleman, as the Opposition spokesman, would have dealt with the right of the other place to amend a principle which has already been decided by the House of Commons. After all, there were long debates about this question here. The House of Commons took its decision. One can understand the other place altering details, but it exceeds its functions when it interferes with a principle which has been decided here.
    I should declare my interest. I started my adult life as a miners' lodge secretary. I became a miners' agent. I had five years in the Ministry of Labour dealing with these problems at a time when they were ten times more difficult than they are now. I refer to the period of resettlement after the war, when we had to deal with tremendous problems. In addition, I am a miners' Member and sit on the N.U.M. Executive. In that sense I shall present what I consider to be the opposite side of the case from that presented by the right hon. Gentleman.
    Before taking part in this debate I have read carefully and in detail the OFFICIAL REPORT of the proceedings in the other place. I thought that the debate there took place in a very rarefied atmosphere. It is true that Lord Citrine brought an element of reality into the debate. I commend the noble Lord's speech to my hon. Friends. I ask hon. Members opposite to read what Lord Citrine said paying due weight to his tremendous experience and the tremendous contribution he has made to the welfare of the people.
    The consequences of what their Lordships have done should be considered. It came out more than once in the right hon. Gentleman's speech that the concern of the Opposition, as of the House of Lords, is to protect the rights of the non-unionist. Is their purpose served by the Amendment? In their desire to protect the non-unionist, they confer protection upon the thief, upon the persistent absentee, upon the irresponsible, and upon

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    those whose behaviour threatens the safety of their fellow workers.
    The right hon. Gentleman should listen to the voice of practical experience. I represented 3,000 men in a pit. We had a case of a man who persistently, in the pithead baths, robbed his fellow workers' clothes and got away with it. He was prosecuted once when he was caught. We knew who the man was. He was prosecuted the second time. Under the Amendment I should commit an illegal act if I said to the colliery manager, "Our chaps will not work with that fellow any longer. He must be got rid of". [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] Yes, this was argued in their Lordships' House. It was the threat to strike against another man in breach of contract.
    If I said to the colliery manager, "We shall strike. We will not work with him", it would mean that we would be handing in our notices, not doing anything unofficial. It would not be the men who would be liable under the Amendment. It would be myself.
    Mr. Godber: I am trying to follow the right hon. Gentleman's argument. If the case is as strong as that, why does not the colliery manager take action? Why is it necessary for the men to force the issue in this way?
    Mr. Ness Edwards: The right hon. Gentleman may not understand it. In those days such things happened in a colliery. If a man happened to be a particular friend of the pit manager, no matter what his defalcations everything was done to cover up for him.
    I give as another example that of the man who was stealing the other fellow's trams of coal, altering the markings on the trams after they had been filled by somebody else. He was very difficult to catch. All the workers came under suspicion. Eventually a trap was set and the man was found. In such circumstances the rest of the chaps in the pit would say, "We will not work with him". The lodge secretary would have to tell the manager, "There will be trouble. The boys will not work with that fellow who has been guilty of marking trams".
    Perhaps when the right hon. Gentleman replies he will remove these doubts from our minds. That view was supported
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    by the Lord Chancellor in another place. I assume that he knew what he was talking about, especially as Lord Citrine also expressed this point of view about the effect of the Amendment. There is the case of the man who is always stealing other men's tools. What are we to do with him? These are ordinary human relations in a pit or in a factory where a group of men are working together.
    In most pits and in most large factories today the success of the production depends upon the team function. It depends upon the production line. If everybody pulls his weight, results are good. If one man is absent every Monday or every Friday and thus upsets the production rhythm, he is responsible for reducing the earnings of the rest of the group. We have seen this on conveyors; men have had to suffer as a consequence of persistent absenteeism by an irresponsible workman. The other men have said "It is time that this man was turfed out of our team".
    Sir Edward Brown: I am curious about this. The right hon. Gentleman is talking from the point of view of union organisation. As all these men are members of the union, why does not the union discipline the worker who is at fault?
    Mr. Ness Edwards: The union does not control the employment of people.
    Sir E. Brown: Come, come.
    Mr. Ness Edwards: Is it desired by hon. Members opposite that unions should control employment?
    Sir E. Brown: They do.
    Mr. Ness Edwards: I am speaking mainly from my experience in the mining industry. Men's earnings are materially affected by the irresponsible action of one man, but that one man is protected against any collective action against him by the Amendment their Lordships have carried. That is my complaint.
    Mr. Raymond Gower: It would seem that in some of the examples given by the right hon. Gentleman the man at fault could have been convicted by the magistrates. Would not the right hon. Gentleman agree that in such circumstances, if the body of men after such

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    a conviction told the manager that they did not want to work with the dishonest man, the manager would not be likely to retain him?
    Mr. Ness Edwards: Whatever the manager would like or would not like to do, the fact is that their Lordships' Amendment protects such a man from any collective action on the part of his fellow workers. The hon. Gentleman has certainly put a point. The manager has the right to sack the man for that conduct, but the body of workers who suffer from that conduct have no right to make collective representations. This blows the Amendment to pieces.
    5.0 p.m.
    May I mention one other case? When I was a miners' agent at a colliery next to the Senghenydd Colliery where an explosion occurred, killing over 400 men, there were rumours of smoking in the pit. Nothing alarms men more than the smell of tobacco smoke underground. They know that everything is at stake and there may be 1,000 men in the pit. The smell of tobacco smoke is the one thing that sets them all on edge. Very often, because of the way the ventilation runs, it is extremely difficult to find out who has been having a smoke.
    Sometimes the offenders are found out and, thank goodness, smoking underground is a rare occurrence. Are miners to be told in future that they will have to continue to work with a man who has been caught smoking underground? Are not they entitled to say to the management, "This man must not be allowed to work here again"? Are not they entitled to protect themselves?
    The right hon. Member for Grantham is concerned about protecting one individual. This matter goes far wider than the question of a closed shop. It is not a question of membership of the union. The Amendment has been framed so widely in the desire to protect the non-unionist that it gives protection to men of great irresponsibility.
    Mr. Charles Curran: I am following the right hon. Gentleman's argument closely, and I am puzzled. This is a Bill concerned with acts done "in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute" I fail to see how the sort of conduct to which the right hon. Gentleman
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    has referred can be described as coming anywhere near within those words.
    Mr. Ness Edwards: Any difference between management and workmen is a trade dispute. Let us get down to what happens in real life and not in the rarified atmosphere of the courts. Any difference between management and workmen is a dispute about the conditions and circumstances of employment.
    Mr. Curran: Surely in the case of those whom the right hon. Gentleman is describing it is not a dispute between management and workers, but a dispute between the men collectively and a fellow employee.
    Mr. Ness Edwards: Yes, but when the other workmen concerned make their representations to the management it becomes a matter in dispute.
    Mr. Curran: No.
    Mr. Ness Edwards: All right, but that is the view taken by the Lord Chancellor in another place. If the hon. Member will read the Lord Chancellor's final speech he will find that he took this view. I am prepared to accept the Lord Chancellor's judgment on the point.
    As for the non-unionist, the darling of the Conservative Party, it is astonishing that in my experience I have not met this type of individual who wears a halo because he will not play in the team. This man who is a non-unionist, who will not join a trade union or, having joined, cannot get his own way and becomes a non-unionist is apparently a man of the highest principles, actuated by the highest motives. This is an astonishing indication that the right hon. Member for Grantham has no understanding of what goes on either at pit level or shop floor level.
    In my experience the non-unionist was a chap who either spent too much time in the pub or put too much money on the horses. He was usually the chap who had not paid his rent. These are people who are nurtured in the Conservative club. He is usually the stool-pigeon of the colliery manager. He is usually used to carry tales and he receives preferences and privileges in his job in order to betray his fellow-workers.

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    Hon. Members opposite may say that this is not so, but that is my experience and I am sure that trade union officials who have had the same experience as I have had in the mining industry would say that the non-unionist of high principle is perhaps one in 100,000. I never met a trade union official who took the view taken by the right hon. Member for Grantham and some others.
    Sir E. Brown rose—
    Mr. Ness Edwards: No, I will not give way again. I have already given way six times.
    In the desire to protect the non-unionist the Amendment sacrifices the well-being and the interests of the vast majority. It gives to the irresponsible person a protection which the right hon. Member for Grantham wanted to give only to one person, that is the non-unionist. In that sense the Amendment fails to do what the right hon. Member wants it to do in a limited way. At the same time, it provides cover for those who believe that non-unionism is a sacred cause and it denies the right to thousands of workers in small factories to become unionists. One would have thought that the right hon. Gentleman would have shown the same concern for the minority who cling to the right to be unionists and are denied it that he is showing for the non-unionist.
    I hope that my right hon. Friend will stand by his guns. We do not want to create a non-unionists' charter. Lord Citrine was absolutely right. The Amendment is nothing but a potential blacklegs' charter and I hope that we shall reject what their Lordships have done.
    Sir Tatton Brinton: The right hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr. Ness Edwards) has made some remarkable points in such exaggerated terms that he has done considerable damage to whatever case he may have been trying to make. I am sure that this is not the view of the ordinary average trade unionist, but the right hon. Gentleman apparently believes that anyone who does not belong to a union is bound to be a crook, a thug, a stooge or a spy and may even dare not to agree with the right hon. Gentleman's party.
    Mr. Ness Edwards: The hon. Gentleman should not misrepresent me. I said that the non-unionist was irresponsible. I did not say that he was a thug or anything like that. I said that he was a man who often forgot his social responsibilities.
    Sir T. Brinton: If I misquoted the right hon. Gentleman in including almost the only epithet which he did not use I withdraw that one, but the substance of my argument remains that he spoke of non-unionists in a most wild and exaggerated way which I do not believe represents the true feeling about them even among loyal members of trade unions. We must not, because we happen to belong to a body of people, believe that those who disagree with us are in some way morally inferior, which was the tenor of the right hon. Gentleman's speech.
    The right hon. Gentleman seemed to suggest that the Amendment was designed only to protect the non-unionist. I do not know where he gets that idea. We are talking, as we have done throughout the lengthy stages of the Bill, about individuals, and whether they are unionists or non-unionists makes no difference whatsoever. They have the same rights.
    It should be said in this debate that neither unions nor trade unionists—or management, for that matter—ought ever to make the point that the other place or this House talks in a ratified way about matters which it does not understand because many Members of both Houses do not happen to be employers, managers or trade unionists. What we are discussing now does not only matter at that level. We are discussing a question of vital principle, a question on which every Member of this House and of the other place is perfectly entitled to hold firm convictions. Indeed, he ought to hold them and be prepared to assert them to over-ride the individual opinions of both management and labour on issues such as this.
    Mr. Gunter: I am sure that I take the hon. Gentleman with me, nevertheless, when I say that purely academic statements here without any knowledge whatever of the temper and influences in industry and the events which take place in steel works, in pits and the rest ought to be very deeply considered before they are uttered.
    Sir T. Brinton: Again, I feel that the Minister himself is suggesting, as has been frequently argued, that in matters like this everything should be left for decision at union or management level. I cannot agree. I have some claim at least to speak on the management side of this question. I "say some claim" because I do not pretend to have intimate knowledge on all these points or to understand—and I do not believe that any one person can understand—the detailed problems of every industry as they may be affected by this Measure. But we must talk here in broad principle, and if the rights of the individual are not broad principle, I do not know what is.
    The right hon. Member for Caerphilly said that the fact that the Amendment would, potentially, include some protection for undesirable people, thieves, shirkers or those who produced hazardous or dangerous situations, was an argument against the Amendment. I do not follow him there. Very often, the law protects people whom we might regard as morally undesirable, but that is no reason for saying that the law is had. We must not argue that because a crook may benefit from a safety regulation on the roads, we should not have safety regulations on the roads. That would be absurd.
    Many of the cases cited by the right hon. Gentleman would come within the purview of management. Several of my hon. Friends who intervened during his speech made this point. Does the right hon. Gentleman seriously intend the logical consequence of his argument in the last case which he gave, the case of smoking in a pit, an act which would almost qualify as the offence of attempted murder, in view of the appalling consequences which it might bring? Does he really mean that, if it were established that a miner down a pit had committed that offence, any colliery management now, or in the past, would not sack him instantly, or, incidentally, that there is not such a penalty written into every regulation which the collieries have?
    Mr. Ness Edwards: The hon. Gentleman asks me a question. I should say that 999 colliery managers out of 1,000 would take instant action themselves. What concerned me was the state of affairs if the men made representations. Under the Amendment, they would immediately be caught.
    Sir T. Brinton: We ought not to take too long on these points, but I must answer that. Even if the Amendment were adopted, there would be nothing to prevent the men going to the management and saying, "In such circumstances, we shall strike, not to secure dismissal of this man but because you are not carrying out your own safety regulations". That is precisely what I should do in similar circumstances. I cannot treat that point with any seriousness as a point against the Amendment. There may be other points, but that cannot be one.
    The Minister made the point that the Rookes v. Barnard judgment extended far beyond the actual case itself. Of course, this is precisely why the Bill was brought in in the first instance. We accept that that is so. We may not like the Bill—I do not like it myself, and I think that nothing should have been done but the matter should have been left to the Royal Commission—but that is water under the bridge now, and we have to consider the specific Amendment before us. Of course, the implications of the judgment went far beyond the Rookes v. Barnard case, but had they not done so, I wonder whether the Government would have brought in this Measure at all to deal only with the Rookes v. Barnard type of case, that is, the case in which a man was to lose his employment as a result of union action. If the issue had been confined to that, I do not believe that the Government would have brought in the Bill, but, if they had done so nevertheless, they would have faced a barrage of criticism from everyone in this country who knows of not very many but, none the less, too many cases of men being pressured out of their jobs by union action, and sometimes on not very firm ground. The nation as a whole does not like that sort of thing.
    The Amendment is designed precisely to remove from the Bill this particular aspect but no others, and in so doing it would give the protection which the unions say they need in their ordinary operations, provided that they are not directed against an individual. My right hon. Friend the Member for Grantham (Mr. Godber) dealt at some length with the question of the rights of majorities. The rights of majorities, of course, are usually built into their own strength and their ability to defend their rights. A great deal of the legislation passed by

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    this House over the centuries has been directed, on the other hand, to ensuring that the minority does not suffer under the will of majority. This is the issue again here.
    5.15 p.m.
    It has been frequently argued that the Amendment affects the closed shop issue. It does to some extent, though not necessarily, and I do not think it necessary to argue against the rather extraneous points which have been brought in about people not wanting to work with a certain man or about people resenting the fact that a non-unionist may get the benefit of union negotiations without contributing to the funds. This is not the central point. The central point is the protection of people against the possibility of oppression.
    The Minister pointed out that the Amendment, if carried, would in any case give only partial protection to the individual and it did not go as far as the Opposition sought to go. I accept that. I even add to the limitations which he cited. He said that the Amendment would not operate where a threat was made but there was no breach of contract. This is true. It would not operate also if no threat were made but a strike were called off the cuff, without preliminary warning. But all this is no argument for saying that what protection the Amendment would give should not be given to the individual. Why should it not be given merely because the protection would be only partial? The whole Bill is only partial. It operates in very limited circumstances. It is no argument to say that the Amendment would not afford full protection. We sincerely hope that the full protection will be afforded—a difficult thing to do—in the Report of the Royal Commission and any subsequent legislation, but, in the meantime, we ask for the best protection for the individual now.
    It has been argued that there would be great confusion in the mind of trade union officials because the Bill might apply in one case and not in another and they would not know in what circumstances they might contravene the law. We heard this argument countless times in Committee, and I can only repeat the same reply to it. The law is an immensely complicated mass which the ordinary
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    citizen frequently does not understand. Could every hon. Member put his hand on his heart and swear, confident that he was telling the truth, that he had never contravened any law, however well intentioned he may have been?
    Mr. Deputy-Speaker: If they did so swear, they would be out of order.
    Sir T. Brinton: I was not proposing to give vent to any oaths myself, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. The point has been made that such confusion can arise, and obviously it can, but it is up to trade union officials, as it is to all of us, to know what the law is. They would at least know one thing, and that is that they had better be circumspect if their actions are aimed at the termination of the employment of any individual. I feel, therefore, that we must press this Amendment. I hope that my hon. Friends are going to stick to their guns on it, because I am sure that if right hon. and hon. Gentlemen on both sides have considered it, they will agree that the last thing the House should attempt to do is infringe the rights of individuals. However much they may wish to protect the operations of trade unions, that is the one thing they must be careful not to do.
    Mr. Norman Atkinson: I should like to discuss three of the opinions that were advanced by the hon. Member for Kidderminster (Sir T. Brinton) and by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Grantham (Mr. Godber), in dealing with the whole question of shop organisation and unofficial strikes and their origin. Before doing so, perhaps I might mention that, contrary to what has been said already in the debate, the overwhelming majority of trade unionists throughout the country will rejoice at and welcome the statement by the Minister this afternoon in rejecting the Lords Amendments.
    Hon. Members opposite have raised three very important issues which affect the basic purpose of trade union organisation. I want to make quite clear the very important distinction between the closed shop and 100 per cent. trade union membership. It is an extremely important question, and we must be clear about the definition of the two expressions. The trade union movement supports a great deal of what has been said in its opposition to the very crude type of closed

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    shop, where it means that when a man seeks employment at a particular factory, corporation or municipality, he is told that, of necessity, he must be a member of a certain trade union. In other words, in the case of the closed shop the employer names the trade union. That is the important point about it and its definition—the fact that if a man seeks employment and agrees to accept work, he is told that he must belong to a particular trade union.
    The trade unions are believers and advocates of 100 per cent. trade union membership in the shop, meaning that an individual commencing work has the right of choice and some degree of freedom to say which trade union he is about to join, so long as it conforms to the general negotiating machinery which applies to that particular shop. In engineering, for example, a man going to work in a factory will be asked to become a member of a trade union belonging to the confederation which negotiates on behalf of workers throughout the engineering industry. In other words, there is a degree of flexibility.
    It is absolutely essential that we should understand the difference between the closed shop principle, to which many of us are opposed in its crudest sense, and a shop which is attempting to achieve 100 per cent. trade union organisation. I mention that because it is an important contributory factor to many shop floor disputes which have been seen to take place in recent times.
    The second point was raised by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Grantham—the origin of unofficial strikes. I can quite understand why many hon. Members oposite have raised the question of "wage drift" recently and are asking the House to place sanctions on trade unionists who take unofficial action. If one makes an analysis of present wage agreements and wage levels throughout industry, it soon becomes pretty obvious that the major gains that have been made in industry in terms of wage levels have arisen from "wage drift" and not from national negotiations. To take the example of engineering again, our nationally negotiated wages have been very slow to rise over the years. If we were totally dependent upon national negotiations as an industry, we would be far
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    behind what is now required to keep up with the rising cost of living.
    Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Order. I am not contradicting anything that the hon. Gentleman has said, but he must relate what he is saying to the Amendment that we are discussing.
    Mr. Atkinson: I apologise, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. I was attempting to follow up the remarks of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Grantham, who was talking about the origin of unofficial strikes.
    One can understand the reasons why they occur, because they are directly related to floor level negotiations—the thing that we now describe as "wage drift". It is from that source that the major wage increases have been achieved. As a result, we get conflict between managements, and it is a conflict of interests. The weapon used by the person in the factory in attempting to increase his negotiating strength is the threat to withdraw labour, and it is in that context that most unofficial strikes occur.
    We must recognise that 99 per cent. of strikes are unofficial before they become official, and one of the reasons—
    Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Order. I would again ask the hon. Gentleman to come to the Amendment. The right hon. Gentleman who referred to the point did eventually get to the Amendment. The hon. Gentleman must get to the Amendment, which deals with the threat to an individual
    Mr. Atkinson: I am trying to follow up the point made by the right hon. Gentleman that it is a contributory factor. I am trying to follow his rather tenuous path and come to the question of the individual. What we are talking about is a balance of rights—on the one hand, protecting individual rights and, on the other hand, protecting majority rights. It is in that context that I am talking about the origin of unofficial strikes.
    Sir E. Brown rose—
    Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Order. Before the hon. Member for Bath (Sir E. Brown) intervenes, may I express the hope that he will not intervene on the argument which is, I hope, leading up to the hon. Gentleman dealing with the Amendment itself.
    Sir E. Brown: I am not going to talk about wages. I merely want to understand the hon. Gentleman's point when he says that the closed shop begins at shop floor level and that we must understand that these organisations are affiliated to a confederation. Surely the hon. Member will agree with me that it is the confederation which negotiaties and not the local people.
    Mr. Atkinson: I have listened very carefully to the hon. Member's point, but I have failed to grasp it. The relationship between the individual's rights and the confederation which would be negotiating on his behalf is precisely what I am talking about.
    Let me come to the third point that was raised, because perhaps it is more directly involved in the question of the rights of individuals. It is the right to strike as an individual. I make these observations and relate them to what I have said before and what the hon. Member for Kidderminster mentioned when he talked about the plight of the individual, because I hope that both sides of the House will reject any attempt that is made at any time to impose sanctions upon trade unionists when they avail themselves of their right to withdraw their labour. I hope that we will do everything we possible can to defend that right at all times, and that we will not listen to what I call the extremists demanding that sanctions be taken against trade unionists for exercising their individual right to withdraw their labour.
    I make the point because it is very important that we should recognise that we are living in a class society. In a class society, we say that it is right for speculators and investors to withdraw their investments if the return is not great enough; in other words when they make an investment they do so on the understanding that they will get the greatest return. Therefore, if we accept that that is an individual right for a speculator or investor, surely we must at all times say that a man who has only his labour or brain, or a combination of both, to offer has exactly the same right to withdraw his labour because that is his equivalent to investment.
    5.30 p.m.
    Sir T. Brinton: I would not argue about the individual's right to withdraw
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    his labour any time he wished to. But we are talking about the right being exercised collectively. There are many things that one may do legitimately as an individual which one may not do in agreement with other people. One has only to look at the Restrictive Trade Practices Act.
    Mr. Atkinson: Precisely. In this sense we must always speak collectively. During my trade union experience I have never known a man say that he proposed to establish a strike on his own. It must be done collectively. Strength in the workshop results from collective action. I accept that.
    The point about maintaining the right to strike at all times is a very important one, particularly because we await the publication of the Royal Commission's Report in order to tidy up some of our ideas about it. But we ought to say clearly where we stand about the rights of individuals in this sense, and must at all times be vigilant to maintain those rights and permit no interference with them.
    I finish on a point which has already been made concerning the right of the individual in the workshop not to belong to a trade union. In my trade union experience I have known only three people refuse to become members of a trade union, and they refused because they did not want to pay the trade union dues. They were concerned about the weekly contribution and not the principle involved. Apart from the Rookes v. Barnard case, which is the classic one, I have never really known anyone in a factory say that he objected to the principle of collective security and collective bargaining, but I have known those three people who objected to being forced to pay trade union dues, and I think that that is the basis of many of the criticisms that we hear when men attempt to establish the principle of following their individual wishes.
    I join my fellow trade unionists throughout the country in telling the Minister that we totally endorse and support what he has said, and we emphasise with all our vigour the need to reject the Lords Amendments.
    Mr. David Mitchell: I sat speechless through the Minister's

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    reading of his speech, which I can only think was prepared for him by Transport House and was not really his own case. He must have been acutely unhappy in presenting it to the House. He is a Minister whom many of us admire—kindly, genial, tolerant. He must have been acutely unhappy about bringing forward proposals which are intolerably vindictive in their nature. He cannot have had very much joy in telling the House about them.
    I was fascinated to hear the right hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr. Ness Edwards), who is not at the moment in the Chamber, talking about the academic atmosphere in which trade union matters are discussed in this House and another place. He would have us believe from the example which he gave that where there was a persistent absentee damaging production and the earnings of men on a production line and the men wanted the individual sacked, the management would not do it. But we know that in real life not only would the men's earnings be damaged but so would the factory's production and profits, and the first people who would want the individual sacked would be the management, but the management would not dare to sack him for fear of strike action and unsettled labour relations. In real life the boot is very much on the other foot.
    We were told of a man who was found smoking in a mine and who might be taken on at another mine after a major disaster in which men lost their lives. The last time I went down a pit I noticed a very large warning at the pithead that anyone found with cigarettes in his possession or smoking below would be subject to instant dismissal. I can hardly think that it was an example from real life which was quoted to us.
    The Government's case for the original Bill was that there was uncertainty in the minds of trade unionists which must be clarified without delay, uncertainty which arose from the Rookes v. Barnard case. It was also said that that uncertainty would interfere with the day-to-day activities of trade union officials. I can well accept, and most hon. Members can, that that is a very fair case for the Minister to make. He made it on a number of occasions in Committee and in the House.
    Mr. Gunter: The hon. Gentleman missed the point all the time we were in Committee. It is true that we wanted to clear up the confusion. I said that. But the main purpose of the Bill was to put us back as far as was possible where we had been for 60 years, so that we could review the whole matter by means of a Royal Commission.
    Mr. Mitchell: On Second Reading the right hon. Gentleman said that he would hesitate to bring in any further action before the Royal Commission had reported other than that required to put the law back where it was. The Lords Amendment does not affect the day-to-day working of trade union officials. We are constantly asked to debate Clauses which are in a negative form, and that makes it very difficult for us to understand them. However, if we put them into the positive we are able to see exactly what is meant by the proposed legislation. When we turn this proposal from the negative to the positive, it says, "This Act shall apply if it is shown that a threat is made to secure the termination of the employment of any person." This clearly, as I see it, introduces the principle of victimisation. The right hon. Member for Caerphilly referred to the right of the other House to interfere with a principle passed by the House of Commons. The principle of victimisation is surely hardly one that the Minister would have any pride in having forced on to the Statute Book.
    I have three very simple, straightforward questions to ask, and I hope that I may have answers to them. First, if there is one example which the Minister can quote to show that failure to accept the Lords Amendment would have interfered with the normal day-to-day working of trade union officials since the Rookes v. Barnard case, will he quote it to the House? I do not want an airy-fairy "It might happen at so-and-so." Surely the Minister must have been seeking concrete examples to give the House to show the damage which would be done if we failed to accept the Lords Amendments. May we have just one example quoted to us so that we can see where since the Rookes v. Barnard case non-acceptance of the Lords Amendment would have a serious effect?

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    Secondly, does the right hon. Gentleman consider that victimisation, which would be legalised by leaving the Bill unamended, is part of the normal day-to-day activity of trade union officials?
    Mr. Gunter: Will the hon. Gentleman now define what he means by "victimisation"?
    Mr. Mitchell: I will be happy to do so. I mean the precise, phraseology which the Bill, if this Amendment is not accepted, will put into operation. The Bill would thereby legalise
    "… a threat … to secure the termination of the employment of any person."
    The Rookes v. Barnard case was one of victimisation. I have a case in my constituency, which I quoted in Committee.
    The case is one of arrant, outright victimisation of a man because he failed to renew his subscription to a trade union which he quarrelled with, did not want to belong to and refused to belong to. It was a matter not of money but of principle. That man was not allowed to continue to work in that shop and as a result he has employment other than the highly-skilled position that he might have been in had the union allowed him to continue work.
    Mr. William Hamling: Is the hon. Gentleman suggesting that in that case there was a strike or threat to strike?
    Mr. Mitchell: There were both a threat to strike and the beginnings of a strike but the management reacted in the way the union asked. The action taken was very much on the same lines as that in the Rookes v. Barnard case except that this man did not take the matter to the High Court and suffered as a result. I have sent the papers to the Royal Commission and I hope that it will give careful consideration to the example.
    Mr. Gunter: Time and again I have tried to explain to the hon. Gentleman that Mr. Rookes was a profound supporter of the closed shop. He started off as a supporter and quarrelled with the branch secretary and other officers of the union because they would not take militant action. He fertilised the bog in which he was eventually caught.
    Mr. Mitchell: I cannot see what Mr. Rookes's beliefs have to do with it. He may have believed that the earth is flat but his beliefs had nothing to do with the case and the question of whether he had the right to refuse to join an association that he did not wish to join.
    Thirdly, is the right hon. Gentleman aware that this is against Article 20 of the United Nations Charter, reaffirmed by a spokesman of the Government in another place. On 23rd February last, Lord Conesford asked Her Majesty's Government:
    "… whether they accept the principle laid down in Article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights approved by the General Assembly … in 1948 … viz., that 'No one may be compelled to belong to an Association' …"
    against his will. The reply began:
    "My Lords, the Government accept the principle laid down in Article 20."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, House of Lords, 23rd February, 1965, Vol, 263, c. 684.]
    What could be simpler than that? But now we have legislation in defiance of Article 20. We are to legalise victimisation to compel a man to join an organisation against his wishes. That is no more than paying lip-service to the U.N. and is particularly disconcerting to the many thousands who support the United Nations Association.
    The Minister should take courage, go back to his Transport House masters and tell them that he is not prepared to continue to press this legislation, which is vindictive and intolerant and so much at variance with the commonsense, international agreements and sense of justice of which this House should be so proud.
    5.45 p.m.
    Mr. Eric S. Heffer: I want to take up a point about the problem that arises as between the majority and the minority viewpoints. Everyone will agree that it is essential in a democracy to maintain a balance so that there is fairness between the position of the majority and that of the minority. Everyone accepts this within the context of our democratic society. But it would seem that hon. Members opposite have a very strange view on the question of human rights and what precisely is fair.
    I have been in the trade union movement all my adult life. I have been a shop steward, a federation steward

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    and a branch official and have held many other offices within the movement. I want hon. Members opposite to look at this from the other point of view. I know of many cases where men have said that they are not prepared to work alongside individuals who were not members of their unions, but I have also known cases where action has been taken against trade unionists in various ways, sometimes by dismissal, only because they were active and militant trade unionists.
    Thus, when the working people in a factory or mine or on a building site see comrades who are speaking on their behalf—in many cases, elected shop stewards—being subjected to victimisation and possible dismissal, it is understandable that they should say that they are not prepared to work alongside people who will not join the union.
    It seems to me that we are getting bogged down about the issues in this case. We are not really discussing the principle. Despite the attempts of hon. Members to raise the principle, what we are discussing is why the Government feel that the Amendment ought to be rejected. That leads us to the question of why the Bill was brought in in the first place.
    It is understandable that the Opposition should regard this as a matter of principle because the interests of both sides of the House come out clearly in the situation. I have heard the arguments which are now used by the Opposition made many times and in very different circumstances. I draw attention to a speech by Mr. Victor Feather, Assistant General Secretary of the T.U.C. Speaking at the Trades Councils' Conference in 1964, and talking in terms of the Rookes v. Barnard judgment, he was reported as saying:
    "This judgment involved the trade union movement but it could not involve the trade union movement in isolation from the work trade unions did; therefore, it involved collective bargaining, and that, in turn, involved employers and management as well as trade unions. It presented a threat not to the trade union movement solely but to the orderly processes of collective bargaining of Britain which were a model for the rest of the world. Our collective bargaining system was flexible and brought about changes in an orderly way. Rookes v. Barnard could replace the orderly procedures that existed in British industry for the settlement of industrial disputes, with the prospect, if it were carried to its logical conclusion, of industrial chaos."
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    This view was not merely the view of Mr. Victor Feather. The General Council of the Trades Union Congress consulted its legal advisers on the matter. Legal opinion was very clear. It was precisely the same as that of Mr. Victor Feather; in fact, it was probable that Mr. Feather was basing his argument upon information and advice that he had received from legal sources.
    The essence of the matter was that there was a need for a revision of the law so that the position could be restored to what it had previously been understood to be. Everyone had thought that in carrying out his duty a trade union official could take his stand in relation to trade union matters without the threat of intimidation, but the decision in Rookes v. Barnard altered this situation completely. And it was not only the position of a trade union official that was involved; this could be brought about by a third person. This was a very serious situation for the trade unions.
    The General Council approached the Government of the day and asked them whether they would be prepared to write 16 words into the Act as it stood. The Government were not prepared to consider this. If we read the correspondence that passed between the T.U.C. General Council and the Government of the day we see that the Government were adamant that under no circumstances was this to be brought about. Their whole argument was based upon the need for the establishment of a Royal Commission.
    Sir John Hobson: I am sure that the hon. Member heard my right hon. Friend say that from the very beginning he asked for particulars of any real difficulties to be brought to him. He said that he was always willing and anxious to deal with them if they were drawn to his attention.
    Mr. Heffer: I was coming to that point. It is true that because of the furore that developed as a result of Rookes v. Barnard no other action was taken at the time. It is also true that since then there has been a General Election, and that at the moment no employer would be prepared to take action, because we now have a Labour Government. But the facts are that while the law remains as it stands, without being amended by the Bill, it can be

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    invoked at any time. This is a very serious threat to the trade union movement. It is one that must be removed, and one that the Bill seeks to remove.
    I want to take up the question of the freedom of the individual. Freedom does not mean licence. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] Precisely. "Hear, hear", say hon. Members opposite. When workers who are engaged in proper trade union negotiations feel that it is important that all the workers in their establishment should belong to trade unions—not to one, but a number, within the trade union movement—surely they have the right to put it forward as a serious argument, and if an individual does not wish to belong to a trade union he can do what many bosses have told me to do. They have said. "If you do not like it here, Heffer, you can leave." I have said. "No—the answer is to try to change this situation through trade union negotiations. "If a worker does not like working with people who are 99 per cent. trade unionists he can leave and work somewhere else. He has that right. He can work with people who operate an open shop and do not believe in trade unionism.
    In many parts of the United States the so-called "right to work" laws operate. In these States there has been an abandonment of proper negotiated trade union agreements, and there is chaos in industry precisely of the type that trade unions do not want to see introduced into this country. We have built up a vast, organised trade union movement which conducts its business properly with organised employers. We believe in organised agreements. If the Amendment is accepted it will be the thin end of the wedge for the complete and utter destruction of proper negotiating machinery in the long run. That is what we are arguing about. That is the essence of the problem.
    It is clear that these arguments about the freedom of the individual do not really matter, because if the Opposition were really serious about this they would have added something else to the Amendment. They would have put in a few words providing that no action should be taken against individual workers by management. I do not see those words being added to the Amendment. I do not
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    see hon. Members opposite rushing forward to propose a form of words of that kind. Why not? It is because they are not really concerned with that sort of thing. What they are concerned about is the workers who organise themselves into trade unions for their own protection. That is why the Opposition are fighting in such an organised way.
    The whole attitude of the Opposition to the question of trade unions has been clearly revealed in this Chamber. The other day, at Question Time, an hon. Member asked why legislation should not be introduced to prevent unofficial strikes. Unofficial strikes are brought about because workers reach a certain stage at which they cannot accept the situation any longer. There are even unofficial strikes in Franco Spain and in Soviet Russia. Wherever workers feel that they cannot tolerate the situation any further they take unofficial action.
    We live in a democracy. We believe in persuasion. We believe in not bringing about certain situations by force. But that is what hon. Members opposite are trying to do. They are trying to fetter the trade union movement. I hope that the House will reject the Lords Amendments.
    Mr. Ray Mawby: The hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) followed the normal line. He may not have meant to emphasise it to such an extent, but nevertheless he took the line that everybody on this side of the House is basically against trade unions and that we have no experience of them. He proceeded to list his experiences, and suggested that we were not interested in the question.
    Mr. Heffer indicated dissent.
    Mr. Mawby: If the hon. Member did not mean that, I apologise to him immediately. But if he reads the report of his speech in tomorrow's HANSARD he will see that that was the suggestion that he made.
    I want to try to deal with what I regard as the major points that we are discussing within the very narrow terms of this Lords Amendment. The main thing is that the Minister said again, this afternoon, that this Bill was designed to put back the law to what everyone thought it was before the Rookes v. Barnard case. I do not

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    want to go into a long argument about this. All I can say is that there are some very reliable authorities who, even in 1906, and since, have expressed the view that this was not so, and that the 1906 Act did not give the protection from actions for tort to trade unionists in all actions that they may take. Certainly the Lord Chancellor of the day when the 1906 Act was brought in, and Lord Citrine, in his book, are both on record as pointing out that this was not so.
    Even if it were so, what one has to remember is that one is now 60 years on from 1906. It seems funny to me that we should have to put the law back to what it was felt to be in 1906, particularly when the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Caerphilly (Mr. Ness Edwards), in telling us of some of his interesting experiences, said that when he was a lodge steward he had problems ten times more difficult than they are today. In other words, even the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Caerphilly was pointing out that we have moved a long way in the whole question of industrial relations since 1906.
    The Bill deals, purely and simply, with threats, and threats by a person. It does not even need to be a trade union official. The arguments that have been put forward have been that trade union officials ought to have the right to work and to do their job without the danger of becoming involved in legal actions. Even if the Amendment was accepted, officials would have to be a little more careful in issuing threats to managers and that would only be where the rights of a person to continue in employment were involved—
    Mr. Hamling: Is the hon. Gentleman trying to tell the House that a threat to intimidate is worse than intimidation itself?
    6.0 p.m.
    Mr. Mawby: Yes, certainly I am. This is an important point. We know full well that a person, not an official, not a shop steward, the leader of a group of dissidents inside a union, can threaten the management that if certain action is not taken, labour will be withdrawn.
    The employer could then try to work out a balance of what he would lose if a strike took place, against what it would cost him to placate those who were
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    threatening strike action, when there may not be the possibility of a strike if the crunch came. In other words, it may very well be a bluff.
    As far as the Rookes v. Barnard decision is concerned, no one can be certain that if B.O.A.C. had refused to sack Rookes, the union would have withdrawn its labour from London Airport. This is a matter of conjecture, and this is the reason why I say that a threat could be more dangerous and more damaging, particularly where an individual is concerned, where an individual is causing difficulties, and where the employer knows that, if he dispenses with his services, then his problems are over and there is no possibility of a strike taking place. In those circumstances, I think that a threat could be more damaging to the person on the receiving end than the actual strike.
    The hon. Member for Walton referred to the fact that we were dealing with balance and that the balance must be kept right. This is true. It involves rights and responsibilities of those who have joined together collectively into a trade union, and those who for one reason or another have decided that they do not wish to join that particular corporate body. It also involves those-I agree they are few—who may have been disciplined by their trade union, and as a result it is impossible for them to belong to that particular union.
    There we have the balance which we must try to maintain. I think everyone in this House would accept that it is important that trade union officials, in their day-to-day activities, should not have to take a training in law to make certain that they are not getting themselves into difficulties. It is right and proper that the principle of the 1906 Act should have been brought in, and it is right and proper that we should make certain that in their normal, legitimate activities, they should be reasonably protected.
    There is also another point which we have to consider. An individual can lose his employment and there is nothing that this House, or the Minister or anyone else can do to prevent a group of men from physically withdrawing their labour or refusing to work with him. There is nothing we can do about it and let us not attempt the task.

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    What the House can do is at least to make certain that the person concerned can have a forum to which he can go to prove that he has suffered damages as a result of this, and to claim some sort of compensation for that damage. This is where we have to keep the balance right. I think that when this Bill gives a sweeping right, not only to trade union officials, but to other persons who threaten action, which would cause great damage to the person concerned, we should be wrong to take away that person's right to be able to go to the courts and, if he can prove he has suffered damage, and that that damage was caused by people acting contrary to law, in the form of a conspiracy not already covered by an Act of Parliament to claim compensation.
    The Declaration of Human Rights has been mentioned. I do not propose to dwell upon it except to point out that it is important that we should not become hypocritical. If we accept what the Declaration of Human Rights says about "solemnly entering into", then I do not think we can run away and say that neither we, as the Houses of Parliament, or as Minister of Labour, or as the Government, are forcing anyone to join an association. Technically we may get away with that argument, but if we do not accept these Lords Amendments we shall be giving licence to other people to do just that. We should seriously consider whether we are right in taking this action. If we are not prepared to retain this right for the ordinary individual, then at least we ought to be truthful and to say that we must now ask that this section of the Declaration of Human Rights should be cut out so far as we are concerned, because we cannot abide by it. This is a matter to which I do not think we ought just to pay lip-service.
    It is true, as the Minister has said, that this Bill will obviously sweeten the whole atmosphere and allow the Royal Commission to be able to work in a better atmosphere than it may have been able to do if this action were not taken. I believe that the Minister ought to be happy, in regard to that part of the Bill which gives everything except this narrow point, to wait until the Royal Commission reports before he decides whether the
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    Royal Commission is of the same opinion as we are about the right of the individual. Hon. Members have tended to refer to anyone who is dealt with in these circumstances as a "non-unionist", this description being applied to those who fail to join a union and those who refuse to join a union. The suggestion was that the only men who refused to join a union were those who were influenced by the question of the "subs". In my experience, this is not so. I have known few people who have refused to join a trade union when they have been approached and shown the benefits which could derive from their joining that union.
    In my experience as a shop steward over a long period, I have found that the voluntary approach—by which men were shown what may be obtained and what they were already obtaining from the services of a union, as well as the other services they could enjoy, particularly the legal support if they were involved in an action concerning an employer's liability—results in few people refusing to join. There are certain religious orders, for instance, who say that someone should not join a trade union. I believe that they are wrong, that this is a closed shop in reverse, but this is, nevertheless, an important point. Those people should be entitled to wide employment, unless their fellows feel so strongly that they force the employer to get rid of that man. In those circumstances, that man should not be denied the right which is denied to no one else in this country—to go to the courts and seek his legal remedy.
    This problem goes even further than that. As I said earlier, there have been cases of an ordinary member of a trade union being faced with this terrible dilemma, that his own department, the men in his own shop, decide that they will take unofficial action. The executive committee of the union says, "There is no need for this. We are telling you that negotiations are going on and the last thing we want is for you to withdraw your labour." They probably even send someone from London to tell the men, "This is not on." Yet the men still insist on coming out on strike. What does the ordinary man do? Does he follow his executive or does he say, "Against my wishes—I believe that this is wrong—I will go out with my fellows on unofficial strike."?

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    In some cases, he follows the stream and goes out with his fellows. That is the end of it. But what of the man who says, "No. I went to the last policy conference and we decided on a number of resolutions, which the executive is carrying out. If I go out on strike now, I shall be taking action with my foot against motions put forward with my mouth."? He does not take part in that unofficial strike. As a result, he is treated as a blackleg by his fellows—there are few cases of this, but it can happen—and he may be disciplined and lose his trade union card.
    How do we deal with that person? Is he to travel the country finding the odd open shop where there is still no need for him to join a union, getting himself established and then having to move on again as soon as the closed shop is established there? Not only that, but he will be unable at any time to go to any court in the land and sue for any compensation for the damages he has sustained.
    This is what we are discussing. I suggest that we—whether we are trade unionists, employers or experts in this and that—are here as Members of Parliament not to look after the interests of one section of the community, but to make certain that the balance is right. If we do not accept this Amendment, the balance will be wrong and it will legitimise victimisation. In most cases, trade union leaders will not use this wrongly, but we should remember that the reference in the Bill is to "a person" and this gives too much power.
    I would remind the House that the hon. Member for Walton said that freedom should never be licence. I believe that, if we accept the Lords Amendment, we shall be maintaining about the right balance in which trade union officials can go about their daily job without let or hindrance, and that the ordinary individual, whether a member of a trade union or not, will still have his legal remedy if, in some action over which he has no control, he is damaged and faced with the prospect of being able to find no remedy in any court in the land.
    6.15 p.m
    Mr. Hugh Jenkins: It was a pleasure, in some ways, to listen to the speech of
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    the hon. Member for Totnes (Mr. Mawby), because, although I disagreed with a great deal of what he said, he was at least talking on the right wavelength. It was clear that he was talking from personal knowledge of the background. Although he said things with which I disagree, he made points which were objective, intelligent and intelligible. He made the correct point, that what we are talking about is the question of an individual. My complaint is that the individual, to whom most of the Opposition speakers have directed their attention, is not the individual referred to in the Amendment. The Bill refers to:
    "An Act done after the passing of this Act by a person in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute."
    This is the person with whom we are concerned.
    What the Lords are seeking to do is to remove the protection from that person. They are, in other words, seeking to expose that person to the possibility of being sued. If we were to spend a little more time being concerned about the person referred to in the Bill—the person exposed to the possibility of being sued at law by the Lords Amendment—and concerned ourselves a little less with the various hypothetical persons who have been mentioned by the Opposition as being people who may suffer intimidation and victimisation, we should do right. We should do right not only because we should be addressing ourselves to the actuality but because we should be talking about the Amendment, which we ought to be talking about, and not about the Bill as a whole.
    For this reason, I should like to talk about this chap. He is not always the stereotype in the minds of hon. Members opposite. He is not always the big trade union boss who says, "You shall do this." Much more often than not, he is a chap who happens to have undertaken a certain responsibility as a shop steward or something of that kind. He is not another stereotype, the militant Communist who exists sometimes in the minds of hon. Members opposite. More often than not, the chap in this position is virtually drafted there by his fellow workers and asked to stick his neck out. What hon. Members are seeking to do is make it more difficult for him to stick his neck out, to make it more difficult for

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    him to undertake this responsibility, because he would know that by undertaking that responsibility he would expose himself to the danger of being sued in law.
    Hon. Members opposite ask whether this has happened. We in the trade union movement can tell them that since the Act has been passed it has been more difficult in trade unions to get the ordinary rank and file trade unionist to undertake the ordinary responsibilities within the movement, because they are scared that they will place themselves in a difficult position in taking the actions which have to be taken almost every day. Scarcely a day passes without a trade unionist going to the boss and saying, "If we cannot get this settled the chaps will come out". Under the Amendment that is a threat.
    Sir Stephen McAdden: When the hon. Member refers to the unwillingness of trade unionists under the Act, he means since the Rookes v. Barnard decision, does he not?
    Mr. Jenkins: Yes. I mean until the Bill becomes effective and recreates the position as we thought it was before Rookes v. Barnard. That is the position which we are seeking to re-establish. We cannot accent the Amendment because it removes an essential protection.
    I will be brief. Indeed, I might not have intervened at all had the right hon. Member for Grantham (Mr. Godber) done me the courtesy of allowing me an intervention in his speech. My right hon. Friend who followed him gave hon. Members opposite the opportunity to intervene on six occasions. Perhaps next time the right hon. Member for Grantham will not fail to see me when I stand up.
    The point which I would have made in that intervention relates to the Declaration of Human Rights. That must be seen in its context. If we were to say that this United Nations statement is to be effective in relation to employment and workers, civilised society would be impossible. All guilds have accepted the proposition that obligatory membership of associations is right and proper, and in the old days they used to enforce it. Certain establishments in the City possess
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    this theoretical power to enforce membership of an organisation. Not only the workers but also employers have done this. The idea of obligatory membership in relation to work is well established, and it is operated in relation to doctors and the law. Membership of an organisation in work is part of our society.
    The United Nations statement means that it is improper to extend that necessary obligation, which is part of the economic framework of society, into a political obligation, and this is why in the trade unions we rightly have the ability to opt out of political obligations. The analogy which has been drawn in rather exaggerated terms by some hon. Members opposite, but in more reasonable terms by the hon. Member for Totnes, is not a valid analogy for that reason and for many other reasons with which I will not weary the House. I support my right hon. Friend in opposing the Amendment and in standing for the Bill unamended.
    Mr. Eric Lubbock: The hon. Member for Putney (Mr. Hugh Jenkins) would agree, if he considered his remarks carefully, that they are not valid in relation to a threat which might be made to withdraw labour. He said that if the Amendment were accepted then a shop steward or a person representing a body of workers could not go to the employer and say, "Unless you do so and so my colleagues will withdraw their labour." He can still do that in any circumstances except if the action which he is taking is to persuade the employer to dismiss one of his colleagues.
    If the employer has not carried out all his obligations, for example if there is a dangerous machine, he can go to the employer and say, "Unless you put the machine right and instal safety guards, I shall have to persuade my colleagues to withdraw their labour". It is only in the one case covered by the Amendment that he cannot do it without laying himself open to the sort of action which we saw in Rookes v. Barnard.
    I am a trade unionist, and, like the hon. Member for Totnes (Mr. Mawby), I start with a prejudice in favour of the trade unions. But we cannot accept the pronouncement that people, however eminent, such as Lord Citrine, necessarily represent accurately the views of the

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    whole body of trade unionists in this country. It is wrong for anyone to claim that they are doing that unless they have carried out a thorough survey in their own trade union or the movement generally. I agree very much that we should pay serious attention to the views expressed by leaders of the trade unions, but we should not say that they necessarily represent the views of the rank and file members.
    Mr. J. J. Mendelson: Is the hon. Member suggesting that a man who has been General Secretary of the Trades Union Congress for many years and who is regarded as the greatest British authority on trade unions has little more right to claim that he knows what is in the minds of British trade unionists than perhaps other people?
    Mr. Lubbock: Not necessarily. If he has been General Secretary of the Trades Union Congress for a number of years he may be out of touch with the workers on the shop floor. It would be out of order to say too much about this, but I could quote many examples to show where the leadership of the trade unions is out of touch with the rank and file. The recent go-slow on the railways is probably an outstanding example.
    Mr. Heffer: The fact that for a period they have been slightly out of touch with the rank and file does not mean that they do not know what the rank and file are thinking. That was the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Penistone (Mr. Mendelson).
    Mr. Lubbock: The hon. Member for Penistone (Mr. Mendelson) suggested that the General Secretary of the Trades Union Congress was more likely to know what were the views of the rank and file than were some other people. It depends on who the other people are. I am saying that he is not more likely to know what are the views of the rank and file than is a shop steward who is engaged in day-to-day negotiations or even somebody at district level or even the hon. Member for Totnes, who has been a shop steward in his time. I am not trying to make too much of it. All I am saying is that one should not accept the pronouncements of people, however eminent they are in the trade union movement, as necessarily being indicative of the
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    views of the general majority either in their own union or in the movement as a whole.
    I am not entirely happy with the wording of the Amendment, because there is something in the contention that it goes too wide. I listened carefully to the right hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr. Ness Edwards), and I thought that his examples were a little far-fetched. It would have been better if in another place they had accepted the Liberal Amendment, which was concerned only with acts done with the sole intention of forcing another person to remain or to seek to become a member of a trade union. This Amendment from another place could cover a much wider area than those people who will not join a trade union. The examples given by the right hon. Member for Caerphilly did not strike me as being very plausible. But I agree that if a person smoked in a mine he would be dismissed instantly—not in 999 cases out of 1,000 but in 1,000 cases out of 1,000. I should like the right hon. Gentleman with his long experience in these matters, to quote me one example of a miner who has been found to have smoked down in the pit and who has not been instantly dismissed.
    6.30 p.m.
    Mr. Thomas Swain: The hon. Gentleman might care to know that I began in the coal mines in 1925. In the first mine in which I worked, with 450 other men, smoking was allowed underground.
    Mr. Lubbock: That may have been true in 1925, but I do not think that it is true today. From the discussions I have had with people who are experienced in the coalmining industry I understand that smoking is one of the gravest fears of men working underground and that there are severe penalties, including that of instant dismissal, for men found smoking. Perhaps if such stringent regulations were in force in 1925 the number of accidents in the mining industry at that time would have been reduced.
    The right hon. Member for Caerphilly then spoke of persistent absenteeism, mentioned the case of men in a bonus team and pointed out that by one member of the team being persistently absent on the Monday or Friday the earnings of the rest of the team were reduced. I should

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    have thought that absenteeism was sufficiently serious a matter to be dealt with without threats being made to the management for securing the dismissal of the persistent absentee in such circumstances.
    I go this far with the right hon. Member for Caerphilly, that there might be cases, which we cannot at the moment envisage, which could be covered by the Tory Amendment of another place and which might not be covered had the Liberal Amendment been accepted. I will give one example, although in doing so I do not want to suggest that this is likely to happen often, although its happening is conceivable. There may be a group of workers who are colour prejudiced and who do not like working alongside someone from, say, the West Indies. They might decide that to procure his dismissal they will threaten the employer to withdraw their labour unless he accedes to their request. This is an unpleasant situation to have to discuss and I am mentioning it merely to point out that there are circumstances other than those mentioned by the right hon. Member for Caerphilly which must receive our attention and which could occur in this context.
    Sir J. Hobson: Our Amendment would make it illegal to make such a threat in order to get rid of a man on colour grounds whereas the Liberal Amendment would not.
    Mr. Lubbock: That is correct. Although this is an unpleasant situation to envisage, it could happen, and the fact that a few examples have been given today does not mean that we know how far the Amendment we are discussing might extend. I agree that in the case I have cited the Conservative Amendment is an improvement on ours, but there might be other instances in which the Tory Amendment, extensive though it is, might have undesirable consequences.
    There are only two factors in favour of leaving the Bill exactly as it stands. One is that the trade unions believe that the Amendment would greatly restrict their operations. They consider it right and fair that no restriction should be placed on their activities, pending the Royal Commission's Report. Many trade unionists are under a misapprehension
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    about the effect of the Amendment and, as the hon. Member for Putney said, this is a question of explaining exactly what are the implications.
    The second factor is one to which the Minister drew attention when he said that the main thing was to put the situation back to where it was for 60 years following the passage of the Trade Disputes Act 1906. However, with respect to the right hon. Gentleman, lawyers differ as to what the position was prior to the Rookes v. Barnard decision. Even the Lord Chancellor has said about that decision that the difficulty of the Rookes v. Barnard situation was that nobody knew what it was that it had decided. For this reason I hope the Government will not make too much of the argument that by accepting the Amendment we are destroying something which was in existence for 60 years, for different legal authorities have different views on the subject. For that reason it would, on balance, be better to accept the Amendment and go forward to the result of the Royal Commission on that basis.
    Mr. Hamling: I have a few observations to make on the speech of the hon. Member for Orpington (Mr. Lubbock). It might be wise, at the outset, to consider the position of a shop steward, to which the hon. Gentleman referred following the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Putney (Mr. Hugh Jenkins).
    It has been suggested that under the Amendment a shop steward might be in jeopardy if he threatened an employer that the men would withdraw their labour if a certain person was employed. However, might he not be in this difficult position? A shop steward or permanent officer of a union might seek, in a friendly way, to warn an employer, but this might be interpreted as a threat. For example, it might be interpreted that, by going to tell the employer that by employing a certain person there might be trouble in the shop, this could be construed at law as a threat.
    This brings us back to the point made by the hon. Member for Totnes (Mr. Mawby), when I pointed out that an action—such as the withdrawal of labour—would not be covered by the Amendment but that a threat of such an action would be. This seems to be a strange

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    anomaly in the law; that when one does a thing one is not punished or sued and the action is not actionable, while a threat is.
    Sir J. Hobson: Is not the position that if a person strikes in breach of contract he is liable—that he may not be sued, although he is liable to be sued?
    Mr. Hamling: I am referring to the Amendment, which says nothing about an action. It refers to a threat. I am under the impression that we are speaking to the Amendment and not about a hypothetical situation.
    We might ask which could cause more damage. Does a threat cause more damage than an action? For example, a strike may cause considerable damage. I should have thought that the argument in this case was quite clear; that a threat in itself might cause no damage whatever—such as a friendly warning that might be given by a shop steward to an employer or the passing on of information—whereas a strike could certainly cause damage. It comes as a strange surprise that the Opposition lightly con-template strikes, but take more seriously the threatening of shop stewards who warn employers in an effort to prevent strikes. This is a strange "turn up for the book".
    I mention, in passing, that our discussion of the Bill has been extremely friendly. I understand that some hon. Members were rather afraid that there might be, as a result of this discussion, some kind of verbal assault on another place. That has not eventuated. [HON. MEMBERS: "Why?"] The answer is because my right hon. Friend is such a reasonable and kindly man and that any prospect or talk of an assault would be quite out of character. Indeed, my right hon. Friend set the tone of the debate. I have heard nothing of a sufficiently violent or controversial nature in this debate to cause anyone in the other place a particular spasm.
    The Declaration of Human Rights has been mentioned several times, and it was also mentioned in the Standing Committee. One is entitled to ask why, if the Opposition place so much store on that Declaration, they do not live up to it—because they do not. Very many of them belong to associations of one sort or another
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    where compulsion is used and where the Declaration of Human Rights is frequently transgressed. Never once have they protested about it here, and it comes as passing strange that they should talk about it now.
    One has only to refer to an association within the precincts of this Palace—the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association. An hon. Member cannot take a trip abroad in certain directions—
    Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Member was good enough to remind us earlier that this debate was confined to this Amendment.
    Mr. Hamling: With respect, Sir, I am speaking to a specific point, which is that the right of employment might be terminated if a man refused to join a union.
    Right hon. and hon. Members opposite talked about compulsory trade unionism, so I suggest that what I say is within the terms of the Amendment. They prayed in aid the Declaration of Human Rights, and I suggest that if the Declaration is to be prayed in aid in one context it is quite reasonable to pray it in aid in another. I hope that in talking about the Declaration of Human Rights and the consistency or inconsistency of hon. and right hon. Members opposite, Mr. Speaker, I shall not be ruled out of order, but I am, as always, speaking subject your guidance.
    We on this side have always said in connection with trade unionism that the subject matter of the Amendment should be left to the good sense of people. That was precisely what my right hon. Friend was after when he said that we want to restore the law to the position we thought existed before a recent legal decision. We in the trade union movement have always said, and it has been widely accepted on both sides of the House over many years, that the law ought to interfere in trade union affairs as little as possible. It has been widely accepted that the lawyers should restrain themselves very much in relation to industrial matters, and particularly in relation to trade union matters because we have felt—and this is not a party matter at all—that in seeking to define these things in law too closely we run into great difficulties.
    I have been a trade unionist ever since I started work, and those of us who are

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    concerned with trade unions recognise that we cannot talk to ordinary working men about the niceties and exactitudes of the law. They will dismiss it in a very picturesque turn of phrase which would be quite out of order to repeat this afternoon, though I am sure that hon. Members, with their equally wide experience of the world, will not only know the words but will have heard them used on occasion by trade unionists and working men.
    6.45 p.m.
    We live in a very real and very practical world, but I suggest that by accepting this Amendment we would very quickly get into the impractical world, the artificial world, of exact definition by lawyers, and we would run into very serious trouble. One of the dangers of the Amendment is that it would expose trade unionists and trade union officials to some very severe uncertainties. For example, one hon. Member opposite has suggested that the real state of trade union law at the moment could be exemplified by leaving the word "not" from the Amendment, so as to make it read:
    "( ) This Act shall apply if it is shown that a threat of the character specified in the next following subsection was made to secure the termination of the employment of any person."
    He read that version to mean that at present this is how trade unionists operate, but he is completely wide of the mark, and any trade unionist, any employer or anyone with experience of industry would tell him so.
    We believe that the lawyers should abstain here, but, in any case, I suggest that if members of the party opposite really want to make trade union law exact, really want to import the law into the trade union world in a much more widespread way than has hitherto been the case, this Amendment is obviously quite insufficient for that purpose. We would require a complete transformation of the legal position of trade unionists and trade unions, and the Amendment does not go half far enough in that direction. We should either do the whole thing properly or we should leave it alone, and my right hon. Friend's case is that until we have had this review by the Royal Commission we should leave it alone. These are very
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    sound and logical reasons for resisting the Amendment.
    Partial amendment is quite unsatisfactory. In this respect we can draw on the experience of previous Governments. It is most remarkable that the eloquent speeches we have heard from the benches opposite today were not made in the last Parliament, nor have they been made during the last 13 years, when they had the opportunity—
    Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman's speech must be directed, if I might remind him, to this Amendment.
    Mr. Hamling: I am most grateful, Mr. Speaker. I was trying to show that this partial Amendment is really insufficient, and that if right hon. and hon. Members opposite were really serious they would have taken action in this respect. If I was out of order, I apologise most sincerely.
    If the Amendment were accepted, who would be sued? Would it be the working men, who issued threats? Or would it be the shop representative or the permanent trade union official? The Amendment would make the law much more uncertain than it is. Hon. Members opposite are already complaining that the law is uncertain; this Amendment would make uncertainty twice uncertain. For the reasons I have given, in addition to those others that have been advanced from these benches, I recommend the House to reject the Amendment.
    Mr. Gower: I was rather sorry that the Minister of Labour closed his mind to the posibility of accepting the principle of this Amendment. He will be aware that on this side of the House there is a tremendous amount of good will for his attitude towards matters affecting labour relations and good relations in industry. For many of the things he has said and done he has maximum support from this side of the House. I was particularly surprised that he should have invoked in support of his argument an example of an employer who had given notice to employees because of their membership of trade unions. He must be aware that that kind of situation has long been condemned by public opinion including, of course, trade unionists.
    Mr. Gunter: I am not arguing with the hon. Member about that. We all condemn it, but it goes on and on. The only argument I was adducing was that we had better look at the whole picture before we legislate.
    Mr. Gower: The point I was making was that the right hon. Gentleman is aware that it has long been condemned. For many years it has been accepted by both sides of the House and by the country that freedom of association is one of the constitutional rights of the people. This Amendment is directed to something quite different.
    Mr. Gunter: No.
    Mr. Gower: The right hon. Gentleman says "No", but I should have thought that he should take some account of the state of public opinion on this matter. While public opinion is solidly behind the idea of freedom of asociation, today a large degree of public opinion is deeply concerned about some aspects of the exercise of the power in whom that freedom is reposed. That concern extends far beyond the ranks of Conservatives. It is very deeply felt by Liberals. It is significant to those who read the proceedings on this Amendment in another place that the Liberal seers were among those who spoke most strongly about these matters. The concern extends through all sections of the community. Examples have been given tonight of the kind of situation we could envisage.
    Recently, I read about such an association. Of course, there is always a background, but we do not know all the facts. That is why one is guarded in one's assessment of a situation, but it seems that in that situation there was a long history of dislike of a particular man. That led to a threatened strike. The reports of that situation refer to the man's assertion and claim that he was being victimised because he was working too hard. I do not know how accurate that statement may have been, but to refer to such a situation shows the danger which might exist.
    My hon. Friend the Member for Totnes (Mr. Mawby) referred to those minority religious bodies which, for reasons of conscience which we might think quite misguided, are placed in a difficult position. Is this House to enshrine in an Act of Parliament a provision
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    whereby such people can be driven out of their industry? Is this to be the sort of law we are to pass? I cannot understand those who are the successors of persons who fought for freedom of association now being party to any kind of legislation which would lessen the freedom of an individual. It seems a wrong ending to what has been a splendid history.
    Mr. Hamling: The hon. Member completely misunderstands our situation. I am opposed to the closed shop, and always have been. I am opposed to compulsory trade unionism. All that we are saying is that this Amendment is the wrong way of setting about it.
    Mr. Gower: I do not limit my argument to the closed shop. I am in favour of the maximum possible membership of a trade union, achieved by voluntary methods—
    Mr. Hamling: Voluntary methods?
    Mr. Gower: Yes, voluntary methods—and the knowledge that the union gives to its members. Nine willing members are worth 10 who are compelled.
    We have to weigh in the balance whether it is worse for 99 to be aggrieved because of one person in their industry or for one apparently helpless man, not backed up by a great organisation, to be drummed out of an industry in which he has any possible skill. [An HON. MEMBER: "The same as doctors and lawyers?"] It is not the same as doctors and lawyers. That is where hon. Members are completely wrong. Doctors and lawyers are under the necessity of having a certain amount of knowledge demonstrated by their success in examinations. That is completely different. It is to ensure that the community has doctors and lawyers reaching a certain academic standard. We cannot compare that with the situation we are discussing on this Amendment.
    Sir E. Brown: Will my hon. Friend agree that that one person has the right to leave his organisation and also the right to stay in it?
    Mr. Gower: He has the right to leave, yes, and he has the right to remain, but he should not be placed in a situation in which, without recourse to any forum, he might be driven out of a trade and unable

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    to achieve a livelihood in the trade in which he has been trained.
    Mr. Ted Fletcher: I wonder whether the hon. Member for Barry (Mr. Gower) would make further observations on the question raised about the British Medical Association and the Law Society, which, of course, are compulsory trade unions? Is he attempting to suggest that some trade unions do not exist in which the members have, for instance, to pass an apprenticeship? Is there not an analogy between insistence on compulsory trade union membership for professional workers and for manual workers?
    Mr. Gower: I thought that I had dealt with that argument. I suggested, I think rightly, that in the case of lawyers and doctors the main reason is the necessity for reaching a minimum academic standard.
    Mr. Curran: The analogy also breaks down because a lawyer or a doctor cannot be kicked out of his organisation without a judicial inquiry, or an inquiry on judicial lines.
    Mr. Gower: That is the case, but it is outside the terms of this Amendment.
    It is no answer to the problem for the Minister to say that the sensible thing would be to wait for the report of the Royal Commission. It is desirable that these matters should be considered by such an august body, but we all know that such bodies take a considerable time to publish their findings and recommendations and there is an even longer time before their recommendations are implemented.
    What I have said about the interests of many people, including Liberals, makes me hopeful that the Solicitor-General, with his long Liberal antecedents, will find himself constitutionally incapable of resisting the Amendment. I cannot believe that a man who has spent most of his political career asserting the rights of the individual could advocate support for a proposal which would have the most damaging effect on those rights. I hope that the Government will have second thoughts about this matter. We on this side of the House are just as much attached as they are to freedom of association
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    and membership of trade unions, but we are desperately opposed to compulsion. We are desperately opposed to the principle of compulsion and the idea of force of any kind. We hope that in that setting the hon. and learned Gentleman will now announce that there has been a change of mind.
    7.0 p.m.
    Mr. William Small: The question before the House is whether it is right to accept the Amendment now or whether it would be better to await the Report of the Royal Commission. I claim some experience in trade union matters, because I have been a shop steward, district president, and other things connected with a trade union. The motivation and the background to this matter must not be overlooked. Some years ago there was the Crichel Down case, and I remind hon. Members of the atmosphere which prevailed at the time.
    I draw attention to the provisions under the Defence of the Realm Act in relation to conscientious objectors. I yield to no one in my defence of the rights of the individual. I agree, however, that this matter is being viewed at the moment side by side with the present round of unofficial or wildcat strikes and also in the light of the judgment in Rookes v. Barnard.
    In my union experience I had to deal with many people. Most of them had religious and moral reasons as to why they should not join a trade union. I met many such people. If the Amendment were written into the Bill and a certain interpretation followed, the sense of injustice felt by these people would be magnified and they would be prepared to test their case in the courts. When such cases go to the courts, there is always plenty of money from peculiar sources to support the rights of the individual. I do not object to this if it is done above board, but it is not always done above board.
    In my view, it would be better to await the report of the Royal Commission. Under the existing structure I agree that the courts are the proper place to deal with the matter, but courts of inquiry with specific reference to certain industries and specific cases should be set up, rather than that case law should be built

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    up in the courts. In my view if such a case were to be taken to court it would be magnified out of all reality.
    Mr. Aidan Crawley: The hon. Member for Woolwich, West (Mr. Hamling) said that this had been a very friendly debate. I agree with him. One of the reasons he adduced for saying that was that no assault had been made on another place. Perhaps he did not hear the speech of his right hon. Friend the Member for Caerphilly (Mr. Ness Edwards), who at the beginning of his speech said that the Amendment should never have been sent down from another place because it dealt with a question of principle and not with a question of detail.
    I want to argue the exact opposite. It is of immense importance that on questions of principle another place should have the right to revise and review and send Measures back to us for reconsideration. After all, this House is absolute. It can do anything it likes in the end. To take a historical example, one of the things it has often done has been to vary the length of Parliament. There is no reason why the House should not pass a Measure extending the life of any Parliament to seven years, or 10 years, or indefinitely. That would raise a vitally important question of principle. [Interruption.] It has done so. We have had seven-year Parliaments. It the other place had no right to make us think again, our Constitution would be very much weaker than it is.
    The essence of the Amendment, the retention of which I support, has been very clearly stated. As the Minister has said today, in Committee and on Second Reading, the difference between us is that, whereas he and his hon. Friends think that the Bill without the Amendment puts the law back where many people thought it was, we on this side say that the law is never what people think it is and that what, in effect, is happening is that, without the Amendment, the Bill would extend the immunities of trade unions, and extend them in a particular way, in that the Bill without the Amendment would give a positive licence to members of trade unions to use the threat of a strike to intimidate an individual.
    I was interested to hear the Minister say, rather more clearly than he has said on previous occasions, that the reason why
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    he opposes the Amendment is that he wants to hold the balance between an individual's right not to join a trade union and the right of the majority of trade unionists to refuse to work with a non-trade unionist.
    The Amendment restores or adjusts a balance that is pretty heavily tilted the other way. In any society, particularly in industrial societies, individuals suffer at the hands of a majority. They may be sent to Coventry. We had the case only the other day of the man who caught a thief in his factory at night and then gave evidence against the thief in court. When it was discovered that the thief was a member of his union and worked in the same works, this man was sent to Coventry and he found life so unbearable that he left his job.
    There are cases as hon. Members opposite know very well, of men who are sometimes much against their will obliged to pay funds to unofficial strike leaders, even though it may be against the rules of their union. There have been cases in which men who have refused to do this have not been supported by their union. There are all sorts of instances of this kind. [Interruption.] These cases are common. I can give chapter and verse of a case where this has occurred.
    Mr. Ted Fletcher: Could the hon. Gentleman give us instances of where this has happened?
    Mr. Crawley: I have detailed facts of cases where this has happened. I will give the hon. Gentleman details later. These cases are very well known. [An HON. MEMBER: "Give the details now."] On the next occasion when I speak on this matter I will give two detailed cases.
    Mr. Speaker: Order. The confines of this debate must be borne in mind. It is legitimate to argue, no doubt, that, were this Amendment to be rejected, there would be increasing pressures by the union on the individual, but I think that to go through a detailed discussion of possible methods of bringing such pressures to bear goes beyond the bounds permitted.
    Mr. Crawley: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. That is why I was not going into any detail. [Laughter.] Hon. Members opposite are being foolish. They know full well that these things have happened.

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    can give them the details later. Therefore, all that we are saying is that, although these pressures exist, and everybody knows that they exist, these are inevitable and individuals have their legal remedy against them. Where it is a question of a man's livelihood, where intimidation can take the form of his losing his job and perhaps his livelihood, then at least he can have no remedy.
    There is no suggestion that anybody can stop trade unionists or the majority of people in a factory or an industry from using the threat of a strike to get a man sacked. That can still take place. All that the Amendment does is to say that, if an individual loses his job and his livelihood, he should have the right to take action in court.
    I am surprised that hon. Members opposite take such objection to this. I do not believe that any of them in practice would either wish to use such intimidation or indeed have ever done so. I find it difficult to understand why they feel so strongly about it. This is a very limited Amendment. It is a very limited thing we are trying to stop. It is essentially reasonable.
    The only two arguments against it which I want to deal with are these. The right hon. Member for Caerphilly said that a halo is being put round a man who does not want to join a team. Almost all of the great reform movements in history have been started by men who did not want to join a team. The founder of the Christian religion did not want to join the Pharisaical team of his day. The founder of the Labour movement, Mr. Keir Hardie, did not want to join the political teams of his day. Such individuals seem to me to be admirable. They seem to me to need protection. If they can get a halo, some of them deserve it. I do not think that it is a strong argument to say that the team should be provided with the right to intimidate those who do not want to join it.
    The second main argument against the Amendment has been that men should not enjoy the benefits a trade union has negotiated without becoming members of the union. Fundamentally, this is an argument for compulsory trade unionism. If wherever trade unions negotiate everybody has to apply to join a trade union, there will be compulsory trade unionism.
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    I do not believe that hon. Members opposite want this. If all the 12 million wage and salary earners joined trade unions, the whole character of trade unions would change fundamentally. I do not believe that this is what they are after.
    Mr. Heffer: Would the hon. Gentleman be prepared to take this to its logical conclusion and put it in the form of an Amendment that those who do not belong to their trade unions should not receive the benefits of the trade union movement?
    Mr. Crawley: Let me put it in another way. I wonder whether that is a worthy argument. All great associations do not only work for their members. The National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children does not only take an interest in the children of those who support the Society. Throughout their history trade unions have not only worked for the benefit of trade unionists. They have worked broadly for the benefit of all workers. I do not believe that there are many trade unionists who want to make trade unionism compulsory, and it would be contrary to the Declaration of Human Rights.
    It is not only a question of people benefiting from the work which the trade unions have done. Throughout their history trade unions have enormously improved the standard of living of working people generally. Under full employment today the boot is very often on the other foot and it is a statistical fact, which I have mentioned before in Committee, that occupations where trade unionism is very weak have gained as high or even higher increases in wages since the war as those occupations where trade unionism is very strong. In the trade union movement in these days of full employment it is often true also that agreements negotiated by trade unionists have deprived trade unionists and non-trade unionists of advantages which they might otherwise have gained.
    This is often true of piecework and of the pricing of new jobs. The pricing of new jobs is done at the pace if not of the slowest then of the slow, and once the price has been fixed the next thing that happens is that the trade unionists agree among themselves what percentage above the basic rate a man should be allowed to work. It may be 100 per cent., 150 per cent. or even 200 per cent.,

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    and they will not allow him to earn any more than that.
    I was discussing this matter recently with the Amalgamated Engineering Union. Members of the union find that they can earn 400 per cent. or 500 per cent. more, but because for various reasons they want to keep their members in their jobs they have decided not to do that and no one is allowed to earn more than the agreed percentage. This pricing system is probably a more dangerous and more important restrictive practice even than over-manning. It is this sort of practice which prevents tens of thousands of people in industry from earning nearly as much as they could earn.
    Mr. Gunter: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Does the wage structure have anything to do with the Amendment?
    Mr. Speaker: It is a legitimate argument to say—and I was listening with attention to it—that one reason why one might force a man out of his employment or threaten to do so was that he was doing more than was agreed as the appropriate maximum for him to do. To that extent the hon. Member for Derbyshire, West (Mr. Crawley) is in order.
    Mr. Crawley: Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
    The argument, therefore, that those who are not members have benefited from what the trade unions have done is not always true. It loses a great deal of its validity in modern conditions. To use the power of the majority as a steamroller against the individual is contrary to the whole spirit of our way of life. We have the absolute power of the majority in many spheres of our society, but the whole basis of our life is that we use restraint and we do not use the majority, particularly against individuals, to force people out of their jobs or to compel them to do what they do not want to do. I think that this is true of the trade union movement as a whole and is the view taken of the sort of action which gave rise to the Rookes v. Barnard case.
    7.15 p.m.
    I am surprised, therefore, at the Minister not accepting this very limited Amendment to protect the individual in an extreme case. Trade unions normally do not use their power in this way. They
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    are extremely tolerant and I do not understand why they do not want the Amendment to become law. I hope that the Amendment will be allowed to stand.
    Mr. Mendelson: The right hon. Member for Grantham (Mr. Godber) made the limited case which he usually makes on this point, but this legislation is important because under the general umbrella of this limited case which the right hon. Gentleman always argues reasonably there is room for the kind of smears and accusations which we have just heard from the hon. Member for Derbyshire, West (Mr. Crawley) about the trade union movement. It is for this reason that many of our constituents have taken a great deal of interest in the debates on the Bill.
    The right hon. Member for Grantham expressed surprise again today that Mr. George Woodcock and Mr. Jack Jones, two responsible trade union leaders, have reacted in a certain way to the passing of this Amendment in another place. In expressing his incomprehension the right hon. Gentleman made clear, once again, what has bedevilled this whole business. When he was Minister of Labour—and this must be put on the record again and again—it would have been a comparatively simple matter to proceed in a reasonable, agreed manner to have co-operation between the Government of the day and the trade union movement in putting this matter right, without any prejudice to a more long-term inquiry into the general place of the trade union movement and similar associations in our national life.
    This is why the right hon. Gentleman returns repeatedly to the subject and comments upon the reactions of Mr. Woodcock and other trade union leaders to this legislation. It is important that the House and the trade union movement should not forget that the right hon. Gentleman had two aims in mind. He did not want to put the matter right in the simple straightforward way suggested to him by the T.U.C., though he could have done that. Equally, he did not want to enter into conflict with the trade union movement. He therefore chose a way in between which would allow the Government to suggest to people that this was an opportunity to at tack the trade unions and, at the same time, reserve

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    to the Government of the day a position in which they could not be accused of anti-trade-union activity.
    Mr. Speaker: Order. Will the hon. Gentleman address himself more closely to the Amendment? Our debate is confined to that.
    Mr. Mendelson: With great respect, Mr. Speaker, I do not know whether you were in the Chair when the right hon. Member for Grantham spent some part of his time in declaring his amazement at the speeches made by Mr. George Woodcock, General Secretary of the T.U.C., and Mr. Jack Jones, Assistant Secretary of the Transport and General Workers' Union.
    Mr. Speaker: I was not, but I understand that the right hon. Gentleman was dealing with passages of speeches relevant to the Amendment. That is the point.
    Mr. Mendelson: I submit, Mr. Speaker, that if I am allowed to continue my remarks in commenting on what the right hon. Gentleman said will be equally in order and related to the Amendment.
    As a result of the right hon. Gentleman's attitude, the matter was not put right and the grave uncertainty created by the Rookes v. Barnard case was allowed to continue. Many hon. Members have argued that there is no real evidence that this uncertainty exists. If they had attended the last Trades Union Congress, and had talked to responsible trade union officers at every level, they would have been convinced that the decision in Rookes v. Barnard created the most widespread uncertainty.
    Mr. Godber: To put the record straight, and in the light of what you yourself have just said, Mr. Speaker, I must remind the hon. Gentleman that the quotations I gave today related solely to the reactions of those people to the Lords Amendment when it was passed. I was dealing with their reaction after the Amendment was passed. I referred today to no other quotations from trade unionists.
    Mr. Mendelson: But, in referring to the attitude of the General Secretary of the Trades Union Congress and expressing his amazement at what had been
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    said, the right hon. Gentleman did less than justice to Mr. Woodcock's point of view, not even hinting at the long history of this matter. Obviously, the reaction of the trade union leaders whom he quoted was not the reaction of men who, after the passing of the Amendment in another place, suddenly came upon a new subject for the first time. It was the reaction of men who had been involved in the matter ever since the negotiations started between Mr. Woodcock and the right hon. Gentleman.
    Mr. Godber: I am sorry to interrupt again, and I do so only because this is extremely important. The point which arises here is the narrow one raised by this particular Amendment, and I was making clear that this was not a point which any of those trade union leaders had been concerned with when we were having our discussions earlier. This was a point which arose subsequent to the passing of the Amendment in another place, and my amazement was caused by their having raised it now and not before.
    Mr. Mendelson: I agree that this is extremely important. That is the only reason why I am taking the time of the House in what I hope will be the final debate on this matter. Although the reaction of the two trade union leaders whom the right hon. Gentleman quoted was directed to the passing of the Amendment in these terms, behind it, nevertheless, was the uncertainty created by the Rookes v. Barnard case.
    The right hon. Gentleman quoted from the speech of one of the two trade union leaders, referring to his reaction—of course, it was only rhetorically because he is far too responsible a man, and the General Council of the T.U.C. is far too responsible a body of men, to issue such a recommendation—"It seems that, unless this is put right, and the Amendment is removed, we shall reach the nonsensical situation under the Bill when it will be perfectly in order to say to trade unions affiliated to Congress, 'Do not ever have talks with your employers; just go on strike straight away and you will not be covered by the Amendment'". That is the relevance of what the right hon. Gentleman said, and I agree that this is of the utmost importance.
    What happened at the time was that, in spite of the uncertainty created by

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    the Rookes v. Barnard decision, the Trades Union Congress issued two suggestions or recommendations to its members. First, it told them, as it was in duty bound to tell them, that the decision in Rookes v. Barnard created great uncertainty all round, and it had good legal opinion to back up that point of view. But the General Council of the T.U.C., being a body of practical trade union leaders, knew that normal day-to-day industrial life had to go on and trade unionists still had their contribution to make. It therefore issued a second letter to affiliated trade unions saying, "But, of course, you must not now assume that you cannot, or should not, carry on your normal work as trade union officers and functionaries".
    This brings me, in passing, to another important point. It is nonsensical to paint a picture to give the impression—some hon. Members who do not usually show themselves to be expert in trade unionism have taken part in the attempt—that throughout our industrial life there are many employers who share the Opposition's view on these matters. Any hon. Member who has discussed these matters with employers in his own area, as I and many of my hon. Friends have done, will know that a large majority are convinced that the whole attitude of the previous Government, when the Rookes v. Barnard case came up, has been harmful and has bedevilled industrial relations ever since.
    Far from making a contribution to good industrial relations—
    Mr. Speaker: Order. We cannot cover the whole field of industrial relations. We must confine the debate to the Amendment.
    Mr. Mendelson: Enough has been said to show that, insistence on putting this Amendment into the Bill, far from improving the situation or removing the uncertainty which is felt by so many trade union officers, will prolong the uncertainty and damage industrial relations. It is in this limited context that we must consider the issue before us now.
    Many issues are raised by this narrow Amendment which are of the greatest importance to people who are active as trade unionists. There is the greatest concern in sections of the trade union
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    movement in my own area, for instance, that matters must be put right. Mr. Jack Jones, in his speech, was doing no more than give expression to this widespread concern.
    The Government have agreed that there shall be a wider inquiry into the place and function of trade unionism in society. By this Amendment, the other place is trying to make a decision meanwhile on a matter of vital importance to the trade union movement and to individual trade unionists.
    The limited question which we have to consider today resolves itself into these propositions. First, to ensure reasonable harmony in our industrial life and in relations between employer and employee, the Government had a duty to agree to a simple change in the law to put the matter where it had been held to be for 60 years. This they did by introducing the Bill. Hon. Members opposite expressed their view on the matter and moved Amendments, but those Amendments were defeated. When the other place starts to interfere in more and more cases with some of the established principles embodied in legislation passed by this House, it ought to consider its own position very carefully.
    I do not accept the novel constitutional doctrine enunciated by the hon. Member for Derbyshire, West that it is an important function of the other place to revise the principles embodied in legislation approved by this House. The hon. Gentleman is going back a long time if he believes that, and he will not find many supporters for that view among constitutional lawyers on his own side. However, I say no more about that now. I merely comment that it is a novel view to express for which he will find little support.
    The Government having done their duty and having introduced this limited change, the other place decided to undo the essential part of what the Bill, already approved by the House of Commons, provided. Therefore, on this limited issue, it is the duty of the majority of the House of Commons to put the matter right, throw out the Amendment and restore the position as it was.
    If there is to be a successful outcome from the general discussions now being pursued by the Royal Commission, if the

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    best results are to be achieved, if our industrial life is not to be bedevilled as it has been recently, if the interests of good employers and good trade unionists are to be secured and if we are to retain the great amount of good will which already exists, silly complaints of the kind we have heard during the past 12 months from hon. and right hon. Members opposite must cease. They can do nothing but disservice.
    On the other hand, in fulfilling the pledge they have given and in putting the position back to what it was held to have been for the previous 60 years, the Government are right in taking action, are right in advising the House to reject the Amendment and restore the previous position in the Bill, and are equally right in suggesting that we should only prejudice the work of the Royal Commission if we were to be rushed into action at the present time, appearing to undertake to tell the country that some of the conclusions being discussed there have already been reached.
    That is the wider point. The more important one is that my right hon. Friend and the Government must know that the trade union movement expects them to stand fast on the original version of their legislation, and, therefore, that they must insist tonight that the Amendment should be rejected and the original position restored.
    7.30 p.m.
    Mr. Emlyn Hooson: I think that the hon. Member for Penistone (Mr. Mendelson) was guilty of gross exageration when he suggested that the other place had undone the essential part of this legislation. No one can regard the Amendment as in any way undermining the purpose for which the Bill was introduced into the House. I think that the hon. Member is right when he says that many employers would accept the reversal of Rookes v. Barnard, because that was the point that the Minister of Labour made, in what I thought was a very fine speech, when he pointed out that in future the danger will be that employers and trade unions will agree about the case, and the Amendment is surely calculated to protect the individual and not the employer.
    I support the retention of the Amendment in the Bill, and I want to say very
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    shortly why. There is only one justification for the introduction of the Bill at the present stage. The Minister of Labour has said that we are setting up a Royal Commission and that everything should be left to that Commission. If that argument is carried to its logical conclusion, the Bill itself should be left to the Commission. On the other hand, I understand his point, and that is why I say that the sole justification for the Bill was that he had to enlist the good will of the trade unions for a thorough investigation.
    As a result of the speeches in Rookes v. Barnard, and not the decision, there was a great deal of panic in trade union circles. When I say panic, many lawyers disagreed in the weeks following the Rookes v. Barnard decision, which is a fascinating decision from the lawyer's point of view, as to its interpretation. It is right to say that very few people in the country disagreed with the decision. Most people were worried about the implications of certain of the speeches in Rookes v. Barnard.
    Nevertheless, I accept that the Minister should have wanted to set at ease the fears of trade unionists on the point, whether well founded or not. Therefore, he introduced the Bill. I have written to him and I have spoken on many occasions during the passage of the Bill. I have said all along that I was surprised that he did not accept the Amendment, particularly as I had pared down two Amendments to the final form of the Liberal Amendment which was so narrow that he could have accepted it.
    I ask myself: was it right to put the fears of the trade unionists at rest? I think, yes. On the other hand, if the Amendment is accepted, does it in any way undermine the force of the Bill? I do not think that it does. The Amendment is perhaps a little wider than I would have drafted it myself, but, nevertheless, I am not very much worried about that. It is calculated to protect individuals against victimisation, which is what the ordinary people of this country want to avoid. In any society, it should not be possible for a body of men, whether employers or a trade union, to victimise an individual.
    The Amendment would protect and reassure the individual, and I refer to the man who does not raise his voice, not the large employer who is prepared

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    to play along with the trade unions. Why is it thought that the acceptance of the Amendment will in any way undermine the Bill?
    May I deal with one matter that has been raised several times in the course of the debate, which is that the purpose of the Bill was to restore the law to what people thought it was? The right way to put it is that it was to restore the law to what some people thought it was.
    A very distinguished leader in my profession, an hon. and learned Member who sits on the benches opposite, appeared for Rookes in that case, and brilliantly, if I may say so. He and his lawyer colleagues must have advised Rookes that they thought he would eventually succeed, or the case would never have been taken to the House of Lords. With their legal knowledge and experience they gave him certain advice which he must have followed and, in the end, the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords declared the law to be what Rookes's counsel had always argued that it was. It is not right to say that the Bill itself was restoring the law to what people thought it was. Some people thought it was: it was always an arguable matter.
    What I cannot understand about the Minister of Labour, for whom I have a very warm regard, is why he has not accepted the Amendment or an Amendment of this kind. If it was right to reassure the trade unionists by introducing the Bill, whether their fears were justified or not—and it was right—it is equally right to reassure those who want to avoid the possibility of the victimisation of an individual. That is why I could not but support the Amendment.
    Mr. Ted Fletcher: As the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Hooson) has said, the intention of the Bill is to restore trade union law to what it was thought to be prior to the Rookes v. Barnard case. If the Amendment is carried it will, in effect, change the whole trade union climate that has existed since 1906. As a consequence, the trade union movement believes that it is restrictive and will shackle its future recruitment and organisation.
    It is essential for us to get the matter into perspective, because no doubt my right hon. Friend the Minister has in
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    the Ministry of Labour statistics of the number of industrial disputes that have started as a result of strikes in support of a closed shop. I would venture to suggest that they would prove to be a very small proportion of the industrial disputes that take place in this country every year.
    I must declare my interest in the matter because, before coming to the House in October, I was for 15 years a full-time trade union official and for many years before that an active shop steward. It has been my experience to endeavour to solve many problems resulting from the desire of members to get a 100 per cent. trade union membership in a particular workshop.
    We must understand the mentality of the average trade unionist. He does not apply a closed shop to people who have principled objections to the trade union movement. I could quote many instances of trade unionists who have resigned from the organisation because they have joined a religious sect which forbids them, according to biblical teaching, to join a trade union or any other association. The trade unionists in the shop respect the beliefs of such people.
    I have never known an industrial dispute against non-unionists who, for religious reasons, do not wish to join a trade union. But I have known of strikes caused by feckless individuals who wittingly get into arrears with their contributions and finally drop out of the union. They are prepared to accept all the advantages of trade union negotiations—better working conditions and higher wages—without making any contribution to keep the trade union organisation in being. The ordinary trade unionist regards this as immoral. This is similar to a man who takes a bus ride without paying his fare. He is getting services provided by the community but is making no payment for them and is, in fact, getting a free ride. I have no doubt that the man who takes a free ride on a bus can be prosecuted, but a trade union cannot prosecute a trade unionist who gets a "free ride" in trade union services.
    The man who takes a free ride on a bus can no doubt say in court "I sincerely believe as a principle that people taking rides on buses should not pay

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    fares. I believe that we should have a free bus service. Because I want to stand by my principles I took a free ride on a bus." I do not think the court would listen very attentively if such a plea was made. Yet the man would be demonstrating, as hon. Members opposite want all non-unionists to demonstrate, the right of an individual to say "I sincerely believe in having free rides on buses, and as a consequence you must respect my belief."
    That is the attitude that hon. Members opposite adopt towards a non-unionist who takes "a free ride" at the expense of a trade union and accepts all the wage increases and other benefits obtained by the trade union without making any contribution. Quite rightly, men working in the shops take the attitude that if one receives services, one must pay for them. But hon. Members opposite seem to think that the Lords Amendment is directed exclusively against trade disputes designed to end a closed shop against non-unionists. That is not so. I could give from my own experience many instances of trade disputes designed, in the words of the Amendment, to secure the termination of the employment of some person, but not a non-unionist.
    Some years ago my union had a complaint from members that a woman supervisor was a very strict disciplinarian. She was known as a sergeant-major. She was causing concern to the girls she supervised. For instance, the girls were allowed to go to the toilet twice a day, once in the morning and once in the afternoon. They could not remain there for more than three minutes or else the supervisor hauled them back to the desk. This became so intolerable that they told the management that the behaviour would have to stop or they would take action. But it did not stop. In fact, it became worse. So the girls told the union that they wanted the firm to dismiss the supervisor.
    One of the complications was that the supervisor happened to be a relative of the manager. Therefore, it was a little difficult for the trade union to induce the firm to dismiss her. The consequence was that the girls came out on a token strike for 24 hours. Fortunately, the matter was concluded to the satisfaction of the girls because a few weeks
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    later the woman supervisor was taken away to a mental institution.
    There was a case of a group of workers organised in a trade union who wanted to secure the termination of the employment of a person, not a non-unionist but a person who made their working lives intolerable. Surely it is the obligation of a trade union to look after the conditions under which its members work, not only the ventilation, lighting and space, but the physical conditions of supervision.
    Had the Lords Amendment become law, presumably the woman supervisor could have sued the trade union for heavy damages because she could have made the case that there had been strong pressure brought to bear on the management to dismiss her. I could give other illustrations of similar industrial action taken against intolerable conditions affecting personnel employed in factories. I suggest that it would be an unwarrantable restriction of trade union activity if a union could not take action to safeguard the working conditions of its members.
    Hon. Members opposite have been climbing on the band wagon, saying what a fine movement the trade union movement is. But this matter should have been rectified by the previous Administration. This is a belated piece of legislation, an interim piece of legislation pendinig the outcome of the Royal Commission's report, and I hope that the House will accept it.
    7.45 p.m.
    Mr. Edward M. Taylor: I want to say a few words primarily on the points raised by the hon. Member for Penistone (Mr. Mendelson) and the hon. Member for Darlington (Mr. Ted Fletcher) It is ludicrous to talk about the Amendment as though, as the hon. Member for Penistone said, it will affect fundamental principles and the operations of trade unions in general and threaten the freedom of action of trade unionists in their normal functions.
    Let us consider how circumstances could arise which could be covered by the Amendment. First, there must be a threat which is expressed by a trade union, which can mean just a group of individuals. Secondly, it must result in someone being dismissed and, therefore, suffering injury. Thirdly, that person

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    must go to the courts and sue for damages. This is concerned primarily with the question of the closed shop. It would be intolerable to reject the Lords Amendment wren we have a situation whereby a trade union can through a district committee or its national executive expel someone and then instruct its members to strike because the person is a non-unionist. Unless persons have a right to join a trade union, it is intolerable to threaten a strike because they are not members.
    The hon. Members for Putney (Mr. Hugh Jenkins) and Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) suggested that we were talking hypothetically here and had no individual cases to quote. I hope that both of them will read the Committee proceedings in which details were given of individual cases. If they will walk five minutes from this spot, I will give them full details of a case. There was a skilled engineer, a member of a sheet metal workers union, who refused on three occasions to pay a so-called voluntary levy to finance a strike elsewhere. He refused on the ground that it was against the rules of his union. He was deprived of his membership, and the men on the shop floor then threatened to go on strike and finally had him dismissed. That is the kind of situation about which we are concerned, and it is the kind of situation with which the Amendment deals.
    I feel that the trade union movement is not such that it must have two or three martyrs affected by circumstances such as these in order to obtain its co-operation in a fundamental review of the trade union law. This is only one of the circumstances in which individuals are suffering such damage. The Government will be taking a great deal of responsibility on themselves if they turn down the Amendment.
    Sir J. Hobson: We have had a very wide-ranging debate on a very narrow Amendment, but I am bound to concede that this Amendment, as has been said throughout the debate, is a very important one, which raises matters of considerable importance to trade unionists and individuals.
    The most remarkable feature of the debate has been the extraordinary assertions which have been made by hon. Members opposite, repeating what has
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    been said outside, about the impact of this Amendment. I thought that we were living in a world of fantasy when I heard some of the suggestions put forward by hon. Gentlemen opposite supporting the Government who were trying to describe the consequences of the Bill. The right hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr. Ness Edwards) seemed not to have apprehended the purpose of the Bill or its impact.
    Of course, I understand the prejudices of many trade unionists throughout the country against the Amendment if they think that the consequences are the some as those described by many hon. Members opposite. But if they analyse both Amendment and Bill they will see that this is a wholly reasonable Amendment and that there has been the grossest possible exaggeration of the consequences of accepting it.
    The highlight came when the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) said that if the Amendment were accepted it would be the thin end of the wedge in the negotiating machinery. I do not think that the Minister would be able to confirm that as a consequence of the Amendment. The truth is that the Amendment attempts to limit in a small and narrow degree the operation of the Bill. We support the Amendment because there is here a great conflict of interests which we think can be and ought to be resolved and because the Amendment will resolve it.
    First, there are the legitimate functionings and rights of trade unions and officials. I do not think that any hon. Member on this side of the House would wish ordinary trade union officials, in the ordinary course of their normal duties, not to be able properly to perform those duties without risk of incurring legal action. But there is, as well, the desire that we should limit the power of people to victimise by illegal action individual citizens—and we are interested to see, in the light of the Queen's Speech, that the Bill is not performing the job of safeguarding the liberties of Her Majesty's subjects in this respect.
    I cannot understand why any trade unionist or official should think it necessary for the unions or their members to have a licence from this House to permit a civil wrong of intimidation in order to get a man sacked by his boss. This is all

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    we are discussing: is it right that an official should be able to commit what, in any other citizen, would be the civil wrong of intimidation in order to get a man sacked?
    For trade unions and their officials to claim that they cannot function properly or that the negotiating machinery in industry will break down if they are not to have the right to exercise illegal pressure—or pressures that would be illegal in anyone else—in order to get a man sacked is an astonishing attitude. I am sure that it is based upon a misapprehension of the nature of the Amendment and the effect it would have.
    The truth is that the Bill, as amended, would still provide ample protection to trade union officials against the risks that they foresaw—I think probably wrongly—as the result of the decision of the House of Lords in the Rookes v. Barnard case. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Totnes (Mr. Mawby) that the ordinary trade union official would still be amply protected even if this Amendment were accepted. The bill would continue to provide protection for an official, acting in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute, to threaten with complete impunity that any contracts of employment—either his own or any of his members—will be broken, broken without proper notice and broken illegally, for the purpose of bringing pressure to bear on any employer—in other words, committing the tort of intimidation—if his purpose is, in what I would imagine would be the normal course of negotiations, to bring pressure to bear on the employer.
    If an official wants to deal with the wages and conditions of his members he can, even under the Bill as amended, commit what would have been the tort of intimidation in bringing pressure to bear, by threat of illegal breach of contract by his members, in relation to safety or to benefits or side benefits or to holidays or redundancy or to any of the 1,001 other items which arise in industrial negotiations. In all this, the official would still be entitled, under the Bill as amended, to proceed in a way in which he thought, after Rookes v. Barnard, he might not be able to proceed. The Bill will still protect him.
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    The only thing that the Amendment does is to remove from that situation in which the Bill will place a trade union official the single purpose where such a threat of intimidation and unlawful action has the objective of getting a man sacked by his boss. Is it such a terrible resignation of power by trade unionists not to be able illegally to threaten an employer with illegal action unless he sacks one of their fellow workers? They would still be at full liberty to bring all the lawful pressures that they have always been able to bring against the employers. Their ordinary right to withdraw their labour on due notice, their ordinary rights whereby they can exercise pressure so powerfully on employers, would remain to them except for the purpose of getting a colleague sacked.
    What the unions are asking by insisting on rejecting the Amendment is nothing other than the right to do what no other citizen or organisation in this country is entitled to do—to intimidate an employer to sack a colleague. What justifications are put forward for this remarkable attitude? First, it is said that we must restore the law to what it has always been. That is a good Conservative attitude but one hon. Member opposite said that, if the Amendment were allowed, the image of the trade unions as they were in 1906 would be altered. I was a little surprised. I thought that the country as a whole, and the trade unions in particular, had made considerable progress since 1906 and I did not think that everything should be as it was then. That attitude is something which I had not expected to hear argued from hon. Members opposite.
    Be that as it may, it has been pointed out by my hon. Friend the Member for Derbyshire, West (Mr. Crawley) and the hon. Member for Orpington (Mr. Lubbock), that the law was in fact considerably doubtful before the Rookes v. Barnard case, and that it is not right to say that it is being restored to the position which everybody thought it had been in since 1906.
    The author of the principal work on trade union law, Mr. Citrine, on page 476 expressly said, long before the Rookes v. Barnard case:
    "If there is some ground of action other than the mere fact of interfering with contractual relations, the section does not afford protection."

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    What has changed is that the tort of intimidation has been given new emphasis and not that the law protecting trade union officials has been altered in any degree by the Rookes v. Barnard decision. I agree with the Minister that the decision in that case caused anxiety not by the actual decision itself but by the side effects and I hope I have made it clear that, in our view, the Bill has removed all anxieties from trade union officials in that respect. We are only suggesting that they should not be able to exercise illegal powers in order to get a man sacked.
    Some hon. Members have mentioned that the question of personality arises—that Mr. Rookes has changed his opinions. Indeed, the right hon. Gentleman himself said that we should not change the law in this way because Mr. Rookes at one stage was a convinced trade unionist.
    8.0 p.m.
    All these matters must be irrelevant. The great principles of law that protect the liberties of the subject are not dependent on who is to benefit from them. We know that habeas corpus has been exercised in favour of many unmeritorious people. The protection of the liberty of the subject is available for all, good and bad. If there is a good principle of law and the citizens should have the protection of that law, it should apply to them whether they be good or bad, or whatever their political views may be, and whoever they may be.
    Another point was made about the position of the other place, although very little was said about it. It is not right to say that this Amendment attacks the main principles of the Bill. It makes a small exclusion from the wide protection which the Bill will provide for all trade union officials. However much people may think that the House of Lords ought to be abolished, the fact is that it still exists, and it matters not, while we have a constitution with two Chambers, how wide or how small is the ambit of an Amendment. If Members of either of the Chambers in the Legislature are to be expected to perform their functions they are entitled to perform them fully.
    When political power rested in the other place Members of this House would have thought themselves craven if, on a matter of principle, they had not voted against the view of the other place, in
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    which the major legislative and political power then rested. When the positions are reversed I should have thought that no Member would take the view that while we have two Chambers, two Chambers ought not fully to exercise their rights in these matters. The other Chamber has done so, and all that we have to do is to consider whether or not we agree with it. I hope that on this occasion the House will agree with the Lords Amendment, but if the two Houses find themselves in disagreement, our constitution has provided what will happen.
    Another question is that of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948. The proposition that Article 20 in that Declaration provides is simple in the extreme, namely, that no one may be compelled to belong to an association. There is no qualification as to whether he should be a trade unionist or not, or whether he objects on religious grounds, or because he does not want to pay. It is an essential freedom of citizens that they should not be compelled to belong to an association, and this is something that I should have thought we all know in our hearts to be correct—something upon which we stand. It therefore surprised me that the hon. Member for Walton should have said that he thought that the Opposition had a strange view on this point. If it be a strange view it is at any rate the view of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
    Mr. J. T. Price: The right hon. and learned Gentleman is stating an abstract proposition very fairly, and I am listening to him most carefully. When that proposition is applied in practice all kinds of exceptional circumstances arise. The right hon. and learned Gentleman himself could not practise his own profession if he did not belong to an association—which I need not name.
    Sir J. Hobson: I thought that we should have that intervention sooner or later. I know not whether the Solicitor-General or the Minister of Labour is to reply, but I will deal with the point now. That is the only argument that has been produced from anybody in the course of this debate why the principle of Article

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    20 should not apply in these circumstances. It is a wholly false argument, because we know that what we are talking about in the case of doctors and lawyers are professional qualifications which people have to obtain for the protection of the public before they are allowed to practise in professions which affect the public.
    Not only do they have to acquire the qualifications; they can be expelled if they fall below the necessary protection that the public ought to have from professional qualifications. It is wrong to say that a person who wishes to join a profession has been compelled to join an association because he has been made to acquire the necessary professional qualifications to practise that profession.
    In the end we come back to the principle which is simply stated, namely, that no one may be compelled to belong to an association. What the Amendment seeks to do is to prevent individual citizens in this country from being forced, by what would in any other person be an illegal act—by threats of victimisation and intimidation—to join an association when they do not want to do so, for good, bad or indifferent reasons, it matters not.
    Another argument that has been put forward against the Amendment is: why should non-trade unionists reap the benefits and advantages of negotiations undertaken by trade union officials? I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Derbyshire, West. I should not have thought that the trade union movement would want to put forward a claim that it came into existence to help only its own members. I should have thought that it would have stood upon a much wider basis, namely, that it came into existence to help not only its own members but fellow workers generally, and that it intended that not only its members should benefit from its efforts to improve wages and working conditions but all those employed in industry, irrespective of whether they were members of the union or not.
    To take the very narrow view that trade unions have to force people into their organisations so that they can count up the pence paid in and compare the sum with what is going out seems to me to diminish their stature. That argument does not do them much credit.
    324
    What about the rights of the majority to decide with whom they should work? This argument was put forward by the right hon. Member for Caerphilly. He said that it was essential that employees should be able to say who should be the companions with whom they should work. The Amendment would not prevent any employee complaining about the thieving or dangerous activities of another employee. What it would prevent is the threat of illegal strike in order to get him sacked.
    If a shop steward, a man on the shop floor, or mineworker, went to the management and said, "This man is stealing, and ought to be sacked", or "This man is smoking down the mine, and ought to be instantly dismissed", he could not possibly have committed a civil wrong of intimidation, and this Amendment would have no effect at all upon his position.
    I was glad that, in the end, the right hon. Gentleman acknowledged that in 999 cases out of 1,000, or perhaps in an even greater proportion of cases, if such a complaint were made by an individual to the management the erring fellow workman would be sacked out of hand. I should have thought that was the ordinary and normal result. If it were not—and I should be surprised if it were not—the full and lawful pressures of the union would still be available to achieve the object it desired, namely, getting an undesirable fellow employee out of the place.
    Mr. E. S. Bishop: Surely the right hon. and learned Gentleman will recall that in Rookes v. Barnard there was an agreement between the union and the management that the union would have 100 per cent. membership, and that Rookes was a party to this agreement; indeed, he went to the management and this agreement was arrived at. If B.O.A.C. had continued to employ Rookes after he had left the union the Corporation would surely have violated the agreement to which it was a party.
    Sir J. Hobson: I do not think it was a non-strike agreement which was part of the trouble. I do not think there was any agreement at all that B.O.A.C. would employ only 100 per cent. union employees.
    I made a point on Second Reading which I think is important, but it has

    325
    never arisen again. I am sure that hon. Gentlemen who are interested in this will realise that all employers' associations are trade unions, and that the Bill puts in their hands a weapon about which we have not heard very much, and the implications of which have been very little discussed. This Amendment would prevent an employers' association embarking upon a course of victimisation to get a man sacked from his job. This is something that I should have thought went in favour of the Amendment being accepted. It has not been pointed out that the position, not only for trade unions and their officials, but for the officials of employers' associations, will be radically altered by this Bill.
    The other way of looking at it is to consider lock-outs in breach of contracts. They may not be now, for practical purposes, a very immediate threat, but changes in economic conditions might well make them much more realistic. If the district employers' association wanted to ensure that no union labour was employed on the shop floor of any of its members it could injure and damage trade unions and their members in the district by intimidating them and their workmen by the threat of an unlawful lock-out, even if they and their members were bound by an agreement that there should be no lock-outs.
    This would be one of the consequences that would flow from the passing of this Bill, without this Amendment. The Amendment would prevent employers victimising anyone for the purpose of getting them out of their job. I use that not so much as an argument but as an illustration of what might happen, because I think that from the practical point of view it may not be very likely. I ask hon. Gentlemen to test it in their own minds and to ask themselves what they think is fair. If one is going to look at what are the fair rules one has to look at it from both ends, to see who enjoys the benefits of the Bill and whether they ought to have the Bill in its full extent, or limited, as we say it should be. If it is looked at from the point of view of unions and employers' associations quite plainly there is no employers' association which ought to be able to victimise a man in order to get him sacked from his job. If that is not right for an employers' assoication why on
    326
    earth should trade unions be able to do it?
    I ask the Minister why it is necessary and how can it be justified that trade unions should have a right which no other citizen or organisation in this country enjoys, namely the right to intimidate employers and management in order to secure the dismissal of an employee. It is wholly unnecessary to trade unionists to have this right while they and their officials can perform all the other functions and their normal duties, fully protected by the law, even with this Amendment included. I agree entirely with what the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Montgomery (Mr. Hooson) said, that all decent people were glad that Mr. Rookes got damages and thought that it was right and that justice had been done and that the victimisation committed against him should have given him a right to compensation.
    If the Royal Commission should eventually decide that all other Mr. Rookes's should be deprived of that right to compensation, so be it, let us accent that decision. But unless and until the Royal Commission has decided that, on a full investigation of the matter, I ask hon. Members to consider whether it is right that we should do anything to make it easier for our citizens to be victimised by being sacked as a result of an illegal threat. I do not know whether we did not see the truth popping out just a minute ago when one hon. Gentleman opposite said that trade unions expected the Government to do their duty and stand by the Bill as introduced. There is their master's voice. Cannot they, on this occasion, consider that a small Amendment for the benefit of the individual citizen is wholly acceptable and ought to be accepted.
    8.15 p.m.
    Mr. Gunter: May I say, at the outset—
    Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Samuel Storey): Order. The right hon. Gentleman must ask the leave of the House to speak again.
    Mr. Gunter: I ask leave of the House to speak again, Mr. Deputy Speaker.
    One of the interesting parts of this debate has been the attempt by the Front Bench opposite to make it appear that

    327
    we on this side were in favour of the closed shop. I want to say very plainly that I am opposed to the closed shop. The hon. Member for Derbyshire, West (Mr. Crawley) put his finger on why I have always opposed it. The closed shop may very well eradicate or eliminate the rebellious man, the man who, as he rightly said, first started many causes and has found himself in conflict with the majority and with associations. Therefore, it has always appeared to me to be wrong that employers and trade unions might agree between themselves to prevent even a very awkward and rebellious person from exercising the right to be heard. Let it be very clearly understood by hon. Members opposite that during this debate no one has defended the closed shop as such.
    There has been defence of 100 per cent. trade union membership, which is a legitimate ambition. In asking the House to reject this Amendment it cannot be interpreted that I am defending the closed shop. All I want to do—and I would agree to a large extent with some of the speeches that have been made—is to ensure that we approach this problem in the right and proper way. I do not propose to make a lengthy speech now because we have heard all the arguments before. I feel that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Grantham (Mr. Godber) and I could change places and deliver each other's speeches, because we have memorised them so often on this issue. We on this side of the House are confident that by restoring the Bill to its original form we shall be serving the best interests of industrial relations. Nothing I have heard from the opposite side alters me in my opinion.
    The hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Montgomery (Mr. Hooson) led me up the garden path for a couple of minutes. He said at one stage that confusion existed on the Rookes v. Barnard case among lawyers and trade unions. I thought that he would go on to the truly Liberal approach and say, "Let us sit down coolly and sort this out". Instead, he turned round and said, "Let us deal with it by this type of Amendment." The Rookes v. Barnard case, for good or ill—and great good may grow from that decision—left us in a state of confusion.
    328
    I thought that I understood what the matter was all about until the lawyers started explaining it to me. I still do not know what it is about. If I may deviate for a moment, two very eminent lawyers came to explain this to me when I was in opposition. In five minutes I was almost dismissed from the room because they had forgotten all about me; they were quarrelling between themselves as to what it was all about. These confusions have arisen and all we are suggesting is that the Royal Commission should sit down, with the legal background to this, and have a look at it.
    The 1906 Act—which, I know, is not cherished too much by the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery, because it is 60 years old and he is a forward-looking young man—recognised explicitly that trade disputes could be about the employment of an individual. Let me read the definition of a trade dispute of that Act in Section 5(3):
    "In this Act … the expression 'trade dispute' means any dispute between employers and workmen or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment … of any person.…"
    We believe, on this side of the House, that such was that confusion that it would be far better to try to restore—if I may take the point of the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery—what was generally assumed in industry to be the correct interpretation. The hon. and learned Member said that "some people" thought this, but, from my own trade union background, I can say that it was generally assumed that the 1906 Act meant certain things.
    Therefore, the point which we wish to make is that, with the confusion which has been created, it would be far better to let the Royal Commission investigate the matter. The right hon. Member for Grantham said that he had some hard things to say about me. They were not hard at all, but what I want to say to him may be a bit hard. During the whole of his speech he never looked at the other side of the coin. I tried to intervene and to get him to face the high principle that, if a man has a right not to associate, surely, also, there ought to be the right to associate.
    When Members opposite invoke the Declaration of Human Rights, there are two sides to the question. I have always

    329
    believed, and still believe, that a man has a right to associate and a right not to associate. That is clear and simple. Whether it be on religious, political, or on any other ground, he has that right. That is what makes us men, I suppose, this eternal right to determine our course of action in these matters.
    Hon. Members opposite—this may be hard to the right hon. Gentleman—spoke about principles without a deep knowledge of the forces and the tempers and the nuances of heavy industry today. To a man in a pit, the high principle is that every man should belong to the union. He regards the man who will not join in this collective machine which defends and looks after him as an outsider. It is no good saying that this man is an angel; the men who work with him regard him as a sinner. Therefore, they feel intensely that this man is an outsider, that he does not belong to the community.
    We should, therefore, be very careful when we judge the attitudes of men. It is easy for right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite to stand on their high horses and declare the massive power of the right of this Parliament to say that the individual should be protected. Of course it is the duty of this House to defend individual freedom. It is one of the great purposes of the House, to defend the individual. I hope that it will always remain so, but we cannot discuss this sort of thing in a vacuum. We have to understand the tempers of men and the strains under which they live and work in industry. When we talk about the Declaration of Human Rights we must realise that these general declarations are difficult to interpret in natural law.
    That is why I wanted the Royal Commission. I wanted to know how we should interpret those matters in the circumstances of a modern industrial society. Not only on the question of the closed shop, but upon the right of men to associate has the Declaration of Human Rights been invoked. However, in the case which I drew to the notice of the right hon. Gentleman, there was
    a direct contravention of the I.L.O. Convention of 1948, where it is laid down that a man has the right to associate and to join a trade union.
    If we are to look at this problem—there are problems in the closed shop—it would be better if we looked at the whole legal background, had an objective review of the whole situation, and let the Royal Commission give us the guiding lights. Then, there may well be—I believe will have to be—fundamental changes in the law as it affects employers and workmen. This debate—
    Sir Derek Walker-Smith rose—
    Mr. Gunter: I am just winding up—
    Sir D. Walker-Smith: Would the right hon. Gentleman please answer one question, because I am a little disturbed by the tenor of the philosophy which he has just stated? Surely it is not his view that it is right that minorities should be protected from victimisation, but that that right should go when a majority may feel sufficiently strongly that they should not have it. Surely he is not putting forward that view for the commendation of the House.
    Mr. Gunter: I thought that I was saying exactly the opposite, but I am not a lawyer and I do not know.
    I hope that what I have said shows how we on this side feel about the confusion which exists at present in the real state of the law. It has been demonstrated that it is difficult to distinguish these questions, even for those with experience in such matters. How much more difficult it must be for trade unionists with little or no knowledge of these things. I think that it is clear that this confusion must be removed and that this is incompatible with the Amendment. I invite the House to reject it.
    Question put, That this House cloth disagree with the Lords in the said Amendment:—
    The House divided: Ayes 294, Noes 291.

    Division No. 263.]

    AYES

    [8.26 p.m.

    Abse, Leo

    Atkinson, Norman

    Beaney, Alan

    Albu, Austen

    Bacon, Miss Alice

    Bellenger, Rt. Hn. F. J.

    Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)

    Bagier, Gordon A. T.

    Bence, Cyril

    Alldritt, Walter

    Barnett, Joel

    Benn, Rt. Hn. Anthony Wedgwood

    Allen, Scholefield (Crewe)

    Baxter, William

    Bennett, J. (Glasgow, Bridgeton)

    Binns, John

    Hamilton, William (West Fife)

    Murray, Albert

    Bishop, E. S.

    Hamling, William (Woolwich, W.)

    Neal, Harold

    Blackburn, F.

    Hannan, William

    Newens, Stan

    Blenkinsop, Arthur

    Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)

    Noel-Baker, Francis (Swindon)

    Boardman, H.

    Hart, Mrs. Judith

    Noel-Baker, Rt. Hn. Philip (Derby, S.)

    Boston, Terence

    Hattersley, Roy

    Norwood, Christopher

    Bottomley, Rt. Hn. Arthur

    Hazell, Bert

    Oakes, Gordon

    Bowden, Rt. Hn. H. W. (Leics, S. W.)

    Healey, Rt. Hn. Denis

    Ogden, Eric

    Boyden, James

    Heffer, Eric S.

    O'Malley, Brian

    Braddock, Mrs. E. M.

    Henderson, Rt. Hn. Arthur

    Oram, Albert E. (E. Ham, S.)

    Bradley, Tom

    Herbison, Rt. Hn. Margaret

    Orbach, Maurice

    Bray, Dr. Jeremy

    Hobden, Dennis (Brighton, K'town)

    Orme, Stanley

    Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.

    Holman, Percy

    Oswald, Thomas

    Brown, Rt. Hn. George (Belper)

    Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas

    Owen, Will

    Brown, Hugh D. (Glasgow, Provan)

    Howarth, Harry (Wellingborough)

    Padley, Walter

    Brown, R. W. (Shoreditch & Fbury)

    Howarth, Robert L. (Bolton, E.)

    Page, Derek (King's Lynn)

    Buchan, Norman (Renfrewshire, W.)

    Howell, Denis (Small Heath)

    Paget, R. T.

    Buchanan, Richard

    Howie, W.

    Palmer, Arthur

    Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)

    Hoy, James

    Pannell, Rt. Hn. Charles

    Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)

    Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)

    Pargiter, G. A.

    Callaghan, Rt. Hn. James

    Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)

    Park, Trevor (Derbyshire, S. E.)

    Carmichael, Neil

    Hunter, Adam (Dunfermline)

    Parker, John

    Carter-Jones, Lewis

    Hunter, A. E. (Feltham)

    Pavitt, Laurence

    Castle, Rt. Hn. Barbara

    Hynd, H. (Accrington)

    Pearson, Arthur (Pontypridd)

    Coleman, Donald

    Hynd, John (Attercliffe)

    Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred

    Conlan, Bernard

    Irvine, A. J. (Edge Hill)

    Pentland, Norman

    Corbet, Mrs. Freda

    Irving, Sydney (Dartford)

    Perry, Ernest G.

    Cousins, Rt. Hn. Frank

    Jackson, Colin

    Popplewell, Ernest

    Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)

    Janner, Sir Barnett

    Prentice, R. E.

    Crawshaw, Richard

    Jeger, George (Goole)

    Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)

    Cronin, John

    Jeger, Mrs. Lena (H'b'n & St. P'cras, S.)

    Probert, Arthur

    Crosland, Rt. Hn. Anthony

    Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)

    Pursey, Cmdr. Harry

    Cullen, Mrs. Alice

    Johnson, Carol (Lewisham, S.)

    Randall, Harry

    Dalyell, Tam

    Johnson, James (K' ston-on-Hull. W.)

    Rankin, John

    Darling, George

    Jones, Dan (Burnley)

    Redhead, Edward

    Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)

    Jones, Rt. Hn. Sir Elwyn (W. Ham, S.)

    Rees, Merlyn

    Reynolds, G. W.

    Davies, Harold (Leek)

    Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)

    Rhodes, Geoffrey

    Davies, Ifor (Gower)

    Jones, T. W. (Merioneth)

    Richard, Ivor

    Davies, S. O. (Merthyr)

    Kelley, Richard

    Roberts, Albert (Normanton)

    de Freitas, Sir Geoffrey

    Kenyon, Clifford

    Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvon)

    Delargy, Hugh

    Kerr, Mrs. Anne (R'ter & Chatham)

    Robertson, John (Paisley)

    Dell, Edmund

    Kerr, Dr. David (W'worth, Central)

    Robinson, Rt. Hn. K. (St. Pancras, N.)

    Dempsey, James

    Lawson, George

    Rodgers, William (Stockton)

    Diamond, Rt. Hn. John

    Leadbitter, Ted

    Rogers, George (Kensington, N.)

    Dodds, Norman

    Ledger, Ron

    Rose, Paul B.

    Doig, Peter

    Lee, Rt. Hn. Frederick (Newton)

    Ross, Rt. Hn. William

    Donnelly, Desmond

    Lee, Miss Jennie (Cannock)

    Rowland, Christopher

    Driberg, Tom

    Lever, Harold (Cheatham)

    Sheldon, Robert

    Duffy, Dr. A. E. P.

    Lewis, Arthur (West Ham, N.)

    Shinwell, Rt. Hn. E.

    Dunn, James A.

    Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)

    Shore, Peter (Stepney)

    Dunnett, Jack

    Lipton, Marcus

    Short, Rt. Hn. E. (N'c'tle-on-Tyne, C.)

    Edwards, Rt. Hn. Ness (Caerphilly)

    Lomas, Kenneth

    Short, Mrs. Renée (W'hampton, N. E.)

    Edwards, Robert (Bilston)

    Loughlin, Charles

    Silkin, John (Deptford)

    English, Michael

    Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson

    Silkin, S. C. (Camberwell, Dulwich)

    Ennals, David

    McBride, Neil

    Silverman, Julius (Aston)

    Ensor, David

    McCann, J.

    Silverman, Sydney (Nelson)

    Evans, Albert (Islington, S. W.)

    MacColl, James

    Skeffington, Arthur

    Evans, Ioan (Birmingham, Yardley)

    MacDermot, Niall

    Slater, Mrs. Harriet (Stoke, N.)

    Fernyhough, E.

    McGuire, Michael

    Slater, Joseph (Sedgefield)

    Finch, Harold (Bedwellty)

    McInnes, James

    Small, William

    Fletcher, Sir Eric (Islington, E.)

    McKay, Mrs. Margaret

    Snow, Julian

    Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)

    Mackenzie, Gregor (Rutherglen)

    Solomons, Henry

    Fletcher, Raymond (Ilkeston)

    Mackie, John (Enfield, E.)

    Soskice, Rt. Hn. Sir Frank

    Floud, Bernard

    McLeavy, Frank

    Spriggs, Leslie

    Foley, Maurice

    MacMillan, Malcolm

    Steele, Thomas (Dunhartonshire, W.)

    Foot, Sir Dingle (Ipswich)

    Mahon, Peter (Preston, S.)

    Stewart, Rt. Hn. Michael

    Foot, Michael (Ebbw Vale)

    Mahon, Simon (Bootle)

    Stonehouse, John

    Ford, Ben

    Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)

    Stones, William

    Fraser, Rt. Hn. Tom (Hamilton)

    Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield, E.)

    Strauss, Rt. Hn. C. R. (Vauxhall)

    Freeson, Reginald

    Mapp, Charles

    Stross, Sir Barnett (Stoke-on-Trent, C.)

    Galpern, Sir Myer

    Marsh, Richard

    Summerskill, Hn. Dr. Shirley

    Garrett, W. E.

    Mason, Roy

    Swain, Thomas

    Garrow, A.

    Maxwell, Robert

    Swingler, Stephen

    Ginsburg, David

    Mayhew, Christopher

    Symonds, J. B.

    Gourlay, Harry

    Mendelson, J. J.

    Taverne, Dick

    Greenwood, Rt. Hn. Anthony

    Millan, Bruce

    Taylor, Bernard (Mansfield)

    Gregory, Arnold

    Miller, Dr. M. S.

    Thomas, George (Cardiff, W.)

    Grey, Charles

    Milne, Edward (Blyth)

    Thomas, Iorwerth (Rhondda, W.)

    Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)

    Molloy, William

    Thomson, George (Dundee, B.)

    Griffiths, Rt. Hn. James (Llanelly)

    Monslow, Walter

    Thornton, Ernest

    Griffiths, Will (M'chester, Exchange)

    Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)

    Tinn, James

    Gunter, Rt. Hn. R. J.

    Morris, Charles (Openshaw)

    Tomney, Frank

    Hale, Leslie

    Morris, John (Aberavon)

    Tuck, Raphael

    Hamilton, James (Bothwell)

    Mulley, Rt. Hn. Frederick (Sheffield Pk)

    Urwin, T. W.

    332

    333

    Varley, Eric G.

    Whitlock, William

    Wilson, William (Coventry, S.)

    Wainwright, Edwin

    Wigg, Rt. Hn. George

    Winterbottom, R. E.

    Walden, Brian (All Saints)

    Wilkins, W. A.

    Woodburn, Rt. Hn. A.

    Walker, Harold (Doncaster)

    Willey, Rt. Hn. Frederick

    Woof, Robert

    Wallace, George

    Williams, Alan (Swansea, W.)

    Wyatt, Woodrow

    Watkins, Tudor

    Williams, Clifford (Abertillery)

    Yates, Victor (Ladywood)

    Weitzman, David

    Williams, Mrs. Shirley (Hitchin)

    Zilliacus, K.

    Wells, William (Walsall, N.)

    Williams, W. T. (Warrington)

    White, Mrs. Eirene

    Willis, George (Edinburgh, E.)

    TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

    Mr. Harper and Mr. Fitch.

    NOES

    Agnew, Commander Sir Peter

    Dean, Paul

    Iremonger, T. L.

    Alison, Michael (Barkston Ash)

    Deedes, Rt. Hn. W. F.

    Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)

    Allan, Robert (Paddington, S.)

    Digby, Simon Wingfield

    Jenkin, Patrick (Woodford)

    Allason, James (Hemel Hempstead)

    Doughty, Charles

    Jennings, J. C.

    Amery, Rt. Hn. Julian

    Douglas-Home, Rt. Hn. Sir Alec

    Johnson Smith, G. (East Grinstead)

    Anstruther-Gray, Rt. Hn. Sir W.

    Drayson, G. B.

    Jones, Arthur (Northants, S.)

    Astor, John

    du Cann, Rt. Hn. Edward

    Jopling, Michael

    Atkins, Humphrey

    Eden, Sir John

    Joseph, Rt. Hn. Sir Keith

    Awdry, Daniel

    Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)

    Kaberry, Sir Donald

    Baker, W. H. K.

    Elliott, R. W. (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, N.)

    Kerby, Capt. Henry

    Balniel, Lord

    Emery, Peter

    Kerr, Sir Hamilton (Cambridge)

    Barlow, Sir John

    Errington, Sir Eric

    Kershaw, Anthony

    Batsford, Brian

    Eyre, Reginald

    Kimball, Marcus

    Beamish, Col. Sir Tufton

    Farr, John

    King, Evelyn (Dorset, S.)

    Bell, Ronald

    Fell, Anthony

    Kirk, Peter

    Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torquay)

    Fisher, Nigel

    Kitson, Timothy

    Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gos. & Fhm)

    Fletcher-Cooke, Charles (Darwen)

    Lagden, Godfrey

    Berkeley, Humphry

    Fletcher-Cooke, Sir John (S'pton)

    Lambton, Viscount

    Berry, Hn. Anthony

    Foster, Sir John

    Lancaster, Col. C. G.

    Bessell, Peter

    Fraser, Rt. Hn. Hugh (St'fford & Stone)

    Langford-Holt, Sir John

    Biffen, John

    Fraser, Ian (Plymouth, Sutton)

    Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry

    Biggs-Davison, John

    Galbraith, Hn. T. G. D.

    Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)

    Bingham, R. M.

    Gammans, Lady

    Litchfield, Capt. John

    Birch, Rt. Hn. Nigel

    Gardner, Edward

    Lloyd, Rt. Hn. Geoffrey (Sut'n C'dfield)

    Black, Sir Cyril

    Gibson-Watt, David

    Lloyd, Ian (P'tsm'th, Langstone)

    Blaker, Peter

    Giles, Rear-Admiral Morgan

    Lloyd, Rt. Hn. Selwyn (Wirral)

    Bossom, Hn. Clive

    Gilmour, Ian (Norfolk, Central)

    Longbottom, Charles

    Box, Donald

    Gilmour, Sir John (East Fife)

    Longden, Gilbert

    Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hn. J.

    Clover, Sir Douglas

    Loveys, Walter H.

    Boyle, Rt. Hn. Sir Edward

    Glyn, Sir Richard

    Lubbock, Eric

    Braine, Bernard

    Godber, Rt. Hn. J. B.

    Lucas, Sir Jocelyn

    Brewis, John

    Goodhart, Philip

    McAdden, Sir Stephen

    Brinton, Sir Tatton

    Goodhew, Victor

    Mackenzie, Alasdair (Ross & Crom'ty)

    Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. Sir Walter

    Gower, Raymond

    Mackie, George Y. (C'ness & S'land)

    Brooke, Rt. Hn. Henry

    Grant, Anthony

    Maclean, Sir Fitzroy

    Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)

    Grant-Ferris, R.

    Macleod, Rt. Hn. Iain

    Bruce-Gardyne, J.

    Gresham Cooke, R.

    Maddan, Martin (Hove)

    Bryan, Paul

    Grieve, Percy

    McMaster, Stanley

    Buchanan-Smith, Alick

    Griffiths, Eldon (Bury St. Edmunds)

    McNair-Wilson, Patrick

    Buck, Antony

    Griffiths, Peter (Smethwick)

    Maginnis, John E.

    Bullus, Sir Eric

    Grimond, Rt. Hn. J.

    Maitland, Sir John

    Butcher, Sir Herbert

    Gurden, Harold

    Marten, Neil

    Buxton, Ronald

    Hall, John (Wycombe)

    Mathew, Robert

    Campbell, Gordon

    Hall-Davis, A. C. F.

    Maude, Angus

    Carlisle, Mark

    Hamilton, Marquess of (Fermanagh)

    Maudling, Rt. Hn. Reginald

    Carr, Rt. Hn. Robert

    Hamilton, M. (Salisbury)

    Mawby, Ray

    Cary, Sir Robert

    Harris, Frederic (Croydon, N. W.)

    Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J.

    Channon, H. P. G.

    Harris, Reader (Heston)

    Maydon, Lt.-Cmdr. S. L. C.

    Chataway, Christopher

    Harvey, Sir Arthur Vere (Macclesf'd)

    Meyer, Sir Anthony

    Chichester-Clark, R.

    Harvey, John (Walthametow, E.)

    Mills, Peter (Torrington)

    Clark, William (Nottingham, S.)

    Hastings, Stephen

    Mills, Stratton (Belfast, N.)

    Clarke, Brig. Terence (Portsmth, W.)

    Hawkins, Paul

    Miscampbell, Norman

    Cole, Norman

    Hay, John

    Mitchell, David

    Cooke, Robert

    Heald, Rt. Hn. Sir Lionel

    Monro, Hector

    Cooper, A. E.

    Heath, Rt. Hn. Edward

    More, Jasper

    Cooper-Key, Sir Neill

    Hendry, Forbes

    Morrison, Charles (Devizes)

    Cordle, John

    Higgins, Terence L.

    Mott-Radclyffe, Sir Charles

    Corfield, F. V.

    Hiley, Joseph

    Munro-Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh

    Costain, A. P.

    Hill, J. E. B. (S. Norfolk)

    Murton, Oscar

    Courtney, Cdr. Anthony

    Hirst, Geoffrey

    Neave, Airey

    Craddock, Sir Beresford (Spelthorne)

    Hobson, Rt. Hn. Sir John

    Nicholls, Sir Harmar

    Crawley, Aidan

    Hogg, Rt. Hn. Quintin

    Nicholson, Sir Godfrey

    Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col. Sir Oliver

    Hooson, H. E.

    Noble, Rt. Hn. Michael

    Crowder, F. P.

    Hopkins, Alan

    Nugent, Rt. Hn. Sir Richard

    Cunningham, Sir Knox

    Hordern, Peter

    Onslow, Cranley

    Curran, Charles

    Hornby, Richard

    Orr, Capt. L. P. S.

    Currie, G. B. H.

    Hornsby-Smith, Rt. Hn. Dame P.

    Orr-Ewing, Sir Ian

    Dalkeith, Earl of

    Howard, Hn. G. R. (St. Ives)

    Osborn, John (Hallam)

    Dance, James

    Howe, Geoffrey (Bebington)

    Osborne, Sir Cyril (Louth)

    Davies, Dr. Wyndham (Perry Barr)

    Hunt, John (Bromley)

    Page, John (Harrow, W.)

    d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry

    Hutchison, Michael Clark

    Page, R. Graham (Crosby)

    334

    335

    Pearson, Sir Frank (Clitheroe)

    Shepherd, William

    van Straubenzee, W. R.

    Peel, John

    Sinclair, Sir George

    Vaughan-Morgan, Rt. Hn. Sir John

    Percival, Ian

    Smith, Dudley (Br'ntf'd & Chiswick)

    Vickers, Dame Joan

    Peyton, John

    Smyth, Rt. Hn. Brig. Sir John

    Walder, David (High Peak)

    Pickthorn, Rt. Hn. Sir Kenneth

    Soames, Rt. Hn. Christopher

    Walker, Peter (Worcester)

    Pike, Miss Mervyn

    Spearman, Sir Alexander

    Walker-Smith, Rt. Hn. Sir Derek

    Pitt, Dame Edith

    Speir, Sir Rupert

    Wall, Patrick

    Pounder, Rafton

    Stainton, Keith

    Walters, Dennis

    Powell, Rt. Hn. J. Enoch

    Stanley, Hn. Richard

    Ward, Dame Irene

    Price, David (Eastleigh)

    Steel, David (Roxburgh)

    Weatherill, Bernard

    Prior, J. M. L.

    Stodart, Anthony

    Webster, David

    Pym, Francis

    Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir Malcolm

    Wells, John (Maidstone)

    Quennell, Miss J. M.

    Studholme, Sir Henry

    Whitelaw, William

    Ramsden, Rt. Hn. James

    Summers, Sir Spencer

    Williams, Sir Rolf Dudley (Exeter)

    Rawlinson, Rt. Hn. Sir Peter

    Talbot, John E.

    Wills, Sir Gerald (Bridgwater)

    Rees-Davies, W. R.

    Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)

    Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)

    Renton, Rt. Hn. Sir David

    Taylor, Edward M. (G'gow, Cathcart)

    Wise, A. R.

    Ridley, Hn. Nicholas

    Taylor, Frank (Moss Side)

    Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick

    Ridsdale, Julian

    Teeling, Sir William

    Wood, Rt. Hn. Richard

    Rodgers, Sir John (Sevenoaks)

    Temple, John M.

    Woodhouse, Hn. Christopher

    Roots, William

    Thatcher, Mrs. Margaret

    Woodnutt, Mark

    Royle, Anthony

    Thomas, Sir Leslie (Canterbury)

    Wylie, N. R.

    Russell, Sir Ronald

    Thomas, Rt. Hn. Peter (Conway)

    Yates, William (The Wrekin)

    St. John-Stevas, Norman

    Thompson, Sir Richard (croydon, s.)

    Younger, Hn. George

    Sandy, Rt. Hn. D.

    Tiley, Arthur (Bradford, W.)

    Scott-Hopkins, James

    Turton, Rt. Hn. R. H.

    TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

    Sharples, Richard

    Tweedsmuir, Lady

    Mr. McLaren and Mr. MacArthur.

    Remaining Lords Amendments disagreed to.
    Committee appointed to draw up Reason to be assigned to the Lords for disagreeing to their Amendments to the Bill: The Solicitor-General, Mr. Godber, Mr. Gunter, Sir John Hobson, and Mr. Ernest Thornton; three to be the Quorum.—[Mr. Gunter.]
    To withdraw immediately.
    Later:—
    Reason for disagreeing to the Lords Amendments reported and agreed to; to be communicated to the Lords.

  COMMONS REGISTRATION BILL [Lords]
  As amended (in the Standing Committee), considered.
  COMMONS REGISTRATION BILL [Lords]

    New Clause.—(REGISTRATION OF GRAZING RIGHTS LIMITED BY NUMBER AND OF RIGHTS NOT SO LIMITED.)
    (1) Where a right of common consists of or includes a right to graze animals or animals of any class it shall be registered for the purposes of this Act as either—

    (a) appendant, appurtenant or otherwise attached to a dominant tenement the location, address and acreage of which shall also be registered for this purpose; or

    (b) held in gross by the claimant whose name and address shall also be registered.

    (2) Any application for the registration of a right limited by number or class of animal shall state the number of animals to be entered in the register or, as the case may be, the numbers of animals of different classes to be so entered.
    (3) Where a right of common consists of or includes a right to graze animals or animals of any particular class or classes, limited by the number or class of animals to be grazed, it shall for the purposes of registration under this Act be treated as exercisable in relation to no more animals or animals of a class than that number or class or classes; and shall, when the registration has become final, be exercisable accordingly.
    (4) Where a right of common consists of or includes a right to graze animals or animals of any class or classes, not limited by number or class of animals, it shall for the purposes of registration under this Act be treated as exercisable in relation to the needs of either—

    (a) the dominant tenement to which the right is appendant, appurtenant or otherwise attached whose location, address and acreage are registered under subsection (1) of this section; or

    (b) the owner of the right in gross lying in express grant under deed as specified in that deed; or established or establishable under the fiction of a Lost Modern Grant or other common law principle.—[Mr. Corfield.]

    Brought up, and read the First time.
    8.44 p.m.
    Mr. F. V. Corfield: I beg to move, That the Clause be read a Second time.
    Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir Samuel Storey): The following Amendments have been selected to be taken with the new Clause: Amendment No. 33, in page 7, line 43, leave out Clause 15; Amendment No. 34, in Clause 15, page 7, line 45, leave out from "shall" to end of Clause, and insert:
    "be registered in such manner as the Minister by regulations may prescribe".

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    Amendment No. 41, in Clause 19, page 10, line 31, at end insert:
    (g) for requiring an application for registration of rights of common attached to any land to specify the location and acreage thereof.
    I understand that it would be for the convenience of the House if we also discussed Amendment No. 19, in Clause 10, page 6, line 16, at end insert:
    Provided that where a right of common consists of, or includes, a right not limited by number, to graze animals or animals of any class, any definite number of such animals registered in accordance with section 15(1) of this Act may be varied either by any subsequent scheme of management devised with the consent of the person registered as the owner of the land (whether under this Act, or under the Land Registration Acts 1925 or 1936), and of all persons in whose name rights of common over that land are registered under this Act; or as Parliament may hereafter determine.
    and Government Amendments Nos. 32, 35, and 36.
    Mr. Corfield: This new Clause and one of our Amendments are designed to overcome the main difference of principle—perhaps even the only difference of principle—which divided us in the Standing Committee. The other Opposition Amendments—Nos. 33, 34 and 19—merely represent alternative methods of meeting our objections, so I think that we can very conveniently discuss them all together.
    The principle on which we are divided is embodied in Clause 15 which requires, in effect, that all rights of common for grazing which are not limited by number—and which in the old Norman French are always known as rights sans nombre—shall, for purposes of registration, be quantified and registered as rights to graze a definite and specific number of beasts. By virtue of Clause 10, once the registration becomes final the register becomes conclusive evidence of a right to graze that number, and that number only.
    As we see it, there are a number of objections to this principle. The first, and perhaps the least important—more a technical objection and, as some might say, a legalistic one—is one that the Government Amendments mentioned are designed to meet. However, this is not the most important objection. On the contrary, I think that the practical objections to which I shall refer later are the most fundamental.
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    For a definition of the rights sans nombre, one turns to page 276 of the Royal Commission Report which defines sans nombre:
    "Literally 'without number'; applied to right of common of pasture appurtenant or in gross if the right exists for an unspecified number of animals. In the case of common appurtenant sans nombre the principle of levancy and couchancy is held to apply; in the case of common in gross sans nombre the right is limited to as many cattle as the common will maintain over and above the levant and couchant cattle of the lord and commoners."
    I think it is clear—although I shall not quote further—from Cheshire's "Modern Law of Property" that a right of common gross can exist if created by deed, although not by prescription, for an unlimited, number of animals over and above the numbers for which rights existed, for limited numbers depending, of course, on the carrying capacity of the common.
    The principle of levancy and conchancy implies that the numbers must be limited in accord with the wintering capacity of the holding. In the old days they were confined to the type of stock which were required either to work the holding or to manure it. In providing for the registration and determination of these rights, one comes up against two difficulties. The first is that the principle of levancy and conchancy can have very little relevance to any form of modern farming. The second is that where we are dealing with rights in gross not attached to any particular holding there is by definition no dominant holding in relation to the numbers which can be assessed. So, in actual practice, one is up against the determination of the actual numbers of cattle or other species of stock on the basis of the carrying capacity of the common. Of course, if there are a number of rights established with definite numbers of cattle attached, it would be relevant to the surplus carrying capacity over and above that of the particular common.
    Looking forward to the second stage of the operation which the Royal Commission, the Government and ourselves contemplate, it will be accepted that one of the main purposes of the operation, anyway as regards commons which are predominantly agricultural in their use and value, is usefully to increase the productivity of those commons, in other

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    words, to increase the carrying capacity. It follows that if any specific number of cattle is to be determined under the Bill it will have to be based on the current carrying capacity of the common. Therefore, if the whole operation on which we are embarking is to make any sense at all it can be only a temporary number.
    On the face of it, we have the situation in the Bill in which we are inviting commoners to register rights with a view to their becoming established when the registration has become final as absolute and permanent rights, although we all know that the whole object of the exercise is that they should be neither absolute nor permanent. That, as I put it in Committee, is bogus in an Act of Parliament. I do not use that in any derogatory sense towards the Minister or the Parliamentary Secretary, but it is the result that the Clause produces as it is at present drafted.
    As I understand it, this is what the Minister seeks to put right by Amendments Nos. 32, 35 and 36. Clause 13, as amended by Amendment No. 32, would make paragraph (c) read:
    "any rights registered under this Act are apportioned, extinguished or released varied or transferred in such circumstances as may be prescribed."
    That deals with the power to alter the register where that is appropriate. So we start with the proposition that the Minister accepts that there may be variations and alterations of the register to meet them to the full under Clause 13 as amended.
    The Minister goes on to amend Clause 15 to make it clear that Parliament expects to have something to say on the subject at some future date. That is all right as far as it goes, except that I would query the drafting, in that it gives the impression that the right hon. Gentleman contemplates that Parliament will concern itself with the actual numbers on any particular common. I cannot believe that that is what he contemplates Parliament will do. It will merely set up machinery by which some other body can devise management schemes under which these numbers can be varied, either for all time or from time to time as the carrying capacity of the common varies.
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    I must admit that that criticism applies, though I think to a lesser extent, to one of the alternatives we have tabled, namely, Amendment No. 19, which is an Amendment to Clause 10. That follows somewhat similar lines to those of the Minister's. I like to think that it perhaps inspired the Minister rather than that he inspired me, but that is as it may be. Our Amendment allows for a variation to be made with the consent of all the commoners of a common and the owner of the land, if he is ascertainable, either under this Measure or under the Land Registration Acts.
    Even on this narrow point, our Amendment has a very substantial advantage, because I am sure that we all want to see commoners get together before the second stage if they are disposed to do so. We should make it clear that if they are disposed to do so, there is nothing in the Bill to prevent them from getting together and varying the numbers, if this is appropriate in relation to the management scheme which they propose to devise. I therefore hope that the Minister will consider this alternative seriously. It is very much on the same principle as his own. At the same time it goes that little bit wider and is that much more valuable, if only because it encourages the co-operation without which we shall not make a real success of this legislation, either this stage or the next.
    As I said earlier, all this deals only with the technical or legalistic objection to the Clause as it stands. To our way of thinking, it is the practical objections that are the most fundamental and the most damaging. Put very shortly—I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Norfolk, South (Mr. J. E. B. Hill) will wish to go into this in more detail, if he catches your eye, Mr. Deputy-Speaker—the requirement that all these rights need to be quantified seems to us to raise the following practical difficulties. First, this implies that, whether a particular common has had any form of stinting arrangement up to now or not, some form of stinting will have to be devised, though this is the fundamental of the second stage of this operation.
    There are a large number of commons which have never had any stinting and where the commoners are wholly unfamiliar with the process. It becomes more and more clear, as some of the

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    evidence of the Nuffield Research Unit at Cambridge is studied, that this is by no means a simple and straightforward operation. Indeed, in some commons it can be a very complex one. In any case, it is very much the function of the management scheme stage, to which we look forward after five or six years, or some such period. I submit that it is wholly outside the proper function of the Commons Commissioner established under this Measure who, after all, is basically there, as I see it, to adjudicate on legal rights. As I understand it, this is the reason why he has to be a lawyer of so many years' standing.
    The second objection is that there are a number of commons which suffer, not from being over-grazed but from being under-grazed. If one were to limit the exercise of some of these common rights, which are at present without number, one would not only be doing no good but one might well be doing something which was positively harmful. This is a powerful argument for rethinking the approach to this matter.
    First, there are a number of commons where the commoners have got together not with a view to exercising their own rights but to let those rights, usually to one farmer, leaving the whole management to that farmer to cultivate it to the maximum benefit in accordance with the general policy of his dominant holding. The commoners, therefore, are interested only in collecting and distributing the rent among themselves. In that sort of instance, it clearly would be inappropriate to attempt a stinting operation at this stage, since there is clearly a manager running the common as a single unit and the commoners may not only be uninterested in stinting but wholly uninterested in achieving a result which will have no bearing on the prosperity of the common in which they are interested.
    We realise that this is a difficult matter and that is why we have tried to offer the right hon. Gentleman a number of choices. Although we have had disagreements on principle and drafting in Committee, I think we would all agree that the right hon. Gentleman has shown himself anxious to get a good answer out of this machinery when it is established. I hope that he will accept it as a compliment that in one of our Amendments we
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    are prepared to leave it to him to provide regulations because this will give him more time to consider this difficult matter and to consult experts, whether research units, agricultural executive committees or Commons Preservation Society people, or whoever it may be. It will also give him time to prepare a scheme which will provide, if necessary, different alternatives for different types of commons. This is the purpose of our Amendment to Clause 15, leaving it as a short Clause and leaving the registration of these rights to be provided for by regulations.
    As for the new Clause, our approach has been rather different. It has been to try to give detailed guidance to the registration authorities on the registration of each main type of common right. In subsection (1,a) we are making clear that whether a right is appurtenant or appendant, the dominant tenement, in particular, should form part of the registration, and here new Clause No. 1 overlaps Amendment No. 41 which gives the Minister power to make regulations for the same purpose.
    In subsections (2) and (3) we provide for some guidance where a right of common relates to a common which has a limited number attached to it. In subsection (4) we are dealing with rights unlimited by number and here we suggest that those rights should be registered and exercised either in relation to the dominant tenement, if there be one, or where there is right in gross—whereby definition there is no dominant tenement—in relation to the owner of that particular right, leaving it to the management in the final stage to define the numbers and, if necessary, to make special arrangements for the seasonal changes on the common, and so on.
    9.0 p.m.
    Of our three main efforts to meet this problem, we prefer, in the circumstances, either Amendment No. 19 or Amendment No. 34, largely because both would allow time to work out a more satisfactory scheme. The first would enable the commoners themselves to do something in the meantime, and the second would allow the Minister to produce some sort of machinery which, I hope would—I am sure that it would—allow for an encourage alteration by consent where this led to an interim management

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    scheme or a management scheme which might well be confirmed as permanent.
    I put the new Clause bottom of the list, but, again, I prefer it very much to the Minister's two little Amendments which do not go far enough, although they meet the technical point.
    Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Before calling the next speaker, I should add to the group of Amendments which we are considering at the same time the Amendment to Amendment No. 19.
    Mr. J. E. B. Hill: The controversy which has arisen on this point is unusual in the sense that it has absolutely no political content at all. Both Government and Opposition have been concerned solely to produce an effective Bill and one which, broadly, implements the recommendations of the Royal Commission. At first sight, the argument about quantification seems to be an obscure and minor matter, but, as one digs into it, one realises that it is much more complicated and more central to the successful operation of the Bill. It has gradually revealed itself as, so to speak, the key test of the Bill's practicability.
    At the moment, it is largely a matter of chance and history whether a grazing common is stinted or not. We derive some idea of the extent of this problem from paragraph 73 of the Royal Commission's Report, where it is stated that 79 per cent. of the common land in England and Wales is grazing, 33 per cent. being stinted—that is approximately 500,000 acres, and there is no problem about registering those grazing rights—and 46 per cent. being unstinted, that is, grazing without any definite number of animals attached to the right, and this latter area comes to nearly 700,000 acres. It is a sizeable problem, and the success of the registration process must largely depend upon the statutory requirements being clear, easy to comply with, and likely to inspire both confidence and action.
    The Government, in a commendable desire to expedite this procedure—they have done it successfully in regard to registration periods and so on—are here calling for a precise definition at a stage when the claimant cannot know it and, indeed, cannot be expected to know it.
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    In this respect, the Bill goes outside the recommendations of the Royal Commission, which, looking at the problem in great detail, recognised the impossibility of claimants giving any precise definition at this stage.
    The key paragraph is worth quoting again. It is paragraph No. 275:
    "The impossibility of making an objective definition leaves only one alternative—to allow the commoner in his claim to rights of common of pasture to define them himself; in other words, to allow him to claim whatever he believes he is entitled to. If our recommendation is accepted, we do not think that in practice it will work badly. In most places, the commoners will settle their individual claims by discussion before registering them, some in their present associations or manor courts, the others in all probability by getting together informally in the parish hall or bar parlour."
    My only criticism of that paragraph is that I personally think that agreement is unlikely to be reached informally prior to registration. It is more probable that people will try to register, and that agreement will be reached only when one considers all the details that are involved at a much later stage.
    I would say that the subsequent survey into the management problems that are likely to arise in commons, which has been carried out by the Nuffield Foundation and Cambridge University and which includes several members of the Royal Commission, has confirmed my view. They are quite certain in their view that defining numbers at the stage of registration is not merely going to be difficult but is going to give rise to serious trouble. The basic reason for it is that where quantification exists, in the vast majority of cases it has come about only as a result of some stinting arrangements, and that any such arrangements are essentially a complex process of assessing and reconciling both the supply of grazing on the one hand and the demand for it on the other and coming to an agreement on a co-operative and not an individual basis.
    In Standing Committee we examined an old stinting arrangement of the late nineteenth century, and we were all surprised to find what a large number of factors were involved. Until those factors were determined, it was quite impossible for anyone to arrive at any quantification of numbers, whatever his authortiy in the matter. Therefore, without repeating the

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    details of that argument, I am quite certain that quantification must be the result and, indeed, is the natural result of management and never of registration, and still less of adjudication by a commons commissioner.
    The most that registration can be expected to do is to identify the commoners and their claims of rights, plus the property in respect of which those rights may be based or the other titles on which they may be based. If we succeed in doing that, we shall have all the ingredients on which to work out a later quantification and stinting programme. It seems, therefore, that registration needs to be comprehensive, but I do not think it can be precise. If at the registration stage we try to do more, several practical difficulties must be expected, and that has been confirmed, as I have said, by the detailed examination of several hundred commons that has been going on for the last four years by the Nuffield Foundation investigation.
    Several difficulties will be apparent. As I have said, stinting has always been a very complicated process. It cannot bee simplified or speeded up because it depends on many factors which can be evaluated in deail only on the ground and in respect of a particular common—such as, what is the area of grazing which will be available, during what times, and what claims are there to be upon it? It is no easier to work out a stinting programme today than it was a century ago. If anything, it has become much more difficult because the techniques of agriculture are much more complicated and the potential non-agricultural, non-grazing usage and commitments of the common are more varied and probably more extensive.
    It seems to me that it is quite impossible for an individual commoner thinking of registration to have any idea of how to express his right, which may have been exercised almost from time immemorial by him and his forebears on the holding, in terms of definite numbers. Since the publication of the Bill anxiety on this point has been expressed in many areas. I merely mention the Commoners of Millburn Forest in the North and the Gower Common Association in Wales, and similar difficulties are known to obtain on Dartmoor and on Bodmin Moor.
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    The second difficulty in practice is that stinting amounts to an act of enclosure in that in many cases it will replace the old manorial customs, and it requires, therefore, general agreement among all the commoners, who previously relied upon custom, to accept the new and exact regulation of the commons and the manorial wastes, and that, of course, would include, where one has a lord of the manor, dealing with the residue of grazing right and manorial right which remains in the enjoyment of the lord of the manor after the use made of them by individual commoners. Therefore, how can any individual claimant work out that sum at the moment of registration?
    Thirdly, modern husbandry practices make old stocking customs quite unrealistic. So I think that in practice the use to which any right can be put must depend on the consensus among commoners at the time of management later on and far beyond the time when individual claims would be determined by a Commons Commissioner.
    Mere quantification of numbers as suggested by Clause 15 would in practice cause chaos, because numbers by themselves have very little practical value. They have to be accompanied by express conditions about the types of animal which can be grazed in the alternative, details of areas that can be grazed, grazing seasons, and so on, all of which are matters of management and cannot be within the knowledge or jurisdiction of a Commons Commissioner.
    We have very good examples of modern stinting formulas which have been worked out. There is one by the National Trust at Rodburgh Common in Gloucestershire. One need only examine the position to realise that this is essentially something that can he arrived at only after the most detailed study. If one has a stinting programme it is not much use and is not meaningful unless there is some form of oversight and enforcement procedure. In modern times, for instance, there is the effective procedure at Allendale Common in Northumberland. We can see the need for enforcement procedure at Bollihope in County Durham. If we register numbers, even if this is not the intention of the Bill, it will be taken by many commoners as indicating and conferring some definite legal rights to certain fixed

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    numbers when registration has become final. It may well be that, in many cases, later management schemes would have to cut down on such registered numbers simply because the carrying capacity of the common would be far less than the numbers claimed.
    9.15 p.m.
    Mr. Leo Abse indicated assent.
    Mr. Hill: I see the hon. Member for Pontypool (Mr. Abse) nodding his head and I think that I only have to mention Ebbw Vale for him to realise the astonishing excessive numbers at the moment being carried and claimed in respect of very small areas. Therefore, if any fraction of these numbers were registered, there would almost certainly in any subsequent management scheme have to be severe reductions. That would surely at least give rise to a great deal of complaint and even claims for compensation for expropriation.
    Then there are the other areas of hill country—again, I think, in Wales and the Pennines. Here, there are long chains of unstinted commons running across county boundaries. Grazing animals are no respecters of county boundaries and wander across them at leisure. It will be very difficult and certainly unjust unless relative quantification can be kept in step where an area crosses the boundaries between one local authority and another. This cannot be achieved unless and until there has been a comprehensive survey of the whole of each area of common and until there has been obtained the consent of all the commoners on each and every common to one comprehensive common standard. That would be wholly outside the jurisdiction and capacity of the commons commissioners acting within separate county boundaries.
    As registration is not in itself any evidence of legal title, we should then be in a worse position than at present because commoners would be uncertain of their legal standing although they would have to register fixed numbers. That kind of uncertainty, if created by compulsory quantification, could only be resolved by a later stinting scheme. As I have said, the biggest objection is that stinting arrangements can be reached only
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    by allocating the resources of the common and regulating their use, and before one can assess the resources or carrying capacity there are a number of factors that must be taken into account.
    It is a long list. There is the control of public access. There is nature conservation, which may eliminate certain grazing rights. Certain portions of the common may be sold or leased. There is the question of archaeological preservation, and the very important question of fencing or gating—because, if a common is fenced, it may greatly increase its carrying capacity. There is the question whether any part of the common may be subject to arable cultivation; the question of the state and scale of grassland husbandry of the common, and forestry and silviculture. There is even the question of the control of gypsies, and of water supplies, and scrub control. If there is not effective scrub control the grazing will be reduced; conversely, if there is control, it may be extended.
    Then there is the question of the degree of public access, in the form of games or sports, such as horse riding, golf and other organised games, together with camping. Some or all of those factors are bound to occur on most commons, and until it is known what effect they have on the carrying capacity of the common it is impossible to decide upon a class or the sum that must be arrived at before any numbers can be decided.
    I have wearied the House by indicating some of the practical difficulties. I assure hon. Members that these are not idle fears. They all exist today, and can be seen. They will at once become apparent if this quantification at the registration stage is insisted upon.
    We believe that it is not essential to press for this decision and that it would be far better to concentrate on the registration of claims in respect of all the dominant land upon which many claims are based. There is nothing original in this. That was an essential first stage in the traditional stinting award—but it was only the first stage. Our suggested Amendments are in the alternative. The new Clause spells out the detail required for comprehensive registration, and if still more flexibility is desired—and I would prefer that—Amendment No. 34 gives the Minister power to prescribe what matters should be registered.

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    I would much prefer to see him have those admittedly wide powers, because we are agreed on the common objective, and if he can wait a little before specifying exactly what is to be registered he will probably have the advantage of being able to study the forthcoming Cambridge University and Nuffield Report, which will amount to a vade mecum of the management of commons and will make quite clear what are the indispensable matters to insist upon for registration, and what matters are best avoided.
    The Minister of Land and Natural Resources (Mr. Frederick Willey): The House is greatly indebted to the hon. Member for Norfolk, South (Mr. J. E. B. Hill) and his hon. Friends for the efforts that they have made to solve a very difficult problem. The hon. Member talks about a controversy. I do not regard it as a controversy. We recognise the difficulty. I have tried hard to arrive at a solution which might be more acceptable.
    The difficulties were clearly brought out by the speech which the hon. Member for Norfolk, South has just made because, as I emphasised in Standing Committee, what we are trying to do—I hoped that this would be agreed between us—is to establish the legal rights of the commoners. It may well be that in many cases when we have established those rights we will face difficulties. As I emphasised in Committee, and I emphasise it again, I think that these are ancient rights which ought to be recognised, and our endeavours, as far as registration goes, should be to register those rights as accurately as we can.
    The hon. Gentleman talked about public access to common, nature conservation of the common, archeological preservation, husbandry, forestry, water, even gypsies and camping. These are not matters which should qualify and determine the legal rights of commoners. It may be that when we consider management these are matters which we should consider. What I am anxious to do, and I have been trying very hard to carry hon. Members opposite with me on this, is to consider these things, recognising the established rights of the commoners as accurately and as definitely as we can establish them. Here there is the difficulty that the records of manorial courts,
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    since the abolition of copyhold tenure, are hard to come by and we are faced with a difficult problem. We have the Commons Commissioners and they have to discharge this obligation as best they can.
    The Royal Commission was faced with this difficulty and we are following its recommendation. When we talk about the importance of being definite one of the things that I emphasise is that, if we are to consider a scheme of management, it is important to know the relative rights of those who have rights in the common
    Mr. Corfield: The thing that worries me is that, as I understand, it is quite possible to have a legal right in gross for a number of cattle, unlimited in number. Where I think the cases in the old books have proved that this is not possible is only when an attempt is made to establish this by prescription. Where the origin of the right can be proved as a grant it is possible. Therefore, I think that the right hon. Gentleman is not registering rights that exist, but he may in some cases be cutting down rights by putting a number on something which is, perfectly legitimately, unlimited.
    Mr. Willey: I would just make two points. First, rights are definite if we establish them. On the second practical issue, which is important, I think that if he looks forward and anticipates schemes of management—and one has to determine the relative rights of commoners on the common—the only way this can really be done is by having definition. That is a point which we considered in another context, when we discussed whether there should be a provisional register. If we had a provisional register we would have to move to a definite register at a later stage. I think that that was merely putting off a decision which would have to be taken if we are to tackle this problem.
    I recognise that the new Clause has some disadvantages, which the hon. Gentleman for Gloucestershire, South (Mr. Corfield) anticipated. I would mention only two. I think that it would only add confusion if we introduce "appendant, appurtenant" into the definition. I agree with the Royal Commission about this; it would not make things any easier and would serve no useful purpose. The main criticism of the Clause is that it

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    goes on to give "needs" as the criterion and one difficulty is that there is no definition of needs. It would be very difficult for a Commons Commissioner to apply this criterion. The other difficulty is that we should be changing the law by defining the rights as determined by needs. A very simple illustration would be a prescriptive right. For this reason, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will not press the New Clause. It would mean a practical difficulty, that there is no definition of needs and it would mean a substantial change of the law which, I am sure, the hon. Gentleman would not wish to pursue.
    9.30 p.m.
    The hon. Member said that he had a particular preference for Amendment No. 34. The difficulty there is that it would merely leave it to regulations. I have found out that if this were left to regulations they would have to provide as we already provide in Clause 15. In other words, the regulations would empower me only to do what I feel I must do in the present Clause 15. We have to be definite and certain about this. We cannot start commons registration unless this is defined and certain. Once the process is begun, we could not alter the criterion.
    Therefore, this does not meet our difficulty—we have to decide on quantification—because I should have to decide and, having decided, we could not change the criteria or the process during registration. Amendment No. 41 also refers to regulations. This would give me no powers which I do not have at present. For this reason, I do not think that it would help. It might cause some difficulty about the powers at present in the Bill. Amendment No. 19 was the second preference of the hon. Gentleman. I had a good deal of sympathy with this. We are now trying to meet the point which the hon. Gentleman made in Standing Committee that there is the appearance of finality. Yet the whole discussion, particularly the contribution of the hon. Member for Norfolk, South, has made it clear that this will be subject to adjustment, that there will be schemes of management and improvement.
    There is a drafting difficulty over the Amendment. I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman appreciates that the
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    result of his Amendment would be that any variation would require the consent of all those who held rights in common, so that a person with a right of piscary would have to give his consent to a variation in rights of grazing. I do not think that the hon. Member expected that that would be the effect. This is the point on which I have tried to meet him and have failed. That is why I am advised that the effect of the Amendment might be to restrict the rights which commoners at present have in contract to vary their rights of common.
    This is a very real difficulty, which I will explain when I come to the Government Amendments. I concede at once to the hon. Gentleman the initiative in this respect. I do not claim to have anticipated him, but I was anxious to see what he might propose. I was sympathetic towards this and still wish to meet him as far as I can.
    There were difficulties with the hon. Member's Amendment. First, it was so drawn that the consent of those who had rights other than grazing rights would have been necessary to variation. Secondly, I am advised that the Amendment would have had the effect of limiting the rights which commoners have to vary their rights of contract. I put down an Amendment to Clause 13 to make it quite clear that we are providing for variation of rights of common. I agree that this does not make it very clear to whoever studies the Bill that we intend to make it clear in Clause 13 that there will be variation.
    In the further Amendments to Clause 15 I have been able to meet the point which the hon. Member made in Standing Committee that, as in Clause 1, we should make it clear that although we are providing for a definition of those rights, Parliament intends to carry out the recommendations of the Royal Commission and there will be legislation which will provide for the variation of the rights which are quantified under Clause 15. That is straightforward. What I have not been able to do is to meet the point which the hon. Member makes in his own Amendment that these rights can also be varied by agreement or in other ways by the commoners themselves.
    My difficulty has been that which I pointed out on his own Amendment—that I have been advised that the various

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    efforts which we have made to meet this point have been unsuccessful and we have not been able to produce a form of words which would not possibly limit these rights and—
    Mr. Corfield: The right hon. Gentleman is saying that there may be, by custom of the country, a means by which this can be done which, if it does not happen to be by mutual consent of all those concerned, we should be cutting it out by his words.
    Mr. Willey: I am obliged to the hon. Member. That is the difficulty which we face. What I have done is to take his Amendment No. 19, and to try to improve it by Amendment. But I have failed. I then put down two Amendments in Clause 13 particularly to call attention to the fact that these rights can be varied because I recognised that under the Amendment which I have made to Clause 15 it is unsafe to try to do this because we might be at serious risk of prejudicing some of those with rights of common who may wish to vary their rights.
    May I tell hon. Members of the other steps which I will take? By publicty we shall try to make this as clear as we can. We intend with the co-operation of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food to take the professional staff of the Agricultural Land Service and to hold meetings which will be informal and informative of the commoners so that we may have fruitful discussions between the commoners and there can be an opportunity to give general advice and guidance to assist the commoners in proceeding to registration.
    The hon. Member realises that we have discussed this matter before. I hope that he will agree that while I have not been able to accept that quantification should be avoided, I have tried as successfully as I can—not as successfully as I should have wished—to meet his point that we should make clear that although we are quantifying the right under Clause 15, this is not final and Parliament will be proceeding in due course to further legislation on the commons which will provide for the management and the improvement of the commons.
    Mr. Peter Mills: I will delay the House for only a few moments
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    to issue a word of warning to the Minister now that the Bill has begun to be understood—now that its meaning is percolating down, as it were—because the problem of quantification is indeed a thorny one. Now that the implications of the Measure have percolated down to the local branches of the N.F.U. and the commoners' associations, grave concern, to say the least, is being caused.
    Several people have asked me what will happen once the Bill become law. "Do the Government really realise the difficulty and muddle there will be?", I have been asked. I therefore pass this warning on to the Minister because there is mounting anxiety about the difficulties associated with quantification at this first stage rather than at the second. The Minister must realise that he has been warned about the difficulties and problems—warned not merely by me but by many of my hon. Friends in Committee, by many important people outside Parliament and by the N.F.U.
    Mr. Willey: It might help if I tell the hon. Gentleman at this point in his remarks that we have had further discussions with the N.F.U., and I think that its members now concede that what we are doing represents the best way of tackling this problem.
    Mr. Mills: The right hon. Gentleman may have that impression, but that is not the case from the point of view of the Devon branch of the N.F.U. I appreciate that the members there may be a little difficult, but I assure the right hon. Gentleman that what he says is not so in their case. They are indeed worried about the real problem which exists, remembering that a large tract of Devon—and, I believe, of Cornwall too—is affected by the proposals. I assure the Minister, therefore, that there is still grave concern.
    Just to specify numbers of animals without management entering into the matter—with all that that means, although I will not go into that subject again now—will cause considerable trouble, some chaos and may even sabotage the whole Bill. That would be a great pity, so I now warn the Minister about these problems. I do not think that he has settled these issues yet, certainly not to the satisfaction of the Devon branch of the N.F.U.

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    I welcome the news that the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and its officers are to help to solve this difficulty. Nevertheless, we must realise that the problem is not so much the farmers, who more or less know what they stock on the moors and commons. The Minister has still not answered the question which I posed in Committee about the problem of the claims which will come from people outside the farming world and who, I am sure, will be registered. I hope that the Minister will now answer that question.
    Mr. James Scott-Hopkins: I thank the Minister for the way in which he has dealt with the Opposition new Clause and the obvious effort which he, the Joint Parliamentary Secretary and their officials have made in trying to meet the points which my hon. Friends put in Committee and during the intervening period. I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his approach to the matter because he has adopted a kind and sympathetic attitude.
    I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that no political controversy is involved in this issue. Both sides of the House are trying to achieve the same object, which is to get the right type of machinery to secure properly managed commons as a result of the passage of the Bill. What controversy there is has arisen over the method by which this may be achieved.
    In the debate today we have had some extremely good discussion and fresh ground has been broken. My hon. Friends have not merely repeated the points they made in Committee. At that stage we had an exhaustive debate on the various merits and demerits of the proposals before us and tonight we have heard some further excellent speeches. My hon. Friend the Member for Norfolk, South (Mr. J. E. B. Hill) made an excellent speech on the problems which will face the Minister if he persists in the attitude he has adopted. The Minister's mellow tone makes it quite obvious that he intends to persist in it.
    9.45 p.m.
    I accept the right hon. Gentleman's point about lack of definition making it possible for the new Clause to be interpreted as an attempt to change the law,
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    but I do not think that he has met our points on the other Amendments. I might mention, in passing, that in connection with Amendment No. 41 the right hon. Gentleman said that he already had these powers. I take his word for that, of course, but I should like to be told where they exist.
    Our other two Amendments perhaps represent our first and second preferences. The Minister turned down the idea of taking the powers suggested, because he said that they were already there. I disagree, as I think it is necessary for him to meet the points made by my hon. Friends and, in particular, the argument of my hon. Friend the Member for Torrington (Mr. Peter Mills). There would be no need for him to take the suggested action straight away; the methods to be used could be put off until the second stage.
    In my constituency in Cornwall there is quite an extensive amount of commons. The commoners as such, and the farmers as such, will find great difficulty in quantifying their existing rights. I do not say that it cannot be done—it can be done, and the Minister has said that it will have to be done later in any case—but it will put the Commons Commissioners, who will have to decide the issue, in an impossible position, and put the commoners in an extremely difficult position when they do not know whether a common on which they may now have rights will be fenced or enclosed, or what type or kind of management there will be. They will not know whether they should put in for this or that amount of stint.
    This is a very important point because, as the Minister said, registration under Clause 10, if accepted after the time allowed, will be as final as possible, with the exception of the variations embodied in the Minister's own Amendments. It will be as final as may be, with very little likelihood of increase. That means that registration of rights that up to now have been sans nombre will be of great importance but extremely difficult to achieve. The commoner, and the Commissioners at a later date, will be put in a very difficult position.
    I therefore ask the right hon. Gentleman to look once again at our Amendment No. 34 in Clause 15, which would

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    give the Minister the right to make regulations prescribing the way in which this should be done. I am sure that it is the right way to go about things, and if the right hon. Gentleman agreed, it would give the necessary breathing space by which these registrations could be gathered together, and a comprehensive picture obtained before quantification in anything like finality took place.
    The Minister's method goes a long way towards meeting our case about the variableness of the registration, but the registration is not final, and those who register must not be under any impression that it is. If they were given that impression and at a later stage under the management then taking place their rights were reduced, they could well be in a position to ask for compensation. As it is, with the Minister's Amendment, that position would not arise. It seems a very cumbersome way of going about things, particularly the last line of Amendment No. 36:
    "or such other number or numbers as Parliament may hereafter determine."
    I take it that the Minister has taken what advice he can and that this is the only way in which this can be done. The right hon. Gentleman did not answer my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucestershire, South (Mr. Corfield) who asked if this means that, for each and every new common, Parliament has to make a decision and the Minister has to lay an order. I do not think the Minister wants to have to do that or that he wants to have to make regulatory powers.
    While the Minister has gone an appreciable way—and I thank him for doing so and for the courtesy with which he has done so—towards meeting the case we have put forward on variableness in Amendments Nos. 35 and 36, he has not gone far enough. Although we accept his argument about our new Clause, I hope he will look again at the point made by Amendment No. 34. That is the correct way of dealing with the problem. If the matter is left as it is it will cause a great deal of difficulty and expense to commoners and a great deal of difficulty and trouble for the Commons Commissioners and for the right hon. Gentleman himself if he is still in a position to administer the law.
    I ask the right hon. Gentleman to think again about Amendment No. 34 as I
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    believe that it is the correct way of dealing with this thorny problem. We are all trying to achieve the same end. This is not a political controversy. I am certain that if this were done in the way we suggest we should achieve what the right hon. Gentleman and we are trying to do.
    Mr. Michael Jopling: We ought to have some clarification about one point which arises. The House is in serious difficulty over the question of how quantification is to be done. There is a difference between this side of the House and hon. Members opposite about how much dispute there will be over claims put in by commoners. We think that there will be many disputes, while the Minister thinks that there will be very few. It is beyond argument that some disputes will certainly arise and that some people—perhaps few, perhaps many—will put in excessive claims where there are rights of this sort, sans nombre, and a great deal of time and expense will be taken up by disputes being heard by the Commissioners.
    We cannot seriously consider what the Minister is proposing unless we know on what basis disputes about quantification are to be settled. That is the whole basis of this part of the Bill. I earnestly ask the Minister to tell us on what basis, agriculturally, these grazing rights are to be settled. I am very disturbed that the Minister has not seen fit to involve the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food in the various debates that we have had on the Bill. This is on his own shoulders. If he feels that he can manage without that Minister that is fair enough, but he must be prepared to answer these questions which are so important. He must say what he means by quantification and how disputes will be settled from an agricultural point of view.
    There are two extreme possibilities. First, in relation to sheep grazing, are the sheep numbers to be settled on the basis of present usage? If this is done, it will be unfair to commoners who for a variety of reasons are not at the moment using their rights. That is the one extreme. At the other extreme, will the sheep numbers be assessed by giving equal rights to all those who have rights to graze sans nombre on the common? If this is done, clearly it will be unfair to present users of the common.

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    This is the basis of the difficulty. I do not think that we can proceed with the Bill, unless the Minister tells us how the present difficulty of quantification will be sorted out. After the matter had been raised in Committee, the Minister drew attention to a letter which he had received from the Cumberland and North Westmorland Branch of the National Farmers' Union. It was a most helpful letter. The Minister was kind enough to quote it. The letter drew attention to the difficulty which I have pointed out tonight. However, the Minister did not go any way towards explaining how the difficulty will be overcome. He has skated round this very serious problem throughout the proceedings on the Bill.
    We must have an answer to this tonight. If the Minister will not answer this point, and will not explain how quantification is to be worked out, he must tell us why he is not prepared to do this, because he has shirked this responsibility throughout the proceedings on the Bill. The choice is clear. The Minister must tell us how it will be worked out, or, if he refuses to do this, he must tell us why he refuses, because we must have this answer.
    Sir Henry Studholme: There is one point with regard to the horrible word "quantification", registering the number of animals that any commoner is allowed to pasture. I am not a lawyer. I would like the Minister to repeat something which I understood him to say. I hope that he will repeat it in simple language so that farmers and others concerned can understand it. I understood him to say that the number of animals registered at the first stage under Clause 15 will not be hard and fast but may very well have to be altered in the second stage. Is that clear? Is that what the Minister means? If it is not, farmers and commoners will think that they have been defrauded if in the second stage the numbers they have registered have to be reduced.
    Mr. Willey: I am sorry that I did not reply to the point about my own Amendment to Clause 15. I am advised that that is not the effect. It merely indicates that Parliament may provide. It does not mean that Parliament would provide in the case of each individual common.
    Mr. Scott-Hopkins: What does the Minister mean by that? Does he mean that there will have to be Orders, Statutory Regulations, or a Bill? I have a suspicion that it means that a Bill will be necessary for each and every common.
    Mr. Willey: It would have to be a Bill, but it would not necessarily be a Bill for each common. I have used the words previously used in Clause 1. I take the point that I took before: it is offensive to anticipate what Parliament may do. We have gone as far as we can go in anticipating that Parliament may do something. What we were anxious to do was to meet the Opposition in making it as clear as we could that whatever is established by registration is liable to be affected by subsequent legislation providing for the management and improvement of commons.
    On his question about criteria I cannot satisfy the hon. Gentleman. We saw the difficulties of trying to define criteria when we discussed the new Clause. I cannot satisfy him because the Commissioners have to establish the rights according to the law. I remember saying in Standing Committee that in the sort of case he had in mind that probably the Commissioner would need an assessor.
    It being Ten o'clock, the debate stood adjourned.
    Ordered,
    That the Proceedings on Government Business may be entered upon and proceeded with at this day's Sitting at any hour, though opposed.—[Mr. George Rogers.]
    Question again proposed, That the Clause be read a Second time.
    Mr. Willey: This is an extraordinarily complex and difficult subject but one has to pay regard to local custom and rights and one may well have in such cases as the hon. Member referred to in Committee a reference to an assessor to help the Commissioner in giving a decision.
    Mr. Jopling: How is an assessor to begin to know how to do this? There is no law which says how one reduces rights to a specified number. The law is of no help to an assessor. I know many agricultural valuers, and my father was one. These would be the sort of people who would be the assessors but one can have one agricultural valuer saying one thing

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    and another saying something entirely different. Unless the Minister gives a lead the assessor will be absolutely lost.
    Mr. Willey: This is the one thing that I cannot do. If I appoint a Commissioner to establish the rights according to the law—and this is the dialogue which we have had in Committee—I cannot advise him to pay attention to considerations which ought not properly to affect him. This is the difficulty, because the manorial courts have gone.
    As to the question of disuse, a right is not necessarily lost by disuse. Again it will be for the Commissioner to decide whether the right is established notwithstanding disuse. I cannot accept the proposal made by hon. Members opposite because, as I have said, in all honesty if I accepted it I would then have to bring in immediately a regulation to the effect of Clause 15. I must do this for the good reason that we are holding meetings to explain these matters and having explanatory publicity. It is important that we should be as definite as we can be so that the explanation can be understood. It would be very difficult if this matter were left open and the Ministry had to explain at meetings which we may hold that the position may be one way or another.
    We have had the difficulty that these matters have been discussed in the light of a provisional register, but there are no Amendments before us suggesting that we should have a provisional register. This is a final register. We have a timetable and I have been pressed again and again to be as expeditious as I can. If we had regulations we would have to define in the sense of Clause 15 and once we defined we could not go back. The proposal now put to us would introduce not only an element of uncertainty but also possibly an element of unfairness.
    Mr. Corfield: May I, with the leave of the House, say a few words before the debate concludes?
    Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Dr. Horace King): The hon. Gentleman moved the Second Reading of the new Clause. He does not need the leave of the House to speak again.
    Mr. Corfield: I am obliged, Mr. Deputy-Speaker.
    What concerns me is that the Minister is saying, in effect, that he must establish legal rights. As I understand, it is quite possible to have a legal right without limit. I quote now from Cheshire, page 495:
    "In the case of a common in gross, there is no objection in principle to the existence of pasture without stint, in other words the right to put an unlimited number of cattle on the servient tenement because, as it is not appurtenant to anything, there is no dominant tenement with reference to the needs of which the content of the rights must be apportioned."
    He goes on to quote a judicial statement and sums up in this way:
    "Such an unstinted right might no doubt be granted expressly by deed, but it cannot be prescribed for."
    I think that the Minister is contradicting himself when he says that he must not alter the law, because that is precisely what he is doing. If he is insisting that every right, sans nombre, must be registered with a specific number, he is altering the law in respect of these particular rights in gross which do exist with an unlimited number attached to them.
    I suggest to him that there really is a strong case, particularly following what was said by my hon. Friend the Member for Westmorland (Mr. Jopling), for at least giving himself the opportunity to prescribe in regulations—even if this would be additional only to the powers he wants to take under Clause 15—for specific types of right, and there may indeed be special categories of common for which provision should be made. The right hon. Gentleman says that he does not wish to do anything to alter the law which might cut down anybody's rights. As I understand, if one insists upon putting a definite number on all these rights—which may well be legitimate in respect of some of them, particularly those which are either appurtenant or appendant—that will entail a cutting down of rights in respect of those which are in gross.
    I appeal to the right hon. Gentleman again to think hard and consult before we actually come to the Amendment. I confess that this new Clause is not the most satisfactory of all the methods we have, and I suggest that Amendment No. 34 is by far the most satisfactory way of

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    proceeding, whether compared with our other efforts or with the Minister's. I ask him to try to meet us on Amendment No. 34, but, in the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Motion.
    Motion and Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

    New Clause.—(ECCLESIASTICAL BENEFICES.)
    Where any ecclesiastical benefice of the Church of England is vacant the Church Commissioners shall have power to take any action which, but for the vacancy, would fall to be taken under this Act by the incumbent for the time being.—[Mr. Corfield]
    Brought up, and read the First time.
    Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Clause be read a Second time.—[Mr. Corfield.]
    Mr. Deputy-Speaker: It is proposed that with this new Clause we take the following four Amendments, all in Clause 19: Amendment No. 42, in page 10, line 32, to leave out paragraph (g) and to insert:
    (g) for enabling the Church Commissioners to take any action under this Act which would, but for the vacancy of any particular ecclesiastical benefice of the Church of England, falls to be taken by the incumbent for the time being.
    Amendment No. 43, in page 10, line 32, to leave out paragraph (g).
    Amendment No. 44, in page 10, line 32, to leave out from "act" to "ecclesiastical" in line 33 and to insert:
    "with respect to any right belonging to an".
    Amendment No. 45, in page 10, line 32, to leave out from "act" to "ecclesiastical" in line 33 and to insert:
    "with respect to any land or rights belonging to an".
    Mr. Antony Buck: This new Clause and all the Amendments which go with it are relevant to Clause 19 (1,g). I say "relevant", though in the context of this Bill I suppose that a more appropriate term would be "appurtenant to" or "levant" and "couchant with". Clause 19 (1,g) provides that the Minister may make regulations
    "for enabling the Church Commissioners to act on behalf of the incumbent of any
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    ecclesiastical benefice of the Church of England which is vacant".
    The first point which arises is that that does not make sense. This was pointed out in Committee, when the Minister said that he was quite unbiased about it and would look at the matter again. We note with gratification that the right hon. Gentleman has put down an Amendment to cause the paragraph to make sense. In the first place, as at present drafted it does not make sense because, ex hypothesi, there is no incumbent there if a benefice is vacant.
    The House can make its selection about the ways of dealing with the "sense" point. One attempt which I have made is Amendment No. 42. I concede at once that perhaps it is not the most elegant of drafting, but it does at least make sense, and Amendment No. 43 goes with it. Amendment No. 44 is an admirable Amendment put forward by my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester-sire, South (Mr. Corfield), and that makes sense. Finally, I am glad to say that there is Amendment No. 45, put down by the Minister himself, which one has to concede also makes sense.
    The first matter which arises is that we should make sense of Clause 19(1,g), and we hope that, with the many alternatives open to the House, it will select one of them and achieve a sensible Clause 19 (1,g), if it decides to persist in keeping that clause in its present form at all.
    That raises the second issue which comes before the House in considering the new Clause, and that is a consideration which was again raised in Committee as to whether it is right to provide for matters such as this by regulation and whether it would not be preferable, as envisaged by the new Clause, that the matter be dealt with in the body of the Bill—namely, that it should be stated quite clearly that,
    "Where any ecclesiastical benefice of the Church of England is vacant the Church Commissioners shall have power to take any action which, but for the vacancy, would fall to be taken under this Act by the incumbent for the time being."
    I do not know about the elegance of the drafting, although it seems to be effective and cogent and I hope and expect that the Minister will support us and will adopt the Clause on behalf of the Government. I am confident in taking

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    that attitude because of what the right hon. Gentleman said in Committee. The point was raised, and he said:
    "One is intending to make a provision. The provision is explicit, and unless there are difficulties which means that one ought to do it by regulation, I shall see whether we can meet the hon. Gentleman on this matter."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing Committee A, 15th June, col. 237.]
    That does not entirely make sense, just as the Clause originally did not, but what the Minister was saying was that he had made up his mind that the right people to act where there is a vacancy are the Church Commissioners. If that be the case, we feel that it would be entirely right that it should be said and should be put in the Bill as a definite statement.
    If the Minister does not accept the new Clause, we on this side should like to hear what are the difficulties which have arisen. He conceded in Committee that only if there are difficulties should a matter such as this be dealt with by regulation, and that normally such a matter is dealt with in the body of the Act. We would agree with that, because it is in accordance with precedent that a matter such as this is dealt with in the Act.
    Perhaps I might refer the Minister to Section 205 of the Town and Country Planning, Act, 1962, where, in subsection (2,b) he will find the following words,
    "in any case, the fee simple shall, for the purposes of a compulsory acquisition of the property under Part V of this Act, be treated as being vested in the Church Commissioners, and any notice to treat shall be served, or be deemed to have been served, accordingly".
    Here is a matter which is almost pari passu with what we are considering now where it was thought appropriate in the body of the Act to mention that the Church Commissioners in similar circumstances should be the right body to act.
    We shall be interested to hear whether there are any special difficulties of the character that the Minister referred to in Committee which prevent the Minister from adopting the new Clause, because we have no doubt that the proper place for the provision is in the body of the Act, and it is not an appropriate matter about which to give the Minister the power to make regulations.
    10.15 p.m.
    The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Land and Natural Resources (Mr. Arthur Skeffington): First, I would express the gratitude of my right hon. Friend and myself to the hon. Member for Colchester (Mr. Buck) for the matter which he mentioned. I do not think that I can agree with him that the Clause as originally drafted was quite as idiotic as he made out, but this is not to say that it cannot be improved, and we think that our Amendment No. 45 improves the Clause and simplifies what we want to ensure in it.
    As to the new Clause, my right hon. Friend, having consulted with those concerned, as he promised in Committee, has examined whether it would be advisable to provide for this matter directly in the body of the Bill, as the Clause suggests. I ought to say that paragraph (g) has had a somewhat unfortunate history. I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman, who has been so interested in it, realises that it appeared only after discussion in another place. It was not in the Bill as originally drafted. It was put in at the instance of the Church Commissioners. We no sooner get it in and it comes from the other place, and there is this objection.
    Nevertheless, we have reconsidered the matter to ascertain the best way of dealing with Church property which might involve ecclesiastical property or rights covered by the Bill. We have consulted our advisers, and our view is that it should not be dealt with in the Bill. Elegant as is the drafting of the new Clause, it could not possibly provide for all the types of ecclesiastical rights relating to the subject matter of the Bill.
    We are dealing with a much more complicated matter than the transfer of the fee simple in the Town and Country Planning Acts. It is true that there are precedents for referring to these matters in a Statute. If I may give a point to the hon. Gentleman, he would have found a very much better precedent in the Pipelines Act. However, he will notice that it is at very considerable length, and if we wanted to cover all the types of rights in ecclesiastical property in this Bill it would make the subject matter of the Bill diminish in relation to the total length of the Bill. Those who have complained that this is a difficult matter, and that

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    their constituents will not understand it, would find it even more difficult if a third of the Bill were taken up with such very complicated drafting. We cannot add this at present, and we think that it would not be in the interests of the Church Commissioners themselves, a view which, I think, they support.
    The matter will be provided for in regulations. My right hon. Friend will have detailed consultations with the Church Commissioners so that the regulations will meet all that they have in mind. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will not feel it necessary to press his other Amendments on the point since in Amendment No. 45 we have substantially given the hon. Gentleman what he thought right and what we, on reflection, think right. We believe that the new definition puts the matter adequately and simply and leaves out all reference to "on behalf of the incumbent" because this is somebody acting when an incumbent is not there and we think this is a simpler and better way. We hope that when the time comes the hon. Gentleman will not press his Amendments, but will support Amendment No. 45
    Mr. Peter Mills: I support the Clause, but I want to mention again my grave doubts about the whole matter being in the hands of the Church Commissioners only. I mentioned this point in Committee and still think it is important. We can hardly expect the Church Commissioners to be in touch with this sort of problem. Admittedly, it might be important that they should have the last say. But what do they really know in London about grazing rights and all that it means I do not think that they know very much about it. Surely it is the duty of the parochial church council during a vacancy to look after this matter, or at least the duty of the rural dean.
    Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Dr. Horace King): Is the hon. Member speaking in favour in the Clause, or against it?
    Mr. Mills: I am just coming to my point about this, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, that surely the parochial church council or the rural dean should advise the Church Commissioners and that it should not be left entirely to the Church Commissioners. We have previously been into the matter of hunting parsons and
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    parsons who graze sheep and cattle on the moors and I do not want to go into that again. We have many vacancies, and we do not want to lose these rights. I ask the Minister to let the Church Commissioners know that they should at least take the advice of the parochial church council and the rural dean.
    Mr. Graham Page: The Parliamentary Secretary has missed the point. If the incumbent were in office the Minister would not need to make regulations. This new Clause would merely give the Church Commisisoners the power to carry out what the incumbent would do if he were there. This is a wholesale gift, as it were, to the Church Commissioners. More important, the hon. Gentleman suggested what is a very bad parliamentary procedure that the House should delegate to the Minister the right to legislate and that the Minister should then sub-delegate that right to the Church Commissioners. Clause 19 starts with the words,
    "The Minister may make regulations …"
    That is well and good. If he is to make complete regulations we have delegated power to him to do so. But then the Clause goes no to say that he may make regulations enabling the Church Commissioners to do something.
    That is really giving the Church Commissioners power to carry out sub-delegated legislation and it is bad parliamentary procedure. Far better, by our new Clause, to give the Church Commissioners the power to carry out quite clear duties which the incumbent would have carried out himself without having the status of delegated legislation—delegated to the Minister by this House with the Minister then sub-delegating it to the Church Commissioners.
    Mr. Corfield: I am not satisfied with the Parliamentary Secretary's reply. He said that this provision is not as idiotic as it appears. But when there is a Clause which provides for one to do something on behalf of somebody who does not exist by definition, I regard that as a little stupid. I will not put it stronger. We hear about ghost writers in this House and we do not want ghost parsons creeping into the Bill.
    It is no excuse to say that the House of Lords forgot about this and have now brought it into the wrong place. That

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    does not make the situation any better. I support the view that the proper place for this provision is in the body of the Bill. In the Clause as originally drafted—which the hon. Gentleman did not think particularly idiotic—provision was merely made for the Church Commissioners to act where the incumbent is non-existent.
    This is precisely what our new Clause itself says, that
    "Where any ecclesiastical benefice … is vacant the Church Commissioners shall have power to take any action which, but for the vacancy, would fall to be taken under this Act by the incumbent for the time being."
    I cannot see that there is anything in the Bill or in the registration under the Bill which does not fall within those words
    "… any action which, but for the vacancy, would fail to be taken …"
    This would not be the last Government who would get beyond saying that a thing cannot be done. A lot can be done if one is determined. I challenge anyone in this House or in Whitehall to tell me of a single thing that the Church Commissioners could not do by virtue of the Bill. Unless the hon. Gentleman can give us an example, he should follow precedent and put this provision in the body of the Bill where it belongs.
    Question put and negatived.

    Clause 1.—(REGISTRATION OF COMMONS AND TOWN OR VILLAGE GREENS AND OWNERSHIP OF AND RIGHTS OVER THEM.)
    Mr. Corfield: I beg to move Amendment No. 4, Clause 1, in page 1, line 11, to leave out paragraph (c) and to insert:
    (c) persons claiming to be or found to be owners of such land or becoming the owners thereof by virtue of this Act.
    Mr. Deputy-Speaker: It will be convenient to discuss, at the same time, the three Amendments standing in the name of the hon. Gentleman and the names of some of his hon. Friends, Amendment No. 1, in page 1, line 8, after "is", insert "claimed to be".
    In line 10, at beginning insert "claims to".
    In line 11, at beginning insert "claims to".
    Mr. Corfield: Amendments No. 1, No. 2 and No. 3 are exactly the same as Amendments which were discussed in Committee and I shall not waste time
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    discussing them now. But at this stage in registration the rights required to be registered can only, by the nature of things, be claims to rights and do not become rights by the process of the Bill until that process becomes final under Clause 10.
    It therefore seems to us, with respect to our mother tongue, that it would be a good idea to say what we mean and not what the draftsman has got into the habit of murdering the English language with. I still maintain that this is what we should do. No doubt the Minister will tell us that there are great drafting difficulties. I do not want to waste time repeating what was said in Committee. I accordingly turn to Amendment No. 4, which is a variant. This has even more substance because, by virtue of Clause 10, when the ownership of land is registered under Clause 1 (1,c) we are specifically told that a person having registered himself as an owner means nothing in terms of his establishing any form of title. We had a really long debate on that point in Committee, and it was mentioned in the Second Reading debate. The Minister convinced us that, odd as it seems, that it was a sensible thing to do, in view of the fact that this was not the type of legislation or procedure which should affect such a complicated thing as title—especially title to a common, which tends to be more complicated than anything else. But the corollary seems to us to be that it makes bigger nonsense than ever to use the term "ownership of such land" as an item to be registered under Clause 1(1).
    We have, therefore, proposed a new paragraph (c) in respect of which I willingly admit that I am indebted to the Minister, having picked his brain on this, as he has picked my brain on one or two other matters. Persons, in the ordinary sense, do not become owners under the Act, but certain local authorities do, under the Interpretation clause. We are mutually agreed that this is satisfactory and I hope that the Minister will accept the Amendment.
    Mr. Willey: As the hon. Member said, Amendments Nos. 1, 2 and 3 would be unacceptable because they would require consequential Amendments which have not been put down.
    Mr. Corfield: Oh.
    Mr. Willey: This is a fact. If the hon. Member feels that these Amendments should be accepted he should have put down the consequential Amendments.
    I hope now to be able to restore the harmony of the House. As he has said,
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    Amendment No. 4 covers the point raised in Committee, when we conceded that there might be a disadvantage in not making it clear that title was not afforded as a result of registration. For this reason, I hope that the House will accept the Amendment.
    Amendment agreed to.

    Clause 2.—(REGISTRATION AUTHORITIES.)
    Mr. Corfield: I beg to move Amendment No, 6, Clause 2, in page 2, line 9, after "shall", to insert:
    ", subject to subsection (3) of this section,".
    Mr. Deputy-Speaker: With this Amendment it will be convenient to take Amendment No. 7, Clause 2, at end insert:
    (3) Where, subsequent to the passing of this Act any county borough ceases to be a county borough, the Minister may, by order, nominate as Commons Registration Authority such other new or existing local authority as he considers appropriate, notwithstanding that it is neither a county council nor a county borough council.
    Mr. Corfield: Yes, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. Very shortly, the purpose of the Amendment is to ensure that if during the course of this preliminary five-years' period, or whatever period is prescribed during which registration takes place, a change of status occurs in any local authority which, under the Act, is a registration authority, the Minister shall be enabled to ensure continuity by keeping the register going by whatever is the most suitable substitute authority created under the boundary change. The local government legislation contains an omnibus Section which enables the Minister to put in the actual order which alters the boundaries or status of a local authority a very large number of consequential matters. The real purpose of this Amendment is to ask the Minister if he can assure us that this matter would come under that omnibus Section. If he can assure us of that we would readily withdraw it. If not, will he accept the Amendment?
    10.30 p.m.
    Mr. Skeffington: I am happy to assure the hon. Gentleman, and the House that this matter has been very fully considered by my right hon. Friend, and the Minister of Housing and Local Government. The Amendment envisages one sort of change but there may be a great many. There may be an amalgamation of registration authorities or they may be divided, or their boundaries may be changed, and we have consulted the Ministry of Housing and Local Government about this. It is fully aware of the need when registration starts, to provide for this continuance by the appropriate
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    authority, and we adhere to the view that this is something which has to be done by the county, or the county borough council, because it is a pretty substantial operation, and could not be done by a district council, or still less by a parish council. Provision can be made in the orders bringing forward the changes for any of these functions to be transferred.
    The hon. Gentleman may remember the Luton Order in the last stages of the last Parliament where there were an enormous number of functions, including the division of water undertakings between new authorities, so it is, technically, fairly easy, by established instruments, to provide for this. With that assurance, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will not press his Amendment.
    There may be a case where an authority had been acting as a commons registration authority, and the registration period had been completed, but it was in the course of hearing objections. In such a case it would be possible, in the order by the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, to provide that the authority could continue with the objections, because it would be very confusing, at that stage to get a new authority to carry on with part-heard objections. This can all be done under the Local Government Act.
    Mr. Corfield: I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
    Mr. Corfield: I beg to move Amendment No. 8, Clause 4, in page 2, to leave out line 38 and to insert "for complying with any prescribed conditions".
    This is a drafting Amendment. We raised the matter in Committee, and the Minister said that he would look at it again. The last lines of Clause 4(1) read:
    "… documents (if any) as may be prescribed for the purpose of verification or of proving compliance with any prescribed conditions."
    It seemed to us that the point would be much more simply met by the words on the Order Paper, merely,
    "for complying with any prescribed conditions."

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    Many provisions as to compliance would themselves be conditions which, I would have thought, would have been amply covered by the words on the Order Paper and, if that is so, it is a much simpler sentence. Other things being equal, I would suggest that the simpler sentence is always more appropriate than the longer one.
    Mr. Willey: I am obliged to the hon. Gentleman for pursuing this point, but it does not quite help. The sort of example we have in mind is that it may be a condition that the applicant claiming common rights should give notice to certain persons of his intention to apply. The acknowledgement of the notice might then be prescribed as a document which would be required to be produced to prove compliance with the conditions, and it is for that reason that it is so worded. I am obliged to the hon. Gentleman for according me the opportunity to explain the words as they are at the moment.
    Mr. Corfield: I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
    Mr. Willey: I beg to move, Amendment No. 9, Clause 4, in page 3, line 4, to leave out "if the land" and insert "which".
    Mr. Deputy-Speaker: With this Amendment we can also take Amendment No. 10, Clause 4, in page 3, line 7, to leave out "so registered" and insert "registered under this Act". and Amendment No. 11, Clause 4, in page 3, line 7, to leave out "so registered" and insert "registered under this section".
    Mr. Willey: This is a drafting Amendment, to a meet the point which I thank the hon. Member for Gloucester, South (Mr. Corfield) for raising in Committee. This improves the Bill. If I may anticipate, the hon. Gentleman's Amendment No. 11, which is also a drafting Amendment, also improves the Bill.
    Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Did I understand the right hon. Gentleman to say that he was favourably disposed towards Amendment No. 11?
    Mr. Willey: Yes, Sir.
    Amendment agreed to.
    Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I understand that Amendment No. 10 falls with No. 9.
    Amendment made: In page 3, line 7, leave out "so registered" and insert:
    "registered under this section."—[Mr. Corfield.]
    Mr. A. P. Costain: I beg to move Amendment No. 12, Clause 4, in page 3, line 7, at the end to insert:
    (4) Where any land over which rights of common are registered under this Act is registered under the Land Registration Acts 1925 and 1936 that fact, together with the name and address of the person in whose name the land is so registered, shall be noted upon the appropriate register maintained in accordance with the last preceding section.
    This Amendment can be easily explained. The object is to give complete equality to any land which is inside or outside land registration areas, as defined in the 1925 and 1936 Acts. One of the objects of the Bill is to enable owners of commons and the rights of commoners to be better known. It is quite illogical, if commons come in an area which is covered by the Land Registration Acts, that they should be any different. There are many commons which come under the present Land Registration Acts area. We hope that the Minister, for as long as he continues in office—not too long, we hope, but for the short time that he will be there—will extend the scope of land registration. It can be seen to be quite absurd that, at one time, the names of the owners were on the register and available, and, as the scope of the Acts advanced, they were not. This is quite illogical, and the Minister ought to put it right.
    Mr. Willey: I am sorry to disappoint the hon. Gentleman, but this would mean a radical departure from the provisions of the Land Registration Acts. However strongly the hon. Gentleman may feel about this, I am sure that he would agree that this is not the place to take such a step. However, I can assure him that we are alive to the point which he raises. We shall be discussing with the Land Registry the steps which we can properly take when we come to further legislation.
    Mr. Corfield: I appreciate the right hon. Gentleman's difficulty, because of the secrecy element in the Land Registration Acts. Nevertheless, I am sure that he will appreciate that if we can,

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    under this Act, make the register as complete as possible, it will be to our advantage, so that, when someone goes to see who is the owner, it will be possible to get some indication of who is the owner, despite the fact that his title is registered. It is nonsense that, despite the fact that he is the real owner, he is the one man whom one cannot find in the register and discover that he owns the land. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will consider that, under regulations—his powers are wide enough—at least to provide for a note of the owner, where he consents even where his title is registered. At the moment, we are in a slightly ludicrous position, though I know that this would be hardly the right Bill in which to amend the Land Registration Acts. In so far as it is possible, I hope that we can get the fact known that these people are owners.
    Mr. Willey: I speak again by leave of the House. I appreciate the point which the hon. Member has made.
    Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The right hon. Gentleman does not need leave of the House.
    Mr. Costain: In view of the fact that the Minister nodded twice, I gather that he is in agreement with me, although he will not admit it. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    Clause 5.—(NOTIFICATION OF, AND OBJECTIONS TO, REGISTRATION.)
    Mr. Buck: I beg to move, Amendment No. 13, Clause 5, in page 3, line 34, to leave out "of the registration" and to insert
    "specified under subsection (6) of the last preceding section".
    Subsection (2) deals with the period during which objections to any matter which has been registered should be made. It provides that objection to any registration under Clause 4 may be made in such a period as will not be
    "less than two years after the date of the registration, as may be prescribed."
    We touched on this point briefly in Committee.
    The difficulty is that registration may take place, at any time, quite informally, and there will be a great variation in
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    the times when a person or a commoner or an alleged commoner seeks to register his claim. It is difficult for people to know the time within which they have to bring forward their objections. We therefore seek a more certain date, and the only certain date which appears to be available is that provided for in Clause 4(6)—the time which the Minister prescribes after which no longer shall registration be possible. This is a known time, which could be varied according to the type of right which is to be registered, and which is easily ascertainable.
    How can a person who wishes to object to something being registered find out exactly how much time he has without going to the inspector and working it out in that way? It is much simpler to have a whole series of objections tied to a specific date which will be prescribed by the Minister under the provisions of Clause 4(6). I hope that the Minister thinks this right, will indicate so and will accept the Amendment.
    Mr. Skeffington: We very much sympathise with the purpose of the Amendment and we shall ensure that by the publicity and advertising at all levels we do all that we can in every way to bring home to all those who think they have any rights the period in which they must claim their rights or lodge their objections. That is fundamental to the success of this part of the Bill.
    But there is a fundamental objection to doing what the hon. Member for Colchester (Mr. Buck) suggests, because it goes very much against the other exhortations which we have heard, particularly from the hon. Member for Cornwall, North (Mr. Scott-Hopkins) that we should get the Bill working as quickly as we can. The Amendment would make no registration certain from objection for five years, whereas under my right hon. Friend's proposals this would be the case in less than four years.
    This matter would partly be dealt with in Regulations. May I recapitulate what was said? It was suggested that the registration period should be divided into two periods of 18 months, the first running from 1st January, 1967 to 30th June, 1968. We said that if this period could be started earlier we should do so but that we did not want to be unrealistic in suggesting that that could be done. The

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    second period would run from 1st July, 1968 to 31st December, 1969. After a month or two to allow the registration authority to tidy up the registration, there would be a period of two years for the objections. Those claims which will be registered in the first period—there will be no fee, which is an encouragement—could become final after the 18 months plus two years, which would mean that by the end of that period there would be the second period of registration, and at the end of the total period one would have established all possible claims and all objections.
    10.45 p.m.
    Under the Bill and the regulations as now proposed it will be possible for the majority of the things we want to see registered to be so registered within four years. Acceptance of the Amendment would mean that this could not be achieved in under five years. This would be a great loss. We appreciate the hon. Gentleman's point about objectors having every right and we agree that adequate publicity must be given to the matter.
    Mr. Buck: Why have the Government chosen the date of registration rather than the date which will be prescribed under Clause 4(6)?
    Mr. Skeffington: After consultation, this seemed to be the most convenient date.
    Mr. Corfield: The point that worries me on this matter is that one might have a situation in which there is a running period, so to speak, for objections. In other words, one may have a claim to a right of common made by "A" very early in the period and the objection period will run out, say, two years after that date of registration. But later in that two-year period one may get a claim to a right made by "B", whose right cannot be settled because the objection period will run on further—yet the two rights, if they are relevant to the same common, may not be able to be sorted out by the commissioners unless the two are held together.
    I am concerned lest we may have a situation in which, because of taking this date—producing, therefore, a running period, so to speak; the two years from
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    the date of each individual registration—someone who goes to all the trouble of objecting may be called back to give evidence in a later claim because another claim in respect of the same common is so interwoven that the two cannot be decided separately.
    Despite the Parliamentary Secretary's laudible desire for speed, he may get himself into a situation in which the old adage, "More haste, less speed", will apply. I hope that he and his right hon. Friend will think about the matter further. If he cannot accept the Amendment or alter the Bill now, I imagine that something could be put into the regulations to ensure that the Commons Commissioners are able to deal with the problem I have raised, when it is likely that they will have to consider substantially the same issues on another claim relating to the same common.
    Mr. Skeffington: I assure hon. Gentlemen opposite that my right hon. Friend will look at this point again. We have had a number of consultations with the interested bodies concerned and this point has not been put to us. Perhaps it is because of the rather late hour that I have not completely understood the point about another objection arising, as explained by the hon. Member for Gloucestershire, South (Mr. Corfield), but I assure him that we will look into the matter again after studying his remarks in the OFFICIAL REPORT. I can only add that, at present, we do not envisage any great difficulty.
    Mr. Buck: It is with a heavy heart that, in due course, I shall ask the leave of the House to withdraw the Amendment. I am tempted at this stage, in view of the totally unsatisfactory reply of the Parliamentary Secretary, to call out the troops, telephone White's and Boodle's and divide the House. That is tempting, particularly since the hon. Gentleman gave a most extraordinary answer. When I ask him why the Government had chosen as their linchpin the date of registration rather than the date to be prescribed in Clause 4(6), he merely replied that the date selected was more convenient, yet he gave no reason why it was more convenient. It seems to us more convenient to have the fixed date.
    The Parliamentary Secretary spoke about publicity being given to the matter.

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    We agree with that. The publicity must be imaginative, but it will be difficult to publicise the individual dates of registration so that people will know exactly how long they have in which to lodge an objection. Despite the hon. Gentleman's unsatisfactory reply, I crave leave, reluctantly, to withdraw the Amendment.
    Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The hon. Gentleman has, with a heavy heart, asked the leave of the House to withdraw the Amendment.
    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
    Mr. Scott-Hopkins: And I beg to move—with a light heart in the certain knowledge of what the Minister will do about it—Amendment No. 14, Clause 5, page 4, line 2, to leave out "or" and to insert "and to any person".
    This point was discussed briefly in the Committee, when the Minister said that he would see whether there was a point of substance involved, as we firmly believe there is. Our intention is to make quite certain that if there should be, as there may well be, two claimants in the same registration claim, both shall be notified. I do not need to go into the various combinations one could have in this respect—I see the Minister nodding his head. I am sure that all my hon. Friends are extremely conversant with the position. We want to make quite certain that all concerned know just what is going on. I am sure the right hon. Gentleman does not want any ambiguity, or to be in a position later of having an incomplete Bill, leaving some people without knowledge of what is happening. I hope that the Minister will let sweet reasonableness prevail.
    Mr. Skeffington: This will be a thoroughly satisfactory answer, because we propose to accept the Amendment. It carries out what has always been the intention, which we thought had been adequately provided for. The Amendment makes the intention absolutely clear by providing that objections shall be sent not only to applicants but to those who are noted but not necessarily registered. Many people may be interested in a particular claim; the first will be registered, and the rest will be notified. The intention is that all the objections shall be notified.
    Amendment agreed to.
    Mr. Corfield: I beg to move Amendment No. 15, Clause 5, page 4, line 6, to leave out from "made" to the second "the" and to insert "by a local authority".
    This Amendment was originally tabled because I thought that in the Interpretation Act the words "any person" meant only ordinary persons and incorporated bodies. It has since been brought to my attention that it also covers unincorporated bodies. That, however, does not undermine the point of the Amendment because, as I understand it, subsection (5) is designed to provide that where registration is made other than on an application, one is concerned with the word "application." Presumably, it refers back to Clause 4(2), where a local authority, without having an application may effect a registration. If
    that be so, it seems to me that it can be done only by the local authority; and that the words "by a local authority" would be very much beta than the words "of any person." I still think that the Amendment is an improvement in terms both of clarity and of English.
    Mr. Skeffington: I am sorry to have to slip back into unsatisfactory answers again. We have considerable sympathy with the point which has been made. As the hon. Member fairly said, "person" under Clause 19 of the Interpretation Act covers both incorporated and unincorporated bodies, but the only local authorities we are concerned with here are the registration authorities.
    There are two cases where provision ought to be made for them to act. There is the case where they are requested to register common rights but the common has not been put on the register. There is the other case where, despite there being no application by anyone for registration of the common or green, the registration authority takes the view that that common or green should be on the register and it is in a position to deal with subsequent stages of procedure. Our advice is—and we have looked at this carefully—that the Amendment would throw a great deal of confusion on the wording of Clause 5 and might lead to doubt as to whether, or not registration authorities could hear objections if they were the applicant for registration.

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    For these reasons I must advise the House not to accept the Amendment.
    Mr. Corfield: The hon. Member's advisers, like the ghost parson, seem to find doubts under their beds. It seems incredible that there should be any doubt about this, but it is not a matter on which we should spend a great deal of time. I therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    Clause 6.—(DISPOSAL OF DISPUTED CLAIMS.)
    Mr. Corfield: I beg to move Amendment No. 17, Clause 6, in page 4, line 31, to leave out from "and" to the end of line 38 and to insert:
    "if no appeal is brought against the confirmation or refusal, the registration shall, if it is confirmed, become final, and if it is refused, become void, at the end of the period during which such an appeal could have been brought; but if no appeal is brought, the registration shall not become final until the date on which the appeal is finally disposed of, and the registration shall have effect in accordance with the direction of the court".
    This is a straight redrafting. I submit the Amendment because I suggest that the Clause as drafted could hardly be clumsier, particularly in the latter part:
    "and the registration shall, if it is confirmed, become final, and, if the confirmation is refused, become void—

    (a) if no appeal is brought against the confirmation or refusal, at the end of the period during which such an appeal could have been brought;

    (b) if such an appeal is brought, when it is finally disposed of."

    I suggest that my drafting is very much better. If not, despite the doubts under the bed, I hope we shall be told why it is not.
    Mr. Willey: We are obliged to the hon. Member for his gallant attempt, but I am sorry to tell him that it has a flaw. The flaw is that the last words of the Amendment do not make any provision for the case in which the court makes a registration void, in other words, upsets the decision of the Commons Commissioner by making the registration void.
    The Clause is a little difficult to follow, but it is not easy to express this provision accurately without some difficulty. I must disappoint the hon. Member as his attempt fails because it does not cover
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    the case where the court makes a registration void.
    Mr. Corfield: This is not just a case of doubts under the bed but of dreams as well, because here we have clearly set out:
    "with the direction of the court."
    This is very common form. In the Town and Country Planning Act we have this sort of thing where the Lands Tribunal deals with a claim to purchase in advance and so on. I cannot accept that this is something which is not dealt with elsewhere. The whole object of the court is to give an opportunity of declaring void as well as confirming a registration. I do not call this a very good explanation. I hope that the dreams may develop into nightmares and that we shall have a better answer, because the answer given so far does not make sense.
    Mr. Deputy-Speaker: An attempt to improve Government drafting seems to fail. Is it your pleasure the Amendment be withdrawn?
    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    Clause 8.—(VESTING OF UNCLAIMED LAND.)
    11.0 p.m.
    Mr. Peter Mills: I beg to move Amendment No. 18, Clause 8, in page 5, line 47, at the end to insert:
    Provided that where, subsequent to the vesting of land in a rural district council in accordance with paragraph (b) of this subsection, a parish council is constituted for the parish within which the land is situated, the said rural district council shall, unless the land is regulated by a scheme under the Commons Act 1899, forthwith vest the land in the said parish council.
    If I may translate this provision into my own language, it is really the right of a parish council to take a village green from a rural district council. This may be desired because of the introduction of a new parish or possibly because of a revised parish council. It may be that there are many lapsed parish councils, and possibly through new vigour, a lapsed parish council may be revived.
    In both these cases, they should have the right to own and manage their own village green or small common. It has been said that there are about 3,500 parishes without parish councils, but I am glad that this number is declining.

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    The Amendment is important because important principles are at stake. Smaller villages with parish councils should look after their own affairs, or at least part of their own affairs. Among these the village green is very important.
    These rights and powers are rapidly being shorn from village communities. We cannot go into arguments about local government reform. That would be ruled out of order, as would the question of grouping parishes into other units, but everyone, I am sure agrees that in some cases, powers have to be withdrawn from parish councils and handed over to rural district councils. But I do not think this is true of village greens. The parish council should have the right to own and manage this important part of village life. It is right that even if parish councils have lapsed, and these rights have lapsed, they should be returned, if it is desired, to parish councils.
    Village greens are a heritage which are passed on to us and they should be maintained. I hope that all villages will stir themselves to life. Perhaps this Bill will remind them of the importance of village greens and that they will seize the opportunity to hold on to something which can play a part in maintaining village life. It is not only a right. It is highly desirable that a small parish council should take a real and active interest in its common. The village green should be the focal point of a village.
    Parish councils should seek to preserve the amenities of the green. These are amenities for sport, for playing cricket and football. Many of us learned to play our games on village greens. Children can play there without being interfered with by traffic, and the pensioner can take a walk in comfort and safety. The green is very important for courting, too. I well remember my courting days on the village green. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] I am glad to note that I have the House with me at least on this. We must preserve the village green not only for these, whether we call them courting or sporting rights, but also for villagers to graze cows or donkeys.
    A village should take pride in its green. Some do. I hope the Bill will stir to life those which do not. A village should be prepared to spend money and use voluntary effort to keep the green
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    trim and tidy. None of these interests will be maintained if the land is vested in another authority. We cannot afford to lose this focal point of the village and the interest in it. I hope that, because of all its benefits, this right will be preserved by the parish councils. I hope also that the planning authorities in the new areas will make provision always for the village green. I hope that new parish councils will not only obtain these rights but will gladly bear the responsibilities of them. I humbly submit that in this case responsibility at parish level is more suitable than at rural district council level.
    Mr. Corfield: I am not sure whether the right of courting is a right of common, or of profit or perhaps of easement. However that may be, I suggest that the Amendment is very much in line with what the Minister is anxious to do in subsection (5, c) which is, unless there are good reasons to the contrary, such as a scheme under the 1899 Act, to make the parish council the primary local authority. It is consistent with this that where there is no parish council but one comes into being the common should vest in the new parish council. I know that the Minister has to put this to council associations which unfortunately spend a great deal of time trying to cut each other's throats. I hope that any jealousy between parish council associations, rural district council associations and county council associations will not prevent the Minister accepting the Amendment.
    Mr. Skeffington: As I listened to the hon. Member for Torrington (Mr. Peter Mills) I wondered whether he was going to move a manuscript Amendment to some of the definition Clauses in the later part of the Bill. The effect of his Amendment is that where in future a parish council is created and the village green has been vested in the rural district council it should go to the parish council. I hope that it will be realised that when we say that we are sympathetic that is not a hollow phrase, because, as the hon. Member for Gloucestershire, South (Mr. Corfield) has pointed out, subsection (5,c) makes this the dominating principle where the parish council still exists.
    There are snags, however, with the proposal in the Amendment. First, some

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    representations have been made to me in the opposite direction. There are those who think that in general greens are better looked after by the larger authorities. This may be true in some cases and not true in others. Like the hon. Member for Torrington, I hope that the Bill will stimulate parish councils. Where a rural district council has had entrusted to it a village green and has expended money to provide a pavilion and things of that kind there may be some reluctance to transfer the green at a later stage to a parish council. It is easier to do this when the land is unclaimed and one makes a decision to which authority it goes. The suggestion has also been made that if a rural district council thought that it was going to lose a village green vested in it, the council might be more reluctant to take steps to look after it now.
    My right hon. Friend is sympathetic, because it is a guiding principle, and what he would like to do is this. First of all, on completion of the registration stage, we shall be able to see how many of these unclaimed greens there are and how many parish councils have been created to which the Amendment would apply. I can give an undertaking that, when the facts are known consequent upon registration, at the second stage of registration my right hon. Friend will see whether it is necessary, in his view, to meet the purpose of the Amendment. He is sympathetic, but he would like more time before making a decision in a matter which is not altogether free from snags.
    Mr. Buck: I support the Amendment. I had the privilege of serving the parish councils' association for some time as its legal adviser, and it survived that. The Amendment offers a way of making a definite step which would assist parish councils. Parish councils are as nearly a perfect a form of democracy as one could have. They are a classic example of democracy, in fact, because the council is answerable each year to the whole village, and it is precisely the sort of body which ought to deal with village greens. We are all glad to know that, by and large, this is the state of affairs wherever there is a parish council, and I cannot accept what the Parliamentary Secretary has said about the difficulty of
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    handing a village green back from a rural district council to a parish council.
    Thank goodness, parish councils are not, generally speaking, at war with the rural district councils, so there should not be any difficulty. The fact that some money has been spent by the rural district council should not make any great difference. The money will have come from rates which the particular parish council has contributed to, and I do not accept that the objections to the Amendment raised by the hon. Gentleman have any real force.
    However, we take some comfort from what the Minister said about the next stage of registration and the possibility that the position may be rectified then, after further consultation with the National Association of Parish Councils. We are glad to know that the Government Front Bench take the attitude they do towards parish councils generally.
    Mr. Peter Mills: I am sorry that the Minister cannot accept the Amendment. I hope that it does not mean that he does not accept in principle what I have been saying and he does not accept the activities on the village green. However, I gather than he is sympathetic, and I am glad that it is hoped to do something later on. In the circumstances, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    Clause 11.—(EXEMPTION FROM REGISTRATION.)
    Mr. Skeffington: I beg to move Amendment No. 23, Clause 11, in page 6, line 23, to leave out from "prescribed" to the end of line 26.
    Mr. Speaker: I suggest that with this we should discuss the following further Amendments, all in Clause 11: Amendment No. 24, in page 6, line 24, to leave out "and".
    Amendment No. 25, in page 6, line 26, at the end to insert:
    "and the Registration Authority shall cause to be inserted in at least one newspaper circulating in the district an advertisement of the Minister's intention to make the Order, stating the place where the application can be inspected, and the address to which, within a period to be specified (not less than thirty days) objections to the making of the order are to be sent".

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    Amendment No. 26, in page 6, line 28, to leave out, "it appears to him".
    Amendment No. 27, in page 6, line 29, to leave out "that".
    Amendment No. 28, in page 6, line 34, to leave out paragraph (b) and to insert:
    (b) after affording to any person submitting to the Registration Authority an objection to the making of the order within the period specified in the last preceding subsection, the opportunity of being heard by a person appointee by the Minister, and considering the report of that person he is satisfied that no rights of common have been exercised over the land for at least thirty years, and that the owner of the land is known.
    Amendment No. 29, in page 6, line 36, at the end to insert:
    (4) The person appointed to hear objections in accordance with the last preceding subsection may, if the Chief Commons Commissioner agrees, be one of the Commons Commissioners appointed under section 17 of this Act.
    Amendment No. 30, in page 6, line 37, to leave out subsection (4) and to insert:
    (4) The Minister shall, before dealing with any application under this section, send copies thereof to the registration authority and to such other local authorities as may be prescribed, and shall inform those authorities whether he has granted or refused the application; and those authorities shall take such steps as may be prescribed for informing the public of the application and its grant or refusal.
    I shall select for decision the Government Amendment No. 30, and I include for discussion at the same time the Amendment to it in the name of the hon. Member for Rye (Mr. Bryant Godman Irvine), after the second "shall" to insert, "in due course".
    Mr. Skeffington: The effect of Amendments No. 23 and 30 will be to oblige the Minister to send copies of applications for exemption to the relevant registration authorities and to each other local authority as may be necessary, and he will be enabled to provide by regulations for full publicity to be given to applications for exemption and to the rejection of an application for an order.
    When the Clause was debated in Committee, the Opposition stressed the need to give full prior publicity in respect of applications for exemption, and my right hon. Friend entirely agreed with that view. It is important to give everyone an opportunity to make representations beforehand and for these to be taken into
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    account before a decision is reached. As the Bill stands now, potential objectors will be put on their guard by the Minister's advertisements in the London Gazette, which not everyone reads, and also in the local Press. These advertisements will be inserted before registration is started.
    It is true that, even where there are local newspapers, these are not always an extremely good medium, although, in my view, people read their local papers more comprehensively and thoroughly than they read the national Press. But all commoners, for instance, who may wish to establish their rights will read even the local papers, and a notice on the parish board will be even more effective. By the Amendment, we shall require district councils not only to make available copies of the applications for exemption but also of the Minister's advertisements as well.
    11.15 p.m.
    This will follow the general procedure which we have suggested in other parts of the Bill. We also think it is very important—and we agree with the Opposition on this and there has been no dispute on this matter—to let everyone know when an application is refused, because this refusal will be the result of objections made to the Minister. We think, on reflection, that it is necessary to notify the objectors of the Minister's determination.
    Mr. Corfield: I do not for a moment want to oppose the Amendment, but I want to point out that the purpose of the series of Amendments in my name and those of my hon. Friends is to ensure the same result. It is to write it into the Bill instead of the regulations that there will be publicity. This would give an opportunity for anybody who can claim that his particular bit of land is not included in the common or forest under subsection (1) or that this particular area should not apply, to make written representations, if there is not a formal hearing in the normal sense of the Local Government Act. I was not quite certain that the Parliamentary Secretary covered this point.
    It seemed to us that, in view of the fact that these issues will be similar to those which the Commons Commissioners

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    will consider under other provisions of this Bill, it might be useful for the Minister to use one of the Commons Commissioners to hear this issue, subject of course to the consent of the Chief Commons Commissioner whose prime duty must be to ensure that his Commissioners are available for the other hearings for which they are provided under the Bill.
    If I may come to Amendment No. 30, and touch upon the Amendment to it in the name of the hon. Member for Rye (Mr. Bryant Godman Irvine) and myself, I think it is fairly clear what its purpose is, and I hope that the Minister will accept it. As his Amendment reads at the moment the new subsection (4) would read
    "The Minister shall, before dealing with any application under this section, send copies thereof to the registration authority" etc.
    and then
    "and shall inform those authorities whether he has granted or refused the application."
    In other words, before dealing with it he has to tell them how he has dealt with it, rather on the principle of the parson under the bed who did not exist. I would suggest that with a very small insertion, which we suggest, the point is made quite clear.
    Possibly the best answer would have been a semi-colon after the word "prescribed", but there are certain difficulties in drafting an Amendment to insert a semi-colon, and it seemed that the better answer was after "shall" to insert "in due course" to make it quite clear that it is a later operation which the Minister has in mind, and so that it does not appear to be a contradiction in terms.
    This Amendment does improve the drafting, and I hope that the hon. Gentleman can give the assurance that anyone with an objection will have an opportunity to make representations and to have them considered.
    Mr. J. E. B. Hill: I should like to support the Amendment to add the words "in due course" to the Minister's Amendment No. 30. I found the subsection very hard to understand until I puzzled out that there must be two separate stages, so I hope that that clarification will be accepted.
    May I also ask the Minister, when he is prescribing the methods of advertisement
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    that should be undertaken, to go rather more widely than the local Press? Acres of advertisements have to be inserted in the local Press under some statutory requirement or other, and it is fair to say that, although the law may be satisfied, very few people read those advertisements except inadvertently when they are looking for details of sales or for forthcoming attractions at the local cinema.
    What catches the attention is a notice which is actually affixed to the land in question. That is certainly true of railway closures. One can advertise as much as one likes, but a proposal to close a railway affixed to the railway station itself catches one's attention. Likewise, if a common or alleged common is to be the subject of an inquiry, putting the subject-matter on a board in a prominent place on the common and directing anyone interested to the local authority will, I think, result in the effect which we all want.
    Mr. Graham Page: I feel very much more strongly about the complete nonsense of Amendment No. 30 than my hon. Friends who have already spoken. It really does not make sense when one reads it.
    May I go back to what was originally in Clause 11, subsection (2)? In that subsection, the public was given the right to see an application before the Minister started to deal with it. That will be taken out, I assume, by the Minister's Amendment No. 23, and the only words put in its place are those contained in the last two lines of Amendment No. 30, which read:
    "and those authorities shall take such steps as may be prescribed for informing the public of the application and its grant or refusal."
    The common sense reading of that is that they inform the public that an application has been made and it has been granted or refused. There are not to be two separate publications of the application and the grant or refusal. If it means separate publications, it should say so in the Amendment, otherwise the public will not have the opportunity to see the application before the Minister has dealt with it.
    Going back to the beginning Amendment No. 30, that provides:
    "The Minister shall, before dealing with any application under this section, send copies thereof to the registration authority".

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    It is quite clear that the words "before dealing" apply also to the third line of the Amendment, and that, before dealing with the application, the Minister
    "shall inform those authorities whether he has granted or refused the application".
    Really, it is complete nonsense. Before dealing with it, he is going to tell them whether he has granted or refused it. Surely the right procedure is already contained in subsection (2), where the Minister tells the local authorities about the application, the local authorities are bound to advertise it or make it available to the public, the Minister then deals with it, he then informs the local authorities whether he has granted or refused it, and they then publish that fact. That is the order of things, surely. However, it is not the order of things in Amendment No. 30, because that puts them exactly the other way round. It stands the Minister on his head. It will confuse the local authorities completely, and it really is a shocking bit of drafting.
    Mr. Skeffington: I am surprised that that interpretation has been put on the Amendment by the hon. Member for Gloucestershire, South (Mr. Corfield) and the hon. Member for Crosby (Mr. Graham Page), because it was most carefully drafted. While the two hon. Members were making their speeches, I tried to interpret it in the way that has been suggested, and I failed to do so. Had the meaning of the Amendment been as suggested by the hon. Member for Gloucestershire, South, the words "before dealing with any application" would have been put at the beginning so as to govern the whole Amendment. But that is not the case. Certainly we will look at the wording again, but I am quite unable to give it the interpretation suggested by the two hon. Members.
    We were asked about representations in writing. I think that it would be possible to do that. We have considered the possibility of dealing with objections by means of a Commons Commissioner. On the whole, we have come to the view that it is much better that at this stage the matter should be dealt with by the Minister with the resources of his Department. For one thing, the Commons Commissioners are not likely to be appointed until the end of the first registration period, and
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    unless we take steps to appoint a number earlier, at additional expense, they will not be there. It seems to us that these are matters with which the Minister and his staff can properly deal, and so we do not feel inclined to meet the hon. Gentleman on that point at this stage.
    Amendment agreed to.
    Further Amendment No. 30 made: Clause 11, in page 6, line 37, leave out subsection (4) and insert:
    (4) The Minister shall, before dealing with any application under this section, send copies thereof to the registration authority and to such other local authorities as may be prescribed, and shall inform those authorities whether he has granted or refused the application; and those authorities shall take such steps as may be prescribed for informing the public of the application and its grant or refusal.—[Mr. Skeffington.]
    Mr. Corfield: I beg to move Amendment No. 31, Clause 11, in page 6, line 44, to leave out "decided by the Minister" and to insert:
    "a Commons Commissioner who shall, after the Registration Authority have given such notices as may be prescribed, inquire into and decide upon the matter; and section 18 of this Act shall apply".
    This is another suggestion that the issue raised in subsection (5) would seem to be a matter much more suitably dealt with by a Commons Commissioner than the Minister. I was surprised at the reference by the Parliamentary Secretary on the last Amendment to "the resources of the Department". What are they? Has the Minister a team of inspectors to hold inquiries, like the Ministry of Housing and Local Government? Is he empowered, like the Minister of Transport, to employ them from outside? Has he a panel of inspectors? If so, who sets it up—the Minister or the Lord Chancellor? It is glib to say that the Minister has these resources. The last time we questioned the Minister about his staff, he had taken on only some administrative officers from the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, some from the Ministry of Agriculture and some experts on trees. As far as we know, he has no strength of inspectors.
    I suggest that our suggestion is worthy of serious consideration, not only to relieve the work on the Minister's hard-pressed staff who have none of these

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    people to assist them but, more important, because this is a judicial issue. The Clause states:
    "If any question arises under this Act whether any land is part of the forests mentioned in subsection (1) … it shall be referred to and decided".
    This is essentially something to be decided in the same framework as the other decisions which have to be made of a judicial nature relating to the rights or status of common land. This is a question of status just as other questions of status arise in relation to common land or town or village greens. I suggest that in procedure and administration this is an improvement on the provisions in the Bill.
    Mr. Skeffington: The Amendment would require the Minister to arrange a hearing whatever objection was made to an application for exemption. It is suggested that the person appointed by the Minister should be a Commons Commissioner. It seems to us that the Amendment makes very heavy weather of a fairly simple matter. We do not think it desirable or necessary that a formal hearing should be arranged when an objection is made. I will explain why.
    11.30 p.m.
    It is expected that most of these cases will be open and shut—that they will be cases for exemption which have to meet the statutory requirements set out in the Bill. If there are any doubts, the Minister will refer the matter to be dealt with at a later stage and will not grant the exemption. Only when it is clear beyond peradventure that an exemption meets the conditions laid down in the Bill will he be able to issue his final authority to that effect.
    My right hon. Friend will, of course, as we have indicated, whenever there is an application for an exemption, give it publicity in the normal way in the London Gazette and in newspapers circulating in the vicinity of the land concerned. These advertisements will not only define the nature of the land and the exemption sought but will enable objections to be sent to the Department from any people who wish to do so. The advertisements will also specify the time limit for objections and, incidentally, will state where, in the offices of the local registration authority copies of the
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    application may be inspected. Thus, people will not have to come to London to inspect the documents.
    An additional reason for resisting the Amendment is that it is not our intention to appoint Commissioners at this early stage and, therefore, the combination of the advertisements, access to the documents locally and the opportunity for objectors to submit objections provides a convenient administrative way of dealing with the matter.
    I give an undertaking that, if there is any doubt that an exemption does not qualify under the two loops in the Bill, the Minister will refer the matter for decision at a later stage and will not grant the exemption. I hope, therefore, that the hon. Gentleman will not feel it necessary to press the Amendment.
    Mr. Corfield: I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    Clause 13.—(AMENDMENT OF REGISTERS.)
    Amendment made: In page 7, line 25, after "are", insert "varied or".—[Mr. Skeffington.]

    Clause 15.—(QUANTIFICATION OF CERTAIN GRAZING RIGHTS.)
    Amendments made: In page 8, line 2, leave out from "number" to end of line 3.
    In page 8, line 7, at end insert:
    (3) When the registration of such a right has become final the right shall accordingly be exercisable in relation to animals not exceeding the number or numbers registered or such other number or numbers as Parliament may hereafter determine.—[Mr. Skeffington.]

    Clause 16.—(DISREGARD OF CERTAIN INTERRUPTIONS IN PRESCRIPTIVE CLAIMS TO RIGHTS OF COMMON.)
    Mr. Corfield: I beg to move Amendment No. 37, Clause 16, in page 8, line 19, to leave out "and".
    Mr. Speaker: It would be convenient to discuss at the same time the following Amendment, No. 38, standing in the name of the hon. Gentleman and the names of some of his hon. Friends, Clause 16, in page 8, line 21, at end insert:
    "and
    (iii) in determining, in the case of a right of common in gross, whether the evidence justifies the presumption of a lost modern grant".
    Mr. Corfield: The Amendments are linked, Mr. Speaker. Indeed, the first is a paving Amendment to the second.
    The purpose is to extend the provisions of Clause 16, which is designed to prevent the Prescription Act from running against the commoner when he has had a break in the use of his rights as a result of either animal health matters or his land being requisitioned. This is really only one aspect of a much more general problem.
    The earlier means of establishing many of these rights was the old common law prescription which gradually developed into the fiction of lost modern grants which, in turn, developed into the theory laid down by the Prescription Act. The grants followed relatively long and continuous use. It seems to us that these exemptions should apply whether one is concerned with the Prescription Act or not.
    I have picked out the case of rights of common in gross because the courts have found that rights of common in gross are not covered by the Prescription Act and cannot be established by that Act. They can only be established by provisions in common law—which becomes rarer and rarer because any generally proved grant could not have been made prior to 1198 or whatever the date of official legal memory is.
    Normally, a right in gross would depend upon the fiction of the lost modern grant, and if I may quote again from that admirable book, "Cheshire", it is stated that it is dependent on user as is the establishment of a right under the common law. As "Cheshire" says, 20 years is enough to raise a prescription, but there is nothing rigid. If we look to see where the plea has been successful in recent times, we find nothing less than 40 years; and the user must have been continuous, although I admit the Parliamentary Secretary's point made in Committee that it need not be quite so continuous as the user which is used in evidence under the Prescription Act.
    There is a case for extending the principle, because the Prescription Act is only a development of the basic idea of prescription at common law, as is the idea of the lost modern grant historically and logically, if there is any logic in this rather curious fiction.
    Mr. Skeffington: We had a very interesting discussion in Committee on lost modern grant, and the House would not be grateful in any way if I continued the discussion at any length, but it is an interesting point. Gaps in user are not nearly so important in common law or the doctrine of the lost modern grant, and the time factor in prescription has really become important only in the Act of 1832. I hope to give some evidence which I hope the hon. Gentleman the Member for Gloucestershire, South (Mr. Corfield) will think is conclusive.
    Our view is that this Clause does not need to be extended as he suggests. If prescription under common law or lost modern grant, provided that there has been a 20 years' user at least before an action, is to be taken as the basis for establishing a right, then the case rests on Carr v. Foster, decided in 1842.
    This was an interesting case only 10 years after the new Prescription Act, and the judges in the Appeal Court of that time were not only familiar with the new Statute, but with the earlier law which had decided many of these cases. The Lord Chief Justice of that time and two other judges gave judgment, and Mr. Justice Williams said:
    "Before the statute, in cases relating to common, it was very usual to explain the ceasing to turn on cattle by the fact that there were not, at that time, commonable cattle to turn on. No necessary inference arises from a cesser during two, three, or seven years".
    This case also decided that "interruption" meant an obstruction by some person other than the claimant.
    We take the view that in the light of that judicial dictum which, I think, is a good interpretation of the common law and lost modern grant it would, if pleaded in the courts, make this Amendment unnecessary. Nobody would be likely to lose their rights if there is a 20 years' period before, and they could prove they were not intending to abandon the right to graze their cattle or whatever their right might be.
    Mr. Corfield: I think that this does concern all rights of way. Clearly, as one of the old cases said, one cannot be continually using one's right of way in the same way one continually exercises one's right of grazing. I am perfectly willing to accept the Parliamentary

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    Secretary's interpretation. Neither of us is likely to find a final answer to this, unless it goes to the House of Lords, which seems very unlikely. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    Clause 17.—(COMMONS COMMISSIONERS AND ASSESSORS.)
    Mr. Scott-Hopkins: I beg to move Amendment No. 39, Clause 17, in page 9, line 23, at the end to insert:
    (4) Where an objection before a Commons Commissioner relates to a right, not limited by number, to graze animals or animals of any class, and the person who has registered that right relies upon the exercise of that right during any period subsequent to 21st December 1964, and it appears to the Commons Commissioner that the number of animals grazed upon the common in the exercise of such right during any such period substantially exceeds the number habitually grazed in exercise of the same right before 21st December 1964, then, for the purpose of determining the definite number of animals referred to in section 15(1) of this Act, the Commons Commissioner may disregard any evidence of the exercise of the right during any such period subsequent to 21st December 1964.
    This Amendment goes right back to the debate on Clause 15 and the new Clause which we discussed earlier this evening, because it seems right that one should take precautions to prevent a vast over-stocking which could take place on these farms in order to establish a right, which is going to be so important under the new procedure of quantification, which the right hon. Gentleman is determined to bring in under Clause 15. The words drafted by my hon. and right hon. Friends to be inserted into the Bill say quite clearly that those commoners who have rights on commons and who rely on the exercise of those rights constantly to establish their rights, shall not, after 21st December of last year, be allowed to graze more animals than they had been habitually used to grazing before that period, solely for the purpose of establishing greater rights for the purpose of rights under Clause 15, for quantification purposes.
    The Minister will be aware of the exhaustive discussions we had about this in Committee when my right hon. and hon. Friends and myself pointed out to the right hon. Gentleman that it was quite possible that in the circumstances
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    which are now going to prevail, of a final quantification taking place on registration under Clause 15, it was absolutely essential for those commoners who have rights sans nombre to try to establish the maximum amount in order to be able to get this on to the register. It is possible that in the West Country, as in the North and Wales and elsewhere, the ordinary commoner, the ordinary farmer, seeing the provisions of this Bill, and what he has heard about it, will think that the only way he can be certain of getting the best deal possible is to shove as much stock as he can up on to the moors in order to establish his right.
    At the moment he has this right of sans nombre, and in his view he can put as much stock on as he likes, as long as he puts some up there and maintains or establishes his right, as he has done in the past—and it could well be that he has not had all that many. Having read the announcements in the Press, and having read the Bill, or having been advised by his legal adviser, it could be that he will try to establish a greater quantity than he has been used to grazing over the past years or months, certainly before 21st December, when the Bill was published.
    It is more than probable that a great many people will put a great many types of stock on to these commons to establish for this one purpose. This could happen. There are certainly people in my part of the world, and in other parts too, who could do this. It is a natural consequence of the right hon. Gentleman being so stubborn in refusing to accept the arguments of Clause 15. If he insists on registration before management schemes are brought in, and quantification where rights are sans nombre this increased stocking is the natural corollary. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman is going to be sympathetic and accept this Amendment. Unless he does, the Bill will have a serious effect on the commons, some of which cannot hold or carry much more stock than is there at the moment. It is doubtful whether they can carry as much as is being carried.
    A great deal of anxiety has been caused by the existing provision of the Bill, certainly among welfare societies. The Dartmoor Preservation of Wildlife Society has written to me—and I know that it has written to the right hon.

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    Gentleman, because I have had a copy of the correspondence—expressing great fear about what will happen if the existing provisions go through.
    11.45 p.m.
    I do not pretend that this Amendment deals with all the Society's complaints and those of the other welfare societies—some of them are exaggerated, I admit—but it says that, where a commoner has rights sans nombre for purposes of registration, in assessing the quantification at this stage, the Commissioner should not take into account any amount of stock which is shoved up on to the moors after 21st December last which is in excess of what he used to put up and commonly had done so in periods previous to 21st December, 1964.
    This is an eminently reasonable Amendment. It does not stop the commoner putting anything he likes up there, but it says that when the Commons Commissioner is working out the quantification when there is a dispute—as there is bound to be—he shall not bear in mind any excess quantity than was previously put up there. It will make it easier for the Commissioners if the commoner realises that this is so and this is the Minister's intention. This is the right way of going about this. It is making the best of what the Minister has made a very bad job. That is water under the bridge, unfortunately. These are the criteria which we are trying to bring into the Bill to make it work.
    Mr. Willey: I appreciate the hon. Gentleman's fears, which he has expressed before, but the Amendment would not be very effective. All it provides is that the Commons Commissioners "may" disregard any evidence of such exercises. That is all. This would not be helpful. The Commons Commissioners may disregard or regard. If the hon. Gentleman had the courage of his convictions, he would have put down an Amendment stronger than this.
    Mr. Scott-Hopkins: I do not want to throw these words in the Minister's face, but he made the point time and time again in Committee that he turned his face against directing the Commissioner on anything. In trying to co-operate with the right hon. Gentleman—as we have done throughout—we have used the word "may" rather than "shall". The use
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    of this word would make it have great force on those people who will read, if not our debates, at least the new provisions if the Amendment is accepted.
    Mr. Willey: The hon. Gentleman has fallen into the trap which I set for him. I have made it clear throughout that we are concerned with the registration of rights. This is why the hon. Gentleman cannot go further than he has done in the Amendment. If he had used the word "shall", it would have affected rights. If the hon. Gentleman concedes—as he has conceded—that we are concerned with establishing rights, the most he can do is suggest that the Commons Commissioners "may" disregard the stocking of the common.
    As he anticipated me by saying, the Commons Commissioner will do his best to establish what are the legal rights. As I said to the hon. Member for Westmorland (Mr. Jopling) we are not putting criteria before the Commons Commissioners. We found it impossible to do so. For this reason also, it would be wrong to put into the Bill something affecting the Commissioner's exercise of his judicial function. This is not acceptable. What one can do, of course—this is different—is to pay regard to the hon. Gentleman's fears. If over-stocking occurs, there are remedies. The remedies ought to be taken.
    The best I can do to allay the hon. Member's fears is to say that this is the sort of thing which ought to be discussed at the meetings which I mentioned when we discussed the first new Clause and the Amendments which went with it. The fact that the claims have to be attested will discourage commoners from making exaggerated claims. But when one is concerned with the Commons Commissioners, here are people performing a judicial function and it would be wrong to try to affect them in this way.
    Mr. Peter Bessell: This is not the time to make a long speech or to elaborate anything which has been said so admirably by the hon. Member for Cornwall, North (Mr. Scott-Hopkins). All I would do is to support the hon. Member in his contention. I strongly share his fears about the possible overstocking of the common land as a result of the Bill and, in particular, as a result of Clause 15.

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    With respect to the Minister, I believe that the wording of the Amendment has much to commend it. He said that in his view it is not possible to give a directive to the Commissioners but one could give guidance to the Commissioners and, if I dare to read the mind of the hon. Member for Cornwall, North, this is probably what he has in mind. This would give guidance and at least express a caution to the Commissioners which would not otherwise exist. This is important not only for the sake of the animals concerned but for the sake of the commoners and for the sake of the land, too. I do not think that it is a matter which can lightly be dismissed, and I am disappointed that we have not had a more satisfactory and more realistic answer from the Minister.
    Mr. J. E. B. Hill: I support the Amendment. The Minister appears to think that the Bill compels people to register their rights. In fact, it compels them to register something other than their rights, possibly exceeding their rights; it is the requirement for quantification. Someone having a legal right will feel obliged, if he has to put it in terms of numbers, to graze some cattle in order to justify his argument.
    My hon. Friend the Member for Gloucestershire, South (Mr. Corfield) on the first Amendment referred to commoners who have already come together by agreement, informally, and let out the whole of the common to some other body or person to take all the grazing and pay a rent for it. When that situation arises, as it does, for example, at the Outwoods Cow Pasture, Atherstone, the individual commoners still retain their rights, and in that case we have common rights which are held by 180 owners of ancient messuages in the town. Their interests are represented by shares in the monetary income which is obtained from letting arrangements, made and supervised by an official called the piecemaster and a management committee.
    But these commoners still have individual rights of common pasture appurtenant to their town dwellings. Under the Bill they cannot just say that they have this common right of pasture appurtenant to their dwellings and let it rest there. Instead of registering the simple fact that the dwelling is a dominant tenement carrying
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    a right of common, they have to go further and prove a definite number of animals. How will they justify their case unless they put up animals as soon as they can to fill out their claims?
    It is true that by so doing they may be breaching an informal agreement which they have come to not to exercise their common rights but to take some money in lieu. However, that will not be relevant when they seek to fulfil the requirements of registration. They must show what number of beasts apply to their right of common. I therefore apprehend that some commoners in this sort of situation—not all of them, but certainly some—may wish to get in first and possibly steal a march on their neighbours by placing animals on the common, perhaps resulting in overstocking.
    It appears that this could follow in such districts as Ebbw Vale, where the comparatively few genuine farmers there may be deterred, by the high cost of litigation, from objecting to the large numbers of animals which may be placed on common land to build up registration claims by people who are not bona fide commoners. I hope, therefore, that the Amendment will be accepted, for it would give some guidance, and perhaps justification, to a Commons Commissioner wishing to say, "For the purposes of registration I reject the evidence put before me". He cannot say that it is false evidence because presumably the evidence will prove that the animals have been put on the common. If we give a Commissioner the right to say, "I disregard the evidence for these purposes", we may achieve our aim because advance notice of the power to disregard evidence will discourage people from following a course of practice which, although helping to fill out a legal right, will probably be bad husbandry and be bad for the unfortunate animals which are placed on common land to share the insufficient quantity of grazing.
    Mr. Scott-Hopkins: I was disappointed at the Minister's answer, particularly since he picked on the word "may" and developed his argument from there. It was wrong for him to do that because we are here dealing solely with commoners who have rights sans nombre.
    As my hon. Friend the Member for Norfolk, South (Mr. J. E. B. Hill) explained, the Minister is saying that this

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    is going beyond establishing legal rights. As the right hon. Gentleman recognised when we were discussing an earlier Amendment, we are dealing with commoners who have rights sans nombre, although he is now saying that the Commons Commissioners will quantify them and limit it down, so to speak. I should have thought that in this case it is only right and proper that the sort of provision contained in the Amendment should be included in the Bill.
    It would appear that the Minister has no real disagreement with my hon. Friends and I. He picked on the word "may", but in a completely different context, and said that it was not a direction to the Commissioners. We agree. It is not such a direction. It would apply where a common is under-grazed as well. Since it seems, therefore, that the right hon. Gentleman accepts our case in principle, I trust that he will now accept the Amendment.
    As we have accepted the terms of Clause 15, and that quantification must unfortunately take place, I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will realise that there is no disagreement between us on the principle of the Amendment. I trust that he will now look sympathetically at our proposal and will accept that its inclusion in the Measure will help to make it a better Bill.
    12 m.
    Mr. Willey: My difficulty is twofold. First of all, as I have said, we are not giving guidance to the Commons Commissioners and, in the second place, if one considers the qualifications of the Commons Commissioners one appreciates that we can leave it to their good judgment to weigh the evidence, and that is what one ought to do. The commoners will be advised that inflating a claim in this way is not likely to establish a right.
    Amendment negatived.
    Mr. Buck: I beg to move Amendment ment No. 40, Clause 17, in page 9, line 30, after the first "direction" to insert:
    "provided that any such modifications shall not result in increasing the costs payable by any party above those which would fall to be paid under the aforementioned rules);"
    Subsection (4) deals with the whole subject of costs, and this Amendment gives the Minister an opportunity to explain
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    what is intended in this regard. We have heard that in other matters it is not proposed, for reasons that have been stated, to give directions to the Commissioner as to how he should perform his functions, and we should now like to hear how the Government see the question of costs being dealt with.
    Is it envisaged that costs shall, as in ordinary county court cases, follow the outcome of the cause, in so far as it is clear cut? If one claimant is successful in his claim to certain commons rights and the other claimant is not, is it suggested that the costs should automatically follow the successful claim? The subsection reads:
    "A Commons Commissioner may order any party to any proceedings before him to pay to any other party to the proceedings any costs incurred by that party in respect of the proceedings …"
    We should like to have that provision explained. The subsection goes on:
    "and any costs so awarded shall be taxed in the county court according to such of the scales prescribed by county court rules for proceedings in the county court as may be directed by the order …"
    How does the Minister envisage the county court scale being fitted into this type of proceeding before the Commons Commissioners, if a man has lost a claim to have, say, 50 cattle on a particular common? The subsection goes on:
    "but subject to any modifications specified in the direction …"
    Those words were included as a result of an Amendment moved in Committee by the right hon. Gentleman. My hon. Friend the Member for Gloucestershire, South (Mr. Corfield) asked whether they did not give too broad a discretion to the Commissioners to award any sort of costs, and this Amendment seeks to modify that discretion so that the Commissioner cannot give more than the county court scale. He would have discretion up to the county court limits, but not beyond. We think that to be a proper and reasonable limitation of his powers. It would seem to be unusual for the Commissioner to be given almost unfettered power with respect to any modification or direction of county court costs.
    In Committee the Minister said that he would consider the point again and that he was concerned about the definition about costs in the Bill and the powers

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    he had conferred on the Commissioner. I shall be interested to hear the results of his consideration, whether he thinks that the Amendment meets the case, or that he proposes to deal with it by regulations or some other means. At the moment the matter is by no means clear.
    Mr. J. E. B. Hill: I am concerned about the matter of costs. I am afraid that this is the theme in which my main objection to the Bill keeps recurring because it is applicable to practically every aspect of the Bill.
    The requirement to quantify the number of animals at the time of registration must increase the business of the Commissioner. Therefore it must increase the costs of the hearing. If the Commissioner had to decide only on the identity of the claimants, that they had a claim either in respect of their dominant land or through some claim in gross or by deed and so on, these would be all legal issues which can be fairly easily deter-minded; but once he is involved in settling matters which we think are properly matters of management, the amount of time and costs will increase enormously.
    I have a further fear. Registration seems to be a matter between one individual and another. The Commissioner should be determining an individual issue but, as we have seen, also if one has to arrive at quantification that can be done only by judging all claims, not on an individual basis but in relation to all other claims. It will therefore be very difficult for the Commissioner to take the individual claims and objections one by one. He will be bound to join them all together and have one general hearing with many individual claimants as parties. This may result in very heavy costs being awarded against one individual who perhaps through no fault of his may have failed to satisfy the Commissioner on one point about which the claimant felt absolute certainty.
    If only individual claims were being heard the costs would be limited, but if a great many have to be joined together the penalties could be very great. The necessity for quantifying will cause much joining together which otherwise would be unnecessary. I very much hope that the Minister will not hold out a sort of sanction of penal legal costs
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    as a deterrent to claims, because that may have a very unfortunate effect in deterring some commoners from registering rights when clearly they ought to register them without delay.
    Mr. Jeremy Thorpe: As a lawyer I find it difficult to know which does more damage, and which is more ambiguous in trying to maintain some basic guiding light in the assessment of costs, the Clause as drafted by Her Majesty's Government, or the Amendment put forward by Her Majesty's loyal Opposition.
    The only merit at the moment is that the Bill says that costs shall either be referable to the county court scale, or that if no such order be given, thereafter the county court shall make an assessment. I presume that is what the words mean.
    Presumably, the object of the Bill is to refer that matter to well-established legal principles. If that be a principle which the Government have taken care to write into the Bill, the county court scale of taxation is subject in well-defined cases to certain exceptions. For example, if there be a case in a county court for breach of copyright, the county courts, as the hon. Member for Colchester (Mr. Buck) with his experience at the Bar will know, not only have the power to give punitive damages, but by the same token, inflated costs. Various other matters are exceptions to the well-laid-down scale of costs. So, if we are talking about exceptions, the county court already has them.
    Therefore, the first difficulty in the Clause as drafted is that the Government, having accepted the principle of existing county court procedure as a guiding light, thereafter promptly expresses lack of confidence in it by suggesting that there should be power of defined modification and whatever is said and whatever may have transpired in Committee, this is an unqualified modification in the hands of the Commons Commissioner.
    Either it is right to fetter his discretion by saying that assessment of costs shall be on a county court basis or it is not, and I should have thought that one could not have the best of both worlds. It is either the county court scale, or a matter for his discretion. If one is ready to give, him sole discretion, do not let us pretend that we are being respectable

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    in tying it to county court costs, because we are doing no such thing, but using them as a useful guide.
    So much for the failure of logic in the Government Clause. Having established a principle, they make such wide exceptions as to destroy the principle almost altogether. The objection to the Opposition is that they say, "Yes, we are in favour of this. We think it is an excellent thing to rely on the persuasive precedent of the county court as far as assessment of costs is concerned. We agree that if no order is given, this is a matter for the county court. We agree there should be power for modification, but only in a downward direction."
    They overlook the fact that the county court judge has a discretion. He is bound, save for these exceptional cases, by the scale of costs. There is a ceiling upon what costs a county court judge may give, but there is also a discretion as to how far below that ceiling he will fix the final figure and if that is what the Opposition want to achieve, it is already in the power of the county court and this Amendment is unnecessary, repetitive and totally superfluous. If they are saying that modification shall be downwards only, this already exists. Therefore I would have said, first, that the Government's Clause as drafted breaches the very principle which they seek to perpetuate and, second, that the Opposition are bringing in an Amendment which is not necessary, having regard to the facts.
    12. 15 a.m.
    Mr. Graham Page: The hon. Member is thinking of a case where it has been before the court and the judge may order an upward or a downward change in the scale. The Amendment envisages the case where the Commons Commissioner directs the scale on which the costs should be taxed. It will not then go before the court. It will go before the registrar for taxing.
    Mr. Thorpe: I appreciate the hon. Member's ecclesiastic, almost Freudian slip in this matter. He knows well and as a practising solicitor knows far better than a member of the Bar that the question of taxing involves enormous powers of scaling downwards. The ceiling is established and references in the Clause
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    to county court costs set what the ceiling will be. I am sure that the hon. Member will agree that the power of discretion which the taxing master has, taking the High Court as an example, is to say to himself, "Do we give the full costs, that is to the ceiling beyond which we may not go, or do we exercise our discretion and for certain reasons go far below that ceiling, either because the case was badly prepared or had no merit or because unnecessary expense was caused?" The discretion is downwards.
    If that is so, the very object which the Amendment tries to achieve is written into the Government's Clause and therefore the Amendment is superfluous. I should have thought that a far better course would have been not to move an Amendment to effect what is already in the Bill but rather to remind the Government of what would be reasonable to give as costs so as not to hit the county court ceiling in circumstances in which even if someone is successful he is not entitled to recover full costs. One should also ask the Government what they have in mind when they talk about modifications and what are the circumstances in which they can see the present ceiling being hit and overtopped, the scale bursting through the roof and reaching the chimney pots.
    This is the question which the Minister should answer. What are the circumstances which he can see where there is litigation, pursuant to the powers in the Bill, in which it would be reasonable for a Commissioner to exercise his discretion to give costs which overtop those laid down normally by the county court. These are the questions which should be asked. This is where the Opposition have failed to ask the relevant questions.
    Mr. Buck: One tries to follow the hon. Member's late-night logic with care but one finds it spurious logic because it is clear that a modification could be ordered by the Commissioner in an upward direction. The second point on the logic of the approach is that if the Government are wrong and if the Opposition are wrong in the Amendment, we are entitled to ask where is the Liberal Amendment which is right.
    Mr. Thorpe: I am asking the Government for a statement of the facts. I assure the hon. Member that there are no pacts

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    as far as we on the Liberal benches are concerned about dividing the House late at night. There is no question of our saying, "You can send your boys home. We shall not ambush you. The three-line Whip is off, and everything will go through on the nod". On the last Amendment, the hon. Member for Cornwall, North (Mr. Scott-Hopkins) got up to say how dissatisfied he was with the Minister's reply. This is the preamble to all his speeches in Committee and on Report, but there is not a cheep out of him when the Question is put. I warn the hon. Member for Colchester (Mr. Buck) not to go home too early. He may find his views put to the vote.
    Will the Minister tell us what is meant by "subject to any modification"? What are the circumstances in which there will be a modification upwards? It is not in point to say that the modifification shall be only downwards. The object of an Opposition is to find out why this provision is here in the first place. In what circumstances should the modification be upward? If the answer is unsatisfactory, it follows that this provision should not be in the Bill at all. The Conservative Opposition are not pressing the Government and probing these questions as one is entitled to expect them to do, even, as the hon. Member for Colchester said, at this late hour.
    Mr. Buck: I did not.
    Mr. Thorpe: The hon. Gentleman talked about late-night logic and the difficulty he had in following it. If he finds the hour late, I sympathise and I applaud his resilience in staying up.
    We are entitled to know in what circumstances the Commissioner would recommend that the well-established costs awardable in the county court should be overtopped so that an unsuccessful applicant would be mulcted of a larger sum of damages than he would be if he were an unsuccessful litigant in the county court. A county court judge is in a far better position to exercise his discretion in these matters than a Commissioner. We must be very careful before giving to someone who is a barrister of seven years standing, however distinguished, greater powers than those which are given to one of Her Majesty's judges.
    Mr. Corfield: I am surprised by the lecture on opposition which we have just had from the hon. Member for Devon, North (Mr. Thorpe). In fact, it is he who is not asking the right questions. We raised this matter in Committee, and, no doubt, the hon. Gentleman will spend some of his Summer Recess studying that admirable document, the OFFICIAL REPORT of our proceedings at that stage.
    The problem here is that the Government, having adopted the county court scales as a guide, have at the same time indicated that the power to award costs will be a deterrent to the frivolous or unprepared claim. If costs are to be used for that purpose—it is part of their purpose, to some extent—it is right that the subject should know the maximum scale of costs to which he is likely to be put. If there are to be modifications, it is imperative that they be limited to the downward direction.
    I disagree entirely with the hon. Member for Devon. North that it would be right to give either a county court judge or a commons commissioner complete discretion to use a higher ceiling than is laid down in the county court rules. This is what I seek to prevent. Through our whole system, we endeavour to produce scales of costs which provide the maximum basis of assessment. If that is the general principle, it is wrong to give a junior judicial officer power to raise those costs at his discretion. This is why we submitted this Amendment. In my view it is both a sensible and a responsible Amendment and very much more so than anything that has come from the Liberal benches tonight.
    Mr. Willey: As far as the Opposition are concerned, I should think that we are about right. Hon. Members will recall that Lord Molson, in another place, moved an Amendment that we should make provision for High Court scale of costs. As it is getting rather late I would economise by accepting the argument of the hon. Member for Devon, North (Mr. Thorpe) in disposing of this Amendment. I would say to him that I feel no anxiety so far as he is concerned. I think that he has demolished the Amendment.
    This has to be left largely to the discretion of the Commons Commissioner. I do not envisage this being used as a

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    deterrent, but one can think of the complexity of a case, one can think even of the value of the common rights involved, the factors in other words which shall determine the court in exercising such a power. This is a discretion which if exercised is appealable, and I think it is proper that this discretion should be there and I think that it will be properly exercised.
    Mr. Buck: Perhaps one can ask why the Minister—
    Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir Samuel Storey): Order. The hon. Gentleman has exhausted his right to speak.
    Mr. Buck: On a point of order. I considered that having proposed the Amendment I had a right to speak at the end.
    Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The hon. Member has not.
    Mr. Scott-Hopkins: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, the Ruling has been given several times this evening that if an hon. Member proposed an Amendment he had the right, without asking leave of the House, to reply to the debate.
    Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Only if he replies to a new Clause on Report stage.
    Mr. Scott-Hopkins: With respect, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, your predecessor did in fact make the point. He called several of my hon. Friends to order when they asked leave of the House to reply to the debate on Amendments they had proposed. He called to order the Parliamentary Secretary, who also sought leave of the House to reply to a debate when he had himself moved the Amendment which initiated the debate. Has not my hon. Friend the right to reply to the short debate we have already had?
    Mr. Deputy-Speaker: If that precedent has been established, yes.
    Mr. Buck: All I would like to say is that one finds it a little difficult to reconcile what the Minister has said tonight with the doubts he expressed about this Clause in Committee. We have not heard anything about the change in his thought processes which has occurred to make him change his mind.
    This is an unusual power of a discretionary character, and that point seems
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    to have been conceded by the Minister, but he now appears to take an entrenched position and to have hardened his attitude.
    It seems a pity that we cannot have some assurance about this. The Parliamentary Secretary has not exhausted his right to speak on this matter.
    Amendment negatived.

    Clause 19.—(REGULATIONS.)
    Amendment made: In page 10, line 32, leave out from "act" to "ecclesiastical" in line 33 and insert "with respect to any land or rights belonging to an".
    —[Mr. Skeffingtond]

    CLAUSE 22.—(INTERPRETATION.)
    12.30 a.m.
    Mr. Willey: I beg to move Amendment No. 46, Clause 2, in page 11, leave out lines 35 to 37.
    These words have a good precedent, but we are obliged to the Law Society for calling our attention to the fact that they might have an unfortunate effect. They pointed out, for instance, that the forecourt to a building containing, say, two fiats each separately owned, half of the forecourt being owned by the owner of each flat, such owners each having the use of the whole forecourt in common, might become common land, as might a private road between two rows of houses, the owner of each house having the ownership of the road fronting his property up to the middle of the road and having the right to use the whole road.
    It is for that reason that I move the present Amendment. I should reassure the hon. Member for Gloucestershire, South (Mr. Corfield) that, on the other hand, I have received an assurance from the Commons, Open Spaces and Footpaths Preservation Society, whom we consulted, that they are satisfied with the Amendment.
    Mr. Corfield: I must say that I am fascinated, after all that we have heard about the sanctity of Government draftsmanship, that we would have had a situation where the common entrance to a pair of semi-detached houses was a common and must be registered under the Bill, had it not been for a last-minute Amendment resulting from a suggestion by the Law Society. Perhaps the Law Society

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    are the ghosts under the bed, and not myself.
    Anyhow, we are very happy to assist the right hon. Gentleman and accept his Amendment.
    Amendment agreed to.
    Mr. Jopling: I beg to move Amendment No. 47, Clause 22, in page 12, line 9, after "common", insert:
    "mean any rights recognised at common law or by the custom of the country as a right of common and".
    It is by no means the first time that a similar type of Amendment has been brought in during the course of the Bill's passage through the House. It was first of all debated in another place, it was referred to in this House on Second Reading, and it was the subject of an Amendment in Committee. That was a much more specific Amendment, which I moved, and all the way through the proceedings on the Bill in the House hon. Members on this side have been anxious to try and preserve as many of the rights of common as possible. Some of us have been slightly surprised that at no stage has there been any interest shown in rights of common by members of the Liberal Party, but now, at the fag-end of the passage of the Bill—
    Mr. Bessell: I have been present through practically the whole debate this evening, so that attack is quite unjustified.
    Mr. Jopling: All I would say is that there are 10 members of the Liberal Party in the House, four of whom represent constituencies where I imagine there are enormous tracts of common land, but not a cheep did we hear from any of them. However, here they are at this late stage making two cheeps for us to put on the record.
    To get back to the facts of the Amendment, what we are trying to do now is something that the Minister is anxious to accept himself. When I proposed an Amendment in Committee, he said that he appreciated and shared my view, and that has been the attitude of the Minister throughout the passage of the Bill. The Minister would very much like to specify in greater detail the rights of common involved. It is a shame that we have only very limited rights of common specified in the Bill. The Amendment would make
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    much clearer what rights of common can be included and registered.
    12.30 a.m.
    I believe that the Minister has been frightened all the way through—I hope he will relent tonight—of specifying in greater detail the rights which may be registered. All the rights which embody the old-fashioned and quaint English words "estover", "pannage" and "turbary" are well known, and they are all recognised at common law. That constitutes the first part of our Amendment.
    I know that the Minister is frightened that if one attempts to specify what rights of common are involved one is in danger of leaving some out. But surely any other rights of common which might be left out are included under the heading of "customs of the country". I noticed that in our first debate at this stage my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucestershire, South (Mr. Corfield) used the phrase "a custom of the country", and I noted with interest that the Minister nodded very vigorously. I am sure that the Minister and every other hon. Member is well acquainted with the phrase. It is frequently used. I am sure that it would cover all the problems.
    There are many customs of the country where there are local rights of common which the phrase would cover. My hon. Friend the Member for Torrington (Mr. Peter Mills) drew attention in Committee to the right of common of some of his constituents in Dartmoor Prison to take stone from the moor and break it up. I suppose that that would come under the heading "a custom of the country".
    I believe that the Amendment would cover all the doubts and worries that the Minister has. It still leaves the rights in respect of cattle gates and beast gates which he particularly wanted included. I think that it would solve his problems. No rights of common could slip through my definition. It is important that we should go as far as possible in specifying rights of common so that people will know what they must try to register. Many people enjoying certain rights of common will not realise that they should register them. If the Government will accept the Amendment, I believe that many people will realise that there are rights which they must register which they would not otherwise do.
    Mr. Skeffington: It is not a question of asking the Government to relent. What every hon. Member has to do in this very important constitutional matter is to make certain that by any definition that we put in the Bill we are not taking away from people rights which belong to them and may have belonged to people for hundreds of years. Far from establishing that, the Amendment would very severely curtail common rights which exist.
    If the Amendment were accepted, it would define for the purposes of the Bill common rights as rights recognised either at common law or by the custom of the country—whatever that may mean, because there is no possible definition of it and no statutory definition that I can find. We took the view on Second Reading and in Committee that if we attempted to define the Clause by additions or the kind of limitation which the hon. Member suggested we might be robbing large numbers of people of their common rights. The Government do not want to do that, and I am sure that no hon. Member does. It is impossible for us to say that there are not common rights recognised by Statute which are not recognised by common law. If we are asked why the Government cannot say so, the answer is simple. We have not had the chance to search hundreds of Acts of Parliament and perhaps thousands of local Acts. Therefore, it would be wrong at this stage to impose this sort of limitation.
    There is an even more fundamental objection. The definition suggested would not cover the kind of rights of common that arise in circumstances where a piece of common ground is exchanged for another. It frequently happens that, under a statute, a public authority requisitions a piece of common land and substitutes for it a piece of ground elsewhere. There may be on the ground substituted rights of common that would not come under this definition. Thus, whole categories of people with common rights would be excluded.
    Going even further—and this is no academic lawyers' argument—we should have to ask what is meant by common law. Unfortunately, it has a great many meanings. Although this might be of great interest to legal practitioners because cases which might arise could be
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    limitless in number, this is not something that we want to put in the Bill.
    Do we mean by common law the whole body of the law of this country, or common law as it is sometimes defined—the law of the common courts before 1875, the law of the Queen's Bench, the Court of Common Pleas and the Court of Exchequer as opposed to the rules established by courts of equity? Do we mean, by common law, law that is derived from stated cases as opposed to statute law?
    This definition is capable of so many meanings that it would lead to hopeless confusion if it was part of the Bill. We included a special category of cattle gates and beast gates and one or two other cases which are generally regarded as rights of common but about which doubts have been expressed. But we have resisted all attempts at limitation either by definition or by trying to include an exhaustive list of all the possibilities.
    Mr. Thorpe: Is it not true to say that, because the word "includes" is used in the interpretation Clause, this is a clear statement by the Government that it is not to be taken as an exclusive interpretation? All the Government are doing is to say that the law is as it is at the moment. There are certain things on one or two matters which it is thought might be outside the definition and we are to say that these matters are to be included and taken into account.
    Mr. Skeffington: That is the general point about the definition. I developed this point at some length on Second Reading. If we attempted to produce an exhaustive list we should prejudice some people. If we used the definition in this Amendment, whole categories of rights would be left out. Such definition would be extremely complex because no one really knows what is meant by common law.
    Mr. Corfield: I accept the explanation of the Parliamentary Secretary. It was not the intention to cut down the rights in any way. It was an attempt to put into the Bill some provision following discussion in Committee, when, I think, we all agreed that not only were we anxious to get the law right but as far as possible to make it clear to the sort of person who is likely to be a commoner

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    without his having to find out whether his rights are being cut down.
    Certainly, the words "custom of the country" appear in a number of Agriculture Acts and they have always been possible of interpretation. I am certain that the common law does it. I am also sure that there are common rights created by statute. We are willing to withdraw the Amendment.
    Mr. Jopling: This is not the time to dazzle the Government with a thesis about common law and I prefer not to do so. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
    12.45 a.m.
    Mr. Buck: I beg to move Amendment No. 48, Clause 22, in page 12, line 15, after "Act" to insert
    "or by or under any private trust or settlement".
    We should like to hear why it is thought necessary that this Amendment should not be made. It was said during the Committee stage that there might be village greens brought about by way of a private trust or settlement. Indeed, there are village greens which have come about in this manner. It would seem right that the definition Clause should provide for that contingency. I could name a possible one in Oxfordshire, and have a statement from a member of the Bar that it is a village green provided by a private trust. Therefore, we think it is necessary to extend "town or village green further than the definition of the land as given in this part of the Bill.
    We have put this Amendment down as being one which we think is necessary.
    Mr. Skeffington: I am grateful to the hon. Member for Colchester (Mr. Buck) for raising this matter again, because it gives an opportunity to clarify the position. His Amendment would bring in a great number of recreation grounds which have not hitherto been thought of as being village greens because they are used almost exclusively for playing games and sports rather than for the activities mentioned by the hon. Member for Torrington (Mr. Peter Mills).
    Village greens and town greens are frequently mentioned in legislation, but have
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    not hitherto been defined. We have in the Bill defined them as pieces of land
    "… for the exercise or recreation of the inhabitants of any locality or on which the inhabitants of any locality have a customary right to indulge in lawful sports and pastimes or on which the inhabitants of any locality have indulged in such sports and pastimes as of right for not less than twenty years".
    Twenty years is the period which follows precedent as in the Rights of Way Act, 1932, as amended by the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act, 1949, and we think that this will deal by definition with the normal types of town and village green.
    The Amendment would bring in many recreation grounds where organised sports and games were played and these are, of necessity, nearly all held for recreational purposes by charitable trusts, and supervised by the Secretary of State for Education and Science. My right hon. Friend is one of the Charity Commissioners for this purpose and the matter is, therefore, adequately covered. Section 4 of the Open Spaces Act, 1906, states that land can be transferred
    "… to any local authority on such terms as they"
    that is, the trustees and the authority—
    "… may agree, and the local authority shall thenceforth be entitled to hold the same as an open space …"
    This course might be open if there was a degree of community interest and supervision was held to be desirable. I do not think it necessary to bring in all the categories of ground. If they have been used by the inhabitants for twenty years, they will come under the scope of the Bill and be covered in that way. We think that they are adequately covered.
    Mr. Buck: I am much obliged to the Parliamentary Secretary. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
    Order for Third Reading read.—[Queen's Consent, on behalf of the Crown, the Duchy of Cornwall and the Duchy of Lancaster, signified]
    12.50 a.m.
    Mr. Willey: I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
    I am sure that the House, and those who took part in our discussions in the

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    Standing Committee, would wish me to thank the Parliamentary Secretary for the great patience that he has shown in allaying the anxieties of the Opposition. I would also like to thank the hon. Gentleman the Member for Gloucestershire, South (Mr. Corfield) and his colleagues for their pertinacity in endeavouring to improve the Bill. I hope they feel they have had some modest success.
    This is the first Measure to implement the Royal Commission's Report. This Bill is limited in its effect. It does no more than set out to establish the facts. I think fiat we all realise that until the facts are established we cannot go on to the second stage, of providing for the better management and improvement of our commons.
    The commons are very much part of our national heritage, with 1½ million acres still remaining, and I am certain that the Bill will be the first step in seeing that once again they play a vital part in our national life.
    12.52 a.m.
    Mr. Corfield: I certainly do not wish to detain the House. I would probably not carry the back benches opposite with me when I say that I and my hon. Friends and, I believe, the right hon. Gentleman and his hon. Friends, have found a certain fascination in this subject, with its very great historical interest, in a way mirroring the whole social development of our country.
    This is not an easy Bill to understand. We had assumed that the problems that have arisen could give to considerable difficulties. We have seen the clash between the right hon. Gentleman, supported by a large Government Department, and ourselves, supported by rather more agricultural knowledge than perhaps can be seen among hon. Members opposite. However that may be, I do not think that it has been an entirely uneven argument. I am a little disappointed with the right hon. Gentleman's timidity in accepting drafting improvements on advice that he has not very often been able to amplify in such detail as to enable us to judge its soundness.
    However, we are all satisfied that the right hon. Gentleman's intentions are honourable. We hope that they are not leading to the place where the old adage
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    says they go to, and that he will not be daunted by the difficulties in formulating what he wants, or persuading his Parliamentary draftsmen to draft his requirements according to his liking. We wish his enterprise well.
    Question put and agreed to.
    Bill accordingly read the Third time and passed, with Amendments.

  PATENTS (EMPLOYEES' INVENTIONS) BILL [Lords]
  Order read for resuming adjourned debate on Question [23rd July], That the Bill be now read a Second time.
  Question again proposed.
  12.54 a.m.
  Mr. Peter Emery: It will be in the memory of the House that I had just risen to my feet last week, during a very brief debate which had lasted perhaps 25 minutes, on the Second Reading of the Bill. I am sorry that the House needs to be detained longer, so I will try to be as brief as possible at this hour.
  It must be said that it is a strange position when the Government are so insistent in trying to rush this Bill through this Session, although there are apparently quite a number of other highly important Measures which they are concerned about. In so doing, they have neglected to consult, as I said in my earlier remarks, any of the bodies specifically concerned with the matter of patents, and particularly trade marks designs, or inventions generally.
  The Minister of State, Board of Trade, said that this was a small Bill. It is in length, but it is quite considerable in some of its implications; and because some of its implications are not quite as simple as is generally considered, I want, if I may to pose a few questions to the Minister before we leave the Second Reading.
  In his speech the Minister referred, particularly in the matter of apportionments, to the particular phrase "as may be just". We all understand this, but in leaving this to the courts there are a number of worries and considerations because completely new principles are involved. Some people think that there should be some criteria in the Bill by which an exact judgment could be made

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  before the case goes to the court. I believe that the Minister of State is aware of this. I wonder whether it would be possible for the Government to do something along these lines when we get to Committee.
  I turn now to the element of retrospection on the Bill. It was said quite definitely in another place that the Bill was not retrospective. I accept that. The Bill sweeps away the action open to an inventor—either an employer or an employee—under Section 56(2) of the 1949 Patents Act. I do not criticise that at the moment. But what is the position of an inventor—an employer or employee—who has not taken action at the moment open to him under that Section on an invention which is already established and to which he would have had rights prior to the passing of the Bill? That action would be open to him normally under the 1949 Act. If the Bill is not to be retrospective, it means that any invention which has been used in the past would not be affected by the operation of this part of the Bill, that is, that it is not retrospective.
  However, what right then has the inventor or the employer to take action on his past inventions? As Section 56(2) is swept away, he is to have no powers at all, unless they be powers under the Bill, and, in those circumstances, the Bill must be retrospective. Because of the assurances in another place, it is extremely important that the Minister of State should clear up this matter. I cannot believe that it is the intention of the Government that an inventor should take action under an Act which they have swept away. That would be a nonsense.
  Is the Bill wide enough to cover joint inventions? I realise that it is wide enough to cover two people or a team of people employed by one employer who are working on the same project, but I should like confirmation of that interpretation—
  The Minister of State, Board of Trade (Mr. George Darling)indicated assent.
  Mr. Emery: I am glad that the Minister of State nods.
  Is it not sense, if we are going as far as we are going in the Bill, that the particular power should be open to an employee
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  and to another person who is not an employee? This happens in the medium sized or smaller businesses, and, in the same way, in the very small businesses, an employee may be working with his employer on an invention. What situation does the Bill cover in that case? It may be that neither of these cases is covered by the Bill, and it might be reasonable and proper if these points were covered by the Government themselves in Committee.
  I come to a technical point. There is some concern about the exception by Clause 1(2) from the operation of Clause 1. It reads:
  "This section shall not affect the operation of any agreement between them expressly providing for the allocation of that benefit".
  It is suggested—it seems to me with some force—that these words would not break a service agreement or contract of employment because such a document signed at the commencement of employment—and this is a normal procedure—could at best refer to possible future inventions, but it is most unlikely that it would be expressly allocating the benefit referred to in the Clause, which is the benefit in a specific invention made by the employee. I should like to know what is the exact intention of the Bill.
  If service agreements entered into are anticipatory of future inventions, are they not excluded by the operation of Clause 1(1)? If that is so, it puts industry in a strange position whereby it is perhaps possible that a new contract would have to be entered into for every specific invention which any team of persons working in research might be about to make. When one sets a team of people working on new projects they often stumble across a number of ideas, techniques and inventions which were not specifically considered in the immediate project. It seems nonsense to have lawyers rushing around to sign up all the employees on a new contract the moment the employees stumble on something new. That is carrying my example to a slightly absurd level, but I am trying to show the problems which might face certain industrialists, especially those working with many people on new designs and inventions.
  May I turn to the aspect of timing of the Bill? As with previous legislation,

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  there is no statutory limitation to action which might or might not be taken by an employee or an employer. They will be able to take action at any time in the future about any invention in which they may have been involved. I should have thought it particularly important to have a time aspect or statute of limitations, for we are opening up a provision whereby an apportionment of value to an employer or an employee may be decided years after an invention. That would mean that a firm would have to keep exact books of record of every invention which may have occurred where there is no specific settlement so that if the matter comes to court they are able to provide some financial and factual evidence of what apportionment might reasonably be made by any decision of the courts.
  Industry should have the right to know that this application of the Bill will last for only a specific time. My hon. Friends and I have not set a time limitation. Whether it should be seven or 12 years should be open for discussion between the Board of Trade and the experts, such as the Chartered Institute and other bodies. There is every reason for saying that a statutory limitation of this kind should be considered and I am informed that this could be done.
  My hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dame Joan Vickers) apologises to the Minister for not being here tonight. She was in her place for the first part of the Second Reading last week, but tonight she has had to go to her constituency. She has asked me to raise two points with the Minister concerning references in another place to the Central Awards Committee about civil servants and dock workers, a subject in which my hon. Friend has a constituency interest.
  My hon. Friend's first question is: are dock workers and civil servants covered by the Bill, or will they receive no greater benefit than that which they get at present? In other words, do the present contracts under which they serve stop them from benefiting from the provisions which apply to ordinary employees? [Interruption.] I realise that some hon. Gentlemen opposite are not worried about the Bill. I assure them that some of us are extremely concerned about it. I am being as brief as I can and I am sorry
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  if some of them find my remarks tedious. My hon. Friend the Member for Devonport has some fears about the Bill. For people working in the docks, trying to do their best, just because they are employed by the State they should still have the same benefits as anybody else.
  My hon. Friend's second question is: will the Minister look into the working of the Central Awards Committee to see whether this cannot be hurried up, because there is no doubt that it is very slow and that there is a certain amount of bad feeling, particularly on the part of those who are working in these services, who feel that they are not being given the consideration which private industry would give to its employees?
  An assurance was given in another place that there would be at least two Amendments tabled to the Bill. When we reach the Committee stage my hon. Friends and I will table some Amendments to follow some of the points which I have raised. However, since the hour is late and while there is a great deal more that I could say, I will curtail my remarks at this stage because many of the other points are more appropriate for the Committee stage. I will only add now that the Government must realise that because of the lack of consultation about the Bill my hon. Friends must attempt to get the Measure right in view of the many years we have been waiting for this legislation to come forward.
  Perhaps it can be reasonably said that my hon. and right hon. Friends are partly to blame for the Measure not having been brought forward earlier. However, we have been waiting for the Bill since 1949, which is a considerable time. In view of the time we have been waiting for it, I cannot believe that there is such urgency now that it must be rushed through, perhaps at an hour as late as this. We must consider the matter further and, in so doing, it might be useful to fall in line with a number of international interpretations which are now being dealt with in connection with the problems of inventions and patents.
  I am sure that I am only reminding the Minister that a congress is being held in Tokyo of the International Association for the Protection of Industrial Property, and we might well have been able to tie up with that as well as with the Strasbourg Convention. There are certain

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  aspects of that Convention that are not being taken into the Bill. While we on this side want, in general, to improve this Bill, and are obviously delighted to support it, I would like the Minister to answer the few questions I have posed.
  1.10 a.m.
  The Minister of State, Board of Trade (Mr. George Darling): With the leave of the House, I should like to answer the points raised. As I said on an earlier occasion, this is a very limited Bill. The wider amendments to the patent law of which the hon. Member for Reading (Mr. Peter Emery) has spoken belong to another occasion. Quite clearly, from the aspect of international conventions in particular, our present patent law is very rapidly getting out of date. But we are not rushing this Bill through. As the hon. Gentleman says, this matter has concerned some lawyers, at any rate, for about 10 years. We have merely seized the opportunity to get the law right after the House of Lords decision to which reference has been made.
  As to consultation, because of the limited character of the Measure we went back to the Swan Committee, which recommended what we have since thought was the law. That Committee consulted practically everyone—the list of organisations which made representations to it and were consulted is very long. Trade unions, employers, patent lawyers—everyone who had an interest gave evidence. We went back to that evidence, and because of the narrow character of what we were trying to do we did not feel it necessary to ask those people to make the same representations again.
  If the hon. Member thinks that we have not had proper consultation, we can look into that aspect again; but I can assure him that we went over all the representations that had been made. We were merely trying to get the law as we thought it was before the House of Lords decision in the Patchett case—
  Mr. Emery: I do not want to make a meal of this, but the hon. Gentleman will realise that the consultation with the Swan Committee is now 16 years out of date, and it is no defence to say reference was made to evidence given 16 years ago.
  Mr. Darling: We were trying to put the law in line with what we thought it
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  to be 10 years ago. Therefore, the point of consultation is covered.
  The hon. Gentleman asked about the criteria put in the Bill to guide the courts and the Comptroller of Patents. These criteria are spelled out, in response to representations in the other place, in subsection (3) of Clause 1. That subsection, which lays down the criteria, is in general accepted to be the right kind of guidance for the courts.
  The hon. Member also spoke of joint inventions. The Bill deals with inventions made by co-employees, as is implicit in subsection (3), but to deal with problems of inventions made by an employee and some third person would, we think, lead to far too many complications. Such cases would be dealt with under the ordinary common law. But we can look at this point again. The criteria are not exhaustive. We have the usual words to say that the court will pay regard to other relevant circumstances, which covers practically everything.
  Retrospection is a very difficult legal point, as the hon. Gentleman will appreciate. The Bill is not retrospective in the sense in which he put it, because it is recognised that there will be many firms which are exploiting inventions made before the Bill will come into force, and the employers have taken into account in their costings all the foreseeable financial claims that may come along. We can discuss the question of retrospection again.
  With regard to service contracts, what we should like would be that in the long run all employees should be covered by a desirable and workable form of contract, rather than that they should get involved in legal proceedings as to what their proper share of an invention or the fruits of an invention may be. The Swan Committee accepted the view that contracts for Civil Service employees were on the whole satisfactory, especially concerning the machinery of the Central Awards Committee. I appreciate the point the hon. Member raised about the time taken before the awards come out. We shall certainly look into that matter. So far as I know, apart from the time factor there are no complaints about machinery for dealing with awards to Civil Service employees.

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  That, I think, covers the point raised by the hon. Member on behalf of the hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dame Joan Vickers) about dockyard employees. They are covered. The hon. Member's fears about the way in which service contracts operate in the matter of inventions are unfounded. The type of standard contract which now applies in the nationalised industries has been built up on the basis of the Civil Service form of contract and works well. There is no need to make a separate contract. Every invention in that regard is covered by the same contract. If necessary we can look at this to see if it is satisfactory.
  The Bill does not specify any time limit, but it applies to two parties. As the hon. Member will see, in Clause 1(4) there is a trust relationship. The ordinary rules applicable to trustees and beneficiaries will apply. Those rules have been developed on sound lines over many years. We see no reason to depart from them to deal with the special case of employees' inventions. If we discuss the matter at great length as I imagine he wishes to do in Committee, I think the hon. Member will find that this arrangement is satisfactory. I have questioned the legal advisers on this point and I am satisfied that the trust relationship will work satisfactorily in the case the hon. Member mentioned.
  Question put and agreed to.
  Bill accordingly read a Second time.
  Motion made, and question proposed, That the Bill be committed to a Committee of the whole House.—[Mr. McCann.]
  1.18 a.m.
  Mr. Peter Emery: There are quite a number of technical points which I have to put to the Minister of State. We on this side of the House are not trying to be difficult, but we feel that it is an impertinence on the part of the Government to suggest that we should deal with these highly technical matters on the Floor of the House at this hour of the night. I should have hoped that we would not have the Committee stage on the Floor of the House, but upstairs, so as to avoid having in the House technical debates which are bound to arise. I do not know whether this matter can be discussed through the usual channels.
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  I will not oppose this Motion the Government feel strongly about it, but the technical aspects and legal problems comprise the sort of thing that make it an imposition to ask that the House should deal with it in Committee of the whole House rather than by way of a Standing Committee.
  Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Dr. Horace King): It is possible to divide on this Question.
  Question put and agreed to.
  Bill committed to a Committee of the whole House.—[Mr. McCann.]
  Committee this day.

  DOMICILIARY PHYSIOTHERAPY
  Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. McCann.]
  1.20 a.m.
  Mr. Norman Cole: The matter I wish to draw to the attention of the House is that of the physiotherapy treatment of patients in their own homes. I would like to thank the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Health for remaining to this late hour to reply to the debate. I have advised the hon. Member of some of the points I wish to raise and I would like to put them as succinctly as possible.
  I wish, first, to refer to the case of a comparatively young man of 45 who suffered a stroke and who at various times during the course of his long illness, was quite unable to attend hospital, partly because of the weather conditions at that time of year and partly because of his general unfitness. He was, nevertheless, able to take a full course of physiotherapy at the hospital, and also got much benefit from physiotherapy in his own home.
  Because of the lack of provision in the National Health Service, to which I shall refer, this home treatment had to be provided by private resources, and had to be paid for. Here, I should like to pay tribute to the Luton Branch of the Royal Air Forces Association and others who met the bill for many months, so that my unfortunate constituent might have the physiotherapy treatment at home. I am sorry to say that he died during the last

  431
  two or three months, but he enjoyed very much improved mobility over the last few months of his life. I saw him about earlier this year and I am sure that this was because he had been able to have this physiotherapy treatment at home when he was unable to go to hospital.
  This matter was raised at the R.A.F.A. conference at Edinburgh a month or two ago, where a resolution was passed about this which will, no doubt, find its way to the Ministry. I hasten to say that neither my constituent nor have I, any complaint about the hospital, or the consultation or treatment given there. This is merely a matter of the circumstances of a man being unable to go there and obtain treatment because of his state of health and the weather. As an urgent and desperate matter he had treatment from private sources, for which fees were paid, and which was not provided under the National Health Service.
  There is the question of minor injuries where a patient is not ill enough to be hospitalised, but where a course of physiotherapy at home would be very advantageous to make him fit again. I am thinking of broken limbs. No provision is made under the Health Service for payment for outside physiotherapy. This is a considerable gap in the provisions for the benefit of health. The treatment might have been to hospitalise this man for some months. There must have been a considerable saving to the State because he did not go to hospital for any length of time at all. I would have thought it would have been worth while for the State to provide physiotherapy at home in place of hospitalisation at a much higher cost.
  As evidenced by Answers to Questions which I have had in the last few weeks, the trouble is that the Ministry and the executive committees take the line that this treatment is a hospital service. All well and good. The Parliamentary Secretary, in reply to one of my Questions, said that it was a hospital service, but that consultants could give instructions for the physiotherapy treatment to be given at the patient's home in necessitous cases. But the plain fact is that there are no physiotherapists to spare in the hospital to carry out this treatment and we are, therefore,
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  up against the impasse that it cannot be effected and the patient has to go without this domiciliary treatment.
  Hospitals have demands for more Physiotherapists than they can obtain to give treatment inside the hospital, but there are State-registered physiotherapists available under the Act governing services ancillary to medicine and their fees are not excessive. It seems quite proper that such treatment if authorised should be given by these State-registered physiotherapists. There are analogies in the Health Service. Chiropody is one and there are others. It is curious that this domiciliary physiotherapy service should be eliminated from the Health Service scheme.
  There are also many cases—and I do not refer to those where the general practitioner would naturally wish to have the views of the consultant at the hospital—where the general practitioner should be able in his own right to order domiciliary treatment for the benefit of his patient to improve his well-being and make him fit for work again. This is not the situation at the moment. No one except the consultant at the hospital can order physiotherapy either at the hospital or at home. It seems to me that considerable benefit would be obtained if the general practitioner were able to order it to be given in the patient's own home in cases which he approved. The general practitioner has considerable authority and power in many other respects in the National Health Service and I do not see why this power should be denied to him.
  The general practitioner should also be able to order minor personal equipment such as a tripod walking stick. Under the present arrangement such equipment can be authorised only by the hospital consultant.
  I feel very strongly on this matter. Like the subject of many Private Members' Bills and Adjournment debates, this is a point which has come to my notice in a tragic way. I have also met over the years other people who have paid for domiciliary physiotherapy for wives or husbands who are bedridden. They have improved the health of their bedridden relatives by providing this treatment at home at their own expense.
  If this is a matter affecting an enormous number of people it should be put

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  in hand right away. If it is a minor matter from the point of view of the finances of the National Health Service, but not at all minor to the patients in these cases, that surely should not be a stumbling block to the Ministry in bringing it within the provisions of the Service. Either way, it is a matter for urgent action and I hope that the Parliamentary Secretary will say something of benefit tonight.
  1.30 a.m.
  The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Health (Mr. Charles Loughlin): The hon. Gentleman the Member for Bedfordshire, South (Mr. Cole) has no need to apologise to me at least for raising this matter even though the hour is a little late. He has raised it with his usual courtesy and put the matter very clearly, for which I thank him, for he has rendered a service in spotlighting a problem.
  In practice, there is not a great deal between us. The hon. Gentleman, as I do, wants to ensure, as far as is humanly possible, that the full range of services is given under the National Health Service to everyone in our society. His raising of the matter this morning gives me an opportunity to explain in a little detail the problems with which we are faced in trying to ensure that the fullest and best service is given.
  Let us be quite clear about the present position. The hon. Gentleman may be under some misapprehension about what domiciliary service can be given. A general practitioner can request a domiciliary consultation, and if the consultant, once he has attended the patient at his home, considers that domiciliary physiotherapy is the adequate and proper treatment for him, the consultant himself can see to it that the patient receives domiciliary physiotherapy. I am sure that this is being done in South Bedfordshire, although it is true that, because of various problems at present, it is done largely in urgent cases only.
  I am very sympathetic to the case which the hon. Gentleman mentioned and which he described as urgent and desperate. I do not wish to be thought to imply any criticism either of the general practitioner or of the hospital, but, if what the hon. Gentleman has said is absolutely correct, I think that the
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  service would have been available to that particular patient if the case was so urgent.
  Mr. Cole: This is quite right in theory, of course, but the hon. Gentleman knows as well as I do that there is a limited source of physiotherapists in our hospitals and they really have not time to spare to go out on visits. It is always a question of trying to get the patient to hospital or of waiting until he is well enough to atttend. The hospitals have a problem, and the consultants know this, so the theory does not really work.
  Mr. Loughlin: I was saying that, within certain limitations, this is what applies. It is the desire of the Ministry that every possible effort should be made to see that urgent cases are given domiciliary treatment if that is appropriate.
  There is a problem, as the hon. Gentleman himself says, which we have to face. The problem is really in two parts. First it is a question of the shortage of staff at present. The numbers of the staff that we have are by no means adequate, as the hon. Gentleman says. There has been a slight increase in the number employed in the hospital service in the last year, and our job is to try to create the conditions where we can get an adequacy of physiotherapists working inside the National Health Service. We have tried to do this, and we are trying to do it, by various means.
  But let me put this to the hon. Gentleman. If there is an overall shortage of staff then, obviously, we have to deploy that staff to the best possible advantage. It is no good extending the use of physiotherapists in the domiciliary services, if we find that that method of employment of the staff within the context of the shortage is expensive—not in terms of money but rather of time.
  We find that under the present system, very often if one has got a physiotherapy department attached to a hospital, then one can get treatment on a group basis. I do not say there will not be cases where it is necessary to treat the patient in an individual way, but very often the group basis is found to be to the advantage of the patient. And we have to bear in mind that what we are faced with is the need to give this service to the greatest number of people we possibly can.

  435
  The hon. Gentleman referred to the possibility of using the State-registered physiotherapists who are in private practice in the domiciliary field. Although he referred to a number of analogous services and quoted the case of the chiropodist, I would not accept that there were a number of analogous cases, nor would I accept that the chiropodist is analogous in any way. The fundamental reason, of course, is that the chiropodist does not need to work under medical supervision.
  I want now to deal with the second leg of the problem which we are having to face. There have been changes in concept in the use of physiotherapists in recent years. Recent developments in medicine have had a marked effect on the practice of physiotherapy. In 1962, the Minister's Standing Medical Advisory Committee observed that many patients still asked for massage because it gave a symptomatic comfort at the time of application and they assumed it must be doing some good, but in the long run it was kinder to teach them how to use modern aids to minimise their disabilities.
  They went on to say that it was perhaps noteworthy that hospitals with fuller facilities for rehabilitation made little use of massage. The Committee also found that whilst there had been a marked reduction in the use of massage and electrotherapy there had been a greater increase in the demand for other forms of physiotherapy, notably the modern type of remedial exercises, which are used in all stages of medical rehabilitation in a steadily increasing number of hospital departments and special centres.
  What we feel is essential, because there have been these changes, because there has been a shift of emphasis from massage and heat treatment to various other types of exercises and the use of appliances, is that if we are to use physiotherapy in the proper and most adequate manner, the whole of the treatment should be given in such a way as to be under direct medical supervision all the time. We consider that there should be medical control over physiotherapists, even when they are treating patients on a domiciliary basis.
  As I say, physiotherapists are in short supply, both nationally and in South Bedfordshire. Those available to the
  436
  National Health Service should be employed where they can do most good. In a hospital, a physiotherapist can be used to the best possible advantage. We do not feel that we can afford to take any action that might well reduce the availability of staff to the hospital service.
  If we start employing State-registered physiotherapists who are in private practice in the way that the hon. Gentleman suggests, there may well be, although I do not say that it necessarily follows, a temptation for those people who are wanting to come into the service, or who are likely to come into the service and, indeed, some of those who are in the service at present, to feel that they ought to go into private practice.
  I know that the hon. Gentleman would be the last Member in the House who would want the Government to take any step that was likely to reduce the number of this type of personnel available in the hospitals. I am sure that he will agree with me that, in the normal course of events, one can use the time and great skill of physiotherapists to far better advantage in the hospitals than in domiciliary visits. One wants domiciliary visits where it is not possible or where it is very inconvenient for the patient to go to the hospital, not as an in-patient, because such people are not normally inpatients anyway, but to attend the physiotherapy out-patients' department.
  I can assure the hon. Gentleman that I have looked through the papers searchingly since he raised the question with me, and that this has been the policy of successive Ministers, not merely the present Minister. The hon. Gentleman will probably know that at least three Ministers of Health before the present one have underlined, for the same reasons as we are stating this morning, the need to ensure the adequate supply of physiotherapists in the hospital service and the maximum utilisation of their time and skills, rather than dilute the service by the extension of domiciliary services.
  I agree with the hon. Gentleman that where one has urgent cases and where it is possible to extend the service beyond the urgent cases that have it at present, provided there is medical supervision, that would be extremely desirable. I can assure him that the Minister takes precisely the same attitude as the two or three Ministers before him who have had to

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  face the fact that if we could assure ourselves that we should be able to get a sufficiency of this particular skilled person to enable us to expand the domiciliary service, then we should be only too glad to do it.
  I am very appreciative of the attempt that has been made by the hon. Member to get an extension of the domiciliary service in this field. I cannot accept his argument that there would not be any danger at all in using private practitioners without medical supervision.
  Mr. Cole: I did not say that.
  Mr. Loughlin: I am very sorry. I do not want to misrepresent the hon. Member.
  Mr. Cole: In the sort of cases that we have at the moment the general practitioner would naturally consult the consultant—the position with regard to consultation would be as it is at the moment—but in other cases, especially in minor cases, and also in some major ones, naturally the general practitioner would have a very close liaison with the person giving the physiotherapy.
  Mr. Loughlin: I accept that if we had an adequacy of physiotherapists that might well be so, although there is a school of thought that the general practitioner is not necessarily the best judge of what is best in this aspect of the service, and that—this is why at the moment we take the point of view that the general practitioner must call in the consultant—the person who is best able to determine the course of treatment is the consultant himself.
  I hope that the hon. Gentleman will do whatever he possibly can to encourage those who are at present in private practice to come into the National Health Service side. We are doing whatever we possibly can to improve the terms and
  438
  conditions of service. There was a 9 per cent. pay increase last summer, and there is at present a review going on by the Whitley Council. I pay tribute to the skill and dedication of the people in the service who are working in this field, and I feel sure that those who are at the moment working outside the National Health Service would find a very fruitful place for their services if they would come into it.
  1.48 a.m.
  Mr. William Wilson: I should like a few moments to support the hon. Member for Bedfordshire, South (Mr. Cole), who has raised the important question of domiciliary physiotherapy treatment. I do so at this late hour because of the special experience in Coventry of the domestic physiotherapy service which has been provided.
  In Coventry, there is the Coventry and Warwickshire Hospital Saturday Fund. At the onset of the National Health Service that organisation was faced with a change in its objects because originally it was set up for the purpose of supplying ordinary hospital treatment. When the Service came into being, part of its previous obligations were taken over by the State. As a result, the organisation had to consider what it could do to provide for its members. I say "its members".
  The fund has just over 100,000 members who, through their employers generally, individually provide a small amount of money each week towards the organisation—
  The Question having been proposed after Ten o'clock and the debate having continued for half an hour, Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.
  Adjourned at ten minutes to Two o'clock.

MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY
  Computers
  Computers
  Sea Water (Desalination)
  Sea Water (Desalination)
  Ministry of Technology (Controller)
  Ministry of Technology (Controller)
  Technological Information
  Technological Information
  Industries (Technical and Economic Studies)
  Industries (Technical and Economic Studies)
  VACANCIES IN APPRAISAL GROUPS IN THE MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY
  VACANCIES IN APPRAISAL GROUPS IN THE MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY
  Consultants
  Consultants
  Machine Tools
  Machine Tools
  Economics and Statistics Division
  Economics and Statistics Division
  Estimates Committee's Report
  Estimates Committee's Report
  Ministry of Technology (Organisation)
  Ministry of Technology (Organisation)
NATIONAL FINANCE
  Overseas Countries (Grants and Loans)
  Overseas Countries (Grants and Loans)
  Non-Industrial Civil Servants (Pay and Pension Increases)
  Non-Industrial Civil Servants (Pay and Pension Increases)
  Credit Squeeze
  Credit Squeeze
  Re-refined Oil
  Re-refined Oil
  Balance of Payments
  Balance of Payments
  Retail Price Index and Retirement Pensions
  Retail Price Index and Retirement Pensions
  Purchase Tax (Soft Drinks)
  Purchase Tax (Soft Drinks)
  Inland Revenue Department (Staff Shortages)
  Inland Revenue Department (Staff Shortages)
  Public Service Pensions
  Public Service Pensions
  Currency Notes (Design)
  Currency Notes (Design)
  Newsprint (Import Surcharge)
  Newsprint (Import Surcharge)
  Investment Allowances
  Investment Allowances
  Companies (Overseas Investment)
  Companies (Overseas Investment)
  New Taxes (Guidance to Income Tax Inspectors)
  New Taxes (Guidance to Income Tax Inspectors)
  Civil Servants (Staggering of Working Hours)
  Civil Servants (Staggering of Working Hours)
  Authors Works (Copyright)
  Authors Works (Copyright)
  National Savings Certificates (Net Investment)
  National Savings Certificates (Net Investment)
  Double Taxation Agreements
  Double Taxation Agreements
  Government Work, Merseyside
  Government Work, Merseyside
  Spain (Support of Sterling)
  Spain (Support of Sterling)
  American Portfolio
  American Portfolio
  Earned Income Relief
  Earned Income Relief
  Valuation Office (Staff)
  Valuation Office (Staff)
  Retired Civil Servants, Western Isles
  Retired Civil Servants, Western Isles
  Export Rebate Payments
  Export Rebate Payments
  Government Expenditure (Reduction)
  Government Expenditure (Reduction)
  Post Office Savings Bank (Deposits) and Premium Bonds (Net Receipts)
  Post Office Savings Bank (Deposits) and Premium Bonds (Net Receipts)
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
  Gypsies (Census)
  Gypsies (Census)
  Abandoned Motor Vehicles
  Abandoned Motor Vehicles
  Derelict Land
  Derelict Land
  Local Government Reorganisation, Tyneside
  Local Government Reorganisation, Tyneside
  Holiday Resorts (Sewage Disposal)
  Holiday Resorts (Sewage Disposal)
  Proposed New Town, North Buckinghamshire
  Proposed New Town, North Buckinghamshire
  Local Government Finance
  Local Government Finance
  Planning Advisory Group (Report)
  Planning Advisory Group (Report)
  Pension Rights (Transfer)
  Pension Rights (Transfer)
  Valuation Appeals
  Valuation Appeals
HOUSING
  Old Properties (Modernisation)
  Old Properties (Modernisation)
  Mortgage Interest Rates
  Mortgage Interest Rates
  Rent Officers and Assessment Committees (Cost)
  Rent Officers and Assessment Committees (Cost)
  Plastic Piping
  Plastic Piping
OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT
  British Veterinary Association (Memorandum)
  British Veterinary Association (Memorandum)
KENYA
  British Service Personnel
  British Service Personnel
BOARD OF TRADE
  Travel Brochures
  Travel Brochures
  Companies (Directors' and Employees' Remuneration)
  Companies (Directors' and Employees' Remuneration)
  Broiler Chickens (Import from Denmark)
  Broiler Chickens (Import from Denmark)
  Waste Paper
  Waste Paper
ROADS
  Schools (Road Hazards)
  Schools (Road Hazards)
  New Roads (Acquisition of Land)
  New Roads (Acquisition of Land)
  Christchurch By-pass
  Christchurch By-pass
  M.6 Motorway (Bridge)
  M.6 Motorway (Bridge)
  M.1 and M.6 (Motorway Link)
  M.1 and M.6 (Motorway Link)
  Severn Bridge
  Severn Bridge
  Motorways
  Motorways
RAILWAYS
  London-Liverpool Line (Electrification)
  London-Liverpool Line (Electrification)
  Passenger Services (Proposed Closures)
  Passenger Services (Proposed Closures)
TRANSPORT
  London Passenger Transport Area
  London Passenger Transport Area
  Liverpool Docks
  Liverpool Docks
  IMMIGRATION (MOUNTBATTEN REPORT)
  IMMIGRATION (MOUNTBATTEN REPORT)
  STEEL INDUSTRY
  STEEL INDUSTRY
  PRIME MINISTER'S CAR (RADIO TELEPHONE)
  PRIME MINISTER'S CAR (RADIO TELEPHONE)
  ROYAL COMMISSION ON MEDICAL EDUCATION (MEMBERS)
  ROYAL COMMISSION ON MEDICAL EDUCATION (MEMBERS)
  ROYAL NAVAL AUXILIARY SERVICE (MEDAL)
  ROYAL NAVAL AUXILIARY SERVICE (MEDAL)
AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD
  Poultry (Production)
  Poultry (Production)
  River Teign (Oil Pollution by British Rail)
  River Teign (Oil Pollution by British Rail)
  Harbour Dues, Southwold (Annual Income)
  Harbour Dues, Southwold (Annual Income)
MINISTRY OF AVIATION
  New Runway, Speke Airport
  New Runway, Speke Airport
ADEN
  Merchant Shipping (Liability of Shipowners and Others) Act, 1958
  Merchant Shipping (Liability of Shipowners and Others) Act, 1958
  Secretary of State's Visit
  Secretary of State's Visit
GIBRALTAR
  Delegation (Results of Discussions)
  Delegation (Results of Discussions)
ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
  Regional Development, North Staffordshire and Stoke-on-Trent
  Regional Development, North Staffordshire and Stoke-on-Trent
  South-West Regional Headquarters
  South-West Regional Headquarters
  South-East Study (Review)
  South-East Study (Review)
EDUCATION AND SCIENCE
  School Building Programme, Liverpool
  School Building Programme, Liverpool
  Direct Grant Schools (Allocation of Places)
  Direct Grant Schools (Allocation of Places)
  Careers Teachers (Training)
  Careers Teachers (Training)
  KENNEDY ROUND NEGOTIATIONS
  KENNEDY ROUND NEGOTIATIONS
  WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION
  WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION
MINISTRY OF HEALTH
  Drugs
  Drugs
  Medicine (Legislation)
  Medicine (Legislation)
  Doctors (Heywood Area)
  Doctors (Heywood Area)
  Disposable Syringes
  Disposable Syringes
HOME DEPARTMENT
  Wife Maintenance Orders
  Wife Maintenance Orders
MINISTRY OF LABOUR
  Training Centres, Merseyside
  Training Centres, Merseyside
  Regional Cost of Living Indices and Unemployment Figures
  Regional Cost of Living Indices and Unemployment Figures
  Dock Labour (Inquiries and Reports)
  Dock Labour (Inquiries and Reports)
  National Joint Advisory Council (Committee)
  National Joint Advisory Council (Committee)
PENSIONS AND NATIONAL INSURANCE
  National Assistance
  National Assistance
TELEPHONE SERVICE
  Subscriber Trunk Dialling
  Subscriber Trunk Dialling
POST OFFICE
  Christmas Greeting Air Letter Forms
  Christmas Greeting Air Letter Forms
MINISTRY OF POWER
  Gas and Electricity Boards (Financial Obligations)
  Gas and Electricity Boards (Financial Obligations)
PUBLIC BUILDING AND WORKS
  Land, Kirkby Thore (Archaeological Importance)
  Land, Kirkby Thore (Archaeological Importance)
SCOTLAND
  Electrical Transmission Lines
  Electrical Transmission Lines
  Anthrax
  Anthrax
  Hospitals (Administrative Staff)
  Hospitals (Administrative Staff)
  Strychnine
  Strychnine

Preamble
The House met at half-past two of the clock (Prayers having been read earlier at the Judicial Sitting by the Lord Bishop of St. Edmundsbury and Ipswich): The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
The Lady Kinloss—Took the Oath.

THE ADVISORY COUNCIL ON TECHNOLOGY
THE EARL OF BESSBOROUGH: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government how often the Advisory Council on Technology has met, what staff it has and which particular projects it is studying.]
THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY (LORD SNOW): My Lords, the Council has met ten times. It is serviced by the staff of the Ministry. The Council's terms of reference are to advise on the application of advanced technology in British industry, and in doing so it has given attention to the industries for which my right honourable friend has sponsorship responsibility. Among other subjects considered have been the status of engineers and designers, the development of British standards for export markets, the promotion of the metric system and problems of industrial structure.
THE EARL OF BESSBOROUGH: My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lord for that information. As I understand it, the Council must recently have been meeting fairly frequently. May I ask him whether the Council are in fact considering the rôle, the structure and the terms of reference of the Ministry of Technology, in view of the recent all-Party criticisms—very serious criticisms—of its present top-heavy organisation? May T also ask—and I want to avoid any obstructive criticism here; we should all like to be helpful—whether a real effort is being made to get the organisa
1156
tion of the Ministry right? In addition, may I ask the noble Lord, if it is not asking too much, whether or not he considers that perhaps the Ministry has taken on the wrong industries to over-haul—the ones that we know are already advanced—and would it not be better, also, to consider, for example, the adequacy of the building industry? How in these matters, too, is work divided between the Department of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Technology? Is there not some overlap here?
LORD SNOW: My Lords, I think that to answer those supplementaries completely would require quite a long speech. First, I am sure that the noble Earl is much too sensible a man to join in the foolish and ill-informed vendetta against my right honourable friend. Secondly, the noble Earl has been in Government and he knows the form when a Select Committee report. The Select Committee report to the Treasury, the Treasury informs my right honourable friend, and my right honourable friend then writes back to the Treasury. I cannot anticipate the terms of his reply, except to assure your Lordships that it will be good reading.
On the matter of the concern of the Council with the structure of the Ministry, this has, of course, not been part of their duties. It would be ridiculous for them to occupy themselves so. This is a matter of pure internal administration which, as I say, will be covered in my right honourable friend's reply to the Treasury. As to the industries which my right honourable friend has chosen for sponsorship, this was a cool and deliberate choice and we are quite sure this is still right. The building industry is covered by another Ministry—the Ministry of Housing and Local Government—and has its own sponsoring department, and a very active one. We chose industries, in the first instance, whose disappearance from our economy would in our view do untold harm. The fact that they were advanced made it, in fact, easier rather than harder, to try some methods of injecting technology. It will then be our duty to try to do the same process on other industries.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, the noble Lord began his answer by

1157
referring to ill-informed criticism—I cannot quote his words quite accurately. Would he make it clear to whom he was referring? It would appear that he was referring to the Report of the Estimates Committee.
LORD SNOW: No, my Lords; I was referring to sources much wider than that.
LORD FRASER OF LONSDALE: My Lords, if the Advisory Council are considering the metric system, which is a long-term job, are they also considering the decimal coinage system, which is much less long-term and might have a very considerable effect upon our technological advancement?
LORD SNOW: My Lords, the question of decimal coinage is, in fact, strictly a duty of the Treasury. But it is obvious that in the course of our concerns this cannot go completely unthought of.
THE EARL OF BESSBOROUGH: My Lords, may I also ask the noble Lord, on this question of overlapping in regard to the Department of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Technology which I touched on, whether he is satisfied that the work of the Advisory Council on Technology and that of the Council for Scientific Policy under the chairmanship of Sir Harry Massey is adequately coordinated? Is the work of those two bodies co-ordinated? For example, is atomic energy research a matter for the Advisory Council on Technology or for the Council for Scientific Policy, and maybe the Science Research Council, under Sir Harry Melville? May I also ask the noble Lord, finally, whether it is true that Professor Blackett, who I think was on both Councils, is now to resign?
LORD SNOW: My Lords, the answer to the last part of the question is, No. The relations between the Council for Scientific Policy and the Advisory Council on Technology are close and are joined by common membership. I think there is no danger of any serious lacuna between them. The relations of the Ministry of Technology with the Department of Economic Affairs must be close. This is necessary and inevitable, just as the relations of the little "Neddies" with our analytical groups must also be close. I think there is little danger of over
1158
lapping, but in fact it was a case where it was better to have overlapping rather than a gap.

SUPPLIES OF BEEF
2.38 p.m.
LORD HURD: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the first Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what are the prospective supplies of beef for the United Kingdom market in the second half of this year from home sources and the chief exporting countries, particularly Australia, Argentina and Yugoslavia, compared with average supplies over the past five years, and what forecast has been made of total supplies of beef to the United Kingdom in 1966.]
THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO (LORD CHAMPION): My Lords, our total beef supplies for the July-December period averaged 620,000 tons over the last five years. Of this total, 445,000 tons were home-produced, 85,000 tons came from Argentina, 33,000 tons from Australia, and some 8,000 tons from Yugoslavia. In addition, the Irish Republic and Uruguay each sent some 13,000 tons, and New Zealand about 9,000 tons. In the second half of this year total supplies are expected to be considerably below the five-year average, although no precise forecast is possible. Compared with this average, home supplies will be lower (although about the same as last year), imports from the Argentine will be substantially less, and those from Yugoslavia and Uruguay may also be down. On the other hand, imports of frozen beef from Australia and New Zealand may be double the five-year average. With regard to 1966, there are too many uncertainties in world supply and demand for me to be able to give a reliable estimate of our total supplies, but I am glad to say that we expect an increase in home production.
LORD HURD: My Lords, may I thank the noble Lord for that Answer? Having looked at the whole situation, does he not think that the outlook for the British consumer, who likes a nice bit of beef occasionally, is pretty grim for the next two or three years, and would it not be

1159
right for the Government to take further measures now to stimulate and encourage an increased production of beef in this country, as the demand from the Continent of Europe seems to be continuing very strongly and is likely to persist?
LORD CHAMPION: Yes, my Lords, I agree with the noble Lord that the outlook is not very good for that nice little bit of succulent beef that he was talking about. The fact is that, as the noble Lord knows, we have taken some measures to increase future beef supplies, and evidence already available to us shows that measures taken at the last Review in relation to the guaranteed price, calf subsidy and hill cow subsidy are achieving the Government's purpose of stimulating home production. We think that, to some extent, this will meet the shortage; but clearly this is a world shortage, and we cannot hope to make this up by stimulating our own home production.
EARL FERRERS: My Lords, in view of the fact that the majority of the countries who supply us with beef are now themselves consuming more of their own products, and in view of the fact that, as the noble Lord said, our home-produced beef in the last six-month period was lower than previously, could he say what steps Her Majesty's Government have in mind, other than those he has mentioned, to increase the home production—because would he not agree that the increase of 10s. in the calf subsidy is wholly inadequate to encourage further beef production?
LORD CHAMPION: My Lords, we are finding that it has, in fact, increased it. The full results will be coming in later; the figures I have given are those which are available to the Ministry to date. But, of course, we shall have to watch the position. We shall have to consider it before the next Annual Review, because clearly this is a matter of tremendous importance to the consumer in this country.
EARL FERRERS: But does the noble Lord not appreciate that, while there is a difficulty at the moment, it is not likely to have its full impact until about another eighteen months' time, and that therefore measures should be taken immediately, as
1160
opposed to waiting for another year or so when it may be too late?
LORD CHAMPION: I take it the noble Earl is still talking about home production?
EARL FERRERS: Yes.
LORD CHAMPION: As I have said, the measures already taken are showing results. Clearly, the calf cubsidy cannot have any immediate result—the beasts have got to grow up and reach beef standard and beef size—but we think that we have taken appropriate measures. However, as I say, we shall watch the position, because we are, as the noble Earl is, anxious about it.
LORD COLYTON: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord whether Her Majesty's Government are taking steps to encourage the import of beef from Rhodesia? Is he aware that the Rhodesian National Farmers' Union recently let it be known that, with appropriate markets, they could increase the export of beef from Rhodesia to some £20 million per annum within a very short time?
LORD CHAMPION: I am sorry to say, my Lords, that I have no information on that point, but I will look into it and write to the noble Lord; or if he cares to put down a Question, I will give him the reply.

AGRICULTURAL POLICY DISCUSSIONS
2.44 p.m.
LORD HURD: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the second Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether the policy discussions initiated by the Prime Minister following farmers' dissatisfaction with this year's price review have now been concluded, and when a White Paper will be published.]
LORD CHAMPION: My Lords, the discussions which my right honourable friend the Minister of Agriculture is holding with the farmers' unions cover a wide range of subjects, including the contribution which agriculture can make to the

1161
national economic development plan, and they are still continuing. Statements have already been made about the conclusions reached in the talks on eggs and potatoes, and the Government will make further announcements as the various discussions are concluded. It is not, however, intended to issue a single White Paper covering all the subjects being considered.
LORD HURD: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for that Answer. It is disappointing that the Government do not at the moment intend to publish a White Paper, because would it not be best to try to draw together these various threads to see that they make a coherent whole and make sense? We are rather drifting in the matter of agricultural policy. Does the noble Lord put it. I should think desirable we should draw these various threads together, so that the farmers really know what the nation needs from British agriculture?
LORD CHAMPION: My Lords, from the announcements to be made it will be possible to draw the threads together, as the noble Lord put it. I would think that, after these separate announcements have been made, the Government would consider the possibility of bringing them together, so that people can see them as a single whole. Some of the questions under consideration will be the subject of announcements to be made in a very short time—I hope before the end of this month.
EARL FERRERS: My Lords, does the sudden appearance of posters by the roadside indicating that Great Britain should have great farming indicate an unsatisfactory outcome of these talks?
LORD CHAMPION: My Lords, I saw these after the Annual Review. I thought some of them were stuck up by the noble Earl on his farm gate.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
2.46 p.m.
LORD CHAMPION: My Lords, I should like to make a Statement about the course of Business this afternoon. I think the House would agree that every effort should be made to conclude the Committee stage of the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Bill to-day. It
1162
is recognised that this may involve sitting until a late hour. There will be a break for dinner between 7.30 and 8.30 p.m. If it is impossible to complete the Committee stage to-day, it will be continued on Thursday next, July 29. In any event, the Report and Third Reading of the Monopolies and Mergers Bill will be taken this evening. It may be for the convenience of the House if I stated the Government's intentions with regard to the Judges' Remuneration Bill. The Second Reading has been set down for Tuesday next, August 3. It is proposed that the Committee and the remaining stages be taken on Wednesday, August 4.
At a suitable moment after 3.30 p.m. my noble friend Lord Shepherd will be making a Statement on Government economic measures.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, with regard to the Business for to-day, the noble Lord is aware that the last Amendments tabled in relation to the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Bill are Amendments tabled to reverse a decision arrived at in another place on a vote. I think it would be extremely unfortunate if that effort to reverse a decision arrived at by the elected Chamber was taken at a late hour to-night, and I must say that I should strongly object to that. I hope, therefore, that if the proceedings on that Bill are not concluded by, say, 7 o'clock this evening, we shall leave consideration of those Amendments over until Thursday.
LORD CHAMPION: My Lords, this is very much a matter for arrangement through the usual channels. I hope that perhaps the channels concerned will get together to discuss what the noble Viscount has said. All I can do is to make the announcement on behalf of the Chief Whip, but I will certainly call his attention to what the noble Viscount has said.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, there may have been a slight slip between the usual channels—it does sometimes occur, although one hopes it will not—but I think it would be a serious matter if we took those Amendments at a late hour to-night.

LONDON TRANSPORT BILL
Read 3a, with the Amendments, and passed, and returned to the Commons.

PRICE STABILITY OF IMPORTED PRODUCTS (SPECIFIED COMMO DITIES) (AMENDMENT) ORDER, 1965
2.50 p.m.
LORD CHAMPION: My Lords, I beg to move that the Price Stability of Imported Products (Specified Commodities) (Amendment) Order 1965, which was laid before this House in draft on July 8, 1965, be approved. This introduces a relatively minor change of a technical nature in the minimum price arrangements which I trust will not long delay your Lordships. Under Section 1 of the Agriculture and Horticulture Act 1964, the appropriate Ministers may by order specify commodities and prescribe minimum price levels for them. These powers, which may be exercised in the interest of maintaining a stable market for agricultural or horticultural produce of a kind produced in the United Kingdom, were used to introduce the present minimum price arrangements for cereals. It is the purpose of the draft Order now before your Lordships to add one item to the list of specified cereals and related products so that a minimum import price level may be prescribed for it.
I should perhaps explain that in order to achieve the objective of the minimum import price arrangements it is necessary to cover, in addition to the main cereals, a number of important cereal products and by-products, in order to prevent them from being imported free from control in substitution for the basic cereals. For this reason, bran, sharps and other residues derived from the sifting, milling or working of cereals, other than of rice under Tariff Heading 23.02, were specified in the original Order, and a minimum import price level was prescribed for them. I understand that at that time it was intended that a minimum import price level should apply to all milling residues, whether in meal or compressed form. It has since been established that compressed milling residues should be regarded as preparations of animal feedingstuffs and that they are properly classified under Tariff Heading 23.07 and not under Tariff Heading 23.02, as had been assumed. They are therefore not covered by the existing minimum price arrangements.
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Article 2 of the draft Order now before your Lordships amends the principal Order by adding milling residues in compressed forms to the Schedule in which are listed the specified cereals and cereal products and by-products. A further Order prescribing a minimum import price for this item will be laid before the House shortly after the present Order has been approved and made. The change has been discussed with representatives of the domestic interests concerned, and overseas suppliers to our market have also been consulted. I commend the Order to your Lordships for approval.
Moved, That the Draft Price Stability of Imported Products (Specified Commodities) (Amendment) Order 1965, laid before the House on 8th July, be approved.—(Lord Champion.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

SMALL FARM (BUSINESS MANAGEMENT) SCHEME 1965
LORD CHAMPION: My Lords, I beg to move that the Small Farm (Business Management) Scheme 1965 be approved, and I trust that it will be convenient if, at the same time, we consider the Small Farm (Business Management) (Scotland) Scheme 1965. The introduction of a revised Small Farmer Scheme was foreshadowed in the Annual Review White Paper last March. We said then that the upper eligibility limits of the Scheme would be extended from 100 to 125 acres of crops and grass, and from 500 standard man-days, on the old scale, to 600 standard man-days, on a new scale. We also said that the Scheme itself would be revised to place a greater emphasis on business management and the keeping of farm records.
The Scheme which we are discussing to-day implements those promises. The changes in the eligibility limits which I have mentioned will bring an additional 39,500 farmers in the United Kingdom within the scope of the Scheme. But the main difference between this Scheme and the existing Small Farmer Scheme is in the concept of a three-year programme based on the conclusions to be drawn from the regular keeping of farm records. Provision is made first of all for the

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Minister to approve a "complete" programme, covering a detailed schedule of work or activities on the farm for the whole three years. As each year's work is completed satisfactorily—and this will include the keeping of records and submitting a summary of them to the Ministry—an annual grant will be paid. In the first year this will be £50, plus £2 for each acre of crops and grass; in the second year, £50 plus £3 10s. an acre; and in the third year £50 plus £3 an acre. The maximum acreage eligible for grant is 100 acres, which gives a maximum grant of £1,000.
This facility for the approval of a complete programme is, however, available only to those farmers who at the time they submit their proposals have already been keeping adequately detailed farm records for a sufficient period to enable a firm judgment to be made about the most profitable development of their business over the following three years. Most small farmers, however, are probably not in this position, and for them we have a rather different approach. They will be able to have a basic programme which will set out in detail only the work which needs to be done in the first year. The rest of the programme, at the initial stage, will simply consist of instituting and maintaining proper farm records over the whole three years.
Upon satisfactory completion of the first year's plan, the farmer will be entitled to the grant of £50, plus £2 an acre; but before he can qualify for the full grant in the second year he will be invited to discuss with the Ministry's advisory officer the results of the first year's work, and in the light of the information given by the records they will agree on what needs to be done in the second year in order to make the farm more profitable. This agreed second-year plan will then be added to the basic programme and will enable the farmer to qualify for the second-year grant of £50 plus £3 10s. an acre. A similar procedure will operate at the end of the second year to enable the farmer to qualify for the third-year grant of £50 plus £3 an acre. If, however, the farmer decides not to develop his basic programme in this way, but to continue to keep the stipulated records, he can qualify for the flat rate grant of £50 a year in the second and third years. There are provisions in the
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Scheme which allow for the normal delays and accidents of farm life so that the three-year programme may be extended by up to two years and there are other provisions, to allow for a reduced grant to be paid to those small farmers who have already received some assistance under the existing Scheme.
My Lords, I have outlined briefly the main provisions of this small but important Scheme, but before I close I should like to say a few words about the existing Scheme and our reasons for introducing this new one. The existing Scheme came into operation in 1959 and, apart from the extension of the man-day limits in 1962, has remained unchanged. A total of 53,000 small farmers have had farm business plans approved under it, and up to May 31 this year some £30 million had been paid in grants. In many respects the Scheme has been a success, and I am sure that many of the small farmers who were assisted by its provisions have benefited permanently. But during the years over which it has operated, certain disadvantages have emerged. Perhaps the most significant is that the Scheme placed a great deal of emphasis on the traditional aspects of husbandry-ploughing, ditching and so on—not only as a way of increasing the efficiency of the business but as a means of earning grant. The small farmers of to-day—and more particularly those who occupy the rather larger businesses which we are now proposing to assist—are, however, well versed in the skills and arts of husbandry. What has not been emphasised, perhaps, in the past is the need for farmers to exercise the skills of modern business management. The farmers with whom we are now concerned need help and advice to acquire these skills. This Scheme is designed to give them that advice, and the payment of fairly substantial annual grants will help them to implement the management decisions which they take.
The Scheme will operate from September 1 next until August 31, 1968. Over its full life, which of course will extend for three years beyond this latter date, the total cost in the United Kingdom is estimated to be £22 million, of which about £5 million is expected to arise at the end of the first year. The details of this Scheme have been fully discussed and agreed with the Farmers' Unions, and I commend it to the House.
Moved, That the Draft Small Farm (Business Management) Scheme 1965, laid before the House on July 8, be approved.—(Lord Champion)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
3.0 p.m.
EARL FERRERS: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Champion, has given us interesting details about this scheme and your Lordships will be grateful to him for doing so. I am bound to say that my own reactions are only lukewarm, because I cannot help wondering how much real good will be done by this scheme, which the noble Lord has outlined. The noble Lord will remember that his Government have all along, hinted and implied—indeed they have put their words into print in the annual determination White Paper—that many farms are too small and must amalgamate and join together to make small farms into bigger farms. I wonder therefore whether it is not an anachronism for the noble Lord to come forward with a scheme designed solely for the continuation of small farms. One wonders how to reconcile the two points of view.
I feel that before long the noble Lord's Government will have to take a very far-reaching decision about the future of the small farmers. At the moment, if I may so put it, they are rather like a hen scratching around on top of a stack. They come forward with small schemes like this one which do not have any great impact, and at the same time they suggest that small farms must be joined to make bigger ones. It should be pointed out to the noble Lord that this is a matter of paramount interest not only to small farmers but to all farmers who wish to know exactly what is wanted of them now, and in five, ten and twenty years' time. I hope that at some time in the near future the noble Lord will be able to tell the House precisely what are the Government's intentions regarding this matter.
Some months ago I asked him a Question on the subject and he said that the future of the small farmers was being discussed. So far we have heard no results of the discussions. Perhaps they will be announced in line with the announcement to which the noble Lord alluded in his reply to the question put
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by my noble friend Lord Hurd. I am aware that a scheme for small farmers may prove of assistance in individual cases, but taken as a national plan it can be received, I would say, with only lukewarm enthusiasm, because we wish to know precisely what are the Government's intentions with regard to small farmers.
LORD FORBES: My Lords, I would support any scheme designed to improve the business efficiency of farmers, especially small farmers. Like the noble Earl, Lord Ferrers, I wonder whether the Government realise what problems they are creating for themselves over small farms in general. Do the Government realise that 50 per cent. of the farms In this country are under 50 acres in extent, and only 5 per cent. (I think it is) of the farms are over 200 acres? Every other European country is dealing with this problem. Is it not about time that this country began to deal with the problem presented by the small farmers? What is going to happen if we think again about entering the Common Market? We shall be on a very bad footing compared with other countries.
LORD INGLEWOOD: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord, Lord Champion, one question about administration? The administration of this scheme would seem to be fairly complicated. If my memory is right, it will be more complicated than the scheme which it amends. Can the noble Lord assure us that this scheme will not place an undue burden on the resources of the N.A.A.S. and will not take the Service off other work which some of us think more vital? I remember that when the original scheme came in it was considered a pretty heavy load. This amended scheme may well be an even heavier load? Can the noble Lord enlighten us on that point?
LORD CHAMPION: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Inglewood, is quite right about the load on the N.A.A.S., but it has been found that the Service has been able to carry the load, and it is thought that the further extension of this Scheme into business management aspects will still be capable of being carried by the N.A.A.S. We think that preparations have been such that the Service will be able to carry on the Scheme. One reason why we have not gone up to the full 150 acres provided for in the Act of 1959

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is that we regard the 125 acre farm as the limit which the N.A.A.S. can assist at this stage. I think we shall have no difficulty on that score.
The noble Lord, Lord Forbes, and the noble Earl, Lord Ferrers, referred to the situation in which we appear, on the one hand, to be helping the small farmer and, on the other, to be saying that it is time he disappeared. I recognise the difficulty that we are perhaps getting into here. We hope and expect to assist those farms which could become viable and useful economic units. I would never say that every farm must be 200 or 300 acres in extent, or over. I believe that that would be quite wrong. In our view, many farms in the range we are considering may be made really sound economic units, and I believe that it would be to the advantage of the country to make them so. We recognise that there is what one might call a dichotomy—I think that is a nice word for this occasion—and I think that is the answer here. So far as other things are concerned, as I said to the noble Lord, Lord Hurd, when replying to his Question, we shall, I hope shortly—that is, within a very few days—be making an announcement of our proposals on farm structure which, of course, includes amalgamation and the merging of smaller farms.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

SMALL FARM (BUSINESS MANAGEMENT) (SCOTLAND) SCHEME 1965
THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SCOTLAND (LORD HUGHES): My Lords, I expect that your Lordships would not wish me to add anything to the very full statement made by my noble friend. I beg to move approval of this Scheme for Scotland.
Moved, That the Draft Small Farm (Business Management) (Scotland) Scheme 1965, laid before the House on July 8, be approved.—(Lord Hughes.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

HIRE-PURCHASE BILL [H.L.]
House in Committee (on Recommitment) (according to Order).
House resumed: Bill reported without amendment; Report received.
Then, Standing Order No. 41 having been suspended (pursuant to the Resolution of July 22), Bill read 3a, and passed, and sent to the Commons.

HIRE-PURCHASE (SCOTLAND) BILL [H.L.]
House in Committee (on Recommitment) (according to Order).
House resumed: Bill reported without amendment; Report received.
Then, Standing Order No. 41 having been suspended (pursuant to the Resolution of July 22), Bill read 3a, and passed, and sent to the Commons.

PUBLIC WORKS LOANS BILL
Brought from the Commons; read 1a, and to be printed.
BACKING OF WARRANTS (REPUBLIC OF IRELAND) BILL [H.L.]
Returned from the Commons, agreed to.

MURDER (ABOLITION OF DEATH PENALTY) BILL
3.13 p.m.
Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee read.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Baroness Wootton of Abinger.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[The LORD MERTHYR in the Chair.]
Clause 1:
Abolition of death penalty for murder
1.—(1) No person shall suffer death for murder, and a person convicted of murder, shall, subject to subsection (4) below be sentenced to imprisonment for life.
LORD CONESFORD LORD CONESFORD had given Notice of three Amendments to Clause 1, the first being, in subsection (1), after "murder", where that word first occurs, to insert:
"other than any murder specified in the next subsection".

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The noble Lord said: It is clearly convenient to the Committee, I think, that we should discuss together Amendments Nos. 1, 2 and 4. No. 4 shows clearly and simply the purpose of these Amendments and Nos. 1 and 2 are preparatory. Under the Amendments, liability to the death penalty would remain for two categories of murder mentioned in Section 5 of the Homicide Act 1957. Let me explain to the Committee why I think it right and necessary to retain that liability. I outlined my reasons in my speech on Second Reading, when I explained why I supported the Second Reading but regarded some amendment as essential.
Before I come to the more specific arguments showing why I think these Amendments essential, let me explain to the Committee what I think these categories of murder have in common and what differentiates them from other murders. The murders specified in my Amendment No. 4 are acts of war against civilised government itself, against the whole machinery of justice and against the very existence of the rule of law. Their motive is to prevent men, whatever they have done, from being brought to trial at all, or, if they have been tried and are in custody, from suffering the penalty prescribed. It will be seen, therefore, that these murders have much in common with treason, for which the death penalty remains. I am not saying, of course, that they amount to treason, but they have much in common. I think that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor will probably agree with me that levying war against the Crown, which is one kind of treason, has been shown by decided cases and legal commentators to include such things as a rising to break all prisons open. That would be treason. But a rising to release a particular prisoner, unless he happened to be imprisoned for treason, would not be. I merely mention that as showing how closely associated with the elements of treason are the murders which I have specified. I think, therefore, that it is quite logical to make the distinction.
I now come to the main reasons why I think it is necessary to make this distinction. The first reason I explained, I hope clearly, in my speech on Second Reading. If my Amendments are not
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carried, our law will retain no deterrent at all against certain murders. I do not wish to say much about any theory of punishment. As I have said in earlier speeches, I agree with the late Archbishop Temple in holding that deterrence in itself could not justify punishment, if punishment were not otherwise justified. If the theory were true that retribution, meaning that a man deserves punishment, was entirely wrong, then mere deterrence could not justify a punishment.
But if punishment is justified for murder, then I think that we are probably all agreed that it is desirable that the punishment should deter. Members in all quarters of the Committee, whatever their views on the merits of the Bill, desire that there should be a deterrent against murder. What has been debated is whether capital punishment is a unique deterrent. Clearly the House of Commons and this House, by a large majority, think that imprisonment can be an adequate deterrent, and I, too, am quite content to accept that view in nearly every case. That is why I think many of us supported this Bill on Second Reading.
I know that there are some who think that all capital punishment is wrong, and I know that I cannot hope for their support to my Amendment. But those for whose support I would ask are those who think that capital punishment is not invariably wrong but who require to be satisfied that there is a case for it in the particular categories which I have mentioned. The cases where imprisonment is no deterrent are those cases where long imprisonment would be certain, even if murder were not committed. I have repeatedly called attention to this in earlier speeches, and I do not wish to repeat myself. I should, however, like to quote one paragraph from what was said by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Shawcross, in his speech in the debate on Second Reading, which I think made a considerable impression on the House. He was, in general, in favour of the abolition of capital punishment for the reasons which he gave. Towards the end of his speech, he said this:
"My Lords, there is one special case about which I must confess that I feel some anxiety and in regard to which I have an open mind. That is the case of the man who has already been convicted for some crime for which he has received a very long sentence, or who has committed a crime for which he is liable

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to receive a very long sentence. I ask myself whether capital punishment is a deterrent to his shooting or killing his way out, in order to escape arrest or to escape from prison. Is it necessary to retain capital punishment as a protection to warders and police officers against this risk? On this point all I will say is that I shall listen with great interest to what may be said on both sides in regard to this matter during the Committee stage of this Bill. Meanwhile, I shall support its Second Reading."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 268 (No. 105), col. 513, July 19, 1965.]
I have quoted that passage because I wanted a statement by somebody other than myself of the clear distinction between those for whom imprisonment may be, and can be, a deterrent, and those for whom, using our best reasoning, we agree that it is not likely to be a deterrent at all.
The two categories which I mention in my Amendment No. 4 overlap. Neither of the two categories is confined to the police, though the police may be the persons chiefly concerned under each. The views of the police, or at least of their representative bodies, are, I think, well known. The danger that they and others run in effecting arrests are known to us all from recent examples; and impressive examples were cited by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, in his speech on Second Reading. In the murders which I have described in my Amendment, therefore, we are not dealing with imaginary dangers. I share the view of the police that the death penalty is a deterrent to such men. In many cases, in the absence of that deterrent, there would be no other deterrent at all; and I believe that this view is shared by many practitioners of my old profession who have experience of criminal cases. But even if I did not myself share the view of the police, if I felt some doubt about it, I think I should still treat the considered view of the police with much greater respect than has been shown by some. These men run great risks as our servants, and know better than most of us the criminals with whom they have to deal. Their views are, therefore, entitled to respect.
What have we to set against their views? Professor Sellin's book has been quoted in both Houses, and I am grateful to those noble Lords who quoted it, because some of his statistics are most interesting, and they may be important in various connections. They do not, of
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course, show that no one has been deterred by the death penalty from committing murder: for reasons that have been given in many quarters, that is something which we can never know. While I do not for one moment doubt the sincerity of those who think that these statistics indicate that in some countries, at any rate, the abolition of the death penalty has not increased the danger to the police, I do not think that they can be said to go further than that. And, of course, we have not been told, what I think would be rather valuable in assessing these statistics, what is the alternative deterrent; that is to say, what imprisonment in those countries actually involves. I am, in particular, not over-impressed with examples taken from the United States, having regard to the appalling failure of their campaign against murder. Their homicide rate, as we know, is enormously greater than anything we endure in this country.
There is one final point that I should like to put to the Committee. No one, I think, whatever his views on capital punishment, desires frequent changes in our law on this subject. If we make the change advocated in this Bill, surely we must all, on both sides of the Committee, wish that the experiment should have prospects of lasting success. For that purpose I sincerely believe that the trust, the confidence and the support of the police is indispensable. I honestly wonder whether the supporters of this Bill, if they resist my Amendment, have thought about the probable effect that future murders of police officers may have on public opinion. For myself, all I can say, quite simply, is this. For me, these Amendments are crucial. If they are accepted, I can and will support the Bill, as I have hitherto supported it. Without them, I cannot. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 5, after ("murder") insert ("other than any murder specified in the next subsection").—(Lord Conesford.)
3.28 p.m.
THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE, HOME OFFICE (LORD STONHAM): I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, for inviting the Committee to consider the three Amendments in the name of his noble friend and himself,

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because they all go together. The noble Lord reminded us of what he said in his Second Reading speech, explaining why he supported the principle of abolition and why, when we came to the Committee stage, he would move Amendments indicating the reservations he had. I think it will be agreed, even among those noble Lords who are not wholly convinced abolitionists, that there has been a general, and at times severe condemnation of the limitation of the 1957 Homicide Act: indeed, I think that the noble Lord was himself a critic in 1957, when he forecast the difficulties that would arise. But, basically, what the noble Lord is now proposing is that, instead of there being five exceptions, five opportunities for anomalies, there should be three.
LORD CONESFORD: Two.
LORD STONHAM: I will come to that point. In my reading of the noble Lord's Amendment, there are three classes of person who would be excepted if his Amendments were incorporated in the Bill. They would be private persons who exercise the right of a private person to attempt to arrest a felon, or, indeed, to prevent the escape of a felon, whether or not they come to the assistance of the police, police officers themselves, and prison officers. So we are considering three classes of persons in these Amendments, and not two.
Let me say right away that experience, not as a Minister, but of twenty years in both Houses of Parliament, leads me to place as much reliance on statistics as most other noble Lords do. But at least I can say that there have been no murders which come under subsection (1)(c) of Section 5 of the Homicide Act. At least we have that recent experience in this country. Then, although he did not specifically mention them (but I know he now accepts what I say), the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, is arguing that the category of capital murder should be retained as a protection for ordinary citizens who may be exercising the private person's power to arrest where a felony has been committed, and who may be acting alone in the absence of any police officers; or, alternatively, for a private person who may be murdered while seeking to prevent an escape from
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legal custody, though he may not at the time be assisting a prison or police officer. Therefore, in effect, the noble Lord argues that it is necessary to retain this exception to the general principle of abolition on the ground—quite rightly—that no citizen should be discouraged from supporting the forces of law and order.
While the Government certainly do not wish to discourage such actions, whether by private persons or by police or prison officers, it would surely be anomalous to retain capital punishment for murder in these circumstances affecting private citizens, but to abolish it, for example, for the murder of an elderly or defenceless shopkeeper in the course of theft. In other words, I would submit to the noble Lord that this particular class of murders cannot justifiably be treated in a different way from capital murders in general. I think that should come within the orbit of what the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, himself accepted on Second Reading—namely, the principle that the death penalty should not he retained for capital murders.
It could be argued that we should retain the death penalty for murders in the course of escapes or rescues from legal custody, or in order to prevent further escapes, such as that of Biggs the other week. But the Government's view is that these escapes are best prevented, not by retaining the death penalty, but by the special security precautions in the special prison units and in other ways which I described to your Lordships on July 14. I, as I am sure we all do, fully appreciate and understand the reasons of the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, for wishing to retain the death penalty for the murder of a police officer because, as he rightly said, of all sections of the community they are most exposed to danger from violent criminals. But there is no sort of evidence to support the belief that this Bill will lead to an increase in violent crime, or to more killings by criminals in order to escape detection. Equally, there is no reason to believe that the police will be in greater danger as a result of this Bill than, unfortunately, they are to-day.
I acknowledge the correctness of Lord Conesford's claim that there is a strongly held, but, I would say, by no means unanimous, view in the police service that

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the death penalty is a deterrent to the murder of a police officer and is therefore some protection. That certainly is the view of the Police Federation of England and Wales, whose representatives had a full and frank discussion with my right honourable and learned friend the Home Secretary, at which I also was present. This was before the Bill received a Second Reading in the House of Commons. But I would point out something I refrained from pointing out on Second Reading, that in their memorandum which they sent to all Members of Parliament, the Federation made it clear that, as in other sections of the community, there was a division of opinion in their ranks. I would quote from that memorandum:
"Some policemen will hold that capital punishment is against the very foundations upon which our civilisation is based"—
"some policemen", my Lords.
"On the other hand, others will hold directly contrary views equally firmly."
It is not without significance, I submit, that the English Association of Chief Police Officers has, we understand, decided not to make any representations to the Home Secretary, and no representations have been received from the Superintendents' Association in England and Wales.
On this key question of deterrence, there is no objective evidence that the death penalty deters murders of police officers, any more or any less than other types of murder. In England and Wales in the last seventeen years since 1948, seven persons have been convicted of murdering police officers on duty, and there has been one such conviction in Scotland during the same period. The death penalty did not prevent any of these tragedies. They happened, unhappily, in spite of it. Now it is suggested, although not claimed categorically by the noble Lord, that it will be worse if this Bill becomes law in its present form. There is no evidence to support that view. The noble Lord referred to the previous mention of the researches of Professor Sellin in the United States. He may remember this point. Whatever may be said about those researches, they indicated that the fatalities to police officers were at least greater—something like 6 per cent. greater—in the cities of those States which
1178
had retained the death penalty for murder than in those where it was abolished.
The noble Lord mentioned, too, what he described as the appalling failure in the United States in their campaign against murder; and only to-day the newspapers said that in the United States there was a murder every hour, a rape every 26 minutes, and a theft of a car every 60 seconds. I would submit that the answer to the noble Lord is that, over a considerable part of the United States, the death penalty is still in operation and policemen there are being killed. Therefore, he really cannot call that in aid.
If we are agreed that the death penalty should be retained for the police, we should be continuing the anomalies of the 1957 Act, because we could scarcely justify drawing the line at police officers and persons assisting them. If the death penalty is a protection for the policeman threatened by a criminal, or the person who comes to the aid of the police, would it not be equally true for, say, a night watchman, a bank clerk, a householder or any other member of the public—who, incidentally, would not be covered by paragraph (a) of the noble Lord's Amendment unless he was trying to make an arrest or prevent an escape? In other words, the Amendment illustrates once more that it is not possible to retain the death penalty for selected categories of murder without creating indefensible anomalies. There is also the fact that the Amendment violates the principle overwhelmingly supported by your Lordships on Second Reading—namely, that capital punishment is a barbarous penalty which is out of place in 20th century Britain, and is no longer used in many civilised countries. Indeed, the brutalising effect on society of retaining the death penalty might, in the long run, be more of a danger to the police than the loss of any deterrent value it may have.
Finally, I must make it clear that one of the considerations that the Home Secretary takes into account—and this will be made even more clear as we come to discuss later Amendments—in deciding when a prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment should he released, is the circumstances of the offence. Your Lordships. the police, prison officers and the country can be assured that, if this Bill is passed

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without this Amendment, and a person is sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of a police officer or of a prison officer or of a person assisting him, the particular heinousness of the offence would be reflected in the period of detention served, which, in the absence of special or mitigating circumstances, is bound to be very much in excess of the much-quoted and misleading nine-year period.
With regard to prison officers, it is quite properly argued that, unless the death penalty is retained in the way proposed, a prisoner serving a long sentence may feel he has little to lose by murdering a prison officer, particularly if this will facilitate his escape. I cannot say categorically, of course, that this could never happen, but I do question whether there is any real danger of its happening if the death penalty is abolished. Nor is there such a certainty, or near-certainty, that retention of the penalty would prevent its happening so as to justify such a major departure from the overwhelming decision of the House, a decision, indeed, in which the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, and the noble Lord, Lord Ilford, concurred.
I could quote statistics—or perhaps it would be more accurate to say the almost complete absence of statistics—covering nearly 100 years with regard to prison officers murdered by prisoners in European countries which have abolished capital punishment, but I will not do so because I do not think that it would help to convince your Lordships. I believe that last week your Lordships decided that we were going to abolish capital punishment for the crime of murder, and I firmly believe that at the end of the day that will be your decision and that we shall not make these exceptions. Therefore, I hope your Lordships will reject this Amendment.
3.43 p.m.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: I am sure your Lordships will not be surprised, and indeed the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, will be the least surprised of all, if I say that I found his reply entirely unconvincing. He never dealt with the case put forward by my noble friend; he never suggested what would be the deterrent to the professional
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criminal from using violence to avoid arrest or to escape arrest if the death penalty is abolished. He started by saying that he did not place much reliance on statistics, and then, as usual, we got information about the statistics in other countries. He said that there was no evidence that it really was a deterrent, and lie quoted one selected passage from a document sent to all Members of Parliament from the Police Federation. That sentence was:
"Some people will hold that capital punishment is against the very foundations upon which our civilisation is based."
I have no doubt that some people in all sections of society take that view in regard to this matter. I cannot seek to argue with them or to convince them that their view is wrong, and I would not endeavour to do so. But what we are concerned with here is the protection given to those who are responsible for the maintenance of law and order. And in considering that question, surely the conclusions of the Police Federation are worthy of serious attention.
In the course of the Second Reading debate, I asked the noble Lord whether the advice of the police to the Home Secretary differed from the advice that was given in 1957. To that I had no answer. Likewise, we have had no information about that to-day. We have been told that certain bodies of superintendents and others have not made representations, but we know that the Police Federation have. Has not the Home Secretary sought to obtain advice from the police on this most important issue? If he has, he would naturally consult them, I assume, if their advice differed from the advice given in 1957. Before we pass from this Amendment, we surely ought to have an answer to that question; and I should like, if I may, to remind your Lordships of what was said by the Police Federation. Paragraph 9 said this:
"Why are not more policemen murdered than now? We have no proof, but we believe that a professional criminal is strongly deterred by the fear of capital punishment. Remove this, and if he is eventually caught he then faces life imprisonment. He may regard this as a worthwhile risk because, despite the sincerity of the views being expressed by some people at the moment, he may well believe that the public of this country would not tolerate perpetual imprisonment—the thought

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of a human being rotting in prison until he dies—and in due course he would be released."
That was their considered view.
On Second Reading, I put the case of the professional criminal with a long record who knew that if he was caught again he would serve a very long sentence, and I asked, without receiving a reply, some of those in favour of abolition to indicate what would be the deterrent against such a person using violence if he was interfered with. I think to some of us it does not require any evidence that the deterrent of a life sentence—whatever that may mean—is less than the deterrent of capital punishment. That view which I have held is confirmed by a letter that I received yesterday from an inmate of one of Her Majesty's Prisons. I should like to read to your Lordships a passage from this letter. His first complaint was one which many of us have made, about the Post Office. He goes on to say this—and I will just read it to your Lordships; it is for you to say what attention should be paid to it:
"My next complaint deals with your Hanging Bill, or rather Mr. Silverman's. You may not be aware of it but long-term prisoners are laughing now because it seems that in the future ex-cons will be able to shoot their way out of any tight spot and not be hanged for it. I myself was arrested with a gas gun after a police chase. I did not use it on the police because the gas could affect the heart and kill one of them. However, I can assure you, quite frankly, that if I ever get in a cornered position again, I will not hesitate to shoot to kill because you won't be able to hang me. Also, I will never do a long sentence again in a prison because if I can use a gun on a warder, what can you do? Nothing.
"There are many prisoners even now talking about how they will be out as soon as hanging becomes illegal because it will remove all the deterrent, and police and warders' lives will then be of no value. As a criminal I can tell you now that you are like ostriches. You pretend you are doing good by giving in to criminals and hard cases, but you only fool yourselves because blags (wage snatches) will now increase and before long hundreds of cheap thugs will glorify themselves by carrying shooters."
He goes on to say:
"I am a man of no politics personally, but even I feel that I must protest at the idiots who advocate no hanging. I have no love for the prison staff or police or the fuddyduds in the Home Office. I also have no love for the so-called hard cases who use iron bars and guns on innocent people. Why don't you sort out the country's real problems instead of playing 'mummy' to prisoners?"
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He ends with this sentence:
"Just go on and get the no-hanging Bill passed and I will be one of the first to go to Soho and buy a gun, like thousands of others, ex cons. You all need a shaking up."
"In fact, Sirs, you all deserve shooting."
"Yours faithfully"—
and he signs his name and adds "serving four years". I do not know what weight should be attached to that. It seems, in parts of it, to be some evidence that certainly in some circles a sentence of hanging is regarded as a deterrent, and I think we ought to consider very carefully indeed the effect in this country of removing this protection from those responsible for the enforcement of law and order.
Since our last debate we have had published the Report of Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary; it is a very well written document, if I may say so, but it makes very gloomy reading. We find on page 9, that, for the first time, crime figures reached the one million mark and soared to a new record of 1,066,000. The rate of detection, not surprisingly, dropped from 43·1 per cent. to 39·6 per cent. One finds again, on page 38, that this was an increase of 9 per cent. over the previous year and there was an increase of 9·1 per cent. in that year. Then comes this sentence, which I should like to quote:
"Particularly serious increases have been recorded in 1964 in crimes of violence against the person and robbery, the former having risen by 16·9 per cent. and the latter by 23·4 per cent. compared with 1963. There were 731 indictable offences in which firearms were used, and the upsurge in this type of crime particularly towards the end of the year led to the introduction of a Firearms Bill."
I wonder whether it is pure coincidence that the upsurge in that type of crime coincided with the introduction of this Bill in another place.
At the same time the Report makes it clear (this appears at page 11) that there is a serious shortage of over 10,000 police officers in England and Wales, excluding the Metropolitan Police. I wonder whether, if this Amendment is not carried, recruitment to the police forces will not be seriously and adversely affected. I think it may be. And if it is, then that will be reflected in the detection figures for all forms of crime. We are concerned here not just with the few cases of murder that come before the courts, but with the effect on crime prevention

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generally. We are not concerned here with the few cases to which the noble Lord referred, where the deterrent had not operated—they are very tragic cases, as he said. But what we are concerned with it the effect in this country, the effect on recruitment of police and the effect on law and order if this deterrent is removed at this particular time.
I must say that if my noble friend presses his Amendment I shall certainly support him in the Lobby. Of course, we do not know—none of us does—the view of the noble Baroness, Lady Wootton of Abinger, on this particular Amendment, but on the noble Lord's arguments I think it is quite clear that, if this Amendment is not carried, we shall be removing from the police and the prison warders some of the protection that they now have against the use of violence towards them by persons of bad record who, if caught again, face only long terms of imprisonment—and perhaps very long terms at that.
House resumed.

MEASURES TO MEET THE ECONOMIC SITUATION:
3.54 p.m.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I wish to repeat a Statement that has just been made in another place by my right honourable friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer; and I will use his own words:
"The measures taken in the Budget to correct the balance of payments deficit are beginning to take effect. This year's balance of payments deficit is likely to be well below half last year's figure. To ensure that we reach our aim of eliminating the deficit in the course of next year and of maintaining the strength of sterling, the Government have decided to adopt the following measures.

PUBLIC INVESTMENT AND EXPENDITURE
First, expenditure at home. The Government intend to slow down the rate of expenditure on capital projects and to defer as far as possible purchases of equipment and stores by Government Departments, Local Authorities and nationalised industries.
Housing, schools and hospitals will be contained within their existing programmes. For other non-industrial capital projects for which contracts have not yet been signed, the starting dates will be postponed for six months. Exemptions will be made for projects in development districts and areas of high unemployment.
Similarly, purchases of goods will be deferred to the maximum possible extent.
All Government Departments have been instructed to carry out this policy and to arrange for other bodies for which they are responsible to do likewise. The nationalised industries will be called on to follow a similar course of action. Local authorities will be asked to follow suit.
Loan sanction and grants will only be given to local authority projects which are urgently required. In particular, sanction will not be given except in special circumstances to loans for expenditure on land purchases in advance of requirements, on civic buildings, offices and a variety of miscellaneous projects which, though desirable in themselves, are not essential at this time. The expenditure in these categories is now running at £150 million a year.
Lending by local authorities on mortgage for house purchase has trebled in England and Wales in the last five years, and in 1964– 65 reached £180 million. With the co-operation of the local authorities this will be restricted to the average of the three years ended 31st March, 1965, namely £130 million.
Since the beginning of the financial year drawings by local authorities on the Public Works Loan Board have been exceptionally heavy. In present circumstances a more regular phasing of issues is necessary, and I have asked the Public Works Loan Commissioners to arrange this forthwith.
The Government, in addition to reviewing their own establishments, are asking the local authorities to review their present establishments; and in the light of this to confine net increases in their staffs to very urgent services, where essential professional workers, e.g. teachers, arc required.
The House will recall that last Spring I undertook to review the swollen programmes of public expenditure left behind by our predecessors. This review is now complete. As I forecast before the Election, the examination revealed that it would not be possible to carry out all the programmes we inherited within the limits of our resources until the necessary rate of growth of production has been achieved. We have accordingly reshaped the total programme and I can inform the House that from now on expenditure will be kept to the level that we as a nation can afford. I am giving instructions to Departments that the 1966–67 Estimates shall be drawn up within a limit which has been determined for each Department within the agreed total.
As regards Defence, good progress is being made with the review designed to reduce the forward defence programme by some £400 million by 1969–70 and to achieve a large cut in that part which falls on the balance of payments. Next year's programme is being reduced by about £100 million. As to other overseas expenditure, all Departments and public authorities are to observe the most stringent economy in overseas expenditure and do all they can to increase overseas receipts.
So much for cuts in existing expenditure. We shall also have to defer some of the desirable social reforms we had hoped to do in the immediate future. While priority must go to wage-related unemployment and sickness benefits, the Government have decided that it will not be possible to introduce an income guarantee scheme or remove the remaining National Health Service charges in the next Session. We have also decided to postpone the introduction of the scheme of specially favourable interest rates for owner-occupiers.

PRIVATE INVESTMENT
The Government will introduce legislation instituting a licensing procedure to govern the starting dates of privately sponsored construction projects of the value of £100,000 or more with the exception only of housing projects and industrial building.
The control will be made retrospective to all such projects for which no contracts have been entered into before the time of this announcement.
Provision will be made for exempting projects in development districts and areas with high unemployment.
It is further proposed to introduce control over office development in the Birmingham conurbation. An Order giving effect to this will be laid before Parliament as soon as possible after the Control of Office and Industrial Development Bill receives the Royal Assent. As my right honourable friend the President of the Board of Trade has already announced, closed control over industrial building will also be introduced when this Bill becomes law. It will become necessary in the London and South Eastern, Midlands and Eastern Regions to obtain an industrial development certificate for industrial development exceeding 1,000 sq. ft.

HIRE-PURCHASE
I have decided to reinforce the hire-purchase measures. As from to-morrow the maximum repayment period of hire-purchase contracts will be reduced from 3 years to 30 months. This will apply to all goods which are now subject to hire-purchase control other than furniture, bedding, cookers and water heaters, for which the period will not he altered.
The Government will consult immediately with the Gas and Electricity industries to secure a reduction in promotional expenditure.

EXCHANGE CONTROL
I propose to introduce some further changes in exchange control. The first concerns direct investment outside the Sterling Area. Hitherto, official exchange has been allowed in certain cases regarded as specially favourable for the balance of payments. For the time being no further approvals will be given for the use of official exchange. All approved projects will have to be financed with investment currency or by borrowing abroad.
Another change concerns investment currency. I announced in the Budget

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that certain receipts of foreign currencies by residents of the United Kingdom which had hitherto been allowed to be sold as investment currency would in future be exchanged at the official rate. The same change will now be made in respect of certain other receipts, including the proceeds of life policies and the assets of immigrants redesignated as residents of the United Kingdom.
Finally, I am asking the Bank of England to exercise more uniform control over borrowing in this country by companies registered here but controlled by non-residents of the Sterling Area.

IMPORTS
It is the Government's policy to limit to the greatest possible extent facilities for financing imports of manufactured goods for home consumption and imports of all kinds for stockbuilding. With the Government's approval, the Governor of the Bank of England has now written a further letter to the banks. It asks them to scrutinise with even greater care than they do already all requests for credit when there is prima facie evidence that to provide the finance would facilitate payment for imports.
As regards prepayment for imports, at present payment for imports into this country may be made at any time between the date of contract and the date of arrival of the goods. In future payments will not normally be allowed before the goods have been shipped. This should produce a useful once-for-all saving and help to check excessive purchases.
If the exchange control measures I mentioned earlier are continued for a full year, these, together with this once-for-all saving should produce a total saving in official exchange of at least £45 million over the next year.

EXPORTS
My right honourable friend the President of the Board of Trade is introducing from Monday next a further improvement in the Export Credits Guarantee Department bank guarantee facility, by reducing the
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qualifying contract value from £50,000 to £25,000.
Arrangements are also being made to reduce the cost of shorter-term credit. This will affect a much larger volume of exports, and help many more companies. For shorter-term credits of at least 30 days and less than two years, guaranteed unconditionally by E.C.G.D., the banks have agreed in principle to make finance available at bank rate. This compares with rates of around 1 per cent. above bank rate at present. The scheme will involve a large extension of E.C.G.D.'s unconditional bank guarantee facility.
Details will be announced as soon as possible.
Urgent action will also be taken to increase efficiency in the docks and to improve access to them.
Together with the other measures the Government have taken previously, these further steps will reinforce our position and enable us to continue with the tasks of balancing our payments and reconstructing the economy.
My Lords, that is the end of the Statement.
4.7 p.m.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords. I am sure that your Lordships are grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, for communicating the contents of this long Statement made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer to-day in another place. It is indeed a grave Statement, and I am sure your Lordships would not expect me, or indeed wish me, to comment on any aspect of it at the present time; indeed, I have only just had an opportunity of seeing it. But I am sure your Lordships will desire an opportunity, before we rise for the Summer Recess, of discussing these serious proposals, their implications and their likely effects; and I hope that an opportunity will occur, because this Statement is made towards the very end of this Session.
I would ask the noble Lord whether, before the end of the Session, we can at least be given a statement as to what is intended by the words in the Statement:
"Urgent action will be taken to increase efficiency in the docks and to improve access to them."

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I would ask that we should be told what it is proposed to do and when it is proposed to do it. Apart from that, I will not at this moment put any further questions to the noble Lord.
4.10 p.m.
LORD REA: My Lords, I should like from the Liberal Benches to extend our thanks and appreciation to the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, for repeating this Statement. It is, of course, a Statement of serious proposals in respect of our present economic situation. While we sympathise with Her Majesty's Government in the position in which they find themselves, following a long term of Conservative Government, it seems to us on these Benches and to a lot of people in the country by no means clear how much of this is propter hoc and how much is post hoc.
LORD SHEPHERD: I beg the noble Lord's pardon?
LORD REA: How must is propter hoc, because of it, and how much is post hoc, because of you. I would agree with Viscount Dilhorne that it would indeed be inappropriate to pursue the matter now, and therefore we on the Liberal Benches propose to reserve our observations for the Second Reading of the Finance Bill on Wednesday of next week.
LORD SHEPHERD: I am most grateful for what the noble and learned Viscount has said. I personally hope that the House will respond and leave this matter to a discussion. It is a very important Statement which needs to be digested by each and every one of us. The noble Viscount will know that the Finance Bill is due for its Second Reading in this House to-morrow week. That is an occasion upon which, as well as discussing the Finance Bill, we take the opportunity to discuss the economic situation. It would seem to me that that is the occasion on which this matter should be discussed. I will not rise to the opportunity provided by the noble Lord, Lord Rea, to discuss the problems which have faced Her Majesty's Government. We will leave that until Wednesday.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, next Wednesday might be a suitable opportunity for discussing some of these matters. Perhaps we can have further discussions through the usual channels. I am sure that a great many noble Lords will wish to discuss the contents of the Finance Bill and what it does. To discuss at the same time both the massive Finance Bill and also these important proposals may be somewhat difficult. I have no doubt that we can have talks about that and see what will best meet the convenience of Members.
LORD SHEPHERD: I am quite willing to have discussions, but the noble Viscount will appreciate that the timetable is pretty full. It would be possible to find another day only if a gesture could be made by noble Lords opposite in regard to other Business. This is a matter which we could no doubt discuss through the usual channels.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: Would the noble Lord seek, before the Finance Bill debate, an opportunity to tell us what is the action which it is proposed to take urgently in the docks?
LORD SHEPHERD: I have taken note of the point and will certainly draw it to the attention of the appropriate authorities.
LORD NEWTON: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord one question, on a matter of information? I understood him in his statement to say that, so far as hospitals, roads and schools were concerned, the present programmes would be contained within the present levels, or words to that effect. Are we to understand from that that the major school-building programme, as already published for 1966–67, will remain unchanged?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, as I received the Statement only a matter of a few minutes before the other side received their copy, I am not in a position to answer that question. I will make enquiries and will write to the noble Lord. But, again, this is a matter which could be raised in the debate next week.

MURDER (ABOLITION OF DEATH PENALTY) BILL
4.15 p.m.
House again in Committee.
LORD ILFORD: I have never myself experienced any great difficulty or hesitation in arriving at a conclusion on the principal question which is raised by this Bill. It has never seemed to me to be right that a court of law should be required to pass a sentence upon an individual, the full range, character and nature of which is not known to us and can never be known to us.
I am not myself convinced that the death penalty is a deterrent, as is the view of so many of your Lordships. That is not really the question which is raised by these Amendments. The view of the death penalty which I have expressed is not shared by the representatives of the police. The noble Lord, Lord Stonham, conceded that the contrary view was strongly held by the representatives of the Police Forces. I have no doubt that the same view is held by many of the senior officers of the Police Forces who hesitated to express an opinion in what is a highly controversial question. Your Lordships have to accept the position that the view that the death penalty still constitutes a substantial deterrent is widely, if not universally, held by the representatives of the Police Forces and of the Prison Service. That is the real point which is raised by these Amendments.
The question which we have to ask ourselves this afternoon is this: ought we to require these men to arrest violent, frequently homicidal, criminals and at the same time withhold from them what, rightly or wrongly, they believe to be a substantial protection? It seems to me to be quite wrong for us to allow the moral considerations which must guide us in our approach to the general question raised by the Bill to influence us unduly when we have to deal with a practical, administrative matter in which the safety of men's lives is in jeopardy. I submit to your Lordships that we have no right, because we are moved by these moral considerations, to withhold from these men something which they, at any rate, believe to be a deterrent.
It seems to me that there is no reason for those of your Lordships who voted
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for the Second Reading of the Bill not to vote for these Amendments this afternoon. I myself voted for the Second Reading, and no doubt when the time comes I shall vote for the Third Reading. But I shall not hesitate to vote for these Amendments, because it seems to me that we are not justified in withholding from these police officers and prison officers something which they regard as a major deterrent which will protect them from the violence which might otherwise be directed against them.
It is possible to state the case for these Amendments very shortly. I shall not dwell too long upon them; but I should like, if I may, to deal with one or two of the observations that were made by the noble Lord, Lord Stonham. The noble Lord seemed to think that there was something inconsistent in our having united the protection which these Amendments seek to give to the police and to prison officers with similar protection for private persons who are engaged in attempting an arrest or in resisting an escape. It is the case, of course, that these Amendments are intended primarily to secure the safety of police officers and prison officers. But one cannot separate these two classes of persons. It would, indeed, be totally illogical to provide this safeguard—if it be a safeguard—for the police and for the prison officers, and not to extend a similar safeguard to private individuals performing the same duty from, no doubt, some sense of public obligation. The reason goes a little further than that. If one excepted private persons who were assisting in an arrest, or assisting in preventing an escape, the result might well be that the criminal would direct his violence against the private individual, for whom he could not be hanged, and would refrain from directing it against the police officer or the prison warder for whose death he could be hanged. So my noble friend and I were inevitably bound to include, with the police officers and with the prison warders, this class of public-spirited persons who come forward to assist the police.
The noble Lord, Lord Stonham, seemed to think that these Amendments brought us back to the inconsistencies of the 1957 Act. I should not have thought that myself. The 1957 Act failed because it attempted to differentiate between

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different classes of murder, which cannot readily be defined. These Amendments do not seek to differentiate between different classes of murder; they seek to differentiate between different classes of persons who may be at risk of murder, and who can be defined without difficulty. That is a very different thing because you can with certainty define a class of persons such as police officers and prison warders and those who go to their assistance; it is quite simple and not illogical to retain the penalty for them; whereas it proved impracticable to differentiate between different classes of offence. For all those reasons, I do not see why those of your Lordships who voted for the Second Reading of this Bill should not vote for these Amendments.
There is one observation which the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, made about which I should like to say something. I think that your Lordships have always been rather confused by the statistics that have been collected in such vast quantities and distributed from many different sources among your Lordships. They seem to lead to no very definite or obvious conclusion. But I understood that the noble Lord pointed out that the number of murders of police officers was very small. That may be due to the fact that the death penalty is still enforced for the murder of a police officer. For what these figures are worth, they seem to indicate that the fears entertained by the police officers and prison warder service are not groundless. That being so, I hope that your Lordships will have no hesitation in adopting these two Amendments.
LORD DENNING: May I say just one word in support of these Amendments? Many of the principal objections previously made arose from the anomalies produced by the 1957 Act. Those were anomalies such as the difference between the poisoner, the stabber and the shooter. In this case, in spite of what the noble Lord said, it is not really an anomaly, or preserving an anomaly, if we say that those who are exposed to the risk of being killed in the active defence of law and order should be protected. Whether it is civilians who stand in the way of the robber and seek to arrest him, or the police, they really are on active service.
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For them it is not an anomaly, but a legitimate protection of our whole system that there should be not only the deterrent to others but the vindication of law and order itself.
I would only take this further illustration. If a robber severely injured a policeman or, indeed, a civilian, I should imagine that the Judge would well be justified in sentencing him to, say, fifteen or twenty years' imprisonment, and that would be expected by the people at large. If the policeman is killed, does it adequately vindicate society if the sentence is what is said to be for life, but is really just imprisonment at the discretion of the Executive? The vindication of society is the reason why I would support this Amendment, an Amendment which is not an anomaly but which is seeking to protect those who are defending us.
LORD SIMEY: I speak in opposition to these Amendments for one purpose and one purpose only, and that is to give expression to some extent to the views of my colleagues who have studied these matters scientifically, in so far as it is possible to do so. They start their work with the assumption that the onus of proof lies on those who wish to go against the general belief in this country that the taking of human life is wrong, especially when human life is taken on behalf of the community as a whole. I have listened for some time to discover whether or not the onus of proof has been discharged, and all I have really heard is the attempt of able advocates to transfer this onus from those who wish to maintain hanging to those who wish to see its abolition. We have been asked, in fact: "What alternative do you have to this punishment of death? What can you put in its place?" We have heard that over and over again.
I address myself, on behalf of my colleagues, to the issue of whether hanging is really the deterrent that my opponents in this debate think that it is. We abolitionists have made the point earlier on that it is quite possible that so long as we have hanging there will be a wanton disregard of life on the part of criminals because the State has itself shown that wanton disregard. That point has not been met, and I believe myself that the onus of proof has not been discharged.

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We have looked at the problem collectively, from the point of view of the ordinary person—the person who is so much respected by lawyers, the ordinary rational person who fears hanging.
Each of us in this Chamber has doubtless said to himself in the course of these debates, "I should not like to be hanged, should I?" I hardly think that that fear has restrained many of us in this Chamber, and other people like us outside, from committing murders—at least, I hope not. We have to ask ourselves, realistically: what sorts of people are those who commit serious crimes and commit murders? The answer is that such people are miserable; they are people who have acted, often, on impulse; they have been educated or miseducated by the circumstances in which they have been brought up, and so on. It is unlikely that many of these people will go out into the world with some sort of fear of being hanged, and will therefore be restrained in that way from violent acts. I ask myself: what is the real condition of mind of such people? I do not think it is a valid point to assert that people like ourselves are so intimidated; in fact, I suggest to your Lordships that we are not. We are deterred from these despicable crimes by quite other restraints altogether.
So far as deterrents are concerned, what has been said on the part of the supporters of capital punishment (and it has been said this afternoon) is that the life sentence is so horrible, and deterioration comes virtually so swiftly in a long sentence, that the nation would turn against the life sentence, and a life sentence would be terminated by discharge, perhaps on the part of the Home Secretary, because of that. But you cannot have it both ways. You cannot say that the life sentence is of no deterrence worth mentioning when it confronts a murderer, and also the opposite. It is a terrible sentence.
Realistically, what happens when somebody commits a crime hitherto punishable by death? He may or may not be deterred by the life sentence. He may ask himself what is going to become of his own life if he goes prepared into a situation, with a firearm in his hands, with intent to resist arrest. The noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, read to us a remarkable letter from a prisoner. As he read the letter. I
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endeavoured to apply such technique as I have to make up my mind what was the motive of the man who wrote it; and I got some surprising answers. The letter is a very valuable subject for analysis—and that will doubtless be done in the future by my colleagues; but, if he goes into this situation determined to shoot his way out, what will happen to him? Will the police throw themselves down before him, targets of attack by firearms? If they know that he has a firearm, or if he shoots for the first time, they themselves will be armed. The English police force is usually unarmed on the streets only when it goes about its ordinary business; but when it confronts a desperate offender it is armed. Our chief constables, our senior police officers, are not by any means fools, to put it mildly.
Recently, we had a case in Lancashire in which a man, a desperate criminal, shot a police officer, despite the fear of the rope, and was himself shortly afterwards shot by a police officer; and I for one would certainly take no exception to that. He had exposed himself, by wanton action of that kind, to being dealt with in this way. Therefore, it seems to me that the only thing we can do in this society now is to go ahead with the measure now before us; to examine with the greatest possible care the consequences of passing it, and particularly to do much more to discover what the motives of offenders really are—we are only at the beginning of an endeavour of that kind—and not in any sense to pin far too much faith in hanging as a deterrent for almost anything, as the noble Viscount did.
Not only have I little expectation that the abolition of hanging will affect to any high degree the recruitment of police officers, but I have also a feeling of complete certainty that it will not affect the growth in the statistics of crime which has been occurring for some little time past. And it seems to me, as I said quite recently in this House, that the figures will continue to grow in the years that lie ahead of us. I can only offer to your Lordships the suggestion, the plea, that we should continue to give the most dispassionate thought to these problems, and arm those who are able to consider them scientifically with the opportunity and the finances that will make that consideration possible.
4.36 p.m.
LORD REAY: The Amendments of the noble Lords, Lord Conesford and Lord Ilford, attempt a substantial infringement of the Bill as passed on Second Reading. They seek to leave as capital murder two out of the five such categories under the 1957 Homicide Act. This is a substantial infringement, because it challenges both the view that the death penalty is a useless institution and the opinion that the satisfactory categorisation of murders into capital and non-capital categories is, in the words of the Royal Commission, "a chimerical quest", and one certainly not achieved by the 1957 Homicide Act—both of which views, on any reading, must be taken to have been the conclusions of this House on Second Reading. There is nothing less, nothing whatever less, therefore, to be said against this Amendment than against the Homicide Act generally. There is no reason at all for this Amendment to escape any part of the indictment of capital punishment or of the Homicide Act. But is there some very particular necessity why these exceptions should be adopted, no less odious or arbitrary in themselves though they are than any existing or imaginable category?
It was frequently maintained on Second Reading that statistics could be dismissed on the ground that they could not prove the case for abolition. I think that these concepts must he separated. It certainly cannot be claimed by abolitionists that any experience could prove that, should the death penalty be abolished here, to-day, there will be no case of a murder committed hereafter that would have been deterred but for abolition. It cannot even be claimed that statistics of the murder rate, compiled subsequently to abolition, whatever the story they tell, can prove that there have been no such murders. But it is one thing to say that statistics of this subject cannot prove, and quite another to say—as, for example, the noble Lord, Lord Derwent, said—that they should therefore be dismissed. They are evidence; and the statistics available from other countries and from this country amount to very powerful evidence indeed that the abolitionists' case is right—the more so as this evidence not only is uncontradicted, but does not even need to be weighed against evidence produced
1198
by the retentionists, because they have produced none.
Anyone familiar with the process of our courts of law knows that guilt should be found on a balance of the available evidence: anyone familiar with business decisions knows that they are taken according to the likeliest of readings as to what will happen in the future, based on available evidence, not excluding statistics. There is no need to talk of proof in these cases. It is not proof that is required, for proof is not obtainable. The noble Lord, Lord Derwent, said that he hoped we should hear no more about statistics. I hope that we shall hear no more that statistics should be dismissed.
The other contention frequently made was that the experience of other countries cannot be relevant to our own, very different, country. But it is surely not sufficient to say that this country is different, and to leave it at that. It should be indicated how this country is so different from all others as to render inapplicable to it their experiences on this subject. Moreover, it is not as though all these other abolitionist countries were like each other and different from us. There is an enormous difference between Wisconsin and Queensland, between Sweden and Finland and Italy, in their murder rates, in their history, in their culture, and in their climate. And it is precisely because of their great variety that the uniformity of their experience is so striking; for the history of each of them in each case provides evidence that the murder rate is affected by factors other than the death penalty—and these murder rates, of course, include murders of policemen.
I do not wish to repeat anything that I said during the Second Reading debate, but I should like to refer once again to two studies made in the United States into the murders of policemen, in abolitionist states and in capital punishment states. These studies arose out of some claims made in America, and particularly those made by the President of the Chief Constables' Association of Canada who was testifying before the Canadian Joint Committee on Capital Punishment in 1944. He said that the main objection of his Association was that abolition would adversely affect the personal safety of policemen in the daily discharge of their duties. He went on, rather dangerously, to submit that it would be found that

1199
the number of policemen murdered in the execution of duty in those parts of the world where capital punishment had been abolished would be "much higher" than in those countries where the death penalty was still in effect. He said also that, in his experience, this was the general opinion among police officers on the North American Continent.
In the first study into municipal police, it was found—and there was another reference to this to-day, I think—that from a total of 264 United States cities (82 in six abolitionist states and 182 in eleven death penalty states) the total of recorded murders of policemen since 1919, expressed as a rate per population, had been lower in the abolitionist than in the death penalty states. It was also found from the second study into state police—and possibly the noble Lord, Lord Ilford, may be interested in this—that only four states were able in their entire history to report no murders of a policeman, and all those four states were states in which the death penalty had been abolished.
But finally I should like again to refer to the drastic difference in police opinion on the subject of the protection given to the police by the death penalty, to the difference in opinion between police in abolitionist jurisdictions and those in death penalty ones, and to the fact that, whereas there was found to be an overwhelming belief in the efficacy of the death penalty as a protection to the police in death penalty jurisdictions, in abolitionist states there was a large majority of disbelief in any such function of capital punishment. Some 75 per cent. of the abolitionist municipal police recorded a vote that they did not believe that there was any connection between the possible threat of the death penalty and the likelihood of a criminal using a lethal weapon in encounters with the police.
But this, of course, was the discovery of the Royal Commission. In paragraph 61 of their Report, they reveal that from the representatives of the police and prison service they received (and I quote)
"virtually unanimous evidence in both England and Scotland, to the effect that they were convinced of the uniquely deterrent value of capital punishment in its effect on professional criminals."
Yet the Royal Commission, who visited not only the United States but also
1200
Norway, Sweden, Belgium and Holland, to collect evidence from foreign countries, also said with reference to this point—and again I quote:
"We received no evidence that the abolition of capital punishment in other countries had in fact led to the consequences apprehended by our witnesses in this country."
But these curious contradictions—on the one hand, the confidence of the police under death penalty jurisdiction that the removal of the penalty would make their jobs more hazardous; and, on the other hand, the overwhelming verdict of the police who have had experience of abolition that this has not proved to be the case—were recognised over twenty years earlier. The Select Committee on Capital Punishment, which reported in 1930, concluded:
"We had no evidence put before us that after the abolition of capital punishment in other countries there has been any increase in the number of burglars arming themselves or in the carrying of lethal weapons."
I will make one more point. There is no country in Europe, no State of America or of Australia, whether it is retentionist or abolitionist, that includes on its Statutes the specified capital crime of killing a policeman in the course of his duty. So far as I can discover, there is no country in the world which, in principle abolitionist, makes an exception of this category. May I conclude by suggesting that we should do the police a far better service if we were to try to alleviate their real complaints about their numbers, their pay, their equipment, their conditions and their scope of work, instead of making a concession to a fear that we may reasonably hope within a few years will be recognised by the police themselves to have been unfounded?
LORD GRIMSTON OF WESTBURY: I wish briefly to take up two points made by the noble Lord, Lord Simey. I should like to comment first on his saying that he hoped that for criminals and others the real deterrent was not the fear of the rope; and that if he applied the argument of the retentionists to himself he would hope that the real deterrent was not the fear of the rope. He then went on to argue from that that the idea that the criminal classes are deterred by the death penalty was not a tenable proposition. But I would put this to the Committee. It came out in evidence before

1201
the Royal Commission that many of the professional criminal classes deliberately do not carry firearms because they do not want to be liable to the temptation of using them for fear of the rope. Surely, that is evidence one cannot ignore. Whatever other considerations, technological or technical, one may bring to this problem, that seems to me to be a thoroughly common-sense one. One cannot ignore it.
The noble Lord then went on to say that in a case in Lancashire the other day the police and a criminal shot it out. He said he did not mind that happening. I ask the Committee: who has the greatest wanton disregard of life, those who want to take away something in the law which we know prevents criminals from carrying arms and shooting it out with the police, or those who, taking that away, say "Let them shoot it out."? It is an argument I cannot understand.
The other point the noble Lord made was that those who say that the life sentence is not a deterrent cannot have it both ways. But it is not the retentionists who have it both ways. We would say that if a life sentence really is to be a life sentence, it probably is a deterrent; but every criminal knows that it is not a life sentence. It is those who have great sympathy with the criminal who come along and say, "We must not leave him in prison for life; he will rot." But, I would say, let us remember the policeman, say, who has been murdered. At the end of nine, ten or fifteen years the criminal who committed the murder will come out; the policeman will still be dead. I hold that it is a false argument to say that one cannot have it both ways when it is not the retentionists who speak of the cruelty of the life sentence; it is the abolitionists who do so. For these reasons, I hope the Committee will support this Amendment.
LORD SIMEY: The noble Lord is not suggesting that I am in favour of arming criminals, is he? He is not suggesting that I am in favour of encouraging them to shoot it out?
LORD GRIMSTON OF WESTBURY: The noble Lord did say that they shot it out, and that in the circumstances he had no objection.
4.50 p.m.
LORD FERRIER: My Lords, on the subject of statistics, the point made by
1202
the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, weighs greatly with me. It was mentioned several times during the Second Reading debate. It is that we have no statistics in respect of the number of occasions on which a murder might have been committed but for the threat of the rope. The noble Lord who has just spoken, emphasised this point when he said that sometimes professional criminals do not carry a weapon because of the threat of the rope. Such statistics are absent from all our considerations, and I think that they are very important. I spoke and voted against the Second Reading of the Bill, and I still believe that a comprehensive measure would have been better than this one. Be that as it may. As I argued during the Second Reading, and as one who feels that capital punishment should be retained only in circumstances such as are covered by the Amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, I propose to support the Amendment and to vote for it.
I have only one further point to make—it is one that has not yet been made during this debate, although it was touched upon by the noble Lord, Lord Ilford. It is with special reference to the second part of paragraph (b) in Amendment No. 4. I take this opportunity to refer to what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Byers, during the Second Reading debate. He suggested that I supported retention because it gave the public a general feeling of cosiness. That is not what I said at all. I said that I believed, and I think it is agreed that most members of the general public believe, that the threat of capital punishment is a deterrent to the desperado who finds himself in a corner. I contend that a member of the public might go to the help of a policeman with greater alacrity if the deterrent were retained in that special respect. For that reason I propose to support the Amendment.
4.53 p.m.
VISCOUNT NORWICH: My Lords, I wish to make some brief observations on the Amendment we are considering. The Title of this Bill is the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Bill. If we accept this Amendment we shall be left with a version so watered-down that it will be nothing of the kind. Like all such watered-down versions (we learned this lesson from the 1957 Act), it leads us

1203
into a large number of anomalies which we can never properly resolve. For example, the position in which we should find ourselves, were we to accept these Amendments, would be that such a man as was referred to in the debate last week, who deliberately sets out to poison his wife over a period of years, would not suffer the death penalty, but a man who, in a moment of blind fear or desire for self-preservation, killed someone while resisting arrest, would. I am not saying that there is anything excusable about the conduct of the second man who was trying to resist arrest: clearly, he should not have got himself into that position in the first place. But once he is in it, it seems to me that his action is at least as understandable as, and certainly no worse than, that of the man who sets out to poison his wife. It seems to me anomalous that he should be "strung up" and that the man who poisons his wife should not.
In the debate last week, when speaking about the disadvantages of fixed penalties for given crimes, I said that it seemed very unwise that the punishment should be made to fit the crime rather than the criminal. If we accept this Amendment, it seems to me we shall be adopting yet a third criterion—we shall have a punishment designed to fit the victim. Once again, murder will be the only crime to fall into such a category—a category which is surely as curious as it is inadvisable.
I should like briefly to pick up two points made by the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne. The first relates to the very remarkable letter which he read to us. Like the noble Lord, Lord Simey, I am extremely interested in this letter and absolutely baffled by the motivation of it. I cannot understand why this gentleman should have written. We gather from the letter—
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: I did not invite the gentleman to write it: I can assure the noble Viscount of that.
VISCOUNT NORWICH: I am not suggesting the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, invited it, but that does not make it any clearer to me why the man should have written the letter. What, as I understand it, he is saying is that this will make all the differ
1204
ence to his future criminal life and that everything will henceforth be much easier for him; but at the same time he warns the noble and learned Viscount—and through him the House—not to accept this Bill. It seems to me that there is something very curious about this man and, incidentally, about the letter. With respect, I should like to ask the noble and learned Viscount whether he has satisfied himself completely that the letter is genuine, and that it does, in fact, come from a convict in prison. I should, incidentally, very much like to know what crime the convict committed.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: I have no doubt that the letter is genuine. It was written on the usual notepaper used by convicts, and contained the typed part on the top, and the usual number. There can be no doubt about the genuineness of the letter. I received it only yesterday by first post, and I have not made inquiries about it. The noble Viscount may make such comments on it as he likes. I should have thought it indicated at least the point of view of one convicted criminal.
LORD STONHAM: It would be fair to add that the contents of the letter, having as usual been censored, will have been fully noted by the prison authorities, and therefore the gentleman's hopes may not be realised.
VISCOUNT NORWICH: The other point I wish to make relates to the Police Federation; and I say this with some diffidence because I do not want to be misinterpreted. We have heard a great deal about the views of that Federation. Of course the views of the police, with their inside knowledge and experience of criminals, must be taken into careful account. At the same time the Police Federation, it seems to me, can hardly be considered a totally unprejudiced body. Nor should it be; its job is to represent the views of its members. It is rather like the taxpayers' union saying that we should not have to pay income tax. Naturally the Police Federation sees no reason why it should risk the lives of its members any more than is absolutely necessary. It is our job to try to weigh up the relative risks of accepting this Amendment with the alternative risks of leaving the Bill as it is drafted. Naturally we should take the views of the Police

1205
Federation into careful account, but we should also remember that it has considerable internal pressures to contend with. Having said this, I think it is all the more remarkable and creditable that even inside the police organisation, both in this country and America, there is a difference of opinion on this subject.
My Lords, last week, by an overwhelming majority, we gave a Second Reading to this Bill. Already we have one loophole, which is that the Bill should continue in existence for only five years without being reconsidered. That being so, let us have the courage to make this Bill what it says it is—the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Bill. Let us in fact abolish the death penalty for murder. Only in that way shall we be able to see how it works out in practice. Surely the point of discussing this legislation and the reason for the introduction of the Bill is that we believe the death penalty to be a bad punishment. If it is a bad punishment, in Heaven's name let us do away with it.
5.0 p.m.
BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER: My Lords, this is a Bill to abolish the death penalty for murder and the Committee are concerned here with one thing only; that is, a proposed exception to that abolition. At the Second Reading of this Bill, your Lordships expressed overwhelming support for the principle of the abolition of the death penalty for murder. There is, I know, a great temptation to those who regret the vote on Second Reading to reopen discussion over the whole field of the merits and demerits of capital punishment as a deterrent, but I submit that that is an irrelevance. It is not the matter with which the Committee are concerned at the moment.
In moving his Amendment, the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, produced an argument which I must confess I found singularly specious. His argument was intended to identify in some degree the offence of killing a policeman with the offence of treason. I think he was aiming thereby to bring the category of murderous attacks upon policemen outside the scope of this Bill, which is not concerned with the death penalty for treason or for any crime except that of murder. As a layman, I have always been accustomed to believe that the law drew fine distinctions, sometimes distinctions that were
1206
so fine that they were not always easily intelligible to the man and woman in the street, but the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, seems to have abandoned that practice and substituted instead an attempt to throw an enormous blanket over what I should have thought was an important distinction, the distinction between the crime of treason, which is intended to destroy the State of which the offender is a national, and the crime of attacking a policeman, who is a representative of the State, concerned with the maintenance of internal law and order.
The noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, took a different view and based his argument, in the main, upon somewhat slender support. He gave great prominence to a letter which he has received from a prisoner, but I cannot think that the noble and learned Viscount really has no better weapon with which to attack the supporters of the Bill and the opponents of this Amendment than a letter from a self-confessed criminal, whose crime must have been fairly serious, since he was sentenced to four years' imprisonment. I suppose that most of us have had letters of one sort or another from prisoners, just as we have had many letters from persons of unsound mind, and it is for us to assess their value. I cannot think that this is the kind of evidence that your Lordships will wish to rate very high, or that your Lordships will wish to accept this Amendment because it commends itself to a gentleman of such dubious character as that described by the noble and learned Viscount.
The great evil of the Homicide Act was that it did draw fine distinctions, and as a result of those distinctions it happened more than once that lives were at stake and lives were decided almost entirely, one might say, by forensic skill. I have had the task of reading the transcripts of a large number of trials under the Homicide Act, not in connection with this clause which the Amendment seeks to reinstate, but with another clause, and I have been deeply distressed to see, when we make different categories of murder, how the issue of life and death can turn upon points which are so fine and upon forensic skill which is so subtle that no ordinary person can feel that fundamental justice is thus done.

1207
The noble Lord, Lord Ilford, argued that the Amendment would not mean a differentiation but it means one kind of differentiation—that is, differentiation by victim instead of differentiation by method or differentiation by objective, as in the case of murder in the course of theft. We have been lucky, perhaps, rather than skilful that, so long as the Homicide Act was in force, there have not been cases of murder
"done in the course or for the purpose of resisting or avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest".
This is the first of the two paragraphs the Amendment seeks to add. But one can easily see that there may be such cases, and if there were, and the death penalty were involved, forensic skill would once again be the deciding factor in determining exactly in what consists resisting, avoiding or preventing arrest or assisting an escape. These are vague phrases, which are capable of a great many interpretations, and it is not upon vague phrases that life ought to hang.
The Committee, as were your Lordships on Second Reading, have been presented repeatedly with the experience in other countries. It seems that your Lordships are reluctant to look at other countries, and I do not understand why. I do not understand why, when a noble Lord says that he believes this or believes that, this should be regarded as better evidence than the recorded, consistent experience of communities like our own and of communities which are different from our own. It has been repeatedly said that the statistics are inconclusive, but in this particular instance, just because they are inconclusive, the statistics create a strong possibility on the one side. Certainly, it is true that we cannot have the figures of the number of people who have been prevented from committing a murder because they have been afraid of being hanged, but it is a remarkable thing that in every country where the death penalty has been abolished there has been no evidence of a substantial, consistent, subsequent increase in the murder rate. That is inconclusive, but it is a very strong pointer.
I cannot think why the experience of other countries is so little acceptable. Is it because our criminals are more savage
1208
than those we find throughout the Continent of Europe? Or is it because our police are less effective or less courageous? I do not think the Committee will accept either of those two arguments. It is a very significant fact, quoted by the noble Lord, Lord Reay, that in all the countries which have abolished the death penalty it has not been found necessary to make these exceptions. Since the date of these figures, there has been only one exception, in one American state.
I must remind your Lordships again, as I said on Second Reading, that many of the most dangerous murderers are those of unsound mind and that, if they should commit a murder while they are detained in an institution, there is nothing further that can or will be done to them. There is therefore no further deterrent in that case any more than there is for someone serving a life sentence, though for both there is the deterrent that all hope of release is gone if he subsequently commits a murder. I think it has been the experience, with people of unsound mind who have committed murder, that this terrible risk of a subsequent murder of those who have charge of them has not materialised. The Committee will, I think, need to think most carefully before they commit themselves to accepting these exceptions to the abolition of the death penalty. These exceptions, after all, create a kind of privileged class of lives. It is true, and it is very understandable, that many police officers and the spokesmen of the police have expressed themselves as anxious to retain the death penalty. But I do not believe that the police have expressed themselves as anxious to be put in a specially privileged position, which is what is being asked for by these Amendments. That is quite a different matter.
The police, as we all know, are men of tremendous courage and, what is no less important, quite remarkable skill in dealing with difficult and dangerous situations. I do not believe that they would ask your Lordships to accept a principle which would give countenance to the view that their lives have a special and peculiar value. A life is a life. The murder of a police officer is a terrible tragedy; the murder of a prison officer, should it occur, is a terrible tragedy; and the murder of an ordinary citizen is a

1209
terrible tragedy. But I do not think your Lordships will wish to accept the view that in the last resort we should differentiate between one of these tragedies and another, and express that differentiation by re-enacting the death penalty in the one case when it is abolished in the other.
5.15 p.m.
LORD CONESFORD: I think the Committee are now ready to come to a decision on this matter, and I wish only to reply, in the briefest possible way, to a few points which the noble Lady has just made. On her last point, I agree with her. I should not wish to put the police in a totally different class from anybody else. If the noble Lady will examine the two exceptions which I propose in my Amendments, she will see that neither of the two is confined to the police.
I should also like to correct the noble Lady's misunderstanding of what I said on the subject of treason. I feel certain that it was due to the inadequacy of my own exposition, and was not her fault. Let me say that I made it perfectly clear that I did not suggest that these offences were treason. I said that they were rather similar to treason in certain respects. I described the murders dealt with in my Amendments as murders which were acts of war against civilised government itself, against the whole machinery of justice and against the very existence of the rule of law. That seems to me to constitute a perfectly clear distinction between these murders and such subtleties as whether a murder was in the course or furtherance of theft or not, and I do not think it would give rise to the sort of difficulties that such refinements in the 1957 Act gave rise to. That is why I said it was quite logical to except these two classes of murder mentioned in my Amendments. The reason I wished to
except them was a reason which has received no reply at all in the course of this debate: that without these Amendments there are some murders against which our law would provide no deterrent of any kind whatsoever, because the imprisonment to which the murderer would be liable would be certain even in the absence of murder.
BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER: The noble Lord, Lord Conesford, will surely recall that I did point out that there is still a deterrent: that any person who commits a murder of this kind knows that if it is murder of a police officer he is committing a murder of exceptional gravity; and if it is a prison officer, he knows that his chance of release has gone for ever.
LORD CONESFORD: Murder of great gravity. But I ask the noble Lady and others to picture the position of a man who is threatened with arrest, to whom a sentence of long imprisonment is quite certain, even in the absence of murder, but who has a very good chance of escaping altogether if he commits a murder. The matter is entirely for noble Lords in every section of the Committee to consider for themselves—namely, whether, in those circumstances, imprisonment is a deterrent. The reason why I mentioned that the view of the police is entitled to respect is that I think they know a good deal more than most of us of the people with whom they have to deal. My reasons for these Amendments I endeavoured to make clear in my original speech, and I do not wish now to delay the Committee in coming to a decision.
5.20 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 1) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 81; Not-Contents, 114.

CONTENTS

Ailwyn, L.

Clitheroe, L.

Ebbisham, L.

Albemarle, E.

Colwyn, L.

Effingham, E.

Aldington, L.

Conesford, L. [Teller.]

Ellenborough, L.

Allerton, L.

Coutanche, L.

Erroll of Hale, L.

Ampthill, L.

De La Warr, E.

Falkland, V.

Ashton of Hyde, L.

Denham, L.

Ferrers, E.

Balfour of Burleigh, L.

Denning, L.

Ferrier, L.

Birdwood, L.

Derwent, L.

Fraser of Lonsdale, L.

Blackford, L.

Digby, L.

Gage, V.

Bossom, L.

Dilhorne, V.

Goschen, V.

Bridgeman, V.

Drumalbyn, L.

Grenfell, L.

Grimston of Westbury, L.

Mabane, L.

Somers, L.

Hailes, L.

Margadale, L.

Stamp, L.

Hawke, L.

Massereene and Ferrard, V.

Strange of Knokin, Bs.

Hobson, L.

Merrivale, L.

Strathcarron, L.

Hodson, L.

Milverton, L.

Stuart of Findhorn, V.

Horsbrugh, Bs.

Molson, L.

Swaythling, L.

Hurd, L.

Moyne, L.

Swinton, E.

Ilford, L. [Teller.]

Pearce, L.

Tenby, V.

Inglewood, L.

Reid, L.

Terrington, L.

Kenilworth, L.

Rockley, L.

Thurlow, L.

Kilmuir, E.

St. Aldwyn, E.

Tucker, L.

Latymer, L.

St. Helens, L.

Tweedsmuir, L.

Lilford, L.

St. Oswald, L.

Ullswater, V.

Long, V.

Selkirk, E.

Wakefield of Kendal, L.

Lothian, M.

Simonds, V.

Waleran, L.

Lucas of Chilworth, L.

Sinclair of Cleeve, L.

Wolverton, L.

NOT-CONTENTS

Addison, V.

Foley, L.

Phillips, Bs.

Airedale, L.

Francis-Williams, L.

Plummer, Bs.

Archibald, L.

Gaitskell, Bs.

Raglan, L.

Arran, E.

Gardiner, L. (L. Chancellor)

Rea, L.

Arwyn, L.

Gifford, L.

Reay, L. [Teller.]

Attlee, E.

Gowrie, E.

Rhodes, L.

Auckland, L.

Grantchester, L.

Robertson of Oakridge, L.

Baldwin of Bewdley, E.

Greenhill, L.

Rothermere, V.

Beswick, L.

Greenway, L.

Royle, L.

Blyton, L.

Haddington, E.

St. Davids, V.

Bowles, L.

Haig, E.

St. Edmundsbury and Ipswich, L. Bp.

Boyd-Orr, L.

Haire of Whiteabbey, L.

Brockway, L.

Harmsworth, L.

Samuel, V.

Brooke of Ystradfellte, Bs.

Henderson, L.

Savile, L.

Brown, L.

Henley, L. [Teller.]

Segal, L.

Burden, L.

Howard of Glossop, L.

Shackleton, L.

Burton of Coventry, Bs.

Jessel, L.

Shepherd, L.

Byers, L.

Kennet, L.

Sherfield, L.

Canterbury, L. Abp.

Kirkwood, L.

Silkin, L.

Carrington, L.

Layton, L.

Simey, L.

Cawley, L.

Leatherland, L.

Snow, L.

Champion, L.

Lindgren, L.

Sorensen, L.

Chichester, L. Bp.

Listowel, E.

Stonham, L.

Chorley, L.

Llewelyn-Davies, L.

Swanborough, Bs.

Citrine, L.

Lloyd of Hampstead, L.

Tangley, L.

Clwyd, L.

London, L. Bp.

Taylor, L.

Cohen, L.

Longford, E. (L. Privy Seal.)

Twining, L.

Cohen of Brighton, L.

Mancroft, L.

Wade, L.

Coleraine, L.

Merthyr, L.

Waldegrave, E.

Colgrain, L.

Meston, L.

Walston, L.

Cowley, E.

Milford Haven, M.

Ward of Witley, V.

Cranbrook, E.

Mitchison, L.

Wells-Pestell, L.

Croft, L.

Morris of Borth-y-Gest, L.

Wilberforce, L.

Cullen of Ashbourne, L.

Morrison, L.

Williams, L.

Dudley, L.

Mottistone, L.

Windlesham, L.

Eccles, V.

Newton, L.

Winterbottom, L.

Elliot of Harwood, Bs.

Norwich, V.

Wise, L.

Emmet of Amberley, Bs.

Ogmore, L.

Wootton of Abinger, Bs.

Faringdon, L.

Parker of Waddington, L.

Resolved in the negative, and Amendment disagreed to accordingly.

5.30 p.m.
LORD PARKER OF WADDINGTON LORD PARKER OF WADDINGTON moved, in subsection (1), to leave out "sentenced" and insert "liable at the discretion of the court". The noble and learned Lord said: The object of this Amendment, which is very simple, is to abolish once and for all a fixed penalty for murder; in other words, to prevent
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life imprisonment from being the only sentence which can be passed. The Amendment is in simple terms. If it is passed, subsection (1) will read:
"… a person convicted of murder shall … be liable at the discretion of the court to imprisonment for life."
It has been questioned in another place whether those words achieve their object, but I sincerely believe—and the lawyers will correct me if I am wrong—that those

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words enable a judge to give anything, from probation, up through terms of years, to life imprisonment. At any rate, that is the object of the Amendment.
I move this Amendment on a number of grounds. The first is one of principle. In common with a great many other people, I dislike a fixed sentence, and now that it is proposed to abolish the fixed sentence of the death penalty I do not wish to see another fixed sentence in its place. In a fixed sentence there is no room for any matters of mitigation. The sentence is passed; and the prisoner is removed from the dock, when almost the only things that have been said publicly are things which are against him. No one hears of his home circumstances or his background. I do not think that any Home Secretary would claim to have a monopoly of the quality of mercy. Certainly I think that judges have this quality, and wish to exercise it. It is a horrifying experience to have to sentence the perpetrator of a mercy killing, in circumstances which are most distressing—to have to sentence him to life imprisonment, to cast on him the slur of life imprisonment, when nobody has the slightest desire that anything should happen other than that a home should be found for him and somebody to look after him.
Secondly, is it really right now that there should be any distinction between murder and other serious crimes? Murder is no longer a unique crime. It may be the most serious offence, but it is nothing more than that. What really is the difference to-day between murder and attempted murder? The only difference is the accident that in one case the man dies. Yet in a case of attempted murder the judge, according to the circumstances, and after hearing all the mitigating factors of the case, can do anything from putting the man on probation to giving him life imprisonment. But under this Bill, as it stands, if the victim unfortunately dies, there is the one and only sentence to be passed, irrespective of all the circumstances of the case.
The matter gets worse when one thinks that two classes of what are really murders are, anyhow, reduced to manslaughter, on the grounds either of diminished responsibility or of provocation. They are both murders, albeit reduced to manslaughter. If they are reduced to manslaughter, the judge has
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absolute power to give anything from probation up to life imprisonment. But if they are not reduced to manslaughter then once more it is the fixed sentence. Matters of provocation are matters of great difficulty, and the line is sometimes very fine. A judge may well have a case of murder due to provocation. It may be that one jury will be able to say that it is true provocation in law, whereas a second jury may well take the opposite view. If the judge is lucky enough to have the first jury he can give a sentence of five years' imprisonment, whereas if he has the second jury he has to give life imprisonment.
Is not the true position to-day that there is only one offence, the offence of homicide, which varies infinitely in degree from the lowest manslaughter up to murder in the course of organised crime in a war against society? There is every grade, and I hope the judges may be left to give the proper sentence in all the circumstances of the case. The third object is, as I think I mentioned on Second Reading, that it will enable the judge to pass a sentence which marks the seriousness of the crime and signifies the public feeling of revulsion. Let me make one thing perfectly clear. If a trial judge gives a fixed sentence, he is not saying, "That is the sentence which shall exist years and years to come". He cannot make a prognosis.
I think it was the most reverend Primate who, on Second Reading, said that the judge ought not to give long sentences because he is not in a position to give them. That, if I may say so with respect to the most reverend Primate, is not the object of the exercise. The object of the exercise is to give at the time a sentence marking the seriousness of the offence, the revulsion of the public feeling and the hope that it will act as a deterrent. There is no judge on the Bench who does not hope—and I sincerely hope—that the time is coming, and coming very shortly, when there will be machinery for reviewing long sentences. Nobody wants to miss the opportunity of releasing a man when it is thought that he can be a good citizen, and I certainly hope that the Royal Commission on Penal Reform will look into that matter; and it may be that we shall have a parole board system.
I am one of those who feel that a long sentence given at the time does act as some deterrent. I know it is always said that the only deterrent is the certainty of detection; that if you once set out to commit a crime you do not think of the consequences—you think you are too clever to be caught. That undoubtedly is true, up to a point. But there are innumerable people—and particularly the young—who do not get to the point of having decided to commit a criminal action, or even consider it; and it is to those people that one wishes to bring home that, if that sort of thing is done, the perpetrator will be severely sentenced.
I think it is clear (this is one of the things which have emerged in this debate) that, if nothing else is done, nine years, or thereabouts, will be a life sentence. I am not talking about the mentally deranged, the man who, because of some mental aberration, cannot be freed because it is not safe to do so: I am talking of the murderer about whom there is no mental element of that sort. I think it became clear from the statement of my right honourable friend the Home Secretary in another place, which was read on Second Reading by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross. I venture, at the expense of wearying your Lordships, to read once again what was quoted from the Home Secretary's speech. It appears at col. 564. He said this:
"it may well be—I do not say that it will always be—that in cases hereafter, if there were no commutation because of mitigating circumstances, the death penalty having gone, whether it would seem proper, having regard to the nature of the crime and the character of the individual, that his sentence should be longer than nine years. I would be very reluctant to make it much longer …".
Then he goes on:
"… because, generally speaking, experience shows that nine years, ten years, or thereabouts is the maximum period of confinement that normal human beings can undergo without their personality decaying, their will going and their becoming progressively less able to reenter society and to look after themselves and become useful citizens."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 704 (No. 38), December 21, 1964.]
Finally he says:
"As I have said on previous occasions, the nine years, experience shows, is round about the time when one may begin to get symptoms to show that the person in prison is beginning
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to break down. Therefore in practice a number of persons have been released after nine years in prison."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 716 (No. 152), c. 388, July 13, 1965.]
There it is. We know where we are. What I feel is that this surely must be the answer: first, that in proper cases—and this is a matter which would concern inspiring confidence in the police—the judge should he able to give a fixed term of years which is considered by the public longer than a life sentence; secondly—and this has shown a great indictment, I think, of prison conditions—something must be done urgently to see that people do not rot in prison when they are kept in for nine years. It really is ridiculous.
I did not intervene on the last Amendment because I confess I was against it and voted against the Amendment. But one of the reasons, I think, why in countries where there has been abolition there has been no sign of an increase of murders of the police, and why the police are quite satisfied, is that in most of those countries (and I shall be corrected if I am wrong) life imprisonment is very much more than 9 years. I believe that in Switzerland it is a minimum of 20, and the noble Baroness on Second Reading was talking of a citizen of the United States who came out, after 33 years, and became a highly respected and useful citizen. Something is wrong with the conditions in this country.
Finally, there should be some machinery by way of a parole board which can review life sentences from time to time. Is it right that sentencing policy, what the judges have a right to give by way of sentence, should be determined by the conditions of imprisonment? To take an example as an absurdity, is it that nobody should be sentenced to imprisonment because there are no places or few places in prison? Surely this is a case where sentencing policy must be carried out but the institutions and the conditions therein must be altered accordingly.
May I in advance endeavour to meet what I think is the only possible argument that could be raised against my suggestion? It will, I am sure, be said that there is a real danger in a judge fixing a term of years because it is said, quite rightly, that at the end of that term, less remission, the prisoner has to be released even if it is not thought safe

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to release him. I think that is the only possible argument, but it is an argument which applies already in numbers and numbers of offences; take manslaughter, rape, wounding with intent, attempted murder, robbery and the like, where the permissible sentence is not merely life but a number of years. In all those cases, it could be said, the judge should not give a fixed term of years because if at the end it was not thought safe to release him he would have to be released. The answer surely is that in those cases, and I suggest in murder also, the judges should be trusted to give life where there is some mental element involved, some mental aberration where it may well be quite unsafe to let him out if a number of years were given. It is a matter, I think, to which all the judges are very much alive. And, really, if my Amendment were carried the number of cases where sentence of imprisonment of any substantial length would be passed would be in those very cases where highly organised professional criminals were out to fight society and were possibly breaking out of prison or resisting arrest.
May I say this, finally? I think the difference between those who would support this Amendment and those who would be against it rests fundamentally on two matters. The first is the answer to the question: Do the public have confidence in the judges? Well, despite what happens from time to time in another place, I am of the firm opinion that the public still do trust the judges. I am quite certain also that the Legislature trusts the judges. Otherwise, why have all their sentencing powers not been taken away from them long ago? I am satisfied that the Executive have confidence in the judges, because whenever they get into a difficulty they haul out a judge as the first person to man some inquiry. And so I say that the judges are trusted by the people and that it is absurd to say that this suggestion would break down because the judges would do some fantastically stupid thing.
The other vital consideration, I think, is whether the public are or are not content with the life sentence as we now understand it. There are undoubtedly two views, sincerely held, on this. There are some—I have heard it said—who say that the public are entirely content and that maybe it is Tory propaganda that suggests the contrary. Anything like
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that distresses me. This is not a Party matter. I am not a Tory. I do not owe affiliation to any Party whatsoever. But I do sincerely believe that, up and down the country—I could go into percentages or even majorities; I would say a majority, although I am not concerned with that—a substantial body of opinion sincerely believes that something more is needed than life sentence as we understand it.
Then there are the police. I agree with the noble Baroness that certain sections of the police do not desire to be in a privileged position. That is why I voted against the last Amendment. But what they do need is a confident feeling that the organised criminal, out to fight society, out to kill, if necessary, in the course of arrest and escape, will be dealt with in such a way as will deter others. I sincerely believe that if the judges in that sort of case—I think this is just the sort of case in which they would exercise their power—could give a long sentence of imprisonment, it would satisfy the police.
The other matter is whether anything is a deterrent sentence. There are some people who take the view that nothing is a deterrent other than the certainty of detection and punishment. The certainty of detection and punishment is something which cannot be achieved in the near future, if ever—I would venture to think, never—but, at the same time, I am quite convinced, and experience has shown, that a long sentence given occasionally on a carefully selected occasion, for some serious offence, does have that effect. I would instance only the spate of Post Office Savings Bank frauds after the war. By the imposition of severe sentences then, their number became negligible in a matter of a year or two years. I do not think anybody rationally or reasonably could say that the sentences in regard to the Notting Hill Gate racial riots did not have a miraculous effect. I myself—and I think experience has shown this—feel that a deterrent sentence occasionally, given in a well selected case (if I may put it that way) works wonders, and I should like to see the judges able to do that in the few cases in which it will be necessary.
Finally—and I am really at an end—as the noble Baroness said, this is a Bill to abolish the death sentence. That was

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why many of us voted for this Bill on Second Reading, and indeed against the last Amendment. I have worked for this result for several years, and I think it has always been currently understood that I have been at the same time quite emphatic that a life sentence as now understood is inadequate. As I have said, there are many who think the same, of whatever Party; and it is surely but a small price—may I put it that way?—for the sponsors of this Bill to agree to this Amendment, to meet the feelings of a substantial number of the public (I put it no higher); to carry with them the well-wishers for the object of this Bill, and, finally, to ensure that the object of this Bill is on Third Reading achieved. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 7, leave out ("sentenced") and insert ("liable at the discretion of the court").—(Lord Parker of Waddington.)
LORD STONHAM: On one point I must immediately disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Parker of Waddington. I understood him to say that the question of whether the Legislature, the Executive and the public had confidence in Her Majesty's judges was an issue in this discussion. I am quite sure that it will not be an issue at all, and that no shadow of it will be found in my remarks. I also agree with him that this decision is most certainly not a Party matter, and further, that the words of his Amendment will achieve his objective as he has described it to us.
There is one other important point that I should like to make now, and that is that now, since after our last vote Parliament has virtually abolished capital punishment for murder, no major difference exists between us except the method of achieving our common objective, namely, to ensure the protection of the public. We agree that for that the sentence must be of a severity commensurate with the crime, and we agree that no murderer should be released from prison if there is any danger that he would harm anyone. Subject to those overriding considerations, we both wish to do what we can to make the criminal fit for eventual return to society.
Unfortunately, we strongly disagree with the Lord Chief Justice about the
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means of achieving this objective. Taking the two Amendments together, he as I see it, suggests a sort of three-legged sentencing policy for murderers. The first is anything from probation to a term of years; the second is a life sentence as provided in the Bill; and the third is a life sentence with, tacked on to it, a recommendation for a minimum term of years. If in any way I misrepresent what he suggests, I hope that the noble Lord will interrupt me at once. But as I see it, the point is, which method will best ensure the safety of the public. Lord Parker of Waddington's proposals, or the Bill as it stands, with a mandatory life sentence and the Home Secretary deciding if, or when, and how, a murderer should be released?
Before I come on to the details of that comparison, I must express complete disagreement with the view expressed by the noble Lord equating murder with manslaughter. He frankly agreed that we should put murder in line with burglary, arson, rape and all the rest of the 31 other offences which still invite the maximum penalty of life imprisonment. But the Government—and in this, at least, we have the great majority of people with us—regard murder as a crime apart, the ultimate crime, and as such we think that murder requires a mandatory life sentence, because this demonstrates to everybody that a murderer, by taking the life of another, subjects himself to detention until he himself dies, or, if he is released, to supervision, subject to recall.
A life sentence for murder is no empty formula. No other sentence carries such lifelong disabilities. And, if you believe that penalties deter murderers, no other sentence can possibly have such a deterrent effect. I am bound to say this. I think it denotes a complete lack of imagination and indeed sensitivity to suggest that this lifelong penalty, including perhaps ten or more years in prison, is a light sentence. Whatever improvements we make, a prison will still be a cage; and no man lightly risks being caged for the rest of his life.
Consider the alternative suggested by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Parker of Waddington. If the Amendments were approved the courts might sentence a murderer to anything from probation to 50 or more years' imprisonment. I think

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it likely that, if we accepted this Amendment, sentences for crimes of apparently equal gravity would, at any rate at first, vary widely from judge to judge; but gradually, if painfully, we should settle down until we had a sort of tariff for murder.
It might work out perhaps at a year or two for a mercy killing—a sort of legal euthanasia for a small penalty; five years for shooting your wife's lover; and thirty years for murdering a policeman. We are all distressed by those heartrending cases where a life sentence appears at first sight cruelly unnecessary and wrong. But consider the effect of sentencing a man to, say, two years for a mercy killing. First, in our view, it diminishes the gravity of murder in the eyes of the public. Secondly, the judge is in effect, saying "Release this man sixteen months hence because he will not harm anyone again". The degree of risk cannot be assessed at the time of trial. There are cases where seemingly innocuous murderers subsequently reveal latent tendencies not previously apparent.
Under the existing system the State can, and does, take a merciful view, and some murderers are released after serving short terms. There have been four such short-term releases of offenders sentenced under the 1957 Act. To take one case, a man killed his invalid brother, who was suffering from a mental disorder which made him aggressive and caused him violently to attack his mother. This man killed in a state of considerable emotional tension. He was released after six years—that is, the equivalent of a nine years' sentence. There are others who have been released after three or four years, pitiful cases which would have earned the sympathy of anybody, in court or otherwise. How could any judge possibly decide, in advance, a term of years appropriate to those cases, a term which would be consistent with the safety of the public and the true interests of the offender?
Then, at the other end of the scale, the position would be even more dangerous. Suppose a judge sentenced a dangerous criminal to 30 years for the murder of a policeman. The Home Secretary of the day would be compelled to release that man after twenty years, whatever the danger to the public. Surely your Lordships would not wish to force
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such a situation either on the Home Office or on the public.
If you then take refuge in Lord Parker of Waddington's third leg, you would say, "In such a case the judge would impose a life sentence with a recommendation for a minimum of thirty years." But that reduces the Amendment to a public relations exercise. Moreover, if there is a recommendation for a long sentence, the minimum would be regarded as a maximum.
LORD PARKER OF WADDINGTON: I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord, but I was not intending to deal with my second Amendment at this stage. That is completely alternative to this suggestion.
LORD STONHAM: It was a misunderstanding. I thought that the noble Lord was dealing with the two together, so far as discussion was concerned, and that we would, if necessary, deal with them separately so far as voting was concerned. It is the case that a long sentence such as that would subject the Home Secretary to great pressure to release the man when the time came—pressure which indeed he could not resist.
I want to put another point to your Lordships. No court, however wise, can tell what a man will be like in 20 or 30 years' time. He will not be the same man. The Home Secretary, however, can judge from hindsight how closely the middle-aged man under consideration for release resembles the young "tearaway" sentenced by the court. The young thug may have become a middle-aged thug. Or he may have been reborn in prison. One should stay in prison. The other should be released. But the decision can be taken only when the time comes. No court can take it 20 years in advance.
All these arguments against fixed sentences for murder—I used the term "fixed sentence" as a term of years, not in the sense that the Lord Chief Justice was using it, as applied to a life sentence—
LORD PARKER OF WADDINGTON: An indeterminate sentence.
LORD STONHAM: Yes. All these arguments against fixed sentences for murder become still stronger when one considers the power to recall a released life prisoner. In the case of a murderer released after being sentenced to a fixed

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term, the Home Secretary would be quite powerless however alarming the man's conduct might turn out to be. I must confess that I find this result of the Lord Chief Justice's Amendment difficult to reconcile with our objective of securing the safety of the public. Whichever way you look at it, these Amendments would create a dangerous situation.
I believe that much of Lord Parker of Waddington's speech sprang from the mistaken belief that, by and large, life imprisonment means nine years in prison. I want, if I can, to kill that nine-year myth. I know that the Lord Chief Justice, quite fairly, quoted a speech of my right honourable friend in another place, but he did not then quote the very strong qualifications which my right honourable friend made, and which I should now like to indicate.
I think that this nine-year idea has arisen, in part, from publication of the terms of imprisonment which have been served by men who have actually been released. One gets a very different picture when one considers the terms which have been served by murderers still in prison. As your Lordships will know, the only murderers now in prison are those sentenced under the Homicide Act or men who were condemned to death and had their sentences commuted because of mitigating circumstances. But, even so, there are a number who, in terms of fixed sentences, allowing for normal remission, have served sentences ranging from 16 to 30 years. They are still in prison and it has not yet been decided when, or even if, they will be released.
LORD PARKER OF WADDINGTON: I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord. Could he indicate—because it is always difficult to get any information from the Home Office—how many of those imprisoned for 16 to 30 years have a mental abnormality or aberration?
LORD STONHAM: The Lord Chief Justice asked me how many who had been in prison for 20 years had a mental abnormality. My answer, according to my information, is, none. I have been very careful in what I have said about these men and the noble and learned Lord himself is probably aware of the reasons why I do not want to particu
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larise. He will know that what I have said in this regard is accurate. But I will come a little later on to the point of mental abnormality.
I was saying that it has not been decided when, or even if, these men would be released, but I would make it clear that, if this Amendment were to be accepted, we should be obliged to set such men free after the specified number of years, whether or not it was safe to do so. Compare this with the present system, where every case is reviewed at least at four-year intervals, and more frequently after eight years. The review takes account of the trial judge's impression of the prisoner, his mental and physical health, his conduct and attitude in prison, his training, his relations with his family and an assessment of his prospects for outside life. The prison reports are based on continuous observation over the whole period of a prisoner's detention. Reporting officers have full information about the prisoner's history—the events which led up to the crime itself—and detailed medical reports are also available. Eventually a provisional decision is made and the trial judge is consulted through the Lord Chief Justice.
If the prognosis is still favourable, the Home Secretary agrees a provisional release date. This is communicated to the prisoner a year in advance and is subject to continuing good conduct. A considerable proportion of murderers serve part of their sentences in open prisons. They could walk out, but they do not, because it would stop them from earning their way back to normal life. The bad types are held in maximum security prisons and the Home Secretary has said many times that, in the interests of public safety, he would be prepared, however reluctantly, to keep a man in prison for the rest of his life. The new prison at Albany in the Isle of Wight is specially designed for this because within a secure curtilage it will provide freedom not possible in the older prisons and help to avoid deterioration arising from long confinement. We wholeheartedly support the views expressed by the Lord Chief Justice on the responsibility which rests on the Government, if we have to keep men in prison for a great many years, to provide conditions under which they will not deteriorate.

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Each decision on the matter of release is the Home Secretary's personal responsibility and no decision is taken more painfully, more responsibly or, through the years, more successfully. This century, out of the many hundreds of cases of men released on licence only two have committed a second murder. The details are familiar to your Lordships. But what is even more remarkable is that only two murderers who have been convicted and released on licence in the last twenty years have been convicted of a further offence of violence. One of the two was sentenced to two months' imprisonment. That will give your Lordships an idea of what has happened.
This overstates the position, because, like the Amendments, it does not deal with the very large number of violent criminals and murderers who, under a similar procedure, and on the Home Secretary's responsibility, are released from detention during Her Majesty's pleasure. During the last twenty years there have been 552 discharges from Broadmoor alone; 289 of these were murderers and none of the 289 has committed a second murder. From the public safety point of view, this is a 100 per cent. security record. It is impossible in my submission, to believe that this would be maintained if fixed sentences with irrevocable discharge dates were substituted for mandatory life sentences with release on licence subject to the procedure I have described.
During his speech on Second Reading, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Parker of Waddington, said that his support for this Bill arose largely through the absurdities and anomalies of the Homicide Act and that he was completely disgusted at the results of that Act. But his Amendments would, in my mind, produce the remarkable new anomaly that, whilst the Home Secretary would have no control over the release of murderers awarded fixed sentences of imprisonment, he would (presumably in the interests of public safety) retain complete control over the release of murderers ordered to be detained during Her Majesty's pleasure, and over the release or continued detention of persons sentenced to life imprisonment for crimes other than murder. There are 70 such persons in prison now, and every one of them could have been sentenced to fixed terms of imprisonment, but the judges chose to inflict life
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sentences instead. Yet in the special case of murder, for which we propose to impose mandatory life sentences—the most flexible of all sentences—we are asked to provide for fixed sentences.
At the outset—I am sure with your Lordships' agreement—I said that one of the prime objects of a sentence for murder was to ensure that the public is not exposed to the risk of the murderer committing murder or some act of violence again. The Government believe, and decades of successful experience confirm, that a life sentence, giving maximum flexibility about the period of detention, is the only sure way of safeguarding the public against the release of a dangerous murderer.
The Amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Parker of Waddington, would in many cases remove that public safeguard because a judge would very probably impose a fixed sentence and in many cases, without its being realised at the time, this would be against the public interest. The surest way to get bad decisions is to blur the responsibility for making them. I therefore urge your Lordships to leave the clear responsibility for these decisions to the one man who is armed with all the relevant facts and who is responsible to Parliament and the people for the decision he takes—the Home Secretary of the day. Please do not leave us, and please do not leave the people, as the Amendment would, with a bewildering range of possible sentences, sentencers, and releasers. I hope the noble and learned Lord will agree to withdraw these Amendments, but, if he feels unable to take that course, then I would ask your Lordships to reject them.
LORD DENNING: May I say a word in support of the Amendment and especially to underline what the Lord Chief Justice said—namely, about the frequent narrowness of the line between murder and manslaughter. I have tried cases where the jury were greatly perplexed, and indeed, might well have found murder, but had taken the merciful view and found manslaughter instead. I remember one case where I gave only two years to a man on that account, and another case where I gave fourteen years. In cases of manslaughter it is open to the judge to inflict such sentence as is appropriate to the offence, ranging from probation to life. Therefore, it seems to me

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that the argument which the noble Lord has put could equally apply to all manslaughter cases. You could say, "Well, do not leave it to the judge. Leave it to the discretion of the Minister and the Prison Commissioners, who indeed have all the information as the years go by". But is that right when you consider further—and I think this is the important point—the impact on the public in regard to adequate sentences being passed to vindicate the law?
When the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment considered this question of sentence to life imprisonment, they asked: Why should it not be brought into accord with reality? They said:
"… we can find no good reason why the terms of that sentence should not be brought into conformity with its reality, and we recommend that it should be expressed as 'imprisonment during Her Majesty's pleasure '."
I ask your Lordships: What is to be the impact on the community when a sentence is passed which is known to be a sentence of imprisonment during Her Majesty's pleasure? A sentence of life imprisonment does sound, and is, awe-inspiring if it is really carried out. But when the public know, and when the Royal Commission say, that it is imprisonment during Her Majesty's pleasure, does that express the denunciation which the community should express?
The Lord Chief Justice has instanced cases where the emphatic sentence of the court has had its impact throughout the whole of society. Your Lordships will remember that he mentioned the cases of the youths of 17 in the race riots at Notting Hill Gate. I should have thought that in the ordinary way a judge would have given six to nine months' imprisonment in those cases, if there had not been behind them the colour prejudice, and the impact on the public. As your Lordships know, the judge sentenced boys of 17 to 19 to five or seven years' imprisonment, and the impact on the whole of the community and its effect on race relations was enormous. If, say, a train robber, or a man who is already in prison for a long time, escapes and then shoots a police officer or a civilian, such as Mr. Antiquis, whom I mentioned last time, and if the judge is to say to that prisoner, who may already
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be serving twenty years or longer, "You are to be sentenced to imprisonment during Her Majesty's pleasure", does that express the public indignation and the emphatic denunciation that there should be?
As my noble and learned friend the Lord Chief Justice has indicated it will be in only a few cases that long sentences, or indeed life sentences, will be necessary. But it seems to me that to keep this power of the judge (representing, as he does, the community) to say what should be done to the man is the right public way of dealing with the matter, and it should not be left to the discretion of the Executive, however well exercised, bearing in mind that it can still be exercised within the margins permitted by a wise and humane administration of the prison service. I suggest that this Amendment keeps the law in conformity with all other sentences, and I ask your Lordships to accept it.
6.22 p.m.
LORD REID: I should like to add a few words in support of the Amendment. I support my noble and learned friend Lord Parker of Waddington in this Amendment, but I do not think I would support either of the two alternatives. However, they will come later, no doubt, if this Amendment is not accepted. The reason why I support this Amendment is that otherwise the position will be left in a wholly illogical state. If the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, has proved anything, he has proved far too much, because at the moment all other serious crimes are dealt with by fixed terms. There are a few cases, I agree, in which life sentences are indeed given, but they are very few.
Nobody can say that the problem of the other dangerous criminal is any different from the problem of the man who has committed murder. It just so happens that one will have committed murder; another will have committed manslaughter, because of technical differences in the law; and another will have been lucky in that he has committed armed robbery, although he was quite prepared to commit murder if it had been necessary. There is no difference at all among these criminals. Therefore, if the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, is right, there ought

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to be this indeterminate sentence of "during Her Majesty's pleasure" for every one of these dangerous criminals.
Now, there is a good case for that. I am not sure that I would be convinced by it, but there is a very good case for inquiry into that matter, and I see no reason why there should not be an inquiry. If it turns out, after the inquiry, that the proper thing to do is to have an indeterminate sentence for everybody, then Parliament can consider that when the time arrives—and I think the points put by my noble and learned friend Lord Denning would probably weigh rather heavily when it came to considering whether indeterminate sentences were, as a general rule, a good thing. But why have this illogical distinction? Having abolished the death sentence, the moral guilt of the man who has committed murder is very often no greater than the moral guilt of the man who happens to have committed manslaughter (because there are still technical differences in the law, and the line between them is still very narrow) and no greater than the moral guilt of the man who has committed armed robbery with violence. Therefore, why treat these people differently? I suggest that the right thing to do is to treat them all in the same way until we decide to treat them all differently.
At this moment, the only logical thing to do is to accept this Amendment and to say, "Very well, the judge has the option; he either sentences to a term of years or he sentences for life", in which case the sentence is really "during Her Majesty's pleasure", and the matter is at the disposal of the Home Office. But I am really most puzzled by the defence put up by the noble Lord, Lord Stonham. He seems to have put forward two quite inconsistent views, and I hope that, if the noble Lord is going to reply, he will make the position a little clearer. We are told, on the one hand, that you cannot keep a man in prison for more than nine years, however guilty he may be, because he is then apt to rot and become a wreck. If that is true, then you do not let him out because it is safe to let him out; you let him out because it would be barbarous to keep him any longer: he is in danger of becoming a mental and physical wreck. On the other hand, the noble Lord took credit for the fact that he keeps some people in for
1230
sixteen to thirty years. Are they wrecks? If they are not wrecks, why should the other people be wrecks at the end of nine years? I do not understand it at all.
LORD STONHAM: I am most grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reid, for giving way, but as I shall not, I think, be replying myself, I want to answer his point now. I do not accept at all—and I did not say—that all men necessarily became wrecks when they had been in prison for nine years. I do not think, in any case, it is necessary if they are housed under proper conditions. And I did not take credit for the fact that some men had been in prison for an inordinate length of time. I very much regret it. I simply brought the figures forward to show that nine years is not an average, that it must not be taken as an average, and that it is quite wrong to go on saying that it should be so. But I should like to ask the noble and learned Lord how he would get over the difficulty, where a fixed sentence is passed, if a man is not fit for release, and the Home Secretary has no power to keep him in prison.
LORD REID: That is why I think there is a very good case for reconsidering this matter. It really is rather ridiculous in the case of a really dangerous criminal. He is sentenced to four years, or what ever it is; he gets out; he commits another crime within a very few months; he is put in for another four or five years, and he becomes an habitual criminal before you know where you are. I will deal with that matter at once. The right way to deal with a man who is in that state is not to punish him at all: the right way to deal with that man is to put him under tolerable conditions, but to make quite certain that he is never let loose again so that he can interfere with the public.
If you are going to give long sentences, it is ridiculous to treat the men who receive them in the same way as you would men who receive short, sharp sentences. A man given a long sentence ought to be given interesting work; he ought to be allowed to use his leisure in a sensible way; he ought to be encouraged to become a good citizen, and he ought not to be kept in the gloomy portals of an ordinary prison, but he should not be let out. If that is what the

1231
noble Lord has in mind as a prison reform, I am wholly on his side; but I have not seen any sign of it yet.
I said that the noble Lord was taking credit for keeping these people in because I thought he was trying to prove that safety was uppermost in the mind of his right honourable friend, and that nobody would be let out unless it was safe to let him out. But what about the man who is becoming a wreck at the end of nine years? The Home Secretary said that there were a lot of such people, if I understood him aright. What about such a man? Is he kept in and allowed to become a wreck because it is not safe to let him out, or is he let out because he is a wreck and then it is not safe for the public? Which is it?
NOBLE LORDS: Hear, hear!
LORD STONHAM: He is certainly not let out. The figures prove that.
LORD REID: I beg the noble Lord's pardon. I did not hear because of the applause.
LORD STONHAM: I said that if he is a danger to the public, the man is not let out.
LORD REID: Wreck or no wreck?
LORD STONHAM: Wreck or no wreck.
LORD REID: Now we know where we are. If that is right, if you let a man out only when it is thought to be safe to let him out, then I do not know why they are all let out at about the same time, because apparently nine years is the sort of period that you adopt if there is no reason to change it. I should have thought that, if it was a question of safety, you would say that some people are safe to be let out after a matter of months. In the case of others, it depends—you wait and see. I should have thought that there would be a graph showing the periods of detention stretching from a few months to 30 years, and that this 9 years is a pure delusion. But that is not the impression that one gets by reading what the Home Secretary says. I beg the noble Lord, in the interests of clarity, to try to get his right honourable friend to make this situation intelligible to the general public, because,
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to me, it is not. But I will say no more on that subject.
No one could possibly say, if you were starting afresh, that when a life has been taken it is proper to have regard to the technicalities of the law of murder and of manslaughter. Everybody knows that, even after the changes made by the 1957 Act, there are still technical and narrow differences between the two. If it is right that the indeterminate sentence should be the proper way to deal with one who is technically a murderer, it must be equally right that it is the proper way to deal with a serious case of manslaughter. If the noble Lord is going to introduce penal reform so that all these people are treated in this way, then we can argue it out. Until that is ready, I suggest that there should be no distinction between the serious case of manslaughter and the technical murder; and that we should, as this Amendment suggests, put it all at the discretion of the judge and then the judge will decide. If that is wrong, let us make a change of the system but do not let us have a dichotomy—that was the word used from those Benches earlier this afternoon—between the two classes of offenders.
6.33 p.m.
BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER:
It surely is important that we should keep murder in a class apart. I must say that I felt a great shock of surprise when I heard it argued at a lofty level that the distinction between murder and manslaughter is now described as "technical". The first reason for keeping a life sentence is surely that it marks the distinctive category of murder. It is almost the only case in which the court has no discretion—and has no discretion for the very reason that the crime stands in a category apart. The other reason is one of which I think not enough has been made in this discussion. It is that the life sentence involves a lifelong power of recall; a determinate sentence does not. And it is very important that somebody who has committed murder shall be under the control of the penal authorities throughout his whole life, so that he may be, as he sometimes is, recalled if necessary.
It is not the point, as was perhaps implied by the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chief Justice, that the public

1233
do not trust the judges. But no one will argue that even the most notable of our judges has the gift of phophecy for as much as ten, fifteen or twenty years ahead; and I am sure that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Parker of Waddington, will not claim that for himself. It is a fact that the Home Secretary does seek the advice of the Judiciary before he releases a convicted murderer—at any rate, that is the present practice.
I was puzzled by the argument used by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chief Justice, and also by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning; because it seemed to me that both were arguing that the ground for a fixed sentence was that it would not, in fact, be fixed. The Lord Chief Justice went to great pains to show that even a fixed sentence could subsequently be commuted; but it is true that it is not so easy to alter the sentence fixed by the court—to reduce the court's sentence—as it is to alter the sentence by arranging release where the sentence is in itself completely flexible. I thought that the dénouement of both the Lord Chief Justice and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, was that this was a gesture; that the reason for fixing long sentences, long in terms of years, was to show the public the gravity of the crime of murder. But I know of no gesture more effective than to declare a sentence of life imprisonment.
Much has been said about the nine years. I think it is time that we stopped talking about nine years, if only for the reason given by my noble friend, Lord Stonham; that the nine years is, first of all, an average, so that some sentences are shorter and others very much longer—and twenty years is not unknown. Secondly, it is an average which has obtained during the time in which certain murderers were, in fact, executed. When the time comes when, we are glad to think, nobody will ever be executed in this country, it will be necessary to reconsider the whole matter.
The Lord Chief Justice referred to the practices in other countries where there is no death penalty. These vary very much. In some cases, as in Belgium, the minimum period of imprisonment fixed is very low, something like three years. In the case of other countries—for example, Austria, Denmark and, I think, Sweden (or, at any rate, one of the Scan
1234
dinavian countries)—release is usually possible, curiously enough, after nine years. So perhaps this nine-year myth is more widespread than we think. Elsewhere, periods of as long as 20 years are found. There are enormous ranges of imprisonment from three years to over 20 years.
Much has been made of the argument that this is for the satisfaction of the public. This puzzles me. What evidence have we that the public are concerned about the present interpretation of life sentences? The public certainly have views about the death sentence. The debates on this subject in your Lordships' House have been very widely publicised. Even my own part in them has been fairly widely publicised; and, not surprisingly, I have had a certain number of letters—not many—from people who wish to retain the death penalty. In every case the argument in those letters was based on a particular murder which, in fact, did not attract the death penalty under the present law. But I will let that pass. I have not had a single communication from any source which says that murderers are let out too soon. I do not know whether this is also the experience of my noble friends; but perhaps they will tell us.
It seems to me that the public are quite unaware of the duration of the sentence. They are mainly concerned with the murderer who is let out and then commits a further murder. But our experience is that this is a very rare occurrence. There was one case not long ago; but I think the blame for the second murder should be shared between the Executive and the Judiciary; for the Executive let him out and the court, when he was charged with a not very grave offence, but an offence which had potentialities of gravity, because it had to do with a dangerous weapon, decided that he should be put on probation. Subseqently, he committed the second murder. But we have had to scrape to find these cases. The public are aware of that; and that is why they show no interest and are, I think, unaware of what the periods are.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: I listened with interest to the noble Lady in her reply to the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chief Justice, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning. I must

1235
say that I am surprised that murder, she asserts, still remains a distinctive offence. All offences are distinctive, in the sense that different ingredients go into them. In the case of murder and manslaughter there is loss of life. Let us take the case of the distinction between the attempted murder and murder. There is a distinction, of course, the distinction being that in one case the victim has died; and in the other, due to the advances in medical science. the victim has lived.
The noble Lady, who in talking to the earlier Amendment referred to its creating anomaly, is, by resisting this particular Amendment, doing no more than creating a very big anomaly. I believe this raises the very serious issue of whether the Executive should, under the present system, encroach on the functions of the Judiciary. I believe it raises that issue by insisting—
BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER:
The noble and learned Viscount must be aware that the intention of this Amendment is for the Judiciary to take over certain functions now exercised by the Executive.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: The intention of this Amendment is that the judge will have a discretion about what sentence to pass. He can pass a fixed determinate term if he wishes. Resisting the Amendment, as I understand it, means that the judges will be left with no power to mark the gravity of an offence by saying what sentence ought to be imposed. In a case of attempted murder they can mark the gravity of the offence by imposing a sentence of a particular length. If a victim happens to die, according to the Government's attitude, the judges will cease to have that power. I cannot think that is either right or justifiable.
I think there is great force in the view put forward by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, that the effect of passing a long determinate sentence may be a great deterrent, much greater than passing a sentence of life imprisonment which everyone knows may be imprisonment for a pretty short term. It is all very well for the noble Baroness to say that we have talked enough about nine years being the average, but that means that some people have been let out long before a period of nine years. Some may
1236
have been let out after a longer time. It is all very well for her to chide those of us who have mentioned nine years. I am the last person to wish to misrepresent the Home Secretary, but when I read what he said on July 13, 1965, I think it is absolutely clear that in the normal case, unless a man is likely to be a danger to society on his release, he will be let out after he has served something in the region of nine years. I do not think that what the Home Secretary said is capable of any other interpretation. The noble Lady should not chide us if we read it in that way, because I think that is the natural meaning of the words.
I said on Second Reading that I think there is a great advantage in this determinate sentence. I would link it with one thing that I regard also as important: that is, the power to release at any earlier time on licence when there is a determinate sentence. The noble Lady went on to say that with a life sentence there is a lifelong power to recall, and that is true. I think the point was dealt with by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reid. By keeping this as an automatic sentence on a conviction of murder we are creating one of the anomalies about which the noble Lady made such play during the debate on the last Amendment. The noble Lady referred to the gift of prophecy. I do not think that any judge claims any such gift. I am all in favour of the licensing system being enlarged where there is a determinate sentence. I do not wish to take up the time of your Lordships on this matter except to say in conclusion that I believe resistance to this Amendment to be wholly unreasonable. I believe that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Parker of Waddington, who attaches great importance to this Amendment, is clearly right, and that if this Amendment fails it will mark some encroachment by the Executive on the functions of the Judiciary.
6.45 p.m.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, I do not think that this Amendment should be left entirely in the hands of the Law Lords. I have supported this Bill right through. I should like to support the Amendment. I think that a sentence of life imprisonment is unrealistic and liable to mislead the general public. If there is a deterrent in a long term of imprisonment, it is to a large extent removed by

1237
the knowledge that life imprisonment does not mean life imprisonment at all; it means some lesser period. I will not argue whether it means nine years or something else, but on the vast majority of occasions it means something far less. To that extent the deterrent effect is removed.
No one has suggested that if it is left to the discretion of the judges sentences of life imprisonment would not be imposed. There might well be; but in that case life imprisonment will in practice mean life imprisonment, subject always—here I agree with the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne—that there should be the right of the Home Secretary to review. I hope that can be incorporated if we accept this Amendment.
A great deal has been made of the point that judges cannot foreshadow what anyone will be like in ten, fifteen or twenty years' time. Of course they cannot, and they do not pretend to. But judges are passing these sentences continually. A number of train robbers were sentenced to periods of 30 years' imprisonment. That did not mean that the judges were endeavouring to foreshadow what the robbers would be like in 30 years' time. The long sentences were passed primarily as a deterrent, just as long sentences were passed in the case of the Notting Hill riots. It was primarily for the deterrent effect. I think the sentences were fully justified, and I imagine that prospective train robbers will think again, knowing that they are liable, on conviction, to be sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment.
We trust the judges to pass sentences. They sentence for manslaughter, attempted murder and lesser offences. Occasionally the sentences are subject to review by a higher court of appeal, but on the whole there is general satisfaction. My noble friend tried to show, or attempted to make the case, that murder is a unique crime; but really there is no difference in principle between murder and attempted murder. An attempted murder becomes a murder if the victim dies after a year and a day—
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Within a year.
LORD SILKIN: Within a year; I beg your Lordships' pardon. One day may
1238
make all the difference between attempted murder and murder. I feel that on this occasion my noble friend Lord Stonham has not made out a case against the Amendment. I feel that, on the whole, justice would be better served by leaving it to the judges to impose long sentences in outstandingly bad cases if they so decide, with the right of the Home Secretary to review, and treat murder from the penal point of view in exactly the same way as all other crimes with which judges have to deal.
6.49 p.m.
THE LORD BISHOP OF CHICHESTER: I wish to make a brief comment, since I must express, as other noble Lords have expressed, great perplexity over this issue, and great sympathy for the Amendment. Yet I have some unresolved questions in my mind. I should like to support what was said by the noble Lady. I should have thought that on the whole we should wish to establish that murder is in a category different from other crimes. I realise the complication at law between murder and attempted murder, but I imagine that in a sense that is always the case in law. An attempted crime is not necessarily treated in the same way as a crime, whatever the crime may be; but I believe that in the view of the general public murder is recognised as murder. We recognise that there are extenuating and difficult circumstances which would be dealt with in terms of length of sentence, or merciful release, but the condemnation of this act by the public is, I believe, more safeguarded by having a fixed sentence than by having certain categories fixed in the courts. I can only express that as my opinion; but from the point of view of the public our condemnation of it is more effective than a fixed sentence.
Secondly, it is clear that the same arguments may be used on both sides when we come to the length of sentence. The public would certainly wish to be assured that in any length of sentence to which a murderer was committed he would not be released if there was any reasonable danger of his being a menace to the public. But, as has been remarked, this is an issue that cannot be settled there and then in the court, but later. On the reformatory aspect of the penalty, on what we can do for the criminal himself, this,

1239
again, is something impossible to decide except in terms of time, when we can see how he responds or otherwise to any treatment we can give him. Elasticity of time, therefore, becomes a matter for whoever has to make the decision. Therefore, I think that the case for retaining it in the hands of the Home Secretary is stronger.
I should like to take up what the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chief Justice, said about fixing a sentence and then calling upon society to see that the treatment of the criminal in prison suited that. I am entirely in favour of this. We ought well to pursue this point. If a life sentence sometimes works out at no more than nine years because a prisoner is deteriorating so fast, then there is something radically wrong with the prison system. We should take this to heart. It may be that in other countries this is better, and therefore the length of time a criminal has to endure is longer. Surely this is something which we should take on our consciences. The abolition of the death sentence imposes on the public the absolute duty of looking into this question and seeing what can be done for the reclamation of the criminal from within, even if it takes longer than the length at present on record. I hope that we shall all support that principle.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: If I may express a personal point of view, I would say that this is a fairly debatable matter. For hundreds of years the punishment for murder has been either capital or, if imprisonment, a life sentence. This Bill proposes that that should continue. Therefore it cannot be said that in this Bill the Executive are trying to alter something in their favour or to take away the rights of the Judiciary, because in this instance they have never had them. It is this Amendment which is seeking, it may be rightly, to take for the Judiciary a power which in murder cases they have never had before.
Murder, I suggest, is a crime apart, not only in the sense which the right reverend Prelate has mentioned but because there is no other crime which is so largely a product of the disordered mind. We have to bear in mind that about one-third of all murders are committed usually in circumstances suggestive of disordered mind. Even before the
1240
Homicide Act, in order to establish insanity it had to be proved that this came under the M'Naghten Rules—that is to say, that the accused did not know what he was doing—so that when he was cutting his wife's throat he thought he was carving the Sunday joint; or if he did know, he did not know that what he was doing was against the law. A great many could not comply with that strict standard, but even in the days of the M'Naghten Rules, half of all those who came to trial at assizes were found to be insane. They did not include the aggressive psychopath or men like Christie, who was found not to come within the M'Naghten Rules and therefore hanged, though some would have thought he was very odd, and did not include a lot of people who had been in and out of mental hospitals. It is only when one realises that, that one realises that while all murderers are not of disordered mind, an enormous proportion are.
People like that may get better, on and off. A judge knows very little about the man in front of him. He sees him for a couple of days. He may not go into the witness box at all. No doubt, if the man has a record, the judge knows the bare bones of fact of his record. But this is quite different from the Home Secretary. I have become persuaded that the right time to decide when somebody ought to be let out is when a man's whole record is being considered; and that cannot be done by any man, however able, ten or twenty years in advance. The Home Secretary has all the reports from the prison officers, who see the man every day and get to know him well, reports of prison doctors and prison governors. The modern Home Secretary, and I dare say former ones, goes round the prisons and meets a number of life prisoners. My right honourable friend the present Home Secretary, I know, has done that, and when papers come before him on the table he may say, "This is Joe—I know Joe; I have met him several times." It is with all that information that he is in a position to decide. The difficulty about saying that this ought to be left to the judges in relation to this particular crime, is that if they say five years and at the end of five years it is not safe to let a man out, there is nothing the Home Secretary can do to keep him

1241
in, and he may be wrong the other way round as well.
I subscribe to the view, which has been expressed by the right reverend Prelate and others, that murder is a crime apart and that its incidence is such that, on the whole, it is better that it should continue to be, as it has always been when not capital, a life sentence, and it should be left to the Home Secretary, whose responsibility it is and who, after all, will be blamed if anything goes wrong, to determine the matter.
6.57 p.m.
LORD PARKER OF WADDINGTON:
I do not want to weary the House at this hours by going over all the ground, but I should like to pick on one or two points. The noble Lord, Lord Stonham, held up his hands in horror at the fact that I was tending and intending to merge manslaughter and murder. Let me make it clear. Of course, as a matter of law murder is a separate offence, and it is also perhaps the most serious offence. But, equally, like the noble Baroness, I dislike fine lines and technical distinctions, and, as she put it in dealing with an earlier Amendment, I would rather blanket this. I think that there is one offence of homicide, varying infinitely from the lowest degree of manslaughter up to the most intentional, deliberate and calculated true murder. Therefore, I think my argument, as was that of the noble Lord, Lord Reid, is based on the anomaly which has been produced by the abolition of the death penalty.
The other matter I should like to take up is this. Both those who support and those who are against this Amendment have one object in view—which, indeed, may be the chief object of punishment—that is, the protection of the public. The whole of the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, and of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, was really based on the fact that this Amendment gives less protection to the public, and graphic illustrations were given of how a judge would give a sentence of two or three years and the Home Secretary would have to let the man out when that
period, less remission, had elapsed, and when it was completely unsafe to do so. That sort of thing seldom, if ever, occurs in practice. It could be happening every day to-day with other offences. The noble Lord, Lord Stonham, suggested that in a mercy killing the Judge might give two years. I was thinking of a mercy killing, and I have a vivid recollection of an old gentleman at Newcastle-upon-Tyne who was tried for murder. After ten years with an invalid wife who was virtually bedridden, and two years older than himself, he had finally administered some sleeping pills. Should I he very wrong in remanding him, maybe until some home could be found for him? Would there be any real risk that, if allowed out, he would go and commit another murder?
There are many murders—I suppose 80 or 90 per cent.—which do involve some aberration of mind, some abnormality which may not amount to diminished responsibility, such as the curious sexual murders and others. I can assure your Lordships that it is inconceivable that, for that sort of thing, judges will do anything other than give life imprisonment. Life imprisonment is the one thing they always fall back on: because they are not seeking to give a deterrent sentence; they do not know how the man will react in ten or fifteen years' time, and the right thing is to leave it to the Home Secretary. But the idea in this Amendment is that in the odd case—and such cases may be only 5 per cent. of the total—the judge at the time can give a sentence which will act as some deterrent. As I said earlier, such a sentence would be given only in the case of highly professional organised crime, and as something which we hope will prevent crime in this country from developing on the lines on which it has developed in the States. I cannot withdraw this Amendment.
7.2 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 3A) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 80; Not-Contents, 78.

CONTENTS

Ailwyn, L.

Boothby, L.

Coleraine, L.

Albemarle, E.

Brocket, L.

Colyton, L.

Allerton, L.

Clitheroe, L.

Conesford, L.

Ampthill, L.

Clwyd, L.

Coutanche, L

Cowley, E.

Hawke, L.

Newton, L.

Cullen of Ashbourne, L.

Hobson, L.

Norwich, V.

Denning, L. [Teller.]

Hodson, L.

Oakshott, L.

Derwent, L.

Horsbrugh, Bs.

Parker of Waddington, L

Digby, L.

Howard of Glossop, L.

Pearson, L.

Dilhorne, V.

Hurd, L.

Reid, L. [Teller.]

Drumalbyn, L.

Inglewood, L.

Rockley, L.

Dundee, E.

Killearn, L.

St. Aldwyn, E.

Effingham, E.

Kirkwood, L.

Savile, L.

Ellenborough, L.

Latymer, L.

Sherfield, L.

Elliot of Harwood, Bs.

London, L. Bp.

Silkin, L.

Falkland, V.

Lothian, M.

Sinclair of Cleeve, L.

Ferrier, L.

Lucas of Chilworth, L.

Somers, L.

Gage, V.

Margadale, L.

Stamp, L.

Goschen, V.

Massereene and Ferrard, V.

Stuart of Findhorn, V.

Grantchester, L.

Merrivale, L.

Swansea, L.

Greenway, L.

Milverton, L.

Swinton, E.

Grenfell, L.

Molson, L.

Thurlow, L.

Grimston of Westbury, L.

Monk Bretton, L.

Tweedsmuir, L.

Guest, L.

Monson, L.

Wilberforce, L.

Haig, E.

Morris of Borth-y-Gest, L.

Williamson, L.

Hailes, L.

Morrison, L.

Wolverton, L.

Hastings, L.

Mowbray and Stourton, L.

NOT-CONTENTS

Addison, V.

Gifford, L.

Rothermere, V.

Adrian, L.

Gladwyn, L.

Royle, L.

Airedale, L.

Haddington, E.

St. Davids, V.

Archibald, L.

Haire of Whiteabbey, L.

Samuel, V.

Arwyn, L.

Harmsworth, L.

Sandford, L.

Auckland, L.

Henderson, L.

Segal, L.

Beswick, L.

Henley, L. [Teller.]

Shackleton, L.

Blyton, L.

Hertford, M.

Shepherd, L.

Bowles, L.

Kennet, L.

Simey, L.

Brockway, L.

Kinnoull, E.

Snow, L.

Brooke of Ystradfellte, Bs.

Latham, L.

Sorensen, L.

Brown, L.

Layton, L.

Stonham, L.

Burden, L.

Leatherland, L.

Strang, L.

Burton of Coventry, Bs.

Lindgren, L.

Strange of Knokin, Bs.

Byers, L.

Listowel, E.

Summerskill, Bs.

Champion, L.

Llewelyn-Davies, L.

Swanborough, Bs.

Chichester, L. Bp.

Lloyd of Hampstead, L.

Tangley, L.

Cohen, L.

Longford, E. (L. Privy Seal.)

Tenby, V.

Colwyn, L.

Mitchison, L.

Terrington, L.

Cranbrook, E.

Mottistone, L.

Ullswater, V.

Croft, L.

Perth, E.

Waldegrave, E.

Crook, L.

Phillips, Bs.

Walston, L.

Denham, L.

Plummer, Bs.

Wells-Pestell, L.

Francis-Williams, L.

Raglan, L.

Windlesham, L.

Gaitskell, Bs.

Reay, L. [Teller.]

Winterbottom, L.

Gardiner, L. (L. Chancellor.)

Rhodes, L.

Wootton of Abinger, Bs.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Resolved in the affirmative, and Amendment agreed to accordingly.
Clause 1 agreed to.
7.17 p.m.
LORD PARKER OF WADDINGTON LORD PARKER OF WADDINGTON had given Notice of his intention to move, after Clause 1, to insert the flowing new clause:
Release on licence of those sentenced for murder.
"No person convicted of murder shall be released by the Secretary of State on licence under section 27 of the Prison Act 1952 or section 21 of the Prisons (Scotland) Act 1952 unless the Secretary of State has immediately prior to such release consulted the Lord Chief
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Justice of England or the Lord Justice General as the case may be together with the trial judge if available."
The noble and learned Lord said: This Amendment is to bring the case of a release from life imprisonment into line with what is the constitutional practice if there is a variation of a sentence of a fixed term of years. If a judge gives ten years, let us say, and the Home Secretary in the exercise of the Prerogative, wants to reduce the sentence, it has always been the constitutional practice for him invariably to consult the Lord Chief Justice or the trial Judge, or both. It always seemed to me anomalous that

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that did not occur in the case of a life sentence prisoner being let out on licence. The reason was that that was not an interference with the sentence—the sentence of life imprisonment remained; it was merely an executive act of letting him out on licence.
My right honourable friend the Home Secretary said in another place at a much earlier stage that he thought it would be right, in these circumstances, to consult the Lord Chief Justice and/or, as it were, the trial Judge, if he were available. This Amendment is merely putting what I think is the Home Secretary's intention into the Statute.
LORD STONHAM: Before the noble and learned Lord sits down, may I ask him whether it was not his intention, in moving this Amendment, to move it without the word "immediately"? I think that was his intention, and it is rather important.
LORD PARKER OF WADDINGTON: I am most grateful to the noble Lord. In the excitement of the last Division I had forgotten. I would ask leave to move this Amendment with the deletion of the word "immediately" in the fourth line. It is a technical matter. The consultation would have to be at a time well in advance of the release, because the prisoner is informed in advance that he will be released. I am afraid I had not got that point in mind when drafting the Amendment. As this has been pointed out to me, I should like to have the word "immediately" deleted.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 1, insert the following new clause:
Release on licence of those sentenced for Murder
(". No person convicted of murder shall be released by the Secretary of State on licence under section 27 of the Prison Act 1952 or section 21 of the Prisons (Scotland) Act 1952 unless the Secretary of State has prior to such release consulted the Lord Chief Justice of England or the Lord Justice General as the case may be together with the trial judge if available.")—(Lord Parker of Waddington.)
LORD STONHAM: I am most grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Parker of Waddington, for moving this Amendment, and particularly for having at the last moment moved it in an amended form, because, as he has
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explained, this conforms entirely with the practice that is pursued—namely, the trial judge gives my right honourable friend the Home Secretary a memorandum of the case, and approximately a year before it is possible that the murderer is going to be released we should then consult the Lord Chief Justice and have his advice. If the prognosis was good, the prisoner would be informed about a year before he was likely to be released. As I said, this is the practice. We see no reason why it should not be put into the Statute, and I hope my noble friend Lady Wootton of Abinger will agree that it should be included in the Bill.
BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER: I think perhaps the Bill would be better without this Amendment, because it introduces an element of rigidity into the Bill, and once a thing is written into the actual text of the law it may be difficult to alter it. But this is current practice and it is, as we see things now, desirable current practice, and I for my part should not wish to oppose it if it is the wish of the Committee that this should be made a statutory obligation.
7.20 p.m.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, we have made quite good progress and we are approaching the hour at which it was agreed we should adjourn for dinner. Therefore, I should like to move that the Committee stage be now adjourned until 8.30 p.m.
Moved, That the Committee stage be now adjourned until 8.30 p.m.—(Lord Shepherd.)
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: May I ask the sponsors of the Bill whether it is their intention to try to conclude the Committee stage tonight? I gather we shall possibly have a long debate on the Amendments down in the name of the Lord Chancellor, which seek to reverse the decision of another place.
BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER: I think that is the intention. It does not seem very likely that we shall have contentious debates on any of the other Amendments, and it would seem desirable that we should soldier on and complete the Committee stage.
VISCOUNT STUART OF FINDHORN: If I undertake to speak for not more than two minutes, would it be possible to deal with Amendment No. 10?
LORD SHEPHERD: I am quite happy, if the Committee is, to meet the noble Viscount. We can watch the two minutes.
LORD BOOTHBY: If I may say so, I should like to support very strongly the contention of the noble Viscount. If he is going to be very brief it would be better that we should continue, and I do not see why we should adjourn for dinner at all. We can always go to the cafeteria for a snack.
LORD SHEPHERD: I will withdraw the Motion, but I would add that in adjourning for dinner we are not considering only ourselves; we are considering the servants of the House, and particularly the shorthand writers, who have been on duty for a considerable time and I think it is desirable that we should adjourn. However, I now beg leave to withdraw the Motion.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: I hope the noble Lord will move that Motion again when my noble friend has moved his Amendment.
LORD SHEPHERD: I will.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
VISCOUNT STUART OF FINDHORN VISCOUNT STUART OF FINDHORN moved, after Clause 1, to insert the following new clause:
Right to choose execution
".Any person sentenced to imprisonment for life shall have the right to choose to be executed rather than suffer the decay of soul and body resulting from a long term of imprisonment."
The noble Viscount said: The intention of this Amendment is serious. I do not suppose it will be taken advantage of in the years to come, but I have always had three very strong dislikes: one is to see people imprisoned, especially for a long time, and to see them in the prison; the second is to see prisoner-of-war camps and cages. One cannot see a more depressing sight of unhappy and untidy people. My third strong dislike is to see caged animals, and if I had my way I would abolish zoos.
During the Second Reading debate in another place, the Home Secretary spoke
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about the deterioration of prisoners after nine years. He strongly supported my case, and I will not quote him again because his words have been quoted here this afternoon by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, as they were on a previous occasion by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross. That explains my sole intention in moving this Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 1, insert the said new clause.—(Viscount Stuart of Findhorn.)
EARL HAIG EARL HAIG moved, as an Amendment to the Amendment, after "executed" to insert "painlessly". The noble Earl said: In supporting this Bill I have at the same time an anxiety about the rightness of putting people into gaol for long sentences, to suffer a period of misery even more cruel than the death sentence. This Amendment provides a painless alternative to a lifetime's imprisonment. It is true that the prisons in this country are out of date, and that much of the present suffering could be alleviated; also that there are many types of people for whom the prison environment could be re-shaped so as not to be incompatible. But there are other types of people for whom no prison and no way of life in prison could be so devised as to prevent real mental and physical damage. These are the people for whom freedom is necessary, for whom prison routine and restrictions are abhorrent and to whom the ebb and flow of natural life are essential.
I speak with a little knowledge of confinement. My noble friend mentioned the dreariness of prisoner-of-war camps, which I had the honour of frequenting for a few years during the last war. My knowledge of Her Majesty's prisons is perhaps not so great as that of some noble Lords, but I have a little knowledge, having been asked by the late Lord Templewood to visit a number of prisons all over the country to help and advise in regard to the practice of the visual arts in those prisons—a practice which to-day has alleviated for many prisoners some of the frustrating effects of prison life. I believed then, and I still believe, that however hard we try to disguise it, prison will always be prison, and for many temperaments and mentalities the prison way of life can never

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he anything other than harmful—a bitter freezing of the mind and the senses, and of the soul.
Such people as these I consider should be thought about in this Amendment, and for that reason I ask your Lordships to accept it. By complete abolition of the death sentence and the substitution of long prison sentences in certain cases we should be substituting on humane grounds a much worse kind of suffering. To those people I suggest that a way be opened to choose as a last resort the penalty of death, not by the old method of hanging but through the administration to the body of some lethal preparation after preparatory anaesthetic. This form of execution could enable a person sentenced to a life sentence to cross painlessly over to the other side without any of the indignities and callousness of hanging. I beg to move.
Amendment to Amendment moved:
Line 2, after ("executed") insert ("painlessly").—(Earl Haig.)
VISCOUNT STUART OF FINDHORN:
So far as I am concerned I should be very glad to agree to my noble friend's Amendment to my Amendment.
LORD STONHAM: That is a most helpful intervention because I shall not have to consider Amendment 10A in particular. The noble Viscount, Lord Stuart of Findhorn, is such an unfailingly kind person, and at the same time has an inexhaustible and unquenchable sense of humour, that I know he will not mind if I say that the only good thing I can see about his Amendment, No. 10, with or without its subsequent Amendment, is that its intention is clear and it is self-explanatory.
The noble Earl, Lord Haig, has introduced the word "painlessly". I do not want to pursue the point—because I think it would bring us into fields that we ought not to pursue—as to which kind of death was a painless one. But I would say to the noble Viscount that if his Amendment were accepted it would have the obvious objection that it would make a statutory provision for what would, in effect, be suicide with the sanction of, and indeed with the assistance of, the State. So far as I am aware, nothing approaching that has ever been in the law of any civilised country in the world.
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I am not quite sure whether the noble Viscount intended that this right that would be granted should be exercised when the sentence was passed, or at some future date when the sentence was being served; but long-sentence men do at times suffer fits of depression and it would mean that a man might suddenly ask to exercise his right to be executed. That would mean that, in a Bill which we had thought earlier this afternoon finally abolished the death penalty, that provision would still be there. Then, if we accepted this Amendment, it would mean that we should not be able to abolish the gallows; we should still have to retain them and keep executioners in training against the possibility that some prisoner, in a fit of depression, would wish to be executed.
EARL HAIG: Under my Amendment the intention is that the gallows should be abolished.
LORD STONHAM: I said that I did not want to discuss which kind of death was more painful than another, although understand from those who ought to know that, much as we object to it in the main, hanging is the quickest death, because the man becomes unconscious almost immediately. But I would rather not argue it because I think it is a very distasteful subject.
Finally, I would say to the noble Viscount, Lord Stuart of Findhorn, that his Amendment applies in terms to "any person sentenced to imprisonment for life". There arc, as he is aware, offences other than murder for which a person can be sentenced to life imprisonment but which have never, or at least not for a hundred years, carried the death penalty, and I do not think it could possibly be his intention that a person sentenced to life imprisonment for one of those offences should be able to choose to be executed. If that is the noble Viscount's intention, then I hope he will not pursue it, because I should have to ask your Lordships to reject the Amendment.
BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER:
Underlining what my noble friend has just said, I would remind the Committee that while attempted suicide is no longer a crime, it is a crime to aid, abet or counsel suicide, and this is getting dangerously near it.
LORD BOOTHBY: I should like to add one final word, which is that you cannot have a tooth out painlessly and therefore I do not see how you can be killed painlessly. I think this is a bad idea.
VISCOUNT STUART OF FINDHORN:
I still think it might be kinder not to have life imprisonment, even if it is not for murder.
On Question, Amendment to the Amendment negatived.
On Question, Amendment negatived.
[The Sitting was suspended at 7.32 p.m. and resumed at half-past eight.]
Clause 2 agreed to.
Clause 3:
Duration
3. This Act shall continue in force until the thirty-first day of July nineteen hundred and seventy, and shall then expire unless Parliament by affirmative resolutions of both Houses otherwise determines: and upon the expiration of this Act the law existing immediately prior to the passing of this Act shall, so far as it is repealed or amended by this Act, again operate as though this Act had not been passed, and the said repeals and amendments had not been enacted.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR had given Notice of several Amendments to subsection (3), the first being to leave out "continue in force until" and insert "expire on". The noble and learned Viscount said: I beg to move the first Amendment standing in my name on the Marshalled List. This is not a matter of grave importance one way or another. As the Bill left another place it provides, in effect, that capital punishment should be abolished for an experimental period of five years. I am not against having a proper experimental period, because I am absolutely certain that the murder rate is wholly unaffected by the existence or non-existence of capital punishment, or, if you have capital punishment, whether executions are frequent or infrequent. But in this part of Northern Europe we have so relatively few murders that the numbers naturally go up and down as between one year and another. Experience, however, shows that over a ten-year period this evens itself out, and over any ten-year period in this century there has been hardly any difference in the murder rate.
I am not myself satisfied that a five-year period is really long enough to judge, and I should personally have preferred a ten-year period. However, I have not put down any Amendment on this point and, as the Bill has left another place, it provides in effect for a five-year experimental period. But the effect of the Bill as now worded is that if, at the end of five years, nobody does anything at all, we have the Homicide Act back. I quite appreciate that the Homicide Act was well-intentioned. The House of Commons had passed through all its stages a Bill to abolish capital punishment and, while your Lordships' House had rejected that Bill on Second Reading, there was a general feeling that the position could not be left as it was, and there was a quite natural and perfectly proper desire to see whether some compromise could not be reached.
It has, I think, been accepted in your Lordships' House that the noble and learned Earl, Lord Kilmuir, and the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, were really the authors of the Homicide Act. When I said on Second Reading that I thought that this was the worst Act that had ever been put on the Statute Book, I was not meaning to show any lack of appreciation of the fact that they were genuinely and sincerely trying to arrive at a compromise, which indeed is our ordinary English way of doing things, and doing their best to arrive at a sensible one. After all, the Royal Commission, had spent four-and-a-half years on seeing whether they could find some way of keeping executions for the worst murders but abolishing capital punishment for the rest. This was their job. They were not allowed to say whether they were in favour of or against capital punishment; they were appointed to do what the Labour Government had wholly failed in doing; namely, to try to suggest some scheme of grading for murder.
After four-and-a-half years of examining any scheme of grades of murder which had ever been suggested or tried, they unanimously reported that to do so was impossible, and that if any scheme were to be tried it would be found to be so full of anomalies that it could not be supported. It was in face of that advice that the authors of the Homicide Act said, "We have found a new basis.

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We are not going to try to divide murders into the least culpable and the most culpable, but will adopt a new basis of keeping capital punishment for those kinds of murders which will deter the professional criminal."
The trouble was that this was really a matter of two lawyers playing ducks and drakes with men's lives. It was two lawyers—who were very well-intentioned, but who did not sufficiently take into account what murder really does consist of in the ordinary way—working out as an intellectual exercise the men they thought ought to live and the men they thought ought to die. But in real life the situation has proved different: first, because the British public do not like laws which have no moral basis at all—and the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, realised this at the time, and said so.
The very first man who was hanged under the Homicide Act, which was intended only to protect us against professional criminals, was Vickers. Vickers was a young man whose only previous conviction was that of stealing a bicycle lamp. Being unemployed, he had broken into the local shop to see if he could find some money in the till. He had no gun, he had no weapon of any kind. Being surprised by the woman who kept the shop coming down from above, he hit her, with his hand, blows which the pathologist described as moderate to light, but in falling she hit her head on concrete and she died.
Ever since then we have experienced under the Homicide Act cases, first of all, appalling murders which are not capital offences—cases like that of the the man who, quietly and with premeditation, and deliberately, poisoned another in order to get money under his will. On the other hand, we have had people who are not professional criminals—like the man who finds his wife with another man, or suspects it, and kills her with the nearest weapon to hand. If the weapon nearest to hand is a gun, that is capital murder; if the weapon nearest to hand is a hatchet, then it is not capital. Then there is the man who rapes a girl, strangles her and then steals her handbag. If he does not steal her handbag, then it is not capital murder. This is what two lawyers, than whom no two we have are more distinguished
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and intelligent, have arrived at by trying an intellectual exercise without—
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: Will the noble and learned Lord forgive me for one moment? If he is going to pursue this line, which is wholly unrelated to the content of the Amendment, wholly unjustified, and wholly inaccurate, I will reply to him in kind. I will tell him straight away that I do not claim authorship of that Act; I had something to do with it. My noble and learned friend Lord Kilmuir was not Home Secretary at that time—Lord Tenby was. The whole reasoning for that Act was made perfectly patent during the course of the Second Reading. It is quite monstrous for the noble Lord to say that we were men who thought at the time who should live and who ought to die. I really do resent that kind of observation, which is wholly unjustified.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The noble Earl, Lord Kilmuir, on Second Reading intimated, as I understood it, that he and the noble and learned Viscount were primarily responsible for the Homicide Act, which did in fact, however well-intentioned, decide who since then has lived and who has died.
The point of the present Bill, as it has come up from another place, is that if nobody does anything, we get the Homicide Act back. The object of the Amendments which I have ventured to put down—and we are now discussing No. 12, but, with your Lordships' permission, I will take Nos. 12, 13 and 14 together, because they are all on the same point—is to provide that if nothing happens then the law which we are now passing will continue, because the effect of the first three Amendments is to alter the first part of Clause 3 to read:
"This Act shall expire on the thirty-first day of July nineteen hundred and seventy, if Parliament by affirmative resolutions of both Houses so determines".
As it stands at present, Clause 3 would have the effect that, unless Affirmative Resolutions were passed by both Houses before July 31, 1970, the Act would on that date automatically expire, and the provisions of the Homicide Act relating to capital punishment would automatically come back into operation. If for no other reason, therefore, these Amendments are necessary to ensure that there

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will be no risk of the Act expiring by default, simply because no resolutions to continue it are moved.
Since decisions have now been taken by substantial majorities in both Houses of Parliament to abolish capital punishment for murder, the onus should surely be on those who wish to restore the death penalty after five years or any other period, to demonstrate that something has happened in the intervening period to make it necessary. As I understand it, while this precise point was not considered in another place, somewhat similar Amendments were put down there by Mr. Channon and Mr. Royle—I think Mr. Channon is a Conservative, but I am not sure about Mr. Royle—but in the event they were not moved. So, as far as I am aware, this precise point has not been considered in another place, and it seemed to me right, whilst, as I say, the matter is not one of enormous importance, that your Lordships should at least consider whether it was right to provide that the Homicide Act should not automatically come back unless there were Affirmative Resolutions to the contrary, and that now that both Houses have passed the abolition of capital punishment by a substantial majority it should continue unless there was some Affirmative Resolution to the contrary. I think that Amendment No. 15 raises rather a different point, which I probably ought not to consider at this stage. I beg to move accordingly.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 24, leave out ("continue in force until") and insert ("expire on").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: I do not know why the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor thought it necessary to make such an offensive speech about an Amendment which he thought was of little importance. When he refers to my noble and learned friend Lord Kilmuir and myself in the terms of two lawyers who have found a new basis, and two lawyers playing ducks and drakes with men's lives, I cannot but regard that as wholly offensive. If the noble and learned Lord wants to continue the debate on those lines, I will be perfectly happy to do so with him, but it really is a monstrous thing to say. That Act may be criticized—and has been criticised, I know—but
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the reasoning behind that Act was made clear at the time it was passed, and I really think that the noble and learned Lord was quite unnecessarily rude in making that kind of observation, which is unworthy of him and his office.
The reference to the Homicide Act is quite irrelevant to this Amendment. The noble and learned Lord said that he thinks it is not a matter of very grave importance one way or another. He omitted to tell your Lordships how this particular provision came to be in the Bill. It came to be in the Bill as a result of an Amendment moved by my right honourable friend Mr. Henry Brooke, who himself had voted for the Second Reading and was in favour of this Bill's being passed. He moved this provision into the Bill. It was carried into the Bill in Committee on May 22, 1965, after a Division in which my honourable friends in another place—abolitionists and retentionists—had voted together. The noble and learned Lord omitted to draw the Committee's attention to the fact that the terms of this provision moved by Mr. Henry Brooke were in the precise terms of an Amendment moved by Mr. Silverman to the 1948 Act.
What was the simple object of this provision? It was to ensure that there was, in fact, a trial period. As the noble Viscount, Lord Norwich, said in the course of an earlier debate, we are going to have this only for a trial period of five years. That is what Mr. Brooke's Amendment sought to provide, and the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor is really being more disingenuous than even he could find ordinarily possible by suggesting that, at the expiry of five years, nobody will do anything about it if the clause stands as it is. Of course, if the clause does stand as it is, someone who is keen on abolition and who thinks it should continue will move the necessary Affirmative Resolution. What this provision ensures, as it stands, is that this matter must be reconsidered by Parliament in five years' time, and that certainly was the wish of the abolitionists in my Party in another place, and is certainly the wish of, I think, many noble Lords here. That is all that the provision in the Bill does. Now the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor wants to take it out of the Bill and say that it will not be

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automatically considered in five years' time.
As to this business about, "If it is not automatically considered we revert to this pernicious Homicide Act," that is the worst piece of special pleading I have heard for years. I think the argument advanced by the noble Lord in respect of this Amendment was not only the most offensive, provocative and rude, but also misleading. We on this side of the House, whatever view we take on abolition or retention, are agreed, I think I am right in saying, that this provision moved by Mr. Brooke is right and justified—and it is the provision which will ensure that Parliament has a look at this matter again in five years' time.
It is all very well for the noble Lord to say, with confidence, that he does not think the murder rate will increase, that he does not think it will have any effect, but that of course there may be a temporary increase which will have evened out in ten years' time. He may be right, he may be wrong. I hope he is right. I hope he is wrong in thinking that there will be a temporary increase—I hope he is very wrong about that. I shall be very pleased indeed if there is no increase at all. But surely it is right to ensure that Parliament has a look at this matter in five years' time. The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor started by saying that this was not a matter of very grave importance. We disagree with him, and if we do not succeed in retaining the Bill in its present form tonight I give the noble Lord warning that we will endeavour to put this Bill back into its present form on Third Reading.
LORD COHEN: I had not intended to intervene, but I feel I owe it to the Committee to explain why, having supported this Bill throughout, and having voted throughout, I will not say with the Government but with the noble Baroness, I feel bound on this occasion to vote against the Amendment which the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has moved. I do it not because I agree, I am afraid, that the first part of his speech was wholly irrelevant and rather offensive—that does not affect my judgment—but because my conclusion has been influenced by the fact that I am not satisfied on the evidence (indeed I am satisfied the other way, on the balance
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of the evidence so far) that the retention of the death penalty is not a necessary deterrent. But the evidence so far as this country is concerned is not conclusive, and, like my noble friend, Lord Norwich, I should like to be sure that the matter will be reconsidered in five or ten years' time. I should have had much more sympathy with the Lord Chancellor if he had substituted ten years for five; but, as he has not, and as he has adopted this attitude, I feel bound to vote against him and to support the Bill in the "No" Lobby. I will not detain the Committee any longer.
LORD STONHAM: I am very sorry to hear the noble Lord, Lord Cohen, say he will vote against the Amendment moved by my noble friend the Lord Chancellor. Certainly the Government are in favour of these Amendments, and while I do not wish to enter into the exchanges between the noble and learned Viscount and my noble and learned friend, I am bound to say that I think the noble and learned Viscount was himself somewhat disingenuous when he seemed to think that there was this tremendous difference between the position that would operate if these Amendments are accepted and that in the Bill at present. There is nothing in these Amendments which would prevent the Bill from being reconsidered, if Parliament so decided, at the end of five years.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: There is nothing to prevent Parliament from reconsidering the matter without any provision of this kind at all. What this does is to make sure that those who want the Act to continue will see to it that Parliament has the opportunity of discussing it.
LORD STONHAM: Even I am not so disingenuous as the noble and learned Viscount imagines. There is a clear issue here. As the Bill stands at present, the Act will expire unless positive and affirmative action is taken by Parliament. We all know that in the conditions which may operate in five years' time—conditions having nothing to do with whether this Bill has been a success or not, having nothing to do with whether or not murders have increased or decreased, but simply of Parliamentary time, perhaps, and congestion of business—it may then be difficult for Parliament, as it were, to re-enact this Bill, and, as the noble and

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learned Viscount made so clear, fight it through both Houses of Parliament again.
This Bill has been before Parliament for some eight months, I believe. The retentionists—as they have every right to do; I do not complain about it—have used every device of democracy to oppose it. They have been resoundingly defeated on Second and Third Readings in another place; they have been resoundingly defeated on Second Reading in your Lordships' House. In effect, all that these Amendments do is to say that five years hence when we reconsider this Bill, it shall continue unless Parliament by Motion decides otherwise. Surely that is reasonable and fair enough. It is better, I should have thought, after this lapse of time, than that it should lapse altogether.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: When the noble Lord says that this is entirely due to the retentionists' opposition to this Bill through all its stages, does he dispute the fact that this provision was inserted in the Bill after a Division in another place on an Amendment moved by a supporter of the Bill and supported in the Division Lobby by members of my Party, whether retentionist or abolitionist? Does he still deny that?
LORD STONHAM: I am not in a position to deny or to accept what the noble and learned Viscount has said; but I am in a position to assert beyond any peradventure and any contradiction from him that in the last eight months this measure has been opposed by every democratic Parliamentary device. That is a fact which nobody can deny. I am not complaining about that. What I am saying is that what we want to avoid is another battle of the same kind—an unnecessary battle, as I hope it will prove to be. But if in the next five years those of us who think that the abolition of the death penalty will not make any material difference to the number of murders, will not add to the number of policemen or prison officers who are murdered in the execution of their duty, are proved wrong about it, then it would most certainly be for the noble and learned Viscount and others who think like him to bring this matter before both Houses of Parliament; and it would be extremely difficult for the abolitionists,
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for those of us who believe in the abolition of the death penalty, to stand against them. This is all that it is.
While I would, of course, congratulate the noble and learned Viscount on the attitude that he has taken, I think that it confuses the issue, which is: do we accept these Amendments and five years later let the Bill go on if it has proved a success; or do we reject the Amendment and five years hence, if it has been a success and justified our hopes, subject Parliament, unnecessarily, because of the views of a minority which has been defeated, to going through all this again? I hope that your Lordships will accept the Amendments.
LORD DERWENT: Surely this is simply a question of whether we are prepared to reverse an Amendment which was put into the Bill in another place—that and nothing else.
LORD STONHAM: I think the effect it what I have stated. We are concerned with these Amendments. It has nothing to do with another place and I hope that we shall be concerned to deal with that.
8.56 p.m.
BARONESS ELLIOT OF HARWOOD: As one who has supported the Bill on Second Reading and during the Division on the Amendment moved by the noble Lords, Lord Conesford and Lord Ilford, I wish to say that I supported the Bill on the understanding that it was the measure which came from another place. There is in the Bill a clause that the law shall be enacted for five years and then come up for review. That played a considerable part in enabling me to arrive at a decision to support the Bill. I am aware of all the arguments on both sides. I am very much on the side of the abolitionists, hut, nevertheless, as we have heard, a case may be made out by those whose feelings and views are different from mine.
The noble Lord, Lord Stonham, said that they were defeated during the Second Reading debate, and I was one who voted for abolition on the understanding that there was the five-year period during which the Bill would be tried. I should not be in favour of saying now, at the eleventh hour, that the five-year period is not important and is something which

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could be done away with, as would happen if the Amendments of the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor were accepted.
I think it would be much better to leave the Bill in its present state. A period of five years is simple and straightforward. The noble Lord, Lord Stonham, referred to the possibility of there being no Parliamentary time. This is a major point of the greatest possible importance and I do not think any Government would be so foolish as not to allow time for another discussion. If, as I believe it will, the Bill proves successful, it will be passed again. If it is not a success, those who have voted for it will be proved wrong, in which case it would be up to those on the other side to alter the measure. This is the first time that I have seen the Amendments in the name of the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, but if what is in the Bill is to be reversed at the eleventh hour, I think it would be entirely wrong and I will vote against the Amendments.
LORD BYERS: I hope that the House will not be completely swayed by the noble Lady in this matter. I do not think it is a question of the eleventh hour. We hope to improve the Bill. What weighs with me is what was said by the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, that if nothing is done to amend it, this Bill, as an Act, will expire automatically at the end of five years. I can understand that the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, as one of the co-authors of the Homicide Act, is not prepared to see that Act challenged. We know what it has been like. There has been a whole array of evidence of the way in which it has worked.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: I do not mind the Act's being challenged. I do not mind its being criticised. I recognised on Second Reading that it was open to criticism in several respects. But what I do object to is the kind of observations made to-night, that my noble friend Lord Kilmuir and myself have been "playing ducks and drakes with men's lives". That is what the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said. He said that we decided which men we thought ought to live and who ought to die. I object especially to such comments, and I think that they are completely unforgivable.
LORD BYERS: The noble and learned Viscount must not accuse me of having made those observations, but I think they could arise out of the fact that the noble Earl, Lord Kilmuir, whose speech I listened to and interrupted with some relish, when talking about poisoning, spoke of the difficulty that the noble and learned Viscount and he had in trying to come to a definition of poisoning that would come within the ambit of capital murder, and he went on to say:
"However, we came before both Houses of Parliament with a Bill which deliberately set out to preserve what we thought was the minimum necessary for preserving law and order and public safety."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 269 (No. 106), col. 640, July 20, 1965.]
That is a very proper sentence, but I do not think that the noble and learned Viscount can now avoid the fact that he was regarded by the noble Earl, Lord Kilmuir as one of the co-authors of the Bill.
I do not want to say any more about the Homicide Act, except that we have had a tremendous amount of important evidence which all points to the fact that we dare not go back to that Act. That is the point. I know that there are occasions when Governments have extreme difficulty in giving time. But if this Act is working as we hope it will work, there will be no reason to review it at all. If it is not working, then any Government will be forced to give Parliamentary time. The most sensible thing to do is to accept this Amendment and, with any luck, we shall avoid the sort of difficulties we have had to go through since 1948. The sensible thing, I suggest, is to accept these Amendments, and if the Act does not work, in five years we shall all want to review it.
LORD TANGLEY: I wonder whether the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, realises what an embarrassment this Amendment is to non-Party people like myself, who have been steadily supporting this Bill in all the Divisions that have taken place. I voted for the Second Reading and supported the Bill on the footing that there was to be an experimental period of five years. That meant that the law would be changed in five years' time unless Parlaiment in its wisdom felt that it should continue. The effect of this Amendment would be to make this Bill permanently

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part of the law of the land unless someone does something about it. That is quite different. It is not an experimental period. Bearing in mind that there was no suggestion on Second Reading, or at any earlier stage of the Bill, until we saw the Marshalled List of Amendments, that this Amendment was to be moved, I feel that I am being asked now to vote for a different Bill from the one that I voted for on Second Reading, and I do not think that that is fair at this stage.
There is an additional reason, I suggest. I think that at this moment of time this Bill is much more experimental than it was when we had our Second Reading debate. As a result of Amendments which have been carried this afternoon, we have gone in one step from a compulsory, automatic death sentence in respect of numerous classes of murder to a state of affairs where the sentence can be anything from probation to life. That is the result of the Amendments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Parker of Waddington, against which I voted. I think that this is quite wrong and I think the public will be quite astonished when they learn what steps have been taken this afternoon. I believe that this makes it all the more necessary that this should be a real experiment, and I beg the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor to relieve us from our embarrassment by not pressing this Amendment.
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: May I support the noble Lord who has just sat down? I voted for abolition on Second Reading and I should feel that I had been tricked, if these Amendments were carried. We were told—and I voted strictly on this understanding—that this Bill was to last for a trial period of five years; that after five years the position would be reviewed, and that if the experiment had not been successful, we should then have a new Bill. I feel very sore about this, and, as I say, I should feel tricked if the Amendments were carried.
VISCOUNT ST. DAVIDS: I am, as everyone knows, an abolitionist, and I have supported this Bill throughout its progress. But I try to remember the words of Oliver Cromwell, that "I may be wrong", and therefore I should be very
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happy to see a review of this matter in five years' time. But here I am in a difficulty, because, as the Bill now stands, if this Motion appears on the Table, and I have been wrong, and there has been an increase in murders, I then have to vote on whether I prefer this Act (as it will then be) to continue, or feel that we should go back to the Homicide Act. I should feel most unhappy at throwing out this Act, even if it had been unsuccessful, if I were faced with having to go back to the Homicide Act. In those circumstances, I personally should call for a third measure—neither the one now before us, nor the one which we are now rejecting. For that reason, I support the Amendment.
BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER: I am surprised, and I might say rather moved, by the astonishing regard that has just been shown by a number of noble Lords opposite for the opinions of another place. It will be remembered in other contexts that it is not the function of their Lordships, apparently, to make any decision which is in conflict with what has already been there decided.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: I said nothing of the sort.
THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT (LORD LINDGREN): Take your medicine. Sit down.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: I remember Mr. Silverman saying that it would be improper to interfere at all with the Bill. Now the sponsors of the Bill are doing just that.
BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER: I have no responsibility for what any Member of another place may have said. I have only noted that what is said in another place, and what is done in another place, has evoked to-day a surprising amount of respect which I have not previously seen in earlier decisions of your Lordships' House. That is the only comment I would make.
BARONESS ELLIOT OF HARWOOD: I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lady, but I never said anything about the other place. What I said was that I was supporting this Bill—and I have done so all the way through—but that I was not prepared to support at the eleventh hour

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Amendments put down by the Lord Chancellor which would alter the Bill, irrespective of what the other place had said, and I opposed these Amendments because the Bill would not then be the Bill for which I voted on Second Reading.
BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER: I am obliged for those observations, but I made no reference to anything which the noble Lady said. Your Lordships' House has debated the question of capital punishment in various contexts for more than 100 years. Your Lordships' House has debated the question of capital punishment in relation to murder on three occasions in the last seventeen years. Your Lordships' House has at last brought itself to the point of agreeing in principle, and now completely, to the abolition of capital punishment for murder. But such is the timidity, apparently, of your Lordships' Committee, that after 100 years, in which you have defeated it right up to the last occasions, after having at last conceded that capital punishment is something which ought not to be operated in this country, your Lordships are so afraid that you have no confidence that your judgment can be valid for more than five years ahead unless it is expressly validated. The Committee are perfectly entitled to make that decision. But I can only say that the effect of that decision will be to enhance a reputation for timidity and hesitation which is very undesirable if the continuance of this House is wished—
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: No, no!
BARONESS HORSBRUGH: Would the noble Lady agree that what is being voted for is the Bill as it came to us, and that we are wishing to keep it exactly, not making any change—
A NOBLE LORD: It is changed already.
BARONESS HORSBRUGH: —as it came from another place.
LORD LINDGREN: What about the Rent Bill?
BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER: I appreciate what the noble Lady has said, but if we are to vote for the Bill as it came to us, it seems extraordinary that noble Lords have moved and carried Amendments.
LORD OAKSHOTT: May I apologise to the noble and learned Lord Chancellor
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for not being here at the beginning of this debate, through no fault of my own? I have been moved to intervene for a few minutes because the noble Baroness, Lady Wootton of Abinger, said a moment ago that people seemed to be afraid of something. I am not by any means the only one in this Chamber to-night who has served a good many years in another place, and we came to learn, as your Lordships know, the difference between an Affirmative Resolution and the Negative procedure. To change this now seems to me to be a strange thing, in view of the fact that another place decided that this should be done at the end of five years by Affirmative Resolutions rather than Negative procedure.
The noble Lord on the Cross Benches spoke of his embarrassment, in that he had supported the Second Reading of this Bill with a perfectly clear reservation, I think he said, in regard to this five-year trial period. I myself supported the Second Reading of this Bill. Three times I voted in another place for the retention of this punishment. Over the years I have come to a different conclusion, and I voted for the Second Reading. I appeal to the noble Lord to have regard to the embarrassment which this causes us, and perhaps the noble and learned Lord will think again about pressing this Amendment, because there is a difference between the two types of procedure, Affirmative and Negative, in Parliament. Some of us who supported this Bill would feel happier if we could retain the Affirmative procedure, as it came to us from another place.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: As I have said, I do not regard this matter as enormously important. But if I may reply to the noble Baroness and the noble Viscount, Lord Massereene and Ferrard, and the noble Lord, Lord Tangley, I can, of course, understand their attitude: that this is the Bill as it came to us which we voted for on Second Reading, and it is not really right to make alterations in this House, because either we ought to be in favour of the Bill or against it.
LORD TANGLEY: May I interrupt for one moment? That is not what I said. I am perfectly happy to see Amendments made in this House to Bills brought from another place. I have voted for them, and I have indeed moved some

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myself. What I object to is this being done in this way, and at this stage.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The Amendment that has already been made this evening by the Committee is a major one. It changes the punishment for murder, and changes it pretty radically, and in a sense with which the other House refused to agree. But this House, as it is entitled to, has overruled the other place. The Amendment which I am moving is not one which has been expressly considered in another place at all, and I always thought that it was part of the function of your Lordships' House to act as a revising Chamber—not for the purpose we fulfilled on the previous Amendment, or yesterday, when on the Rent Bill your Lordships took an opposite view to what had already been considered and voted on in another place, but to revise particularly on matters which had not been expressly considered in another place.
This Amendment does not abolish the five-year trial period. That is not its object. If it had been its object it would of course have been worded differently. On the contrary, if the words in this Amendment are inserted the clause will start:
"This Act shall expire on the 31st day of July 1970".
It still maintains the five-year trial period. The sole question is the question which was never really considered in another place as to whether that should happen if no action was taken at all or only if Parliament, by Affirmative Resolution, so determined. It seemed to me, rightly or wrongly, that it would be much more satisfactory to provide that it should expire if there was an Affirmative Resolution rather than that we should automatically, if nobody did anything, go back to the Homicide Act.
I am sorry if the noble and learned Viscount thinks I was rather rude or discourteous. I had assumed, it may be wrongly, from the passage in the speech of the noble Earl, Lord Kilmuir on Second Reading, quoted by the noble Lord, Lord Byers, that in substance he was saying that it was he and the noble Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, who had been in effect responsible for the contents of the Homicide Act. I apologise if I have misunderstood that passage.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: I am grateful to the noble Lord for saying that, but what he did say and I do regard as most offensive—I do not mind any criticism of the Homicide Act, in which many Members of Parliament took some part—was for the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor to say that my noble and learned friend and myself were two lawyers "playing ducks and drakes with men's lives". If the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor does not think that was highly offensive, then I am sorry, but I do.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I said it was an attempt to arrive at a compromise; I said it was well intentioned, but, for the reasons I gave on Second Reading, I have, rightly or wrongly, always taken the view that the question of capital punishment ought not to be a question of Party politics. I have always opposed that. I know a number of members of the Labour Party who are passionate retentionists and a number of members of the Conservative Party who are strong abolitionists, and, for a generation, whenever this question has come before either House it has always been dealt with on a free vote, with one exception only, the Homicide Act, which was forced through with the Whips on, and not one word was allowed to be changed from the first draft in another place, in spite of innumerable Amendments, or in your Lordships' House. The opinion that I have expressed of the Homicide Act is one that I sincerely hold.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: If the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, will forgive me, I am not sure whether his observations on the Homicide Act are meant to be a withdrawal or an apology for what I regard as a most offensive observation, that my noble and learned friend and I were playing ducks and drakes with men's lives.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: What I said was that this was the effect of the Homicide Act. I made it quite clear I was sure that it was not intentional and that it was an ordinary, English attempt to arrive at a compromise, though it was in a field which I myself think does not admit of compromise. I accepted the fact that it was well-intentioned, but this was the actual result. After all, we do

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not often have the Lord Chief Justice, speaking, he thought, with the agreement of all the other judges, saying that they were all absolutely disgusted at having to administer an Act like the Homicide Act. That is the Act which, under this clause as at present drafted and if we make no amendment to it, is the position to which the law of England will return if nobody does anything in five years' time. I hope that no Government of the day, whatever it is, will do anything; I hope that no Opposition of the day, whatever it is, will do anything, because of this very strong view of mine: that this question ought not to become a matter of Party politics.
There are some things on which we ought to be allowed to say what we think, whatever the politicians may say. But
Resolved in the negative, and Amendment disagareed to accordingly.
it is not always easy for the Private Member to get something done at a particular time, and this was why it seemed to me that this would be the wrong way round. I am for keeping the five years' period but I am for changing the emphasis so as to provide that the Act shall expire on July 31, 1970 if Parliament by Affirmative Resolution so determines, but I think it would be wrong to leave it as it is and to provide, as is now provided, that if nobody does anything at all then we get the Homicide Act. It is for those reasons I put down this Amendment.
9.25 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 12) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 55; Not-Contents, 59.

CONTENTS

Addison, V.

Haddington, E.

Reay, L. [Teller.]

Airedale, L.

Haig, E.

Rhodes, L.

Archibald, L.

Haire of Whiteabbey, L.

Royle, L.

Arwyn, L.

Henderson, L.

St. Davids, V.

Beswick, L.

Henley, L.

Samuel, V.

Blyton, L.

Hertford, M.

Segal, L.

Bowles, L.

Kinnoull, E.

Shepherd, L.

Brockway, L.

Kirkwood, L.

Simey, L. [Teller.]

Brown, L.

Latham, L.

Snow, L.

Burden, L.

Leatherland, L.

Sorensen, L.

Burton of Coventry, Bs.

Lindgren, L.

Stonham, L.

Byers, L.

Listowel, E.

Swanborough, Bs.

Champion, L.

Longford, E. (L. Privy Seal.)

Taylor, L.

Crook, L.

Merthyr, L.

Terrington, L.

Emmet of Amberley, Bs.

Mitchison, L.

Waldegrave, E.

Francis-Williams, L.

Peddie, L.

Wells-Pestell, L.

Gaitskell, Bs.

Plummer, Bs.

Winterbottom, L.

Gardiner, L. (L. Chancellor.)

Raglan, L.

Wootton of Abinger, Bs.

Gifford, L.

NOT-CONTENTS

Ailwyn, L.

Dilhorne, V.

Massereene and Ferrard, V.

Albemarle, E.

Drumalbyn, L. [Teller.]

Molson, L.

Allerton, L.

Dundee, E.

Monk Bretton, L.

Auckland, L.

Effingham, E.

Monson, L.

Bossom, L.

Elliot of Harwood, Bs.

Mowbray and Stourton, L.

Boyd of Merton, V.

Erroll of Hale, L.

Newall, L.

Bridgeman, V.

Falkland, V.

Oakshott, L.

Brocket, L.

Ferrers, E. [Teller.]

St. Aldwyn, E.

Brooke of Ystradfellte, Bs.

Ferrier, L.

St. Oswald, L.

Chichester, L. Bp.

Gage, V.

Somers, L.

Clitheroe, L.

Goschen, V.

Strabolgi, L.

Cohen, L.

Greenway, L.

Strang, L.

Colville of Culross, V.

Grimston of Westbury, L.

Strange of Knokin, Bs.

Colyton, L.

Hawke, L.

Stuart of Findhorn, V.

Conesford, L.

Hobson, L.

Swansea, L.

Coutanche, L.

Horsbrugh, Bs.

Tangley, L.

Cullen of Ashbourne, L.

Howard of Glossop, L.

Tenby, V.

Denham, L.

Inglewood, L.

Wakefield of Kendal, L.

Derwent, L.

Killearn, L.

Wolverton, L.

Digby, L.

McCorquodale of Newton, L.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved to add to the clause:
"Provided that this Act shall continue to have effect in relation to any murder not shown to have been committed after the expiration of this Act, and for this purpose a murder shall be taken to be committed at the time of the act which causes the death."
The noble and learned Lord said: This Amendment arises on the Bill as it came from another place, and it would equally have arisen if the Committee had passed the Amendment which I have just moved. It is needed to deal with the situation where a murder may have been committed before the expiration of the Act, but is not dealt with by the courts until after the Act has expired—assuming that the Act is allowed to expire. The one thing that none of us wants is that men's lives should depend on the toss of a coin.
As at present drafted the clause would have the effect that if abolition of the death penalty should expire on July 31, 1970, the death penalty would immediately revive for anyone convicted of a murder that was capital under the present Homicide Act, even though the murder was committed during the period of abolition. To take an extreme example, a person who murdered in the course of theft would be sentenced to life imprisonment if convicted on July 30, 1970, but would he sentenced to death if convicted on the following day, no matter on what date the murder had been committed. It is an established principle that where the criminal law is changed to provide for increased or different penalties the change does not apply to offences committed before the change became operative. Therefore, this Amendment seeks to ensure that if the death penalty does revive, it shall apply only to murders committed after revival.
The words:
"and for this purpose a murder shall be taken to be committed at the time of the act which causes the death "
are necessary in order to avoid the anomalous situation that could otherwise arise in which a murder would be non-capital if the victim died before July 31, 1970, but would become capital if his life lingered on till that date. This is because a person can be charged and convicted of murder if his victim dies within a year and a day of the act which causes his death. Therefore, quite irrespective of the previous Amendment and taking
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the Bill as it now is, I submit that, for those reasons, this Amendment is right in order to cure the defects to which I have ventured to refer. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 31, at end insert the said proviso.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 3, as amended, agreed to.
Schedule agreed to.
House resumed: Bill reported, with Amendments.

MONOPOLIES AND MERGERS BILL
9.35 p.m.
Report of Amendments received (according to Order).
LORD DRUMALBYN LORD DRUMALBYN moved, after Clause 2, to insert the following new clause:
Extension to nationalised industries of powers of reference.
"The proviso to subsection (1) of section 2 of the principal Act (which prevents a reference under that section where the prevalence of the conditions in question is expressly authorised by or under any enactment, other than enactments relating to patents and trade marks) shall cease to apply to the enactments referred to in Schedule (Enactments referred to in Section (Extension to nationalised industries of powers of reference)) to this Act."
The noble Lord said: The purpose of this Amendment is to enable the Board of Trade to make references to the Monopolies Commission in regard to main activities of those nationalised industries which are listed in the Schedule which is Amendment 16, and perhaps it is in accordance with your Lordships' wishes that we should consider Amendment 16 at the same time as this Amendment. Perhaps I may say right away that I hold no particular brief for the Schedule. It covers coal, electricity, gas, transport, civil aviation, cable and wireless and atomic energy, but there may be other industries that should be covered, and it may be that some of the Acts which are there mentioned do not entirely need to be included.
I should like to make it quite clear that the Amendment is not prompted by any antagonism or suspicion of the nationalised industries. There is no discrimination involved in the Amendment against nationalised industries. Indeed,

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at present, if anything, the discrimination is against the non-nationalised industries, in that they can be referred to the Monopolies Commission and the nationalised industries cannot. There is nothing in this Amendment which compels the Board of Trade to refer any practice in any nationalised industries to the Monopolies Commission. But at a time when we are overhauling the monopolies administration, there seem to be advantages in not continuing to make any such references impossible.
The legislation dates from 1948 when nationalisation was fashionable, and when, in the eyes of some, nationalised industries could do no wrong. Whatever they did was, by definition, in the public interest. We all know now that, if anyone thought that, their definition was wrong. Nationalised industries are run by people who are fallible, just as all other people are. Nationalised industries have not so far exercised their power to extort excessive profits from the public. Indeed, some of them have extorted excessive losses from the Exchequer. But profiteering is not the only possible misuse of monopoly power. If noble Lords will look at Clause 3, they will see some of the uses of monopoly power which the Bill authorises the Board of Trade to prevent. Perhaps I may quote subsection (3)(d):
"… to require, as a condition of the supplying of goods or services to any person, the buying of goods or making of any payment in respect of services other than the goods and services supplied, or the doing of any other such matter as may be specified or described in the order."
This is something which the nationalised industries might be liable to do just as much as anybody else.
Even if so far there has been no misuse of monopoly power by nationalised industries—and I am not arguing about it one way or the other—it still seems to me that it would be prudent to enable the Board of Trade, if the need were to arise, to refer the supply of particular goods or services by a nationalised industry to the Monopolies Commission. I suggest that the raison d'être of the Monopolies Commission is that it is a body of individuals, independent of the Government, on the one hand, and of the interests it is asked to examine, on the other, and if it is a good thing that such an independent body should take a
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detached and impartial look at the day-to-day working of non-nationalised enterprises and industries, surely it could be equally advantageous for them to look at certain aspects of the day-to-day working of a nationalised industry, especially since Ministers always disclaim responsibility for their day-to-day working and cannot, as I understand it, give general directions about it. I suggest to your Lordships that it would be a pity to miss this opportunity of enabling the Government, should the need arise, to use this instrument of inquiry, which is ready to hand but which at present they are forbidden by law to use in this way as applied to the nationalised industries. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 2, insert the said new clause.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)
LORD RHODES: My Lords, this Amendment goes considerably further than the Amendment that was moved in another place. I would point out that the normal form of a reference to the Monopolies Commission requires the Commission to investigate whether the existence of the monopoly as such is contrary to the public interest, whether "things done" for the purpose of preserving the monopoly are contrary to the public interest, and also whether "things done" as a result of the monopoly are contrary to the public interest. What would happen if the Amendment were carried is that it would leave the Board of Trade to make references covering all these matters in the case of the nationalised industries established by the Statutes specified. This is neither the time nor place, neither is it the way, to effect any change in what has been decided already. When you think about it, the last Government was in power for 13 years, and they had the opportunity to alter it if they did not agree with it.
Now certain things were done. Certain powers were given to the Minister; safeguards were set up; and the consumer councils were initiated. The debates on nationalised industries that have occurred in another place have very often arisen as a result of the machinery that is available to investigate what goes on in the nationalised industries, by way of the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries which they have there. I would put it to the noble Lord that he is asking

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this House to decide something on which, in the other place, the honourable Member for Darwen said:
"… whenever an attempt has been made in the past to bring the nationalised industries within the orbit of the Monopolies Commission the same argument is always brought forward, namely, that Parliament has willed a monopoly and that it would be foolish and otiose to ask the Commission to inquire into whether there was a monopoly or not."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 715 (No. 141), col. 40, June 28. 1965.]
He went on to say:
"Of course that is so, and we do not seek to reverse that position by these new clauses."
Then he went on to describe what was done by the Amendment that he was moving. I do not know whether the noble Lord has had liaison with the Members who moved this Amendment in another place, but obviously what they said was the view of the House. They backed up what he said—
"… that it would be foolish and otiose to ask the Commission to inquire into whether there was a monopoly or not".
If this Amendment were confined to the same point as the Amendment debated in another place it would remain quite unacceptable to us in the Government. The Government do not think that the Monopolies Commission ought to be empowered to scrutinise the activities of the nationalised industries and say whether they are contrary to the public interest. The proper way to do it is for legislation to be introduced in another place to alter it. This certainly is not the method. If the safeguards that are there to protect the public interest are inadequate, then the right course is to improve them, and to improve them in another place. This is not the appropriate place to do anything about it; and I would ask the noble Lord to withdraw his Amendment, or the Committee not to pass it.
LORD ERROLL OF HALE: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for his expressing what I can only describe as the standard point of view on this question. But he must surely realise that although we left control of the nationalised industries in very much better shape when we were unfortunately removed from office last October than was the case when his Party left in 1951, the fact remains that the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries, the Consumer
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Councils and the like are really inadequate to offer protection for the public against what I can only describe as benevolent monopolistic practices, always done for the general good and the general interests. But these are the things that the Monopolies Commission are designed to investigate and show up. They have, for example, shown us, in the case of the investigation into the solus sites of petrol stations that all is not well in that field; and that while we may be happy to be able to get our little maps and cleaning rags and other services, it is in that very field of day-to-day management of these monopolies that neither Parliament nor the Consumer Councils are able to exercise effective control. And it is in this very field that the Monopolies Commission have a growing and an increasingly more valuable body of experience to guide them.
We feel that after all these years that we have had to live with the nationalised industries the time has come when the Monopolies Commission should be empowered and authorised to look at some of their practices and pronounce upon them for the good of the public and for the good of the nationalised industries themselves. I hope that the noble Lord will look at this very reasonable Amendment again.
LORD RHODES: Yes, I will; and I will come to the same conclusion.
LORD ERROLL OF HALE: You are a "stubborn old what's-his-name".
LORD RHODES: I agree that during the last three years the previous Government in another place made considerable alterations to the nationalised industries, and I can quote one example. That was the Transport Act 1962, under which they set up various Boards so that they could decentralise what they considered was too big a body to make it a workable proposition. But I must say to the noble Lord that, however genially he has put over his comments on this Amendment, his objections are standard, too. May I say that his Government had all this time, thirteen years, to do something about this; and nothing has been done. I cannot agree at this late stage to do anything about it. In the light of that I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his Amendment.
LORD HAWKE: My Lords, the noble Lord gave what I may perhaps be forgiven for thinking was an amusing speech. I am sure that it will amuse him when he reads it afterwards, as a Yorkshire manufacturer. But when he said that this House is not the proper place to do anything about the nationalised industries, I do not think he is constitutionally correct. It is perfectly within our power to suggest to another place—which is in effect what would be meant by an Amendment to this Bill—that the Bill would be better if a certain clause were in it. I think that constitutionally the noble Lord was wrong in saying we could not do any such thing.
9.50 p.m.
LORD BROWN: My Lords, may I say a word about this? On Second Reading I pleaded at one point that all we really needed was an industrial efficiency commission and not a Monopolies Commission, and I am in print some years ago to that effect. If this had been an industrial efficiency commission set up by the Bill, I should have been entirely in agreement with noble Lords opposite that the affairs of the nationalised industries should come within the ambit of its investigations. I hope that one day we shall have an industrial efficiency commission. I suspect that a lot of those in the Conservative Party who are in industry would object strenuously to it, but I still hope that we shall have one and that wiser counsels will prevail. I feel that to attempt to turn an instrument set up by this Bill into what in fact, in relation to the nationalised industries, would be a scrutiny of their efficiency would be jumping the gun.
LORD DRUMALBYN: I do not wish to detain the House. The point here is that legislation on monopolies is comparatively rare. During the period of thirteen years when we were in Government, I agree that there were two occasions when we did not take opportunities. In point of fact, we were looking at other matters. One was the setting-up of the restrictive practices court and the other a comparatively minor change, and we did not have our eyes on this especially at the time when we were considering other means of dealing with the nationalised industries. All I
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have suggested is that this is a convenient opportunity for applying an instrument which might be useful and giving an opportunity to the Board of Trade to have an instrument available for day-to-day work on nationalised industries. At present there is no means whatsoever of doing so.
This is not something that the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries in the House of Commons deals with. I think it is a good idea, but the noble Lord, Lord Rhodes, does not, and at the moment he is in Government. I hope that he will change his mind next time if not this time. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 6 [General provisions about mergers]:
LORD DRUMALBYN LORD DRUMALBYN moved, in subsection (1)(b)(ii), after "taken over" to insert "which are situated in the United Kingdom". The noble Lord said: My Lords, I think that I can explain this Amendment quite shortly. It deals with the case of a merger which has already taken place—that is the case with which the subsection deals—and where the test of whether the value of assets exceeds £5 million is applied to bring it within the ambit of the Bill, as a merger capable of being submitted to the Monopolies Commission. The Amendment is designed to limit assets in such a case to those in the United Kingdom, the reason being, as I pointed out earlier, that the Government in another place appears to have admitted that there is little point in the value of assets test, except in cases where a non-British firm is taking over the assets of a British firm. Any assets situated overseas once a merger has taken place will be outside the jurisdiction of Her Majesty's Government, in those circumstances, where it is a non-British firm taking over a British firm, unless of course the non-British firm is a subsidiary of a foreign firm in Britain.
I appreciate that, as the Bill is drafted. a later subsection applies this clause to cases where a merger has not taken place, but that comes later. Here we are dealing with this subsection and if the noble Lord can give any examples of the sort of mergers between British firms where the value of assets test would be relevant and the monopoly test would not, I shall not

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pursue the Amendment. But so far I would say that no valid examples have been quoted in either test. I recognise that the Board of Trade would be unlikely to refer a case to the Commission if it could do nothing about it at the end of a report, so they would not be likely to refer a merger where the assets taken over were situated overseas and the merger had taken place. That being so, there seems little point in having the value of assets test for mergers which have taken place. The purpose of this Amendment is to bring out that point, and I hope that the noble Lord will comment on it.
Amendment moved—
Page 10, line 20, after ("taken over") insert ("which are situated in the United Kingdom")—(Lord Drumalbyn.)
LORD RHODES: My Lords, may I say how much I appreciate the co-operation of the two noble Lords opposite who have been in charge of the Bill. I shall have something to say about that later, and also about the way in which explanations other than in the House have been accepted. This first Amendment would modify the size-of-assets test so that the value of assets situated outside the United Kingdom would not count. The principal effect would be to exclude reference of acquisitions of enterprises outside the United Kingdom, although it would also operate in relation to the foreign assets of a British company. May I say here that the Amendment to page 15, line 18, is consequential. Leaving aside for the moment the policy aspects of this proposal, I think it would work in a haphazard way, if what the noble Lord seeks to do were put into effect. You can determine the geographical situation of physical assets, but it is exceedingly difficult to come to an assessment of the geographical situation of an intangible asset like the goodwill of a company carrying on business in a number of countries.
May I say, too, that the proposal has certain anomalous aspects? For instance, if a British company, "A", owns a nickel mine in Canada, under what the noble Lord wants to do we should automatically ignore the assets of the company in Canada when determining the value of its assets. But supposing that that nickel mine was owned by a subsidiary of com
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pany "A", you would automatically take into account the value of company "A's" share in its subsidiary. So an anomalous situation would arise.
Quite apart from the technical objections to the Amendment, there are other objections to it on grounds of policy. To exclude from consideration assets situated outside the United Kingdom would mean that investigation of a merger by which a British company acquired a foreign company would, by and large, be excluded from the scope of the Bill. I want to make it quite clear that in exercising the powers conferred on them by the Bill the Government would, of course, do nothing that would be inconsistent with International Law. My right honourable friend the President of the Board of Trade has underlined that point in another place. In practice, it would be unlikely that the Government would wish to have an investigation into such a transaction, but the possibility cannot be excluded; and it might be useful to investigate the acquisition of a foreign firm by a British firm.
I will give an illustration. Supposing the firm here was the dominant supplier, or the sole producer, of some commodity in the United Kingdom, and faced some competition from a firm importing goods here, the firm here might want to acquire that firm and close it to competition. The effect of such an acquisition on the competitive position on the United Kingdom market, as anybody who looks at this with the knowledge of noble Lords opposite would agree, might be a proper subject for investigation. The fact that the Bill might permit investigation of a transaction of this kind is not intended to put any gloss on the general policy towards investment overseas of British firms. I do not want that to be misunderstood either. We think it is sensible to legislate comprehensively while we are at it. In the light of the explanation I have given, I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his Amendment.
LORD HAWKE: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord one question? Do I understand from his speech that should any British company based in this country contemplate taking over a foreign company, however small, and the British assets happen to be £5 million, the Board of Trade might still refer that matter to

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the Monopolies Commission, and, therefore, that that company cannot with due propriety start the takeover until the Board of Trade give them the all clear?
LORD RHODES: I think the noble Lord has it a little wrong. What we are saying is that the combined assets of the firm in this country and the firm abroad should measure up to the £5 million criterion.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I do not want to prolong this discussion, but I was under the impression that it was the value of assets actually taken over that had to exceed £5 million, and not the combined assets. However that may be, I am grateful to the noble Lord for having thrown a good deal more light on this subject. As he probably knows, it is a matter that has aroused a certain amount of misgiving. He has thrown some further light on it, and given a better reason for the retention of the words as they are now than has been given before. We are grateful to him, and I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
9.57 p.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN LORD DRUMALBYN moved, at the end of subsection (1), to leave out the proviso. The noble Lord said: This is an Amendment that I have put down for clarification, but I have some hope that in this case the noble Lord may be able either to agree with my interpretation of the clause as it stands now, or to accept the Amendment and eliminate the proviso. The position, as I see it, is this. The proviso deals with the prevalence of the conditions in question; that is to say, as I understand it, monopoly as defined by the 1948 Act. This proviso which deals with the prevalence of the conditions in question says that
"where the prevalence of the conditions in question is expressly authorised by or under any enactment, other than the enactments relating to patents and trade marks"—
that is to say, the monopoly test and the value of assets test—the paragraph regarding the reference of the case to the Monopolies Commission shall not apply. It seems to me that it is only in regard to the main activities, and not to the ancillary activities, of the nationalised industries that the prevalence of the conditions in question applies.
The prevalence of the conditions in question is authorised by the enactments concerning nationalised industries, and it is with this matter that this Amendment is solely concerned. It is only the main activities which are nationalised and, therefore, as I understand it, the Amendment does not touch the ancillary activities. Those Acts are merely permissive: while they do not forbid monopoly in the ancillary activities, they certainly do not expressely authorise it. Section 1(1) of the Coal Industry Nationalisation Act 1946 confers on the National Coal Board the duty of
"working and getting the coal in Great Britain, to the exclusion (save as in this Act provided) of any other person."
Subsection (1)(c) refers to their duty of
"making supplies of coal available, of such qualities and sizes, in such quantities and at such prices, as may seem to them best calculated to further the public interest in all respects. …"
Then subsection (2) (I give this by way of example) allows them to carry on:
"such activities as it may appear to the Board to be requisite, advantageous or convenient for them to carry on for or in connection with the discharge of their duties under the preceding subsection. …"
For example, they can manufacture coal mining machinery if they like.
The same applies to the Electricity Boards. They have a monopoly of the supply of electricity, and are permitted by the 1947 Act to sell, hire or otherwise supply electricity. The 1947 Act also gave the Central Authority, as it then was, power to manufacture electrical plant as well as electrical fittings. But neither of these Acts expressly authorised the prevalence of the conditions in question. Neither of them expressly authorised a monopoly, as defined in the 1948 Act, in these ancillary functions of production and supply.
What I am asking the noble Lord to do, if he will be so good, is to make it clear that there is nothing in the proviso to prevent the Board of Trade—I am not saying that they must do it, or they should do it—from referring a take-over by a nationalised industry to the Monopolies Commission in a field of activity outside their main activity; that is to say, for example, a merger of the Nationalised Coal Board with a company producing coal-mining machinery, or a subsidiary of the Coal Board merging

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with a private enterprise company manufacturing mining machinery. If my reading of the proviso is right, it does not bite at such references at all. That is to say, the Board of Trade would be free to refer such mergers, where a nationalised industry takes over a private enterprise firm, in the same way as any other mergers. Of course, the proviso is quite unnecessary to cover those activities of nationalised industries where they already enjoy a complete monopoly, because in those circumstances there is nothing for them to merge with.
This is the purpose that I have in mind in regard to this proviso, and I hope that the noble Lord will be able to tell us that my interpretation regarding ancillary activities is correct. If it is, in that case the proviso is quite unnecessary for the main activities, and, therefore, the proviso as a whole is not necessary in the Bill. If I am wrong in thinking that the proviso is not necessary to cover the main activities, then I hope the noble Lord will at least confirm that it is open to the Board of Trade—and again I say "should the need arise"—to refer to the Monopolies Commission the supply of goods or services by a nationalised industry, whether by themselves or by the whole industry, including other firms. This is all I am asking here, and I hope that the noble Lord will be able to deal with this point.
Amendment moved—
Page 10, line 27, leave out the proviso.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)
LORD RHODES: My Lords, I think the noble Lord's interpretation is correct. There is no question about it. For the sake of argument, suppose a nationalised industry such as the Gas Board started making gas ovens and their share was 10 per cent., if they went over the one-third criterion they could be referred to the Monopolies Commission. The proviso does not expressly prevent references under the test of the size of assets, so to that extent the noble Lord's interpretation is correct.
We come now to the proviso itself and its inclusion in the Bill. We believe that the law on mergers should keep in step with the law on monopolies in this respect. If Amendment No. 1 had been acceptable to your Lordships, it would have followed that the proviso would have fallen too. But so long as
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statutory monopolies are immune from reference to the Commission, it is proper that mergers should not be referable to the Commission solely on the ground that they contribute to such monopolies. The noble Lord has implied that if there is a 100 per cent. monopoly it is not possible to do anything about it, but I would assure the noble Lord that other circumstances could arise. It may be true that mergers of this sort could very seldom arise. It goes without saying that if Parliament has conferred a 100 per cent. monopoly on a publicly-owned concern, there is no scope for that monopoly to be intensified by subsequent mergers. But monopoly conditions for the purpose of the monopolies legislation can exist at less than a 100 per cent. monopoly, and the possibility cannot be excluded that monopoly conditions of this kind might be expressly authorised by Statute.
I also concede that it might be difficult to quote obvious examples of transactions of this kind on which, as the noble Lord says. the proviso might bite. But I am not in a position to assure your Lordships that none could ever arise. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the right course is to retain the proviso for mergers as well as for monopolies. and in the light of my explanation I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his Amendment.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for his explanation, and I am glad he accepts my interpretation so far as ancillary activities are concerned. Although he has not quoted examples, I think we can all conceive some possible examples on which the proviso might bite where there is not a 100 per cent. monopoly, and in those circumstances I do not propose to pursue the Amendment. I think that the noble Lord's argument in this case has to some extent gone across his argument in the previous case, because here he says he is not able to see any particular case where the proviso would be necessary but he nevertheless wants to retain the proviso, whereas on the last Amendment I was arguing it would be a good thing to have the powers even though you do not see at the moment where you could use them. However, with that dialectical point I will leave it and beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
10.16.p.m.
LORD RHODES LORD RHODES moved, after subsection (2), to insert:
"() The Board of Trade may by order made by statutory instrument provide that the value mentioned in subsection (1)(b)(ii) above shall be varied, or, if a previous order has been made under this subsection, further varied, by such amount as may be specified in the order, but, where an order under this subsection is made after the reference of a matter to the Commission, then, in the case of that reference, in determining under subsection (2) above whether subsection (1)(b) above is satisfied, the variation made by the order shall be disregarded.
A statutory instrument containing an order under this subsection shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament."
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment is a result of an Amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Erroll of Hale, moved on Committee which would have permitted the Board of Trade to raise but not to lower the value of £5 million specified in the Bill for the purpose of the size of assets test. That Amendment was withdrawn and we gave an undertaking that we would put down our own Amendment giving flexibility both ways. I think the Amendment fulfills that obligation we gave. It would give the Board of Trade power by order to vary the figure up or down, such orders being subject to the Negative Resolution procedure. I commend the Amendment to your Lordships and I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 10, line 46, at end insert the said new subsection.—(Lord Rhodes.)
LORD ERROLL OF HALE: I had myself proposed that there should be variability upwards, but the noble Lord suggested at an earlier stage that it should be variability up and down, and in view of the way in which he has met the substantial point of my Amendment I should not like to appear to be churlish in pointing out that he has varied downwards. Although noble Lords opposite may want to go down pretty fast I was only wanting to go upwards. I am grateful to the noble Lord for understanding the point and for the gracious way he has proposed the Amendment, which we gladly accept.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD DRUMALBYN LORD DRUMALBYN had given Notice of his intention to move two Amendments, the first being, in sub
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section (4), at the end of paragraph (a), to delete "and". The noble Lord said: My Lords, if I may, I will take this Amendment and No. 6 together. This is a paving Amendment for No. 6 This Amendment has been the subject of conversations with the noble Lord opposite, and I should like to express my gratitude to him for having given myself and my noble friend separate opportunities to discuss these Amendments with him. The purpose of the Amendment is to leave to the Board of Trade the discretion as to whether or not they publish a report of the Commission on a merger where the Commission find that paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 6(1) are not satisfied; that is to say, where the merger has not resulted or will not result in monopoly and that the value of assets taken over or to be taken over does not exceed £5 million. This is similar to the discretion given to the Board of Trade to publish or not publish the report of the Commission on a reference as to the supply of goods and services where the Commission find that there is not in fact a monopoly within the meaning of the Act.
It seemed to me that this was a sensible discretion to give to the Board of Trade, because it may not always be desired by the parties investigated who do not come within the terms of the Bill that the information in the report should be disclosed, and the Board of Trade may agree; and that being so, it would be as well to leave the discretion to the Board of Trade. I am grateful to the noble Lord for his consideration of this, and I hope he can accept it.
LORD RHODES: My Lords, may I say that we accept this Amendment. It is a good one. It is characteristic of the constructive attitude of the noble Lord throughout this debate. We have pleasure in accepting the Amendment.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 11, line 19, at end insert,
("and
() in section 9 (which exempts from the obligation thereby imposed on the Board of Trade to lay a report of the Commission before Parliament a case where the reference was so framed as to limit

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the investigation and report to the facts) for the exemption of that case there shall be substituted the exemption of a case where the Commission find that subsection (1)(a) and (b) above are not satisfied.")—(Lord Drumalbyn.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 7 [Application of general provisions about mergers]:
LORD RHODES: My Lords, this Amendment is to correct a mistake in the present text of the Bill. It leaves out (1) and inserts (2). I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 13, line 42, leave out ("(1)") and insert ("(2)").—(Lord Rhodes.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
10.22 p.m.
LORD RHODES LORD RHODES moved to add to the clause:
"() In considering for the purposes of section 6(2) above whether the fact of enterprises having ceased to be distinct enterprises operates or may be expected to operate against the public interest, the Commission shall take into account all matters which appear in the particular circumstances to be relevant and have regard (amongst other things) to any matters to which the Board may from time to time direct them to have regard; and the Board shall publish any direction under this subsection in such manner as they think fit."
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment would permit the Board of Trade to give general directions to the Monopolies Commission about the considerations that they should have regard to in considering whether a merger was contrary to the public interest. Concern
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was expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Erroll of Hale, and I think the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, that the Commission had not been given any criteria on the basis of Section 14 of the 1948 Act. The Government are not convinced that it will be necessary or desirable to spell out the considerations relative to the public interests to which the Commission should have regard in investigating mergers. But if experience should suggest that general guidance would be useful, this Amendment gives them power to give the necessary directions. To that extent I think the noble Lords would agree that we have met them in that particular. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 15, line 25, at end insert the said subsection.—(Lord Rhodes.)
LORD ERROLL OF HALE: My Lords, I should like to thank the noble Lord for the way in which he received our representations at an earlier stage of the Bill. This is not exactly what we wished, but I think it goes a long way to meeting our point of view. After all, this is a new field. None of us, including the Minister at the Board of Trade, can be sure as to exactly what criteria may or may not be properly set before the Commission and made public. This Amendment gives the Board authority to issue criteria and to make them public. The noble Lord who took part in the debate at an earlier stage of the Bill and I are grateful to the noble Lord for the consideration that he has given to the point of view we have expressed.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 8 [Newpaper mergers]:
Lord SHEPHERD Lord SHEPHERD moved, in subsection (1), to leave out "relevant circulation" and insert "circulation per day of publication". The noble Lord said: My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend I beg to move Amendment No. 10 which is a paving Amendment for Amendment No. 14. The House may remember that in Committee there was concern as to the definition of an "average relevant circulation" of a newspaper, particularly a weekly newspaper. The Amendment should make it quite clear that where a paper comes out twice a week, say on a Tuesday and a Friday, the average circulation will be computed by taking into account all the copies published during the relevant period of six months. There is no question of taking one average for the Tuesday issue and another for the Friday issue. I think this will deal with the points that were raised by my noble friend Lord Francis-Williams and the noble Duke, the Duke of Atholl. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 15, line 28, leave out ("relevant circulation") and insert the said words.—(Lord Shepherd.)
Lord ERROLL OF HALE: My Lords, on behalf of the absentee Peer, we on this side of the House wish to thank the noble Lord for his courtesy in meeting his point.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Lord SHEPHERD: My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend, Lord Rhodes, I beg to move Amendment No. 11. I should also like to speak to Amendment No. 12 which goes with it. The noble Lord, Lord Erroll of Hale, moved an Amendment in Committee which would have removed from the scope of the Bill newspapers with circulations of less than 50,000 copies. The noble Lord will remember that I thought this figure was too high. After very careful consideration, the Government had come to the conclusion that it would be right to set a limit of 25,000 copies. Therefore, no newspaper with a circulation of less than 25,000 copies would automatically be referred to the Monopolies Commission if a merger took place. In a later Amend
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ment there is power to vary the figure according to the circumstances.
Amendment moved—
Page 15, line 34, after ("Act") insert ("(i)").—(Lord Shepherd.)
LORD ERROLL OF HALE: My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lords and members of Her Majesty's Government for the consideration they have given to the proposal which I put at an earlier stage of the Bill. Obviously my figure of 50,000 was something in the nature of a cockshy, but as the Bill was full of round figures I thought that I should not go far wrong by suggesting a round figure myself. The figure proposed by the noble Lord in his Amendment is obviously one which has been arrived at as a result of consideration of relevant circulations. Therefore, I would thank the Ministers concerned for the consideration which they have given to the proposal which was put to them at an earlier stage of the Bill.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 12.
Amendment moved—
Page 15, line 44, at end insert—
("(ii) if the Board of Trade are satisfied by such evidence as aforesaid that the newspaper concerned has an average circulation per day of publication of not more than twenty-five thousand copies, consent may be given under this section without a report from the Commission being required").—(Lord Shepherd.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Erroll of Hale, will remember that on Committee stage he moved an Amendment in regard to 500,000 copies per day of publication. As a rule when a merger or proposed merger took place it had to be sent to the Monopolies Commission. He recommended to the Committee that there should be some flexibility in the matter. I undertook that, if he were to withdraw his Amendment, we would put down our own Amendment with the assistance of the Parliamentary draftsmen. This has resulted in Amendment No. 13 and I hope that it meets the point of the noble Lord.
Amendment moved—
Page 16, line 2, at end insert—
("() The Board of Trade may by order made by statutory instrument provide that any amount of circulation specified in subsection (1) above shall be varied, or, where a previous order has been made under this subsection, further varied, by such amount as may be specified in the order; and a statutory instrument containing an order under this subsection shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.")—(Lord Shepherd.)
LORD ERROLL OF HALE: My Lords, on behalf of noble Lords on this side of the House, I should like to thank the noble Lord for this Amendment and also for providing me with a further opportunity of realising how much I still have to learn from Parliamentary draftsmen.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 14.
Amendment moved—
Page 17, line 26, leave out from ("above") to end of line 35 and insert ("any reference to average circulation per day of publication is a reference, in relation to a newspaper, to such average circulation for the appropriate period ascertained by dividing the number of copies to which the circulation of the newspaper amounts for that period by the number of days on which the newspaper is published during that period, circulation being calculated on the basis of actual sales in the United Kingdom of the newspaper as published on those days; and for the purposes of this subsection 'appropriate period' means—

(i) in a case in which an application for consent is made, the period of six months ending six weeks before the date of the application; or

(ii) in a case in which a transfer or purported transfer is made without any application for consent, the period of six months ending six weeks before the date of the transfer or purported transfer.")—(Lord Shepherd.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD ERROLL OF HALE LORD ERROLL OF HALE moved, after Clause 10, to insert the following new clause:
Amendment of section 9 of principal Act
. Paragraph (b) of section 9 (publication of reports of Commission) of the principal Act shall be repealed to the extent mentioned in the third column of Schedule 3 to this Act."
The noble Lord said: My Lords, in moving Amendment No. 15 I should like
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to deal with Amendment No. 17. Amendment No. 15 is similar in form to that which I moved on Committee stage. It concerns particularly Section 9 of the principal Act, where there are two provisos. Proviso (a) concerns the public interest, and proviso (b) concerns the private interest of the firms concerned in regard to publication of information in a report by the Monopolies Commission submitted to the Board of Trade for publication. Proviso (b) of Section 9 of the principal Act has been very narrowly construed, so that only secret processes of manufacture or mineral deposits may be properly regarded as subject matter which may be excluded from the report on the decision of the Board of Trade.
In Committee, I argued that these two cases should be regarded as examples and not as being entirely exclusive. If one reads the appropriate proviso, it is clear that these two are meant to be only examples, because it says:
"… or as to any other similar matter ".
By moving this Amendment again, I am seeking to elicit from the noble Lord whether such other similar information can be extended to cover particularly the field of know-how. It has always seemed to me that the original phrase "secret process of manufacture" could properly be extended to include know-how, particularly in important fields such as the following which I should like to mention to noble Lords as examples. First, there are design or performance data relating to an aeroplane or a motor car under development where the process of manufacture is quite straightforward once these data are disclosed; secondly, chemical formulæ where once these are known the actual process of manufacture is quite simple; and, thirdly, information about new products of a company which are in the design or development stage. I would regard all these three cases as coming within the field of know-how, which I should have thought was properly a form of information similar to secret processes. If the noble Lord could give an assurance that these three types of cases are know-how which would be covered by proviso (b), which would then not be held to be quite so restricted, I should be most grateful and most relieved.
I should also just like to enter a plea for consideration, under proviso (b), of

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financial information about possible future activities of a company, or new fields of operation into which it proposes to venture, leakage of which information could harm the company very seriously. Finally, there is the importance of market research information which could be very valuable in the hands of a competitor. Anything which the noble Lord can say in elucidation of the points which I have made would make it easier for me to withdraw this Amendment, although, naturally, I should be very pleased if the noble Lord felt able to accept it. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 10, insert the said new clause.—(Lord Erroll of Hale.)
LORD RHODES: My Lords, the noble Lord is correct in that proviso (b) to Section 9 of the 1948 Act does empower the Board of Trade to delete material from a report, so long as it is possible to do so without affecting the understanding or the sense of the report. It has been suggested by the noble Lord that the Board of Trade interpret their powers under Section 9 rather too narrowly, and that these powers are not intended to be limited to information about secret processes, mineral deposits, et cetera. The Board of Trade have never suggested that they are so limited. The law clearly provides for information about "any other similar matter" to be omitted. The fact that material has not in practice been deleted under this head, whether about mineral deposits, et cetera, or about "similar matter", indicates that the Monopolies Commission are careful to avoid putting into their reports information about industry's confidential affairs.
The Report on Petrol, to which I would draw the attention of noble Lords in this regard, says as Item 4 in the introduction:
"We wish to record our appreciation of the assistance given to us by all the companies named above, and by the many others who have provided us with the information required in our investigation. Some of the information relates to confidential business matters, and we have been careful not to disclose it in our report unless it is essential for a proper understanding of the issue."
I think that underlines the way in which the Monopolies Commission goes about its business.
The noble Lord asked me about what the possible attitude would be to certain items—design or performance data about
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engineering products, chemical formula' and information about products at the design or development stage. The noble Lord will know that I have a great deal of sympathy with what he has in mind. May I say that, to us, there seems to be no reason in principle why such information should not be deleted under the existing provision. It is not possible, as he will know full well with all his experience, to give a categorical assurance, since a final decision could be taken only in the circumstances of an actual case; but there is certainly nothing in the nature of the examples quoted which would bring them obviously outside the category of "other similar matter". May I say to the noble Lord, as to the other examples which he gave—the financial structures, the leakages that may occur or the market research—that I am afraid that those would have to be considered in the light of the circumstances at the time. At this juncture, I cannot give the same kind of assurance as I have given on these other three aspects; but, at any rate, that goes a good deal towards what he has in mind, with which I have some sympathy. I hope that, in the circumstances, he will be able to withdraw his Amendment.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I wonder whether I may ask the noble Lord one point about this. I welcome very much—and I am sure my noble friend does, too—the noble Lord's statement that the Board of Trade interpret the phrase "any other similar matter" widely, or as widely as they can—that is, where it is used in connection with the words
"… any secret process of manufacture or as to the presence, absence or situation of any mineral or other deposits …".
He has been good enough to say that the Board of Trade interpret these words widely. This has a good deal to do with a matter I raised at the Committee stage as to the factual side of a report, and I should like to ask him a point on it. As I understand it, what happens is this. In conjunction with the people whose affairs are being investigated, the Commission make a study of the factual side, and they investigate it together. A report is then drawn up and the relevant parts of the factual side are shown generally to the firms in question. At that stage, it may be open to the firms to object

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to particular information on the grounds that it may be damaging to them for it to be printed.
What we are principally concerned with in this connection is this. The noble Lord has said that the Commission is very willing to listen to this kind of objection—and, indeed, the example he has just quoted to the House shows how willing it is to do so, and we appreciate that. But there may be occasions on which there is a difference of opinion on this matter as between the Commission and the firms being investigated. The Commission may say, "No; our report cannot be clear and lucid unless we include this information". This is where Section 9 comes in, because in such a case the firm may say, "We understand that the Commission have not acceded to our representations that such-and-such information should be excluded", and they may go to the Board of Trade and say, "We attach the very greatest importance to the exclusion of this particular matter. Will you at the Board of Trade please exclude this information? "This is really the point at issue. This is the aspect covered by Section 9. Then, it is open to the Board of Trade, under Section 9, to consider, in spite of the fact that the Commission have put the information into their report, whether they will exclude it or not. They can exclude it only if they are satisfied that:
"the portions of the report embodying that information could he omitted from the report without substantially affecting the sense, clarity or cogency of the report or the value thereof as an aid to the proper understanding of the subject matter of the reference."
Moreover, at the moment matters that may be excluded are limited to matters similar in character to any—
"secret process of manufacture or as to the presence, absence or situation of any mineral or other deposits."
I can understand that the noble Lord is not prepared to give the assurance that they will go as far as my noble friend suggested on financial matters, which might also in certain circumstances be very important to the firm; but the purpose of my noble friend's Amendment, as I understand it, is simply to broaden the type of exemptions. We should have liked to see this broadened. We should have liked to see the Board of Trade given greater discretion in this matter,
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so long as the proviso is maintained, that the omission does not affect the "sense, clarity or cogency" of the report. We feel that it should be possible to broaden the clause in this way.
I appreciate what the noble Lord said on the previous occasion, that the Board of Trade do not want to act as a censor. That is not the point. It is only on the rare occasion that there will be a difference of opinion between the Commission and the firms concerned as to the inclusion of certain information to which the firm attaches great importance. It is just on that one point that we were anxious. We are grateful to the noble Lord for going so far as he has done, but I would still ask him to consider this a little further before the next stage.
LORD ERROLL OF HALE: This is the last stage.
LORD DRUMALBYN: In that case, I must say: "consider this further the next time he is legislating on monopolies"; because this is a matter which has been brought to our attention and there has been anxiety on it in certain quarters. I think that the noble Lord appreciates that, and, of course, we all appreciate that the Board of Trade have exercised their powers very fairly in this matter. But we should have liked a little more discretion left to the Board as to what could be omitted. If my noble friend will allow me—I do not know whether he wants to say anything more—
LORD ERROLL OF HALE: Not after what you have said.
LORD DRUMALBYN: In that case, I beg leave, on our joint behalf, to withdraw this Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Then, Standing Order No. 41 having been suspended (pursuant to the Resolution of July 22), Bill read 3a, with the Amendments.
LORD RHODES: My Lords, I beg to move that the Bill do now pass.
Moved, That the Bill do now pass.—(Lord Rhodes.)
LORD ERROLL OF HALE: My Lords, at this late hour I will detain noble Lords no more than to say that, for my part, I appreciate very much the

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co-operative spirit shown by noble Lords opposite during the Committee stage of this Bill and in the Amendments they have moved on the Report stage. I hope that this Bill, when it becomes an Act, will prove to be a useful measure in the modernisation and in the increasing efficiency of British industry. I should like once again to thank noble Lords for what they have done to meet our points.
LORD RHODES: My Lords, may I briefly reply with the same sentiments? I would add that, with the co-operation of noble Lords opposite, this Bill is a better measure than when it came here.
On Question, Bill passed, and returned to Commons.

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  BRITAIN'S CONTRIBUTION TO UNITED NATIONS FUNDS